Appendix — Venture Industries Industries Corp. v. Autolive ASP, Inc. (No. 08-471)

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APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

No. 2008-1113

[Filed July 10, 2008]

VENTURE INDUSTRIES

CORPORATION,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

and

VEMCO, INC., PATENT HOLDING

COMPANY, and LARRY J. WINGET,

Plaintiffs,

we

AUTOLIV ASP, INC. (successor to

Morton International, Inc.),

Defendant-Appellee.

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John E. Anding, Drew Cooper & Anding, of Grand

Rapids, Michigan, argued for plaintiff-appellant. With

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him on the brief were Thomas V. Hubbard and

Theodore J. Westbrook.

Cyrus Amir-Mokri, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher

& Flom LLP, of New York, New York, argued for

defendant-appellee. With him on the brief was Peter E.

Greene.

Appealed from: United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Michigan

Senior Judge Avern Cohn

Judgment

ON APPEAL fromthe United States District

Court for the Eastern

District of Michigan

in CASE NO(S). 99-CV-75354

This CAUSE having been heard and considered, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED:

Per Curiam (DYK, PROST, and MOORE, Circuit

Judges).

AFFIRMED. See Fed. Cir. R. 36.

DATED July 10, 2008

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

/s/ Jan Horbaly

Jan Horbaly, Clerk

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3 APPENDIX B

: UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

: EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

4 SOUTHERN DIVISION

q Civil Action No. 99-75354

j [Filed November 14, 2007]

3 VENTURE INDUSTRIES _ )

7 CORPORATION, et al., )

4 )

: Plaintiffs, )

| Vv. )

4 )

AUTOLIV, INC., et al., )

- )

Defendants. )

‘

Honorable Avern Cohn

AMENDED ORDER REGARDING

SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT

Autoliv ASP, Inc. has fully, finally and completely

satisfied the Judgment in the above-entitled case, in

the amount of $36,418,483.50.

SO ORDERED

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

Civil Action No. 99-75354

[Filed November 9, 2007]

VENTURE INDUSTRIES

CORPORATION, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

AUTOLIYV, INC., et al.,

)

)

)

)

)

v. )

)

)

)

Defendants. )

)

Honorable Avern Cohn

ORDER

The parties having brought various matters before

the Court, which were heard on October 25, 2007, and

the Court being fully advised in the premises;

IT IS ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:

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1. The final amount of the Judgment in the above-

captioned action is $36,418,483.50, inclusive of all

interest and costs.

2. The Second Amended Judgment dated November

29, 2006 is, for the reasons stated upon the record at a

hearing before this Court on October 25, 2007,

corrected to read “plaintiff Venture Industries

Corporation” instead of “plaintiffs”, the latter entry

being a ministerial error.

3. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 67, Autoliv ASP, Inc.

(“Autoliv”) is granted leave to deposit the sum of

$155,468 into the interest-bearing account established

by the Court’s October 3, 2007 Order, pursuant to

which Order Autoliv has already paid $36,263,015.50

towards final payment of the full amount of the

judgment in this case. Withdrawals from the account

shall be by order of the Court. The Clerk shall deposit

the funds in a money market account at the prevailing

rate of interest at a federally approved financial

institution. The Clerk shall deduct any administrative

registry fee set by the Director of the Administrative

Office of the U.S. Courts and authorized by the

Judicial Conference of the United States from the

interest earned on the funds without further order of

the Court.

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4. Upon depositing $155,468 with the Court,

Autoliv will have fully and completely satisfied the

; judgment in the above-captioned action, including all

interest and costs, and the Letter of Credit No.

d SLT410035, issued by JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. on

March 3, 2004 (ainended on November 10, 2006) on

behalf of Autoliv in this action, shall become functus

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officio and shall forthwith be returned by Venture to

Autoliv.

SO ORDERED.

s/Avern Cohn

AVERN COHN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

if

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document

was mailed to the attorneys of record on this date,

November 9, 2007, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

s/Julie Owens

Case Manager, (313) 234-5160

Dated: November 9, 2007

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APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

Case No. 99-75354

[Filed October 30, 2007]

VENTURE INDUSTRIES CORPORATION,

VEMCO, INC., PATENT HOLDING

COMPANY, and LARRY J. WINGET,

Plaintiffs,

Vv.

AUTOLIV ASP, INC.,

Defendant.

ed

Hon: AVERN COHN

ORDER REGARDING PREJUDGMENT AND

POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST

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I. Introduction

This is a contract case tried to a jury and affirmed

on appeal. Before the Court is plaintiffs, Venture

Industries Corp., Vemco, Inc., Patent Holding

Company, and Larry J. Winget (collectively, Venture),

motion to determine prejudgment interest.” Venture

seeks a ruling that prejudgment interest is calculated

from November 3, 1999, the date the complaint was

filed, through September 27, 2007, the date the

mandate issued from the Court of Appeals for the >

Federal Circuit on Autoliv’s second appeal.® :

. Defendant Autoliv, Inc. (Autoliv) says that

prejudgment interest runs from November 3, 1999 to

December 4, 2003, the date the Court entered a

judgment on the jury verdict and that post-judgment

interest begins thereafter.

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For the reasons that follow, Venture is entitled to

prejudgment interest from November 3, 1999 to

December 4, 2003, which has already been calculated

' At the hearing on Venture’s motion to determine prejudgment

interest, the parties agreed that the sole plaintiff is Venture. The

Court directed the parties to submit a proposed order to that

effect. Since the proposed order has not yet been received or

entered, the case captions contains all of the named plaintiffs.

” Also before the Court is Venture’s motion for reconsideration of

the Court’s October 3, 2007 Order regarding Autoliv’s letter of

credit. That motion is the subject of a separate order.

* The desire to have such an expansive period of prejudgment

interest is not surprising as prejudgment interest rates are

significantly higher than post-judgment interest rates.

10a

as $6,902,251.00. Venture is entitled to post-judgment

interest thereafter.

II. Background

On November 3, 1999, Venture sued Autoliv for.

failing to allow Venture to supply air bag covers to

Autoliv in breach of an agreement. The jury returned

a verdict in favor of Venture. On December 4, 2003,

the Court entered a judgment on the jury verdict in

the amount of $27,576.001.00. Venture then filed a

motion to amend the judgment in part to include

prejudgment interest. On April 7, 2004, the Court

entered a Memorandum and Order on Prejudgment

Interest, awarding Venture prejudgment interest in

the amount of $5,878,972. The Memorandum stated

that an amended judgment would enter “nunc pro tunc

December 4, 2003.” That same day, the Court entered

an Amended Final Judgment including the amount of

the jury verdict plus prejudgment interest and costs.

The Amended Fina] Judgment also stated that it was

“nunc pro tunc December 4, 2003 for purposes of

computing interest.”

Autoliv appealed from the jury’s verdict and the

Court’s denial of its Rule 60(b) motion. Venture cross-

appealed on the issue of the manner of calculating

prejudgment interest. Venture argued _ that

prejudgment interest should accrue at the date of

filing the complaint. On August 7, 2006, the Court of

Appeals for the Federal Circuit separately issued its

decisions on Autoliv’s appeal and Venture’s cross

appeal. As to Venture’s cross-appeal, the Federal

Circuit agreed with Venture and vacated the Court’s

calculation of prejudgment interest and directed that

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the start date for prejudgment interest was the filing

of the complaint. As to Autoliv’s appeal, the Federal

Circuit vacated and remanded for consideration

Autoliv’s motion for a new trial under Rule 60(b)(3).

Accordingly, on November 29, 2006, the Court

entered an Order Amending Judgment, calculating

prejudgment interest from the date the complaint was

filed. The Order stated that “Prejudgment interest has

been recalculated as required, and is $6,902,251.00 as

of December 4, 2003.” On that day, the Court also

- entered a Second Amended Final Judgment to reflect

the difference in prejudgment interest. The Second ;

: Amended Judgment, like the Amended Judgment, .

stated that it was “nunc pro tunc December 4, 2003 for

. purposes of computing interest.” Venture did not take

an appeal from this judgment. |

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Meanwhile, the Court considered Autoliv’s Rule

60(bX3) motion in accordance with the Federal —

Circuit’s decision. On November 29, 2006, the Court

denied Autoliv’s motion. Autoliv again appealed. On

July 16, 2007, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Court’s

decision. The mandate issued on September 27, 2007.

III. Analysis

A.

Venture argues that interest from the time the

complaint was filed until the mandate issued should be

considered prejudgment interest. Autoliv says that

prejudgment interest runs from the time the complaint

was filed until December 4, 2003; thereafter, interest

accruing is considered post-judgment interest. Thus,

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the issue is what affect, if any, is the December 4, 2003

judgment under the circumstances.

The Michigan statute regarding prejudgment

interest states that “interest on a money judgement

recovered in a civil action is calculated ... from the date

of filing the complaint ... on the entire amount of the

money judgement, including attorney fees and costs.”

M.C.L. §600.6013(8). Under this statute, prejudgment

interest must be calculated on the entire judgment

from the date that the complaint was filed. Perceptron,

Inc. v. Sensor Adaptive Machs., Inc., 221 F.3d 913, 923

(6th Cir. 2000)

While prejudgment interest is determined by

reference to state law, the Court of Appeals for the

Sixth Circuit has made clear that “the question of

which judgment should be used to trigger interest is a

matter of federal law.” Coal Resources, Inc. v. Gulf &

| | Western Indus., Inc., 954 F.2d 1263, 1274 (6th Cir.

1992) (citing Bailey v. Chattem, Inc., 838 F.2d 149, 152

: (6th Cir. 1988). Thus, the date for determining the line

between pre and post judgment interest is controlled

by federal law. 28.U.S.C. § 1961 states:

Interest shall be allowed on any money

judgment in a civil case recovered in a district

court.... Such interest shall be calculated from

the date of the entry of the judgment....

In Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp v. Bonjorno,

494 U.S. 827 (1990), the Supreme Court held that the

trigger date for the accrual of post judgment interest

is the date of the judgment in which damages have

“been ascertained in a meaningful way.” Jd. at 836. In

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Kaiser, the district court set aside the jury’s initial

findings on damages, holding that they were not

supported by the evidence. A new judgment was

entered after a limited re-trial. Jd. at 830. The

Supreme Court concluded that since the first trial was

not supported by the evidence, it did not represent a

meaningful assessment of the damages. Thus, post-

judgment interest began to accrue after entry of the

second judgment. Jd. at 836.

Subsequent cases in the Sixth Circuit adhere to

this rule. Following Kaiser, the Sixth Circuit in Coal

Resources, supra, held that the post-judgment interest

began on the date of the original judgment because the

original award had not been vacated on appeal even

though it has been reduced by the court-ordered

remittitur. The damages were meaningfully

ascertained from the original judgment. Jd. at 1274-

1275. In Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson

Co., 917 F.2d 1413 (6th Cir. 1990), the plaintiffs

received an award following a trial and a judgment

entered in their favor. The Sixth Circuit vacated and

remanded the case for a new trial because of an error

of law. After a re-trial, plaintiffs again prevailed.

Plaintiffs argued that post-judgment interest accrued

as of the date of the original judgment. The district

court disagreed and awarded post-judgment interest

from the date of the judgment after the second trial.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that the damages

were meaningfully ascertained after the second

judgment since the original judgment was vacated. Jd.

at 1447. See also Adkins v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd., 18

F.3d 1349, 1352 (6th Cir. 1994) (post-judgment

interest runs from the “date of any judgment that is

not entirely set aside”); Skalka v. Fernald, Envtl.

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Restoration Mgmt. Corp., 178 F.3d 414, 429 (6th Cir.

1999) (damages suffered by the plaintiffs were

meaningfully ascertained after the second trial since

original judgment was vacated in its entirety on the

first appeal).

Here, the damages amount reflected in the jury

verdict as stated in the December 4, 2003 judgment

has never been set aside. All subsequent judgments

were specifically entered “nunc pro tunc December 4,

2003 for purposes of computing interest.” Therefore,

the appropriate date for determining when damages

were meaningfully ascertained and triggering the post-

judgment period is December 4, 2003. The essential

damages portion of the judgment - the jury verdict -

has never been modified, vacated, or rendered

incomplete at any time since the date of entry.

Likewise, Venture’s argument that prejudgment

interest should be calculated through at Icast the

November 29, 2006 Second Amended Judgment is

unavailing because that judgment, like the Amended

Judgment, was entered nunc pro tunc December 4,

2003.

Venture, however, takes the position that

prejudgment interest accrues until the date the

Federal! Circuit issued its mandate following Autoliv’s

second appeal from the denial of its Rule 60(b) motion.

In support, Venture cites Michigan cases which it says

provide authority for the proposition that prejudgment

interest accrues during “prejudgment appellate delay.”

Ayar v. Foodland Distrib., 472 Mich. 713, 716-17

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(2005); Morales v. Auto-Owners Ins., Co., 469 Mich.

487, 491-92 (2003). Venture also cites a federal case

interpreting Michigan law on the issue of prejudgment

interest, Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 290 F. Supp.

2d 821 (W.D. Mich. 2003).

Venture’s reliance on these cases is wholly

misplaced. First, Ayar involved the issue of when

prejudgment interest accrues on an award of costs and

mediation sanctions which the Michigan Court of

Appeals held begins at the time the complaint was

filed. It did not address the issue of prejudgment

interest running during the appellate process. Thus,

Ayar provides no support for Venture’s argument.

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In Morales, the plaintiff/insured sued

defendant/insurer seeking no-fault coverage following

an accident. The trial court granted the insurer’s

motion for summary disposition. The Michigan Court

| of Appeals affirmed. The Michigan Supreme Court

| reversed and remanded the case for trial. Morales v.

Auto-Owners, 458 Mich. 288 (1998). After a trial, a

jury found for the plaintiff. The trial court entered a

judgment on the jury verdict and awarded

prejudgment interest for the entire period, including

the time the case was on appeal. The Michigan

Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s calculation of

prejudgment interest, noting that “the statute [M.C.L.

§ 6000.6013(8) makes no exception for periods of

prejudgment appellate delay.” 469 Mich. at 852.

In Wrench, the plaintiffs sued defendant claiming

breach of implied contract and various torts related to

defendant’s alleged use of their ideas relating to a

cartoon character. The district court originally granted

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summary judgment to defendant. Plaintiffs appealed.

The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed

and remanded the case for trial on several claims.

Wrench v. Taco Bell LLC, 256 F.3d 446 (6th Cir. 2001).

After a trial, a jury found in favor of plaintiffs and the

district court entered an amended judgment. The

district court then awarded plaintiffs prejudgment

interest from the time the complaint was filed to the

date of entry of an amended judgment awarding

interest, which encompassed the time the case was on

appeal.

What Venture fails to appreciate, or perhaps failed

to discover, is that both Morales and Wrench involved

the situation where the initial judgment was for the

defendant and it was only after an appeal and reversal

that the case went to trial and a judgment entered in

favor of the plaintiffs. In that circumstances, an award

of prejudgment interest during the appeal process is

consistent with Michigan law on prejudgment interest

because the plaintiff did not obtain a judgment in their

favor until after the appeal. It is also consistent with

federal law on post-judgment interest because it was

only after the appellate process that the damages, .e.

a jury verdict, was “meaningfully ascertained.” Here,

however, Venture obtained a judgment in their favor

at trial before an appeal. Holding that the dividing line

for pre-judgment and post-judgment interest is the

date of entry of judgment in Venture’s favor, December

4, 2003, is consistent with Morales and Wrench.

Moreover, it is noted that Wrench did not cite the

Supreme Court’s decision in Kaiser or any of the Sixth

Circuit decisions addressing the line between pre and

post-judgment interest.

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C.

In its reply brief, Venture cites Scotts v. Central:

Garden & Pet Co., 403 F.3d 781 (6th Cir. 2005) to

support its argument that “the latest judgment should

be used as the stop date for state-law prejudgment

interest and start date for post-judgment interest.” In

Scotts, the plaintiff/manufacturer (Scotts) sued

defendant, its distributor (Central), for breach of

contract and quasi contract. Central filed

: counterclaims for breach of contract. In May of 2002,

. the jury returned a verdict in favor of Scotts for $22.5

million and a verdict in favor of Central for $12.075

million. The verdict in favor of Scotts was based

entirely on its breach of contract claim. The verdict in

favor of Central was composed of four parts, one part

being an award of $750,000.00 for breach of contract

on an incentive-compensation issue. On May 16, 2002,

the district court entered a judgment on the jury’s

verdict. The judgment, as stated in the district court’s

docket sheet entry, provided as follows:

An award of $22,500.00 [sic] in favor of pif

Scotts on its claim against dft Central Garden

for breach of contract. An award of $7,700,000

in favor of dft counter-plf Central Garden on its

claim against Scotts for breach of contract for

pymt of agency fees; an award of $3,275,000 in

favor of Central Garden on its claims against

Scotts for excess shipments; an award of

$750,000 in favor of Central Garden on its claim

against Scotts for breach of contract for

incentive compensation; and an award of

$350,000 in favor of Central Garden on its claim

against Scotts for Miracle Gro subject to the

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right of return, which yields a total award of

$12,075,000 in favor of dft Central Garden

against plf Scotts as to all of Central Garden

counterclaims (cc: all counsel) ( no pgs: 1) (sh)

(Entered: 05/17/2002)

Scotts then filed a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or

amend with regard to the $750,000.00 incentive

award.

Central also filed a Rule 59(e) motion on grounds

that are not clear. On September 30, 2002, the district ’

court entered an Order and Amended Judgment which

granted Central’s motion. The district court’s docket

sheet shows the following entry:

ORDER AND AMENDED JUDGMENT by

Judge Edmund A. Sargus Jr granting motion to

amend jgm [195-1];7,700,000 in favor of dft

counter-plf Cen Gar against Scotts for breach of

contract; $3,275,000 in favor of Cen Gar against

Scotts for excess shipments; $750,000 in favor of

Cen Gar against Scotts for breach of contract for

incentive compensation; $350,000 in favor of

Cen Gar against Scotts for MiracleGro, which

yields a total award of $12,075,00 in favor of dft

Cen Gar against plf Scotts as to all of Cen Gar’s

counterclaims (cc: all counsel) ( no pgs: 3) (sh)

(Entered: 09/30/2002)

The jury verdict amounts were not changed; however,

the language describing the component parts was

changed. There is no indication that the Amended

Judgment was entered nunc pro tunc of the May 16,

2002 Judgment.

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Subsequently, the district court granted Scott’s

motion to alter or amend and set aside the $750,000.00

award in favor of Central for lack of evidence.

Both parties also moved for prejudgment interest.

The district court directed them to confer on the net

amount of prejudgment interest they owed each other.

After doing so, they agreed that “2,827,123.65 is the

net amount of prejudgment interest that has accrues

in favor of plaintiff Scotts though May 16, 2002.” On

September 22, 2003, the district court entered a Final

Amended Judgment which awarded Scotts the full

amount of the jury verdict ($22.5 million) and Central

$11.325 million (reflecting the $750,000.00 reduction

from the Rule 59(e) motion). It also awarded Scotts

prejudgment interest through May 16, 2002 - the date

of the original judgment on the jury’s verdict. The

district court awarded Scotts post-judgement interest

from May 17, 2002 through the date of payment. There

is no indication on the Final Amended Judgment that

it was entered nunc pro tunc to May 16, 2002.

Despite the parties’ agreement on prejudgment

interest noted above, they disagreed as to the date

through which prejudgment interest ran. Central

argued that it stopped at the date of entry of the

judgment on the jury verdict - May 16, 2002. Scotts

argues that it accrued until a final appealable order

was entered - the Final Amended Judgment on

September 22, 2003. The district court held that the

cut off date for post judgment interest was May 16,

2003.

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On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that

September 22, 2003 was the cut off date for

prejudgment/post-judgment interest, explaining:

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a), which controls

postjudgment interest in civil cases decided in

the federal district courts, postjudgment

“interest shall be calculated from the date of the

entry of the judgment.” The Supreme Court has

interpreted this statute to require interest to

run from the date of the entry of judgment by

the court rather than from the date of the jury

verdict. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. uv.

Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 835, 110 S.Ct. 1570, 108

L.Ed.2d 842 (1990). This circuit has held that

postjudgment interest can run “from the date of

any judgment that is not entirely set aside.”

Skalka v. Fernald Envtl. Restoration Mgmt.

Corp., 178 F.3d 414, 429 (6th Cir. 1999).

As the district court noted, the Ninth Circuit

addressed an issue similar to the one that faces

us here and held that postjudgment interest

should accrue from the date of the final

judgment. See AT & T Co. v. United Computer

Systems, Inc. , 98 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 1996)

(calculating postjudgment interest from the

later of two possible dates of judgment, where

the prejudgment interest was higher than the

postjudgment interest, on the ground that

“{(wlhere a prior judgment awarding damages

has been vacated pursuant to the actions of an

ultimately losing party, equitable principles

favor calculating the interest in a manner that

more fully compensates the prevailing party”).

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The district court attempted to distinguish

AT & T by stating that “there is only one

judgment in this case-the Rule 54(b) judgment

entered on May 16, 2002.”

This is incorrect. At least two judgments were

entered after May 16, 2002, imcluding a

September 30, 2002 amended judgment and a

September 22, 2003 final amended judgment.

Several judgments were also entered before the

jury verdict, but those judgments are not

candidates for the date that postjudgment

interest begins because the damages due were

not sufficiently ascertained. Cf. AT & T, 98 F.3d

at 1210.

The justification given by the Ninth Circuit for

calculating postjudgment interest from the date

of final judgment applies with equal force in the

present case. Although both parties received

jury awards, Scotts was clearly the “prevailing

party.” Id. at 1211. Scotts was awarded $22.5

million of its $23.8 million claim; Central was

awarded only $12.075 million of the originally

requested sum of $976 million (and this award

was further reduced by the district court).

Because the prejudgment-interest rate on ali of

the claims is substantially higher than the

postjudgment-interest rate, the district court’s

decision to start postjudgment interest from the

May 16, 2002 judgment on the jury verdict

grants an unjustified benefit to Central as the

losing party. This equitable imbalance could

have been avoided if the district court had ruled

that postjudgment interest did not begin until

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the September 22, 2003 final amended

judgment. We therefore reverse the district

court’s ruling on this issue, and set the date at

which postjudgment interest begins to run at

September 22, 2003.

Scotts, 403 F.3d at 792-93.

Although the holding in Scotts might support a

finding that the dividing line between pre-judgment

and postjudgment interest should be January 20, 2004

- the date of the Final Judgment, there is no indication

that the judgments in Scotts were entered nunc pro

tunc. It is also noted that nothing in Scotts supports

Venture’s argument that the dividing line should be

the date of the Federal Circuit’s mandate.

Additionally, the rationale for the Sixth Circuit’s

holding in Scotts to move the date for starting post

judgment interest was to avoid inequity. It cannot be

said under the circumstances that it would be

inequitable to use December 4, 2003 as the dividing

line between pre and post-judgment interest. The

Amended Judgment and Second Amended Final

Judgment were both entered “nunc pro tune December

4, 2003 for purposes of computing interest.” This

language clearly implies that the dividing line for pre

and post-judgment interest has always been

contemplated to be December 4, 2003. The litigation

history of the prejudgment interest issue supports this

date as the demarcation. Moreover, the issue before

the Federal Circuit as to prejudgment interest was the

start date, not the end date.

SO ORDERED.

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Dated: October 30, 2007

s/Avern Cohn _

AVERN COHN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document

was mailed to the attorneys of record on this date,

October 30, 2007, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

‘Julie O |

Case Manager, (313) 234-5160

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APPENDIX E

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

Case Number: 99-75354

[Filed November 29, 2006]

VENTURE INDUSTRIES CORP., et al,

Plaintiff,

AUTOLIV ASP, INC.,

Defendant.

)

)

)

)

Vv. )

)

)

)

)

)

Honorable Avern Cohn

SECOND AMENDED FINAL

JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE

s Jury Verdict. This action came before the Court

for a trial by jury. The issues have been tried and

the jury has rendered its verdict.

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the

judgment be and hereby is entered in favor of

25a

plaintiffs and against defendant in the

AGGREGATE OF $34,482,413.84.

$27,567,001.00 - jury verdict

$ 6,902,251.00 - prejudgment interest

SS 13,161.84 - costs

Pursuant to Rule (77d), FRCivP

Copies have been mailed to:

the attorneys of record

Date November 29, 2006

nunc pro tunc December 04, 2003 for

purposes of computing interest

David Weaver, Clerk of Court

s/Julie Owens _

Deputy Clerk

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APPENDIX F

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

Case Number: 99-75354

[Filed April 7, 2004]

VENTURE INDUSTRIES CORP., ET AL,

Plaintiff,

AUTOLIV ASP, INC.,

)

)

)

)

v. )

)

)

)

Defendant. )

)

Honorable Avern Cohn

AMENDED FINAL

JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE

s Jury Verdict. This action came before the Court i

for a trial by jury. The issues have been tried and

the jury has rendered its verdict. !

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the

judgment be and hereby is entered in favor of

27a

plaintiffs and against defendant in the

AGGREGATE OF $33,459,134.84.

$27 567,001.00 - jury verdict

f $ 5,878,972.00 - prejudgment interest

$ 13,161.84 - costs

4 Pursuant to Rule (77d), FRCivP

Z Copies have been mailed to:

John Anding and William Horton

Date April 7, 2004

NUNC PRO TUNC December 4, 2003

for purposes of computing interest

David Weaver, Clerk of Court

/s/

JUDY CASSADY Deputy Clerk

28a

APPENDIX G

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FEDERAL CIRCUIT

; Nos. 04-1486, 04-1488

[Filed August 7, 2006]

VENTURE INDUSTRIES CORPORATION,

VEMCO, INC., PATENT HOLDING

COMPANY, and LARRY J. WINGET,

Plaintiffs-Cross Appellants,

v.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

AUTOLIV ASP, INC. (successor to )

Morton International, Inc.), )

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

v.

Defendant-Appellant,

AUTOLIV , INCORPORATED,

Defendant.

Before LINN, DYK, and PROST, Circuit Judges.

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PROST, Circuit Judge.

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Venture Industries Corp. (“Venture”) sued Autoliv

ASP (“Autoliv”) for breach of contract. The contract

was a Supply Agreement that had been entered into as

part of the settlement of previous litigation between

Ver. cré and Morton International (“Morton”), the

predecessor in interest to Autoliv. The trial was -

complicated by the fact that aside from the breach of

Supply Agreement claim, many other claims relating

to other agreements resulting from the settlement had

been stayed pending arbitration. In particular, claims

arising from a Cross Licensing agreement were stayed

including claims disputing who between Autoliv and

Venture owned various technologies. This complication

led to numerous evidentiary rulings relating to

testimony addressing any technology ownership issue.

As the district court did not err in these evidentiary

rulings, we affirm the district courts rulings.

Ultimately, the jury found that Autoliv had breached

the Supply Agreement and Venture was awarded

$27,576,001 in damages and $5,878,972 in resulting

prejudgment interest. The district court did err in

calculating the accrual date of prejudgment interest.

In this case, the proper date to calculate prejudgment

interest is the date of filing the complaint. We

therefore vacate the district court’s calculation of

prejudgment interest and remand the case to

re-calculate the prejudgment interest consistent with

this opinion. Even though other claims remain pending

in this suit, we have jurisdiction over this appeal

because the district court entered judgment pursuant

to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as

to the breach of contract claim.

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After the entry of final judgment, Autoliv filed a

motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court’s

denial of that motion is the subject of a separate

appeal, which we also resolve today. Venture Indus.

Corp. v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., 457 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir.

2006). In the companion case, we vacate and remand

as to Autoliv’s request for a new trial pursuant to Rule

60(b\(3). Id., at 1333-34. Our affirmance of the

judgment below and our remand for the

re-computation of interest in this case are, of course,

subject to the outcome of the proceedings on remand in

the companion case.

Autoliv is the successor in interest to the

Automotive Safety Products Unit of Morton

International, Inc. Morton was a ‘tier one’ supplier of

safety restraint systems to the automotive industry

meaning that it directly supplied safety restraint

systems to car and truck manufacturers. Venture was,

on the other hand, a ‘tier two’ supplier because it

supplied components to ‘tier one’ suppliers. Venture

custom molded plastics, including air bag covers. From

1990 to 1995, Venture supplied Morton with air bag

covers.

In 1995, Venture sued Morton in the Eastern

District of Michigan asserting that Morton had

misappropriated intellectual property relating to air

bag cover technology owned by Venture. Morton

counter-claimed asserting ownership of the technology.

On December 31, 1995, Morton and Venture settled

the case by entering into a Settlement Agreement

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containing two separate agreements: a Cross License

Agreement and a Supply Agreement. The Cross

License Agreement permitted each party to use the

other’s claimed technology. One relevant provision of

the Cross License Agreement addressed the

procedures for resolving any disputes arising from the

Cross License Agreement:

If a dispute arises between the parties relating

to [the Cross License Agreement] they shall use

the following procedure prior to either party’s

pursuing any other available remedy:

(b) If the dispute relates to the inventorship

and/or ownership of Subject Technology or

whether any particular Invention constitutes

Subject Technology, or whether Subject

Technology constitutes Solely or Jointly Owned

Subject Technology, the dispute shall be

submitted to binding arbitration ....

The other agreement that formed part of the

settlement was the Supply Agreement. It allowed

Venture to place bids on all of Morton’s future air bag

cover programs and provided that Venture would be

awarded those contracts where Venture’s bids were

“reasonably competitive.” The Supply Agreement

stated that:

(a) Morton shall give [Venture] the opportunity

to quote on all of Morton’s world wide future

Cover programs awarded to it by its customers

. excluding, however, such future cover

programs (i) for which Morton has been directed

by its customer to use a source other than

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[Venture] or has been directed by its customer

not to use [Venture], (ii) for which [Venture], in

Morton’s reasonable judgment, does not have

the capability at the time of quotation to meet

their requirements for the particular program(s)

under consideration; and (iii) which Morton has

elected, in its sole discretion, to retain

internally for manufacture by Morton itself.

(b) All timely quotes received from [Venture] for

programs described in subsection (a) above,

shall be compared by Morton to quotes received |

from other established module cover suppliers i

for the same program(s). Provided [Venture’s] .

quote is reasonably competitive (as determined

in good faith by Morton taking in to account

price, terms, quality, ability to meet

qualification requirements and delivery dates

and other objective factors related to

competitiveness), it shall be awarded such

program(s).

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On November 3, 1999, Venture once again sued

Morton and Autoliv as the successor in interest to

Morton, alleging that they had breached the Supply

Agreement and the Cross License Agreement and also

alleging patent infringement and misappropriation of

trade secrets. Of all the claims in the amended

complaint, only the claim for the breach of the Supply

Agreement was fully adjudicated. All remaining claims

were either stayed or dismissed. In particular, as the

Cross License Agreement contains a mandatory

binding arbitration requirement, the claims that arose

out of disputes over the Cross License Agreement have

been stayed pending the outcome of arbitration. As the

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claim for breach of the Supply Agreement did not arise

from the Cross License Agreement, this claim was

neither stayed nor taken up in the arbitration.

On October 23, 2003, prior to trial, Autoliv filed a

; motion in limine to exclude, inter alia, evidence

; referencing the earlier lawsuit, the resulting

Settlement Agreement and the Cross _ License

. Agreement. It argued such evidence was irrelevant,

unfairly prejudicial, and impermissible character

evidence as the 1995 case and the Cross License

Agreement has “no relevance and no relationship” to

this case. On October 29, 2003, the district court held

a pre-trial conference addressing, among other things,

Autoliv’s motion in limine. The district court ruled that

Venture and Autoliv would prepare a stipulation of

facts describing the facts leading to the formation of

the Supply Agreement and stated that the stipulation

“can be done in lieu of testimony, but I’m not going to

shade the testimony and I’m not going to confine

[Venture] to the four corners.” The resulting

stipulation of facts was read to the jury at the start of

trial on Nov-mber 4, 2003 and stated that

between 1990 and 1995, Venture had a

relationship with Morton under which Venture

manufactured air bag covers which it sold to

Morton. Next, in 1995, Venture and Morton had

a falling out which resulted in Venture suing

Morton. Next, on December 31, 1995, the

lawsuit was settled. A component of the

settlement was a supply agreement pursuant to *

which Morton agreed to permit Venture to bid

on [some] of Morton’s air bag cover programs

34a

On the third day of trial, the district court re-visited

the evidentiary issue and ruled on the scope of

evidence that could be admitted regarding the

settlement of the prior litigation. Along similar lines,

on the fourth day of the tria!, the district court again

explained the type of evidence that could be admitted.

stating that “I think Venture is entitled to explain

what the essence of the prior dispute was about so the

jury can understand fully how that prior dispute was

settled. All they know now is it was a dispute between

Morton and Venture.” Based on these evidentiary

rulings, Venture introduced testimony relating to the

origins of the Supply Agreement and relating to

Venture’s licensing practices with third party air bag

suppliers. Autoliv moved to have the cour. issue a

limiting instruction as to this testimony but the

district court denied the motion. Autoliv also requested

a specific jury instruction that placed the burden on

Venture to establish that its quotes were reasonably

competitive with the quotes from other suppliers but

the district court declined to use Autoliv’s jury

instruction.

Ultimately, the case went to the jury and, on

December 4, 2003, the jury found that Autoliv had

breached the Supply Agreement with respect to thirty

three of thirty eight air bag programs and it awarded

Venture $33,459,135 in damages. That damage award

included $5,878,972 in prejudgment interest where the

interest was calculated from the date the damages

were incurred.

Autoliv appeals the district court’s evidentiary

rulings, the district court’s refusal to give a limiting

instruction, and the district court’s refusal to use

35a

Autoliv’s jury instruction. Venture cross-appeals the

district court’s failure to award prejudgment interest

from the date of filing the complaint rather than from

the date the damages accrued.

Il.

As to the question of whether evidence was

properly admitted at trial is a procedural question, the

regional circuit law controls the issue. Micro Chem.,

Ine. v. Lextron, Inc., 317 F.3d 1387, 1390-91 (Fed. Cir.

2003). In the Sixth Circuit, a district court’s decision to

admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for abuse of

discretion. Beck v. Haik, 377 F.3d 624, 636 (6th Cir.

2004). Jury instructions are reviewed “as a whole to

determine whether they adequately inform the jury of

relevant considerations and provide a basis in law for

the jury to reach its decision.” Beard v. Norwegian

Caribbean Lines, 900 F.2d 71, 72 (6th Cir. 1990). A

district court’s decision whether to use a party’s jury

instruction is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Hisrich

v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., Inc., 226 F.3d 445, 449 (6th

Cir. 2000).

On appeal, Autoliv argues that the district court

erred in three ways. First, it contends that Venture’s

references to technology ownership were prejudicial

and should have been excluded. Second, once this

evidence was admitted, Autoliv contends that the

district court erred by refusing to give a limiting

instruction covering the admitted evidence. Lastly,

Autoliv argues that the trial court erred by refusing to

use Autoliv’s jury instruction.

:

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A.

As to the initial evidentiary rulings, Autoliv argues

that the district court improperly expanded its initial

decision to limit technology evidence when it allowed

two particular pieces of evidence. First, Autoliv objects

to the testimony of Mr. Torakis who regarded the

Supply Agreement as the quid pro quo for the Cross

Licensing Agreement stating that “[Venture] wanted

business, [Morton] wanted our ideas that was the

deal.” Autoliv also objects to the testimony of Mr.

Winget who testified that third party suppliers like

Toyota Gosei and TRW had paid Venture a license fee

of fifty cents per air bag cover for Venture’s technology.

Autoliv contends that this testimony unfairly

prejudiced Autoliv because evidence of a quid pro quo

arrangement or of licensing payments suggests that

Venture owned the air bag technology.

The district court was well within its discretion to

allow testimony especially where it felt it was needed

to illuminate central issues to the case provided that

“the judge inform|s] the parties and give[s] them an

opportunity to present evidence relating to the newly

revived issue.” Huss v. King Co., 338 F.3d 647, 651

(6th Cir. 2003). It is clear from the record that where

the district court revisited the scope of the testimony

because it was necessary for the jury’s understanding,

it also allowed the parties recourse to adjust their

litigation strategies regarding this testimony. For

example, on November 6, 2003, the district court

stated that

at an earlier time in this case I made a ruling,

and I don’t know whether any part of it was

37a

reserved, that the supply agreement was a

stand-alone agreement and excluded any

evidence of the cross-license agreement or the

settlement agreement of the litigation.

Based on the testimony I’ve heard over the

last two days, I think that ruling was too

restrictive. I don’t think this jury is capable of

understanding the supply agreement... . |

can’t understand why anybody would enter into

such an agreement without knowing that there

was a lawsuit, there was a settlement of the

lawsuit, and the settlement of that lawsuit

included both the cross-license agreement,

because it was a dispute over technology, and

included the supply agreement .... [T)hat

doesn’t mean a wide-ranging inquiry can be

made into it, but . . . on a limited basis, I will

allow testimony on the settlement agreement

and on the litigation ... .

In response to this change, Mr. Horton, counsel for

Autoliv asked, “Obviously the scope of this is now

changing dramatically. I may want to call a witness

regarding the cross-licensing agreement.” The judge

responded, “You can. You can do anything you want.

In tight of this ruling, if anyone wants to amend the

witness list or the exhibit list, they can do so.”

Second, Autoliv argues that, once evidence of

technology ownership was admitted, the district court

erred by not granting Autoliv’s request for a limiting

instruction as to the technology ownership evidence.

We do not agree with Autoliv. Autoliv requested a

limiting instruction that two exhibits, Plaintiffs

Exhibits 129a and 130, were being introduced to

SE OCT Net EE Oe SR Pip Le ER PE Pe I aS Sy «SS ee IE ON Pe ee ee eee

38a

demonstrate Autoliv’s ownership over the technology.

As stated by the district court the exhibits were

admitted to demonstrate Autoliv’s manufacturing

capabilities and included no “claim to proprietorship

{and] no claim to ownership.” We discern no clear

error in the district court’s refusal to give the limiting

| instruction.

Third, and lastly, as to the jury instruction, Autoliv

argues that the district court erred by refusing to

grant its more specific instruction which stated that

Venture bore the burden of establishing that the

exclusions in the Supply Agreement did not apply. “[A}

district court’s refusal to give a jury instruction

constitutes reversible error if: ‘(1) the omitted

instructions are a correct standard of the law; (2) the

instruction is not substantially covered by other

delivered charges; (3) the failure to give the instruction

impairs the requesting party’s theory of the case.”

Webster v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 197 F.3d 815, 820

(6th Cir. 1999). The instruction that was read to the

jury stated:

Pe Pa Se eRe Le Te Ne *

Venture has the burden of proving each of the

following propositions. First, that Venture

performed all obligations required of it under

the contract. Second, that Autoliv ASP failed to

perform its obligations under the contract and

breached the contract. Third, as a result of the

breach of the contract, Venture was damaged.

Autoliv ASP has the burden of proving it

qualified for any exclusion set forth in the

- Supply Agreement which it maintains absolved

it of an obligation under the Supply Agreement.

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The district court also read the entirety of Section 2.2

of the Supply Agreement to the jury. That section

detailed the requirements of each party and the

circumstances and conditions under which Autoliv

could have refused to award a cover program to

Venture. Those sections of the Supply Agreement

outline that programs could be excluded from the

Supply Agreement under specific circumstances such

as where a customer directs that a specific cover

supplier be used rather than Venture. Under these

circumstances, we conclude that the district court

properly instructed the jury that Autoliv bore the

burden of proving that the exclusions excused it from

allowing Venture to bid on a contract. The district

court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Autoliv’s

proposed jury instruction.

Autoliv’s arguments regarding the evidentiary and

jury related rulings have been considered and are

found to be without merit. We see no reason to disturb

those rulings of the district court.

Itt.

In its cross-appeal, Venture argues that the district

court erred by failing to award Venture prejudgment

interest from the date of the filing of the complaint,

regardless of the time the damages actually accrued.

In particular, Venture argues that Michigan Compiled

Laws section 600.6013 explicitly grants prejudgment

interest from the time of filing of the complaint and

that statute controls the grant of prejudgment interest

in this case.

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law nor any other subject matter specific to the

Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction. Therefore, in this case,

the law of the Sixth Circuit applies. See Biodex Corp.

v. Loredan Biomedical, Inc., 946 F.2d 850, 855-56 (Fed.

Cir. 1991). Statutory interpretation is reviewed de

novo. United States v. Thomas, 211 F.3d 316, 319 (6th

Cir. 2000). In the Sixth Circuit, the issue of

prejudgment interest is governed by the law of the

forum state, which, in this case is Michigan. The

interpretation of a statute by a district court is

reviewed de novo. United States v. Thomas, 211 F.3d

316, 319 (6th Cir. 2000).

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Autoliv argues that prejudgment interest in this

case should not be calculated from the time the

complaint was filed. It cites to a portion of Michigan

Compiled Laws section 600.6013(1) which states that

liIntscest is allowed on a money judgment

recovered in a civil action, as provided in this

section. However, for complaints filed on or

after October 1, 1986, interest is not allowed on

future damages from the date of filing the

complaint to the date of entry of the judgment.

As used in this subsection, “future damages”

means that term as defined in section 6301.

But Autoliv relegates to a footnote the relevant

information that under section 600.6301 the “future

damages” discussed in section 600.6013 are “damages

arising from personal injury.” As this case is not one

for damages for personal injury, the limits on

prejudgment interest cited by Autoliv are irrelevant.

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Instead, as has been held by the Sixth Circuit in a

breach of contact case,

liln Michigan, prejudgment interest is not

discretionary as the statute provides in relevant

part that “interest on a money judgment

recovered in a civil action shall be calculated

from the date of filing the complaint” and “shall

be calculated on the entire amount of the money

judgment, including attorney fees and other

costs.” The statute excepts from this

proscription prejudgment interest on future

damages for personal injuries.

Perceptron, Inc. v. Sensor Adaptive Mach., 221 F.3d

913, 922 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.

§ 600.6013(6) (West Supp. 2000)). The Sixth Circuit in

Perceptron further articulates that

[w]e are convinced Michigan law requires that

prejudgment interest be calculated in this case

on the entire judgment from the date that the

complaint was filed. The prejudgment interest

statute is remedial in nature and is to be

construed liberally in favor of the prevailing

party. The purpose of awarding statutory

prejudgment interest is not only to compensate

the prevailing party for the delay in the use of

the money, but also to offset the costs of

bringing the action and to provide an incentive

for prompt settlement. The statute must be

applied in accordance with its plain terms.

Id. at 923 (citations omitted). In view of the arguments

made, we agree with Venture that damages in this

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case should have been calculated from the date the

complaint was filed rather than when the damages

accrued. See also Ayar v. Foodland Distribs., 472

Mich. 713, 698 N.W.2d 875, 877 (2005) (finding the

language of section 600.6013(8) “to be clear and

unambiguous”); Morales v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 469

Mich. 487, 672 N.W.2d 849 (2003) (holding that “the

language of MCL 600.6013 unambiguously states that

prejudgment interest is to be calculated from the date

the complaint is filed”).

IV.

In sum, we affirm the district court’s rulings on the

evidentiary and procedural issues, however, we

conclude that the district court did err in calculating

prejudgment interest. In this case, the proper date to

calculate prejudgment interest is the date of filing the

complaint. We, therefore, vacate the district court’s

calculation of prejudgment interest and remand the

case to the district court to re-calculate the

prejudgment interest consistent with this opinion, and

subject to the outcome of the remand proceedings in

the companion case.

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43a

APPENDIX H

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FEDERAL CIRCUIT

No. 05-1537

[Filed August 7, 2006]

VENTURE INDUSTRIES CORPORATION,

Vemco, Inc., Patent Holding Company,

and Larry J. Winget,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

Vv.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

AUTOLIV ASP, INC. (successor to )

Morton International, Inc.), )

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Defendant-Appellant.

and

Autoliv, Incorporated,

Defendant.

Appealed from: United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Michigan

PT ee ee ra Se COD gy Ra Nee oe, MY oy ty ee Pee By

John E. Anding, Drew, Cooper & Anding, of Grand

Rapids, Michigan, argued for plaintiffs-appellees. With

him on the brief was Thomas V. Hubbard. Of counsel

on the brief was Richard W. McLaren, Jr., Welsh &

Katz, Ltd., of Chicago, Illinois.

Peter G. Greene, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher &

Flom LLP, of New York, New York, argued for

defendant-appellant. With him on the brief was Cyrus

Amir-Mokri. Of counsel on the brief was William H.

Horton, Cox, Hodgman & Giarmarco, P.C., of Troy,

Michigan.

Before LINN, DYK, and PROST, Circuit Judges.

DYK, Circuit Judge.

Autoliv ASP, Inc. (“Autoliv”) appeals the decision of

the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Michigan denying Autoliv’s motion for relief

from judgment in favor of Venture Industries Corp,,

Vemceo, Inc., Patent Holding Co., and Larry J. Winget

(collectively “Venture”), pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 60, sections (bX2) and (bX3). Venture

Indus. Corp. v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., No. 99-75354 (E.D.

Mich. July 15, 2005) (Judge Avern Cohn)." We

conclude that the district court did not err in denying

Autoliv’s request under Rule 60(b)(2), but that the

district court erred in failing to address whether

Venture’s use at trial of financial statements

* On August 4, 2005, the district court issued an opinion

explaining its reasons for denying Autoliv’s Rule 60(b) motion.

Venture Indus. Corp. v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., No. 99-75354 (E.D.

Mich. Aug. 4, 2005) (“Rule 60(b) Opinion ”).

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45a

containing false information constituted “fraud,

misrepresentation, or other misconduct” warranting

relief under Rule 69(b)(3). Accordingly, we affirm in

part, vacate in part, and remand.

BACKGROUND

This appeal presents the issue of whether the use

of falsified information in financial statements by

Venture’s damages expert at trial entitles Autoliv to

relief from judgment under either Rule 60(b)(2) or

60(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

As part of the 1995 settlement of a patent dispute

between Venture and Autoliv, Venture and Autoliv

executed a supply agreement.? Under the supply

agreement, Autoliv was obligated to purchase airbag

covers from Venture so long as Venture was capable of

filling the order and Venture’s bids were “reasonably

competitive” with the bids ef other suppliers. In the

period after 1995, Autoliv purchased some covers from

Venture, but also acquired covers fram other sources.

On November 3, 1999, Venture filed suit against

Autoliv alleging that Autoliv breached the supply

agreement with respect to 38 airbag cover projects

either by not allowing Venture to bid on the projects or

by rejecting Venture’s reasonably competitive bids.

* The supply agreement and two other agreements that were part

of the settlement were executed by Venture and Morton

International, Inc. (Autoliv ASP’s predecessor in interest). Morton

was acquired by and merged into Autoliv ASP in 1997. For

convenience, we refer to both Morton International, Inc. and

Autoliv ASP as “Autoliv.”

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46a

Venture’s complaint also stated several patent law

claims, including claims for correction of inventorship,

declaratory judgment of unenforceability of patents

Autoliv claimed to own, and declaratory judgment of

infringement of patents Venture claimed to own. These

claims were stayed by the district court pending the

outcome of arbitration of these claims as required by

a cross-license agreement, also executed as part of the

settlement of the 1995 litigation. Other claims relating

to the supply agreement were either stayed by

; stipulation of the parties or voluntarily dismissed.’

Discovery and other pretrial proceedings took place for

: the next several years.

Discovery proved to be contentious. For this reason,

on March 5, 2002, the district court appointed a

Special Master to oversee discovery. On November 14,

| 2002, Autoliv submitted to Venture the following

: request for production of documents:

. Please produce each and every one of Venture’s

3 monthly, quarterly, and annua! internal and

external financial statements for the years 1995

to the present, whether reviewed, compiled or

audited, and all documents relied upon, referred

to, consulted or generated in preparing such

statemerts, including your general ledgers,

subsidiary ledgers, accounts payable and

* The other claims related to the supply agreement were for

fraudulent inducement and misrepresentation, termination and

cancellation of contract, accounting, unjust enrichment, and

unfair competition. Venture also asserted claims for fraudulent

inducement of the settlement of the 1995 litigation and

misappropriation of trade secrets.

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receivable ledgers, trial balances, accountants’

work papers, bank statements, check registers

and bank records. The term financial

statements shall include, but is not limited to

your balance sheets, income statements, profit

and loss statements, cash flow statements,

statements of net worth, statements of retained

earnings and all notes to such financial

statements.

J.A. at 648. Autoliv also requested financial

information regarding the relationship between

Venture and its subsidiaries. Venture responded that

these requests “lack[ed] foundation in that Defendants

have never contended Plaintiffs’ financial condition

was the basis for withholding the award of any

program.” J.A. at 668. Unsatisfied, Autcliv filed a

motion to compel further responses on January 27,

2003. On March 10, 2003, the Special Master denied

Autoliv’s motion, concluding that “[(rlequests for

financial information in this lawsuit are appropriate,

but these requests are overbroad.” Rule 60(b) Opinion,

shp op. at 6 (quoting Special Master report and

recommendation).

On April 9, 2003, Autoliv, seeking additional

financial information, filed a motion to compel the

depositions of representatives of Venture and two of —

its subsidiaries pursuant to Rule 30(b)\(6) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On September 23,

2003, the district court orally denied Autoliv’s motion,

concluding that “faJjll of [Venture’s}] financial

statements, its annual statements and its quarterly

statements and its monthly statements should be

produced,” but that Autoliv’s proposed deposition topic

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(“the basis for [the deponent’s] contention that

Venture’s bid on each [project] would have been

reasonably competitive with those quotes submitted by

others”) was “actually asking for Venture’s position in

the litigation.” Id. at 6-7. The district court explained:

“I prefer to wait until the final pretrial statement is

prepared and we see which witnesses Venture is going

to offer and the nature of their testimony . . . and then

if there’s some basis for asking that because you don’t

already have that, that’s okay ... .” Jd. at 7.

Autoliv did not challenge or seek reconsideration of

either the Special Master’s or the district court’s

discovery rulings. Autoliv also did not submit further

requests for the documents or alert the district court to

any further problems with the discovery of Venture’s

financial information.

On November 4, 2003, trial began in Venture’s

action against Autoliv for breach of the Supply

Agreement. Venture’s expert witness on damages at

trial was Aron Levko. Tocalculate Venture’s damages,

Levko relied on financial information from a

manufacturing facility in Grand Blanc, Michigan,

operated by a Venture subsidiary, Vemco, Inc., which

would have produced the airbag covers for the projects

awarded to Venture under the supply agreement with

Autoliv. Levko utilized Venture’s actual bids, some

third party bids, and two independent production cost

studies commissioned by Venture in 1997 and 1998.

The cost estimates in the bids on which Levko relied

did not separate variable costs (e.g., the costs of

material and labor) from fixed costs (e.g., general

overhead). Levko needed to separate fixed from

variable costs for two reasons: (1) In addition to

49a

claiming lost profits, Venture claimed the right to

recover the fixed c ts attributable to the contracts;

and (2) Levko neede. to assign the correct amount of

variable costs to the hypothetical bids he constructed

for programs where no bid was submitted. To do this,

Levko used the ratio of fixed to variable costs reflected

in Grand Blanc’s plant-wide financial statements.

In order to compute the material cost component of

the variable costs, Levko needed to calculate the

amount of the purchased raw material that would

become unusable scrap. To verify the accuracy of the

material (scrap) costs reflected in the bids, Levko

compared the scrap rate reflected in the bids (15

percent), against the scrap rate discernable from

actual production data (approximately 11 percent), and

the scrap rate reflected in Grand Blanc’s plant-wide

financial statements (12.4 percent). To be conservative,

Levko used the bid scrap rate of 15 percent in his

calculations. Based on the bid data, Levko calculated

a contribution margin of 25 percent.

On December 4, 2003, the jury found that Autoliv

had breached the supply agreement and awarded

Venture $27,576,001 in damages. The district court

entered final judgment against Autoliv in th. amount

of the jury’s verdict on January 20, 2004, pursuant to

Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

During the discovery period, Venture filed for

reorganization under the Bankruptcy Code. The

bankruptcy court appeinted Doeren Mayhew &

Company, P.C. (“Doeren Mayhew”), a_ forensic

accounting firm, to investigate certain aspects of

Venture’s financial condition, including

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“inter-company, shareholder and related party

transactions.” Rule 60(b) Opinion, slip op. at 3.*

After the entry of final judgment in this case, on

March 10, 2004, Doeren Mayhew issued a report

stating that “Venture had suffered multi-million dollar

damages as a result of fraudulent related party

transactions.” Rule 60(b) Opinion, slip op. at 3-4. This

conclusion called into question the representations in

Venture’s firm-wide financial statements.

On March 25, 2004, Doeren Mayhew issued a

second report concerning the results of its “preliminary

investigation of potential accounting irregularities.”

J.A. at 583. The report focused on Vemco and the

Grand Blanc facility.° As noted, the books and records

of that facility had been used by Venture’s damages

expert at trial. Doeren Mayhew discovered

* The scope of Doeren Mayhew’s initial investigation included (1)

investigating “related party transactions that have taken place

with Venture for the six-year period, March 29, 1997 through

March 28, 2003 . . . . to determine whether the transaction was

considered on no less favorable terms to the Debtor than would be

obtained if such transaction were an ‘arms-length’ transaction

with a non-affiliated entity|,)” J.A. at 185; and (2) reviewing and

identifying “preferential transfers to insiders or affiliated

companies as defined by Code Section 547(b) of the United States

Bankruptcy Code” during the twelve-month period preceding

Venture’s date of insolvency, May 28, 2002. J.A. at 187.

®* Doeren Mayhew undertook this investigation after it was

“notified in early March 2004 regarding potential accounting

irregularities discovered by Venture’s management at the

company’s Grand Blanc facility.” J.A. at 583. The scope of the

investigation was limited to the Grand Blanc facility's internal

financial information.

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“questionable accounting procedures and practices,” a

“(l]lack of proper accounting controls,” and “potential

accounting irregularities” and “errors,” and concluded

(1) that Grand Blanc’s “material cost may have been

understated by approximately $700,000 on a monthly

basis” during 2003, and (2) that “Grand Blanc had

overstated its inventory on its financial records as of

December 31, 2002 and 2003 by $2,800,000 and

$2,500,000 respectively.” J.A. at 584-85, 588. These

misstatements resulted from an _ employee’s

manipulation of entries in the Grand Blanc facility’s

computerized accounting system and were reflected in

reports generated by that system, including Grand

Blanc’s plant-wide financial statements. Doeren

Mayhew’s second report also called into question

Venture’s firm-wide financial statements, insofar as

those statements were based in part on the inaccurate

Grand Blanc plant-wide financial statements.

On April 5, 2004, Venture filed a Securities and

Exchange Commission Form 8-K disclosing the

information in the Doeren Mayhew reports. As to the

related-party transactions addressed in the March 10,

2004 Doeren Mayhew report, the 8-K stated that

Venture had filed a lawsuit seeking “[rlecovery of

payments to one or more of Deiendants aggregating in

excess of [$300,000,000],” J.A. at 591, and that as a

result of the related-party transactions, “financial

information previously publicly reported by Venture

Holdings as far back as at least 1998 is unreliable and

should not be relied upon by investors.” J.A. at 592. As

to the Grand Blanc accounting issues addressed in the

March 25, 2004 Doeren Mayhew report, the 8-K stated

that “[i]nvestigation by [Venture] and Doeren Mayhew

disclosed .. . {a]pparent understatement of payables at

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the Grand Blanc facility during fiscal 2003 aggregating

$8,000,000-$10,000,000 . . . [and} [o]verstatement of

inventory at the Grand Blanc facility during fiscal

2002 and 2003 in the range of $2,500,000-$2,800,000.”

J.A. at 592.

The Doeren Mayhew investigation was not

immediately called to the district court’s attention by

either party. On April 7, 2004, the district court

entered an amended final judgment in the amount of

$33,459,134.84, adding prejudgment interest to the

jury award. Autoliv appealed to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which

transferred the appeal to this court on July 16, 2004.

On October 4, 2004, we stayed the appeal to allow

Autoliv the opportunity to file with the district court a

motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 60(b) based on

the Doeren Mayhew reports. Autoliv filed its Rule

60(b) motion on October 21, 2004. Autoliv argued that

the falsified financial information identified in the

Doeren Mayhew reports constituted: (1) newly

discovered evidence that could have affected the

outcome of the trial, entitling Autoliv to a new trial

pursuant to Rule 60(b)(2); and (2) “fraud,

misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse

party” during discovery and the trial, entitling Autoliv

to a new trial under Rule 60(b)(3).

After conducting an evidentiary hearing at which

Levko testified that Doeren Mayhew’s conclusions had

no effect on his trial testimony, the district court

denied Autoliv’s Rule 60(b) motion. As to Rule 60(b)(2),

the district court concluded that Autoliv failed to prove

that the newly discovered financial information would

have had an effect on the jury’s decision on damages.

53a

As to Rule 60(b)(3), the district court held that Venture

did not commit discovery misconduct by failing to

produce financial information that Autoliv alleged

would have disclosed the misrepresentations Doeren

Mayhew uncovered in time for use at trial. Because

the district court had earlier denied Autoliv’s motions

to compel such production, and Autoliv neither

challenged those rulings nor requested further

disclosures of internal financial information from

Venture, the district court concluded that there had

been no discovery misconduct. The district court did

not address Autoliv’s request for relief under Rule

60(b)(3) based on Levko’s trial testimony.

Autoliv timely appealed from the district court’s

disposition of the Rule 60(b) issues. Because

Venture’s complaint asserted claims under the patent

laws, we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1295(a\(1). The ruling of a district court under Rule

60(b) is final and appealable pursuant te 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292. Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Prods. Corp., 806

F.2d 1031, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 1986). At oral argument, we

requested supplemental briefing as to the legal

standard applicable to Autoliv’s Rule 60(b)(3) request.

© We lifted the stay, allowing Autoliv’s appeal from the jury

verdict and final judgment (nos. 04-1486 and 04-1488) to proceed.

In an opinion also issued teday, we affirm the judgment on the

merits, subject to the remand proceedings that we order in this

appeal. As to Venture’s cross appeal, we vacate the district court’s

award of prejudgment interest and remand to the district court.

Venture Indust. Corp., et al. v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., Nos. 04-1486,

-1488, --- Fed.Appx. ----, 2006 WL 2252836 (Fed. Cir. August 7,

2006).

:

54a

DISCUSSION

The denial of a motion for a new trial under Rule

60(b) is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Good v. Ohio

Edison Co., 149 F.3d 413, 423 (6th Cir. 1998); Mallory

v. Eyrich, 922 F.2d 1273, 1279 (6th Cir. 1991). “An

abuse of discretion will be found if the district court

relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact, improperly

applies the law or uses an erroneous legal standard.”

United States v. Chambers, 441 F.3d 438, 455 (6th Cir.

2006).

We address Autoliv’s Rule 60(b\2) and Rule

60(b\(3) arguments separately.

I

As a threshold matter, we reject Venture’s

contention that Autoliv’s motion was untimely. Rule

60(b) provides that motions “shall be made within a

reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not

more than one year after the judgment, order, or

proceeding was entered or taken.” Autoliv filed its

- Rule 60(b) motion on October 21, 2004, nine months

after the entry of judgment on January 20, 2004.

Though the district court accepted Autoliv’s motion

without comment, Venture argues here that the

nine-month delay was unreasonable under Rule 60(b).

The Sixth Circuit has held that whether the time of

filing a Rule 60(b) motion was reasonable “is

dependent upon the facts in a case, including length

and circumstances of delay in filing, prejudice to

opposing party by reason of the delay, and

circumstances warranting equitable relief.” in re

55a

G.A.D., Inc., 340 F.3d 331, 334 (6th Cir. 2003).” Here,

Venture makes no colorable claim that it we.

prejudiced by Autoliv’s delay. Further, Venture itself

was likely under an obligation to promptly notify the

district court of the inaccuracies in Levko’s testimony.

See Mich. R. Profl Conduct 3.3(aX4), adopted by

reference E.D. Mich. Local R. 83.22(b) (“Ifa lawyer has

offered material evidence and comes to know of its

falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial

measures.”); see also Schreiber Foods, Inc. v. Beatrice

Cheese, Inc., 402 F.3d 1198, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 2005)

(“Once counsel became aware that highly material

false statements had been made by a witness, in

pleadings submitted to the court and in response to

discovery requests . . . Schreiber and its counsel were

under an obligation to promptly correct the record.”).

Rule 60(bX2) provides, in pertinent part: “On

motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may

relieve a party .. . from a final judgment, order, or

proceedii for the following reasons: . . . (2) newly

discovered evidence which by due diligence could not

have been discovered in time to move for a new trial

under Rule 59(b)[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(2) (West 2006).

“In order to prevail on a Rule 60(b)(2) motion, a

movant must demonstrate . . . that the evicence is

material and controlling and clearly would have

produced a different result if presented before the

” One exception (not pertinent here) applies to Rule 60(b)(1)

motions predicated upon alleged errors of law, for which the Sixth

Circuit has held that the “reasonable time” is limited to the time

for filing a notice of appeal. Barrier v. Beaver, 712 F.2d 231,

234-35 (6th Cir. 1983).

56a

original judgment.” Good, 149 F.3d at 423 (internal

quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted).

Autoliv argues that the Doeren Mayhew reports

constitute newly discovered evidence that undercut the

accuracy of Levko’s testimony, entitling Autoliv to a

new trial under Rule 60(b)(2). At the evidentiary

hearing on Autoliv’s motion, Levko testified in detail

that Doeren Mayhew’s findings had no effect on his

assessment of Venture’s damages because, in making

his calculations, he did not rely primarily on

information from the Grand Blanc facility’s main

accounting system or the plant-wide financial

statements. Instead, he relied principally on

information from the Grand Blanc facility’s “bid” (or

“quote”) system. Both Levko and Autoliv’s expert,

Glenn Sheets, testified that the bid system was

separate and independent from the accounting system

and that the information from the bid system was not

ealled into question by the Doeren Mayhew reports.

The district court found that “Autoliv has not made out

a case for a finding that had the accounting

irregularities described in the March 25 Doeren

Mayhew report been known prior to trial, Levko’s

opinion and conclusion on damages would have

produced a different resul]t at trial with regard .. . to

damages.” Rule 60(b) Opinion, slip op. at 18.

Autoliv insists that the district court, in making

findings of fact and determinations of the weight and

credibility of the evidence, rejected Autoliv’s Rule

60(b\(2) motion based on the district court’s own

judgment rather than the probable effect of the

evidence on the jury. We disagree. The district court

expressly assessed the probable effect on the jury,

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stating: “It cannot be said that if the jury was

presented with the Doeren Mayhew reports .. . its

decision on damages would have been any different.”

Id. at 20. The district court reviewed the factual record

in the light of the newly discovered evidence and made

findings as to the weight of that evidence to determine

what the effect on the jury likely would have been.

Analysis of the record is necessary to resolve a Rule

60(b)(2) request.®

Autoliv also challenges several of the district

court’s specific findings regarding the effect of the

accounting irregularities on Levko’s testimony. Autoliv

questions the bid system information that Levko used

primarily in calculating Venture’s damages. The bid

information was obtained from the Grand Blanc

facility’s separate bid system. The district court found

that this information “was separate and independent

from the Grand Blanc facility plant-wide financial

data” implicated by the Doeren Mayhew reports, id. at

18, and “was specific and reliable.” Jd. at 10. Levko

relied on Venture’s bids on Autoliv projects that were

submitted before 2002, whether accepted or not. For

projects that Venture did not actually bid on, Levko

created hypothetical bids using data from submitted

bids and five third-party bids.

® See, e.g., Daniels v. Pipefitters’ Ass'n Local Union No. 597, 983

F.2d 800, 802-03 (7th Cir. 1993) (“[I}t is only logical that a district

court weigh the credibility of evidence before granting or denying

a Rule 60(bX2) motion. Rule 60(b2) motions are decided by

judges; not by juries. Credibility determinations are necessary to

these decisions. To hold otherwise would mean that the district

court would have to order a new trial no matter how incredible the

new evidence.”).

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Autoliv points out that the erroneous Grand Blanc

financials were the result of a “lack of proper

accounting controls.” J.A. at 588. It argues that

because there were errors in the Grand Blanc facility’s

financial statements for 2002-2003, “[t]he only

reasonable inference to be drawn... is that [Venture’s

accounting] controls were not appropriate during that

earlier time period either.” Reply Br. of Autoliv at 25.

Autoliv contends that this inference undercuts the

reliability of the pre-2002 bid data Levko used. The

district court concluded, however, that “Levko’s

opinion on damages was grounded on bids that

antedated December 31, 2001,” and that “[t]here is no

evidence to suggest that the accounting irregularities

at the Grand Blanc facility . . . affected Venture’s

1996-2001 financial statements.” Rule 60(6) Opinion,

slip op. at 20. We see no clear error in these factual

conclusions.

Autoliv also contends that a new trial should have

been granted because Levko relied, in some of his

testimony, on the fact that the Grand Blanc facility’s

plant-wide financial statements were audited and

therefore presumptively reliable. Levko testified at

trial that the fact that Grand Blanc had independently

certified plant-wide financial statements “tells me

that) what’s being reported is fair . . . [and that] the

internal controls are appropriate and adequate... .”

Rule 60(6) Opinion, slip op. at 11 n. 4. At the Rule

60(b) hearing, the district court questioned Levko

about whether having the information in the Doeren

Mayhew reports concerning the Grand Blanc financial

statements would have altered his trial testimony.

Levko responded “I couldn’t say that the certified

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59a

statements were accurate, but it wouldn’t change my

conclusions.” J.A. at 130.

Autoliv contends that even if Levko’s conclusions

would have remained the same, these alterations to

Levko’s testimony might have “colored” the trial. While

the district court’s Rule 60(b) opinion did not expressly

address this possibility, the district court specifically

recognized it during the Rule 60(b) hearing, and we

are convinced that the district court considered the

question and rejected Autoliv’s contention utilizing the

Rule 60(b)\(2) standard for prejudice. We see no error

in that conclusion.

Although Autoliv agrees that the Grand Blanc

accounting system was separate from the bid system,

Autoliv argues that financial information directly

called into question by Doeren Mayhew was utilized by

Levko in two respects: (1) to determine the ratio of

fixed to variable costs; and (2) to test the accuracy of

the scrap rate reflected in the bids.

As to the first, Autoliv contends that Levko’s

separation of the fixed and variable costs was affected

because Doeren Mayhew found that inventory was

overstated and recommended a downward inventory

adjustment. Levko explained that a downward

inventory adjustment would increase the cost of sales

to the Grand Blanc facility, potentially altering the

ratio of fixed and variable production costs. Levko

stated in an affidavit that Doeren Mayhew’s findings

did not affect his allocation of fixed and variable costs

in the bid data because the inventory adjustment

would not materially affect the ratio. The district court

explained that of the $2.5 million inventory

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adjustment, “$888,000 consisted of non-air bag

inventory which had no effect on the cost of sales

related to air bag covers. Of the $1.6 million dollar

balance, approximately 25% could be attributed to the

cost of sales of air bag cover products.” Rule 60(b)

Opinion, slip op. at 5. The district court concluded

that, while Levko determined the fixed-to-variable cost

ratio from Grand Blanc’s plant-wide financial

statements, “any change in the financial statements as

a consequence of the Doeren Mayhew reports did not

affect the allocation.” Jd. at 12. We see no error in this

conclusion.

As to the scrap rate, Levko used a scrap rate of 15

percent in his calculations. He derived that scrap rate

from the bid information. Levko checked the bid-based

scrap rate against the plant-wide scrap rate reported

in Grand Blanc’s plant-wide financial statements. That

figure was 12.4 percent. He nevertheless used the 15

percent rate from the bids in order to make his

calculations conservative. Autoliv relies on the

affidavit of Kevin Dages, an accounting consultant, to

argue that the inventory adjustments recommended by

the Doeren Mayhew reports would have resulted in

increased scrap rates for 2002 and 2003. Levko

testified, however, that even assuming the inventory

adjustment, the plant-wide scrap rate (only partially

attributable to airbag cover production) would increase

to 13.4 percent, still well below the 15 percent rate

Levko used. The district court explained in detail that

it rejected Dages’ analysis on the basis of several

methodological flaws, including Dages’ calculation of

increases in “[p]roduction costs based on plant-wide

financial data [which] does not particularize air bag

production costs.” Rule 60(b) Opinion, slip op. at 19.

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The district court found that even after making the

inventory adjustment called for by the Doeren Mayhew

reports, “the plant-wide scrap rate would be 13.4%,

still below the 15% rate Levko used,” id. at 13, and

thus concluded that the Doeren Mayhew reports’ effect

on the scrap rate would not have altered the jury’s

decision. We find no clear error in this determination.

The district court also did not err in failing to consider

the totality of the allegedly prejudicial evidence.

Clear error only exists if we are “left with a definite

and firm conviction that a mistake has been

committed.” United States v. Monumental Life Ins.

Co., 440 F.3d 729, 732 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting

Alexander v. Local 496, Laborers’ Int'l Union of N.

Am., 177 F.3d 394, 402 (6th Cir. 1999)). Here, we are

left with no such conviction. We conclude that the

district court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Autoliv’s motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule

60(b)(2).

II

We now address Autoliv’s Rule 60(bX3) motion.

Rule 60(b)(3) provides: “On motion and upon such

terms as are just, the court may relieve a party...

from a fina] judgment, order, or proceeding for the

following reasons: . . . (3) fraud (whether heretofore

denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation,

or other misconduct of an adverse party ... .”

A

Autoliv argues that Venture engaged in discovery

misconduct by withholding “Venture’s non-public

62a

financial information-the data that ultimately

disclosed Venture’s fraud.” Autoliv’s Rule 60(b) Motion

at 2. Autoliv contends that Venture should have

disclosed the information in response to Autoliv’s

document-production requests and through the

deposition testimony of representatives of Venture and

pertinent Venture subsidiaries. In particular, Autoliv

contends that it was denied the opportunity to depose

the controller at the Grand Blanc facility who,

according to Doeren Mayhew, manipulated the

accounting system to cause the misrepresentations in

the financial statements.

Failure to produce material in response to

legitimate discovery requests can _ constitute

misconduct under Rule 60(b)(3). Abrahamsen uv.

Trans-State Express. Inc., 92 F.3d 425, 428 (6th Cir.

1996).° However, the question is not whether Venture

failed to comply with Autoliv’s initial discovery

requests; it is whether Venture complied with Autoliv’s

requests as limited by the Special Master and the

district court. There is no contention that Venture

failed to comply with the discovery ordered by the

district court. As the district court stated, “Autoliv had

ample opportunity to ask the Court to require further

of Venture if it felt that its discovery requests [were]

not being met.” Rule 60(b) Opinion, slip op. at 7.

Autoliv did not request further action from the district

court in this regard. We conclude that the district

* See also Summers v. Howard Univ., 374 F.3d 1188, 1193 (D.C

Cir. 2004); Cummings v. Gen. Motors Corp., 365 F.3d 944, 955

(10th Cir. 2004); Schultz v. Butcher, 24 F.3d 626, 630 (4th Cir.

1994); Stridiron v. Stridiron, 698 F.2d 204, 207 (3d Cir. 1983);

Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332, 1339 (5th Cir. 1978).

Pe er ee ee

63a

court did not abuse its discretion in holding that

Venture did not engage in discovery misconduct within

the meaning of Rule 60(b)(3)."°

B

We now turn to Autoliv’s contention that reliance

on the financial statements by Venture’s damages

expert warrants relief under Rule 60(b)(3). As a

threshold matter, Venture insists that Autoliv failed to

raise this ground before the district court. Based on

our examination of the record, we conclude that the

issue was properly raised in Autoliv’sRule 60(b)(3)

motion.

Autoliv’s contention here is based on the same

grounds as its request under Rule 60(b)(2): (1) Levko’s

reliance on the bid data; (2) Levko’s testimony that the

Grand Blanc facility’s certified financial statements

gave him comfort about Venture’s accounting controls;

and (3) Levko’s reliance on the Grand Blanc plant-wide

financial statements to derive the fixed/variable cost

ratio and check the bid-based scrap rate for his

damage calculations.

The district court did not address Autoliv’s Rule

60(b)(3) contention with respect to Levko’s testimony.

The district court did, however, hold that Autoliv

failed to establish prejudice according to the Rule

60(b)(2) standard. Thus, even if Autoliv could establish

fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct, the

” We note that Autoliv does not contend that Venture engaged in

any misconduct in opposing the discovery requests.

64a

district court’s failure to address Autoliv’s Rule

60(b)(3) contention as to Levko’s testimony could only

constitute harmful error if the standard for prejudice

under Rule 60(b)(3) is different from the standard for

prejudice under Rule 60(b\2). We conclude that the

standard for prejudice is indeed different under the

two rules, and thus that the district court’s error was

potentially harmful.

At oral argument, we requested supplemental

briefing from both parties addressing the appropriate

standard for relief under Rule 60(b)(3) in the Sixth

Circuit. Venture argues that the issue is controlled by

the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Abrahamsen. While the

court stated that relief is appropriate where a witness

testifies falsely and “without [the false testimony], a

jury might have reached a different conclusion,”

Abrahamsen, 92 F.3d at 428 (internal quotation marks

omitted), the court did not clearly articulate a general

standard for determining prejudice.*’ Nor does any

other published Sixth Circuit decision.

Autoliv contends that the appropriate rule is stated

in Jordan v. Paccar, Inc., No. 95-3478, 1996 WL

528950 (6th Cir. 1996), an unpublished decision. In the

Sixth Circuit, only published decisions are binding on

the court; unpublished decisions may be persuasive

'' Prejudice was obvious in Abrahamsen because the district court

expressly held that it would not have found the plaintiffs

contributorily negligent absent the false testimony. /d. at 428-29.

'2 United States v. Wood, 364 F.3d 704, 725 (6th Cir. 2004); S.J. v.

Hamilton County, Ohio, 374-E.3d 416, 423 n. 5 (6th Cir. 2004);

Sheets v. Moore, 97 F.3d 164, 167 (6th Cir. 1996); see also Sixth

65a

authority depending on their pertinence and depth of

reasoning. Harper v. AutoAlliance Int'l, Inc., 392 F.3d

195, 205 n. 3 (6th Cir. 2004). Autoliv urges that we

should rely on Jordan because the court in Jordan

thoroughly analyzed the question of the proper legal

standard under Rule 60(b)(3). See1996 WL 528950, at

*6-*9. We agree. The court in Jordan set forth the

legal standard applicable under Rule 60(b)(3) based on

thorough analysis of the language of the rule and its

treatment by other circuits. Thus, we conclude that

relying on Jordan is appropriate under the

circumstances.

In some circuits, the standard for prejudice under

Rule 60(b)(3) requires the movant to demonstrate that

the fraud or misconduct “prevented the moving party

from fully and fairly presenting his case.” Schultz, 24

F.3d at 630; see also Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 862

F.2d 910, 924 (1st Cir. 1988).’* The Sixth Circuit in

Cir. R. 206(c) (“Reported panel opinions are binding on subsequent

panels.”).

'8 See also Sixth Cir. R. 28(g) (citation of unpublished opinions is

“disfavored,” but permissible “{iJf a party believes ... that an

unpublished disposition has precedential value in relation to a

material issue in a case, and that there is no published opinion

that would serve as well . . . .”); Oviedo v. Jago, 809 F.2d 326, 329

n. 3 (6th Cir. 1987) (relying on unpublished decision because “the

panel's reasoning [is] sound and its decision supported by the

existing law”).

'* See also Cummings, 365 F.3d at 955; Sellers v. Mineta, 350 F.3d

706, 715 (8th Cir. 2003); Tobel v. City of Hammond, 94 F.3d.360,

362 (7th Cir. 1996); Diaz vu. Methodist Hosp., 46 F.3d 492, 496 (5th

Cir. 1995); In re M/ V Peacock, 809 F.2d 1403, 1404-05 (9th Cir.

66a

Jordan, however, “dispens[ed}] with any requirement

that the moving party demonstrate prejudice,” Jordan,

1996 WL 528950, at *8, holding that “prejudice should

be presumed| | once the moving party has shown by

clear and convincing evidence that misbehavior falling

into one or more of the three categories set out in Rule

60(b)(3) has occurred.” Id. The burden then shifts to

the non-moving party “to demonstrate by clear and

convincing evidence that the misbehavior which

occurred had no prejudicial effect on the outcome of

the litigation.” Id.

As we noted earlier, under Rule 60(b)(2) the moving

party must show that the newly discovered evidence,

if introduced at trial, “clearly would have produced a

different result if presented before the original

judgment.” Good, 149 F.3d at 423. The prejudice

standards of Rule 60(b)(3) and Rule 60(b)(2) thus differ

as to the party that initially bears the burden of proof,

and as to the nature of the necessary showing. The

district court analyzed the possibility of prejudice from

Levko’s testimony only under the Rule 60(b)(2)

standard.” it did not apply the standard for prejudice

1987); Stridiron, 698 F.2d at 207; GAF Corp. v. Transamerica Ins.

Co., 665 F.2d 364, 371 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

© “Autoliv has not made out a case for a finding that had the

accounting irregularities described in the March 25 Doeren

Mayhew report been known prior to trial, Levko’s opinion and

conclusion on damages would have produced a different result at

trial with regard . . . to damages.” Rule 60(6) Opinion, slip op. at

18; see also id. at 20 (“It cannot be said that if the jury was

presented with the Doeren Mayhew reports, particularly the

March 25 Doeren Mayhew report, its decision on damages would

have been any different.”).

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that we conclude is applicable to Autoliv’s Rule

60(b)(3) request with respect to Levko’s testimony.

We conclude that we must vacate in part the

district court’s denial of Autoliv’s Rule 60(b)(3) motion

as it concerned Levko’s testimony and remand for

adjudication under the proper legal standard. In doing

so, we do not address the question of whether Levko’s

testimony constitutes “fraud, misrepresentation, or

other misconduct” within the purview of Rule 60(b)(3);

that is a question best addressed by the district court

in the first instance.*® On remand, the district court

must decide whether Autoliv has established, by clear

and convincing evidence, that reliance upon Venture’s -

financial information by Venture’s damages expert

constituted fraud or misrepresentation. If Autoliv

makes such a showing, the district court must consider

whether Venture established, by clear and convincing

evidence, that the misbehavior had zo prejudicial

effect on the outcome of the litigation.

Ill

In summary, we affirm the district court’s denial of

Autoliv’s motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule

'© In this connection, we do not decide-one way or the

other-whether, as the district court correctly held in connection

with the alleged discovery misconduct issue, “there is no evidence

that Venture was aware of the accounts payable understatement

or inventory overstatement that Doeren Mayhew describes... in

its March 25 report.” Rule 60(b) Opinion, slip op. at 8. We have

rejected the discovery argument on a different ground-that the

failure to produce documents that would reveal the fraud was not —

misconduct.

68a

60(b)(2). We also affirm the district court’s conclusion

that Autoliv is not entitled to a new trial under Rule

60(bX3) on the basis of discovery misconduct. But

because the district court did not consider Autoliv’s

allegation with respect to Levko’s testimony as a

ground for relief under Rule 60(b)(3), we vacate the

district court’s denial of Autoliv’s Rule 60(b)(3) motion

and remand for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion.

CONCLUSION

The decision of the district court is

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND

REMANDED.

COSTS

No costs.

69a

APPENDIX I

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FEDERAL CIRCUIT

No. 2007-1118

[Filed July 11, 2007]

VENTURE INDUSTRIES CORPORATION,

Vemco, Inc., Patent Holding Company,

and Larry J. Winget,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

— a. Ss ~te? = eS’. Sew = eee eee

AUTOLIV ASP, INC. (successor to

Morton International, Inc.),

)

)

)

)

)

)

v. )

)

)

)

)

Defendant-Appellant. )

)

Appealed from United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Michigan, No. 2:99-CV-75354,

Avern Cohn, Senior Judge.

John E. Anding, Drew, Cooper & Anding, of Grand

| Rapids, MI, argued for plaintiffs-appellees. With him

on the brief was Thomas V. Hubbard.

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70a

Peter E. Greene, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher &

Flom LLP, of New York, NY, argued for

defendant-appellant. With him on the brief was Cyrus

Amir-Mokri.

Judgment

ON APPEAL fromthe United States District

Court for the Eastern

District of Michigan

in CASE NO(S). 2:99-CV-75354

This CAUSE having been heard and considered, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED:

Per Curiam (LINN, and PROST, Circuit Judges,

CLEVENGER, Senior Circuit Judge).

AFFIRMED. See Fed. Cir. R. 36.

ENTERED BY ORDER

OF THE COURT

DATED: July 11, 2007 /s/ Jan Horbaly

Jan Horbaly, Clerk

Jla

APPENDIX J

TITLE 28. JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL

PROCEDURE

PART V--PROCEDURE

CHAPTER 125--PENDING ACTIONS AND

JUDGMENTS

28 U.S.C.A. § 1961. Interest

(a) Interest shall be allowed on any money judgment

in a civil case recovered in a district court. Execution

therefor may be levied by the marshal, in any case

where, by the law of the State in which such court is

held, execution may be levied for interest on

judgments recovered in the courts of the State. Such

interest shall be calculated from the date of the entry

of the judgment, at a rate equal to the weekly average

1-year constant maturity Treasury yield, as published

by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve

System, for the calendar week preceding.’ the date of

the judgment. The Director of the Administrative

Office of the United States Courts shall distribute

notice of that rate and any changes in it to all Federal

judges.

(b) Interest shall be computed daily to the date of

payment except as provided in section 2516(b) of this

' So in original. The period probably should not appear.

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title and section 1304(b) of title 31, and shall be

compounded annually.

(c)(1) This section shall not apply in any judgment of

any court with respect to any internal revenue tax

case. Interest shall be allowed in such cases at the

underpayment rate or overpayment rate (whichever is

appropriate) established under section 6621 of the

Internal Revenue Code of 1986.

(2) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (1) of

this subsection, interest shall be allowed on all final

judgments against the United States in the United

States Court of Appeals for the Federal circuit,’ at the

rate provided in subsection (a) and as provided in

subsection (b).

(3) Interest shall be allowed, computed, and paid on

judgments of the United States Court of Federal

Claims only as provided.in paragraph (1) of this

subsection or in any other provision of law.

(4) This section shal] not be construed to affect the

interest on any judgment of any court not specified in

this section.

? So in original. Probably should_be “Circuit,”.

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Michigan Compiled Laws

_ Chapter 600. Revised Judicature Act of 1961

M.C.L.A. Sec. 6013. (1) Interest is allowed on a money

judgment recovered in a civil action, as provided in

this section. However, for complaints filed on or after

October 1, 1986, interest is not allowed on future

damages from the date of filing the complaint to the

date of entry of the judgment. As used in this

subsection, “future damages” means that term as

defined in section 6301.

(2) For complaints filed before June 1, 1980, in an

action involving other than a written instrument

having a rate of interest exceeding 6% per year, the

interest on the judgment is calculated from the date of

filing the complaint to June 1, 1980, at the rate of 6%

per year and on and after June 1, 1980, to the date of

satisfaction of the judgment at the rate of 12% per year

compounded annually.

(3) For a complaint filed before June 1, 1980, in an

action involving a written instrument having a rate of

interest exceeding 6% per year, the interest on the

judgment is calculated from the date of filing the

complaint to the date of satisfaction of the judgment at

the rate specified in the instrument if the rate was

legal at the time the instrument was executed.

However, the rate after the date judgment is entered

shall not exceed either of the following:

(a} Seven percent per year compounded

annually for a period of time between the date

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74a

judgment is entered and the date of satisfaction of the

judgment that elapses before June 1, 1980.

(b) Thirteen percent per year compounded

annually for a period of time between the date

judgment is entered and the date of satisfaction of the

judgment that elapses after May 31, 1980.

(4) For a complaint filed on or after June 1, 1980,

but before January 1, 1987, interest is calculated from

the date of filing the complaint to the date of

satisfaction of the judgment at the rate of 12% per year

compounded annually unless the judgment is rendered

on a written instrument having a higher rate of

interest. In that case interest is calculated at the rate

specified in the instrument if the rate was legal at the

time the instrument was executed. The rate shall not

exceed 13% per year compounded annually after the

date judgment is entered.

(5) Except as provided in subsection (6), for a

complaint filed on or after January 1, 1987, but before

July 1, 2002, if a judgment is rendered on a written

instrument, interest is calculated from the date of

filing the complaint to the date of satisfaction of the

judgment at the rate of 12% per year compounded

annually, unless the instrument has a higher rate of

interest. In that case, interest shall be calculated at

the rate specified in the instrument if the rate was

legal at the time the instrument was executed. The

rate shall not exceed 13% per year compounded

annually after the date judgment is entered.

(6) For a complaint filed on or after January 1,

1987, but before July 1, 2002, if the civil action has not

3

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75a

resulted in a final, nonappealable judgment as of July

1, 2002, and if a judgment is or has been rendered on

a written instrument that does not evidence

indebtedness with a specified interest rate, interest is

calculated as provided in subsection (8).

(7) For a complaint filed on or after July 1, 2002, if

a judgment is rendered on a written instrument

evidencing indebtedness with a specified interest rate,

interest is calculated from the date of filing the

complaint to the date of satisfaction of the judgment at

the rate specified in the instrument if the rate was

legal at the time the instrument was executed. If the

rate in the written instrument is a variable rate,

interest shall be fixed at the rate in effect under the

instrument at the time the complaint is filed. The rate

under this subsection shall not exceed 13% per year

compounded annually.

(8) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (5)

and (7) and subject to subsection (13), for complaints

filed on or after January 1, 1987, interest on a money

judgment recovered in a civil action is calculated at 6-

month intervals from the date of filing the complaint

at a rate of interest equal to 1% plus the average

interest rate paid at auctions of 5-year United States

treasury notes during the 6 months immediately

preceding July 1 and January 1, as certified by the

state treasurer, and compounded annually, according

to this section. Interest under this subsection is

calculated on the entire amount of the money

judgment, including attorney fees and other costs. The

amount of interest attributable to that part of the

money judgment from which attorney fees are paid is

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76a

retained by the plair tiff, and not paid to the plaintiff's

attorney.

(9) If a bona fide, reasonable written offer of

settlement in a civil action based on tort is made by

the party against whom the judgment is subsequently

rendered and is rejected by the plaintiff, the court

shall order that interest is not allowed beyond the date

the bona fide, reasonable written offer of settlement is

filed with the court.

(10) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (1)

and subject to subsections (11) and (12), if a bona fide,

reasonable written offer of settlement in a civil action

based on tort is not made by the party against whom

the judgment is subsequently rendered, or is made and

is not filed with the court, the court shall order that

interest be calculated from the date of filing the

complaint to the date of satisfaction of the judgment.

(11) Ifa civil action is based on medical malpractice

and the defendant in the medical malpractice action

failed to allow access to medical records as required

under section 2912b(5), the court shall order that

interest be calculated from the date notice was given

in compliance with section 2912b to the date of

satisfaction of the judgment.

(12) Ifa civil action is based on medical malpractice

and the plaintiff in the medical malpractice action

failed to allow access to medical records as required

under section 2912b(5), the court shall order that

interest be calculated irom 182 days after the date the

complaint was filed to the date of satisfaction of the

judgment.

77a

(13) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (1),

if a bona fide, reasonable written offer of settlement in

a civil action based on tort is made by a plaintiff for

whom the judgment is subsequently rendered and that

offer is rejected and the offer is filed with the court,

the court shall order that interest be calculated from

the date of the rejection of the offer to the date of

satisfaction of the judgment at a rate of interest equal

to 2% plus the rate of interest calculated under

subsection (8).

(14) A bona fide, reasonable written offer of

settlement made according to this section that is not

accepted within 21 days after the offer is made is

rejected. A rejection under this subsection or otherwise

does not preclude a later offer by either party.

(15) As used in this section:

(a) “Bona fide, reasonable written offer of

settlement” means either of the following:

(i) With respect to an offer of settlement

made by a defendant against whom judgment is

subsequently rendered, a written offer of settlement

that is not less than 90% of the amount actually

received by the plaintiff in the action through

judgment.

(iz) With respect to an offer of settlement

made by a plaintiff, a written offer of settlement that

is not more than 110% of the amount actually received

by the plaintiff in the action through judgment.

oe 8 ee Leis

i i aN ce el i

78a

(b) “Defendant” means a defendant, a counter-

defendant, or a cross-defendant.

(c) “Party” means a plaintiff or a defendant.

(d) “Plaintiff’ means a plaintiff, a counter-

plaintiff, or a cross-plaintiff.

79a

| APPENDIX K

: UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

Case No.: 99-75354

ee en

[Filed March 1, 2004}

VENTURE INDUSTRIES

: CORPORATION, et al.,

|

Plaintiffs,

Vv.

AUTOLIV ASP, INC., successor to

MORTON INTERNATIONAL, INC.;

AUTOLIV, INC., and MORTON

INTERNATIONAL, INC.,

Defendants.

ee ee ee ee ee

HON. AVERN COHN

MAGISTRATE JUDGE WALLACE CAPEL

JOHN E. ANDING (P30356)

Attorney for Plaintiffs

DREW COOPER & ANDING

Ledyard Building, Suite 300

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Grand Rapids, Michigan 49503

(616) 454-8300

A. SIDNEY KATZ

RICHARD W. MCLAREN, JR.

THOMAS L. GEMMELL

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

WELSH & KATZ, LTD.

120 South Riverside Plaza, 22"¢ Floor

Chicago, Illinois 60606

(312) 655-1500

WILLIAM H. HORTON (P31567)

LINDA M. WATSON (P45320)

SEAN M. WALSH (P48724)

Attorneys for Defendants

COX, HODGMAN & GIARMARCO, P.C.

Tenth Floor Columbia Center

101 W. Big Beaver Road

Troy, Michigan 48084-5280

(248) 457-7000

JONATHAN F. PUTNAM

Attorney for Defendants

KIRKLAND & ELLIS, P.C.

153 East 53” Street, 39th Floor

New York, New York 10022

(212) 446-4800

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Notice was given that Defendant Autoliv ASP, Inc.,

appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the

Sixth Circuit from the Final Judgment entered by the

Clerk of the Court in this action on January 29, 2004

‘

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and the Memorandum and Order Denying Defendant’s

Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law entered in

this action on February 12, 2004.

COX, HODGMAN & GIARMARCO, P.C.

By: /sf

WILLIAM H. HORTON (P31567)

LINDA M. WATSON (P45320)

SEAN M. WALSH (P48724)

Attorneys for Defendants

Cox, Hodgman & Giarmarco, P.C.

Tenth Floor Columbia Center

101 W. Big Beaver Road

Troy, Michigan 48084-5280

(248) 457-7000

Dated: March 1, 2004

82a

APPENDIX L

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

Civil Action No. 99-75354

[Filed March 16, 2004]

VENTURE INDUSTRIES CORPORATION,

VEMCO, INC., PATENT HOLDLING

COMPANY, and LARRY J. WINGET,

’ " PO ee ee ee ee woe

ee. ee ke ee ee re .

Plaintiffs / Cross-Appeliants

._—e Se ee ee

he Ba, a ee >

AUTOLIV ASP, INC., and AUTOLIV, INC.,

w= & :

Defendants / Cross-Appellees.

i— S

)

)

)

)

)

)

v. ; )

)

)

)

)

)

ee

Judge Avern Cohn

Magistrate Judge Wallace Capel, Jr.

John E. Anding (P30356)

Bridget C. Kehoe (P28196) }

Thomas V. Hubbard (P60575)

DREW, COOPER & ANDING

Attorney for Plaintiffs/Cross-Appellants

ee ee ay ee Se ee ee ee. a, Pee rl ho > el

83a

125 Ottawa Avenue NW

Ledyard Building, Suite 300

Grand Rapids, MI 49503

(616) 454-8300

A. Sidney Katz

Richard W. McLaren, Jr.

Thomas L. Gemmell

WELSH & KATZ, LTD.

Attorney for Plaintiffs/Cross-Appellants

120 South Riverside Plaza, 22™ Floor

Chicago, IL 60606

(312) 655-1500

William Horton (P31567)

COX, HODGMAN & GIARMARCO, P.C.

Attorney for Defendants/Cross-Appellees

Tenth Floor Columbia Center

101 W. Big Beaver Road

Troy, MI 48084

(248) 457-7000

Jonathan F. Putnam

KIRKLAND & ELLIS, P.C.

Attorney for Defendants/Cross-Appellees

153 East 53 Street

New York, NY 10022

(212) 446-4800

NOTICE OF FILING CROSS APPEAL

Notice is hereby given that all Plaintiffs in the

above named case cross appeal, pursuant to Federal

Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(3), to the United

-_——— el. -=- oF

84a

States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’ from the

Order granting Defendant Autoliv, Inc.’s Motion for

Summmary Judgment as to Counts II (Breach of

Supply Agreement - Autoliv, Inc.), TV (Breach of Cross

License Agreement - Autoliv, Inc.) and V

(Abondonment of Supply Agreement, Cross License

Agreement and Settlement Agreement) of Plaintiffs’

Second Amended Complaint, entered in this action on

May 20, 2003.

Respectfully Submitted,

DREW, COOPER & ANDING

Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Cross-Appellants

By: /s/

John E. Anding (P30356)

Bridget C. Kehoe (P28196)

Thomas V. Hubbard (P60575)

Ledyard Building, Suite 300

125 Ottawa Avenue NW

Grand Rapids, MI 49503

(616) 454-8300

Dated: March 12, 2004

' This Notice of Cross Appeal may not be construed as an

acceptance by Plaintiffs of the Sixth Circuit’s jurisdiction over this

appeal. Plaintiffs intend to file with the Sixth Circuit a Motion to

Transfer this appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit because of patent claims pleaded in Plaintiffs’ Second

Amended Complaint.

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85a

APPENDIX M

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-2457

[Filed December 4, 2007]

VENTURE INDUSTRIES CORPORATION,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

)

)

)

)

r VEMCO INC.; PATENT HOLDING )

q COMPANY; LARRY J. WINGET, )

4 )

Plaintiffs, )

s )

q V. )

3 )

3 AUTOLIV ASP, INC., successor to )

: Morton International, Incorporated; )

3 AUTOLIV, INC., )

q )

4 Defendants-Appellees. )

4 ORDER

3 In this patent action, the plaintiff filed a notice of

appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit on November 15, 2007. The appeal was

86a

inadvertently transmitted to and docketed in this

court. The appeal is hereby sua _ sponte

TRANSFERRED to the United States Court of

Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

ENTERED PURSUANT TO RULE 45

SIXTH CIRCUIT RULES

Leonard Green, Clerk

/s/ Leonard Green ji

87a

APPENDIX N

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

Nos. 04-1486, -1488

[Filed August 28, 2006]

VENTURE INDUSTRIES CORPORATION,

VEMCO INC., PATENT HOLDING

COMPANY, and LARRY J. WINGET,

Plaintiffs-Cross Appellants,

Re ee I, Pa ee ee eee ae = Te

Vv.

“ATs

}

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

AUTOLIV ASP, INC., (successor to )

Morton International, Inc.), )

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

7 eas, Tr

Defendant-Appellant,

v.

AUTOLIV, INCORPORATED,

Defendant.

JUDGMENT :

FO te ee ee ee ew Pe Tye Ee BO PR Fee ROT NT eS ee eae ee rest a

ON APPEAL fromthe United States District

Court for the Eastern

District of Michigan

CASE NO.: 2:99-CV-75354

This CAUSE having been heard and considered, it

is ORDERED and ADJUDGED:

7 AFFIRMED-IN PART, VACATED-IN-PART and

3 REMANDED.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF

4 THE COURT

: DATED AUG 7, 2006 /s/Jan Horbaly/ims_

Jan Horbaly, Clerk

ISSUED AS A MANDATE: AUG 28, 2006 3

{Opinion omitted here, contained in :

this appendix at page 28a]

eg ee A eee eee ee ee, es ee Ee al 7, a eo . ee ne de es. BER le 1 i nd * wh oti) a) eh ee

: 89a

4

APPENDIX O

.

: IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION '

Civil Action No. 99-75354

|

[Filed October 10, 2007] :

VENTURE INDUSTRIES CORPORATION, ) :

VEMCO INC., PATENT HOLDING )

COMPANY, and LARRY J. WINGET, )

4 )

Plaintiffs, )

‘ )

v. )

)

AUTOLIV ASP, INC., and AUTOLIV, INC., )- =

. )

Defendants. )

| )

Honorable Avern Cohn

| Magistrate Wallace Capel

John E. Anding (P30356)

Thomas V. Hubbard (P60575)

DREW, COOPER & ANDING

Attorney for Plaintiffs

Ledyard Building, Suite 300

125 Ottawa Ave., NW

Pa Pe ee rie Le

90a

Grand Rapids, Michigan 49503

(616) 454-8300

Peter E. Greene

Cyrus Amir-Mokri

SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP

Attorneys for Defendant Autoliv ASP, Inc.

Four Times Square

New York, New York 10036-6522

(212) 735-3000

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO DETERMINE

PREJUDGMENT INTEREST __.

EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION REQUESTED

Plaintiff Venture Industries, Inc. (“Venture”)

respectfully moves this Court for an assessment of

prejudgment interest, pursuant to M.C.L.

§ 600.6013(8), in the amount of $13,525,577.00 non pro

tunc September 27, 2007. This amount reflects

prejudgment interest on the verdict in Venture’s favor

of $27,500,001.00 calculated from November 3, 1999

through September 27, 2007.

Venture states, in further support of its Motion:

1. Michigan’s prejudgment interest statute, M.C.L.

§ 600.6013(8) applies in this case because, in federal

diversity actions, the law of the forum state governs

prejudgment interest. Perceptron, Inc. v. Sensor

Adaptive Machines, Inc., 221 F.3d 913, 922 (6 Cir.

2000); Venture Indus. Corp. v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., Nos.

04-1486, 04-1488, 2006 WL 2252836, at **6 (Fed. Cir.

Aug. 7, 2006).

9la

2. Under Michigan law, prejudgment interest

accrues beginning with the filing of the complaint,

through the conclusion of any appeal. Morales v. Auto-

Owners Ins. Co., 469 Mich. 487, 491-92 (2003); Ayar v.

Foodland Distributors, 472 Mich. 713, 716-17 (2005).

3. The Complaint in this case was filed on

November 3, 1999. The latest appeal in this case

concluded on September 27, 2007, the date the Federal

Circuit’s Judgment was issued as a Mandate.

4. In a pre-motion telephone conference, the Court

stated that it would consider and resolve this matter

as expeditiously as possible.

WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth above and

in the accompanying Memorandum in support of this

Motion, Venture respectfully requests that: 1) this

court assess prejudgment interest totaling

$13,525,577.00 against Autoliv and in favor of

Venture, reflecting a calculation of prejudgment

pursuant to M.C.R. § 600.6013(8) beginning on

November 3, 1999 and ending September 27, 2007; 2)

this Court exercise its discretion and set this Motion

for hearing within the next ten (10) days.

Respectfully submitted,

DREW, COOPER & ANDING

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

/s/ John E. Anding

John E. Anding (P30356)

Bridget C. Kehoe (P28196)

Thomas V. Hubbard (P60575)

Building, Suite 300

125 Ottawa Avenue, NW

Grand Rapids, Michigan 49503

(616) 454-8300

Dated: October 10, 2007

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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