Appendix — Rodriguez v. Editor in Chief, Legal Times Times (No. 08-411)

Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

6 @)

8-411 SEP 292008

No. OFFICE OF THE CLERK

IN THE K Suter, Clerk

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq.,

Petitioner,

Vv.

Editor in Chief, Lega/ Times, Individually and

in his corporate capacity, et al,

Respondents.

Petition For Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit

APPENDIX TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Isidoro Rodriguez

Counsel for Petitioner

Member of the Bar of this Court since

September 11, 1992

7924Payton Forest Trail

Annandale, Virginia 22003-1560

Telephone: 571.423.5066

E-Mail: isidoror@EarthLink.net

-1"

TABLE OF CONTENT

Judgement of the Special Designated Panel for

the U.S. Court of Appeals For the District of

Columbia Circuit, Docket No. 07-5234, /sidoro

Rodriguez v. Editor in Chief, Legal Times,

Individually and in his corporate capacity, et al,

(“Special Panel in Rodriguez IT’), dated July 2,

2008, and mandate issued on August 28, 2008,

affirming dismissal of the complaint based on

absolute judicial/ministerial immunity from

liability for suit under RICO and lack of venue in

the District of Columbia of federal causes of

PE Aaa vahevsegesebe kes eoas eames A-1

Order of the Special Designated in Rodriguez I,

dated June 18, 2008, denying motion to

SES td 5 a wa ee ees eee nS A-11

Order of the Special Designated in Rodriguez I,

dated May 17, 2008, denying access to en banc

consideration of denial of Writ ......... A-13

Order of the Special Designated Panel

Rodriguez II, April 23, 2008, denying Petition for

Writ of Mandamus under 18 U.S.C. § 3771A-15

Order of the Special Designated Panel

Rodriguez lI, February 25, 2008, granting

absolute immunity to all defendants for violation

Ns ew ens ha be be eis ae ee A-17

Order of the Special Designated Panel

Rodriguez II, December 19, 2007, denying

10.

the

TRO/Preliminary Injunction, empaneling of

grand jury, granting absolute judicial

immunity to Committee on Admission and all

defendants for RICO violation ...... A-20

Order of District Court for District of

Columbia, Docket No. 07-0975, June 25,

2007, denying motion to disqualify and for

ERR GAR ARE aa Ra OTe A-25

Order of District Court for District of

Columbia, Docket No. 07-0975, June 18,

2007, denying dismissing RICO action based

on absolute judicial/executive immunity-even

for criminal acts, and to dismiss based on

I Ec vce keV ied ks tea A-27

June 29, 2007, Void Order of the Supreme

Court of Virginia affirming vod order of the

Virginia State Bar revoking Rodriguez's

license to practice law for taking “actions” to

enforce his rights under Treaty and Va. Code

as a father and Virginia attorney, Jsidoro

Rodriguez, Esq. v. Virginia State Bar, No.

Ee 6 fae es awe ee hy eee A-35

November 28, 2006, Void order of the

Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board, Jn re

Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq., ........... A-38

Case 1:07-cv-00975-PLF Document 38 Filed

09/03/2008 Page 1 of 5

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 07-5234

Isidoro Rodriguez, Appellant

Vv.

Editor in Chief, Legal Times, Individually

and in his corporate capacity, et al., Appellees

September Term, 200707cv00975

Filed On: July 2, 2008

BEFORE: Tacha, McConnell and Gorsuch, Circuit

Judges*

JUDGMENT

This appeal was considered on the record of

the United States District Court for the District of

Columbia and on the briefs filed by the parties. See

Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); D.C. Cir. R. 34G). It is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that those

portions of the judgment of the district court not

already affirmed by this court be affirmed for the

* Judge Tacha, Judge McConnell, and Judge

Gorsuch are judges of the. United States Court of

Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 291(a).

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reasons set forth in the accompanying

memorandum.

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this

disposition will not be published. The Clerk is

directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein

until seven days after resolution of any timely

petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en

banc. See Fed. R. App. 41(b); D.C. Cir. Rule 41.

Per Curiam

FOR THE COURT: Mark J. Langer, Clerk

Is/

BY: MaryAnne McMain Deputy Clerk

MANDATE ISSUED AUGUST 28, 2008

MEMORANDUM

Isidoro Rodriguez brought suit in the United

States District Court for the District of Columbia

against numerous defendants’ alleging claims

‘The complaint named the following defendants: the

Editors-in-Chief of The Lega/ Timesand The Washington Post:

Chief Justice John G. Roberts: The Supreme Court of Virginia:

Virginia Justice Leroy Rountree Hassell, Sr.; the Virginia

State Bar: Karen Ann Gould, President of the Virginia State

Bar; Noel D. Sengel, Virginia State Bar Senior Assistant Bar

Counsel; Virginia State Bar disciplinary officials James Leroy

Banks, Jr., William Carlyle Boyce, Jr., William Ethan Glover,

Glenn M. Hodge, Stephen A. Wannall, Davis J. Gogal, Daniel

M. Rathbun, Edward V. O'Connor, Jr., and John W. di Zerega:

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under: (1) the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962; (2) the First,

Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

States Constitution and Articles | and VI of the

Virginia Constitution; (3) the First and. Ninth

Amendments to the United States Constitution and

Articles I and VI of the Virginia Constitution; (4) 42

U.S.C. § 1983; (5) 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and Virginia

statute; (6) 42 U.S.C. § 1986; (7) the Federal Tort

Office of Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Virginia:

Assistant Attorney General Catherine Crooks Hill; the Court

of Appeals of Virginia; the Fairfax County Circuit Court; the

Fairfax County J & D District Court; Virginia judge Thomas

Mann; federal judges Richard W. Roberts, Jane A. Restani,

Paul R. Michel, William H. Stafford, Jr., and T.S. Ellis III; U.S.

Department of Justice; Director, Office of Juvenile Justice and

Delinquency Prevention of the Office of Justice Programs of the

U.S. Department ofJustice; Office of the Solicitor General: U.S.

Attorney General ‘lberto Gonzales; Paul McNulty, U.S.

Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia; Offices of the U.S.

Attorneys for the Eastern District of Virginia and the District

of Columbia; Marina Utgoff Braswell, U.S. Attorney’s Office for

the District of Columbia; Federal Bureau of Investigation; U.S.

Department of State: U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice;

Legal Advisor for Consular Affairs of the U.S. Department of

State: Director, Office of Children Issues of the Bureau of

Consular Affairs of the U.S. Department of State; Supreme

Court of the United States; U.S. Courts of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit and the Fourth Circuit; U.S.

District Courts for the District of Columbia and the Eastern

District of Virginia; National Center for Missing and Exploited

Children (NCMEC):; Board of Directors of NCMEC; NCMEC

officials Ernie Allen and Nancy Hammer; Proskauer Rose LLP

and Susan Brinkerhoff; Miles & Stockbridge LLP & Stephen J.

Cullen; Patrick H. Stiehm; Covington and Burling, Eric H.

Holder, Jr., and D. Jean Veta; Committee on Admissions,

District of Columbia Court of Appeals: and John Does 1-20.

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Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680; (8)

Virginia common law (intentional infliction of

emotional distress and common-law conspiracy):

and (9) Virginia statutes (business conspiracy under

Va. Code §§ 18.2-499, 18.2-500 and the Virginia

Tort Claims Act, Va. Code §§ 8.01-195.1 to 195.9).

The district court sua sponte dismissed the claims

against all judges under the doctrine of absolute

judicial immunity and dismissed the remaining

claims without prejudice for lack of venue.

Rodriguez filed a motion for reconsideration, a

motion to disqualify, a motion for stay, and a motion

to empanel a grand jury. The district court denied

all of Rodriguez’s motions. Rodriguez appealed. In

prior orders issued in this case; this court

summarily affirmed judgment in favor of the

Editor-in-Chief of The Lega/ Times and summarily

affirmed the dismissal of all claims for money

damages against the Committee on Admissions for

the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, all

federal and state judges, including defendants

involved in adjudicating bar disciplinary

proceedings (except for a claim related to Chief

Justice Roberts’ confirmation testimony), the federal

agencies and the federal defendants in their official

capacities, the Virginia state agencies and Virginia

state defendants in their official capacities, and the

Virginia prosecutors and disciplinary counsel in

their individual capacities. —

Our review is de novo. See King & King,

Chartered v. Harbert Int'l, Inc., 503 F.3d 153, 156

(D.C. Cir. 2007). With regard to all remaining

claims, we now affirm for grounds other than those

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relied upon by the district court. See Jenkins v.

Washington Convention Ctr., 236 F.3d 6, 8n.3 (D.C.

Cir. 2001); Nat? Mining Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of

Interior, 70 F.3d 1345, 1353 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

Failure to Argue

Although Rodriguez asserts he is appealing

the district court’s denial of his postdismissal

motions as well as its order of dismissal, his opening

brief does not present any argument regarding the

motions. Consequently, he has waived any

challenge to those orders. See Parsippany Hotel

Mgmt. Co. v. NLRB, 99 F.3d 413, 418 (D.C. Cir.

1996).

Failure to State a Claim

_ At least two of Rodriguez’s federal causes of

action fail to set forth all of the essential elements of

those claims and thus fail to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted. As we held in a prior

action that Rodriguez brought, his § 1985(3) claim

fails because he failed to alleged any equal

protection claim based upon a conspiracy motivated

by a racial or class-based discriminatory animus.

See In re Rodriguez, No. 05-5130, 2005 WL 3843612,

at *4 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 14, 2005). And because he did

not state a claim under § 1985(3), there is no basis

for relief under § 1986. Jd.

In addition, all of the federal claims, which

involve allegations of a wide-ranging, multi-year

conspiracy among federal and state courts, federal

and state agencies, and private defendants, are

subject to dismissal for fail to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted simply because “it is

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patently obvious that [plaintiff] could not have

prevailed on the facts alleged in his complaint.”

Baker v. Director, U.S. Parole Comm'n, 916 F.2d

725, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per curiam); see also Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007)

(“[Wle do not require heightened fact pleading of

specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face. Because the

plaintiffs here have not nudged their claims across

the line from conceivable to plausible, their

complaint must be dismissed.”). Particularly,

Rodriguez's allegations include no facts suggesting

“unity of purpose” or a “meeting of the minds”

among the defendants, a necessary element of a

conspiracy. See Kreuzer v. Am. Academy of

Periodontology, 735 F.2d 1479, 1487 (D.C. Cir.

1984) (quotation omitted).

Failure to Exhaust Administr: tive Remedies

To proceed under the FTCA, Rodriguez first

must file an administrative claim. 28 U.S.C. §

2675(a). An administrative claim must be

presented to the agency within two years of the

accrual of the claim; a court action must be filed

within six months after the agency’s denial. Jd. §

2401(b).

Rodriguez’s complaint fails to demonstrate

that he exhausted his administrative remedies as to

each of his FTCA claims. Further, it affirmatively

shows that some of his FTCA claims are untimely,

as he alleges that he received a denial of an

administrative claim in 2002. See also In re

Rodriguez, 2005 WL 3843612, at *3 (noting that

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Rodriguez had not exhausted his administrative

remedies with regard to all but one of his FTCA

claims).

Rooker-Feldman and Younger

With regard to Rodriguez's claims against the

Virginia defendants, those claims challenge

decisions by the Virginia state bar and the Virginia

courts or are inextricably intertwined with such

decisions. To the extent that those decisions were

final at the time of the filing of the complaint, the

claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

See Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923);

D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462

(1983); see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic

Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (stating that

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is applicable to “cases

brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries

caused by state-court judgments rendered before the

district court proceedings commenced and inviting

district court review aiid rejection of those

judgments”). Amd to the extent that some of the

decisions were not final because proceedings were

still pending, the district court would have had to

exercise equitable restraint from hearing his claims

under the Youngerdoctrine. See Younger v. Harris,

401 U.S. 37 (1971).

Improper Forum

The Committee on Admissions of the District

of Columbia Court of Appeals denied Rodriguez's

application for bar admission before he filed his

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federal complaint. The proper forum for review of

that decision was the District of Columbia Court of

Appeals, not the federal district court. See D.C.

Court of Appeals Rule 46(g) (providing for review of

Committee decisions); see also Feldman, 460 U.S. at

482 (holding that the federal district court had no

subject matter jurisdiction to review the court’s

denial of a particular application for admission to

the District of Columbia bar).

Preclusion

We take judicial notice of the prior litigation

involving most of these parties. See Gullo v.

Veterans Coop. Housing Ass'n, 269 F.2d 517, 517

(D.C. Cir. 1959). In that action Rodriguez raised

some of the same claims, based on the same

underlying circumstances. See Jn re Rodriguez,

2005 WL 3843612, at *1 (noting that appellant

brought claims “alleging that the defendants

conspired to deprive him of his constitutional rights

under the First, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments and

civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3) and 1986

(2000) and are also liable under the Federal Tort

Claims Act”).? Consequently, the doctrines of claim

*In the prior litigation, Rodriguez named the following parties

in his original complaint:

the National Center for Missing and Exploited

Children, Ernie Allen, Nancy Hammer, Guillermo

Galarza, Proskauer Rose LLP, Warren L. Dennis,

Susan Brinkerhoff, Miles & Stockbridge LLP, Stephen

J. Cullen, Patrick H. Stiehm, Mary B. Marshall,

Robert McCannell, Knute E. Malmborg, and John

A-°8

preclusion (res judicata) and issue preclusion

(collateral estoppel) likely bar further litigation on

these issues against these parties.*See Nat. Res. Def.

Council v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 513 F.3d 257, 260

(D.C. Cir. 2008) (setting forth standards for claim

preclusion); Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. United States,

961 F.2d 245, 254 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (setting forth

standards for issue preclusion). Further, claim

preclusion bars i.litigation not only of all matters

determined in the prior action, but all matters that

might have been determined, Tutt v. Doby, 459 F.2d

1195, 1197 (D.C. Cir.1972), and issue preclusion

bars new legal theories that could

Does 1-20, in their individual capacity, the Office of

Children Issues, the Office of Legal Advisor for

Consular Affairs, U.S. Department of State, an

unknown number of unnamed and unknown employees

of the United States in their official and individual

capacities, the United States Department of State, and

the United States of America.

In re Rodriguez, 2005 WL 3843612, at *1 n.3. While that case

was pending, “Rodriguez filed an amended complaint, adding

numerous additional defendants, including every court and the

majority of judges who had ruled on his previous federal and

state filings.” /d. at *1.

*Because claim preclusion “prcetects not only the interests

of a particular party but the interests of the court,” this court has

held that the issue can be considered for the first time on appeal.

Brown v. Dist. of Columbia, 514 F.3d 1279, 1285-86 (D.C. Cir.

2008); see also Stanton v. Dist. of Col. Court of Appeals, 127 F.3d

72, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“As res judicata belongs to courts as well

as litigants, even a party's forfeiture of the right to assert it .. .

does not destroy a courts ability to consider the issue sua

sponte.”).

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have been raised in the prior action, Hall v. Clinton,

285 F.3d 74, 81 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

State-Law Claims

It is proper for a district court to decline to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law

claims once it has disposed of all of the claims over

which it has original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c)(3). Because the federal-law claims were all

subject to dismissal, as discussed above, the

state-law claims were subject to dismissal as well.

Conclusion

For these reasons, the district court’s

judgment of dismissal is affirmed.

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF.COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 07-5234

Isidoro Rodriguez, Appellant

V.

Editor in Chief, Legal Times, Individually and in his

corporate capacity, et al., Appellees

September Term, 200707cv00975

Filed On: June 18, 2008

BEFORE: Tacha, McConnell and Gorsuch, Circuit

Judges*

ORDER

Upon consideration of appellant’s motion to

disqualify the panel, it is

ORDERED that the motion be denied. See

SEC v. Loving Spirit Found. Inc., 392 F.3d 486, 494

(D.C. Cir. 2004) (observing that adverse judicial

decisions “virtually never provide a basis for

recusal”). It is

FURTHER ORDERED, on the court’s own

*Judge Tacha, Judge McConnell, and Judge

Gorsuch are judges of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 291(a).

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motion, that the record and the presentations in the

briefs. The court has determined oral argument will

not assist it in this case. See Fed. R. App. P.

34(a)(2); D.C. Cir. Rule 34(j).

Per Curiam

FOR THE COURT:

Mark J. Langer, Clerk

BY: /s/Linda Jones

Deputy Clerk

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 07-5234

Isidoro Rodriguez, Appellant

v.

Editor in Chief, Legal Times, Individually

and in his corporute capacity, et al., Appellees

September Term, 200707cv00975

Filed On: May 17, 2008

BEFORE: Tacha, McConnell and Gorsuch, Circuit

Judges*

ORDER

Appellant has filed a petition for rehearing en

banc, by all sitting judges of the United States Court

of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, of the denial of his

petition for a writ of mandamus under the Crime

Victims’ Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3). He also

has filed a petition for a hearing en banc by all

sitting judges of the Tenth Circuit in his pending

appeal. But this appeal is not before the Tenth

Circuit. Although Circuit Judges Tacha, McConnell,

and Gorsuch are judges of the Tenth Circuit, in this

* Judge Tacha, Judge McConnell, and Judge

Gorsuch are judges of the United States Court. of

Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 291(a).

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appeal they are sitting by designation pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 291(a). Accordingly, there is no Tenth

Circuit en banc court to entertain appellant’s

petitions. It is

ORDERED that the petition for rehearing en

banc and the petition for hearing en banc be

dismissed.

Per Curiam

FOR THE COURT: Mark J. Langer, Clerk

: BY:/s/

Michael C. McGrail Deputy Clerk

United States Court of Appeals:

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 07-5234

Isidoro Rodriguez, Appellant

v.

Editor in Chief, Legal Times, Individually and in his

corporate capacity, et al., Appellees

September Term, 200707cv00975

Filed On: April 23, 2008

BEFORE: Tacha, McConnell and Gorsuch, Circuit

Judges*

ORDER

Upon consideration of appellant’s petition for

a writ of mandamus pursuant to the Crime Victims’

Rights Act (CVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3),’ it is

*Judge Tacha, Judge McConnell and Judge Gorsuch

are judges of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 291(a).

‘18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3) provides that the court of appeals

shall “take up and decide [a CVRA] application forthwith within 72

hours after the petition has been filed. In no event shall

proceedings be stayed or subject to a continuance of more than five

days for purposes of enforcing this chapter.” This petition has

been decided within the statutorily permissible extended time

frame.

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ORDERED that the petition be denied as

frivolous. Even assuming that appellant could be

considered a “crime victim” as that term is defined

in 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e), his requests for relief go well

beyond enforcing the rights that the CVRA accords

to crime victims. Further, contrary to appellant’s

contentions, he has an adequate remedy other than

mandamus — namely, a direct appeal of the district

court’s judgment, which is pending under this case

number. We caution appellant that the filing of any

further frivolous submissions may result in the

imposition of sanctions against him. See D.C. Cir.

Rule 38.

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this

disposition will not be published.

Per Curiam

FOR THE COURT:

Mark J. Langer, Clerk

BY: /s/ Scott H. Atchue Deputy Clerk

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 07-5234

Isidoro Rodriguez, Appellant

v. ~

Editor in Chief, Legal Times, Individually and in his

corporate capacity, et al., Appellees

September Term, 200707cv00975

Filed On: February 25, 2008

BEFORE: Tacha, McConnell and Gorsuch, Circuit

Judges*

ORDER

Upon consideration of the federal and Virginia

state defendants’ motions for summary affirmance,

the court’s December 19, 2007, order to show cause,

and appellant's response thereto, and it appearing

that partial summary disposition on certain claims

is appropriate because the merits are so clear as a

matter of law that no substantial question regarding

their disposition exists, see Taxpayers Watchdog,

Inc. v. Stanley, 819 F.2d 294, 297-98 (D.C. Cir.

1987), it is, on grounds other than those relied upon

by the district court,

*Judge Tacha, Judge McConnell, and Judge Gorsuch

are judges of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 291(a).

ORDERED that the motion for summary

affirmance of the federal defendants be granted in

part and denied in part. The claims for money

damages against the federal/agencies and the

federal defendants in their official capacities are

barred by sovereign immunity. See FDIC v. Meyer,

510 U.S. 471, 477-78 (1994); Clark v. Library of

Congress, 750 F.2d 89,103 & n.31 ,104 (D.C.

Cir.1984). It is

FURTHER ORDERED that the motion for

summary affirmance of the Virginia state

defendants be granted in part and denied in part.

The claims for money damages against the Virginia

state agencies and the Virginia state defendants in

their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh

Amendment. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.s. 651,

663 (1974); Aliv. Dist. of Columbia, 278 F.3d 1,6

(D.C. Cir. 2002). The claims for money damages

against the Virginia prosecutors and counsel who

prosecuted disciplinary proceedings against

Plaintiff-Appellant, in their individual capacities,

are barred by prosecutoriat immunity. See Jmbler v.

Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976); Ajirsh v.

Justices of Sup. Ct., €7 F.3d 708, 715 (9th Cir.

1995). It is

FURTHER ORDERED, on the court’s own

motion, that the district court’s judgment in favor of

the Editor in Chief, Legal Times, be summarily

affirmed. Plaintiff-appellant has failed to state a

claim against this defendant. It is

FURTHER ORDERED, on the court's own

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motion, that the court’s reference in its December

19, 2007, order to the “federal and state judge

defendants” who are entitled to judicial immunity

against claims for money damages, be clarified as

including those Virginia state defendants who were

involved in adjudicating bar disciplinary proceedings

against Plaintiff-Appellant.

The Clerk is directed to enter a briefing

schedule with respect to all remaining claims.

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this

disposition will not be published. The Clerk is

directed to withhold issuance of the mandate

pending resolution of the remainder of the appeal.

Per Curiam

FOR THE COURT:

BY: Deputy Clerk

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 07-5234

Isidoro Rodriguez, Appellant

v.

Editor in Chief, Legal Times, Individually and in

his corporate capacity, et al., Appellees

September Term, 200707cv00975

Filed On: December 19, 2007

BEFORE: Tacha, McConnell and Gorsuch, Circuit

Judges*

ORDER

Upon consideration of (1) appellant’s

emergency motion for a preliminary injunction; (2)

appellant's emergency motion for. expedited

consideration of motion for preliminary injunction;

(3) appellant’s supplemental brief in support of

emergency motion for the issuance of preliminary

injunction; (4) appellant’s second supplemental brief

in support of emergency motion for the issuance of

a preliminary injunction; (5) ‘appellant's praecipe

and letter in support of motion for expedited

consideration of the July 10, 2007 motion for a

*Judge Tacha, Judge McConnell, and Judge

Gorsuch are judges of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 291(a).

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letter in support of motion for expedited

consideration of the July 10, 2007 motion for a

preliminary injunction against the Committee on

Admissions for the District of Columbia Court of

Appeals, Virginia State Bar, and the Supreme Court

of Virginia; (6) appellant’s motion to disqualify

Assistant Commonwealth Attorney Catherine

Crooks Hill; (7) appellant’s motion to order the

empaneling of a grand jury and appoint a special

prosecutor; (8) appellant’s motion to disqualify the

judges of the Court of Appeals of the District of

Columbia Circuit; (9) Virginia state defendants’

motion for summary affirmance; (10) federal

defendants’ motion for summary affirmance; (11)

Committee on Admissions of the District of

Columbia Court of Appeals’s motion for summary

affirmance; (12) all responses and replies to the

above-listed filings; and (13) the record of the United

States District Court for the District of Columbia, it

is

ORDERED that appellant's emergency

motion for a preliminary injunction be denied.

Appellant has friled to show that he meets the

standards for an injunction pending appeal. See

Wash. Metro. Area Transit Comm'n v. Holiday

Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1977). It is

FURTHERORDERED that _ appellant’s

emergency motion for expedited consideration of the

motion for preliminary injunction be dismissed as

moot. It is

FURTHER ORDERED that appellant’s

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motion to disqualify Assistant Commonwealth

Attorney Catherine Crooks Hill be denied. It is

FURTHER ORDERED that appellant's

motion to order the empaneling of a gramd jury and

appoint a special prosecutor be denied. It

FURTHER ORDERED that appellant's

motion to disqualify the judges of the Court of

Appeals of the District of Columbia Cirewit be

dismissed as moot because Chief Justice John G.

Roberts, Jr. designated the judges of this special

panel, each of whom sit outside of the United States

Court of Appeals for the MWstrict of Columbia

Circuit, to hear and decide this appeal. It is

FURTHER ORDERED that the motion for

summary affirmamce of the Committee on

Admissions of the District of Columbia Court of

Appeals be gramted im part and the district court’s

dismissal of damages claims against this defendant

be summarily affirmed. Summary disposition of

this questio® 1s appropriate because the merits are

so clear as a matter of law that no substantial

question regarding its disposition exists. See

Taxpayers Watchdog, Inc. v. Stanley, 819 F.2d 294,

297 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam). The Committee

on Admissions of the District of Columbia Court of

Appeals is entitled to absolute judicial immunity

against damages claims when acting within its

jurisdiction. See Simons v. Bellinger, 643 F.2d 774

(D.C. Cir. 1980); see also Dist. of Columbia Court of

Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 479 (1983)

(holding that bar admission proceedings were

A--22

PO — — —=<- ~~ s_- -_—— ee ~~ a —_ _— hal ———————— EO — eo

judicial in nature). It is

FURTHER ORDERED that the motions for

summary affirmance of the federal defendants and

the Virginia state defendants be granted in part and

the dismissal of all damages claims against federal

and state judges be summarily affirmed, with one

exception. Summary disposition of these claims is

appropriate because the merits are so clear as a

matter of law that no substantial question regarding

its disposition exists. See Taxpayers Watchdog, Inc.,

819 F.2d at 297. The district court correctly

determined that appellant's damages claims against

all federal and stzte judge defendants are barred by

absolute judicial immunity because appellant’s

challenges clearly concern acts committed within

those defendants’ judicial jurisdiction. See Mireles

v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 10-12 (1991); Stump v.

Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). The sole exception

is appellant’s damages claims against Chief Justice

John G. Roberts, Jr. relating to alleged statements

during the Chief Justice’s confirmation hearing

before the United States Senate, which do not stem

from a judicial function. It is

FURTHER ORDERED, on the court’s own

motion, that within thirty (30) days of the date this

Order is filed, appellant shall show cause why this

appeal shall not be summarily affirmed on grounds

other than those relied upon by the district court:

(1) as to the Virginia state defendants, on

alternative grounds raised in the district court, see

R. Doc. 9 at 4 (leventh Amendment immunity,

abstention, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and/or

A--23

prosecutorial immunity); and (2) as to defendant

Editor in Chief, Legal Times, on alternative grounds

raised in the district court, see R. Doc. 21 at 8-13

(that the action is time-barred under the applicable

statutes of limitations and/or the complaint fails to

state a claim against this defendant); and (3) as to

the federal defendants, on the jurisdictional ground

of sovereign immunity.

The show-cause response may not exceed

twenty (20) pages. Failure to comply with this

order will result in dismissal of the appeal for lack

of prosecution. See D.C. Cir. R. 38.

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this

disposition will not be published. The Clerk is

directed to withhold issuance of the mandate

pending resolution of the remainder of the appeal.

Per Curiam

FOR THE COURT:

Mark J. Langer, Clerk

BY:DeputyClerk

A--24

Case 1:07-cv-00975-PLF Document 34 Filed

46/26/2007 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

)

ISIDORO RODRIGUEZ, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

Vv, )Civil Action No.

)07-0975 (PLF)

LEGAL TIMES, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

fe

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on plaintiffs

motion for reconsideration of this Court’s

Memorandum Opinion and Order dated June 18,

2007. A motion to alter or amend judgment under

Rule 59(e) is discretionary with the court and need

not be granted unless the Court finds that there is

“an intervening change of controlling’ law, the

availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a

clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Ciralski

v. Central Intelligence Agency, 355 F.3d 661, 671

(D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting Firestone v. Firestone, 76

F.3d1205 08 (D.C. Cir. 1996)); see also Long v.

Department of Justice, 479 F. Supp. 2d 23,

25(D.D.C. 2007). Rule 59(e) motions to alter or

A--25

amend judgment are “not to be used to relitigate

matters already argued and disposed of; they are

intended to permit the court to correct errors of fact

appearing on the face of the record, or errors of law.”

Independent Petroleum Ass'n of America v. Babbitt,

178 F.R.D. 323, 324(D.D.C. 1998); see Niedermeier

v. Office of Max S. Baucus, 153 F. Supp. 2d 23, 28

(D.D.C. 2001) (Rule 59(e) motion may not be used to

“relitigate old matters, or to raise new arguments or

present evidence that could have been raised prior

to the entry of judgment.”). Such motions are

“disfavored and relief from judgment is granted only

when the moving party establishes extraordinary

circumstances.” Id. Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that plaintiffs motion for

reconsideration [31] is DENIED. This is a final

appealable order. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a). It is

FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs motion

to disqualify [32] is DENIED as moot, in light of

this fact that this case is closed.

SO ORDERED.

/s/

PAUL L. FRIEDMAN

United States District Judge

DATE: June 25, 2007

A--26

Case 1:07-cv-00975-PLF Document 28 Filed

06/18/2007 Page 1 of 7

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ISIDORO RODRIGUEZ,

Plaintiff,

i a a a

v, )Civil Action No.

)07-0975 (PLF)

LEGAL TIMES, et al.,

Defendants.

ee eee ee

MEMORANDUM OPNION AND ORDER

Pro se plaintiff Isodoro Rodriguez has filed a

76 page Complaint against numerous defendants:

the Editor in Chief of the Legal Times: the Editor in

Chief of the Washington Post; Chief Justice John

Roberts; Chief Justice of the Virginia Supreme Court

Leroy Hassell; the Supreme Court of Virginia; Karen

Ann Gould, Esq., the President of the Virginia State

Bar; the Virginia State Bar; Noel Sengel, Senior

Assistant Bar Counsel for the Virginia State Bar;

James Leroy Banks, Jr., Esq., First Vice Chair of the

Virginia State Rar Disciplinary System; William

Carlyle Boyce, Esq., William Ethan Glover, Esq.,

Glenn M. Hodge, Esq., and Stephen A. Wannall,

Panel Members of the Virginia State Bar

A-°27

Disciplinary System; Davis J.Gogal, Esq., Daniel

Rathbun, Esq., Edward O’Connor Jr., Esq., and

John W. di Zerega, Members of the Subcommittee or

the 5th District Committee of the Virginia State

Bar; the Office of the Attorney General for the

Commonwealth of Virginia; Catherine Crooks Hill,

Esq. of the Office of the Attorney General for the

Commonwealth of Virginia; the Court of Appeals of

Virginia; the Fairfax County Circuit Court; the

Fairfax County J&D District Court; Judge Thomas

Mann of the Fairfax County J&D District Court;

Judge Richard W. Roberts of this Court; Chief

Judge Jane A. Restani of the United States Court of

International Trade; Chief Judge Paul R. Miche] of

the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit: Judge William H. Stafford Jr. of the United

States District Court for the Northern District of

Florida; Judge T.S. Ellis III of the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia:

the United States Department of Justice; the Office

of the Solicitor General of the United States:

Alberto Gonzalez, the Attorney General of the

United States; Paul McNulty, the Deputy Attorney

General of the United States and former United

States Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia:

the United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern

District of Virginia; the United States Attorney’s

Office for the District of Columbia; Marina Utgoff

Braswell, an Assistant United States Attorney in

the District of Columbia; the Director of the Office

of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention of

the United States Department of Justice; the

Federal Bureau of Investigation; the United States

Department of State; United States Secretary of

A--28

State Condoleeza Rice; the Legal Advisor for

Consular Affairs at the State Department; the

Director of the Gifice of Children [src] Issues of the

Bureau of Consular Affairs at the State Department:

the National Center for Missing and Exploited

Children; the Supreme Court of the United States;

the United States Court of Appeals for the District

of Columbia Circuit; the United States Court of

Appeals for the Fourth Circuit: the United States

District Court for the District of Columbia; the

United States District Court for the Eastern District

of Virginia; Ernie Allen, the President and Chief

Executive Officer of the National Center for Missing

and Exploited Children; the Board of Directors of the

National Center for Missing and Exploited Children;

Nancy Hammer of the National Center for Missing

and Exploited Children; Susan _ Brinkerhoff:

Proskauer Rose LLP; Stephen J. Cullen; Miles &

Stockbridge LLP; Patrick H. Stiehm; Covington &

Burling; Eric H. Holder, Jr., Esq.; D. Jean Veta; the

Committee on Admissions of the District of

Columbia Court of Appeals; and John Does 1-20.

Plaintiff lists thirteen causes of action,

including: (1) civil RICO; (2) “For Violation of Due

Process, Equal Protection, and Access to the Federal

and Virginia Courts (Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments)”; (3) “Denial of Right to Petition the

Government and Privacy (First and Ninth

Amendments)”; (4) “Violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

and §§ 241 and 242: Deprivation of Parental Rights”:

(5) “Violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 18 U.S.C. § .

4, 241, 242, 371, 1001, and 1204: Obstruction of

parental rights depravation of rights as an

A--29

attorney”; (6) “Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Denial

of Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses)”; (7)

“Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and VA Code

(conspiracy)”; (8) “Violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1986,

Refusing or neglecting or failing to protect and

prevent the wrongs conspired to be done to obstruct

parental rights of visitation and punish in violation

of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242"; (9) Intentional

Infliction of Emotional Distress; (10) Business

Conspiracy under Va. Code §§ 18.2-499 and 500";

(11) Common Law Conspiracy; (12) the Federal Tort

Claims Act; and (13) the Virginia Tort Claims Act,

VA Code §§ 8.01-195.1-195.9.

The gravamen of plaintiffs complaint in this

case appears to be that he is seeking a temporary

restraining order and/or a preliminary injunction

“to enjoin the Supreme Court of Virginia, the

Virginia State Bar’s void, [sic] and the Committee

on Admissions of the District of Columbia Court of

Appeals refusal to either process Rodriguez-father’s

application on file since July 21, 2005, or grant a

hearing... .” Complaint ¥ 9. Plaintiff was involved

in a custody dispute related to his son, who is a

resident of Colombia. See id. 94 74-86. Plaintiff

was a defendant in a lawsuit brought by the mother

of his son in the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Virginia, which he litigated all

the way_to the Supreme Court. See id. {4 8791.

Plaintiff filed a previous lawsuit in this Court before

Judge Richard W. Roberts, which he litigated

through a petition for certiorari to the Supreme

A--30

= ‘ 3

Court.__See id. 9] 92-94, 105.’ Judge Roberts

summarized some of the previous legal proceedings

in Rodriguez v. National Center for Missing &

Exploited Children, Civil Action No. 03-0120, 2005

WL 736526, *2-3 (D.D.C. March 31, 2005), afd sub

nom In re: Rodriguez, 2005 WL 3843612 (D.C. Cir.

Oct 14, 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct._1902 (2006).

See also Virginia State Defendants’ Response to

Plaintiffs Motion for a Temporary Restraining

Order and Preliminary Injunction (“Opp.”) at 2

(citing previous litigation). Plaintiff has also

litigated related events in the courts of the

Commonwealth of Virginia. See Complaint {4

107-127.

Plaintiff alleges that he has been a member of

the Bar in Virginia since 1982. See Complaint {

150. Plaintiff applied to waive into the District of

Columbia bar in July_2005. See id. Two Virginia

State Bar complaints were filed against the plaintiff

in 2004, and disbarment proceedings followed. See

Order of Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board, Exh.

2 to Plaintiffs Motion for a Temporary Restraining

Order and a Preliminary Injunction (“Mot.”); see also

Complaint {4 144-176. This lawsuit arises from

these disbarment proceedings. See Mot. at 1-2.

The Attorney General of Virginia has entered

an appearance, and filed an opposition to plaintiffs

motion for a temporary restraining order and

preliminary injunction, on behalf of following

‘It appears that at least some of the causcs of action and defendants

were the same in plaintiff's prior lawsuit in this Court as in this lawsuit.

A-"31

defendants: the Supreme Court of Virginia; the

Court of Appeals of Virginia: Chief Justice of the

Virginia Supreme Court Leroy Hassell; Karen Ann

Gould, Esq., the President of the Virginia State Bar:

Noel Sengel; Senior Assistant Bar Counsel for the

Virginia State Bar; James Leroy Banks, Jr., Esq.,

First Vice Chair of the Virginia State Bar

Disciplinary System; William Carlyle Boyce, Esq.,

William Ethan Glover, Esq., Glenn M. Hodge, Esq.,

and Stephen A. Wannall, Panel Members of the

Virginia State Bar Disciplinary System; Davis J.

Gogal, Esq., Daniel Rathbun, Esq., Edward

O’Connor Jr., Esq., and John W. di Zerega,

Members of the Subcommittee of the 5th District

Committee of the Virginia State Bar; the Office of

the Attorney General for the Commonwealth of

Virginia; Catherine Crooks Hill, Esq. of the Office of

the Attorney General for the Commonwealth of

Virginia; the Fairfax County Circuit Court; the

Fairfax County Juvenile and Domestic Relations

District Court; and Judge Thomas Mann of the

Fairfax County J&D District Court (hereinafter

“Virginia State Defendants”). Plaintiff filed a reply

brief in support of the issuance of a temporary

restraining order and preliminary injunction

(“Reply”).

As counsel for the Virginia State Defendants

points out, there are numerous problems with this

lawsuit apparent from the face of plaintiffs

complaint. The Virginia State Defendants note,

among other things, that judges are immune from

suit. See Opp. at 2. This is correct. Judges and

other court officials have absolute immunity for

A--32

their actions taken in a judicial or quasi-judicial

capacity._ See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349,

356 (1978); Sindram v. Su 86 F.2d 1459, 1460

(D.C. Cir. 1993) (per curiam); Moore v. Motz, 437 F.

Supp. 2d 88, 91 (D.D.C. 2006) (“Absolute judicial

immunity provides immunity from suit as well as

from the ultimate imposition of damages.”) (citing

Mirales v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991)). The only

allegations in the Complaint regarding any of the

judges describe acts undertaken in their judicial

capacities. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss from

this suit all judges named as defendants.

This suit will fail because venue is improper

in the District of Columbia. “A civil action wherein

jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of

citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by

law, be brought only in .. . a judicial district in

which a substantial part of the events or omissions

giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial

part of property that is the subject of the action is

situated[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 13891. Venue in this case

does not lie in the District of Columbia. See Naartex

Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 779, 789 (D.C.

Cir. 1983). This action arises from disbarment

proceedings in Virginia. See Mot. at 1-2. _ It

therefore will be dismissed without prejudice to its

being refiled in an appropriate court in Virginia, if

there is such a court.”

Accordingly, it is hereby

|

*1t appears that plaintiffhas already challenged his disbarment in the

Virginia courts. See Mot. at 5-6

A--33

ORDERED that the defendant judges are

DISMISSED from this lawsuit; it is FURTHER

ORDERED that the remainder of this case is

DISMISSED without prejudice for improper venue;

and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that the pending

motion for a temporary restraining order and a

preliminary injunction [3] therefore is DENIED; the

pending motion to request the Attorney General of

the United States to appoint a special prosecutor [4]

also is DENIED; and plaintiffs second motion for a

temporary restraining order [22] also is DENIED.

The Clerk of the Court shall remove this case from

the docket of the Court. This is a final appealable

order. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a). Any other pending

motions are denied as moot.

SO ORDERED.

DATE: June 18, 2007

/s/

PAUL L. FRIEDMAN

United States District Judge

VIRGINIA:

In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the

Supreme Court Building in the City of Richmond on

Friday the 29" day of June, 2007.

Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq.

Appellant,

v. Record No. 070283

VSB Docket Nos. 004-052-0794

And 04-052-1044

Virginia State Bar,

Appellee.

Upon an appeal of right from an order entered

by the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board.

Upon consideration of the record, briefs, and

arguments by appellant, in proper person, and by

counsel} for the appellee, the Court is of the opinion

that there is no error in the order of the Virginia

State Bar Disciplinary Board (the “Board”) revoking

Isidoro Rodriguez's license to practice law in the

Commonwealth of Virginia based upon finding that

he violated Rules 1.2, 1.5, 1.7, 1.16, 3.1, 3.4, 3.7, 4.4,

7.1 and 8.4 of the Virginia Rules. of Professional

Conduct.

A--35

In reviewing the Board’s decision in a

disciplinary proceeding, we conduct an

independent examination of the entire

record. We consider the evidence and all

reasonable inferences that may be drawn

from the evidence in the light most favorable

to the Bar the prevailing party in the Board

proceeding. We give the Board’s factual

finding substantial weight and view them as

prima facie correct. While we do not give the

Board’s conclusions the weight of a jury

verdict, we will sustain those conclusions

unless it appears they are not justified by

reasonable view of the evidence or are

contrary to law.Barrett v. Virginia State Bar,

269 Va. 583, 587-88, 611 S.E.2d 375, 377

(2005) (quoting Williams v. Virginia State

Bar, 261 Va. 258, 264, 542 S.E.2d 385, 389

(2001) (citations ounitted): see also El-Aminv.

Virginia State Bar, 257 Va. 608 612, 514

S.e.2d 163, 165 (1999); Myers v. Virginia

State Bar, 226 Va. 630, 632, 312 S.E.2d 286,

287 (1984).

In making its determination, the Board

considered allegations that Rodriguez violated the

Rules of Professional Conduct during litigation

involving two sets of cases. ‘One group of cases

involving Rodriguez’s relationship and work with

Sea Search Armada. The other group involved

custody litigation regarding his son. The Virginia

State Bar proved by clear and convincing evidence

that Rodriguez violated Rules 1.2(a), 1.5(a),

1.16(a)(3), 3.4(1), 7.1(a), and 8.4(b) and (c ) in his

A--36

Er

relationship with and representation of Sea Search

Armada, including his attempts to recover unpaid

attorney's fees. The Virginia State Bar proved by

clear and convincing evidence that Rodriguez

violated Rules1.7(b), 3.1, 3.4(d)(h)@), 3.7(a), 4.4,

and 8.4.

_ We independently review each of the alleged

Rule violations and find no error in the Board’s

order. Accordingly, the order appealed from is

affirmed.

Appellant shall pay to the appellee thirty

dollars damages.

This order shall be certified to the Virginia

State Bar Disciplinary Board.

A Copy,

Teste: /S/

Patricia L. Hanninton, Clerk

A--37

VIRGINIA:

BEFORE THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR

DISCIPLINARY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF ISIDORO RODRIGUEZ

VSB DOCKET NOS. 04-052-0794 and 04-052-1044

ORDER OF VIRGINIA STATE BAR

N B D

THIS MATTER came on to be heard on the

26th and 27th days of October, 2006, before a panel

of the Disciplinary Board consisting of James L

Banks, Jr., Ist Vice-Chair, presiding,(the “Chair”),

William C. Boyce Jr, Glenn M. Hodge, William F.

(Hover, and Stephen A. Wannall, Lay member. The

Virginia State Bar (“VSB’” or “Bar”) was represented

by Noel D. Sengel, Senior Assistant Bar Counsel.

The Respondent, Isidro Rodriguez, appeared in

person and represented himself. The Chair polled

the members of the Board Panel as to whether any

of them was aware of any personal or financial

interest or bias which would preclude any of them

from fairly hearing this matter and serving on the

panel, to which inquiry each member; including the

Chair, responded in the negative. Donna T.

Chandler, RPR, RMR, CCR of Chandler & Ralasz,

court reporter. P.O. Box 9349, Richmond, Virginia,

23227, (804-730-1222) after being duly sworn,

reported the hearing and transcribed the

proceedings.

A--38

The matter came before the Board on the

Subcommittee Determination (Corrected

Certification) by the Fifth District Committee

Section II.

At the beginning of the proceedings the

Respondent renewed his motion for the members of

the panel to disqualify themselves as being

interested patties for the reasons stated in his

written motion previously filed. Upon consideration

of this motion it was denied by the Panel for the

reasons previously stated in the Board’s Order of

August 8,2006 that originally addressed

Respondent’s Motion to Recuse and Disqualify

Members of the Disciplinary Board Within the

Jurisdiction of N. Virginia and the U.S. Dist. Ct. for

the RD. of Va. so to Assure Impartiality.

FINDINGS OF FACT

VSB Exhibits 1-92 were admitted during the

course of the hearing without objection. The

Respondent’s Exhibits 1-42 were admitted during

the course of the hearing without objection or over

Bar counsel’s objection. The VSB presented evidence

through its witnesses, the Respondent

cross-examined -the witnesses and _ thereafter

testified on his own behalf. After consideration of the

exhibits and the testimony the Board makes the

following findings of fact on the basis of clear and

convincing evidence:

A--39

VSB No. 04-052-0794

1. At all times relevant hereto, Isidoro

Rodriguez, hereinafter the “Respondent”, has been

an attorney licensed to practice law in the

Commonwealth of Virginia and his address of record

with the Virginia State Bar has been 7924 Peyton

Forest Trail, Annandale, VA 22003-1560. VSB Ex.

1. The Respondent received paper notice of

this proceeding as required by Part Six, IV, 13 (E)

and (I){a) of the Rules of Virginia Supreme Court.

VSB Ex. 2.

2. The Complainant, Jack Harbeston,

hereinafter referred to as “Harbeston”, was the

managing director of Sea Search Armada (“SSA”) a

Cayman Island entity that invests in and conducts

searches for sunken treasure ships and engages in

the salvage and the recovery of their contents.

Sometime prior to 1988 SSA had discovered what it

thought to be the remains of sunken Spanish ships

off the coast of Colombia. SSA had been unable to

have its rights to any sunken treasure recognized by

the government of Columbia and was looking for

legal representation in Colombia to assert its

claims. Harbeston sought assistance from the

Economic Officer at the United States Embassy in

Bogota, Colombia for names of attorneys who could

represent SSA The Economic Officer provided

Harbeston with a list of attorneys in Colombia

which included the Respondent as a member of the

partnership of Devis and Rodriguez. Harbeston

subsequently contacted the Respondent regarding

A--40

possible legal representation. In his conversation

with the Respondent, Harbeston learned that Devis,

a Colombian attorney, would handle any litigation

on behalf of SSA in the Colombian courts. Harbeston

was looking for an American attorney, if possible,

because of his concerns as to the potentially divided

Icyalty of a Colombian attorney. In correspondence

between the Respondent and Harbeston, Respondent

noted that he was the only attorney licensed in the

United States working in Colombia and as such his

firm was subject to the same standards as law firm

in the United States; that unlike any other firm in

Colombia his firm “must comply with the State of

Virginia Bar Association’s Ethics of Professional

Responsibility.” VSB Ex. 4.

3. SSA subsequently hired the firm of Devis

and Rodriguez. Ry agreemert. dated October 20,

1988, the parties entered into a representation

agreement prepared by Rodriguez which set forth

the terms of the engagement including a fee

arrangement on an hourly basis that had been

discussed prior to the execution of the agreement.

VSB Ex. 7. By affidavit dated October 21, 1988,

Harbeston, as managing Director of SSA, authorized

the law firm of Devis and Rodriguez to act as SSA’s

legal representative to pursue its claims in

Colombia.

4. Inorder for SSA to proceed with its claims

in Colombia, SSA was required to appoint an agent

with broad powers to represent SSA. By agreement

dated December 16, 1988, executed in the District of

Columbia, SSA appointed the Respondent as its

A--41

legal representative in Colombia. Respondent's Ex.

8. However, Harbeston and SSA were concerned

with the scope of the general power of attorney

appointing Rodriguez as its agent in Colombia

(Respondent’s Ex. 8) and sought to limit his

authority by advising the Respondent that he could

only act upon the written authorization of

Harbeston. By letter dated December 14, 1988, the

Respondent acknowledged this limitation on his

authority, noting that any violation of the

restriction “will result in an action before The

Virginia Bar Ethics Committee”. VSB Ex. 9. By

memorandum dated December 13, 1988, Harbeston

advised all law firms employed by 58.4, including

Devis and Rodriguez, that John Erlichman would

coordinate and manage all litigation by SSA. VSB

Ex. 8.

5. By letter dated Januaryl10, 1989 SSA

authorized Respondent as its legal representative in

Colombia to file a lawsuit against the Republic of

Colombia to confirm its rights to the sunken ships.

VSB Ex. 12. Thereafter, Devis proceeded to pursue

SSA’s claims in the courts of Colombia with

apparent skill and professionalism to _ the

satisfaction of SSA. Harbeston soon became

dissatisfied with the Respondent's performance

because of actions he took without written

authorization but nevertheless continued the

representation arrangement because of his

satisfaction with Devis’ performance as a litigator.

By memorandum to Respondent dated June 9, 1989,

(VSB Ex. 13) Harbeston reaffirmed that Respondent

was to take no action on behalf of SSA without

A--42

Harbeston’s written authorization as Respondent

had acknowledged by his December 14,1988 letter.

Sometime thereafter, but prior to January 1990, the

law firm of Rodriguez and Devis had dissolved but

Devis continued to represent SSA in its ongoing

litigation against the Republic of Colombia. By

agreement dated January 3, 1991, Respondent,

acting as attorney for SSA, entered into a

professional services agreement with Devis to

continue with the litigation on behalf of SSA against

the Republic of Colombia. This agreement changed

the fee arrangement to a contingency fee

arrangement whereby Devis would receive 20% of

any recovery. VSB Ex. 14. Devis and the Respondent

then entered into an agreement to share any

contingent fee recovery.

6. By request dated January 3, 1990, the

Respondent sought a legal ethics opinion from the

VSB that as a Virginia attorney who had entered

into a contract in Idaho to be performed in a foreign

country, whether he could terminate his

representation because the client had failed to pay

his fee and could sue the client to collect such a fee.

The VSB Ethics Committee gave its opinion on the

issue (LEO 1325) that under the facts presented, the

Respondent could terminate his representation and

sue the client for fees, with the opinion concluding

with the customary notice that it was an advisory

opinion and not binding on any court. VSB Ex. 18.

7. Devis continued the litigation successfully

as the case made its way through the Colombian

judicial system as the Colombian government

A--43

appealed each adverse decision. Respondent does

not appear to have played any role in the litigation.

By letter dated March 24,2000 Devis advised

Respondent not to use his name in Respondent’s

professional activities, and that Harbeston was

upset with Respondent’s activities and wanted to

revoke the power of attorney. VSB Ex. 15. Devis

acknowledged he would honor their contingent fee

sharing arrangement By letter dated April 6,2000,

Harbeston revoked the general power of attorney

from SSA to Respondent (which he had forgotten to

do earlier), stating that neither SSA nor its related

entities owed Respondent any legal fees and that

any understanding relating to fees was in the

agreement between Devis and Respondent to share

any contingency iee. VSB Ex. 16.

8. In September of 2000 the Respondent filed

suit against SSA in the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia seeking to

enforce a claim for attorney’s fees in the amount of

$4.5 million against SSA. VSB Ex. 19, The

Respondent testified that he based the amount of

his attorney’s fee claim on the anfual salary

($300,000 to.$400,000) of a legal representative of a

United States company in a foreign land for a

period of 12 years. Included as defendants-in this

litigation were Harbeston, related entities to SSA

and Devis. None of the defendants were residents of

the Commonwealth of Virginia. The Respondent

basis for jurisdiction by the federal court in Virginia

was the fact that he was a Virginia attorney,

Virginia Code Section 54.1-3932 grants an attorney

a lien for fees and LEO 1325 which said he could

A--44

sue his client. The defendants in this litigation

obtained the services of Harrison Pledger, a Virginia

attorney, who filed a mation to dismiss based on the

lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendants.

This motion was granted and the suit was

dismissed. The Respondent then appealed to the

Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and that court

affirmed the District Court’s ruling. The Respondent

then petitioned for a Writ of Certiorariin the United

States Supreme Court but that petition was denied.

9. After the denial of The Writ of Certiorari

by the United States Supreme Court the Respondent

filed a slightly different law suit in the United

States District Court for the Eastern District of

Virginia against the defendants in the earlier suit

and also added s: veral other defendants who were

investors in SSA or related entities. VSB Ex. 20.

The District Court dismissed this second law suit,

finding that the Respondent had ‘failed to plead

additional facts to the first suit to give the court

personal jurisdiction over any of the defendants.

This ruling was affirmed on appeal to the Fourth

Circuit The Respondent then sought a Writ of

Certiorari from the United States Supreme Court

which was also denied.

10. While the appeal of the second lawsuit

was pending, the Respondent filed a third similar

lawsuit - this time in the Circuit Court of Fairfax

County against SSA. In this third lawsuit the

Respondent named the defendants in the second law

suit and Harrison Pledger and his law firm as

defendants. VSB Ex. 21. This law suit was also

A-°45

dismissed but the court denied the defendants’

motions for sanctions.

11. The Respondent created a website which

displayed false and misleading information

regarding his relationship with SSA and his

participation in the litigation in Colombia. VSB Ex

24 & 25. On the site, the Respondent claimed that

in 1988, at the request of the United States

Department of State, he became SSA's legal

representative and managing attorney responsible

for managing alternative dispute resolution

negotiations and outside counsel in litigation

against the government of Colombia, posts he

claims he held until 2000. These assertions are not

true. Onhis resume, the Respondent listed a LLM

Civil law degree from the University of Bordeaux.

While the Respondent attended a ciass at the

University of Bordeaux, he never received a degree

from that university. The Respondent also listed an

American Trial Lawyers Ultimate Trial Lawyer

Certification. There is no such certification. The

basis for Respondent’s claim is the fact that he

attended a one week continuing legal education

program sponsored byte Association of Trial

Lawyers of American titled “Ultimate Trial

Advocacy”.

12. Respondent, in 2004,while

communicating with the U.S. State Department

regarding Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”)

requests he had made for information relating to

SSA litigation, represented that he was the attorney

for SSA notwithstanding the fact that Harbeston

A--46

had revoked his authority in 2000. VSB Ex. 23.

Respondent claimed that since the power of attorney

filed with the Colombian government had never

been terminated he was not miking a

misrepresentation in his FOIA request.

VSB Docket No. 94-502-1044

1. The Respondent lived for many years in

Colombia and had married. Amalin Hazbun Escaf a

citizen of Colombia. One son was born of the

marriage. The marriage ultimately ended in a

divorce in Colombia with the wife/mother obtaining

custody of the son by order of a Colombian court

with visitation rights to the Respondent.

2. The Respondent subsequently returned to

the United States where he has been living and

hisson visited him pursuant to the visitation rights

granted by the Colombian Court. In 2001 while the

son was visiting the Respondent the Respondent

refused to return his son to Colombia and filed an

action in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court

in Fairfax County to gain custody of his son.

3. In 2001, subsequent to the filing of

Respondent’s suit in the Juvenile and Domestic

Relations Court in Fairfax County, Respondent’s

ex-wife filed an action in the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, under the

Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of Child

Abduction (the “Hague Convention”) and the

International Child Abduction Remedies Act

(“ICARA”) in order to secure the return to Colombia

A--47

of her son. VSB Ex. 34. In this litigation she was

represented by Patrick Stiehm, a Virginia attorney

who had undertaken this representation pro bonoat

the request of the National Center for Missing and

Exploited Children (““NCMEC”). NCMEC is a non

profit corporation that acts as a neutral in

facilitating the processing of claims under the

Hague Convention and ICARA. When Stiehm

initially contacted Respondent to inform him of the

pending litigation, Respondent told Stiehm that his

pro bono representation would cost Stiehn “a big

chunk of change.” In keeping with this threat,

Respondent immediately filed a motion for

sanctions against Stiehn (VSB Ex. 35) but that

motion was denied. VSB Ex. 38. However,

Respondent's subsequent litigation described

herein, which included Stiehm as a defendant,

resulted in Stiehm incurring significant legal

expenses to respond to meritless and vexatious

litigation.. After a bench trial the Court ruled that

the Respondent had kept the child in Virginia in

violation of his ex-wife’s custody rights. VSB Ex. 39.

The Court ordered that the child be removed from

the Respondent’s custody and returned to the child’s

mother in Colombia The Respondent’s appeals to

the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and the United

States Supreme Court were denied. After all

appeals and stays were denied the son was reunited

with his mother and left for Colombia in June of

2002.

4. In January of 2003, the Respondent filed

suit in the District Court for the District of

Columbia against numerous defendants, including

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NCMEC, several employees of NCMEC, the United

States District Court for the Eastern District of

Virginia, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, the

Circuit Court of Fairfax County, the Court of

Appeals of Virginia, the District Court for the

District of Columbia, the United States Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia, various judges,

a court clerk, the United States Department of

State, Patrick Stiehm and Stephen Cullen (an

attorney who had assisted Stiehm in the Virginia

litigation) claiming a constitutional conspiracy by

the defendants against him in his litigation in

Virginia. VSB Ex. 43. Staff members of NCMEC had

been witnesses in the Virginia litigation and

NCMEC had provided legal representation to

witnesses in the iitigation in Virginia. In filing this

litigation in which Respondent and his son were

named as plaintiffs, Respondent who is not licensed

to practice in the District 6f Columbia and had not

obtained an order to appear pro hoc vice, attempted

to act as attorney for his son.

5. In March of 2003, the Respondent filed a

Writ of Mandamus in an attempt to compel NCMEC

to take actions to force the country of Colombia to

grant the Respondent access to his son. VSB Ex. 64.

By letter dated September 24,2003, Warren L.

Dennis, Esquire, counsel for NCMEC, informed the

Clerk of the United States Supreme Court that

NCMEC would not be filing a responsive brief to the

Respondent’s Writ because, inter alia, it had no

power to compel the government of the country of

Colombia to do anything. VSB Ex. 65. Upon receipt

of a copy of the letter, the Respondent called Mr.

A--49

Dennis’s office and left a voice mail message in

which he threatened to file an ethics complaint

because the letter falsely characterized the

Respondent's Virginia litigation. Also, by letter

dated September 29,2003, the Respondent gave

notice of his intent to file a judicial complaint and

District of Columbia Bar complaint against those

involved in the litigation unless facts already proved

were proved within twenty-four (24) hours. VSB Ex

67.

6. In the District of Columbia litigation the

Respondent repeatedly filed pleadings with no basis

in law or fact. VSB Ex. 43 - 81. In an amended

complaint (VSB Ex. 72) Respondent asserted a

claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

Organization Act (RICO) 18 U.S.C. 1961. Included

as defendants in the complaint were the United

States Supreme Court; the United States Court of

Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; the United States

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, the

United States District Court for the Eastern

Districtof Virginia, the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia, the Virginia Supreme

Court, the Court of Appeals of Virginia and the

Circuit Court of Fairfax County. Respondent’s

actions in the D.C. litigation clearly demonstrates

his use of the legal system to harass and intimidate

anyone whom he considered to have been involved

in the Virginia litigation that returned his son to

Colombia and to re-litigate the Virginia case.

7. Respondent’s actions in naming NCMEC

and some of its employees as defendants in this

A--50

litigation cost NCMEC over $160,000 in legal

expenses and nearly bankrupted the organization.

Throughout the course of this litigation, the

Respondent misrepresented his credentials as a

lawyer and his license status in the District of

Columbia and New York to the courts and opposing

parties. The Respondent graduated from law school

in 1976. He was first licensed to practice law in the

Commonwealth of Virginia in 1982. Virginia is the

only jurisdiction in which Respondent has a:license

to practice law. The Respondent listed a number of

governmental and quasi governmental legal jobs in

the District of Columbia on his resume between the

years 1976 and 1982 requiring a valid law license in

the United States, during which period he was not

licensed to practice law anywhere in the United

States. The Respondent also noted on various

documents that he practiced law in the District of

Columbia for a period of time after his licensure in

Virginia, but has never been licensed in the District

of Columbia.

8. During this litigation, the Respondent filed

pleadings and attempted to represent his minor

sonon several occasions in the District of Columbia

litigation, despite the fact there was a conflict of

interest between the father.and son, despite the fact

that the Respondent would be a witness in the case

and despite the fact that the judge instructed the

Respondent to cease representing his son. VSB Ex

48 & 50. The Respondent’s iaw partner also

attempted to represent the son but the court refused

to permit that representation.

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1. MISCONDUCT

The Certification for VSB Docket No.

04-052-0794 charges violations of the following

provisions of the Virginia Rules of Professional

Conduct:

RULE 1.2 Scope of Representation

(a) A lawyer shall abide by a cliert’s decisions

concerning the objectives of representation, subject

to paragraphs (b), (c ), and (d), and shall consult

with the client as to the means by which they are to

be pursued. A lawyer shall abide by a client’s

decision, after consultation with the lawyer,

whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter.

In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the

client’s decision, after consultation with the lawyer,

as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury

trial and whether the client will testify.

RULE 1.5 Fees

(a) A lawyer’s fee shall be reasonable. The factors to

be considered in determining the reasonableness of

a fee include the following:

(1) the time and labor required, the novelty

and difficulty of the questions involved, and the

skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;

(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client,

that the acceptance of the particular employment

will preclude other employment by the lawyer,

A--52

(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality

for similar legal services;

(4) the amount involved and the results

obtained;

(5) the time limitations imposed by the client

or by the circumstances;

(6) the nature and length of the professional

relationship with the client:

(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of

the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and

(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

RULE 1.16 Declining Or Terminating

Representation

(a) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer

shall not represent a client or where representation

has commenced, shall withdraw from the

representation of a client if:

(3) the lawyer is discharged.

RULE 3.4 Fairness To Opposing Party And

Counsel

A lawyer shall not:

(LD) file a suit, initiate crimiral charges, assert a

position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take

A--53

other action on behalf of the client when the lawyer

knows or when it is obvious that such action would

serve merely to harass or maliciously injure

another.

RULE 7.1 Communications And Advertising

Concerning A Lawyer’s Services

(a)A lawyer shall not, on behalf of the lawyer

or any other lawyer affiliated with the lawyer or the

firm, use or participate in the use of any form of

public communication if such communication

contains a false, fraudulent, misleading, or

deceptive statement or claim. For example, a

communication or advertisement violates this Rule

if it:

(1) contains misleading fee information:

(2) states or implies that the outcome of a

particular legal matter was not or will not be

related to its facts or merits;

(3) compares the lawyer's services with other

lawyers’ services, unless the comparison can be

factually substantiated;

(4) contains an endorsement by a celebrity or

public figure who is not a client of the firm without

disclosure (I) of the fact that the speaker is not a

client of the lawyer or the firm, and (ii) whether the

speaker is being paid for the appearance or

endorsement; or

(5) contains a portrayal of a client by a

non-client without a disclosure that the depiction is

a dramatization.

In the -determination of whether a

communication or advertisement violates this Rule,

the communication or advertisement shall be

considered in its entirety including any qualifying

statements or disclaimers contained therein.

RULE 8.4 Misconduct

It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:

(b) commit acriminal or deliberately wrongful —

act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty,

trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer;

(c) engage in professional conduct involving

dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;

The Certification for VSB Docket No.

04-052-1044 charges violations of the following

provisions of the Virginia Rules of Professional

Conduct:

RULE 1.7 Conflict of Interest: General Rule

(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the

representation of that client may be materially

limited by

the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client or toa

A-*55

third person, or by the lawyer’s own interests,

unless:

(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the

representation will not be adversely affected; and

(2) the client consents after consultation. When

representation of multiple clients in a single matter

is undertaken, the consultation shall include

explanation of the implications of the common

representation and the advantages and risks

involved.

RULE 3.1 Meritorious Claims And

Contentions

A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or

assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is

a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which

includes a good faith argument for an extension,

modification or reversal ofexisting law. A lawyer for

the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the

respondent in a proceeding that could result in

incarceration may nevertheless so defend the

proceeding as to require that every element of the

case be established.

RULE 3.3 Candor Toward The Tribunal

(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly

(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a

tribunal;

A--56

(2) fail to disclose a fact to a tribunal when

disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal

or fraudulent act by the client, subject to Rule 1.6;

(3) fail to disclose to the tribunal controlling legal

authority in the subject jurisdiction known to the

lawyer to be adverse to the position of the client and

not disclosed by opposing counsel; or

(4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.

Ifa lawyer has offered material evidence and comes

to know of its falsity; the lawyer shall take

reasonable remedial measures.

RULE 3.4 Fairness To Opposing Party And

Counsel

A lawyer shall not:

(d) Knowingly disobey or advise a client to disregard

a standing rule or a ruling of a tribunal made in the

course of a proceeding, but the lawyer may take

steps, in good faith, to test the validity of such rule

or ruling.

(h) Present or threaten to present criminal or

disciplinary charges solely to obtain an advantage in

a civil matter.

(I) File a suit, initiate criminal charges, assert a

position, conduct a defense, delay a trail, or take

other action on behalf of the client when the lawyer

knows or when it is obvious that such action would

serve merely to harass or maliciously injure

A--57

another. Effective January 1,2004

(j) Present or threaten to present criminal or

disciplinary charges solely to obtain an advantage

in a civil matter,

(k) File a suit, initiate criminal charges, assert a

position, conduct a defense, delay a trail, or take

other action on behalf of the client when the lawyer

knows or when it is obvious that such action would

serve merely to harass or maliciously injure

another.

RULE 3.7 Lawyer As Witness

(a) A.lawyer shall not act as an advocate in

an adversarial proceeding in which the lawyer is

likely to be a necessary witness except where:

(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested

issue;

(2) the testimony relates to the nature and

value of legal services rendered in the case; or

(3) disqualification of the lawyer would work

substantial hardship on the client.

RULE 44 Respect For Rights Of Third

Persons

In representing a client, a lawyer shall not

use means that have no purpose other than to

embarrass, delay; or burden a third person, or use

A--58

methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal

rights of such a person.

RULE 5.5-Unauthorized Practice Of Law

(a) A lawyer shall not:

(1) practice law in a jurisdiction where doing so

violates the regulation of the legal profession in that

jurisdiction; or

(2) assist a person who is not a member of the bar in

the performance of activity that constitutes the

unauthorized practice of law.

RULE 7.1. Communications Concerning A

Lawyer's Services

(a) A lawyer shall not, on behalf of thelawyer

or any other lawyer affiliated with the lawyer or the

firm, use or participate in the use of any form of

public communication if such communication

contains a false, fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive

statement or claim. For example, a communication

violates this Rule if it:

(1) contains false or misleading fee

information; or

(2) states or implies that the outcome of a

particular legal matter was not OR will not be

related to its facts or merits; or

(3) compares the lawyer's services with other

A--59

lawyers’ services, unless the comparison can be

factually substantiated; or

(4) is likely to create an unjustified

expectation about results the lawyer can achieve, or

states or implies that the lawyer can achieve results

by means that violate the Rules of Professional

Conduct or other law.

RULE 7.4 Communication Of Fields Of

Practice And Certification

Lawyers may state, announce or hold

themselves out as limiting their practice in a

particular area or field of law so long as the

communication of such limitation of practice is in

accordance with the standards of this Rule, Rule

7.1, and Rule 7.3, as appropriate. A lawyer shall not

state or imply that the lawyer has been recognized

or certified as a specialist in a particular field of law

except as follows:

(a) A lawyer admitted to engage in patent

practice before the United States Patent and

Trademark Office may use the designation “Patent

Attorney” or a substantially similar designation:

(b) A lawyer engaged in Admiralty practice

may use as a designation “Admiralty,” “Proctor in

Admiralty” or a substantially similar designation;

(c) A lawyer who has been certified by the

Supreme Court of Virginia as a specialist in some

capacity may use the designation of being so

A--60

certified, e.g., “certified mediator” or a substantially

similar designation;

(d) A lawyer may communicate the fact that

the lawyer has been certified as a specialist in a field

of law by a named organization, provided that the

communication clearly states that there is no

procedure in the Commonwealth of Virginia for

approving certifying organizations. Effective Nov.

1,2002

(a) A lawyer admitted to engage in patent

practice before «he United States Patent and

Trademark Office may use the designation “Patent

Attorney” or a substantially similar designation:

(b) A lawyer engaged in Admiralty practice

may use as a designation “Admiralty,” “Proctor in

Admiralty” or a substantially similar designation;

(c) A lawyer who has been certified by the

Supreme Court of Virginia as a specialist in some

capacity may use the designation of being so

certified, e.g., “certified mediator” or a substantially

similar designation;

(d) A lawyer may communicate the fact that

the lawyer has been certified as a specialist in a field

of law by a named organization, provided that the

communication clearly states that there is no

procedure in the Commonwealth of Virginia for

approving certifying organizations.

RULE 8.4 Misconduct

A--61

It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:

(b) commit a criminal or deliberately wrongful act

that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty,

trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer;

(c) engage in professional conduct involving

dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation:;

Effective Mar. 25, 2003

(b) commit a criminal or deliberately wrongful act

that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty,

trustworthiness or fitness to practice law.

(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,

deceit or misrepresentation which reflects adversely

on the lawyer's fitness to practice law;

Ill. DISPOSITION

Upon review of the forgoing finding of facts,

the exhibits presented by Bar Counsel on behalf of

the VSB as Exhibits 1- 92, the exhibits presented by

the Respondent as The Respondent’s Exhibits 1-42,

the evidence from witnesses presented on behalf of

the VSB and evidence presented by the Respondent

in the form of his own testimony, and at the

conclusion of the evidence regarding misconduct,

the Board recessed to deliberate. After deliberation

the Board reconvened and stated that it had found

by clear and convincing evidence that the

Respondent had violated The following Rules of

Professional Conduct: in Docket No. 004-052-0794,

Rule 1.2(a); 1.5(a); 1.16(a)(3); 3.4); 7.1a); 8.4(b) &

A--62

(c); in Docket No. 04-052-1044. Rule 1.7(b) 1-2; 3.1;

3.4 (d)(h)G)(); 3.7(a)(1-3); 4.4 and 8(b) and (c).

The Board stated that the Bar had failed

toprove by clear and convincing evidence any

violation of the following the Rules of Professional

Conduct: 3.3(a)1-4; 5.5(a)l-2; 7.1(a)1-4:;

7.4(a)(b)(c)(d); and effective Nov. 1, 2002

7.4(a)(b)(c)(d).

The bases for the Boards finding of violation

of the Rules of Professional Conduct are as follows:

VSB Docket No. 04-052-0794

(a) The Respondent violated Rule 1.2(a)

(Scope of Representation) in that his authorization

to act on behalf of his client SSA was limited, but he

nonetheless acted without written authorization

from his client. Furthermore, after he had been

discharged by SSA, he wrote the Department of

State claiming to be the managing attorney of SSA,

which was not the case. He also made a FOIA

request without any authorization.

(b) The Respondent violated Rule 1.5(a) 1-8

(Fees) with his claim of a fee of 4.5 million dollars.

Respondent acknowledged that the fee arrangement

was a contingent fee arrangement and no recovery

had been made. Therefore, there was no basis to

claim a fee. Furthermore, the amount of the fee, $4.5

million, does not appear to have any reasonable

relationship to work actually performed which is

necessary for a recovery on a quantum merit basis.

A-°63

Respondent testified that he determined the amount

based upon what the salary would be for a legal

representative for a U.S. company operating in a

foreign country.

(c) The Respondent violated Rule 1.16 (a)(3)

(Declining or Terminating Representation) by

representing that he was SSA’s managing

attorneyin a FOIA request (VSB Ex. 23), which he

made well after SSA had terminated their

relationship.

(d) The Respondent violated Rule 3.4(1)

(Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel) by tiling

the litigation in the United States District Court for

the Eastern District of Virginia and the Circuit

Court of Fairfax County, Virginia. It should appear

to any reasonably competent lawyer that the courts

did not have jurisdiction over the parties named as

defendants. Even giving the Respondent the benefit

of the doubt as to the first suit, he received a ruling

that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the

defendants which was upheld on appeal. He

nonetheless filed a second suit with the same

infirmity seeking the same recovery. Furthermore,

his suit in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County,

Virginia, included as a defendant Harrison Pledger

and his law firm, merely because Mr. Pledger had

acted as defense counsel in the two suits in the

federal court

(e) The Respondent violated Rule 7.1(a) 1-5

(Communication Concerning a Lawyer’s Services)

by misrepresentation on his website and resume.

A--64

VSB Exhibits 24 and 25 show that Mr. Rodriguez, on

the website he created, misrepresented his

relationship with SSA. He misrepresented what he

did for SSA and how he became employed by SSA.

He misrepresented his education by listing an LLM

civil law degree from the University of Bordeaux. He

improperly claimed a certification (the American

Trial Lawyer Ultimate Trial Lawyer Certification)

where no such certification exists.

(f) The Respondent violated Rule 8.4(b) and

8.4(c) (Miscondnct) by representing in his

FO TArequest that he was the managing attorney for

SSA, when the evidence shows that he clearly was

not.

VSB Docket No. 04-052-1044

(a) The Respondent violated Rule 1.7(b) 1-2

(Conflict of interest) in his attempt to represent his

son in the District Court for the District of Columbia

and his continued actions to do so even in the face of

a court ruling that there was a conflict.

(b) The Respondent violated Rule 3.1

(Meritorious Claims and Contentions) by his

litigation in the District Court for the District of

Columbia and his actions in the Circuit Court of

Fairfax County, Virginia. The complaint filed by the

Respondent with all the parties he named as

defendants staiding alone shows that the

Respondent has violated this Rule. The numerous

pleadings filed thereafter further demonstrate that

the Respondent’s aim was to punish anyone who had

A--65

any connection with the litigation filed by his

former wife to regain custody of their son. Any

attorney who had in any way appeared in that

litigation ended up being named as a defendant.

NCMEC and several of its staff were named as

defendants resulting in a legal cost to NCMEC

alone of $160,090.00 Attorney Patrick Stiehm who

had taken Respondent’s ex-wife’s case pro bono was

named as a_ defendant thereby making good on

Respondent's claim that Stiehm’s representation

would cost him a “big chunk of change.”

Furthermore, in litigation in Fairfax County,

Respondent subpoenaed two members of NCMEC as

witnesses for a hearing involving his efforts to filea

Statement of the Case for an appeal, ‘when these

two staff members had nothing to do with the

Fairfax litigation. While the subpoenas were

quashed they nevertheless had the effect of

harassing the NCMEC staff members. Remarkably

this is the only instance in which the Respondent

was sanctioned by a court.

Perhaps if he had been sanctioned earlier,

either by the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Virginia or the District Court for

the District of Columbia, such action would have

put a stop to Respondent’s unwarranted and

vexatious conduct. Unfortunately neither of the

courts saw fit to impose sanctions.

(c) The Respondent violated Rule

3.4(d)(h(i)G) (Fairness to Opposing Party and

Counsel) by the following conduct: (1) by continuing

A--66

to attempt to represent his son in the District of

Columbia litigation in the face of a court ruling, in

violation of Rule 3.4(d); (2) by threatening the

NCMEC attorney with a bar complaint and filing a

criminal complaint with the FBI, in violation of

3.4(h); (3) by filing a motion for sanctions against

Patrick Stiehm and naming Stiehm as a defendant

in the District of Columbia litigation and by his

entire course of conduct in the District of Columbia

litigation, in violation of Rule 3.4()(@);

(d) The Respondent violated Rule 3.7(a) 1-3

(Lawyer as Witness) by acting as an advocate when

he was a necessary witness in the Eastern District

of Virginia litigation.

(e) The Respondent violated Rule 4.4 (Respect

for the Rights of Third Persons) by the whole course

of litigation in the District Court for the District

ofColumbia. In addition, his subpoena of Ms.

Brinkerhoff and Mr. Dennis to the Fairfax Circuit

Court for a bearing on the Statement of Facts to be

submitted for appeal further demonstrates a

‘violation of this Rule.

(f) The Respondent violated Rule 8.4(b) and

8.4( c ) (Misconduct) in asserting a RICO claim and

by his letter to the FBI.

Thereafter, the Board received further

evidence of aggravation and mitigation from the Bar

and the Respondent, including the Respondent’s

prior disciplinary record. The Board recessed to

deliberate what sanction to impose upon its findings

A-°67

oF

of misconduct by the Respondent.

After due deliberation the Board reconvened

to announce the sanction imposed. The Chair

announced the sanction as REVOCATION.

The Board in reaching its decision of

revocation recognized that the violation of certain of

the Rules such as Rule 1.5(a), 7.1, and 8.4(b) & (c)

standing alone may not merit the ultimate sanction

of revocation. However, the Respondent’s conduct by

pursuing litigation in Virginia in Docket No.

04-052-0794 and in the District of Columbia in

Docket No. 04-052-1044 is conduct that cannot be

tolerated. While a court through sanctions can

protect itself from such conduct by a deceitful and

unprincipled attorney, the public must look to the

VSB for protection. The other violations

demonstrate Respondent’s complete disregard for

the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Furthermore the Respondent was defiant to

any criticism of his conduct in pursuing what can

only be described as meritless and vexatious

litigation. This same defiance was evident to the

Board as the Respondent sought to justify his

conduct. Therefore the Board concluded that the

sanction of revocation was the only remedy by

which the public and bar could be adequately

protected.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the

Respondent's license to practice law in the

Commonwealth of Virginia is revoked, effective

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October 27, 2006.

It is further ORDERED that the Respondent

must comply with the requirements of Part Six, § IV,

4 13(M) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of

Virginia. The Respondent shall forthwith give notice

by certified mail, return receipt requested, of the

revocation of his license to practice law in the

Commonwealth of Virginia, to all clients for whom

he is currently handling matters and to all opposing

attorneys and presiding judges in pending litigation.

The Respondent shall also make appropriate

arrangements for the disposition of matters then in

his care in conformity with the wishes of his client

The Respondent shall give such notice within 14

days of the effective date of the revocation, and make

such arrangements as are required herein within 45

days of the effective date of the revocation. The

Respondent shall also furnish proof to the Bar

within 60 days of the effective day of the revocation

that such notices have been timely given and such

arrangements made for the disposition of matters.

It is further ORDERED that if the

Respondent is not handling any client matters on

the effective date of October 27,2006, he shall

submit an affidavit to that effect to the Clerk of the

Disciplinary System at the Virginia State Bar. All

issues concerning the adequacy of the notice and

arrangements required by Paragraph 13 (M) shall be

determined by the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary

Board, unless the Respondent makes a timely

request for hearing before a three-judge court.

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Itis further ORDERED that pursuant to Part

Six, § IV, ¥ 13,B.8.c. of the Rules of the Supreme

Court of Virginia, the Clerk of the Disciplinary

System shall assess all costs against the

Respondent.

It is further ORDERED that the Clerk of the

Disciplinary System shall mail an attested copy of

this order to the Respondent at his address of record

with the Virginia State Bar, being 7924 Peyton

Forest Trail, Annandale, VA 22003-1560, by

certified mail, return receipt requested, and by

regular mail to Noel 0. Sengel, Bar Counsel,

Virginia State Bar, Suite 310, 100 North Pitt Street,

Alexandria, Virginia, 22314-3133.

ENTERED this 28th day of November, 2006

VIRGINIA STATE BAR DISCIPLINARY BOARD

By: /S/

James Leroy Banks., Jr. 1* Vice Chair

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