Record and brief — Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett
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PETITION
FOR
WRIT OF
CERTIORARI
‘\) vy vat ty
No. (| 10-2 38 wes 27 700
an The ORFNOE OF THE CLERK
Supreme Court of the Hnited States
°
ARIZONA FREE ENTERPRISE CLUBS FREEDOM
CLUB PAC.) ARIZONA TANBPAY ERS ACTION
COMMIPTER, DEAN MARTIN, and RICK MURPHY
\
KEN BENNETT. in his offteral capacity as Secretary otf
State of the State of Arona, and GARY SCARAMAZ/0
ROYANN J PARKER, JE PRREY Lo FAIRMAN,
LORLS DANIELS. and LOUIS HOPRRFEMAN in
therr offieral capacities as members of the ARIZONA
CITIZENS CLEAN ELECTIONS COMMISSION,
CLEAN ELECTIONS INSTTIPU PEL ING ,
AY NJrerriade PIS
eo
On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Ninth Circuit
e
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
.
INSTITUTE BOR .TUSTIC? INSTITU TR PoR POSTE
WitLtLtAM RO MAUKER* Witti AM Ht MeLLOR
101 VYesler Wav. Suite 603 M01 North Glebe Road
Seattle, WA YS1O4 Suite 800
VOG) G4 1-9800 Arhangton, VA 2evos
wimaurere@y ory PO3) BSLV-YIVO
INSTITU PE POR JUsric!
DiMorHy D> KEELER
Paur Vo AVELAR
39S South Mall Avenue,
Suite Qo
Tempe, AZ SALS1
480) SOT SR00
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
In Davis vo. FEC, 128 S.Ct. 2759 (2008), this
Court held that the First Amendment forbids the
government from attempting to level the plaving field
in elections by raising contribution lumits for candi-
dates who are outspent by self-financed opponents
Arizona's Citizens Clean Elections Act achieves a
similar result by providing extra subsidies in the
form of “matching funds” to publhely financed candi-
dates who are outspent by independent expenditure
groups and privately financed candidates. The ques-
tions presented are:
lL. Whether the First Amendment forbids Arizo-
na from providing additional government subsidies to
pubhely financed candidates that are triggered by
independent expenditure groups’ speech against such
candidates”
y
2 Whether the First Amendment forbids Arivo
na from providing additional government subsidies
to pubhely financed candidates that are triggered by
the fundraising or expenditures by these candidates’
privately financed opponents”
il
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
In addition to the parties named in the caption,
the following individuals were parties in the court of
appeals proceeding and separate plaintiffs before the
district court: John MeComush, Nanev MeLain, and
Tony Bouie
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
The Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom
Club PAC has no parent company and there is no
publicly held company that has a 10% or greater
ownership interest in the Arizona Free Enterprise
Club's Freedom Club PAC.
The Anzona Taxpavers Action Committee has no
parent company and there is no pubhely held compa.
ny that has a 10% or greater ownership interest in
the Arizona Taxpayers Action Committee
wv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING i
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT un
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............:0ccscccceee0:: Vv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ... vu
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI l
OPINIONS BELOW “3 l
JURISDICTION : ho Maa l
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES
AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED | l
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2
lL THE ACT 3
Il THE ACT’S EFFECT ON SPEECH Ss
Il THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW i2
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT 17
lL EVEN AFTER THIS COURT'S DECISION
IN DAVIS, CIRCUITS ARE DIVIDED ON
WHETHER SYSTEMS OF PUBLIC FI.
NANCING OF CAMPAIGNS EMPLOYING
MATCHING FUNDS MECHANISMS ARF
CONSTIPUTIONAL | 19
A THE NINTH CIRCUITS DECISION
DIRECTLY CONFLICTS WITH DE-
CISIONS OF THE SECOND AND
ELEVENTH CIRCUITS 20
TABLE OF CONTENTS — Continued
Page
B. THE SPILT AMONG THE CIRCUITS
CREATES CONSIDERABLE CONFU-
SION REGARDING THE CONSTITU-
TIONALITY OF SIMILAR SYSTEMS
ACROSS THE COUNTRY. RBS
ll THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION
CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT'S
HOLDING IN DAVIS THAT, IN) THE
CONTEXT OF A COMPETITIVE ELEC-
TION, LAWS THAT PROVIDE FUNDING
ADVANTAGES TO A SPEAKER'S POLIT-
ICAL OPPONENTS BASED ON THE EX-
ERCISE OF THE SPEAKER'S FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHTS ARE UNCON.
STITUTIONAL .......... ninasiaaanas:* “ee
lll THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION
CONFLICTS WITH CITIZENS UNITED
BY ALLOWING GOVERNMENTS TO
INDIRECTLY RESTRAIN THE SPEND-
ING OF INDEPENDENT EXPENDI-
~
TURES GROUPS | | —
CONCLUSION..... we aS 39
APPENDIX INDEX
US. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Order and Amended Opimon (June 23,
Shae CSE ste App. 1-44
US. Distmet Court for the Distmet of Arizona
Order (January 20, 2010). : App. 45-78
Vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS ~- Continued
Page
U.S. Supreme Court Order (June 8, 2010)....... App. 79
US. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Order (February 1, 2010).0000 occ. App. 80-86
Us. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Order (January 29, 2010) 20.0000... App. 87-89
U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law
De WEN I oink nt nccntwsunsnninnnn cindipienneans App. 90-118
U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona
Order (August 29, 2008) 2000000000000... ..... App. 119-131
Si IG: MINI Bh sas cicnceonsectnsccueseaenicwencnseqeses App. 182
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV... aCe te
a oh. de eee een eat ..... App. 133
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-940 ef seq. ................ App. 134-149
Declaration of Plaintiff-Intervenor Dean Mar-
tin in Support of Motion for Summary
SEE RSI pe at eA one App. 150-153
Declaration of Robert Burns .................... App. 154-157
Declaration of Chad Kirkpatrick ............ App. 158-161
Excerpts from the Deposition Transcript of
Stephen James Voeller (taken on February
I ie oh iain cra elhncins scan ietevaimincin App. 162-164
Declaration of Plaintiff-Intervenor Rick Mur-
phy in Support of Motion for Summary
Nic citciithdind duke aiptnanioncgscuniensnnis App. 165-170
Vil
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Ass'n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Brewer,
486 F.3d 586, reh’g granted, rev'd in part, A494
F.3d 1145, amended by, 497 F.3d 1056 (9th
I ree hr ket Le kadikenmincibiaanes 13
Ass'n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Brewer,
363 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (D. Ariz. 2005) ..........0000000..... 12
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 A976)... eee 35
Crttzens United v. FEC, 1308. Ct. 876 (2010).... passim
Daggett v. Comm'n on Gov'tal Ethics & Election
Practices, 205 F.3d 445 (1st Cir. 2000) ............. 20, 23
Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008)... passim
Day v. Holahan, 34 F3d 1356 (Sth Cir.
SEED sisnicirustseeiinsncatastabidamiagebactameusuian 20, 22, 23, 24, 34
FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238
(1986)
FEC v. Natl Conservative Political Action
AO ry A a 36
Gable v. Patton, 142 F.3d 940 (6th Cir. 1998).........20, 21
Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 5 F.3d ___
2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 14286 (2d Cir. July
SE I dence csiinc ink cid anidatulnsnauncinaubaimeiades 17, 19, 21, 32
Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 648 F. Supp. 2d
I I TO a eaecnnetusioniin 33
Martin, et al. v. Brewer. et al., No. 04-cev-0200
Se ls GI Wil CID sists dks ces puccduuscovesiatasunansinsmadacs 13
Vill
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Page
McComish v. Brewer, No. 08-cv-1550 (D. Ariz.
I I I erie siciscehisdsintcsieinngebesicdaenaaleatnieltciasiniptedsceiiiisanieiene 13
N.C. Right to Life Comm. Fund for Indep.
Political Expenditures v. Leake, 524 F.3d 427
(4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, Duke v. Leake,
a ks ey i IO x evenncecniccssnecnccescccssccnsens 20, 23, 24
Scott v. Roberts, F.3d , 2010 U.S.
App. LEXIS 15897 (llth Cir. July 30,
SE clecasested cieeusditoaiicidiuhtatnainindninainnisses 17, 19, 21, 22, 32
United States v. Stevens, 1380S. Ct. 1577 (2010)....... 34
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
ee es MINI, Uh viivechsicctsnteenscisnccisdecneseteceupinisiia passim
Copes, RULES AND STATUTES
RE IELTS OS eae ae ARES Sree Per A rar 1
Albuquerque, N.M., Charter art. XVI (2004)............ 27
An Act Concerning Comprehensive Campaign
Finance Reform for State-Wide Constitution-
al and General Assembly Offices, 2005 Conn.
Pub. Acts. 5 (Spec. Sess.) (codified as amend-
ed Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 9-600 to -674, 9-700 to
I ET ih ais ce atacieat inate uhacetinaioieeds 25
An Act to Reform Campaign Finance, 1996 Me.
Legis. Serv. Initiated Bill Ch. 5 (West) (codi-
fied at scattered sections of Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann. Tit. 21-A, $§ 1121-1128 (Supp. 2006)) ........... 25
IX
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued
Anizona Citizens Clean Elections Act.
Ariz. Rev. Stat.
IIR RNS Rie Sa eee Sneed
S
N
S
RES LUE ie pean AyD ek Sa eae
O_O SE See ee ee
$ 16-952(A-C)..00 LE se RE es I |
SP MIE ioe cacsvecesisdvcscaaves ‘ed
§ 16-952.C\2)...
TIE iis ssa <cccarcnevaschuceouanacnoveciecesusteciac:
16-9521) ............. cad antaecied cinema
SS.
SS:
Arizona Citizens Clean Elections Act. 1998
Anz. Legis. Serv. Prop. 200 (West) (codified
at Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann... $$ 16-901.0, -940 to
"REINS S SC A A Pe Peet Ch ae OER Oe
Florida Election Campaign Financing Act, Fla.
Laws 86-276 (codified at Fla. Stat. $$ 106.30
Nebraska Campaign Finance Limitation Act,
1992 Neb. Laws S56 $$ 1-10 (codified as
amended at Neb. Rev. Stat. $$ 32-1601 to
WY Cisiin neces punesdenhiseddeaeceestdesbdechathoantapedaretincedicess
Page
sve
a?
> r-
aseee are)
Vo
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued
North Carolina Judicial Campaign Reform Act,
2002 N.C. Sess. Laws. 158 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of N.C. Gen.
es a I NOD ooo vacacccaccuseacenccccucaneca:
Portland, Or., Municipal Code ch. 2.10 (2005)
Pilot Comprehensive Public Funding for Flee-
tions to the Hawau County Couneil, 2008
Haw. Act 244............. [aided
Tueson, Ariz., Charter cho XVI, Subchapter (B)
Op SED oikcccaseievecccccucnis
Voter Action Act, 2007 N.M. Laws Ist Spee
Sess. Ch. 2 (H.B. 6) (West).....000000...
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Pubhe
Campaign Financing Pilot Program, 2010 W.
Va. Acts 72 (codified at Wo Va. Code $$ 3-12-1
IE Bathe xc dectcescachsanekucndeceess
Wisconsin Impartial Justice Act, 2009 Wis
Sess. Laws SY (codified in scattered sections
of Wis. Stat. Ch. 8S, 11, 20. 25. 71 (2010)
Sup. Ct. R. 10 ca)
OTHER PUBLICATIONS
Brennan Center for Justice et al.. Breaking
Free with Fair Elections: A New Declaration
of Independence for Congress (March 2007),
avaliable at https www.ecleanupwashington
org documents breaking free pdf...
H.R. 1826, 111th Cong. (2009)
Page
*s,°
oO
XI
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued
Pare
Press Release, Public Campayrn: While Congress
Fiddles and Washington Burns, States Take
Action to Clean Up Politics (May 22, 2006),
http: www publhicampaign org pressroom LOO
05 22 while-conygress-fiddles-and-washingyton-
burns-states-take-action-to-clean-up politics 26
S. 1285, 110th Cong. (2007)... s : 27
S. 7482, 111th Cong. (L009) 27
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club
PAC, Anvona Taxpavers Action Committee, Dean
Martin, and Rick Murphy respecttully petition for a
writ of certiorart to review the yudgment of the US
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cireuit
— 6 -——-_-_-—--_-——--
OPINIONS BELOW
The oryanal decision of the court of appeals is
reported at GOS F3d 720. The court's amended dect-
Sion is unreported and appears ino the Appendix
App”) at App. 1-44. The decision of the US) Dhstmet
Court for the District of Anzona is unreported and
appears in the Appendix at App. 45-78
— -- — —~ @ — —__—_—_—_—
JURISDICTION
The pudgment of the court of appeals was entered
on May 21, 2010. This Court's jurisdiction is invoked
under JS USC. § 125401)
———
CONSTIPUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED
The First Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides, ino pertinent part: “Congress
shall make no law abridging the freedom of
speech.” Relevant portions of the Anvona Citizens
Clean Elections Act, Ariz. Rev. Stat. $$ 16-940 ef seg.
are reproduced at App. 134-49
—_—_—__-+-___—-@
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case asks whether the government may
provide funding: benefits to candidates ino contested
elections in order to “level the playing field” among
those candidates. In Davis vo FEC, 128 S.Ct. 2759
(2008), this Court held the government may not do so
The benefit: provided in Davis was an increase in
contmbutien limits for federal candidates who ran
against so-called “millionaire” candidates who could
finance their own campaigns. In this case, the benefit
is a subsidy in the form of “matching funds” pand to
candidates when their opponents or their supporters
engage in political activity in excess of a government.
created threshold. The result, however, is the same
The candidates who opt into the system are granted
funding advantages desizned to equalize their speech
with the speech of candidates who elect to fund their
own camMpawyns or raise money from private donors
But Docis us clear that the government may not
create funding benefits for favered candidates im
order to equalve their ability to spend menev on
campaign speech) Arizona does just that by providing
matching funds to one candidate trigyered by the
spending by or for his opponent
In upholding Arizona's system of matching tunds
subsidies, the Ninth Cireuit resected Dacis’ apphea-
tion to Anvona’s law and concluded that the govern
ment mav burden the speech of advocacy groups that
speak independently of candidates independent
expenditure groups”) and privately tinanced cand,
dates as an incentive tor candidates to publicly fi
nance their campaigns. The Ninth Cireurt’s decision
simply cannot be squared with Doacis and both the
Second and Eleventh Crreuits have therefore subse
quently refused to follow the Ninth Circuit's reason,
Ing, creating a significant conflict among the circuits
Because the law burdens the speech of independent
groups, the Ninth Cireuit’s decision also conthets with
Citizens United & FEC, U0S. Ct S76 (2010). In light
of the inextmeable conflict among the cireuits, the
increasing prevalence of similar laws in the states,
and the Ninth Cireuit’s erroneous reading of Dacrs
and Citizens United, this Court's authoritative guid
ance is urgently needed
lL THEACT
1 Atussue are certain provisions of the Arizona
Citizens Clean Elections Act, Arne. Rev Stat $$ 16
MO ef seg che “Act™), and specifically, Arie Rew Stat
§ 16-952. A-C) (the “Matching Funds Provision”) App
138-41. The Act is a system of public funding for
campaigns for Arizona state offices It was adopted in
1998 through a ballot initiative by a margin of SL. to
49% It took effect in 2000) The Act apphes to races
for Governor, Secretary of State, Attorney General,
Treasurer, Superintendent of Puble Instruction,
Corporation Commussioner, Mine Inspector State
Senator, and State Representative. The Citizens
Clean Elections Commission, the members of which
are named as defendants in their official capacities, is
tasked with enforcing the provisions of the Act
The Act provides government funds to candidates
who collect a sufierent number of $5 “qualifving
contmbutions” trom the puble These candidates
must agree to abide by spending hmuats set out in the
Act) Ariz” Rev Stat. $ 16-946 The government pro-
vides a set amount of money, or “rmitial disburse.
ment,” to qualifving candidates) Except for the $5
centmbutions and other minor exceptions, pubhely
financed candidates cannot accept any private contr
butions Amz Rev Stat) §$ 16-941,An 1) App 135
They also may not make expenditures above the
initial disbursement unless they receinve funds under
the Matching Funds Provision Ariz Rev Stat § 16
M4L(AKS-4), App. 1385-86. These matching funds are
provided by the government and can amount to up to
two times the amount of the initial disbursement for
each candidate that recenves them Ariz) Rev Stat
S16 8520F), App. 142-48
2. Two overmding purposes of the Act were to
“level the plaving fleld” among candidates and reduce
the influence and relative vorce of certain business
xroups with whom the ballot measure’s proponents
disagreed (Pubhe Campaign, “Why America’s Semors
Should Care about Money in Polities.” ECF No 294-2
at 123-24, Ninth Cir) Excerpts of Ro CER™) 4194-95,
Pubhe Campaign, “Why Working People Should Care
About Monev in Politics,” ECR No. 294-2 at T2oee,
ER 4197-98; Pubhe Campaign, “Why Environmental
ists Should Care about Money in Politics.” ECF No
294-2 at 129-30, ER 4200-01; see also Chart of “Level
the Plaving Field” andor “Lanmait Spending” Reter
ences owith citations), ECF No. 288-6 at 37 70, ER
3584-3617.) As an internal memorandum to the ballot
measure's steering committee from the initiative's
campayin manager stated “Clean Elections is NOT
about pubhe funding. Its [sic] about spending limits,
getting md of spemal interests, and leveling the
playing field.” (Confidential “State of the Campaign”
Mem From Campaiutn Manager Josh Silver, Apr. 6,
194s, ECF No 358-2 at 38. ER 5070.) The constitu
tional problem arses in the Act's attempt to address
those situations where the “playing Meld” is not level
and independent groups or privately financed cand
dates can outspend pubhely financed candidates To
achieve this leveling, the Act's dratters added the
Matching Funds Provision, Ariz) Rew Stat § 16-952
This section is entitled “Equal Funding of Cand:
dates “App 138
The matching funds subsidies distributed by the
government to each pubhely financed candidate
equal the amount the privately financed candidate
spent or received or the amount spent bw the
independent political group — over the initial dis
bursement, less 6° for fundraising: expenses Ari
fe)
Rev. Stat) §$ 16-952. AC) App 188-41. Independent
expenditure groups tmgeger matching funds to each
publicly financed candidate in a race when «) they
spend money in opposition to a publicly financed
candidate or in tavoer of a privately financed oppo-
nent, and (n) the total amount spent by an independ-
ent expenditure group plus the amount spent or
received by the prvately financed candidate exceeds
the amount of the initial disbursement. Jd) When an
independent group's) spending triggers matching
funds, the government provides those funds directly
to the publicly financed candidate or candidates in
the race and not to independent groups supporting
them. Independent expenditures on behalf of pubhely
financed candidates or against privately financed
candidates do not tmyger matching funds to privately
financed candidates. See Amz. Rev. Stat. § 16-952.C),
App. 189-41) An independent expenditure in support
ofa publicly financed candidate results in matching
funds to other publicly financed candidates in the
same race, however Ariz Rev Stat) § 16 952.043),
App. 140. Thus, a $10,000 expenditure on behalf of a
privately financed candidate results ino an almost
$10,000 governmental subsidy to each pubhely fi
nanced candidate in the race In contrast, a $10,000
independent expenditure on behalf of a pubhely
financed candidate results in no government money
going to any privately financed candidates in that
race, but would trigger matching funds to any other
pubhely financed candidates in the race
Privately financed candidates trigger matching
tunds to each publicly financed candidate in a race
when they spend Un the primary election) or raise Un
the general election) money above the government's
initial disbursement amount. Anz Rev Stat. § 16-
952. A-B);, App. 138-39.
Although commonly referred to as “matching
funds,” that term does not accurately deseribe how
the Matching Funds Provision actually works. The
money distmbuted by the government to pubhely
financed candidates often substantially exceeds the
amount of contributions or spending that triggered
the Matching Funds Provision. That is, the Act does
not really “match” expenditures or contrmbutions ou
often significantly exceeds them. This is because the
Act offers a grant of the total matching funds subsidy
to each publicly financed candidate running against a
privately financed candidate. Ariz) Rev Stat. § 16-
Y2AA-B) App. 138-39) For example, assume a race
with Gi) one privately tinanced candidate and three
pubhely financed candidates, and «u) the privately
financed candidate has spent or raised more than the
amount of the initial disbursement. [fan independent
expenditure group makes an expenditure of $10,000
in support of the privately financed candidate in this
race, then the government gives $10,000 Cless 6%)
directly to each publicly financed candidate. In other
words, $10,000 worth of expenditures in support of a
privately financed candidate (who may not have
wanted it) results in $28,200 worth of speech against
that candidate
S
ll. THE ACT'S EFFECT ON SPEECH
1 The Petitioners are two political action
committees, the Anzona Free Enterpmse Club's
Freedom Club PAC (the “Freedom Club PAC”) and
the Anzona Taxpavers Action Committee (“Arizona
Taxpayers”), which make or fund independent ex-
penditures in Arizona state campaigns. The Petition-
ers also include two elected officials, Arizona State
Treasurer Dean Martin and State Representative
Rick Murphy, who have in the past, and intend to in
the future, run campaigns for Arizona state offices
using money raised from private parties
The Petitioners brought this case because the Act
burdens their ability to engage in unfettered political
speech ino competitive elections for Amzona. state
oMeces. As an expenmenced political consultant test-
fied below, since the advent of the Act, “every spend-
ing decision” is made with the Act’s matching funds in
view. [Querard Dep. 99, Feb. 12, 2009, ECF No. 345-3
at 3, ER 1927.] Independent expenditure groups and
candidates testified that their entire campaign strat-
eyyv takes the Act's matching funds into account.
Candidates testified to intentionally lowering their
expenditures and fundraising to avoid triggering
matching funds. The Act’s matching funds therefore
affect speech at the very core of elections. As Repre-
sentative Murphy stated, candidates “do not run two
campaigns: one with matching funds and one without
matching funds.) The availability of matching funds
for my opponents dictates my strategy and influences
my thinking frem the very beginning of the election
9
evele right up to the very end.” |Pl.-Intervenor Mur-
phy’s Resp. to Defs. & Def.-Intervenor’s Interrogs. &
Doc. Regs. at 5, ECF No. 338 at 97, ER 31386. |
In that regard, the record below demonstrates
that the Act causes independent expenditure groups
to take the Act’s matching funds into account when
deciding on which races to spend money. Specifically,
Arizona Taxpayers has delayed making independent
expenditures to avoid triggering matching funds until
later in the election cycle. It engaged in self-
censorship in 2006 when it chose not to speak in
opposition to a publicly financed candidate in a
Senate primary race to avoid triggering the Act's
matching funds. [Kirkpatrick Dep. 72-75, Jan. 30,
2009, ECF No. 338 at 135-36, ER 3224-25.| The
Freedom Club PAC has reluctantly triggered match-
ing funds to candidates it opposes and the Act has
affected every spending decision it makes with regard
to races involving publicly financed candidates. This
forces the Freedom Club to alter the timing of its
independent expenditures. App. 163-64.
2. The Matching Funds Provision also burdens
the speech of privately financed candidates. Repre-
sentative Murphy is an Arizona State Representative
and a privately financed candidate for the Senate in
2010 facing at least one publicly financed general
election candidate. He ran as a privately financed
candidate in 2006 and 2008 and a publicly financed
candidate in 2004. In his 2006 general election
campaign, Murphy stopped raising money to avoid
10
triggering matching funds to his publicly financed
opponent. Murphy did not fundraise during the 2008
general election because doing so would have trig-
gered almost $3 in additional subsidies for every $1
he raised. Nonetheless, in the 2008 general election,
when a group made an independent expenditure of
$3.627 to support Murphy's candidacy, all three of
his publicly financed opponents received a check for
nearly $3,627 — meaning that the group’s small
expenditure triggered $10,881 (minus 6%) in govern-
ment subsidies to his opponents. [Pl.-Intervenors’
Resps. to Defs.” & Def.-Intervenor’s First Set of
Interrogs. & Doc. Reqs. at 6-8, ECF No. 338 at 71-73,
ER 3160-62.)
Treasurer Martin is a former state senator and
the current Arizona State Treasurer. He was a candi-
date for governor in the 2010 election but has since
withdrawn. His campaigns for the Senate and
Treasurer were all privately financed. In his 2004
Senate campaign, Martin intentionally delayed
fundraising to minimize the amount of government
* Although he has ended his race for governor in the 2010
election, Martin has long been active in Arizona state politics
and expects to run for state office again in the future. App. 151-
53. He has also been pressing his claim that the Matching
Funds Provision is unconstitutional for six years. Because his
claims could not be resolved before this or any of his previous
campaigns for office had concluded, and because he plans to run
for state office again, his claim is “capable of repetition, yet
evading review.” Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2770.
ll
subsidies his opponents received. In his 2006 cam-
paign, Martin avoided fundraising to prevent trigger-
ing the Act’s matching funds. Martin has also actively
discouraged groups from making independent ex-
penditures on his behalf to avoid triggering matching
funds to his opponents. [Martin Dep. 21-22, 69-71,
Jan. 23, 2009, ECF No. 338 at 20-21, 23-24, Tr. 3109-
10, 3112-13; Pl.-Intervenor Dean Martin’s Supple-
mental Resp. to Defs.’ Req. for Clarification at 1-2,
ECF No. 338 at 37-38, ER 3126-27; Martin Decl. 2,
Nov. 26, 2007, ECF No. 288-7 at 113, ER 3753; Martin
Fundraising Email, Aug. 31, 2004, ECF No. 338 at 27,
ER 3116.) In 2010, the Matching Funds Provision
forced Martin to run a publicly financed campaign for
governor. Despite being philosophically and politically
opposed to the Act, Martin believed this was the only
strategy that would preclude his opponents from
receiving significant government subsidies based on
his exercise of his free speech rights. See App. 153.
{Martin Decl. 2, Nov. 26, 2007, ECF No. 288-7 at 113,
ER 3753.]'
* Robert Burns, a plaintiff-intervenor below, is an Arizona
State Senator and the current President of the Arizonz Senate.
Senator Burns testified that the Act coerced him to change the
timing of his speech in order to avoid triggering the Act’s
matching funds. App. 155. [Pl.-Intervenor Burns’ Resps. to Defs.’
& Def.-Intervenor’s Interrogs. & Doc. Reqs. at 1-2, ECF No. 338
at 57-58, ER 3146-47; Burns Dep. 104, Sept. 17, 2008, ECF No.
338 at 47, ER 3136.) Senator Burns has announced that he
intends to retire from politics when his current Senate term
ends. While he no longer has a direct interest in the outcome of
(Continued on following page)
12
3. Finally, a systematic analysis of four eveles of
Arizona election data shows that it is now common-
place for candidates to delay campaign activities to
minimize the Act’s matching funds triggered by their
own speech. [Primo Deel. in Support) of PL-
Intervenors’ Mot. for Summ. Jd... May 26, 2009, ECE
No. 288-7 at 2-39, ER 3642-79.) Indeed, one research-
er reports that, of the Arizona candidates who re-
sponded to his) survey, all reported putting off
spending to avoid having their opponents receive
these additional subsidies through the Matching
Funds Provision. Michael Miller, Garing Arizona:
Public Money and Shifting Candidate Strategies, 41
PS: Political Science & Politics 527 (Jul. 2008) [ECE
No. 288-7 at 54-59, ER 3694-99 |
ll. THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
1. ‘Treasurer Martin, along with other privately
financed candidates and an independent expenditure
group, first challenged the constitutionality of the
Matching Funds Provision in 2004, when he was a
State Senator. The United States District Court for
the District of Arizona, the Honorable Earl Carroll,
dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. Ass'n of
Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Brewer, 363 F. Supp. 2d
1197 CD. Ariz. 2005).
this proceeding, his expermence is relevant to ilustrate how the
Matching Funds Provision burdens tree expression
18
Martin and his co-plaintiffs appealed to the
Ninth Cireuit. The Ninth Cireuit initially dismissed
the entire appeal as moot, but then reversed itself
solely as to Martin. The court held that Martin's
claim was not moot, conciuded that he had stated a
cause of action, and remanded to the distmet court.
Ass'n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons vo Brewer, A&86
F.3d 586, rehig granted, rev'd in part, A494 F.3d 1145,
amended by, 497 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 2007). Martin
then amended his complaint to include two independ,
ent expenditure groups, Petitioners Arizona Taxpay-
ers and the Freedom Club PAC, as plaintitls. The
amended complaint was entitled Martin, et al. v
Brewer et al., No. O4-ev-0200 (D. Ariz. May 1, 2008).
Separate from Treasurer Martin’s case, on Au-
gust 21, 2008, privately financed candidates John
MeComish, Naney MeLain, Tony Boule and others
filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Mistrict of Arizona, the Honorable Roslyn Silver. This
complaint was stvled MeComiush v. Brewer, No. OS-cv-
1850 (D. Ariz. Aug. 21, 2008). These candidates
asserted that the Matching Funds Provision violated
the First Amendment and ran afoul of this Court's
then-verv recent decision ino Davis. Because the
MceComish and Martin actions were against the same
defendants and raised similar issues, the state de-
fendants moved to consolidate the cases before Judge
Carroll. The Martin plaintiffs did not object. Nonethe-
less, Judge Carroll denied the motion. To avoid duphi-
cative proceedings, the Martin plaintiffs intervened
in the MeComush case and voluntarily dismissed the
14
Martin case” Murphy then joined Martin and the in-
dependent expenditure groups as plaintifTintervenors
in the MecComish proceeding. The Clean Elections
Institute, Inc. (CED, a non-profit group promoting the
Act, also intervened as a defendant
In the end, there were four groups of parties to
the case before Judge Silver, each represented by
separate counsel: (i) the state detendants (the Arizona
Secretary of State and the members of the Citizens
Clean Elecuons Commussion), (1) detendant-intervenor
CEI, au) the MecComuish plaintitts (privately financed
candidates MeComish, MeLain, and Boute), and uv)
the Martin plaintiflintervenors Undependent expen-
diture groups Arizona Taxpayers and the Freedom
Club PAC and privately financed candidates Martin
and Murphy), which are the Petitioners here *
Before the Martin plamntitYs intervened in) the
case, the MeComisé plaintif!s moved for a temporary
restraining order prohibiting the members of the
As discussed more thoroughly infra, the MoeCorus’
plaintiffs are also filumg a separate petition for certroram wath
this Court regarding the Ninth Cireuit’s decisren) Petitioners
here fully support the MoComus/ plaintiffs’ petition and urge
this Court to grant it) Petitioners also respectfully request that
this Court consolidate its review of both petitions inte one
proceeding so that this Court can consider the full range of the
Act’s harm to the free speech of both independent expenditure
xroups and privately financed candidates
“As noted above in) footnote 2. the Martin plamtit?-
intervenors alse included Senator Burns at this time
Lo
Clean Elections Commission trom applying the
Matching Funds Provision during the 200S elections
On August 29, 2008, Judge Silver found that the
Matching Funds Provision “violates the First
Amendment of the US) Constitution,” but refused to
grant the motion because of ongoing elections. App
128. Both the MceCornisk plaintitYs and the Martin
intervenors then moved to prelaminarily enjoin the
members of the Clean Elections Commission from
applying the Matching Funds Provision during the
2008 elections. On October 17, 2008, Judge Silver
found that the challengers had “shown a high hkeh-
hood of success on the merits.” but refused to tempo-
ranily enjorn the svstem because, again, the court did
not wish to interfere with ongoing elections. App. 112
After surnificant discovery, all parties filed cross
motions for summary judgment. On January 20,
2010, Judge Silver found that the Matching Funds
Provision was unconstitutional, granted the challeng
S
ers’ motions, and entered an igunction. App. 45-7
Judge Silver staved the effect of the inpunction for ten
days to permit defendants and detendant-intervenor
time to appeal, which they did. App. 77.
2 The MeCormish plaintitYs then moved the
Ninth Cireuit to vacate the stav On January 29,
2010, the Ninth Cireuit refused to vacate the stay of
the inyunetion and consolidated both state defendants’
and defendant-intervenor’s appeals. App. S7-SS8
Judge Carlos Bea dissented from the court's refusal to
vacate the stay. App. 89 On February 1, 2010, the
Ninth Cireuit extended the stay of the injunction and
le
expedited the appeals. App. SQ-S1) Judge Bea again
dissented, concluding that this case was “determined
by Darvis ... because state intervention in the fund.
Ing of campaign contmbutions in a manner to benefit
candidates when their opponents spend their own
money on speech imposes a substantial burden on the
exercise of the free speech of the candidate who
spends his money” App. 81.
3. On May 21, 2010, the Ninth Cireuit issued its
opinion on the merits, reversing the distmet court as
to its First Amendment determination and remand.
ing: for further proceedings on the challengers’ Equal
Protection claims. App I-38. Judge Nleinteld con.
curred separately, noting that, while he agreed with
the majority, Dacrs was the closest decision on point
and that the cireuits were divided. App. 38 44
On June 8S, 2010, at the request of both the
Martin and McComish plarntitts, this Court: vacated
the Ninth Cireunt’s stay of the distmet court's ingune-
tion and staved the mandate of the Ninth Cireuit
“pending the timely filing and disposition of a petition
for a writ of certiorari.” App. 79. On dune 23, 2010,
the Nanth Cireuit issued an amended opinion, but did
not withdraw its judgment or issue a new judgment
App. 3-4. This timely Petition by the Martin plaintiffs
tollowed
ly
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
This Court should grant this Petition for three
PeASOTIS
First, the Ninth Cireuit’s decision directly con
flaets with the Second Circuit’s decision ino Green
‘arty of Conn. vo Garfield, Food . 2010 US
App. LEXIS 14286 (2d Cir, July 18, 2010), and the
Fleventh Circuit's decision in Seoti co Roberts,
F 3d . 2010 US. App. LENIS 15897 (Lith Cir. July
30, 2010). The reasen for this split is simple: the
Second and Eleventh Cireuits both correctly apphed
Davis to the matching funds systems they considered,
while the Ninth Cireuit did not. The Second and
Eleventh Circuits’ reyection of the Ninth Cuireuit’'s
conclusion thus creates a clear circuit split. Resolu-
tion of this split is imperative because there is cur-
rently significant uncertainty regarding the con.
sututionahty of pubhe financing laws) emploving
matching funds subsidies across the nation For
independent groups, countless candidates running tn
states and municipalities across the country wath
such systems, and lawmakers who may attempt to
umplement similar laws in the future, tumelv clarmfica
tion of this area of the law ts imperative
Second, Chis split flows from the conflict between
the Ninth Cireut’s decision and Daris autself The
Ninth Cireuit upheld a law that attempts to coerce
speakers into Limiting their political activities by
turning the exercise of their First Amendment rights
into the catalyst by which their political and ideo-
logecal opponents gain funding advantages. As the
Is
Second and Eleventh Cireuits correctly concluded,
Darcrs controls in such a situation and requires that
the reviewing: court stmke such a law down The
Ninth Cireuit’s conclusion otherwise means its deci
sion clearly conflicts with Dacor, in which this Court
struck down a federal law that emploved a similar
mechanism that provided funding advantages to a
candidate's opponent triggered by the candidate's
exercise of his First Amendment rights
Third, with regard to independent expenditure
groups, the Ninth Cireuit’s decision contliets wath
Citizens United and decades of decisions trom this
Court striking down laws seeking to limit the amount
of expenditures such groups may make in elections
A mere four months atter Crfrsens United was decid.
ed, the Ninth Cireuit has gaven the government a
powertul tool to indirectly achieve what this Court
has made clear it cannot do directly: burden political
expenditures by independent groups. Under Arizona's
law, af an independent expenditure group) spends
above a certain level, the government then directly
subsidizes candidates the independent: expenditure
group opposes. And the more an independent ex-
penditure group speaks, the more the candidates it
wishes to defeat benefit. Because Petitioners include
independent expenditure groups directly affected by
the Matching Funds Provision, granting this Petition
will provide this Court with the opportunity to direct.
ly address whether the government may make such
an end-run around Créiserns United
1
lL EVEN AFTER THIS COURT'S DECISION
IN DAVIS, CIRCUITS ARE DIVIDED ON
WHETHER SYSTEMS OF PUBLIC. FI-
NANCING OF CAMPAIGNS EMPLOYING
MATCHING FUNDS MECHANISMS ARE
CONSTITUTIONAL.
In Davis, this Court struck down the “Millon
ares Amendment.” which allowed opponents of selt-
financed candidates in federal elections to accept
funds at three times the maximum contmbution lmat
from ondividuals af ther self financed opponents
spent more than a certain amount P28 S Ct at 277
This Court concluded that such a system “impermis-
sibly burdenled! [the self-financing candidate's] First
Amendment right to spend his own money tor cam
paign speech” by reating an “unprecedented penalty”
on any self-financing candidate who robustly exer
cised her First Amendment rights: if she “engage(s’
in unfettered political speech.” she will be subject
“to discriminatory fundraising limitations” Jd. Selt
financing candidates could still spend their own
money, “but they must shoulder a special and poten
tially significant burden if they make that chore” Jd
at 2772) This Court apphed strict scrutiny to the law
and struck it down Jd
The Second and Eleventh Cireuits both specifical
lv tollowed Darcis when they considered matching
funds systems and, consistent with the reasoning of
Dacrs, each court struck down the system before ut
Scott, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 15897, at *30; Green
Party, 2010 US. App. LEXIS 14286. at *77. The
a 0)
Ninth Ciremit, mn contrast, did not apply Dares and
upheld Arizona’s matching funds system. App. 24, 37
The Ninth Cireuit’s tailure to follow this Court's
decision in Dacis has thus created a clear split among
the circuits regarding the constitutionality of pubhe
financing systems emploving matching funds mecha.
nisms and whether, or to what extent, such svstems
burden core political speech
A. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION
DIRECTLY CONFLICTS WITH DECI.
SIONS OF THE SECOND AND ELEV-
ENTH CIRCUITS.
The Ninth Circuit's decision below directly con-
flicts with the decision of the Second Cirewit in Green
Party and the decision of the Eleventh Circuit in
Scott. It also directly conthets with the pre-Davcrs
decision of the Fighth Cireuiti in Dav oo Holahan,
34 F 3d 1356 (Sth Cir) 1994) Moreover, the Second,
Eighth, and Eleventh Cireuit) decisions not only
conflict with the Ninth Cireuit’s decision, but they
also conflict with pre-Dacrs decisions from the First
and Fourth Cireuits, NLC. Right to Life Conmium. Fund
for Indep. Political Expenditures vo Leake, 524 Bk
27 (4th Cir. ZOOS), cert. dented, Duke vo Leake, 129
S.Ct. 490 (2008), and Daggett v Comen'n on Gov tal
Bthics & Election Practices, 205 FSd 445 (lst Cir.
2000)" The depth and scope of the spht among the
The Sixth Crreuit, in Gadle co Patton, 142 F dd 940, 847-49
oth Cir 1998S) upheld a Rentucky campaiyrn finance law that
(Continued on following page
2)
circuits strongly militate in tavor of review under
Sup. Ct. Ro 1Ova)
In Green Pariv, the Second Cireuit considered
Connecticut's version of the Matching Funds Provi-
sion — there called the “Excess Expenditure Provi-
sion” — in its system of public financing for state
elections. The Second Circuit correctly concluded that
while the burden imposed by the Excess Expenditure
Provision was shghtly different than the burden at
issue in Davis, matching funds provisions are actually
“more constitutionally objectionable” than the law in
Davis. Green Party, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 14286, at
*Sl Unternal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The Second Circuit apphed = strict) scrutiny to the
KExeess Expenditure Provision and concluded that the
“state's asserted interest in promotiing] participation
in’ Connecticut's system Was not enough to justify the
burden placed on speech. Jd. at) *85-86 Unternal
quotation marks omitted) Significantly, the Second
Circuit expressly stated that 10 was “not persuaded by
the Ninth Cireuit’s opinion” below. Jd. at *83 n 19.
tragened a benefit to a candidate particpating ina public financing
system when bis non-participating: opponent collected more than
$18 milhen in campaum funds in a pnmar or general election
That benefit was not the direct provision of additional funds, but
rather gave the participating candidate the mght to raise
additional funds, which the state would match on a 2-to-1 basis
ld at 947 Although Kentucky's system was not a pure matching
tunds system, the fact that the court upheld a system that
trugrered funding: advantages to a candidate's epponent based on
that candidate’s exercise of his First Amendment rmyhts means
that Gadle also conflicts with Dacus, Green Party, and Scott
oy
This split became even more pronounced with the
Eleventh Cireuit’s decision in Scott. There, a self-
financing candidate sought to preliminarily enjoin
Florida’s system of matching subsidies for gubernato-
rial candidates.” The district court refused to enter
the injunction (albeit while noting that the “Ninth
Circuit is just wrong” on whether such matching
subsidies imposed a burden on speech). Prelim. Inj.
Tr. at 91, Scott v. Roberts, No. 10-cev-0283 (ND. Fla.
July 14, 2010). The Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding
it “obvious that the subsidy imposes a burden on
nonparticipating candidates ... who spend large
sums of money in support of their candidacies.” Scoft,
2010 US. App. LEXIS 15897, at *30. Moreover, it
concluded that this burden was “substantial,” and
that it “is harsher than the penalty in Davis, as it
leaves no doubt that the nonparticipants’ opponents
will receive additional money.” /d. at *33 Unternal
quotation marks and citations omitted). The court
held that the system did not satisfy strict scrutiny
because the supporters of the system had not “sufh-
ciently explained how the Florida public financing
system furthers the anticorruption interest.” Jd. at
*35. Finally, the court concluded that “the system
levels the electoral playing field, and that purpose is
constitutionally problematic.” Jd. at *37.
The Second and Eleventh Circuits did not tread
new ground. In Day, the Eighth Circuit considered a
" Lake Flomda’s system, Arnvzona’s law uses a candidate's
contributions of their own funds to their campagrn in calculating
matching funds
23
challenge to a Minnesota statute that provided addi-
tional funds to a publicly financed candidate in
response to independent expenditures either against
the publicly financed candidate or for his privately
financed opponent. If groups made such independent
expenditures, publicly financed candidates had their
own expenditure limits increased by the amount
of the independent expenditure and received an
additional public subsidy equal to one-half of the
independent expenditure’s value. Day, 34 F.3d at
1358. The Eighth Circuit concluded that this law
burdened speech “because of the chilling effect the
statute has on the political speech of the person or
group making the independent expenditure.” /d. at
1360. It found that the law was not narrowly tailored
to support a compelling government interest and
struck it down. Jd. at 1361-62.
This Court specifically referenced Day in Davis
when it concluded that “[mJany candidates who can
afford to make large personal expenditures to support
their campaigns may choose to do so despite [the
Millionaire's Amendment], but they must shoulder a
special and potentially significant burden if they
make that choice.” Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2772 (citing
Day, 34 F.3d at 1359-60). Nonetheless, the Ninth
Circuit explicitly refused to rely on Day. The court
stated, “loJur decision is not controlled by Day, nor
are we persuaded by it.” App. 28 n.9. It also mini-
mized this Court’s reference to Day in Davis by
claiming that this Court cited Day “only once for a
single, limited proposition,” and that this Court did
not “affirm or adopt the Eighth Circuit's approach.”
24
App. 28 n.9. Instead, the Ninth Circuit followed two
pre-Davis decisions that approved similar systems
and specifically rejected Day. App. 27 n.9 (citing
Leake, 524 F.3d at 437-49, and Daggett, 205 F.3d at
464-65). As Judge Kleinfeld noted in concurrence
below, “lolther circuits have divided on whether
schemes like Arizona’s violate the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court cited with apparent approval
the Eighth Circuit decision [in Day], which may be
contrary to the view we take today.” App. 39
(Kleinfeld, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
See also Leake, 524 F.3d at 437 (“There is some con-
flict in the circuits as to whether the provision of
matching funds burdens or chills speech in a way
that implicates the First Amendment.”).
In sum, at best, there exists a fundamental dis-
agreement between the Second, Eighth, and Eleventh
Circuits, on one hand, and the First, Fourth and
Ninth Circuits, on the other, regarding the constitu-
tionality of public financing systems employing a
matching funds subsidy. At worst, the Ninth Circuit's
decision is an outlier reflecting a now-extinct trend in
pre-Davis First Amendment jurisprudence. This is
particularly troubling given that, as explained below,
a number of other jurisdictions employing such
systems (Hawaii, Portland, Oregon, and Tucson,
Arizona) are located in the Ninth Circuit. This level of
uncertainty and patchwork of constitutional protec-
tions for independent expenditure groups and pri-
vately financed candidates across the circuits confirm
the urgent need for this Court’s intervention.
25
B. THE SPLIT AMONG THE CIRCUITS
CREATES CONSIDERABLE CONFU-
SION REGARDING THE CONSTITU-
TIONALITY OF SIMILAR SYSTEMS
ACROSS THE COUNTRY.
At the time of the Ninth Circuit’s decision, three
states — Maine,’ Arizona® and Connecticut’? — had
statutes that create public financing systems with
matching funds in all of their statewide and legisla-
tive political campaigns. At least six other states
have public financing systems with matching fund
mechanisms for certain offices: Florida (governor),
Hawaii (pilot program for county of Hawaii Council
” An Act to Reform Campaign Finance, 1996 Me. Legis.
Serv. Initiated Bill Ch. 5 (West) (codified at scattered sections of
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 21-A, §§ 1121-28 (Supp. 2006)). This law
has now been challenged in federal court as well. Compl.,
Cushing v. McKee, No. 10-cv-0330 (D. Me. Aug. 8, 2010).
* Arizona Citizens Clean Elections Act, 1998 Ariz. Legis.
Serv. Prop. 200 (West) (codified at Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann., §§ 16-
901.01, -940 to -961 (2006)).
* An Act Concerning Comprehensive Campaign Finance
Reform for State-Wide Constitutional and General Assembly
Offices, 2005 Conn. Pub. Acts 5 (Spec. Sess.) (codified as amend-
ed at Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 9-600 to -674, 9-700 to -751 (Supp.
2007)). As noted above, the Second Circuit has struck down Connect-
icut’s Excess Expenditure Provision. The Connecticut Legisla-
ture has now revised the law to conform to the court’s decision.
Florida Election Campaign Financing Act, Fla. Laws 86-
276, (codified at Fla. Stat. §§ 106.30-.36). As noted above, the
Eleventh Circuit has preliminarily enjoined enforcement of this
law.
26
elections),"’ New Mexico (Public Regulation Commis-
sion and statewide judicial elections)” North Caroli-
na (Qudicial elections), West Virginia Gudicial
elections)’ and Wisconsin (judicial elections).'* Ne-
braska provides government subsidies to candidates
for statewide and legislative offices who agree to
abide by a spending limit to match the expenditures
by those candidates’ opponents that the government
deems excessive.” Still more states have considered
enacting such systems, including New York, Illinois,
Maryland, Washington and Wyoming.’ In addition,
Pilot Comprehensive Public Funding for Elections to the
Hawau County Council, 2008 Haw. Act 244.
* Voter Action Act, 2007 NM. Laws Ist Spec Sess Ch 2
(HB. 6) (West) (Public Regulation Commission provisions are
codified at N.M. Stat. § 1-19A-10 (2003)). The judicial elections
provisions took effect in 2008
* North Carolina Judicial Campaign Reform Act, 2002 N.C
Sess. Laws 158 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
N.C. Gen. Stat. ch 163 (2005))
* West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Pubhe Cam-
paign Financing Pilot Program, 2010 W. Va. Acts 72 (codified at
W. Va_ Code $$ 3-12-1 to 3-12-17) (pilot program for 2012)
* Wisconsin Impartial Justice Act, 2009 Wis. Sess.) Laws 89
(codified in scattered sections of Wis. Stat. Ch. 8, 11, 20, 25, 71
(20105)
“ Nebraska Campaign Finance Limitation Act, 1992 Neb.
Laws 556 $§ 1-10 (codified as amended at Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 32-
1601 to -1613)
" Press Release, Public Campaign: While Congress Fiddles
and Washington Burns, States Take Action to Clean Up Politics
(May 22, 2006), http: www publicampaign. org pressroom 2006
05 22 while-congress-fiddles-and-washington-burns-states-take-
action-to-clean-up-politics
the cities of Tueson, Ariz..”” Portland, Or.” and Albu-
querque, N.M..“ have some form of matching funds
systems. For a number of vears, U.S. Senators Rich-
ard Durbin and Arlen Specter introduced a taxpaver-
funding system for federal elections called the “Fair
Elections Now Act.” although the senators removed
the matching funds provision from later versions of
this bill after this Court's decision in Dacrs.*' Moreo-
ver, the push to enact similar public financing svs-
tems with matching funds subsidies in states across
the country is a top priority for well-funded, politi-
cally influential special interests groups, who view
such systems as “a bold solution to the problem of
money in politics.” Brennan Center tor Justice et al.,
Breaking Free with Fair Elections: A New Declara
tion of Independence for Congress 1 (March 2007), avail
able at http: www.cleanupwashington.org documents
breaking_free.pdf. Put simply, such systems are
becoming more common across the country and their
proponents seek to make them the norm for all U.S
campaigns.
* Taeson, Anz, Charter ch XVI, Subchapter (B) $5 (2005)
Portland, Or, Municipal Code ch. 2.10 (2005)
* Albuquerque, N.M., Charter art: XV1T (2004)
Compare S. 1288, 110th Cong. (2007) (2007 version of
Fair Elections Now Act containing a matching funds provision
similar to Arizona’s!, with So 7av. 11th Cong. ©2009) (2009
version of Fair Elections Now Act omitting the previous match-
ing funds provision) See a/so HR 26, llth Cong. (2009)
(House version of 2009 Senate version of Farr Elections Now
Act)
. ‘
28
There is now no clear answer as to whether these
laws are constitutional, however The existence of a
three-to-three deadlock in the tederal appellate courts
is clear evidence that there is so much confusion here
that this Court should intervene. Independent ex-
penditure groups and privately financed candidates
sbould know whether thev have judicial recourse for
the harm caused to their free speech rights by such
schemes. Publicly financed candidates and the en-
forcement agencies administering such systems
should have some degree of certainty as to whether
the systems in which they participate or administer
are constitutional. As a federal judge recently noted
while struggling with whether to preliminarily enjoin
Florida’s system for the 2010 primary election, “|t}he
law on the merits is unsettled. ... 1] cannot end the
uncertainty.” Prelim. Inj). Tr at 108, Scott 0 Roberts,
No. 10-ev-02838 (NLD. Fla. July 14, 2010). While this
district court judge could not end the uncertainty in
each of the jurisdictions in which such schemes
operate, this Court) can. This Court’s immediate
intervention before vet another election season
occurs with such systems in place is. therefore
necessary.
YQ
ll. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION CON-
FLICTS WITH THIS COURT'S HOLDING
IN DAVIS THAT, IN THE CONTEXT OF A
COMPETITIVE ELECTION, LAWS THAT
PROVIDE FUNDING ADVANTAGES TO
A SPEAKER’S POLITICAL OPPONENTS
BASED ON THE EXERCISE OF THE
SPEAKER'S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
The spht among the circuits reflects the fact that
the Ninth Circuit’s decision directly conflicts wath
Davis. Like the law at issue in Daris, the Matching
Funds Provision attempts to “level electoral opportu
miies” in the context of competitive elections by
providing funding advantages to a candidate based on
the exercise of free speech ryghts by that candidate's
political and ideolomeal opponents. See Davis, 128
S.Ct. at 2773. As Judge Bea correctly concluded in
his dissent from the panel decision extending the stay
of the district court's injunction, “this case is deter
mined by Dacrs ... because state intervention in the
funding of campaign contmbutions in a manner to
benefit candidates when their opponents spend their
own Money on speech imposes a substantial burden
on the exercise of the free speech by the candidate
who spends his own money.” App. SL.
Despite the existence of a similar tmygyger mecha-
mism in the Matehing Funds Provision, the Ninth
Circuit reyected Davis's appheation here. The court
30
held that Davis did not apply because this Court had
described the Millionaire's Amendment as asvmmet-
nical and disertminatory. The Ninth Cireuit averred
that, “the law constituted a burden on Davis's speech
only because it treated candidates running against
each other under the same regrulatory framework
differently based on a candidate's decision to selt-
finance his or her campaign...” App. 25 ¢emphasis
added). Because candidates under the Arizona system
were burdened based on their status as pubhely or
privately financed, the court held that the Matching
Funds Provision was not asymmetrical and discrimi-
natery and was therefore unlike the Milhonatre’s
Amendment. App. 25-26. The court concluded that
what distinguished the Matching Funds Provision in
a constitutional sense was that the Arizona law
“makes no such identiy-based distinctions.” App. 26-
27. The Court thus suggested that) publicly and
privately financed candidates are not stmilarly situ-
ated and that the government may distmbute differ-
ent benefits and burdens to each In that regard, the
court placed considerable emphasis on the fact that
publicly financed candidates “voluntarily choose to
participate ina publhe financing system” and accept
expenditure limits, while privately financed candi
dates choose to run without a spending cap. App. 25
These benetits and burdens, the court) suggested,
balance each other out
The Ninth Circuit badly misinterpreted Davis.
As the Eleventh Cireuit: subsequently noted, “what
triggered stmet scrutiny was the grant of a competi
tive advantage — an increase in the ability of Davis's
opponent to speak,” Scott, 2010 US App. LEXIS
15897, at *33, not the fact that the law was asvmmet
nical. Neither Davis nor any of the cases cited by the
Ninth Circuit require that a speaker be similarly
situated with another speaker ino order to cham a
burden on free speech. In Davis, this Court was clear
that the burden on the self-financed candidate — not
the attributes of his opponent ultimately decided
> heed “.)
the First Amendment question. 128 S.Ct at 2771-72
The Ninth Cireuit’s “voluntary choice” theory also
tails because it is irrelevant to independent expendi.
ture groups. Under the Act, independent expenditure
groups cannot quality for public funding and cannot
“voluntarily choose” to accept or reject public funds
The government's imposition of burdens on such
groups cannot be balanced by the benefit: of public
tunds because these groups cannot receive public
funds. Independent groups supporting privately
financed candidates or opposing pubhely financed
candidates have only two choices available to them:
they can either remain silent or they can speak and
have the government “level” their speech by directly
funding candidates they oppose. As in Dacrs, the Act
does not “provide any way” an independent expendi
ture group “can exercise’ the untettered right to make
unhmited expenditures without abmdygment. See
Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2772.
Because of this misreading of the law, the Ninth
Cireuit apphed only intermediate scrutiny to the Act
vv
Me
The court did so despite the fact that it found that the
Matching Funds Provision burdens “fully protected
speech” App. 22. It classified the Act's effect) on
speech as “indirect or minimal” and the harm to
Petitioners as “mere metaphysical threats to political
speech ~ App. 27) Again, the Ninth Circuit) badly
misread Daris. Daris held that the “fundamental
nature of the right to spend personal funds for cam.
pays speech” was burdened by the Millhonatre’s
Amendment because it “imposeld] some consequene-
es” on a candidate’s choice to self-finance bevond
certain amounts. Dacrs, 128 S.Ct. at 2772 Uunternal
quotation marks and citation omitted) Because these
consequences affected core political speech, this Court
apphed strict scrutiny. As discussed above, however,
the Act does more than simply “impose some conse-
quences” on speech. It creates distinct and measura-
ble harm to the nature, timing, and amount of
expenditures
Aside trom the Ninth Cireuit, every court consid
ering: “clean elections” systems after Decis has con-
cluded that matching funds subsidies burden speech
more heavily than the Millionaire’s Amendment. See
Scott, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 15897, at *33 (Like
both the district court and the Second Cireuit, we
conclude that the burden that an excess spending
subsidy imposes on nonparticipating candidates is
harsher than the penalty in Davis, as it leaves no
doubt that the nonparticipants’ opponents will receive
additional money.” anternal quotation marks omit-
ted)!, Green Party, 2010 US) App. LEXIS 14286, at
“ve
«>?
*s82 The penalty imposed by the excess expenditure
provision, therefore, is harsher than the penalty on
Davis, as it leaves no doubt that Candidate B, the
opponent of the self-financed candidate, will receive
additional money”); Prelim. Inj). Tr at 91. Scott ¢
Roberts, No. 10-cev-O283 (NOD. Fla duly 14, 2010)
“Indeed, in the Davrs case, it was only a potential
dollar Here, it’s not just a potential dollar. Its a
certain dollar”); App) 65-66 ("In Dacrs, the negative
consequence Was having? one’s opponent subject) to
higher contmbution limits. Here, the negative conse-
quence is having one’s opponent recetve additional
funds.”); Green Party of Conn. cv. Garfield, 6438
F. Supp. 2d 298, 373 (D. Conn. 2009) (“Arguably the
benefit conferred by the CEP trigger provisions is
more constitutionally objectionable than increasing
an opponent’s individual contribution limits.”)) Under
the Milhonaire’s Amendment, the non-self- financing
candidate still had to raise funds from private parties
that is, the candidate had to develop a message
contributors wished to support, identify potential
contmbutors, and persuade them to contribute. In
contrast, a group or candidate triggenng the Match-
ing Funds Provision results in the government direct.
lv gnving extra financing to all publicly financed
candidates in a race. It beggars lome to hold. as the
Ninth Cireuit did, that a law that imposes harsher
penalties on speech than the Milhonaire’s Amend.
ment should receive less searching scrutiny because
the law burdens speech in a purportedly nondiserimt,
natory fashion,
34
The Ninth Cireuit’s failure to apply strict scruti-
ny was also erroneous because the Act is clearly
content-based. In races between privately financed
candidates and publicly financed candidates, inde-
pendent expenditures in favor of privately financed
candidates are “matched” by the government, while
independent expenditures against privately financed
candidates are not. See United States vo Stevens, 130
S.Ct. 1d77, 1584 (2010) daws that distinguish be-
tween message, ideas, subject matter, or content are
content-based); Day, 34 F.3d at 1360-61 (Minnesota's
excess subsidy provision was content-based because it
“singles out particular political speech — that which
advocates the defeat of a candidate and or supports
the election of her opponents -— for negative treatment
that the state apphes to no other variety of speech”)
As such, not only is the Matching Funds Provision
subject to strict scrutiny, it is “presumptively mnvalid”
as well. Stevens, L808. Ct. at Los.
The Ninth Cireuit’s attempt to distinguish Davis
is httle more than a rejection of that case. Lower
federal courts, however, cannot overturn, alter, or
narrow Supreme Court) precedent. Moreover, the
Ninth Cireuit’s appheation of intermediate scrutiny
means that Arizona’s Matching Funds Provision has
so far escaped appellate applheation of the appropri-
ate level of scrutiny. The Ninth Circuit's decision thus
creates uncertainty regarding the scope of Davrs and
its appheation to similar public financing systems.
Ill. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION CON-
FLICTS WITH CITIZENS UNITED BY AL-
LOWING GOVERNMENTS TO INDIRECTLY
RESTRAIN THE SPENDING OF INDE-
PENDENT EXPENDITURE GROUPS.
Section C of the Matching Funds Provision
explicitly treats the expenditures of groups acting
independently of candidates as “expenditures of ...
nonparticipating candidates.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-
952CK2) App. 140. lt empowers the government to
match the expenditures of independent groups sup-
porting a privately financed candidate or opposing a
publicly financed candidate. The purported rationale
behind this burden is enticement - that is, the gov-
ernment must burden the speech of independent
expenditure groups in order to encourage candidates
who might otherwise be subject to purportedly cor-
rupting influences to accept public funds. App. 35-37
It is beyond dispute that the government may not
burden independent expenditures under an anti-
corruption rationale. In Citizens United, this Court
stated explicitly what many understood the law to be
since Buckley v. Valeo, 424 US. 1 (1976) — that inde-
pendent expenditures cannot be regulated under an
anti-corruption rationale. Crtizens United, 1380 8. Ct.
at 909 (“[I|ndependent expenditures ... do not give
rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.”).
Because of the absence of pre-arrangement and
coordination between an independent expenditure
committee and a candidate, the value of the expendi.
ture to the candidate is undermined and the danger
36
that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for
improper commitments from the candidate ts allevi-
ated. Jd. at 908; see also FEC v. Natl Conservative
*olitical Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 498 (1985)
(“But here, as in Buckley, the absence of prearrange-
ment and coordination undermines the value of the
expenditure to the candidate, and thereby alleviates
the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid
pro quo tor improper commitments from the candi-
date.”).
Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit determined that
the Matching Funds Provision could be apphed
against independent expenditure groups because the
relevant inquiry is not whether independent expendi-
ture groups cause corruption, but “whether matching
funds bear a substantial relation to reducing corrup-
tion among participating candidates.” App. 35. Ac-
cording to the court, unless the state matches
“independent expenditures or expenditures from a
nonparticipating candidate's own funds, the Act's
public funding plan would not attract participants.”
App. 36. Thus, while independent expenditure groups
cannot be directly regulated to reduce the possibility
of corruption, the government may indirectly burden
their speech to encourage candidates into the public
financing system to reduce the possibility of corrup-
tion by these candidates. In other words, publicly
financed candidates need matching funds available so
they know they can match spending by independent
groups that oppose them if they enter the system.
37
This rationale is simply a dressed-up version of the
“level the playing field” justification for campaign
finance restrictions that this Court has repeatedly
and correctly rejected. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2771,
2773 (rejecting the “leveling the electoral opportuni-
ties” justification for the Millionaire’s Amendment).
In sum, the Ninth Circuit's decision stands for
the proposition that whi'e the government cannot
burden speech to “level the playing field” and it
cannot directly burden independent expenditures, it
can indirectly burden independent expenditures in
order to level the playing field. It is difficult to con-
ceive of a conclusion more at odds with the holdings
of both Davis and Citizens United.
The Ninth Circuit’s holding stands Citizens
United on its head. Because independent expendi-
tures are core political speech and pose no threat of
corruption, the government simply may not burden
them in order to fight corruption, even if doing so
might have an ancillary benefit of increasing partici-
pation by others in a public financing program.
“Where at all possible, government must curtail
speech only to the degree necessary to meet the
particular problem at hand, and must avoid infring-
ing on speech that does not pose the danger that has
prompted regulation.” FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life,
479 U.S. 238, 265 (1986).
While matching funds do not directly restrict
independent expenditures, they work as an indirect
38
and substantial restriction on the ability of independ-
ent expenditure groups to exercise “the unfettered
right to make unlimited .. . expenditures.” Davis, 128
S. Ct. at 2772. By allowing the government to create
real, if indirect, restrictions on the right of independ-
ent groups to make unlimited expenditures, the
Ninth Circuit has provided the state with the ability
to achieve indirectly what it is constitutionally for-
bidden from doing directly and has set an example
for other courts and legislators to follow to undermine
Citizens United. This disruptive jurisprudential
development in a circuit covering much of the western
United States threatens to restrict the speech of inde-
pendent expenditure groups mere months after this
Court held, in the strongest possible terms, that such
restrictions are constitutionally impermissible.
As Citizens United made clear, the Constitution
protects the political speech of groups as well as
individual candidates. 130 S.Ct. at 899-903. The
Martin plaintiffs (the Petitioners here) include
independent groups and raise issues regarding the
application of Citizens United that are in addition
to the harm the Act causes to candidate speech.
Petitioners note that contemporaneously with this
Petition, the McComish plaintiffs ~ each a privately
financed candidate — are seeking this Court’s review
of the Ninth Circuit’s decision. Petitioners here fully
support the McComish plaintiffs’ petition and urge
this Court to accept it. This Court should grant both
petitions, though, in order to directly consider the
affect the Act has on both candidates and independ-
ent groups in one proceeding. In particular, this Court
39
should grant review of this Petition in order to pro-
vide much-needed guidance (if not outright correc-
tion) to the Ninth Circuit and other courts on the
scope of Citizens United.
¢
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Petitioners respect-
fully request that this Court grant both their petition
for a writ of certiorari and that of the McComish
plaintiffs and that this Court consolidate both peti-
tions for consideration.
*Counsel of Record
Respectfully submitted,
INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE
WILLIAM R. MAURER*
101 Yesler Way, Suite 603
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 341-9300
INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE
WILLIAM H. MELLOR
901 North Glebe Road, Suite 900
Arlington, VA 22203
(703) 682-9320
INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE
TIMOTHY D. KELLER
PAUL V. AVELAR
398 South Mill Avenue, Suite 301
Tempe, AZ 85281
(480) 557-8300
Counsel for Petitioners
App. 1
FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOHN McComisn; Nancy McLain:
TONY Boule,
—— ee ——w
Plaintiffs-Appeliees,
ROBERT BURNS,
Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellee,
ARIZONA FREE ENTERPRISE CLUB'S
FREEDOM CLUB Pac: ARIZONA
TAXPAYERS ACTION COMMITTEE.
agent of Taxpavers Action
Committee: DEAN MARTIN: Rick
MURPRY.,
Plaintifts-Intervenors-Appellees . Pea eee
tT es No. 10-15165
¥V. 7
f . D.C. No.
KEN BENNETT, in his official CV-08-1550-ROS
capacity as Secretary of State of
the State of Arizona; GARY
SCARAMAZZO; ROYANN J. PARKER;
JEFFREY L. FAIRMAN: DONALD
LINDHOLM; LORLS. DANIELS, in their
otficial capacities as members of
the Arizona Citizens Clean
Elections Commission,
Defendants-Appellanis,
and
Clean Elections Institute, Ine..
Defendant-Intervenor.
’
App. 2
JOHN McComish;: NANCY McLaAIN;
Tony Bove,
Plaintiffs-Appelilees,
DEAN MARTIN; ROBERT BURNS;
Rick MURPHY; ARIVONA FREE
ENTERPRISE CLUB'S FREEDOM
CLUB PAc; ARIZONA TAXPAYERS
ACTION COMMITTEE, agent of
Taxpayers Action Committee,
Plaintiffs-Intervenors-Appellees.
j i i
. 4
KEN BENNETT. in his official
capacity as Secretary of State of
the State of Arizona; GARY
SCARAMAZ70; ROYANN J. PARKER:
JEFFREY L. FAIRMAN: DONALD
LINDHOLM; LoRLS. DANIELS, in
their official capacities as
members of the Arizona Citizens
Clean Elections Commission,
Defendants,
and
CLEAN ELECTIONS INSTITUTE, INC.,
Defendant-Intervenor-Appellant
No. 10-15166
DC No.
CV OS. 1550-ROS
ORDER AND
AMENDED
OPINION
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Roslyn O. Silver, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted
April 12, 2010 — San Francisco, California
App. 3
Filed May 21, 2010
Amended June 23, 2010
Before: Andrew J. Kleinteld, A. Wallace Tashima,
and Sidney R. Thomas, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge Tashima;
Concurrence by Judge Kleinfeld
COUNSEL
Nicholas C. Dramas, Goldwater Institute. Phoeniz,
Arizona, for the plaintiffs-appellees.
William Ro Maurer, Institute for Justice, Seattle,
Washington, tor the plaintiffs-intervenors-appellees.
Marvy R. O'Gracy, Solicitor General of Arizona,
Phoenix, Arizona, for the defendants-appellants.
Bradley S. Phillips. Munger, Tolles. & Olson, Los
Angeles, California, for the defendant-intervenor-
appellant.
Stephen M. Hoersting, Center for Competitive
Pohtics, Alexandria, Virginia, for) ariucus curiae
Center tor Competitive Politics.
ORDER
The opimoen filed May 21, 2010, slp op. 7319, is
amended by deleting footnote 1, shp op. at 7326, and
substituting the following footnote in its place:
1 Governor Symington was sentenced to a
30-month term of imprisonment, but his con-
vViction Was reversed and the case remanded
App. 4
for a new tral See United States vo. Svm-
ington, 195 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 1999). He was
then granted a presidential pardon just as
his retrial was set to commence.
a -- ——_—— a —- Oe
OPINION
TASHIMA, Circuit Judge:
This ts a challenge to the constitutionahty of the
“matching funds” provision of Arizona’s Citizens
Clean Elections Act, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-952. The Act
establishes a legal framework within which the State
of Arizona may provide publ financing to candidates
for state political offices. A candidate who chooses to
participate in the Act’s voluntary pubhe financing
scheme relinquishes her or his right to raise private
campaign contributions. Instead, she or he receives
an initial grant of funds from the state to spend on
her or his campaign. The challenged provision
ensures that if the participating candidate has an
opponent who is not) participating in the pubhie
financing system and whose campaign expenditures
or contributions exceed a threshold set by the Act. she
or he receives additional matching funds from the
State.
Six past and future candidates for Amzona politi
eal office who have, or plan to, run privately financed
campaigns, as Well as two political action committees
who fund such candidates, brought suit to enjoin the
Act's matching funds provision, alleging that it vio-
lates their rights under the First Amendment and the
App 9
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the U.S. Constitution. These Plaintitfs claim
that the matching funds provision severely burdens
their exercise of protected political speech by punish-
ing them for making, receiving, or spending campaign
contributions. As nonparticipating candidates, if they
exceed the Act's matehing funds threshold, they will
trigyer the disbursement of matching funds to their
opponents. They allege that their fear of tmggering
matching funds to their opponent causes them to curb
their campaign fundraising or spending, thereby chill-
ing their speech. They also claim that because the Act
treats candidates differently based on whether or not
they participate in the pubhe financing scheme, it
demies them the equal protection of the law
The district court held that the matching funds
provision of the Act violated the First Amendment. It
did not reach Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim. After
determining that the matching funds provision of the
Act could not be severed from the Act as a whole, the
district court granted Plaintit¥s’ motion for summary
judgment, issued a declaratory judgment that the Act
violates the First Amendment, and enjoined its
enforcement.
Applying Supreme Court) precedent) analyzing
campaign finance laws under the First Amendment,
see Citizens United vo FEC, 130 S. Ct. S76 (2010);
Davis v. FEC, 128 S.Ct. 2759 (2008), Buckley v. Valeo,
424 US. 1 (1976) (per cumam), we conclude that the
matching funds provision of the Act imposes only
a minimal burden on First Amendment rights. It
App. 6
survives intermediate scrutiny because it bears a
substantial relation to the State's important interest
in reducing guid pro quo political corruption. Because
the Act conforms to the requirements of the First
Amendment and must be upheld, we reverse. We
decline to address Plaintiffs’ equal protection clamm in
the first instance; instead, we remand to the district
court so that it may consider the issue.
I. Statutory Background
Prnor to the passage of the Citizens Clean Eleec-
tions Act (the “Act™, Amzona had already adopted
campaign contribution limits. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-
905 (histomcal and. statutory note) In 1986, the
State's voters passed an initiative measure estab-
hshing individual contmbution limits of $200 for
lemslative candidates and $500 for statewide can-
didates, per election. See id) Even with these cam-
paign contribution limits in place, Arizona expen
enced a osemes of massive political corruption
scandals
In 1988, Governor Evan Mecham was indicted on
multiple criminal charges, including perjury and
fraud for allegedly hiding a campaign loan. He was
later impeached on charges of misuse of pubhe funds
and obstruction of justice, and ousted from office.
Next, the “Savings and Loan Scandal” led to a United
States Senate Ethics Committee investigation of
certain activities of both US. Senators from Arizona,
App. ¢
who had received contributions and favers from
Arizona savings and loan tvcoon Charles Keating.
Then, in 1991, AzSecam erupted. A sting operation
caught state lemslators on videotape accepting cam-
paign contributions and bribes in exchange for ayree-
Ing to support gambling legislation. The video footage
Was generally seen as outrageous. For example,
Representative Don Kenny was seen. stuffing a
$55,000 cash bribe into a gym bag after joking, “are
vou sure there are no Indden cameras up there?”
AvScam resulted in the indictment of twenty one
individuals, including lobbyists, political activists,
and seven state legislators. TWwo additional state
legislators were named ina civil racketeering suit. In
total, nearly ten percent of the Arizona Legslature at
the time faced civil or ermminal charges related to
AzScam. Former Arizona Governor J. Fife Symington
testified that the scandal was highly pubheized
around the state
In the late nineties, Governor Symington himself
was embroiled ino scandal and indicted on twenty-
three counts, including using the power of his office to
extort concessions from a pension fund to which he
owed $10 million. He became Arizona's second gover-
nor in a row to leave his office in disgrace when he
resigned ino 1997, after being convicted on seven
counts of filyng false financial statements.
Governor Symington was sentenced to a 30-month term of
imprisonment, but his conviction was reversed and the case
(Continued on tollowing: page)
App. 8
In the wake of these scandals, the voters of
Arizona passed the Citizens Clean Elections Act, Ariz.
Rev. Stat. $$ 16-940-16-961, an initiative measure, in
the 1998 statewide election. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-940
(historical and statutory note). There ts no evidence
that the Act was intended solely to remedy Arizona's
apparent susceptibility to pohtical corruption. Plain-
tiffs, however, introduced ample evidence indicating
that when the Act was adopted, voters were aware of,
and concerned about, continuing and repeated poli-
tical corruption in Arizona.
The voter information pamphlet tor the 1998
election argued that the Act should be approved
because it would free politicians “to represent the
best interests of all the citizens, not just the large
financial contributors who can trade their cash for
political support.” Ballot Propositions Publeity Pam-
phlet for the 1998 Arizona General Election, at "S87,
avatlable at http: wwwiazsos gov election 1998 into
pubpamphilet. prop200 pdf. One justification for the
Act was that it would change Arizona's “reputation
las] a state mfe with corruption and the abuse of
money in politics... . land] restore confidence in our
political system.” /d. at *S8. The pamphlet further
noted that under the existing election law regime,
remanded for a new trial See United States t. Svrungton, WW
FSd 1080 (Sth Cir 1999) He was then granted a presidential
pardon just as hos retrial was set to commence
App. 9
“tolur elected officials are going to jail and this evcle
of abuse seems endless.” /d.
The Act's findings state that the State’s previous
election financing system, “|u}/ndermine|d} public con-
fidence in the integrity of pubhe officials,” because it
“lalllowled] Arizona elected officials to accept large
campaign contributions from private interests over
which they have governmental jurisdiction.” Ariz.
Rev. Stat. §$ 16-940. The Act's stated purpose is to
“create a clean elections system that will improve the
integrity of Arizona state government by diminishing
the influence of special-interest money, will encourage
citizen participation in the political process, and will
promote freedom of speech.” /d.
Plaintiffs argue that the Act was not aimed at
reducing corruption, and that legislative reforms
designed to prevent another AzScam had already
been adopted at the time the Act was passed. Instead,
Plaintiffs contend that the Act’s true purposes were
to level the political playing field and reduce cam-
paign spending.” Voters are motivated by varied and
' One of the Act’s onginal supporters testified that another
one of its goals was to “promote freedom of speech because
cunder the Act.) more candidates would have more opportunity
to speak 7
We recently recognized in Long Beach Area Chamber of
Commerce vo City of Long Beach, that in light of Supreme Court
preeedent, “'preventing corruption or the appearance of corrup
tion are the only legitimate and compelling government
interests thus tar identified for restmeting campaign finances *~
Long Beach, No 07-55691, — FSd __. 2010 WL 1729710 at *7
(Continued on following page)
App. 10
conflicting motivations. Generally, a diverse elector-
ate cannot be said to share one true intent in
adopting an initiative measure. More specifically, the
extent to which Arizona’s various corruption scandals
led to the passage of the Act cannot be precisely
determined. Based on the record before us, however,
(Mh Cir. Apnl 30, 2010) (quoting FEC v. Natl Conservative
Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1985)). In
particular, we observed that the so-called) “anti-distortion
rationale.” under which the government claims an “interest in
combating ‘the corrosive and distorting effects of immense
ayyrregations of wealth,” is not a legitimate basis for campaign
finance restrictions after the Supreme Court partially overruled
Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652
(1990), in its Citizens United decision. Jd. at "6 (quoting Austin,
494 US. at 660 and discussing Citizens United, 1380 S Ct. at
904, 912-13) Likewise, the “time protection rationale.” under
which the government claims an interest in “‘protectling]
candidates from spending too much time raising money rather
than devoting that time to campaigning among ordinary voters’ ”
may not serve as the basis for restmcting campaign finance
activity Jd. at *7 (quoting Randall vo Sorrell, 548 US. 230, 243-
45 (2006))
We need not, however, address the potential legitimacy of
arguments that the State has not raised before us in defense of
the Act. Further, even if the State had raised these arguments,
“fajt is unnecessary to look beyond the Act’s primary purpose to
lint the actuahty and appearance of corruption resulting from
lange individual financial contmbutions in order to find a con
stitutionally sufficient justification” for the matching funds pro-
vision Buckley, 424 US. at 26. Because the Act is justified by
the State's legitimate and non-illusory interest in reducing quid
pro quo corruption, we need not consider the constitutional
legntimacy of other potential rationales that might support it
See td. at 24-27
App. 11
we conclude that one of the principal purposes of the
Act was to reduce quid pro quo corruption.
The Act created a system of public financing for
political campaigns. A candidate who chooses not to
participate in this system may raise unlimited funds
from private donations, subject to contribution limits
and disclosure requirements, which existed before the
Act. If a candidate opts to participate in the public
financing system, she or he agrees to forfeit her or his
right to fund her or his campaign with private con-
tributions. Instead, she or he must collect a required
number of five-dollar “qualifying contributions” dur-
ing a specified time period to demonstrate that she or
he has the voter support to be a viable candidate.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-946. The number of required
qualifying contributions varies between two hundred
and four thousand, depending on the office that the
candidate is seeking. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-950(D).
If the candidate qualifies for public financing, she
or he will then receive a lump-sum grant for her or
his primary campaign, which varies depending on
whether she or he is running opposed or unopposed in
a party primary, or whether she or he is an inde-
pendent candidate. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-951. If the
participating candidate has a nonparticipating oppo-
nent in the primary who spends more than her or his
initial grant, or whose expenditures, combined with
the value of independent expenditures in opposition
to her or his candidacy or in support of her or his
App. 12
nonparticipating opponent,’ exceed the amount of her
or his initial grant, the participating candidate will
receive “matching funds” in the amount of the com-
bined spending of her or his nonparticipating oppo-
nent, plus the value of independent expenditures
against her or him or in support of her or his
nonparticipating opponent, reduced by six percent
and reduced by the amount of “early contributions”
raised by the nonparticipating opponent during the
preprimary fundraising period.’ Ariz. Rev. Stat. $§ 16-
952, 16-945.
If the participating candidate wins her or his
primary and continues on to the general election,
she or he receives a_ second initial lump-sum
grant. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-952. If she or he has a
*“ An independent expenditure is a campaign expenditure
made by a third party that “expressly advocates the election or
defeat of a clearly identified candidate, that is made without
cooperation or consultation with any candidate or comrnittee or
agent of the candidate and that is not made in concert with or at
the request or suggestion of a candidate, or any committee or
agent of the candidate.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-901( 14).
* The matching funds that the participating candidate
receives are reduced by six percent to take into account the fact
that nonparticipating candidates incur expenses in order to
raise money. The assumption underlying this provision is that a
nonparticipating candidate must spend six dollars (on postage,
event costs, etc.) in order to raise one hundred dollars, while a
participating candidate has no fundraising costs. Therefore, in
order for both candidates to have the same net amount available
to spend on non-fundraising campaign expenses, the matching
funds that the participating candidate receives are reduced by
Six percent.
App. 13
nonparticipating opponent in the primary whose con-
tributions received, combined with the value of
independent expenditures in supporting him or her
and opposing the participating candidate, less his or
her expenditures during the primary campaign, ex-
ceed the amount of the participating candidate’s
second initial grant, the participating candidate will
receive matching funds, calculated in the same
manner as in the primary campaign. Ariz. Rev. Stat.
§ 16-952(B). During both elections, matching funds,
combined with the initial grant, may not exceed three
times the amount of the initial grant. Ariz. Rev. Stat.
$ 16-952(E). This means that a nonparticipating can-
didate who is able to raise funds in excess of three
times the amount of his or her participating can-
didate’s initial grant gains a potentially unlimited
financial advantage in the campaign.
II. Factual Background
Plaintiffs are John McComish and Nancy McLain,
current members of the Arizona House of Repre-
sentatives who are seeking reelection in 2010, Tony
Bouie, a non-incumbent candidate for the Arizona
House of Representatives, and Robert Burns, an
Arizona State Senator seeking reelection in 2010.
Joining them in this challenge to the Act are
plaintiffs-intervenors, Dean Martin, a former Arizona
State Senator, current State Treasurer, and candidate
for Governor in 2010, Rick Murphy a member of the
Arizona House of Representatives seeking reelection
in 2010, the Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom
App. 14
Club PAC (“Freedom Club PAC”), a political action
committee (“PAC”) which makes contributions to
Arizonans for a Sound Economy, an independent
expenditure committee that funds independent ex-
penditures in races subject to the Act, and the
Arizona Taxpayers Action Committee (“Arizona Tax-
payers”), an independent expenditure committee that
makes independent expenditures in races subject to
the Act. All candidate-plaintiffs have declined to par-
ticipate in the Act’s public funding program and will
be running in the 2010 election as privately-financed
candidates.
Plaintiffs sued Jan Brewer, in her official ca-
pacity as Arizona Secretary of State,” and Gary
Scaramazzo, Royann Parker, Jeffrey Fairman, Don-
ald Lindholm, and Lori Daniels, in their official
capacities as members of the Arizona Citizens Clean
Elections Commission (collectively, the “State”). The
Clean Elections Institute, Inc., a nonprofit organi-
zation formed to continue the work of Arizonans for
Clean Elections, the campaign committee that spon-
sored the initiative that created the Act, intervened
as a defendant.
Since 2002, between fifty-two percent and sixty-
seven percent of candidates for state office during
general elections have chosen to participate in the
Act’s public funding program. Plaintiffs contend that
* Ken Bennett has succeeded Jan Brewer as Secretary of
State since the commencement of this action.
App. 15
matching funds have dampened overall campaign
spending in Arizona. It is undisputed, however, that
overall campaign spending in Arizona has increased
since the Act’s passage.
Plaintiffs also allege that matching funds have
specifically deterred them from engaging in political
expression through monetary expenditures. They
argue that the fear of triggering matching funds
causes privately-funded candidates to refrain from or
delay raising and spending money in support of their
campaigns. They contend that matching funds bur-
den the speech of independent expenditure com-
mittees by causing them to delay making inde-
pendent expenditures in order to avoid triggering
matching funds until later in the campaign, when the
publicly-financed candidate will have less time to use
them, in an attempt to minimize the competitive
benefit of the matching funds to the publicly-financed
candidate.
We agree with the district court’s observation
that “Plaintiffs testimony is somewhat scattered and
shows only a vague interpretation of the burden of
the Act.” John MecComish testified that in his 200s
campaign for the House of Representatives, he trig-
gered matching funds to his opponents. In order to
avoid tmggering additional matching funds to his
opponents until later in the campaign, he “deci| ded’
to wait and not make any substantial expenditures
until September 2, 2008.” McComish describes this as
an act of “self-censorship” in order to avoid the conse-
quence of “disseminat|ing] viewpoints hostile to my
campaign.”
App. 16
Nancy MeLain testified that during her 2008
campaign for House of Representatives she “made a
conscious decision to not raise or spend a significant
amount because it could not be spent without
resulting in ‘equalizing funds.” Although she avoided
triggering matching funds in the general election, she
triggered matching funds in the primary. She claims
that her “reluctance to fundraise and spend money
during the primary election meant that [she] was not
able to broadcast [her] message either on air or in
newspapers as often as [she] thought necessary to
win the election.” although she was victorious. She
describes matching funds as imposing a ~
disadvantage” on her campaign, which her fund-
competitive
raising and spending choices “seek to minimize.”
Tony Boute also triggered matching funds during
tis 2008 campaign for House of Representatives. He
testified that because he had “no control over inde-
pendent expenditures that the Commission deems
{to} benefit him” he “fellt] compelled to conserve
money for damage-control in anticipation of poorly-
conceived independent expenditures backfinng after
they trigger matching funds” to his opponents. As a
result he “change!|d his] campaign strategy” by “hold-
ing [his] campaign speech until his] expenditures
could be timed to minimize the impact of the match-
ing funds.” He believes that matching funds thereby
“placed [him] at a continuous tactical disadvantage.”
Robert Burns “behevels! that the existence of
matching funds coerces traditionally funded candi-
dates into changing their message and the timing of
App. 17
getting out their message, even if ultimately the
amount of messaging a traditional candidate chooses
to engage in does not change.” His deposition testi-
mony indicated that matching funds had not actually
chilled his speech during his most recent 2008
election for State Senate. He admitted that he was
willing to tngger matching funds. Further, he also
indicated that despite the matching funds provision,
he simply communicated his message to the extent he
felt was necessary to win, stating “[ilf I had to spend
NX number of dollars to get out a — a mailer. and I had
that amount of money, I would go ahead and do the
mailer.”
Dean Martin stated that “the matching funds
provision of the Act forced [him] to self-censer” in his
most recent race for State Treasurer in 2006. He
reasoned that the “only way [jhe] could avoid being
massively outspent by this) opponent was to prevent
the triggering of additional matching funds to her
campaign” and “was thus coerced into accepting the
same hmits as [his] government-funded opponent
without] receiviing}] any of the benefits of being a
government-funded candidate, such as the receipt of
matching funds for independent expenditures that
opposed {his} candidacy and the label ‘participating’
or ‘clean’ candidate.” Despite Martin's testimony that
he felt matching funds severely burdened his speech,
he curiously could not even recall whether he had
ever triggered matching funds to an opponent. The
record indicates that Martin ts) fundamentally
~
opposed to the policy of publicly financing political
App. 18
campaigns, regardless of whether ao given pubhe
financing scheme includes a provision tor matching
funds.
Rick Murphy ran. successtully for House of
Representatives as a participating candidate in 2004.
He later ran for reelection in 2006 and 2008 as a
nonparticipating candidate. He testified that he
attempted to not trigger matching funds during his
2006 campaign because, since his opponent would
receive additional matching funds once he surpassed
the threshold amount, “[ijt didn’t seem like it made a
lot of sense for me to do that, so 1 curtailed my speech
and curtailed my fundraising in order to prevent it”
Sull, Murphy testified that matching funds have
never prevented him from accepting a political
contribution. Murphy's testimony that he curtailed
his fundraising for fear of triggering matching funds
was directly contradicted by his own campaign con-
sultant, who testified that he advised Murphy to
“raise as much money
where,” that he never advised Murphy to stop raising
as he could from “every-
money, and that Murphy never curtailed or stopped
his fundraising efforts.
The treasurer of the Freedom Club PAC testified
that the PAC has never been prevented from making
an independent expenditure for fear of triggering
matching funds. He further stated that he takes into
account Various campaign finance “reporting require-
ments, notifications and filings” upon which matching
tunds disbursement determinations by the Citizens
App. 19
Clean Elections Commission are based, in determin.
ing When to spend money.
Anzona Taxpayers stated that it “decided not to
speak in opposition to [a] participating candidate |...
in the 2006 primary election because such speech
would have triggered matching funds.” However, the
groups’s founder admitted that it had never decided
against making an expenditure because it would trig-
ger matching funds. Further, the evidence demon-
strates that Arnzona Taxpavers could not afford to
make expenditures during the 2006 primary election,
because it had only $52.72 1n cash on hand.
Ill. Standard and Scope of Review
We review the district court's grant of summary
judgment to Plaintiffs and denial of summary judg-
ment to the State de nove. See Block o Crtv of LA.
253 F.3d 410, 416 (9th Cir. 2001). This means that we
will look at the case “anew, the same as if it had not
been heard before. and as if no decision previously
had been rendered,” and “giving no deference to the
district judge's determinations.” Freeman vo DirecTV.
Inc... 457 F.3d 1001, 1004 (9th Cir, 2006); Ditto ¢
“Ordinarily a denial of a motion for summary judgment is
net a final order and thus not appealable. 28 USC. § 1291
However, the distmet court's grant of summary pudgment was a
final decision waiving us yursdiction to review its demial of (the
State's] motion for summary judgment 7 Abend o MCA. Ince. S63
Fld 1465, 1482 n.20 «9th Cir 1TSss)
App. 20
MeCurdy, 510 F3d 1070, 1075 (9th Cir, 2007)" We
apply the same legal standard that the district court
did, “[vhewing the evidence in the hght most tavor-
able to the nonmoving party.” and granting summary
judgment “only if no genuine issues of matenmal fact
remain for trial and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law” Block, 253 F.3d at 416.
We “may affirm on any ground supported by the
record.” N. Mariana Islands v. United States, 399
F.3d 1057, 1060 (9th Cir. 2005). Because the district
court did not rule on the parties’ evidentiary objec-
tions and did not strike any evidence from the record,
all of the evidence adduced below remains a part of
the record before us on appeal. See Vinson coo TRorias,
288 F.3d 1145, 1152 & n Sith Cir. 2002).
First, we must determine what level of consti-
tutional scrutiny apphes to the Act’s matching funds
* We reyect Plaintiffs’ argument that Brown o Cal Dept of
Imonsp.. S21 FSd L217, 1221 (Sth Cir 2008), requires us to
review the district court’s findinys of fact for clear error because
its opimien was one which struck down a restmction on speech
Brown, and the line of cases that it follows, apply to this Court's
review of cases in which the district court made findings of fact
in the process of issuing a preliminary injunction er holding a
bench trial, or when questions of fact were submitted to a jury
See Planned Parenthood vo Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 290
F.3d LOSS, 1066.1070 (9th Crr 2OO2! cen bane! This case, artsing
from a grant of summary judgment. ts in an entirely different
procedural posture to which these cases do not apply
App. 21
provision. The level of scrutiny that apples to a law
Which implicates First Amendment concerns is “dic-
tated by both the intrinsic strength of, and the mag-
nitude of the burden placed on, the speech and
associational freedoms at issue.” Lincoln Club vo City
of Irvine, 292 F.3d 9384, 938 (9th Cir, 2002). We must,
therefore, engage in a two-step inquiry. First, we
determine whether the type of speech the law affects
is fully protected by the First Amendment. Next, we
determine the type of burden, if any, that the law
places on that speech. Laws that place severe bur-
dens on fully protected speech are subject to strict
scrutiny. Laws that “place| | only a minimal burden
on fully protected ... freedoms” or that apply to
“speech and associational freedoms [that] are not
fully protected by the First Amendment” receive
intermediate serutiny. /d.
[1] Buckley, the Supreme Court's landmark
case on the constitutionality of campaign finance laws
under the First Amendment, provides sguuidance tin
determining whether the Act affects fully protected
speech. Buckley held that campaign contributions are
not fully protected political speech. 424 U.S. at 21-22;
see also” Lincoln Club, 292 F3d at 938-39. The
Supreme Court reasoned that a “contmbution serves
as a general expression of support for the candidate
and his views, but does not communicate the under-
lving basis for the support. ... [The transformation
of contributions into political debate involves speech
by someone other than the contributor.” Buckley, 424
US. at 21. By contrast, campaign expenditures are
App. 22
fully protected speech because a “restriction on the
amount of money a person can spend on political com-
munication during a campaign necessarily reduces
the quantity of expression by restricting the number
of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration,
and the size of the audience reached.” Jd. at 19.
(2) Following Buckley, a law that has a hybnd
efYect on both contributions and expenditures ts
interpreted as though it affects fully protected speech.
See Lincoln Club, 292 F.3d at 939. The matching
funds provision of the Act affects both contributions
and expenditures. During primary elections, the Act
explicitly ties participating candidate’s matching fund
disbursements to nonparticipating candidates’ expen-
ditures. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-952. During a general
election, the Act bases matching fund calculations on
contributions received by nonparticipating candh-
dates. Jd. This includes contnmbutions that come from
a nonparticipating candidate's personal funds, which,
under Buckley's framework, are considered expen-
ditures, and fully protected speech. See 424 U.S. at
51-55. Because the Act affects both contributions and
expenditures, we analyze it as though it affects fully
protected speech.
Next, we determine what level of burden, if any,
the Act imposes on that speech. Plaintitts argue that
the Supreme Court's recent decision in Davis, 128
S.Ct. 2759, controls this case, and compels the con
clusion that the Act places a severe burden on their
speech triggering the application of strict) scrutiny.
The State and Defendant Intervenor counter that the
App. 2.
Act places only a minimal or indirect burden on
Plaintiffs’ speech and that the Supreme Court's latest
campaign finance decision, Citizens United, 1308. Ct.
876, reaffirmed that intermediate scrutiny applies to
such laws.
[3]) In Buckley, the Supreme Court evaluated
the constitutionality of provisions of the Federal Elec-
tion Campaign Act of 1971, and related provisions of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended,
which allowed for the pubhe financing of presidential
elections. See 424 U.S. at 6, 85-109. The Court found
that the public financing scheme in that case was “a
congressional effort, not to abridge, restrict, or censor
speech, but rather to use public money to facilitate
and enlarge public discussion and participation in the
electoral process, goals vital to a self-governing
people. Thus [it] furthers, not abridges, pertinent
First Amendment values.” Jd at 92-93 (footnote
omitted). Therefore, the public financing of elections
itself does not create any burden on speech.
In Davis, the Court struck down the Millionaire's
Amendment to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
of 2002 (““BCRA”), 2 U.S.C. § 441a-lia). The Milhon-
aires Amendment apphed to campaigns for the
United States House of Representatives, in which all
candidates are privately financed and there is no
public funding. But if one candidate financed his
campaign with personal funds in excess of a threshold
amount, “a new, asymmetrical regulatory scheme
c{ame] into play.” 128 8. Ct. at 2766. While the self-
financing candidate continued to be subject to the
App. 24
normal contribution limits, his opponent, the ‘non-
self-financing’ candidate became eligible to “receive
individual contributions at treble the normal limit .. .
even from individuals who may have reached the nor-
mal aggregate contributions cap, and [could] accept
coordinated party expenditures without limit.” /d.
The Davis Court held that this “scheme of discrimi-
natory contribution limits,” “imposes a substantial
burden on the exercise of the First Amendment right
to use personal funds for campaign speech.” /d. at
2772. Having found the Millionaire’s Amendment to
be a substantial burden on fully protected speech, the
Court applied strict scrutiny. Jd.
Plaintiffs urge us to adopt the rationale of the
district court and conclude that, under the logic of
Davis, they have “established a cognizable burden”
under the First Amendment. The district court rea-
soned that “[i]f the mere potential for your opponent
to raise additional funds is a substantial burden, the
granting of additional funds to your opponent must
also be a burden.” We disagree. As discussed below,
we conclude that Davis is easily and properly dis-
tinguished from the case at bench.
The regulatory framework the Supreme Court
examined in Davis is different from the one we con-
front under the Act. Davis says nothing about public
“funding schemes and therefore says nothing about
their constitutionality.” Comment, 122 Harv. L. Rev.
375, 383 (Nov. 2008). All of the candidates in Davis
were subject to the same scheme regulating privately
financed candidates. “Under the usual circumstances,
App. 25
the same restrictions apply to all the competitors for
a seat and their authorized committees.” Davis, 128
S.Ct. at 2765. But if one candidate heavily self-funded
his campaign, it triggered an entirely new “asym-
metrical regulatory scheme” that required him to file
three additional types of campaign finance disclo-
sures not required of his opponents. /d. at 2766-67.
“Failure to comply with the reporting requirements
may [have] resultfed] in civil and criminal penalties.”
Id. at 2767. It also triggered new, more generous
campaign contribution limits, but only for the self-
ere
financing candidate's opponents. /d. at 2771.
In striking down the Millionaire's Amendment,
the Supreme Court noted that had the law “simply
raised the contribution limits for all candidates,
Davis’ argument would plainly fail.” Jd. at 2770; see
also td. at 2771 (““Consequently, if § 319(a)’s elevated
contribution limits applied across the board, Davis
would not have any basis for challenging those
limits.”). Instead, the law constituted a burden on
Davis’ speech only because it treated candidates run-
ning against each other under the same regulatory
framework differently based on a candidate's decision
to self-finance his or her campaign, which is a man-
ner of engaging in fully protected speech. /d. at 2771.
In contrast, the Supreme Court has held that it is
constitutional to subject candidates running against
each other for the same office to entirely different reg-
ulatory schemes when some candidates voluntarily
choose to participate in a public financing system.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 97. “[T]he Constitution does not
App. 26
require Congress to treat all declared candidates the
same for public financing purposes.” /d. “Sometimes
the grossest discrimination can lie in treating things
that are different as though they were exactly alike.”
Id. at 97-98.
In Davis, the Millionaire’s Amendment was an
attempt to “level electoral opportunities for candi-
dates of different personal wealth.” 128 S.Ct. at
2773. This was problematic because Buckley had held
that “the First Amendment simply cannot tolerate [a]
restriction upon the freedom of a candidate to speak
without legislative limit on behalf of his own can-
didacy.” 424 U.S. at 54. In Citizens United, the
Supreme Court elaborated on its decision in Davis,
indicating that the Millionaire’s Amendment was
unconstitutional because it specifically sought to
disadvantage the rich. “The rule that political speech
cannot be limited based on a speaker’s wealth is a
necessary consequence of the premise that the First
Amendment generally prohibits the suppression of
political speech based on the speaker's identity.”
Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 905. Under the Act,
while matching funds are calculated based on the
total contributions received and expenditures made
by a nonparticipating opponent, they are not distri-
buted specifically to the opponents of wealthy can-
didates. Matching funds do not distinguish between
different sources of nonparticipating candidates’
financing at all. The law in Davis was problematic
because it singled out the speakers to whom it
applied based on their identity. The Act’s matching
App. 27
funds provision makes no such identity-based distinc-
tions.
[4] Plaintiffs, perhaps recognizing that they
have not demonstrated any actual chilling of their
speech by the Act, argue that under Davis, we could
strike down the matching funds provision without
any proof that their speech has been deterred or
punished. But Davis does not require this Court to
recognize mere metaphysical threats to political
speech as severe burdens. We will only conclude that
the Act burdens speech to the extent that Plaintiffs
have proven that the specter of matching funds has
actually chilled or deterred them from accepting
campaign contributions or making expenditures.
[5] Based on the record before us, we conclude
that any burden the Act imposes on Plaintiffs’ speech
is indirect or minimal.” Since the Act’s adoption,
* Prior to, and without the benefit of, the Supreme Court's
recent decisions in Citizens United and Davis, three of our sister
circuits considered the constitutionality of state public financing
schemes with matching funds provisions similar to the one we
now confront. See N.C. Right to Life Comm. Fund for Indep.
Political Expenditures v. Leake, 524 F.3d 427 (4th Cir. 2008);
Daggett v. Comm’n on Govtal Ethics and Election Practices, 205
F.3d 445 (1st Cir. 2000); Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356 (8th Cir.
1994). The Fourth and First Circuits concluded that the
respective statutes imposed no First Amendment burden at all.
See N.C. Right to Life, 524 F.3d at 437-49; Daggett, 205 F.3d at
464-65. The Eighth Circuit. however, concluded that the
Minnesota law at issue imposed a substantial burden on fully
protected political speech and, because it could not survive strict
scrutiny, struck it down. See Day, 34 F.3d at 1360, 1363.
(Continued on following page)
App. 28
Plaintiffs argue that because the Supreme Court’s decision
in Davis cites Day, Davis somehow transformed the decision of
one of our sister circuits into controlling precedent. Davis cites
Day only once for a single, limited proposition. See Davis, 128
S. Ct. at 2772 (“Many candidates who can afford to make large
personal expenditures to support their campaigns may choose to
do so despite [the Millionaire’s Amendment], but they must
shoulder a special and potentially significant burden if they
make that choice. See Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1536, 1359-60
(C.A.8 1994) (concluding that a Minnesota law that increased a
candidate’s expenditure limits and eligibility for public funds
based on independent expenditures against her candidacy
burdened the speech of those making the independent expen-
ditures)”). In so citing Day, Davis did not affirm or adopt the
Eighth Circuit’s approach, nor did it overturn sub silento the
decisions of the First and Fourth Circuits. It merely cited Day
for what it is — a decision in which our sister circuit found that a
law chilled protected speech and held that such a burden could
not survive strict scrutiny. Our decision is not controlled by Day,
nor are we persuaded by it.
In Day, plaintiffs demonstrated that the Minnesota statute
they were challenging had a “chilling effect” on political speech
and that its “mere enactment ... ha[d]) prevented many if not
most potential political expenditures from ever being made.” 34
F.3d at 1360. As discussed infra, Plaintiffs have not established
the existence of such a chilling effect in the instant case. Having
found that the Minnesota law imposed a substantial burden on
fully protected political speech, the Eighth Circuit proceeded to
apply strict scrutiny. Jd. at 1361. The court concluded that the
law could not survive that test because it found that the state’s
professed interest supporting the law, that of encouraging parti-
cipation in the public financing program, was “not legitimate,”
“no matter how compelling in the abstract,” because it was not
based in fact, but was rather “contrived for purposes of []
litigation.” Jd. The record there demonstrated that the chal-
lenged provision was “not necessary to encourage candidates’
involvement in public campaign financing, as participation was
(Continued on following page)
App. 29
campaign spending in Arizona has increased. Several
Plaintiffs testified that they would have made
increased expenditures or undertaken increased
fundraising but for the matching funds provision. No
Plaintiff. however, has pointed to any specific
instance in which she or he has declined a contmri-
bution or failed to make an expenditure for fear of
triggering matching funds. The record as a whole
contradicts many of Plaintiffs’ unsupported assertions
that their speech has been chilled. Robert Burns
admitted he was willing to trigger matching funds
and spent as much money as he needed to in order to
communicate his message. Dean Martin claimed his
speech was chilled by matching funds, but could not
even recall whether he had triggered them in the
past. Rick Murphy admitted he had never turned a
contribution away, and his political consultant testi-
fied that he never slowed his fundraising. The
Freedom Club PAC’s treasurer testified that he has
approaching 100% before the new campaign finance laws were
passed.” Ja.
Two years after it decided Day, the Eighth Circuit.
recognizing the unusual factual background of that case.
declined to extend its reasoning and upheld other provisions of
Minnesota's campaign finance law under stmet scrutiny See
Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544, 1555 «Sth Cir. 1996). In
the case at bench. because the interest Amzona asserts in
support of the Act is not “contnved for purposes of this hti-
gation.” Day. 34 F.3d at 1362, even under current Eighth Circuit
law “the circumstances surrounding the enactment of the [Act)
make Day inapposite.” Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1555. We decline
to follow the Eighth Circuit down a road that even it refused to
follow
App. 30
never been dissuaded from making an independent
expenditure by the possibility of triggering matching
funds. Anzona Taxpayers’s claim that it declined te
speak in the 2006 primary for fear of triggering
matching funds seems disingenuous in light of the
fact that it only had $52.72 cash on hand. PlaintifYs
have not demonstrated that any chilling effect exists.
Their own experiences campaigning under the Act
highlight that it “in no way limits the quantity of
speech one can engage in or the amount of money one
can spend engaging in political speech. nor does it
threaten censure or penalty for such expenditures.”
Dagsett, 205 F.3d at 464.
Plaintiffs bemoan that matching funds deny
them a competitive advantage in elections. The
essence of this claim is not that they have been
silenced, but that the speech of their opponents has
been enabled. We agree with the First Circuit that
the First Amendment includes “no right to speak tree
from response — the purpose of the First Amendment
is to secure the widest possible dissemination of infor-
mation from diverse and antagonistic sources.” Ji.
(internal quotations omitted).
Plaintiffs’ assertions that they have delayed
making certain expenditures in order to avoid trig-
gering matching funds to their opponents until later
in the campaign cycle is evidence that they continue
to seek strategic advantages under the Act. but does
not support the argument that their speech has been
chilled. Many campaign finance regulations. parti-
cularly disclosure requirements. lead candidates to
App. $1
engage in such strateme behavior, but this does not
make them unconstitutional. As the Court has
observed, “the public begins to concentrate on elec-
tions only in the weeks immediately before they are
held.” Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at S895. Conse-
quently, waiting until that time to make campaign
expenditures would not necessamly be evidence of
coerced behavior. Rather, such decisions likely reflect
a rational strategy of maximizing the impact of one’s
campaign funds.
[6] Although Plaintiffs cannot point to anv
specific imstances in which their speech has been
chilled because of the Act. we recognize that under
the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, even laws that
create only potential chilling effects impose some
First Amendment burden. For example, the Supreme
Court has held that campaign contribution disclosure
requirements and campaign advertisement funding
disclosure and disclaimer requirements impose a
minimal burden on speech and are therefore subject
to intermediate scrutiny. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64
disclosure requirements); Citizens United, 130 8. Ct
at 914 (disclosure and disclaimer requirements). In
Buckley, the law at issue required candidates and
PACs, as well as some other individuals or groups
making political contributions or expenditures, to file
disclosure reports with the FEC. 424 U.S. at 63. The
Court recognized that these reporting requirements
“ean seriously intmnge on privacy of association and
belief guaranteed by the First Amendment.” Jd. at 64.
The Court also realized that the pubhe disclosure of
App. 32
pohtical contributions “will deter some individuals
who otherwise might contribute. In some instances.
disclosure may even expose contributors to harass-
ment or retaliation.” Jd. at 68. Even though these
Were “not insignificant burdens on individual nights.”
the Court analyzed them under intermediate serutiny
rather than strict scrutiny because the disclosure
laws “impose no ceiling on campaign-related acti,
vikies.” Jd. at 64, 6S.
Recently, in Citizens United. the Court apphed
the same type of analysis to the BCRA’s requirement
that political advertisements must state who “is
responsible for the content of [certain] advertising.”
130 S.Ct. at 913-14. The Court reaffirmed Buckley's
reasoning that such requirements MAY impose a
cognizable burden under the First Amendment even
though they “do not prevent anyone from speaking.”
Ia. at 914.
The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments that
the requirement “decreases both the quantity and
effectiveness of the group's speech by forcing it to
devote four seconds of each advertisement to the
spoken disclaimer.” Jd. at 915. Notably. in the absence
of any evidence “of harassment or retaliation.” the
Court also dismissed the plaintiffs’ arguments that
the disclosure requirements would “chill donations to
an organization.” Jd. at 916.
[7] In this case, as in Buckley and Citizens
United, the burden that Plaintiffs allege is merely a
theoretical chilling effect on doners who might dishke
App 33
the statutory result of making a contmbution or can-
didates who may seek a tactical advantage related to
the release or timing of matching funds. The match-
ing funds provision does not actually prevent anvone
from speaking in the first place or cap campaign
expenditures. Also, as in Bucklev and Citizens United,
there is no evidence that any PlaintifY has actually
suffered the consequence they allege the Act imposes.
We conclude that the burden created by the Act 1s
most analogous to the burden of disclosure and
disclaimer requirements ino Buckley and Citizens
United. Following the Supreme Court's precedents in
those cases, because the Act imposes only a minimal
burden on fully protected speech, intermediate
scrutiny apphes.
[8] Examining the matching funds provision
under intermediate scrutiny, because there is a “‘sub-
stantial relation’” between the Act’s matching funds
provision and ae “‘sufficiently important’ govern-
mental interest.” we conclude that it does not violate
the First Amendment. See Citizens United, 1380S. Ct.
at 914 (quoting Buckley). The State has a sufficiently
important interest in preventing corruption and the
appearance of corruption. See Citizens United, 130
S.Ct. at 909. The record demonstrates that Arizona
has a long history of quid pro quo. corruption.
AzSeam, in which legislators literally sold their votes
for cash bribes, was just one of many substantial,
wide-spread, and highly-publicized political scandals
that Arizona expenenced in the late 1980s and 1990s.
These incidents occurred despite the contmbutions
App. 34
limits in place prior to the Act. Regardless of whether
quid pro quo corruption continued to be a problem at
the time of the Act’s passage, the appearance of quid
pro quo corruption to the electorate was undeniable.
Arizona voters were justified in) concluding that
contribution limits alone were not sufficient to com-
bat corruption and its appearance. As the Supreme
Court has recognized, the State’s interest in eradi-
cating the appearance of quid pro quo corruption to
restore the electorate’s confidence in its system of
government is not “illusory.” it is substantial and
compelling. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27.
Furthermore, the State has an interest in pro
viding matching funds to encourage participation in
its pubhe funding scheme. Because Buckley held that
pubhe financing of elections furthers First Amend-
ment values, federal courts have found that states
may structure them in a manner which will encour-
age candidate participation in them. See, e.g. Rosen.
stiel, 101 F.3d at 1553 (the State has a compelling
interest in stimulating candidate participation in its
pubhe financing scheme”). The Eighth and First
Circuits have found this interest to be so compelling
as to withstand even the strictest scrutiny.” See td.
Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26, 39-40 Clst
Cir. 1993) (finding that the state has a “compelling”
Because we hold that the Act is sulyect only to inter.
mediate scrutiny, we need not decide whether the Act would
survive stmet scrutiny, as the First and Fourth Circuits have
held with respect to publhe finanemg schemes similar to the Act
App. 35
interest ino “having candidates accept) public fi-
nancing” ).
The district court misapprehended how the Act
functions to reduce corruption. It assumed that the
Act works by reducing nonparticipating candidates’
incentive to fundraise private contmbutions, thereby
reducing the appearance of corruption among non-
participating candidates. Thus, it concluded that the
Act did not further an anticorrpution interest by
providing matching funds to participating candidates
triggered by non-participating candidates making
contributions to their own campaigns trom their own
private funds. In doing so, it relied on the Court's
holding that “discouraging use of personal funds| |
disserves the anticorruption interest.” Davis, 128
Ss. Ct. at 2773.
The fact is, however, that the Act is aimed at
reducing corruption among participating candidates.
The relevant inquiry thus is whether matching funds
bear a substantial relation to reducing corruption
among participating candidates. In exchange for
public funding, participating candidates relinquish
their mght to raise campaign contributions from
private donors. They therefore have both reduced
opportunities and reduced incentives to trade
lemslative favors for financial tavors. The Supreme
Court has held “li/t cannot be gainsaid that public
financing as a means of eliminating the improper
influence of large private contributions furthers a
significant governmental interest.” Buckley, 424 ULS.
at 96.
App. 36
Viewing the Act from this perspective, it is clear
that the Act’s anticorruption interest is) further
promoted by high participation in the program. The
more candidates that run with public funding, the
smaller the appearance among Arizona elected off-
cials of being susceptible to quid pro quo corruption,
because fewer of those elected officials will have
accepted a private campaign contribution and thus be
viewed as beholden to their campaign contnbutors or
as susceptible to such influence.
It is not relevant under this analysis what the
source of a nonparticipating candidate's campaign
contributions is when he or she triggers matching
funds. In order to promote participation in the
program, and reduce the appearance of guid pro quo
corruption, the State must be able to ensure that
participating candidates will be able to mount com-
petitive campaigns, no matter what the source of their
opponents funding. If matching funds were not
triggered by independent expenditures or expendh-
tures from a nonparticipating candidate's own funds,
the Act's pubhie funding plan would not attract parti-
cipants. It would be an enormous political risk to
participate in such a system.
In this way, matching funds bear a substantial
relation to the State’s anticorruption interest. A pub-
he financing system with no participants does noth-
ing to reduce the existence or appearance of quid pro
quo corruption. If participants were not given match-
ing funds, they would not join the program because
they would not be viable candidates in their elections.
App. 37
If the State were to adopt the district court's
recommendation of structuring matching funds by
tying them “solely to contributions made by third par-
ties to a candidate,” it would have the effect of deter-
ring the participation of any candidate who feared
she or he might have an opponent who was able to
self-finance or would be the beneficiary of large in-
dependent expenditures. This would substantially
diminish the Act’s ability to attract participants,
thereby undermining its ability to prevent corruption.
{9} In contrast, if the Act were to raise the
amount of its lump-sum grants and do away with
matching funds altogether, it would make the Act
prohibitively expensive and spell its doom. By linking
the amount of public funding in individual races to
the amount of money being spent in these races, the
State is able to allocate its funding among races of
varying levels of competitiveness without having to
make qualitative evaluations of which candidates are
more “deserving” of funding beyond the base amounts
provided to all publically-funded candidates. The
State must walk a fine line between providing too
much and too little funding to participating candi-
dates, and we cannot conclude that the Act's
matching funds provision has failed in this effort
Vv. Conclusion
{10} For the reasons set forth above, we
conclude that the matching funds provision of the Act
does not violate the First Amendment. We decline to
App. 38
reach the equal protection claim, and reverse and
remand to the district court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
KLEINFELD, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I concur. My reasoning is shghtly different. In my
view, the historical and policy considerations do not
matter to the outcome. Although the complaint
asserts both a facial and an as-applied challenge, the
district court injunction and the arguments amount
to a facial rejection of the statute.
The fact that matters is that the Arizona public
financing scheme imposes no limitations whatsoever
on a candidate's speech. Davis v. Federal Election
Commission’ is easily distinguished because there the
scheme did indeed impose a limit on the candidate's
speech, at least indirectly. If the candidate spent too
much of his own money promoting his political posi-
tion, then his opponent would benefit from a tripled
contribution limit per donor. The Arizona scheme
does not manipulate the limits on private donors’ con-
tributions according to whether a competing candi-
date is participating in the government funding
128 S.Ct. 2759 (2008)
; la at "ie
App. 39
scheme. Had it done so, Davis would apply by anal-
ORV.
Other circuits have divided on whether schemes
like Arizona’s violate the First Amendment.” The
Supreme Court cited with apparent approval the
Eighth Circuit decision,” which may be contrary to
the view we take today. But as the majority correctly
says, it is not clear that the Supreme Court meant to
adopt the Eighth Circuit view, and Davis did not
require the Court to address a scheme like the one
addressed by the Eighth Circuit.
I doubt that the level of scrutiny or risk of cor-
ruption matter in this case. The Arizena_ public
financing scheme's matchsng funds provision imposes
no limit at all on contributions or expenditures for
one’s own campaign. The limits are separate from the
public financing scheme and not challenged. The
* Compare N.C. Right to Life Comm. Fund for Indep.
Political Expenditures v. Leake, 524 F.3d 427, 437 (4th Cir. 2008)
(holding that matching funds te peblicly funded candidates that
trigger based on contributiems and expenditures for privately
funded candidates do not wmpose amy burden on First Amend-
ment mghts) and Dagget® v. Commn on Govtal Ethics and
Election Practices, 205 F3d 445, 464 (1st Cir. 2000) (same) with
Day v. Holahan, 34 P.3a@ 1356, 1860-62 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding
that providing additiomal public funds in response to inde-
penderit expenditures advocateng for a privately financed
candidate burdens the speech of the independent advocacy
groups, subjecting the law to strict scrutimy, and striking it
dovwen ).
* Davis, 128 S.Ct. at 2772
App. 40
plaimtiffs do not challenge the contributien limits.’
Contribution limits are what invoke corraptien and
level of serutimy considerations.
Plaintiffs challenge not contribution limits, but
the bemefits that the public financing scheme gives to
paticipatimg candidates running against privately
finaneed camdidates and the strategic concerns the
scheme creates for privately financed candidates.
Because the challenged scheme imposes no contri-
butien or spending limits, it does not restrict speech
at all, so I cannot see why heightened scrutiny would
apply.“ All that the evidence shows is that candidates
whe forege public funding make strategic decisions in
response to the public funding scheme. That is not a
restriction en speech. Intelligent, ambitious people
seeking political office, or any other goal, are likely to
study the rules and develop strategies taking maxi-
mum advantage of the rules. The kinds of strategic
* Contribution limits are impesed by Arizona Revised
Statutes § 16-905. Part of the referendum that created Arizome’s
public funding scheme alters the centribution limits by
providing new rules for participating candidates. § 16-941; A),
and uniformly decre@sing the contribution limits for nompar-
ticipating candidates, § 16-941(B). The complaint does not allege
that either § 16-905 or § 16-941 is unconstitutional. It alleges
that § 16-952, the matching funds provision of the referendum,
is unconstitutional. Section 16-952 does not impose contribution
limuts.
“ Accord N.C. Right to Life, 524 F.3d at 437: Daggett, 205
F.3d at 464.
’ N.C. Right to Life, 524 F.3d at 438; Daggett, 205 F.3d att
464.
ma
App. 41
choices generated by the Arizona rules do not differ in
kind from the choices presented to candidates by
other election laws. For example, candidates will run
their campaigns differently according to whether
there is a fixed election day or an extended period for
mail-in ballots, at large elections of multiple
candidates in one district or single winner elections in
multiple smaller districts, or partisan or nonpartisan
elections. That different laws generate different
strategres does not make them restrictions on speech.
The only speech:-related eoncern I can see to the
Arizona scheme is that a privately funded candidate
has to raise a lot more money to swamp a publicly
funded candidate. Someone not serious about politics,
but serious about traveling, eating meals, and seeing
his picture on billboards and in the newspapers for
months, all at taxpayer expense, might pose a gen-
uine challenge to a priwately funded candidate, unless
that candidate could raise funds well beyond the
ceiling in the public fumding scheme. If the notion is
that campaign contributioms amount to disguised
bribery, I suppose this might mean the Arizona
scheme would premote rather thai inhibit corruption.
But it is hard to see the materiality of that because
contribution limits have mot been challenged, and all
the corruption theory has been used to justify in First
Amendment law is contribution limits. As for the
privately funded candidate, his or her speech is not
limited by this increased burden of fundraising.
Rather, his chances of winning are inhibited if he
makes an incorrect judgment about whether he is
App. 42
going to be able to raise enough money to swamp the
publicly funded candidate. But the First Amendment
does not protect the candidate’s interest in winning,
just his interest in being heard. There is no First
Amendment right to make one’s opponent speak less,*
nor is there a First Amendment right to prohibit the
government from subsidizing one’s opponent,’ espe-
cially whem the same subsidy is available to the
challenger if the challemger accepts the same terms
as his opponent.”
As for the practical effects of the Arizona scheme,
I have no idea whether they are good or bad, and
nothing in the record throws any light on whether the
good outweighs the bad or vice versa. Intent and
metivation do not show effect, because the unin-
tended effects of reform frequently outweigh the
mtended effects. Nor does it matter whether the
scheme is a good or bad one, for First Amendment
purposes. Arizona is entitled to make good or bad
laws so long as they do not violate the Constitution.
* See Daggett, 205 F.3d at 464.
* Cf. Natl Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569,
587-88 (1998) (holding that the National Endowment for the
Arts may decide who to subsidize based on aesthetic value of
artworks because a subsidy is not a regulation on who can
speak).
© Cf. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va.,
515 U.S. 819, 829-30 (1995) (holding that a public university
must make its printing facilities available to all qualifying
student publications regardless of viewpoint).
App 433
Since this law does not Limit: speech, it does not
violate the First Amendment.
Perhaps pubhe funding is good because it helps
candidates run for office without relying on contr.
butions from people who will want) something in
return. Perhaps it is bad because in a state with a
large electorate and mass media, large contributors
are the only people involved who know a candidate,
and their money gives the public the benefit of what
amounts to quality screening by people who actually
know the candidate. As for the notion that contm
butions amount to bmbery, at least when they are
large, that may be so, or 11 may be that large contri-
butions amount to protection money that those
especially vulnerable to government power pay to
those they fear will wield it. Perhaps both, or neither,
is true. Doubtless many contributions result) from
contributors’ beliefs about who will) provide good
government, and gratitude to those willing to accept
elected office and competent to discharge it well.
None of this matters to this case. The only signif
icance of the corruption concern to First Amendment
law is that in Buckley v. Valeo, the concern was used
to justifv a limit on contributions to campaigns.
Since the case before us does not involve a contri-
bution limit or any other burden on speech, the con-
cern is immaterial.
494 US) 1, 25-26 C1976) (per curiam): see also Citizens
United v. Fed. Election Conon 'n, 130 S.Ct. S76, MOT C2010)
App. 44
In sum, the Arizona public financing scheme does
not limit speech directly or indirectly. The only
Supreme Court case touching at all closely upon the
issues is Davis, and Davis has to be distinguished
because the scheme in that case affected contribution
limits and this scheme does not. No Ninth Circuit
ease speaks to the constitutionalitw of the Arizona
scheme or anything like it. Qur sister circuits are
divided. Accordingly, T conclude that Arizona is not
constitutionally barred from using the scheme before
us.
App. 45
IN THE UNTPED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
John MeComush, et al. ) No. CV-O8-1550-PHX-ROS
; ) "
Plaintitts, ORDER
Vs \
Jan Brewer. et al.
Detendants.
This case involves claims by PlaintiltYs that the
campaign finance regime adopted by the State of
Anzona violates their free speech and equal protec-
fon rights. In short, Plaintiffs beheve the campaign
finance regime violates their rights because the state
provides additional funds to pubhely-funded candi.
dates in the event: non-publicly funded candidates
exceed certain campaign expenditure and fundraising
limits. As set forth below, the regime burdens Plain-
ufts’ First Amendment rights, is not supported by a
compelling state interest, is not narrowly tailored,
and is not the least restrictive alternative
The four cross motions for summary judgment
were filed in dune 2009. The parties filed responses
and rephes in duly 2009. Beganning in late July, and
continuing through September 2009, the parties made
various filings regarding supplementing the record
and submission of supplemental authority. In October
the Court) directed additional bnefing on crucial
issues not addressed in the parties’ orymnal sub-
mussions. The additional briefing was not complete
App. 46
until mid-November. In December 2009 the parties
continued to submut additional filings, and in Jan-
uary 2010) Plainti®s filed ao second motion for
preliminary ingunetion. The Court ordered expedited
brefing on that motion as well as supplemental briet-
ing on the appropriate scope of avatlable remedies
The record in this case is unusually large and
compheated. The summary judgment brieting: con
sists of more than one hundred separate docket
entmes, many of which consist of multiple documents
and hundreds of pages. Given the complicated nature
of this case, the Court deemed it prudent to review in
great detail the parties’ submussions betore issuing its
ruling. This ruling is issued less than two months
after the parties submitted the supplemental bniet-
ns
BACKGROUND
1. Passage of Clean Elections Act
The November 1998 election contained the tutia-
tive Measure known as the Citizens Clean Elections
Act (Aet")* According to the findings and declarations
Phe Distmet Court hearing the Dacis matter took approx
imately ten months to tssue its oprmion, and it took the Supreme
Court pust under one vear to issue its oprmen
Defendants’ bmefing reoounts various episodes of corrup
thonoain Arizona's state government allegedly leading: up to pas
sagre of the Act) Plaintitls concede the eprsodes eccurred, but
disagree that they were the driving foree tor passage of the Act
From the record presented in the oontert of what constitutes
(Continued on following page)
App. ay
contained in that muitiative, the intent of the Act was
“to create a clean elections system that will improve
the integmty of Arizona state government by dim-
imshing the influence of special-interest money, will
encourage citizen participation in the political proe-
ess, and will) promote freedom of speech.” The
proponents of the Act beheved the election-financing
system in effect at that time suffered from the eight
flaws that follow:
lL Allowed “elected officials to accept large
campaign contributions from. private inter:
ests over which they have governmental
jurisdiction’;
2 Gave “incumbents an unhealthy ad van
tage over challengers”;
3. Hindered “communication to voters by
many qualfied candidates”,
4. Suppressed “the voices and influence of
the vast majority of Arizona citizens in favor
of aoosmall number of wealthy special
Interests”,
& Undermined “pubhe confidence in the
integrity of pubhie officials”:
6 Cost “average taxpavers millions of dol-
lars in the ferm of subsidies and special
privileges for campaign contributors”:
—_—_——-—— =
admissible evidence, its impossible to determine the extent to
which the various corruption scandals led to passage of the Act
App. 48
7 Drove “up the cost of ranning for state
office, discouramng otherwise qualified can.
didates who lack personal wealth or access to
special interest funding”; and
SS. Required “elected officials spend too
much of their time raising funds rather than
representing the pubhe”™
The voter intormation pamphlet contained vari-
ous arguments “tor” and “against” passage of the Act
According to the arguments in taver of the Act, “i's
money that talks in political campaigns and it
threatens the principles of our democracy” Also, “(a)
thriving system depends upon solid governance and
poheies that benefit all of Arizonans, not just a few
who can afford to ‘pay to play’ ” And “[plolls reveal
that a lack of confidence in government is a major
factor” why individuals choose not to vote Voting in
favor of the Act would “end the monev chase, halt
corruption, limit campaign spending and reduce
special interest influence.” Voting: in tavor of the Act
would also “make sure that no lobbyist or special
Interest can again “buy a candidate as they are doing
now.”
The arguments against the Act in the voter
information pamphlet chamed it would levy “a host
of new taxes, create! | a new level of bureaucracy,
Thus information is taken from the Ballot) Propositions
Publiaty Pamphlet for the 1998 General Election Available at
itp www azsas gov clection 1998 Info PubPamphiet Cover btm!
App. 49
provide! | taxpayer funds for tringe candidates, pun
ishi | candidates who don’t want to use taxpayer
funds, and limit]! tree speech.” The opponents be
heved tax dollars should be saved “for education and
the safety of [their] children” instead of wasted on
“wacky candidates.” The Act passed with approx-
imately SU of the vote
2. Operation of Act
The Act, as currently constituted, provides a
voluntary system of campaign ftinanemg in which all
candidates for pubhe office must decide whether to be
a “participating: candidate” or ao “non-participating
candidate.” Particrpating candidates must collect: a
certain number of five-dollar “quahltving contmbu.
tions.” Once a participating candidate collects the
minimum number of “qualifving contributions,” he or
she recetves an initial grant for the primary. During
the pmmarvy campaign, the participating candidate
will receinve additional funds in the form of “matching
funds” af the participating candidate has a non-par-
tiopating opponent that spends more than the initial
grant” The participating candidate wall also receive
matching contmbutions af there are “independent
“Matching funds” are a dollar ter dellar match minus 6
meant to compensate tor the fundraising expenses tncurpmed by
traditional candidates ARS §$ 16-952 A) The parties use the
terms “matching contmbutions” and “matching funds” inter
changeabliv This opinien will use matching funds
App. 50
expenditures” against the participating candidate or
in favor of the non-participating opponent. Parties
patings candidates cannot raise or spend money in
addition to the grant
In the general election, a participating candidate
receives a second mmitial grant. Matching funds are
awarded if the non-participating candidate's receipts
(Le contmbutions), less expenditures made during the
pmmary campaign, exceed the second initial grant
Independent expenditures trigger matching funds in
the general campaign the same way they triggered
matching funds in the primary campayrn. Matching
funds cap out at three times the applicable spending
himit. Independent expenditures by Political Action
Committees’ PACS") made on behalf of a candidate
non-participating: or participating Or In opposition
to the participating opponent also count towards the
spending limit
Based on this structure, a candidate is taced with
the initial choice of whether to participate in public
funding. If the candidate decides not to participate in
“Independent expenditures” are defined as “expenditures
by a person or political committee, other than a candidate's
campanmn committee, that expressly advocates the election ot
defeat of a clearly identified candidate, that iw made without
cooperation or consultation with any candidate or committee or
agent of the candidate and that is not made rn coneert with or at
the request or sugwestion of a candidate. or any committee or
agent of the candidate "ARS § 16 901 14
Political Action Committees are groups omnanized “tor the
purpose of influencing the result of anv election "ARS 16 901
App 51
publhe funding, he or she must determine how much
money to spend on the race and how much time to
engaged in seeking fundraising. Assuming the can-
didate has a publicly funded opponent, the can-
didate’s expenditures and fundraising may result in
additional funds granted to that opponent. Those
additional funds, however, are hmited. Once a non-
participating candidate has raised or spent more than
three times the initial grant, no additional matching
funds will be piven to the participating opponent
Simply, there are no consequences once a non-
participating candidate has raised or spent more than
three times the initial grant
3. Participation in and Consequences of Act
The Act has been in place for the past five elec
tions. Since 2002, candidate participation has varied
between S29 and 67°. (Doc. 298 at 3). The parties
disagree on whether the Act has had an impact on
total campaign spending. It is undisputed that cam-
paurn spending has increased since the Act's passage,
but itis unclear whether that increase can be traced
to the Act. The parties also disagree on whether
candidates’ spending patterns show the Act has any
effect on candidate behavior Defendants assert the
spending patterns of candidates prove the Act has no
chilling effect. According to Defendants, if the Act
truly is chilling speech, one would expect to find
-_—— — —— -
The Act apphes to electrons tor statewide offices
aa
App. 52
candidates spend just up to but no more than the
spending limit. In other words, candidates would
attempt to spend the maximum amount they are able
to spend without triggering matching funds. Agyre-
yate statistics show candidates do not do so. But this
evidence does not dispose of Plaintiffs’ claims that
their speech was chilled and will be chilled. For
example, some of the Plaintiffs triggered matching
funds. Those individuals now claim they would have
spent more or spent at a different time if matching
funds were not a possibilty” Accordingly, the evi
dence regarding candidate spending does not defini
tively establish a chilling effect, or lack thereof
4. Plaintiffs’ Statements Regarding Burden of
Act
Plaintiffs and Plaintit®-Intervenors are incum
bents, past or future candidates for office, and Polit:
cal Action Committees ("PACS"). Plaintiffs were asked
during discovery to explain how the Act burdens their
rights. Plaintiffs’ testimony ts somewhat scattered
and shows only a vague interpretation of the burden
of the Act. Evidence regarding each Plaintiff? os
recounted below
* Other Plaintiffs did not spend enough to trigger matching
funds. and at does not appear that thes stopped spending just
shert of the point where matching funds would be awarded
App. 43
a. John McComish
Plant? John MeComish is a member of the
Anzona State House of Representatives who plans on
running tor reelection in 2010. In 2008, Mr. MeComish
ran as a non-participating candidate. (Doc. 316). In
the 2008 election, Mr. MeComish had at least three
participating opponents. Those opponents received
matching funds based on Mr. MeComish’s expend-
tures as Well as expenditures by third parties. Mr.
McComush claims the Act requires him to take steps
to minimize the impact of matching funds. Mr.
MeComish does this “by refraining from) making
campautn expenditures that (he! would otherwise
make... or by adopting a tactic of delaying [his] ex-
penditures mm such a manner as to minimize the
benefit any participating candidate may receive from
matching funds.” This, according to Mr. MeComish,
“amounts to self-censorship because (he! will retrain
from engaging in communication at times and in
manners that [he! would otherwise choose in order to
avoid disseminating viewpoints that are hostile to
this! candidacy.” da. at 5)
Mr. MeComush also beheves matching tunds “dis-
cruminate against traditional candidates.” (Doc. 316
at 5). This “discrimination” allegedly occurs when a
non-participating candidate tmggers matching funds
to his opponents. The Court is unable to conceive of
how an award of matching funds “discriminates”
against MeComuish. Discrimination in a general sense
requires that two individuals or groups be treated
differently by the government. Mr. MeComuish and the
App. 54
other Plaintiffs mentioned below have not explained
how they have been legally disfavored by the govern-
ment in comparison to participating candidates.
b. Nancy McLain
Plaintiff Naney McLain is a member of the Ari-
zona House of Representatives and plans on running
for reelection in 2010. During the 2008 primary
election, Ms. McLain triggered the award of matching
funds to an opponent. (Doc. 317 at 4). Independent
expenditures, allegedly aiding Ms. McLain, triggered
additional matching funds. During the most recent
general election, Ms. McLain had two participating
opponents. The presence of these opponents made her
“reluctant to fundraise ... or personally contribute or
loan money to [her] campaign.” Ms. McLain did not
trigger matching funds for the general election. In the
future, Ms. McLain plans on minimizing her fund-
raising and spending, or altering the mode of her
fundraising and spending, to lessen the impact of any
matching funds. Thus, matching funds allegedly re-
quire that Ms. McLain engage in “self-censorship.”
Like Mr. MeComish, Ms. MeLain claims match-
ing funds constitute a “discriminatory legal frame-
work.” Again, it is unclear what type of discrimination
Ms. MeLain believes is at issue.
~
App. 55
c. Tony Bouie
Tony Bouie is a non-participating candidate for
the Arizona House of Representatives. During the
2008 primary campaign, Mr. Boule had participating
and non-participating opponents. Mr. Boule and his
non-participating opponent both exceeded the spend-
ing limit during the primary campaign. Thus, the
participating opponent received matching funds. Mr.
Bouie claims his “speech was chilled from the mo-
ment [he] understood the general idea of matching
funds.” (Doe. 318). Mr. Bouie ceased “the promotion of
[his] campaign and [held his] campaign speech until
[his] expenditures could be timed’ to minimize the
impact of matching funds provisions.” The Act caused
Mr. Bouie to “self-censor until the last davs of the
election rather than sending out mailers, making au-
to calls, and passing out information door-to-door.”
d. Dean Martin
Dean Martin is the current Arizona State Trea-
surer and was elected to the State Senate in 2000,
2002, and 2004. (Doc. 288-2 at 4). In each of his
campaigns, Mr. Martin ran as a non-participating
candidate. Mr. Martin claims during his most recent
campaign he “was forced to limit [his] speech and
abide by the Act’s expenditure limits or rmsk being
* Delaying expenditures as much as possible minimizes the
impact of matching funds because the participating opponent
will not have time to spend the matching funds
App. 56
further outspent by [his] government-funded oppo-
nent because of the operation of the Act.” (Doc. 288-6
at 113). Mr. Martin states “|t]he only way [he] could
avoid being massively outspent by [his] opponent was
to prevent the triggering of additional matching
funds to [his opponent’s] campaign.” (Ud. at 114).
Thus, Mr. Martin “stopped accepting contributions to
[his] campaign.” Ud.). Mr. Martin triggered a rela-
tively small amount of matching funds in the 2006
State Treasurer race. (Doc. 362-1 at 22).
Despite Mr. Martin’s statement that matching
funds forced him to limit his speech, and the fact that
Mr. Martin triggered matching funds in 2006, Mr.
Martin was unable during his deposition to recall]
whether he had ever triggered matching funds. (Doc.
309-8 at 3). It follows that if matching funds were a
serious concern, Mr. Martin would know whether he
had triggered such funds. Mr. Martin also testified he
has supported legislation to repeal the Act, and his
opposition to matching funds is based, at least in
part, on the provision that if you accept government
funding “you're not allowed ... to support your own
campaign over a certain amount.” (Ud. at 9). Thus, it
appears that Mr. Martin’s real focus has been on pub-
lic funding of elections in general, and not matching
funds in particular.
e. Robert Burns
Robert Burns is an Arizona State Senator. Mr.
Burns was first elected in 2002, was reelected in
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