Record and brief — Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S. A.
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SUPREME COURT
ol rae £Neg w BIA AS
Global lech Apphances, Inc , etal, Petitioners
Vv
SEBSA
dune 29) 2 O10
Uimled States Court of Appeals for the | ederal Circuit
(2009 1099, 2009 1408, 2009 1119)
March 25 2010
Proceedings and Orders
Pehton for a witof cemoran tiled (Response due July 29, 2010)
Boel of respondent SEBS A om opposition tiled
Boef anuci cunae of 96 Law, Fcononucs, and Business Professors tiled
DISTRIBUTED tot Conference of September 27, 2010
DOS TRIBUTE D for Conference of October 8 2010
Petthon GRANTED
Consent to the ting of anucus Cunae brets, in Support of ether party or of
neither party, recenved tron) Course! tor the respondent
Consent to the tng of amicus Cunae bets, in support of either party oF of
neither party, received trom Counsel for the petitioners
Lxtension of time to tile the joint appendix and petiioners’ bret on the merits to
and mchuding November 29° 2010
The time to file respondent's bret on the merits ts extended to and mclhuding
December 30, 2010
Jomt appendix tiled (Statement of costs tiled )
net of peutlioners Global lech Apphances Inc. et al tiled
Supplemental appendix of Global lech Apphances inc , etal filed
Bnet anvcus Cunae of Newegg, Inc tiled
net anc: Cunae of Yahoo! inc , etal tied
Bet anvous Cunae of Business Software Alliance tiled
Boel anc Cunae of Comcast Corporation, et al filed
Bet anvous Cunae of Software Freedom | aw Center tiled
Binet anc: Cunae of Motion Picture Association of America and Recording
Industry in support of neither party filed
inet amict Cunae of Cisco Systems, Inc , et al tiled
net anvcus Cunae of Google Inc tiled
Bnet anucus Cunae of Intellectual Property Owners Association in Support of
neither party filed
Boeft anc cunae of The Cleaning House Association, et al filed
Bnet amici Curae of 41 Law, Lconomics, and Business Professors tiled
Bnet anvcus cunae of federal Crrcunt Bar Association in support of neither
party tiled
SET FOR ARGUMENT ON Wednesday, February 23, 2011
Bnet olrespondent SEBS A ted (Distributed)
CIRCULATED
Bnet anc Cunae of Law Professors filed (Orstibuted)
Bnet anna cunae ot Hoffmann ta Roche tnc , et al filed (Distributed)
Bnet amicus cunae of Wiham Mitchell College of | aw tntellectual Property
Jano 201
dan ?0 2011
Jan 31 2011
feb 112011
beb
2S 27011
Institute tled (UDistibuted)
Bet amicus Cunae of Amencan Intellectual Property Law Association tiled
(Lustributed)
Record received trom US © A_ for Federal Circunt: (1 box)
Reply of petitioners Global Tech Appliances, Inc , et al tiled (Distributed)
Record received trom US 0 C for Southern District of New York (VVhite Plains)
(4 boxes) [here are sealed documents in this record
Argued For petitioners Wilham Dunnegan, New York NY For respondent R
led Cruz, Houston, lex
PETITION
FOR
WRIT OF
CERTIORARI
| t, US.
Summ resYS
. JUN 23 2010
No. 09 10-6
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
ee ——
GLOBAL-TECH APPLIANCES INC. and
PENTALPHA ENTERPRISES, LTD.,
Petitioners,
v.
SEB S.A.,
Respondent.
On Pevirion vor A Writ OF CERTIORARI TO THE
Unrrep States Court or APPEALS
FOR THE FreperaLCimcurr
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
WILLIAM DUNNEGAN
350 lifth Avenue
New York, New York 10118
(212) 332-8300
wd@dunnegan.com
Counsel for Petitioners
230422 cr
COUNSEL PRESS
(BOO) 274 S321 © (800) 359 -G&59
l
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the legal standard for the state of mind
element of a claim for actively inducing infringement
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) is “deliberate indifference of a
known risk” that an infringement may occur, as the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held, or
“purposeful, culpable expression and conduct” to
encourage an infringement, as this Court taught in
MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 918, 937,
125 S. Ct. 2764, 2780, 162 L. Ed. 2d 781, 801 (2005)?
vt
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
The petitioners here, and defendants-appellants in
the Federal Circuit, are Global-Tech Appliances Ine.
(now “Global-Tech Advanced Innovations Ine.”), and
Pentalpha Enterprises, Ltd. (now “Pentalpha Medical,
Ltd.”) (collectively “Pentalpha”).
The respondent here, and plaintiff-appellee in the
tederal Circuit, is SEB S.A (“SERB”).
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Pentalpha Enterprises, Ltd. is a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Global-Tech Appliances Inc., a publicly
traded corporation, with its principle place of business
in Hong Kong.
SiiB is a publicly traded corporation, with its
principle place of business in France.
TT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Pave
QUESTION PRESENTED .................. i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING .......... ii
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT .. il
po A a eee eer ill
TABLE OF APPENDICES .................. vi
pe OR Tt Sips ot) y | >. Se vii
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI . .. ]
ae red deus see adean eas 078 ]
rns ks ahaa eben ead as | I
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOIVED ..... 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............... 3
A. Factual Background ................... 3
Bb. The Proceedings in the District Court .. 4
©. The Proceedings in the Federal Circuit . 6
REASON FOR GRANTING THE PETITION |...
I.
iv
Contents
THE COURT SHOULD DETERMINE
WHETHER THE SALE OF A
PRODUCT WITH “DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE OF A KNOWN RISK”
THAT AN INFRINGEMENT MAY
OCCUR SATISFIES THE INTENT
KLEMENT FOR ACTIVELY
INDUCING INFRINGEMENT UNDER
ee We EEE ces evncdeunbiseecosva
A THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S
“DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE”
STANDARD FOR ACTIVELY
INDUCING INFRINGMENT
UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)
CONFLICTS WITH THE
TEACHING OF THIS COURT IN
MGM — STUDIOS, INC. v.
ee Pre eee
B. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT HAS
NOT ADEQUATELY ARTICU-
LATED AN APPROPRIATE
STANDARD FOR ACTIVELY
INDUCING INFRINGEMENT
UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 271 (b) ........
Page
7
(‘ontents
Page
C. THE “DELIBERATE INDIFFER-
ENCE” STANDARD OF SEB MAY
PROFOUNDLY IMPACT INTER-
NATIONAL AND DOMESTIC
SEED ghana ncenecedvesuns 17
be | eer reer Tee eee 20
vl
TABLE OF APPENDICES
Appendix A — Opinion Of The United States
Court Of Appeals For The Federal Circuit
Decided February 5, 2010 ..................
Appendix B — Memorandum Decision And
Order Of The United States District Court For
The Southern District Of New York Dated
ee ae ane kas bee
Appendix C — Order Of The United States
Court Of Appeals For The Federal Circuit
Denying Petition For Rehearing Dated March
RNR PE ee Pere eiphnnnae & Pasa oe
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases Bead
Carolina Power & Light Co. v. United States,
573 EF. 3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2009) .............. 10
DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co. Ltd., 471 F.3d
1293 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en bane) ............. 6, 14
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.825,114S Ct. 1970,
eS eee 9, 11
First Interstate Bank of Billings v. United
States, 61 F. 3d 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1993) 2.0.2... 10
Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Nokia, Ine. , 527 F.3d
EIEN ED icc sce cvacecocsuseesss 10
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc.,
909 F.2d 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1990) 2. ..0.00000... 13, 14
Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Systems,
Inc., 917 F.2d 548 (Fed. Cir. 1990)... 2... 13, 14, 19
In Re Seagate, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007). . 5
Insituform Technologies, Ine. v. Cat
Contracting, Inc., 161 F.3d 68% (Fed. Cir.
FOE Saskaceb Gan ancva wenneaaWicerspasees. 1h
MGM Studios, Ine. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S.
913, 125 8. Ct. 2764, 162 L. Kd. 2d 781 (2005)
(tae CENECS CR WELEV ON SREE Sea re reo we sealed passim
vill
Authorities
Page
Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 127
S. Ct. 2201, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1045 (2007) ....... sy)
SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc.,
594 F.3d. 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ............ passim
SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80394 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2007)
LRERSECELECES CES SORLESESS EUS NAETER CREO ONS 10
The Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air
Circulation Systems, Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 122
S. Ct. 1889, 152 L. Ed. 2d 18 (2002) ......... 17
Statutes
a Oe eee: Oe EEE os Vcr e 6G bk bebe ue eee ee sees 1
i eG eee a estab e reece kweli 6,17
Se as eI od i vin ev ake dees teen passim
ee eR EY oc cccetuseanuneus es seeecke 2,18
uF tee eer rere rrr 2,15
ix
Authorities
Pave
Other Authorities
Prosser and Keeton § 34; Restatement (Second)
OE UU BUD vc ccc ccccesvccsecestac )
Trade Stats Express, International Trade
Administration, http://tse.export.gov/NTD
ChartDisplay.aspx? UniqueU RL =aox4m345
pk4v0145mgp3f055-2010-6-18-10-37-37
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Pentalpha respectfully petitions for a writ of
certiorari to review the judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, insofar as it
found Pentalpha liable for actively inducing
infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), based upon
Pentalpha’s sales of a product FOB Hong Kong or China
with “deliberate indifference of a known risk” that an
infringement may oceur.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Federal Circuit is reported at 594
i Sd 1360, and a copy is annexed as Appendix A.
The memorandum and order of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York is
not officially reported, but is available at 2006 U.S. Dist.
LLIeXIS $0394, and a copy is annexed as Appendix B.
The order denying the petition of Pentalpha for
rehearing en bane is not officially reported, but is
available at 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7937, and a copy is
annexed as Appendix C.
JURISDICTION
The Federal Circuit entered its judgment on
Kebruary 5, 2010, and denied Pentalpha’s petition for
rehearing en bane by an order entered on March 25,
2010. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1254(1).
2
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The relevant portions of the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(a), (b), and (¢) provide:
“§ 271 Infringement of patent
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this
title, whoever without authority makes, uses,
offers to sell, or sells any patented invention
within the United States, or imports into the
United States any patented invention during
the term of the patent therefor, infringes the
patent.
(b) Whoever actively induces
infringement of a patent shall be liable as an
infringer.
(c) Whoever offers to sell or sells within
the United States or imports into the United
States a component of a patented machine,
manufacture, combination, or composition, or
a material or apparatus for use in practicing
a patented process, constituting a material
part of the invention, knowing the same to be
especially made or especially adapted for use
in an infringement of such patent, and not a
staple article or commodity of commerce
suitable for substantial non-infringing use,
shall be liable as a contributory infringer.”
3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Factual Background
SEB is engaged in the business of manufacturing
household appliances. It owns United States Patent No.
4,995,312 (the “Patent”), for a specific type of deep fryer.
SEB markets its products in the United States through
an indirect subsidiary, T-F'al Corporation.
Pentalpha is also engaged in the business of
manufacturing household appliances. In 1997, Pentalpha
developed a deep fryer by purchasing and studying
various deep fryers on the market in Hong Kong,
including a SEB deep fryer that lacked United States
patent markings. Before selling its deep fryer, Pentalpha
contacted a New York patent attorney for an opinion as
to whether its deep fryer would infringe any United
States patent. Pentalpha did not disclose to the attorney
which products it had used to develop its deep fryer.
The attorney then provided a written opinion that the
deep fryer did not infringe any United States patent.
But, the patent search the attorney performed failed to
identify SE B’s Patent. Pentalpha in August 1997 began
selling deep fryers to Sunbeam Corporation
(“Sunbeam”), FOB Hong Kong or China, and Sunbeam
imported them into the United States. Pentalpha later
sold essentially the same deep fryer FOB Hong Kong
or China to two additional United States retailers,
Montgomery Ward & Co., Ine. (“Montgomery Ward”),
and Fingerhut, Ine., which imported them into the
United States.
4
In March 1998, SEB sued Sunbeam in the District
of New Jersey for infringing the Patent. As a result of
that action, Pentalpha on or about April 9, 1998
learned—for the first time—of the existence of the SEB
Patent. On July 10, 1998, SEB sued Pentalpha in the
New Jersey action. In July 1999, Sunbeam paid SEB
$2,000,000 to settle that action. Contemporaneously, the
New Jersey district court dismissed SEB’s claims
against Pentalpha for lack of personal jurisdiction.
B. The Proceedings in the District Court
On August 27, 1999, SEB commenced an action for
patent infringement against Pentalpha and one of its
customers, Montgomery Ward, in the Southern District
of New York. On December 16, 1999, the district court
granted a preliminary injunction enjoining Pentalpha
from selling its deep fryers. After receiving a non-
infringement opinion from new patent counsel,
Pentalpha began selling a redesigned deep fryer. On
SER’s motion, the district court extended its
prejiiminary injunction to that redesigned deep fryer.
After discovery and pretrial motions, the district
court tried the action beginning on April 17, 2006.
At the close of evidence on April 20, 2006, Pentalpha
moved for judgment as a matter of law on certain claims.
Specifically, Pentalpha argued that it could not be
liable for actively inducing infringement under 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(b) for its sales before April 9, 1998 because the
parties agreed that Pentalpha had no knowledge of the
Patent before that date. The district court denied
Pentalpha’s motion. In its charge, the district court
instructed the jury that it could find Pentalpha liable
5
for inducing infringement if Pentalpha “knew or should
have known” that its actions would induce actual
infringement. Pentalpha objected to that charge. On
April 21, 2006, the jury found as follows.
i. Pentalpha had directly infringed and
induced infringement for both deep fryers.
ii. SEB was entitled to a reasonable royalty
of $4,650,000 on Pentalpha’s sales,
although the jury did not allocate any
amount to either theory of liability.
ili. Pentalpha’s infringement was willful, but
did not specify any product or time period
for that finding.
Post-trial motions followed. By memorandum and
order dated October 9, 2007, annexed as Appendix B,
the district court denied all of Pentalpha’s post-trial
motions, except it reduced the verdict by $2,000,000,
the amount Sunbeam had paid SEB in the related suit
over the deep fryers. The district court also awarded
SiiB enhanced damages of $2,650,000, attorney’s fees
of $932,123, and prejudgment interest at the prime rate.
Pentalpha moved to reargue because the district court
had failed to consider /n Re Seagate, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed.
Cir. 2007). The district court granted Pentalpha’s motion
to reargue and vacated its award of enhanced damages
and attorneys’ fees. It entered judgment on October 2,
2008 in the amount of $4,878,341.
Pentalpha filed a notice of appeal on October 30,
2008.
6
C. The Proceedings in the Federal Circuit
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
exercised appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295
Pentalpha argued, among other things, that the
district court erroneously charged the jury concerning
the elements of a claim for actively inducing
infringement because the Federal Circuit had held, en
banc, that knowledge of a patent was a necessary
element of a claim for actively inducing infringement,
DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co. Ltd., 471 F.3d 1293, 1304
(ed. Cir. 2006) (en banc), and because Pentalpha, the
parties agreed, had no knowledge of the Patent before
April 9, 1998, seven months after Pentalpha began its
sales. In an opinion entered February 5, 2010, annexed
as Appendix A, the Federal Circuit held that, because
of ambiguous jury instructions, it could not determine
whether the jury had found damages based on inducing
infringement alone, direct infringement alone, or both.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that, to affirm, it
had to uphold the judgment based upon both the
theories of direct infringement and actively inducing
infringement.
The Federal Circuit nevertheless affirmed the
district court’s judgment that Pentalpha was liable for
inducing infringement under 85 U.S.C. § 271(b). The
Kederal Circuit reasoned that Pentalpha’s “deliberate
indifference” as to whether its product might infringe a
patent satisfied the state of mind element for actively
inducing infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b).
7
On March 2, 2010, Pentalpha filed a petition for
rehearing en banc. Two bar associations submitted a
joint brief in support of Pentalpha’s petition. By order
entered March 25, 1010, annexed as Appendix C, and
without modifying the decision, the Federal Circuit
denied the petition.
REASON FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
l. THE COURT SHOULD DETERMINE
WHETHER THE SALE OF A PRODUCT WITH
“DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE OF A KNOWN
RISK” THAT AN INFRINGEMENT MAY OCCUR
SATISFIES THE INTENT ELEMENT FOR
ACTIVELY INDUCING INFRINGEMENT
UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)
A. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S “DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE” STANDARD FOR
ACTIVELY INDUCING INFRINGMENT
UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) CONFLICTS WITH
THE TEACHING OF THIS COURT IN MGM
STUDIOS, INC. v. GROKSTER, LTD.
In MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S.
913, 1265S. Ct. 2764, 162 L.. hd. 2d 781 (2005), this Court
taught that the state of mind element for actively
inducing patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)
requires “affirmative intent that the product be used
to infringe.” Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936. Grokster was a
copyright ease in which this Court considered whether
a distributor of software with significant non-infringing
uses should be secondarily liable for copyright
infringement if it intentionally designed and marketed
8
its product for an infringing purpose. See /d. at 941.
This Court applied the patent law rule for inducing
infringement to the copyright law, to allow secondary
copyright liability premised on Grokster’s intentional
acts to encourage others to infringe. /d. at 936-87. In
doing so, this Court articulated its view of the level of
culpable conduct 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) requires:
“The rule on inducement of infringement as
developed in the early cases is no different
today. Evidence of ‘active steps . . . taken to
encourage direct infringement’... show an
affirmative intent that the product be used
to infringe, and a showing that infringement
was encouraged overcomes the law’s
reluctance to find liability when a defendant
merely sells a commercial product suitable for
some lawful use.”
Id. at 936 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Thus,
this Court in Grokster taught that actively inducing
patent infringement requires more than a disregard of
the risk that a patent infringement might occur.
lurthermore, in applying its interpretation of
35 U.S.C. § 271(b) to the copyright law, this Court held
that “mere knowledge of infringing potential or of actual
infringing uses would not be enough here to subject a
distributor to liability ...The inducement rule, instead
premises liability on purposeful, culpable expression and
conduct.” /d. at 937.
Here, the Federal Circuit adopted a standard for
actively inducing patent infringement under 35 U.S.C.
9
§ 271(b) that conflicts with that teaching of this Court.
The SEB standard bases liability on conduct manifesting
“deliberate indifference of a known risk” that a patent
may exist. SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc.,
594 F 38d. 1360, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“as courts have
observed in a variety of settings, the standard of
deliberate indifference of a known risk is not different
from actual knowledge.”) (citations omitted). The SEB
standard does not require “affirmative intent that the
product be used to infringe.” Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936.
Instead, the SEB standard allows “mere knowledge of
infringing potential” to serve as the basis for liability.
Id. at 937.
The Federal Circuit’s “deliberate indifference”
standard does not require recklessness. This Court has
previously held that “[t}he civil law generally calls a
person reckless who acts or (if the person has a duty to
act) fails to act in the face of an unjustifiably high risk
of harm that is cither known or so obvious that it should
be known.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836, 114
S. Ct. 1970, 1979, 128 L. Id. 2d 811, 825 (1994) (citing,
Prosser and Keeton § 34, at 213-14; Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 500 (1965)). Furthermore,
“recklessness requires ‘a known or obvious risk that
was so great as to make it highly probable that harm
would follow.” Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S.
47, 69, 127 S. Ct. 2201, 2215, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1045, 1065
(2007) (quoting Prosser and Keeton § 34, at 213). The
Kederal Circuit conspicuously avoided articulating any
standard concerning the severity of the risk of
infringement necessary to find liability.
10
Similarly, the Federal Circuit’s “deliberate
indifference” standard does not require negligence. The
Federal Circuit stated “deliberate indifference’ is not
necessarily a ‘should have known’ standard. The latter
implies a solely objective test, whereas the former may
require a subjective determination that the defendant
knew of and disregarded the overt risk that an element
of the offense existed.” SEB, 594 F.3d at 1376 (citations
omitted).
In any event, the Federal Circuit’s “deliberate
indifference” standard involves a level of culpability
lower than negligence. The district court charged the
jury under a “knew or should have known” negligence
standard. Transcript of Record at 987, SEB S.A. v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
#0394 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2007). If the Federal Circuit
intended for “deliberate indifference” to be a standard
higher than negligence, like recklessness, it would have
reversed and remanded for a new trial under that
standard, rather than sit as jury to determine the
question of whether that higher standard was met.
Carolina Power & Light Co. v. United States, 573 F. 3d
1271, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (even “a matter that can be
tested by fairly simple arithmetic ... is nonetheless a
factual issue properly within the purview of the trial
court”); Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Nokia, Ine., 527
3d 1318, 1828 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Appellate courts review
district court judgments; we do not find facts.”); F'erst
Interstate Bank of Billings v. United States, 61 I. 3d
1477, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“Fact-finding by the
appellate court is simply not permitted”). Accordingly,
the new “deliberate indifference” standard requires less
culpability than negligence.
1]
The Federal Circuit attempted to reconcile its new
“deliberate indifference” standard with the standard set
forth in Grokster, but failed. The Federal Circuit cited
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, an Eighth
Amendment case. In Farmer, this Court annunciated a
subjective “deliberate indifference” standard under
which liability can attach when the accused “knows of
and disregards an excessive risk.” /d. at 887. Farmer,
however, equated its formulation of “deliberate
indifference” to “subjective recklessness as is used in
criminal law.” See, Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839. In applying
the “deliberate indifference” standard, the Federal
Circuit did not import the standard of “subjective
recklessness as it is used in criminal law,” but imported
a standard lower than negligence.
Accordingly, because the Federal Circuit has
articulated a standard for the state of mind element for
actively inducing infringement that is inconsistent with
this Court’s teaching in Grokster, this Court should
address that inconsistency.
B. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT HAS NOT
ADEQUATELY ARTICULATED AN
APPROPRIATE STANDARD FOR
ACTIVELY INDUCING INFRINGEMENT
UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)
Putting aside the inconsistency between the
teaching of Grokster and the decision of the Federal
Circuit, the Federal Circuit has failed to articulate a
standard for the state of mind element of actively
inducing infringement under 85 U.S.C. § 271(b) that
lower courts can consistently apply.
Under the “deliberate indifference” standard, a jury
could find that the accused inducer “deliberately
disregarded a known risk,” SHB, 594 F.3d at 1377, that
an infringement may occur in virtually any situation. For
12
example:
None of these fact patterns differ materially from the
fact pattern of the present case, where Pentalpha relied
upon a legal opinion based upon a faulty patent search.
SEHB’s confusing treatment of the state of mind
element for actively inducing infringement did not
If the accused inducer did not conduct a
patent search, the jury could find that the
accused inducer “deliberately disregarded
a known risk” that a patent search would
have revealed an applicable patent.
If the accused inducer conducted a patent
search, but did not obtain an opinion of
counsel, the jury could find that the
accused inducer “deliberately disregarded
a known risk” that an opinion of counsel
would have identified a problem with the
search, and revealed the applicable patent.
If the accused inducer retained counsel to
provide a right to use opinion, the jury
could find that the accused inducer
“deliberately disregarded a known risk,”
usually disclosed in opinions of counsel,
that a jury could reach a different
conclusion on the issue of infringement.
13
develop in a vacuum. Rather, it represents the
culmination of at least three attempts by the Federal
Circuit to articulate an appropriate standard for the
state of mind element for that claim.
In Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Ine., 909
I.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1990), the Federal Circuit
articulated a standard suggesting that the patentee
need only prove an intent to cause the acts that
constituted the infringement, stating:
“On its face, § 271(b) is much broader than
§ 271(c) and certainly does not speak of any
intent requirement to prove active
inducement. However, in view of the very
definition of ‘active inducement’ in pre-1952
case law and the fact that § 271(b) was
intended as merely a codification of pre-1952
law, we are of the opinion that proof of actual
intent to cause the acts which constitute the
infringement is a necessary prerequisite to
finding active inducement.”
In Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Systems,
Inc., 917 F.2d 548, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1990), the Federal
Circuit announced a conflicting standard that required
not only knowledge of the acts giving rise to
infringement but knowledge of the infringement itself,
stating:
“It must be established that the defendant
possessed specific intent to encourage
another’s infringement and not merely that
the defendant had knowledge of the acts
alleged to constitute inducement.”
14
In DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co. Ltd., 471 F.3d 1293
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (en bane), the Federal Circuit, recognized
the inconsistency between Hewlett-Packard and
M ~lle, and, given this Court’s decision in Grokster,
chose to tollow Manville. The Federal Circuit stated,
“Grokster, thus, validates this court’s articulation of the
state of mind requirement for inducement. In Manville,
this court held that the ‘alleged infringer must be shown
... to have knowingly induced infringement’ not merely
knowingly induced the acts that constitute
infringement,” DSU, 471 F.3d at 1306 (quoting Manville,
917 F.2d at 544). The Federal Circuit specifically
articulated its new standard as follows:
“| T Jhe plaintiff has the burden of showing that
the alleged infringer’s actions induced
infringing acts and that he knew or should
have known his actions would induce actual
infringements. The requirement that the
alleged infringer knew or should have known
his actions would induce actual infringement
necessarily includes the requirement that he
or she knew of the patent.”
DSU, 471 F.3d at 1306 (quoting Manville, 971 F.3d at
554) (citation omitted).
The application of Manville and DSU in SEB
demonstrated, and deepened, the profound confusion
in the law concerning the state of mind element for
inducing infringement. The Federal Circuit
acknowledged that “inducement requires a showing of
‘specific intent to encourage another’s infringement.”
SEB, S.A., 594 F.3d at 1376 (citation omitted). But, it
1h
then suggested that specific intent is not a high
standard, stating: “As other courts have observed,
‘specific intent in the civil context is nel so narrow as Lo
allow an accused wrongdoer to actively disregard a
known risk that an element of an offense exists.” /d. at
1376 (citations omitted). The Federal Cireuit therefore
held that the mere presence of a risk that infringement
could occur would constitute specific intent to infringe.
SEB created additional uncertainty by discarding
DSU’s express requirement that the accused must have
knowledge of the patent. SH B’s new standard allowed
Pentalpha’s “deliberate indifference of a known risk”
that SEB held a protective patent to be treated as
functionally equivalent to knowledge of the patent.
/d at 1377. Under this standard, a trier of facet could
find “deliberate indifference” and, thus liability, in
virtually any case.
Adding further to the uncertainty, SHB noted that
“{t}his opinion does not purport to establish the outer
limits of the type of knowledge needed for inducement.”
id. at 1378. It suggested that “a patentee may perhaps
only need to show, as lnsituform |Technologies, Inc. v.
Cat Contracting, Inc., 161 F.3d 688 (Fed. Cir. 199%8)]
suppests, constructive knowledge with persuasive
evidence of disregard for clear patent markings, similar
to the constructive notice requirement in § 287(a).”
SEB, 594 F.3d at 1378. Thus, the level of culpability to
prove inducing infringement under SEB may be so
elastic that neither actual knowledge nor even
“deliberate indifference” is required to find liability.
16
The result of SKB is utter confusion as to the
standard for the state of mind element for the claim of
actively inducing infringement. In an Amicus Curiae
brief submitted in support of Pentalpha’s petition for
rchearing en banc, the American Intellectual Property
Law Association (“AIPA”), a bar association of over
16,000 members who share an interest in intellectual
property, and the Federal Circuit bar Association
(“CBA”), a bar association of over 2,600 members who
practice before the Federal Circuit stated:
“AIPLA and the FCBA are of the view that
the reasoning expressed by the panel in SHB
S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co. Inc., Nos.
2009-1099, 2009-1108, 2009-1119, 2010 WL
398118 (led. Cir. Feb. 5, 2010), is symptomatic
of the lack of clarity in the law of induced
patent infringement. In the wake of SEB,
the law regarding the culpability level
required to establish induced patent
infringement is as confused as ever. A
clearer formulation of the law would allow
practitioners and those in the industry to
understand better the boundary between
allowed and wrongful conduct.” (Emphasis
added.)
brief for the American Intellectual Property Lawyers
Association and the Federal Circuit Bar Association as
Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants’ Petition for
Rehearing lin Bane at 2, SEB S_A. v. Montgomery Ward
& Co, Inc., 594 F.3d. 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
17
Thus, for 20 years, the Federal Circuit has struggled
to articulate an appropriate standard for inducing
infringement. It has failed to do so. It is therefore
appropriate for this Court to address this issue.
C. THE “DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE”
STANDARD OF SEB MAY PROFOUNDLY
IMPACT INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC
COMMERCE
The Federal Circuit has, subject to limited
exceptions, exclusive jurisdiction over appeals in patent
infringement actions. 28 U.S.C. §1295; The Holmes
Group, Ine. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc.,
535 U.S. $26, 122 S. Ct. 1889, 152 L. Ind. 2d 13 (2002).
SEB is therefore, for all practical purposes, controlling
precedent in the entire United States, not simply a
regional circuit.
If the “deliberate indifference” standard of SHB
remains the law, foreign seliers of goods imported into
the United States will face increased costs of doing
business. A foreign seller could no longer rely upon its
lack of knowledge of a competitor’s patent as a basis to
sell its product. To avoid liability, it must, at a minimum,
secure a written legal opinion from patent counsel that
its product does not infringe. If the foreign seller
concludes that the cost of compliance, coupled with the
risk of an error in the opinion (as in this case), outweighs
its potential profit, the foreign seller may decline to sell
its legitimate products for the United States market,
resulting in the elimination of a competitor and, if it
occurs on a large enough seale, the elimination of
competition in the United States market.
18
At the very least, foreign sellers will pass on the cost
of compliance to American consumers and businesses
in the form of higher prices. In 2009, the United States
imported over $1.5 trillion worth of merchandise. Trade
Stats Express, International Trade Administration,
http://tse.export.gov/NTDChartDisplay.aspx?
UniqueURL=aox4m345pk4v0145megp3fo55-2010-6-18-
10-37-37 (last visited June 22, 2010). While this broad
inducement rule will not impact all merchandise
imported to the United States, even a trivial increase
in the percentage of commerce affected could have a
dramatic impact upon the costs United States
consumers and businesses are asked to absorb.
Domestic sellers of component parts of finished
products would also face increased costs of doing
business. A seller of a component of a product would
ordinarily evaluate its potential liability under a theory
of contributory infringement pursuant to 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e). Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(¢) a component seller
“knowing [its product] to be especially adapted for use
in an infringement,” may face liability. However, nothing
would prohibit a patentee from bringing a claim for
inducing infringement against a seller of a component,
asserting “deliberate indifference” to its patent. Indeed,
Grokster held that copyright owners could potentially
succeed on a claim for inducing infringement in
circumstances where a theory of contributory
infringement would fail. See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 935-
37. That liability will become real for a component
manufacturer if, for example, its customer becomes
insolvent.
Additionally, the new “deliberate indifference”
standard may increase the costs of certain sellers of
19
domestic products. That standard will create personal
liability for directors and officers of corporations who
are not acting with any intent to induce infringement.
“|Cljorporate officers who actively assist with their
corporation’s infringement may be personally liable for
inducing infringement regardless of whether the
circumstances are such that a court should disregard
the corporate entity and pierce the corporate veil.”
Manville, 917 I-2d at 553 (citation omitted). After SEB,
directors and officers would face liability based merely
upon their “deliberate indifference” as to whether a
product their employer sold may infringe. The end
result will be reluctance by corporate directors and
officers to take even reasonable risks, thereby reducing
diversity in the market for consumer goods and
increasing costs.
This Court in Grokster struck a balance between
the protection of intellectual property rights and the
promotion of free trade that would create liability for
actively inducing infringement only if a party acted with
“purposeful, culpable conduct to induce an
infringement.” (“We are, of course, mindful of the need
to keep from trenching on regular commerce or
discouraging the development of technologies with
lawful and unlawful potential”). Grokster, 545 U.S. at
937. SVB upsets that balance. Unless this Court grants
the petition, the burden on domestic and international
commerce will needlessly increase.
20
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Pentalpha respectfully
requests that this Court grant its petition for a writ of
certiorari.
Respectfully submitted,
WILLIAM DUNNEGAN
350 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10118
(212) 332-8300
wd@dunnegan.com
Counsel for Petitioners
APPENDIX
la
APPENDIX A — OPINION OF THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
DECIDED FEBRUARY 5, 2010
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
2009-1099, -1108, -1119
SEB 3S.A.,
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant-
Cross Appellant,
and
T-FAL CORPORATION,
Counterclaim Defendant,
V.
MONTGOMERY WARD & CO., INC.,
Defendant,
and
GLOBAL-TECH APPLIANCES, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
PENTALPHA ENTERPRISES, LTD.,
Defendant/Counterclaimant-Appellant.
2a
Appendix A
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York in 99-CV-9284, Judge
Stephen C. Robinson.
DECIDED: February 5, 2010
Before RADER , BRYSON, and LINN, Circuit Judges.
RADER, Circuit Judge.
This case began in August of 1999 when Plaintiff
SEB S.A. (“SEB”) sued defendants Montgomery Ward
& Co., Inc. (“Montgomery Ward”), Global-Tech
Appliances, Inc. (“Global-Tech”), and Pentalpha
Enterprises, Ltd. (“Pentalpha”) for infringement of U.S.
Patent No. 4,995,312 (the “ ’312 patent”). Almost seven
years later, a jury found that Pentalpha had willfully
infringed, and induced infringement of, claim | of the
312 patent and awarded SEB $ 4.65 million in damages.
Pentalpha filed post-trial motions on a number of
grounds. The district court granted them in part,
reducing the amount of damages by $ 2 million. SEB
S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., No. 99-9284, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 80394, 2007 WL 3165783 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9,
2007) (“JMOL Opinion”). The district court awarded
SEB enhanced damages and attorneys’ fees, but later
vacated that award in light of this court’s decision in
In re Seagate Technology, LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (en banc). SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & UCo.,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113468, 2008 WL 4540416
(S.D.N-Y. Oct. 1, 2008) (“Enhanced Damages Opinion”).
On appeal, Pentalpha raises a host of issues that relate
3a
Appendix A
to the jury verdict and the district court’s post-trial rulings.
SEB cross-appeals the district court’s enhanced damages
ruling. Detecting no reversible error in the district court
proceedings, this court affirms.
I.
SEB is a French company that specializes in home-
cooking appliances. It sells products in the United States
through an indirect subsidiary, T-Fal Corp.
(“T-Fal”). SEB owns the “312 patent, entitled “Cooking
Appliance with Electric Heating,” which claims a deep fryer
with an inexpensive plastic outer shell, or skirt. In the past,
skirts for deep fryers were made of plastic material capable
of continuously withstanding temperatures higher than
150 [degrees] C. These heat resistant plastics, however,
are expensive and therefore incompatible with large-scale
manufacture of low-priced fryers.
‘The skirt disclosed in the '312 patent, labeled with the
number 3 in the cross-section shown below, is well-insulated
from the heat of the fryer’s metal] pan (1).
4a
Appendix A
The ’312 patent explains construction of a deep fryer
with a well-insulated skirt. A ring of heat-insulating and
heat-resistive material (5) joins the top edge of the skirt
to the top edge of the pan. Other than that ring, however,
the skirt is “completely free with respect to the pan.”
’312 patent col.1 1.65-col.2 1.2. The skirt and the pan are
separated by “an air space of sufficient width to limit
the temperature of the skirt.” /d. at col.1 11.60-64. Thus,
because of the insulation provided by air space, the skirt
“can be fabricated from inexpensive ordinary-grade
plastic material [that] does not afford resistance to high
temperatures.” Jd. at col.4 11.32-35.
Claim 1 of the ’312 patent, the only claim at issue,
reads as follows (emphasis added):
An electrical deep fryer comprising a metal
pan (1) having a wall, and an electric heating
resister [sic] (2) that heats said wall directly
by conductive heating to a temperature higher
than 150 [degrees] C, said pan (1) being
surrounded by a plastic skirt (3), wherein said
skirt (3) is of plastic material which does not
continuously withstand a temperature of
150 [degrees] C., said skirt (8) entirely
surrounding the lateral wall (1a) and the base
(1b) of the pan and being separated from said
wall and said base by an air space (4) of
sufficient width to limit the temperature of the
skirt (3) to a value which is compatible with
the thermal resistance of the plastic material
of the skirt (3), said skirt (3) being completely
Sa
Appendix A
free with respect to the pan (1) with the
exception of a ring (5) which joins only the top
edge (3a) of the skirt to the top edge (1c) of the
pan and to which this latter is attached, said
ring (5) being of heat-insulating material which
is continuously resistant to the temperature of
the top edge (1c) of the pan (1).
Defendant Pentalpha is a Hong Kong corporation
and a subsidiary of defendant Global-Tech, a British
Virgin Islands corporation, which was formerly known
as Wing Shing International, Ltd. (For convenience, this
opinion will refer to Pentalpha and Global-Tech
collectively as “Pentalpha.”) Pentalpha began selling its
accused deep fryers to non-party Sunbeam Products,
Inc. (“Sunbeam”) in 1997. In developing its deep fryer,
Pentalpha purchased an SEB deep fryer in Hong Kong
and copied its “cool touch” features. Shortly after
agreeing to supply Sunbeam, Pentalpha obtained a
“right-to-use study” from an attorney in Binghamton,
New York. The attorney analyzed 26 patents and
concluded that none of the claims in those patents read
on Pentalpha’s deep fryer. Pentalpha, however, did not
tell the attorney that it had copied an SEB deep fryer.
Sunbeam resold the Pentalpha deep fryers in the
United States under its own trademarks, “Oster” and
“Sunbeam.” On March 10, 1998, SEB sued Sunbeam in
the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey, alleging that Sunbeam’s sales infringed the '312
patent (the “Sunbeam Suit”). See SEB S.A. v. Sunbeam
Corp., No. 2:98-CV-1050 (date closed May 28, 2002).
6a
Appendix A
Pentalpha was notified of the Sunbeam Suit on April 9,
1998. That suit ended in a settlement in which Sunbeam
agreed to pay SEB $ 2 million.
Pentalpha also sold the same deep fryers to non-
party Fingerhut Corp. (“Fingerhut”) and defendant
Montgomery Ward. These sales to Fingerhut and
Montgomery Ward occurred after Pentalpha learned of
the Sunbeam Suit. Like Sunbeam, Fingerhut and
Montgomery Ward also sold the products under their
own trademarks, CHEF’S MARK and ADMIRAL.
Pentalpha sold these deep fryers to its three customers
free on board Hong Kong or mainland China. “Free on
board,” or “f.o.b.,” is a “method of shipment whereby
goods are delivered at a designated location, usually a
transportation depot, at which legal title and thus the
risk of loss passes from seller to buyer.” Litecubes, LLC
v. N. Light Prods., Inc., 523 F.3d 1353, 1358 n.1 (Fed.
Cir. 2008).
Il.
SEB filed a motion for a preliminary injunction on
September 10, 1999. Following a claim construction
hearing, the district court granted SEB’s motion,
holding that SEB was likely to prove at trial that
Pentalpha’s deep fryers infringe at least claim 1 of the
312 patent. SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 77 F-
Supp. 2d 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“Preliminary Injunction
Opinion”). This court affirmed the preliminary
injunction order without opinion. SFB, S.A. v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 243 F.3d 566 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (Rule 36).
Ta
Appendix A
Pentalpha then redesigned its deep fryer by
replacing the ring that separated the skirt and the pan
with six blocks or ring segments. SEB sought to
supplement the original preliminary injunction to
include Pentalpha’s modified deep fryer. The district
court granted SEB’s application for supplemental
injunctive relief in 2001, finding that SEB was likely to
prove at trial that the modified fryer infringes at least
claim 1 of the ’312 patent under the doctrine of
equivalents. SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 137
I. Supp. 2d 285 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“DOE Opinion”).
Pentalpha’s primary argument, which the district court
did not adopt, was based on prosecution history
estoppel. Pentalpha did not appeal the district court’s
ruling of infringement by equivalents.
Discovery closed on October 30, 2001. On April 17,
2006, the district court commenced a trial. During trial,
the record shows that the jury received evidence of
Pentalpha’s sales to Sunbeam, Fingerhut, and
Montgomery Ward. Following the close of evidence,
Pentalpha moved for judgment as a matter of law
(“JMOL’) on SEB’s claim that Pentalpha had induced
infringement of the ’312 patent through those sales.
Pentalpha’s JMOL motion was based on the lack of
evidence that anyone at Pentalpha “had any knowledge
whatsoever with respect to the existence of the patent.”
J.A. 2209. The district court noted at the Rule 50(a)
motion proceedings that “there is no evidence that
| Pentalpha]} was aware of [the ’312] patent” before April
9, 1998. Nonetheless, the court held that there was
Sa
Appendix A
evidence to support SEB’s theory of inducement, which
the court characterized as follows:
[SEB is] saying that you could infer the specific
intent to... encourage the infringement by the
fact that [Pentalpha’s president] doesn’t disclose
that [Pentalpha copied the SEB product} to the
people doing the |patent] search. [Pentalpha]
wants them to doa search that . . . is doomed to
failure, and that that is enough, that a
reasonable jury could infer that, specific intent
.... Tlere is the argument. There are a zillion
patent attorneys in New York City, [yet] | t}hey
fo to this guy in the middle of nowhere to do
this patent search. ... | don’t know what
happened. I’m not in | Pentalpha’s President’s]}
head. I don’t know what he did. . . . I think itis .
.. areasonable argument, could a jury infer from
those actions, if they chose to believe them in
the way the plaintiffs want, that that was an
indication that [he] understood that he was likely
violating a patent, in fact violating a patent.
The district court therefore allowed SEB’s inducement
claim to reach the jury.
The jury found that Pentalpha, with both its original
and modified deep fryers, willfully infringed claim 1 of
the ’312 patent. The jury also found that Pentalpha
induced others to infringe with both versions of the
fryers. As damages, the jury awarded SEB a total of
$ 4.65 million as a reasonable royalty, with $ 3.6 million
9a
Appendix A
attributable to Sunbeam’s sales of Pentalpha’s deep
fryers, $ 540,000 to Fingerhut’s sales, and $ 510,000 to
Montgomery Ward’s sales.
Pentalpha then renewed its motion for JMOL and
moved for a new trial, arguing that SEB did not
adequately prove inducement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b).
Pentalpha also sought an offset of damages in an amount
equal to the $ 2 million that SEB received in its
settlement with Sunbeam. SEB filed a cross motion for
enhanced damages, attorneys’ fees, prejudgment
interest, and injunctive relief.
In response to Pentalpha’s post-trial motions, the
district court reduced the damages award by $ 2 million.
JMOL Opinion, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80394, 2007 WL.
3165783, at *5. The trial court denied the rest of
Pentalpha’s post-trial motions. 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
$0394, |WL] at *12. The district court granted SEB’s
cross-motion in part, based on the reduced award, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80394, [WL] at *10-12, but later
vacated its award of enhanced damages and attorneys’
fees based on Seagate, Knhanced Damages Opinion,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113468, 2008 WL 4540416, at *4.
Thus, the district court entered judgment against
Pentalpha in the amount of $ 4,878,341. These appeals
followed.
10a
Appendix A
IIT.
As a threshold matter, this court needs to address a
claim construction issue. The district court, as a part of
its preliminary injunction order in 1999, construed the
limitation “completely free with respect to the pan” in
claim 1 to mean “there are no thermal bridges between
the skirt and the pan.” Preliminary Injunction
Opinion, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 405. A thermal bridge is an
element that conducts heat. As a matter of context, this
court notes that a vertical stabilizing screw secures the
skirt of Pentalpha’s fryer to the base of the pan. This
screw, however, is not a thermal bridge. Thus, the
stabilizing screw does not preclude the conclusion that
the skirt is “completely free with respect to the pan”
under the district court’s claim construction. But if
“completely free” means instead “no solid material
between the pan and the skirt,” as Pentalpha contends,
then the stavilizing screw absolves Pentalpha’s deep
fryer of infringement.
This court, of course, reviews claim construction
without deference. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138
I°3d 1448, 1455-56 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc). This court’s
prior affirmance of the district court’s preliminary
injunction order does not make the district court’s claim
construction in its 1999 opinion the law of the case.
See Int’lComme’n Materials, Inc. v. Ricoh Co., 108 F.3d
316, 319 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (claim construction for a
preliminary injunction is not definitive “without the
more complete record that the district court deemed
necessary to its own final decision”). The words of a claim
lla
Appendix A
receive the meaning discernible by a person of ordinary
skill in the art who has read the entire patent, including
the specification, at the time of the invention. Phillips
v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(en banc). The claims themselves, both asserted and
unasserted, povern the meaning of claim terms. /d. at
1314.
This court perceives a slight internal inconsistency
with the district court’s claim construction of
“completely free” in the phrase “said skirt (3) being
completely free with respect to the pan (1) with the
exception of a ring (5).” The claim requires the ring to
be “heat-insulating” and “continuously resistant to the
temperature of the ... pan.” Thus, the ring is not a
thermal bridge. If “completely free” merely meant “no
thermal bridges between the skirt and the pan,” the
claim would not need to exclude expressly the ring from
the completely free limitation.
Despite this minor inconsistency, the district court’s
construction of “completely free” rings true. Claim & of
the ’312 patent, which depends from claim 1, adds an
insulated stabilizing screw between the base of the pan
and the base of the skirt. ’312 patent col.6 11.19-24. With
this context, a person of ordinary skill in the art would
not read the “completely free” limitation of claim 1 to
mean “no solid material between the pan and the skirt”
because that reading would not allow for the vertical
rod of claim &. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314
(“Differences among claims can... be a useful guide in
understanding the meaning of particular claim terms.”).
lla
Appendix A
Moreover, the only embodiment in the specification
includes solid material between the pan and the skirt,
namely, the vertical rod, id. at col.3 11.55-65, as well as a
thermostat attached to the base of the pan, 7d. at col.4
11.3-7. “[A] construction that would not read on the
preferred embodiment would rarely if ever be correct
and would require highly persuasive evidentiary
support.” Chimie v. PPG Indus., Inc., 402 F.3d 1371,
1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (internal quotations and alterations
omitted). Thus, with the preferred embodiment showing
a vertical stabilizing screw, the “completely free”
limitation cannot be read so broadly as to exclude this
preferred embodiment.
Finally, the specification repeatedly highlights the
inventiveness of eliminating thermal bridges to prevent
heat transfer to the plastic skirt. For example, the
specification notes that in the prior art, “the attachment
of the metal pan within the plastic skirt is such that
numerous thermal bridges exist between said pan and
said skirt.” ’312 patent col.1 11.38-40. Those thermal
bridges required the skirt to be “formed of [costly]
plastic material.” /d. at col.1 11-41-42. Following the theme
of preventing heat transfer, the specification discusses
a thermostat between the pan and the skirt but
emphasizes its placement “remote from the base 21 of
the skirt 3 of plastic material in order to prevent any
thermal bridge which would be liable to heat this plastic
material to an excessive extent.” /d. at col.4 11.3-8. Thus,
the patent stresses that eliminating thermal bridges is
not the same as eliminating any solid material.
l3a
Appendix A
Read in light of the entire specification and with an
eye to the preferred embodiment, then, the term
“completely free” means “practically or functionally
free.” Indeed, the specification uses the two terms
“completely” and “practically” interchangeably.
Compare ’312 patent col. 1 11.65-66 (“Said skirt is
completely free with respect to the pan ....”) (emphasis
added) with id. at col. 4 H.28-35 (“{I]n addition to the
fact that the skirt 3 is practically free with respect to
the pan 1 or in other words that no thermal bridge is
created between the pan and the skirt, this latter can
be fabricated from inexpensive ordinary-grade plastic
material, which does not afford resistance to high
temperatures.”) (emphasis added). This court often
assumes that different terms convey different meanings.
Symantec Corp. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 522 F.3d
1279, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2008). That assumption, however,
carries less weight when comparing a term in the claim
to a term in the specification, especially where, as here,
the specification only describes one embodiment. Cf /d.
(“{'T'Jhere is nothing in the claims, the specification or
the prosecution history that suggests that the preamble
language ‘as it is being transferred’ has any different
meaning than |the claim term] ‘prior to storage.’”).
Pentalpha supplies some evidentiary support for its
proposed construction, but that support is not “highly
persuasive” or sufficient to overcome the meaning that
embraces the preferred embodiment. During
prosecution of the 312 patent, the examiner rejected
the proposed claims as anticipated by or obvious over
U.S. Patent No. 4,672,179 (“Onishi”). Onishi discloses a
14a
Appendix A
rice cooker with the side walls of the pan and the side
wall of the skirt separated by an adiabatic material, or a
material that does not gain or lose heat:
Onishi at Fig. 1, col.2 11.49-58.
‘To distinguish Onishi, the applicant stated
in ONISHI ..., the two walls | and 8 are
separated by an adiabatic material 2 (whose
nature is not specified) whereas in the case of
the present invention, the outer plastic skirt
3 is completely free with respect to the pan 1]
with the exception of a ring 5. This means that
the space comprised between the skirt 3 and
the pan 1 is entirely occupied by avr and that
there is no solid material therebetween.
A-119 (emphasis added). Pentalpha argues that SEB
thereby narrowed the claim limitation “completely free”
lSa
Appendix A
during prosecution and that the doctrine of prosecution
disclaimer should preclude the district court’s
construction. See N. Am. Container, Inc. v. Plastipak
Packaging, Inc., 415 F.3d 1335, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(“[W]e have previously explained that limitations may
be construed to exclude a preferred emvodiment if the
prosecution history compels such a result.”).
Contrary to Pentalpha’s contentions, however, this
court interprets this prosecution history as consistent
with the district court’s claim construction. As noted,
this also allows this court to account for the only
embodiment provided in the ’312 patent’s specification.
Thus, read in context, the applicant’s reference to “no
solid material” refers only to the volume between the
sides of the pan and skirt. As the quote from the
prosecution history reveals, the applicant was only
addressing the lack of “adiabatic material” in his
invention to distinguish the Onishi reference. Indeed
the applicant could not have intended his comment to
preclude any solid material between the base of the pan
and the base of the skirt because both Onishi and his
own invention include a vertical stabilizing element.
Thus, this court does not read the prosecution
history to alter or disclaim the district court’s
interpretation of the claim language. Pentalpha’s
attempt to create a disclaimer simply stretches this
prosecution history too far. At most, the prosecution
statement requires “completely free” to mean “no solid
material between the sides of the pan and the sides of
the skirt and no thermal bridges between the base of
loa
Appendix A
the skirt and the base of the pan.” The additional
precision of this construction would also avoid the slight
internal inconsistency of excepting the ring from the
“completely free” limitation. In any event, this court
detects no reversible error in the district court’s claim
construction.
LV.
Following the jury verdict, Pentalpha moved for
JMOL based on prosecution history estoppel, arguing
that SEB’s statements during prosecution should
preclude any infringement by its modified deep fryer
under the doctrine of equivalents. As noted, Pentalpha
modified its deep fryer by replacing the ring that
separates the skirt and the pan with six blocks.
According to Pentalpha, the applicant’s prosecution
arguments during patent acquisition at the PTO
preclude a finding that the six blocks are equivalent to
the ring in claim 1. See Conoco, Inc. v. Energy & Envtl.
Int'l, L.C., 460 F.3d 1349, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“To
invoke argument-based estoppel .. . the prosecution
history must evince a clear and unmistakable surrender
of subject matter.”).
Pentalpha did not seek JMOL on this ground at the
close of evidence. Under Rule 50(b), a party may “renew”
an earlier “request for judgment as a matter of law by
filing a motion no later than 10 days after entry of
judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P 50(b); see Broadnax v. City of
New Haven, 415 3d 265, 268 (2d Cir. 2005). If an issue
is not raised in a previous motion for a directed verdict,
l7a
Appendix A
however, this court’s review is highly deferential. The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, whose law
governs the procedural aspects of this case, see Bd. of
Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche
Molecular Sys., Inc. , 583 F.3d 832, 840 (Fed. Cir. 2009),
requires that, in such a case, “a Rule 50(b) motion should
not be granted unless it is required to prevent manifest
injustice.” Broadnax, 415 F.3d at 268 (quotation marks
omitted).
During prosecution, the applicant argued that the
claims were not obvious over Onishi in light of a Spanish
reference (“Taurus”), which discloses a fryer with
openings in the outer wall:
To distinguish Taurus, the applicant explained that
cool outside air circulated through the above spaces
between the inner and outer walls. This cooling
mechanism is called convective cooling. Onishi, the
applicant argued, relied on convective heating. Onishi
itself explains that the heater heats the air in the heating
space so as to uniformly heat the pot. Onishi col.1 11.45-
la
Appendix A
59. The applicant argued to the PTO that the teachings
of Onishi and Taurus could not be combined to achieve
the claimed deep fryer because neither convective
“heating or cooling mechanisms has anything to do with
the present invention.”
At trial, however, SEB's expert, Charles Van Horn,
testified that the temperature of the skirt in Pentalpha’s
modified deep fryer might be kept at a low level in part
due to hot air leaking out of the deep fryer. Specifically,
Mr. Van Horn testified that the ring segments in the
modified fryer did not completely close off the air space
between the pan and the skirt. Moreover, he indicated
that hot air escaped the modified fryer, although he did
not know the rate of escape. And he affirmed that a deep
fryer that has hot air leaking out of it will result in a
cooler outside plastic wall than a deep fryer that does
not. Pentalpha thus argues that its modified deep fryer
cannot infringe under the doctrine of equivalents
because the ring segments allow for the same convective
cooling that SEB disavowed during prosecution of the
312 patent.
This court can assume, without deciding, that the
applicant’s statement during prosecution disclaimed any
coverage of deep fryers that control the temperature of
the outer wall through convective cooling. A reasonable
jury could nonetheless conclude that Pentalpha’s
modified fryer does not rely on convective cooling to
control the temperature of the skirt. The six large vent
holes in Taurus that together span almost the entire
width of the side wall do not readily compare to
19a
Appendix A
Pentalpha’s modified fryer, which was presented to the
jury and appears to allow only minimal air leakage. Mr.
Van Horn’s testimony about some hot air leakage does
not compel the jury to find that the modified deep fryer
relied on convective cooling to control the temperature
of the wall. The jury might also reasonably conclude that
the hot air leakage along the ring of the modified fryer
did not appreciably contribute to controlling the
temperature of the vuter plastic wall. Because Pentalpha
did not raise its JMOL motion in a timely fashion, this
court must detect a manifest injustice before sustaining
this untimely motion. With substantial questions about
the operation of the modified fryer and Mr. Van Horn’s
vague testimony on convective cooling, this court detects
no manifest injustice in honoring the jury’s finding of
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.
This court also perceives no prejudice to Pentalpha
in the district court’s conclusion at the preliminary
injunction stage that prosecution history estoppel did
not apply. As discussed already, a preliminary injunction
ruling is by nature only preliminary. Pentalpha had
opportunities to renew its argument before the jury or
to request a jury instruction estopping application of
the doctrine of equivalents to a fryer that relies on
convective cooling. Finally, Rule 50 at least required
Pentalpha to raise its argument before the jury verdict.
Broadnax, 415 F.3d at 268. By the time Pentalpha filed
its post-verdict JMOL mution, it was too late. And, as
noted, this court discerns no material injustice in the
jury’s findings in this setting.
20a
Appendix A
V
The district court allowed SEB’s expert, Mr. Van
Horn, to testify over Pentalpha’s objections. Pentalpha
argued that Mr. Van Horn should be precluded from
testifying as to infringement on the ground that he
lacked expertise in the art of designing deep fryers. On
appeal, Pentalpha argues that the district court’s
decision to admit Mr. Van Horn’s testimony was an abuse
of discretion.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by
admitting Mr. Van Horn’s testimony. This court will not
disturb a district court’s evidentiary rulings unless
“manifestly erroneous.” SR Int'l Bus. Ins. Co. v. World
Trade Ctr. Props., LLC, 467 F.3d 107, 119 (2d Cir. 2006)
(quotation omitted). District courts enjoy “wide latitude”
to determine admissibility and “the mode and order” of
evidentiary presentations. /d. In this case, the district
court was in the best place to judge that Mr. Van Horn
had the “knowledge, skill, experience, training, [and]
education” of a “specialized” nature that was likely to
“assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine” infringement. Fed. R. Evid. 702.
Mr. Van Horn has an undergraduate degree in
chemical engineering from Lehigh University, a J.D.
from American University, and an M.B.A. from George
Washington University with a specialty in behavioral
science. He worked in the U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office for 31 years in various capacities, including as a
patent examiner in the classes of fiber technology,
dla
Appendix A
electric photography, and structural and nonstructural
laminates; as a supervisor in miscellaneous chemical
technology; and as a director of the organic chemistry
and biotechnology group. Although he testified that he
is not skilled in designing deep fryers, Mr. Van Horn
explained that his experience was relevant because the
claimed invention “involves the selection of particular
_.. polymer material that have certain characteristics”
and that “[mJost of the areas [he has} worked in. . .
have used polymers in one form or another.” Moreover
Mr. Van Horn did not testify about deep frying per se,
but instead described the importance of selecting a
material for the ring or ring segments that would be
resistant to the hot pan, as well as the importance of
the spacing between the hot pan and the skirt. In light
of the court’s claim construction, which, as discussed,
included a reference to thermal bridges, Mr. Van Horn’s
testimony established an adequate relationship between
his expenience and the claimed invention.
This case comes nowhere close to the unusual
situation in Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating
Ltd., 550 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In Sundance this
court held that a district court abused its discretion
when it admitted the testimony of a patent law expert
“|djespite the absence of any suggestion of relevant
technical expertise.” /d. at 1361-62. Here, as explained,
Mr. Van Horn had sufficient relevant technical expertise
for the district court to allow him to testify. This court
detects no abuse of discretion.
22a
Appendix A
VI.
Pentalpha also challenges the district court’s
judgment under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) and (b). As to § 271 (a),
direct infringement, Pentalpha challenges the district
court’s jury instructions. As to § 271(b), inducement of
infringement, Pentalpha contends that the district court
erred in its JMOL rulings because Pentalpha had no
actual knowledge of the patent during part of the time
it was selling deep fryers to Sunbeam. See DSU Med.
Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(en banc) (“The requirement that the alleged infringer
knew or should have known his actions would induce
actual infringement necessarily includes the
requirement that he or she knew of the patent.”)
(emphasis added). Before addressing either of
Pentalpha’s arguments, this court must determine if it
needs to address direct infringement only, inducement
of infringement only, or both.
Under the general verdict rule, where one or more
of multiple claims is found legally invalid, a reviewing
court must reverse and order a new trial if unable to
determine whether the invalid theory tainted the
verdict. AIG Global Sec. Lending Corp. v. Banc of
America Sec. LLC, 646 I Supp. 2d 385, 406 (S.D.N_LY.
2009) (collecting cases). That rule has also been held to
apply in cases where the jury received multiple legal
theories of liability. /d. (same).
Here, the jury received a verdict form with the label
“special” rather than general. Using that verdict form,
23a
Appendix A
the jury found both direct infringement and inducement
of infringement. Normally, such a verdict could support
a damages award even if only one theory was correct.
As long as the court can “determine” that “the verdict
was based upon the | valid] theory,” the general verdict
rule does not require a new trial. /d. A closer look at
the damages question in this verdict form, however,
along with the jury instructions, reveals a hopeless
ambigruity.
The verdict form itself suggests that the jury was
asked to base its damages calculation on inducement
only. The verdict form asked, “What amount of damages
in the form of a reasonable royalty do you find the
plaintiff to have proven by a preponderance of the
evidence with respect to deep fryers sold by Sunbeam,
Fingerhut, and Montgomery Ward?” J.A. 2508
(emphasis added). This instruction advised the jury to
consider deep fryers sold by Pentalpha’s customers, as
opposed to the deep fryers that Pentalpha sold to its
customers. Therefore, this instruction could have led
the jury to base the damages calculation on inducement
alone.
Qn the other hand, the jury instructions also
indicate that the jury could assess damages for direct
infringement. The instructions stated:
The patent law specifically provides that the
amount of damages that the Defendants must
pay Plaintiff for infringing Plaintiff's patent may
not be Jess than a reasonable royalty for the use
24a
Appendix A
that the Defendants made of Plaintiff's
invention. You must determine what a
reasonable royalty would be for the infringing
sales of these Defendants and _ their
subsidiaries
J.A. 2484 (emphasis added). In contrast to the verdict
form, the jury instructions required the jury to look to
Pentalpha’s sales. This language requires a classic direct
infringement analysis. See, e.g., Minco, Inc. v.
Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 95 F.3d 1109, 1119 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (affirming a reasonable royalty award where “the
district court awarded [the patentee] a royalty rate of
20% on the gross value of [the direct infringer’s]
applicable sales”’).
Lhe record therefore does not clearly indicate that
the jury found damages based on inducement alone, or
based on direct infringement alone, or both. The general
verdict rule requires that the only way this court can
affirm in such a circumstance is by determining that the
jury’s finding of both direct infringement and
inducement of infringement was proper. As explained
below, after carefully examining the record and the
authority cited by both parties, this court discerns that
this verdict satisfies that requirement and was proper
on both counts.
25a
Appendix A
A.
Section 271(a) makes it an act of infringement to
“without authority make| J, use|], offer| | to sell, or sell J
any patented invention, within the United States.”
Pentalpha faults the jury instructions with respect to
direct infringement on two grounds, each of which
relates to the extraterritorial effect of U.S. patent law.
l‘irst, Pentalpha argues that the district court should
have charged the jury that an offer in the United States
to sell goods outside of the United States would not
violate the “offer to sell” provision of § 271(a). Second,
Ventalpha argues that the district court erred by
instructing the jury that, in determining if a sale
occurred in the United States, it could consider “where
the products were shipped from and where the products
were shipped to.”
Pentalpha does not specify the point in the record
showing an objection to these portions of the jury
instructions. Fed. R. Civ. P51 requires a litigant to make
a timely objection to a jury instruction in order to
challenge that instruction on appeal. “The purpose of
this Rule is to require the parties to give the trial court
an adequate opportunity to cure any error in the
instructions before the jury deliberates.” Metromedia
Co. v. Fugazy, 983 2d 350, 363 (2d Cir. 1992). The United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviews
jury instructions for which a timely objection is lacking
for fundamental error. Fabri v. United Techs. Int'l, lnc.,
387 I3d 109, 121 (2d Cir. 2004). “Fundamental error is
more egregious than the ‘plain’ error that can excuse a
26a
Appendix A
procedural default in a criminal trial and is so serious
and flagrant that it goes to the very integrity of the
trial.” Jd. (quoting Jarvis v. Ford Motor Co., 283 F.3d
33, 62 (2d Cir. 2002)).
Neither of the alleged problems with the district
court’s jury instruction constitutes fundamental error.
This court has yet to define the full territorial scope of
the “offers to sell” offense in § 271(a). But see Rotec
Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1260
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (Newman, J., concurring) (“{[A]n offer to
sell a device or system whose actual sale can not infringe
a United States patent is not an infringing act under
§ 271.”). But even if this court had, Pentalpha’s sales in
this case did not so clearly occur overseas that the
district court’s failure to include such a limitation in its
jury instructions affected the integrity of the trial.
To the contrary, the only evidence on which
Pentalpha relies to argue that its sales occurred
overseas was that it delivered its products to Sunbeam,
Montgomery Ward, and Fingerhut f.0.b. Hong Kong or
mainland China. This court has “rejected the notion that
simply because goods were shipped f.o0.b., the location
of the ‘sale’ for the purposes of § 271 must be the location
from which the goods were shipped.” Lightcubes, 523
M38c at 1370.
lor the same reason, the district court’s instruction
that the jury could consider “where the products were
shipped from and where the products were shipped to”
in determining if a sale occurred in the United States
27a
Appendix A
was not a fundamental error. If anything, the jury
instructions helped Pentalpha: the court instructed the
jury that it could consider the f.o.b. terms, even though
those terms were not dispositive. Other than the f.o.b.
terms in the invoices presented to the jury, the record
shows that Pentalpha intended to sell its deep fryers
directly into the United States. Pentalpha itself affixed
the American trademarks of Sunbeam, Montgomery
Ward, and Fingerhut to the deep fryers, and it
manufactured the deep fryers with North American
electrical fittings. Moreover, the invoices between
Pentalpha and the three U.S. companies all identify
delivery to U.S. destinations. In sum, this court does
not perceive any fundamental error with the jury
instructions in light of the record evidence.
I.
“Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent
shall be liable as an infringer.” 85 U.S.C. § 271(b). In
DSU Medical, which was decided after the jury verdict
in this case, this court addressed the intent necessary
Lo support a finding of induced infringement. Under that
rule, the plaintiff must show that the alleged infringer
knew or should have known that his actions would induce
actual infringements. 471 I°3d at 1304. This court further
stated that “|t}he requirement that the alleged infringer
knew or should have known his actions would induce
actual infringement necessarily includes the
requirement that he or she knew of the patent.” Id
(emphasis added). This court’s opinion did not, however,
set out the metes and bounds of the knowledge-of-the-
28a
Appendix A
patent requirement. Compare Insituform Techs., Inc.
v. CAT Contracting, Inc., 161 F.3d 688, 695 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (“A crucial element of induced infringement is that
the inducer must have actual or constructive knowledge
of the patent.”) (emphasis added).*
The facts of DSU Medical did not require this court
to address the scope of the knowledge requirement for
intent. Instead, the court resolved conflicting case law
setting forth both a requirement to knowingly induce
infringement and to merely knowingly induce the acts
that constitute direct infringement. /d. at 1306. In other
words, the court decided the target of the knowledge,
not the nature of that knowledge. As Chief Judge
Michel’s concurring opinion noted, the record in DSU
Medical showed that the alleged infringer had actual
knowledge of the patent-in-suit. /d. at 1311.
“Accordingly, the ‘knowledge of the patent’ issue [was]
not before us.” ld.
‘This court has made clear, however, that inducement
requires a show.ng of “‘specific intent to encourage
another’s infringement.’” Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm
Inc., 543 F.3d 683, 699 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting DSU
* SEB contends that this court need not reach this issue
because the district court reduced the damages award by $ 2
million based on SEB's settlement with Sunbeam and thus
eliminated all damages for pre-notice sales. The record indicates
that the district court did not attribute the reduction to any
particular Sunbeam sales. Therefore this court has no way to
ascertain on appeal if the reduction precludes the knowledge
und intent issue.
29a
Appendix A
Medical, 471 F.3d at 1306). As other courts have
observed, “specific intent” in the civil context is not so
narrow as to allow an accused wrongdoer to actively
disregard a known risk that an element of the offense
exists. See Crawford-kl v. Britton, 951 F.2d 1314, 1318,
293 U.S. App. D.C. 47 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (equating specific
intent and deliberate indifference); Boim v. Holy Land
Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 693 (7th Cir. 2008)
(equating intentional misconduct with knowledge and
deliberate indifference).
Pentalpha argues that the court in DSU Medical
did not mean “knew or should have known of the patent”
because the decision states “knew of the patent.”
See 471 3d at 1804. At the outset, this court notes that
the Supreme Court has indicated, in a different civil
context, that “deliberate indifference” is not necessarily
a “should have known” standard. Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. $25, 840, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811
(1994). The latter implies a solely objective test, whereas
the former may require a subjective determination that
the defendant knew of and disregarded the overt risk
that an element of the offense existed. See id.
(“| DJeliberate’ is better read as implying knowledge of
a risk, [but] the concept of constructive knowledge is
familiar enough that the term ‘deliberate indifference’
would not, of its own force, preclude a scheme that
conclusively presumed awareness from a risk’s
obviousness.”). For example, an accused infringer may
defeat a showing of subjective deliberate indifference
Lo the existence of a patent where it shows that it was
penuinely “unaware even of an obvious risk.” /d. at 844.
30a
Appendix A
More importantly, and as courts have observed in a
variety of settings, the standard of deliberate
indifference of a known risk is not different from actual
knowledge, but is a form of actual knowledge. See, e.g.,
l/nited States v. Carani, 492 F.3d 867, 873 (7th Cir. 2007)
(“Deliberate avoidance is not a standard less than
knowledge; itis simply another way that knowledge may
be proved.”); Woodman v. WWOR-T'V, Inc., 411 F.3d 69,
84 n.14 (2d Cir. 2005) (“We note that a party’s
knowledge of a disputed fact may also be proved
through evidence that he consciously avoided knowledge
of what would otherwise have been obvious [to] him.”).
In this case, this court must determine whether the
district court erred in denying Pentalpha’s motion for
JMOL where the record shows no direct evidence that
Pentalpha had actual knowledge of the patent before
April 9, 1998. The standard of review following the denial
of JMOL, is de novo. Fabri, 387 F.3d at 119. Nevertheless,
this court must apply the same standard as the
district court, which is deferential to the jury’s verdict.
AMW Materials Testing, Inc. v Town of Babylon, 584
I.3d 436, 456 (2d Cir. 2009). A grant of JMOL is
appropriate only where a reasonable jury would not have
a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the non-
movant on the issue. Agrizap, lnc. v. Woodstream Corp.,
520 I°3d 1337, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P
50(a)). For that reason,
|wje will reverse the denial of a motion for
judgment as a matter of law only when there
is such a complete absence of evidence
3la
Appendix A
supporting the verdict that the jury’s findings
could only have been the result of sheer
surmise and conjecture, or where there is such
an overwhelming amount of evidence in favor
of the moving party that fair minded jurors
could not reasonably arrive at a verdict
against the movant.
SR Int'l, 467 F.3d at 118-119 (internal quotation marks
and alterations omitted).
As just explained, a claim for inducement ts viable
even where the patentee has not produced direct
evidence that the accused infringer actually knew of the
patent-in-suit. This case shows such an instance. The
record contains adequate evidence to support a
conclusion that Pentalpha deliberately disregarded a
known risk that SEB had a protective patent. The jury
heard evidence that Pentalpha purchased an SEB deep
fryer in Hong Kong and copied all but the cosmetics.
The owner of a company related to Pentalpha testified
that Pentalpha’s engineer took a T-Fal deep fryer and
used “the same ring that separates ... the wall making
it a cool touch unit and the construction, basically
everything the same; thermostat, it was the same; the
timer was the same, just a little bit different on the
cosmetics of the outside appearance for the deep fryer.”
Again, the record shows that Pentalpha hired an
attorney to conduct a right-to-use study, but did not tell
him that it had based its product on SEB’s product.
32a
Appendix A
A failure to inform one’s counsel of copying would
be highly suggestive of deliberate indifference in most
circumstances. Here, the jury also heard testimony that
indicated that Pentalpha’s president, John Sham, was
well versed in the U.S. patent system and understood
SEB to be cognizant of patent rights as well. Sham
testified that he was the named inventor on 29 U.S.
patents and that Pentalpha and SEB had an earlier
business relationship that involved one of Pentalpha’s
patented steamer products. ‘he record thus contains
considerable evidence of deliberate indifference.
In contrast, Pentalpha did not produce any
exculpatory evidence. As noted, proof of knowledge
through a showing of deliberate indifference may be
defeated where an accused infringer establishes that
he actually believed that a patent covering the accused
product did not exist. But here Pentalpha did not argue
that it or its employees actually believed that an SEB
patent did not exist. Pentalpha’s brief implies that it
should be excused because the SEB deep fryer that it
copied was not marked with a U.S. patent number. But
Pentalpha does not argue that it relied on the lack of a
mark to come to a belief that the deep fryer was not
patented. And even if it had, such an argument would
likely lack credibility unless it were supplemented by
an explanation for why one would expect an SEB deep
fryer purchased in Hong Kong to have U.S. patent
markings.
This opinion does not purport to establish the outer
limits of the type of knowledge needed for inducement.
33a
Appendix A
For instance, a patentee may perhaps only need to show,
as Insituform suggests, constructive knowledge with
persuasive evidence of disregard for clear patent
markings, similar to the constructive notice
requirement in § 287(a). See txfra Part VII. This court
does not set those boundaries now, just as it did not set
them in DSU Medical. Here, the record establishes
sufficient support for the conclusion that Pentalpha
deliberately ignored the risk that SEB hada patent that
covered its deep fryer. Thus, the jury’s finding of
inducement is justified, and the damage award, even if
it was based on inducement alone, stands.
VII.
Ventalpha also challenges the damages award on the
basis that, contrary to § 287(a), the record did not show
that SEB marked “substantially all” of its deep fryers
before July 10, 1998. Pentalpha also sought a reduction
in damages, alleging that the record shows that SEB
withheld documents related to marking. The district
court declined to reduce the award on either ground.
Under § 287(a) a patentee that sells its patented
product within the United States must provide actual
or constructive notice of the patent to the accused
infringer Lo qualify for damages. Sentry Prot. Prods.,
Inc. v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 400 F3d 910, 918 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Constructive notice requires the record to show that
“the patentee consistently marks substantially all of its
patented products.” /d.
34a
Appendix A
At trial, an SEB executive, Gregers Infeld, affirmed
that “to the best of [his] knowledge” SEB’s deep fryers
were “always” marked and that SEB had a policy of
marking its products. SEB also put into evidence one of
its deep fryers with an unknown manufacturing date
that had a sticker that listed the 312 patent. On cross
examination, however, Infeld testified that “there was a
batch of products where the patent marking wasn’t on.”
In addition to that testimony on cross, Pentalpha also
relies heavily on Infeld’s admission, at his deposition,
that he had no knowledge of SEB’s marking practices.
Once again, the district court properly denied
Pentalpha’s motions for JMOL. The record supplies
sufficient evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that
SEB consistently marked substantially all of its deep
fryers. Indeed, the record at trial did not even contain
Infeld’s deposition testimony. In any event, the record
supports the jury verdict.
Pentalpha contends that discovery misconduct
justifies a reduction in the damage award. The discovery
dispute at issue extends back five years before trial. In
May of 2001, Pentalpha served discovery requests
seeking, among other things, documents relating to, and
a Rule 30(b)(6) witness with knowledge of, SEB’s patent
marking practices. SEB produced only a one-page
document: a picture of a sample sticker that listed the
‘312 patent. SEB objected to the Rule 30(b)(6) request.
Pentalpha filed a motion to compe! in response to SEB’s
objection. On October 5, 2001, Magistrate Judge
Yanthis, who had been appointed to oversee discovery,
35a
Appendix A
refused to consider the motion to compel due to the
parties’ failure to meet and confer.
The marking issue arose again with Pentalpha’s
motion in limine, filed four-and-a-half years later, in
which Pentalpha moved to exclude any evidence related
to marking at trial. At the hearing on the motion, SEB's
counsel asserted that there were “no other documents”
concerning patent markings. Accordingly, the district
court denied Pentalpha’s motion, but noted that “[ijf
witnesses on the stand say there are other documents,
we've got a different issue before us.”
At trial, Infeld testified that SEB’s factories print
the stickers found on its deep fryers based on a “list
which shows [the factories] exactly what needs to be put
on” and that the compilation of that list required a lot
of paperwork. Pentalpha relied on that testimony in its
post-verdict JMOL to argue that SEB did not produce
documents related to marking, namely, the paperwork
needed to compile the sticker list. The district court
denied Pentalpha’s motion on the ground that Pentalpha
had delayed too long in seeking these documents and
did not raise the issue immediately after Infeld’s trial
testimony. JMOL Opinion, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
80394, 2007 WL 3165783, at *2.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Pentalpha’s motion for JMOL on discovery
misconduct grounds. Pentalpha clearly forfeited the
issue, if not during its four-and-a-half year silence before
trial, then when it did not object during trial following
36a
Appendix A
lnfeld’s testimony. Pentalpha cannot “fail lo prepare [its]
case|| adequately and then seek to remedy the defects
after judgment.” Korea First Bank v. Lee, 14 F. Supp.
2d 530, 532-33 (S.D.N.Y. 199%).
VIII.
linally, Pentalpha appeals the district court’s denial
of its motion for new trial, which was based on SEB’s
altorney’s allegedly improper argument during his
closing argument on reasonable royalty damages. As a
part of its damages case, SEB relied on a price list that
listed its “cool wall” deep fryers at around $ 40 per unit.
fut an SEB executive testified at trial that, although
he thought SEB made a profit, SEB did not always sell
its deep fryers at the list prices. Relying on that
testimony, Pentalpha moved for JMOL at the close of
evidence on SEB’s claim for lost profits. The district
court granted that motion, concluding that “[tjhere’s
nothing in the record, in my view, from which [the jury]
could say, ‘this is what a single deep fryer sold for.’” The
district court allowed SEB’s claim for damages based
on a reasonable royalty to reach the jury.
During summation on its reasonable royalty claim,
SEB's attorney argued that SEB was making a
“substantial profit” through its deep fryers, that it “got
something close to [its] list prices”, and that it “sought
to obtain a gross margin of about 40 to 45 percent of
the selling price.” Pentalpha objected during and after
(he summation on the basis that the court had already
rejected SEB’s claim for lost profits. SI: L’s arguments
47a
Appendix A
with respect to a reasonable royalty, Pentalpha argued,
were just another version of its baseless lost profit
argument. The district court overruled Pentalpha’s
objections, but warned the jury that its “recollection of
what the witness has said what a gross margin was and
what a profit was in this case is what should control.”
“|W Je will reverse a district court’s decision to grant
or deny a motion for a new trial only for an abuse of
discretion.” Song v. lves Labs, Inc., 957 F.2d 1041, 1047
(2d Cir. 1992). Reasonable royalty damages postulate a
hypothetical negotiation between a willing licensor and
licensee at the time of infringement. Minco, 95 F:3d at
1119. “this hypothetical construct seeks the percentage
of sales or profit likely to have induced the hypothetical
negotiators to license use of the invention.” /d. In
denying Pentalpha’s motion for a new trial, the district
court held that although “the Court ruled that [lost
profits) had not been shown with sufficient exactness
... this does not mean that the jury could not consider
S1B's expectations of profits as part of a hypothetical
neyotiation.” JMOL Opinion, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
40394, 2007 WI, 3165783, at *7 (citing Georgia-Pacific
Corp. v» U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120
(S.D.N.Y. 1970)).
‘The district court did not abuse its discretion in
declining to grant a new trial to Pentalpha based on the
summation of SEB’s counsel. The record adequately
supports SEB’s argument that it sought to obtain a gross
margin of about 40 to 45 percent of the list price. There
is a difference between an expectation of success and
38a
Appendix A
actual success at achieving a certain margin, and that
difference is relevant in caleulating the hypothetical
negotiation. But this court sees no reason to preclude a
jury from hearing attorney argument based on an
expectation of success, particularly when Pentalpha had
every opportunity to respond by highlighting to the jury
that SEB’s stated gross margin was only an expectation
and that, absent established commercial success at that
rate, the hypothetical negotiation should result in a
lower rate. SE B’s argumentative efforts to frame the
hypothetical negotiation in its favor were not improper.
Moreover the district court did not abuse its discretion
in denying a new trial on this basis.
IX.
SEB cross appeals the district court’s decision to
set aside its original awards of enhanced damages and
attorneys’ fees. Those awards were based on the jury’s
finding of willfulness, JMOL Opinion, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LMXIS 0394, 2007 WL 3165783, at *10-12, but the
district court vacated them in light of this court’s
intervening opinion in Seagate, hnhanced Damages
Opinion, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113468, 2008 WL
4540416, at *4.
In Seagate, this court set out a new test for willful
infringement. [t overruled the affirmative duty of due
care set forth in Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison
Knudsen Co., 117 F.2d 1380, 1389-90 (ed. Cir. 1983),
and held that proof of willful infringement requires a
patentee to show by clear and convincing evidence that,
39a
Appendix A
as a threshold matter, “the infringer acted despite an
objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted
infringement of a valid patent.” 497 F.3d at 1371. The
district court, proceeding under pre-Seagate law,
instructed the jury that a potential infringer “has an
affirmative duty of due care not to infringe” a known
patent, and that failure to abide by that duty constituted
willful infringement. The jury found Pentalpha’s
infringement willful.
In vacating its award of enhanced damages and
attorneys’ fees, the district court held:
The record contains evidence from which a
jury could find that the Seagate standard of
objective recklessness is satisfied. .... The
evidence regarding Pentalpha’s willfulness,
however, is not so one-sided or overwhelming
to allow the Court to conclude that a jury,
properly instructed under the new Seagate
standard, was required to find, by clear and
convincing evidence, willful infringement.
Vnhanced Damages Opinion, 200% U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11468, 200% WIL, 4540416, at *4. This court detects no
reversible error in this analysis.
importantly, 54 B does not ask this court to order a
new trial on willfulness. Had it asked, this court might
have granted the request in light of the district court’s
conclusion that the willfulness verdict could have gone
either way under the Seagate test. “An erroneous
40a
Appendix A
instruction, unless harmless, requires a new trial.”
Anderson v. Branen, 17 F.3d 552, 556 (2d Cir. 1994); see
Voda v. Cordis Corp., 536 F.3d 1311, 1828 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(remanding and noting that the district court “may at
its discretion assess Voda’s evidence of willful
infringement under the [intervening } Seagate standard
to determine whether a new trial on willfulness is
necessary”). Instead, SEB argues that the evidence on
willfulness is so strong that the district court erred in
vacating the enhanced damages and attorneys’ fees
awards. This court agrees with the district court that
SERB’s evidence is not so strong that SEB is entitled to
a finding of willful infringement as a matter of law.
SEB also argues that there were factors other than
willful infringement that warranted an award of
altorneys’ fees, focusing primarily on alleged litigation
misconduct. But the district court apparently did not
find any litigation misconduct sufficient to warrant an
award of attorneys’ fees. Knhanced Damages Opinion,
200% U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113468, 2008 WL 4540416, at *4.
Moreover this court declines to impose attorneys’ fees
on a different basis than ordered by the district court.
Finally, SigB appeals the district court’s modification
of a pre-judgment attachment in light of its ruling with
respect to Seagate, but makes no arguments in its briefs
with respect to that appeal. Any claim of error with
respect to that modification is therefore waived.
Ala
Appendix A
X.
lor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
COSTS
ach party shall bear its own costs.
42a
APPENDIX B — MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
DATED OCTOBER 9, 2007
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
99 Civ. 9284 (SCR)
SEB S.A.,
Plaintiff,
Vv.
MONTGOMERY WARD & CO., et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
STEPHEN C. ROBINSON, United States District
Judge:
Plaintiff brought this action, alleging patent
infringement related to commercial deep fryers. Plaintiff
asserted infringement of U.S. Patent No. 4,995,312,
entitled “Cooking appliance with electric heating” (“the
‘$12 patent”). Following trial, where the jury rendered
a verdict in favor plaintiff, defendants move for judgment
aS a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 50, or in the alternative for a new trial
pursuant to Rule 59. Plaintiff makes a motion for
enhanced damages, attorney fees, and other relief.
Ata
Appendix B
I. Defendants’ Motion for Judgment as a Matter of
Law
Defendants make a renewed motion for judgment
as a matter of law under Rule 50(b), on various grounds.
“In deciding a Rule 50(b) motion, the Court has two
options: if a verdict was returned, the court may, in
disposing of the new motion, allow the judgment to stand
or may reopen the judgment and either order a new
trial or direct the entry of judgment as a matter of
law.” KMI Music Mktg. v. Avatar Records, Inc., 364
lk. Supp.2d 337, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). In making it’s
decision, a court should consider the evidence “in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party and give
that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences from
the evidence that the jury might have drawn in that
party’s favor.” Morales v. City of New York, No. 99 Civ.
10004, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18711, *6 (S.D.N-Y.
December 29, 2000). Judgment as a matter of law should
be granted when there is no legally sufficient evidentiary
basis for a reasonable jury to find for a party on an issue.
Nadel v. isaksson, 3821 F.3d 266, 271 (2d Cir. 2008).
“Weakness in the evidence does not justify judgment
as amatter of law.” Dagen v. CFC Group Holdings Ltd,
No. 00 Civ. 5682, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6582, *7
(S.D.N_Y. April 18, 2004). Defendants’ individual bases
for their motion are discussed separately below.
Asa
Appendix B
A. Lack of Evidence of Patent Markings
Defendants first move for judgment on SEB’s claims
for reasonable royalties on Defendants’ sales before July
10, 1998 because there was insufficient evidence for a
jury to conclude that the deep fryers sold before that
date contained required patent markings. Defendants’
motion on this basis is denied.
Plaintiff identifies the testimony of Mr. Gregers
Infeld, a senior officer at SEB, and indicate that he
testified that “substantially all” fryers sold before July
10, 1998 were properly marked. Infeld testified that it
was SEB’s policy to mark the fryers and that SEB did
always mark the fryers to the best of his knowledge.
(Tr: 120:13 -121:3). Plaintiff additionally admitted into
evidence two fryers from after July 1998 which were
marked.
Defendants impeach the testimony of Infeld because
1) he testified at a 30(b)(6) deposition that at the time of
the deposition he had no knowledge of this topic; and
2) he acknowledged that a single batch of fryers sold in
the year 2000 was not marked. Neither reason is an
appropriate basis to grant defendants judgment as a
matter of law.
First, the strength of Mr. Infeld’s testimony in light
of his testimony at his 30(b)(6) deposition may be the
subject of cross-examination, but is not an appropriate
basis for granting judgment as a matter of law because
it goes to the strength and weight of his testimony.
45a
Appendix B
Second, the fact that a single batch of fryers was
net marked is hardly evidence that calls into question
whether “substantially all” fryers were marked. While
defendants argue that plaintiff never defined what a
“batch” is — and that therefore the jury had no basis to
determine whether substantially all fryers were marked
— Infeld ultimately testified that substantially all were
marked to the best of his knowledge. The number of
fryers in the single batch of unmarked fryers goes to
the weight of Infeld’s testimony, and is a fair topic for
cross-examination. But it is not a sufficient basis to grant
judgment as a matter of law.
In addition, defendants argue that the sample fryers
admitted into evidence are not relevant because they
were sold after July 1998. This issue is ultimately
irrelevant because Mr. Infeld testified that substantially
all fryers were marked, and the jury was free to credit
or discredit this testimony. In any event, this argument,
again, goes Lo the strength of plaintiff’s case.
Finally, defendants argue that a sample label
provided by SEB did not have the proper marking. ‘This
is, again, an issue of the strength of the evidence in the
case. The jury was free to consider this argument, but
it ultimately found for the plaintiff. The strength of the
parties’ cases is not an appropriate basis for judgment
as a matter of law.
46a
Appendix B
B. Inadequate Production of Documents Related to
Patent Markings
Defendants argue that the court should grant
judgment on SEB’s claims concerning Pentalpha’s deep
fryers sold before July 10, 1998 because of the failure of
SilB to produce documents concerning patent markings
on T-Fal’s deep fryers. Defendants’ motion on this basis
is denied.
Pentalpha originally moved in limine to exclude
SEB from offering evidence regarding patent markings
because SEB had not produced documents concerning
those markings. The Court denied the in limine motion
because SEB’s counsel represented to the Court that
no documents existed other than the one page
produced. Based on that representation, the Court
allowed SEB to introduce the testimony.
At trial, in response to a question from defense
counsel regarding how the factory will know what to
print on the stickers it places on the fryers, Mr. Infeld
testified that ‘the factory will have a “list which shows
them exactly what needs to be put on.” (Tr: 143:9- 10).
Pointing to other testimony as well, defendants argue
that this indicates that Infeld was aware of a “list”
concerning patent markings, which was never produced.
Plaintiff maintains there are no more documents
despite a recent search following the first oral argument
on this motion. While the parties dispute what Infeld
meant by this testimony — indeed still dispute as to
47a
Appendix B
whether additional documents exist — the Court
believes that the current dispute is insufficient to grant
judgment to defendants. The parties engaged in
discovery for years prior to trial, yet defendants waited
until the eve of trial to raise the issue of the adequacy
of plaintiff’s production on patent markings. Further,
defendants could have asked Infeld to clarify during his
examination what he meant by the “list” that he referred
to. Or, defendants could have renewed its motion to
preciude plaintiff from introducing evidence on patent
markings -— giving the Court or SEB an opportunity to
seek clarification from Mr. Infeld. Defendants declined
to do so. In short, defendants did not adequately raise
the issue of plaintiff’s production during discovery, nor
raise an issue regarding Infeld’s testimony during trial,
and the Court is disinclined to disturb the jury’s verdict
at this point. Defendants’ motion on this basis is
therefore denied.
C. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) — Sales and Offers to Sell
Defendants’ motion for judgment on plaintiff’s
§ 271(a) claims is denied. Defendants state that SEB
admitted that all the sales of deep fryers occurred F.O.B.
Hong Kong or China. (Tr: 856:1-6). Therefore,
Defendants argue that, as a matter of law this is not a
“sale” in the United States. See MEMC klec. Materials,
Ince. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d
1369, 1875 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[ 1 }t is well-established that
the reach of section 271(a) is limited to infringing
activities that occur within the United States.”); HRotec
Indus. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1251 (Fed.
48a
Appendix B
Cir. 2000). In MEMC, the Federal Circuit granted
summary Judgment on the issue of sales in the United
States for products which were delivered f.0.B. Tokyo
because these did not constitute sales within the United
States. However, the Court noted several other factors
in deciding that the sale had not occurred within the
United States. See 420 F.3d 1376-77. The Court also
specifically noted that “simply because an article is
delivered ‘free on board’ outside of the forum, a ‘sale’ is
not necessarily precluded from occurring in the forum.”
ld. at 1377. In addition, defendants’ argument that the
Court did not instruct the jury that the sale must also
occur in the United States before an offer to sell in the
United States is actionable is moot because according
to the verdict, the sale did occur in the United States.
Defendants’ motion for judgment on plaintiffs §
271(a)claims is therefore denied.
Db. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) — Inducement
The jury found that defendants induced
infringement under § 271(b). Defendants argue that
there was insufficient evidence that Defendants were
aware of the SEB patent, and therefore they could not
have induced infringement.
“In order to succeed on a claim of inducement, the
patentee must show, first that there has been direct
infringement,” and “second, that the alleged infringer
knowingly induced infringement and possessed specific
intent to encourage another's infringement.” MAMC,
420 F'3d at 1878; Minn. Mining & Mfy. Co. v. Chemque,
4a
Appendix B
Inc., 803 E3d 1294, 1804-05 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citations
omitted). “While proof of intent is necessary, direct
evidence is not required; rather, circumstantial evidence
may suffice.” ME'MC, 420 F.3d at 1378; Water Techs. Corp
v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F:2d 660, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1988). However,
an inducer must have actual or constructive knowledge
of the patent. DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293,
1305 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see also id. at 1311 (Michel, C.J.,
concurring). “It must be established that the defendant
possessed specific intent to encourage another's
infringement and not merely that the defendant had
knowledge of the acts alleged to constitute inducement.
The plaintiff has the burden of showing that the alleged
infringer’s actions induced infringing acts and that he
knew or should have known his actions would induce
actual infringements.” /d. at 1306.
Defendants argue that plaintiff’s evidence that John
Sham “set up” defendants’ counsel Mark Levy to fail to
find the SEB patent is insufficient to establish the
requisite constructive knowledge of the patent.
However, contrary to defendants’ argument, the jury
was free to consider whether key information was not
disclosed to Levy in his patent search and whether that
information would have allowed defendants to discover
the patent. Moreover, this evidence was sufficient to
establish “specific intent and action to induce
infringement”. /d. at 13805. Accordingly, defendants’
motion for judgment is denied.
SUa
Appendix B
ki. Ke-Designed Deep Fryer
Defendants argue that the court should enter
judgment for the defendants on defendants’ re
designed deep fryer because there was no evidence to
allow the jury to determine that a person of reasonable
skill in the art of designing deep fryers would have
considered the differences between the redesigned deep
fryer and the SEB patent as “insubstantial”.
A finding of infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents requires a showing that the difference
between the claimed invention and the accused product
or method was insubstantial or that the accused product
or method performs the substantially same function in
substantially the same way with substantially the same
result as each claim limitation of the patented product
or method.” AquaTex Indus. v. Techniche Solutions,
479 I3d 1820, 1826 (hed Cir, 2007).
Defendants aryue that SI B’s patent expert did not
offer an opinion on how a person skilled in the art would
perceive the changes. They argue that the expert, Mr.
(Charles Van Horn, was not skilled in the art, had no
experience with persons or companies that made deep
fryers, and could not remember having examined a
patent concerning deep fryers while working at the PTO.
However, Mr. Van Horn testified that he was testifying
from the perspective of someone skilled in the art.
(Tr: 474:10 12). The Court overruled the objection to
his testimony as an expert and allowed his testimony
with respect to the issues relevant to the lawsuit.
Sla
Appendix B
(Tr. 479.24 — 480.2) Any other question regarding the
basis of Van Horn’s testimony would go to the credibility
and weight of the testimony. While appropriate subjects
for cross-examination, they are an insufficient basis to
grant judgment as a matter of law.
Ii Willful Infringement
Defendants argue that they are entitled to
judgment as matter of law on the issue of willful
infringement by the redesigned deep fryer. As an initial
matter, it does not appear that Defendants raised this
issue in their pre-verdict motion for judgment as a
matter of law and it is therefore denied.' Taylor v.
National RR. Passenger Corp., $68 I. Supp. 479, 482
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) C'Phe initial motion, brought before
submission of the case to the jury, is a prerequisite to
any movion brought after trial.”)
On the merits, while defendants obtained an opinion
letter from Peter Canelias, plainuff presented evidence
lo impeach the quality and credibility of the letter. First,
the claim construction used by Mr. Canelias did not
comport with the claim construction by this Court.
Cir: 6%5:%-687:6) There was also evidence that the Mr.
(anelias possibly gave an opinion that Mr. Sham wanted
lL. ‘The Court notes that in December Z006, Kule 50 was
amended so as to eliminate the requirement that a motion be
made at the close of ali the evidence, effectively overruling the
relevant portions of the cases cited. HMowever, the law in this
Circuit during the relevant time period for this motion required
such @ motion at the close of evidence, with few exceptions
52a
Appendix B
to hear. (Tr: 687:7 - 689:4). There was also evidence
indicating that Mr. Sham did not rely on Canelias’s
opinion, for example because Pentalpha had finalized
the plans for the deep fryer prior to obtaining the
opinion letter. (Tr: 402:5-403:23). See Stryker Corp. v.
Davol Ine. , 234 F.3d 1252, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2000). In short,
the jury was free to consider the opinion letter as
evidence of a lack of willfulness. But it was also free to
discount that evidence based on other evidence in the
record. Judgment as a matter of law is therefore
inappropriate.
G. Reduction of Damages Award
Since all infringers are jointly and severally liable,
a settlement by one infringer reduces the recovery from
the others. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement
Co., $77 US. 476, 503, 84S. Ct. 1526, 12 L. Ed. 2d 457,
1964 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 760 (1964); see also Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 348,
91 5S. Ct. 795, 28 L. Ed. 2d 77 (1971); Crystal
Semiconductor Corp. vo Tritech Microelectronics Int'l,
Inc, 246 F.3d 1336, 1361 (hed. Cir. 2001) (“A party that
induces or contributes to infringement is jointly and
severally liable with the direct infringer for all general
damages.”) Courts have generally held that parties may
only obtain up to a single full recovery for damapes from
infringement. See Glenayre Elecs., Ine. v. Jackson, 443
I3d 851, 864 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding that a patentee
could not suc users for damages because actual damages
covering the use of the product had already been
recovered from the manufacturer); Shockley uv. Arcan,
53a
Appendix B
Inc, 24% F3d 1349, 1364 (Ked. Cir, 2001) (“Each joint
tort-feasor is lable for the full amount of damages (up
to a full single recovery) suffered by the patentee.”).
“!Tjn determining whether there has been an
impermissible double recovery of damages, the inquiry
focuses on whether the damages issue arose from the
same set of operative facts.” Aero Prods. Intl, Inc. v
Intex Kec. Corp., 466 k-3d 1000, 1018 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
The parties agree that plaintiff recovered $ 2,000,000
from Sunbeam in settlement of a related lawsuit for the
sale of up to 350,000 units. The record indicates that
Pentalpha sold Sunbeam 312,736 units. A reduction of
the jury’s award to avoid double recovery is therefore
appropriate. In addition, this reduction should occur
prior to any damages enhancement for willful
infringement because SEB has already agreed to settle
its claims with respect to the sale of those fryers. Any
trebling of damages from an injury for which SEB has
recovered would result in a windfall bo SEB. Accordingly,
the jury’s award of $ 3,600,000 on this claim is reduced
to $ 1,600,000.
Il. Defendants’ Motion for a New Trial
Defendants also move more [sic] a new trial on
various grounds. “The standard for granting a new trial
is Jess stringent than that for judgment as a matter of
law. On a motion for new trial the judge may set aside
the verdict even though there is substantial evidence
to support it.” Am. Nat'l Fcre Ins. Co. v. Mtrasco, Ine.,
451) I. Supp.2d 576, 582 (S.D.N-Y. 2006) Gnternal
54a
Appendix B
quotations and citations omitted). “Still, anew trial may
only be granted if the court is convinced that the jury
has reached a seriously erroneous result, or that the
verdict is against the weight of the evidence, making its
enforcement a miscarriage of justice.” /d. See also
Farrior v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 277 F.3d 633, 635 (2d
Cir. 2002) (“[A] decision is against the weight of the
evidence, for purposes of a Rule 59 motion, if and only if
the verdict is seriously erroneous or a miscarriage of
justice.”) A jury’s verdict should rarely be disturbed.
Karrnor, 277 3d at 635.
A. Reasonable Royalty Rate
Defendants move for a new trial on the basis that
the evidence does not support the reasonable royalty
award by the jury. The award by the jury was $ 11.52
per fryer for sales to Sunbeam, $ 11.34 for each fryer
sold to Finger Hut, and $ 10.98 for each fryer sold to
Montgomery Ward. Defendants request a new trial on
damages, or alternatively, the Court to remit the award
to $ 5.71 per fryer for the first 350,000, and then $ 9.7]
or $ 10.00 after that. Alternatively, Defendants request
a royalty rate of $ 9.71 or $ 10.00 per fryer. Defendants’
motion is denied.
“The jury’s award of damages is entitled to
deference. Specifically, the jury’s damages award must
be upheld unless the amount is grossly excessive or
monstrous, Clearly not supported by the evidence, or
based only on speculation or guesswork.” Monsanto Co.
v Ralph, 382 3d 1374, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (internal
SSa
Appendix B
quotes omitted); Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro
Devices, Ine., 9TT 2d 1555, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The
moving party has the burden of showing that “the award
is, In view of all the evidence, either so outrageously high
or so outrageously low as to be unsupportable as an
estimation of a reasonable royalty.” Monsanto, 382 I.3d
at 1383; Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GmbH v. Am.
Hoist & Derrick Co., 895 F-2d 1408, 1406 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
The Federal Circuit reviews damages awards by a jury
for substantial evidence. Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86
Kd 1098, 1108 (Fed Cir. 1996).
Defendants’ argues {sic} that a high hypothetical
negotiation between the parties would have resulted in
a far lower royalty because: 1) SEB accepted a $ 5.71
per fryer figure in their setthement with Sunbeam for
the first 350,000 fryers; 2) SEB accepted $ 10.00 per
fryer after the first 350,000; 3) SEB agreed to pay 50%
of any damage award over $ 4.00 to Sunbeam — adding
the $ 4.00 to the $ 5.71 SEB obtained in its settlement
with Sunbeam, means that SEB considers anything
above $ 9.71 a windfall —- so much so that it has agreed
to pay Sunbeam half of anything above that number;
and 4) Pentalpha would not have agreed to pay above
$ 10.98 per deep fryer because if it did, it would not have
made any profit.
Defendants’ arguments regarding SIB’s settlement
with Sunbeam are unconvincing. A settlement in
litigation is based many different criteria, including for
example, potential defenses available to Sunbeam, and
other litigation risks that the Court need not speculate
56a
Appendix B
on. In addition, in cases where more than one defendant
is sued, parties that settle early often get better deals.
As result, the particulars of the Sunbeam settlement
are insufficient to overcome the presumption of
upholding the jury’s award.
With respect to a royalty rate being higher than the
gross margin, there is no per se rule requiring that the
royalty rate allow the infringer to have turned a profit.
See Monsanto, 382 F.8d at 1884 (“[A]lthough an
infringer’s anticipated profit from use of the patented
invention is among the factors to be considered in
determining a reasonable royalty, the law does not
require that an infringer be permitted to make a
profit.”). The Court in Monsanto also noted that a
patentee has every right not to allow anyone else to use
his patent, and a requirement that a hypothetical
negotiation result in a profit for the infringer would
effectively allow infringers to circumvent as patentee’s
right to exclude parties from using their patent. /d. This
is especially true where the patent holder chose not to
license their patent. See id; Tr: 125:8-219. Accordingly,
defendants’ motion for a new trial on the issue of a
reasonable royalty, or in the alternative to remit the
award, is denied.
Kk. Weight of the Evidence on Issues of Liability
lefendants also argue that the verdict was against
the weight of the evidence on four issues of lability:
1) infringement by the original deep fryers; 2) whether
the fryers sold before July 10, 1998 were marked;
S7a
Appendix B
3) whether the differences between the modified deep
fryer and the patent were substantial (i.e. whether the
modified fryer infringed under the doctrine of
equivalents); 4) willful infringement. Defendants make
no argument with regards to why the weight of the
evidence was such that the verdict is seriously
erroneous or a miscarriage of justice, and as discussed
already with respect to defendants’ Rule 50 motion,
there is substantial evidence supporting the jury’s
findings on these issues. Defendants therefore have not
met their burden of establishing serious error or a
miscarriage of justice and their motion is therefore
denied
C. Improper Closing Arguments of SEB’s Counsel
Finally, defendants move for a new trial based on
alleyedly improper arguments at closing. Their motion
is denied.
“Although trial courts possess broad discretion to
determine when the conduct of counsel is so improper
as to warrant a new trial, attorneys also require latitude
in formulating their arguments.” Smith v. National R
Pussenger Corp, 856 F.2d 467, 470 (2d Cir. 19838) (internal
quotations and citations omitted); See also Patterson v.
Balsamico, 440 F.3d 104, 119 (2d Cir. 2004). “Not every
improper or poorly supported remark made in
summation irreparably taints the proceedings; only if
counsel's conduct created undue prejudice or passion
which played upon the sympathy of the jury, should a
new trial be granted.” Smith v National RO Passenger
SSa
Appendix B
Corp., 856 F:2d at 470 (internal, quotations and citations
omitted); see also Patterson, 440 F.3d at 119. “Because
attorneys are given wide latitude in formulating their
arguments to the jury, rarely will an attorney’s conduct
so infect a trial with undue prejudice or passion as to
require reversal.” Patterson, 440 F.3d at 119 (internal
quotation marks omitted); Reilly v. Natwest Mkts.
Group Inc., 181 F.3d 253, 271 (2d Cir. 1999).
Defendants identify four improper arguments made
to the jury: 1) that SEB’s counsel argued that the
reasonable royalty should reflect the lost profit to SEB,
despite the fact that the Court had ruled that a claim
for lost profits could not be submitted to the jury
because there was no evidence as to what SEB actually
sold the fryers for; 2) that SEB’s counse! improperly
argued to the jury that the failure of defendants to seek
an opinion of counsel is evidence of willful infringement;
3) that SEB’s lawyer improperly compared T-Fal’s
commercial product to the Pentalpha product —- as
opposed to comparing the patent claims to the product;
and 4) SEB’s counsel improperly appealed to the
passions of the jury by suggesting that Pentalpha does
not do business in the U.S. to avoid paying taxes in the
US.
With respect to lost profits, the Court ruled that
they had not been shown with sufficient exactness to
allow a ¢laim for lost profits. However, this does not
mean that the jury could not consider SEB’s
expectations of profits as part of a hypothetical.
negotiation. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States
S9a
Appendix B
Plywood Corp., 318 F.Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N-Y. 1970)
(holding that one of the factors relevant to a reasonable
royalty is “|t}he established profitability of the product
made under the patent; its commercial success; and its
current popularity.”).
With regards to willful infringement the federal
circuit has held that the court may not instruct the jury
that they are to draw an adverse inference or
presumption as a matter of law. See Anorr-Bremse
Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp. , 383
F3d 1337, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004). However, nothing in
Knorr-Bremse forbids a jury to consider whether an
infringer sought the advice of counsel in considering
whether, under the totality of the circumstances,
infringement has been willful. See tid. at 1342
(“Determination of willfulness is made on consideration
of the totality of the circumstances”.); see also Golden
Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 E3d 1354,
1369 (Fed. Cir 2006) (rejecting argument that, under
Anorr-Bremse, “the district court could not consider
whether [defendant] obtained an opinion of counsel in
evaluating whether it discharged its duty of due care.”).
Defendants’ third argument is without merit. Sk B
clearly compared the infringing products to the patent
(e.g. ‘Tr: 917:25-921:6). The reference to the T Fal
commercial product was an argument that the T-Fal
wouldn't avoid infringement of the claims because of
minor differences, and the defendants’ product
therefore also couldn't avoid infringement of the claims
because of those same minor differences. In addition,
60a
Appendix B
any error here is insufficient to warrant setting aside
the jury’s verdict and granting a new tri.
With respect to the final error charged — the
foreign status of the defendants — it appears that this
argument was made in response to the defendants’
defense that they were not doing business in the U.S.
In any event, to the extent that this argument was
inappropriate it is insufficient to warrant setting aside
the jury's verdict and granting a new trial.
Ill. Defendants’ Motion for Judgment On the Basis
of Prosecution History Estoppel
The jury found that the modified deep fryer, which
used blocks (or “ring segments”) rather than rings,
infringed the ’812 patent under the doctrine of
equivalents. Defendants move for judgment on this issue
on the basis of prosecution history estoppel.*
Defendants’ motion is denied.
Prosecution history estoppel is a question of law.
Ranbaxy Pharm. Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 350 E3d 1235,
1240 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Under the doctrine, a patentee’s
deciston to narrow a claim during patent prosecution 1s
presumed to be a disclaimer of the territory between
the original claim and the amended claim. Festo Corp. v
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. Ltd, 535 US.
722, 740, 122 S. Ct. 1831, 152 L. Ed. 2d 944 (2002);
)
2. Defendants originally moved in lemime on this issme
before trial, but a decision was deferred until after the verdict
ola
Appendix B
Research Plastics, Ine. v. Fed. Packaging Corp, 421 Fad
1290, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“A narrowing amendment
made to avoid prior art creates a presumption that the
patentee surrendered the territory between the original
claims and the amended claims.”). Estoppel also applies
in the case of arguments made to the patent examiner
rather than amendments made in response to the
patent examiner’s actions. See Glaro Wellcome, Inc. v
Impax Labs. Inc., 356 F.3d 1348, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
However, “(flor an estoppel to apply, such assertions in
favor of patentability must ‘evince a clear and
unmistakable surrender of subject matter.” Pharmacia
& Upjokn Co. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 170 F38d 1873,
1377 (Fed Cir. 1999); Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc,
140 F.3d 1449, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
Defendants argue that in prosecuting its patent
betore the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”),
SEB argued that its invention only applied to a deep
fryer in which the “ring” completely closed off the air
space between the pan and the skirt. See Dunnegar
Declaration, Ex. FE at S000094-96. This argument was
used to distinguish the application at issue from the prior
art — namely U.S. Patent No. 4,672,179 (“the Omshi
Patent”) and Spanish Utility Model 290,283 (“the
Spanish Utility Patent”). Defendants now argue that,
since SEB’s expert admitted at trial that the redesigned
deep fryer does not completely close off the air space
between the pan and the skirt, defendants’ product
could not infringe the patent as a matter of law under
the doctrine of equivalents
62a
Appendix B
Defendants’ argument is precluded by this Court's
earlier decision on this issue. “Under the doctrine of
law of the case, ‘a legal decision made at one stage of
litigation, unchallenged in a subsequent appeal when
the opportunity to do so existed, becomes the law of the
case for future stages of the same litigation, and the
parties are deemed to have waived the mght to challenge
that decision at a later time.” See North River Ins. Co.
v. Philadelphia Reinsurance Corp., 63 F.3d 160, 164 (2d
Cir. 1995). “Because there is a strong policy favoring
finality ...acourt should be loathe to revisit an earlier
decision in the absence of extraordinary circumstances
s' ch as where the initial decision was clearly erroneous
and would work a manifest injustice.” /d@. at 165 (internal
quotations and citations omitted). On March 20, 2001,
then District Judge Barrington D. Parker, Jr. issued a
decision on plaintiff’s motion for a supplemental
preliminary injunction regarding the sale of the modified
deep fryer. * See SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,
Inc., 1387 E'Supp.2d 285 (S.D_N-Y. 2001). In that decision,
Judge Parker rejected the very arguments defendants
currently make. Specifically, Judge Parker held that:
1) in the modified fryer, defendants have replaced the
insulating ring with a series of insulating ring segments;
2) the use of ring segments, as opposed to the use of a
continuous ring, do [sic] not change the essential nature
of the device; 3) independent claim 1 does not contain
any requirement that the ring functions to seal the air
space; 4) there is no prosecution history estoppel based
3. Judge Parker has since been appointed to a seat on the
Second Cireuit.
63a
Appendix B
on the arguments made to the PTO regarding the
Spanish Utility Patent because they were not directed
to the claim at issue in this case. /d. at 287-89.
Defendants’ arguments regarding factual errors in
this Court’s earlier ruling are unconvincing. Whether
claim 1 was amended, or repealed is ultimately irrelevant
to the Court’s decision that prosecution history estoppel
did not apply because the arguments made to the PTO
were directed at claim 13, not claim 1. Indeed Judge
Parker specifically found that “independent claim 1 does
not contain any requirement that the ring functions to
seal the air space.” SEB, 137 F.Supp.2d at 288.
Defendants have therefore failed to show that the initia!
decision was clearly erroneous and would work a
manifest injustice.
burther, the Supreme Court’s decision in Festo Corp
v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co, Lta., does
not invite this Court to re-visit its earlier decision. 535
U.S. 722, 122 S. Ct. 1831, 152 L. Ed. 2d 944 (2002). In
Festo, the Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit,
and narrowed the defense of prosecution history
estoppel. The Federal Circuit had held that prosecution
history estoppel is a complete bar to the doctrine of
equivalents, regardless of the purpose of the
amendment. The Supreme Court reversed, applying a
more flexible “fair interpretation” standard for
determining what subject matter was surrendered by
the amendment or argument. /d at 737-38. Judge
Parker's decision, which holds that estoppel does not
apply, is not undercut by a ruling by the Supreme Court
which actually further limits the doctrine’s applicability
64a
Appendix B
Accordingly, under the law of the case doctrine, this
Court will not disturb its earlier decision.
IV. Plaintiff’s Motions
A. Enhanced Damages
The jury found for SEB for direct infringement and
inducement of infringement and awarded damages of
$ 4,650,000. The jury also found that Pentalpha’s
infringement had been willful. Plaintiff moves to
enhance damages on this basis.
Under 35 U.S.C. §284, damages may be enhanced
up to three times the compensatory award. An award of
enhanced damages for infringement, as well as the
extent of the enhancement, is committed to the
discretion of the trial court. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc.,
970 F.2d 816, 826 (Fed. Cir. 1992). While no statutory
standard dictates the circumstances under which the
district court may exercise its discretion, the Federal
Circuit has approved such awards where the
infringement is willful. /d. On the other hand, a finding
of willful infringement does not mandate that damages
be enhanced, much less mandate treble damages. /d.;
Modine Mfg. Co. v. Allen Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 538, 543
(Fed. Cir. 1990). “The paramount determination in
deciding to grant enhancement and the amount thereof
is the egregiousness of the defendant’s conduct based
on all the facts and circumstances.” Read, 970 F.3d at
826. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 819 F-2d 1120,
1125 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The court must consider factors
65a
Appendix B
that render defendant's conduct more culpable, as well
as factors that are mitigating or ameliorating. Read, 970
3d at 826.
Factors considered by courts in determining when
an infringer has acted in such bad faith as to merit an
increase in the damages awarded against him include:
1) whether the infringer deliberately copied the ideas
or design of another; 2) whether the infringer, when he
knew of the other’s patent protection, investigated the
scope of the patent and formed a good-faith belief that
it was invalid or that it was not infringed; 3) the
infringer’s behavior as a party to the litigation; 4) the
defendant’s size and financial condition; 5) closeness of
the case; 6) duration of defendant’s misconduct;
7) remedial action by the defendant; 8) defendant’s
motivation for harm; and 9) whether defendant
attempted to conceal its misconduct. Jd. at 826-27.
Kirst the Court notes that evidence in the record
indicates that employees of Pentalpha purchased a SEB
fryer in Hong Kong for the purposes of market research,
and presented no evidence of independent design
(e.g. design drawings). (Tr: 242:18-24; 339:12-340-13).
Indeed, there was testimony that the engineers simply
took a T-Fal fryer and made cosmetic changes to it.
(Tr: 609:25-610:18; 611:13-613:24),
Second, the court notes that evidence in the record
indicates that Pentalpha knew that it had copied a SEB
fryer, but never told this to its attorney, Mr. Levy who
was performing a patent search with respect to the
66a
Appendix B
original deep fryer. (Tr: 345:4-20; Tr: 414:20-416:20).
There was also evidence that Pentalpha had finalized
the plans for its modified deep fryer prior to obtaining
the opinion letter of its counsel, Mr. Canelias. (Tr: 402:5-
403:23).
Third, the Court does not believe this was a
particularly close case. The Court granted judgment to
the plaintiff on many of defendants’ affirmative defenses.
(Tr: 716:1-717:1). The case law was also contrary to
defendants’ defense that the sales in this case were not
infringing because they were “F.0.B. China”. SeeMEMC,
420 F.3d at 1377 (“simply because an article is delivered
‘free on board’ outside of the forum, a ‘sale’ is not
necessarily precluded from occurring in the forum.”)
Fourth, as discussed already, this court does not
believe that plaintiff’s counsel’s argument regarding
willfulness and defendants’ failure to seek the advice of
counsel was prohibited by Knorr-Bremse. It therefore
does not preclude enhanced damages in this case.
Fifth the court notes that upon issuance of a
preliminary injunction forbidding the sale of the original
deep fryer, defendants developed a modified deep fryer
with few changes, which infringed on the ’312 patent
under the doctrine of equivalents. This modification
required additional motion practice by plaintiff, who
needed to seek a supplemental injunction against the
sale of the modified deep fryer in order to avoid further
infringement of its patent rights.
67a
Appendix B
Accordingly, and upon consideration of all other
relevant factors, this court believes enhanced damages
are appropriate. In its discretion, and in consideration
of the high damage award in this case relative to the
defendants’ size, this Court elects to award damages
two times the jury award.
BK. Attorneys’ Fees
Under 35 U.S.C. § 285, “the court in exceptional
cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the
prevailing party.” Whether a case is exceptional is a
determination of fact which is reviewed for clear error.
L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Tom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117,
1128 (Fed. Cir. 1993). A decision whether to award
attorneys’ fees, once it is found to be exceptional, is
committed to the discretion of the trial judge. Modine
Mfg. Co., 917 F.2d at 543. Bad faith litigation, willful
infringement, or inequitable conduct are among the
circumstances which may make a case exceptional.
Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 1572, 1579 (Fed
tir. 1996). Indeed, an express finding of willful
infringement is a sufficient basis for classifying a case
as “exceptional”. Modine Mfg. Co., 917 F.2d at 543.
Because the jury expressly found willful infringement,
and in consideration of the various facts in the record
to support this finding, the Court holds that the current
case is an exceptional case within the meaning of § 285.
Accordingly, an award of attorneys’ fees is appropriate.
With regards to the particulars of the fee
submission, the Court agrees with defendants that
68a
Appendix B
attorneys’ fees from the Sunbeam action in the District
of New Jersey are an inappropriate for an award from
this Court. Fees associated with that action should have
been sought from that Court, or in settlement
negotiations of that action.
The Court agrees with plaintiff that fees paid to Mr.
Didier Martin and Mr. Gregers Infeld are appropriate.
Mr. Martin was retained as an outside legal consultant
» 1d defendants have provided no adequate basis to deny
plaintiff payment of his fees. Mr. Infeld was also retained
as an outside consultant and defendants provide no
specific objection to his fees other than the conclusory
assertion that they are unreasonable. Finally, contrary
to defendants’ assertion, plaintiff is entitled to
reasonable expenses incurred by plaintiff’s counsel
during the prosecution of this case.
C. Pre-Judgment Interest under 35 U.S.C. § 284
“[PJrejudgment interest should be awarded under
§ 284 absent some justification for withholding such an
award.” GM Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 657, 103
S. Ct. 2058, 76 L. Ed. 2d 211 (1983); Flanagan v.
Continental Apparel Corp., No. 94 Civ. 9338, 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 12102, *12 (S.D.N.Y. August 20, 1996).
Defendants do not dispute that prejudgment interest
is appropriate here, but argue that the statutory post-
judgment interest rate under 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) is
appropriate. While plaintiff has not submitted evidence
of the rate at which it borrows money, the court believes
that the prime interest rate provided by Federal Reserve
69a
Appendix B
compounded annually is provides fair compensation to
plaintiff Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 939 F2d
1540, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[I]t is not necessary that a
patentee demonstrate that it borrowed at the prime rate
in order to be entitled to prejudgment interest at that
rate.”). However, because the jury’s judgment is
reduced by $ 2,000,000 to reflect plaintiff’s settlement
with Sunbeam, plaintiff is instructed to re-submit its
calculation regarding the amount of prejudgment
interest due.
D. Permanent Injunction
SEB requests entry of a permanent injunction.
Defendants’ concede that a permanent injunction is
warranted, and do not oppose the language of SEB’s
proposed injunction for the most part. Defendants do
argue that any injunction should preserve Pentalpha’s
claims against SEB for liability up to the amount of the
bond in the event Pentalpha ultimately prevails.
However, damage to Pentalpha is moot because the jury
ultimately found infringement. In any event, should
Pentalpha prevail on appeal, any claims against SEB
will be preserved. Therefore, no modification to SEB’s
proposed permanent injunction is necessary.
70a
Appendix B
Ili. Conclusion
Defendants’ renewed motion for judgment as a
matter of law is granted in part. Defendants’ motion for
a new trial is denied. Defendants’ motion for judgment
on the issue of prosecution history estoppel is denied.
Plaintiff’s motion for enhanced damages is granted in
part.
The jury’s award of $ 4,650,000 is reduced to
$ 2,650,000 to reflect SEB’s settlement with Sunbeam.
This Court awards an additional $ 2,650,000 in enhanced
damages in light of the jury’s finding of willful
infringement. The Court awards attorneys’ fees of
$ 932,123.53. The Court awards pre judgment of interest
at the prime rate. Plaintiff is instructed to re-submit a
calculation of the amount of pre judgment interest owed
in light of this Court’s reduction of the jury’s award to
$ 2,650,000.
Case closed.
It is so ordered.
Dated: White Plains, New York
October 9, 2007
s/ Stephen C. Robinson
Stephen C. Robinson, U.S.D.J.
T7la
APPENDIX C — ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL
CIRCUIT DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING
DATED MARCH 25, 2010
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
2009-1099, -1108, -1119
SEB S.A.,
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant-
Cross Appellant,
and
T-FAL CORPORATION,
Counterclaim Defendant,
V.
MONTGOMERY WARD & CO., INC.,
Defendant,
and
GLOBAL-TECH APPLIANCES, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
PENTALPHA ENTERPRISES, LTD.,
Defendant-Counterclaimant-
Appellant.
72a
Appendix ©
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York in 99-CV-9284, Judge
Stephen C. Robinson.
ORDER
A petition for rehearing en banc having been filed by
the Appellants,* and the matter having first been referred
as a petition for rehearing to the panel that heard the
appeal, and thereafter the petition for rehearing en banc
having been referred to the circuit judges who are in
regular active service,
UPON CONSIDERATION THEREOR it is
ORDERED that the petition for rehearing be, and the
same hereby is, DENIED and it is further
ORDERED that the petition for rehearing en banc
be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.
The mandate of the court will issue on April 1, 2010.
FOR THE COURT,
s/ Jan Horbaly
Jan Horbaly
Clerk
Dated: 03/25/2010
* The court granted leave to American Intellectual
Property Law Association and The Federal] Circuit Bar
Association to file a brief amici curiae in support of Appellants’
petition for rehearing en banc.
OPPOSITION
BRIEF
No. 10-6
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
GLOBAL-TECH APPLIANCES, INC.,, etal.,
Petitioners,
v.
SEB 5.A.,
Respondent.
On PETITION FOR A Writ OF CERTIORARL TO THE
Unrirep Srares Court OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL Cirncuir
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
JouN P Wuite
NorMAN H. Zivin*
WeENpy E. MILLER
Cooper & Dunnam LLP
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, New York 10112
(212) 278-0400
nzivin@cooperdunham.com
* Counsel of Record Attorneys for Respondent
241345 g
COUNSEL PRESS
(BOO) 274 4821 © (800) 359 6859
1
RULE 29.6 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Respondent, SEB $.A., a publicly-held French
corporation, has no parent company. No publicly owned
company owns 10% or more of the stock of SEB S.A.
il
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Pave
RULE 29.6 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT .... i
TABLES OF CONTENTS ...ccccccccvccccccess ii
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES ......... iv
See RSIS «sos dwalds cb 665 Sbabehd babes l
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION
aiken ehavatiebes ceca erceeteaetceds 2
1. ‘There Is No Justiciable Controversy For
This Court To Resolve. ................ 2
Il. The Federal Circuit’s “Deliberate
Indifference” Sub-Test Is A Practical And
Workable Test That Provides Courts With
Flexibility In Assessing An Infringer’s
Knowledge Of A Patent. ............... 3
A. The “Detiberate Indifference” Sub-
Test Is Well-Grounded In Precedent.
Leeks bE CAS USURERSOUEOHSGANUDEM ELS 3
B. The “Deliberate Indifference” Sub-
Test Gives Courts Flexibility When
Addressing A Particular Class Of
Infringers Who Assume Known
a oe ee ee rs er rer era 5
Ti
Contents
Page
Ill. The “Deliberate Indifference” Standard
Is In Harmony With Grokster. ......... 10
oe) oF): | errr rrrerr TT ere reer 11
iv
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases:
Bilski v. Kappos,
US. , 3308. Ct. 3218 (2010) ........... 2,9
DSU Medical Corporation v. JMS Co., Ltd.,
471 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ............ 3, 4, 10
Farmer v Brennan,
b11 U.S. 825, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994) ......... 5, 9
Herb v. Pitcairn,
324 U.S. 117, 65 S. Ct. 459 (1945) ........... |
Insituform Technologies, Inc.
v. Cat Contracting, Ine.,
161 I3d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1998),
cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1018 (1999) .......... 3
ASK Intl Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.,
550 U.S. 398, 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) ......... 2,9
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc.
v. Grokster, Ltd.,
545 U.S. 9138, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005) ......... 1,10
SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., lnc.,
094 F'3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ............ passim
|
INTRODUCTION
SEB S.A. (“SEB”) respectfully submits that the
Petition of Global-Tech and Pentalpha (“Pentalpha”)
should be denied because the decision of the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit in SEB S.A. v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 594 F.3d 1360 (Ked. Cir.
2010), does not warrant review by this Court.
There is no justiciable controversy requiring review
by this Court because a decision will not affect the
outcome of this case. Pentalpha was found liable for both
direct infringement and inducing infringement, and its
Petition addresses only inducing infringement. At most,
a reversal of the Federal Circuit’s decision would require
a retrial on damages. See, Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S.
117, 125, 65 S. Ct. 459, 468 (1945) (the Court will not
review a judgment resting on independent grounds).
Iven if there were a justiciable controversy worthy
of review (which there is not), the Federal Circuit’s
decision in SEB should be affirmed because it advances
the Patent Law by establishing a flexible standard to
determine whether a defendant had knowledge of a
patent sufficient to induce infringement of that patent.
By adopting a flexible standard, the Federal Circuit
closed a loophole which may have allowed manufacturers
to avoid liability for inducement by deliberately ignoring
known legal risks. The “deliberate indifference” sub-
test used by the Federal Circuit is well grounded in
authority and consistent with existing authority,
including this Court’s decision in Grokster!
1. Metro-Goldwyn-Muayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd, 545
US. 918, 922-23, 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2772 (2005).
2
By establishing a standard that provides courts with
flexibility for addressing varied factual circumstances,
the Federal Circuit’s approach is consistent with the
approach taken by this Court in its recent decisions in
Bilski and KSR, both of which seek to create a balance
between flexibility and certainty.’ Therefore, this is not
an appropriate case for this Court’s review, and the
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari should be denied.
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION
1. There ls No Justiciable Controversy For This Court
To Resolve.
The jury in this case found Pentalpha liable for both
direct infringement and inducement to infringe. The
verdict form, however, contains a single damage award.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the verdict under both
theories of liability. Therefore, there was no need to
address the damage award. SHB, 594 F:3d at 1374.
In its Petition, Pentalpha seeks reversal of the
portion of the verdict finding liability only under the
theory of inducement. Even if that portion of the verdict
is reversed (although it should not be reversed),
Pentalpha will remain liable for direct infringement.’
2. Bilskiv. Kappos, — US. , 1380S. Ct. 3218 (2010);
KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 1278. Ct. 1727 (2007).
3. Pentalpha suggests that the Federal Circuit improperly
affirmed the verdict of direct infringement because Pentalpha’s
sale of deep fryers to American retailers with the term “FOB
China” occurred outside the United States. The Federal Circuit
dismissed that argument. SH’, 594 F.3d at 1375. This issue was
not presented for review.
3
Therefore, any decision by this Court will not affect the
ultimate issue of Pentalpha’s liability. At most, the matter
would be remanded to the district court for a retrial on
damages. Since any decision by this Court would not
change the substantive outcome of this case, the case is
not properly before this Court and Pentalpha’s Petition
should be denied.
Il. The Federal Circuit’s “Deliberate Indifference”
Sub-Test Is A Practical And Workable Test That
Provides Courts With Flexibility In Assessing An
Infringer’s Knowledge Of A Patent.
A. The“Deliberate Indifference” Sub-Test Is Well-
Grounded In Precedent.
Inducement to infringe a patent requires proof of
specific intent, i.e., that an infringer “knew or should have
known his actions would induce actual infringements.”
DSU Medical Corporation v. JMS Co., Ltd., 471 F.3d
1293, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2006). That proof may be presented
by direct or circumstantial evidence. Insituform
Technologies, Inc. v. Cat Contracting, Inc., 161 F3d 688,
695 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1018 (1999).
In DSU, the Federal Circuit en banc reconciled a prior
conflict in the law and held that a plaintiff can demonstrate
inducement of patent infringement by showing that the
infringer “knew or should have known his actions would
induce actual infringements.” DSU, 471 F.3d at 1304. The
hederal Circuit held that knowledge of the patent is an
included element of this test:
The requirement that the alleged infringer
knew or should have known his actions would
4
induce actual infringement necessarily
includes the requirement that he or she knew
of the patent.
Id. at 1304.
However, the Federal Circuit declined at that time
to articulate a standard for this lesser included
“knowledge of the patent” element of proof. Jd. at 1311
(“Moreover, we write to make clear that we do not set
forth a new standard here as to what satisfies the
‘knowledge of the patent’ requirement in cases brought
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b).”) (Michel and Mayer, C.J.,
concurring).
SHB presented an opportunity for the Federal
Cireuit to consider a standard for the lesser included
element of “knowledge of the patent.” The Federal
Circuit clearly distinguished the test for knowledge of
acts of inducement from the sub-test for the lesser
included element of knowledge of the patent. The Court
stated that the standard in DSU addresses “the target
of the knowledge,” while the standard in SE'B addresses
“the nature of that knowledge.” SEB, 594 F3d at 1376.
The Federal Circuit recognized that direct evidence
of knowledge of a patent rarely exists and confirmed
that a claim for inducement is viable even without such
direct evidence. SHA, 594 F.3d at 1377. Therefore, the
Federal Circuit adopted a flexible “deliberate
indifference” sub-test, based on authority from other
circuits that “deliberate indifference to a known risk is
not different from actual knowledge, but is a form of
actual knowledge.” SEB, 594 F.3d at 1376-77 (citations
5
omitted). Relying on authority of this Court, the Federal
Circuit confirmed that “deliberate indifference” is a
subjective standard, as distinguished from an objective
“should have known” standard. SEB, 594 F.3d at 1376,
citing, Farmer v Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 839-40, 114
S. Ct. 1970, 1980 (1994). Therefore, the “deliberate
indifference” sub-test is consistent with DSU because
it does not reduce DSU to a “should have known”
standard. /d.
B. The “Deliberate Indifference” Sub-Test Gives
Courts Flexibility When Addressing A
Particular Class Of Infringers Who Assume
Known Risks.
The “deliberate indifference” standard is directed
to a particular class of infringers who adopt a “head in
the sand” approach to infringement and assume a known
risk that a patent may exist. In the present case, for
example, Pentalpha purchased one of SE'B’s deep fryers
in Hong Kong, brought the deep fryer into its laboratory
and copied the patented features. Pentalpha had the
presence of mind to seek a clearance opinion from patent
counsel. Despite this deliberate conduct, Pentalpha
concealed from its patent attorney the fact that it had
copied material features of SEB’s deep fryer. Under
these circumstances, Pentalpha exercised deliberate
indifference to the possibility that SEB had a patent on
the features that Pentalpha copied, and Pentalpha
engaged in affirmative conduct to avoid finding out.
Allowing a competitor to avoid liability in this manner is
a loophole that the Federal Circuit now has closed.
6
Pentalpha argues that the “deliberate indifference”
sub-test creates uncertainty and is unworkable because it
could result in liability “in virtually any situation.”
Pentalpha’s argument is incorrect because Pentalpha has
misconstrued the “deliberate indifference” sub-test.
Pentalpha characterizes the test as follows:
|Tjhe SEB standard allows “mere knowledge
of infringing potential” to serve as the basis for
liability. (Petition p. 9, citation omitted).
The Federal Circuit therefore held that the mere
presence of a risk that infringement could occur
would constitute specific intent to infringe.
(Petition p. 15).
That, however, is an overstatement of the sub-test. “Mere
knowledge of infringing potential” and “risk that
infringement could occur” is present in every case. The
lederal Circuit’s test addresses the presence of a known
risk, not any potential risk, and the distinction is critical.‘
Attempting to illustrate its misplaced argument,
Pentalpha contends that the application of the “deliberate
indifference” test would attribute knowledge of a patent
in the following circumstances (Petition p. 12):
* Where the infringer does not conduct a patent
search;
4. Contrary to Pentalpha’s suggestion (Petition p. 7), amicz
briefs submitted in support of Pentalpha’s petition for
rehearing by the Federal Circuit en banc did not support the
particular grounds asserted by Pentalpha for its Petition. Amici
Look no position on how the Federal Circuit should have decided
this case, or what the appropriate standard should be.
7
* Where the infringer conducts a patent search
but does not obtain a noninfringement opinion;
and
* Where the infringer conducts a patent search
and obtains a noninfringement opinion, where
the noninfringement opinion contains a
statement by counsel that the opinion does not,
and cannot, eliminate all risk, as “usually
disclosed in opinions of counsel.”
To the contrary, the “deliberate indifference” sub-
test would not cover a defendant who assumes general,
potential risk in the ordinary course of business, or a
defendant who acts negligently but without knowledge
of a particular risk. If a defendant does not copy the
material features of a competitor’s product, there may
be no known risk. If a defendant fails to have counsel
conduct a patent search, there may be no known risk. If
a defendant conducts a patent search and obtains an
opinion from patent counsel stating generally that the
opinion does not, and cannot, eliminate all risk, there
may be no known risk.°*
The “deliberate indifference” sub-test for the
“knowledge of the patent” element of inducement would
be satisfied only when an infringer deliberately and
purposefully assumes a known risk. Here, Pentalpha
deliberately assumed a known risk because it copied
5. For the same reasons, Pentalpha’s argument that the
“deliberate indifference” sub-test would impose on sellers of
goods an affirmative duty to secure a noninfringement opinion
for all new products (Petition pp. 17-19) is misplaced.
8
material features from SEB’s deep fryer, it sought a
clearance opinion from patent counsel and it failed to
tell counsel that it had copied SEB’s product.® The
“deliberate indifference” sub-test describes a specific
and separate class of infringers, such as Pentalpha, who
cannot reasonably allege that they did not know of the
plaintiff’s patent.
By alleging that the “deliberate indifference” sub-
test creates uncertainty, Pentalpha suggests that the
courts should maintain a bright-line test where a
plaintiff could prove “knowledge of the patent” only with
direct evidence that the defendant actually knew of the
patent. That, however, is not a workable test. As
discussed above, evidence of actual knowledge is rarely
available, and courts need a flexible test to assess
inducement in those circumstances.
Indeed, if the courts were to adopt a bright-line test
aS Pentalpha suggests, infringers could easily avoid
liability, and inducement would be virtually unprovable.
A foreign manufacturer, such as Pentalpha, which copies
a product for sale to U.S. retailers, and seeks a
noninfringement opinion from patent counsel, could
deliberately avoid learning of a patent covering that
product (or deliberately avoid creating evidence of such
knowledge). This is not a desired result. Courts need
flexibility to close this loophole and find liability for
inducement when a defendant adopts a “head in the
sand” approach. The Federal Circuit’s “deliberate
indifference” sub-test accomplishes this purpose without
6. As another example, an infringer assumes a known risk
when it obtains advice of counsel but fails to follow that advice.
9
posing undue risk of liability on defendants who act in
good faith and do not disregard known risks. Indeed,
this test is equally certain, if not more certain, than the
tests set forth by this Court in Bilski and KSR,'
confirming that the Federal Circuit’s decision does not
require review.
Pentalpha argues that the Federal Circuit
“conspicuously avoided articulating any standard
concerning the severity of the risk of infringement
necessary to find liability,” and that the “deliberate
indifference” sub-test could encompass acts of simple
negligence (Petition pp. 9-10). To the contrary, this Court
has held that “deliberate indifference entails something
more than mere negligence.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. at 8855
Indeed, the “deliberate indifference” standard
accurately reflects patent law as it is practiced on a daily
basis. When asked for a noninfringement opinion about
a new product, patent attorneys typically ask their
clients to identify any materials that were referenced in
developing the new product. The “deliberate
indifference” standard now creates liability for clients,
such as Pentalpha, which do not make full disclosure to
counsel, and particularly those who conceal the fact that
they copied an existing product.
7. Bilske v. Kappos, — US. __, 1808. Ct. 3218 (2010);
KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 1275S. Ct. 1727 (2007).
4%. Itis illogical to equate a “should have known” negligence
test to a test that requires the disregard of a “known” risk.
10
lil. The “Deliberate Indifference” Standard Is In
Harmony With Grokster.
As discussed above, according to the Federal
Circuit’s decision in DSU, inducement to infringe a
patent occurs when the infringer “knew or should have
known his actions would induce actual infringements,”
where “knowledge of the patent” is a necessary included
element of proof. DSU, 471 F3d at 1304. In SEB, the
ederal Circuit established the “deliberate indifference”
standard for the lesser included “knowledge of the
patent” element, distinguishing “the target of the
knowledge” addressed in DSU, from “the nature of that
knowledge” addressed in SEB. SEB, 594 E3d at 1376.
As in DSU, the standard for inducement set forth
by this Court in Grokster addresses the target of the
knowledge, not the nature of the knowledge. Grokster
did not involve a “knowledge of the copyright”
requirement, since the defendants in that case
essentially admitted having knowledge that the
infringed works were subject to copyright. Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S.
913, 922-23, 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2772 (2005). Therefore, the
Federal Circuit’s decision in SEB concerning the
“knowledge of the patent” requirement does not conflict
with Grokster, which has nothing to do with the
“knowledge of the copyright.”
1]
CONCLUSION
Pentalpha has failed to provide any valid reason for
this Court to review the Federal Circuit’s decision in
this case. It is clear that Pentalpha has submitted this
Petition to avoid or delay paying the final judgment, not
to seek clarification of the law. Accordingly, the Petition
should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
Joun P Wuite
NorMan II. Zivin*
Wenby E. MILLER
Cooper & DuNHAM LIP
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, New York 10112
(212) 278-0400
nzivin@cooperdunham.com
Attorneys for Respondent
* Counsel of Record
AMICUS
CURIAE
BRIEF
No. 10-6 ae
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
ooo EE we <a —
GLOBAL-TECH APPLIANCES, INC., etal,
Petitioners,
v.
SEBS.A.,
Respondent.
ON PeTririon FOR A Writ OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES Court OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL Cincult
BRIEF AMICI CURIAE OF 26 LAW, ECONOMICS,
AND BUSINESS PROFESSORS
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
PROFESSOR Mark A. LEMLEY
STANFORD LAw SCHOOL
Crown Quadrangle
559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
(650) 723-2465
mlemley@law.stan
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