Record and brief — Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S. A.

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SUPREME COURT

ol rae £Neg w BIA AS

Global lech Apphances, Inc , etal, Petitioners

Vv

SEBSA

dune 29) 2 O10

Uimled States Court of Appeals for the | ederal Circuit

(2009 1099, 2009 1408, 2009 1119)

March 25 2010

Proceedings and Orders

Pehton for a witof cemoran tiled (Response due July 29, 2010)

Boel of respondent SEBS A om opposition tiled

Boef anuci cunae of 96 Law, Fcononucs, and Business Professors tiled

DISTRIBUTED tot Conference of September 27, 2010

DOS TRIBUTE D for Conference of October 8 2010

Petthon GRANTED

Consent to the ting of anucus Cunae brets, in Support of ether party or of

neither party, recenved tron) Course! tor the respondent

Consent to the tng of amicus Cunae bets, in support of either party oF of

neither party, received trom Counsel for the petitioners

Lxtension of time to tile the joint appendix and petiioners’ bret on the merits to

and mchuding November 29° 2010

The time to file respondent's bret on the merits ts extended to and mclhuding

December 30, 2010

Jomt appendix tiled (Statement of costs tiled )

net of peutlioners Global lech Apphances Inc. et al tiled

Supplemental appendix of Global lech Apphances inc , etal filed

Bnet anvcus Cunae of Newegg, Inc tiled

net anc: Cunae of Yahoo! inc , etal tied

Bet anvous Cunae of Business Software Alliance tiled

Boel anc Cunae of Comcast Corporation, et al filed

Bet anvous Cunae of Software Freedom | aw Center tiled

Binet anc: Cunae of Motion Picture Association of America and Recording

Industry in support of neither party filed

inet amict Cunae of Cisco Systems, Inc , et al tiled

net anvcus Cunae of Google Inc tiled

Bnet anucus Cunae of Intellectual Property Owners Association in Support of

neither party filed

Boeft anc cunae of The Cleaning House Association, et al filed

Bnet amici Curae of 41 Law, Lconomics, and Business Professors tiled

Bnet anvcus cunae of federal Crrcunt Bar Association in support of neither

party tiled

SET FOR ARGUMENT ON Wednesday, February 23, 2011

Bnet olrespondent SEBS A ted (Distributed)

CIRCULATED

Bnet anc Cunae of Law Professors filed (Orstibuted)

Bnet anna cunae ot Hoffmann ta Roche tnc , et al filed (Distributed)

Bnet amicus cunae of Wiham Mitchell College of | aw tntellectual Property

Jano 201

dan ?0 2011

Jan 31 2011

feb 112011

beb

2S 27011

Institute tled (UDistibuted)

Bet amicus Cunae of Amencan Intellectual Property Law Association tiled

(Lustributed)

Record received trom US © A_ for Federal Circunt: (1 box)

Reply of petitioners Global Tech Appliances, Inc , et al tiled (Distributed)

Record received trom US 0 C for Southern District of New York (VVhite Plains)

(4 boxes) [here are sealed documents in this record

Argued For petitioners Wilham Dunnegan, New York NY For respondent R

led Cruz, Houston, lex

PETITION

FOR

WRIT OF

CERTIORARI

| t, US.

Summ resYS

. JUN 23 2010

No. 09 10-6

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

ee ——

GLOBAL-TECH APPLIANCES INC. and

PENTALPHA ENTERPRISES, LTD.,

Petitioners,

v.

SEB S.A.,

Respondent.

On Pevirion vor A Writ OF CERTIORARI TO THE

Unrrep States Court or APPEALS

FOR THE FreperaLCimcurr

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

WILLIAM DUNNEGAN

350 lifth Avenue

New York, New York 10118

(212) 332-8300

wd@dunnegan.com

Counsel for Petitioners

230422 cr

COUNSEL PRESS

(BOO) 274 S321 © (800) 359 -G&59

l

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the legal standard for the state of mind

element of a claim for actively inducing infringement

under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) is “deliberate indifference of a

known risk” that an infringement may occur, as the

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held, or

“purposeful, culpable expression and conduct” to

encourage an infringement, as this Court taught in

MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 918, 937,

125 S. Ct. 2764, 2780, 162 L. Ed. 2d 781, 801 (2005)?

vt

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

The petitioners here, and defendants-appellants in

the Federal Circuit, are Global-Tech Appliances Ine.

(now “Global-Tech Advanced Innovations Ine.”), and

Pentalpha Enterprises, Ltd. (now “Pentalpha Medical,

Ltd.”) (collectively “Pentalpha”).

The respondent here, and plaintiff-appellee in the

tederal Circuit, is SEB S.A (“SERB”).

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Pentalpha Enterprises, Ltd. is a wholly-owned

subsidiary of Global-Tech Appliances Inc., a publicly

traded corporation, with its principle place of business

in Hong Kong.

SiiB is a publicly traded corporation, with its

principle place of business in France.

TT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Pave

QUESTION PRESENTED .................. i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING .......... ii

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT .. il

po A a eee eer ill

TABLE OF APPENDICES .................. vi

pe OR Tt Sips ot) y | >. Se vii

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI . .. ]

ae red deus see adean eas 078 ]

rns ks ahaa eben ead as | I

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOIVED ..... 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............... 3

A. Factual Background ................... 3

Bb. The Proceedings in the District Court .. 4

©. The Proceedings in the Federal Circuit . 6

REASON FOR GRANTING THE PETITION |...

I.

iv

Contents

THE COURT SHOULD DETERMINE

WHETHER THE SALE OF A

PRODUCT WITH “DELIBERATE

INDIFFERENCE OF A KNOWN RISK”

THAT AN INFRINGEMENT MAY

OCCUR SATISFIES THE INTENT

KLEMENT FOR ACTIVELY

INDUCING INFRINGEMENT UNDER

ee We EEE ces evncdeunbiseecosva

A THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S

“DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE”

STANDARD FOR ACTIVELY

INDUCING INFRINGMENT

UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)

CONFLICTS WITH THE

TEACHING OF THIS COURT IN

MGM — STUDIOS, INC. v.

ee Pre eee

B. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT HAS

NOT ADEQUATELY ARTICU-

LATED AN APPROPRIATE

STANDARD FOR ACTIVELY

INDUCING INFRINGEMENT

UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 271 (b) ........

Page

7

(‘ontents

Page

C. THE “DELIBERATE INDIFFER-

ENCE” STANDARD OF SEB MAY

PROFOUNDLY IMPACT INTER-

NATIONAL AND DOMESTIC

SEED ghana ncenecedvesuns 17

be | eer reer Tee eee 20

vl

TABLE OF APPENDICES

Appendix A — Opinion Of The United States

Court Of Appeals For The Federal Circuit

Decided February 5, 2010 ..................

Appendix B — Memorandum Decision And

Order Of The United States District Court For

The Southern District Of New York Dated

ee ae ane kas bee

Appendix C — Order Of The United States

Court Of Appeals For The Federal Circuit

Denying Petition For Rehearing Dated March

RNR PE ee Pere eiphnnnae & Pasa oe

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases Bead

Carolina Power & Light Co. v. United States,

573 EF. 3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2009) .............. 10

DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co. Ltd., 471 F.3d

1293 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en bane) ............. 6, 14

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.825,114S Ct. 1970,

eS eee 9, 11

First Interstate Bank of Billings v. United

States, 61 F. 3d 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1993) 2.0.2... 10

Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Nokia, Ine. , 527 F.3d

EIEN ED icc sce cvacecocsuseesss 10

Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc.,

909 F.2d 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1990) 2. ..0.00000... 13, 14

Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Systems,

Inc., 917 F.2d 548 (Fed. Cir. 1990)... 2... 13, 14, 19

In Re Seagate, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007). . 5

Insituform Technologies, Ine. v. Cat

Contracting, Inc., 161 F.3d 68% (Fed. Cir.

FOE Saskaceb Gan ancva wenneaaWicerspasees. 1h

MGM Studios, Ine. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S.

913, 125 8. Ct. 2764, 162 L. Kd. 2d 781 (2005)

(tae CENECS CR WELEV ON SREE Sea re reo we sealed passim

vill

Authorities

Page

Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 127

S. Ct. 2201, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1045 (2007) ....... sy)

SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc.,

594 F.3d. 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ............ passim

SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 2006

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80394 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2007)

LRERSECELECES CES SORLESESS EUS NAETER CREO ONS 10

The Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air

Circulation Systems, Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 122

S. Ct. 1889, 152 L. Ed. 2d 18 (2002) ......... 17

Statutes

a Oe eee: Oe EEE os Vcr e 6G bk bebe ue eee ee sees 1

i eG eee a estab e reece kweli 6,17

Se as eI od i vin ev ake dees teen passim

ee eR EY oc cccetuseanuneus es seeecke 2,18

uF tee eer rere rrr 2,15

ix

Authorities

Pave

Other Authorities

Prosser and Keeton § 34; Restatement (Second)

OE UU BUD vc ccc ccccesvccsecestac )

Trade Stats Express, International Trade

Administration, http://tse.export.gov/NTD

ChartDisplay.aspx? UniqueU RL =aox4m345

pk4v0145mgp3f055-2010-6-18-10-37-37

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Pentalpha respectfully petitions for a writ of

certiorari to review the judgment of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, insofar as it

found Pentalpha liable for actively inducing

infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), based upon

Pentalpha’s sales of a product FOB Hong Kong or China

with “deliberate indifference of a known risk” that an

infringement may oceur.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Federal Circuit is reported at 594

i Sd 1360, and a copy is annexed as Appendix A.

The memorandum and order of the United States

District Court for the Southern District of New York is

not officially reported, but is available at 2006 U.S. Dist.

LLIeXIS $0394, and a copy is annexed as Appendix B.

The order denying the petition of Pentalpha for

rehearing en bane is not officially reported, but is

available at 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7937, and a copy is

annexed as Appendix C.

JURISDICTION

The Federal Circuit entered its judgment on

Kebruary 5, 2010, and denied Pentalpha’s petition for

rehearing en bane by an order entered on March 25,

2010. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1254(1).

2

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The relevant portions of the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.

§ 271(a), (b), and (¢) provide:

“§ 271 Infringement of patent

(a) Except as otherwise provided in this

title, whoever without authority makes, uses,

offers to sell, or sells any patented invention

within the United States, or imports into the

United States any patented invention during

the term of the patent therefor, infringes the

patent.

(b) Whoever actively induces

infringement of a patent shall be liable as an

infringer.

(c) Whoever offers to sell or sells within

the United States or imports into the United

States a component of a patented machine,

manufacture, combination, or composition, or

a material or apparatus for use in practicing

a patented process, constituting a material

part of the invention, knowing the same to be

especially made or especially adapted for use

in an infringement of such patent, and not a

staple article or commodity of commerce

suitable for substantial non-infringing use,

shall be liable as a contributory infringer.”

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Factual Background

SEB is engaged in the business of manufacturing

household appliances. It owns United States Patent No.

4,995,312 (the “Patent”), for a specific type of deep fryer.

SEB markets its products in the United States through

an indirect subsidiary, T-F'al Corporation.

Pentalpha is also engaged in the business of

manufacturing household appliances. In 1997, Pentalpha

developed a deep fryer by purchasing and studying

various deep fryers on the market in Hong Kong,

including a SEB deep fryer that lacked United States

patent markings. Before selling its deep fryer, Pentalpha

contacted a New York patent attorney for an opinion as

to whether its deep fryer would infringe any United

States patent. Pentalpha did not disclose to the attorney

which products it had used to develop its deep fryer.

The attorney then provided a written opinion that the

deep fryer did not infringe any United States patent.

But, the patent search the attorney performed failed to

identify SE B’s Patent. Pentalpha in August 1997 began

selling deep fryers to Sunbeam Corporation

(“Sunbeam”), FOB Hong Kong or China, and Sunbeam

imported them into the United States. Pentalpha later

sold essentially the same deep fryer FOB Hong Kong

or China to two additional United States retailers,

Montgomery Ward & Co., Ine. (“Montgomery Ward”),

and Fingerhut, Ine., which imported them into the

United States.

4

In March 1998, SEB sued Sunbeam in the District

of New Jersey for infringing the Patent. As a result of

that action, Pentalpha on or about April 9, 1998

learned—for the first time—of the existence of the SEB

Patent. On July 10, 1998, SEB sued Pentalpha in the

New Jersey action. In July 1999, Sunbeam paid SEB

$2,000,000 to settle that action. Contemporaneously, the

New Jersey district court dismissed SEB’s claims

against Pentalpha for lack of personal jurisdiction.

B. The Proceedings in the District Court

On August 27, 1999, SEB commenced an action for

patent infringement against Pentalpha and one of its

customers, Montgomery Ward, in the Southern District

of New York. On December 16, 1999, the district court

granted a preliminary injunction enjoining Pentalpha

from selling its deep fryers. After receiving a non-

infringement opinion from new patent counsel,

Pentalpha began selling a redesigned deep fryer. On

SER’s motion, the district court extended its

prejiiminary injunction to that redesigned deep fryer.

After discovery and pretrial motions, the district

court tried the action beginning on April 17, 2006.

At the close of evidence on April 20, 2006, Pentalpha

moved for judgment as a matter of law on certain claims.

Specifically, Pentalpha argued that it could not be

liable for actively inducing infringement under 35 U.S.C.

§ 271(b) for its sales before April 9, 1998 because the

parties agreed that Pentalpha had no knowledge of the

Patent before that date. The district court denied

Pentalpha’s motion. In its charge, the district court

instructed the jury that it could find Pentalpha liable

5

for inducing infringement if Pentalpha “knew or should

have known” that its actions would induce actual

infringement. Pentalpha objected to that charge. On

April 21, 2006, the jury found as follows.

i. Pentalpha had directly infringed and

induced infringement for both deep fryers.

ii. SEB was entitled to a reasonable royalty

of $4,650,000 on Pentalpha’s sales,

although the jury did not allocate any

amount to either theory of liability.

ili. Pentalpha’s infringement was willful, but

did not specify any product or time period

for that finding.

Post-trial motions followed. By memorandum and

order dated October 9, 2007, annexed as Appendix B,

the district court denied all of Pentalpha’s post-trial

motions, except it reduced the verdict by $2,000,000,

the amount Sunbeam had paid SEB in the related suit

over the deep fryers. The district court also awarded

SiiB enhanced damages of $2,650,000, attorney’s fees

of $932,123, and prejudgment interest at the prime rate.

Pentalpha moved to reargue because the district court

had failed to consider /n Re Seagate, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed.

Cir. 2007). The district court granted Pentalpha’s motion

to reargue and vacated its award of enhanced damages

and attorneys’ fees. It entered judgment on October 2,

2008 in the amount of $4,878,341.

Pentalpha filed a notice of appeal on October 30,

2008.

6

C. The Proceedings in the Federal Circuit

The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

exercised appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1295

Pentalpha argued, among other things, that the

district court erroneously charged the jury concerning

the elements of a claim for actively inducing

infringement because the Federal Circuit had held, en

banc, that knowledge of a patent was a necessary

element of a claim for actively inducing infringement,

DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co. Ltd., 471 F.3d 1293, 1304

(ed. Cir. 2006) (en banc), and because Pentalpha, the

parties agreed, had no knowledge of the Patent before

April 9, 1998, seven months after Pentalpha began its

sales. In an opinion entered February 5, 2010, annexed

as Appendix A, the Federal Circuit held that, because

of ambiguous jury instructions, it could not determine

whether the jury had found damages based on inducing

infringement alone, direct infringement alone, or both.

Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that, to affirm, it

had to uphold the judgment based upon both the

theories of direct infringement and actively inducing

infringement.

The Federal Circuit nevertheless affirmed the

district court’s judgment that Pentalpha was liable for

inducing infringement under 85 U.S.C. § 271(b). The

Kederal Circuit reasoned that Pentalpha’s “deliberate

indifference” as to whether its product might infringe a

patent satisfied the state of mind element for actively

inducing infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b).

7

On March 2, 2010, Pentalpha filed a petition for

rehearing en banc. Two bar associations submitted a

joint brief in support of Pentalpha’s petition. By order

entered March 25, 1010, annexed as Appendix C, and

without modifying the decision, the Federal Circuit

denied the petition.

REASON FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

l. THE COURT SHOULD DETERMINE

WHETHER THE SALE OF A PRODUCT WITH

“DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE OF A KNOWN

RISK” THAT AN INFRINGEMENT MAY OCCUR

SATISFIES THE INTENT ELEMENT FOR

ACTIVELY INDUCING INFRINGEMENT

UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)

A. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S “DELIBERATE

INDIFFERENCE” STANDARD FOR

ACTIVELY INDUCING INFRINGMENT

UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) CONFLICTS WITH

THE TEACHING OF THIS COURT IN MGM

STUDIOS, INC. v. GROKSTER, LTD.

In MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S.

913, 1265S. Ct. 2764, 162 L.. hd. 2d 781 (2005), this Court

taught that the state of mind element for actively

inducing patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)

requires “affirmative intent that the product be used

to infringe.” Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936. Grokster was a

copyright ease in which this Court considered whether

a distributor of software with significant non-infringing

uses should be secondarily liable for copyright

infringement if it intentionally designed and marketed

8

its product for an infringing purpose. See /d. at 941.

This Court applied the patent law rule for inducing

infringement to the copyright law, to allow secondary

copyright liability premised on Grokster’s intentional

acts to encourage others to infringe. /d. at 936-87. In

doing so, this Court articulated its view of the level of

culpable conduct 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) requires:

“The rule on inducement of infringement as

developed in the early cases is no different

today. Evidence of ‘active steps . . . taken to

encourage direct infringement’... show an

affirmative intent that the product be used

to infringe, and a showing that infringement

was encouraged overcomes the law’s

reluctance to find liability when a defendant

merely sells a commercial product suitable for

some lawful use.”

Id. at 936 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Thus,

this Court in Grokster taught that actively inducing

patent infringement requires more than a disregard of

the risk that a patent infringement might occur.

lurthermore, in applying its interpretation of

35 U.S.C. § 271(b) to the copyright law, this Court held

that “mere knowledge of infringing potential or of actual

infringing uses would not be enough here to subject a

distributor to liability ...The inducement rule, instead

premises liability on purposeful, culpable expression and

conduct.” /d. at 937.

Here, the Federal Circuit adopted a standard for

actively inducing patent infringement under 35 U.S.C.

9

§ 271(b) that conflicts with that teaching of this Court.

The SEB standard bases liability on conduct manifesting

“deliberate indifference of a known risk” that a patent

may exist. SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc.,

594 F 38d. 1360, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“as courts have

observed in a variety of settings, the standard of

deliberate indifference of a known risk is not different

from actual knowledge.”) (citations omitted). The SEB

standard does not require “affirmative intent that the

product be used to infringe.” Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936.

Instead, the SEB standard allows “mere knowledge of

infringing potential” to serve as the basis for liability.

Id. at 937.

The Federal Circuit’s “deliberate indifference”

standard does not require recklessness. This Court has

previously held that “[t}he civil law generally calls a

person reckless who acts or (if the person has a duty to

act) fails to act in the face of an unjustifiably high risk

of harm that is cither known or so obvious that it should

be known.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836, 114

S. Ct. 1970, 1979, 128 L. Id. 2d 811, 825 (1994) (citing,

Prosser and Keeton § 34, at 213-14; Restatement

(Second) of Torts § 500 (1965)). Furthermore,

“recklessness requires ‘a known or obvious risk that

was so great as to make it highly probable that harm

would follow.” Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S.

47, 69, 127 S. Ct. 2201, 2215, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1045, 1065

(2007) (quoting Prosser and Keeton § 34, at 213). The

Kederal Circuit conspicuously avoided articulating any

standard concerning the severity of the risk of

infringement necessary to find liability.

10

Similarly, the Federal Circuit’s “deliberate

indifference” standard does not require negligence. The

Federal Circuit stated “deliberate indifference’ is not

necessarily a ‘should have known’ standard. The latter

implies a solely objective test, whereas the former may

require a subjective determination that the defendant

knew of and disregarded the overt risk that an element

of the offense existed.” SEB, 594 F.3d at 1376 (citations

omitted).

In any event, the Federal Circuit’s “deliberate

indifference” standard involves a level of culpability

lower than negligence. The district court charged the

jury under a “knew or should have known” negligence

standard. Transcript of Record at 987, SEB S.A. v.

Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

#0394 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2007). If the Federal Circuit

intended for “deliberate indifference” to be a standard

higher than negligence, like recklessness, it would have

reversed and remanded for a new trial under that

standard, rather than sit as jury to determine the

question of whether that higher standard was met.

Carolina Power & Light Co. v. United States, 573 F. 3d

1271, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (even “a matter that can be

tested by fairly simple arithmetic ... is nonetheless a

factual issue properly within the purview of the trial

court”); Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Nokia, Ine., 527

3d 1318, 1828 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Appellate courts review

district court judgments; we do not find facts.”); F'erst

Interstate Bank of Billings v. United States, 61 I. 3d

1477, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“Fact-finding by the

appellate court is simply not permitted”). Accordingly,

the new “deliberate indifference” standard requires less

culpability than negligence.

1]

The Federal Circuit attempted to reconcile its new

“deliberate indifference” standard with the standard set

forth in Grokster, but failed. The Federal Circuit cited

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, an Eighth

Amendment case. In Farmer, this Court annunciated a

subjective “deliberate indifference” standard under

which liability can attach when the accused “knows of

and disregards an excessive risk.” /d. at 887. Farmer,

however, equated its formulation of “deliberate

indifference” to “subjective recklessness as is used in

criminal law.” See, Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839. In applying

the “deliberate indifference” standard, the Federal

Circuit did not import the standard of “subjective

recklessness as it is used in criminal law,” but imported

a standard lower than negligence.

Accordingly, because the Federal Circuit has

articulated a standard for the state of mind element for

actively inducing infringement that is inconsistent with

this Court’s teaching in Grokster, this Court should

address that inconsistency.

B. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT HAS NOT

ADEQUATELY ARTICULATED AN

APPROPRIATE STANDARD FOR

ACTIVELY INDUCING INFRINGEMENT

UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)

Putting aside the inconsistency between the

teaching of Grokster and the decision of the Federal

Circuit, the Federal Circuit has failed to articulate a

standard for the state of mind element of actively

inducing infringement under 85 U.S.C. § 271(b) that

lower courts can consistently apply.

Under the “deliberate indifference” standard, a jury

could find that the accused inducer “deliberately

disregarded a known risk,” SHB, 594 F.3d at 1377, that

an infringement may occur in virtually any situation. For

12

example:

None of these fact patterns differ materially from the

fact pattern of the present case, where Pentalpha relied

upon a legal opinion based upon a faulty patent search.

SEHB’s confusing treatment of the state of mind

element for actively inducing infringement did not

If the accused inducer did not conduct a

patent search, the jury could find that the

accused inducer “deliberately disregarded

a known risk” that a patent search would

have revealed an applicable patent.

If the accused inducer conducted a patent

search, but did not obtain an opinion of

counsel, the jury could find that the

accused inducer “deliberately disregarded

a known risk” that an opinion of counsel

would have identified a problem with the

search, and revealed the applicable patent.

If the accused inducer retained counsel to

provide a right to use opinion, the jury

could find that the accused inducer

“deliberately disregarded a known risk,”

usually disclosed in opinions of counsel,

that a jury could reach a different

conclusion on the issue of infringement.

13

develop in a vacuum. Rather, it represents the

culmination of at least three attempts by the Federal

Circuit to articulate an appropriate standard for the

state of mind element for that claim.

In Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Ine., 909

I.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1990), the Federal Circuit

articulated a standard suggesting that the patentee

need only prove an intent to cause the acts that

constituted the infringement, stating:

“On its face, § 271(b) is much broader than

§ 271(c) and certainly does not speak of any

intent requirement to prove active

inducement. However, in view of the very

definition of ‘active inducement’ in pre-1952

case law and the fact that § 271(b) was

intended as merely a codification of pre-1952

law, we are of the opinion that proof of actual

intent to cause the acts which constitute the

infringement is a necessary prerequisite to

finding active inducement.”

In Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Systems,

Inc., 917 F.2d 548, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1990), the Federal

Circuit announced a conflicting standard that required

not only knowledge of the acts giving rise to

infringement but knowledge of the infringement itself,

stating:

“It must be established that the defendant

possessed specific intent to encourage

another’s infringement and not merely that

the defendant had knowledge of the acts

alleged to constitute inducement.”

14

In DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co. Ltd., 471 F.3d 1293

(Fed. Cir. 2006) (en bane), the Federal Circuit, recognized

the inconsistency between Hewlett-Packard and

M ~lle, and, given this Court’s decision in Grokster,

chose to tollow Manville. The Federal Circuit stated,

“Grokster, thus, validates this court’s articulation of the

state of mind requirement for inducement. In Manville,

this court held that the ‘alleged infringer must be shown

... to have knowingly induced infringement’ not merely

knowingly induced the acts that constitute

infringement,” DSU, 471 F.3d at 1306 (quoting Manville,

917 F.2d at 544). The Federal Circuit specifically

articulated its new standard as follows:

“| T Jhe plaintiff has the burden of showing that

the alleged infringer’s actions induced

infringing acts and that he knew or should

have known his actions would induce actual

infringements. The requirement that the

alleged infringer knew or should have known

his actions would induce actual infringement

necessarily includes the requirement that he

or she knew of the patent.”

DSU, 471 F.3d at 1306 (quoting Manville, 971 F.3d at

554) (citation omitted).

The application of Manville and DSU in SEB

demonstrated, and deepened, the profound confusion

in the law concerning the state of mind element for

inducing infringement. The Federal Circuit

acknowledged that “inducement requires a showing of

‘specific intent to encourage another’s infringement.”

SEB, S.A., 594 F.3d at 1376 (citation omitted). But, it

1h

then suggested that specific intent is not a high

standard, stating: “As other courts have observed,

‘specific intent in the civil context is nel so narrow as Lo

allow an accused wrongdoer to actively disregard a

known risk that an element of an offense exists.” /d. at

1376 (citations omitted). The Federal Cireuit therefore

held that the mere presence of a risk that infringement

could occur would constitute specific intent to infringe.

SEB created additional uncertainty by discarding

DSU’s express requirement that the accused must have

knowledge of the patent. SH B’s new standard allowed

Pentalpha’s “deliberate indifference of a known risk”

that SEB held a protective patent to be treated as

functionally equivalent to knowledge of the patent.

/d at 1377. Under this standard, a trier of facet could

find “deliberate indifference” and, thus liability, in

virtually any case.

Adding further to the uncertainty, SHB noted that

“{t}his opinion does not purport to establish the outer

limits of the type of knowledge needed for inducement.”

id. at 1378. It suggested that “a patentee may perhaps

only need to show, as lnsituform |Technologies, Inc. v.

Cat Contracting, Inc., 161 F.3d 688 (Fed. Cir. 199%8)]

suppests, constructive knowledge with persuasive

evidence of disregard for clear patent markings, similar

to the constructive notice requirement in § 287(a).”

SEB, 594 F.3d at 1378. Thus, the level of culpability to

prove inducing infringement under SEB may be so

elastic that neither actual knowledge nor even

“deliberate indifference” is required to find liability.

16

The result of SKB is utter confusion as to the

standard for the state of mind element for the claim of

actively inducing infringement. In an Amicus Curiae

brief submitted in support of Pentalpha’s petition for

rchearing en banc, the American Intellectual Property

Law Association (“AIPA”), a bar association of over

16,000 members who share an interest in intellectual

property, and the Federal Circuit bar Association

(“CBA”), a bar association of over 2,600 members who

practice before the Federal Circuit stated:

“AIPLA and the FCBA are of the view that

the reasoning expressed by the panel in SHB

S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co. Inc., Nos.

2009-1099, 2009-1108, 2009-1119, 2010 WL

398118 (led. Cir. Feb. 5, 2010), is symptomatic

of the lack of clarity in the law of induced

patent infringement. In the wake of SEB,

the law regarding the culpability level

required to establish induced patent

infringement is as confused as ever. A

clearer formulation of the law would allow

practitioners and those in the industry to

understand better the boundary between

allowed and wrongful conduct.” (Emphasis

added.)

brief for the American Intellectual Property Lawyers

Association and the Federal Circuit Bar Association as

Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants’ Petition for

Rehearing lin Bane at 2, SEB S_A. v. Montgomery Ward

& Co, Inc., 594 F.3d. 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2010).

17

Thus, for 20 years, the Federal Circuit has struggled

to articulate an appropriate standard for inducing

infringement. It has failed to do so. It is therefore

appropriate for this Court to address this issue.

C. THE “DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE”

STANDARD OF SEB MAY PROFOUNDLY

IMPACT INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC

COMMERCE

The Federal Circuit has, subject to limited

exceptions, exclusive jurisdiction over appeals in patent

infringement actions. 28 U.S.C. §1295; The Holmes

Group, Ine. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc.,

535 U.S. $26, 122 S. Ct. 1889, 152 L. Ind. 2d 13 (2002).

SEB is therefore, for all practical purposes, controlling

precedent in the entire United States, not simply a

regional circuit.

If the “deliberate indifference” standard of SHB

remains the law, foreign seliers of goods imported into

the United States will face increased costs of doing

business. A foreign seller could no longer rely upon its

lack of knowledge of a competitor’s patent as a basis to

sell its product. To avoid liability, it must, at a minimum,

secure a written legal opinion from patent counsel that

its product does not infringe. If the foreign seller

concludes that the cost of compliance, coupled with the

risk of an error in the opinion (as in this case), outweighs

its potential profit, the foreign seller may decline to sell

its legitimate products for the United States market,

resulting in the elimination of a competitor and, if it

occurs on a large enough seale, the elimination of

competition in the United States market.

18

At the very least, foreign sellers will pass on the cost

of compliance to American consumers and businesses

in the form of higher prices. In 2009, the United States

imported over $1.5 trillion worth of merchandise. Trade

Stats Express, International Trade Administration,

http://tse.export.gov/NTDChartDisplay.aspx?

UniqueURL=aox4m345pk4v0145megp3fo55-2010-6-18-

10-37-37 (last visited June 22, 2010). While this broad

inducement rule will not impact all merchandise

imported to the United States, even a trivial increase

in the percentage of commerce affected could have a

dramatic impact upon the costs United States

consumers and businesses are asked to absorb.

Domestic sellers of component parts of finished

products would also face increased costs of doing

business. A seller of a component of a product would

ordinarily evaluate its potential liability under a theory

of contributory infringement pursuant to 35 U.S.C.

§ 271(e). Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(¢) a component seller

“knowing [its product] to be especially adapted for use

in an infringement,” may face liability. However, nothing

would prohibit a patentee from bringing a claim for

inducing infringement against a seller of a component,

asserting “deliberate indifference” to its patent. Indeed,

Grokster held that copyright owners could potentially

succeed on a claim for inducing infringement in

circumstances where a theory of contributory

infringement would fail. See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 935-

37. That liability will become real for a component

manufacturer if, for example, its customer becomes

insolvent.

Additionally, the new “deliberate indifference”

standard may increase the costs of certain sellers of

19

domestic products. That standard will create personal

liability for directors and officers of corporations who

are not acting with any intent to induce infringement.

“|Cljorporate officers who actively assist with their

corporation’s infringement may be personally liable for

inducing infringement regardless of whether the

circumstances are such that a court should disregard

the corporate entity and pierce the corporate veil.”

Manville, 917 I-2d at 553 (citation omitted). After SEB,

directors and officers would face liability based merely

upon their “deliberate indifference” as to whether a

product their employer sold may infringe. The end

result will be reluctance by corporate directors and

officers to take even reasonable risks, thereby reducing

diversity in the market for consumer goods and

increasing costs.

This Court in Grokster struck a balance between

the protection of intellectual property rights and the

promotion of free trade that would create liability for

actively inducing infringement only if a party acted with

“purposeful, culpable conduct to induce an

infringement.” (“We are, of course, mindful of the need

to keep from trenching on regular commerce or

discouraging the development of technologies with

lawful and unlawful potential”). Grokster, 545 U.S. at

937. SVB upsets that balance. Unless this Court grants

the petition, the burden on domestic and international

commerce will needlessly increase.

20

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Pentalpha respectfully

requests that this Court grant its petition for a writ of

certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM DUNNEGAN

350 Fifth Avenue

New York, New York 10118

(212) 332-8300

wd@dunnegan.com

Counsel for Petitioners

APPENDIX

la

APPENDIX A — OPINION OF THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

DECIDED FEBRUARY 5, 2010

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

2009-1099, -1108, -1119

SEB 3S.A.,

Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant-

Cross Appellant,

and

T-FAL CORPORATION,

Counterclaim Defendant,

V.

MONTGOMERY WARD & CO., INC.,

Defendant,

and

GLOBAL-TECH APPLIANCES, INC.,

Defendant-Appellant,

and

PENTALPHA ENTERPRISES, LTD.,

Defendant/Counterclaimant-Appellant.

2a

Appendix A

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of New York in 99-CV-9284, Judge

Stephen C. Robinson.

DECIDED: February 5, 2010

Before RADER , BRYSON, and LINN, Circuit Judges.

RADER, Circuit Judge.

This case began in August of 1999 when Plaintiff

SEB S.A. (“SEB”) sued defendants Montgomery Ward

& Co., Inc. (“Montgomery Ward”), Global-Tech

Appliances, Inc. (“Global-Tech”), and Pentalpha

Enterprises, Ltd. (“Pentalpha”) for infringement of U.S.

Patent No. 4,995,312 (the “ ’312 patent”). Almost seven

years later, a jury found that Pentalpha had willfully

infringed, and induced infringement of, claim | of the

312 patent and awarded SEB $ 4.65 million in damages.

Pentalpha filed post-trial motions on a number of

grounds. The district court granted them in part,

reducing the amount of damages by $ 2 million. SEB

S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., No. 99-9284, 2007 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 80394, 2007 WL 3165783 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9,

2007) (“JMOL Opinion”). The district court awarded

SEB enhanced damages and attorneys’ fees, but later

vacated that award in light of this court’s decision in

In re Seagate Technology, LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir.

2007) (en banc). SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & UCo.,

2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113468, 2008 WL 4540416

(S.D.N-Y. Oct. 1, 2008) (“Enhanced Damages Opinion”).

On appeal, Pentalpha raises a host of issues that relate

3a

Appendix A

to the jury verdict and the district court’s post-trial rulings.

SEB cross-appeals the district court’s enhanced damages

ruling. Detecting no reversible error in the district court

proceedings, this court affirms.

I.

SEB is a French company that specializes in home-

cooking appliances. It sells products in the United States

through an indirect subsidiary, T-Fal Corp.

(“T-Fal”). SEB owns the “312 patent, entitled “Cooking

Appliance with Electric Heating,” which claims a deep fryer

with an inexpensive plastic outer shell, or skirt. In the past,

skirts for deep fryers were made of plastic material capable

of continuously withstanding temperatures higher than

150 [degrees] C. These heat resistant plastics, however,

are expensive and therefore incompatible with large-scale

manufacture of low-priced fryers.

‘The skirt disclosed in the '312 patent, labeled with the

number 3 in the cross-section shown below, is well-insulated

from the heat of the fryer’s metal] pan (1).

4a

Appendix A

The ’312 patent explains construction of a deep fryer

with a well-insulated skirt. A ring of heat-insulating and

heat-resistive material (5) joins the top edge of the skirt

to the top edge of the pan. Other than that ring, however,

the skirt is “completely free with respect to the pan.”

’312 patent col.1 1.65-col.2 1.2. The skirt and the pan are

separated by “an air space of sufficient width to limit

the temperature of the skirt.” /d. at col.1 11.60-64. Thus,

because of the insulation provided by air space, the skirt

“can be fabricated from inexpensive ordinary-grade

plastic material [that] does not afford resistance to high

temperatures.” Jd. at col.4 11.32-35.

Claim 1 of the ’312 patent, the only claim at issue,

reads as follows (emphasis added):

An electrical deep fryer comprising a metal

pan (1) having a wall, and an electric heating

resister [sic] (2) that heats said wall directly

by conductive heating to a temperature higher

than 150 [degrees] C, said pan (1) being

surrounded by a plastic skirt (3), wherein said

skirt (3) is of plastic material which does not

continuously withstand a temperature of

150 [degrees] C., said skirt (8) entirely

surrounding the lateral wall (1a) and the base

(1b) of the pan and being separated from said

wall and said base by an air space (4) of

sufficient width to limit the temperature of the

skirt (3) to a value which is compatible with

the thermal resistance of the plastic material

of the skirt (3), said skirt (3) being completely

Sa

Appendix A

free with respect to the pan (1) with the

exception of a ring (5) which joins only the top

edge (3a) of the skirt to the top edge (1c) of the

pan and to which this latter is attached, said

ring (5) being of heat-insulating material which

is continuously resistant to the temperature of

the top edge (1c) of the pan (1).

Defendant Pentalpha is a Hong Kong corporation

and a subsidiary of defendant Global-Tech, a British

Virgin Islands corporation, which was formerly known

as Wing Shing International, Ltd. (For convenience, this

opinion will refer to Pentalpha and Global-Tech

collectively as “Pentalpha.”) Pentalpha began selling its

accused deep fryers to non-party Sunbeam Products,

Inc. (“Sunbeam”) in 1997. In developing its deep fryer,

Pentalpha purchased an SEB deep fryer in Hong Kong

and copied its “cool touch” features. Shortly after

agreeing to supply Sunbeam, Pentalpha obtained a

“right-to-use study” from an attorney in Binghamton,

New York. The attorney analyzed 26 patents and

concluded that none of the claims in those patents read

on Pentalpha’s deep fryer. Pentalpha, however, did not

tell the attorney that it had copied an SEB deep fryer.

Sunbeam resold the Pentalpha deep fryers in the

United States under its own trademarks, “Oster” and

“Sunbeam.” On March 10, 1998, SEB sued Sunbeam in

the United States District Court for the District of New

Jersey, alleging that Sunbeam’s sales infringed the '312

patent (the “Sunbeam Suit”). See SEB S.A. v. Sunbeam

Corp., No. 2:98-CV-1050 (date closed May 28, 2002).

6a

Appendix A

Pentalpha was notified of the Sunbeam Suit on April 9,

1998. That suit ended in a settlement in which Sunbeam

agreed to pay SEB $ 2 million.

Pentalpha also sold the same deep fryers to non-

party Fingerhut Corp. (“Fingerhut”) and defendant

Montgomery Ward. These sales to Fingerhut and

Montgomery Ward occurred after Pentalpha learned of

the Sunbeam Suit. Like Sunbeam, Fingerhut and

Montgomery Ward also sold the products under their

own trademarks, CHEF’S MARK and ADMIRAL.

Pentalpha sold these deep fryers to its three customers

free on board Hong Kong or mainland China. “Free on

board,” or “f.o.b.,” is a “method of shipment whereby

goods are delivered at a designated location, usually a

transportation depot, at which legal title and thus the

risk of loss passes from seller to buyer.” Litecubes, LLC

v. N. Light Prods., Inc., 523 F.3d 1353, 1358 n.1 (Fed.

Cir. 2008).

Il.

SEB filed a motion for a preliminary injunction on

September 10, 1999. Following a claim construction

hearing, the district court granted SEB’s motion,

holding that SEB was likely to prove at trial that

Pentalpha’s deep fryers infringe at least claim 1 of the

312 patent. SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 77 F-

Supp. 2d 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“Preliminary Injunction

Opinion”). This court affirmed the preliminary

injunction order without opinion. SFB, S.A. v.

Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 243 F.3d 566 (Fed. Cir.

2000) (Rule 36).

Ta

Appendix A

Pentalpha then redesigned its deep fryer by

replacing the ring that separated the skirt and the pan

with six blocks or ring segments. SEB sought to

supplement the original preliminary injunction to

include Pentalpha’s modified deep fryer. The district

court granted SEB’s application for supplemental

injunctive relief in 2001, finding that SEB was likely to

prove at trial that the modified fryer infringes at least

claim 1 of the ’312 patent under the doctrine of

equivalents. SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 137

I. Supp. 2d 285 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“DOE Opinion”).

Pentalpha’s primary argument, which the district court

did not adopt, was based on prosecution history

estoppel. Pentalpha did not appeal the district court’s

ruling of infringement by equivalents.

Discovery closed on October 30, 2001. On April 17,

2006, the district court commenced a trial. During trial,

the record shows that the jury received evidence of

Pentalpha’s sales to Sunbeam, Fingerhut, and

Montgomery Ward. Following the close of evidence,

Pentalpha moved for judgment as a matter of law

(“JMOL’) on SEB’s claim that Pentalpha had induced

infringement of the ’312 patent through those sales.

Pentalpha’s JMOL motion was based on the lack of

evidence that anyone at Pentalpha “had any knowledge

whatsoever with respect to the existence of the patent.”

J.A. 2209. The district court noted at the Rule 50(a)

motion proceedings that “there is no evidence that

| Pentalpha]} was aware of [the ’312] patent” before April

9, 1998. Nonetheless, the court held that there was

Sa

Appendix A

evidence to support SEB’s theory of inducement, which

the court characterized as follows:

[SEB is] saying that you could infer the specific

intent to... encourage the infringement by the

fact that [Pentalpha’s president] doesn’t disclose

that [Pentalpha copied the SEB product} to the

people doing the |patent] search. [Pentalpha]

wants them to doa search that . . . is doomed to

failure, and that that is enough, that a

reasonable jury could infer that, specific intent

.... Tlere is the argument. There are a zillion

patent attorneys in New York City, [yet] | t}hey

fo to this guy in the middle of nowhere to do

this patent search. ... | don’t know what

happened. I’m not in | Pentalpha’s President’s]}

head. I don’t know what he did. . . . I think itis .

.. areasonable argument, could a jury infer from

those actions, if they chose to believe them in

the way the plaintiffs want, that that was an

indication that [he] understood that he was likely

violating a patent, in fact violating a patent.

The district court therefore allowed SEB’s inducement

claim to reach the jury.

The jury found that Pentalpha, with both its original

and modified deep fryers, willfully infringed claim 1 of

the ’312 patent. The jury also found that Pentalpha

induced others to infringe with both versions of the

fryers. As damages, the jury awarded SEB a total of

$ 4.65 million as a reasonable royalty, with $ 3.6 million

9a

Appendix A

attributable to Sunbeam’s sales of Pentalpha’s deep

fryers, $ 540,000 to Fingerhut’s sales, and $ 510,000 to

Montgomery Ward’s sales.

Pentalpha then renewed its motion for JMOL and

moved for a new trial, arguing that SEB did not

adequately prove inducement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b).

Pentalpha also sought an offset of damages in an amount

equal to the $ 2 million that SEB received in its

settlement with Sunbeam. SEB filed a cross motion for

enhanced damages, attorneys’ fees, prejudgment

interest, and injunctive relief.

In response to Pentalpha’s post-trial motions, the

district court reduced the damages award by $ 2 million.

JMOL Opinion, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80394, 2007 WL.

3165783, at *5. The trial court denied the rest of

Pentalpha’s post-trial motions. 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

$0394, |WL] at *12. The district court granted SEB’s

cross-motion in part, based on the reduced award, 2007

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80394, [WL] at *10-12, but later

vacated its award of enhanced damages and attorneys’

fees based on Seagate, Knhanced Damages Opinion,

2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113468, 2008 WL 4540416, at *4.

Thus, the district court entered judgment against

Pentalpha in the amount of $ 4,878,341. These appeals

followed.

10a

Appendix A

IIT.

As a threshold matter, this court needs to address a

claim construction issue. The district court, as a part of

its preliminary injunction order in 1999, construed the

limitation “completely free with respect to the pan” in

claim 1 to mean “there are no thermal bridges between

the skirt and the pan.” Preliminary Injunction

Opinion, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 405. A thermal bridge is an

element that conducts heat. As a matter of context, this

court notes that a vertical stabilizing screw secures the

skirt of Pentalpha’s fryer to the base of the pan. This

screw, however, is not a thermal bridge. Thus, the

stabilizing screw does not preclude the conclusion that

the skirt is “completely free with respect to the pan”

under the district court’s claim construction. But if

“completely free” means instead “no solid material

between the pan and the skirt,” as Pentalpha contends,

then the stavilizing screw absolves Pentalpha’s deep

fryer of infringement.

This court, of course, reviews claim construction

without deference. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138

I°3d 1448, 1455-56 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc). This court’s

prior affirmance of the district court’s preliminary

injunction order does not make the district court’s claim

construction in its 1999 opinion the law of the case.

See Int’lComme’n Materials, Inc. v. Ricoh Co., 108 F.3d

316, 319 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (claim construction for a

preliminary injunction is not definitive “without the

more complete record that the district court deemed

necessary to its own final decision”). The words of a claim

lla

Appendix A

receive the meaning discernible by a person of ordinary

skill in the art who has read the entire patent, including

the specification, at the time of the invention. Phillips

v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 2005)

(en banc). The claims themselves, both asserted and

unasserted, povern the meaning of claim terms. /d. at

1314.

This court perceives a slight internal inconsistency

with the district court’s claim construction of

“completely free” in the phrase “said skirt (3) being

completely free with respect to the pan (1) with the

exception of a ring (5).” The claim requires the ring to

be “heat-insulating” and “continuously resistant to the

temperature of the ... pan.” Thus, the ring is not a

thermal bridge. If “completely free” merely meant “no

thermal bridges between the skirt and the pan,” the

claim would not need to exclude expressly the ring from

the completely free limitation.

Despite this minor inconsistency, the district court’s

construction of “completely free” rings true. Claim & of

the ’312 patent, which depends from claim 1, adds an

insulated stabilizing screw between the base of the pan

and the base of the skirt. ’312 patent col.6 11.19-24. With

this context, a person of ordinary skill in the art would

not read the “completely free” limitation of claim 1 to

mean “no solid material between the pan and the skirt”

because that reading would not allow for the vertical

rod of claim &. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314

(“Differences among claims can... be a useful guide in

understanding the meaning of particular claim terms.”).

lla

Appendix A

Moreover, the only embodiment in the specification

includes solid material between the pan and the skirt,

namely, the vertical rod, id. at col.3 11.55-65, as well as a

thermostat attached to the base of the pan, 7d. at col.4

11.3-7. “[A] construction that would not read on the

preferred embodiment would rarely if ever be correct

and would require highly persuasive evidentiary

support.” Chimie v. PPG Indus., Inc., 402 F.3d 1371,

1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (internal quotations and alterations

omitted). Thus, with the preferred embodiment showing

a vertical stabilizing screw, the “completely free”

limitation cannot be read so broadly as to exclude this

preferred embodiment.

Finally, the specification repeatedly highlights the

inventiveness of eliminating thermal bridges to prevent

heat transfer to the plastic skirt. For example, the

specification notes that in the prior art, “the attachment

of the metal pan within the plastic skirt is such that

numerous thermal bridges exist between said pan and

said skirt.” ’312 patent col.1 11.38-40. Those thermal

bridges required the skirt to be “formed of [costly]

plastic material.” /d. at col.1 11-41-42. Following the theme

of preventing heat transfer, the specification discusses

a thermostat between the pan and the skirt but

emphasizes its placement “remote from the base 21 of

the skirt 3 of plastic material in order to prevent any

thermal bridge which would be liable to heat this plastic

material to an excessive extent.” /d. at col.4 11.3-8. Thus,

the patent stresses that eliminating thermal bridges is

not the same as eliminating any solid material.

l3a

Appendix A

Read in light of the entire specification and with an

eye to the preferred embodiment, then, the term

“completely free” means “practically or functionally

free.” Indeed, the specification uses the two terms

“completely” and “practically” interchangeably.

Compare ’312 patent col. 1 11.65-66 (“Said skirt is

completely free with respect to the pan ....”) (emphasis

added) with id. at col. 4 H.28-35 (“{I]n addition to the

fact that the skirt 3 is practically free with respect to

the pan 1 or in other words that no thermal bridge is

created between the pan and the skirt, this latter can

be fabricated from inexpensive ordinary-grade plastic

material, which does not afford resistance to high

temperatures.”) (emphasis added). This court often

assumes that different terms convey different meanings.

Symantec Corp. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 522 F.3d

1279, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2008). That assumption, however,

carries less weight when comparing a term in the claim

to a term in the specification, especially where, as here,

the specification only describes one embodiment. Cf /d.

(“{'T'Jhere is nothing in the claims, the specification or

the prosecution history that suggests that the preamble

language ‘as it is being transferred’ has any different

meaning than |the claim term] ‘prior to storage.’”).

Pentalpha supplies some evidentiary support for its

proposed construction, but that support is not “highly

persuasive” or sufficient to overcome the meaning that

embraces the preferred embodiment. During

prosecution of the 312 patent, the examiner rejected

the proposed claims as anticipated by or obvious over

U.S. Patent No. 4,672,179 (“Onishi”). Onishi discloses a

14a

Appendix A

rice cooker with the side walls of the pan and the side

wall of the skirt separated by an adiabatic material, or a

material that does not gain or lose heat:

Onishi at Fig. 1, col.2 11.49-58.

‘To distinguish Onishi, the applicant stated

in ONISHI ..., the two walls | and 8 are

separated by an adiabatic material 2 (whose

nature is not specified) whereas in the case of

the present invention, the outer plastic skirt

3 is completely free with respect to the pan 1]

with the exception of a ring 5. This means that

the space comprised between the skirt 3 and

the pan 1 is entirely occupied by avr and that

there is no solid material therebetween.

A-119 (emphasis added). Pentalpha argues that SEB

thereby narrowed the claim limitation “completely free”

lSa

Appendix A

during prosecution and that the doctrine of prosecution

disclaimer should preclude the district court’s

construction. See N. Am. Container, Inc. v. Plastipak

Packaging, Inc., 415 F.3d 1335, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2005)

(“[W]e have previously explained that limitations may

be construed to exclude a preferred emvodiment if the

prosecution history compels such a result.”).

Contrary to Pentalpha’s contentions, however, this

court interprets this prosecution history as consistent

with the district court’s claim construction. As noted,

this also allows this court to account for the only

embodiment provided in the ’312 patent’s specification.

Thus, read in context, the applicant’s reference to “no

solid material” refers only to the volume between the

sides of the pan and skirt. As the quote from the

prosecution history reveals, the applicant was only

addressing the lack of “adiabatic material” in his

invention to distinguish the Onishi reference. Indeed

the applicant could not have intended his comment to

preclude any solid material between the base of the pan

and the base of the skirt because both Onishi and his

own invention include a vertical stabilizing element.

Thus, this court does not read the prosecution

history to alter or disclaim the district court’s

interpretation of the claim language. Pentalpha’s

attempt to create a disclaimer simply stretches this

prosecution history too far. At most, the prosecution

statement requires “completely free” to mean “no solid

material between the sides of the pan and the sides of

the skirt and no thermal bridges between the base of

loa

Appendix A

the skirt and the base of the pan.” The additional

precision of this construction would also avoid the slight

internal inconsistency of excepting the ring from the

“completely free” limitation. In any event, this court

detects no reversible error in the district court’s claim

construction.

LV.

Following the jury verdict, Pentalpha moved for

JMOL based on prosecution history estoppel, arguing

that SEB’s statements during prosecution should

preclude any infringement by its modified deep fryer

under the doctrine of equivalents. As noted, Pentalpha

modified its deep fryer by replacing the ring that

separates the skirt and the pan with six blocks.

According to Pentalpha, the applicant’s prosecution

arguments during patent acquisition at the PTO

preclude a finding that the six blocks are equivalent to

the ring in claim 1. See Conoco, Inc. v. Energy & Envtl.

Int'l, L.C., 460 F.3d 1349, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“To

invoke argument-based estoppel .. . the prosecution

history must evince a clear and unmistakable surrender

of subject matter.”).

Pentalpha did not seek JMOL on this ground at the

close of evidence. Under Rule 50(b), a party may “renew”

an earlier “request for judgment as a matter of law by

filing a motion no later than 10 days after entry of

judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P 50(b); see Broadnax v. City of

New Haven, 415 3d 265, 268 (2d Cir. 2005). If an issue

is not raised in a previous motion for a directed verdict,

l7a

Appendix A

however, this court’s review is highly deferential. The

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, whose law

governs the procedural aspects of this case, see Bd. of

Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche

Molecular Sys., Inc. , 583 F.3d 832, 840 (Fed. Cir. 2009),

requires that, in such a case, “a Rule 50(b) motion should

not be granted unless it is required to prevent manifest

injustice.” Broadnax, 415 F.3d at 268 (quotation marks

omitted).

During prosecution, the applicant argued that the

claims were not obvious over Onishi in light of a Spanish

reference (“Taurus”), which discloses a fryer with

openings in the outer wall:

To distinguish Taurus, the applicant explained that

cool outside air circulated through the above spaces

between the inner and outer walls. This cooling

mechanism is called convective cooling. Onishi, the

applicant argued, relied on convective heating. Onishi

itself explains that the heater heats the air in the heating

space so as to uniformly heat the pot. Onishi col.1 11.45-

la

Appendix A

59. The applicant argued to the PTO that the teachings

of Onishi and Taurus could not be combined to achieve

the claimed deep fryer because neither convective

“heating or cooling mechanisms has anything to do with

the present invention.”

At trial, however, SEB's expert, Charles Van Horn,

testified that the temperature of the skirt in Pentalpha’s

modified deep fryer might be kept at a low level in part

due to hot air leaking out of the deep fryer. Specifically,

Mr. Van Horn testified that the ring segments in the

modified fryer did not completely close off the air space

between the pan and the skirt. Moreover, he indicated

that hot air escaped the modified fryer, although he did

not know the rate of escape. And he affirmed that a deep

fryer that has hot air leaking out of it will result in a

cooler outside plastic wall than a deep fryer that does

not. Pentalpha thus argues that its modified deep fryer

cannot infringe under the doctrine of equivalents

because the ring segments allow for the same convective

cooling that SEB disavowed during prosecution of the

312 patent.

This court can assume, without deciding, that the

applicant’s statement during prosecution disclaimed any

coverage of deep fryers that control the temperature of

the outer wall through convective cooling. A reasonable

jury could nonetheless conclude that Pentalpha’s

modified fryer does not rely on convective cooling to

control the temperature of the skirt. The six large vent

holes in Taurus that together span almost the entire

width of the side wall do not readily compare to

19a

Appendix A

Pentalpha’s modified fryer, which was presented to the

jury and appears to allow only minimal air leakage. Mr.

Van Horn’s testimony about some hot air leakage does

not compel the jury to find that the modified deep fryer

relied on convective cooling to control the temperature

of the wall. The jury might also reasonably conclude that

the hot air leakage along the ring of the modified fryer

did not appreciably contribute to controlling the

temperature of the vuter plastic wall. Because Pentalpha

did not raise its JMOL motion in a timely fashion, this

court must detect a manifest injustice before sustaining

this untimely motion. With substantial questions about

the operation of the modified fryer and Mr. Van Horn’s

vague testimony on convective cooling, this court detects

no manifest injustice in honoring the jury’s finding of

infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.

This court also perceives no prejudice to Pentalpha

in the district court’s conclusion at the preliminary

injunction stage that prosecution history estoppel did

not apply. As discussed already, a preliminary injunction

ruling is by nature only preliminary. Pentalpha had

opportunities to renew its argument before the jury or

to request a jury instruction estopping application of

the doctrine of equivalents to a fryer that relies on

convective cooling. Finally, Rule 50 at least required

Pentalpha to raise its argument before the jury verdict.

Broadnax, 415 F.3d at 268. By the time Pentalpha filed

its post-verdict JMOL mution, it was too late. And, as

noted, this court discerns no material injustice in the

jury’s findings in this setting.

20a

Appendix A

V

The district court allowed SEB’s expert, Mr. Van

Horn, to testify over Pentalpha’s objections. Pentalpha

argued that Mr. Van Horn should be precluded from

testifying as to infringement on the ground that he

lacked expertise in the art of designing deep fryers. On

appeal, Pentalpha argues that the district court’s

decision to admit Mr. Van Horn’s testimony was an abuse

of discretion.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by

admitting Mr. Van Horn’s testimony. This court will not

disturb a district court’s evidentiary rulings unless

“manifestly erroneous.” SR Int'l Bus. Ins. Co. v. World

Trade Ctr. Props., LLC, 467 F.3d 107, 119 (2d Cir. 2006)

(quotation omitted). District courts enjoy “wide latitude”

to determine admissibility and “the mode and order” of

evidentiary presentations. /d. In this case, the district

court was in the best place to judge that Mr. Van Horn

had the “knowledge, skill, experience, training, [and]

education” of a “specialized” nature that was likely to

“assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to

determine” infringement. Fed. R. Evid. 702.

Mr. Van Horn has an undergraduate degree in

chemical engineering from Lehigh University, a J.D.

from American University, and an M.B.A. from George

Washington University with a specialty in behavioral

science. He worked in the U.S. Patent & Trademark

Office for 31 years in various capacities, including as a

patent examiner in the classes of fiber technology,

dla

Appendix A

electric photography, and structural and nonstructural

laminates; as a supervisor in miscellaneous chemical

technology; and as a director of the organic chemistry

and biotechnology group. Although he testified that he

is not skilled in designing deep fryers, Mr. Van Horn

explained that his experience was relevant because the

claimed invention “involves the selection of particular

_.. polymer material that have certain characteristics”

and that “[mJost of the areas [he has} worked in. . .

have used polymers in one form or another.” Moreover

Mr. Van Horn did not testify about deep frying per se,

but instead described the importance of selecting a

material for the ring or ring segments that would be

resistant to the hot pan, as well as the importance of

the spacing between the hot pan and the skirt. In light

of the court’s claim construction, which, as discussed,

included a reference to thermal bridges, Mr. Van Horn’s

testimony established an adequate relationship between

his expenience and the claimed invention.

This case comes nowhere close to the unusual

situation in Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating

Ltd., 550 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In Sundance this

court held that a district court abused its discretion

when it admitted the testimony of a patent law expert

“|djespite the absence of any suggestion of relevant

technical expertise.” /d. at 1361-62. Here, as explained,

Mr. Van Horn had sufficient relevant technical expertise

for the district court to allow him to testify. This court

detects no abuse of discretion.

22a

Appendix A

VI.

Pentalpha also challenges the district court’s

judgment under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) and (b). As to § 271 (a),

direct infringement, Pentalpha challenges the district

court’s jury instructions. As to § 271(b), inducement of

infringement, Pentalpha contends that the district court

erred in its JMOL rulings because Pentalpha had no

actual knowledge of the patent during part of the time

it was selling deep fryers to Sunbeam. See DSU Med.

Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2006)

(en banc) (“The requirement that the alleged infringer

knew or should have known his actions would induce

actual infringement necessarily includes the

requirement that he or she knew of the patent.”)

(emphasis added). Before addressing either of

Pentalpha’s arguments, this court must determine if it

needs to address direct infringement only, inducement

of infringement only, or both.

Under the general verdict rule, where one or more

of multiple claims is found legally invalid, a reviewing

court must reverse and order a new trial if unable to

determine whether the invalid theory tainted the

verdict. AIG Global Sec. Lending Corp. v. Banc of

America Sec. LLC, 646 I Supp. 2d 385, 406 (S.D.N_LY.

2009) (collecting cases). That rule has also been held to

apply in cases where the jury received multiple legal

theories of liability. /d. (same).

Here, the jury received a verdict form with the label

“special” rather than general. Using that verdict form,

23a

Appendix A

the jury found both direct infringement and inducement

of infringement. Normally, such a verdict could support

a damages award even if only one theory was correct.

As long as the court can “determine” that “the verdict

was based upon the | valid] theory,” the general verdict

rule does not require a new trial. /d. A closer look at

the damages question in this verdict form, however,

along with the jury instructions, reveals a hopeless

ambigruity.

The verdict form itself suggests that the jury was

asked to base its damages calculation on inducement

only. The verdict form asked, “What amount of damages

in the form of a reasonable royalty do you find the

plaintiff to have proven by a preponderance of the

evidence with respect to deep fryers sold by Sunbeam,

Fingerhut, and Montgomery Ward?” J.A. 2508

(emphasis added). This instruction advised the jury to

consider deep fryers sold by Pentalpha’s customers, as

opposed to the deep fryers that Pentalpha sold to its

customers. Therefore, this instruction could have led

the jury to base the damages calculation on inducement

alone.

Qn the other hand, the jury instructions also

indicate that the jury could assess damages for direct

infringement. The instructions stated:

The patent law specifically provides that the

amount of damages that the Defendants must

pay Plaintiff for infringing Plaintiff's patent may

not be Jess than a reasonable royalty for the use

24a

Appendix A

that the Defendants made of Plaintiff's

invention. You must determine what a

reasonable royalty would be for the infringing

sales of these Defendants and _ their

subsidiaries

J.A. 2484 (emphasis added). In contrast to the verdict

form, the jury instructions required the jury to look to

Pentalpha’s sales. This language requires a classic direct

infringement analysis. See, e.g., Minco, Inc. v.

Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 95 F.3d 1109, 1119 (Fed. Cir.

1996) (affirming a reasonable royalty award where “the

district court awarded [the patentee] a royalty rate of

20% on the gross value of [the direct infringer’s]

applicable sales”’).

Lhe record therefore does not clearly indicate that

the jury found damages based on inducement alone, or

based on direct infringement alone, or both. The general

verdict rule requires that the only way this court can

affirm in such a circumstance is by determining that the

jury’s finding of both direct infringement and

inducement of infringement was proper. As explained

below, after carefully examining the record and the

authority cited by both parties, this court discerns that

this verdict satisfies that requirement and was proper

on both counts.

25a

Appendix A

A.

Section 271(a) makes it an act of infringement to

“without authority make| J, use|], offer| | to sell, or sell J

any patented invention, within the United States.”

Pentalpha faults the jury instructions with respect to

direct infringement on two grounds, each of which

relates to the extraterritorial effect of U.S. patent law.

l‘irst, Pentalpha argues that the district court should

have charged the jury that an offer in the United States

to sell goods outside of the United States would not

violate the “offer to sell” provision of § 271(a). Second,

Ventalpha argues that the district court erred by

instructing the jury that, in determining if a sale

occurred in the United States, it could consider “where

the products were shipped from and where the products

were shipped to.”

Pentalpha does not specify the point in the record

showing an objection to these portions of the jury

instructions. Fed. R. Civ. P51 requires a litigant to make

a timely objection to a jury instruction in order to

challenge that instruction on appeal. “The purpose of

this Rule is to require the parties to give the trial court

an adequate opportunity to cure any error in the

instructions before the jury deliberates.” Metromedia

Co. v. Fugazy, 983 2d 350, 363 (2d Cir. 1992). The United

States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviews

jury instructions for which a timely objection is lacking

for fundamental error. Fabri v. United Techs. Int'l, lnc.,

387 I3d 109, 121 (2d Cir. 2004). “Fundamental error is

more egregious than the ‘plain’ error that can excuse a

26a

Appendix A

procedural default in a criminal trial and is so serious

and flagrant that it goes to the very integrity of the

trial.” Jd. (quoting Jarvis v. Ford Motor Co., 283 F.3d

33, 62 (2d Cir. 2002)).

Neither of the alleged problems with the district

court’s jury instruction constitutes fundamental error.

This court has yet to define the full territorial scope of

the “offers to sell” offense in § 271(a). But see Rotec

Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1260

(Fed. Cir. 2000) (Newman, J., concurring) (“{[A]n offer to

sell a device or system whose actual sale can not infringe

a United States patent is not an infringing act under

§ 271.”). But even if this court had, Pentalpha’s sales in

this case did not so clearly occur overseas that the

district court’s failure to include such a limitation in its

jury instructions affected the integrity of the trial.

To the contrary, the only evidence on which

Pentalpha relies to argue that its sales occurred

overseas was that it delivered its products to Sunbeam,

Montgomery Ward, and Fingerhut f.0.b. Hong Kong or

mainland China. This court has “rejected the notion that

simply because goods were shipped f.o0.b., the location

of the ‘sale’ for the purposes of § 271 must be the location

from which the goods were shipped.” Lightcubes, 523

M38c at 1370.

lor the same reason, the district court’s instruction

that the jury could consider “where the products were

shipped from and where the products were shipped to”

in determining if a sale occurred in the United States

27a

Appendix A

was not a fundamental error. If anything, the jury

instructions helped Pentalpha: the court instructed the

jury that it could consider the f.o.b. terms, even though

those terms were not dispositive. Other than the f.o.b.

terms in the invoices presented to the jury, the record

shows that Pentalpha intended to sell its deep fryers

directly into the United States. Pentalpha itself affixed

the American trademarks of Sunbeam, Montgomery

Ward, and Fingerhut to the deep fryers, and it

manufactured the deep fryers with North American

electrical fittings. Moreover, the invoices between

Pentalpha and the three U.S. companies all identify

delivery to U.S. destinations. In sum, this court does

not perceive any fundamental error with the jury

instructions in light of the record evidence.

I.

“Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent

shall be liable as an infringer.” 85 U.S.C. § 271(b). In

DSU Medical, which was decided after the jury verdict

in this case, this court addressed the intent necessary

Lo support a finding of induced infringement. Under that

rule, the plaintiff must show that the alleged infringer

knew or should have known that his actions would induce

actual infringements. 471 I°3d at 1304. This court further

stated that “|t}he requirement that the alleged infringer

knew or should have known his actions would induce

actual infringement necessarily includes the

requirement that he or she knew of the patent.” Id

(emphasis added). This court’s opinion did not, however,

set out the metes and bounds of the knowledge-of-the-

28a

Appendix A

patent requirement. Compare Insituform Techs., Inc.

v. CAT Contracting, Inc., 161 F.3d 688, 695 (Fed. Cir.

1998) (“A crucial element of induced infringement is that

the inducer must have actual or constructive knowledge

of the patent.”) (emphasis added).*

The facts of DSU Medical did not require this court

to address the scope of the knowledge requirement for

intent. Instead, the court resolved conflicting case law

setting forth both a requirement to knowingly induce

infringement and to merely knowingly induce the acts

that constitute direct infringement. /d. at 1306. In other

words, the court decided the target of the knowledge,

not the nature of that knowledge. As Chief Judge

Michel’s concurring opinion noted, the record in DSU

Medical showed that the alleged infringer had actual

knowledge of the patent-in-suit. /d. at 1311.

“Accordingly, the ‘knowledge of the patent’ issue [was]

not before us.” ld.

‘This court has made clear, however, that inducement

requires a show.ng of “‘specific intent to encourage

another’s infringement.’” Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm

Inc., 543 F.3d 683, 699 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting DSU

* SEB contends that this court need not reach this issue

because the district court reduced the damages award by $ 2

million based on SEB's settlement with Sunbeam and thus

eliminated all damages for pre-notice sales. The record indicates

that the district court did not attribute the reduction to any

particular Sunbeam sales. Therefore this court has no way to

ascertain on appeal if the reduction precludes the knowledge

und intent issue.

29a

Appendix A

Medical, 471 F.3d at 1306). As other courts have

observed, “specific intent” in the civil context is not so

narrow as to allow an accused wrongdoer to actively

disregard a known risk that an element of the offense

exists. See Crawford-kl v. Britton, 951 F.2d 1314, 1318,

293 U.S. App. D.C. 47 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (equating specific

intent and deliberate indifference); Boim v. Holy Land

Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 693 (7th Cir. 2008)

(equating intentional misconduct with knowledge and

deliberate indifference).

Pentalpha argues that the court in DSU Medical

did not mean “knew or should have known of the patent”

because the decision states “knew of the patent.”

See 471 3d at 1804. At the outset, this court notes that

the Supreme Court has indicated, in a different civil

context, that “deliberate indifference” is not necessarily

a “should have known” standard. Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. $25, 840, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811

(1994). The latter implies a solely objective test, whereas

the former may require a subjective determination that

the defendant knew of and disregarded the overt risk

that an element of the offense existed. See id.

(“| DJeliberate’ is better read as implying knowledge of

a risk, [but] the concept of constructive knowledge is

familiar enough that the term ‘deliberate indifference’

would not, of its own force, preclude a scheme that

conclusively presumed awareness from a risk’s

obviousness.”). For example, an accused infringer may

defeat a showing of subjective deliberate indifference

Lo the existence of a patent where it shows that it was

penuinely “unaware even of an obvious risk.” /d. at 844.

30a

Appendix A

More importantly, and as courts have observed in a

variety of settings, the standard of deliberate

indifference of a known risk is not different from actual

knowledge, but is a form of actual knowledge. See, e.g.,

l/nited States v. Carani, 492 F.3d 867, 873 (7th Cir. 2007)

(“Deliberate avoidance is not a standard less than

knowledge; itis simply another way that knowledge may

be proved.”); Woodman v. WWOR-T'V, Inc., 411 F.3d 69,

84 n.14 (2d Cir. 2005) (“We note that a party’s

knowledge of a disputed fact may also be proved

through evidence that he consciously avoided knowledge

of what would otherwise have been obvious [to] him.”).

In this case, this court must determine whether the

district court erred in denying Pentalpha’s motion for

JMOL where the record shows no direct evidence that

Pentalpha had actual knowledge of the patent before

April 9, 1998. The standard of review following the denial

of JMOL, is de novo. Fabri, 387 F.3d at 119. Nevertheless,

this court must apply the same standard as the

district court, which is deferential to the jury’s verdict.

AMW Materials Testing, Inc. v Town of Babylon, 584

I.3d 436, 456 (2d Cir. 2009). A grant of JMOL is

appropriate only where a reasonable jury would not have

a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the non-

movant on the issue. Agrizap, lnc. v. Woodstream Corp.,

520 I°3d 1337, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P

50(a)). For that reason,

|wje will reverse the denial of a motion for

judgment as a matter of law only when there

is such a complete absence of evidence

3la

Appendix A

supporting the verdict that the jury’s findings

could only have been the result of sheer

surmise and conjecture, or where there is such

an overwhelming amount of evidence in favor

of the moving party that fair minded jurors

could not reasonably arrive at a verdict

against the movant.

SR Int'l, 467 F.3d at 118-119 (internal quotation marks

and alterations omitted).

As just explained, a claim for inducement ts viable

even where the patentee has not produced direct

evidence that the accused infringer actually knew of the

patent-in-suit. This case shows such an instance. The

record contains adequate evidence to support a

conclusion that Pentalpha deliberately disregarded a

known risk that SEB had a protective patent. The jury

heard evidence that Pentalpha purchased an SEB deep

fryer in Hong Kong and copied all but the cosmetics.

The owner of a company related to Pentalpha testified

that Pentalpha’s engineer took a T-Fal deep fryer and

used “the same ring that separates ... the wall making

it a cool touch unit and the construction, basically

everything the same; thermostat, it was the same; the

timer was the same, just a little bit different on the

cosmetics of the outside appearance for the deep fryer.”

Again, the record shows that Pentalpha hired an

attorney to conduct a right-to-use study, but did not tell

him that it had based its product on SEB’s product.

32a

Appendix A

A failure to inform one’s counsel of copying would

be highly suggestive of deliberate indifference in most

circumstances. Here, the jury also heard testimony that

indicated that Pentalpha’s president, John Sham, was

well versed in the U.S. patent system and understood

SEB to be cognizant of patent rights as well. Sham

testified that he was the named inventor on 29 U.S.

patents and that Pentalpha and SEB had an earlier

business relationship that involved one of Pentalpha’s

patented steamer products. ‘he record thus contains

considerable evidence of deliberate indifference.

In contrast, Pentalpha did not produce any

exculpatory evidence. As noted, proof of knowledge

through a showing of deliberate indifference may be

defeated where an accused infringer establishes that

he actually believed that a patent covering the accused

product did not exist. But here Pentalpha did not argue

that it or its employees actually believed that an SEB

patent did not exist. Pentalpha’s brief implies that it

should be excused because the SEB deep fryer that it

copied was not marked with a U.S. patent number. But

Pentalpha does not argue that it relied on the lack of a

mark to come to a belief that the deep fryer was not

patented. And even if it had, such an argument would

likely lack credibility unless it were supplemented by

an explanation for why one would expect an SEB deep

fryer purchased in Hong Kong to have U.S. patent

markings.

This opinion does not purport to establish the outer

limits of the type of knowledge needed for inducement.

33a

Appendix A

For instance, a patentee may perhaps only need to show,

as Insituform suggests, constructive knowledge with

persuasive evidence of disregard for clear patent

markings, similar to the constructive notice

requirement in § 287(a). See txfra Part VII. This court

does not set those boundaries now, just as it did not set

them in DSU Medical. Here, the record establishes

sufficient support for the conclusion that Pentalpha

deliberately ignored the risk that SEB hada patent that

covered its deep fryer. Thus, the jury’s finding of

inducement is justified, and the damage award, even if

it was based on inducement alone, stands.

VII.

Ventalpha also challenges the damages award on the

basis that, contrary to § 287(a), the record did not show

that SEB marked “substantially all” of its deep fryers

before July 10, 1998. Pentalpha also sought a reduction

in damages, alleging that the record shows that SEB

withheld documents related to marking. The district

court declined to reduce the award on either ground.

Under § 287(a) a patentee that sells its patented

product within the United States must provide actual

or constructive notice of the patent to the accused

infringer Lo qualify for damages. Sentry Prot. Prods.,

Inc. v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 400 F3d 910, 918 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

Constructive notice requires the record to show that

“the patentee consistently marks substantially all of its

patented products.” /d.

34a

Appendix A

At trial, an SEB executive, Gregers Infeld, affirmed

that “to the best of [his] knowledge” SEB’s deep fryers

were “always” marked and that SEB had a policy of

marking its products. SEB also put into evidence one of

its deep fryers with an unknown manufacturing date

that had a sticker that listed the 312 patent. On cross

examination, however, Infeld testified that “there was a

batch of products where the patent marking wasn’t on.”

In addition to that testimony on cross, Pentalpha also

relies heavily on Infeld’s admission, at his deposition,

that he had no knowledge of SEB’s marking practices.

Once again, the district court properly denied

Pentalpha’s motions for JMOL. The record supplies

sufficient evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that

SEB consistently marked substantially all of its deep

fryers. Indeed, the record at trial did not even contain

Infeld’s deposition testimony. In any event, the record

supports the jury verdict.

Pentalpha contends that discovery misconduct

justifies a reduction in the damage award. The discovery

dispute at issue extends back five years before trial. In

May of 2001, Pentalpha served discovery requests

seeking, among other things, documents relating to, and

a Rule 30(b)(6) witness with knowledge of, SEB’s patent

marking practices. SEB produced only a one-page

document: a picture of a sample sticker that listed the

‘312 patent. SEB objected to the Rule 30(b)(6) request.

Pentalpha filed a motion to compe! in response to SEB’s

objection. On October 5, 2001, Magistrate Judge

Yanthis, who had been appointed to oversee discovery,

35a

Appendix A

refused to consider the motion to compel due to the

parties’ failure to meet and confer.

The marking issue arose again with Pentalpha’s

motion in limine, filed four-and-a-half years later, in

which Pentalpha moved to exclude any evidence related

to marking at trial. At the hearing on the motion, SEB's

counsel asserted that there were “no other documents”

concerning patent markings. Accordingly, the district

court denied Pentalpha’s motion, but noted that “[ijf

witnesses on the stand say there are other documents,

we've got a different issue before us.”

At trial, Infeld testified that SEB’s factories print

the stickers found on its deep fryers based on a “list

which shows [the factories] exactly what needs to be put

on” and that the compilation of that list required a lot

of paperwork. Pentalpha relied on that testimony in its

post-verdict JMOL to argue that SEB did not produce

documents related to marking, namely, the paperwork

needed to compile the sticker list. The district court

denied Pentalpha’s motion on the ground that Pentalpha

had delayed too long in seeking these documents and

did not raise the issue immediately after Infeld’s trial

testimony. JMOL Opinion, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

80394, 2007 WL 3165783, at *2.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in

denying Pentalpha’s motion for JMOL on discovery

misconduct grounds. Pentalpha clearly forfeited the

issue, if not during its four-and-a-half year silence before

trial, then when it did not object during trial following

36a

Appendix A

lnfeld’s testimony. Pentalpha cannot “fail lo prepare [its]

case|| adequately and then seek to remedy the defects

after judgment.” Korea First Bank v. Lee, 14 F. Supp.

2d 530, 532-33 (S.D.N.Y. 199%).

VIII.

linally, Pentalpha appeals the district court’s denial

of its motion for new trial, which was based on SEB’s

altorney’s allegedly improper argument during his

closing argument on reasonable royalty damages. As a

part of its damages case, SEB relied on a price list that

listed its “cool wall” deep fryers at around $ 40 per unit.

fut an SEB executive testified at trial that, although

he thought SEB made a profit, SEB did not always sell

its deep fryers at the list prices. Relying on that

testimony, Pentalpha moved for JMOL at the close of

evidence on SEB’s claim for lost profits. The district

court granted that motion, concluding that “[tjhere’s

nothing in the record, in my view, from which [the jury]

could say, ‘this is what a single deep fryer sold for.’” The

district court allowed SEB’s claim for damages based

on a reasonable royalty to reach the jury.

During summation on its reasonable royalty claim,

SEB's attorney argued that SEB was making a

“substantial profit” through its deep fryers, that it “got

something close to [its] list prices”, and that it “sought

to obtain a gross margin of about 40 to 45 percent of

the selling price.” Pentalpha objected during and after

(he summation on the basis that the court had already

rejected SEB’s claim for lost profits. SI: L’s arguments

47a

Appendix A

with respect to a reasonable royalty, Pentalpha argued,

were just another version of its baseless lost profit

argument. The district court overruled Pentalpha’s

objections, but warned the jury that its “recollection of

what the witness has said what a gross margin was and

what a profit was in this case is what should control.”

“|W Je will reverse a district court’s decision to grant

or deny a motion for a new trial only for an abuse of

discretion.” Song v. lves Labs, Inc., 957 F.2d 1041, 1047

(2d Cir. 1992). Reasonable royalty damages postulate a

hypothetical negotiation between a willing licensor and

licensee at the time of infringement. Minco, 95 F:3d at

1119. “this hypothetical construct seeks the percentage

of sales or profit likely to have induced the hypothetical

negotiators to license use of the invention.” /d. In

denying Pentalpha’s motion for a new trial, the district

court held that although “the Court ruled that [lost

profits) had not been shown with sufficient exactness

... this does not mean that the jury could not consider

S1B's expectations of profits as part of a hypothetical

neyotiation.” JMOL Opinion, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

40394, 2007 WI, 3165783, at *7 (citing Georgia-Pacific

Corp. v» U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120

(S.D.N.Y. 1970)).

‘The district court did not abuse its discretion in

declining to grant a new trial to Pentalpha based on the

summation of SEB’s counsel. The record adequately

supports SEB’s argument that it sought to obtain a gross

margin of about 40 to 45 percent of the list price. There

is a difference between an expectation of success and

38a

Appendix A

actual success at achieving a certain margin, and that

difference is relevant in caleulating the hypothetical

negotiation. But this court sees no reason to preclude a

jury from hearing attorney argument based on an

expectation of success, particularly when Pentalpha had

every opportunity to respond by highlighting to the jury

that SEB’s stated gross margin was only an expectation

and that, absent established commercial success at that

rate, the hypothetical negotiation should result in a

lower rate. SE B’s argumentative efforts to frame the

hypothetical negotiation in its favor were not improper.

Moreover the district court did not abuse its discretion

in denying a new trial on this basis.

IX.

SEB cross appeals the district court’s decision to

set aside its original awards of enhanced damages and

attorneys’ fees. Those awards were based on the jury’s

finding of willfulness, JMOL Opinion, 2007 U.S. Dist.

LMXIS 0394, 2007 WL 3165783, at *10-12, but the

district court vacated them in light of this court’s

intervening opinion in Seagate, hnhanced Damages

Opinion, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113468, 2008 WL

4540416, at *4.

In Seagate, this court set out a new test for willful

infringement. [t overruled the affirmative duty of due

care set forth in Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison

Knudsen Co., 117 F.2d 1380, 1389-90 (ed. Cir. 1983),

and held that proof of willful infringement requires a

patentee to show by clear and convincing evidence that,

39a

Appendix A

as a threshold matter, “the infringer acted despite an

objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted

infringement of a valid patent.” 497 F.3d at 1371. The

district court, proceeding under pre-Seagate law,

instructed the jury that a potential infringer “has an

affirmative duty of due care not to infringe” a known

patent, and that failure to abide by that duty constituted

willful infringement. The jury found Pentalpha’s

infringement willful.

In vacating its award of enhanced damages and

attorneys’ fees, the district court held:

The record contains evidence from which a

jury could find that the Seagate standard of

objective recklessness is satisfied. .... The

evidence regarding Pentalpha’s willfulness,

however, is not so one-sided or overwhelming

to allow the Court to conclude that a jury,

properly instructed under the new Seagate

standard, was required to find, by clear and

convincing evidence, willful infringement.

Vnhanced Damages Opinion, 200% U.S. Dist. LEXIS

11468, 200% WIL, 4540416, at *4. This court detects no

reversible error in this analysis.

importantly, 54 B does not ask this court to order a

new trial on willfulness. Had it asked, this court might

have granted the request in light of the district court’s

conclusion that the willfulness verdict could have gone

either way under the Seagate test. “An erroneous

40a

Appendix A

instruction, unless harmless, requires a new trial.”

Anderson v. Branen, 17 F.3d 552, 556 (2d Cir. 1994); see

Voda v. Cordis Corp., 536 F.3d 1311, 1828 (Fed. Cir. 2008)

(remanding and noting that the district court “may at

its discretion assess Voda’s evidence of willful

infringement under the [intervening } Seagate standard

to determine whether a new trial on willfulness is

necessary”). Instead, SEB argues that the evidence on

willfulness is so strong that the district court erred in

vacating the enhanced damages and attorneys’ fees

awards. This court agrees with the district court that

SERB’s evidence is not so strong that SEB is entitled to

a finding of willful infringement as a matter of law.

SEB also argues that there were factors other than

willful infringement that warranted an award of

altorneys’ fees, focusing primarily on alleged litigation

misconduct. But the district court apparently did not

find any litigation misconduct sufficient to warrant an

award of attorneys’ fees. Knhanced Damages Opinion,

200% U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113468, 2008 WL 4540416, at *4.

Moreover this court declines to impose attorneys’ fees

on a different basis than ordered by the district court.

Finally, SigB appeals the district court’s modification

of a pre-judgment attachment in light of its ruling with

respect to Seagate, but makes no arguments in its briefs

with respect to that appeal. Any claim of error with

respect to that modification is therefore waived.

Ala

Appendix A

X.

lor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the

United States District Court for the Southern District

of New York is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

COSTS

ach party shall bear its own costs.

42a

APPENDIX B — MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

DATED OCTOBER 9, 2007

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

99 Civ. 9284 (SCR)

SEB S.A.,

Plaintiff,

Vv.

MONTGOMERY WARD & CO., et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

STEPHEN C. ROBINSON, United States District

Judge:

Plaintiff brought this action, alleging patent

infringement related to commercial deep fryers. Plaintiff

asserted infringement of U.S. Patent No. 4,995,312,

entitled “Cooking appliance with electric heating” (“the

‘$12 patent”). Following trial, where the jury rendered

a verdict in favor plaintiff, defendants move for judgment

aS a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 50, or in the alternative for a new trial

pursuant to Rule 59. Plaintiff makes a motion for

enhanced damages, attorney fees, and other relief.

Ata

Appendix B

I. Defendants’ Motion for Judgment as a Matter of

Law

Defendants make a renewed motion for judgment

as a matter of law under Rule 50(b), on various grounds.

“In deciding a Rule 50(b) motion, the Court has two

options: if a verdict was returned, the court may, in

disposing of the new motion, allow the judgment to stand

or may reopen the judgment and either order a new

trial or direct the entry of judgment as a matter of

law.” KMI Music Mktg. v. Avatar Records, Inc., 364

lk. Supp.2d 337, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). In making it’s

decision, a court should consider the evidence “in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party and give

that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences from

the evidence that the jury might have drawn in that

party’s favor.” Morales v. City of New York, No. 99 Civ.

10004, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18711, *6 (S.D.N-Y.

December 29, 2000). Judgment as a matter of law should

be granted when there is no legally sufficient evidentiary

basis for a reasonable jury to find for a party on an issue.

Nadel v. isaksson, 3821 F.3d 266, 271 (2d Cir. 2008).

“Weakness in the evidence does not justify judgment

as amatter of law.” Dagen v. CFC Group Holdings Ltd,

No. 00 Civ. 5682, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6582, *7

(S.D.N_Y. April 18, 2004). Defendants’ individual bases

for their motion are discussed separately below.

Asa

Appendix B

A. Lack of Evidence of Patent Markings

Defendants first move for judgment on SEB’s claims

for reasonable royalties on Defendants’ sales before July

10, 1998 because there was insufficient evidence for a

jury to conclude that the deep fryers sold before that

date contained required patent markings. Defendants’

motion on this basis is denied.

Plaintiff identifies the testimony of Mr. Gregers

Infeld, a senior officer at SEB, and indicate that he

testified that “substantially all” fryers sold before July

10, 1998 were properly marked. Infeld testified that it

was SEB’s policy to mark the fryers and that SEB did

always mark the fryers to the best of his knowledge.

(Tr: 120:13 -121:3). Plaintiff additionally admitted into

evidence two fryers from after July 1998 which were

marked.

Defendants impeach the testimony of Infeld because

1) he testified at a 30(b)(6) deposition that at the time of

the deposition he had no knowledge of this topic; and

2) he acknowledged that a single batch of fryers sold in

the year 2000 was not marked. Neither reason is an

appropriate basis to grant defendants judgment as a

matter of law.

First, the strength of Mr. Infeld’s testimony in light

of his testimony at his 30(b)(6) deposition may be the

subject of cross-examination, but is not an appropriate

basis for granting judgment as a matter of law because

it goes to the strength and weight of his testimony.

45a

Appendix B

Second, the fact that a single batch of fryers was

net marked is hardly evidence that calls into question

whether “substantially all” fryers were marked. While

defendants argue that plaintiff never defined what a

“batch” is — and that therefore the jury had no basis to

determine whether substantially all fryers were marked

— Infeld ultimately testified that substantially all were

marked to the best of his knowledge. The number of

fryers in the single batch of unmarked fryers goes to

the weight of Infeld’s testimony, and is a fair topic for

cross-examination. But it is not a sufficient basis to grant

judgment as a matter of law.

In addition, defendants argue that the sample fryers

admitted into evidence are not relevant because they

were sold after July 1998. This issue is ultimately

irrelevant because Mr. Infeld testified that substantially

all fryers were marked, and the jury was free to credit

or discredit this testimony. In any event, this argument,

again, goes Lo the strength of plaintiff’s case.

Finally, defendants argue that a sample label

provided by SEB did not have the proper marking. ‘This

is, again, an issue of the strength of the evidence in the

case. The jury was free to consider this argument, but

it ultimately found for the plaintiff. The strength of the

parties’ cases is not an appropriate basis for judgment

as a matter of law.

46a

Appendix B

B. Inadequate Production of Documents Related to

Patent Markings

Defendants argue that the court should grant

judgment on SEB’s claims concerning Pentalpha’s deep

fryers sold before July 10, 1998 because of the failure of

SilB to produce documents concerning patent markings

on T-Fal’s deep fryers. Defendants’ motion on this basis

is denied.

Pentalpha originally moved in limine to exclude

SEB from offering evidence regarding patent markings

because SEB had not produced documents concerning

those markings. The Court denied the in limine motion

because SEB’s counsel represented to the Court that

no documents existed other than the one page

produced. Based on that representation, the Court

allowed SEB to introduce the testimony.

At trial, in response to a question from defense

counsel regarding how the factory will know what to

print on the stickers it places on the fryers, Mr. Infeld

testified that ‘the factory will have a “list which shows

them exactly what needs to be put on.” (Tr: 143:9- 10).

Pointing to other testimony as well, defendants argue

that this indicates that Infeld was aware of a “list”

concerning patent markings, which was never produced.

Plaintiff maintains there are no more documents

despite a recent search following the first oral argument

on this motion. While the parties dispute what Infeld

meant by this testimony — indeed still dispute as to

47a

Appendix B

whether additional documents exist — the Court

believes that the current dispute is insufficient to grant

judgment to defendants. The parties engaged in

discovery for years prior to trial, yet defendants waited

until the eve of trial to raise the issue of the adequacy

of plaintiff’s production on patent markings. Further,

defendants could have asked Infeld to clarify during his

examination what he meant by the “list” that he referred

to. Or, defendants could have renewed its motion to

preciude plaintiff from introducing evidence on patent

markings -— giving the Court or SEB an opportunity to

seek clarification from Mr. Infeld. Defendants declined

to do so. In short, defendants did not adequately raise

the issue of plaintiff’s production during discovery, nor

raise an issue regarding Infeld’s testimony during trial,

and the Court is disinclined to disturb the jury’s verdict

at this point. Defendants’ motion on this basis is

therefore denied.

C. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) — Sales and Offers to Sell

Defendants’ motion for judgment on plaintiff’s

§ 271(a) claims is denied. Defendants state that SEB

admitted that all the sales of deep fryers occurred F.O.B.

Hong Kong or China. (Tr: 856:1-6). Therefore,

Defendants argue that, as a matter of law this is not a

“sale” in the United States. See MEMC klec. Materials,

Ince. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d

1369, 1875 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[ 1 }t is well-established that

the reach of section 271(a) is limited to infringing

activities that occur within the United States.”); HRotec

Indus. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1251 (Fed.

48a

Appendix B

Cir. 2000). In MEMC, the Federal Circuit granted

summary Judgment on the issue of sales in the United

States for products which were delivered f.0.B. Tokyo

because these did not constitute sales within the United

States. However, the Court noted several other factors

in deciding that the sale had not occurred within the

United States. See 420 F.3d 1376-77. The Court also

specifically noted that “simply because an article is

delivered ‘free on board’ outside of the forum, a ‘sale’ is

not necessarily precluded from occurring in the forum.”

ld. at 1377. In addition, defendants’ argument that the

Court did not instruct the jury that the sale must also

occur in the United States before an offer to sell in the

United States is actionable is moot because according

to the verdict, the sale did occur in the United States.

Defendants’ motion for judgment on plaintiffs §

271(a)claims is therefore denied.

Db. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) — Inducement

The jury found that defendants induced

infringement under § 271(b). Defendants argue that

there was insufficient evidence that Defendants were

aware of the SEB patent, and therefore they could not

have induced infringement.

“In order to succeed on a claim of inducement, the

patentee must show, first that there has been direct

infringement,” and “second, that the alleged infringer

knowingly induced infringement and possessed specific

intent to encourage another's infringement.” MAMC,

420 F'3d at 1878; Minn. Mining & Mfy. Co. v. Chemque,

4a

Appendix B

Inc., 803 E3d 1294, 1804-05 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citations

omitted). “While proof of intent is necessary, direct

evidence is not required; rather, circumstantial evidence

may suffice.” ME'MC, 420 F.3d at 1378; Water Techs. Corp

v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F:2d 660, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1988). However,

an inducer must have actual or constructive knowledge

of the patent. DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293,

1305 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see also id. at 1311 (Michel, C.J.,

concurring). “It must be established that the defendant

possessed specific intent to encourage another's

infringement and not merely that the defendant had

knowledge of the acts alleged to constitute inducement.

The plaintiff has the burden of showing that the alleged

infringer’s actions induced infringing acts and that he

knew or should have known his actions would induce

actual infringements.” /d. at 1306.

Defendants argue that plaintiff’s evidence that John

Sham “set up” defendants’ counsel Mark Levy to fail to

find the SEB patent is insufficient to establish the

requisite constructive knowledge of the patent.

However, contrary to defendants’ argument, the jury

was free to consider whether key information was not

disclosed to Levy in his patent search and whether that

information would have allowed defendants to discover

the patent. Moreover, this evidence was sufficient to

establish “specific intent and action to induce

infringement”. /d. at 13805. Accordingly, defendants’

motion for judgment is denied.

SUa

Appendix B

ki. Ke-Designed Deep Fryer

Defendants argue that the court should enter

judgment for the defendants on defendants’ re

designed deep fryer because there was no evidence to

allow the jury to determine that a person of reasonable

skill in the art of designing deep fryers would have

considered the differences between the redesigned deep

fryer and the SEB patent as “insubstantial”.

A finding of infringement under the doctrine of

equivalents requires a showing that the difference

between the claimed invention and the accused product

or method was insubstantial or that the accused product

or method performs the substantially same function in

substantially the same way with substantially the same

result as each claim limitation of the patented product

or method.” AquaTex Indus. v. Techniche Solutions,

479 I3d 1820, 1826 (hed Cir, 2007).

Defendants aryue that SI B’s patent expert did not

offer an opinion on how a person skilled in the art would

perceive the changes. They argue that the expert, Mr.

(Charles Van Horn, was not skilled in the art, had no

experience with persons or companies that made deep

fryers, and could not remember having examined a

patent concerning deep fryers while working at the PTO.

However, Mr. Van Horn testified that he was testifying

from the perspective of someone skilled in the art.

(Tr: 474:10 12). The Court overruled the objection to

his testimony as an expert and allowed his testimony

with respect to the issues relevant to the lawsuit.

Sla

Appendix B

(Tr. 479.24 — 480.2) Any other question regarding the

basis of Van Horn’s testimony would go to the credibility

and weight of the testimony. While appropriate subjects

for cross-examination, they are an insufficient basis to

grant judgment as a matter of law.

Ii Willful Infringement

Defendants argue that they are entitled to

judgment as matter of law on the issue of willful

infringement by the redesigned deep fryer. As an initial

matter, it does not appear that Defendants raised this

issue in their pre-verdict motion for judgment as a

matter of law and it is therefore denied.' Taylor v.

National RR. Passenger Corp., $68 I. Supp. 479, 482

(S.D.N.Y. 1994) C'Phe initial motion, brought before

submission of the case to the jury, is a prerequisite to

any movion brought after trial.”)

On the merits, while defendants obtained an opinion

letter from Peter Canelias, plainuff presented evidence

lo impeach the quality and credibility of the letter. First,

the claim construction used by Mr. Canelias did not

comport with the claim construction by this Court.

Cir: 6%5:%-687:6) There was also evidence that the Mr.

(anelias possibly gave an opinion that Mr. Sham wanted

lL. ‘The Court notes that in December Z006, Kule 50 was

amended so as to eliminate the requirement that a motion be

made at the close of ali the evidence, effectively overruling the

relevant portions of the cases cited. HMowever, the law in this

Circuit during the relevant time period for this motion required

such @ motion at the close of evidence, with few exceptions

52a

Appendix B

to hear. (Tr: 687:7 - 689:4). There was also evidence

indicating that Mr. Sham did not rely on Canelias’s

opinion, for example because Pentalpha had finalized

the plans for the deep fryer prior to obtaining the

opinion letter. (Tr: 402:5-403:23). See Stryker Corp. v.

Davol Ine. , 234 F.3d 1252, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2000). In short,

the jury was free to consider the opinion letter as

evidence of a lack of willfulness. But it was also free to

discount that evidence based on other evidence in the

record. Judgment as a matter of law is therefore

inappropriate.

G. Reduction of Damages Award

Since all infringers are jointly and severally liable,

a settlement by one infringer reduces the recovery from

the others. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement

Co., $77 US. 476, 503, 84S. Ct. 1526, 12 L. Ed. 2d 457,

1964 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 760 (1964); see also Zenith Radio

Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 348,

91 5S. Ct. 795, 28 L. Ed. 2d 77 (1971); Crystal

Semiconductor Corp. vo Tritech Microelectronics Int'l,

Inc, 246 F.3d 1336, 1361 (hed. Cir. 2001) (“A party that

induces or contributes to infringement is jointly and

severally liable with the direct infringer for all general

damages.”) Courts have generally held that parties may

only obtain up to a single full recovery for damapes from

infringement. See Glenayre Elecs., Ine. v. Jackson, 443

I3d 851, 864 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding that a patentee

could not suc users for damages because actual damages

covering the use of the product had already been

recovered from the manufacturer); Shockley uv. Arcan,

53a

Appendix B

Inc, 24% F3d 1349, 1364 (Ked. Cir, 2001) (“Each joint

tort-feasor is lable for the full amount of damages (up

to a full single recovery) suffered by the patentee.”).

“!Tjn determining whether there has been an

impermissible double recovery of damages, the inquiry

focuses on whether the damages issue arose from the

same set of operative facts.” Aero Prods. Intl, Inc. v

Intex Kec. Corp., 466 k-3d 1000, 1018 (Fed. Cir. 2006).

The parties agree that plaintiff recovered $ 2,000,000

from Sunbeam in settlement of a related lawsuit for the

sale of up to 350,000 units. The record indicates that

Pentalpha sold Sunbeam 312,736 units. A reduction of

the jury’s award to avoid double recovery is therefore

appropriate. In addition, this reduction should occur

prior to any damages enhancement for willful

infringement because SEB has already agreed to settle

its claims with respect to the sale of those fryers. Any

trebling of damages from an injury for which SEB has

recovered would result in a windfall bo SEB. Accordingly,

the jury’s award of $ 3,600,000 on this claim is reduced

to $ 1,600,000.

Il. Defendants’ Motion for a New Trial

Defendants also move more [sic] a new trial on

various grounds. “The standard for granting a new trial

is Jess stringent than that for judgment as a matter of

law. On a motion for new trial the judge may set aside

the verdict even though there is substantial evidence

to support it.” Am. Nat'l Fcre Ins. Co. v. Mtrasco, Ine.,

451) I. Supp.2d 576, 582 (S.D.N-Y. 2006) Gnternal

54a

Appendix B

quotations and citations omitted). “Still, anew trial may

only be granted if the court is convinced that the jury

has reached a seriously erroneous result, or that the

verdict is against the weight of the evidence, making its

enforcement a miscarriage of justice.” /d. See also

Farrior v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 277 F.3d 633, 635 (2d

Cir. 2002) (“[A] decision is against the weight of the

evidence, for purposes of a Rule 59 motion, if and only if

the verdict is seriously erroneous or a miscarriage of

justice.”) A jury’s verdict should rarely be disturbed.

Karrnor, 277 3d at 635.

A. Reasonable Royalty Rate

Defendants move for a new trial on the basis that

the evidence does not support the reasonable royalty

award by the jury. The award by the jury was $ 11.52

per fryer for sales to Sunbeam, $ 11.34 for each fryer

sold to Finger Hut, and $ 10.98 for each fryer sold to

Montgomery Ward. Defendants request a new trial on

damages, or alternatively, the Court to remit the award

to $ 5.71 per fryer for the first 350,000, and then $ 9.7]

or $ 10.00 after that. Alternatively, Defendants request

a royalty rate of $ 9.71 or $ 10.00 per fryer. Defendants’

motion is denied.

“The jury’s award of damages is entitled to

deference. Specifically, the jury’s damages award must

be upheld unless the amount is grossly excessive or

monstrous, Clearly not supported by the evidence, or

based only on speculation or guesswork.” Monsanto Co.

v Ralph, 382 3d 1374, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (internal

SSa

Appendix B

quotes omitted); Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro

Devices, Ine., 9TT 2d 1555, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The

moving party has the burden of showing that “the award

is, In view of all the evidence, either so outrageously high

or so outrageously low as to be unsupportable as an

estimation of a reasonable royalty.” Monsanto, 382 I.3d

at 1383; Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GmbH v. Am.

Hoist & Derrick Co., 895 F-2d 1408, 1406 (Fed. Cir. 1990).

The Federal Circuit reviews damages awards by a jury

for substantial evidence. Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86

Kd 1098, 1108 (Fed Cir. 1996).

Defendants’ argues {sic} that a high hypothetical

negotiation between the parties would have resulted in

a far lower royalty because: 1) SEB accepted a $ 5.71

per fryer figure in their setthement with Sunbeam for

the first 350,000 fryers; 2) SEB accepted $ 10.00 per

fryer after the first 350,000; 3) SEB agreed to pay 50%

of any damage award over $ 4.00 to Sunbeam — adding

the $ 4.00 to the $ 5.71 SEB obtained in its settlement

with Sunbeam, means that SEB considers anything

above $ 9.71 a windfall —- so much so that it has agreed

to pay Sunbeam half of anything above that number;

and 4) Pentalpha would not have agreed to pay above

$ 10.98 per deep fryer because if it did, it would not have

made any profit.

Defendants’ arguments regarding SIB’s settlement

with Sunbeam are unconvincing. A settlement in

litigation is based many different criteria, including for

example, potential defenses available to Sunbeam, and

other litigation risks that the Court need not speculate

56a

Appendix B

on. In addition, in cases where more than one defendant

is sued, parties that settle early often get better deals.

As result, the particulars of the Sunbeam settlement

are insufficient to overcome the presumption of

upholding the jury’s award.

With respect to a royalty rate being higher than the

gross margin, there is no per se rule requiring that the

royalty rate allow the infringer to have turned a profit.

See Monsanto, 382 F.8d at 1884 (“[A]lthough an

infringer’s anticipated profit from use of the patented

invention is among the factors to be considered in

determining a reasonable royalty, the law does not

require that an infringer be permitted to make a

profit.”). The Court in Monsanto also noted that a

patentee has every right not to allow anyone else to use

his patent, and a requirement that a hypothetical

negotiation result in a profit for the infringer would

effectively allow infringers to circumvent as patentee’s

right to exclude parties from using their patent. /d. This

is especially true where the patent holder chose not to

license their patent. See id; Tr: 125:8-219. Accordingly,

defendants’ motion for a new trial on the issue of a

reasonable royalty, or in the alternative to remit the

award, is denied.

Kk. Weight of the Evidence on Issues of Liability

lefendants also argue that the verdict was against

the weight of the evidence on four issues of lability:

1) infringement by the original deep fryers; 2) whether

the fryers sold before July 10, 1998 were marked;

S7a

Appendix B

3) whether the differences between the modified deep

fryer and the patent were substantial (i.e. whether the

modified fryer infringed under the doctrine of

equivalents); 4) willful infringement. Defendants make

no argument with regards to why the weight of the

evidence was such that the verdict is seriously

erroneous or a miscarriage of justice, and as discussed

already with respect to defendants’ Rule 50 motion,

there is substantial evidence supporting the jury’s

findings on these issues. Defendants therefore have not

met their burden of establishing serious error or a

miscarriage of justice and their motion is therefore

denied

C. Improper Closing Arguments of SEB’s Counsel

Finally, defendants move for a new trial based on

alleyedly improper arguments at closing. Their motion

is denied.

“Although trial courts possess broad discretion to

determine when the conduct of counsel is so improper

as to warrant a new trial, attorneys also require latitude

in formulating their arguments.” Smith v. National R

Pussenger Corp, 856 F.2d 467, 470 (2d Cir. 19838) (internal

quotations and citations omitted); See also Patterson v.

Balsamico, 440 F.3d 104, 119 (2d Cir. 2004). “Not every

improper or poorly supported remark made in

summation irreparably taints the proceedings; only if

counsel's conduct created undue prejudice or passion

which played upon the sympathy of the jury, should a

new trial be granted.” Smith v National RO Passenger

SSa

Appendix B

Corp., 856 F:2d at 470 (internal, quotations and citations

omitted); see also Patterson, 440 F.3d at 119. “Because

attorneys are given wide latitude in formulating their

arguments to the jury, rarely will an attorney’s conduct

so infect a trial with undue prejudice or passion as to

require reversal.” Patterson, 440 F.3d at 119 (internal

quotation marks omitted); Reilly v. Natwest Mkts.

Group Inc., 181 F.3d 253, 271 (2d Cir. 1999).

Defendants identify four improper arguments made

to the jury: 1) that SEB’s counsel argued that the

reasonable royalty should reflect the lost profit to SEB,

despite the fact that the Court had ruled that a claim

for lost profits could not be submitted to the jury

because there was no evidence as to what SEB actually

sold the fryers for; 2) that SEB’s counse! improperly

argued to the jury that the failure of defendants to seek

an opinion of counsel is evidence of willful infringement;

3) that SEB’s lawyer improperly compared T-Fal’s

commercial product to the Pentalpha product —- as

opposed to comparing the patent claims to the product;

and 4) SEB’s counsel improperly appealed to the

passions of the jury by suggesting that Pentalpha does

not do business in the U.S. to avoid paying taxes in the

US.

With respect to lost profits, the Court ruled that

they had not been shown with sufficient exactness to

allow a ¢laim for lost profits. However, this does not

mean that the jury could not consider SEB’s

expectations of profits as part of a hypothetical.

negotiation. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States

S9a

Appendix B

Plywood Corp., 318 F.Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N-Y. 1970)

(holding that one of the factors relevant to a reasonable

royalty is “|t}he established profitability of the product

made under the patent; its commercial success; and its

current popularity.”).

With regards to willful infringement the federal

circuit has held that the court may not instruct the jury

that they are to draw an adverse inference or

presumption as a matter of law. See Anorr-Bremse

Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp. , 383

F3d 1337, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004). However, nothing in

Knorr-Bremse forbids a jury to consider whether an

infringer sought the advice of counsel in considering

whether, under the totality of the circumstances,

infringement has been willful. See tid. at 1342

(“Determination of willfulness is made on consideration

of the totality of the circumstances”.); see also Golden

Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 E3d 1354,

1369 (Fed. Cir 2006) (rejecting argument that, under

Anorr-Bremse, “the district court could not consider

whether [defendant] obtained an opinion of counsel in

evaluating whether it discharged its duty of due care.”).

Defendants’ third argument is without merit. Sk B

clearly compared the infringing products to the patent

(e.g. ‘Tr: 917:25-921:6). The reference to the T Fal

commercial product was an argument that the T-Fal

wouldn't avoid infringement of the claims because of

minor differences, and the defendants’ product

therefore also couldn't avoid infringement of the claims

because of those same minor differences. In addition,

60a

Appendix B

any error here is insufficient to warrant setting aside

the jury’s verdict and granting a new tri.

With respect to the final error charged — the

foreign status of the defendants — it appears that this

argument was made in response to the defendants’

defense that they were not doing business in the U.S.

In any event, to the extent that this argument was

inappropriate it is insufficient to warrant setting aside

the jury's verdict and granting a new trial.

Ill. Defendants’ Motion for Judgment On the Basis

of Prosecution History Estoppel

The jury found that the modified deep fryer, which

used blocks (or “ring segments”) rather than rings,

infringed the ’812 patent under the doctrine of

equivalents. Defendants move for judgment on this issue

on the basis of prosecution history estoppel.*

Defendants’ motion is denied.

Prosecution history estoppel is a question of law.

Ranbaxy Pharm. Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 350 E3d 1235,

1240 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Under the doctrine, a patentee’s

deciston to narrow a claim during patent prosecution 1s

presumed to be a disclaimer of the territory between

the original claim and the amended claim. Festo Corp. v

Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. Ltd, 535 US.

722, 740, 122 S. Ct. 1831, 152 L. Ed. 2d 944 (2002);

)

2. Defendants originally moved in lemime on this issme

before trial, but a decision was deferred until after the verdict

ola

Appendix B

Research Plastics, Ine. v. Fed. Packaging Corp, 421 Fad

1290, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“A narrowing amendment

made to avoid prior art creates a presumption that the

patentee surrendered the territory between the original

claims and the amended claims.”). Estoppel also applies

in the case of arguments made to the patent examiner

rather than amendments made in response to the

patent examiner’s actions. See Glaro Wellcome, Inc. v

Impax Labs. Inc., 356 F.3d 1348, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

However, “(flor an estoppel to apply, such assertions in

favor of patentability must ‘evince a clear and

unmistakable surrender of subject matter.” Pharmacia

& Upjokn Co. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 170 F38d 1873,

1377 (Fed Cir. 1999); Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc,

140 F.3d 1449, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

Defendants argue that in prosecuting its patent

betore the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”),

SEB argued that its invention only applied to a deep

fryer in which the “ring” completely closed off the air

space between the pan and the skirt. See Dunnegar

Declaration, Ex. FE at S000094-96. This argument was

used to distinguish the application at issue from the prior

art — namely U.S. Patent No. 4,672,179 (“the Omshi

Patent”) and Spanish Utility Model 290,283 (“the

Spanish Utility Patent”). Defendants now argue that,

since SEB’s expert admitted at trial that the redesigned

deep fryer does not completely close off the air space

between the pan and the skirt, defendants’ product

could not infringe the patent as a matter of law under

the doctrine of equivalents

62a

Appendix B

Defendants’ argument is precluded by this Court's

earlier decision on this issue. “Under the doctrine of

law of the case, ‘a legal decision made at one stage of

litigation, unchallenged in a subsequent appeal when

the opportunity to do so existed, becomes the law of the

case for future stages of the same litigation, and the

parties are deemed to have waived the mght to challenge

that decision at a later time.” See North River Ins. Co.

v. Philadelphia Reinsurance Corp., 63 F.3d 160, 164 (2d

Cir. 1995). “Because there is a strong policy favoring

finality ...acourt should be loathe to revisit an earlier

decision in the absence of extraordinary circumstances

s' ch as where the initial decision was clearly erroneous

and would work a manifest injustice.” /d@. at 165 (internal

quotations and citations omitted). On March 20, 2001,

then District Judge Barrington D. Parker, Jr. issued a

decision on plaintiff’s motion for a supplemental

preliminary injunction regarding the sale of the modified

deep fryer. * See SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,

Inc., 1387 E'Supp.2d 285 (S.D_N-Y. 2001). In that decision,

Judge Parker rejected the very arguments defendants

currently make. Specifically, Judge Parker held that:

1) in the modified fryer, defendants have replaced the

insulating ring with a series of insulating ring segments;

2) the use of ring segments, as opposed to the use of a

continuous ring, do [sic] not change the essential nature

of the device; 3) independent claim 1 does not contain

any requirement that the ring functions to seal the air

space; 4) there is no prosecution history estoppel based

3. Judge Parker has since been appointed to a seat on the

Second Cireuit.

63a

Appendix B

on the arguments made to the PTO regarding the

Spanish Utility Patent because they were not directed

to the claim at issue in this case. /d. at 287-89.

Defendants’ arguments regarding factual errors in

this Court’s earlier ruling are unconvincing. Whether

claim 1 was amended, or repealed is ultimately irrelevant

to the Court’s decision that prosecution history estoppel

did not apply because the arguments made to the PTO

were directed at claim 13, not claim 1. Indeed Judge

Parker specifically found that “independent claim 1 does

not contain any requirement that the ring functions to

seal the air space.” SEB, 137 F.Supp.2d at 288.

Defendants have therefore failed to show that the initia!

decision was clearly erroneous and would work a

manifest injustice.

burther, the Supreme Court’s decision in Festo Corp

v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co, Lta., does

not invite this Court to re-visit its earlier decision. 535

U.S. 722, 122 S. Ct. 1831, 152 L. Ed. 2d 944 (2002). In

Festo, the Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit,

and narrowed the defense of prosecution history

estoppel. The Federal Circuit had held that prosecution

history estoppel is a complete bar to the doctrine of

equivalents, regardless of the purpose of the

amendment. The Supreme Court reversed, applying a

more flexible “fair interpretation” standard for

determining what subject matter was surrendered by

the amendment or argument. /d at 737-38. Judge

Parker's decision, which holds that estoppel does not

apply, is not undercut by a ruling by the Supreme Court

which actually further limits the doctrine’s applicability

64a

Appendix B

Accordingly, under the law of the case doctrine, this

Court will not disturb its earlier decision.

IV. Plaintiff’s Motions

A. Enhanced Damages

The jury found for SEB for direct infringement and

inducement of infringement and awarded damages of

$ 4,650,000. The jury also found that Pentalpha’s

infringement had been willful. Plaintiff moves to

enhance damages on this basis.

Under 35 U.S.C. §284, damages may be enhanced

up to three times the compensatory award. An award of

enhanced damages for infringement, as well as the

extent of the enhancement, is committed to the

discretion of the trial court. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc.,

970 F.2d 816, 826 (Fed. Cir. 1992). While no statutory

standard dictates the circumstances under which the

district court may exercise its discretion, the Federal

Circuit has approved such awards where the

infringement is willful. /d. On the other hand, a finding

of willful infringement does not mandate that damages

be enhanced, much less mandate treble damages. /d.;

Modine Mfg. Co. v. Allen Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 538, 543

(Fed. Cir. 1990). “The paramount determination in

deciding to grant enhancement and the amount thereof

is the egregiousness of the defendant’s conduct based

on all the facts and circumstances.” Read, 970 F.3d at

826. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 819 F-2d 1120,

1125 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The court must consider factors

65a

Appendix B

that render defendant's conduct more culpable, as well

as factors that are mitigating or ameliorating. Read, 970

3d at 826.

Factors considered by courts in determining when

an infringer has acted in such bad faith as to merit an

increase in the damages awarded against him include:

1) whether the infringer deliberately copied the ideas

or design of another; 2) whether the infringer, when he

knew of the other’s patent protection, investigated the

scope of the patent and formed a good-faith belief that

it was invalid or that it was not infringed; 3) the

infringer’s behavior as a party to the litigation; 4) the

defendant’s size and financial condition; 5) closeness of

the case; 6) duration of defendant’s misconduct;

7) remedial action by the defendant; 8) defendant’s

motivation for harm; and 9) whether defendant

attempted to conceal its misconduct. Jd. at 826-27.

Kirst the Court notes that evidence in the record

indicates that employees of Pentalpha purchased a SEB

fryer in Hong Kong for the purposes of market research,

and presented no evidence of independent design

(e.g. design drawings). (Tr: 242:18-24; 339:12-340-13).

Indeed, there was testimony that the engineers simply

took a T-Fal fryer and made cosmetic changes to it.

(Tr: 609:25-610:18; 611:13-613:24),

Second, the court notes that evidence in the record

indicates that Pentalpha knew that it had copied a SEB

fryer, but never told this to its attorney, Mr. Levy who

was performing a patent search with respect to the

66a

Appendix B

original deep fryer. (Tr: 345:4-20; Tr: 414:20-416:20).

There was also evidence that Pentalpha had finalized

the plans for its modified deep fryer prior to obtaining

the opinion letter of its counsel, Mr. Canelias. (Tr: 402:5-

403:23).

Third, the Court does not believe this was a

particularly close case. The Court granted judgment to

the plaintiff on many of defendants’ affirmative defenses.

(Tr: 716:1-717:1). The case law was also contrary to

defendants’ defense that the sales in this case were not

infringing because they were “F.0.B. China”. SeeMEMC,

420 F.3d at 1377 (“simply because an article is delivered

‘free on board’ outside of the forum, a ‘sale’ is not

necessarily precluded from occurring in the forum.”)

Fourth, as discussed already, this court does not

believe that plaintiff’s counsel’s argument regarding

willfulness and defendants’ failure to seek the advice of

counsel was prohibited by Knorr-Bremse. It therefore

does not preclude enhanced damages in this case.

Fifth the court notes that upon issuance of a

preliminary injunction forbidding the sale of the original

deep fryer, defendants developed a modified deep fryer

with few changes, which infringed on the ’312 patent

under the doctrine of equivalents. This modification

required additional motion practice by plaintiff, who

needed to seek a supplemental injunction against the

sale of the modified deep fryer in order to avoid further

infringement of its patent rights.

67a

Appendix B

Accordingly, and upon consideration of all other

relevant factors, this court believes enhanced damages

are appropriate. In its discretion, and in consideration

of the high damage award in this case relative to the

defendants’ size, this Court elects to award damages

two times the jury award.

BK. Attorneys’ Fees

Under 35 U.S.C. § 285, “the court in exceptional

cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the

prevailing party.” Whether a case is exceptional is a

determination of fact which is reviewed for clear error.

L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Tom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117,

1128 (Fed. Cir. 1993). A decision whether to award

attorneys’ fees, once it is found to be exceptional, is

committed to the discretion of the trial judge. Modine

Mfg. Co., 917 F.2d at 543. Bad faith litigation, willful

infringement, or inequitable conduct are among the

circumstances which may make a case exceptional.

Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 1572, 1579 (Fed

tir. 1996). Indeed, an express finding of willful

infringement is a sufficient basis for classifying a case

as “exceptional”. Modine Mfg. Co., 917 F.2d at 543.

Because the jury expressly found willful infringement,

and in consideration of the various facts in the record

to support this finding, the Court holds that the current

case is an exceptional case within the meaning of § 285.

Accordingly, an award of attorneys’ fees is appropriate.

With regards to the particulars of the fee

submission, the Court agrees with defendants that

68a

Appendix B

attorneys’ fees from the Sunbeam action in the District

of New Jersey are an inappropriate for an award from

this Court. Fees associated with that action should have

been sought from that Court, or in settlement

negotiations of that action.

The Court agrees with plaintiff that fees paid to Mr.

Didier Martin and Mr. Gregers Infeld are appropriate.

Mr. Martin was retained as an outside legal consultant

» 1d defendants have provided no adequate basis to deny

plaintiff payment of his fees. Mr. Infeld was also retained

as an outside consultant and defendants provide no

specific objection to his fees other than the conclusory

assertion that they are unreasonable. Finally, contrary

to defendants’ assertion, plaintiff is entitled to

reasonable expenses incurred by plaintiff’s counsel

during the prosecution of this case.

C. Pre-Judgment Interest under 35 U.S.C. § 284

“[PJrejudgment interest should be awarded under

§ 284 absent some justification for withholding such an

award.” GM Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 657, 103

S. Ct. 2058, 76 L. Ed. 2d 211 (1983); Flanagan v.

Continental Apparel Corp., No. 94 Civ. 9338, 1996 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 12102, *12 (S.D.N.Y. August 20, 1996).

Defendants do not dispute that prejudgment interest

is appropriate here, but argue that the statutory post-

judgment interest rate under 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) is

appropriate. While plaintiff has not submitted evidence

of the rate at which it borrows money, the court believes

that the prime interest rate provided by Federal Reserve

69a

Appendix B

compounded annually is provides fair compensation to

plaintiff Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 939 F2d

1540, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[I]t is not necessary that a

patentee demonstrate that it borrowed at the prime rate

in order to be entitled to prejudgment interest at that

rate.”). However, because the jury’s judgment is

reduced by $ 2,000,000 to reflect plaintiff’s settlement

with Sunbeam, plaintiff is instructed to re-submit its

calculation regarding the amount of prejudgment

interest due.

D. Permanent Injunction

SEB requests entry of a permanent injunction.

Defendants’ concede that a permanent injunction is

warranted, and do not oppose the language of SEB’s

proposed injunction for the most part. Defendants do

argue that any injunction should preserve Pentalpha’s

claims against SEB for liability up to the amount of the

bond in the event Pentalpha ultimately prevails.

However, damage to Pentalpha is moot because the jury

ultimately found infringement. In any event, should

Pentalpha prevail on appeal, any claims against SEB

will be preserved. Therefore, no modification to SEB’s

proposed permanent injunction is necessary.

70a

Appendix B

Ili. Conclusion

Defendants’ renewed motion for judgment as a

matter of law is granted in part. Defendants’ motion for

a new trial is denied. Defendants’ motion for judgment

on the issue of prosecution history estoppel is denied.

Plaintiff’s motion for enhanced damages is granted in

part.

The jury’s award of $ 4,650,000 is reduced to

$ 2,650,000 to reflect SEB’s settlement with Sunbeam.

This Court awards an additional $ 2,650,000 in enhanced

damages in light of the jury’s finding of willful

infringement. The Court awards attorneys’ fees of

$ 932,123.53. The Court awards pre judgment of interest

at the prime rate. Plaintiff is instructed to re-submit a

calculation of the amount of pre judgment interest owed

in light of this Court’s reduction of the jury’s award to

$ 2,650,000.

Case closed.

It is so ordered.

Dated: White Plains, New York

October 9, 2007

s/ Stephen C. Robinson

Stephen C. Robinson, U.S.D.J.

T7la

APPENDIX C — ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL

CIRCUIT DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING

DATED MARCH 25, 2010

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

2009-1099, -1108, -1119

SEB S.A.,

Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant-

Cross Appellant,

and

T-FAL CORPORATION,

Counterclaim Defendant,

V.

MONTGOMERY WARD & CO., INC.,

Defendant,

and

GLOBAL-TECH APPLIANCES, INC.,

Defendant-Appellant,

and

PENTALPHA ENTERPRISES, LTD.,

Defendant-Counterclaimant-

Appellant.

72a

Appendix ©

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of New York in 99-CV-9284, Judge

Stephen C. Robinson.

ORDER

A petition for rehearing en banc having been filed by

the Appellants,* and the matter having first been referred

as a petition for rehearing to the panel that heard the

appeal, and thereafter the petition for rehearing en banc

having been referred to the circuit judges who are in

regular active service,

UPON CONSIDERATION THEREOR it is

ORDERED that the petition for rehearing be, and the

same hereby is, DENIED and it is further

ORDERED that the petition for rehearing en banc

be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.

The mandate of the court will issue on April 1, 2010.

FOR THE COURT,

s/ Jan Horbaly

Jan Horbaly

Clerk

Dated: 03/25/2010

* The court granted leave to American Intellectual

Property Law Association and The Federal] Circuit Bar

Association to file a brief amici curiae in support of Appellants’

petition for rehearing en banc.

OPPOSITION

BRIEF

No. 10-6

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

GLOBAL-TECH APPLIANCES, INC.,, etal.,

Petitioners,

v.

SEB 5.A.,

Respondent.

On PETITION FOR A Writ OF CERTIORARL TO THE

Unrirep Srares Court OF APPEALS

FOR THE FEDERAL Cirncuir

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

JouN P Wuite

NorMAN H. Zivin*

WeENpy E. MILLER

Cooper & Dunnam LLP

30 Rockefeller Plaza

New York, New York 10112

(212) 278-0400

nzivin@cooperdunham.com

* Counsel of Record Attorneys for Respondent

241345 g

COUNSEL PRESS

(BOO) 274 4821 © (800) 359 6859

1

RULE 29.6 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Respondent, SEB $.A., a publicly-held French

corporation, has no parent company. No publicly owned

company owns 10% or more of the stock of SEB S.A.

il

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Pave

RULE 29.6 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT .... i

TABLES OF CONTENTS ...ccccccccvccccccess ii

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES ......... iv

See RSIS «sos dwalds cb 665 Sbabehd babes l

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

aiken ehavatiebes ceca erceeteaetceds 2

1. ‘There Is No Justiciable Controversy For

This Court To Resolve. ................ 2

Il. The Federal Circuit’s “Deliberate

Indifference” Sub-Test Is A Practical And

Workable Test That Provides Courts With

Flexibility In Assessing An Infringer’s

Knowledge Of A Patent. ............... 3

A. The “Detiberate Indifference” Sub-

Test Is Well-Grounded In Precedent.

Leeks bE CAS USURERSOUEOHSGANUDEM ELS 3

B. The “Deliberate Indifference” Sub-

Test Gives Courts Flexibility When

Addressing A Particular Class Of

Infringers Who Assume Known

a oe ee ee rs er rer era 5

Ti

Contents

Page

Ill. The “Deliberate Indifference” Standard

Is In Harmony With Grokster. ......... 10

oe) oF): | errr rrrerr TT ere reer 11

iv

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases:

Bilski v. Kappos,

US. , 3308. Ct. 3218 (2010) ........... 2,9

DSU Medical Corporation v. JMS Co., Ltd.,

471 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ............ 3, 4, 10

Farmer v Brennan,

b11 U.S. 825, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994) ......... 5, 9

Herb v. Pitcairn,

324 U.S. 117, 65 S. Ct. 459 (1945) ........... |

Insituform Technologies, Inc.

v. Cat Contracting, Ine.,

161 I3d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1998),

cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1018 (1999) .......... 3

ASK Intl Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.,

550 U.S. 398, 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) ......... 2,9

Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc.

v. Grokster, Ltd.,

545 U.S. 9138, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005) ......... 1,10

SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., lnc.,

094 F'3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ............ passim

|

INTRODUCTION

SEB S.A. (“SEB”) respectfully submits that the

Petition of Global-Tech and Pentalpha (“Pentalpha”)

should be denied because the decision of the Court of

Appeals for the Federal Circuit in SEB S.A. v.

Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 594 F.3d 1360 (Ked. Cir.

2010), does not warrant review by this Court.

There is no justiciable controversy requiring review

by this Court because a decision will not affect the

outcome of this case. Pentalpha was found liable for both

direct infringement and inducing infringement, and its

Petition addresses only inducing infringement. At most,

a reversal of the Federal Circuit’s decision would require

a retrial on damages. See, Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S.

117, 125, 65 S. Ct. 459, 468 (1945) (the Court will not

review a judgment resting on independent grounds).

Iven if there were a justiciable controversy worthy

of review (which there is not), the Federal Circuit’s

decision in SEB should be affirmed because it advances

the Patent Law by establishing a flexible standard to

determine whether a defendant had knowledge of a

patent sufficient to induce infringement of that patent.

By adopting a flexible standard, the Federal Circuit

closed a loophole which may have allowed manufacturers

to avoid liability for inducement by deliberately ignoring

known legal risks. The “deliberate indifference” sub-

test used by the Federal Circuit is well grounded in

authority and consistent with existing authority,

including this Court’s decision in Grokster!

1. Metro-Goldwyn-Muayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd, 545

US. 918, 922-23, 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2772 (2005).

2

By establishing a standard that provides courts with

flexibility for addressing varied factual circumstances,

the Federal Circuit’s approach is consistent with the

approach taken by this Court in its recent decisions in

Bilski and KSR, both of which seek to create a balance

between flexibility and certainty.’ Therefore, this is not

an appropriate case for this Court’s review, and the

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari should be denied.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

1. There ls No Justiciable Controversy For This Court

To Resolve.

The jury in this case found Pentalpha liable for both

direct infringement and inducement to infringe. The

verdict form, however, contains a single damage award.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the verdict under both

theories of liability. Therefore, there was no need to

address the damage award. SHB, 594 F:3d at 1374.

In its Petition, Pentalpha seeks reversal of the

portion of the verdict finding liability only under the

theory of inducement. Even if that portion of the verdict

is reversed (although it should not be reversed),

Pentalpha will remain liable for direct infringement.’

2. Bilskiv. Kappos, — US. , 1380S. Ct. 3218 (2010);

KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 1278. Ct. 1727 (2007).

3. Pentalpha suggests that the Federal Circuit improperly

affirmed the verdict of direct infringement because Pentalpha’s

sale of deep fryers to American retailers with the term “FOB

China” occurred outside the United States. The Federal Circuit

dismissed that argument. SH’, 594 F.3d at 1375. This issue was

not presented for review.

3

Therefore, any decision by this Court will not affect the

ultimate issue of Pentalpha’s liability. At most, the matter

would be remanded to the district court for a retrial on

damages. Since any decision by this Court would not

change the substantive outcome of this case, the case is

not properly before this Court and Pentalpha’s Petition

should be denied.

Il. The Federal Circuit’s “Deliberate Indifference”

Sub-Test Is A Practical And Workable Test That

Provides Courts With Flexibility In Assessing An

Infringer’s Knowledge Of A Patent.

A. The“Deliberate Indifference” Sub-Test Is Well-

Grounded In Precedent.

Inducement to infringe a patent requires proof of

specific intent, i.e., that an infringer “knew or should have

known his actions would induce actual infringements.”

DSU Medical Corporation v. JMS Co., Ltd., 471 F.3d

1293, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2006). That proof may be presented

by direct or circumstantial evidence. Insituform

Technologies, Inc. v. Cat Contracting, Inc., 161 F3d 688,

695 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1018 (1999).

In DSU, the Federal Circuit en banc reconciled a prior

conflict in the law and held that a plaintiff can demonstrate

inducement of patent infringement by showing that the

infringer “knew or should have known his actions would

induce actual infringements.” DSU, 471 F.3d at 1304. The

hederal Circuit held that knowledge of the patent is an

included element of this test:

The requirement that the alleged infringer

knew or should have known his actions would

4

induce actual infringement necessarily

includes the requirement that he or she knew

of the patent.

Id. at 1304.

However, the Federal Circuit declined at that time

to articulate a standard for this lesser included

“knowledge of the patent” element of proof. Jd. at 1311

(“Moreover, we write to make clear that we do not set

forth a new standard here as to what satisfies the

‘knowledge of the patent’ requirement in cases brought

under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b).”) (Michel and Mayer, C.J.,

concurring).

SHB presented an opportunity for the Federal

Cireuit to consider a standard for the lesser included

element of “knowledge of the patent.” The Federal

Circuit clearly distinguished the test for knowledge of

acts of inducement from the sub-test for the lesser

included element of knowledge of the patent. The Court

stated that the standard in DSU addresses “the target

of the knowledge,” while the standard in SE'B addresses

“the nature of that knowledge.” SEB, 594 F3d at 1376.

The Federal Circuit recognized that direct evidence

of knowledge of a patent rarely exists and confirmed

that a claim for inducement is viable even without such

direct evidence. SHA, 594 F.3d at 1377. Therefore, the

Federal Circuit adopted a flexible “deliberate

indifference” sub-test, based on authority from other

circuits that “deliberate indifference to a known risk is

not different from actual knowledge, but is a form of

actual knowledge.” SEB, 594 F.3d at 1376-77 (citations

5

omitted). Relying on authority of this Court, the Federal

Circuit confirmed that “deliberate indifference” is a

subjective standard, as distinguished from an objective

“should have known” standard. SEB, 594 F.3d at 1376,

citing, Farmer v Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 839-40, 114

S. Ct. 1970, 1980 (1994). Therefore, the “deliberate

indifference” sub-test is consistent with DSU because

it does not reduce DSU to a “should have known”

standard. /d.

B. The “Deliberate Indifference” Sub-Test Gives

Courts Flexibility When Addressing A

Particular Class Of Infringers Who Assume

Known Risks.

The “deliberate indifference” standard is directed

to a particular class of infringers who adopt a “head in

the sand” approach to infringement and assume a known

risk that a patent may exist. In the present case, for

example, Pentalpha purchased one of SE'B’s deep fryers

in Hong Kong, brought the deep fryer into its laboratory

and copied the patented features. Pentalpha had the

presence of mind to seek a clearance opinion from patent

counsel. Despite this deliberate conduct, Pentalpha

concealed from its patent attorney the fact that it had

copied material features of SEB’s deep fryer. Under

these circumstances, Pentalpha exercised deliberate

indifference to the possibility that SEB had a patent on

the features that Pentalpha copied, and Pentalpha

engaged in affirmative conduct to avoid finding out.

Allowing a competitor to avoid liability in this manner is

a loophole that the Federal Circuit now has closed.

6

Pentalpha argues that the “deliberate indifference”

sub-test creates uncertainty and is unworkable because it

could result in liability “in virtually any situation.”

Pentalpha’s argument is incorrect because Pentalpha has

misconstrued the “deliberate indifference” sub-test.

Pentalpha characterizes the test as follows:

|Tjhe SEB standard allows “mere knowledge

of infringing potential” to serve as the basis for

liability. (Petition p. 9, citation omitted).

The Federal Circuit therefore held that the mere

presence of a risk that infringement could occur

would constitute specific intent to infringe.

(Petition p. 15).

That, however, is an overstatement of the sub-test. “Mere

knowledge of infringing potential” and “risk that

infringement could occur” is present in every case. The

lederal Circuit’s test addresses the presence of a known

risk, not any potential risk, and the distinction is critical.‘

Attempting to illustrate its misplaced argument,

Pentalpha contends that the application of the “deliberate

indifference” test would attribute knowledge of a patent

in the following circumstances (Petition p. 12):

* Where the infringer does not conduct a patent

search;

4. Contrary to Pentalpha’s suggestion (Petition p. 7), amicz

briefs submitted in support of Pentalpha’s petition for

rehearing by the Federal Circuit en banc did not support the

particular grounds asserted by Pentalpha for its Petition. Amici

Look no position on how the Federal Circuit should have decided

this case, or what the appropriate standard should be.

7

* Where the infringer conducts a patent search

but does not obtain a noninfringement opinion;

and

* Where the infringer conducts a patent search

and obtains a noninfringement opinion, where

the noninfringement opinion contains a

statement by counsel that the opinion does not,

and cannot, eliminate all risk, as “usually

disclosed in opinions of counsel.”

To the contrary, the “deliberate indifference” sub-

test would not cover a defendant who assumes general,

potential risk in the ordinary course of business, or a

defendant who acts negligently but without knowledge

of a particular risk. If a defendant does not copy the

material features of a competitor’s product, there may

be no known risk. If a defendant fails to have counsel

conduct a patent search, there may be no known risk. If

a defendant conducts a patent search and obtains an

opinion from patent counsel stating generally that the

opinion does not, and cannot, eliminate all risk, there

may be no known risk.°*

The “deliberate indifference” sub-test for the

“knowledge of the patent” element of inducement would

be satisfied only when an infringer deliberately and

purposefully assumes a known risk. Here, Pentalpha

deliberately assumed a known risk because it copied

5. For the same reasons, Pentalpha’s argument that the

“deliberate indifference” sub-test would impose on sellers of

goods an affirmative duty to secure a noninfringement opinion

for all new products (Petition pp. 17-19) is misplaced.

8

material features from SEB’s deep fryer, it sought a

clearance opinion from patent counsel and it failed to

tell counsel that it had copied SEB’s product.® The

“deliberate indifference” sub-test describes a specific

and separate class of infringers, such as Pentalpha, who

cannot reasonably allege that they did not know of the

plaintiff’s patent.

By alleging that the “deliberate indifference” sub-

test creates uncertainty, Pentalpha suggests that the

courts should maintain a bright-line test where a

plaintiff could prove “knowledge of the patent” only with

direct evidence that the defendant actually knew of the

patent. That, however, is not a workable test. As

discussed above, evidence of actual knowledge is rarely

available, and courts need a flexible test to assess

inducement in those circumstances.

Indeed, if the courts were to adopt a bright-line test

aS Pentalpha suggests, infringers could easily avoid

liability, and inducement would be virtually unprovable.

A foreign manufacturer, such as Pentalpha, which copies

a product for sale to U.S. retailers, and seeks a

noninfringement opinion from patent counsel, could

deliberately avoid learning of a patent covering that

product (or deliberately avoid creating evidence of such

knowledge). This is not a desired result. Courts need

flexibility to close this loophole and find liability for

inducement when a defendant adopts a “head in the

sand” approach. The Federal Circuit’s “deliberate

indifference” sub-test accomplishes this purpose without

6. As another example, an infringer assumes a known risk

when it obtains advice of counsel but fails to follow that advice.

9

posing undue risk of liability on defendants who act in

good faith and do not disregard known risks. Indeed,

this test is equally certain, if not more certain, than the

tests set forth by this Court in Bilski and KSR,'

confirming that the Federal Circuit’s decision does not

require review.

Pentalpha argues that the Federal Circuit

“conspicuously avoided articulating any standard

concerning the severity of the risk of infringement

necessary to find liability,” and that the “deliberate

indifference” sub-test could encompass acts of simple

negligence (Petition pp. 9-10). To the contrary, this Court

has held that “deliberate indifference entails something

more than mere negligence.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. at 8855

Indeed, the “deliberate indifference” standard

accurately reflects patent law as it is practiced on a daily

basis. When asked for a noninfringement opinion about

a new product, patent attorneys typically ask their

clients to identify any materials that were referenced in

developing the new product. The “deliberate

indifference” standard now creates liability for clients,

such as Pentalpha, which do not make full disclosure to

counsel, and particularly those who conceal the fact that

they copied an existing product.

7. Bilske v. Kappos, — US. __, 1808. Ct. 3218 (2010);

KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 1275S. Ct. 1727 (2007).

4%. Itis illogical to equate a “should have known” negligence

test to a test that requires the disregard of a “known” risk.

10

lil. The “Deliberate Indifference” Standard Is In

Harmony With Grokster.

As discussed above, according to the Federal

Circuit’s decision in DSU, inducement to infringe a

patent occurs when the infringer “knew or should have

known his actions would induce actual infringements,”

where “knowledge of the patent” is a necessary included

element of proof. DSU, 471 F3d at 1304. In SEB, the

ederal Circuit established the “deliberate indifference”

standard for the lesser included “knowledge of the

patent” element, distinguishing “the target of the

knowledge” addressed in DSU, from “the nature of that

knowledge” addressed in SEB. SEB, 594 E3d at 1376.

As in DSU, the standard for inducement set forth

by this Court in Grokster addresses the target of the

knowledge, not the nature of the knowledge. Grokster

did not involve a “knowledge of the copyright”

requirement, since the defendants in that case

essentially admitted having knowledge that the

infringed works were subject to copyright. Metro-

Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S.

913, 922-23, 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2772 (2005). Therefore, the

Federal Circuit’s decision in SEB concerning the

“knowledge of the patent” requirement does not conflict

with Grokster, which has nothing to do with the

“knowledge of the copyright.”

1]

CONCLUSION

Pentalpha has failed to provide any valid reason for

this Court to review the Federal Circuit’s decision in

this case. It is clear that Pentalpha has submitted this

Petition to avoid or delay paying the final judgment, not

to seek clarification of the law. Accordingly, the Petition

should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

Joun P Wuite

NorMan II. Zivin*

Wenby E. MILLER

Cooper & DuNHAM LIP

30 Rockefeller Plaza

New York, New York 10112

(212) 278-0400

nzivin@cooperdunham.com

Attorneys for Respondent

* Counsel of Record

AMICUS

CURIAE

BRIEF

No. 10-6 ae

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

ooo EE we <a —

GLOBAL-TECH APPLIANCES, INC., etal,

Petitioners,

v.

SEBS.A.,

Respondent.

ON PeTririon FOR A Writ OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES Court OF APPEALS

FOR THE FEDERAL Cincult

BRIEF AMICI CURIAE OF 26 LAW, ECONOMICS,

AND BUSINESS PROFESSORS

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

PROFESSOR Mark A. LEMLEY

STANFORD LAw SCHOOL

Crown Quadrangle

559 Nathan Abbott Way

Stanford, CA 94305-8610

(650) 723-2465

mlemley@law.stan

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Record and brief — Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S. A. · 563 U.S. 754 | Frix