Respondents Brief — Shell Oil Co. v. United States (Nos. 07-1607, 07-1601)

Supreme Court brief2009

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

alte Fe -ssome Us

\\v Nos. 07-1601 and 07-1607 err

1601 07-1 Océ , 2 2008

In Whe OF THE CLERK

Joupreme Court of the Anite States

BURLINGTON NORTHERN & SANTA FE RAILWAY

COMPANY, UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY,

Petitioners,

V.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

*

SHELL O11. COMPANY,

Petitioner,

V.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

*

On Writs Of Certiorari To The United States

Court Of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit

¢

BRIEF FOR THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

°

EDMUND G. BROWN JR.

Attorney General of the State of California

JAMES HUMES

Chief Assistant Attorney General

MANUEL M. MEDEIROS

State Solicitor General

GORDON BURNS

Deputy Solicitor General

KEN ALEX

Senior Assistant Attorney General

Counsel of Record

DONALD A. ROBINSON

Supervising Deputy Attorney General

ANN RUSHTON

JANILL L. RICHARDS

Deputy Attorneys General

1515 Clay Street, 20th Floor

P.O. Box 70550

Oakland, CA 94612-0550

Telephone: (510) 622-2137

Fax: (510) 622-2270

Counsel for the State of California,

Department of Toxic Substances Control

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CU (800) 225-6964

UR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-248)!

Ja

eu"

QUESTIONS PRESEN'TED

1. Whether the court of appeals correctly af-

firmed the district court’s determination that peti-

tioner Shell Oil Company is liable under Section

107(aX(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a\(3), of the Comprehen-

sive Environmental Response, Compensation, and

Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et

seq., as an entity that arranged for disposal of haz-

ardous substances.

2. Whether the court of appeals properly held

petitioners Shell Oil Company and The Burlington

Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company and Union

Pacific Railroad Company jointly and severally liable

under CERCLA for the response costs of the United

States and California governments, based on the

court’s determination that neither petition’r satisfied

its evidentiary burden of providing a reasonable basis

to apportion liability.

ll

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

iio sear vasdeannasecnuadiinnsonnbipebeiaiibn 1

Be II cc avncesnosnacnacencedennnnnessnnnsonsen 19

cintetntnibdiiateccrenercipinmeqennemajninninniitin 23

I. Shell arranged for disposal of a hazardous

substance and therefore is a liable party

i iccidinticsesennsecinenidipteeveniadiinaneds

A. Arranger liability under CERCLA is

B.

broadly construed based on the facts

surrounding the transaction.................

An entity is liable as an arranger when

it knows that disposal of a hazardous

substance is an inherent and inevita-

ble part of the transaction.....................

Shell is liable as an arranger under

CERCLA because it owned the hazard-

ous substance, arranged the proce-

dures for the transfer, and knew that

disposal on delivery was an inevitable

result of its arrangements.....................

Shell’s reading of arranger liability is

contrary to CERCLA’s broad scheme....

1. Arranger liability under CERCLA

does not require a specific intent to

dispose of hazardous waste..............

2. The Solid Waste Disposal Act’s defi-

nition of “disposal,” does not limit

CERCLA arranger liability..............

23

25

26

28

32

32

Il.

ill

TABLE OF CONTENTS — Continued

Page

While liability under CERCLA may be

apportioned based on evidence of divisibil-

ity of harm, the Railroads and Shell failed

to establish a factual basis for apportion-

A. The court below applied the proper

standards of review ..............ccceeceeeeseeeees

B. Because the Railroads and Shell pre-

sented no evidence on divisibility of

harm, the record is insufficient to sup-

port a reasonable basis for apportion-

EF I decienenstenstcctianiinnpidaptarmeres

1. While liability under CERCLA gen-

erally is joint and several, a respon-

sible party may establish that

liability may be apportioned consis-

tent with the Restatement’s com-

mon law principles ...........................

2. Apportionment is appropriate where

a responsible party can show dis-

tinct harm, successive injuries, or

divisible harm, except where injus-

tice to plaintiff will result ................

3. The Railroads and Shell introduced,

and the record contained, no evi-

dence to support apportionment......

a. There is no basis in the record

to apportion the Railroads’ li-

SE siccpicaliciicicnnpsniabaibbagictaimadiladdaicituiopire

36

36

38

38

41

48

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS -— Continued

Page

b. There is no basis in the record to

apportion Shell’s liability ........... 53

c. By taking equity into considera-

tion, the district court wrongly

conflated apportionment of harm

with allocation of damages......... 58

a 60

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

3550 Stevens Creed Associates v. Barclays Bank

of California, 915 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1990).....27, 31

Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 881

F. Supp. 1202 (N.D. Ind. 1994)... 42, 43

AM Int'l, Inc. v. International Forging Equip.

Corp., 982 F.2d 989 (6th Cir. 1993) 0.00.2... 31

Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 2 F.3d 746

CAE FID pan ccnicnncntnutionssninnndibinnutensciisiaciiaianiiiainin 30, 31

Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985) ....... 37

Ass’n of Battery Recyclers, Inc. v. United States

EPA, 208 F.3d 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2000)....................... 35

Aviall Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 312

ey EE SI iicccscccnsccnenunenisepebbdadiibatadiaetai 38

Cadillac Fairview/Cal., Inc. v. United States,

41 F.BG GES (Otin Car. 1GD4}) .......cccccccccccccccccccscosccscees 25

Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. v. Unocal Corp.,

BIO F.BS SSS COCR CAw. BOOT) .nccccccccsccccsccccescsccscccccesses 5

Catellus Dev. Corp. v. United States, 34 F.3d

TEI, SINE sic nsccescsennstabinistiapntasaibeniemeiadl 26, 27

Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc. v. Bush, 292 F.3d

ee Wa I in icnscnsnnctipnaicundgisnuiiiaieialanas 5, 6, 46

Coeur D’Alene Tribe v. Asarco, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d

1094 (D. Idaho 2003)......................eeeeee 43, 55, 56, 57

Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc.,

Se rs re PEs ccnsccnccnnctdesselasdncdieumiadienael 6, 38, 59

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

Courtaulds Aerospace, Inc. v. Huffman, 826

F. Supp. 345 (E.D. Cal. 1993) ...............eeeeeeeeeeee 21, 27

Dayton Indep. School Dist. v. United States

Mineral Products, Inc., 906 F.2d 1059 (5th

EEE ESSE SDR AU RO 31

Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. City of Lodi, 302

I I, ED. ss cia cmmmnannntndeseneseccoess 5

Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers

Corp., 893 F.2d 1313 (11th Cir. 1990).............000..... 20

Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers

Corp., 85 F.3d 1514 (11th Cir. 1996).........0..0.......... 27

Freeman v. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., 189 F.3d 160

ENE SON 25, 27

General Electric Co. v. AAMCO Transmissions,

Inc., 962 F.2d 281 (2d Cir. 1992)................0.. cece. 31

In +. Bell Petroleum Servs., 3 F.3d 889 (5th Cir.

Slits eedinihiieianateacnitietnciinemtesbtbntnecedsannesenee passim

Kamb v. United States Coast Guard, 869

F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Cal. 1994) .................ceeeseseeeeeeees 43

Mathews v. Dow Chemical Co., 947 F. Supp.

Sa scscelliesnenssenesane 20

Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater

Chicago v. North American Galvanizing &

Coatings, Inc., 473 F.3d 824 (7th Cir. 2007)........... 20

Morton Int'l v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 343 F.3d

G69 (Sd Cir. ZOOS).............ccccccccccccoese 24, 25, 26, 27, 34

O’Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176 (1st Cir. 1989)...... 41, 46

vil

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1

iti haa aiid iailallaiaeititasiaheideaisiieinvetapensii 3

Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville

& Denton R.R., 142 F.3d 769 (4th Cir.) .............0.... 25

Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments,

94 F.3d 1489 (11th Cir. 1996)........... eee eceeeeees 26

South Florida Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Montalvo,

84 F.3d 402 (11th Cir. 1996)... ee eeee eens 25

United States v. Aceto Agricultural Chemicals

Corp., 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989) .............. passim

United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990

IE Ca vciicsicticnisnnctsmiseniucesscénushabet 5, 46

United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964

I, cela cedeepenneanenat 7

United States v. Atlantic Research Corp.,

US. ef SL _, : RROD Te EOT NT 59

United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998)...... 3, 20

United States v. Broderick Investment Co., 862

Bie I OEE GED GAINS BPE cecccesisecccsscndccssescisocvesesen 43

United States v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 200

NS a

United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572

F. Supp. 802 (D.C. Ohio 1983) .................... 38, 39, 40

United States v. E.l. DuPont De Nemours &

Co., 432 F.3d 161 (3d Cir. 2005)...................cecceeeee eee 7

United States v. Hercules, Inc., 247 F.3d 706

I IED cisccistivinesnceisainiidiinindianinniadisselpadiasepndaiaiid passim

Vill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24

5 LED at are SPer aie NON COON 5

United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160

ll 5, 6, 38, 47, 58

United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1265

EI SIRS AT AR CURR RT aT eS 6, 58

United States v. Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d 1045

acetal lalallala ital 20, 26

United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326 (1998)............. 37

United States v. TIC Inv. Corp., 68 F.3d 1082

ET ann a eee” eae ee ear ES 26

United States v. Township of Brighton, 153

F.3d 307 (6th Cir. 1998) ..................csssscsseceeeoes passim

United States v. Township of Brighton, 282

en I I se cc tcurespmaibonenens 22

Zands v. Nelson, 779 F. Supp. 1254 (S.D. Cal.

LPS RE A CRO ae el Ne aOR ee SUERTE 35

STATUTES

42 U.S.C.

TT RON enien ee tere 24, 33, 35

TEMPERA aN SEO MIE Rr Tn 35

RTT LASS BME SO SS SIRES Ee 24, 33, 35

ECT TERT RON EEE TT 4

A eae aren Menem EHErenS Cv 6, 59

EE tee ee meer passim

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

TT i oii ennnsisnddennebeeieanininstekinsasinsneeillal 10

iii csc anceiedeipeibdeleneisasctniboniibaniibing 10, 25

ssc cade sc onindcredcsebosimaiiosichanesiedadoentiinenenlail 4

a a eesanleleseumeianeieiennn 4

SIN hit setchiniietiashnnnssetinainbenapteenimbideetiinteahebiganiaanid 6

ST isidindensdnteeverisnederestoctpnsnartynensetnenieel 6, 13, 59

ERT ae aOR 6, 59

California Health and Safety Code

a senihithlllaneme min enublinil 3

in nicisuced deh paemnblkaimbdimbiewecisimabinbtanaienaindeiniiii 3

Sita heinrich a bangrigtendebasiebonsininemidnninsiaeatnniinabintl 3

§ 58009.......... isliesigpnsbiehdiaaigietelittidedundinbaniipsadnmiibiiniaadiaiaieas 4

CouRT RULES

EL, SiiICTTID 1 winssnsosesecdeanpuntsonedediiiasaspnucditinnant 56

OTHER AUTHORITIES

I a cicnicinsicdiniasgiancitonnintbuomendsinnensoniibaens 4

126 Cong. Rec. H11787 (Dec. 3, 1980) ................. ee 39

126 Cong. Rec. S14964 (Nov. 24, 1980)................00... 39

H.R. Rep. No. 253, 99th Cong., lst Sess., pt. 3

SRN SEE CRA NS A a De EE 3

Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 ..........0 ee 3

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A............... passim

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433B........... 40, 47, 58

x

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 434.......0...00000..0.c.... 37

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 875......................0... 40

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 881...................000000- 39

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary

a TUITE ccscscnescvsiesisioseseennenctousesnssionooed 33, 34

1

STATEMENT

The Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) author-

izes states and the United States to take prompt

action to protect the public and the environment from

the harm caused by the release or threatened release

of hazardous substances into the environment.

Rather than requiring that costs associated with

these actions be borne by the government and ulti-

mately the taxpayers, CERCLA authorizes states and

the United States to recover their cleanup expenses

from the parties responsible for the contamination.

As of March 31, 1998, the Department of Toxic

Substances Control of the State of California (“Cali-

fornia”) had expended more than $400,000 to clean up

hazardous substances in the soil and ground water at

a former agricultural chemical storage and distribu-

tion facility in Arvin, California, and the United

States Environmental Protection Agency had spent

significantly more. (Pet. App. at 158a-59a, 230a-31a.)'

The operator of the facility, Brown and Bryant, Inc.

(“Brown and Bryant”), is now insolvent and defunct.

The governments brought cost-recovery actions

pursuant to CERCLA Section 107(a), 42 U.S.C.

§ 9607(a) against The Burlington Northern and Santa

Fe Railway Company, and Union Pacific Railroad

' Unless otherwise noted, all references to “Pet. App.” are to

the appendix in the petition for a writ of certiorari filed by

petitioners The Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway

Company and Union Pacific Railroad Company.

2

Company (“Railroads”), which owned the western

portion of the facility during a period when releases

occurred, and Shell Oil Company (“Shell”), which sold

and arranged for the shipment of large quantities of

chemicals that, as Shell was well aware, were rou-

tinely spilled during delivery at the facility. After a

bench trial, the district court found the Railroads

strictly liable under CERCLA as owners of the facility

at the time of disposal (Pet. App. 187a) and Shell

strictly liable as having arranged for the disposal of

hazardous substance. (Jd. at 218a.)

The district court declined to impose joint and

several liability on the Railroads or on Shell, though

it noted that as a result of their “‘scorched earth,’ all-

or-nothing approach to liability,” neither “offered

helpful arguments to apportion liability.” (Ud. at

236a.) Instead, the court “independently” created a

set of calculations based on a series of assumptions,

assigning 9% liability to the Railroads and 6% liabil-

ity to Shell, leaving the governments to bear 85% of

their cleanup costs. (Jd. at 237a, 252a, 256a.)

The court of appeals affirmed in part, holding

that Shell was strictly liable as an “arranger” due to

its control over, and knowledge of, the chemical

transfer process and resulting disposal through

leaking and spilling, and reversed in part, holding

that the Railroads and Shell did not establish suffi-

cient facts to support apportionment and therefore

were jointly and severally liable. (Pet. App. 1a-57a.)

3

1. Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 in re-

sponse to the serious environmental and health

dangers posed by property contaminated by hazard-

ous substances. United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S.

51, 55 (1998). The two goals of CERCLA, as amended

by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization

Act of 1986 (“SARA”), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat.

1613, are “to provide for clean-up if a hazardous

substance is released into the environment or if such

release is threatened” and “to hold responsible parties

liable for the costs of these clean-ups.” H.R. Rep. No.

253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 15 (1985). Con-

gress broadly defined the categories of parties poten-

tially liable for the cost of such cleanups. ““The

remedy that Congress felt it needed in CERCLA is

sweeping: everyone who is potentially responsible for

hazardous-waste contamination may be forced to

contribute to the costs of cleanup.” Bestfoods, 524

U.S. at 56 n.1 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Union Gas

Co., 491 U.S. 1, 21 (1989) (plurality opinion.)).

California, through its Department of Toxic

Substances Control,’ is authorized to clean up sites

* The Department of Toxic Substances Control (“DTSC”) is

an environmental enforcement agency of the State of California

authorized under the California Hazardous Substance Account

Act to respond to the release or threatened release of hazardous

substances and to imminent or substantial endangerments

to the public health, safety or the environment (see California

Health and Safety Code §§ 25300 et seg.), and to recover

costs expended on such activities under state or federal law.

Cal. Health & Saf. Code §§ 25358.3, 25360; Cal. Health & Saf.

(Continued on following page)

4

contaminated by hazardous substances. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 9604(d). California may then recover its response

costs from responsible parties through an action

under CERCLA Section 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).

To establish a prima facie case under CERCLA

for recovery of its costs, California must establish

four elements: (1) a “release or threatened release” (2)

of a “hazardous substance” (3) from a “facility” (4)

which “causes the incurrence of response costs.” 42

U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4). California must then establish

that a defendant falls within at least one of the four

enumerated classes of responsible parties: (1) the

owner and operator of a facility, (2) the owner or

operator of a facility at the time of any disposal of a

hazardous substance, (3) any person who arranged

for the disposal or treatment of hazardous sub-

stances, or (4) any person who accepts any hazardous

substances for transport to disposal or treatment

facilities. 42 U.S.C. §9607(a). Except for narrow

defenses specifically defined at 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b),

responsible parties are strictly liable for all response

costs incurred by the federal or state government that

are not inconsistent with the national contingency

plan. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4).°

Code § 5/009, as added by Gov. Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1991 (May

17, 1991); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).

* The national contingency plan, which specifies procedures

for preparing and responding to contamination, is codified at 40

C.F.R. pt. 300.

5

Courts of appeals consistently have held that

CERCLA liability is joint and several, except where a

responsible party can prove that the harm is divisi-

ble. See, e.g., Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. City of Lodi,

302 F.3d 928, 945 (9th Cir. 2002); Chem-Nuclear

Systems, Inc. v. Bush, 292 F.3d 254, 260 (D.C. Cir.

2002); Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. v. Unocal Corp.,

270 F.3d 863, 871 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v.

Hercules, Inc., 247 F.3d 706, 717 (8th Cir. 2001);

United States v. Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d 307,

318 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Alean Aluminum

Corp., 990 F.2d 711, 721-22 (2d Cir. 1993); United

States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 26 (1st Cir.

1990); United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160,

167, 171-72 (4th Cir. 1988).

In analyzing divisibility of harm in CERCLA

Section 107(a) actions, the lower courts have followed

the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides

that damages may be apportioned amongst responsi-

ble parties where a party establishes either distinct

harms or divisibility resting on a “reasonable basis

for determining the contribution of each cause to a

single harm.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A;

see, e.g., Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 171-72; In re Bell

Petroleum Servs., 3 F.3d 889, 895-97 (5th Cir. 1993);

Brighton, 153 F.3d at 318; Hercules, 247 F.3d at 717.

Responsible parties have the burden of demonstrat-

ing divisibility by evidence that is “concrete and

specific.” Hercules, 247 F.3d at 717-18. When respon-

sible parties cannot prove distinct harms or divisibil-

ity, joint and several liability governs, and each party

6

is liable for the full amount of the costs incurred.

Chem-Nuclear, 292 F.3d at 260-61; Monsanto, 858

F.2d at 172-73; Hercules, 247 F.3d at 717-19.

At the liability stage, apportionment of responsi-

ble parties’ liability to the government for environ-

mental cleanup costs must be based on proof of

divisibility of harm; equitable considerations are

relevant only in the contribution stage where a court

may allocate damages amongst parties held responsi-

ble for the contamination. Parties subject to joint and

several liability for reimbursement of cleanup costs

may seek contribution from other responsible parties

under Section 113 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613.

Contribution is available to parties that have re-

solved their liability to the United States or a state or

that have been sued under Section 106 or 107 of

CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606, 9607. 42 U.S.C.

§ 9613(f(3)(B); Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Ser-

vices, Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 165-66 (2004). In any contri-

bution phase of litigation, which involves allocation

only amongst responsible parties, the courts consis-

tently have held that equitable considerations may be

taken into account. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (in contri-

bution action, court may allocate response costs

among liable parties using equitable factors that

court determines are appropriate); see Hercules, 247

F.3d at 718; Brighton, 153 F.3d at 318-19; Bell Petro-

leum, 3 F.3d at 901. Considerations of fairness as

between responsible parties are not, however, proper at

the liability stage. See United States v. Rohm & Haas

Co., 2 F.3d 1265, 1280-81 (3d Cir. 1993), overruled on

7

other grounds by United States v. E.I. DuPont De

Nemours & Co., 432 F.3d 161, 162-63 (3d Cir. 2005)

(en banc); United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp.,

964 F.2d 252, 270 n.29 (3d Cir. 1992).

2. In 1960, Brown and Bryant commenced

operation of an agricultural chemical storage and

distribution business on a 3.8-acre parcel (the “B&B

parcel”). (Pet. App. 85a.) In 1975, Brown and Bryant

expanded its operations by leasing a 0.9-acre parcel

owned by the Railroads that adjoined the B&B parcel

to the west (the “Railroad parcel”). (/d.) Brown and

Bryant ceased operating the facility in 1988 or 1989;

the company is now insolvent. (/d. at 83a-84a, 129a.)

The Brown and Bryant facility stored and dis-

tributed numerous chemicals, including the Shell

products D-D and Nemagon (soil fimigants contain-

ing hazardous substances), and non-Shell products,

including various pesticides and the weed killer

dinoseb. (Pet. App. 88a.) During their transfer and

storage, and in the course of maintaining and clean-

ing out equipment, hazardous chemicals routinely

spilled and leaked onto both parcels. (Jd. at 92a-96a.)

Brown and Bryant “used the leased [Railroad] parcel

as part of its total agricultural chemical operations.”

(Id. at 86a.) Spills and leaks on the Railroad parcel

occurred when, for example, gauges on D-D rig tanks

broke (which taey “regularly” did when a hard wind

blew), causing “the contents of a half-filled tank” to

“slowly spill on the ground” (id. at 9l1a-92a); employees

rinsed out mobile “nurse” tanks or checked their filters,

or the nurse gauges broke (id. at 92a); employees

8

transferred D-D to two-ton “bobtail” trucks (id. at

93a); employees washed chemicals off the warehouse

apron and hosed out the warehouse (id. at 94a); and

drums of stored material leaked to the ground. (Jd. at

95a.) Wherever it was located, “the corrosive D-D

caused rubber seals on pumps and valves to fail

suddenly and unexpectedly, causing big leaks.” (/d. at

115a.) Spill and leaks on the B&B parcel occurred in

similar ways (see, e.g., id. at 92a, 11la (rinsing out

“nurse” tanks on a “wash rack”)) and, in addition, in

the process of delivering chemicals (described below).

(Id. at 119a-24a.)

The B&B parcel was graded toward a pond

located in the southeast portion of the site. (/d. at

95a.) A pipe allowed the water on the Railroad parce]

also to drain to the pond. Over the course of the

facility’s operation, spills and leaks created a single

plume of ground water contaminated by hazardous

substances that threatened municipal drinking water

supplies. (/d. at 145a-46a; 174a; 237a-38a; 245a-46a.)

3. To protect public health and the environ-

ment, the California and federal governments began

to clean up the contamination at the facility pursuant

to their authority under CERCLA and, in so doing,

incurred substantial remediation costs at the site. (Jd.

at 229a-23la.) The governments filed suit against

Brown and Bryant, the Railroads, and Shel] seeking

reimbursement of investigation and cleanup costs

pursuant to CERCLA Section 107(a), 42 U.S.C.

§ 9607(a). In 2003, after a bench trial, the district

9

court issued its Amended Findings of Fact and Con-

clusions of Law. (Jd. at 82a-262a.)

a. The district court held that the govern-

ment plaintiffs established a prima facie case of

CERCLA liability against both the Railroads and

Shell. Ud. at 176a-83a (Railroads); id. at 208a-19a

(Shell).) The court determined that the “entire Arvin

plant (both parcels)” constituted a single “facility,”

and Brown and Bryant’s operations released hazard-

ous substances to the environment throughout the

facility. (id. at 172a-74a.) According to the district

court, there was evidence of contamination relating to

both parcels. (/d. at 174a.) The court found that the

pond, a sump on the B&B parcel that was connected

to the pond, and a dinoseb spill area on the B&B

parcel “were and are the primary sources of the

ground water contamination at the Site.” (/d. at 104a,

see also id. at 25la.) The court further found, how-

ever, that “[i]t is not within the realm of science to

quantify the contribution from the Railroad parcel

over the ground surface or through focused infiltra-

tion that has reached the ground water under the

Site” and that the contamination for each parcel could

not be exactly quantified. (/@ at 112a.) Accordingly,

the district court found that the resulting ground

water plume “poses an indivisible threat of leaching

and diffusing contaminants to lower groundwater

suitable for drinking.” Ud. at 172a; see id. at 174a.)

10

The district court held that the Railroads were

liable under CERCLA as owners of a facility at the

time of disposal of hazardous substances, (id. at 176a-

83a); see CERCLA § 107(aX(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2),

and that Shell was liable as a party that had “ar-

range([d] for disposal” of hazardous substances, noting

that “disposal” under CERCLA includes any leaking or

spilling of a hazardous substance. (/d. at 208a-19a); see

CERCLA § 107(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3).

The district court found that Shell had the au-

thority under the conditions of sale to determine the

means and methods of delivery and unloading of the

D-D, that Shell “was an active participant in the D-D

shipment, delivery and receiving process at Arvin

with knowledge that spills and leaks of hazardous D-

D were inherent and inevitable,” and that such spills

and leaks “occurred throughout the period Shell sold

D-D” to Brown and Bryant. (Jd. at 204a.) The district

court noted that in the early 1960s Shell began to

require its distributors, including Brown and Bryant,

to cease buying D-D in barrels and purchase in bulk

in order to ensure that they had adequate supplies of

the chemicals on hand. (/d. at 115a.) The “bulk stor-

age prescribed by Shell ... was intended to and did

economically benefit Shell.” (Jd.) The bulk purchase of

the chemicals required Brown and Bryant to main-

tain large storage tanks and necessitated the use of

hoses to transfer the chemicals from the delivery

trucks to the tanks. (/d. at 119a-24a.) Shell deter-

mined and arranged for the means and methods of

11

delivery to the site, including hiring tanker trucks;

Shell required the trucks to have specific equipment

for unloading the chemical. (/d. at 114a-15a, 120a,

123a.) Shell owned the chemicals at the time it made

these arrangements. (Jd. at 124a-25a, 211la.) For most

of the relevant time period, the trucking companies

that were contracted by Shell performed the actual

unloading of chemicals, rather than Brown and

Bryant personnel. (Jd. at 208a-09a.) It was only after

20 years, in the early 1980s that Shell directed that

the unloading should be done by Brown and Bryant

employees. (Jd. at 209a.) Shell specified the proce-

dures for unloading the chemical from the trucks

and for storing the chemicals at the site. (/d. at 208a-

09a.)

In transferring the D-D from truck to tank, the

transporter placed a bucket under the hose connec-

tion. Ud. at 119a.) When the transfer was complete,

the transporter would drain the hoses into a bucket

and the contents would be dumped either into a

Brown and Bryant tank maintained for “dregs” or

back into the tanker truck. (/d. at 120a.) Spills often

occurred during this process. (/d. at 119a-20a.) At

times, the hoses overflowed the buckets, the buckets

tipped over, or the hose would be tossed on the

ground and residual material would drain from the

hose. (/d. at 121a.) Further, feeding the hose into the

trucks’ hose tubes would cause leaks onto the ground.

(Id.) The court found that “spills were inherent in the

delivery process that Shell arranged, and always

12

occurred, in differing degrees of magnitude.” (/d. at

119a; see id. at 209a.)

Shell knew that spills routinely occurred during

the process it prescribed, and therefore reduced the

purchase price of the chemical D-D in an amount, the

district court concluded, that was linked to such loss.

Ud. at 122a-24a.) “However characterized, there was

a monetary allowance to Brown and Bryant for

product Shell expected to be lost in the process of

delivery and storage.” (Jd. at 122a.) In addition, the

district court noted the control that Shell asserted

throughout the delivery process. For instance, if it

was determined that the facility was inadequately

maintained for receiving and storing the D-D, by

contract Shell had the right to require the truck to

return to the terminal; the court held that under

these circumstances, legal title would not pass to

Brown and Bryant, but would remain with Shell. (/d.

at 21la-12a.)

b. Having found the Railroads and Shell

liable, the district court next addressed whether each

should be held jointly and severally liable for the

governments’ response costs, noting “each defendant

bears the burden of proof on apportionment.” (/d. at

232a.) As a result of the Railroads’ and Shell’s deci-

sion to deny all liability, the court found that “no

party has specifically documented the relative contri-

butions of contamination from either parcel” (id. at

248a), and that there is “no evidence to quantify the

difference in volume of the releases” from the Rail-

road and Brown and Bryant parcels. (/d. at 252a.)

13

The district court expressed frustration at the lack of

evidence addressing divisibility of harm, noting the

Railroads’ and Shell’s “scorched earth,” all-or-nothing

approach to liability. Ud. at 236a.) It observed that

neither the Railroads nor Shell “offered helpful

arguments to apportion liability” (id.), and that they

“effectively abdicated providing any helpful argu-

ments to the court.” (/d. at 236a-37a.) Rather than

holding the Railroads and Shell jointly and severally

liable as a result of their having failed to carry their

burden, the district court instead held that the Rail-

roads’ and Shell’s failure of proof “left the court to

independently perform the equitable apportionment

analysis demanded by the circumstances of the case.”

(Id. at 236a-37a.)

As authority for conducting an “equitable appor-

tionment,” the court cited CERCLA Section 113(f(1),

42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1), which governs allocation of

damages as amongst liable parties in a contribution

action. (ld. at 239a.) The court prefaced its inquiry

with the observation that the “contribution from the

Railroad parcel” to the “indivisible” plume was “incal-

culable.” (id. at 237a-38a.) The court nonetheless

created a multi-part equation by which, in its view,

the Railroads’ “several liability may be roughly calcu-

lated.” Ud. at 251a.)

First, the court noted that the surface area of the

Railroad parcel was 19% of the total site surface. (/d. )

Second, it noted that the Railroads’ 13-year lease to

Brown and Bryant constituted 45% of the site’s total

29 years of operation. (/Jd.) The court next observed

14

that Nemagon and dinoseb were stored on the Rail-

road parcel, and summarily concluded that these two

chemicals, “contributed to */s of overall Site contami-

nation.” (Id.) The district court acknowledged that

“(t]here is no evidence to quantify the difference in

volume of the releases” but concluded that “based on

the considerable evidence of the relative levels of

activity and number of releases on the two parcels,

the Railroad parcel could not have contributed to

more than 10% of the volume or mass of the overall

site contamination resulting from Brown and Bry-

ant’s hazardous substance-release producing activi-

ties as the sole site operator and owner of over 80% of

the site.” (Id. at 252a.) The court then multiplied the

three percentages, stating that “if 19% is multiplied

by 0.45 (13 years of storage on Railroad parcel use/28

years of [Brown and Bryant] operations) and multi-

plied by */s (dinoseb and Nemagon contamination) the

relative figure of 6% is reached.” (Jd.) Finally, the

court adjusted the Railroads’ liability, “[aJllowing for

calculation errors up to 50%,” to 9%. (Id.)

Turning to Shell, the district court first acknowl-

edged that “Shell did not present evidence how its

products’ contribution to the contamination at the

Arvin facility can be apportioned.” (Jd. at 252a.) The

court nonetheless attempted to “roughly calculate”

(id. at 253a) the amount of D-D spilled during the 23

years of Shell-controlled deliveries. (/d. at 253a-57a.)

The starting point of the calculation was the amount

of D-D that Shell sco!d to Brown and Bryant during

that time period. (Jd. at 253a, 89a-90a.) The record

15

contained sales data only for six years. (Jd.) For one

of those years, the total gallons sold were substan-

tially less than the other five, causing the court to

conclude that that year was “statistically aberra-

tional.” (Jd. at 253a.) Based on the remaining five

years of sales data, the court assumed that for each of

the 23 years, delivery trucks arrived at the site with

an average of 122,390 gallons. (/d. at 254a.) The court

further assumed transport by 4,500 gallon trucks,

yielding 27 delivery loads of D-D per year. (Id.) The

court then assumed a typical spill scenario at delivery

of three gallons per load, yielding 81 gallons spilled at

delivery (27 x 3) and 122,309 gallons being placed

into bulk storage (122,390 - 81) each year. (Jd.) Over

the 23-year period, based on the court’s assumptions,

1,863 gallons were spilled at delivery. (Jd.)

The court then created a series of spill assump-

tions for each stage of operations at the Brown and

Bryant facility, including the transfer of D-D from

bulk storage to bobtail trucks, D-D rigs, and nurse

tanks; washing of bobtails; checking of nurse tank

filters; rinsing of nurse tanks; and checking filters

on D-D rigs. Ud. at 254a-56a.) At each step, the

court made assumptions about equipment capacity,

average size of spills, and regularity of cleaning and

maintenance. (/d. at 254a-56a.) Dividing 1,863 gal-

lons (the assumed D-D spills at delivery) by 31,212

(the total assumed D-D spills), the court concluded

that Shell was responsible for approximately 6% of

the spills at the facility, and therefore should be

severally liable for 6% of the total site response costs.

16

(Id. at 256a-57a.) The district court made no findings

linking this assumed spill volume to the soil or

ground water contamination at the site.

The district court found Brown and Bryant

jointly and severally liable. However, Brown and

Bryant is insolvent; the defunct company cannot

contribute to the governments’ cleanup costs. (Jd. at

129a and 24 1a.)

4. Shell appealed the district court’s holding

that it was liable as an “arranger” under CERCLA.

(id. at lla-12a.) The governments appealed the

district court’s apportioning of liability to Shell and

the Railroads and its rejection of joint and several

liability. (Id. at lla.) The governments asserted on

appeal that joint and several liability should have

been imposed on Shell and-the Railroads because

they had not presented sufficient evidence at trial to

justify the apportionment of liability. (/d. at 1la-17a.)

The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in

part. (/d. at la-57a.)

a. The court of appeals affirmed the district

court’s ruling that Shell is a liable party under

CERCLA as one that “arranged for disposal” of

hazardous substances. (/d. at 47a-55a.) The court

observed that “arranger” liability extends not only to

direct arrangements for disposal of hazardous sub-

stances, but also to arrangements in which such

disposal is a foreseeable byproduct of, but not the

purpose of, the transaction. (Jd. at 48a-50a.) The court

also noted that CERCLA’s definition of “disposal”

17

includes the processes of “spilling” and “leaking.” (/d.

at 50a-5la.) The court of appeals noted that the

district court had focused on several aspects of Shell’s

involvement with the Brown and Bryant site. These

included: the frequency of spills at the site; Shell’s

arrangement of delivery and choice of carrier; Shell’s

encouragement of the bulk delivery method, which

necessitated transfers of large quantities of chemicals

causing spills and corrosion leaks; and Shell’s pur-

chase price rebate that the district court found “was

linked to loss from leakage.” (Jd. at 53a-54a.) Conse-

quently, the court of appeals held that Shell “had

sufficient control over, and knowledge of, the transfer

process to be considered an ‘arranger’” under

CERCLA. (/d. at 55a.)

b. The court of appeals reversed the district

court’s determination of divisibility and held Shell

and the Railroads jointly and severally liable. (Jd. at

19a-47a.) The court held that while liability under

CERCLA generally is joint and several, “{iJn line with

every circuit that has addressed the issue ... appor-

tionment is available at the liability stage” under

appropriate circumstances. (Jd. at 20a-21a.) The court

next addressed whether the particular harm at issue

is, by its nature, too unified for apportionment — that

is, whether, as a matter of law, apportionment would

be unavailable based on the facts of this case. Ud. at

36a.) Reviewing this question de novo, it agreed with

the district court that the harm was capable of appor-

tionment. (/d. at 36a.)

18

The court of appeals relied on the apportionment

analysis of Restatement (Second) of Torts Section

433A (Pet. App. at 22a-26a), which provides that

damages may be apportioned where there are distinct

harms or where there is a “reasonable basis for

determining the contribution of each cause to a single

harm.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A(1)(b).

The court held that equitable considerations are not

appropriate for purposes of apportioning liability

among responsible parties at the liability stage. (Pet.

App. at 30a-34a.)

With respect to the Railroads, it held that the

district court’s apportionment calculation, based

solely on percentage of land area, duration of owner-

ship, and leakage volumes, lacked a reasonable basis

in the record. (id. at 37a-44a.) The court of appeals

also held that the district court erred in assigning a */s

fraction to represent the types of hazardous sub-

stances on the Railroad parcel because all three

chemicals (D-D, Nemagon and dinoseb) were on the

Railroad parcel at some time. (/d. at 42a.)

With respect to Shell, the court of appeals held

that the evidence produced at trial was insufficient

to determine Shell’s proportional share of the site

contamination. (/d. at 44a-47a.) The court held that

the evidence did not provide a reasonable basis to

sustain the district court’s conclusions because the

site was contaminated with a number of chemicals,

and because Shell had failed to introduce any evi-

dence from which a court could identify the percent-

age of contamination that was attributable to its

"

19

leaked chemicals. The court of appeals also held that

the district court’s calculations for the leakage of

Shell chemicals at the site were far too speculative to

provide a basis for apportioning liability. Ud. at 45a-

46a.)

Because Shell and the Railroads took an all-or-

nothing approach to liability and failed to sustain

their burden of proof to support an apportionment of

liability, the court of appeals reversed the district

court’s “equitable apportionment” and imposed joint

and several liability. Ud. at 47a.)

Shell and the Railroads petitioned for rehearing

en banc. Eight judges dissented from the order deny-

ing rehearing. (Jd. at 57a.) The dissenting judges

were of the view that the court’s decision placed

arranger liability on Shell as a “mere seller.” (/d. at

60a-61a.) The dissent agreed that the Restatement

test should apply to apportionment of liability, but

opined that the court of appeals applied the test in an

overly stringent manner and characterized the dis-

trict court’s apportionment calculations as “meticu-

lous.” Ud. at 60a.)

e

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In the wake of the environmental disaster at

Love Canal, Congress created CERCLA and its very

20

expansive liability scheme.‘ Unequivocally, Congress

intended that hazardous contamination be remedi-

ated and that the costs be borne by responsible par-

ties. This case raises two straightforward issues

concerning CERCLA liability — the scope of arranger

liability and the availability of apportionment in the

absence of evidence of divisibility of harm based on

considerations of equity.

It is well established that “arranger liability”

under CERCLA is not limited to situations where the

defendant has entered into a contract that focuses on

the disposal of hazardous substances, such as the

disposal of spent product or contaminated drums.

While California and Shell agree that arranger

liability does not apply to entities that merely sell or

ship product containing hazardous substances that

are eventually disposed of through the attenuated

actions of the recipient, under CERCLA, “disposal”

includes the spilling and leaking of hazardous sub-

stances to the environment. Arranger liability includes

actions that go well beyond merely sending away

hazardous waste with the specific intention that it be

dumped. See, e.g., United States v. Shell Oil Co., 294

F.3d 1045, 1054-55 (9th Cir. 2002); Florida Power &

Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313,

1318 (llth Cir. 1990); Mathews v. Dow Chemical

* See Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago v.

North American Galvanizing & Coatings, Inc., 473 F.3d 824,

826-27 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51,

55 (1998).

21

Co., 947 F.Supp. 1517, 1519-20 (D. Colo. 1996);

Courtaulds Aerospace, Inc. v. Huffman, 826 F. Supp.

345, 347-48, 353-54 (E.D. Cal. 1993).

In this case, Shell’s arraigement with Brown and

Bryant led to, and resulted in, spilling and leaking of

agricultural chemicals at the facility. Shell knew that

leaks and spills of the chemicals were inherent in its

prescribed procedures, (Pet. App. 209a) — so much so

that it gave the facility credit for product lost in

delivery and storage. (See id. at 122a.) Shell, in effect,

charged Brown and Bryant only for the chemicals

that were actually placed into Brown and Bryant’s

tanks and not for chemicals spilled in delivery.

As determined by the trier of fact, and fully

supported by the record in this case, Shell arranged

for and controlled the transportation and delivery of

hazardous substances to the Brown and Bryant

facility with the expectation that a portion of the

hazardous substances routinely would be spilled (and

therefore disposed of) onto the ground in the course of

the transactions. Under CERCLA’s broad scope,

Shell’s actions constitute arranger liability even

though disposal was not the central focus of the

transaction.

Shell, held lable as an arranger, and the Rail-

roads, held liable as owners at the time of disposal,

bear the burden of establishing a basis for appor-

tionment of harin in order to avoid joint and several

liability. Neither met its burden in this case.

22

There is no dispute that if adequate information

is available, divisibility may be established by rele-

vant geographic, volumetric, or chronological evi-

dence. (Pet. App. 24a.) See Hercules, 247 F.3d at 719;

Bell Petroleum, 3 F.3d at 895-96; United States v.

Township of Brighton (“Brighton II”), 282 F.3d 915,

919-20 (6th Cir. 2092). The court of appeals narrowly

held “that, in this case, Shell and the Railroads failed

to show that expert testimony and other evidence

establishes a factual basis for making a reasonable

estimate that will fairly apportion liability.” (Pet.

App. 24a (internal quotation omitted).)

There is no dispute that the harm in this case, in

theory, was capable of apportionment had Shell and

the Railroads elected to present evidence (e.g., expert

opinion testimony based on data and on the types of

assumptions that experts are authorized to make).

They did not. The record below reflects Shell’s and

the Railroads’ strategic choice to assume — as the

district court and court of appeals both observed — a

“scorched earth” and “all-or-nothing” approach to

liability. (Pet. App. 236a, 15a.) As the district court

observed, “[nJeither party offered helpful arguments

to apportion liability.” Ud. at 236a.)

The district court erroneously believed that it

was required sua sponte to apportion the damages,

even in the absence of evidence. This led to the court’s

complex calculations, consisting of a series of assump-

tions that the court multiplied together, resulting in

small fractions of liability for both Shell and the

Railroads. The district court based its assumptions on

23

its best guesses, notwithstanding the complicated

chemistry of the site, the convoluted history of dis-

posal, the many possible pathways to contamination,

and the literally dozens of open questions concerning

virtually every aspect of the harm. It also believed, in

error, that equity required it to divide the harm,

confusing apportionment of liability to the govern-

ment with allocation of damages as amongst respon-

sible parties. The district court’s unprecedented

approach runs counter to the law that places the

burden of proof for apportionment on parties held

liable under CERCLA and allows for considerations of

equity only in contribution actions as between liable

parties.

On the record before this Court, Shell and the

Railroads have failed to provide a reasonable basis for

divisibility. As a result, both are subject to joint and

several liability.

e

ARGUMENT

I. Shell Arranged for Disposal of a Hazard-

ous Substance and Therefore Is a Liable

Party Under CERCLA

Shell asks this Court to rewrite CERCLA to limit

arranger liability to parties that possess a hazardous

substance and make arrangements specifically in-

tended to dispose of it as a hazardous waste. The

plain language of CERCLA and 25 years of case law

24

make clear that arranger liability is not so narrowly

construed.

Under CERCLA, arranger liability is a fact-

intensive determination in which the court must look

beyond the defendant’s characterization to whether

the transaction, in fact, involves an arrangement for

“disposal.” See Morton Int'l v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co.,

343 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 2003). CERCLA defines,

“disposal” to encompass not only intentional discard-

ing, but also inadvertent or incidental leaking and

spilling. See 42 U.S.C. §9601(29); 42 U.S.C.

§ 6903(3).

As the district court determined, and the court of

appeals affirmed, the record supports the findings

underlying Shell’s liability as an arranger. For exam-

ple, Shell owned and possessed the chemical D-D at

the time it arranged for delivery to Brown and Bry-

ant; controlled the procedures for shipment, delivery,

and unloading of the chemical at the Brown and

Bryant site; knew that spills were an inevitable

consequence of the delivery and unloading procedures

and that spills were in fact occurring throughout the

entire period of the sale to Brown and Bryant; knew

that some portion of the chemical was being spilled

before it could be transferred to Brown and Bryant’s

control or ownership; and even reduced the price of

the shipment to account for those spills. Under these

circumstances, Shell arranged for disposal of a haz-

ardous substance.

25

A. Arranger Liability Under CERCLA Is

Broadly Construed Based on the Facts

Surrounding the Transaction

A responsible person under CERCLA includes

“any person who, by contract, agreement, or other-

wise arranged for disposal or treatment ... of haz-

ardous substances owned or possessed by such

person, by any other party or entity, at any facil-

ity....” 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a\(3). Although “arranged

for” is not specifically defined in the statute, courts

have broadly interpreted the phrase in order to

effectuate CERCLA’s direction that companies re-

sponsible for introducing hazardous waste into the

environment bear the costs of the cleanup. See

Morton, 343 F.3d at 676; United States v. Aceto Agri-

cultural Chemicals Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1380 (8th

Cir. 1989). The determination of “arranger liability” is

a fact-intensive inquiry that must be made in light of

the totality of circumstances. See Pneumo Abex Corp.

v. High Point, Thomasville & Denton R.R., 142 F.3d

769, 775 (4th Cir. 1998); South Florida Water Mgmt.

Dist. v. Montalvo, 84 F.3d 402, 407 (11th Cir. 1996);

Cadillac Fairview/Cal., Inc. v. United States, 41 F.3d

562, 566 (9th Cir. 1994).

Courts, of course, are not bound by a defendant’s

characterization of the transaction as a mere sale of a

useful product, and look beyond that characterization

to determine whether the transaction amounts to an

arrangement for treatment or disposal of a hazardous

substance. Morton, 343 F.3d at 677; Freeman v. Glaxo

Wellcome, Inc., 189 F.3d 160, 164 (2d Cir. 1999); Aceto,

26

872 F.2d at 1381-82. Here, as discussed below, the

district court found on the evidence that Shell’s

actions involved significantly more than the mere

sale of a useful product; Shell knew that its actions

would result in the spilling and leaking of a hazard-

ous substance on delivery.

B. An Entity Is Liable as an Arranger

When It Knows That Disposal of a

Hazardous Substance Is an Inherent

and Inevitable Part of the Transaction

There is no dispute that arranger liability arises

when a defendant enters into a transaction in which

the central purpose is to dispose of a hazardous

waste. (Shell Br. 18-19); see United States v. Shell Oil

Co., 294 F.3d at 1054 (referring to this as “direct”

arranger liability). Shell’s conduct falls outside of

such “direct” arranger liability.

The courts have, however, recognized that ar-

ranger liability also arises in a broader context in

which disposal of hazardous wastes is not the direct

purpose of the transaction. Catellus Dev. Corp. v.

United States, 34 F.3d 748, 752-53 (9th Cir. 1994);

Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1381; Redwing Carriers, Inc. v.

Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1512 (11th Cir.

1996); United States v. TIC Inv. Corp., 68 F.3d 1082,

1088 (8th Cir. 1995). Rather, an entity with control

over a process that it knows can or will result in the

release of hazardous substances is an arranger.

Morton, 343 F.3d at 676. As the Third Circuit noted,

27

proof of a defendant’s knowledge that haz-

ardous waste can or will be released in the

course of the process it has arranged for, pro-

vides a good reason to hold a defendant re-

sponsible because such proof demonstrates

that the defendant knowingly (if not person-

ally) contributed to the hazardous-waste con-

tamination. Thus general knowledge that

waste disposal is an inherent or inevitable

part of the process arranged for by the de-

fendant may suffice to establish liability.

Morton, 343 F.3d at 678. Thus, under CERCLA, the

government need not prove a specific intent to dis-

pose of hazardous substances as waste in order to

establish arranger liability.

Arranger liability is not without limit. The courts

routinely have distinguished cases where the evi-

dence shows that the defendant sold a useful, though

hazardous, product without any knowledge or control

concerning the ultimate disposal of that product, see,

e.g., Freeman, 189 F.3d at 164; 3550 Sievens Creek

Associates v. Burclays Bank of California, 915 F.2d

1355, 1362 (9th Cir. 1990); Florida Power & Light Co.

v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 85 F.3d 1514, 1520 (11th Cir.

1996), from those cases where the defendant know-

ingly set into action a chain of circumstances that led

directly to disposal as an inherent part of the transac-

tion, even though disposal was not necessarily the

purpose of the transaction, see, e.g., Aceto, 872 F.2d at

1381; Catellus, 34 F.3d 752-53; Courtaulds, 826

F. Supp. at 353. The first set of facts gives rise to

arranger liability, while the second does not.

28

A manufacturer that sells a useful product and

knowingly ioads it into a leaking tanker truck has

made an arrangement that will lead inevitably to

disposal of some portion of its product as a hazardous

waste. Similarly, a manufacturer that establishes and

controls the method of delivery of its useful product in

a manner that it knows will inevitably result in some

portion of the product being spilled and disposed

during the transfer, has arranged for the disposal of a

hazardous waste. Neither can escape liability under

CERCLA simply by claiming that the purpose of the

transaction was merely to sell a useful product.

C. Shell Is Liable as an Arranger Under

CERCLA Because It Owned the Haz-

ardous Substance, Arranged the Pro-

cedures for the Transfer, and Knew

that Disposal on Delivery Was an In-

evitable Result of Its Arrangements

Shell characterizes its actions in sending D-D to

the Brown and Bryant facility as merely an innocent

arrangement for the sale of a useful product. Shell’s

characterization is belied by the district court’s de-

tailed findings, which are supported by abundant

evidence of Shell’s involvement. Shell entered into

transactions with Brown and Bryant knowing that

large amounts of chemicals in Shell’s possession

(“hazardous substances” under CERCLA) would

routinely spill and leak onto the ground before they

were placed into Brown and Bryant’s bulk tanks for

use.

29

As the Brief for the United States discusses in

detail, it is undisputed in the record that Shell was

deeply involved in the delivery process. Under the

contracts of sale, Shell determined and arranged for

the means and methods of delivery of D-D to the site,

including hiring the tanker trucks and requiring

them to have specific equipment for unloading the D-

D into bulk storage. (Pet.App. at 114a-15a, 119a-20a,

124a.) Shell owned the chemical at the time these

arrangements were made. (Jd. at 124a-25a, 211a.)

Shell required the facility to follow certain procedures

in unloading the trucks and storing the chemical on-

site. Id. at 208a-09a.) At one point, Shell changed the

delivery process from sealed drums to bulk delivery,

requiring Brown and Bryant to use large storage

tanks that necessitated the transfer of the D-D with

hoses and resulted in leaks from the transfer process

and storage tanks. (/d. at 114a-15a, 119a-22a, 209a.)

Shell knew that spills were inherent in the process

that it dictated for transporting and unloading the

chemicals (id. at 122a-24a), and took into account

those spills by providing for a “monetary allowance to

{Brown and Bryant] for product Shell expected to be

lost in the process of delivery and storage.” (Jd. at

122a.)

Finally, legal title of the Shell chemical did not

pass automatically to Brown and Bryant when the

delivery truck entered the site. (/d. at 124a.) Thus, if

the transporter found that Brown and Bryant’s

facility was not adequately maintained for receiving

and storing the D-D, Shell could order the tanker

30

truck to return to the terminal. (/d. at 124a, 21la-

12a.)

Under these circumstances, Shell is significantly

more than a mere seller that relinquished control

over its products upon delivery and before any spill

occurred. This is not a case, as posited in the dissent

to the denial of en banc review, in which “sellers of

chemical products will be saddled with the entire

clean-up cost of a facility contaminated in part with

their products, even if they lacked control over the

products spilled following the sale.” (/d. at 80a.)

Rather, under CERCLA’s well-recognized rules of

arranger liability, Shell controlled the method of

delivery of its product in a manner that it knew

would result — and was resulting — in spills of haz-

ardous substances as part of the process of delivery to

the buyer. Indeed, Shell even paid for the spilled

chemicals, charging Brown and Bryant only for what

did not spill. 7d. at 122a.)

The result here is not contrary to Amcast Indus.

Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 2 F.3d 746, 751 (1993), the case

upon which Shell most heavily relies. In Amcast, a

manufacturer of trichloroethylene (“TCE”) sold it to a

customer and delivered it either in its own trucks or

by hiring a common carrier. In both cases, spills

resulted from the delivery of the chemical. The Sev-

enth Circuit held that the manufacturer was liable as

the owner of a facility under CERCLA when it deliv-

ered the TCE in its own trucks, but was not liable as

an arranger when it contracted with a common

carrier to deliver the chemical. Amcast, 2 F.3d at 751.

31

In Amcast, apart from hiring the transporter,

there is no suggestion that the TCE manufacturer

exercised control over the method of delivery of the

chemical, adjusted the price of the chemical due to

spillage, or retained legal control and ownership of

the chemical such that it could refuse to off-load the

chemical if the facility was not adequately prepared

to cooperate in the transfer and handling of the

chemical. Here, the district court found that the

facts demonstrate Shell's significant level of control

over the delivery process and its knowledge and

anticipation of spills, as well as Shell’s ability to

preclude the transfer process if it so chose.

The other cases relied on by Shell underscore the

facts that establish Shell’s arranger liability. Unlike

the cases Shell cites, this case does not raise the

specter of imposing arranger liability on a product

manufacturer solely because there is ultimately a

disposal after the product has served its useful pur-

pose, (see 3550 Stevens Creek, 915 F.2d at 1362-65;

Dayton Indep. School Dist. v. United States Mineral

Products, Inc., 906 F.2d 1059, 1065 (5th Cir. 1990);

General Electric Co. v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc.,

962 F.2d 281, 287-88 (2d Cir. 1992)); or on a seller for

a disposal that occurs decades after sale of a useful

product due to a third party’s negligence, (see

Freeman, 189 F.3d at 164); or on a seller of a facility

storing a useful product where disposal occurs after

deterioration of the facility, (see AM Int'l, Inc. v.

International Forging Equip. Corp., 982 F.2d 989, 999

(6th Cir. 1993)). Here, the disposal occurred due to

32

procedures controlled by the seller, before the product

could even be transferred to the physical control of

the buyer, and the seller had full knowledge that such

disposal would occur.

In the CERCLA context, courts have long distin-

guished between those cases where a party has

merely made a sale of a useful product (recognizing

that some disposal likely will occur eventually after

the product is used), and those cases where the seller

has attempted to “close its eyes” to disposals that are

inherent in its arrangement. See Aceto, 872 F.2d at

1380. Shell asks this Court to permit Shell to close its

eyes to disposals of hazardous waste that were inher-

ent in the arrangements that it made for transfer of

its materials and that were well-known to it.

CERCLA does not permit Shell to escape liability for

the inevitable results of its own arrangements.

D. Shell’s Reading of Arranger Liability Is

Contrary to CERCLA’s Broad Scheme

1. Arranger Liability Under CERCLA

Does Not Require a Specific Intent

to Dispose of Hazardous Waste

Ignoring decades of court opinions and the un-

equivocal intent of Congress for an expansive reading

of CERCLA liability provisions, Shell contends that

the statutory terminology “arranged for treatment or

disposal of a hazardous substance” must be read

narrowly pursuant to a dictionary definition to apply

only when the defendant affirmatively intends to

33

dispose of a hazardous waste. (Shell Br. at 18-19.)

Under Shell’s reading, a manufacturer could entirely

escape CERCLA liability if it sold a hazardous chemi-

cal as a useful product and knowingly loaded the

chemical for delivery into a corroded and leaking

tanker truck, and the truck spilled the chemical on

the delivery site, as long as the manufacturer did not

own the truck that spilled the substance, did not

“intend to dispose of hazardous waste,” and merely

intended to save money by hiring a cheap transporter.

This argument distorts CERCLA’s purpose to hold

parties responsible for the costs of remediating the

contamination they cause, regardless of their specific

intent. See Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1378-82, 1384 (arranger

liability arises when spills are “inherent” in the

formulation process and “waste is generated and

disposed of contemporaneously with the process”).

Further, taking Shell’s dictionary analysis to its

logical conclusion leads to an inconsistent result.

Shell acknowledges that CERCLA incorporates the

definition of “disposal” contained in the Solid Waste

Disposal Act (““SWDA”). 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29). Under

the SWDA, disposal is defined as “the discharge,

deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or

placing ... of any ... hazardous waste into or on any

land” so that it “may enter the environment... .” 42

U.S.C. § 6903(3) (emphasis added). One of the pri-

mary dictionary definitions of “leaking” is “to enter or

escape through a hole, crevice, or other opening, usually

by a fault or mistake.” Webster’s Third New Interna-

tional Dictionary Unabridged (2002). Similarly, “spill”

34

is defined as “to cause or allow to pour, splash, or fall

out and be wasted, lost or scattered.” Jd. Inherent

within the plain meaning of the terms “leak” and

“spill,” therefore, is the notion of mistake, inadver-

tence, or lack of intentionality. Interpreting the

phrase “arrange for” narrowly, as Shell requests,

creates a statutory construction problem, as it would

read “spilling” and “leaking” out of the definition of

arranger liability, even though Congress expressly

chose to include it.

Shell argues that under the plain language of the

statute, arranger liability applies only to an entity

that affirmatively intends to dump waste into the

environment. As the Third Circuit noted in Morton,

343 F.3d at 676, the “dictionary definition of ‘arrange’

does not shed much light on the proper scope of

liability” under CERCLA. Instead, the only reason-

able reading of the statutory language is that “ar-

range for disposal” encompasses liability for an entity

that makes arrangements concerning a hazardous

substance, knowing that such arrangements will lead

to the leak or spill of that substance, thus resulting in

the disposal of a hazardous substance before it can be

used. Shell’s actions satisfy this definition.

2. The Solid Waste Disposal Act’s

Definition of “Disposal” Does Not

Limit CERCLA Arranger Liability

Shell argues that because the D-D was not a

hazardous waste at the time Shell shipped it to

35

Brown and Bryant, it was a useful product and not a

waste, and, therefore, any spill of D-D in the process

of delivery cannot give rise to arranger liability. While

CERCLA identifies disposal of “hazardous sub-

stances” as the basis for liability, it also incorporates

the definition of “disposal” from the Solid Waste

Disposal Act (““SWDA”). See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29). The

SWDA concerns “wastes” rather than “substances,”

and defines “disposal” as “the discharge, deposit,

injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing ... of

any hazardous waste into or on any land ... ” 42

U.S.C. § 6903(3).

Under the SWDA, waste is “any garbage, refuse,

sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply

treatment plant, or air pollution control facility and

other discarded material ....” 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27)

(emphasis added). As such, a “discarded material”

may begin as a useful product and become a waste

upon being discarded, disposed of, thrown away, or

abandoned. At the point of being discarded, it is no

longer a useful product and becomes a waste. Ass’n of

Battery Recyclers, Inc. v. United States EPA, 208 F.3d

1047, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see also Zands v. Nelson,

779 F. Supp. 1254, 1262 (S.D. Cal. 1991) (gasoline

entering soil is no longer useful and therefore consti-

tutes solid waste for purpose of SWDA).

Stated another way, arranger liability under

CERCLA applies to hazardous substances once they

are disposed of, necessarily becoming waste, and at-

taches when the responsible partly arranges for that

disposal, even though, at the time of the arrangement,

36

the substance has not yet become a waste. As a

result, Shell’s SWDA-based argument provides no

exemption. The hazardous substance, Shell’s D-D,

was a useful product when it was in transport to

Brown and Bryant, and that portion that was placed

into Brown and Bryant’s storage tanks continued to

be useful, available for ayricultural application. The

D-D that spilled during delivery to the tanks, how-

ever, became a hazardous waste as defined under the

SWDA as soon as it touched the ground, never having

reached the storage tanks. As such, the spilling and

leaking of D-D during delivery constitutes disposal of

a hazardous substance under CERCLA.

II. While Liability Under CERCLA May Be

Apportioned Based on Evidence of Divisi-

bility of Harm, the Railroads and Shell

Failed to Establish a Factual Basis for

Apportionment

A. The Court Below Applied the Proper

Standards of Review

In line with all cases that have addressed the

issue, the court of appeals acknowledged that appor-

tionment generally is available in CERCLA cases at

the liability stage and, further, that the harm at issue

in this case theoretically was capable of apportion-

ment. (Pet. App. 20a-21la.) The question presented,

however, is whether the Railroads and Shell “submitted

evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable basis for

the apportionment of liability.” (dd. at 36a.) The court of

appeals reviewed the district court’s deter:mination

37

consistent with the law of other circuits and the

Restatement. See, e.g., Bell Petroleum, 3 F.3d at 896

(question whether harm is capable of apportionment

is question of law; actual apportionment of damages

is a question of fact); Hercules, 247 F.3d at 718-19;

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 434 cmt. d.

The Railroads and Shell contend that the court

of appeals did not apply a clear error standard in

reviewing the district court’s findings. (Shell Br. 49;

Railroads Br. 39.) A reviewing court must, of course,

defer to the fact finder’s determinations on matters

involving credibility. See, e.g., Anderson v. Bessemer

City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985) (factual findings enti-

tled to substantial deference, reversed only for clear

error). The court of appeals did, in fact, defer to the

trial court’s factual findings. It accepted, for example,

the district court’s determinations that the Railroads

owned 19% of the site and that spills regularly oc-

curred on delivery of D-D. The court of appeals held

merely that the trial court’s independent cobbling

together of various anecdotal facts and unsupported

assumptions to make a case for “equitable appor-

tionment” of liability was not authorized by law. This

was well within a reviewing court’s role. See United

States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 337 (1998) (where

judgment constitutes application of law to facts,

reviewing court must undertake more substantive

scrutiny to ensure judyment is supported by legal

factors); Restatement (Second) Torts § 434 cmt. d.

38

B. Because the Railroads and Shell Pre-

sented No Evidence on Divisibility of

Harm, the Record Is Insufficient to

Support a Reasonable Basis for Appor-

tionment of Liability

1. While liability under CERCLA gen-

erally is joint and several, a re-

sponsible party may establish that

liability may be apportioned con-

sistent with the Restatement’s

common law prirmciples

Under CERCLA, “[lJiability is strict and is typi-

cally joint and several.” Hercules, 247 F.3d at 715.

CERCLA does not directly address the availability of

apportionment of liability. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607. The

circuits that have addressed these questions have

looked to common law principles of tort in general,

and the Restatement in particular, for guidance as to

when and how to impose joint and several liability

under § 9607(a). See, e.g., Aviall Servs., Inc. v. Cooper

Indus., Inc., 312 F.3d 677, 684 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding

that apportionment of CERCLA liability is matter of

federal common law), rev'd on other grounds, Cooper

Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543 U.S. 157

(2004); United States v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 200

F.3d 679, 697 (10th Cir. 1999) (same); Brighton, 153

F.3d at 329 (same); Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d at 171

(same).

Circuit court discussions of apportionment rou-

tinely start with citation to United States v. Chem-

Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (D.C. Ohio 1983). In

39

Chem-Dyne, the United States sued 24 defendants

that had allegedly generated or transported hazard-

ous substances located at the Chem-Dyne facility.

Defendants sought a determination that they could

not be held jointly and severally liable. Jd. at 804.

The Chem-Dyne court held that while express lan-

guage holding CERCLA responsible parties jointly

and severally liable had been removed from the final

legislation, id. at 806, (citing 126 Cong. Rec. S14964

(Nov. 24, 1980) and 126 Cong. Rec. H11787 (Dec. 3,

1980)) this did not mean that CERCLA prohibited

joint and several liability. Jd. at 807. Rather, the court

reasoned, “the term was omitted in order to have the

scope of liability determined under common law

principles, where a court performing a case by case

evaluation of the complex factual scenarios associated

with multiple-generator waste sites will assess the

propriety of applying joint and several liability on an

individual basis.” Jd. at 808.

The Chem-Dyne court further held that the scope

of liability should be interpreted according to a feder-

ally created uniform common law informed by the

Restatement (Second) of Torts, id. at 809-10. Summa-

rizing, the Chem-Dyne court noted:

|Wjhen two or more persons acting inde-

pendently caused a distinct or single harm

for which there is a reasonable basis for divi-

sion according to the contribution of each,

each is subject to liability only for the portion

of the total harm that he has himself caused.

Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 433A, 881

40

(1976).... But where two or more persons

cause a single and indivisible harm, each is

subject to liability for the entire harm.

Restatement (Second) of Torts, §875....

Furthermore, where the conduct of two or

more persons liable under § 9607 has com-

bined to violate the statute, and one or more

of the detendants seeks to limit his liability

on the ground that the entire harm is capa-

ble of apportionment, the burden of proof as

to apportionment is upon each defendant. Jd.

at § 433B.... These rules clearly enumerate

the analysis to be undertaken when applying

42 U.S.C. § 9607 and are most likely to ad-

vance the legislative policies and objectives

of the Act. :

Id. at 810.

Shell and the Railroads agree with Chem-Dyne

and the court below that the appropriate starting

point for the rule of apportionment applicable to

CERCLA cases is Section 433A of the Restatement

(Second) of Torts. (Shell Br. 37; Railroads Br. 6; Pet.

App. 24a); see, e.g., Hercules, 247 F.3d at 716 n.9, 717;

Bell Petroleum, 3 F.3d at 895; Chem-Dyne, 572

F. Supp. at 810. Section 433A provides for the appor-

tionment of damages where a defendant can show

either (1) “distinct harms” or (2) a “reasonable basis

for determining the contribution of each cause to a

single harm.” Hercules, 247 F.3d at 717 (quoting

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A). “Damages for

any other hari cannot be apportioned among two or

more causes.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 453A(2)

41

As the Hercules court notes, however, the Restate-

ment test is not a perfect fit in CERCLA cases and

must be harmonized to fit that law. Jd. “Thus, for

example, although the Restatement contemplates

that plaintiffs bear the burden of proving causation,

in a CERCLA case, once the government has estab-

lished the four essential elements of liability the

burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that there exists a

reasonable basis for divisibility.” Hercules, 247 F.3d at

717 (citing Brighton, 153 F.3d at 318 and O’Neil v.

Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 182 (1st Cir. 1989)).

2. Apportionment is appropriate where

a responsible party can show distinct

harm, successive injuries, or divisi-

ble harm, except where injustice to

plaintiff will result

Because Shell and the Railroads rely in part on

the examples in the Restatement where apportion-

ment is allowed, California will reiterate those exam-

ples, and their underlying policies, and apply them to

scenarios that occur in CERCLA cases.

Distinct harms. The Restatement first discusses

the concept of “distinct harms”

which, by their nature, are more capable of

apportionment. If two defendants independ

ently shoot the plaintiff at the same time,

amd one wounds him in the arm and the

other in the leg, the ultimate result may be a

badly damaged plaintiff in the hospital, but

*

42

it is still possible, as a logical, reasonable,

and practical matter, to regard the two

wounds as separate injuries, and as distinct

wrongs. The mere coincidence in time does

not make the two wounds a single harm, or

the conduct of the two defendants one tort.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A cmt. b.

Where there are discrete harms flowing from

discrete acts, the Restatement allows a court sizable

latitude to divide those harms, notwithstanding

imprecision. “There may be difficulty in the appor-

tionment of some elements of damages, such as the

pain and suffering resulting from the two wounds, or

the medical expenses, but this does not mean that

one defendant must be liable for the distinct harm

inflicted by the other.” Restatement (Second) of Torts

§ 433A cmt. b. For distinct harms, the common law

allows for apportionment by “a rough estimate which

will fairly apportion such subsidiary elements of

damages.” Apportionment by “rough estimate” applies

only to “distinct harms” presumably on the stated

policy ground that a defendant should not be held

liable for a completely separate harm caused by

another. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A

emt. b.

In the CERCLA context, a defendant may shew

“distinct harm” by establishing, for example, relevant

“geographical considerations.” Hercules, 247 F.3d 717

(citing Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 881

F. Supp. 1202, 1210 (N.D. Ind. 1994), clarified on

reconsid., 909 F. Supp. 1154 (N.D. Ind 1995) and

43

United States v. Broderick Investment Co., 862

F. Supp. 272, 277 (D. Colo. 1994)). Distinct harms

may be shown where, for example, a site consists of

discrete, non-contiguous areas of contamination, see,

e.g., Akzo Coatings, 881 F.Supp. at 1210; Kamb uv.

United States Coast Guard, 869 F. Supp. 793, 798

(N.D. Cal. 1994), or where there are separate and

distinct plumes of ground water contamination ema-

nating from separate releases, see Broderick, 862

F. Supp. at 277; see also Brighton, 153 F.3d at 320

(remanding matter to trial court to determine if

CERCLA apportionment available based on a show-

ing that defendant’s “operating activities were com-

pletely limited to a discrete and measurable section of

the property, and that the releases onto or from that

section represented a discrete and measurable

harm”). Where the harm cannot be “fingerprinted to

determine its exact source” the “distinct harms” rule

is inapplicable. Coeur D’Alene Tribe v. Asarco, Inc.,

280 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1120 (D. Idaho 2003) (finding

no distinct harms where mine tailings from numerous

operations combined over a period of years to create

environmental! pollution in basin).

Successive injuries. The Restatement next allows

for apportionment in the case of successive injuries. It

states:

The harm inflicted may be conveniently sev-

erable in point of time. Thus if two defen-

dants, independently operating the same

plant, pollute a stream over successive

periods, it is clear that each has caused a

44

separate amount of harm, limited in time,

and that neither has any responsibility for

the harm caused by the other.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A cmt. c.

In the case of a successive injury, a court is able

to compare “apples to apples” because each defendant

has engaged in the same activity, causing substan-

tially the same type of harm. The case of Bell Petro-

leum is illustrative. In that case, releases of

hazardous substances from a chrome plating shop

over a six-year period, under the successive tenure of

three different operators, contaminated a nearby

aquifer. Bell Petroleum, 3 F.3d at 892-93. The Fifth

Circuit noted that “(t]he chromium entered the

ground water as the result of similar operations by

three parties who operated at mutually exclusive

times” and that, therefore, “it is reasonable to assume

that the respective harm done by each of the defen-

dants is proportionate to the volume of chromium-

contaminated water each discharged into the envi-

ronment.” /d. at 903.

In Bell Petroleum, one of the defendant operators,

Sequa, “introduced expert testimony regarding a

volumetric approach to apportionment” by calculating

the total amount of chromium that had been intro-

duced into the environment by each of the operators,

collectively and individually, in part based on electri-

cal usage records. Jd. at 904. Sequa also introduced

evidence of chrome flake purchases during each

operator’s tenure, the value of the chrome-plating

45

done by each, summaries of sales, and various wit-

nesses regarding the rinsing and wastewater disposal

practices and the amount of chrome-plating activity

conducted by each defendant operator. Jd. at 903-04.

On these facts, the Fifth Circuit held that Sequa had

by expert testimony and other evidence established a

factual basis for making a reasonable estimate that

would fairly apportion liability. Jd. at 903.

Divisible harm. Finally, the Restatement allows

for apportionment where there is “divisible harm.”

This category of harms differs from “distinct harms”

discussed above; these harms, “while not so clearly

marked out as severable into distinct parts, are still

capable of division upon a reasonable and rational

basis, and of fair apportionment among the causes

responsible.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A

cmt. d. The Restatement includes the following oft-

cited example of trespassing cattle:

Thus where the cattle of two or more owners

trespass upon the plaintiff’s land and de-

stroy his crop, the aggregate harm is a lost

crop, but it may nevertheless be upportioned

among the owners of the cattle, on the basis

of the number owned by each, and the rea-

sonable assumption that the respective harm

done is proportionate to that number. Where

such apportionment can be made without in-

justice to any of the parties, the court may

require it to be made.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A cmt. d. The

Restatement includes a second example, more easily

46

applied to releases of hazardous substances: “Thus

where two or more factories independently pollute a

stream, the interference with the plaintiff’s use of the

water may be treated as divisible in terms of de-

gree....” Id. Unlike the “rough estimate” allowed

where there are truly “distinct harms,” however, the

Restatement provides that liability in the case of

harms that are merely “divisible” be apportioned

“among the owners of the factories, on the basis of

evidence of the respective quantities of pollution

discharged into the stream.” /d.

As the courts have recognized, “divisible harm” is

“perhaps the most difficult type of harm to conceptu-

alize.” Bell Petroleum, 3 F.3d at 895. In many cases

“where wastes of varying (and unknown) degrees of

toxicity and migratory potential commingle,”

CERCLA defendants simply will be unable to prove

divisibility. O’Neil, 883 F.2d at 178-79; see also Chem-

Nuclear, 292 F.3d at 260 (source of at least 80 drums

of hazardous waste could not prove by preponderance

of the evidence that it sent no other drums to site,

held joint and severally liable for cleanup of entire

site). Still, a responsible party may be able to show

divisibie harm, even in a complex CERCLA case. For

example, a defendant held liable with many others

for waste sent to a site may be able to establish that

the harm resulting from its waste can be distin-

guished based on “proof disclosing the relative toxic-

ity, migratory potential, degree of migration, and

synergistic capacities of the hazardous substances at

the site.” See Alcan, 990 F.2d at 722.

47

Where a defendant presents “no evidence, how-

ever, showing a relationship between waste volume,

the release of hazardous substances, and the harm at

the site,” the defendant has not met its burden to

show divisible harm. Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 172. In

those circumstances, the default of joint and several

liability must control. A court should not make an

“‘arbitrary apportionment for its own sake.’” Hercu-

les, 247 F.3d 717 (quoting Restatement (Second) of

Torts § 433A cmt. i.) As the comments to the Re-

statement explain, the burden of proving that the

harm is capable of apportionment is placed on the

defendant to avoid “injustice”:

In such a case the defendant may justly be

required to assume the burden of producing

that evidence [supporting apportionment], or

if he is not able to do so, of bearing full re-

sponsibility. As between the proved tortfea-

sor who has clearly caused some harm, a~d

the entirely innocent plaintiff, any hardship

due to lack of evidence as to the extent of the

harm should fall upon the former.

Restatement (Second) Terts § 433B cmt. d.°

* In a similar vein, the Restatement notes that “[e)xceptional

cases” may “arise in which injustice to the plaintiff may result”

from apportionment. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A cmt.

h.

It may, for example, appear that one of two tortfeasors

is so hopelessly insolvent that the plaintiff will never

be able to collect from him the share of the damages

allocated to him ....In such cases the application of

(Continued on following page)

48

3. The Railroads and Shell intro-

duced, and the record contained,

no evidence to support apportion-

ment

In this case, the district court purported to ap-

portion sua sponte the governments’ harm —- their

response costs — based on various geographic, volu-

metric and chronological considerations. As noted

above, these attributes may allow for apportionment

of CERCLA response costs where they are relevant to

dividing the harm, and where they are supported by

evidence. In this case, however, the district court’s

calculations were not based on evidence showing that

the harms were distinct, severable based on time, or

otherwise divisible on a reasonable and rational

basis. At bottom, the district court engaged in an

equitable allocation, an exercise not properly part of

an apportionment determination.

the rule stated in Clause (b) would mean that the in-

nocent plaintiff would be forced to bear the share of

the loss due to the defendant from whom he could not

collect the damages, and the liability of the other tort-

feasor would be reduced accordingly. Nothing in this

Section, or in the Comments, is intended to say that

the court may not, in a case where justice requires it,

refuse to apply the rule stated in Clause (b).

Id. As discussed in the Statement, the operator of the facility,

Brown and Bryant, is insolvent, and the governments therefore

will not be able to collect from it.

49

a. There is no basis in the record

to apportion the Railroads’ li-

ability

The Railroads’ relationship to the site does not fit

neatly into any of the categories allowing apportion-

ment set forth in the Restatement. The district court

identified no distinct harms related to California’s

response costs, such as geographically discrete areas

of contamination located in segregated areas.°

Rather, as the district court found, the Railroad

parcel and the B&B parcel constituted one facility;

the Railroad parcel was connected to the pond on the

B&B parcel by a pipe, and the contaminants of con-

cern — D-D, Nemagon and dinoseb — were released on

both parcels. The resulting ground water plume was

“indivisible.” Ud. at 172a, 174a.) The district court

expressly found that “[t]here is no evidence to quan-

tify the difference in volume of the releases” from the

two parcels. (/d. at 252a.) The court found that “[iJt is

* The district court found that there was a “hot spot” of

dinoseb contamination on the B&B parcel resulting from a 1983

tank leak. (Pet. App. 137a.) EPA spent $1.3 million on the “hot

spot.” (Pet. App. 253a.) The district court determined that Shell

was not liable for any part of the response cost. related to the

dinoseb spill cleanup, (id.), a determination that the govern-

ments did not appeal. (Pet. App. at 56a-57a.) The district court

did not make findings related to the dinoseb “hot spot” in ruling

on the Railroads’ liability. To California’s knowledge, the Rail-

roads did not argue in their petition for certiorari that the

district court’s failure to exclude costs related to the dinoseb “hot

spot” constituted error.

50

not within the realm of science to quantify the contri-

bution from the Railroad parcel over the ground

surface or through focused infiltration that has

reached the groundwater under the Site.” (Jd. at

112a.)

California and the United States incurred costs

related to soil and ground water investigation and

remediation of the entire site, including both parcels,

and neither Shell nor the Railroads presented evi-

dence at trial to divide those response costs as be-

tween the parcels. Under these circumstances, the

fact that the Railroad parcel constituted 19% of the

site is legally irrelevant to the harm at issue — the

response costs incurred by the State and federal

governments related to soil and ground water con-

tamination. California is aware of no case where a

court has apportioned liability in a CERCLA 107

action based only on the relative area of a portion of a

site containing commingled contaminants and with-

out any evidence establishing distinct harins.

Neither does this case present an example of

successive liability, conveniently severable by succes-

sive site operators taking over operation of the same

facility at successive points in time. Rather, it in-

volves liability that arises from the parties’ different

and distinct roles at the site; their liability is not

successive, but runs concurrently.

Although, as they did below, the Railroads have

taken an all-or-nothing approach in their briefs to

this Court, it may be argued that the Railroads’

51

hability should be no greater than what it would have

been under a successive liability scenario. That is, if

the Railroads assumed the operation of the Brown

and Bryant facility for the period of the 13-year lease,

they might arguably show that they should be held

liable only for the contamination that occurred in

those years, which constitutes 45% of the site’s 29-

year period of operation.

This argument is appealing, but fails for the

simple reason that, unlike the defendant chrome

plate shop operator in Bell Petroleum, the Railroads

chose not to attempt to “prove up” the volumes of

releases in each year of operation. The limited evi-

dence in the record, specifically, the five years of data

for the delivery of the single chemical D-D, suggest

that, in fact, operations, and therefore releases,

cannot be presumed to be substantially similar over

the entire period of the facility’s operation. (See Pet.

App. at 89a-90a, 253a-54a.) Accordingly, the district

court had no basis to apportion based on volumetric

or chronological data. The Railroads suggest that

Brown and Bryant took greater care in later years to

reduce releases. (Railroads Pet. 45.) This qualitative

observation, however, does not allow a court to make

any reasonable inference about the quantity of re-

leases that occurred in any given year, especially

since it is untethered to the volume of chemicals

actually delivered, stored, and distributed from the

site.

52

Divisibility of harm, similarly, is inapplicable in

this case. All chemicals, including D-D, were present

and released on all parts of the site, albeit in varying

volumes. As discussed in the Statement, numerous

activities, including the storage of chemicals and the

washing of equipment, trucks and the warehouse,

took place on the Railroad parcel. The Railroads’

connection to the facility flows from its lease to

Brown and Bryant. Because it is impossible to char-

acterize the activities of Brown and Bryant on the

western portion of its facility as severable from those

on the eastern portion, it is also impossible to sever

the Railroad parcel from the B&B parcel for purposes

of apportionment. Stated simply, the district court’s

arbitrary assignment of a value of ?/s based on the fact

that Nemagon and dinoseb were stored on the Rail-

road parcel — ignoring that D-D repeatedly was

spilled on the Railroad parcel — has no rational con-

nection to the rule of divisible harin.

The district court’s error on each of these as-

serted bases for apportionment was compounded by

the fact that the court multiplied each ungrounded

factor, at each step of the faulty equation, dramati-

cally reducing the Railroads’ fractional share of

liability. The court of appeals was correct to find the

district court’s unprecedented apportionment exercise

to be clear error.

53

b. There is no basis in the record

to apportion Shell’s liability

As discussed above, to arrive at an “equitable”

apportionment of harm for Shell, the district court

used gross sales data for the chemical D-D available

for five’ of 23 years that Shell delivered chemicals to

the site. It then used a series of court-created calcula-

tions to arrive at a ratio of D-D that spilled or leaked

on delivery, as compared to D-D that spilled or leaked

in all other aspects of Brown and Bryant’s operations.

The court calculated the percentage at 6% and appor-

tioned liability to Shell accordingly.

As with the case relating to the Railroads, there

is no evidence that the harm related to Shell’s actions

as an “arranger” is distinct from the other harms at

the facility.” The hazardous constituents in the D-D

spilled during delivery mixed and commingled with

the D-D that spilled: and leaked everywhere else

throughout the Brown and Bryant facility over the

long period that the facility was in operation. Nor

is this a case of successive injuries involving succes-

sive operators; the spills that are related to Shell’s

' As discussed in the Statement, the district court chose to

disregard D-D sales data for 1986 because the amount during

that year (26,000 gallons), in the court’s view “is so significantly

less than in other years as to be statistically aberrational.” (Pet

App. 253a.) Whether the five remaining years of data were

aberrational when compared to the other 18 years of chemical

delivery cannot be determined on the record.

* For a discussion of the dinoseb “hot spot,” see footnote 6,

supra.

54

delivery arrangement with Brown and Bryant oc-

curred contemporaneously with Brown and Bryant’s

operation.

As with the Railroads, it is possible that Shell

could have provided evidence that, at most, it should

be held liable oniy for the years during which it

arranged for delivery of chemicals — 23 of the site’s 29

years of operation (79%) — but Shell chose for strate-

gic reasons to deny all liability and net present evi-

dence relating to apportionment. The sole question,

then, is whether there was evidence in the record

sufficient to show that the harin was divisible based

on a “reasonable and rational basis” — i.e., “evidence of

the respective quantities of pollution discharged ...”

Restatement (Second) Torts § 433A cmt. d.

As the district court itself noted before proceed-

img to apportion liability, “Shell did not present

evidence how its products’ contribution to the con-

tamination at the Arvin facility can be apportioned.”

(Pet. App. 252a.) Believing that it was required to

engage in an apportionment notwithstanding Shell’s

failure of proof (id. at 237a), the district court made

its best guess at how much D-D was delivered every

year for the 23-year period that Shell acted as an

“arranger” based on five years of chemical sales

data (122,390 gallons per year); based on some gen-

eral evidence of delivery truck capacities (~4,500

gallons), its best guess at how many deliveries per

year were required to deliver the chemical (27); and

its best guess about how much chemical spilled on

average during each delivery (three gallons) based on

7 “—

"|

55

testimony that “a few cupfuls to five gallons” spilled

on every delivery, to arrive at a numerator for its

ratio (23 x 27 x 3 = 1,863 gallons spilled during

delivery).

The court then assumed that it could identify

every other activity on the Brown and Bryant site

that resulted in releases of the D-D after the chemical

was placed into the bulk tanks (e.g., transfer of D-D

from bulk storage to bobtails; transfer of D-D to rigs;

and checking of nurse tank filters); and made a series

of factually unsupported assumptions about both the

regularity of the relevant events (e.g., assumed that

bobtails were washed out 70% of the time) and the

amount of D-D that spilled or leaked at each point

(e.g., in transferring D-D from the bulk tank to the

bobtails, though “[t)he spills are not quantified ... it

is assumed that spills ranged from a cup to [a] quart”)

to arrive at the denominator for its ratio. As noted

above, the district court concluded: “The percentage of

D-D spills resulting from Shell deliveries is calculated

by dividing 1,863 gallons (the D-D spilled through

Shell controlled deliveries) by 31,212 gallons (the

total amount of D-D spills) to equal approximately

6%.”

The district court’s sua sponte, back-of-the-

envelope apportionment in this case stands in

marked contrast to that in Asarco, 280 F. Supp. 2d

1094 (D. Idaho 2003), a case cited by Shell. In Asarco,

defendant mining companies, Asarco and Hecla,

along with other mining companies released tailings

containing hazardous metals into the Coeur D’Alene

an

56

Basin over the period of many years. The parties to

the litigation retained experts to calculate the

amount of tailings released by the various companies’

ore milling. Jd. at 1104. The experts investigated the

operations of 22 mills, representing 97-98% of the

mining production in the basin. Jd. at 1105. By evalu-

ating the tonnage of material that went into each mill

as compared to the concentrate produced, historical

information on milling methods, and the type of

concentrate used, the experts estimated the total

tailings released into the basin at 64,390,000 tons,

and that Asarco’s and Hecla’s contributions were 22%

and 31% respectively. Jd. The Asarco court rightfully

noted that “estimating releases is not an exact sci-

ence” and acknowledged that “[dlivisibility of the

common harm to the Basin based on causation using

volumetric calculations may not be the ‘perfect’

method of divisibility”; based on the expert testimony,

the court held it to be “reasonable based on the his-

torical facts available in this particular case.” Jd. at

1120.

California acknowledges that in Asarco, the

parties’ experts on tailing releases necessarily esti-

mated recovery rates since there were no detailed

company records setting out this information. Jd. at

1120. The experts, however, relied on historical

evidence of milling methods in making these esti-

mates. Jd. at 1105 n.9. The evidence for divisibility

did not consist of assumptions or best guesses made

by the trier of fact, but of expert testimony, which

satisfied the requirements of Rules 702 through 706

}

|

57

of the Federal Rules of Ewidence.” The Asa@rco case

thus does not stand for the proposition that a trial

court can create its own expert evidence where defen-

@ants have failed to introduce it." The district court’s

reliance on speculation, based on its own unsupported

assumptions, constitutes clear error. The court of

appeals properly did not allow the district court’s best

guesses to substitute for evidence that would support

apportionment.

Shell contends that any rule that would deny it

apportionment in this case effectively amounts to

* Requiring evidence in the form of expert testimony rather

than allowing the trier of fact to rely on unsupported assump-

tions affords the plaintiff the opportunity to counter such

testimony with that of its own experts. California and the

United States were denied that opportunity in this case.

°° A court may, of course, make certain limited and sup-

ported assumptions in apportioning liability. Taking the Re-

statement’s example of the trespassing cattle, it may be

reasonable for a court to assume (unless there is contrary

evidence) that the cows are of a similar size and weight and tend

to behave in similar ways such that each owner is liable to the

injured farmer in proportion to the number of cows. See

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A cmt. d. This is eminently

reasonable where the mechanism of harm is the action of a

group of wayward cows on a single occasion, but it does not

sanction the degree of speculation in which the district court

engaged in this case. Nothing suggests that a court could, for

example, apportion the crop damage for 30 years of trespass by

assuming that the average farm has 5 cows, 5 sheep, and 5 pigs

on any given year, and the average animal escapes 3 times per

year, a cow tends to eat a pound of grain on each escape, a sheep

'/2 pound, and a pig '/s pound, and so on.

ee SS

58

mandatory joint and several liability. (Shell Br. 32.)

This argument is unsupported. In this case, the court

of appeals did mo more than apply the long-

established “rule placing the burden of proof as to

apportionment upon the defendant... .” Restatement

(Second) ef Torts § 433B cmt. d. As the Restatement

provides, the reason for the rule, which is consistent

with the purposes underlying CERCLA, is to avoid

the injustice of leaving the plaintiff to bear the costs

of harm that “has combined with similar harm”

inflieted by ethers. Jd. “In such a case, the defendant

may justly be required to assume the burden of

producing that evidence, or if he is net able te do so, of

bearing full responsibility.” Id. (emphasis added). The

same rule should apply where, as here, a defendant

chose to take an all-or-nothing approach to liability

and chese aot to submit evidence supporting appor-

tionment. California and the taxpayers should not

bear the lion’s share of the cost of the har:n for which

Shell anc the Railroads are responsible.

ce. By taking equity into considera-

tion, the district court wrongly

conflated apportionment of harm

with allocation of damages

The circuit courts of appeals have recognized that

apportionment under the Restatement and CERCLA

Section 107 is not governed by considerations of

equity, but rather by principles of causation o. harm.

See, e.g., Hercules, 247 F.3d at 718; Brighton, 153 F.3d

at 319; Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 171 n.22; Rohm &

59

Haas Co., 2 F.3d at 1280. CERCLA does not, however,

ignore equity. Rather, Congress expressly allowed

parties that have resolved their liability to the United

States or a state or that have been sued under

Section 106 or 107 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606,

9607, to seek contribution from others that are liable

or potentially liable. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)B); Cooper

Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543 U.S. at

165-66. The statute expressly provides that “[iJn

resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate

response costs among liable parties using such equi-

table factors as the court deems appropriate.” 42

U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1).

As this Court has noted, a defendant in a Section

107(a) suit can “blunt any inequitable distribution of

costs by filing a § 113(f) counterclaim.” United States

v. Atlantic Research Corp., U.S. , 127 S. Ct.

2331, 2339 (2007). California expresses no opinion

about whether the district court’s assumptions and

best guesses might have been appropriate in a contri-

bution proceeding where response costs would be

divided equitably as between Shell and the Railroads.

The law is clear, however, that such considerations

have no place in apportioning harm, with the result

that California, and its citizens, having no connection

to the Brown and Bryant site and having benefitted

in no way from its operation, bear 85% of the site

cleanup costs.

60

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, California respectfully

requests that the Court affirm judgment of the court

of appeals.

Dated: December 22, 2008

Respectfully submitted,

EDMUND G. BROWN JR.

Attorney General of the

State of California

JAMES HUMES

Chief Assistant Attorney General

MANUEL M. MEDEIROS

State Solicitor General

GORDON BURNS

Deputy Solicitor General

KEN ALEX

Senior Assistant

Attorney General

Counsel of Record

DONALD A. ROBINSON

Supervising Deputy

Attorney General

ANN RUSHTON

JANILL L. RICHARDS

Deputy Attorneys General

Counsel for the State of

California, Department of

Toxic Substances Control

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.

Respondents Brief — Shell Oil Co. v. United States (Nos. 07-1607, 07-1601) | Frix