Amicus Curiae Brief — Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett

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dL | PILL D

No- 10-239 | SEP 2 0 2010

In The

Supreme Court of the Anited States

—_—__—_____—_- @ —______--

IOHN MCCOMISH.

NANCY MCLAIN, and TONY BOUTE,

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ae? +,”

Bet, LOMCKRS

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KEN BENNE PER in bis official capacity as Secretary of

State of Arizona, and GARY SCARAMAZ2ZO, ROYANN J

PARKER, JEFFREY Lo FATRMAN, LOUIS HOPPMAN,

and LORE DANTELS, in their oficial capacities as members

of the ARIZONA CLEAN ELECTIONS COMMISSION,

-~-——_-—___-—_—__—- @ -—----—----

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Ninth Cireuit

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AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF THE

YANKEE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY

IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITION

FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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PETER.) MARTIN" JUSTIN RO CLARK

HINCALEY, ALLEN & ANCONA & SIBGEI

SNYDER LLP 49 Fast Cedar Street

20 Church Street Newington, CP Oo

Hartford, CT OG8108 Tel S60-660-1 776

Tel S8O-838 1-27 26 Fan S60-666- 550

Fan SOO-S8L-2727 yastin reclarke gmail com

pmartinehaslaw com

*Conmsel of Record

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether Citizens United vo Federal Election

Comm'n, 180 S.Ct. 876 (2010), and Davis 0 Federal

Flection Comium'n, V8 S.Ct. 27H9 (2OOS), require

this Court to stmke down Arizona's matching funds

trigger under the First and Fourteenth Amend,

ments because it penalizes and deters tree speech

by forcing privately-financed candidates and their

supporters to finance the dissemination of hostile

political speech whenever they raise or spend private

money, or when independent expenditures are made,

above a “spending limit.”

2

Whether Crificens United and Davis require this

Court to strike down Anvona’s matching funds trigger

under the First and Fourteenth Amendments because

it regulates campaign financing in order to equalize

“influence” and financial resources among competing

candidates and interest groups, rather than to ad

vanee directly a compelhng state interest in the least

restmetive manner

uN

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

AMICUS CURIAF BRIEF OF THE YANKEE

INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY

IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICUS

CURIAE

ARGUMENT

1 THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT THE

PETITION SO THAT ITT MAY HARMO

vR

0 ©

NIZE THE CONFLICT AMONG THE

CIRCUITS CONCERNING MATCHING

FUND TRIGGER PROVISIONS CON

SISTENT WITH DAVIS

A Vhe Citivens’ Flection Program

B The Green Party Litigation

CC Comparing Green Party to Davis

D CEPs Impact On This Year's Pri

Mary

CONCLUSION

ty

11

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Pagre

FEDERAL CASES

Dacis vo Federal Election Cormornisston, 28

S.Ct. 2759, 171 LL. Ed. 2d 737 (2008) PMINSTM

Folev cv. State Elections Enforcement Com

misston, No 3 WevlO9l, BOLO US. Dist

LENIS 717440) Conn. dub 16, 2OL0) 8,9

Green Party of Conn. oo Garfield, Nos. 09-3760-

evi h.), OW 394 1CCON), LOTTO TS App LEXIS

14286 (2nd Cir dul. 18, 2010) PMINNTPN

Crreen Party of ( ‘On ?} 4 ( rrrfie ld. OAS

F Supp 2d 298 (DD Conn. 2009) 5

MecComish co Bennett, GCOS F8d 720 (Sth Cir

POLO) S

STATUTES AND RULES

ARS $$ 16 940 f sey 3

CONN. GEN. STAT. $$ 9-700 ef seg 3

CONN GEN. Star. §$ 9-702 3

CONN GEN. Star. § 9-708 3

CONN. GEN Star §$@ 718 8, 4

CONN, GEN. Star §$ 0-714 4

CONN. GEN. Srar. $714.) 4

CONN GEN STAT. $ 9-714.) 4

2010 CONN ActTS 10-2 (REG SESS ) iS

Supreme Court Rule 37 1

AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF THE

YANKEE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY

The Yankee Institute tor Pubhe Poheyv CYankee

Institute”), on behalf of itself and its members, sub

mits this qriuecus curtae bnet in support of the Pet

tion for Writ of Certioram filed by the Petitioners,

John MeComish, Nancy MelLain and Tony Bowe, to

review the judgment of the United States Court of

Appeals tor the Ninth Cireait. Pursuant to Supreme

Court Rule S720), this aqerrcus currae brnet is tiled

with the consent of all the parties

————E 6 ee

IDENTITY AND INTEREST

OF AMICUS CURIAE

The Yankee Institute is a nonpartisan education

al and research group organived im the IYs0s under

the laws of the State of Connecticut. The Yankee

Institute's core mission is to “promote economic

opportunity through lower taxes and new ideas for

better government in Connecticut ”

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule G¢. letters madicating

Vhe Yankee Lnstitute’s intent toe fle this aqrucus caniae brief

were recenved by counsel of record for all partres at least 10 days

prior to the due date of this bret All parties have issued blanket

consents to the filang of arucus curiae bmets in support of ether

party or neither party Finally, The Yankee Institute affirms that

no Counsel for a party authored this briefin whole or in part and

that no party, person or entity made a monetary contmbutron

specifically for the preparation or submission of this briet

a

The Yankee Institute has over 600 members most

of whom reside in and are taxpavers of the State

of Connecticut. If the Ninth Circuit's decision is

affirmed and Arizona’s excess and independent eX:

penditure trigger provisions are upheld as constitu,

tional, itis likely that such a decision will pave the

wavy tor the Connecticut legislature to reenact similar

(rigger provisions in Connecticut's CaMpain finance

law thereby increasing the amount of taxpaver dol-

lars that are used to fund the dissemination of hostile

poliucal speech. The Yankee Institute and its mem

bers tundamentally oppose such a law and have an

interest in the outcome of this case. Therefore, The

Yankee Institute respectfully submits this) aynreus

curiae brnefoin support of the Petion for Wirnit of

Certiorar

ARGUMENT

lL THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT THE PE-

TITION SO THAT IT MAY HARMONIZE

THE CONFLICT AMONG THE CIRCULTS

CONCERNING MATCHING FUND TRIG-

GER PROVISIONS CONSISTENT WITH

DAVIS.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Cireuit defied Davis oo Federal Election Comrn'n, 128

S.Ct. 2759 (2008), when it upheld Arizona’s matching

fund trigger provisions as imposing only an insub-

stantial burden on the exercise of First Amendment

nghts) The Ninth Cireuit’s decision is inconsistent

3

with other Cireuits that have followed Daors. including

the Second Cireuit which struck down Connecticut's

matching fund trigger provisions as unconstitution-

ally intringing en candidates’ protected campaign

speech. Unless this Court grants the Petition, ad-

dresses the merits of the appeal and harmonizes the

Circuits consistent with Darcrs, there wall continue to

be uncertainty as to the constitutionality of matching

fund trigger provisions

A. The Citizens’ Election Program.

In 2005, Connecticut enacted its own so-called

clean election law in an attempt to combat certain

perceived political corruption and untair intluence in

state elections. Green Party of Conn. cv Garfield, Nos

O9-3760-evcL), O9-S941TCCON), 2OL0 US. App. LEXIS

14286, **4-6 (2nd Cir. dul. 13, 2010). The law became

known as the Citizens’ Election Program (CEP”),

CONN. GEN. STAT. $$ 9-700, ef seg.. and has provided

pubhe grants for candidates for state legislative and

executive offices, »acluding Governor. CONN. GEN. Srar.

$ 9-702 and §$ 9-708. Like the Arivona Citizens Clean

Elections Act, ALR.S. $$ 16-940 ef sey., at issue in the

Petition for Writ of Certiorar: betore this Court, when

the CEP was enacted it contained matching fund

trigger provisions Known as (1) the Excess Expendi-

ture Trigger Provision, CONN. GEN. STaT. §$ 9-713; and

(2) the Independent Expenditure ‘Tmgger Provision,

CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-714

Under the Excess Expenditure Trigger Provi-

sion, candidates who participated im the CEP

(“participating candidates”) received additional public

subsidies in response to funds received or spent by

their opponents who did not participate in the CEP

(“non-participating candidates”) CONN. GEN. STAT.

$9713. If a non-participating candidate received

contributions or spent more than an amount equal to

the participating candidate's initial grant, then the

participating candidate would be eligble to receive up

to four additional grants, each worth 25° of the in-

tial grant amount. /d. The excess expenditure grants

would be distributed whenever the non-participating

candidate received contmbutions or made expendi-

tures exceeding 100%, 125°, 150° and 175° of the

initial grant amount. ld

Under the Independent Expenditure Trigger

Provision, a participating candidate receives match-

ing funds when there were independent expenditures

“with the intent to promote the defeat” of that partic-

ipating candidate. CONN. GEN. Svar. $ 9-714. The

amount of matching funds available to the participat-

ing candidate was equal to the amount of the inde-

pendent expenditure on a dollar for dollar basis, up

to lLOOS of the initial grant amount under the

Independent Expenditure Tngger Provision. Jd. at

$ 9-7 14.a) and (ec).

B. The Green Party Litigation.

In 2006, the Green Party of Connecticut com-

meneed a lawsuit against the Connecticut State

Elections Enforcement Commission (“SEEC”) in the

c

o

United States District Court for the District of Con-

necticut challenging the constitutionality of the CEP

based on the First and Fourteenth Amendments to

the United States Constitution. Green Party, U.S.

App. LEXIS 14286 at *15. The lawsuit challenged,

inter alia, the CEP’s Excess and Independent Ex-

penditure Trigger Provisions. /d. at **16-17. On

August 27, 2009, the District Court struck down the

entire CEP and entered a declaratory judgment that

the CEP unconstitutionally burdened political oppor-

tunity and, most relevant to the Petition for Writ of

Certiorari before this Court, that the CEP’s Excess

Expenditure and Independent Trigger Provisions

unconstitutionally burdened First Amendment speech

rights. Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 648

F. Supp. 2d 298 (D. Conn. 2009).

On July 13, 2010, the United States Circuit

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, in

part, the judgment declaring unconstitutional the

Excess and Independent Expenditure Trigger Provi-

sions and reversed, in part, other portions of the

judgment not relevant to the Petition before this

Court. The Second Circuit held that the CEP’s trigger

provisions “imposeld] a substantial burden on the

exercise of the First Amendment right to use personal

funds for campaign speech” and that “the state had

not asserted a compelling state interest in burdening

such speech.” Green Party, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS

14286 at *74. The Second Circuit agreed “with the

District Court that the CEP’s trigger provisions

violate the First Amendment because they operate in

6

a manner similar to the law that the Supreme Court

struck down in Davis v. Federal Election Commission,

128 S. Ct. 2759, 171 L. Ed. 2d 737 (2008).” Id. at *77.

Recently, the Connecticut legislature amended

the CEP by, inter alia, repealing the Excess and

Independent Expenditure Trigger Provisions to bring

the CEP in compliance with the Second Circuit’s

decision in Green Party. See 2010 Conn. Acts 10-2

(REG. SEss.). However, by that time, the damage had

already been done, i.e., matching funds for the Con-

necticut primary had already been distributed to

participating candidates thereby burdening non-

participating candidates’ First Amendment speech

rights contrary to Davis. Making matters worse, the

legislature performed an end-around the Green Party

decision by simply doubling the general election grant

amount for participating gubernatorial candidates to

$6 million (2010 Conn. Acts 10-2 (REG. SEss.), sec. 3),

which is the total amount a participating candidate

would have received under the CEP’s trigger provi-

sions if her non-participating opponent spent more

than 100% of the initial grant amount. This Court

should clarify the law on trigger provisions consistent

with Davis to ensure that the harm to candidates’

sacred First Amendment speech rights are not com-

promised in future elections.

C. Comparing Green Party to Davis.

In striking down the CEP’s trigger provisions in

Green Party, the Second Circuit compared those

7

provisions to the “Millionaire Amendment” that this

Court struck down in Davis. The Second Circuit

concluded that the CEP’s Excess and Independent

Expenditure Trigger Provisions, like Davis’ “Million-

aire Amendment,” caused a non-participating candi-

date to “shoulder a special and significant burden” if

the candidate chose to exercise her First Amendment

speech rights because the more campaign dollars the

non-participating candidate spent above the initial

grant amount, the more matching funds her partici-

pating opponent would receive. Green Party, 2010

U.S. App. LEXIS 14286 at **80-81. The Second

Circuit further held that the “penalty” imposed by the

CEP’s trigger provisions is “harsher” and, therefore,

more constitutionally objectionable than Davis’ “Mil-

lionaire Amendment.” Jd. at **82-83.”

The CEP’s Excess and Independent Expenditure

Trigger Provisions are substantially similar to the

trigger provisions set forth in the Arizona Citizens

Clean Elections Act. Both provide matching funds to

participating candidates as a result of fair non-

participating opponents (or third parties) raising or

spending more than the initial public grant amount.

Accordingly, and in harmony with Davis, the Court

* For purposes of rendering its decision, the Second Circuit

found no significant difference between the CEP’s Excess

Expenditure Trigger Provision and the Independent Expendi-

ture Trigger Provision because “nothing in Davis suggests that

the ‘right to spend personal funds for campaign speech’ is

limited to candidates only.” Jd. at *83-84.

S

should find that Arizona's trigger provistons, like the

CEP’s trigger provisions, impose an unconstitutional

penalty on First Amendment political speech.’

D. CEP'’s Impact On This Year's Primary.

The Excess Expenditure Trigger Provision had a

significant impact on Connecticut's August 10, 2010

primary election as participating candidates from

both Republican and Democratic parties received and

spent matching funds primarily on negative attack

ads against their non-participating opponents. In the

primary for the Democratic nomination for Governor

which featured a high-spending non-participating

candidate, Ned Lamont — negative attack ads by his

participating opponent, Dan Malloy, funded by $1.25

million in matehing funds may have cost Lamont the

nomination,

Similarly, in the primary tor the Republican

nomination, one of the non-participating candidates,

Thomas C. Foley, made expenditures in excess of the

initial grant amount of $1.25 million. Folev v. State

Elections Enforcement Commission, No. 3:10ev L091,

2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71744. *7 (D. Conn. Jul. 16,

2010). As a result, on July 8, 2010, the SEEC ap-

proved the application of his participating opponent,

Michael C. Fedele, for the initial grant plus $937,500

* The Second Cireuit found the Ninth Cireutt’s decision in

MeComush vo Bennett, GOS F.3d 720 (th Cir 2010), unpersua-

sive. Green Party, 2010 U.S: App LEXIS 14286 at *S3, fn 19

In supplemental matching funds Gin amount equal to

7o% of the intial grant amount) pursuant to the

Excess Expenditure Trigger Provision. Jc.

On duly 14, 2010, Fedele apphed for the remain-

ing supplemental matching funds in the amount of

$312,500 triggered by Foley spending more than

175% of initial grant amount. Jd. In response, Foley

fled an application for a temporary restraining order

and permanent injunction seeking to prevent the

SEEC from issuing the remaining matching funds to

Fedele pursuant to the Excess Expenditure Trigger

Provision that the Second Cireuit found unconstitu-

tional just one day before in Green Party ld. at **7-

S. Foley argued that he would be trreparably harmed

in at least two ways if the matching funds were

approved. First, Foley argued that the provision

burdened his First Amendment rights because he was

being penalized for engaging in political speech, re.,

spending more money on the primary campaign than

his opponents. Jd. at **13-14. Second, Folev argued

that granting supplemental matching funds would

foree him to spend more en his campaign than he

originally planned in order to outspend and “com-

municate more visibly and loudly than” his oppo-

nents. Jd. at * 14.

The distret court could not simply enjoin the SEEC from

approving matching funds pursuant to the Second Circuit's

decision in Green Party because the Second Cireurt had vet to

issue a mandate thereby depriving the district court ef parts

diction Jd at **8 9

10

Although it demed the temporary restrarming

order, the district court nonetheless found that Foley

would be irreparably harmed by the Excess Expendt-

ture Trigger Provision in the same way that the Docrs

plaintitYs were harmed because “the vigorous exercise

of the right to use personal funds to finance campaign

speech produces fundraising advantages for oppo

nents in the competitive content of electoral polities ~

Id. at **14-15 (citing Davis, 128 8. Ct. at 2772). The

CEP’s trigger provisions unconstitutionally burdened

Folev’s First Amendment right to “communicate more

visibly and loudly than” his opponents by outspend-

ing them on the pnmary campaign. Foley ultamatels

won the August 10, 2010 primary, but a large, nega-

tive advertising campaign by Fedele — funded in large

part by public tunds received under the Exeess bx

penditure Trigger Provision met their mark and

shrank Folev’s wide-lead in the waning days ot the

primary campaign.

The distribution of supplemental matching funds

to participating candidates in this vear’s: primary

election worked the precise evil anticipated by the

district court in Green Party. Those same evils may

soon betall other candidates in the same way unless

the Court grants the Petition, addresses the merits of

the appeal and harmonizes the Cireuits consistent

with Daves.

11

CONCLUSION

This Court should grant the Petition for Writ of

Cerboorart Fo restore and ensure uniformity in the law

consistent with Dacrs

Respectfully submitted

by counsel for the Yankee

Institute tor Publhie Pohevy,

Perer J. MARTIN*

HIncALEY, ALLEN &

SNYDER LLP

20 Church Street

Harttord, CT 06108

Tel 860-331-2726

Fax S60-3351-2727

pmartin@haslaw com

“Counsel of Record

sand.

JUSTIN RO CLARK

ANCONA & SIFGEI

49 East Cedar Street

Newington, CT 06111

Tel. 860-666-1776

Fan S60-666-5522

yustin relarkegmail com

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