Record and brief — Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett

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PETITION

FOR

WRIT OF

CERTIORARI

‘\) vy vat ty

No. (| 10-2 38 wes 27 700

an The ORFNOE OF THE CLERK

Supreme Court of the Hnited States

°

ARIZONA FREE ENTERPRISE CLUBS FREEDOM

CLUB PAC.) ARIZONA TANBPAY ERS ACTION

COMMIPTER, DEAN MARTIN, and RICK MURPHY

\

KEN BENNETT. in his offteral capacity as Secretary otf

State of the State of Arona, and GARY SCARAMAZ/0

ROYANN J PARKER, JE PRREY Lo FAIRMAN,

LORLS DANIELS. and LOUIS HOPRRFEMAN in

therr offieral capacities as members of the ARIZONA

CITIZENS CLEAN ELECTIONS COMMISSION,

CLEAN ELECTIONS INSTTIPU PEL ING ,

AY NJrerriade PIS

eo

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Ninth Circuit

e

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

.

INSTITUTE BOR .TUSTIC? INSTITU TR PoR POSTE

WitLtLtAM RO MAUKER* Witti AM Ht MeLLOR

101 VYesler Wav. Suite 603 M01 North Glebe Road

Seattle, WA YS1O4 Suite 800

VOG) G4 1-9800 Arhangton, VA 2evos

wimaurere@y ory PO3) BSLV-YIVO

INSTITU PE POR JUsric!

DiMorHy D> KEELER

Paur Vo AVELAR

39S South Mall Avenue,

Suite Qo

Tempe, AZ SALS1

480) SOT SR00

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

In Davis vo. FEC, 128 S.Ct. 2759 (2008), this

Court held that the First Amendment forbids the

government from attempting to level the plaving field

in elections by raising contribution lumits for candi-

dates who are outspent by self-financed opponents

Arizona's Citizens Clean Elections Act achieves a

similar result by providing extra subsidies in the

form of “matching funds” to publhely financed candi-

dates who are outspent by independent expenditure

groups and privately financed candidates. The ques-

tions presented are:

lL. Whether the First Amendment forbids Arizo-

na from providing additional government subsidies to

pubhely financed candidates that are triggered by

independent expenditure groups’ speech against such

candidates”

y

2 Whether the First Amendment forbids Arivo

na from providing additional government subsidies

to pubhely financed candidates that are triggered by

the fundraising or expenditures by these candidates’

privately financed opponents”

il

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

In addition to the parties named in the caption,

the following individuals were parties in the court of

appeals proceeding and separate plaintiffs before the

district court: John MeComush, Nanev MeLain, and

Tony Bouie

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

The Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom

Club PAC has no parent company and there is no

publicly held company that has a 10% or greater

ownership interest in the Arizona Free Enterprise

Club's Freedom Club PAC.

The Anzona Taxpavers Action Committee has no

parent company and there is no pubhely held compa.

ny that has a 10% or greater ownership interest in

the Arizona Taxpayers Action Committee

wv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING i

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT un

TABLE OF CONTENTS ............:0ccscccceee0:: Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ... vu

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI l

OPINIONS BELOW “3 l

JURISDICTION : ho Maa l

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES

AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED | l

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2

lL THE ACT 3

Il THE ACT’S EFFECT ON SPEECH Ss

Il THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW i2

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT 17

lL EVEN AFTER THIS COURT'S DECISION

IN DAVIS, CIRCUITS ARE DIVIDED ON

WHETHER SYSTEMS OF PUBLIC FI.

NANCING OF CAMPAIGNS EMPLOYING

MATCHING FUNDS MECHANISMS ARF

CONSTIPUTIONAL | 19

A THE NINTH CIRCUITS DECISION

DIRECTLY CONFLICTS WITH DE-

CISIONS OF THE SECOND AND

ELEVENTH CIRCUITS 20

TABLE OF CONTENTS — Continued

Page

B. THE SPILT AMONG THE CIRCUITS

CREATES CONSIDERABLE CONFU-

SION REGARDING THE CONSTITU-

TIONALITY OF SIMILAR SYSTEMS

ACROSS THE COUNTRY. RBS

ll THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION

CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT'S

HOLDING IN DAVIS THAT, IN) THE

CONTEXT OF A COMPETITIVE ELEC-

TION, LAWS THAT PROVIDE FUNDING

ADVANTAGES TO A SPEAKER'S POLIT-

ICAL OPPONENTS BASED ON THE EX-

ERCISE OF THE SPEAKER'S FIRST

AMENDMENT RIGHTS ARE UNCON.

STITUTIONAL .......... ninasiaaanas:* “ee

lll THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION

CONFLICTS WITH CITIZENS UNITED

BY ALLOWING GOVERNMENTS TO

INDIRECTLY RESTRAIN THE SPEND-

ING OF INDEPENDENT EXPENDI-

~

TURES GROUPS | | —

CONCLUSION..... we aS 39

APPENDIX INDEX

US. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Order and Amended Opimon (June 23,

Shae CSE ste App. 1-44

US. Distmet Court for the Distmet of Arizona

Order (January 20, 2010). : App. 45-78

Vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS ~- Continued

Page

U.S. Supreme Court Order (June 8, 2010)....... App. 79

US. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Order (February 1, 2010).0000 occ. App. 80-86

Us. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Order (January 29, 2010) 20.0000... App. 87-89

U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona

Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law

De WEN I oink nt nccntwsunsnninnnn cindipienneans App. 90-118

U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona

Order (August 29, 2008) 2000000000000... ..... App. 119-131

Si IG: MINI Bh sas cicnceonsectnsccueseaenicwencnseqeses App. 182

U.S. Const. Amend. XIV... aCe te

a oh. de eee een eat ..... App. 133

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-940 ef seq. ................ App. 134-149

Declaration of Plaintiff-Intervenor Dean Mar-

tin in Support of Motion for Summary

SEE RSI pe at eA one App. 150-153

Declaration of Robert Burns .................... App. 154-157

Declaration of Chad Kirkpatrick ............ App. 158-161

Excerpts from the Deposition Transcript of

Stephen James Voeller (taken on February

I ie oh iain cra elhncins scan ietevaimincin App. 162-164

Declaration of Plaintiff-Intervenor Rick Mur-

phy in Support of Motion for Summary

Nic citciithdind duke aiptnanioncgscuniensnnis App. 165-170

Vil

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Ass'n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Brewer,

486 F.3d 586, reh’g granted, rev'd in part, A494

F.3d 1145, amended by, 497 F.3d 1056 (9th

I ree hr ket Le kadikenmincibiaanes 13

Ass'n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Brewer,

363 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (D. Ariz. 2005) ..........0000000..... 12

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 A976)... eee 35

Crttzens United v. FEC, 1308. Ct. 876 (2010).... passim

Daggett v. Comm'n on Gov'tal Ethics & Election

Practices, 205 F.3d 445 (1st Cir. 2000) ............. 20, 23

Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008)... passim

Day v. Holahan, 34 F3d 1356 (Sth Cir.

SEED sisnicirustseeiinsncatastabidamiagebactameusuian 20, 22, 23, 24, 34

FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238

(1986)

FEC v. Natl Conservative Political Action

AO ry A a 36

Gable v. Patton, 142 F.3d 940 (6th Cir. 1998).........20, 21

Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 5 F.3d ___

2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 14286 (2d Cir. July

SE I dence csiinc ink cid anidatulnsnauncinaubaimeiades 17, 19, 21, 32

Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 648 F. Supp. 2d

I I TO a eaecnnetusioniin 33

Martin, et al. v. Brewer. et al., No. 04-cev-0200

Se ls GI Wil CID sists dks ces puccduuscovesiatasunansinsmadacs 13

Vill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

McComish v. Brewer, No. 08-cv-1550 (D. Ariz.

I I I erie siciscehisdsintcsieinngebesicdaenaaleatnieltciasiniptedsceiiiisanieiene 13

N.C. Right to Life Comm. Fund for Indep.

Political Expenditures v. Leake, 524 F.3d 427

(4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, Duke v. Leake,

a ks ey i IO x evenncecniccssnecnccescccssccnsens 20, 23, 24

Scott v. Roberts, F.3d , 2010 U.S.

App. LEXIS 15897 (llth Cir. July 30,

SE clecasested cieeusditoaiicidiuhtatnainindninainnisses 17, 19, 21, 22, 32

United States v. Stevens, 1380S. Ct. 1577 (2010)....... 34

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

ee es MINI, Uh viivechsicctsnteenscisnccisdecneseteceupinisiia passim

Copes, RULES AND STATUTES

RE IELTS OS eae ae ARES Sree Per A rar 1

Albuquerque, N.M., Charter art. XVI (2004)............ 27

An Act Concerning Comprehensive Campaign

Finance Reform for State-Wide Constitution-

al and General Assembly Offices, 2005 Conn.

Pub. Acts. 5 (Spec. Sess.) (codified as amend-

ed Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 9-600 to -674, 9-700 to

I ET ih ais ce atacieat inate uhacetinaioieeds 25

An Act to Reform Campaign Finance, 1996 Me.

Legis. Serv. Initiated Bill Ch. 5 (West) (codi-

fied at scattered sections of Me. Rev. Stat.

Ann. Tit. 21-A, $§ 1121-1128 (Supp. 2006)) ........... 25

IX

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Anizona Citizens Clean Elections Act.

Ariz. Rev. Stat.

IIR RNS Rie Sa eee Sneed

S

N

S

RES LUE ie pean AyD ek Sa eae

O_O SE See ee ee

$ 16-952(A-C)..00 LE se RE es I |

SP MIE ioe cacsvecesisdvcscaaves ‘ed

§ 16-952.C\2)...

TIE iis ssa <cccarcnevaschuceouanacnoveciecesusteciac:

16-9521) ............. cad antaecied cinema

SS.

SS:

Arizona Citizens Clean Elections Act. 1998

Anz. Legis. Serv. Prop. 200 (West) (codified

at Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann... $$ 16-901.0, -940 to

"REINS S SC A A Pe Peet Ch ae OER Oe

Florida Election Campaign Financing Act, Fla.

Laws 86-276 (codified at Fla. Stat. $$ 106.30

Nebraska Campaign Finance Limitation Act,

1992 Neb. Laws S56 $$ 1-10 (codified as

amended at Neb. Rev. Stat. $$ 32-1601 to

WY Cisiin neces punesdenhiseddeaeceestdesbdechathoantapedaretincedicess

Page

sve

a?

> r-

aseee are)

Vo

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

North Carolina Judicial Campaign Reform Act,

2002 N.C. Sess. Laws. 158 (codified as

amended in scattered sections of N.C. Gen.

es a I NOD ooo vacacccaccuseacenccccucaneca:

Portland, Or., Municipal Code ch. 2.10 (2005)

Pilot Comprehensive Public Funding for Flee-

tions to the Hawau County Couneil, 2008

Haw. Act 244............. [aided

Tueson, Ariz., Charter cho XVI, Subchapter (B)

Op SED oikcccaseievecccccucnis

Voter Action Act, 2007 N.M. Laws Ist Spee

Sess. Ch. 2 (H.B. 6) (West).....000000...

West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Pubhe

Campaign Financing Pilot Program, 2010 W.

Va. Acts 72 (codified at Wo Va. Code $$ 3-12-1

IE Bathe xc dectcescachsanekucndeceess

Wisconsin Impartial Justice Act, 2009 Wis

Sess. Laws SY (codified in scattered sections

of Wis. Stat. Ch. 8S, 11, 20. 25. 71 (2010)

Sup. Ct. R. 10 ca)

OTHER PUBLICATIONS

Brennan Center for Justice et al.. Breaking

Free with Fair Elections: A New Declaration

of Independence for Congress (March 2007),

avaliable at https www.ecleanupwashington

org documents breaking free pdf...

H.R. 1826, 111th Cong. (2009)

Page

*s,°

oO

XI

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Pare

Press Release, Public Campayrn: While Congress

Fiddles and Washington Burns, States Take

Action to Clean Up Politics (May 22, 2006),

http: www publhicampaign org pressroom LOO

05 22 while-conygress-fiddles-and-washingyton-

burns-states-take-action-to-clean-up politics 26

S. 1285, 110th Cong. (2007)... s : 27

S. 7482, 111th Cong. (L009) 27

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club

PAC, Anvona Taxpavers Action Committee, Dean

Martin, and Rick Murphy respecttully petition for a

writ of certiorart to review the yudgment of the US

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cireuit

— 6 -——-_-_-—--_-——--

OPINIONS BELOW

The oryanal decision of the court of appeals is

reported at GOS F3d 720. The court's amended dect-

Sion is unreported and appears ino the Appendix

App”) at App. 1-44. The decision of the US) Dhstmet

Court for the District of Anzona is unreported and

appears in the Appendix at App. 45-78

— -- — —~ @ — —__—_—_—_—

JURISDICTION

The pudgment of the court of appeals was entered

on May 21, 2010. This Court's jurisdiction is invoked

under JS USC. § 125401)

———

CONSTIPUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,

AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

The First Amendment to the United States

Constitution provides, ino pertinent part: “Congress

shall make no law abridging the freedom of

speech.” Relevant portions of the Anvona Citizens

Clean Elections Act, Ariz. Rev. Stat. $$ 16-940 ef seg.

are reproduced at App. 134-49

—_—_—__-+-___—-@

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case asks whether the government may

provide funding: benefits to candidates ino contested

elections in order to “level the playing field” among

those candidates. In Davis vo FEC, 128 S.Ct. 2759

(2008), this Court held the government may not do so

The benefit: provided in Davis was an increase in

contmbutien limits for federal candidates who ran

against so-called “millionaire” candidates who could

finance their own campaigns. In this case, the benefit

is a subsidy in the form of “matching funds” pand to

candidates when their opponents or their supporters

engage in political activity in excess of a government.

created threshold. The result, however, is the same

The candidates who opt into the system are granted

funding advantages desizned to equalize their speech

with the speech of candidates who elect to fund their

own camMpawyns or raise money from private donors

But Docis us clear that the government may not

create funding benefits for favered candidates im

order to equalve their ability to spend menev on

campaign speech) Arizona does just that by providing

matching funds to one candidate trigyered by the

spending by or for his opponent

In upholding Arizona's system of matching tunds

subsidies, the Ninth Cireuit resected Dacis’ apphea-

tion to Anvona’s law and concluded that the govern

ment mav burden the speech of advocacy groups that

speak independently of candidates independent

expenditure groups”) and privately tinanced cand,

dates as an incentive tor candidates to publicly fi

nance their campaigns. The Ninth Cireurt’s decision

simply cannot be squared with Doacis and both the

Second and Eleventh Crreuits have therefore subse

quently refused to follow the Ninth Circuit's reason,

Ing, creating a significant conflict among the circuits

Because the law burdens the speech of independent

groups, the Ninth Cireuit’s decision also conthets with

Citizens United & FEC, U0S. Ct S76 (2010). In light

of the inextmeable conflict among the cireuits, the

increasing prevalence of similar laws in the states,

and the Ninth Cireuit’s erroneous reading of Dacrs

and Citizens United, this Court's authoritative guid

ance is urgently needed

lL THEACT

1 Atussue are certain provisions of the Arizona

Citizens Clean Elections Act, Arne. Rev Stat $$ 16

MO ef seg che “Act™), and specifically, Arie Rew Stat

§ 16-952. A-C) (the “Matching Funds Provision”) App

138-41. The Act is a system of public funding for

campaigns for Arizona state offices It was adopted in

1998 through a ballot initiative by a margin of SL. to

49% It took effect in 2000) The Act apphes to races

for Governor, Secretary of State, Attorney General,

Treasurer, Superintendent of Puble Instruction,

Corporation Commussioner, Mine Inspector State

Senator, and State Representative. The Citizens

Clean Elections Commission, the members of which

are named as defendants in their official capacities, is

tasked with enforcing the provisions of the Act

The Act provides government funds to candidates

who collect a sufierent number of $5 “qualifving

contmbutions” trom the puble These candidates

must agree to abide by spending hmuats set out in the

Act) Ariz” Rev Stat. $ 16-946 The government pro-

vides a set amount of money, or “rmitial disburse.

ment,” to qualifving candidates) Except for the $5

centmbutions and other minor exceptions, pubhely

financed candidates cannot accept any private contr

butions Amz Rev Stat) §$ 16-941,An 1) App 135

They also may not make expenditures above the

initial disbursement unless they receinve funds under

the Matching Funds Provision Ariz Rev Stat § 16

M4L(AKS-4), App. 1385-86. These matching funds are

provided by the government and can amount to up to

two times the amount of the initial disbursement for

each candidate that recenves them Ariz) Rev Stat

S16 8520F), App. 142-48

2. Two overmding purposes of the Act were to

“level the plaving fleld” among candidates and reduce

the influence and relative vorce of certain business

xroups with whom the ballot measure’s proponents

disagreed (Pubhe Campaign, “Why America’s Semors

Should Care about Money in Polities.” ECF No 294-2

at 123-24, Ninth Cir) Excerpts of Ro CER™) 4194-95,

Pubhe Campaign, “Why Working People Should Care

About Monev in Politics,” ECR No. 294-2 at T2oee,

ER 4197-98; Pubhe Campaign, “Why Environmental

ists Should Care about Money in Politics.” ECF No

294-2 at 129-30, ER 4200-01; see also Chart of “Level

the Plaving Field” andor “Lanmait Spending” Reter

ences owith citations), ECF No. 288-6 at 37 70, ER

3584-3617.) As an internal memorandum to the ballot

measure's steering committee from the initiative's

campayin manager stated “Clean Elections is NOT

about pubhe funding. Its [sic] about spending limits,

getting md of spemal interests, and leveling the

playing field.” (Confidential “State of the Campaign”

Mem From Campaiutn Manager Josh Silver, Apr. 6,

194s, ECF No 358-2 at 38. ER 5070.) The constitu

tional problem arses in the Act's attempt to address

those situations where the “playing Meld” is not level

and independent groups or privately financed cand

dates can outspend pubhely financed candidates To

achieve this leveling, the Act's dratters added the

Matching Funds Provision, Ariz) Rew Stat § 16-952

This section is entitled “Equal Funding of Cand:

dates “App 138

The matching funds subsidies distributed by the

government to each pubhely financed candidate

equal the amount the privately financed candidate

spent or received or the amount spent bw the

independent political group — over the initial dis

bursement, less 6° for fundraising: expenses Ari

fe)

Rev. Stat) §$ 16-952. AC) App 188-41. Independent

expenditure groups tmgeger matching funds to each

publicly financed candidate in a race when «) they

spend money in opposition to a publicly financed

candidate or in tavoer of a privately financed oppo-

nent, and (n) the total amount spent by an independ-

ent expenditure group plus the amount spent or

received by the prvately financed candidate exceeds

the amount of the initial disbursement. Jd) When an

independent group's) spending triggers matching

funds, the government provides those funds directly

to the publicly financed candidate or candidates in

the race and not to independent groups supporting

them. Independent expenditures on behalf of pubhely

financed candidates or against privately financed

candidates do not tmyger matching funds to privately

financed candidates. See Amz. Rev. Stat. § 16-952.C),

App. 189-41) An independent expenditure in support

ofa publicly financed candidate results in matching

funds to other publicly financed candidates in the

same race, however Ariz Rev Stat) § 16 952.043),

App. 140. Thus, a $10,000 expenditure on behalf of a

privately financed candidate results ino an almost

$10,000 governmental subsidy to each pubhely fi

nanced candidate in the race In contrast, a $10,000

independent expenditure on behalf of a pubhely

financed candidate results in no government money

going to any privately financed candidates in that

race, but would trigger matching funds to any other

pubhely financed candidates in the race

Privately financed candidates trigger matching

tunds to each publicly financed candidate in a race

when they spend Un the primary election) or raise Un

the general election) money above the government's

initial disbursement amount. Anz Rev Stat. § 16-

952. A-B);, App. 138-39.

Although commonly referred to as “matching

funds,” that term does not accurately deseribe how

the Matching Funds Provision actually works. The

money distmbuted by the government to pubhely

financed candidates often substantially exceeds the

amount of contributions or spending that triggered

the Matching Funds Provision. That is, the Act does

not really “match” expenditures or contrmbutions ou

often significantly exceeds them. This is because the

Act offers a grant of the total matching funds subsidy

to each publicly financed candidate running against a

privately financed candidate. Ariz) Rev Stat. § 16-

Y2AA-B) App. 138-39) For example, assume a race

with Gi) one privately tinanced candidate and three

pubhely financed candidates, and «u) the privately

financed candidate has spent or raised more than the

amount of the initial disbursement. [fan independent

expenditure group makes an expenditure of $10,000

in support of the privately financed candidate in this

race, then the government gives $10,000 Cless 6%)

directly to each publicly financed candidate. In other

words, $10,000 worth of expenditures in support of a

privately financed candidate (who may not have

wanted it) results in $28,200 worth of speech against

that candidate

S

ll. THE ACT'S EFFECT ON SPEECH

1 The Petitioners are two political action

committees, the Anzona Free Enterpmse Club's

Freedom Club PAC (the “Freedom Club PAC”) and

the Anzona Taxpavers Action Committee (“Arizona

Taxpayers”), which make or fund independent ex-

penditures in Arizona state campaigns. The Petition-

ers also include two elected officials, Arizona State

Treasurer Dean Martin and State Representative

Rick Murphy, who have in the past, and intend to in

the future, run campaigns for Arizona state offices

using money raised from private parties

The Petitioners brought this case because the Act

burdens their ability to engage in unfettered political

speech ino competitive elections for Amzona. state

oMeces. As an expenmenced political consultant test-

fied below, since the advent of the Act, “every spend-

ing decision” is made with the Act’s matching funds in

view. [Querard Dep. 99, Feb. 12, 2009, ECF No. 345-3

at 3, ER 1927.] Independent expenditure groups and

candidates testified that their entire campaign strat-

eyyv takes the Act's matching funds into account.

Candidates testified to intentionally lowering their

expenditures and fundraising to avoid triggering

matching funds. The Act’s matching funds therefore

affect speech at the very core of elections. As Repre-

sentative Murphy stated, candidates “do not run two

campaigns: one with matching funds and one without

matching funds.) The availability of matching funds

for my opponents dictates my strategy and influences

my thinking frem the very beginning of the election

9

evele right up to the very end.” |Pl.-Intervenor Mur-

phy’s Resp. to Defs. & Def.-Intervenor’s Interrogs. &

Doc. Regs. at 5, ECF No. 338 at 97, ER 31386. |

In that regard, the record below demonstrates

that the Act causes independent expenditure groups

to take the Act’s matching funds into account when

deciding on which races to spend money. Specifically,

Arizona Taxpayers has delayed making independent

expenditures to avoid triggering matching funds until

later in the election cycle. It engaged in self-

censorship in 2006 when it chose not to speak in

opposition to a publicly financed candidate in a

Senate primary race to avoid triggering the Act's

matching funds. [Kirkpatrick Dep. 72-75, Jan. 30,

2009, ECF No. 338 at 135-36, ER 3224-25.| The

Freedom Club PAC has reluctantly triggered match-

ing funds to candidates it opposes and the Act has

affected every spending decision it makes with regard

to races involving publicly financed candidates. This

forces the Freedom Club to alter the timing of its

independent expenditures. App. 163-64.

2. The Matching Funds Provision also burdens

the speech of privately financed candidates. Repre-

sentative Murphy is an Arizona State Representative

and a privately financed candidate for the Senate in

2010 facing at least one publicly financed general

election candidate. He ran as a privately financed

candidate in 2006 and 2008 and a publicly financed

candidate in 2004. In his 2006 general election

campaign, Murphy stopped raising money to avoid

10

triggering matching funds to his publicly financed

opponent. Murphy did not fundraise during the 2008

general election because doing so would have trig-

gered almost $3 in additional subsidies for every $1

he raised. Nonetheless, in the 2008 general election,

when a group made an independent expenditure of

$3.627 to support Murphy's candidacy, all three of

his publicly financed opponents received a check for

nearly $3,627 — meaning that the group’s small

expenditure triggered $10,881 (minus 6%) in govern-

ment subsidies to his opponents. [Pl.-Intervenors’

Resps. to Defs.” & Def.-Intervenor’s First Set of

Interrogs. & Doc. Reqs. at 6-8, ECF No. 338 at 71-73,

ER 3160-62.)

Treasurer Martin is a former state senator and

the current Arizona State Treasurer. He was a candi-

date for governor in the 2010 election but has since

withdrawn. His campaigns for the Senate and

Treasurer were all privately financed. In his 2004

Senate campaign, Martin intentionally delayed

fundraising to minimize the amount of government

* Although he has ended his race for governor in the 2010

election, Martin has long been active in Arizona state politics

and expects to run for state office again in the future. App. 151-

53. He has also been pressing his claim that the Matching

Funds Provision is unconstitutional for six years. Because his

claims could not be resolved before this or any of his previous

campaigns for office had concluded, and because he plans to run

for state office again, his claim is “capable of repetition, yet

evading review.” Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2770.

ll

subsidies his opponents received. In his 2006 cam-

paign, Martin avoided fundraising to prevent trigger-

ing the Act’s matching funds. Martin has also actively

discouraged groups from making independent ex-

penditures on his behalf to avoid triggering matching

funds to his opponents. [Martin Dep. 21-22, 69-71,

Jan. 23, 2009, ECF No. 338 at 20-21, 23-24, Tr. 3109-

10, 3112-13; Pl.-Intervenor Dean Martin’s Supple-

mental Resp. to Defs.’ Req. for Clarification at 1-2,

ECF No. 338 at 37-38, ER 3126-27; Martin Decl. 2,

Nov. 26, 2007, ECF No. 288-7 at 113, ER 3753; Martin

Fundraising Email, Aug. 31, 2004, ECF No. 338 at 27,

ER 3116.) In 2010, the Matching Funds Provision

forced Martin to run a publicly financed campaign for

governor. Despite being philosophically and politically

opposed to the Act, Martin believed this was the only

strategy that would preclude his opponents from

receiving significant government subsidies based on

his exercise of his free speech rights. See App. 153.

{Martin Decl. 2, Nov. 26, 2007, ECF No. 288-7 at 113,

ER 3753.]'

* Robert Burns, a plaintiff-intervenor below, is an Arizona

State Senator and the current President of the Arizonz Senate.

Senator Burns testified that the Act coerced him to change the

timing of his speech in order to avoid triggering the Act’s

matching funds. App. 155. [Pl.-Intervenor Burns’ Resps. to Defs.’

& Def.-Intervenor’s Interrogs. & Doc. Reqs. at 1-2, ECF No. 338

at 57-58, ER 3146-47; Burns Dep. 104, Sept. 17, 2008, ECF No.

338 at 47, ER 3136.) Senator Burns has announced that he

intends to retire from politics when his current Senate term

ends. While he no longer has a direct interest in the outcome of

(Continued on following page)

12

3. Finally, a systematic analysis of four eveles of

Arizona election data shows that it is now common-

place for candidates to delay campaign activities to

minimize the Act’s matching funds triggered by their

own speech. [Primo Deel. in Support) of PL-

Intervenors’ Mot. for Summ. Jd... May 26, 2009, ECE

No. 288-7 at 2-39, ER 3642-79.) Indeed, one research-

er reports that, of the Arizona candidates who re-

sponded to his) survey, all reported putting off

spending to avoid having their opponents receive

these additional subsidies through the Matching

Funds Provision. Michael Miller, Garing Arizona:

Public Money and Shifting Candidate Strategies, 41

PS: Political Science & Politics 527 (Jul. 2008) [ECE

No. 288-7 at 54-59, ER 3694-99 |

ll. THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW

1. ‘Treasurer Martin, along with other privately

financed candidates and an independent expenditure

group, first challenged the constitutionality of the

Matching Funds Provision in 2004, when he was a

State Senator. The United States District Court for

the District of Arizona, the Honorable Earl Carroll,

dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. Ass'n of

Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Brewer, 363 F. Supp. 2d

1197 CD. Ariz. 2005).

this proceeding, his expermence is relevant to ilustrate how the

Matching Funds Provision burdens tree expression

18

Martin and his co-plaintiffs appealed to the

Ninth Cireuit. The Ninth Cireuit initially dismissed

the entire appeal as moot, but then reversed itself

solely as to Martin. The court held that Martin's

claim was not moot, conciuded that he had stated a

cause of action, and remanded to the distmet court.

Ass'n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons vo Brewer, A&86

F.3d 586, rehig granted, rev'd in part, A494 F.3d 1145,

amended by, 497 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 2007). Martin

then amended his complaint to include two independ,

ent expenditure groups, Petitioners Arizona Taxpay-

ers and the Freedom Club PAC, as plaintitls. The

amended complaint was entitled Martin, et al. v

Brewer et al., No. O4-ev-0200 (D. Ariz. May 1, 2008).

Separate from Treasurer Martin’s case, on Au-

gust 21, 2008, privately financed candidates John

MeComish, Naney MeLain, Tony Boule and others

filed suit in the United States District Court for the

Mistrict of Arizona, the Honorable Roslyn Silver. This

complaint was stvled MeComiush v. Brewer, No. OS-cv-

1850 (D. Ariz. Aug. 21, 2008). These candidates

asserted that the Matching Funds Provision violated

the First Amendment and ran afoul of this Court's

then-verv recent decision ino Davis. Because the

MceComish and Martin actions were against the same

defendants and raised similar issues, the state de-

fendants moved to consolidate the cases before Judge

Carroll. The Martin plaintiffs did not object. Nonethe-

less, Judge Carroll denied the motion. To avoid duphi-

cative proceedings, the Martin plaintiffs intervened

in the MeComush case and voluntarily dismissed the

14

Martin case” Murphy then joined Martin and the in-

dependent expenditure groups as plaintifTintervenors

in the MecComish proceeding. The Clean Elections

Institute, Inc. (CED, a non-profit group promoting the

Act, also intervened as a defendant

In the end, there were four groups of parties to

the case before Judge Silver, each represented by

separate counsel: (i) the state detendants (the Arizona

Secretary of State and the members of the Citizens

Clean Elecuons Commussion), (1) detendant-intervenor

CEI, au) the MecComuish plaintitts (privately financed

candidates MeComish, MeLain, and Boute), and uv)

the Martin plaintiflintervenors Undependent expen-

diture groups Arizona Taxpayers and the Freedom

Club PAC and privately financed candidates Martin

and Murphy), which are the Petitioners here *

Before the Martin plamntitYs intervened in) the

case, the MeComisé plaintif!s moved for a temporary

restraining order prohibiting the members of the

As discussed more thoroughly infra, the MoeCorus’

plaintiffs are also filumg a separate petition for certroram wath

this Court regarding the Ninth Cireuit’s decisren) Petitioners

here fully support the MoComus/ plaintiffs’ petition and urge

this Court to grant it) Petitioners also respectfully request that

this Court consolidate its review of both petitions inte one

proceeding so that this Court can consider the full range of the

Act’s harm to the free speech of both independent expenditure

xroups and privately financed candidates

“As noted above in) footnote 2. the Martin plamtit?-

intervenors alse included Senator Burns at this time

Lo

Clean Elections Commission trom applying the

Matching Funds Provision during the 200S elections

On August 29, 2008, Judge Silver found that the

Matching Funds Provision “violates the First

Amendment of the US) Constitution,” but refused to

grant the motion because of ongoing elections. App

128. Both the MceCornisk plaintitYs and the Martin

intervenors then moved to prelaminarily enjoin the

members of the Clean Elections Commission from

applying the Matching Funds Provision during the

2008 elections. On October 17, 2008, Judge Silver

found that the challengers had “shown a high hkeh-

hood of success on the merits.” but refused to tempo-

ranily enjorn the svstem because, again, the court did

not wish to interfere with ongoing elections. App. 112

After surnificant discovery, all parties filed cross

motions for summary judgment. On January 20,

2010, Judge Silver found that the Matching Funds

Provision was unconstitutional, granted the challeng

S

ers’ motions, and entered an igunction. App. 45-7

Judge Silver staved the effect of the inpunction for ten

days to permit defendants and detendant-intervenor

time to appeal, which they did. App. 77.

2 The MeCormish plaintitYs then moved the

Ninth Cireuit to vacate the stav On January 29,

2010, the Ninth Cireuit refused to vacate the stay of

the inyunetion and consolidated both state defendants’

and defendant-intervenor’s appeals. App. S7-SS8

Judge Carlos Bea dissented from the court's refusal to

vacate the stay. App. 89 On February 1, 2010, the

Ninth Cireuit extended the stay of the injunction and

le

expedited the appeals. App. SQ-S1) Judge Bea again

dissented, concluding that this case was “determined

by Darvis ... because state intervention in the fund.

Ing of campaign contmbutions in a manner to benefit

candidates when their opponents spend their own

money on speech imposes a substantial burden on the

exercise of the free speech of the candidate who

spends his money” App. 81.

3. On May 21, 2010, the Ninth Cireuit issued its

opinion on the merits, reversing the distmet court as

to its First Amendment determination and remand.

ing: for further proceedings on the challengers’ Equal

Protection claims. App I-38. Judge Nleinteld con.

curred separately, noting that, while he agreed with

the majority, Dacrs was the closest decision on point

and that the cireuits were divided. App. 38 44

On June 8S, 2010, at the request of both the

Martin and McComish plarntitts, this Court: vacated

the Ninth Cireunt’s stay of the distmet court's ingune-

tion and staved the mandate of the Ninth Cireuit

“pending the timely filing and disposition of a petition

for a writ of certiorari.” App. 79. On dune 23, 2010,

the Nanth Cireuit issued an amended opinion, but did

not withdraw its judgment or issue a new judgment

App. 3-4. This timely Petition by the Martin plaintiffs

tollowed

ly

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

This Court should grant this Petition for three

PeASOTIS

First, the Ninth Cireuit’s decision directly con

flaets with the Second Circuit’s decision ino Green

‘arty of Conn. vo Garfield, Food . 2010 US

App. LEXIS 14286 (2d Cir, July 18, 2010), and the

Fleventh Circuit's decision in Seoti co Roberts,

F 3d . 2010 US. App. LENIS 15897 (Lith Cir. July

30, 2010). The reasen for this split is simple: the

Second and Eleventh Cireuits both correctly apphed

Davis to the matching funds systems they considered,

while the Ninth Cireuit did not. The Second and

Eleventh Circuits’ reyection of the Ninth Cuireuit’'s

conclusion thus creates a clear circuit split. Resolu-

tion of this split is imperative because there is cur-

rently significant uncertainty regarding the con.

sututionahty of pubhe financing laws) emploving

matching funds subsidies across the nation For

independent groups, countless candidates running tn

states and municipalities across the country wath

such systems, and lawmakers who may attempt to

umplement similar laws in the future, tumelv clarmfica

tion of this area of the law ts imperative

Second, Chis split flows from the conflict between

the Ninth Cireut’s decision and Daris autself The

Ninth Cireuit upheld a law that attempts to coerce

speakers into Limiting their political activities by

turning the exercise of their First Amendment rights

into the catalyst by which their political and ideo-

logecal opponents gain funding advantages. As the

Is

Second and Eleventh Cireuits correctly concluded,

Darcrs controls in such a situation and requires that

the reviewing: court stmke such a law down The

Ninth Cireuit’s conclusion otherwise means its deci

sion clearly conflicts with Dacor, in which this Court

struck down a federal law that emploved a similar

mechanism that provided funding advantages to a

candidate's opponent triggered by the candidate's

exercise of his First Amendment rights

Third, with regard to independent expenditure

groups, the Ninth Cireuit’s decision contliets wath

Citizens United and decades of decisions trom this

Court striking down laws seeking to limit the amount

of expenditures such groups may make in elections

A mere four months atter Crfrsens United was decid.

ed, the Ninth Cireuit has gaven the government a

powertul tool to indirectly achieve what this Court

has made clear it cannot do directly: burden political

expenditures by independent groups. Under Arizona's

law, af an independent expenditure group) spends

above a certain level, the government then directly

subsidizes candidates the independent: expenditure

group opposes. And the more an independent ex-

penditure group speaks, the more the candidates it

wishes to defeat benefit. Because Petitioners include

independent expenditure groups directly affected by

the Matching Funds Provision, granting this Petition

will provide this Court with the opportunity to direct.

ly address whether the government may make such

an end-run around Créiserns United

1

lL EVEN AFTER THIS COURT'S DECISION

IN DAVIS, CIRCUITS ARE DIVIDED ON

WHETHER SYSTEMS OF PUBLIC. FI-

NANCING OF CAMPAIGNS EMPLOYING

MATCHING FUNDS MECHANISMS ARE

CONSTITUTIONAL.

In Davis, this Court struck down the “Millon

ares Amendment.” which allowed opponents of selt-

financed candidates in federal elections to accept

funds at three times the maximum contmbution lmat

from ondividuals af ther self financed opponents

spent more than a certain amount P28 S Ct at 277

This Court concluded that such a system “impermis-

sibly burdenled! [the self-financing candidate's] First

Amendment right to spend his own money tor cam

paign speech” by reating an “unprecedented penalty”

on any self-financing candidate who robustly exer

cised her First Amendment rights: if she “engage(s’

in unfettered political speech.” she will be subject

“to discriminatory fundraising limitations” Jd. Selt

financing candidates could still spend their own

money, “but they must shoulder a special and poten

tially significant burden if they make that chore” Jd

at 2772) This Court apphed strict scrutiny to the law

and struck it down Jd

The Second and Eleventh Cireuits both specifical

lv tollowed Darcis when they considered matching

funds systems and, consistent with the reasoning of

Dacrs, each court struck down the system before ut

Scott, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 15897, at *30; Green

Party, 2010 US. App. LEXIS 14286. at *77. The

a 0)

Ninth Ciremit, mn contrast, did not apply Dares and

upheld Arizona’s matching funds system. App. 24, 37

The Ninth Cireuit’s tailure to follow this Court's

decision in Dacis has thus created a clear split among

the circuits regarding the constitutionality of pubhe

financing systems emploving matching funds mecha.

nisms and whether, or to what extent, such svstems

burden core political speech

A. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION

DIRECTLY CONFLICTS WITH DECI.

SIONS OF THE SECOND AND ELEV-

ENTH CIRCUITS.

The Ninth Circuit's decision below directly con-

flicts with the decision of the Second Cirewit in Green

Party and the decision of the Eleventh Circuit in

Scott. It also directly conthets with the pre-Davcrs

decision of the Fighth Cireuiti in Dav oo Holahan,

34 F 3d 1356 (Sth Cir) 1994) Moreover, the Second,

Eighth, and Eleventh Cireuit) decisions not only

conflict with the Ninth Cireuit’s decision, but they

also conflict with pre-Dacrs decisions from the First

and Fourth Cireuits, NLC. Right to Life Conmium. Fund

for Indep. Political Expenditures vo Leake, 524 Bk

27 (4th Cir. ZOOS), cert. dented, Duke vo Leake, 129

S.Ct. 490 (2008), and Daggett v Comen'n on Gov tal

Bthics & Election Practices, 205 FSd 445 (lst Cir.

2000)" The depth and scope of the spht among the

The Sixth Crreuit, in Gadle co Patton, 142 F dd 940, 847-49

oth Cir 1998S) upheld a Rentucky campaiyrn finance law that

(Continued on following page

2)

circuits strongly militate in tavor of review under

Sup. Ct. Ro 1Ova)

In Green Pariv, the Second Cireuit considered

Connecticut's version of the Matching Funds Provi-

sion — there called the “Excess Expenditure Provi-

sion” — in its system of public financing for state

elections. The Second Circuit correctly concluded that

while the burden imposed by the Excess Expenditure

Provision was shghtly different than the burden at

issue in Davis, matching funds provisions are actually

“more constitutionally objectionable” than the law in

Davis. Green Party, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 14286, at

*Sl Unternal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The Second Circuit apphed = strict) scrutiny to the

KExeess Expenditure Provision and concluded that the

“state's asserted interest in promotiing] participation

in’ Connecticut's system Was not enough to justify the

burden placed on speech. Jd. at) *85-86 Unternal

quotation marks omitted) Significantly, the Second

Circuit expressly stated that 10 was “not persuaded by

the Ninth Cireuit’s opinion” below. Jd. at *83 n 19.

tragened a benefit to a candidate particpating ina public financing

system when bis non-participating: opponent collected more than

$18 milhen in campaum funds in a pnmar or general election

That benefit was not the direct provision of additional funds, but

rather gave the participating candidate the mght to raise

additional funds, which the state would match on a 2-to-1 basis

ld at 947 Although Kentucky's system was not a pure matching

tunds system, the fact that the court upheld a system that

trugrered funding: advantages to a candidate's epponent based on

that candidate’s exercise of his First Amendment rmyhts means

that Gadle also conflicts with Dacus, Green Party, and Scott

oy

This split became even more pronounced with the

Eleventh Cireuit’s decision in Scott. There, a self-

financing candidate sought to preliminarily enjoin

Florida’s system of matching subsidies for gubernato-

rial candidates.” The district court refused to enter

the injunction (albeit while noting that the “Ninth

Circuit is just wrong” on whether such matching

subsidies imposed a burden on speech). Prelim. Inj.

Tr. at 91, Scott v. Roberts, No. 10-cev-0283 (ND. Fla.

July 14, 2010). The Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding

it “obvious that the subsidy imposes a burden on

nonparticipating candidates ... who spend large

sums of money in support of their candidacies.” Scoft,

2010 US. App. LEXIS 15897, at *30. Moreover, it

concluded that this burden was “substantial,” and

that it “is harsher than the penalty in Davis, as it

leaves no doubt that the nonparticipants’ opponents

will receive additional money.” /d. at *33 Unternal

quotation marks and citations omitted). The court

held that the system did not satisfy strict scrutiny

because the supporters of the system had not “sufh-

ciently explained how the Florida public financing

system furthers the anticorruption interest.” Jd. at

*35. Finally, the court concluded that “the system

levels the electoral playing field, and that purpose is

constitutionally problematic.” Jd. at *37.

The Second and Eleventh Circuits did not tread

new ground. In Day, the Eighth Circuit considered a

" Lake Flomda’s system, Arnvzona’s law uses a candidate's

contributions of their own funds to their campagrn in calculating

matching funds

23

challenge to a Minnesota statute that provided addi-

tional funds to a publicly financed candidate in

response to independent expenditures either against

the publicly financed candidate or for his privately

financed opponent. If groups made such independent

expenditures, publicly financed candidates had their

own expenditure limits increased by the amount

of the independent expenditure and received an

additional public subsidy equal to one-half of the

independent expenditure’s value. Day, 34 F.3d at

1358. The Eighth Circuit concluded that this law

burdened speech “because of the chilling effect the

statute has on the political speech of the person or

group making the independent expenditure.” /d. at

1360. It found that the law was not narrowly tailored

to support a compelling government interest and

struck it down. Jd. at 1361-62.

This Court specifically referenced Day in Davis

when it concluded that “[mJany candidates who can

afford to make large personal expenditures to support

their campaigns may choose to do so despite [the

Millionaire's Amendment], but they must shoulder a

special and potentially significant burden if they

make that choice.” Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2772 (citing

Day, 34 F.3d at 1359-60). Nonetheless, the Ninth

Circuit explicitly refused to rely on Day. The court

stated, “loJur decision is not controlled by Day, nor

are we persuaded by it.” App. 28 n.9. It also mini-

mized this Court’s reference to Day in Davis by

claiming that this Court cited Day “only once for a

single, limited proposition,” and that this Court did

not “affirm or adopt the Eighth Circuit's approach.”

24

App. 28 n.9. Instead, the Ninth Circuit followed two

pre-Davis decisions that approved similar systems

and specifically rejected Day. App. 27 n.9 (citing

Leake, 524 F.3d at 437-49, and Daggett, 205 F.3d at

464-65). As Judge Kleinfeld noted in concurrence

below, “lolther circuits have divided on whether

schemes like Arizona’s violate the First Amendment.

The Supreme Court cited with apparent approval

the Eighth Circuit decision [in Day], which may be

contrary to the view we take today.” App. 39

(Kleinfeld, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).

See also Leake, 524 F.3d at 437 (“There is some con-

flict in the circuits as to whether the provision of

matching funds burdens or chills speech in a way

that implicates the First Amendment.”).

In sum, at best, there exists a fundamental dis-

agreement between the Second, Eighth, and Eleventh

Circuits, on one hand, and the First, Fourth and

Ninth Circuits, on the other, regarding the constitu-

tionality of public financing systems employing a

matching funds subsidy. At worst, the Ninth Circuit's

decision is an outlier reflecting a now-extinct trend in

pre-Davis First Amendment jurisprudence. This is

particularly troubling given that, as explained below,

a number of other jurisdictions employing such

systems (Hawaii, Portland, Oregon, and Tucson,

Arizona) are located in the Ninth Circuit. This level of

uncertainty and patchwork of constitutional protec-

tions for independent expenditure groups and pri-

vately financed candidates across the circuits confirm

the urgent need for this Court’s intervention.

25

B. THE SPLIT AMONG THE CIRCUITS

CREATES CONSIDERABLE CONFU-

SION REGARDING THE CONSTITU-

TIONALITY OF SIMILAR SYSTEMS

ACROSS THE COUNTRY.

At the time of the Ninth Circuit’s decision, three

states — Maine,’ Arizona® and Connecticut’? — had

statutes that create public financing systems with

matching funds in all of their statewide and legisla-

tive political campaigns. At least six other states

have public financing systems with matching fund

mechanisms for certain offices: Florida (governor),

Hawaii (pilot program for county of Hawaii Council

” An Act to Reform Campaign Finance, 1996 Me. Legis.

Serv. Initiated Bill Ch. 5 (West) (codified at scattered sections of

Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 21-A, §§ 1121-28 (Supp. 2006)). This law

has now been challenged in federal court as well. Compl.,

Cushing v. McKee, No. 10-cv-0330 (D. Me. Aug. 8, 2010).

* Arizona Citizens Clean Elections Act, 1998 Ariz. Legis.

Serv. Prop. 200 (West) (codified at Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann., §§ 16-

901.01, -940 to -961 (2006)).

* An Act Concerning Comprehensive Campaign Finance

Reform for State-Wide Constitutional and General Assembly

Offices, 2005 Conn. Pub. Acts 5 (Spec. Sess.) (codified as amend-

ed at Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 9-600 to -674, 9-700 to -751 (Supp.

2007)). As noted above, the Second Circuit has struck down Connect-

icut’s Excess Expenditure Provision. The Connecticut Legisla-

ture has now revised the law to conform to the court’s decision.

Florida Election Campaign Financing Act, Fla. Laws 86-

276, (codified at Fla. Stat. §§ 106.30-.36). As noted above, the

Eleventh Circuit has preliminarily enjoined enforcement of this

law.

26

elections),"’ New Mexico (Public Regulation Commis-

sion and statewide judicial elections)” North Caroli-

na (Qudicial elections), West Virginia Gudicial

elections)’ and Wisconsin (judicial elections).'* Ne-

braska provides government subsidies to candidates

for statewide and legislative offices who agree to

abide by a spending limit to match the expenditures

by those candidates’ opponents that the government

deems excessive.” Still more states have considered

enacting such systems, including New York, Illinois,

Maryland, Washington and Wyoming.’ In addition,

Pilot Comprehensive Public Funding for Elections to the

Hawau County Council, 2008 Haw. Act 244.

* Voter Action Act, 2007 NM. Laws Ist Spec Sess Ch 2

(HB. 6) (West) (Public Regulation Commission provisions are

codified at N.M. Stat. § 1-19A-10 (2003)). The judicial elections

provisions took effect in 2008

* North Carolina Judicial Campaign Reform Act, 2002 N.C

Sess. Laws 158 (codified as amended in scattered sections of

N.C. Gen. Stat. ch 163 (2005))

* West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Pubhe Cam-

paign Financing Pilot Program, 2010 W. Va. Acts 72 (codified at

W. Va_ Code $$ 3-12-1 to 3-12-17) (pilot program for 2012)

* Wisconsin Impartial Justice Act, 2009 Wis. Sess.) Laws 89

(codified in scattered sections of Wis. Stat. Ch. 8, 11, 20, 25, 71

(20105)

“ Nebraska Campaign Finance Limitation Act, 1992 Neb.

Laws 556 $§ 1-10 (codified as amended at Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 32-

1601 to -1613)

" Press Release, Public Campaign: While Congress Fiddles

and Washington Burns, States Take Action to Clean Up Politics

(May 22, 2006), http: www publicampaign. org pressroom 2006

05 22 while-congress-fiddles-and-washington-burns-states-take-

action-to-clean-up-politics

the cities of Tueson, Ariz..”” Portland, Or.” and Albu-

querque, N.M..“ have some form of matching funds

systems. For a number of vears, U.S. Senators Rich-

ard Durbin and Arlen Specter introduced a taxpaver-

funding system for federal elections called the “Fair

Elections Now Act.” although the senators removed

the matching funds provision from later versions of

this bill after this Court's decision in Dacrs.*' Moreo-

ver, the push to enact similar public financing svs-

tems with matching funds subsidies in states across

the country is a top priority for well-funded, politi-

cally influential special interests groups, who view

such systems as “a bold solution to the problem of

money in politics.” Brennan Center tor Justice et al.,

Breaking Free with Fair Elections: A New Declara

tion of Independence for Congress 1 (March 2007), avail

able at http: www.cleanupwashington.org documents

breaking_free.pdf. Put simply, such systems are

becoming more common across the country and their

proponents seek to make them the norm for all U.S

campaigns.

* Taeson, Anz, Charter ch XVI, Subchapter (B) $5 (2005)

Portland, Or, Municipal Code ch. 2.10 (2005)

* Albuquerque, N.M., Charter art: XV1T (2004)

Compare S. 1288, 110th Cong. (2007) (2007 version of

Fair Elections Now Act containing a matching funds provision

similar to Arizona’s!, with So 7av. 11th Cong. ©2009) (2009

version of Fair Elections Now Act omitting the previous match-

ing funds provision) See a/so HR 26, llth Cong. (2009)

(House version of 2009 Senate version of Farr Elections Now

Act)

. ‘

28

There is now no clear answer as to whether these

laws are constitutional, however The existence of a

three-to-three deadlock in the tederal appellate courts

is clear evidence that there is so much confusion here

that this Court should intervene. Independent ex-

penditure groups and privately financed candidates

sbould know whether thev have judicial recourse for

the harm caused to their free speech rights by such

schemes. Publicly financed candidates and the en-

forcement agencies administering such systems

should have some degree of certainty as to whether

the systems in which they participate or administer

are constitutional. As a federal judge recently noted

while struggling with whether to preliminarily enjoin

Florida’s system for the 2010 primary election, “|t}he

law on the merits is unsettled. ... 1] cannot end the

uncertainty.” Prelim. Inj). Tr at 108, Scott 0 Roberts,

No. 10-ev-02838 (NLD. Fla. July 14, 2010). While this

district court judge could not end the uncertainty in

each of the jurisdictions in which such schemes

operate, this Court) can. This Court’s immediate

intervention before vet another election season

occurs with such systems in place is. therefore

necessary.

YQ

ll. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION CON-

FLICTS WITH THIS COURT'S HOLDING

IN DAVIS THAT, IN THE CONTEXT OF A

COMPETITIVE ELECTION, LAWS THAT

PROVIDE FUNDING ADVANTAGES TO

A SPEAKER’S POLITICAL OPPONENTS

BASED ON THE EXERCISE OF THE

SPEAKER'S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS

ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

The spht among the circuits reflects the fact that

the Ninth Circuit’s decision directly conflicts wath

Davis. Like the law at issue in Daris, the Matching

Funds Provision attempts to “level electoral opportu

miies” in the context of competitive elections by

providing funding advantages to a candidate based on

the exercise of free speech ryghts by that candidate's

political and ideolomeal opponents. See Davis, 128

S.Ct. at 2773. As Judge Bea correctly concluded in

his dissent from the panel decision extending the stay

of the district court's injunction, “this case is deter

mined by Dacrs ... because state intervention in the

funding of campaign contmbutions in a manner to

benefit candidates when their opponents spend their

own Money on speech imposes a substantial burden

on the exercise of the free speech by the candidate

who spends his own money.” App. SL.

Despite the existence of a similar tmygyger mecha-

mism in the Matehing Funds Provision, the Ninth

Circuit reyected Davis's appheation here. The court

30

held that Davis did not apply because this Court had

described the Millionaire's Amendment as asvmmet-

nical and disertminatory. The Ninth Cireuit averred

that, “the law constituted a burden on Davis's speech

only because it treated candidates running against

each other under the same regrulatory framework

differently based on a candidate's decision to selt-

finance his or her campaign...” App. 25 ¢emphasis

added). Because candidates under the Arizona system

were burdened based on their status as pubhely or

privately financed, the court held that the Matching

Funds Provision was not asymmetrical and discrimi-

natery and was therefore unlike the Milhonatre’s

Amendment. App. 25-26. The court concluded that

what distinguished the Matching Funds Provision in

a constitutional sense was that the Arizona law

“makes no such identiy-based distinctions.” App. 26-

27. The Court thus suggested that) publicly and

privately financed candidates are not stmilarly situ-

ated and that the government may distmbute differ-

ent benefits and burdens to each In that regard, the

court placed considerable emphasis on the fact that

publicly financed candidates “voluntarily choose to

participate ina publhe financing system” and accept

expenditure limits, while privately financed candi

dates choose to run without a spending cap. App. 25

These benetits and burdens, the court) suggested,

balance each other out

The Ninth Circuit badly misinterpreted Davis.

As the Eleventh Cireuit: subsequently noted, “what

triggered stmet scrutiny was the grant of a competi

tive advantage — an increase in the ability of Davis's

opponent to speak,” Scott, 2010 US App. LEXIS

15897, at *33, not the fact that the law was asvmmet

nical. Neither Davis nor any of the cases cited by the

Ninth Circuit require that a speaker be similarly

situated with another speaker ino order to cham a

burden on free speech. In Davis, this Court was clear

that the burden on the self-financed candidate — not

the attributes of his opponent ultimately decided

> heed “.)

the First Amendment question. 128 S.Ct at 2771-72

The Ninth Cireuit’s “voluntary choice” theory also

tails because it is irrelevant to independent expendi.

ture groups. Under the Act, independent expenditure

groups cannot quality for public funding and cannot

“voluntarily choose” to accept or reject public funds

The government's imposition of burdens on such

groups cannot be balanced by the benefit: of public

tunds because these groups cannot receive public

funds. Independent groups supporting privately

financed candidates or opposing pubhely financed

candidates have only two choices available to them:

they can either remain silent or they can speak and

have the government “level” their speech by directly

funding candidates they oppose. As in Dacrs, the Act

does not “provide any way” an independent expendi

ture group “can exercise’ the untettered right to make

unhmited expenditures without abmdygment. See

Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2772.

Because of this misreading of the law, the Ninth

Cireuit apphed only intermediate scrutiny to the Act

vv

Me

The court did so despite the fact that it found that the

Matching Funds Provision burdens “fully protected

speech” App. 22. It classified the Act's effect) on

speech as “indirect or minimal” and the harm to

Petitioners as “mere metaphysical threats to political

speech ~ App. 27) Again, the Ninth Circuit) badly

misread Daris. Daris held that the “fundamental

nature of the right to spend personal funds for cam.

pays speech” was burdened by the Millhonatre’s

Amendment because it “imposeld] some consequene-

es” on a candidate’s choice to self-finance bevond

certain amounts. Dacrs, 128 S.Ct. at 2772 Uunternal

quotation marks and citation omitted) Because these

consequences affected core political speech, this Court

apphed strict scrutiny. As discussed above, however,

the Act does more than simply “impose some conse-

quences” on speech. It creates distinct and measura-

ble harm to the nature, timing, and amount of

expenditures

Aside trom the Ninth Cireuit, every court consid

ering: “clean elections” systems after Decis has con-

cluded that matching funds subsidies burden speech

more heavily than the Millionaire’s Amendment. See

Scott, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 15897, at *33 (Like

both the district court and the Second Cireuit, we

conclude that the burden that an excess spending

subsidy imposes on nonparticipating candidates is

harsher than the penalty in Davis, as it leaves no

doubt that the nonparticipants’ opponents will receive

additional money.” anternal quotation marks omit-

ted)!, Green Party, 2010 US) App. LEXIS 14286, at

“ve

«>?

*s82 The penalty imposed by the excess expenditure

provision, therefore, is harsher than the penalty on

Davis, as it leaves no doubt that Candidate B, the

opponent of the self-financed candidate, will receive

additional money”); Prelim. Inj). Tr at 91. Scott ¢

Roberts, No. 10-cev-O283 (NOD. Fla duly 14, 2010)

“Indeed, in the Davrs case, it was only a potential

dollar Here, it’s not just a potential dollar. Its a

certain dollar”); App) 65-66 ("In Dacrs, the negative

consequence Was having? one’s opponent subject) to

higher contmbution limits. Here, the negative conse-

quence is having one’s opponent recetve additional

funds.”); Green Party of Conn. cv. Garfield, 6438

F. Supp. 2d 298, 373 (D. Conn. 2009) (“Arguably the

benefit conferred by the CEP trigger provisions is

more constitutionally objectionable than increasing

an opponent’s individual contribution limits.”)) Under

the Milhonaire’s Amendment, the non-self- financing

candidate still had to raise funds from private parties

that is, the candidate had to develop a message

contributors wished to support, identify potential

contmbutors, and persuade them to contribute. In

contrast, a group or candidate triggenng the Match-

ing Funds Provision results in the government direct.

lv gnving extra financing to all publicly financed

candidates in a race. It beggars lome to hold. as the

Ninth Cireuit did, that a law that imposes harsher

penalties on speech than the Milhonaire’s Amend.

ment should receive less searching scrutiny because

the law burdens speech in a purportedly nondiserimt,

natory fashion,

34

The Ninth Cireuit’s failure to apply strict scruti-

ny was also erroneous because the Act is clearly

content-based. In races between privately financed

candidates and publicly financed candidates, inde-

pendent expenditures in favor of privately financed

candidates are “matched” by the government, while

independent expenditures against privately financed

candidates are not. See United States vo Stevens, 130

S.Ct. 1d77, 1584 (2010) daws that distinguish be-

tween message, ideas, subject matter, or content are

content-based); Day, 34 F.3d at 1360-61 (Minnesota's

excess subsidy provision was content-based because it

“singles out particular political speech — that which

advocates the defeat of a candidate and or supports

the election of her opponents -— for negative treatment

that the state apphes to no other variety of speech”)

As such, not only is the Matching Funds Provision

subject to strict scrutiny, it is “presumptively mnvalid”

as well. Stevens, L808. Ct. at Los.

The Ninth Cireuit’s attempt to distinguish Davis

is httle more than a rejection of that case. Lower

federal courts, however, cannot overturn, alter, or

narrow Supreme Court) precedent. Moreover, the

Ninth Cireuit’s appheation of intermediate scrutiny

means that Arizona’s Matching Funds Provision has

so far escaped appellate applheation of the appropri-

ate level of scrutiny. The Ninth Circuit's decision thus

creates uncertainty regarding the scope of Davrs and

its appheation to similar public financing systems.

Ill. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION CON-

FLICTS WITH CITIZENS UNITED BY AL-

LOWING GOVERNMENTS TO INDIRECTLY

RESTRAIN THE SPENDING OF INDE-

PENDENT EXPENDITURE GROUPS.

Section C of the Matching Funds Provision

explicitly treats the expenditures of groups acting

independently of candidates as “expenditures of ...

nonparticipating candidates.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-

952CK2) App. 140. lt empowers the government to

match the expenditures of independent groups sup-

porting a privately financed candidate or opposing a

publicly financed candidate. The purported rationale

behind this burden is enticement - that is, the gov-

ernment must burden the speech of independent

expenditure groups in order to encourage candidates

who might otherwise be subject to purportedly cor-

rupting influences to accept public funds. App. 35-37

It is beyond dispute that the government may not

burden independent expenditures under an anti-

corruption rationale. In Citizens United, this Court

stated explicitly what many understood the law to be

since Buckley v. Valeo, 424 US. 1 (1976) — that inde-

pendent expenditures cannot be regulated under an

anti-corruption rationale. Crtizens United, 1380 8. Ct.

at 909 (“[I|ndependent expenditures ... do not give

rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.”).

Because of the absence of pre-arrangement and

coordination between an independent expenditure

committee and a candidate, the value of the expendi.

ture to the candidate is undermined and the danger

36

that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for

improper commitments from the candidate ts allevi-

ated. Jd. at 908; see also FEC v. Natl Conservative

*olitical Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 498 (1985)

(“But here, as in Buckley, the absence of prearrange-

ment and coordination undermines the value of the

expenditure to the candidate, and thereby alleviates

the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid

pro quo tor improper commitments from the candi-

date.”).

Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit determined that

the Matching Funds Provision could be apphed

against independent expenditure groups because the

relevant inquiry is not whether independent expendi-

ture groups cause corruption, but “whether matching

funds bear a substantial relation to reducing corrup-

tion among participating candidates.” App. 35. Ac-

cording to the court, unless the state matches

“independent expenditures or expenditures from a

nonparticipating candidate's own funds, the Act's

public funding plan would not attract participants.”

App. 36. Thus, while independent expenditure groups

cannot be directly regulated to reduce the possibility

of corruption, the government may indirectly burden

their speech to encourage candidates into the public

financing system to reduce the possibility of corrup-

tion by these candidates. In other words, publicly

financed candidates need matching funds available so

they know they can match spending by independent

groups that oppose them if they enter the system.

37

This rationale is simply a dressed-up version of the

“level the playing field” justification for campaign

finance restrictions that this Court has repeatedly

and correctly rejected. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2771,

2773 (rejecting the “leveling the electoral opportuni-

ties” justification for the Millionaire’s Amendment).

In sum, the Ninth Circuit's decision stands for

the proposition that whi'e the government cannot

burden speech to “level the playing field” and it

cannot directly burden independent expenditures, it

can indirectly burden independent expenditures in

order to level the playing field. It is difficult to con-

ceive of a conclusion more at odds with the holdings

of both Davis and Citizens United.

The Ninth Circuit’s holding stands Citizens

United on its head. Because independent expendi-

tures are core political speech and pose no threat of

corruption, the government simply may not burden

them in order to fight corruption, even if doing so

might have an ancillary benefit of increasing partici-

pation by others in a public financing program.

“Where at all possible, government must curtail

speech only to the degree necessary to meet the

particular problem at hand, and must avoid infring-

ing on speech that does not pose the danger that has

prompted regulation.” FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life,

479 U.S. 238, 265 (1986).

While matching funds do not directly restrict

independent expenditures, they work as an indirect

38

and substantial restriction on the ability of independ-

ent expenditure groups to exercise “the unfettered

right to make unlimited .. . expenditures.” Davis, 128

S. Ct. at 2772. By allowing the government to create

real, if indirect, restrictions on the right of independ-

ent groups to make unlimited expenditures, the

Ninth Circuit has provided the state with the ability

to achieve indirectly what it is constitutionally for-

bidden from doing directly and has set an example

for other courts and legislators to follow to undermine

Citizens United. This disruptive jurisprudential

development in a circuit covering much of the western

United States threatens to restrict the speech of inde-

pendent expenditure groups mere months after this

Court held, in the strongest possible terms, that such

restrictions are constitutionally impermissible.

As Citizens United made clear, the Constitution

protects the political speech of groups as well as

individual candidates. 130 S.Ct. at 899-903. The

Martin plaintiffs (the Petitioners here) include

independent groups and raise issues regarding the

application of Citizens United that are in addition

to the harm the Act causes to candidate speech.

Petitioners note that contemporaneously with this

Petition, the McComish plaintiffs ~ each a privately

financed candidate — are seeking this Court’s review

of the Ninth Circuit’s decision. Petitioners here fully

support the McComish plaintiffs’ petition and urge

this Court to accept it. This Court should grant both

petitions, though, in order to directly consider the

affect the Act has on both candidates and independ-

ent groups in one proceeding. In particular, this Court

39

should grant review of this Petition in order to pro-

vide much-needed guidance (if not outright correc-

tion) to the Ninth Circuit and other courts on the

scope of Citizens United.

¢

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Petitioners respect-

fully request that this Court grant both their petition

for a writ of certiorari and that of the McComish

plaintiffs and that this Court consolidate both peti-

tions for consideration.

*Counsel of Record

Respectfully submitted,

INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE

WILLIAM R. MAURER*

101 Yesler Way, Suite 603

Seattle, WA 98104

(206) 341-9300

INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE

WILLIAM H. MELLOR

901 North Glebe Road, Suite 900

Arlington, VA 22203

(703) 682-9320

INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE

TIMOTHY D. KELLER

PAUL V. AVELAR

398 South Mill Avenue, Suite 301

Tempe, AZ 85281

(480) 557-8300

Counsel for Petitioners

App. 1

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOHN McComisn; Nancy McLain:

TONY Boule,

—— ee ——w

Plaintiffs-Appeliees,

ROBERT BURNS,

Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellee,

ARIZONA FREE ENTERPRISE CLUB'S

FREEDOM CLUB Pac: ARIZONA

TAXPAYERS ACTION COMMITTEE.

agent of Taxpavers Action

Committee: DEAN MARTIN: Rick

MURPRY.,

Plaintifts-Intervenors-Appellees . Pea eee

tT es No. 10-15165

¥V. 7

f . D.C. No.

KEN BENNETT, in his official CV-08-1550-ROS

capacity as Secretary of State of

the State of Arizona; GARY

SCARAMAZZO; ROYANN J. PARKER;

JEFFREY L. FAIRMAN: DONALD

LINDHOLM; LORLS. DANIELS, in their

otficial capacities as members of

the Arizona Citizens Clean

Elections Commission,

Defendants-Appellanis,

and

Clean Elections Institute, Ine..

Defendant-Intervenor.

’

App. 2

JOHN McComish;: NANCY McLaAIN;

Tony Bove,

Plaintiffs-Appelilees,

DEAN MARTIN; ROBERT BURNS;

Rick MURPHY; ARIVONA FREE

ENTERPRISE CLUB'S FREEDOM

CLUB PAc; ARIZONA TAXPAYERS

ACTION COMMITTEE, agent of

Taxpayers Action Committee,

Plaintiffs-Intervenors-Appellees.

j i i

. 4

KEN BENNETT. in his official

capacity as Secretary of State of

the State of Arizona; GARY

SCARAMAZ70; ROYANN J. PARKER:

JEFFREY L. FAIRMAN: DONALD

LINDHOLM; LoRLS. DANIELS, in

their official capacities as

members of the Arizona Citizens

Clean Elections Commission,

Defendants,

and

CLEAN ELECTIONS INSTITUTE, INC.,

Defendant-Intervenor-Appellant

No. 10-15166

DC No.

CV OS. 1550-ROS

ORDER AND

AMENDED

OPINION

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Roslyn O. Silver, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

April 12, 2010 — San Francisco, California

App. 3

Filed May 21, 2010

Amended June 23, 2010

Before: Andrew J. Kleinteld, A. Wallace Tashima,

and Sidney R. Thomas, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Tashima;

Concurrence by Judge Kleinfeld

COUNSEL

Nicholas C. Dramas, Goldwater Institute. Phoeniz,

Arizona, for the plaintiffs-appellees.

William Ro Maurer, Institute for Justice, Seattle,

Washington, tor the plaintiffs-intervenors-appellees.

Marvy R. O'Gracy, Solicitor General of Arizona,

Phoenix, Arizona, for the defendants-appellants.

Bradley S. Phillips. Munger, Tolles. & Olson, Los

Angeles, California, for the defendant-intervenor-

appellant.

Stephen M. Hoersting, Center for Competitive

Pohtics, Alexandria, Virginia, for) ariucus curiae

Center tor Competitive Politics.

ORDER

The opimoen filed May 21, 2010, slp op. 7319, is

amended by deleting footnote 1, shp op. at 7326, and

substituting the following footnote in its place:

1 Governor Symington was sentenced to a

30-month term of imprisonment, but his con-

vViction Was reversed and the case remanded

App. 4

for a new tral See United States vo. Svm-

ington, 195 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 1999). He was

then granted a presidential pardon just as

his retrial was set to commence.

a -- ——_—— a —- Oe

OPINION

TASHIMA, Circuit Judge:

This ts a challenge to the constitutionahty of the

“matching funds” provision of Arizona’s Citizens

Clean Elections Act, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-952. The Act

establishes a legal framework within which the State

of Arizona may provide publ financing to candidates

for state political offices. A candidate who chooses to

participate in the Act’s voluntary pubhe financing

scheme relinquishes her or his right to raise private

campaign contributions. Instead, she or he receives

an initial grant of funds from the state to spend on

her or his campaign. The challenged provision

ensures that if the participating candidate has an

opponent who is not) participating in the pubhie

financing system and whose campaign expenditures

or contributions exceed a threshold set by the Act. she

or he receives additional matching funds from the

State.

Six past and future candidates for Amzona politi

eal office who have, or plan to, run privately financed

campaigns, as Well as two political action committees

who fund such candidates, brought suit to enjoin the

Act's matching funds provision, alleging that it vio-

lates their rights under the First Amendment and the

App 9

Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-

ment of the U.S. Constitution. These Plaintitfs claim

that the matching funds provision severely burdens

their exercise of protected political speech by punish-

ing them for making, receiving, or spending campaign

contributions. As nonparticipating candidates, if they

exceed the Act's matehing funds threshold, they will

trigyer the disbursement of matching funds to their

opponents. They allege that their fear of tmggering

matching funds to their opponent causes them to curb

their campaign fundraising or spending, thereby chill-

ing their speech. They also claim that because the Act

treats candidates differently based on whether or not

they participate in the pubhe financing scheme, it

demies them the equal protection of the law

The district court held that the matching funds

provision of the Act violated the First Amendment. It

did not reach Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim. After

determining that the matching funds provision of the

Act could not be severed from the Act as a whole, the

district court granted Plaintit¥s’ motion for summary

judgment, issued a declaratory judgment that the Act

violates the First Amendment, and enjoined its

enforcement.

Applying Supreme Court) precedent) analyzing

campaign finance laws under the First Amendment,

see Citizens United vo FEC, 130 S. Ct. S76 (2010);

Davis v. FEC, 128 S.Ct. 2759 (2008), Buckley v. Valeo,

424 US. 1 (1976) (per cumam), we conclude that the

matching funds provision of the Act imposes only

a minimal burden on First Amendment rights. It

App. 6

survives intermediate scrutiny because it bears a

substantial relation to the State's important interest

in reducing guid pro quo political corruption. Because

the Act conforms to the requirements of the First

Amendment and must be upheld, we reverse. We

decline to address Plaintiffs’ equal protection clamm in

the first instance; instead, we remand to the district

court so that it may consider the issue.

I. Statutory Background

Prnor to the passage of the Citizens Clean Eleec-

tions Act (the “Act™, Amzona had already adopted

campaign contribution limits. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-

905 (histomcal and. statutory note) In 1986, the

State's voters passed an initiative measure estab-

hshing individual contmbution limits of $200 for

lemslative candidates and $500 for statewide can-

didates, per election. See id) Even with these cam-

paign contribution limits in place, Arizona expen

enced a osemes of massive political corruption

scandals

In 1988, Governor Evan Mecham was indicted on

multiple criminal charges, including perjury and

fraud for allegedly hiding a campaign loan. He was

later impeached on charges of misuse of pubhe funds

and obstruction of justice, and ousted from office.

Next, the “Savings and Loan Scandal” led to a United

States Senate Ethics Committee investigation of

certain activities of both US. Senators from Arizona,

App. ¢

who had received contributions and favers from

Arizona savings and loan tvcoon Charles Keating.

Then, in 1991, AzSecam erupted. A sting operation

caught state lemslators on videotape accepting cam-

paign contributions and bribes in exchange for ayree-

Ing to support gambling legislation. The video footage

Was generally seen as outrageous. For example,

Representative Don Kenny was seen. stuffing a

$55,000 cash bribe into a gym bag after joking, “are

vou sure there are no Indden cameras up there?”

AvScam resulted in the indictment of twenty one

individuals, including lobbyists, political activists,

and seven state legislators. TWwo additional state

legislators were named ina civil racketeering suit. In

total, nearly ten percent of the Arizona Legslature at

the time faced civil or ermminal charges related to

AzScam. Former Arizona Governor J. Fife Symington

testified that the scandal was highly pubheized

around the state

In the late nineties, Governor Symington himself

was embroiled ino scandal and indicted on twenty-

three counts, including using the power of his office to

extort concessions from a pension fund to which he

owed $10 million. He became Arizona's second gover-

nor in a row to leave his office in disgrace when he

resigned ino 1997, after being convicted on seven

counts of filyng false financial statements.

Governor Symington was sentenced to a 30-month term of

imprisonment, but his conviction was reversed and the case

(Continued on tollowing: page)

App. 8

In the wake of these scandals, the voters of

Arizona passed the Citizens Clean Elections Act, Ariz.

Rev. Stat. $$ 16-940-16-961, an initiative measure, in

the 1998 statewide election. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-940

(historical and statutory note). There ts no evidence

that the Act was intended solely to remedy Arizona's

apparent susceptibility to pohtical corruption. Plain-

tiffs, however, introduced ample evidence indicating

that when the Act was adopted, voters were aware of,

and concerned about, continuing and repeated poli-

tical corruption in Arizona.

The voter information pamphlet tor the 1998

election argued that the Act should be approved

because it would free politicians “to represent the

best interests of all the citizens, not just the large

financial contributors who can trade their cash for

political support.” Ballot Propositions Publeity Pam-

phlet for the 1998 Arizona General Election, at "S87,

avatlable at http: wwwiazsos gov election 1998 into

pubpamphilet. prop200 pdf. One justification for the

Act was that it would change Arizona's “reputation

las] a state mfe with corruption and the abuse of

money in politics... . land] restore confidence in our

political system.” /d. at *S8. The pamphlet further

noted that under the existing election law regime,

remanded for a new trial See United States t. Svrungton, WW

FSd 1080 (Sth Cir 1999) He was then granted a presidential

pardon just as hos retrial was set to commence

App. 9

“tolur elected officials are going to jail and this evcle

of abuse seems endless.” /d.

The Act's findings state that the State’s previous

election financing system, “|u}/ndermine|d} public con-

fidence in the integrity of pubhe officials,” because it

“lalllowled] Arizona elected officials to accept large

campaign contributions from private interests over

which they have governmental jurisdiction.” Ariz.

Rev. Stat. §$ 16-940. The Act's stated purpose is to

“create a clean elections system that will improve the

integrity of Arizona state government by diminishing

the influence of special-interest money, will encourage

citizen participation in the political process, and will

promote freedom of speech.” /d.

Plaintiffs argue that the Act was not aimed at

reducing corruption, and that legislative reforms

designed to prevent another AzScam had already

been adopted at the time the Act was passed. Instead,

Plaintiffs contend that the Act’s true purposes were

to level the political playing field and reduce cam-

paign spending.” Voters are motivated by varied and

' One of the Act’s onginal supporters testified that another

one of its goals was to “promote freedom of speech because

cunder the Act.) more candidates would have more opportunity

to speak 7

We recently recognized in Long Beach Area Chamber of

Commerce vo City of Long Beach, that in light of Supreme Court

preeedent, “'preventing corruption or the appearance of corrup

tion are the only legitimate and compelling government

interests thus tar identified for restmeting campaign finances *~

Long Beach, No 07-55691, — FSd __. 2010 WL 1729710 at *7

(Continued on following page)

App. 10

conflicting motivations. Generally, a diverse elector-

ate cannot be said to share one true intent in

adopting an initiative measure. More specifically, the

extent to which Arizona’s various corruption scandals

led to the passage of the Act cannot be precisely

determined. Based on the record before us, however,

(Mh Cir. Apnl 30, 2010) (quoting FEC v. Natl Conservative

Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1985)). In

particular, we observed that the so-called) “anti-distortion

rationale.” under which the government claims an “interest in

combating ‘the corrosive and distorting effects of immense

ayyrregations of wealth,” is not a legitimate basis for campaign

finance restrictions after the Supreme Court partially overruled

Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652

(1990), in its Citizens United decision. Jd. at "6 (quoting Austin,

494 US. at 660 and discussing Citizens United, 1380 S Ct. at

904, 912-13) Likewise, the “time protection rationale.” under

which the government claims an interest in “‘protectling]

candidates from spending too much time raising money rather

than devoting that time to campaigning among ordinary voters’ ”

may not serve as the basis for restmcting campaign finance

activity Jd. at *7 (quoting Randall vo Sorrell, 548 US. 230, 243-

45 (2006))

We need not, however, address the potential legitimacy of

arguments that the State has not raised before us in defense of

the Act. Further, even if the State had raised these arguments,

“fajt is unnecessary to look beyond the Act’s primary purpose to

lint the actuahty and appearance of corruption resulting from

lange individual financial contmbutions in order to find a con

stitutionally sufficient justification” for the matching funds pro-

vision Buckley, 424 US. at 26. Because the Act is justified by

the State's legitimate and non-illusory interest in reducing quid

pro quo corruption, we need not consider the constitutional

legntimacy of other potential rationales that might support it

See td. at 24-27

App. 11

we conclude that one of the principal purposes of the

Act was to reduce quid pro quo corruption.

The Act created a system of public financing for

political campaigns. A candidate who chooses not to

participate in this system may raise unlimited funds

from private donations, subject to contribution limits

and disclosure requirements, which existed before the

Act. If a candidate opts to participate in the public

financing system, she or he agrees to forfeit her or his

right to fund her or his campaign with private con-

tributions. Instead, she or he must collect a required

number of five-dollar “qualifying contributions” dur-

ing a specified time period to demonstrate that she or

he has the voter support to be a viable candidate.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-946. The number of required

qualifying contributions varies between two hundred

and four thousand, depending on the office that the

candidate is seeking. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-950(D).

If the candidate qualifies for public financing, she

or he will then receive a lump-sum grant for her or

his primary campaign, which varies depending on

whether she or he is running opposed or unopposed in

a party primary, or whether she or he is an inde-

pendent candidate. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-951. If the

participating candidate has a nonparticipating oppo-

nent in the primary who spends more than her or his

initial grant, or whose expenditures, combined with

the value of independent expenditures in opposition

to her or his candidacy or in support of her or his

App. 12

nonparticipating opponent,’ exceed the amount of her

or his initial grant, the participating candidate will

receive “matching funds” in the amount of the com-

bined spending of her or his nonparticipating oppo-

nent, plus the value of independent expenditures

against her or him or in support of her or his

nonparticipating opponent, reduced by six percent

and reduced by the amount of “early contributions”

raised by the nonparticipating opponent during the

preprimary fundraising period.’ Ariz. Rev. Stat. $§ 16-

952, 16-945.

If the participating candidate wins her or his

primary and continues on to the general election,

she or he receives a_ second initial lump-sum

grant. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-952. If she or he has a

*“ An independent expenditure is a campaign expenditure

made by a third party that “expressly advocates the election or

defeat of a clearly identified candidate, that is made without

cooperation or consultation with any candidate or comrnittee or

agent of the candidate and that is not made in concert with or at

the request or suggestion of a candidate, or any committee or

agent of the candidate.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-901( 14).

* The matching funds that the participating candidate

receives are reduced by six percent to take into account the fact

that nonparticipating candidates incur expenses in order to

raise money. The assumption underlying this provision is that a

nonparticipating candidate must spend six dollars (on postage,

event costs, etc.) in order to raise one hundred dollars, while a

participating candidate has no fundraising costs. Therefore, in

order for both candidates to have the same net amount available

to spend on non-fundraising campaign expenses, the matching

funds that the participating candidate receives are reduced by

Six percent.

App. 13

nonparticipating opponent in the primary whose con-

tributions received, combined with the value of

independent expenditures in supporting him or her

and opposing the participating candidate, less his or

her expenditures during the primary campaign, ex-

ceed the amount of the participating candidate’s

second initial grant, the participating candidate will

receive matching funds, calculated in the same

manner as in the primary campaign. Ariz. Rev. Stat.

§ 16-952(B). During both elections, matching funds,

combined with the initial grant, may not exceed three

times the amount of the initial grant. Ariz. Rev. Stat.

$ 16-952(E). This means that a nonparticipating can-

didate who is able to raise funds in excess of three

times the amount of his or her participating can-

didate’s initial grant gains a potentially unlimited

financial advantage in the campaign.

II. Factual Background

Plaintiffs are John McComish and Nancy McLain,

current members of the Arizona House of Repre-

sentatives who are seeking reelection in 2010, Tony

Bouie, a non-incumbent candidate for the Arizona

House of Representatives, and Robert Burns, an

Arizona State Senator seeking reelection in 2010.

Joining them in this challenge to the Act are

plaintiffs-intervenors, Dean Martin, a former Arizona

State Senator, current State Treasurer, and candidate

for Governor in 2010, Rick Murphy a member of the

Arizona House of Representatives seeking reelection

in 2010, the Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom

App. 14

Club PAC (“Freedom Club PAC”), a political action

committee (“PAC”) which makes contributions to

Arizonans for a Sound Economy, an independent

expenditure committee that funds independent ex-

penditures in races subject to the Act, and the

Arizona Taxpayers Action Committee (“Arizona Tax-

payers”), an independent expenditure committee that

makes independent expenditures in races subject to

the Act. All candidate-plaintiffs have declined to par-

ticipate in the Act’s public funding program and will

be running in the 2010 election as privately-financed

candidates.

Plaintiffs sued Jan Brewer, in her official ca-

pacity as Arizona Secretary of State,” and Gary

Scaramazzo, Royann Parker, Jeffrey Fairman, Don-

ald Lindholm, and Lori Daniels, in their official

capacities as members of the Arizona Citizens Clean

Elections Commission (collectively, the “State”). The

Clean Elections Institute, Inc., a nonprofit organi-

zation formed to continue the work of Arizonans for

Clean Elections, the campaign committee that spon-

sored the initiative that created the Act, intervened

as a defendant.

Since 2002, between fifty-two percent and sixty-

seven percent of candidates for state office during

general elections have chosen to participate in the

Act’s public funding program. Plaintiffs contend that

* Ken Bennett has succeeded Jan Brewer as Secretary of

State since the commencement of this action.

App. 15

matching funds have dampened overall campaign

spending in Arizona. It is undisputed, however, that

overall campaign spending in Arizona has increased

since the Act’s passage.

Plaintiffs also allege that matching funds have

specifically deterred them from engaging in political

expression through monetary expenditures. They

argue that the fear of triggering matching funds

causes privately-funded candidates to refrain from or

delay raising and spending money in support of their

campaigns. They contend that matching funds bur-

den the speech of independent expenditure com-

mittees by causing them to delay making inde-

pendent expenditures in order to avoid triggering

matching funds until later in the campaign, when the

publicly-financed candidate will have less time to use

them, in an attempt to minimize the competitive

benefit of the matching funds to the publicly-financed

candidate.

We agree with the district court’s observation

that “Plaintiffs testimony is somewhat scattered and

shows only a vague interpretation of the burden of

the Act.” John MecComish testified that in his 200s

campaign for the House of Representatives, he trig-

gered matching funds to his opponents. In order to

avoid tmggering additional matching funds to his

opponents until later in the campaign, he “deci| ded’

to wait and not make any substantial expenditures

until September 2, 2008.” McComish describes this as

an act of “self-censorship” in order to avoid the conse-

quence of “disseminat|ing] viewpoints hostile to my

campaign.”

App. 16

Nancy MeLain testified that during her 2008

campaign for House of Representatives she “made a

conscious decision to not raise or spend a significant

amount because it could not be spent without

resulting in ‘equalizing funds.” Although she avoided

triggering matching funds in the general election, she

triggered matching funds in the primary. She claims

that her “reluctance to fundraise and spend money

during the primary election meant that [she] was not

able to broadcast [her] message either on air or in

newspapers as often as [she] thought necessary to

win the election.” although she was victorious. She

describes matching funds as imposing a ~

disadvantage” on her campaign, which her fund-

competitive

raising and spending choices “seek to minimize.”

Tony Boute also triggered matching funds during

tis 2008 campaign for House of Representatives. He

testified that because he had “no control over inde-

pendent expenditures that the Commission deems

{to} benefit him” he “fellt] compelled to conserve

money for damage-control in anticipation of poorly-

conceived independent expenditures backfinng after

they trigger matching funds” to his opponents. As a

result he “change!|d his] campaign strategy” by “hold-

ing [his] campaign speech until his] expenditures

could be timed to minimize the impact of the match-

ing funds.” He believes that matching funds thereby

“placed [him] at a continuous tactical disadvantage.”

Robert Burns “behevels! that the existence of

matching funds coerces traditionally funded candi-

dates into changing their message and the timing of

App. 17

getting out their message, even if ultimately the

amount of messaging a traditional candidate chooses

to engage in does not change.” His deposition testi-

mony indicated that matching funds had not actually

chilled his speech during his most recent 2008

election for State Senate. He admitted that he was

willing to tngger matching funds. Further, he also

indicated that despite the matching funds provision,

he simply communicated his message to the extent he

felt was necessary to win, stating “[ilf I had to spend

NX number of dollars to get out a — a mailer. and I had

that amount of money, I would go ahead and do the

mailer.”

Dean Martin stated that “the matching funds

provision of the Act forced [him] to self-censer” in his

most recent race for State Treasurer in 2006. He

reasoned that the “only way [jhe] could avoid being

massively outspent by this) opponent was to prevent

the triggering of additional matching funds to her

campaign” and “was thus coerced into accepting the

same hmits as [his] government-funded opponent

without] receiviing}] any of the benefits of being a

government-funded candidate, such as the receipt of

matching funds for independent expenditures that

opposed {his} candidacy and the label ‘participating’

or ‘clean’ candidate.” Despite Martin's testimony that

he felt matching funds severely burdened his speech,

he curiously could not even recall whether he had

ever triggered matching funds to an opponent. The

record indicates that Martin ts) fundamentally

~

opposed to the policy of publicly financing political

App. 18

campaigns, regardless of whether ao given pubhe

financing scheme includes a provision tor matching

funds.

Rick Murphy ran. successtully for House of

Representatives as a participating candidate in 2004.

He later ran for reelection in 2006 and 2008 as a

nonparticipating candidate. He testified that he

attempted to not trigger matching funds during his

2006 campaign because, since his opponent would

receive additional matching funds once he surpassed

the threshold amount, “[ijt didn’t seem like it made a

lot of sense for me to do that, so 1 curtailed my speech

and curtailed my fundraising in order to prevent it”

Sull, Murphy testified that matching funds have

never prevented him from accepting a political

contribution. Murphy's testimony that he curtailed

his fundraising for fear of triggering matching funds

was directly contradicted by his own campaign con-

sultant, who testified that he advised Murphy to

“raise as much money

where,” that he never advised Murphy to stop raising

as he could from “every-

money, and that Murphy never curtailed or stopped

his fundraising efforts.

The treasurer of the Freedom Club PAC testified

that the PAC has never been prevented from making

an independent expenditure for fear of triggering

matching funds. He further stated that he takes into

account Various campaign finance “reporting require-

ments, notifications and filings” upon which matching

tunds disbursement determinations by the Citizens

App. 19

Clean Elections Commission are based, in determin.

ing When to spend money.

Anzona Taxpayers stated that it “decided not to

speak in opposition to [a] participating candidate |...

in the 2006 primary election because such speech

would have triggered matching funds.” However, the

groups’s founder admitted that it had never decided

against making an expenditure because it would trig-

ger matching funds. Further, the evidence demon-

strates that Arnzona Taxpavers could not afford to

make expenditures during the 2006 primary election,

because it had only $52.72 1n cash on hand.

Ill. Standard and Scope of Review

We review the district court's grant of summary

judgment to Plaintiffs and denial of summary judg-

ment to the State de nove. See Block o Crtv of LA.

253 F.3d 410, 416 (9th Cir. 2001). This means that we

will look at the case “anew, the same as if it had not

been heard before. and as if no decision previously

had been rendered,” and “giving no deference to the

district judge's determinations.” Freeman vo DirecTV.

Inc... 457 F.3d 1001, 1004 (9th Cir, 2006); Ditto ¢

“Ordinarily a denial of a motion for summary judgment is

net a final order and thus not appealable. 28 USC. § 1291

However, the distmet court's grant of summary pudgment was a

final decision waiving us yursdiction to review its demial of (the

State's] motion for summary judgment 7 Abend o MCA. Ince. S63

Fld 1465, 1482 n.20 «9th Cir 1TSss)

App. 20

MeCurdy, 510 F3d 1070, 1075 (9th Cir, 2007)" We

apply the same legal standard that the district court

did, “[vhewing the evidence in the hght most tavor-

able to the nonmoving party.” and granting summary

judgment “only if no genuine issues of matenmal fact

remain for trial and the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law” Block, 253 F.3d at 416.

We “may affirm on any ground supported by the

record.” N. Mariana Islands v. United States, 399

F.3d 1057, 1060 (9th Cir. 2005). Because the district

court did not rule on the parties’ evidentiary objec-

tions and did not strike any evidence from the record,

all of the evidence adduced below remains a part of

the record before us on appeal. See Vinson coo TRorias,

288 F.3d 1145, 1152 & n Sith Cir. 2002).

First, we must determine what level of consti-

tutional scrutiny apphes to the Act’s matching funds

* We reyect Plaintiffs’ argument that Brown o Cal Dept of

Imonsp.. S21 FSd L217, 1221 (Sth Cir 2008), requires us to

review the district court’s findinys of fact for clear error because

its opimien was one which struck down a restmction on speech

Brown, and the line of cases that it follows, apply to this Court's

review of cases in which the district court made findings of fact

in the process of issuing a preliminary injunction er holding a

bench trial, or when questions of fact were submitted to a jury

See Planned Parenthood vo Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 290

F.3d LOSS, 1066.1070 (9th Crr 2OO2! cen bane! This case, artsing

from a grant of summary judgment. ts in an entirely different

procedural posture to which these cases do not apply

App. 21

provision. The level of scrutiny that apples to a law

Which implicates First Amendment concerns is “dic-

tated by both the intrinsic strength of, and the mag-

nitude of the burden placed on, the speech and

associational freedoms at issue.” Lincoln Club vo City

of Irvine, 292 F.3d 9384, 938 (9th Cir, 2002). We must,

therefore, engage in a two-step inquiry. First, we

determine whether the type of speech the law affects

is fully protected by the First Amendment. Next, we

determine the type of burden, if any, that the law

places on that speech. Laws that place severe bur-

dens on fully protected speech are subject to strict

scrutiny. Laws that “place| | only a minimal burden

on fully protected ... freedoms” or that apply to

“speech and associational freedoms [that] are not

fully protected by the First Amendment” receive

intermediate serutiny. /d.

[1] Buckley, the Supreme Court's landmark

case on the constitutionality of campaign finance laws

under the First Amendment, provides sguuidance tin

determining whether the Act affects fully protected

speech. Buckley held that campaign contributions are

not fully protected political speech. 424 U.S. at 21-22;

see also” Lincoln Club, 292 F3d at 938-39. The

Supreme Court reasoned that a “contmbution serves

as a general expression of support for the candidate

and his views, but does not communicate the under-

lving basis for the support. ... [The transformation

of contributions into political debate involves speech

by someone other than the contributor.” Buckley, 424

US. at 21. By contrast, campaign expenditures are

App. 22

fully protected speech because a “restriction on the

amount of money a person can spend on political com-

munication during a campaign necessarily reduces

the quantity of expression by restricting the number

of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration,

and the size of the audience reached.” Jd. at 19.

(2) Following Buckley, a law that has a hybnd

efYect on both contributions and expenditures ts

interpreted as though it affects fully protected speech.

See Lincoln Club, 292 F.3d at 939. The matching

funds provision of the Act affects both contributions

and expenditures. During primary elections, the Act

explicitly ties participating candidate’s matching fund

disbursements to nonparticipating candidates’ expen-

ditures. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-952. During a general

election, the Act bases matching fund calculations on

contributions received by nonparticipating candh-

dates. Jd. This includes contnmbutions that come from

a nonparticipating candidate's personal funds, which,

under Buckley's framework, are considered expen-

ditures, and fully protected speech. See 424 U.S. at

51-55. Because the Act affects both contributions and

expenditures, we analyze it as though it affects fully

protected speech.

Next, we determine what level of burden, if any,

the Act imposes on that speech. Plaintitts argue that

the Supreme Court's recent decision in Davis, 128

S.Ct. 2759, controls this case, and compels the con

clusion that the Act places a severe burden on their

speech triggering the application of strict) scrutiny.

The State and Defendant Intervenor counter that the

App. 2.

Act places only a minimal or indirect burden on

Plaintiffs’ speech and that the Supreme Court's latest

campaign finance decision, Citizens United, 1308. Ct.

876, reaffirmed that intermediate scrutiny applies to

such laws.

[3]) In Buckley, the Supreme Court evaluated

the constitutionality of provisions of the Federal Elec-

tion Campaign Act of 1971, and related provisions of

the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended,

which allowed for the pubhe financing of presidential

elections. See 424 U.S. at 6, 85-109. The Court found

that the public financing scheme in that case was “a

congressional effort, not to abridge, restrict, or censor

speech, but rather to use public money to facilitate

and enlarge public discussion and participation in the

electoral process, goals vital to a self-governing

people. Thus [it] furthers, not abridges, pertinent

First Amendment values.” Jd at 92-93 (footnote

omitted). Therefore, the public financing of elections

itself does not create any burden on speech.

In Davis, the Court struck down the Millionaire's

Amendment to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act

of 2002 (““BCRA”), 2 U.S.C. § 441a-lia). The Milhon-

aires Amendment apphed to campaigns for the

United States House of Representatives, in which all

candidates are privately financed and there is no

public funding. But if one candidate financed his

campaign with personal funds in excess of a threshold

amount, “a new, asymmetrical regulatory scheme

c{ame] into play.” 128 8. Ct. at 2766. While the self-

financing candidate continued to be subject to the

App. 24

normal contribution limits, his opponent, the ‘non-

self-financing’ candidate became eligible to “receive

individual contributions at treble the normal limit .. .

even from individuals who may have reached the nor-

mal aggregate contributions cap, and [could] accept

coordinated party expenditures without limit.” /d.

The Davis Court held that this “scheme of discrimi-

natory contribution limits,” “imposes a substantial

burden on the exercise of the First Amendment right

to use personal funds for campaign speech.” /d. at

2772. Having found the Millionaire’s Amendment to

be a substantial burden on fully protected speech, the

Court applied strict scrutiny. Jd.

Plaintiffs urge us to adopt the rationale of the

district court and conclude that, under the logic of

Davis, they have “established a cognizable burden”

under the First Amendment. The district court rea-

soned that “[i]f the mere potential for your opponent

to raise additional funds is a substantial burden, the

granting of additional funds to your opponent must

also be a burden.” We disagree. As discussed below,

we conclude that Davis is easily and properly dis-

tinguished from the case at bench.

The regulatory framework the Supreme Court

examined in Davis is different from the one we con-

front under the Act. Davis says nothing about public

“funding schemes and therefore says nothing about

their constitutionality.” Comment, 122 Harv. L. Rev.

375, 383 (Nov. 2008). All of the candidates in Davis

were subject to the same scheme regulating privately

financed candidates. “Under the usual circumstances,

App. 25

the same restrictions apply to all the competitors for

a seat and their authorized committees.” Davis, 128

S.Ct. at 2765. But if one candidate heavily self-funded

his campaign, it triggered an entirely new “asym-

metrical regulatory scheme” that required him to file

three additional types of campaign finance disclo-

sures not required of his opponents. /d. at 2766-67.

“Failure to comply with the reporting requirements

may [have] resultfed] in civil and criminal penalties.”

Id. at 2767. It also triggered new, more generous

campaign contribution limits, but only for the self-

ere

financing candidate's opponents. /d. at 2771.

In striking down the Millionaire's Amendment,

the Supreme Court noted that had the law “simply

raised the contribution limits for all candidates,

Davis’ argument would plainly fail.” Jd. at 2770; see

also td. at 2771 (““Consequently, if § 319(a)’s elevated

contribution limits applied across the board, Davis

would not have any basis for challenging those

limits.”). Instead, the law constituted a burden on

Davis’ speech only because it treated candidates run-

ning against each other under the same regulatory

framework differently based on a candidate's decision

to self-finance his or her campaign, which is a man-

ner of engaging in fully protected speech. /d. at 2771.

In contrast, the Supreme Court has held that it is

constitutional to subject candidates running against

each other for the same office to entirely different reg-

ulatory schemes when some candidates voluntarily

choose to participate in a public financing system.

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 97. “[T]he Constitution does not

App. 26

require Congress to treat all declared candidates the

same for public financing purposes.” /d. “Sometimes

the grossest discrimination can lie in treating things

that are different as though they were exactly alike.”

Id. at 97-98.

In Davis, the Millionaire’s Amendment was an

attempt to “level electoral opportunities for candi-

dates of different personal wealth.” 128 S.Ct. at

2773. This was problematic because Buckley had held

that “the First Amendment simply cannot tolerate [a]

restriction upon the freedom of a candidate to speak

without legislative limit on behalf of his own can-

didacy.” 424 U.S. at 54. In Citizens United, the

Supreme Court elaborated on its decision in Davis,

indicating that the Millionaire’s Amendment was

unconstitutional because it specifically sought to

disadvantage the rich. “The rule that political speech

cannot be limited based on a speaker’s wealth is a

necessary consequence of the premise that the First

Amendment generally prohibits the suppression of

political speech based on the speaker's identity.”

Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 905. Under the Act,

while matching funds are calculated based on the

total contributions received and expenditures made

by a nonparticipating opponent, they are not distri-

buted specifically to the opponents of wealthy can-

didates. Matching funds do not distinguish between

different sources of nonparticipating candidates’

financing at all. The law in Davis was problematic

because it singled out the speakers to whom it

applied based on their identity. The Act’s matching

App. 27

funds provision makes no such identity-based distinc-

tions.

[4] Plaintiffs, perhaps recognizing that they

have not demonstrated any actual chilling of their

speech by the Act, argue that under Davis, we could

strike down the matching funds provision without

any proof that their speech has been deterred or

punished. But Davis does not require this Court to

recognize mere metaphysical threats to political

speech as severe burdens. We will only conclude that

the Act burdens speech to the extent that Plaintiffs

have proven that the specter of matching funds has

actually chilled or deterred them from accepting

campaign contributions or making expenditures.

[5] Based on the record before us, we conclude

that any burden the Act imposes on Plaintiffs’ speech

is indirect or minimal.” Since the Act’s adoption,

* Prior to, and without the benefit of, the Supreme Court's

recent decisions in Citizens United and Davis, three of our sister

circuits considered the constitutionality of state public financing

schemes with matching funds provisions similar to the one we

now confront. See N.C. Right to Life Comm. Fund for Indep.

Political Expenditures v. Leake, 524 F.3d 427 (4th Cir. 2008);

Daggett v. Comm’n on Govtal Ethics and Election Practices, 205

F.3d 445 (1st Cir. 2000); Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356 (8th Cir.

1994). The Fourth and First Circuits concluded that the

respective statutes imposed no First Amendment burden at all.

See N.C. Right to Life, 524 F.3d at 437-49; Daggett, 205 F.3d at

464-65. The Eighth Circuit. however, concluded that the

Minnesota law at issue imposed a substantial burden on fully

protected political speech and, because it could not survive strict

scrutiny, struck it down. See Day, 34 F.3d at 1360, 1363.

(Continued on following page)

App. 28

Plaintiffs argue that because the Supreme Court’s decision

in Davis cites Day, Davis somehow transformed the decision of

one of our sister circuits into controlling precedent. Davis cites

Day only once for a single, limited proposition. See Davis, 128

S. Ct. at 2772 (“Many candidates who can afford to make large

personal expenditures to support their campaigns may choose to

do so despite [the Millionaire’s Amendment], but they must

shoulder a special and potentially significant burden if they

make that choice. See Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1536, 1359-60

(C.A.8 1994) (concluding that a Minnesota law that increased a

candidate’s expenditure limits and eligibility for public funds

based on independent expenditures against her candidacy

burdened the speech of those making the independent expen-

ditures)”). In so citing Day, Davis did not affirm or adopt the

Eighth Circuit’s approach, nor did it overturn sub silento the

decisions of the First and Fourth Circuits. It merely cited Day

for what it is — a decision in which our sister circuit found that a

law chilled protected speech and held that such a burden could

not survive strict scrutiny. Our decision is not controlled by Day,

nor are we persuaded by it.

In Day, plaintiffs demonstrated that the Minnesota statute

they were challenging had a “chilling effect” on political speech

and that its “mere enactment ... ha[d]) prevented many if not

most potential political expenditures from ever being made.” 34

F.3d at 1360. As discussed infra, Plaintiffs have not established

the existence of such a chilling effect in the instant case. Having

found that the Minnesota law imposed a substantial burden on

fully protected political speech, the Eighth Circuit proceeded to

apply strict scrutiny. Jd. at 1361. The court concluded that the

law could not survive that test because it found that the state’s

professed interest supporting the law, that of encouraging parti-

cipation in the public financing program, was “not legitimate,”

“no matter how compelling in the abstract,” because it was not

based in fact, but was rather “contrived for purposes of []

litigation.” Jd. The record there demonstrated that the chal-

lenged provision was “not necessary to encourage candidates’

involvement in public campaign financing, as participation was

(Continued on following page)

App. 29

campaign spending in Arizona has increased. Several

Plaintiffs testified that they would have made

increased expenditures or undertaken increased

fundraising but for the matching funds provision. No

Plaintiff. however, has pointed to any specific

instance in which she or he has declined a contmri-

bution or failed to make an expenditure for fear of

triggering matching funds. The record as a whole

contradicts many of Plaintiffs’ unsupported assertions

that their speech has been chilled. Robert Burns

admitted he was willing to trigger matching funds

and spent as much money as he needed to in order to

communicate his message. Dean Martin claimed his

speech was chilled by matching funds, but could not

even recall whether he had triggered them in the

past. Rick Murphy admitted he had never turned a

contribution away, and his political consultant testi-

fied that he never slowed his fundraising. The

Freedom Club PAC’s treasurer testified that he has

approaching 100% before the new campaign finance laws were

passed.” Ja.

Two years after it decided Day, the Eighth Circuit.

recognizing the unusual factual background of that case.

declined to extend its reasoning and upheld other provisions of

Minnesota's campaign finance law under stmet scrutiny See

Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544, 1555 «Sth Cir. 1996). In

the case at bench. because the interest Amzona asserts in

support of the Act is not “contnved for purposes of this hti-

gation.” Day. 34 F.3d at 1362, even under current Eighth Circuit

law “the circumstances surrounding the enactment of the [Act)

make Day inapposite.” Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1555. We decline

to follow the Eighth Circuit down a road that even it refused to

follow

App. 30

never been dissuaded from making an independent

expenditure by the possibility of triggering matching

funds. Anzona Taxpayers’s claim that it declined te

speak in the 2006 primary for fear of triggering

matching funds seems disingenuous in light of the

fact that it only had $52.72 cash on hand. PlaintifYs

have not demonstrated that any chilling effect exists.

Their own experiences campaigning under the Act

highlight that it “in no way limits the quantity of

speech one can engage in or the amount of money one

can spend engaging in political speech. nor does it

threaten censure or penalty for such expenditures.”

Dagsett, 205 F.3d at 464.

Plaintiffs bemoan that matching funds deny

them a competitive advantage in elections. The

essence of this claim is not that they have been

silenced, but that the speech of their opponents has

been enabled. We agree with the First Circuit that

the First Amendment includes “no right to speak tree

from response — the purpose of the First Amendment

is to secure the widest possible dissemination of infor-

mation from diverse and antagonistic sources.” Ji.

(internal quotations omitted).

Plaintiffs’ assertions that they have delayed

making certain expenditures in order to avoid trig-

gering matching funds to their opponents until later

in the campaign cycle is evidence that they continue

to seek strategic advantages under the Act. but does

not support the argument that their speech has been

chilled. Many campaign finance regulations. parti-

cularly disclosure requirements. lead candidates to

App. $1

engage in such strateme behavior, but this does not

make them unconstitutional. As the Court has

observed, “the public begins to concentrate on elec-

tions only in the weeks immediately before they are

held.” Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at S895. Conse-

quently, waiting until that time to make campaign

expenditures would not necessamly be evidence of

coerced behavior. Rather, such decisions likely reflect

a rational strategy of maximizing the impact of one’s

campaign funds.

[6] Although Plaintiffs cannot point to anv

specific imstances in which their speech has been

chilled because of the Act. we recognize that under

the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, even laws that

create only potential chilling effects impose some

First Amendment burden. For example, the Supreme

Court has held that campaign contribution disclosure

requirements and campaign advertisement funding

disclosure and disclaimer requirements impose a

minimal burden on speech and are therefore subject

to intermediate scrutiny. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64

disclosure requirements); Citizens United, 130 8. Ct

at 914 (disclosure and disclaimer requirements). In

Buckley, the law at issue required candidates and

PACs, as well as some other individuals or groups

making political contributions or expenditures, to file

disclosure reports with the FEC. 424 U.S. at 63. The

Court recognized that these reporting requirements

“ean seriously intmnge on privacy of association and

belief guaranteed by the First Amendment.” Jd. at 64.

The Court also realized that the pubhe disclosure of

App. 32

pohtical contributions “will deter some individuals

who otherwise might contribute. In some instances.

disclosure may even expose contributors to harass-

ment or retaliation.” Jd. at 68. Even though these

Were “not insignificant burdens on individual nights.”

the Court analyzed them under intermediate serutiny

rather than strict scrutiny because the disclosure

laws “impose no ceiling on campaign-related acti,

vikies.” Jd. at 64, 6S.

Recently, in Citizens United. the Court apphed

the same type of analysis to the BCRA’s requirement

that political advertisements must state who “is

responsible for the content of [certain] advertising.”

130 S.Ct. at 913-14. The Court reaffirmed Buckley's

reasoning that such requirements MAY impose a

cognizable burden under the First Amendment even

though they “do not prevent anyone from speaking.”

Ia. at 914.

The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments that

the requirement “decreases both the quantity and

effectiveness of the group's speech by forcing it to

devote four seconds of each advertisement to the

spoken disclaimer.” Jd. at 915. Notably. in the absence

of any evidence “of harassment or retaliation.” the

Court also dismissed the plaintiffs’ arguments that

the disclosure requirements would “chill donations to

an organization.” Jd. at 916.

[7] In this case, as in Buckley and Citizens

United, the burden that Plaintiffs allege is merely a

theoretical chilling effect on doners who might dishke

App 33

the statutory result of making a contmbution or can-

didates who may seek a tactical advantage related to

the release or timing of matching funds. The match-

ing funds provision does not actually prevent anvone

from speaking in the first place or cap campaign

expenditures. Also, as in Bucklev and Citizens United,

there is no evidence that any PlaintifY has actually

suffered the consequence they allege the Act imposes.

We conclude that the burden created by the Act 1s

most analogous to the burden of disclosure and

disclaimer requirements ino Buckley and Citizens

United. Following the Supreme Court's precedents in

those cases, because the Act imposes only a minimal

burden on fully protected speech, intermediate

scrutiny apphes.

[8] Examining the matching funds provision

under intermediate scrutiny, because there is a “‘sub-

stantial relation’” between the Act’s matching funds

provision and ae “‘sufficiently important’ govern-

mental interest.” we conclude that it does not violate

the First Amendment. See Citizens United, 1380S. Ct.

at 914 (quoting Buckley). The State has a sufficiently

important interest in preventing corruption and the

appearance of corruption. See Citizens United, 130

S.Ct. at 909. The record demonstrates that Arizona

has a long history of quid pro quo. corruption.

AzSeam, in which legislators literally sold their votes

for cash bribes, was just one of many substantial,

wide-spread, and highly-publicized political scandals

that Arizona expenenced in the late 1980s and 1990s.

These incidents occurred despite the contmbutions

App. 34

limits in place prior to the Act. Regardless of whether

quid pro quo corruption continued to be a problem at

the time of the Act’s passage, the appearance of quid

pro quo corruption to the electorate was undeniable.

Arizona voters were justified in) concluding that

contribution limits alone were not sufficient to com-

bat corruption and its appearance. As the Supreme

Court has recognized, the State’s interest in eradi-

cating the appearance of quid pro quo corruption to

restore the electorate’s confidence in its system of

government is not “illusory.” it is substantial and

compelling. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27.

Furthermore, the State has an interest in pro

viding matching funds to encourage participation in

its pubhe funding scheme. Because Buckley held that

pubhe financing of elections furthers First Amend-

ment values, federal courts have found that states

may structure them in a manner which will encour-

age candidate participation in them. See, e.g. Rosen.

stiel, 101 F.3d at 1553 (the State has a compelling

interest in stimulating candidate participation in its

pubhe financing scheme”). The Eighth and First

Circuits have found this interest to be so compelling

as to withstand even the strictest scrutiny.” See td.

Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26, 39-40 Clst

Cir. 1993) (finding that the state has a “compelling”

Because we hold that the Act is sulyect only to inter.

mediate scrutiny, we need not decide whether the Act would

survive stmet scrutiny, as the First and Fourth Circuits have

held with respect to publhe finanemg schemes similar to the Act

App. 35

interest ino “having candidates accept) public fi-

nancing” ).

The district court misapprehended how the Act

functions to reduce corruption. It assumed that the

Act works by reducing nonparticipating candidates’

incentive to fundraise private contmbutions, thereby

reducing the appearance of corruption among non-

participating candidates. Thus, it concluded that the

Act did not further an anticorrpution interest by

providing matching funds to participating candidates

triggered by non-participating candidates making

contributions to their own campaigns trom their own

private funds. In doing so, it relied on the Court's

holding that “discouraging use of personal funds| |

disserves the anticorruption interest.” Davis, 128

Ss. Ct. at 2773.

The fact is, however, that the Act is aimed at

reducing corruption among participating candidates.

The relevant inquiry thus is whether matching funds

bear a substantial relation to reducing corruption

among participating candidates. In exchange for

public funding, participating candidates relinquish

their mght to raise campaign contributions from

private donors. They therefore have both reduced

opportunities and reduced incentives to trade

lemslative favors for financial tavors. The Supreme

Court has held “li/t cannot be gainsaid that public

financing as a means of eliminating the improper

influence of large private contributions furthers a

significant governmental interest.” Buckley, 424 ULS.

at 96.

App. 36

Viewing the Act from this perspective, it is clear

that the Act’s anticorruption interest is) further

promoted by high participation in the program. The

more candidates that run with public funding, the

smaller the appearance among Arizona elected off-

cials of being susceptible to quid pro quo corruption,

because fewer of those elected officials will have

accepted a private campaign contribution and thus be

viewed as beholden to their campaign contnbutors or

as susceptible to such influence.

It is not relevant under this analysis what the

source of a nonparticipating candidate's campaign

contributions is when he or she triggers matching

funds. In order to promote participation in the

program, and reduce the appearance of guid pro quo

corruption, the State must be able to ensure that

participating candidates will be able to mount com-

petitive campaigns, no matter what the source of their

opponents funding. If matching funds were not

triggered by independent expenditures or expendh-

tures from a nonparticipating candidate's own funds,

the Act's pubhie funding plan would not attract parti-

cipants. It would be an enormous political risk to

participate in such a system.

In this way, matching funds bear a substantial

relation to the State’s anticorruption interest. A pub-

he financing system with no participants does noth-

ing to reduce the existence or appearance of quid pro

quo corruption. If participants were not given match-

ing funds, they would not join the program because

they would not be viable candidates in their elections.

App. 37

If the State were to adopt the district court's

recommendation of structuring matching funds by

tying them “solely to contributions made by third par-

ties to a candidate,” it would have the effect of deter-

ring the participation of any candidate who feared

she or he might have an opponent who was able to

self-finance or would be the beneficiary of large in-

dependent expenditures. This would substantially

diminish the Act’s ability to attract participants,

thereby undermining its ability to prevent corruption.

{9} In contrast, if the Act were to raise the

amount of its lump-sum grants and do away with

matching funds altogether, it would make the Act

prohibitively expensive and spell its doom. By linking

the amount of public funding in individual races to

the amount of money being spent in these races, the

State is able to allocate its funding among races of

varying levels of competitiveness without having to

make qualitative evaluations of which candidates are

more “deserving” of funding beyond the base amounts

provided to all publically-funded candidates. The

State must walk a fine line between providing too

much and too little funding to participating candi-

dates, and we cannot conclude that the Act's

matching funds provision has failed in this effort

Vv. Conclusion

{10} For the reasons set forth above, we

conclude that the matching funds provision of the Act

does not violate the First Amendment. We decline to

App. 38

reach the equal protection claim, and reverse and

remand to the district court for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

KLEINFELD, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I concur. My reasoning is shghtly different. In my

view, the historical and policy considerations do not

matter to the outcome. Although the complaint

asserts both a facial and an as-applied challenge, the

district court injunction and the arguments amount

to a facial rejection of the statute.

The fact that matters is that the Arizona public

financing scheme imposes no limitations whatsoever

on a candidate's speech. Davis v. Federal Election

Commission’ is easily distinguished because there the

scheme did indeed impose a limit on the candidate's

speech, at least indirectly. If the candidate spent too

much of his own money promoting his political posi-

tion, then his opponent would benefit from a tripled

contribution limit per donor. The Arizona scheme

does not manipulate the limits on private donors’ con-

tributions according to whether a competing candi-

date is participating in the government funding

128 S.Ct. 2759 (2008)

; la at "ie

App. 39

scheme. Had it done so, Davis would apply by anal-

ORV.

Other circuits have divided on whether schemes

like Arizona’s violate the First Amendment.” The

Supreme Court cited with apparent approval the

Eighth Circuit decision,” which may be contrary to

the view we take today. But as the majority correctly

says, it is not clear that the Supreme Court meant to

adopt the Eighth Circuit view, and Davis did not

require the Court to address a scheme like the one

addressed by the Eighth Circuit.

I doubt that the level of scrutiny or risk of cor-

ruption matter in this case. The Arizena_ public

financing scheme's matchsng funds provision imposes

no limit at all on contributions or expenditures for

one’s own campaign. The limits are separate from the

public financing scheme and not challenged. The

* Compare N.C. Right to Life Comm. Fund for Indep.

Political Expenditures v. Leake, 524 F.3d 427, 437 (4th Cir. 2008)

(holding that matching funds te peblicly funded candidates that

trigger based on contributiems and expenditures for privately

funded candidates do not wmpose amy burden on First Amend-

ment mghts) and Dagget® v. Commn on Govtal Ethics and

Election Practices, 205 F3d 445, 464 (1st Cir. 2000) (same) with

Day v. Holahan, 34 P.3a@ 1356, 1860-62 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding

that providing additiomal public funds in response to inde-

penderit expenditures advocateng for a privately financed

candidate burdens the speech of the independent advocacy

groups, subjecting the law to strict scrutimy, and striking it

dovwen ).

* Davis, 128 S.Ct. at 2772

App. 40

plaimtiffs do not challenge the contributien limits.’

Contribution limits are what invoke corraptien and

level of serutimy considerations.

Plaintiffs challenge not contribution limits, but

the bemefits that the public financing scheme gives to

paticipatimg candidates running against privately

finaneed camdidates and the strategic concerns the

scheme creates for privately financed candidates.

Because the challenged scheme imposes no contri-

butien or spending limits, it does not restrict speech

at all, so I cannot see why heightened scrutiny would

apply.“ All that the evidence shows is that candidates

whe forege public funding make strategic decisions in

response to the public funding scheme. That is not a

restriction en speech. Intelligent, ambitious people

seeking political office, or any other goal, are likely to

study the rules and develop strategies taking maxi-

mum advantage of the rules. The kinds of strategic

* Contribution limits are impesed by Arizona Revised

Statutes § 16-905. Part of the referendum that created Arizome’s

public funding scheme alters the centribution limits by

providing new rules for participating candidates. § 16-941; A),

and uniformly decre@sing the contribution limits for nompar-

ticipating candidates, § 16-941(B). The complaint does not allege

that either § 16-905 or § 16-941 is unconstitutional. It alleges

that § 16-952, the matching funds provision of the referendum,

is unconstitutional. Section 16-952 does not impose contribution

limuts.

“ Accord N.C. Right to Life, 524 F.3d at 437: Daggett, 205

F.3d at 464.

’ N.C. Right to Life, 524 F.3d at 438; Daggett, 205 F.3d att

464.

ma

App. 41

choices generated by the Arizona rules do not differ in

kind from the choices presented to candidates by

other election laws. For example, candidates will run

their campaigns differently according to whether

there is a fixed election day or an extended period for

mail-in ballots, at large elections of multiple

candidates in one district or single winner elections in

multiple smaller districts, or partisan or nonpartisan

elections. That different laws generate different

strategres does not make them restrictions on speech.

The only speech:-related eoncern I can see to the

Arizona scheme is that a privately funded candidate

has to raise a lot more money to swamp a publicly

funded candidate. Someone not serious about politics,

but serious about traveling, eating meals, and seeing

his picture on billboards and in the newspapers for

months, all at taxpayer expense, might pose a gen-

uine challenge to a priwately funded candidate, unless

that candidate could raise funds well beyond the

ceiling in the public fumding scheme. If the notion is

that campaign contributioms amount to disguised

bribery, I suppose this might mean the Arizona

scheme would premote rather thai inhibit corruption.

But it is hard to see the materiality of that because

contribution limits have mot been challenged, and all

the corruption theory has been used to justify in First

Amendment law is contribution limits. As for the

privately funded candidate, his or her speech is not

limited by this increased burden of fundraising.

Rather, his chances of winning are inhibited if he

makes an incorrect judgment about whether he is

App. 42

going to be able to raise enough money to swamp the

publicly funded candidate. But the First Amendment

does not protect the candidate’s interest in winning,

just his interest in being heard. There is no First

Amendment right to make one’s opponent speak less,*

nor is there a First Amendment right to prohibit the

government from subsidizing one’s opponent,’ espe-

cially whem the same subsidy is available to the

challenger if the challemger accepts the same terms

as his opponent.”

As for the practical effects of the Arizona scheme,

I have no idea whether they are good or bad, and

nothing in the record throws any light on whether the

good outweighs the bad or vice versa. Intent and

metivation do not show effect, because the unin-

tended effects of reform frequently outweigh the

mtended effects. Nor does it matter whether the

scheme is a good or bad one, for First Amendment

purposes. Arizona is entitled to make good or bad

laws so long as they do not violate the Constitution.

* See Daggett, 205 F.3d at 464.

* Cf. Natl Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569,

587-88 (1998) (holding that the National Endowment for the

Arts may decide who to subsidize based on aesthetic value of

artworks because a subsidy is not a regulation on who can

speak).

© Cf. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va.,

515 U.S. 819, 829-30 (1995) (holding that a public university

must make its printing facilities available to all qualifying

student publications regardless of viewpoint).

App 433

Since this law does not Limit: speech, it does not

violate the First Amendment.

Perhaps pubhe funding is good because it helps

candidates run for office without relying on contr.

butions from people who will want) something in

return. Perhaps it is bad because in a state with a

large electorate and mass media, large contributors

are the only people involved who know a candidate,

and their money gives the public the benefit of what

amounts to quality screening by people who actually

know the candidate. As for the notion that contm

butions amount to bmbery, at least when they are

large, that may be so, or 11 may be that large contri-

butions amount to protection money that those

especially vulnerable to government power pay to

those they fear will wield it. Perhaps both, or neither,

is true. Doubtless many contributions result) from

contributors’ beliefs about who will) provide good

government, and gratitude to those willing to accept

elected office and competent to discharge it well.

None of this matters to this case. The only signif

icance of the corruption concern to First Amendment

law is that in Buckley v. Valeo, the concern was used

to justifv a limit on contributions to campaigns.

Since the case before us does not involve a contri-

bution limit or any other burden on speech, the con-

cern is immaterial.

494 US) 1, 25-26 C1976) (per curiam): see also Citizens

United v. Fed. Election Conon 'n, 130 S.Ct. S76, MOT C2010)

App. 44

In sum, the Arizona public financing scheme does

not limit speech directly or indirectly. The only

Supreme Court case touching at all closely upon the

issues is Davis, and Davis has to be distinguished

because the scheme in that case affected contribution

limits and this scheme does not. No Ninth Circuit

ease speaks to the constitutionalitw of the Arizona

scheme or anything like it. Qur sister circuits are

divided. Accordingly, T conclude that Arizona is not

constitutionally barred from using the scheme before

us.

App. 45

IN THE UNTPED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

John MeComush, et al. ) No. CV-O8-1550-PHX-ROS

; ) "

Plaintitts, ORDER

Vs \

Jan Brewer. et al.

Detendants.

This case involves claims by PlaintiltYs that the

campaign finance regime adopted by the State of

Anzona violates their free speech and equal protec-

fon rights. In short, Plaintiffs beheve the campaign

finance regime violates their rights because the state

provides additional funds to pubhely-funded candi.

dates in the event: non-publicly funded candidates

exceed certain campaign expenditure and fundraising

limits. As set forth below, the regime burdens Plain-

ufts’ First Amendment rights, is not supported by a

compelling state interest, is not narrowly tailored,

and is not the least restrictive alternative

The four cross motions for summary judgment

were filed in dune 2009. The parties filed responses

and rephes in duly 2009. Beganning in late July, and

continuing through September 2009, the parties made

various filings regarding supplementing the record

and submission of supplemental authority. In October

the Court) directed additional bnefing on crucial

issues not addressed in the parties’ orymnal sub-

mussions. The additional briefing was not complete

App. 46

until mid-November. In December 2009 the parties

continued to submut additional filings, and in Jan-

uary 2010) Plainti®s filed ao second motion for

preliminary ingunetion. The Court ordered expedited

brefing on that motion as well as supplemental briet-

ing on the appropriate scope of avatlable remedies

The record in this case is unusually large and

compheated. The summary judgment brieting: con

sists of more than one hundred separate docket

entmes, many of which consist of multiple documents

and hundreds of pages. Given the complicated nature

of this case, the Court deemed it prudent to review in

great detail the parties’ submussions betore issuing its

ruling. This ruling is issued less than two months

after the parties submitted the supplemental bniet-

ns

BACKGROUND

1. Passage of Clean Elections Act

The November 1998 election contained the tutia-

tive Measure known as the Citizens Clean Elections

Act (Aet")* According to the findings and declarations

Phe Distmet Court hearing the Dacis matter took approx

imately ten months to tssue its oprmion, and it took the Supreme

Court pust under one vear to issue its oprmen

Defendants’ bmefing reoounts various episodes of corrup

thonoain Arizona's state government allegedly leading: up to pas

sagre of the Act) Plaintitls concede the eprsodes eccurred, but

disagree that they were the driving foree tor passage of the Act

From the record presented in the oontert of what constitutes

(Continued on following page)

App. ay

contained in that muitiative, the intent of the Act was

“to create a clean elections system that will improve

the integmty of Arizona state government by dim-

imshing the influence of special-interest money, will

encourage citizen participation in the political proe-

ess, and will) promote freedom of speech.” The

proponents of the Act beheved the election-financing

system in effect at that time suffered from the eight

flaws that follow:

lL Allowed “elected officials to accept large

campaign contributions from. private inter:

ests over which they have governmental

jurisdiction’;

2 Gave “incumbents an unhealthy ad van

tage over challengers”;

3. Hindered “communication to voters by

many qualfied candidates”,

4. Suppressed “the voices and influence of

the vast majority of Arizona citizens in favor

of aoosmall number of wealthy special

Interests”,

& Undermined “pubhe confidence in the

integrity of pubhie officials”:

6 Cost “average taxpavers millions of dol-

lars in the ferm of subsidies and special

privileges for campaign contributors”:

—_—_——-—— =

admissible evidence, its impossible to determine the extent to

which the various corruption scandals led to passage of the Act

App. 48

7 Drove “up the cost of ranning for state

office, discouramng otherwise qualified can.

didates who lack personal wealth or access to

special interest funding”; and

SS. Required “elected officials spend too

much of their time raising funds rather than

representing the pubhe”™

The voter intormation pamphlet contained vari-

ous arguments “tor” and “against” passage of the Act

According to the arguments in taver of the Act, “i's

money that talks in political campaigns and it

threatens the principles of our democracy” Also, “(a)

thriving system depends upon solid governance and

poheies that benefit all of Arizonans, not just a few

who can afford to ‘pay to play’ ” And “[plolls reveal

that a lack of confidence in government is a major

factor” why individuals choose not to vote Voting in

favor of the Act would “end the monev chase, halt

corruption, limit campaign spending and reduce

special interest influence.” Voting: in tavor of the Act

would also “make sure that no lobbyist or special

Interest can again “buy a candidate as they are doing

now.”

The arguments against the Act in the voter

information pamphlet chamed it would levy “a host

of new taxes, create! | a new level of bureaucracy,

Thus information is taken from the Ballot) Propositions

Publiaty Pamphlet for the 1998 General Election Available at

itp www azsas gov clection 1998 Info PubPamphiet Cover btm!

App. 49

provide! | taxpayer funds for tringe candidates, pun

ishi | candidates who don’t want to use taxpayer

funds, and limit]! tree speech.” The opponents be

heved tax dollars should be saved “for education and

the safety of [their] children” instead of wasted on

“wacky candidates.” The Act passed with approx-

imately SU of the vote

2. Operation of Act

The Act, as currently constituted, provides a

voluntary system of campaign ftinanemg in which all

candidates for pubhe office must decide whether to be

a “participating: candidate” or ao “non-participating

candidate.” Particrpating candidates must collect: a

certain number of five-dollar “quahltving contmbu.

tions.” Once a participating candidate collects the

minimum number of “qualifving contributions,” he or

she recetves an initial grant for the primary. During

the pmmarvy campaign, the participating candidate

will receinve additional funds in the form of “matching

funds” af the participating candidate has a non-par-

tiopating opponent that spends more than the initial

grant” The participating candidate wall also receive

matching contmbutions af there are “independent

“Matching funds” are a dollar ter dellar match minus 6

meant to compensate tor the fundraising expenses tncurpmed by

traditional candidates ARS §$ 16-952 A) The parties use the

terms “matching contmbutions” and “matching funds” inter

changeabliv This opinien will use matching funds

App. 50

expenditures” against the participating candidate or

in favor of the non-participating opponent. Parties

patings candidates cannot raise or spend money in

addition to the grant

In the general election, a participating candidate

receives a second mmitial grant. Matching funds are

awarded if the non-participating candidate's receipts

(Le contmbutions), less expenditures made during the

pmmary campaign, exceed the second initial grant

Independent expenditures trigger matching funds in

the general campaign the same way they triggered

matching funds in the primary campayrn. Matching

funds cap out at three times the applicable spending

himit. Independent expenditures by Political Action

Committees’ PACS") made on behalf of a candidate

non-participating: or participating Or In opposition

to the participating opponent also count towards the

spending limit

Based on this structure, a candidate is taced with

the initial choice of whether to participate in public

funding. If the candidate decides not to participate in

“Independent expenditures” are defined as “expenditures

by a person or political committee, other than a candidate's

campanmn committee, that expressly advocates the election ot

defeat of a clearly identified candidate, that iw made without

cooperation or consultation with any candidate or committee or

agent of the candidate and that is not made rn coneert with or at

the request or sugwestion of a candidate. or any committee or

agent of the candidate "ARS § 16 901 14

Political Action Committees are groups omnanized “tor the

purpose of influencing the result of anv election "ARS 16 901

App 51

publhe funding, he or she must determine how much

money to spend on the race and how much time to

engaged in seeking fundraising. Assuming the can-

didate has a publicly funded opponent, the can-

didate’s expenditures and fundraising may result in

additional funds granted to that opponent. Those

additional funds, however, are hmited. Once a non-

participating candidate has raised or spent more than

three times the initial grant, no additional matching

funds will be piven to the participating opponent

Simply, there are no consequences once a non-

participating candidate has raised or spent more than

three times the initial grant

3. Participation in and Consequences of Act

The Act has been in place for the past five elec

tions. Since 2002, candidate participation has varied

between S29 and 67°. (Doc. 298 at 3). The parties

disagree on whether the Act has had an impact on

total campaign spending. It is undisputed that cam-

paurn spending has increased since the Act's passage,

but itis unclear whether that increase can be traced

to the Act. The parties also disagree on whether

candidates’ spending patterns show the Act has any

effect on candidate behavior Defendants assert the

spending patterns of candidates prove the Act has no

chilling effect. According to Defendants, if the Act

truly is chilling speech, one would expect to find

-_—— — —— -

The Act apphes to electrons tor statewide offices

aa

App. 52

candidates spend just up to but no more than the

spending limit. In other words, candidates would

attempt to spend the maximum amount they are able

to spend without triggering matching funds. Agyre-

yate statistics show candidates do not do so. But this

evidence does not dispose of Plaintiffs’ claims that

their speech was chilled and will be chilled. For

example, some of the Plaintiffs triggered matching

funds. Those individuals now claim they would have

spent more or spent at a different time if matching

funds were not a possibilty” Accordingly, the evi

dence regarding candidate spending does not defini

tively establish a chilling effect, or lack thereof

4. Plaintiffs’ Statements Regarding Burden of

Act

Plaintiffs and Plaintit®-Intervenors are incum

bents, past or future candidates for office, and Polit:

cal Action Committees ("PACS"). Plaintiffs were asked

during discovery to explain how the Act burdens their

rights. Plaintiffs’ testimony ts somewhat scattered

and shows only a vague interpretation of the burden

of the Act. Evidence regarding each Plaintiff? os

recounted below

* Other Plaintiffs did not spend enough to trigger matching

funds. and at does not appear that thes stopped spending just

shert of the point where matching funds would be awarded

App. 43

a. John McComish

Plant? John MeComish is a member of the

Anzona State House of Representatives who plans on

running tor reelection in 2010. In 2008, Mr. MeComish

ran as a non-participating candidate. (Doc. 316). In

the 2008 election, Mr. MeComish had at least three

participating opponents. Those opponents received

matching funds based on Mr. MeComish’s expend-

tures as Well as expenditures by third parties. Mr.

McComush claims the Act requires him to take steps

to minimize the impact of matching funds. Mr.

MeComish does this “by refraining from) making

campautn expenditures that (he! would otherwise

make... or by adopting a tactic of delaying [his] ex-

penditures mm such a manner as to minimize the

benefit any participating candidate may receive from

matching funds.” This, according to Mr. MeComish,

“amounts to self-censorship because (he! will retrain

from engaging in communication at times and in

manners that [he! would otherwise choose in order to

avoid disseminating viewpoints that are hostile to

this! candidacy.” da. at 5)

Mr. MeComush also beheves matching tunds “dis-

cruminate against traditional candidates.” (Doc. 316

at 5). This “discrimination” allegedly occurs when a

non-participating candidate tmggers matching funds

to his opponents. The Court is unable to conceive of

how an award of matching funds “discriminates”

against MeComuish. Discrimination in a general sense

requires that two individuals or groups be treated

differently by the government. Mr. MeComuish and the

App. 54

other Plaintiffs mentioned below have not explained

how they have been legally disfavored by the govern-

ment in comparison to participating candidates.

b. Nancy McLain

Plaintiff Naney McLain is a member of the Ari-

zona House of Representatives and plans on running

for reelection in 2010. During the 2008 primary

election, Ms. McLain triggered the award of matching

funds to an opponent. (Doc. 317 at 4). Independent

expenditures, allegedly aiding Ms. McLain, triggered

additional matching funds. During the most recent

general election, Ms. McLain had two participating

opponents. The presence of these opponents made her

“reluctant to fundraise ... or personally contribute or

loan money to [her] campaign.” Ms. McLain did not

trigger matching funds for the general election. In the

future, Ms. McLain plans on minimizing her fund-

raising and spending, or altering the mode of her

fundraising and spending, to lessen the impact of any

matching funds. Thus, matching funds allegedly re-

quire that Ms. McLain engage in “self-censorship.”

Like Mr. MeComish, Ms. MeLain claims match-

ing funds constitute a “discriminatory legal frame-

work.” Again, it is unclear what type of discrimination

Ms. MeLain believes is at issue.

~

App. 55

c. Tony Bouie

Tony Bouie is a non-participating candidate for

the Arizona House of Representatives. During the

2008 primary campaign, Mr. Boule had participating

and non-participating opponents. Mr. Boule and his

non-participating opponent both exceeded the spend-

ing limit during the primary campaign. Thus, the

participating opponent received matching funds. Mr.

Bouie claims his “speech was chilled from the mo-

ment [he] understood the general idea of matching

funds.” (Doe. 318). Mr. Bouie ceased “the promotion of

[his] campaign and [held his] campaign speech until

[his] expenditures could be timed’ to minimize the

impact of matching funds provisions.” The Act caused

Mr. Bouie to “self-censor until the last davs of the

election rather than sending out mailers, making au-

to calls, and passing out information door-to-door.”

d. Dean Martin

Dean Martin is the current Arizona State Trea-

surer and was elected to the State Senate in 2000,

2002, and 2004. (Doc. 288-2 at 4). In each of his

campaigns, Mr. Martin ran as a non-participating

candidate. Mr. Martin claims during his most recent

campaign he “was forced to limit [his] speech and

abide by the Act’s expenditure limits or rmsk being

* Delaying expenditures as much as possible minimizes the

impact of matching funds because the participating opponent

will not have time to spend the matching funds

App. 56

further outspent by [his] government-funded oppo-

nent because of the operation of the Act.” (Doc. 288-6

at 113). Mr. Martin states “|t]he only way [he] could

avoid being massively outspent by [his] opponent was

to prevent the triggering of additional matching

funds to [his opponent’s] campaign.” (Ud. at 114).

Thus, Mr. Martin “stopped accepting contributions to

[his] campaign.” Ud.). Mr. Martin triggered a rela-

tively small amount of matching funds in the 2006

State Treasurer race. (Doc. 362-1 at 22).

Despite Mr. Martin’s statement that matching

funds forced him to limit his speech, and the fact that

Mr. Martin triggered matching funds in 2006, Mr.

Martin was unable during his deposition to recall]

whether he had ever triggered matching funds. (Doc.

309-8 at 3). It follows that if matching funds were a

serious concern, Mr. Martin would know whether he

had triggered such funds. Mr. Martin also testified he

has supported legislation to repeal the Act, and his

opposition to matching funds is based, at least in

part, on the provision that if you accept government

funding “you're not allowed ... to support your own

campaign over a certain amount.” (Ud. at 9). Thus, it

appears that Mr. Martin’s real focus has been on pub-

lic funding of elections in general, and not matching

funds in particular.

e. Robert Burns

Robert Burns is an Arizona State Senator. Mr.

Burns was first elected in 2002, was reelected in

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Record and brief — Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett · 564 U.S. 721 | Frix