Amicus Curiae Brief — Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett

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Nos. 10-238 and 10. ols

In The , :

Supreme Court of the Anited States

ARIZONA FREE ENTERPRISE CLUB'S

FREEDOM CLUB PAC, ef al.,

etitloners,

KEN BENNETT, e¢ al.,

Respondents.

JOHN MCCOMISH, et a/.,

Petitioners,

“

KEN BENNETT, et al.,

Respondents.

On Writs Of Certiorari To The United States

Court Of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE

CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES

IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS

FREDRIC D. WoocHER*

STRUMWASSER & WoOoCHER LLP

10940 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 2000

Los Angeles, CA 90024

fwoocher@strumwooch.com

(310) 576-1233

ROBERT M. STERN

JESSICA A. Ley INSON

MARGARET C. MILLIGAN

HILARY L, _RAU

CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES

10951 W. Pico Blvd... Suite 120

Los Angeles, CA 90064

jlevinson@cgs.org

(310) 470-6590 x 115

Counsel for Amicus Curiae Center for Governmental Studies

February 2011 *Counsel of Record

OCUOCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING OO (S00) 225.6084

OR CALL COLLECT 407) 342 2801

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I apaeseausucoressdeusaiiincwanian i

Cf ETRE TE aaa ne eT ORS BROT a lll

Interest of the Amicus Curiae .............c..cecee eee eees 1

NI Ol I i i cc sdnekeneienpmneunaddes 4

(EEE ESE ELAS SSR SE RN ERE SO 8 ONE AE 5

RR RD SII OTA ED RAE AER AEN Dee LO IIE 5

I. This Court Has Found that Public Cam-

Il.

paign Financing Programs Serve Vital

Governmental Interests .........................055

Studies Demonstrate that Public Cam-

paign Financing Programs Serve the

Important Governmental Interests Rec-

IE TF Ge GINIIET nines csv tcncencnicsasscicecese

A. Public Campaign Financing Reduces

the Deleterious Influence of Large

IN cc. tens niwpiebcanscamcceeansasten

B. Public Campaign Financing Promotes

First Amendment Values by Facili-

tating Public Discussion about Elec-

RUIN ncacdsenaxssocbasnalasishavansndeamtuliaiacines teieare

1. Public Campaign Financing Pro-

grams Promote Communication

between Candidates and the Elec-

SEE cticeutsibadsecusbarsesdesnmbiesksasasuuscests

Public Campaign Financing Pro-

grams Promote Public Discussion

and Awareness of Political Cam-

III cn cota dacsinannispue siskiamuiadiecntadd anaes

TABLE OF CONTENTS ~ Continued

Page

C. Public Campaign Financing Facili-

tates and Enlarges Public Participa-

tion in the Electoral Process ............... 18

1. Public Campaign Financing En-

courages More Citizens to Get

Involved in Political Campaigns.... 19

2. Public Campaign Financing In-

creases the Number and Diversity

of Candidates Who Seek Office ...... 21

D. Public Campaign Financing Frees

Candidates from the Rigors of Fund-

PE lotdsncticccdunndncspustictidasdancenandacscehies 25

EES SCE ONT REE ATR TE LP LP 28

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) ............0....... passim

Caperton v. A.T: Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129

| ____EERRSRERE ettnie aE RC cen 12

North Carolina Right to Life v. Leake, 523 F.3d

274 (4th Cir. 2008), certiorari denied sub

nom. Duke v. Leake, 129 S.Ct. 490 (2008).............. 12

Republican National Committee v. FEC, 487

F.Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (three-judge

court), 616 F.2d 1 (2d Cir.) (en banc) aff’d

mem., 445 U.S. 965 (1980) 5

BRIEFS

Brief of Amicus Curiae Center for Competitive

Politics in Support of Petitioners, McComish

v. Bennett, Nos. 10-238 and 10-239, at 2

PEE © cinievautianntmannenevseacteccinaieeidcsansiiie passim

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Marc BRESLOW ET AL., MONEY & POLITICS IM-

PLEMENTATION PROJECT, REVITALIZING DEMOC-

RACY: CLEAN ELECTION REFORM SHOWS THE

ID CID onc cocesccoccccsncocsasccscsosesouesenes 24, 26

CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, LOCAL

PUBLIC FINANCING CHARTS (2007) .........0... ccc cccceceeeee ee 3

CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, LOCAL

PUBLIC FINANCING CHARTS (2009) ..................0..008- 1,3

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES —- Continued

Page

CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL Srupies. MAPPING

PUBLIC FINANCING IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS

Ca Te abet tk nea urbacauocdtuuseuseceiccedinntnul 8

CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL Stupies. MAPPING

PuRLIC FINANCING IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS

ee an cudwiesccidbinias 3

CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIFS. PUBLIC

FINANCING LAWS IN LOCAL JURISDICTIONS -

em TS ) rc cr rr 3

CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES. STATE

PUBLIC CAMPAIGN FINANCING Laws — SUMMARY

CHARTS (20085)................. LARS Re Os A es cite 3

CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES. STATE

PUBLIC FINANCING CHARTS (2007) ....0000000000000cccccee ee

CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES. STATE

PUBLIC FINANCING CHARTS (2009) ..00000o.ooo.. ee

CITIZEN CAMPAIGN COMMISSION, Finst REPORT

TO THE City COUNCIL AND CITIZENS OF PorT-

cane det SANE ERTS seh RRURIAS 20

CITIZEN CAMPAIGN COMMISSION, SFCOND BILEN-

NIAL REPORT TO THE CITY COUNCIL AND CITI-

ZENS OF PORTLAND (2009) .................0.... 15, 16, 18, 26

THE CLEAN ELECTIONS INsTITUTS. THE Roap To

Vierory: CLEAN ELeeTIONS SHAPE 2002 AR?-

er catvacnaseckccanukeionne 22

Michael Clyburn, Pudlie Camipaign Financing:

The Path from Plutocracy to Pluralism,

7 SEATTLE J. FOR Soc. Just. 285 (2008)...... Zi. 20.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Jason B. Frasco, Full Public Fundvig.

An Effective and Legaily Viable Model for

Campaign Finance Reform in the States,

92 CORNELL L. Rev. 733 (2007)......... ae 4 a

SasKA Horwity. Pustic CAMPAIGN FINANCING:

MICHIGAN -— Driving Towarkps ColLarsr”

(2008)

Oe eee Oe Pee eee eee eee eee eee eee eee ee ee eee eee eee eee eee ee eee

Theodore Lazarus, The Maine Clean Election

Act: Cleansing Pudiic Institutions of Private

Money, 34 Covum. dL. & Soc. PRogs. 79

Ee AEST = iis eA ie Ma OE Sas aoe ot te >

STEVEN M. LEVIN, CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL

STUDIES, KEEPING IT CLEAN: PUBLIC FINANC.

ING IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS (2006) ...00...... i 4

STEVEN M. Levin, CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL

STUMES, PUBLIC CAMPAIGN FINANCING: Wis-

CONSIN — SHOWING [Ts AGE (2008).....................

JESSICA LEVINSON, CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL

STUDIES, PUBLIC CAMPAIGN FINANCING _ IN

FLorivpa: A PROGRAM SouRsS (2008) ....00....0........

JdessicA LEVINSON, CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL

STUDIES, PUBLIC CAMPAIGN FINANCING: NEW

JERSEY GOVERNOR — WEEDING OvT Bic Money

IN THE GARDEN StaTF (2008) .....

JESSICA LEVINSON, CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL

Stupies, PUBLic CAMPAIGN FINANCING: NEW

JERSEY LEGISLATURE — A Pitor Prourer TAkKFs

ig). SA eared nee icattes 2, & 2.

Page

‘fy

14.15

Vil

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

JESSICA LEVINSON, CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL

STUDIES, CAMPAIGN FINANCING IN) NORTH

CAROLINA JUDICIARY: BALANCING THE SCALES

(2009)........ ae ; weak! a oe

MAINE COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENTAL ETHics

AND Enrermon Practices, 2007 Stupy Re-

PORT: HAS Purtic FUNDING IMprovED MAINE

BLECTIONS? (2007) ...............:. ot CEP ECE RES 23, 24, 26

ANNA N. MEYER, CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL

Sruptes, Pustic CAMPAIGN FINANCING: MIN-

NESOTA — DAMMING BiG Money IN THE LAND

OF 10,000 LAKES (2008)

MoLiy MILLIGAN, CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL

STUDIES, LOOPHOLES, TRICKS AND FNpD Runs:

EVASIONS OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS AND A

Move: Law po Brock THEM (2009)... sc ubudlaccicadicall

Moity MIvtuicaAN, CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAI

STUDIES, Pustic CAMPAIGN FINANCING IN AL-

BUQUFERQUE: CITIVENS WIN WITH CLEAN MONEY

ee ED sacs cane esnceensdcdecuuccovee: 4, 8, 16, 26, 27

NeW YORK CITY CAMPAIGN FINANCE BOARD, NEW

YORKERS MAKE THEIR Volce HEARD — A RE

PORT ON THE 2009 ELFeCTIONS (2009)..........19. 21. 24

Hiiary Rac, CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL Srup

les, PusBLic CAMPAIGN FINANCING PORTLAND:

SHOULD “VOTER-OWNED Evecrions” SURVIVE?

(2010)...... . AE in op cabin ® aon? ei 1,8,

r >

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

PAUL RYAN, CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUD

IFS, Pourticatl. REFORM THAT Works: PUBLIC

CAMPAIGN FINANCING BLOOMS IN| ‘TUCSON

| aA es ee eee eh ene MTS

PAUL RYAN, CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL Srup.

les, A STATUTE oF LIBERTY: How NEw York

City’s CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW IS CHANGING

THE Fack oF LOCAL ELFCTIONS (2003)... ..2, 8, 22. 27

PAUL RYAN, CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL Stup

IES, Deav ON ARRIVAL? BREATHING LiFe INTO

SUFPOLK CouNTY’s NEw CAMPAIGN FINANCE

REFORMS (2003) 2,8

Paul RYAN, CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL Stub

iss, ON THE BRINK OF CLEAN: LAUNCHING SAN

FRANCISCO'S NeW CAMPAIGN FINANCE Re.

FORMS (2002) 2.8

PAUL RYAN, CENTFR POR GOVERNMENTAL Strup

IFS, Los ANGELES: ELEVEN YEARS oF RF-

PORM: MANY Sticcessrs, MORE TO RE DONE

nr eeerre: Oy fap) ee

ROBERT M. STERN & MOoLuy MiILiiGan, CENTER

FOR GOVERNMENTAL Stupieps, Moprr: Law on

PAYMENTS INFLUFNCING CANDIDATES AND

ELECTED OFFICIALS (2008) s

Ciara Torres-Spellisev and An Weisbard, Wihas

Albany Could Learn from New York City

A Model of Meaningful Campaign Finance

Reform in Action, 1 ALB. Gov'r L. Rev. 194

(2008)...

10,

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

U.S. GAO, CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: EARLY

EXPERIENCES OF TWo STATES THAT OFFER FULL

Pusuic FUNDING FoR PotrricaAl CANDIDATES

(2003)...

PETER WooLuury AND Tim, VeERCELLOTT, RUTGERS

EAGLETON INSTITUTE OF PoLwitics, Puriic

ArrTiTupes TOWARD THE CLEAN ELECTIONS

INITIATIVE: MONIPORING STUDY OF THE 2007

New Jersey CLEAN Ecections Pitot PrRovect

(2007)

Page

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE

The Center for Governmental Studies (CGS) is a

non-profit organization exempt from taxation under

Section 501.¢X%3) of the Internal Revenue Code. CGS’

mussion is to help civic organizations, decision

makers and the media strengthen democracy and

improve governmental processes by providing rigor

ous research, non-partisan analysis, strategie con

sulting and innovative models of pubhe information

and civic engagement.

CGS is uniquely situated to present this brief.

CGS has studied campaign finance laws, with a

specific focus on public campaign financing, for over

twenty-seven vears. Since 1983, CGS has researched,

analyzed and assessed the practical impacts of pubhie

campaign financing programs in twenty-three states

and sixteen local junsdictions throughout the nation.

See, e.g... CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, STATE

PUBLIC FINANCING CHARTS (2009) and CENTER POR Gov-

FRNMENTAL STUDIES, Local Pusiuic FINANCING CHARTS

(2009). CGS has published its research in dozens of re

ports’ and drafted several model campaign financing

This brief is filed with the wrntten consent of all parties

No counsel for a party authored this bmef in whole or in part,

and ne counsel! or party funded its preparation or submission

See MOLLY MILLIGAN, CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES,

Punic CAMPAIGN FINANCING IN ALBUQUERQUE CrrizeNs WIN WITH

CLEAN Monry Evections (2011) (hereinafter MiuiuiGan, CItTizENs

WIN]: Hicaky Rat. CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL Stripes, Pusu

CaMPAIGN FYNANCING PORTLAND. SHOULD “Vorrr-OWNED ELECTIONS”

SURVIVE? (2010): dpssica LEVINSON, CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL

(Continued on following page)

STUDIES, CAMPAIGN FINANCING IN) NORTH CAROLINA JUD TARY

BALANCING THF SCALES (2009) [herernatter LEVINSON, BALANCING

THE ScALES], JESSICA LEVINSON, CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL

Srupies, PURLIC CAMPAIGN FINANCING IN) FrLokIDA] A PROGRAM

Souks (2008) [hereinafter LevInsON, A PROGRAM SouKS): STEVEN

M Levin, CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL Stupties, Pustic CAMPAIGN

FINANCING. WISCONSIN | SuHowine Irs Acre (2008) [hereinafter

Levin, Wisconsin!: dessica LEVINSON, CENTES SOK GOVERNMENTAL

Srupiss, PUsBLic CAMPAIGN FINANCING: NEW JPRSEY GOVERNOK -

Wreping Our Bio Money is rar GARDEN Stare (2008) [herein-

afler LEVINSON, NEW JRRSFY GOVERNOR]: Jpsstca LEVINSON,

CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL StTuDIFS, Pusuic CAMPAIGN FINANC

ING) New Jrasry Leoistature —- A Pivot Prayecr TAKES OFfr

(2008) jhereinatter Levinson, New Jbesty LeGisharcnr): ANNA

No Meyer, CENTERS POR GOVERNMENTAL Strupirs, Posie Can

PAIGN FINANCING MINNESOTA | DAMMING Big MoNFY IN THR LAND

OF 10,000 LAKES (2008), Sasua Horwitz, CENTER POR GOVERN

MENTAL Sropigs, Pusiac CAMPAIGN FINANCING: MICHIGAN

DRIVING ToWakiS CoLLapsr? (2008), STEVEN MM. LEVIN, CENTER

HOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, KEEPING IT CLEAN: PUsiuic FINANC

ING IN AMERICAN ELPCTIONS (2006) [here mnafter LEVIN, KEEPING IT

CLEAN); Pau RYAN, CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, Pour

cAL Rerorm Tuat Works) Pusnic CAMPAIGN FINANCING BLOOMS

IN Teeson (2003) (hereinafter RYAN, PUBLIC CAMPAIGN FINANCING

Brooms ino Tucson’; Paut Ryan. CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL

Stupti¢s, A SvArUTF OF Liserkry:) How New York Citys CAMPAIGN

FINANCE LAW IS CHANGING THE Fack OF LOCAL ELPecTions (2003)

[hereinafter Ryan, A Strarcte op Linerty], Paut RYAN, CENTER

POR GOVERNMENTAL Stupiss, Dean ON ARRIVAL? BREATHING List

INDO SUPPOLAK COUNTY'S NeW CAaMPpalcon FINANCE REPORMS (2003)

thereafter Ryan, Deap ON Arnivat) Paul RYAN, CENTER POR

GOVERNMENTAL Stupies, On THE Brink oF CLEAN LAUNCHING

SAN FRANCISCO'S NEW CAMPAIGN FINANCE REPORMS (2002) [here-

inafler RyAN, ON THE BRINK OF CLEAN]: and Patt RYAN, CENTER

POR GOVERNMENTAL Stopes, Los ANGELES ELEVEN YPRARS oF

REeORM MANY Sttocesses, Morr po ke Done (2001) [herematter

Ryan, ELEVEN Years oF Reeors) All publications by the Center

for Gevernmental Studies are available online at http.

publications egs org

laws. CGS publishes an annually updated online

chart of state and local public financing laws and

provisions,’ as well as an online map of jurisdictions

with public campaign financing laws.” Based on its

research, CGS has concluded that pubhe campaign

financing laws promote public dialogue and involve

ment in the electoral process.

The present case concerns the constitutionality of

Arizona's pubhe campaign financing law, and specifi

cally the “trigger” clause in that law that provides

additional matching funds under certain circum-

stances. Therefore, this case directly implicates the

campaign finance interests and activities of the

amicus. This bref is meant only to elucidate the

* See MouLy Minuican, CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES.

LOOPHOLES, TRICKS AND END RUNS: EVASIONS OF CAMPAIGN

FINANCE Laws AND A Moper. Law to Block THEM (2009). Roserr

M Stern & MOLLY MILLIGAN, CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAI

Srupirs, Mopert Law ON PAYMENTS INFLUENCING CANDIDATES AND

ELECTED OFFICLALS (2008)

* CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL Stupies, Srarke Pustuc FINaANc

ING CHARTS (2009). CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, Local

PUBLIC FINANCING CHARTS (2009); CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL

Srumes, State Purtic FINANCING CHARTS (2007); CENTER POR

GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, Local PUBLIC FINANCING CHARTS (2007),

CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL Stupiss, Pusuic FINANCING Laws IN

LOCAL JURISDICTIONS — SUMMAKY CHART (2005), and CENTER POR

GOVERNMENTAL StTupips, Srats Purtic CAMPAIGN FINANCING LAWS

~ SUMMARY CHARTS (2005)

* CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL Srupirs, MAPPING PURLIC

FINANCING IN) AMERICAN ELECTIONS (2009) and CENTER FOR

GOVERNMENTAL Stumes, Marring PoRtic FINANCING IN AMERICAN

Eieerions (2007)

practical benefits of public campaign financing laws

in general. This amicus brief offers facts and argu-

ments not likely to be advanced in either Party's

filings, in an effort to assist the Court in its analysis

and decision.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

For three and a half decades, this Court has

recognized the fundamental importance of public cam-

paign financing programs to this nation’s democracy.

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1( 1976). Far from failing to

serve the important governmental goals articulated

in Buckley, as argued by amicus Center for Competi-

tive Politics (“CCP”), voluntary public financing pro-

grams on every level of government directly serve

those interests by: lessening the negative effects of

private campaign contributions; promoting and en-

larging public debate and participation in electoral

processes; and reducing the burden of private fund-

raising. The claim of CCP that there is a “lack of

evidence that [public campaign financing] laws bene-

fit the political system or reduce corruption” (Brief of

Amicus Curiae Center for Competitive Politics in Sup-

port of Petitioners, MeComuish v. Bennett, Nos. 10-238

and 10-239, at 2 “CCP Amicus”)) flies in the face of

substantial evidence to the contrary.

CCP attempts to justify this sweeping claim based on a

cursory discussion of only three jurisdictions: Arizona, Manne,

and New Jersey. CCP fails to address the sigmificant body of

(Continued on following page)

The purpose of this amicus brief is to highlight

for the Court the constitutional, beneficial impacts

that voluntary public campaign financing programs

have had throughout the nation. This brief explains

why public campaign financing laws with and with-

out matching funds provisions have a_ significant

history of serving governmental interests long found

to be important by this Court.

ARGUMENT

Introduction

More than thirty years ago, this Court in Buckley

upheld the constitutionality of public campaign

financing programs. Buckley remains the Court’s only

thorough examination of the constitutionality of such

programs. In Buckley, this Court correctly identified

important governmental interests served by volun-

tary public campaign financing programs.

evidence regarding the positive effects of the public financing

programs in these three jumsdictions or the dozens of other

jurisdictions that have implemented public financing programs

over the last forty years. CGS, on the other hand, bases its

conclusions on ever twenty-seven years of experience studying

public campaign financing programs in thirty-nine jurisdictions.

"In 1980, this Court summarily affirmed an en banc

decision of the Second Circuit upholding the constitutionalty of

the presidential public campaign financing program in Republi.

can National Committee v. FEC, 487 F Supp. 280 (SD.NLY

1979) (three-judge court), 616 F2d 1 (2d Cir) (en bane) aff'd

mem., 445 U.S. 955 (1980)

Over more than three decades, dozens of states

and localities have followed the Buckley holding by

enacting voluntary public campaign financing pro-

grams. Studies, academic research, and actual candi-

date experience demonstrate that voluntary public

campaign financing programs serve the important

governmental interests identified in Buckley: they

reduce the deleterious impact of large campaign con-

tributions on the political process; promote speech by

facilitating discussions about candidate campaigns;

increase public participation in the electoral process;

and reduce the burdens of private fundraising.

1. This Court Has Found that Public Campaign

Financing Programs Serve Vital Govern-

mentai Interests

In the Court’s seminal decision in the area of

campaign finance reform, this Court unequivocally

upheld a senes of statutes that created a voluntary

public campaign financing program for Presidential

election campaigns. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 85. The

public campaign financing program at issue in Buckley

provided taxpayer funds for party nominating con-

ventions, as well as for primary and general election

candidate campaigns. /d.

Buckley remains this Court’s only thorough

analysis of the constitutionality of public campaign

financing programs. The Court emphatically stated

that “Congress enacted |presidential public campaign

financing] in furtherance of sufficiently important

governmental interests....” Jd. at 95. Buckley held

that the voluntary Presidential public campaign

financing program was “a congressional effort, not to

abridge, restrict, or censor, but rather to use public

money to facilitate and enlarge public discussion and

participation in the electoral process, goals vital to a

self-governing people.” Jd. at 92-93 (emphasis added).

It concluded that the program “furthers, not abridges,

pertinent First Amendment values.” /d. at 93.

The Buckley Court noted that in enacting volun-

tary public campaign financing, “Congress was legislat-

ing for the ‘general welfare’ to reduce the deleterious

influence of large contributions on our political pro-

cess, to facilitate communication by candidates with

the electorate, and to free candidates from the rigors

of fundraising.” Jd. at 91. In the jurisdictions where

these programs have been enacted, these principles

have guided legislators and citizens, who have rati-

fied voluntary public campaign financing programs

with their votes.

* This Court found that public campaign financing was a

proper mechanism for reducing the burden on candidates that

comes “from the rmgors of soliciting private contributions.”

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 96.

II. Studies Demonstrate that Public Campaign

Financing Programs Serve the Important

Governmental Interests Recognized by this

Court

Relying on this Court’s decision in Buckley,

dozens of jurisdictions have enacted voluntary public

campaign financing programs. See CENTER FOR GOV.

ERNMENTAL STUDIES, STATE PUBLIC FINANCING CHARTS

(2009) and CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, LOCAL

PUBLIC FINANCING CHARTS (2009). CGS has extensively

studied and published detailed reports on the public

campaign financing programs in many of these juris-

dictions.” The evidence presented by CGS demon-

strates that, in practice, these programs do serve the

interests identified in Buckley as furthering the

values of the First Amendment.

There are two types of public campaign financing

programs: full public campaign financing programs

(a.k.a. “clean money” programs) and partial public

campaign financing programs. In both types of pro-

grams, candidates first qualify by raising a small num-

ber of initial qualifying contributions from private

* See MILLIGAN, CITIZENS WIN, supra note 2; RAv, supra note

2; LEVINSON, BALANCING THE SCALES, supra note 2; LEVINSON,

A PROGRAM Sours, supra note 2; LEVIN, WISCONSIN, supra note 2;

LEVINSON, NEW JERSEY GOVERNOR, supra note 2; LEVINSON, NEW

JERSEY LEGISLATURE, supra note 2; MEYER, supra note 2; Hor-

WITZ, supra note 2; RYAN, PUBLIC CAMPAIGN FINANCING BLOOMS IN

TUCSON, supra note 2; RYAN, A STATUTE OF LIBERTY, supra note 2;

RYAN, DEAD ON ARRIVAL?, supra note 2; RYAN, ON THE BRINK OF

CLEAN, supra note 2; and RYAN, ELEVEN YEARS OF REFORM, supra

note 2.

donors. In full public campaign financing programs,

qualifying candidates then receive a lump sum of

public funds to run their campaigns. In partial public

campaign financing programs, qualifying candidates

receive a match of public funds for the subsequent

private contributions they raise. The ratio of that

match varies by the jurisdiction. In both full and

partial public campaign financing systems, the juris-

diction may provide participating candidates with

additional funds based on expenditures by opponents

or independent groups.

Amicus CCP claims that there is an “absence of

any evidence” regarding the benefits of public cam-

paign financing laws (CCP Amicus at 4), ignoring

dozens of CGS reports and other academic research

that demonstrate such programs do in fact serve im-

portant governmental interests. These studies, based

on actual electoral experience over more than three

decades, provide clear evidence that public campaign

financing programs at all levels of government pro-

mote each of the important government interests

specifically identified by this Court in Buckley. First,

public campaign financing reduces the deleterious

effects of large campaign contributions. Second, pub-

lic campaign financing promotes and increases public

discussion. Third, public campaign financing pro-

motes public participation in elections. Fourth, public

campaign financing frees candidates from the consid-

erable burden of private fundraising. This amicus

brief discusses each of these important governmental

interests and demonstrates how each is specifically

served by public campaign financing

A. Public Campaign Financing Reduces

the Deleterious Influence of Large Con-

tributions

Amicus CCP fails to credit evidence that public

campaign financing systems reduce reliance on pmvate

contributions and increase the importance of smail-

dollar donors, thus providing a realistic alternative to

the corrupting potential of large private contmbnu-

tions. Ciara Torres-Spelliscy and An Weisbard, Wha?

Albany Could Learn from New York Citv: A Made!

f Meaningful Campaign Finance Reform in Action,

1 ALB. Gov't L. Rev. 194, 243 (2008). “Only public

funding can eliminate the special access afforded large

donors by those who rely upon them a political sur-

vival.” Theodore Lazarus, The Maitie Clean Election

Act: Cleansing Pubiic Institutions of ics Money,

34 Cotum. J.L. & Soc. Progs. 79, 128 (2000). Cand-

dates and members of the electorate have both stated

that public campaign financing programs can reduce

the potentially corrupting infingnee of money on the

political process, and that the programs have indeed

reduced the pernicious influence of private campaign

money on politics, notwithstanding the conclusory

claims of CCP to the contrary. CCP Amicus at 2, 5.

In New Jersey. for instance, Assemblywoman

Amy H. Handlin stated that without the public cam-

paign financing program, “!slome politicians would go

back to trading favors and votes in the never-ending

pursuit of campaign cash.” and that the result would

be that “ordinary voters would be marginalized again.”

LEVINSON, NEW JERSEY LEGISLATURE, supra note 2, at

17. Similarly, former New Jersey State Senator

William Schluter stated that with public campaign

financing, contributors are forced to influence peliti-

cians with their arguments. not their checks, and

that New Jersey's system of public campaign finane-

Ing Was “a gant step in changng the sturma that

New Jersey's political landscape has a ‘For Sale’ sign

on it.” Jad,

In Los Angeles. Councilmember Jan Perry re-

ported that the citw’s public campaign financing

“reduced [her] need to appeal to a particular special

interest group.” Perry further stated that the public

campaign financing program allowed her to rely more

on individual denations that came “without the spe-

cial interest strings.” RYAN, ELEVEN YEARS OF REFORM,

supra note 2, at 22

In Maine, the public campaign financing program

contributed to a decrease in the “aggregate levels of

direct-to-candidate pmvate contributions, one of the

mast powerful avenues of monetary influence in the

political system.” Jason B. Fraseo, Ful! Public Fund-

ing: An Effective and Legaliv Viable Model for Cam-

paign Finance Reform in the States. 92 Commer. L.

Rev. 733, 746 (2007). Overall, the public campaign

financing program “helped reduce Maine's elected offi-

cials’ dependence on large campaign donors. resulting

ina more effective and unencumbered democracy.” Jd

Stated another way, “(bly reducing the influence of

large contmbutions, [Maine's] Act reduces the increas.

ingly disproportionate influence of those able to make

such contributions and is thus more consistent with

the ‘one person, one vote’ ideal.” Lazarus, supra, at 79.

In 2002, North Carolina adopted a system of full

pubhe campaign financing for Court of Appeals and

Supreme Court candidates. The enactment of North

Carolina’s law was motivated by a fear that private

contributions toa judicial candidates would threaten

the imtegmty and independence of the judiciary — a

tear that this Court specifically recognized as a legit-

imate government concern in Caperion v. AT Massey

Coal Co., Ine., 129 S.Ct. 2252 (2009). North Caro-

lina’s program reduced the influence of private con-

tributions by making it unlawful for pubhely funded

candidates to raise more than 35 pereent of their

campaign funds in private contributions.” LEVINSON,

BALANCING THE SCALES, supra note 2, at 26.

* Notably, Nerth Carolina’s law contains a tngger similar

to the one at issue in this case That tngver provision was

upheld by the Fourth Circuit in North Carolina Right to Life:

Leake, 523 F3d 274 (4th Cir. 2008), oeveoran detied sud nom

Duke v Leake, LYS Ct 490 (D008)

B. Public Campaign Financing Promotes

First Amendment Values by Facilitating

Public Discussion about Elections

Additionally ignored by amicus CCP is the extent

to which voluntary public campaign financing pro

motes, facilitates and enlarges pubhe discussion

about the electoral process. Communication between

candidates and the electorate, and puble discussion

of elections generally, is enhanced in jurisdictions

that have enacted these programs This Court has

desembed the goal of enhancing public discussion

about the elections as “vital to a self-governing peo

ple.” Bucklev. 424 U.S. 92-93. The evndence demon-

strates that this goal is met in many jurisdictions

after voluntary public campaign financing programs

have been adopted. These are precisely the values the

First Amendment was designed to protect.

1. Public Campaign Financing Programs

Promote Communication between

Candidates and the Electorate

Once candidates qualify for public campaign

financing. the public funds thev receive either free

them from having to raise additional funds altogether

un full public campaign financing systems) or sup-

plement the funds they raise trom private contmbu-

tors Un partial public campaign financing systems)

Under either system, participating candidates consis-

tently report that public campaign financing enabi s

them to spend less time fundraising and more time

directly interacting with all of their constituents, not

merely the narrow band of individuals (inside and

outside of the district) who can provide significant

financial support

CGS research shows that the 1985 partial public

campaign financing program) enacted in) Tucson,

Anzona, tor instance, facilitated increased contact

and discourse with the electorate. RYAN, CAMPAIGN

FINANCING BLOOMS IN TUCSON, supra note 2. at 14-16

Kathleen Detrick, former City Clerk of Tucson, stated

that “|Candidates] find that they [have to] go out

there pounding the streets and talking to people

about issues in order to get them to [ve a small-

dollar quahfving contributien).” Ja at 15. Echoing

that sentiment, Councilman Steve Leal reported that

the program “forces the candidate to have to talk toa

whole lot more people.” Jd

Candidates also reported increased discussion

with members of the electorate in New Jersey, which

experimented with a full public campaign financing

program in selected lemslative districts for general

elections in 2005 and 2007. Former New Jersey State

Assemblyman Bill Baron, who ran as a_ publicly

financed candidate, said the program was “the single

best thing [he had ever) participated im in politics.”

Levinson, New JERSEY LEGISLATURF, supra note 2, at

17. Barom highhghted that pubhe campaign financ-

ing gave him the freedom to interact fully with vot-

ers. Jd. at 17. Assemblywoman Amy H. Handlin, who

participated in the 2005 program, echoed Baron's

sentiment, saying that the program put an emphasis

on face-to-face contact. /d. at 19-20."

The public campaign financing program in Port

land, Oregon is yet another example of a program

that facilitated candidate communication with the

electorate. In 2006, the Portland City Council decided

to experiment with a full pubhe campaign financing

program for candidates for citywide office. In 2008, all

six candidates who participated in Portland’s Cam-

paign Finance Fund reported that their participation

increased their opportunities to communicate directly

with voters. CITmeN CAMPAIGN COMMISSION, SECOND

BIENNIAL REPORT TO THE CiTy CoUNCIL AND CITVENS

OF PORTLAND (2009) (hereinafter Srconp BIENNIAL

Reporr}) at 16-17. Commissioner Amanda Fritz, for

instance, told the Portland Citizens Campaign Com-

mission, “Because I didn’t have to dial for dollars,

I had more time to try to meet as many Portlanders

as possible.” Jd) at 16. City Council candidate Jett

Despite (or perhaps ygnering) this evidence, CCP exphert

ly ates New Jersey's pilot program as a fatlure CCP Amicus at

67 CCPH's incorrect assertions about New Jersey's program have

been rebutted by Yale Professor Don Green, whe served as an

expert witness for Respondent. Professor Green, who has spent

decades studying Amencan politics and the election system in

particular, has testified that the two studies cited by CCP in

their Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Anucus Bnet were “tunda-

mentally flawed and cannot support the purported conclusions ~

Declaration of Donald Green in Support of Defendant-Intervenor

Clean Elections Institute, Inc’s Opposition to Phantfls’ and

Maintift-Intervenors’ Motien for Summary Judgment, MeCornish

v. Bennett, No 08-1550, (9th Cir July 17, 2009)

Bissonette reported that the process of gathering

small qualifving contributions led to “some pretty

senious conversations [with voters].” Bissonnette em-

phasized that, because of the public campaign finane-

ings program, his communication with voters “|was

not} about the money. It was about the issues. It was

about the policies and the politics.” Jd. at 17."

CGS also found that the public campaign finance-

Ing program in Albuquerque, New Mexico, increased

interaction between participating candidates and the

electorate. Matt Brix, Policy Director of the Center for

Civic Policy, noted that in the 2009 city election,

Albuquerque's second election with public campaign

financing, “[thhe campaign consisted more of retail

politics — meet and greets, mailers, town hall meetings

with groups of voters, radio spots.” MILLIGAN, Crt

ZENS WIN, supra note 2, at 26. Councilor M. Debbie

O'Malley, an incumbent who ran as a publicly funded

candidate in 2007, echoed that sentiment, stating

that with public funding, “vou do a lot more outreach

and the voters have a lot more ownership of the

election process, because many of them have given

$5 to help get a candidate qualified.” Jd. at 23.

The Portland City Council adopted a pubhe campanrn

financing program in 2005 on a short-term basis; it was sched-

uled to sunset in ZOLO In 2010, durnng the midst of the reces-

sion, Portland voters narrowly declined to renew the program

2. Public Campaign Financing Pro-

grams Promote Public Discussion

and Awareness of Political Cam-

paigns

In addition to increasing the discourse between

candidates and the electorate, public campaign finane-

ing programs facilitate and enlarge public discussion

more generally by increasing pubhe discussion and

awareness of electoral campaigns and specific can

didates

According to a 2007 poll by the Eagleton Institute

of Politics, voters in districts in New Jersey that

offered public campaign financing received more in-

formation about the elections from a greater vanety

of sources, including campaign literature, radio and

television ads, and news articles than voters state

wide." PETER WooLLEY AND ‘TIM VeRCELLOTTI, RUTGERS

EAGLETON INSTITUTE OF POLiTics, PUBLIC ATTITUDES

TOWARD THE CLEAN ELECTIONS INITIATIVE: MONITORING

Stupy oF THE 2007 New Jersey CLEAN ELECTIONS

Pitot PrRovrer (2007) at 17-21. Seventy percent of

voters in “clean elections districts” reported that they

* The Eagleton Institute poll found that among hkely voters

in New Jersey “clean elections” distncts, 82 percent received

campaign matenals in the mail, 55 percent received information

about legsiative races from radio or television advertisements,

and 74 percent received information about the legislative races

from news articles: Among likely voters statewide, 49 percent

received campaign materials in the mail, 43 percent received in-

formation from radio er television ads, and 56 percent received

information from news articles

had heard either “quite a lot” or “some” about the

legislative races in their districts compared with only

37 percent of voters statewide. Ja.

CGS found similar results in Portland. City Coun-

cil candidate Jim Middaugh explained that “| public

campaign financing] generated a lot of conversation

in the community ... [T]here isn’t anything else in

our civic fabric that gets people talking to one another

about City issues.” SECOND BIENNIAL REPORT, supra,

at 17

Some public campaign financing programs also

help foster a larger discussion about elections and

candidates by requiring candidates to debate each

other as a condition for accepting public funding."

Debates give voters additional opportunities to learn

about their local candidates’ political views and

qualifications.

C. Public Campaign Financing Facilitates

and Enlarges Public Participation in

the Electoral Process

Public campaign financing programs help to in-

crease public participation in two other fundamental

ways. First, public campaign financing promotes citi-

zen involvement in political campaigns by increasing

“ The public financing programs in Anzona, New Jersey,

Austin, Los Angeles, New Haven, New York City, and San

Francisco, for example, include provisions for candidate debates

the number and diversity of contributors. Second,

public campaign financing increases the number and

diversity of candidates who seek public office. This

impact has been repeatedly shown in various studies

that amicus CCP does not — because it cannot — rebut.

1. Public Campaign Financing Encour-

ages More Citizens to Get Involved in

Political Campaigns

Giving campaign contributions is one way for

members of the electorate to get involved in the

electoral process. In localities and states with public

campaign financing programs, there has typically

been an increase in the number and diversity of small

donations by candidates’ constituents.

For instance, Arizona adopted publhe campaign

financing in 2000, and the number of contmbutors

to Arizona gubernatorial campaigns more than tri-

pled from 1998 to 2002. LEVIN, KEEPING IT CLEAN,

supra note 2, at 11. New York City’s public campaign

financing program, in existence since 1988, has also

encouraged new donors to become involved in politi-

cal campaigns: in each of the last three city election

cycles, over half of the individuals who contributed to

city campaigns were first-time donors. NEW YORK Crry

CAMPAIGN FINANCE Boarkbp, NEw YORKERS MAKE THEIR

Voice Heard — A REPORT ON THE 2009 ELECTIONS

(2009) at 104-105. After Portland implemented a pub-

lic campaign financing program in 2005, participating

candidates reported an increase in the number of

individuals who made donations to their campaigns.

CITIZEN CAMPAIGN COMMISSION, FIRST REPORT TO THE

City COUNCIL AND CITIZENS OF PORTLAND (2007)

(hereinafter FiksT REPORT] at 19-20. Publicly funded

candidate Chris Iverson described Portland’s public

campaign financing program as a “tool of inspiration

to get people re-involved with politics,” explaining

that the implementation of public campaign financing

brought “people into the political process ... ” /d.

at 20-21.

Public campaign financing programs not only

lead to an increase in the number of small campaign

contributors, they also encourage political participa-

tion in the form of political donations across a more

geographically diverse cross-section of the electorate.

Publicly financed candidates in Portland’s 2006 elec-

tion, for example, relied on much broader and more

geographically diverse donor bases than their private-

ly funded opponents. Privately financed candidates

received most of their donations from downtown

Portland and a few other wealthy neighborhoods,

while publicly financed candidates relied on dona-

tions from all different areas of the city. FIRST REPORT,

supra, at 19-20.

New York City’s public campaign financing pro-

gram has had similar effects on the geographic dis-

tribution of campaign contributions. Historically, a

majority of contributions to New York City campaigns

have come from Manhattan donors, despite the fact

that Manhattan residents make up less than a quar-

ter of the city’s total population. However, since New

York City implemented its partial public campaign

financing program, it has seen a trend toward greater

geographical balance. Between 2001 and 2009, Man-

hattan’s share of contributions dropped from 68

percent to 53 percent. By contrast, Brooklyn’s and

Queens’ combined share of contributions rose from 25

percent in 2001 to 43 percent in 2009. Donor activity

increased almost six-fold in Flushing, a heavily Asian-

American neighborhood that is home to Queens’

Chinatown. NEW YorRK City CAMPAIGN FINANCE BOARD,

supra, at 109-110.

2. Public Campaign Financing In-

creases the Number and Diversity

of Candidates Who Seek Office

Public campaign financing programs are also

specifically designed to facilitate public participation

in the electoral process by encouraging more individ-

uals to run for public office, thus adding more speech

to the public discourse. “Public funding encourages

more candidates to seek public office by providing

them with the necessary means to communicate their

messages effectively.” Lazarus, supra, at 79.

In Arizona, for instance, there was a 24 percent

increase in the number of candidates participating in

the primary when one compares the first full elec-

tion after the implementation of public campaign

financing with the last year prior to the implementa-

tion. Michael Clyburn, Public Campaign Financing:

The Path from Plutocracy to Pluralism, 7 SEATTLE J.

FOR Soc. Just. 285, 302 (2008), citing THE CLEAN

ELECTIONS INSTITUTE, THE ROAD TO VicTory: CLEAN

ELECTIONS SHAPE 2002 ARIZONA ELECTIONS (2002). In

New York City, the combination of making additional

public funds available to run electoral campaigns and

implementing term limits drew record numbers of

candidates for city office in 2001. RYAN, A STATUTE OF

LIBERTY, supra note 2, at 21. In Arizona, the public

campaign financing system “encouraged some candi-

dates who would not have otherwise run for office,

particularly women, to run.” Frasco, supra, at 758. In

addition, a report by the U.S. General Accounting

Office (now known as the Government Accountability

Office) on the public campaign financing programs in

Arizona and Maine found that 55 percent of partici-

pating candidates considered public campaign financ-

ing a “great” or “very great” factor in their decision to

run for office in 2000. U.S. GAO, CAMPAIGN FINANCE

REFORM: EARLY EXPERIENCES OF TWO STATES THAT OF-

FER FULL PUBLIC FUNDING FOR POLITICAL CANDIDATES

(2003) at 4.

In addition to attracting a greater number of can-

didates, public campaign financing also encourages a

broader, more representative range of candidates to

seek public office. With the aid of public campaign

financing, candidates who do not have an existing

network of private contributors have an opportunity

to effectively convey their message to members of the

electorate. For example, Los Angeles City Council-

member Ed Reyes stated that the city’s public cam-

paign financing was crucial to his successful run for

office in 2001. RYAN, ELEVEN YEARS OF REFORM, supra

note 2, at 23. “[As a first generation American,] I don’t

have the traditional ties to the power groups or the

power structure. I literally came from the neighbor-

hood. Without public financing, I knew that I wouldn’t

have been able to throw a stone like in the David and

Goliath story. I probably would have been throwing a

pebble. With public financing, I knew I had a shot.”

Id. Similarly, Portland Commissioner Amanda Fritz

reported that the burden of fundraising would have

dissuaded her from running for office in 2008 had

public financing not been available. Fritz said, “I am

not very good at asking for money ... and I don’t

think that being good at asking for money should be a

prerequisite for serving on the City Council.” RAu,

supra note 2, at 12.

According to a 2006 survey by the Maine Commis-

sion on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices,

87 percent of first-time candidates who participated

in the state’s public financing program reported that

the availability of public funding was “very important

to their decision to run for office.” MAINE COMMISSION

ON GOVERNMENTAL ETHICS AND ELECTION PRACTICES,

2007 Stupy Report: HAS PUBLIC FUNDING IMPROVED

MAINE ELECTIONS? (2007) at 1. Such evidence directly

contradicts the contention that “government funding

goes to candidates who have already shown political

skill in the traditionally funded system.” CCP Amicus

at 8.

Public campaign financing programs also allow

more female and minority candidates to competitively

run for oMee. In Arizona, the number of Native

American and Latino eandidates nearly tripled be

tween 2000 and 2002 with the implementation of

public campaign financing. RYAN, KEEPING IT CLEAN,

supra note 2, at 7. Arizona's pubhe campaign finane

Ing system also encouraged more women to run tor

office. Fraseo, supra, at 758, citing Marc BRESLOW

er at., Money & Pouttics IMPLEMENTATION Provret,

REVITALIZING DeMocRACY: CLEAN ELecTION REPORM

Shows THE Way Forwarp (2002) at 25. In New York

City, minority representation on the City Council has

increased steadily since pubhe campaign financing

was implemented in 1989. Torres-Spellisey and Wets-

bard, supra, at 226. In POOL, the combination of

increased pubhe tunding and term limits resulted in

“an even more diverse group of candidates [for City

Couneil! than has tymeally been seen in the erty, in

cluding the emergence of new immigrant voices from

the Asian-American and Russian-American communt-

ties, AMong others.” LEVIN, KEEPING IT CLEAN, supra

note 2, at 7 In 2009, New York voters for the first

tume elected a majority of minority candidates to the

City Council New York Civy CAMPAIGN FINANCE

BOARD, supra, at 142. In Maine, 71 pereent of female

candidates who participated in the state’s public cam

paign financing program said that the availability of

public funding was “very important” to their decision

to run for office. MAINE COMMISSION ON GOVERNMEN

TAL ETHICS AND ELECTION PRACTICES, supra, at 1.

D. Public Campaign Financing Frees Can-

didates from the Rigors of Fundraising

“The ‘money chase’ is perhaps the most severe

pubhe harm intheted by [our current] campaign

finance regime. " Lavarus, supra, at 128. “When

candidates and elected oMeals spend the overwhelm

ing majority of their time on tundraising activities,

they inevitably spend the majority of ther time

addressing the concerns of donors.” Jd at 129. Accord-

ingly, state and local governments have an munportant

government interest in freeing candidates from the

rigors of fundraising.

Evidence trom academic studies and CGS reports

clearly shows that public campaign tinancing: pro

grams further an important governmental interest by

freeing candidates from the burden of “dialing tor

dollars.” “By freeing candidates from the time

consuming rigor of fundraising, any pubhe campaign

financing program will leave more time available for

public campaign financing-funded candidates to

debate the issues and interact with voters.” Clyburn,

supra, at 3808. CCP, however, does not reference and

Wives NO weight to the experiences of pubhely funded

candidates, even though actual candidate experiences

provide ample evidence that public financing programs

serve this important goal.

In Maine, for imstance, as a result of its voluntary

public campaign financing program, “candidates and

elected officials report that they are now able to spend

sigmiticantly more time reaching a larger number of

*s,°*

constituents instead of focusing on potential large

donors.” Frasco, supra, at 740. see also BRESLOW FT

AL. supra, at 26) MAINE COMMISSION ON GOVERNMEN

TAL ETHics AND ELECTION PRACTICES, supra, at 1

Similarly, publicly financed candidates im Arizona

spent more time with voters and less time fiund-

raising. Clyburn, supra, at 3138

The same phenomenon occurred in Portland,

Oregon. City Council candidate John Branam reported

that “[voters] appreciated the fact that [pubhe cam-

paign financing) afforded me the opportunity to spend

more time talking about the issues as compared to

dialing for dollars.” SECOND BIENNIAL REPORT, supra,

at 16-17. City Council candidate Charles Lewis lhke-

wise stated that the public campaign financing pro

xram “allowed me to spend more time reaching out

directly to voters and not to big money interests | was

able to spend the vast majority of my time meeting

and talking with the people of Portland, not seeking

large donations * /d

CGS tound that as a result of Albuquerque's 2005

public campaign financing law, candidates in that city

sang the praises of a system that allowed them to

spend more time meeting with all constituents, not

just those who could save campaign contributions

Incumbent Councilor Isaac Benton commented that

“there was a by difference (running as a participat-

ing candidate}, Not having to fundraise — 1 had more

time to focus on the issues.” MILLIGAN, CITIZENS Win,

supra note 2, at 32. Further, Councilor Dan Lewis,

Who suceesstally ran as a publhely funded challenger

cp™

im YOUR, stated, “LT like that the election was issue

onmented and there was no added pressure of fund

TAISINg. . I was able to focus on the message and

the issues rather than the fundraising.” Jd) at 32

CGS research shows that voluntary pubhe cam

paygn financing helped to alleviate the burden of

private fundraising ino other jurisdictions, as well,

including New York City and Tucson. Ryan, ASrarure

OF LIBERTY, supra note 2, at 20; Ryan, Pusuic Cam

PAIGN FINANCING BLOOMS IN TUCSON, supra note 2, at

19. As iw other jurisdictions, the Dacson program

allowed incumbents more time to lemslate because

less time was spent fundraising. Ja.

ee ee

CONCLUSION

The expenence of the many jurisdictions that

have unmplemented pubhe campaign financing pro

grams demonstrates that such programs further the

values of the First Amendment ‘This powerful evi

dence supports the constitutionahty of such = pro

grams, Just as the Court found the program at issue

In Buckley to be constitutional, For the foregoing

reasons, We urge this Court to reaffirm the legislative

purposes, importance and constitutionality of pubhe

campaign financing programs, and to affirm the

holding of the Ninth Cireuit Court of Appeals

Respectfully submitted,

FrREpRIC D Woockes

STRUMWASSER & WoockeR LLP

ROBERT M. STERN

Jessica A. LEVINSON

MARGARET C.) MILLIGAN

Hinary L Rav

CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIFS

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