Appendix — Venture Industries Industries Corp. v. Autolive ASP, Inc. (No. 08-471)
Supreme Court brief2008
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
la
APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
No. 2008-1113
[Filed July 10, 2008]
VENTURE INDUSTRIES
CORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
and
VEMCO, INC., PATENT HOLDING
COMPANY, and LARRY J. WINGET,
Plaintiffs,
we
AUTOLIV ASP, INC. (successor to
Morton International, Inc.),
Defendant-Appellee.
ee i i i i i i
John E. Anding, Drew Cooper & Anding, of Grand
Rapids, Michigan, argued for plaintiff-appellant. With
yc hee ee 8 Oe, ye ee, EM oS RS
i
ti Rk One 6. i De A ae on ee Gee Hed by be . * ne Min eye es » ee on ee my rs
a ay r.¢ 1 ba ar iE Lato id oles | yo ee vem ES TD Sok won et ey ae Say: evn y nt Tate a, ee ,
: 4 - ee ee Se ees nF EE ok ek sats Se on a ; ae te thas Pare!
Za
him on the brief were Thomas V. Hubbard and
Theodore J. Westbrook.
Cyrus Amir-Mokri, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher
& Flom LLP, of New York, New York, argued for
defendant-appellee. With him on the brief was Peter E.
Greene.
Appealed from: United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan
Senior Judge Avern Cohn
Judgment
ON APPEAL fromthe United States District
Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan
in CASE NO(S). 99-CV-75354
This CAUSE having been heard and considered, it is
ORDERED and ADJUDGED:
Per Curiam (DYK, PROST, and MOORE, Circuit
Judges).
AFFIRMED. See Fed. Cir. R. 36.
DATED July 10, 2008
ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT
/s/ Jan Horbaly
Jan Horbaly, Clerk
Pa eee ee Mee ee re [a o
Py Oe SR Re LORS SIAR i ee rr See See ee Ae eras oe ee "
3a
3 APPENDIX B
: UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
: EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
4 SOUTHERN DIVISION
q Civil Action No. 99-75354
j [Filed November 14, 2007]
3 VENTURE INDUSTRIES _ )
7 CORPORATION, et al., )
4 )
: Plaintiffs, )
| Vv. )
4 )
AUTOLIV, INC., et al., )
- )
Defendants. )
‘
Honorable Avern Cohn
AMENDED ORDER REGARDING
SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT
Autoliv ASP, Inc. has fully, finally and completely
satisfied the Judgment in the above-entitled case, in
the amount of $36,418,483.50.
SO ORDERED
ee ae ee a eS Ste eee ee ee er
P
” ye —
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
we eee Te eS eee ee eS pee Pe ee” By eet ee ee pe ee el ee ee 2 ae ea oe ee? ee ee
5a
APPENDIX C
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
Civil Action No. 99-75354
[Filed November 9, 2007]
VENTURE INDUSTRIES
CORPORATION, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
AUTOLIYV, INC., et al.,
)
)
)
)
)
v. )
)
)
)
Defendants. )
)
Honorable Avern Cohn
ORDER
The parties having brought various matters before
the Court, which were heard on October 25, 2007, and
the Court being fully advised in the premises;
IT IS ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
© te “ete eed: ete ae
6a
1. The final amount of the Judgment in the above-
captioned action is $36,418,483.50, inclusive of all
interest and costs.
2. The Second Amended Judgment dated November
29, 2006 is, for the reasons stated upon the record at a
hearing before this Court on October 25, 2007,
corrected to read “plaintiff Venture Industries
Corporation” instead of “plaintiffs”, the latter entry
being a ministerial error.
3. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 67, Autoliv ASP, Inc.
(“Autoliv”) is granted leave to deposit the sum of
$155,468 into the interest-bearing account established
by the Court’s October 3, 2007 Order, pursuant to
which Order Autoliv has already paid $36,263,015.50
towards final payment of the full amount of the
judgment in this case. Withdrawals from the account
shall be by order of the Court. The Clerk shall deposit
the funds in a money market account at the prevailing
rate of interest at a federally approved financial
institution. The Clerk shall deduct any administrative
registry fee set by the Director of the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts and authorized by the
Judicial Conference of the United States from the
interest earned on the funds without further order of
the Court.
EN eG ee ere eee ee eee °C ae ed
., - - Ly Ka ; < et oe as Ae
4. Upon depositing $155,468 with the Court,
Autoliv will have fully and completely satisfied the
; judgment in the above-captioned action, including all
interest and costs, and the Letter of Credit No.
d SLT410035, issued by JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. on
March 3, 2004 (ainended on November 10, 2006) on
behalf of Autoliv in this action, shall become functus
7a
officio and shall forthwith be returned by Venture to
Autoliv.
SO ORDERED.
s/Avern Cohn
AVERN COHN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
if
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document
was mailed to the attorneys of record on this date,
November 9, 2007, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/Julie Owens
Case Manager, (313) 234-5160
Dated: November 9, 2007
:
.
.
3
d
a = Pe, eee ee oe ee ee. . eee ae eS ee eee eee eee ee ee eee ee
ee ae ee ee oe ae ee a, ee . 7 J _—- 2s a eae Y % ees nL pe end ‘ 7) ,
4 pint ; . mY 3 * . bi i,
, ch) , > a hie 3 : <a -s” 7 bing has bee, -
7 - » ? n . f 4 et, i
i.
—
"Ky
ee Te ee Re ee ee ee ee ee eee Te ee Le
8a
APPENDIX D
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
Case No. 99-75354
[Filed October 30, 2007]
VENTURE INDUSTRIES CORPORATION,
VEMCO, INC., PATENT HOLDING
COMPANY, and LARRY J. WINGET,
Plaintiffs,
Vv.
AUTOLIV ASP, INC.,
Defendant.
ed
Hon: AVERN COHN
ORDER REGARDING PREJUDGMENT AND
POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST
9a
I. Introduction
This is a contract case tried to a jury and affirmed
on appeal. Before the Court is plaintiffs, Venture
Industries Corp., Vemco, Inc., Patent Holding
Company, and Larry J. Winget (collectively, Venture),
motion to determine prejudgment interest.” Venture
seeks a ruling that prejudgment interest is calculated
from November 3, 1999, the date the complaint was
filed, through September 27, 2007, the date the
mandate issued from the Court of Appeals for the >
Federal Circuit on Autoliv’s second appeal.® :
. Defendant Autoliv, Inc. (Autoliv) says that
prejudgment interest runs from November 3, 1999 to
December 4, 2003, the date the Court entered a
judgment on the jury verdict and that post-judgment
interest begins thereafter.
—" rvs .
‘os os Ge
For the reasons that follow, Venture is entitled to
prejudgment interest from November 3, 1999 to
December 4, 2003, which has already been calculated
' At the hearing on Venture’s motion to determine prejudgment
interest, the parties agreed that the sole plaintiff is Venture. The
Court directed the parties to submit a proposed order to that
effect. Since the proposed order has not yet been received or
entered, the case captions contains all of the named plaintiffs.
” Also before the Court is Venture’s motion for reconsideration of
the Court’s October 3, 2007 Order regarding Autoliv’s letter of
credit. That motion is the subject of a separate order.
* The desire to have such an expansive period of prejudgment
interest is not surprising as prejudgment interest rates are
significantly higher than post-judgment interest rates.
10a
as $6,902,251.00. Venture is entitled to post-judgment
interest thereafter.
II. Background
On November 3, 1999, Venture sued Autoliv for.
failing to allow Venture to supply air bag covers to
Autoliv in breach of an agreement. The jury returned
a verdict in favor of Venture. On December 4, 2003,
the Court entered a judgment on the jury verdict in
the amount of $27,576.001.00. Venture then filed a
motion to amend the judgment in part to include
prejudgment interest. On April 7, 2004, the Court
entered a Memorandum and Order on Prejudgment
Interest, awarding Venture prejudgment interest in
the amount of $5,878,972. The Memorandum stated
that an amended judgment would enter “nunc pro tunc
December 4, 2003.” That same day, the Court entered
an Amended Final Judgment including the amount of
the jury verdict plus prejudgment interest and costs.
The Amended Fina] Judgment also stated that it was
“nunc pro tunc December 4, 2003 for purposes of
computing interest.”
Autoliv appealed from the jury’s verdict and the
Court’s denial of its Rule 60(b) motion. Venture cross-
appealed on the issue of the manner of calculating
prejudgment interest. Venture argued _ that
prejudgment interest should accrue at the date of
filing the complaint. On August 7, 2006, the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit separately issued its
decisions on Autoliv’s appeal and Venture’s cross
appeal. As to Venture’s cross-appeal, the Federal
Circuit agreed with Venture and vacated the Court’s
calculation of prejudgment interest and directed that
oe ae Sere ee ee Ue lt a ee i el a i Ne it i al ei, re
lla
the start date for prejudgment interest was the filing
of the complaint. As to Autoliv’s appeal, the Federal
Circuit vacated and remanded for consideration
Autoliv’s motion for a new trial under Rule 60(b)(3).
Accordingly, on November 29, 2006, the Court
entered an Order Amending Judgment, calculating
prejudgment interest from the date the complaint was
filed. The Order stated that “Prejudgment interest has
been recalculated as required, and is $6,902,251.00 as
of December 4, 2003.” On that day, the Court also
- entered a Second Amended Final Judgment to reflect
the difference in prejudgment interest. The Second ;
: Amended Judgment, like the Amended Judgment, .
stated that it was “nunc pro tunc December 4, 2003 for
. purposes of computing interest.” Venture did not take
an appeal from this judgment. |
oot bic»
Be
a
ss
%
>
¥
t
?
z
fa
bs
fi
Meanwhile, the Court considered Autoliv’s Rule
60(bX3) motion in accordance with the Federal —
Circuit’s decision. On November 29, 2006, the Court
denied Autoliv’s motion. Autoliv again appealed. On
July 16, 2007, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Court’s
decision. The mandate issued on September 27, 2007.
III. Analysis
A.
Venture argues that interest from the time the
complaint was filed until the mandate issued should be
considered prejudgment interest. Autoliv says that
prejudgment interest runs from the time the complaint
was filed until December 4, 2003; thereafter, interest
accruing is considered post-judgment interest. Thus,
a ee ae ee a a Oy: eee ee ee, OO ee ae ae CO eee ee eS ee eee eR ee a” ee eee
ww, " . $
12a
the issue is what affect, if any, is the December 4, 2003
judgment under the circumstances.
The Michigan statute regarding prejudgment
interest states that “interest on a money judgement
recovered in a civil action is calculated ... from the date
of filing the complaint ... on the entire amount of the
money judgement, including attorney fees and costs.”
M.C.L. §600.6013(8). Under this statute, prejudgment
interest must be calculated on the entire judgment
from the date that the complaint was filed. Perceptron,
Inc. v. Sensor Adaptive Machs., Inc., 221 F.3d 913, 923
(6th Cir. 2000)
While prejudgment interest is determined by
reference to state law, the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit has made clear that “the question of
which judgment should be used to trigger interest is a
matter of federal law.” Coal Resources, Inc. v. Gulf &
| | Western Indus., Inc., 954 F.2d 1263, 1274 (6th Cir.
1992) (citing Bailey v. Chattem, Inc., 838 F.2d 149, 152
: (6th Cir. 1988). Thus, the date for determining the line
between pre and post judgment interest is controlled
by federal law. 28.U.S.C. § 1961 states:
Interest shall be allowed on any money
judgment in a civil case recovered in a district
court.... Such interest shall be calculated from
the date of the entry of the judgment....
In Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp v. Bonjorno,
494 U.S. 827 (1990), the Supreme Court held that the
trigger date for the accrual of post judgment interest
is the date of the judgment in which damages have
“been ascertained in a meaningful way.” Jd. at 836. In
7 a . - or ae
Pe ee ee ee ee ED ee a
bo
*
oa
ee eee eS ee ee ee Gen ea, ey
4)
4
,
~
p>
al
‘
Be
>.
.
a
et,
“2
}
.
l3a
Kaiser, the district court set aside the jury’s initial
findings on damages, holding that they were not
supported by the evidence. A new judgment was
entered after a limited re-trial. Jd. at 830. The
Supreme Court concluded that since the first trial was
not supported by the evidence, it did not represent a
meaningful assessment of the damages. Thus, post-
judgment interest began to accrue after entry of the
second judgment. Jd. at 836.
Subsequent cases in the Sixth Circuit adhere to
this rule. Following Kaiser, the Sixth Circuit in Coal
Resources, supra, held that the post-judgment interest
began on the date of the original judgment because the
original award had not been vacated on appeal even
though it has been reduced by the court-ordered
remittitur. The damages were meaningfully
ascertained from the original judgment. Jd. at 1274-
1275. In Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson
Co., 917 F.2d 1413 (6th Cir. 1990), the plaintiffs
received an award following a trial and a judgment
entered in their favor. The Sixth Circuit vacated and
remanded the case for a new trial because of an error
of law. After a re-trial, plaintiffs again prevailed.
Plaintiffs argued that post-judgment interest accrued
as of the date of the original judgment. The district
court disagreed and awarded post-judgment interest
from the date of the judgment after the second trial.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that the damages
were meaningfully ascertained after the second
judgment since the original judgment was vacated. Jd.
at 1447. See also Adkins v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd., 18
F.3d 1349, 1352 (6th Cir. 1994) (post-judgment
interest runs from the “date of any judgment that is
not entirely set aside”); Skalka v. Fernald, Envtl.
;
‘
}
7
4
!
7
l4a
Restoration Mgmt. Corp., 178 F.3d 414, 429 (6th Cir.
1999) (damages suffered by the plaintiffs were
meaningfully ascertained after the second trial since
original judgment was vacated in its entirety on the
first appeal).
Here, the damages amount reflected in the jury
verdict as stated in the December 4, 2003 judgment
has never been set aside. All subsequent judgments
were specifically entered “nunc pro tunc December 4,
2003 for purposes of computing interest.” Therefore,
the appropriate date for determining when damages
were meaningfully ascertained and triggering the post-
judgment period is December 4, 2003. The essential
damages portion of the judgment - the jury verdict -
has never been modified, vacated, or rendered
incomplete at any time since the date of entry.
Likewise, Venture’s argument that prejudgment
interest should be calculated through at Icast the
November 29, 2006 Second Amended Judgment is
unavailing because that judgment, like the Amended
Judgment, was entered nunc pro tunc December 4,
2003.
Venture, however, takes the position that
prejudgment interest accrues until the date the
Federal! Circuit issued its mandate following Autoliv’s
second appeal from the denial of its Rule 60(b) motion.
In support, Venture cites Michigan cases which it says
provide authority for the proposition that prejudgment
interest accrues during “prejudgment appellate delay.”
Ayar v. Foodland Distrib., 472 Mich. 713, 716-17
—s
15a
(2005); Morales v. Auto-Owners Ins., Co., 469 Mich.
487, 491-92 (2003). Venture also cites a federal case
interpreting Michigan law on the issue of prejudgment
interest, Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 290 F. Supp.
2d 821 (W.D. Mich. 2003).
Venture’s reliance on these cases is wholly
misplaced. First, Ayar involved the issue of when
prejudgment interest accrues on an award of costs and
mediation sanctions which the Michigan Court of
Appeals held begins at the time the complaint was
filed. It did not address the issue of prejudgment
interest running during the appellate process. Thus,
Ayar provides no support for Venture’s argument.
Ss)
In Morales, the plaintiff/insured sued
defendant/insurer seeking no-fault coverage following
an accident. The trial court granted the insurer’s
motion for summary disposition. The Michigan Court
| of Appeals affirmed. The Michigan Supreme Court
| reversed and remanded the case for trial. Morales v.
Auto-Owners, 458 Mich. 288 (1998). After a trial, a
jury found for the plaintiff. The trial court entered a
judgment on the jury verdict and awarded
prejudgment interest for the entire period, including
the time the case was on appeal. The Michigan
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s calculation of
prejudgment interest, noting that “the statute [M.C.L.
§ 6000.6013(8) makes no exception for periods of
prejudgment appellate delay.” 469 Mich. at 852.
In Wrench, the plaintiffs sued defendant claiming
breach of implied contract and various torts related to
defendant’s alleged use of their ideas relating to a
cartoon character. The district court originally granted
16a
summary judgment to defendant. Plaintiffs appealed.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed
and remanded the case for trial on several claims.
Wrench v. Taco Bell LLC, 256 F.3d 446 (6th Cir. 2001).
After a trial, a jury found in favor of plaintiffs and the
district court entered an amended judgment. The
district court then awarded plaintiffs prejudgment
interest from the time the complaint was filed to the
date of entry of an amended judgment awarding
interest, which encompassed the time the case was on
appeal.
What Venture fails to appreciate, or perhaps failed
to discover, is that both Morales and Wrench involved
the situation where the initial judgment was for the
defendant and it was only after an appeal and reversal
that the case went to trial and a judgment entered in
favor of the plaintiffs. In that circumstances, an award
of prejudgment interest during the appeal process is
consistent with Michigan law on prejudgment interest
because the plaintiff did not obtain a judgment in their
favor until after the appeal. It is also consistent with
federal law on post-judgment interest because it was
only after the appellate process that the damages, .e.
a jury verdict, was “meaningfully ascertained.” Here,
however, Venture obtained a judgment in their favor
at trial before an appeal. Holding that the dividing line
for pre-judgment and post-judgment interest is the
date of entry of judgment in Venture’s favor, December
4, 2003, is consistent with Morales and Wrench.
Moreover, it is noted that Wrench did not cite the
Supreme Court’s decision in Kaiser or any of the Sixth
Circuit decisions addressing the line between pre and
post-judgment interest.
.
a
J
J
:
F.
3
4
se
oot O56 we)
17a
C.
In its reply brief, Venture cites Scotts v. Central:
Garden & Pet Co., 403 F.3d 781 (6th Cir. 2005) to
support its argument that “the latest judgment should
be used as the stop date for state-law prejudgment
interest and start date for post-judgment interest.” In
Scotts, the plaintiff/manufacturer (Scotts) sued
defendant, its distributor (Central), for breach of
contract and quasi contract. Central filed
: counterclaims for breach of contract. In May of 2002,
. the jury returned a verdict in favor of Scotts for $22.5
million and a verdict in favor of Central for $12.075
million. The verdict in favor of Scotts was based
entirely on its breach of contract claim. The verdict in
favor of Central was composed of four parts, one part
being an award of $750,000.00 for breach of contract
on an incentive-compensation issue. On May 16, 2002,
the district court entered a judgment on the jury’s
verdict. The judgment, as stated in the district court’s
docket sheet entry, provided as follows:
An award of $22,500.00 [sic] in favor of pif
Scotts on its claim against dft Central Garden
for breach of contract. An award of $7,700,000
in favor of dft counter-plf Central Garden on its
claim against Scotts for breach of contract for
pymt of agency fees; an award of $3,275,000 in
favor of Central Garden on its claims against
Scotts for excess shipments; an award of
$750,000 in favor of Central Garden on its claim
against Scotts for breach of contract for
incentive compensation; and an award of
$350,000 in favor of Central Garden on its claim
against Scotts for Miracle Gro subject to the
18a
right of return, which yields a total award of
$12,075,000 in favor of dft Central Garden
against plf Scotts as to all of Central Garden
counterclaims (cc: all counsel) ( no pgs: 1) (sh)
(Entered: 05/17/2002)
Scotts then filed a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or
amend with regard to the $750,000.00 incentive
award.
Central also filed a Rule 59(e) motion on grounds
that are not clear. On September 30, 2002, the district ’
court entered an Order and Amended Judgment which
granted Central’s motion. The district court’s docket
sheet shows the following entry:
ORDER AND AMENDED JUDGMENT by
Judge Edmund A. Sargus Jr granting motion to
amend jgm [195-1];7,700,000 in favor of dft
counter-plf Cen Gar against Scotts for breach of
contract; $3,275,000 in favor of Cen Gar against
Scotts for excess shipments; $750,000 in favor of
Cen Gar against Scotts for breach of contract for
incentive compensation; $350,000 in favor of
Cen Gar against Scotts for MiracleGro, which
yields a total award of $12,075,00 in favor of dft
Cen Gar against plf Scotts as to all of Cen Gar’s
counterclaims (cc: all counsel) ( no pgs: 3) (sh)
(Entered: 09/30/2002)
The jury verdict amounts were not changed; however,
the language describing the component parts was
changed. There is no indication that the Amended
Judgment was entered nunc pro tunc of the May 16,
2002 Judgment.
Tee eee Sh eee ae A ee ee ee
19a
Subsequently, the district court granted Scott’s
motion to alter or amend and set aside the $750,000.00
award in favor of Central for lack of evidence.
Both parties also moved for prejudgment interest.
The district court directed them to confer on the net
amount of prejudgment interest they owed each other.
After doing so, they agreed that “2,827,123.65 is the
net amount of prejudgment interest that has accrues
in favor of plaintiff Scotts though May 16, 2002.” On
September 22, 2003, the district court entered a Final
Amended Judgment which awarded Scotts the full
amount of the jury verdict ($22.5 million) and Central
$11.325 million (reflecting the $750,000.00 reduction
from the Rule 59(e) motion). It also awarded Scotts
prejudgment interest through May 16, 2002 - the date
of the original judgment on the jury’s verdict. The
district court awarded Scotts post-judgement interest
from May 17, 2002 through the date of payment. There
is no indication on the Final Amended Judgment that
it was entered nunc pro tunc to May 16, 2002.
Despite the parties’ agreement on prejudgment
interest noted above, they disagreed as to the date
through which prejudgment interest ran. Central
argued that it stopped at the date of entry of the
judgment on the jury verdict - May 16, 2002. Scotts
argues that it accrued until a final appealable order
was entered - the Final Amended Judgment on
September 22, 2003. The district court held that the
cut off date for post judgment interest was May 16,
2003.
20a
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that
September 22, 2003 was the cut off date for
prejudgment/post-judgment interest, explaining:
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a), which controls
postjudgment interest in civil cases decided in
the federal district courts, postjudgment
“interest shall be calculated from the date of the
entry of the judgment.” The Supreme Court has
interpreted this statute to require interest to
run from the date of the entry of judgment by
the court rather than from the date of the jury
verdict. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. uv.
Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 835, 110 S.Ct. 1570, 108
L.Ed.2d 842 (1990). This circuit has held that
postjudgment interest can run “from the date of
any judgment that is not entirely set aside.”
Skalka v. Fernald Envtl. Restoration Mgmt.
Corp., 178 F.3d 414, 429 (6th Cir. 1999).
As the district court noted, the Ninth Circuit
addressed an issue similar to the one that faces
us here and held that postjudgment interest
should accrue from the date of the final
judgment. See AT & T Co. v. United Computer
Systems, Inc. , 98 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 1996)
(calculating postjudgment interest from the
later of two possible dates of judgment, where
the prejudgment interest was higher than the
postjudgment interest, on the ground that
“{(wlhere a prior judgment awarding damages
has been vacated pursuant to the actions of an
ultimately losing party, equitable principles
favor calculating the interest in a manner that
more fully compensates the prevailing party”).
2la
The district court attempted to distinguish
AT & T by stating that “there is only one
judgment in this case-the Rule 54(b) judgment
entered on May 16, 2002.”
This is incorrect. At least two judgments were
entered after May 16, 2002, imcluding a
September 30, 2002 amended judgment and a
September 22, 2003 final amended judgment.
Several judgments were also entered before the
jury verdict, but those judgments are not
candidates for the date that postjudgment
interest begins because the damages due were
not sufficiently ascertained. Cf. AT & T, 98 F.3d
at 1210.
The justification given by the Ninth Circuit for
calculating postjudgment interest from the date
of final judgment applies with equal force in the
present case. Although both parties received
jury awards, Scotts was clearly the “prevailing
party.” Id. at 1211. Scotts was awarded $22.5
million of its $23.8 million claim; Central was
awarded only $12.075 million of the originally
requested sum of $976 million (and this award
was further reduced by the district court).
Because the prejudgment-interest rate on ali of
the claims is substantially higher than the
postjudgment-interest rate, the district court’s
decision to start postjudgment interest from the
May 16, 2002 judgment on the jury verdict
grants an unjustified benefit to Central as the
losing party. This equitable imbalance could
have been avoided if the district court had ruled
that postjudgment interest did not begin until
22a
the September 22, 2003 final amended
judgment. We therefore reverse the district
court’s ruling on this issue, and set the date at
which postjudgment interest begins to run at
September 22, 2003.
Scotts, 403 F.3d at 792-93.
Although the holding in Scotts might support a
finding that the dividing line between pre-judgment
and postjudgment interest should be January 20, 2004
- the date of the Final Judgment, there is no indication
that the judgments in Scotts were entered nunc pro
tunc. It is also noted that nothing in Scotts supports
Venture’s argument that the dividing line should be
the date of the Federal Circuit’s mandate.
Additionally, the rationale for the Sixth Circuit’s
holding in Scotts to move the date for starting post
judgment interest was to avoid inequity. It cannot be
said under the circumstances that it would be
inequitable to use December 4, 2003 as the dividing
line between pre and post-judgment interest. The
Amended Judgment and Second Amended Final
Judgment were both entered “nunc pro tune December
4, 2003 for purposes of computing interest.” This
language clearly implies that the dividing line for pre
and post-judgment interest has always been
contemplated to be December 4, 2003. The litigation
history of the prejudgment interest issue supports this
date as the demarcation. Moreover, the issue before
the Federal Circuit as to prejudgment interest was the
start date, not the end date.
SO ORDERED.
Re ee ee OE I LE ee 8 re A ae Rae RET ie) TSE ey ee eh ee ee ae ‘ ‘ "a ‘
ee ee ee ee eS Oe
23a
Dated: October 30, 2007
s/Avern Cohn _
AVERN COHN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document
was mailed to the attorneys of record on this date,
October 30, 2007, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
‘Julie O |
Case Manager, (313) 234-5160
te pid J . 4 if ad Pee > a Zid ne . bon of were Se <n titan ae
pe ern ee Ae ee ee. Oe ee ee, ee eee eee ee om ee ae eee ee ee ar. ene ee ee SS Pe ase
;
*
x
:
a.
1A
itt
e
F
é
y
;
+s
aa
.
a
a
4
«s
%
;
t
5
«
a
;
r
’
:
a
:
y
:
APPENDIX E
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
Case Number: 99-75354
[Filed November 29, 2006]
VENTURE INDUSTRIES CORP., et al,
Plaintiff,
AUTOLIV ASP, INC.,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
Vv. )
)
)
)
)
)
Honorable Avern Cohn
SECOND AMENDED FINAL
JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE
s Jury Verdict. This action came before the Court
for a trial by jury. The issues have been tried and
the jury has rendered its verdict.
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the
judgment be and hereby is entered in favor of
25a
plaintiffs and against defendant in the
AGGREGATE OF $34,482,413.84.
$27,567,001.00 - jury verdict
$ 6,902,251.00 - prejudgment interest
SS 13,161.84 - costs
Pursuant to Rule (77d), FRCivP
Copies have been mailed to:
the attorneys of record
Date November 29, 2006
nunc pro tunc December 04, 2003 for
purposes of computing interest
David Weaver, Clerk of Court
s/Julie Owens _
Deputy Clerk
: 2 ae r s * o% -, ~ . “ - “ * 4 4 = -
FF ee ek, ee eee) OP TE Sete ei ee Ie ee ee eT ee oe ee ee oe ee
APPENDIX F
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
Case Number: 99-75354
[Filed April 7, 2004]
VENTURE INDUSTRIES CORP., ET AL,
Plaintiff,
AUTOLIV ASP, INC.,
)
)
)
)
v. )
)
)
)
Defendant. )
)
Honorable Avern Cohn
AMENDED FINAL
JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE
s Jury Verdict. This action came before the Court i
for a trial by jury. The issues have been tried and
the jury has rendered its verdict. !
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the
judgment be and hereby is entered in favor of
27a
plaintiffs and against defendant in the
AGGREGATE OF $33,459,134.84.
$27 567,001.00 - jury verdict
f $ 5,878,972.00 - prejudgment interest
$ 13,161.84 - costs
4 Pursuant to Rule (77d), FRCivP
Z Copies have been mailed to:
John Anding and William Horton
Date April 7, 2004
NUNC PRO TUNC December 4, 2003
for purposes of computing interest
David Weaver, Clerk of Court
/s/
JUDY CASSADY Deputy Clerk
28a
APPENDIX G
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEDERAL CIRCUIT
; Nos. 04-1486, 04-1488
[Filed August 7, 2006]
VENTURE INDUSTRIES CORPORATION,
VEMCO, INC., PATENT HOLDING
COMPANY, and LARRY J. WINGET,
Plaintiffs-Cross Appellants,
v.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
AUTOLIV ASP, INC. (successor to )
Morton International, Inc.), )
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
v.
Defendant-Appellant,
AUTOLIV , INCORPORATED,
Defendant.
Before LINN, DYK, and PROST, Circuit Judges.
|
!
PROST, Circuit Judge.
a
i
4
,
>
*)
uJ
<
ye Se Re ae Tee Ce
ee Se
| ae
4
Venture Industries Corp. (“Venture”) sued Autoliv
ASP (“Autoliv”) for breach of contract. The contract
was a Supply Agreement that had been entered into as
part of the settlement of previous litigation between
Ver. cré and Morton International (“Morton”), the
predecessor in interest to Autoliv. The trial was -
complicated by the fact that aside from the breach of
Supply Agreement claim, many other claims relating
to other agreements resulting from the settlement had
been stayed pending arbitration. In particular, claims
arising from a Cross Licensing agreement were stayed
including claims disputing who between Autoliv and
Venture owned various technologies. This complication
led to numerous evidentiary rulings relating to
testimony addressing any technology ownership issue.
As the district court did not err in these evidentiary
rulings, we affirm the district courts rulings.
Ultimately, the jury found that Autoliv had breached
the Supply Agreement and Venture was awarded
$27,576,001 in damages and $5,878,972 in resulting
prejudgment interest. The district court did err in
calculating the accrual date of prejudgment interest.
In this case, the proper date to calculate prejudgment
interest is the date of filing the complaint. We
therefore vacate the district court’s calculation of
prejudgment interest and remand the case to
re-calculate the prejudgment interest consistent with
this opinion. Even though other claims remain pending
in this suit, we have jurisdiction over this appeal
because the district court entered judgment pursuant
to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as
to the breach of contract claim.
ee ee! ee — ~ 1 = Oe ee. Or. ee ee a ee oe ee oe ‘ “
a
-“
4
4
a4
7
s
DS EE SR eh. eee ee er Te ey
. ee Ee as Wate, Ms Pho wth el a ee a ee ee Ea ee ee Dy eee ee en ee 7
30a
i.
After the entry of final judgment, Autoliv filed a
motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court’s
denial of that motion is the subject of a separate
appeal, which we also resolve today. Venture Indus.
Corp. v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., 457 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir.
2006). In the companion case, we vacate and remand
as to Autoliv’s request for a new trial pursuant to Rule
60(b\(3). Id., at 1333-34. Our affirmance of the
judgment below and our remand for the
re-computation of interest in this case are, of course,
subject to the outcome of the proceedings on remand in
the companion case.
Autoliv is the successor in interest to the
Automotive Safety Products Unit of Morton
International, Inc. Morton was a ‘tier one’ supplier of
safety restraint systems to the automotive industry
meaning that it directly supplied safety restraint
systems to car and truck manufacturers. Venture was,
on the other hand, a ‘tier two’ supplier because it
supplied components to ‘tier one’ suppliers. Venture
custom molded plastics, including air bag covers. From
1990 to 1995, Venture supplied Morton with air bag
covers.
In 1995, Venture sued Morton in the Eastern
District of Michigan asserting that Morton had
misappropriated intellectual property relating to air
bag cover technology owned by Venture. Morton
counter-claimed asserting ownership of the technology.
On December 31, 1995, Morton and Venture settled
the case by entering into a Settlement Agreement
{
7
3la
containing two separate agreements: a Cross License
Agreement and a Supply Agreement. The Cross
License Agreement permitted each party to use the
other’s claimed technology. One relevant provision of
the Cross License Agreement addressed the
procedures for resolving any disputes arising from the
Cross License Agreement:
If a dispute arises between the parties relating
to [the Cross License Agreement] they shall use
the following procedure prior to either party’s
pursuing any other available remedy:
(b) If the dispute relates to the inventorship
and/or ownership of Subject Technology or
whether any particular Invention constitutes
Subject Technology, or whether Subject
Technology constitutes Solely or Jointly Owned
Subject Technology, the dispute shall be
submitted to binding arbitration ....
The other agreement that formed part of the
settlement was the Supply Agreement. It allowed
Venture to place bids on all of Morton’s future air bag
cover programs and provided that Venture would be
awarded those contracts where Venture’s bids were
“reasonably competitive.” The Supply Agreement
stated that:
(a) Morton shall give [Venture] the opportunity
to quote on all of Morton’s world wide future
Cover programs awarded to it by its customers
. excluding, however, such future cover
programs (i) for which Morton has been directed
by its customer to use a source other than
ra
ss
ae
’
=
Biss
x
r
4g
a
«
Be
a
eg
“G
¥
i -
bo
ok
a
Z
-
a
*
">
‘
4
e
i,
;
‘
32a
[Venture] or has been directed by its customer
not to use [Venture], (ii) for which [Venture], in
Morton’s reasonable judgment, does not have
the capability at the time of quotation to meet
their requirements for the particular program(s)
under consideration; and (iii) which Morton has
elected, in its sole discretion, to retain
internally for manufacture by Morton itself.
(b) All timely quotes received from [Venture] for
programs described in subsection (a) above,
shall be compared by Morton to quotes received |
from other established module cover suppliers i
for the same program(s). Provided [Venture’s] .
quote is reasonably competitive (as determined
in good faith by Morton taking in to account
price, terms, quality, ability to meet
qualification requirements and delivery dates
and other objective factors related to
competitiveness), it shall be awarded such
program(s).
a
-
<
|
<
J
:
.
“4
;
7
:
On November 3, 1999, Venture once again sued
Morton and Autoliv as the successor in interest to
Morton, alleging that they had breached the Supply
Agreement and the Cross License Agreement and also
alleging patent infringement and misappropriation of
trade secrets. Of all the claims in the amended
complaint, only the claim for the breach of the Supply
Agreement was fully adjudicated. All remaining claims
were either stayed or dismissed. In particular, as the
Cross License Agreement contains a mandatory
binding arbitration requirement, the claims that arose
out of disputes over the Cross License Agreement have
been stayed pending the outcome of arbitration. As the
ee, TO ne Bi a tl le a OE a ee ie ll, Be 5 eR Ces ll - 7-347, > 4 he, Sait ed es i eee? Fei 4
mr? : , » et ge ee > 7 <n Ra
33a
claim for breach of the Supply Agreement did not arise
from the Cross License Agreement, this claim was
neither stayed nor taken up in the arbitration.
On October 23, 2003, prior to trial, Autoliv filed a
; motion in limine to exclude, inter alia, evidence
; referencing the earlier lawsuit, the resulting
Settlement Agreement and the Cross _ License
. Agreement. It argued such evidence was irrelevant,
unfairly prejudicial, and impermissible character
evidence as the 1995 case and the Cross License
Agreement has “no relevance and no relationship” to
this case. On October 29, 2003, the district court held
a pre-trial conference addressing, among other things,
Autoliv’s motion in limine. The district court ruled that
Venture and Autoliv would prepare a stipulation of
facts describing the facts leading to the formation of
the Supply Agreement and stated that the stipulation
“can be done in lieu of testimony, but I’m not going to
shade the testimony and I’m not going to confine
[Venture] to the four corners.” The resulting
stipulation of facts was read to the jury at the start of
trial on Nov-mber 4, 2003 and stated that
between 1990 and 1995, Venture had a
relationship with Morton under which Venture
manufactured air bag covers which it sold to
Morton. Next, in 1995, Venture and Morton had
a falling out which resulted in Venture suing
Morton. Next, on December 31, 1995, the
lawsuit was settled. A component of the
settlement was a supply agreement pursuant to *
which Morton agreed to permit Venture to bid
on [some] of Morton’s air bag cover programs
34a
On the third day of trial, the district court re-visited
the evidentiary issue and ruled on the scope of
evidence that could be admitted regarding the
settlement of the prior litigation. Along similar lines,
on the fourth day of the tria!, the district court again
explained the type of evidence that could be admitted.
stating that “I think Venture is entitled to explain
what the essence of the prior dispute was about so the
jury can understand fully how that prior dispute was
settled. All they know now is it was a dispute between
Morton and Venture.” Based on these evidentiary
rulings, Venture introduced testimony relating to the
origins of the Supply Agreement and relating to
Venture’s licensing practices with third party air bag
suppliers. Autoliv moved to have the cour. issue a
limiting instruction as to this testimony but the
district court denied the motion. Autoliv also requested
a specific jury instruction that placed the burden on
Venture to establish that its quotes were reasonably
competitive with the quotes from other suppliers but
the district court declined to use Autoliv’s jury
instruction.
Ultimately, the case went to the jury and, on
December 4, 2003, the jury found that Autoliv had
breached the Supply Agreement with respect to thirty
three of thirty eight air bag programs and it awarded
Venture $33,459,135 in damages. That damage award
included $5,878,972 in prejudgment interest where the
interest was calculated from the date the damages
were incurred.
Autoliv appeals the district court’s evidentiary
rulings, the district court’s refusal to give a limiting
instruction, and the district court’s refusal to use
35a
Autoliv’s jury instruction. Venture cross-appeals the
district court’s failure to award prejudgment interest
from the date of filing the complaint rather than from
the date the damages accrued.
Il.
As to the question of whether evidence was
properly admitted at trial is a procedural question, the
regional circuit law controls the issue. Micro Chem.,
Ine. v. Lextron, Inc., 317 F.3d 1387, 1390-91 (Fed. Cir.
2003). In the Sixth Circuit, a district court’s decision to
admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. Beck v. Haik, 377 F.3d 624, 636 (6th Cir.
2004). Jury instructions are reviewed “as a whole to
determine whether they adequately inform the jury of
relevant considerations and provide a basis in law for
the jury to reach its decision.” Beard v. Norwegian
Caribbean Lines, 900 F.2d 71, 72 (6th Cir. 1990). A
district court’s decision whether to use a party’s jury
instruction is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Hisrich
v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., Inc., 226 F.3d 445, 449 (6th
Cir. 2000).
On appeal, Autoliv argues that the district court
erred in three ways. First, it contends that Venture’s
references to technology ownership were prejudicial
and should have been excluded. Second, once this
evidence was admitted, Autoliv contends that the
district court erred by refusing to give a limiting
instruction covering the admitted evidence. Lastly,
Autoliv argues that the trial court erred by refusing to
use Autoliv’s jury instruction.
:
ek i ee ele ee he ee AS A
2 . - : Lae
36a
A.
As to the initial evidentiary rulings, Autoliv argues
that the district court improperly expanded its initial
decision to limit technology evidence when it allowed
two particular pieces of evidence. First, Autoliv objects
to the testimony of Mr. Torakis who regarded the
Supply Agreement as the quid pro quo for the Cross
Licensing Agreement stating that “[Venture] wanted
business, [Morton] wanted our ideas that was the
deal.” Autoliv also objects to the testimony of Mr.
Winget who testified that third party suppliers like
Toyota Gosei and TRW had paid Venture a license fee
of fifty cents per air bag cover for Venture’s technology.
Autoliv contends that this testimony unfairly
prejudiced Autoliv because evidence of a quid pro quo
arrangement or of licensing payments suggests that
Venture owned the air bag technology.
The district court was well within its discretion to
allow testimony especially where it felt it was needed
to illuminate central issues to the case provided that
“the judge inform|s] the parties and give[s] them an
opportunity to present evidence relating to the newly
revived issue.” Huss v. King Co., 338 F.3d 647, 651
(6th Cir. 2003). It is clear from the record that where
the district court revisited the scope of the testimony
because it was necessary for the jury’s understanding,
it also allowed the parties recourse to adjust their
litigation strategies regarding this testimony. For
example, on November 6, 2003, the district court
stated that
at an earlier time in this case I made a ruling,
and I don’t know whether any part of it was
37a
reserved, that the supply agreement was a
stand-alone agreement and excluded any
evidence of the cross-license agreement or the
settlement agreement of the litigation.
Based on the testimony I’ve heard over the
last two days, I think that ruling was too
restrictive. I don’t think this jury is capable of
understanding the supply agreement... . |
can’t understand why anybody would enter into
such an agreement without knowing that there
was a lawsuit, there was a settlement of the
lawsuit, and the settlement of that lawsuit
included both the cross-license agreement,
because it was a dispute over technology, and
included the supply agreement .... [T)hat
doesn’t mean a wide-ranging inquiry can be
made into it, but . . . on a limited basis, I will
allow testimony on the settlement agreement
and on the litigation ... .
In response to this change, Mr. Horton, counsel for
Autoliv asked, “Obviously the scope of this is now
changing dramatically. I may want to call a witness
regarding the cross-licensing agreement.” The judge
responded, “You can. You can do anything you want.
In tight of this ruling, if anyone wants to amend the
witness list or the exhibit list, they can do so.”
Second, Autoliv argues that, once evidence of
technology ownership was admitted, the district court
erred by not granting Autoliv’s request for a limiting
instruction as to the technology ownership evidence.
We do not agree with Autoliv. Autoliv requested a
limiting instruction that two exhibits, Plaintiffs
Exhibits 129a and 130, were being introduced to
SE OCT Net EE Oe SR Pip Le ER PE Pe I aS Sy «SS ee IE ON Pe ee ee eee
38a
demonstrate Autoliv’s ownership over the technology.
As stated by the district court the exhibits were
admitted to demonstrate Autoliv’s manufacturing
capabilities and included no “claim to proprietorship
{and] no claim to ownership.” We discern no clear
error in the district court’s refusal to give the limiting
| instruction.
Third, and lastly, as to the jury instruction, Autoliv
argues that the district court erred by refusing to
grant its more specific instruction which stated that
Venture bore the burden of establishing that the
exclusions in the Supply Agreement did not apply. “[A}
district court’s refusal to give a jury instruction
constitutes reversible error if: ‘(1) the omitted
instructions are a correct standard of the law; (2) the
instruction is not substantially covered by other
delivered charges; (3) the failure to give the instruction
impairs the requesting party’s theory of the case.”
Webster v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 197 F.3d 815, 820
(6th Cir. 1999). The instruction that was read to the
jury stated:
Pe Pa Se eRe Le Te Ne *
Venture has the burden of proving each of the
following propositions. First, that Venture
performed all obligations required of it under
the contract. Second, that Autoliv ASP failed to
perform its obligations under the contract and
breached the contract. Third, as a result of the
breach of the contract, Venture was damaged.
Autoliv ASP has the burden of proving it
qualified for any exclusion set forth in the
- Supply Agreement which it maintains absolved
it of an obligation under the Supply Agreement.
a te eae A Nett gan Obie iJ "ae ee ee ——- aN
39a
The district court also read the entirety of Section 2.2
of the Supply Agreement to the jury. That section
detailed the requirements of each party and the
circumstances and conditions under which Autoliv
could have refused to award a cover program to
Venture. Those sections of the Supply Agreement
outline that programs could be excluded from the
Supply Agreement under specific circumstances such
as where a customer directs that a specific cover
supplier be used rather than Venture. Under these
circumstances, we conclude that the district court
properly instructed the jury that Autoliv bore the
burden of proving that the exclusions excused it from
allowing Venture to bid on a contract. The district
court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Autoliv’s
proposed jury instruction.
Autoliv’s arguments regarding the evidentiary and
jury related rulings have been considered and are
found to be without merit. We see no reason to disturb
those rulings of the district court.
Itt.
In its cross-appeal, Venture argues that the district
court erred by failing to award Venture prejudgment
interest from the date of the filing of the complaint,
regardless of the time the damages actually accrued.
In particular, Venture argues that Michigan Compiled
Laws section 600.6013 explicitly grants prejudgment
interest from the time of filing of the complaint and
that statute controls the grant of prejudgment interest
in this case.
Eo ae ye Pee Pee ee EP Re ee ee Oe oO ne eee nt FE, OES Se OE em ae ie Cee SY Oe eee
REE ee Re TR ES ETE Qtr, ren ata ree ya BR EL a ee Be ey tte Eee Ae eS See CT ye
40a
law nor any other subject matter specific to the
Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction. Therefore, in this case,
the law of the Sixth Circuit applies. See Biodex Corp.
v. Loredan Biomedical, Inc., 946 F.2d 850, 855-56 (Fed.
Cir. 1991). Statutory interpretation is reviewed de
novo. United States v. Thomas, 211 F.3d 316, 319 (6th
Cir. 2000). In the Sixth Circuit, the issue of
prejudgment interest is governed by the law of the
forum state, which, in this case is Michigan. The
interpretation of a statute by a district court is
reviewed de novo. United States v. Thomas, 211 F.3d
316, 319 (6th Cir. 2000).
4 :
Prejudgment interest is neither unique to patent
4
7
:
a
;
Autoliv argues that prejudgment interest in this
case should not be calculated from the time the
complaint was filed. It cites to a portion of Michigan
Compiled Laws section 600.6013(1) which states that
liIntscest is allowed on a money judgment
recovered in a civil action, as provided in this
section. However, for complaints filed on or
after October 1, 1986, interest is not allowed on
future damages from the date of filing the
complaint to the date of entry of the judgment.
As used in this subsection, “future damages”
means that term as defined in section 6301.
But Autoliv relegates to a footnote the relevant
information that under section 600.6301 the “future
damages” discussed in section 600.6013 are “damages
arising from personal injury.” As this case is not one
for damages for personal injury, the limits on
prejudgment interest cited by Autoliv are irrelevant.
3
p..
*
;
fy
~
%
:
:
i
g
s
Ps
PES Per ee ee! ee Ie Oe ae es Py Ne A EY Te Dae ON EEE ECMO METS EIR Eee Ye ee hon
Ala
Instead, as has been held by the Sixth Circuit in a
breach of contact case,
liln Michigan, prejudgment interest is not
discretionary as the statute provides in relevant
part that “interest on a money judgment
recovered in a civil action shall be calculated
from the date of filing the complaint” and “shall
be calculated on the entire amount of the money
judgment, including attorney fees and other
costs.” The statute excepts from this
proscription prejudgment interest on future
damages for personal injuries.
Perceptron, Inc. v. Sensor Adaptive Mach., 221 F.3d
913, 922 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 600.6013(6) (West Supp. 2000)). The Sixth Circuit in
Perceptron further articulates that
[w]e are convinced Michigan law requires that
prejudgment interest be calculated in this case
on the entire judgment from the date that the
complaint was filed. The prejudgment interest
statute is remedial in nature and is to be
construed liberally in favor of the prevailing
party. The purpose of awarding statutory
prejudgment interest is not only to compensate
the prevailing party for the delay in the use of
the money, but also to offset the costs of
bringing the action and to provide an incentive
for prompt settlement. The statute must be
applied in accordance with its plain terms.
Id. at 923 (citations omitted). In view of the arguments
made, we agree with Venture that damages in this
. é
P =e ¢ = be
en kOe BOS Fe ee Bi ee Uy
2
é
3
.
ences Puts
,
=i
ci]
<
%
a
>
a,
:
.
4
4
if
a
.
42a
case should have been calculated from the date the
complaint was filed rather than when the damages
accrued. See also Ayar v. Foodland Distribs., 472
Mich. 713, 698 N.W.2d 875, 877 (2005) (finding the
language of section 600.6013(8) “to be clear and
unambiguous”); Morales v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 469
Mich. 487, 672 N.W.2d 849 (2003) (holding that “the
language of MCL 600.6013 unambiguously states that
prejudgment interest is to be calculated from the date
the complaint is filed”).
IV.
In sum, we affirm the district court’s rulings on the
evidentiary and procedural issues, however, we
conclude that the district court did err in calculating
prejudgment interest. In this case, the proper date to
calculate prejudgment interest is the date of filing the
complaint. We, therefore, vacate the district court’s
calculation of prejudgment interest and remand the
case to the district court to re-calculate the
prejudgment interest consistent with this opinion, and
subject to the outcome of the remand proceedings in
the companion case.
ee ee Ee ee ee ee PT ey ee ee ee ee
43a
APPENDIX H
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEDERAL CIRCUIT
No. 05-1537
[Filed August 7, 2006]
VENTURE INDUSTRIES CORPORATION,
Vemco, Inc., Patent Holding Company,
and Larry J. Winget,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
Vv.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
AUTOLIV ASP, INC. (successor to )
Morton International, Inc.), )
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
and
Autoliv, Incorporated,
Defendant.
Appealed from: United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan
PT ee ee ra Se COD gy Ra Nee oe, MY oy ty ee Pee By
John E. Anding, Drew, Cooper & Anding, of Grand
Rapids, Michigan, argued for plaintiffs-appellees. With
him on the brief was Thomas V. Hubbard. Of counsel
on the brief was Richard W. McLaren, Jr., Welsh &
Katz, Ltd., of Chicago, Illinois.
Peter G. Greene, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher &
Flom LLP, of New York, New York, argued for
defendant-appellant. With him on the brief was Cyrus
Amir-Mokri. Of counsel on the brief was William H.
Horton, Cox, Hodgman & Giarmarco, P.C., of Troy,
Michigan.
Before LINN, DYK, and PROST, Circuit Judges.
DYK, Circuit Judge.
Autoliv ASP, Inc. (“Autoliv”) appeals the decision of
the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan denying Autoliv’s motion for relief
from judgment in favor of Venture Industries Corp,,
Vemceo, Inc., Patent Holding Co., and Larry J. Winget
(collectively “Venture”), pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60, sections (bX2) and (bX3). Venture
Indus. Corp. v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., No. 99-75354 (E.D.
Mich. July 15, 2005) (Judge Avern Cohn)." We
conclude that the district court did not err in denying
Autoliv’s request under Rule 60(b)(2), but that the
district court erred in failing to address whether
Venture’s use at trial of financial statements
* On August 4, 2005, the district court issued an opinion
explaining its reasons for denying Autoliv’s Rule 60(b) motion.
Venture Indus. Corp. v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., No. 99-75354 (E.D.
Mich. Aug. 4, 2005) (“Rule 60(b) Opinion ”).
ee ee ee eee Ce II LF Lee OE ON Ie MG SOE CT OEM, ee Seer ee eS ee Fel ee ee
45a
containing false information constituted “fraud,
misrepresentation, or other misconduct” warranting
relief under Rule 69(b)(3). Accordingly, we affirm in
part, vacate in part, and remand.
BACKGROUND
This appeal presents the issue of whether the use
of falsified information in financial statements by
Venture’s damages expert at trial entitles Autoliv to
relief from judgment under either Rule 60(b)(2) or
60(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
As part of the 1995 settlement of a patent dispute
between Venture and Autoliv, Venture and Autoliv
executed a supply agreement.? Under the supply
agreement, Autoliv was obligated to purchase airbag
covers from Venture so long as Venture was capable of
filling the order and Venture’s bids were “reasonably
competitive” with the bids ef other suppliers. In the
period after 1995, Autoliv purchased some covers from
Venture, but also acquired covers fram other sources.
On November 3, 1999, Venture filed suit against
Autoliv alleging that Autoliv breached the supply
agreement with respect to 38 airbag cover projects
either by not allowing Venture to bid on the projects or
by rejecting Venture’s reasonably competitive bids.
* The supply agreement and two other agreements that were part
of the settlement were executed by Venture and Morton
International, Inc. (Autoliv ASP’s predecessor in interest). Morton
was acquired by and merged into Autoliv ASP in 1997. For
convenience, we refer to both Morton International, Inc. and
Autoliv ASP as “Autoliv.”
— Hs ee oO v .
teed at Khe Old Ci i is ane Ba On dk
PL PO ee A Se Re OLN Gael OE LCT Rae peep ee eS SRR ET See PO i ee aL Caer Ry REY Seat es
46a
Venture’s complaint also stated several patent law
claims, including claims for correction of inventorship,
declaratory judgment of unenforceability of patents
Autoliv claimed to own, and declaratory judgment of
infringement of patents Venture claimed to own. These
claims were stayed by the district court pending the
outcome of arbitration of these claims as required by
a cross-license agreement, also executed as part of the
settlement of the 1995 litigation. Other claims relating
to the supply agreement were either stayed by
; stipulation of the parties or voluntarily dismissed.’
Discovery and other pretrial proceedings took place for
: the next several years.
Discovery proved to be contentious. For this reason,
on March 5, 2002, the district court appointed a
Special Master to oversee discovery. On November 14,
| 2002, Autoliv submitted to Venture the following
: request for production of documents:
. Please produce each and every one of Venture’s
3 monthly, quarterly, and annua! internal and
external financial statements for the years 1995
to the present, whether reviewed, compiled or
audited, and all documents relied upon, referred
to, consulted or generated in preparing such
statemerts, including your general ledgers,
subsidiary ledgers, accounts payable and
* The other claims related to the supply agreement were for
fraudulent inducement and misrepresentation, termination and
cancellation of contract, accounting, unjust enrichment, and
unfair competition. Venture also asserted claims for fraudulent
inducement of the settlement of the 1995 litigation and
misappropriation of trade secrets.
pe ae ae
Pe eat al
t
:
“A
>
:
a
2
4
7
5°
ty
POTS Pe Pe Te er PE Oe FT ED Oe BL Pn es Re RA eR SP Tw ee eee
47a
receivable ledgers, trial balances, accountants’
work papers, bank statements, check registers
and bank records. The term financial
statements shall include, but is not limited to
your balance sheets, income statements, profit
and loss statements, cash flow statements,
statements of net worth, statements of retained
earnings and all notes to such financial
statements.
J.A. at 648. Autoliv also requested financial
information regarding the relationship between
Venture and its subsidiaries. Venture responded that
these requests “lack[ed] foundation in that Defendants
have never contended Plaintiffs’ financial condition
was the basis for withholding the award of any
program.” J.A. at 668. Unsatisfied, Autcliv filed a
motion to compel further responses on January 27,
2003. On March 10, 2003, the Special Master denied
Autoliv’s motion, concluding that “[(rlequests for
financial information in this lawsuit are appropriate,
but these requests are overbroad.” Rule 60(b) Opinion,
shp op. at 6 (quoting Special Master report and
recommendation).
On April 9, 2003, Autoliv, seeking additional
financial information, filed a motion to compel the
depositions of representatives of Venture and two of —
its subsidiaries pursuant to Rule 30(b)\(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On September 23,
2003, the district court orally denied Autoliv’s motion,
concluding that “faJjll of [Venture’s}] financial
statements, its annual statements and its quarterly
statements and its monthly statements should be
produced,” but that Autoliv’s proposed deposition topic
4
4
2
4
48a
(“the basis for [the deponent’s] contention that
Venture’s bid on each [project] would have been
reasonably competitive with those quotes submitted by
others”) was “actually asking for Venture’s position in
the litigation.” Id. at 6-7. The district court explained:
“I prefer to wait until the final pretrial statement is
prepared and we see which witnesses Venture is going
to offer and the nature of their testimony . . . and then
if there’s some basis for asking that because you don’t
already have that, that’s okay ... .” Jd. at 7.
Autoliv did not challenge or seek reconsideration of
either the Special Master’s or the district court’s
discovery rulings. Autoliv also did not submit further
requests for the documents or alert the district court to
any further problems with the discovery of Venture’s
financial information.
On November 4, 2003, trial began in Venture’s
action against Autoliv for breach of the Supply
Agreement. Venture’s expert witness on damages at
trial was Aron Levko. Tocalculate Venture’s damages,
Levko relied on financial information from a
manufacturing facility in Grand Blanc, Michigan,
operated by a Venture subsidiary, Vemco, Inc., which
would have produced the airbag covers for the projects
awarded to Venture under the supply agreement with
Autoliv. Levko utilized Venture’s actual bids, some
third party bids, and two independent production cost
studies commissioned by Venture in 1997 and 1998.
The cost estimates in the bids on which Levko relied
did not separate variable costs (e.g., the costs of
material and labor) from fixed costs (e.g., general
overhead). Levko needed to separate fixed from
variable costs for two reasons: (1) In addition to
49a
claiming lost profits, Venture claimed the right to
recover the fixed c ts attributable to the contracts;
and (2) Levko neede. to assign the correct amount of
variable costs to the hypothetical bids he constructed
for programs where no bid was submitted. To do this,
Levko used the ratio of fixed to variable costs reflected
in Grand Blanc’s plant-wide financial statements.
In order to compute the material cost component of
the variable costs, Levko needed to calculate the
amount of the purchased raw material that would
become unusable scrap. To verify the accuracy of the
material (scrap) costs reflected in the bids, Levko
compared the scrap rate reflected in the bids (15
percent), against the scrap rate discernable from
actual production data (approximately 11 percent), and
the scrap rate reflected in Grand Blanc’s plant-wide
financial statements (12.4 percent). To be conservative,
Levko used the bid scrap rate of 15 percent in his
calculations. Based on the bid data, Levko calculated
a contribution margin of 25 percent.
On December 4, 2003, the jury found that Autoliv
had breached the supply agreement and awarded
Venture $27,576,001 in damages. The district court
entered final judgment against Autoliv in th. amount
of the jury’s verdict on January 20, 2004, pursuant to
Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
During the discovery period, Venture filed for
reorganization under the Bankruptcy Code. The
bankruptcy court appeinted Doeren Mayhew &
Company, P.C. (“Doeren Mayhew”), a_ forensic
accounting firm, to investigate certain aspects of
Venture’s financial condition, including
et voy
¥
et
id
’
-
“inter-company, shareholder and related party
transactions.” Rule 60(b) Opinion, slip op. at 3.*
After the entry of final judgment in this case, on
March 10, 2004, Doeren Mayhew issued a report
stating that “Venture had suffered multi-million dollar
damages as a result of fraudulent related party
transactions.” Rule 60(b) Opinion, slip op. at 3-4. This
conclusion called into question the representations in
Venture’s firm-wide financial statements.
On March 25, 2004, Doeren Mayhew issued a
second report concerning the results of its “preliminary
investigation of potential accounting irregularities.”
J.A. at 583. The report focused on Vemco and the
Grand Blanc facility.° As noted, the books and records
of that facility had been used by Venture’s damages
expert at trial. Doeren Mayhew discovered
* The scope of Doeren Mayhew’s initial investigation included (1)
investigating “related party transactions that have taken place
with Venture for the six-year period, March 29, 1997 through
March 28, 2003 . . . . to determine whether the transaction was
considered on no less favorable terms to the Debtor than would be
obtained if such transaction were an ‘arms-length’ transaction
with a non-affiliated entity|,)” J.A. at 185; and (2) reviewing and
identifying “preferential transfers to insiders or affiliated
companies as defined by Code Section 547(b) of the United States
Bankruptcy Code” during the twelve-month period preceding
Venture’s date of insolvency, May 28, 2002. J.A. at 187.
®* Doeren Mayhew undertook this investigation after it was
“notified in early March 2004 regarding potential accounting
irregularities discovered by Venture’s management at the
company’s Grand Blanc facility.” J.A. at 583. The scope of the
investigation was limited to the Grand Blanc facility's internal
financial information.
De” eee” Ce ee
5la
“questionable accounting procedures and practices,” a
“(l]lack of proper accounting controls,” and “potential
accounting irregularities” and “errors,” and concluded
(1) that Grand Blanc’s “material cost may have been
understated by approximately $700,000 on a monthly
basis” during 2003, and (2) that “Grand Blanc had
overstated its inventory on its financial records as of
December 31, 2002 and 2003 by $2,800,000 and
$2,500,000 respectively.” J.A. at 584-85, 588. These
misstatements resulted from an _ employee’s
manipulation of entries in the Grand Blanc facility’s
computerized accounting system and were reflected in
reports generated by that system, including Grand
Blanc’s plant-wide financial statements. Doeren
Mayhew’s second report also called into question
Venture’s firm-wide financial statements, insofar as
those statements were based in part on the inaccurate
Grand Blanc plant-wide financial statements.
On April 5, 2004, Venture filed a Securities and
Exchange Commission Form 8-K disclosing the
information in the Doeren Mayhew reports. As to the
related-party transactions addressed in the March 10,
2004 Doeren Mayhew report, the 8-K stated that
Venture had filed a lawsuit seeking “[rlecovery of
payments to one or more of Deiendants aggregating in
excess of [$300,000,000],” J.A. at 591, and that as a
result of the related-party transactions, “financial
information previously publicly reported by Venture
Holdings as far back as at least 1998 is unreliable and
should not be relied upon by investors.” J.A. at 592. As
to the Grand Blanc accounting issues addressed in the
March 25, 2004 Doeren Mayhew report, the 8-K stated
that “[i]nvestigation by [Venture] and Doeren Mayhew
disclosed .. . {a]pparent understatement of payables at
aS IR se eae See oe Ce
Pe Ie Coe, eh a eee ee ae eae ee ae
o
a
ae a ee wphe tes vi. Si i RS Tl 9 mn Oe ee .
4 Wake ~~ Sh ie ego, Pete iene CA ee a OED = Ra beet py ee ETE ee sf
52a
the Grand Blanc facility during fiscal 2003 aggregating
$8,000,000-$10,000,000 . . . [and} [o]verstatement of
inventory at the Grand Blanc facility during fiscal
2002 and 2003 in the range of $2,500,000-$2,800,000.”
J.A. at 592.
The Doeren Mayhew investigation was not
immediately called to the district court’s attention by
either party. On April 7, 2004, the district court
entered an amended final judgment in the amount of
$33,459,134.84, adding prejudgment interest to the
jury award. Autoliv appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which
transferred the appeal to this court on July 16, 2004.
On October 4, 2004, we stayed the appeal to allow
Autoliv the opportunity to file with the district court a
motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 60(b) based on
the Doeren Mayhew reports. Autoliv filed its Rule
60(b) motion on October 21, 2004. Autoliv argued that
the falsified financial information identified in the
Doeren Mayhew reports constituted: (1) newly
discovered evidence that could have affected the
outcome of the trial, entitling Autoliv to a new trial
pursuant to Rule 60(b)(2); and (2) “fraud,
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse
party” during discovery and the trial, entitling Autoliv
to a new trial under Rule 60(b)(3).
After conducting an evidentiary hearing at which
Levko testified that Doeren Mayhew’s conclusions had
no effect on his trial testimony, the district court
denied Autoliv’s Rule 60(b) motion. As to Rule 60(b)(2),
the district court concluded that Autoliv failed to prove
that the newly discovered financial information would
have had an effect on the jury’s decision on damages.
53a
As to Rule 60(b)(3), the district court held that Venture
did not commit discovery misconduct by failing to
produce financial information that Autoliv alleged
would have disclosed the misrepresentations Doeren
Mayhew uncovered in time for use at trial. Because
the district court had earlier denied Autoliv’s motions
to compel such production, and Autoliv neither
challenged those rulings nor requested further
disclosures of internal financial information from
Venture, the district court concluded that there had
been no discovery misconduct. The district court did
not address Autoliv’s request for relief under Rule
60(b)(3) based on Levko’s trial testimony.
Autoliv timely appealed from the district court’s
disposition of the Rule 60(b) issues. Because
Venture’s complaint asserted claims under the patent
laws, we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295(a\(1). The ruling of a district court under Rule
60(b) is final and appealable pursuant te 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292. Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Prods. Corp., 806
F.2d 1031, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 1986). At oral argument, we
requested supplemental briefing as to the legal
standard applicable to Autoliv’s Rule 60(b)(3) request.
© We lifted the stay, allowing Autoliv’s appeal from the jury
verdict and final judgment (nos. 04-1486 and 04-1488) to proceed.
In an opinion also issued teday, we affirm the judgment on the
merits, subject to the remand proceedings that we order in this
appeal. As to Venture’s cross appeal, we vacate the district court’s
award of prejudgment interest and remand to the district court.
Venture Indust. Corp., et al. v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., Nos. 04-1486,
-1488, --- Fed.Appx. ----, 2006 WL 2252836 (Fed. Cir. August 7,
2006).
:
54a
DISCUSSION
The denial of a motion for a new trial under Rule
60(b) is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Good v. Ohio
Edison Co., 149 F.3d 413, 423 (6th Cir. 1998); Mallory
v. Eyrich, 922 F.2d 1273, 1279 (6th Cir. 1991). “An
abuse of discretion will be found if the district court
relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact, improperly
applies the law or uses an erroneous legal standard.”
United States v. Chambers, 441 F.3d 438, 455 (6th Cir.
2006).
We address Autoliv’s Rule 60(b\2) and Rule
60(b\(3) arguments separately.
I
As a threshold matter, we reject Venture’s
contention that Autoliv’s motion was untimely. Rule
60(b) provides that motions “shall be made within a
reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not
more than one year after the judgment, order, or
proceeding was entered or taken.” Autoliv filed its
- Rule 60(b) motion on October 21, 2004, nine months
after the entry of judgment on January 20, 2004.
Though the district court accepted Autoliv’s motion
without comment, Venture argues here that the
nine-month delay was unreasonable under Rule 60(b).
The Sixth Circuit has held that whether the time of
filing a Rule 60(b) motion was reasonable “is
dependent upon the facts in a case, including length
and circumstances of delay in filing, prejudice to
opposing party by reason of the delay, and
circumstances warranting equitable relief.” in re
55a
G.A.D., Inc., 340 F.3d 331, 334 (6th Cir. 2003).” Here,
Venture makes no colorable claim that it we.
prejudiced by Autoliv’s delay. Further, Venture itself
was likely under an obligation to promptly notify the
district court of the inaccuracies in Levko’s testimony.
See Mich. R. Profl Conduct 3.3(aX4), adopted by
reference E.D. Mich. Local R. 83.22(b) (“Ifa lawyer has
offered material evidence and comes to know of its
falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial
measures.”); see also Schreiber Foods, Inc. v. Beatrice
Cheese, Inc., 402 F.3d 1198, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(“Once counsel became aware that highly material
false statements had been made by a witness, in
pleadings submitted to the court and in response to
discovery requests . . . Schreiber and its counsel were
under an obligation to promptly correct the record.”).
Rule 60(bX2) provides, in pertinent part: “On
motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
relieve a party .. . from a final judgment, order, or
proceedii for the following reasons: . . . (2) newly
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(b)[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(2) (West 2006).
“In order to prevail on a Rule 60(b)(2) motion, a
movant must demonstrate . . . that the evicence is
material and controlling and clearly would have
produced a different result if presented before the
” One exception (not pertinent here) applies to Rule 60(b)(1)
motions predicated upon alleged errors of law, for which the Sixth
Circuit has held that the “reasonable time” is limited to the time
for filing a notice of appeal. Barrier v. Beaver, 712 F.2d 231,
234-35 (6th Cir. 1983).
56a
original judgment.” Good, 149 F.3d at 423 (internal
quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted).
Autoliv argues that the Doeren Mayhew reports
constitute newly discovered evidence that undercut the
accuracy of Levko’s testimony, entitling Autoliv to a
new trial under Rule 60(b)(2). At the evidentiary
hearing on Autoliv’s motion, Levko testified in detail
that Doeren Mayhew’s findings had no effect on his
assessment of Venture’s damages because, in making
his calculations, he did not rely primarily on
information from the Grand Blanc facility’s main
accounting system or the plant-wide financial
statements. Instead, he relied principally on
information from the Grand Blanc facility’s “bid” (or
“quote”) system. Both Levko and Autoliv’s expert,
Glenn Sheets, testified that the bid system was
separate and independent from the accounting system
and that the information from the bid system was not
ealled into question by the Doeren Mayhew reports.
The district court found that “Autoliv has not made out
a case for a finding that had the accounting
irregularities described in the March 25 Doeren
Mayhew report been known prior to trial, Levko’s
opinion and conclusion on damages would have
produced a different resul]t at trial with regard .. . to
damages.” Rule 60(b) Opinion, slip op. at 18.
Autoliv insists that the district court, in making
findings of fact and determinations of the weight and
credibility of the evidence, rejected Autoliv’s Rule
60(b\(2) motion based on the district court’s own
judgment rather than the probable effect of the
evidence on the jury. We disagree. The district court
expressly assessed the probable effect on the jury,
4
. - ” nm ¥ +
‘ “ -o " ha Pee wd Ge Oe ? .
on an tee te eet Oe ee he ok pe > i, Le ti _ “, ~ ~ * a
eS ae ee Re Ae eee
ee ee pe Pee pF air, er
by.
“
1
ye
57a
stating: “It cannot be said that if the jury was
presented with the Doeren Mayhew reports .. . its
decision on damages would have been any different.”
Id. at 20. The district court reviewed the factual record
in the light of the newly discovered evidence and made
findings as to the weight of that evidence to determine
what the effect on the jury likely would have been.
Analysis of the record is necessary to resolve a Rule
60(b)(2) request.®
Autoliv also challenges several of the district
court’s specific findings regarding the effect of the
accounting irregularities on Levko’s testimony. Autoliv
questions the bid system information that Levko used
primarily in calculating Venture’s damages. The bid
information was obtained from the Grand Blanc
facility’s separate bid system. The district court found
that this information “was separate and independent
from the Grand Blanc facility plant-wide financial
data” implicated by the Doeren Mayhew reports, id. at
18, and “was specific and reliable.” Jd. at 10. Levko
relied on Venture’s bids on Autoliv projects that were
submitted before 2002, whether accepted or not. For
projects that Venture did not actually bid on, Levko
created hypothetical bids using data from submitted
bids and five third-party bids.
® See, e.g., Daniels v. Pipefitters’ Ass'n Local Union No. 597, 983
F.2d 800, 802-03 (7th Cir. 1993) (“[I}t is only logical that a district
court weigh the credibility of evidence before granting or denying
a Rule 60(bX2) motion. Rule 60(b2) motions are decided by
judges; not by juries. Credibility determinations are necessary to
these decisions. To hold otherwise would mean that the district
court would have to order a new trial no matter how incredible the
new evidence.”).
hen dt te i i fat,
wre, OP es ~
—orw |
58a
Autoliv points out that the erroneous Grand Blanc
financials were the result of a “lack of proper
accounting controls.” J.A. at 588. It argues that
because there were errors in the Grand Blanc facility’s
financial statements for 2002-2003, “[t]he only
reasonable inference to be drawn... is that [Venture’s
accounting] controls were not appropriate during that
earlier time period either.” Reply Br. of Autoliv at 25.
Autoliv contends that this inference undercuts the
reliability of the pre-2002 bid data Levko used. The
district court concluded, however, that “Levko’s
opinion on damages was grounded on bids that
antedated December 31, 2001,” and that “[t]here is no
evidence to suggest that the accounting irregularities
at the Grand Blanc facility . . . affected Venture’s
1996-2001 financial statements.” Rule 60(6) Opinion,
slip op. at 20. We see no clear error in these factual
conclusions.
Autoliv also contends that a new trial should have
been granted because Levko relied, in some of his
testimony, on the fact that the Grand Blanc facility’s
plant-wide financial statements were audited and
therefore presumptively reliable. Levko testified at
trial that the fact that Grand Blanc had independently
certified plant-wide financial statements “tells me
that) what’s being reported is fair . . . [and that] the
internal controls are appropriate and adequate... .”
Rule 60(6) Opinion, slip op. at 11 n. 4. At the Rule
60(b) hearing, the district court questioned Levko
about whether having the information in the Doeren
Mayhew reports concerning the Grand Blanc financial
statements would have altered his trial testimony.
Levko responded “I couldn’t say that the certified
DD) = tee eee oe eee, ies
SS a > ee | ™
59a
statements were accurate, but it wouldn’t change my
conclusions.” J.A. at 130.
Autoliv contends that even if Levko’s conclusions
would have remained the same, these alterations to
Levko’s testimony might have “colored” the trial. While
the district court’s Rule 60(b) opinion did not expressly
address this possibility, the district court specifically
recognized it during the Rule 60(b) hearing, and we
are convinced that the district court considered the
question and rejected Autoliv’s contention utilizing the
Rule 60(b)\(2) standard for prejudice. We see no error
in that conclusion.
Although Autoliv agrees that the Grand Blanc
accounting system was separate from the bid system,
Autoliv argues that financial information directly
called into question by Doeren Mayhew was utilized by
Levko in two respects: (1) to determine the ratio of
fixed to variable costs; and (2) to test the accuracy of
the scrap rate reflected in the bids.
As to the first, Autoliv contends that Levko’s
separation of the fixed and variable costs was affected
because Doeren Mayhew found that inventory was
overstated and recommended a downward inventory
adjustment. Levko explained that a downward
inventory adjustment would increase the cost of sales
to the Grand Blanc facility, potentially altering the
ratio of fixed and variable production costs. Levko
stated in an affidavit that Doeren Mayhew’s findings
did not affect his allocation of fixed and variable costs
in the bid data because the inventory adjustment
would not materially affect the ratio. The district court
explained that of the $2.5 million inventory
; iia = _— eee
a ee ae J ation: a clhn eS +
OF eee on a F
ie
s.r oO / u x ba tee ~
<4 4 ‘ra, iakics is ws Wat
60a
adjustment, “$888,000 consisted of non-air bag
inventory which had no effect on the cost of sales
related to air bag covers. Of the $1.6 million dollar
balance, approximately 25% could be attributed to the
cost of sales of air bag cover products.” Rule 60(b)
Opinion, slip op. at 5. The district court concluded
that, while Levko determined the fixed-to-variable cost
ratio from Grand Blanc’s plant-wide financial
statements, “any change in the financial statements as
a consequence of the Doeren Mayhew reports did not
affect the allocation.” Jd. at 12. We see no error in this
conclusion.
As to the scrap rate, Levko used a scrap rate of 15
percent in his calculations. He derived that scrap rate
from the bid information. Levko checked the bid-based
scrap rate against the plant-wide scrap rate reported
in Grand Blanc’s plant-wide financial statements. That
figure was 12.4 percent. He nevertheless used the 15
percent rate from the bids in order to make his
calculations conservative. Autoliv relies on the
affidavit of Kevin Dages, an accounting consultant, to
argue that the inventory adjustments recommended by
the Doeren Mayhew reports would have resulted in
increased scrap rates for 2002 and 2003. Levko
testified, however, that even assuming the inventory
adjustment, the plant-wide scrap rate (only partially
attributable to airbag cover production) would increase
to 13.4 percent, still well below the 15 percent rate
Levko used. The district court explained in detail that
it rejected Dages’ analysis on the basis of several
methodological flaws, including Dages’ calculation of
increases in “[p]roduction costs based on plant-wide
financial data [which] does not particularize air bag
production costs.” Rule 60(b) Opinion, slip op. at 19.
ee La Te een | ee ee ee
6la
The district court found that even after making the
inventory adjustment called for by the Doeren Mayhew
reports, “the plant-wide scrap rate would be 13.4%,
still below the 15% rate Levko used,” id. at 13, and
thus concluded that the Doeren Mayhew reports’ effect
on the scrap rate would not have altered the jury’s
decision. We find no clear error in this determination.
The district court also did not err in failing to consider
the totality of the allegedly prejudicial evidence.
Clear error only exists if we are “left with a definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.” United States v. Monumental Life Ins.
Co., 440 F.3d 729, 732 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting
Alexander v. Local 496, Laborers’ Int'l Union of N.
Am., 177 F.3d 394, 402 (6th Cir. 1999)). Here, we are
left with no such conviction. We conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Autoliv’s motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule
60(b)(2).
II
We now address Autoliv’s Rule 60(bX3) motion.
Rule 60(b)(3) provides: “On motion and upon such
terms as are just, the court may relieve a party...
from a fina] judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons: . . . (3) fraud (whether heretofore
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation,
or other misconduct of an adverse party ... .”
A
Autoliv argues that Venture engaged in discovery
misconduct by withholding “Venture’s non-public
62a
financial information-the data that ultimately
disclosed Venture’s fraud.” Autoliv’s Rule 60(b) Motion
at 2. Autoliv contends that Venture should have
disclosed the information in response to Autoliv’s
document-production requests and through the
deposition testimony of representatives of Venture and
pertinent Venture subsidiaries. In particular, Autoliv
contends that it was denied the opportunity to depose
the controller at the Grand Blanc facility who,
according to Doeren Mayhew, manipulated the
accounting system to cause the misrepresentations in
the financial statements.
Failure to produce material in response to
legitimate discovery requests can _ constitute
misconduct under Rule 60(b)(3). Abrahamsen uv.
Trans-State Express. Inc., 92 F.3d 425, 428 (6th Cir.
1996).° However, the question is not whether Venture
failed to comply with Autoliv’s initial discovery
requests; it is whether Venture complied with Autoliv’s
requests as limited by the Special Master and the
district court. There is no contention that Venture
failed to comply with the discovery ordered by the
district court. As the district court stated, “Autoliv had
ample opportunity to ask the Court to require further
of Venture if it felt that its discovery requests [were]
not being met.” Rule 60(b) Opinion, slip op. at 7.
Autoliv did not request further action from the district
court in this regard. We conclude that the district
* See also Summers v. Howard Univ., 374 F.3d 1188, 1193 (D.C
Cir. 2004); Cummings v. Gen. Motors Corp., 365 F.3d 944, 955
(10th Cir. 2004); Schultz v. Butcher, 24 F.3d 626, 630 (4th Cir.
1994); Stridiron v. Stridiron, 698 F.2d 204, 207 (3d Cir. 1983);
Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332, 1339 (5th Cir. 1978).
Pe er ee ee
63a
court did not abuse its discretion in holding that
Venture did not engage in discovery misconduct within
the meaning of Rule 60(b)(3)."°
B
We now turn to Autoliv’s contention that reliance
on the financial statements by Venture’s damages
expert warrants relief under Rule 60(b)(3). As a
threshold matter, Venture insists that Autoliv failed to
raise this ground before the district court. Based on
our examination of the record, we conclude that the
issue was properly raised in Autoliv’sRule 60(b)(3)
motion.
Autoliv’s contention here is based on the same
grounds as its request under Rule 60(b)(2): (1) Levko’s
reliance on the bid data; (2) Levko’s testimony that the
Grand Blanc facility’s certified financial statements
gave him comfort about Venture’s accounting controls;
and (3) Levko’s reliance on the Grand Blanc plant-wide
financial statements to derive the fixed/variable cost
ratio and check the bid-based scrap rate for his
damage calculations.
The district court did not address Autoliv’s Rule
60(b)(3) contention with respect to Levko’s testimony.
The district court did, however, hold that Autoliv
failed to establish prejudice according to the Rule
60(b)(2) standard. Thus, even if Autoliv could establish
fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct, the
” We note that Autoliv does not contend that Venture engaged in
any misconduct in opposing the discovery requests.
64a
district court’s failure to address Autoliv’s Rule
60(b)(3) contention as to Levko’s testimony could only
constitute harmful error if the standard for prejudice
under Rule 60(b)(3) is different from the standard for
prejudice under Rule 60(b\2). We conclude that the
standard for prejudice is indeed different under the
two rules, and thus that the district court’s error was
potentially harmful.
At oral argument, we requested supplemental
briefing from both parties addressing the appropriate
standard for relief under Rule 60(b)(3) in the Sixth
Circuit. Venture argues that the issue is controlled by
the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Abrahamsen. While the
court stated that relief is appropriate where a witness
testifies falsely and “without [the false testimony], a
jury might have reached a different conclusion,”
Abrahamsen, 92 F.3d at 428 (internal quotation marks
omitted), the court did not clearly articulate a general
standard for determining prejudice.*’ Nor does any
other published Sixth Circuit decision.
Autoliv contends that the appropriate rule is stated
in Jordan v. Paccar, Inc., No. 95-3478, 1996 WL
528950 (6th Cir. 1996), an unpublished decision. In the
Sixth Circuit, only published decisions are binding on
the court; unpublished decisions may be persuasive
'' Prejudice was obvious in Abrahamsen because the district court
expressly held that it would not have found the plaintiffs
contributorily negligent absent the false testimony. /d. at 428-29.
'2 United States v. Wood, 364 F.3d 704, 725 (6th Cir. 2004); S.J. v.
Hamilton County, Ohio, 374-E.3d 416, 423 n. 5 (6th Cir. 2004);
Sheets v. Moore, 97 F.3d 164, 167 (6th Cir. 1996); see also Sixth
65a
authority depending on their pertinence and depth of
reasoning. Harper v. AutoAlliance Int'l, Inc., 392 F.3d
195, 205 n. 3 (6th Cir. 2004). Autoliv urges that we
should rely on Jordan because the court in Jordan
thoroughly analyzed the question of the proper legal
standard under Rule 60(b)(3). See1996 WL 528950, at
*6-*9. We agree. The court in Jordan set forth the
legal standard applicable under Rule 60(b)(3) based on
thorough analysis of the language of the rule and its
treatment by other circuits. Thus, we conclude that
relying on Jordan is appropriate under the
circumstances.
In some circuits, the standard for prejudice under
Rule 60(b)(3) requires the movant to demonstrate that
the fraud or misconduct “prevented the moving party
from fully and fairly presenting his case.” Schultz, 24
F.3d at 630; see also Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 862
F.2d 910, 924 (1st Cir. 1988).’* The Sixth Circuit in
Cir. R. 206(c) (“Reported panel opinions are binding on subsequent
panels.”).
'8 See also Sixth Cir. R. 28(g) (citation of unpublished opinions is
“disfavored,” but permissible “{iJf a party believes ... that an
unpublished disposition has precedential value in relation to a
material issue in a case, and that there is no published opinion
that would serve as well . . . .”); Oviedo v. Jago, 809 F.2d 326, 329
n. 3 (6th Cir. 1987) (relying on unpublished decision because “the
panel's reasoning [is] sound and its decision supported by the
existing law”).
'* See also Cummings, 365 F.3d at 955; Sellers v. Mineta, 350 F.3d
706, 715 (8th Cir. 2003); Tobel v. City of Hammond, 94 F.3d.360,
362 (7th Cir. 1996); Diaz vu. Methodist Hosp., 46 F.3d 492, 496 (5th
Cir. 1995); In re M/ V Peacock, 809 F.2d 1403, 1404-05 (9th Cir.
66a
Jordan, however, “dispens[ed}] with any requirement
that the moving party demonstrate prejudice,” Jordan,
1996 WL 528950, at *8, holding that “prejudice should
be presumed| | once the moving party has shown by
clear and convincing evidence that misbehavior falling
into one or more of the three categories set out in Rule
60(b)(3) has occurred.” Id. The burden then shifts to
the non-moving party “to demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence that the misbehavior which
occurred had no prejudicial effect on the outcome of
the litigation.” Id.
As we noted earlier, under Rule 60(b)(2) the moving
party must show that the newly discovered evidence,
if introduced at trial, “clearly would have produced a
different result if presented before the original
judgment.” Good, 149 F.3d at 423. The prejudice
standards of Rule 60(b)(3) and Rule 60(b)(2) thus differ
as to the party that initially bears the burden of proof,
and as to the nature of the necessary showing. The
district court analyzed the possibility of prejudice from
Levko’s testimony only under the Rule 60(b)(2)
standard.” it did not apply the standard for prejudice
1987); Stridiron, 698 F.2d at 207; GAF Corp. v. Transamerica Ins.
Co., 665 F.2d 364, 371 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
© “Autoliv has not made out a case for a finding that had the
accounting irregularities described in the March 25 Doeren
Mayhew report been known prior to trial, Levko’s opinion and
conclusion on damages would have produced a different result at
trial with regard . . . to damages.” Rule 60(6) Opinion, slip op. at
18; see also id. at 20 (“It cannot be said that if the jury was
presented with the Doeren Mayhew reports, particularly the
March 25 Doeren Mayhew report, its decision on damages would
have been any different.”).
SD Bek a a
ms oar oe
oa og
eS
aie tn ee
pote
,
‘
4%
:
4
y
i$
67a
that we conclude is applicable to Autoliv’s Rule
60(b)(3) request with respect to Levko’s testimony.
We conclude that we must vacate in part the
district court’s denial of Autoliv’s Rule 60(b)(3) motion
as it concerned Levko’s testimony and remand for
adjudication under the proper legal standard. In doing
so, we do not address the question of whether Levko’s
testimony constitutes “fraud, misrepresentation, or
other misconduct” within the purview of Rule 60(b)(3);
that is a question best addressed by the district court
in the first instance.*® On remand, the district court
must decide whether Autoliv has established, by clear
and convincing evidence, that reliance upon Venture’s -
financial information by Venture’s damages expert
constituted fraud or misrepresentation. If Autoliv
makes such a showing, the district court must consider
whether Venture established, by clear and convincing
evidence, that the misbehavior had zo prejudicial
effect on the outcome of the litigation.
Ill
In summary, we affirm the district court’s denial of
Autoliv’s motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule
'© In this connection, we do not decide-one way or the
other-whether, as the district court correctly held in connection
with the alleged discovery misconduct issue, “there is no evidence
that Venture was aware of the accounts payable understatement
or inventory overstatement that Doeren Mayhew describes... in
its March 25 report.” Rule 60(b) Opinion, slip op. at 8. We have
rejected the discovery argument on a different ground-that the
failure to produce documents that would reveal the fraud was not —
misconduct.
68a
60(b)(2). We also affirm the district court’s conclusion
that Autoliv is not entitled to a new trial under Rule
60(bX3) on the basis of discovery misconduct. But
because the district court did not consider Autoliv’s
allegation with respect to Levko’s testimony as a
ground for relief under Rule 60(b)(3), we vacate the
district court’s denial of Autoliv’s Rule 60(b)(3) motion
and remand for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the district court is
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND
REMANDED.
COSTS
No costs.
69a
APPENDIX I
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEDERAL CIRCUIT
No. 2007-1118
[Filed July 11, 2007]
VENTURE INDUSTRIES CORPORATION,
Vemco, Inc., Patent Holding Company,
and Larry J. Winget,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
— a. Ss ~te? = eS’. Sew = eee eee
AUTOLIV ASP, INC. (successor to
Morton International, Inc.),
)
)
)
)
)
)
v. )
)
)
)
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
Appealed from United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan, No. 2:99-CV-75354,
Avern Cohn, Senior Judge.
John E. Anding, Drew, Cooper & Anding, of Grand
| Rapids, MI, argued for plaintiffs-appellees. With him
on the brief was Thomas V. Hubbard.
}
:
;
;
A a aS Se ee aS ae
ey Se Bhs
70a
Peter E. Greene, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher &
Flom LLP, of New York, NY, argued for
defendant-appellant. With him on the brief was Cyrus
Amir-Mokri.
Judgment
ON APPEAL fromthe United States District
Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan
in CASE NO(S). 2:99-CV-75354
This CAUSE having been heard and considered, it is
ORDERED and ADJUDGED:
Per Curiam (LINN, and PROST, Circuit Judges,
CLEVENGER, Senior Circuit Judge).
AFFIRMED. See Fed. Cir. R. 36.
ENTERED BY ORDER
OF THE COURT
DATED: July 11, 2007 /s/ Jan Horbaly
Jan Horbaly, Clerk
Jla
APPENDIX J
TITLE 28. JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL
PROCEDURE
PART V--PROCEDURE
CHAPTER 125--PENDING ACTIONS AND
JUDGMENTS
28 U.S.C.A. § 1961. Interest
(a) Interest shall be allowed on any money judgment
in a civil case recovered in a district court. Execution
therefor may be levied by the marshal, in any case
where, by the law of the State in which such court is
held, execution may be levied for interest on
judgments recovered in the courts of the State. Such
interest shall be calculated from the date of the entry
of the judgment, at a rate equal to the weekly average
1-year constant maturity Treasury yield, as published
by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, for the calendar week preceding.’ the date of
the judgment. The Director of the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts shall distribute
notice of that rate and any changes in it to all Federal
judges.
(b) Interest shall be computed daily to the date of
payment except as provided in section 2516(b) of this
' So in original. The period probably should not appear.
;
4
7
4
Y
4
:
4
:
;
’
:
d
:
4
72a
title and section 1304(b) of title 31, and shall be
compounded annually.
(c)(1) This section shall not apply in any judgment of
any court with respect to any internal revenue tax
case. Interest shall be allowed in such cases at the
underpayment rate or overpayment rate (whichever is
appropriate) established under section 6621 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (1) of
this subsection, interest shall be allowed on all final
judgments against the United States in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal circuit,’ at the
rate provided in subsection (a) and as provided in
subsection (b).
(3) Interest shall be allowed, computed, and paid on
judgments of the United States Court of Federal
Claims only as provided.in paragraph (1) of this
subsection or in any other provision of law.
(4) This section shal] not be construed to affect the
interest on any judgment of any court not specified in
this section.
? So in original. Probably should_be “Circuit,”.
4
|
#
:
3
4
|
—_ ee = Se
»
3
a
73a
Michigan Compiled Laws
_ Chapter 600. Revised Judicature Act of 1961
M.C.L.A. Sec. 6013. (1) Interest is allowed on a money
judgment recovered in a civil action, as provided in
this section. However, for complaints filed on or after
October 1, 1986, interest is not allowed on future
damages from the date of filing the complaint to the
date of entry of the judgment. As used in this
subsection, “future damages” means that term as
defined in section 6301.
(2) For complaints filed before June 1, 1980, in an
action involving other than a written instrument
having a rate of interest exceeding 6% per year, the
interest on the judgment is calculated from the date of
filing the complaint to June 1, 1980, at the rate of 6%
per year and on and after June 1, 1980, to the date of
satisfaction of the judgment at the rate of 12% per year
compounded annually.
(3) For a complaint filed before June 1, 1980, in an
action involving a written instrument having a rate of
interest exceeding 6% per year, the interest on the
judgment is calculated from the date of filing the
complaint to the date of satisfaction of the judgment at
the rate specified in the instrument if the rate was
legal at the time the instrument was executed.
However, the rate after the date judgment is entered
shall not exceed either of the following:
(a} Seven percent per year compounded
annually for a period of time between the date
‘
:
;
4
a ST
ee?
ere ere oe ,s> ~~ 7 =a ee ShCUP =
:
:
.
74a
judgment is entered and the date of satisfaction of the
judgment that elapses before June 1, 1980.
(b) Thirteen percent per year compounded
annually for a period of time between the date
judgment is entered and the date of satisfaction of the
judgment that elapses after May 31, 1980.
(4) For a complaint filed on or after June 1, 1980,
but before January 1, 1987, interest is calculated from
the date of filing the complaint to the date of
satisfaction of the judgment at the rate of 12% per year
compounded annually unless the judgment is rendered
on a written instrument having a higher rate of
interest. In that case interest is calculated at the rate
specified in the instrument if the rate was legal at the
time the instrument was executed. The rate shall not
exceed 13% per year compounded annually after the
date judgment is entered.
(5) Except as provided in subsection (6), for a
complaint filed on or after January 1, 1987, but before
July 1, 2002, if a judgment is rendered on a written
instrument, interest is calculated from the date of
filing the complaint to the date of satisfaction of the
judgment at the rate of 12% per year compounded
annually, unless the instrument has a higher rate of
interest. In that case, interest shall be calculated at
the rate specified in the instrument if the rate was
legal at the time the instrument was executed. The
rate shall not exceed 13% per year compounded
annually after the date judgment is entered.
(6) For a complaint filed on or after January 1,
1987, but before July 1, 2002, if the civil action has not
3
;
4
75a
resulted in a final, nonappealable judgment as of July
1, 2002, and if a judgment is or has been rendered on
a written instrument that does not evidence
indebtedness with a specified interest rate, interest is
calculated as provided in subsection (8).
(7) For a complaint filed on or after July 1, 2002, if
a judgment is rendered on a written instrument
evidencing indebtedness with a specified interest rate,
interest is calculated from the date of filing the
complaint to the date of satisfaction of the judgment at
the rate specified in the instrument if the rate was
legal at the time the instrument was executed. If the
rate in the written instrument is a variable rate,
interest shall be fixed at the rate in effect under the
instrument at the time the complaint is filed. The rate
under this subsection shall not exceed 13% per year
compounded annually.
(8) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (5)
and (7) and subject to subsection (13), for complaints
filed on or after January 1, 1987, interest on a money
judgment recovered in a civil action is calculated at 6-
month intervals from the date of filing the complaint
at a rate of interest equal to 1% plus the average
interest rate paid at auctions of 5-year United States
treasury notes during the 6 months immediately
preceding July 1 and January 1, as certified by the
state treasurer, and compounded annually, according
to this section. Interest under this subsection is
calculated on the entire amount of the money
judgment, including attorney fees and other costs. The
amount of interest attributable to that part of the
money judgment from which attorney fees are paid is
i Mii AP sie! Le —
ea ee eh a ne ne ee ee. ee, Pee Se Ce ee
as
ad Mh oe ee:
76a
retained by the plair tiff, and not paid to the plaintiff's
attorney.
(9) If a bona fide, reasonable written offer of
settlement in a civil action based on tort is made by
the party against whom the judgment is subsequently
rendered and is rejected by the plaintiff, the court
shall order that interest is not allowed beyond the date
the bona fide, reasonable written offer of settlement is
filed with the court.
(10) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (1)
and subject to subsections (11) and (12), if a bona fide,
reasonable written offer of settlement in a civil action
based on tort is not made by the party against whom
the judgment is subsequently rendered, or is made and
is not filed with the court, the court shall order that
interest be calculated from the date of filing the
complaint to the date of satisfaction of the judgment.
(11) Ifa civil action is based on medical malpractice
and the defendant in the medical malpractice action
failed to allow access to medical records as required
under section 2912b(5), the court shall order that
interest be calculated from the date notice was given
in compliance with section 2912b to the date of
satisfaction of the judgment.
(12) Ifa civil action is based on medical malpractice
and the plaintiff in the medical malpractice action
failed to allow access to medical records as required
under section 2912b(5), the court shall order that
interest be calculated irom 182 days after the date the
complaint was filed to the date of satisfaction of the
judgment.
77a
(13) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (1),
if a bona fide, reasonable written offer of settlement in
a civil action based on tort is made by a plaintiff for
whom the judgment is subsequently rendered and that
offer is rejected and the offer is filed with the court,
the court shall order that interest be calculated from
the date of the rejection of the offer to the date of
satisfaction of the judgment at a rate of interest equal
to 2% plus the rate of interest calculated under
subsection (8).
(14) A bona fide, reasonable written offer of
settlement made according to this section that is not
accepted within 21 days after the offer is made is
rejected. A rejection under this subsection or otherwise
does not preclude a later offer by either party.
(15) As used in this section:
(a) “Bona fide, reasonable written offer of
settlement” means either of the following:
(i) With respect to an offer of settlement
made by a defendant against whom judgment is
subsequently rendered, a written offer of settlement
that is not less than 90% of the amount actually
received by the plaintiff in the action through
judgment.
(iz) With respect to an offer of settlement
made by a plaintiff, a written offer of settlement that
is not more than 110% of the amount actually received
by the plaintiff in the action through judgment.
oe 8 ee Leis
i i aN ce el i
78a
(b) “Defendant” means a defendant, a counter-
defendant, or a cross-defendant.
(c) “Party” means a plaintiff or a defendant.
(d) “Plaintiff’ means a plaintiff, a counter-
plaintiff, or a cross-plaintiff.
79a
| APPENDIX K
: UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
Case No.: 99-75354
ee en
[Filed March 1, 2004}
VENTURE INDUSTRIES
: CORPORATION, et al.,
|
Plaintiffs,
Vv.
AUTOLIV ASP, INC., successor to
MORTON INTERNATIONAL, INC.;
AUTOLIV, INC., and MORTON
INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
Defendants.
ee ee ee ee ee
HON. AVERN COHN
MAGISTRATE JUDGE WALLACE CAPEL
JOHN E. ANDING (P30356)
Attorney for Plaintiffs
DREW COOPER & ANDING
Ledyard Building, Suite 300
ery wr wt
3
3
3
1
s
4
:
3
;
3
:
’
a
’
;
:
i>» i i
$ = ~ , ;
.-
:
80a
Grand Rapids, Michigan 49503
(616) 454-8300
A. SIDNEY KATZ
RICHARD W. MCLAREN, JR.
THOMAS L. GEMMELL
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
WELSH & KATZ, LTD.
120 South Riverside Plaza, 22"¢ Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60606
(312) 655-1500
WILLIAM H. HORTON (P31567)
LINDA M. WATSON (P45320)
SEAN M. WALSH (P48724)
Attorneys for Defendants
COX, HODGMAN & GIARMARCO, P.C.
Tenth Floor Columbia Center
101 W. Big Beaver Road
Troy, Michigan 48084-5280
(248) 457-7000
JONATHAN F. PUTNAM
Attorney for Defendants
KIRKLAND & ELLIS, P.C.
153 East 53” Street, 39th Floor
New York, New York 10022
(212) 446-4800
NOTICE OF APPEAL
Notice was given that Defendant Autoliv ASP, Inc.,
appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit from the Final Judgment entered by the
Clerk of the Court in this action on January 29, 2004
‘
TF Oe fe ee ert. Re a Pe IT Teg Er, od ee age eRe Rae Ee PN ES Fo A ee eR Oe eee So ae ee
8la
and the Memorandum and Order Denying Defendant’s
Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law entered in
this action on February 12, 2004.
COX, HODGMAN & GIARMARCO, P.C.
By: /sf
WILLIAM H. HORTON (P31567)
LINDA M. WATSON (P45320)
SEAN M. WALSH (P48724)
Attorneys for Defendants
Cox, Hodgman & Giarmarco, P.C.
Tenth Floor Columbia Center
101 W. Big Beaver Road
Troy, Michigan 48084-5280
(248) 457-7000
Dated: March 1, 2004
82a
APPENDIX L
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
Civil Action No. 99-75354
[Filed March 16, 2004]
VENTURE INDUSTRIES CORPORATION,
VEMCO, INC., PATENT HOLDLING
COMPANY, and LARRY J. WINGET,
’ " PO ee ee ee ee woe
ee. ee ke ee ee re .
Plaintiffs / Cross-Appeliants
._—e Se ee ee
he Ba, a ee >
AUTOLIV ASP, INC., and AUTOLIV, INC.,
w= & :
Defendants / Cross-Appellees.
i— S
)
)
)
)
)
)
v. ; )
)
)
)
)
)
ee
Judge Avern Cohn
Magistrate Judge Wallace Capel, Jr.
John E. Anding (P30356)
Bridget C. Kehoe (P28196) }
Thomas V. Hubbard (P60575)
DREW, COOPER & ANDING
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Cross-Appellants
ee ee ay ee Se ee ee ee. a, Pee rl ho > el
83a
125 Ottawa Avenue NW
Ledyard Building, Suite 300
Grand Rapids, MI 49503
(616) 454-8300
A. Sidney Katz
Richard W. McLaren, Jr.
Thomas L. Gemmell
WELSH & KATZ, LTD.
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Cross-Appellants
120 South Riverside Plaza, 22™ Floor
Chicago, IL 60606
(312) 655-1500
William Horton (P31567)
COX, HODGMAN & GIARMARCO, P.C.
Attorney for Defendants/Cross-Appellees
Tenth Floor Columbia Center
101 W. Big Beaver Road
Troy, MI 48084
(248) 457-7000
Jonathan F. Putnam
KIRKLAND & ELLIS, P.C.
Attorney for Defendants/Cross-Appellees
153 East 53 Street
New York, NY 10022
(212) 446-4800
NOTICE OF FILING CROSS APPEAL
Notice is hereby given that all Plaintiffs in the
above named case cross appeal, pursuant to Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(3), to the United
-_——— el. -=- oF
84a
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’ from the
Order granting Defendant Autoliv, Inc.’s Motion for
Summmary Judgment as to Counts II (Breach of
Supply Agreement - Autoliv, Inc.), TV (Breach of Cross
License Agreement - Autoliv, Inc.) and V
(Abondonment of Supply Agreement, Cross License
Agreement and Settlement Agreement) of Plaintiffs’
Second Amended Complaint, entered in this action on
May 20, 2003.
Respectfully Submitted,
DREW, COOPER & ANDING
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Cross-Appellants
By: /s/
John E. Anding (P30356)
Bridget C. Kehoe (P28196)
Thomas V. Hubbard (P60575)
Ledyard Building, Suite 300
125 Ottawa Avenue NW
Grand Rapids, MI 49503
(616) 454-8300
Dated: March 12, 2004
' This Notice of Cross Appeal may not be construed as an
acceptance by Plaintiffs of the Sixth Circuit’s jurisdiction over this
appeal. Plaintiffs intend to file with the Sixth Circuit a Motion to
Transfer this appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit because of patent claims pleaded in Plaintiffs’ Second
Amended Complaint.
:
ou
Fe ee Pe RG Ee ey oe
FE ee UN Re UT re eee Be Na OE OE ae eee ENE Oe Se eT OF mene MN See eae ee ee eae
“ ‘ “a . 4 ; b
85a
APPENDIX M
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-2457
[Filed December 4, 2007]
VENTURE INDUSTRIES CORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
)
)
)
)
r VEMCO INC.; PATENT HOLDING )
q COMPANY; LARRY J. WINGET, )
4 )
Plaintiffs, )
s )
q V. )
3 )
3 AUTOLIV ASP, INC., successor to )
: Morton International, Incorporated; )
3 AUTOLIV, INC., )
q )
4 Defendants-Appellees. )
4 ORDER
3 In this patent action, the plaintiff filed a notice of
appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit on November 15, 2007. The appeal was
86a
inadvertently transmitted to and docketed in this
court. The appeal is hereby sua _ sponte
TRANSFERRED to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
ENTERED PURSUANT TO RULE 45
SIXTH CIRCUIT RULES
Leonard Green, Clerk
/s/ Leonard Green ji
87a
APPENDIX N
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
Nos. 04-1486, -1488
[Filed August 28, 2006]
VENTURE INDUSTRIES CORPORATION,
VEMCO INC., PATENT HOLDING
COMPANY, and LARRY J. WINGET,
Plaintiffs-Cross Appellants,
Re ee I, Pa ee ee eee ae = Te
Vv.
“ATs
}
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
AUTOLIV ASP, INC., (successor to )
Morton International, Inc.), )
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
7 eas, Tr
Defendant-Appellant,
v.
AUTOLIV, INCORPORATED,
Defendant.
JUDGMENT :
FO te ee ee ee ew Pe Tye Ee BO PR Fee ROT NT eS ee eae ee rest a
ON APPEAL fromthe United States District
Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan
CASE NO.: 2:99-CV-75354
This CAUSE having been heard and considered, it
is ORDERED and ADJUDGED:
7 AFFIRMED-IN PART, VACATED-IN-PART and
3 REMANDED.
ENTERED BY ORDER OF
4 THE COURT
: DATED AUG 7, 2006 /s/Jan Horbaly/ims_
Jan Horbaly, Clerk
ISSUED AS A MANDATE: AUG 28, 2006 3
{Opinion omitted here, contained in :
this appendix at page 28a]
eg ee A eee eee ee ee, es ee Ee al 7, a eo . ee ne de es. BER le 1 i nd * wh oti) a) eh ee
: 89a
4
APPENDIX O
.
: IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION '
Civil Action No. 99-75354
|
[Filed October 10, 2007] :
VENTURE INDUSTRIES CORPORATION, ) :
VEMCO INC., PATENT HOLDING )
COMPANY, and LARRY J. WINGET, )
4 )
Plaintiffs, )
‘ )
v. )
)
AUTOLIV ASP, INC., and AUTOLIV, INC., )- =
. )
Defendants. )
| )
Honorable Avern Cohn
| Magistrate Wallace Capel
John E. Anding (P30356)
Thomas V. Hubbard (P60575)
DREW, COOPER & ANDING
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Ledyard Building, Suite 300
125 Ottawa Ave., NW
Pa Pe ee rie Le
90a
Grand Rapids, Michigan 49503
(616) 454-8300
Peter E. Greene
Cyrus Amir-Mokri
SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP
Attorneys for Defendant Autoliv ASP, Inc.
Four Times Square
New York, New York 10036-6522
(212) 735-3000
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO DETERMINE
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST __.
EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION REQUESTED
Plaintiff Venture Industries, Inc. (“Venture”)
respectfully moves this Court for an assessment of
prejudgment interest, pursuant to M.C.L.
§ 600.6013(8), in the amount of $13,525,577.00 non pro
tunc September 27, 2007. This amount reflects
prejudgment interest on the verdict in Venture’s favor
of $27,500,001.00 calculated from November 3, 1999
through September 27, 2007.
Venture states, in further support of its Motion:
1. Michigan’s prejudgment interest statute, M.C.L.
§ 600.6013(8) applies in this case because, in federal
diversity actions, the law of the forum state governs
prejudgment interest. Perceptron, Inc. v. Sensor
Adaptive Machines, Inc., 221 F.3d 913, 922 (6 Cir.
2000); Venture Indus. Corp. v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., Nos.
04-1486, 04-1488, 2006 WL 2252836, at **6 (Fed. Cir.
Aug. 7, 2006).
9la
2. Under Michigan law, prejudgment interest
accrues beginning with the filing of the complaint,
through the conclusion of any appeal. Morales v. Auto-
Owners Ins. Co., 469 Mich. 487, 491-92 (2003); Ayar v.
Foodland Distributors, 472 Mich. 713, 716-17 (2005).
3. The Complaint in this case was filed on
November 3, 1999. The latest appeal in this case
concluded on September 27, 2007, the date the Federal
Circuit’s Judgment was issued as a Mandate.
4. In a pre-motion telephone conference, the Court
stated that it would consider and resolve this matter
as expeditiously as possible.
WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth above and
in the accompanying Memorandum in support of this
Motion, Venture respectfully requests that: 1) this
court assess prejudgment interest totaling
$13,525,577.00 against Autoliv and in favor of
Venture, reflecting a calculation of prejudgment
pursuant to M.C.R. § 600.6013(8) beginning on
November 3, 1999 and ending September 27, 2007; 2)
this Court exercise its discretion and set this Motion
for hearing within the next ten (10) days.
Respectfully submitted,
DREW, COOPER & ANDING
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
/s/ John E. Anding
John E. Anding (P30356)
Bridget C. Kehoe (P28196)
Thomas V. Hubbard (P60575)
Building, Suite 300
125 Ottawa Avenue, NW
Grand Rapids, Michigan 49503
(616) 454-8300
Dated: October 10, 2007
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.