Respondents Brief — Shell Oil Co. v. United States (Nos. 07-1607, 07-1601)

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Me, \ <a , ey AN alal

WA CV j 3) EW Ces,

d Nos. 07-1601 and 07-1607

Jn the Supreme Court of the Anited States

BURLINGTON NORTHERN AND SANTA FE RAILWAY

COMPANY, ET AL., PETITIONERS

Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FT AL.

SHELL OIL COMPANY, PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES

GREGORY G. GARRE

Solicitor Gencral

Counsel of Record

MICHAEL J. GUZMAN

Acting Assistant Attorney

General

MALCOLM L. STEWART

Deputy Solicitor General

PRATIK A. SHAH

Assistant to the Solicitor

General

LISA E. JONES

JAMES R. MACAYEAL

AARON P. AVILA

Attorneys

PATRICIA K. HIRSCH

Acting General Counsel

Environmental Protection

Anency

Washington, D.C. 20460

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20580-0001

(202) 514-2217

ie

tte

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the court of appeals correctly affirmed

the district court’s determination that petitioner Shell

Oil Company is liable under Section 107(a)(3), 42 U.S.C.

9607(a)(3), of the Comprehensive Environmental Re-

sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980

(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601 et seg., as an entity that “ar-

ranged for disposal” of hazardous substances.

2. Whether the court of appeals properly held peti-

tioners jointly and severally liable under CERCLA for

the response costs of the United States and California

governments, based on the court’s conclusion that peti-

tioners did not satisfy their evidentiary burden of pro-

viding a reasonable basis to apportion liability.

(1)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

‘

Page

RETA ae ROE hE PP eee ie Pant 1

EEE PPR SSE L TEE Pe 12

A stadia aud ok 4d Renee Head eekNe een kaw’ 16

I. Shell is liable under the terms of CERCLA because it

“arranged for disposal” of a hazardous substance and

ois a cid cteedanewcdeceesess

A. Shell was properly held liable as an arranger

under Section 107(a)<3), based on its entry into

transactions that it knew would directly result

in disposals of hazardous substances .............

1. Arranger liability is not limited to trans-

actions designed primarily for disposal ........

2. Shell’s knowledge and role in the disposal of its

hazardous substances during its arrangement

with B&B creates arranger liability ...........

B. Shell identifies no sound basis for limiting

arranger liability where a manufacturer engag-

es in transactions that it knows will directly

result in disposals of its hazardous substances .....

1. Lack of intent to dispose of a hazardous sub-

stance during a transaction does not

preclude arranger liability where the

arranger has advance knowledge of the

EE ca eLu CCU UO RSE EGh US eke s in0s0 000+

2. Section 107(a)(3) encompasses the disposal

of hazardous substances through spills and

PE Rabun cade s 6 eked Obs Ob ube ONE bic 09 000

3. Arranger liability does not require owner-

ship or actual control of the hazardous sub-

stance at the time of disposal .................

(IIT)

26

IV

Table of Contents—Continued:

II. The district court erred in refusing to hold petitioners

jointly and severally liable when petitioners failed to

establish a reasonable basis for apportionment

A. Consistent with Restatement principles,

CERCLA liability for a single harm is joint

and several unless the liable party proves a

reasonable basis for apportionment ........

. The district court erred as a matter of law

by declining to impose joint and several

liability after petitioners failed to establish

any reasonable basis to apportion liability . . .

. The district court’s unsubstantiated

assumptions and gross approximations do

not constitute a reasonable basis to

apportion the harm in this case ............

1. There is no reasonable basis to assume

that each petitioner’s share of the ulti-

mate harm is proportional to its volum-

tric contribution to the contamination ....

2. There is no reasonable basis to assume

that the Railroads’ contribution to the

contamination was proportional to its

land area and duration of ownership. ....

3. There is no reasonable basis for the

district court to assume that 2/3 of the

contamination was from dinoseb and

Nemagon (and thus discount the Rail-

Ce Ey os kwddccavecccce.

4. There is no reasonable basis for using

spillage estimates from anecdotes and

incomplete records to determine Shell’s

contribution to the contamination .......

ooo &

Vv

Table of Contents—Continued: Page

SIDE 4-5 4.5: 4 weed ours nbd odinie be adch dace ee 53

PI so hv accenncndnegstenbeetGheneeebeneeesennens la

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 2 F.3d 746 (7th

Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1044 (1994) ........ 25

Bell Petroleum Servs., Inc., In re, 3 F.3d 889 (5th Cir.

GE. duce ckdewcanesecbpescenenseeucelss 45

Browning-Ferris Indus. of Ill., Inc. v. Ter Maat, 195

F.3d 953 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1098

Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375 (7th Cir. 1992) ........

Catellus Dev. Corp. v. United States., 34 F.3d 748 (9th

SRG c odo'y cele camunwaeens eases onsiee

Centerior Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal

Corp., 153 F.3d 344 (6th Cir. 1998) ..............4..

Chem-Nuclear Sys., Inc. v. Bush, 292 F.3d 254 (D.C.

I io xU-din vk wb ews eae cae ee uae aie cea bulks

Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp.,

808 F.2d 1313 (llth Cir. 1900) ........ cc cccccccce

Freeman v. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., 189 F.3d 160

ME i Cvs cae eu eb eneeheece ee enebens

Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552 (1941) .............

Louisiana & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467

DE s 2:6 5ane cabaeuhoeswwoeeeneeesee tee

Morton Int'l, Inc. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 343 F.3d

Se A EE os cok cdscdepecceecnuacentaeeeael

VI

Cases—Continued: Page

Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135 (2008) ......... 31

Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989) ..... 2,3

Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville &

Denton R.R., 142 F.3d 769 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,

re he Bs cht bd eae 6 06's 000s 24

South Fla. Water Mgmt. v. Montalvo, 84 F.3d 402

i dS oli eeaeeeweudbeaeep eves ey 19

United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d

ee seca cab eevee cases 3, 17, 18, 19

United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp.:

I, BED og ccc cccccccescecccece 3

315 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540

ee eee henceeees 38

United States v. Alean Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d

Tee eka vesesbenes 3

United States v. Atlantic Research Corp., 127 S. Ct.

I ee OL, ake we hc seeesenséee 34

United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51

ESE Ne ee ee a a 2, 3, 18, 19, 30

United States v. Capital Tax Corp., 545 F.3d 525 (7th

United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802

EEE ee ey a 4

United States v. Hercules, Inc., 247 F.3d 706 (8th

Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1065 (2001) ..... 4, 33, 35, 46

United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir.

1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989) .......... 3, 33

Vil

Cases—Continued: Page

United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1265 (3d

Cir. 1993), overruled on other grounds, [/nited

States v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 432 F.3d

Pe ES bo Seb oeievedece ‘ideadeues 34, 46, 47

United States v. Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d 307

ee oa be ee anes 33

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000) ............... 27

Statutes:

Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C.

9601 et seq.:

IE nonce us cctocvenetéeee 17, 26, la

de oc os oi voneeceucee beans 2

42 U.S.C. 9607(a) (§ 107(a)) ...........0206. passim

42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(1)-(2) (§ 107(a)(1)-(2)) ..... 6,47, la

Se 3, la

42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(1) (§ 107(a)(1)) .......... 15, 49, la

42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(2) (§ 107(a)(2)) .... 2.6.2.2... 27, 1a

42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(3) (§ 107(a)(3)) .. 2.2... passim

42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(4)(A)

ne Sa nc dvbe wéan vanes passim

ia edu tinccnveneueeds 3, 3a

42 U.S.C. 9607(b)(3) (§ 107(b)(3)) .. 2.2.26... 6, 47, 3a

42 U.S.C. 9607(0)-(r) (§ 107(0)-(r) (Supp V.

42 U.S.C. 9607(0) (§ 107(0)) (Supp. V 2005) ........ 4

42 U.S.C. 9607(p) (§ 107(p)) (Supp. V 2005) ........ 4

42 U.S.C. 9607(q) (§ 107(q)) (Supp. V 2005) ........5

Vill

Statutes—Continued: Page

42 U.S.C. 9607(r) (§ 107(r)) (Supp. V 2005) ......... 5

42 U.S.C. 9613(f) (§ 113(f)) ............. 4, 14, 34, 40

42 U.S.C. 9613(f)(1) (§ 118(f))) .. 6... 4, 15, 34, 4a

42 U.S.C. 9622(g) (2000 & Supp. V 2005) .......... 5

I ce i cacccndonesthecesademeuss 17, 27, la

i, dwh a ceunepewnetencekeeswwel 3

Miscellaneous:

126 Cong. Rec. (1980):

PE Shee es wee wege nkeeendend.eee be dite 39

es ee aie de due k ee E Nenad ewes 30

H.R. Rep. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. Pt. I (1985) ...31

Letter from Assistant Attorney General, Office of

Legislative Affairs to Chairman, Subecomm. on

Transportation and Commerce, House Comm. on

Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 2d

Sess. (Dec. 1, 1980), 126 Fed. Reg. 31,966 n.*

as han wads ce ocak Ad dei eae eae 00s e000 0% 33

Letter from GAO to Hon. James M. Jeffords

regarding the GAO-04-475R Superfund Program

Se rin ddebens cused idavcuncebsscens « 31

Random House Dictionary of the English Language

SE Rebdiadedeeendsds qeasesenvesseeswsaes 17

Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) ........... passim

Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of

Se eee eleees eckec ns hensekabue 31

S. Rep. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) ......3, 28, 30

U.C.C. § 2-319(1)(b) (14th ed. 1995) ................... 21

4 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary

In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

No. 07-1601

BURLINGTON NORTHERN AND SANTA FE RAILWAY

COMPANY, ET AL., PETITIONERS

Vz.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.

No. 07-1607

SHELL OIL COMPANY, PETITIONER

Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES

STATEMENT

This case arises from actions taken by the United

States and the State of California to address hazardous-

substance contamination at a former agricultural chemi-

cal storage and distribution facility located in Arvin,

California. The United States and the State brought a

cost-recovery action against petitioners, two railroad

companies (the Railroads) and a chemical] manufacturer

(Shell), under CERCLA Section 107(a), 42 U.S.C.

(1)

2

9607(a), which authorizes federal and state governments

to recover their response costs from persons who have

a statutorily specified nexus to the contamination. After

a bench trial, the district court found the Railroads and

Shell to be liable parties under CERCLA, and further

found that the Railroads and Shell were liable for 9%

and 6% of the response costs, respectively. Pet. App.

82a-262a. The court of appeals affirmed in part and re-

versed in part, holding that Shell was a liable party and

that petitioners were jointly and severally liable for the

full costs of the cleanup activities undertaken by the

United States and California. /d. at la-57a.

1. Congress enacted CERCLA “in response to the

serious environmental and health risks posed by indus-

trial pollution.” United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51,

55 (1998). CERCLA “both provides a mechanism for

cleaning up hazardous-waste sites, and imposes the

costs of the cleanup on those responsible for the contam-

ination.” Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1,7

(1989) (citation omitted).

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is au-

thorized to clean up a contaminated site, drawing

from the federal government’s Superfund, and then to

sue to recover its cleanup costs. 42 U.S.C. 9604(a),

9607(a)(4)(A). To establish a prima facie case, the Uni-

ted States must show that a “release” or “threatened

release” of a “hazardous substance” from a “facility” has

caused the United States to incur cleanup costs. 42

U.S.C. 9607(a). The United States must further estab-

lish that the defendant falls within at ieast one of four

classes of covered persons: (1) the owner and operator

of the facility, (2) the owner or operator of the facility at

the time that disposal of hazardous substances occurred,

(3) persons who “arranged for disposal” or treatment of

3

hazardous substances, and (4) certain transporters of

hazardous substances. 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(1)-(4).

Subiect to limited defenses not implicated in these

cases, any person within the categories described above

is liable to the government for “all costs of removal or

remedial action incurred” by the United States “not in-

consistent with the national contingency plan.” 42 U.S.C.

9607(a)(4)(A) and (b); 40 C.F.R. Pt. 300. Under the ap-

portionment rules developed by lower federal courts

pursuant to pre-existing common-law principles, a cov-

ered party is jointly and severally liable to the govern-

ment for the entire amount of response costs unless it

proves that the harm from the release of hazardous sub-

stances is divisible.’ That rule furthers Congress’s pur-

pose of ensuring that the costs of remediation are borne

by those with a defined nexus to the contamination,

rather than by the general public. See Bestfoods, 524

U.S. at 56 n.1 (“The remedy that Congress felt it needed

in CERCLA is sweeping: everyone who is potentially

responsible for hazardous-waste contamination may be

forced to contribute to the costs of cleanup.”) (quoting

Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. at 21 (plurality opinion of

Brennan, J.)); S. Rep. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13

(1980) (stating Congress’s “goal of assuring that those

who caused chemical harm bear the cost of that harm”).

In analyzing divisibility of harm in Section

107(a)(4)(A) actions, courts follow the Restatement (Sec-

' See, e.g., Centerior Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp.,

153 F.3d 344, 348 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Alcan Aluminum

Corp., 990 F.2d 711, 721-722 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Alcan

Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 268-269 (3d Cir. 1992); United States

v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1377 (8th Cir. 1989), Uni-

ted States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 167, 171-172 (4th Cir. 1988),

cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989).

4

ond) of Torts (1965) (Restatement). See, e.g., United

States v. Hercules, Inc., 247 F.3d 706, 717 (8th Cir. 2001)

(recognizing Restatement as the “universal starting

point”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1065 (2001); United States

v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D. Ohio

1983) (establishing framework). Restatement § 433A

provides that damages may be apportioned where there

are distinct harms or where there is a “reasonable basis

for determining the contribution of each cause to a sin-

gle harm.” The party seeking apportionment has the

burden of proof. See Restatement § 433B(2); see also,

e.g., Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 810. Where a liable

party cannot meet its burden, it is jointly and severally

liable “for the full amount of the harm.” Chem-Nuclear

Sys., Inc. v. Bush, 292 F.3d 254, 260 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

A party held jointly and severally liable may file a

separate contribution action pursuant to CERCLA Sec-

tion 113(f)(1) against other liable or potentially liable

parties. 42 U.S.C. 9613(f)(1). Section 113(f), added six

years after CERCLA’s enactment, reflects Congress’s

compromise response to the potentially disproportionate

burden placed on certain covered parties by CERCLA’s

liability provisions. Section 113(f)(1) provides that “[iJn

resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate

response costs among liable parties using such equitable

factors as the court determines are appropriate.” /bid.*

* Congress has also amended CERCLA in other ways to limit the

breadth of CERCLA liability. In January 2002, for example, Congress

enacted an exemption from liability at National Priority List (NPL)

sites for those persons who sent less than 110 gallons of liquid materials

or less than 200 pounds of solid materials to the site (§ 107(0)); an ex-

emption for certain categories of persons from liability at NPL sites for

disposing of municipal solid waste (§ 107(p)); a defense to liability for

certain owners of property located contiguous to, and contaminated by,

5

2. In 1960, Brown & Bryant, Inc. (B&B) began to

operate an agricultural chemical! distribution business

on a 3.8-acre parcel of land (the B&B parcel). Pet. App.

12a. In 1975, B&B expanded its operations by leasing a

0.9-acre parcel owned by the Railroads (the Railroad

parcel) that adjoined the B&B parcel to the west. /bid.

B&B used the Railroad parcel as an “integral part” of

its agricultural chemical operations and treated the two

parcels as a single facility. 7d. at 86a. The Railroad par-

cel was graded toward a pond on the B&B parcel. /d. at

12a. B&B ceased operating the facility in 1989 and is

now insolvent. /d. at 83a-84a.

Among the Shell-manufactured products stored and

distributed at B&B’s facility were two pesticides, D-D

and Nemagon. Pet. App. 13a. B&B also stored dinoseb,

a weed killer, supplied by another company. /bid.

Chemical constituents of all three products have been

banned by EPA or withdrawn from use as pesticides due

to threats to human health and the environment. Gov’t

C.A. E.R. 69-70. EPA has also listed the relevant con-

stituents to be hazardous substances for CERCLA pur-

poses. Pet. App. 174a.

During their transfer and storage, the chemicals rou-

tinely spilled and leaked onto both parcels. Pet. App.

13a-14a, 1380a. Over the course of the facility’s opera-

tion, hazardous substances entered the subsurface, cre-

hazardous waste sites (§ 107(q)); and a defense to liability for bona fide

prospective purchasers of contaminated property (§ 107(r)). 42 U.S.C.

9607(0)-(r) (Supp. V 2005). In addition, those who do not qualify for

Section 107(0)’s exemption, but who sent a relatively small amount of

hazardous substances to a site, may enter into a de minimis settlement,

under which they make a limited cash payment to EPA in exchange for

an immediate release from past and future liability at the site. 42

U.S.C. 9622(g¢) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).

6

ating areas of contaminated soil and, of particular con-

cern, a plume of contaminated groundwater that threat-

ens municipal drinking water supplies. /d. at 14a, 172a-

174a, 245a-246a. After investigations, the United States

and the State began to clean up the contamination at the

facility pursuant to their response authority under

CERCLA. /d. at 14a-15a.

3. In 1996, the United States and the State filed suit

under CERCLA Section 107(a) to recover their response

costs, naming as defendants B&B, the Railroads, and

Shell. In 2003, after a bench trial, the district court is-

sued its Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law. Pet. App. 82a-262a. |

a. The district court held that the United States and

the State had established a prima facie case of CERCLA

liability. Pet. App. 163a-219a. The court determined

that the entire site, encompassing both the B&B and

Railroad parcels, constitutes a single “facility.” Jd. at

172a-173a. The court found that site operations released

hazardous substances “from and located throughout the

facility, particularly in the form of contaminated ground-

water,” and that the plume “poses an indivisible threat

of leaching and diffusing contaminants to lower ground-

water suitable for drinking.” /d. at 172a. The court fur-

ther found that the soil and groundwater at the facility

are contaminated with, among other hazardous sub-

stances, the constituents of the two Shell products as

well as dinoseb. /d. at 88a, 174a.

The district court found that the Railroads were re-

sponsible parties under CERCLA Section 107(a)(1)-(2),

42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(1)-(2), as owners of the facility and as

owners of the facility at the time of disposal. Pet. App.

176a-179a, 186a-187a. The court rejected the Railroads’

proffered defense under CERCLA Section 107(b)(3), 42

7

U.S.C. 9607(b)(3), under which a defendant must show

that “the release or threatened release was caused

solely by an unrelated third party.” Pet. App. 180; see

id. at 184a-187a. The court explained that “[a] ‘contrac-

tual relationship’ between the Railroads and B&B ex-

isted,” that the Railroads “periodically inspected B&B’s

plant and had actual knowledge” of B&B’s operations,

and that “B&B used the leased parcel to store chemicals

where leaks would often occur.” /d. at 184a-185a; see id.

at 176a, 178a-179a. The court further determined that

the Railroads had “submitted no evidence that they took

any action to prevent or mitigate their lessee’s conduct

on the Site, which ignored the hazards of continuous

spills, releases and reckless practices in the unloading,

storage, formulating and loading of toxic ag-chemicals.”

Id. at 185a. The court found that the Railroads had

“failed to show that they acted with due care” or “took

any precautionary actions against the foreseeable re-

sults of B&B’s activities in storing and handling hazard-

ous ag chemicals on the Railroad parcel.” /bid.

The district court also held that Shell was liable pur-

suant to CERCLA Section 107(a)(3), 42 U.S.C.

9607(a)(3), as a party who had “arranged for disposal” of

hazardous substances. Pet. App. 204a, 208a-213a. The

court found that Shell had “determined and arranged for

the means and methods of delivery of the D-D to the

Arvin plant”; that Shell had “hired common carrier de-

livery trucks to haul D-D to B&B’s Arvin plant”; that

B&B was required to follow the Shell manual which pro-

vided “detailed loading and unloading procedures”; and

that over one period Shell had “required B&B to store

highly corrosive D-D in bulk tanks, at a time when the

distributors did not have the equipment or capital to

deal with the corrosive D-D.” /d. at 208a-209a. The

8

court further found that Shell “was an active participant

in the D-D shipment, delivery and receiving process at

Arvin with knowledge that spills and leaks of hazardous

D-D were inherent and inevitable,” and that such spills

and leaks “occurred throughout the period Shell sold

D-D to B&B.” Jd. at 204a.

b. The district court then addressed whether the

Railroads and Shell should be held jointly and severally

liable for the response costs incurred by the United

States and the State.

The district court found that the harm at the site “is

a single harm which consists of contaminated soil at var-

ious locations and depths around the Site and one mass

(plume) of contaminated groundwater.” Pet. App. 245a-

246a. The court also explained that the Railroads and

Shell had presented no evidence or argument to demon-

strate a reasonable basis for apportioning that harm:

Apportionment in this case is exacerbated by defen-

dants’ “scorched earth,” all-or-nothing approach to

liability. Neither acknowledged an iota of responsi-

bility, in the case of Shell, for causing “releases of

hazardous substances,[”] and in the case of the Rail-

roads, that any release of hazardous substance that

required response occurred on [the} Railroad parcel

throughout the 13 year lease terms.

Id. at 236a. The court further found that “no party has

specifically documented the relative contributions of

contamination from either parcel,” id. at 248a, and that

there is “no evidence to quantify the difference in vol-

ume of the releases” from the Railroad and B&B par-

cels, 2d. at 252a.

The district court summarized the situation before it

by stating that “[a]ll parties” to the suits had “effec-

9

tiveiy abdicated providing any helpful arguments to the

court.” Pet. App. 236a-237a. In the court’s view, that

dearth of assistance from the parties had “left the court

to independently perform the equitable apportionment

analysis demanded by the circumstances of the case.”

Id. at 237a. In determining the percentage of the total

response costs for which the Railroads would be held

liable, the district court calculated the surface area of

the Railroad parcel to be 19.1% of the total site surface

area and the 13-year duration of the B&B-Railroad lease

to be 45% of the site’s total 29 years of operation. /d. at

247a. The court assumed that none of the D-D contami-

nation originated from the Railroad parcel and that

Nemagon and dinoseb “contributed to 2/3 of overall Site

contamination.” /d. at 25la. The court then multiplied

the three percentages and arrived at 6%. Id. at 252a.

The court adjusted the Railroads’ liability, “[a]Jllowing

for calculation errors up to 50%,” to 9% of the total re-

sponse costs. /bid.

The district court acknowledged that “Shell did not

present evidence how its products’ contribution to the

contamination at the Arvin facility can be apportioned.”

Pet. App. 252a. The court nonetheless estimated

the amount of D-D spilled during “Shell controlled” de-

liveries and then the amount of D-D spilled for al) other

activities. Jd. at 256a. Dividing the estimated volume

spilled during Shell-controlled deliveries by the total

estimated volume of D-D spills, the court held Shell sev-

erally liable for 6% of the response costs. /d. at

256a-257a.

4. The court of appeals affirmed in part and re-

versed in part. Pet. App. la-81la.

a. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s

ruling that Shell is a liable party under CERCLA as one

10

who “arranged for disposal” of hazardous substances.

Pet. App. 44a-55a. The court observed that “arranger”

liability extends not only to direct arrangements for dis-

posal of hazardous substances, but also to arrangements

in which such disposal is a foreseeable byproduct

(though not the purpose) of the transaction. Jd. at

48a-50a. The court noted that CERCLA’s definition of

“disposal” includes the unintentional processes of “spill-

ing” and “leaking.” /d. at 50a-5la. The court inferred ©

from that definition that “an entity can be an arranger

even if it did not intend to dispose of the product. Ar-

ranging for a transaction in which there necessarily

would be leakage or some other form of disposal of haz-

ardous substances is sufficien:.” /d. at 51a.

The court of appeals then recounted the evidence

supporting “arranger” liability here:

(1) Spills occurred every time the deliveries were

made; (2) Shell arranged for delivery and chose the

common carrier that transported its product to the

Arvin site; (3) Shell changed its delivery process so

as to require the use of large storage tanks, thus ne-

cessitating the transfer of large quantities of chemi-

cals and causing leakage from corrosion of the large

stee] tanks; (4) Shell provided a rebate for improve-

ments in B & B’s bulk handling and safety facilities

and required an inspection by a qualified engineer;

(5) Shell regularly would reduce the purchase price

of the D-D, in an amount the district court concluded

was linked to loss from leakage; and (6) Shell distrib-

uted a manual and created a checklist of the manual

requirements, to ensure that D-D tanks were being

operated in accordance with Shell’s safety instruc-

tions.

11

Pet. App. 53a-54a. The court held that the district

court’s findings “demonstrate that Shell had sufficient

control over, and knowledge of, the transfer process to

be considered an ‘arranger,’ within the meaning of

CERCLA, for the disposal of the chemicals that leaked.”

Id. at 55a. }

b. The court of appeals reversed the district court’s

apportionment of harm and held petitioners jointly and

severally liable for the full costs of the response actions,

except for a “Dinoseb hot spot” for which Shell was not

liable. Pet. App. 19a-47a, 56a-57a.

After agreeing that the harm in this case was theo-

retically capable of apportionment, the court of appeals

reviewed the district court’s actual apportionment for

clear error, using Restatement § 433A as its starting

point. Pet. App. 22a, 36a-37a. With respect to the Rail-

roads, it held that the district court’s apportionment

calculation (based solely on percentage of land area,

duration of ownership, and the Railroads’ responsibility

for two of the three distinct contaminants at the site)

lacked a reasonable basis in the record. /d. at 37a-44a.

The court concluded that the numbers the district court

had used “bore insufficient logical connection to the per-

tinent question: What part of the contaminants found on

the Arvin parcel were attributable to the presence of

toxic substances or to activities on the Railroad parcel?”

Id. at 43a.

With respect to Shell, the court of appeals held that

the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to formu-

late even a rough approximation of Shell’s proportional

share of the site contamination. Pet. App. 44a-45a. The

court found that the leakage evidence in the record did

not provide a reasonable basis to sustain the district

court’s analysis because the site was contaminated with

12

a number of chemicals, and because Shell had failed to

introduce any evidence from which a court could identify

the percentage of the soil contamination that was attrib-

utable to its leaked chemicals. /bid. As the court ex-

plained, the record lacked that evidence “most likely

because Shell put its eggs in the no-liability basket.” Jd.

at 47a.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

CERCLA’s critical cost-recovery remedy is designed

to place the costs of cleaning up contamination from haz-

ardous substances on parties who have a demonstrated

nexus to the contamination, rather than on the general

public. Because Shell knew that its contract to supply

B&B with agricultural chemicals directly and routinely

resulted in spills and leaks that expressly qualify as dis-

posals of hazardous substances covered by CERCLA,

Shell is liable as an “arranger” of those disposals. And

because neither Shell nor the Railroads established a

reasonable evidentiary basis for apportioning the single

harm at issue here, the court of appeals correctly held

that those parties were jointly and severally liable for

the response costs at issue.

I. A. Congress specified that a party may be liable

under CERCLA if it “arrange[s] for” activities whose

direct and anticipated consequence is the “disposal” of

hazardous substances, even if that disposal is not the

purpose of the transaction. Although CERCLA does not

define the term “arrange for,” it defines “disposal” to

include the acts of spilling and leaking. That definition

implies that arranger liability is not limited to transac-

tions involving intentional disposals. That interpreta-

tion is consistent both with the common law (under

which a party may be held liable for arranging a trans-

13

action that it knows will create a nuisance, see Restate-

ment § 427B), and with CERCLA’s purpose of placing

the costs of remediation on those responsible for the

disposal of hazardous substances.

As the courts below found, the record in this case

amply demonstrates that Shell arranged for and was an

active participant in the delivery of its agricultural

chemicals to B&B. Those deliveries directly and rou-

tinely resulted in disposals of hazardous substances

(through spills and leaks) for more than 20 years, and

Shell had actual knowledge of that fact. Under those

circumstances, both the district court and court of ap-

peals correctly determined that Shell had “arranged for

disposal” of hazardous substances, and relieving Shell of

its obligation to pay for response costs would directly

contravene CERCLA’s objective of holding responsible

parties—rather than the taxpaying public—acountable

for their activities.

B. Shell’s proffered bases for avoiding arranger lia-

bility lack merit. The fact that a transaction involves the

delivery of a useful product does not preclude arranger

liability where (as here) the arranger knows that dis-

posal of a hazardous substance—through spills and

leaks, or otherwise—will occur during the course of the

transaction. Moreover, contrary to Shell’s contention,

Section 107(a)(3) imposes liability if a person “arranged

for disposal * * * of hazardous substances,” not just haz-

ardous waste.

Shell is also wrong in arguing that Section 107(a)(3)

limits arranger hability to circumstances in which the

defendant retains ownership, possession, or actual con-

trol of its hazardous substances at the time of disposal.

That provision broadly encompasses “any person who by

contract, agreement, or otherwise” arranges for some

14

“other party or entity” to dispose of its hazardous sub-

stances. Although Section 107(a)(3) refers to “hazard-

ous substances owned or possessed by” the arranger,

that language refers to ownership or possession at the

time the arrangement is made. Shell’s contrary rule,

under which an arranger could escape liability simply by

transferring ownership and control of its hazardous sub-

stances to another party who agrees to carry out the

actual disposal, would render Section 107(a)(3) ineffec-

tual in the paradigmatic arranger case.

II. A. Consistent with Restatement principles, the

courts of appeals uniformly have held that Section

107(a)(4)(A) liability for a single harm is joint and sev-

eral unless the defendant establishes a reasonable basis

for apportioning the harm. At the same time, however,

lower courts have uniformly recognized that, after joint

and several liability has been imposed, a defendant may

invoke the separate CERCLA provision authorizing

suits for contribution, under which the court may weigh

equitable factors in allocating costs, to seek from other

responsible parties the portion of costs paid beyond its

fair share. See 42 U.S.C. 9613(f)(1). That settled frame-

work is consistent with the common law and permits

courts fairly to divide response costs among responsible

parties.

B. Rather than attempt to establish an evidentiary

basis for apportioning costs in this case, the Railroads

and Shell made a strategic choice to pursue a “‘scorched

earth,’ all-or-nothing approach to liability.” Pet.

App. 236a. Nevertheless, despite acknowledging that

neither the Railroads nor Sheil had provided any eviden-

tiary basis for apportionment, the district court per-

formed what it called “the equitable apportionment anal-

ysis demanded by the circumstances of this case.” /d. at

15

237a. That was error. The district court conflated its

task of apportionment under Section 107(a) with the

court’s role in a separate contribution action under Sec-

tion 113(f)(1), which authorizes consideration of a broad

range of equitable factors. As a result, the district court

felt compelled to apportion the harm in this case out of

a sense of equity because the primary polluter was

insolvent—notwithstanding the lack of a reasonable ba-

sis for apportionment. That approach was seriously

flawed, both because it absolved petitioners of their bur-

den of establishing a sound evidentiary basis for appor-

tionment, and because under Restatement principles the

insolvency of another responsible party weighs against

rather than in favor of apportionment.

C. The district court’s equitable apportionment re-

lied on numerous unsubstantiated assumptions and

gross approximations. First, there is no reasonable ba-

sis to assume that each petitioner’s share of the ultimate

harm is proportional to its volumetric contribution to the

contamination. Each source of contamination may have

been independently sufficient to have caused the harm

requiring remediation, and the district court failed to

account for the relative toxicities or costs of remediation

of the different constituents—presumably because the

record lacked that information. Seeond, there is no rea-

sonable basis to assume that the Railroads’ contribution

to the contamination was proportional to their land area

and duration of ownership. Geographic divisibility dees

not mean that a landowner is liable only for the percent-

age of the facility it owned. And temporal divisibility

for landowners is inherently problematic (indeed, it can

have the extreme consequence of negating landewner

liability under Section 107(4)(1) altogether), especially

where (as here) there is no reason to béheve that the

16

degree of contamination remained constant over time.

Third, there is no reasonable basis for the district court

to have assumed that 2/8 of the total contamination was

from dinoseb and Nemagon. Fourth, there is no reason-

able basis for using estimates from anecdotes and in-

complete records to determine the relative volume of

Shell’s spills, and the district court failed to account for

various factors (¢.g., water, porosity, solubility) neces-

sary to correlate those spill volumes with the actual con-

tamination. The upshot is that the district court’s ap-

portionment analysis, on which petitioners rely, has no

foundation in the record, or CERCLA.

ARGUMENT

I. SHELL IS LIABLE UNDER THE TERMS OF CERCLA

BECAUSE IT “ARRANGED FOR DISPOSAL” OF A HAZ-

ARDOUS SUBSTANCE AND NOT MERELY FOR A SALE

CERCLA Section 107(a)(3) imposes liability on:

any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise

arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with

a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment,

of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such

person, by any other party or entity, at any facility

or incineration vessel owned or operated by another

party or entity and containing such hazardous sub-

stances.

42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(3). Shell agreed to supply agricultural

chemicals to B&B, knowing that its chemicals were rou-

timely spilled and leaked (i.e., disposed of) during the

delivery process. The court of appeals properly con-

cluded that, by arranging that transaction, Shell “ar-

17

ranged for” the “disposal” (through the attendant spill-

ing and leakage) of its hazardous substances."

A. Shell Was Properly Held Liable As An Arranger Under

Section 107(a)(3), Based On Its Entry Into Transactions

That It Knew Would Directly Result In Disposals Of

Hazardous Substances

1. Arranger liability is not limited to transactions de-

signed primarily for disposal

CERCLA provides that individuals or entities that

“arranged for” the disposal of hazardous substances

may be held accountable for the costs of cleaning up

those substances. 42 U.S.C. 107(a)(3). The dictionary

defines “arrange” as “to prepare or plan.” Random

House Dictionary of the English Language 116 (2d ed.

1987); see Webster’s Third New International Dictio-

nary 120 (1976) (“to make preparations”). The term

“disposal” is defined specifically in CERCLA, and it in-

cludes the unintentional acts of spilling and leaking. 42

U.S.C. 6903(3) (“The term ‘disposal’ means the dis-

charge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or

placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on

any land or water.”); see 42 U.S.C. 9601(29) (adopting

definition of “disposal” in Section 6903(3)). If a party

enters into a transaction that it knows will directly re-

sult in disposal of its hazardous substances including

through spilling or leaking then it is naturally said to

“arrange for” the disposal itself. See United States v.

Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1380 (8th Cir.

* The Railroads’ brief in this Court does not address whether Shell's

conduet gave rise to arranger liability under Section 107(a)(3). In the

court of appeals, however, the Railroads argued that the district court

had correctly held Shell liable as an arranger, for several of the reasons

explained herein. See Railroads Second C.A. Br. 16-38.

18

1989) (rejecting argument that defendants could be lia-

ble as arrangers “only if they intended to dispose of a

waste”) (emphasis added). Section 107(a)(3)’s use of the

phrase “by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged

for,” 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(3) (emphasis added), reinforces

that reading by making clear that the provision covers

modes of “arrangling]” that do not involve an express

contractual commitment.

That understanding of arranger liability also accords

with the common-law background against which

CERCLA was enacted, of which Congress was presum-

ably aware. See, e.g., United States v. Bestfoods, 524

U.S. 51, 63 (1998) (holding that common-law principles

are to apply unless CERCLA “speak{s] directly to the

question”); Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1382 (approving use of the

common law to interpret CERCLA’s arranger-liability

provision). Restatement § 427B, for example, provides:

“One who employs an independent contractor to do work

which the employer knows or has reason to know to be

likely to * * * creati(e]* * * a private nuisance, is sub-

ject to liability for harm resulting * * * from such

* * * nuisance.” Cf. Restatement §§ 413, 416, 427,

427A. Arranger liability rests on the same principles.

In this case, Shell employed commo~ carriers (and con-

tracted with B&B) to deliver hazardous substances that

it knew would spill and leak during every delivery. See

Pet. App. 259a; infra, pp. 20-23. Common-law under-

standings therefore support the imposition of liability on

a party who arranges a transaction that it knows will

directly result in the disposal of hazardous substances.*

* As the quotation from Restatement § 427B in the text indicates, a

person whu employed an independent contractor was traditionally liable

not. only when the employer possessed actual knowledge that the work

would create a nuisance, but also when he “hald| reason to know” that

19

That construction of Section 107(a)(3) is also consis-

tent with CERCLA’s “sweeping” remedial purposes.

Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 56 n.1 (citation omitted); see, e.g.,

Morton Int'l, Inc. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 343 F.3d 669,

676 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Our view that ‘arranged for’ is to be

broadly construed is consistent with Congress’s overall

purpose in enacting CERCLA.”). When an entity ar-

ranges for activities that it knows will result in the dis-

posal of hazardous substances, the imposition of liability

under Section 107(a)(3) ensures that the costs of reme-

diation can be placed on those who are responsible for,

or who benefit from, the disposal of hazardous wastes.

See p. 3, supra; South Fla. Water Mgmt. v. Montalvo, 84

F.3d 402, 407-409 (11th Cir. 1996) (noting importance for

Section 107(a)(3) purposes of defendant’s knowledge (or

lack thereof) that hazardous substances would be spilled

incident to pesticide spraying, because such knowledge

would demonstrate that defendant “implicitly agreed to

the disposal”).°

such a result was “likely.” Similarly, under Section 107(a)(3), the owner

of hazardous substances may be liable as an “arranger” if he enters into

a transaction whose likely consequence is the disposal of hazardous sub-

stances, even if the owner lacks actual knowledge that a disposal will

oecur. Because Shell was shown to have actual knowledge that spills

and leaks routinely occurred during the deliveries, the Court need not

determine in what additional circumstances arranger liability would be

proper.

* Similarly, in Aceto, a pesticide manufacturer arranged to send its

product to a formulator for processing (7.e., converting from technical-

grade to commercial-grade pesticide). 872 F.2d at 1375. As an “inher-

ent” byproduct of the processing, the formulator generated hazardous

substances, which the formulator disposed of contemporaneously

(thereby creating the contaminated site). /d. at 1375-1376, 1381. Al-

though disposal of the byproduct was not the purpose of the transaction

(like Shell, both parties to the transaction in Aceto presumably would

20

2. Shell’s knowledge and role in the disposal of its haz-

ardous substances during its arrangement with BEB

creates arranger liability

In contesting its liability, Shell relies on a character-

ization of the arrangement that was rejected by both the

district court and court of appeals. Shell asserts (Br. 2,

14-15) that it merely sold a useful product, transported

that product to B&B (its customer) by common carrier,

and transferred ownership of the product to the cus-

tomer when the common carrier arrived at the cus-

tomer’s facility. But that is not all that Shell did. As the

courts below found, Shell arranged for the delivery and

transfer process in which Shell was “deeply involved,”

Pet. App. 13an.5 during which Shell knew disposals of

its hazardous substances were a routine occurrence.

E.g., id. at 259a (noting Shell’s “actual knowledge” that

spills and leaks of D-D were “inherent in the unloading

process”). Accordingly, this was not a situation where

disposal of Shell’s product was an unantici; ated acci-

dent; the disposal was a known and inevitable (albeit

unwanted) consequence of the transaction that Shell

arranged. Shell’s conduct therefore falls within the four

corners of CERCLA’s ‘arranger liability” provision.

a. It is undispute-~ that Shell arranged for the deliv-

ery of its D-D to bé ’s facility. The “Conditions of

Sale” between Shell and B&B provided that the “Seller

may deliver any Product in any delivery equipment, by

any means of transportation and from any shipping

have preferred no byproduct or disposal), the court of appeals held that

the manufacturer was liable as an arranger under Section 107(a)(3). /d.

at 1382. It explained that a contrary result “would allow defendants to

simply ‘close their eyes’ to the method of disposal of their hazardous

substances, a result contrary to the policies underlying CERCLA.”

Ibid

21

point that Seller may select.” J.A. 583. Shell thus con-

tractually reserved the exclusive authority to, and in

fact did, arrange for the delivery of D-D by common

carrier tanker trucks to B&B’s facility. Pet. App. 124a.

Shell owned the D-D at the time such arrangements

were made. /d. at 124a-125a. The deliveries were made

F.O.B. destination, but “Shell still controlled the process

of deliveries, regardless.” Jd. at 124a."

Shell also actively inserted itself into, and exercised

significant control over, the transfer process-when the

tanker trucks it hired arrived at B&B’s facility. At least

until the early 1980s, the common carriers that Shell

hired and paid participated in the D-D transfer process

and used equipment required by Shell. See, e.g., Pet.

App. 119a-120a (relying on testimony of tanker-truck

drivers and others in the field that the drivers would

unload D-D into B&B’s tanks using the truck’s equip-

ment); 7d. at 208a-209a (“Before the early 1980s, Shell

required the tanker truck driver to have a 30 foot hose

and certain couplings and other equipment,” and “[{b]y

the early 1980s, Shell dictated that B&B personnel un-

load the tanker truck and purchase the 30 foot hose

among other unloading equipment.”). Shell documenta-

tion “referenced the fact that the drivers of the tanker

trucks had to have certain equipment for transferring

the D-D into the storage tank, evidencing direction and

control by Shell.” /d. at 124a. B&B was also required to

follow Shell’s manual on handling D-D, which provided

“ “F_O.B. destination” generally means that “the seller must at his

own expense and risk transport the goods to that place and there

tender delivery of them.” U.C.C. § 2-319(1)(b) (14th ed. 1995).

22

detailed loading and unloading procedures, subject to an

inspection program. /d. at 127a-128a.’

b. The record establishes that spills of D-D “were

inherent in the common carrier deliveries that Shell ar-

ranged for and occurred in the course of every delivery.”

Pet. App. 252a; see id. at 119a-122a. The trial evidence

also showed, and the district court found, that “Shell

knew that spills and leaks were inherent in the unload-

ing process.” /d. at 259a. For example, Robert Swain,

a former Shell employee responsible for helping to im-

plement Shell’s manual on handling D-D, testified that

the delivery of Shell D-D to bulk storage “always” re-

sulted in spills. J.A. 64. Swain noted that, while spills

during the truck-transfer process can be collected in a

little bucket, “[mJost often, though, back in those days,

[the workers] just let it dump on the ground.” Jbid.

Shell went so far as to account for the spilling and

leakage of D-D in its contracts with B&B. Pet. App.

122a, 252a-253a. A Shell marketing agreement with

B&B states, in a section entitled “Shrinkage,” that

“{slingle and multiple destination deliveries by common

carrier will be allowed 0.5 percent on a weight basis for

shrinkage that may occur at the time of unloading,” and

that the “shrinkage allowance will be deducted off the

* To the extent the courts below relied on Shell’s imposition of

various requirements, treatment of that fact as relevant to the Section

107(a)(3) analysis does not (as Shell suggests, Br. 31) create a disincen-

tive to the adoption of such safeguards. To the contrary, if shippers

know that the process by which their products are delivered results in

spills of hazardous substances, they will have greater incentive to

prevent such disposals to limit the contamination if they are potentially

subject to arranger liability. In any event, abundant evidence beyond

Shell's imposition of safety precautions established Shell’s awareness

that spills and leaks occurred routinely during the deliveries at issue

here.

23

billing invoice.” J.A. 498; see J.A. 209 (shrinkage allow-

ances in Shell’s bulk-liquid contracts applied to D-D).

Based on trial testimony, the district court construed

such agreements as providing “a monetary allowance to

B&B for product Shell expected to be lost in the process

of delivery and storage.” Pet. App. 122a; see id. at 252a-

253a (referring to “spillage allowance” in the Shell-B&B

contract).®

In sum, based on the extensive trial record, the dis-

trict court correctly found that “[flor over twenty years,

Shell ‘arranged for’ the sale for profit of D-D with actual

knowledge that D-D would spill and be released into the

soil during the delivery and unloading process,” Pet.

App. 259a, in which “Shell was an active participant,” id.

at 204a. The court of appeals correctly affirmed the dis-

trict court’s decision that Shell is liable under CERCLA

because, in light of those circumstances, Shell “arranged

for disposal” of hazardous substances.

B. Shell Identifies No Sound Basis For Limiting Arranger

Liability Where A Manufacturer Engages In Transac-

tions That It Knows Will Directly Result »« Disposals Of

Its Hazardous Substances

In addition to contending that Section 107(a)(3) is

limited to transactions whose purpose is to dispose of

* Although Shell describes that allowance as “a price discount to

meet competition” (Br. 30), that explanation is inherently unlikely, since

an allowance for “shrinkage” at the time of unloading would be a highly

unusual way of providing a discount to adjust for competitors’ prices.

The district court rejected essentially the same argument, explaining

that Shell's “characterization of the spill allowance as a ‘pricing’

strategy to meet competition is not persuasive,” Pet. App. 259a-260a,

and Shell identifies no basis for this Court to reject the district court's

reasonable interpretation of the documentary record.

24

hazardous substances, Shell offers three further bases

for avoiding arranger liability. Each lacks merit.

1. Lack of intent to dispose of a hazardous substance

during a transaction does not preclude arranger lia-

bility where the arranger has advance knowledge of

the disposal

Shell contends (Br. 18-21) that it cannot be liable

under Section 107(a)(3) because its objective was to sup-

ply a useful product rather than to dispose of a hazard-

ous substance. As discussed above (pp. _, supra), that

argument ignores the fact that spills and leaks of haz-

ardous substances were a known and recurring conse-

quence of the deliveries for which Shell arranged. Al-

though the delivery of a useful product was the ultimate

purpose of the arrangement, Shell’s continued participa-

tion in the delivery, with knowledge that spills and leaks

would result, was sufficient to establish Shell’s intent to

dispose of hazardous substances.

Shell’s invocation (Br. 19) of circuit-court cases in-

volving the “mere sale of a useful product” is therefore

misplaced. The question in those cases was whether

sellers could be held liable as arrangers for the ultimate

disposal of the product after the purchaser had incorpo-

rated it into another product or had put it to its intended

use. In that context, some courts of appeals have held

that the seller is not liable as an arranger for the ulti-

mate disposal absent evidence that the sale included an

arrangement for that ultimate disposal. See Freeman v.

Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., 189 F.3d 160, 164 (2d Cir. 1999);

Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville &

Denton R.R., 142 F.3d 769, 775 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,

525 U.S. 963 (1998); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis

Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1317 (11th Cir. 1990);

f

25

but ef. Catellus Dev. Corp. v. United States, 34 F.3d 748,

750-752 (9th Cir. 1994) (arranger liability from sale of

spent batteries for extraction of lead plates).

Here, by contrast, Shell was not held liable for con-

tamination resulting from the application of its pesti-

cides (the useful product) to a farmer’s fields or the sub-

sequent disposal of the contaminated soil. Rather, its

liability is for the portion of product that was never used

for its intended purpose but was disposed of at the time

of delivery through spilling or leaking. See Pet. App.

52a-53a. The decisions on which Shell relies simply rec-

ognize that the causal link between a transaction and a

subsequent disposal of the relevant product may some-

times be too attenuated to support arranger liability.

That potential limit on Section 107(a)(3) liability has no

application here, where the disposal of hazardous sub-

stances occurred during deliveries that Shell closely

monitored and superintended.”

* Shell's reliance (Br. 20-21) on Amcast Industrial Corp. v. Detrex

Corp., 2 F.3d 746 (1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1044 (1994), is also

misplaced. In Amcast, the Seventh Circuit held a manufacturer liable

as an owner for spills of a hazardous substance that veccurred during

deliveries from its own trucks to a customer. See id. at 750. The court

also held that the manufacturer was not liable as an arranger for spills

that occurred during a common carrier’s delivery of the same sub-

stance. See id. at 751. The court did not suggest, however, that the

manufacturer had exercised any control over the latter deliveries other

than hiring the carrier, let alone the extent of control found to have

been exercised by Shell here.. Nor did it suggest that the manufacturer,

like Shell, was aware that disposals (in the form of spills and leakage)

of hazardous substances ever occurred during those deliveries, let alone

during every delivery. See ibid. (limiting arranger liability for “acci-

dents” by transporters hired “in good faith”).

26

2. Section 107(a)(3) encompasses the disposal of hazard-

ous substances through spills and leaks

Shell contends (Br. 21-25) that liability under Section

107(a)(3) requires disposal of hazardous waste, and that

the term “waste” does not encompass “useful products

sold new for consumer use.” That argument lacks merit.

Section 107(a)(3) provides that a person is liable if he

“arranged for disposal * * * of hazardous substances

owned or possessed by such person.” 42 U.S.C.

9607(a)(3). There is no dispute that Shell’s products

constituted “hazardous substances.” In arguing that

arranger liability may not be premised on disposal of the

products at issue here, Shell relies not on Section

107(a)(3), but on definitional provisions under which the

term “disposal” is defined to mean “the discharge, de-

posit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of

any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land

or water.” 42 U.S.C. 6903(3); see 42 U.S.C. 9601(29)

(providing that the term “disposal” as used in CERCLA

shall have the meaning provided in 42 U.S.C. 6903(3)).

To the extent that the term “hazardous waste” has a

narrower reach than the term “hazardous substance,”

Congress’s decision to use the latter term in Section

107(a)(3) must be treated as advertent. Because Section

107(a)(3) specifies the type of material (“hazardous sub-

stances”) whose disposal is covered, the Court should

not ascribe to Congress the self-defeating intent to nar-

row the range of covered materials through the defini-

tion of “disposal.” See, e.g., Lowisiana & Nashville R.R.

v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467, 475 (1911) (“We must have re-

gard to all the words used by Congress, and as far as

possible give effeet to them.”). The most natural read-

ing of the various provisions taken together is that, for

purposes of determining arranger liability under Section

i —~- i. rT.

27

107(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. 6903(3) identifies the actions that

constitute “disposal,” but Section 107(a)(3) identifies the

object of those actions, i.e., the materials whose disposal

is covered. See Pet. App. 216a-217a."°

3. Arranger liability does not require ownership or ac-

tual control. of the hazardous substance at the time of

disposai

Shell contends (Br. 26-27) that, in order te be liable

as an arranger under Section 107(a)(3), a manufacturer

must either own or have “actual contro!” of the hazard-

ous substance at the time of its disposal. That is incor-

rect.

Section 107(a)8) imposes liability on a person who

“by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for dis-

posal * * * of hazardous substances owned or pos-

sessed by such person.” 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(3). By its

terms, that provision applies if the person upon whom

liability is imposed ewned or possessed the relevant sub-

stances when the arrangement for disposal was made.

Liability under Section 107(a)(3) does not turn on

whether the arranger retained ownership or possession

at the time of disposal. The provision also clearly con-

templates that some “other party or entity” may dispose

Shell’s argument, if accepted, could not be limited to arranger lia-

vility under Section 107(a)(3). For example, Section 107(a)(2) imposes

liability on “any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous

substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous sub-

stanees were disposed of.” 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(2). Under Shell's reading,

spills or leaks of a potentially useful product (e.g., cyanide) into the soil

or water would not constitute “disposal” of that substance, and Section

107(a)(2) would not apply. That reading would undermine Congress's

effort to cover inadvertent spills and leaks by including them within the

definition of “disposal,” and it would leave a substantial unintended gap

in CERCLA'’s remedial scheme.

|

|

es Ss

= = aa see .

28

of the hazardous substance. /bid. Accordingly, a person

who arranges to have his hazardous substances disposed

of by another is liable for the consequences of that dis-

posal arrangement, regardless of which entity (the

source or disposer) has title or possession when disposal

occurs.

Shell’s further contention (Br. 26-27) that, at a mini-

mum, an arranger must exercise “actual control” of the

) hazardous substances at the time of disposal is also in-

consistent with the statutory text. Such a requirement

would read the phrase “by contract, agreement, or oth-

erwise arranged for” out of Section 107(a)(3). In any

event, as discussed above (pp. 20-23, supra), Shell did

exercise substantial control over the hazardous sub-

stances at the time of disposal. |

If ownership or actual control at the time of disposal

were legally dispositive, an arranger could easily avoid

liability under Section 107(a)(3). In the ordinary case

when a waste hauler picks up a drum of hazardous sub-

stances from the arranger, the drum is no longer pos-

sessed or controlled by the arranger. And the parties

could readily provide by contract for the immediate

transfer of title to the hauler at the time of pickup. Con-

gress surely did not intend for arrangers to escape

CERCLA liability in that prototypical arrangement for

disposal of hazardous substances. See S. Rep. No. 848,

supra, 31, 33-34 (CERCLA’s liability regime “provides

incentives to all involved with hazardous substances to

assure that such substances are handled with the utmost

care”).''

'' Neither the district court nor the court of appeals based its arrang-

er liability holding on a determination of which entity (Shell or B&B)

held title to the D-D after its tender for delivery. The district court

found that the point at which title to the D-D transferred from Shell to

29

Il. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO HOLD

PETITIONERS JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE

WHEN PETITIONERS FAILED TO ESTABLISH A REA-

SONABLE BASIS FOR APPORTIONMENT

The court of appeals correctly held that, although the

single harm at B&B’s facility was theoretically capable

of apportionment under established common-law princi-

ples, petitioners which elected to pursue a “‘scorched

earth,’ all-or-nothing approach to liability,” Pet.

App. 236a had failed to prove any reasonable basis for

determining their respective contributions to that harm.

The thrust of the court of appeals’ analysis was not that

a more precise and defensible apportionment could have

been made based on the record before the district court.

Rather, the court of appeals explained that, largely be-

cause petitioners had pursued a trial strategy of denying

any liability for the costs of the governments’ cleanup

activities, the existing evidentiary record did not provide

a reliable basis for apportionment. There is no basis for

the Court to overturn that determination.

——

B&B was not as clear-cut as Shell suggests (Br. 5, 26). As the court ex-

plained, if a tanker truck arrived at B&B's facility and began unloading

the D-D, but it subsequently became apparent that the bulk storage

tank was inadequate for receiving and storing the D-D, Shell had the

right to direct the tanker truck to return to Shell's facility. Pet. App.

212a. Thus, although B&B gained “stewardship” once Shell’s tanker

truck arrived at the facility, legal title did not necessarily pass to B&B

at that time. /d. at 124a, 212a.

,

|

|

|

30

A. Consistent With Restatement Principles, CERCLA Lia-

bility For A Single Harm Is Joint And Several Unless

The Liable Party Proves A Reasonable Basis For Appor- |

tionment

1. When the government performs its own cleanup

of a facility, Congress provided, subject to limited affir-

mative defenses not applicable here, that four classes of

persons are liable for “all costs of removal or remedial

action incurred by the United States Government * * *

not inconsistent with the national contingency plan.” 42

U.S.C. 9607(a)(4)(A) (emphasis added).'"* That provision

reflects Congress’s considered judgment that, as be-

tween those with a specified connection to hazardous

substances and those with none (i.e., the taxpaying pub-

lic), the former should be responsible for the costs of

cleanup. See 126 Cong. Rec. 31,978 (1980) (statement of

Rep. Jeffords) (CERCLA “places the costs of releases

of hazardous waste on the sector most responsible for

pollution and which benefits most from chemical produc-

tion rather than on the victim or taxpayers.”); p. 3, su-

pra."®

Petitioners do not contend that the United States’ costs were “in-

consistent with the national contingency plan.”

“ Contrary to Shell's suggestion (Br. 25 n.7, 43), the availability of the

Superfund to finance cleanups does not demonstrate that Congress in-

tended the Superfund, rather than the parties liable under CERCLA,

to bear the cost of cleanups when one responsible party is insolvent. Al-

though the United States may use the Superfund (when certain statu-

tory conditions are met) to finance cleanup efforts, Congress intended

that the fund would be replenished through cost-recovery suits brought

under CERCLA Section 107(a) so that the covered parties that

CERCLA deems responsible for contamination bear the cost. See Best-

foods, 524 U.S. at 55-56; cf. S. Rep. No. 848, supra, 13. Congress sim-

ilarly did not intend the now-expired taxing regime for the Superfund

to release from liability manufacturers who otherwise qualify as liable

31

CERCLA does not specifically address the proper

allocation of cleanup costs in cases where multiple par-

ties share responsibility for contamination at a particu-

lar facility. The courts of appeals have uniformly held,

however, and petitioners agree, that the decision whe-

ther te impese joint and several liability under those

circumstances, or instead to apportion the costs of clean-

up ameng the various responsible parties, should be

guided by common-law principles. See pp. 34, swpra;

Shell Br. 32: Railroads Br. 7. Petitioners also agree

(Shell Br. 37; Railroads Br. 6), comsastent with Con-

gress’s apparent endorsement of the appreach taken in

the semunal case of Chem-Dyne (HR. Rep. No. 253, 99th

Cong., lst Sess. Pt. I, at 74 (1985)), that Restatement

principles provide the starting point for that inquiry.”

2. Umder the Restatement, damages for a single

harm can be apportioned among multiple causes only if

“there is a reasonable basis for determining the contri-

parties under CERCLA. See Letter from GAO to Hon. James M.

Jeffords regarding the GAO-04-475R Superfund Program 1 (Feb. 18,

2004).

' As noted above, all references to the Restatement refer to the Re-

statement (Second). In May 1999, the American Law Institute adopted

the Restatement (Third) Turts: Apportionment of Liability (Third Re-

statement), primarily in response to the increased use of comp erative

responsibility. See id. § 1,cmt. a. The Third Restatement employs the

same basic approach to apportionment as the Restatement. Compare

Third Restatement § 26 with Restatement § 433A. In any event, the

Restatement was in effect both when CERCLA was originally enacted

and when it was amended in 1986, and it is therefore the relevant source

of common-law norms. In addition, many States still retain full joint

and several liability, and most of the recent departures from that tra-

ditional rule have come through legislative enactments, not judicial de-

cisions developing common-law principles. See Norfolk & W. Ry. v.

Ayers, 5388 U.S. 135, 164-165 (2003).

32

bution of each cause to a single harm.” Restatement

§ 433A(1)(b). When two or more liable parties bring

about a single harm, and one or more of them seeks to

limit its liability on the basis that the harm is capable of

apportionment, the burden of proof as to the apportion-

ment is on such party. Restatement § 433B(2). That

burden includes both the burden of production (7.e., of

presenting evidence sufficient to establish its share of

the harm) and the burden of persuasion (7.e., of demon-

strating by a preponderance of the evidence that appor-

tionment is warranted). Restatement § 433B cmt d.

That is because, “[a]s between the proved tortfeasor who

has clearly caused some harm, and the entirely innocent

plaintiff, any hardship due to lack of evidence as to the

extent of the harm caused should fall upon the former.”

Ibid. Petitioners do not dispute that the burden of prov-

ing a reasonable basis for apportionment is on CERCLA

defendants. See Shell Br. 37; Railroads Br. 30.

The Restatement recognizes that “[t]here are kinds

of harm which, while not so clearly marked out as sever-

able into distinct parts, are still capable of division upon

a reasonable and rational basis, and of fair apportion-

ment among the causes responsible.” Restatement

§ 433A emt. d. The Restatement also gives various ex-

amples of situations where “reasonable assumption[s]”

may be made, explaining, inter alia, that if cattle of two

or more owners trespass and destroy a crop, the harm

may be apportioned among the owners on the basis of

the number of cattle owned by each. /bid. Similarly, if

two factories pollute a stream and interfere with an-

other’s use of the water, the harm may be apportioned

“on the basis of evidence of the respective quantities of

pollution discharged into the stream.” /bid.

33

The Restatement also recognizes, however, that

“(cjertain kinds of harm, by their very nature, are nor-

mally incapable of any logical, reasonable, or practical

division.” Restatement § 433A, cmt.i. As Congress was

well aware, that will often be the case for the harms tar-

geted by CERCLA: “An indivisible harm is frequently

the situation at hazardous waste sites where many par-

ties have coniributed to the contamination or other en-

dangerment and there are no reliable records indicating

who disposed of the hazardous wastes (or in what quanti-

ties).” 126 Cong. Rec. at 31,966 n.* (Letter from Assis-

tant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs to

Chairman, Subcomm. on Transportation and Commerce,

House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,

96th Cong., 2d Sess. (Dec. 1, 1980)). Thus, while the

Restatement allows for the limited use of assumptions to

determine the contribution of each cause to a single

harm, those assumptions must be reasonable, based on

the evidence, and grounded in principles of causation.

The Restatement makes clear that, where harms

cannot be apportioned on a reascnable basis, the court

should not make “an arbitrary apportionment for its own

sake” or simply to mitigate the severity of joint and sev-

eral liability. Restatement § 433A cmt. i. Indeed, the

Restatement contemplates that joint and several liabil-

ity may be imposed even when “some of the causes are

innocent.” /b7d. Accordingly, the courts of appeals have

recognized that apportionment under the Restatement

“is guided not by equity” but “by principles of causation

alone.” United States v. Hercules, Inc., 247 F.3d 706,

718 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1065 (2001); see,

e.g., United States v. Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d

397, 319 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Monsanto, 858

F.2d 160, 171 n.22 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S.

34

1106 (1989); United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 2 F.3d

1265, 1280 (3d Cir. 1993); ef. United States v. Atlantic

Research Corp., 127 S. Ct. 2331, 2339 (2007) (“a defen-

dant PRP in such a § 107(a) suit could blunt any inequi-

table distribution of costs by filing a § 113(f) counter-

claim”).

If a party found liable under Section 107(a)(4)(A)

cannot establish a basis for apportionment with the reli-

ability that Restatement principles require, but never-

theless maintains that joint and several liability is unfair

or disproportionate under the particular circumstances

of the case, it may pursue a contribution action against

other responsible parties under CERCLA Section

113(f)(1). Section 113(f)(1) provides that, “[iJn resolving

contribution claims, the court may allocate response

costs among liable parties using such equitable factors

as the court determines are appropriate.” 42 U.S.C.

9613(f)(1); see Restatement § 886A(2) (right of contribu-

tion exists for tortfeasor “paying more than his equita-

ble share of the common liability”). That provision gives

the court broad authority to devise a fair allocation of

costs among the responsible parties without transfer-

ring those costs to taxpayers who have no particularized

nexus to the relevant contamination. That provision

would be largely superfluous if the court had similar

equitable discretion in making the initial determination

of liability under Section 107(a)(4)(A).

To be sure, the availability of a Section 113(f)(1) con-

tribution action may be of little practical benefit to peti-

Lioners here in light of B&B’s insolvency. The Restate-

ment does not suggest, however, that the standards for

proving apportionment may be relaxed in such cases in

order to compensate for the diminished likelihood of

obtaining contribution. To the contrary, the Restate-

35

ment specifically identifies the insolvency cf a co-defen-

dant as a factor weighing against apportionment. The

Restatement provides that, even if a defendant carries

its burden on apportionment, the defendant may still be

held jointly and severally liable if the circumstances are

exceptional, as when “one of two tortfeasors is so hope-

lessly insolvent that the plaintiff will never be able to

collect from him the share of the damages allocated to

him.” Restatement § 433A emt. h.”” That principle is

consistent with CERCLA’s purpose of protecting the

public fise.'®

B. The District Court Erred As A Matter Of Law By De-

clining To Impose Joint And Several Liability After Pe-

titioners Failed To Establish Any Reasonable Basis To

Apportion Liability

It is undisputed that this case involves a single harm,

consisting primarily of a plume of contaminated ground-

water that threatens the drinking water supply. Pet.

'’ Because the court of appeals concluded that petitioners had failed

to establish a sufficient basis for apportionment under general Restate-

ment principles, it declined to determine what effect Restatement

§ 433, comment h, might otherwise have on the apportionment analysis.

See Pet. App. 32a n.27. This Court likewise need not consider comment

h if it agrees that the district court's apportionment lacked a reasonable

evidentiary basis. If this Court disagrees, hewever, and concludes that

the district court’s apportionment was otherwise sound, comment h

provides an alternative basis for affirming the judgment below.

Some courts have suggested that, in light of that purpose and

CERCLA'’s strict-liability regime, the burden of proving divisibility in

CERCLA cases should be more demanding than under general Re-

statement principles. See, e.g., U/nited States v. Capital Tax Corp., 545

F.3d 525, 535 & nn.8-9 (7th Cir. 2008); Hercules, Inc., 247 F.3d at 715-

717. The Court need not decide whether that view is correct because

petitioners failed (indeed, made no meaningful effort) to establish bases

for apportionment that would satisfy Restatement standards.

36

App. 245a-246a. At trial, both the Railroads and Shell

contended that they did not cause any part of that

harm. Neither the Railroads nor Shell attempted (even

in the alternative) to present or prove a reasonable basis

for determining the contribution of each to the contami-

nation.

Once the district court rejected petitioners’ theory of

the case and determined that petitioners were liable

parties, the imposition of joint and several liability

should have followed naturally from petitioners’ failure

even to attempt to identify and prove any reasonable

basis for apportionment. Instead, the district court,

believing that the imposition of joint and several liability

would be inequitable under the circumstances of this

case, scoured the record for evidence on which very

rough approximations of petitioners’ comparative re-

sponsibilities might be based. It may well be that no

demonstrably better apportionment could have been

made given the record before the court. The absence of

evidence from which a sufficiently reliable apportion-

ment could be drawn, however, was the direct result of

petitioners’ own litigation strategy, and there is no basis

for this Court to relieve petitioners of the consequences

of that strategy now that it has failed to absolve them of

all liability. In any event, under established Restate-

ment principles, the party seeking apportionment bears

the burden of proof, and the court of appeals correctly

held that petitioners failed to carry their burden here.

1. The Railroads’ trial theory was that no activity on

the Railroad parcel resulted in contamination at the

facility. Although the Railroads provided expert testi-

mony purporting to estirnate the total amount of con-

tamination in the facility’s subsurface, that testimony

assumed that none of the facility’s contamination was

37

caused by disposals on the Railroad parcel. J.A. 304-

305; Railroads C.A. E.R. 188-191. Accordingly, the Rail-

roads’ only argument and evidence as to their contribu-

tion to the harm was that they contributed zero.

Shell took a similar tack. Shell’s expert testified that

it was “infinitely more likely than not” that D-D could

not get from the delivery areas to the areas from which

it posited that the contamination had originated. J.A.

283-284. Thus, Shell’s trial theory was that Shell was

not a cause of the harm at all.

The district court, however, rejected the Railroads’

and Shell’s theories and evidence. The court further

found that Shell “did not present evidence how its prod-

ucts’ contribution to the contamination at the Arvin fa-

cility can be apportioned.” Pet. App. 252a. Rather, the

court explained, the Railroads’ and Shell’s trial strategy

was a “‘scorched earth,’ all-or-nothing approach to lia-

bility,” in which “[nJeither acknowledged an iota of re-

sponsibility.” /d. at 236a.

That should have been the end of the matter. Liti-

gants must live with the consequences of their own stra-

tegic choices in the adversarial system. See, e.g., Hor-

mel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556 (1941) (“[OJur proce-

dural scheme contemplates that parties shall come to

issue in the trial forum vested with authority to deter-

mine questions of fact. This is essential in order that

parties may have the opportunity to offer all the evi-

dence they believe relevant to the issues which the trial

tribunal is alone competent to decide.”). This Court has

so held in many contexts, including in capital cases. See,

e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 437 (2000) (state

prisoner “must be diligent in developing the record and

presenting, if possible, all claims of constitutional error”

and cannot pursue on habeas “facts and issues which a

38

prisoner made insufficient effort to pursue” earlier).

There is no reason for a different rule in this context,

where (as here) sophisticated parties are represented by

sophisticated counsel.'" When a CERCLA defendant

categorically denies liability and the court rejects that

position, the defendant faces the prospect of joint and

several liability and cannot go back and claim an entitle-

ment to apportionment based on a record that does not

support apportionment.

2. Rather than hold petitioners to the consequence

of their own litigation strategy, the district court “inde-

pendently” performed what it called “the equitable ap-

portionment analysis demanded by the circumstances of

the case.” Pet. App. 236a-237a. The district court’s de-

cision to undertake that apportionment without the par-

ties’ assistance rested on three interrelated legal errors.

In United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 315 F.3d 179, 186-187

(2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1103 (2004), the CERCLA defen-

dant (like petitioners) argued that its liability was zero. The Second

Circuit rejected that argument, determined that the defendant had in-

troduced no evidence on the limited nature of its liability, and therefore

held it jointly and severally liable. /bid.

'* Largely for the reasons stated in the text, the Railroads are wrong

in suggesting (Br. 57-59) that the imposition of joint and several liability

in this case raises serious constitutional concerns. Contrary to the

Railroads’ assertion (Br. 58), the court of appeals did not “interpret{]

CERCLA to impose joint and several liability in all but extraordinary

cases,” and any constitutional issues that such a scheme might implicate

are not presented here. Rather, petitioners pursued a deliberate stra-

tegy of disclaiming a// liability and forgoing any effort to establish the

share of the harm for which they could properly be held responsible.

See Pet. App. 47a (noting that Shell likely could have provided evidence

supporting apportionment but declined to do so, “most likely because

Shell put its eggs in the no-liability basket”). Holding petitioners to the

consequences of that choice creates no meaningful constitutional diffi-

culties.

!

39

First, the district court assumed that the “circum-

stances of this case” primarily the insolvency of the

party (B&B) most responsible for the contamination

“demanded” apportionment. Pet. App. 237a; see 7d. at

245a (deeming it “manifestly inequitable” to allocate

B&B’s orphan share to petitioners). That was incorrect.

As explained above (pp. 34-35, supra), the Restatement

specifically discusses the example of an insolvent co-

defendant. Rather than identifying that circumstance

as a ground for relaxing the standards governing appor-

tionment, the Restatement treats the insolvency of a co-

defendant as a factor that may support joint and several

liability even if apportionment would be otherwise justi-

fied. That approach furthers CERCLA’s purpose of

ensuring that governmental plaintiffs (and the taxpay-

ers they represent) are not required to bear cleanup

costs when there exists a solvent party with a cognizable

nexus to the contamination. See p. 3, supra.'” Although

the Restatement does not preclude apportionment in

cases involving insolvent co-defendants, it is flatly in-

consistent with the district court’s treatment of such

insolvency as a factor supporting apportionment.

Second, the district court treated petitioners and the

United States and the State as equally responsible for

the absence of evidence and argument directed at the

question of apportionment. In explaining its decision

“to independently perform the equitable apportionment

analysis,” the court stated that “[a]ll parties” had “ef-

™ See 126 Cong. Rec. at 26,788 (statement of Rep. Jeffords) (“The

imposition of mandatory apportionment could result in attempts by the

parties liable for a release of hazardous waste to allocate a large portion

of the liability to insolvent defendants. * * * We should not allow the

responsible parties to evade the costs of cleanup at the expense of the

taxpayers.”’).

40

fectively abdicated providing any helpful arguments to

the court.” Pet. App. 236a-237a. As the district court

elsewhere recognized, however, “[o]nce [CERCLA] lia-.

bility has been established, the burden shifts to the de-

fendant to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evi-

dence, that there exists a reasonable basis for divis-

ibility.” /d. at 235a. Because petitioners bore the bur-

den of proof on this issue, the governments’ failure to

provide evidence and argument supporting a different

apportionment (or establishing that apportionment was

infeasible) could not justify the court’s use of estimates

that would otherwise have been insufficiently precise.

Third, the district court conflated the present cost-

recovery suit under Section 107(a)(4)(A) with the dis-

tinct, equitable contribution action available to petition-

ers under Section 113(f). The court stated that, “[wJhile

§ 1138(f)(1) directs courts to allocate cleanup costs be-

tween responsible parties ‘using such equitable factors

as the court determines are appropriate,’ it does not

limit courts to any particular list of factors. The stat-

ute’s expansive language instead affords a district court

broad discretion to balance the equities in the interests

of justice.” Pet. App. 239a. The district court’s evident

premise—.é., that the court possessed the same “broad

discretion” in determining whether and how liability

should be apportioned in the cost-recovery suit under

Section 107(a)(4)(A) is wholly incorrect. See pp. 33-

35, supra.”

* The district court repeatedly confirmed throughout the post-trial

proceedings that its entire apportionment analysis—including but not

limited to the decision to undertake it—was driven by its view that the

imposition of joint and several liability would be inequitable under the

circumstances of this case. At the hearing on the parties’ motions to

amend the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, for example,

41

The legal errors described above led the district

court to undertake an intricate apportionment analysis

despite the failure of the parties who bore the burden of

proof to offer any pertinent evidence or argument. The

court’s mode of procedure also deprived the government

of a fair opportunity to respond to the court’s theories

of apportionment and to rebut their factual underpin-

nings an opportunity the governments would have had

if those theories had been advanced by petitioners them-

selves. See, e.g., Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1380

(7th Cir. 1992) (reversing the trial court where it

“changed the plaintiffs theory of the case after the time

had passed for the defendant to present contrary evi-

dence”).

Petitioners suggest that, despite the rough nature of

the district court’s approximations, the ultimate appor-

tionment should be sustained because the court chose to

err on the side of overestimating petitioners’ contribu-

tions to the harm at the relevant facility. See Railroads

Br. 46-47. The Railroads emphasize (zbid.) that the dis-

trict court provided an adequate “safety margin,” in-

creasing the Railroads’ estimated share from 6% to 9%

to allow for calculation errors. Because the correct

number is likely lower than 9%, the Railroads argue

(Br. 47), imposing joint and several liabilty is unjustifi-

able.

That line of argument fails on two levels. First, giv-

en the significant gaps in the district court’s apportion-

the court stated that it “did what [it] thought was right in accordance

with the law and equity because we still have an allocation and equitable

proceeding.” J.A. 612. But to the extent the court perceived an over-

riding equitable imperative to proceed with apportionment notwith-

standing the sparseness of the record before it, those evidentiary gaps

were the result of petitioners’ own litigation choices.

42

ment analysis as discussed in Pt. II(C), znfra, it is spec-

ulative whether the court’s apportionment actually over-

states petitioners’ appropriate shares of the total liabil-

ity. Second, under applicable Restatement principles,

the propriety of apportionment turns or. whether the

liable party has established through evidence the por-

tion of the harm that it caused. Petitioners cite no au-

thority for the proposition that a liable party car in ef-

fect stipulate to a percentage share that lacks such an

evidentiary foundation simply because it appears likely

that the share overstates its actual contribution to the

overall harm.

C. The District Court’s Unsubstantiated Assumptions And

Gross Approximations Do Not Constitute A Reasonable

Basis To Apportion The Harm In This Case

The district court’s equitable apportionment analy-

sis, conducted on a sparse record without meaningful

argument from petitioners, involved an array of unsub-

stantiated assumptions and gross approximations.

Those include: (1) that each party’s share of the ulti-

mate harm is proportional to each’s party’s volumetric

contribution to the contamination (irrespective of the

relative toxicities and costs of remediation of the differ-

ent chemicals); (2) that the Railroads’ volumetric contri-

bution to the contamination is proportional to the per-

centage of its land area and duration of ownership;

(3) that dinoseb and Nemagon comprised 2/3 of the con-

tamination, so that the Railroads’ liability should be

further reduced by 1/3 (because no D-D originated from

their parcel); and (4) that Shell’s volumetric contribu-

tion to the contamination can be estimated from anec-

dotal evidence and incomplete sales records. As dis-

cussed below, the district court’s assumptions and ap-

43

proximations do not provide a reasonable basis for ap-

portioning the harm in this case.

I. There is no reasonable basis to assume that each peti-

tioner’s share of the ultimate harm is proportional to

its volumtric contribution to the contamination

As an initial matter, there is no reasonable basis to

assume that the harm in this case is divisible. See Pet.

App. 172a (“plume poses an indivisible threat”). Under

the Restatement, joint and several liability is appropri-

ate “where either cause would have been sufficient in

itself to bring about the result,” as in the case of “merg-

ing fires which burn a building” or two companies pol-

luting a stream from which cattle drink and die. Re-

statement § 433A cmt. i.

In this case, the threat to drinking water and need

for remediation presumably would exist even if

the plume contained only the hazardous substances

traceable to Shell’s spillage or only the hazardous sub-

stances from the Railroad parcel. Either source of con-

tamination therefore likely was “sufficient in itself to

bring about the result” (7.e., contamination requiring

CERCLA remediation) here. See Restatement § 433A

emt. i.” It is possible that, even if pollution from either

“' As the Seventh Circuit has explained for cases in which contamina-

tion may be attributable to multiple sources:

It is easy to imagine a case in which, had X not polluted a site, no

clean-up costs would have been incurred; X's pollution would be a

necessary condition to those costs and it would be natural to think

that he should pay at least a part of them. But suppose that even if

X had not polluted the site, it would have to be cleaned up—and at the

same cost—because of the amount of pollution by Y. * * * [T]hat

should not necessarily let X off the hook. * * * In that case, the

conduct of X and the conduct of Y would each be a sufficient but not

44

Shell or the Railroads standing alone would have in-

duced EPA to undertake remediation, the presence of

contaminants from multiple sources compounded the

environmental harm or caused the remediation to be

more costly. Petitioners made no effort, however, to

prove at trial that this was so. EPA based its remedi-

ation decisions at the facility not on the total mass or

volume of the contaminants, but rather on the fact that

the level of contamination from each primary contami-

nant greatly exceeded the applicable maximum concen-

tration levels set by the EPA and State. Pet. App. 97a.

Accordingly, absent a reasonable basis in the record to

find otherwise (and petitioners failed to provide one),

petitioners should be jointly and severally liable for the

entire harm on that ground alone.

Even assuming that petitioners’ respective contribu-

tions were not independently sufficient to have caused

the harm, there is no reason to assume that the ultimate

harm is directly proportional to the volume of hazardous

substances in the plume attributable to each petitioner.

The plume of contamination underlying the facility con-

tains multiple substances, including dinoseb and constit-

uents of D-D and Nemagon. Pet. App. 174a. The share

of harm from a particular volume of waste therefore

depends on a number of variables, including the respec-

tive levels of toxicity and cost of remediation for each

constituent present. (For example, if dinoseb were

much more toxic or much more expensive to extract

than D-D or Nemagon, that might be a basis to conclude

a necessary condition of the clean up, and it would be entirely arbi-

trary to let either (or, even worse, both) off the hook on this basis.

Browning-Ferris Indus. of Ill., Inc. v. Ter Maat, 195 F.3d 953, 958 (7th

Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1098 (2000).

45

that the Railroads are responsible for more of the

harm.) Consistent with their trial strategy of simply

denying all liability, petitioners identify no record sup-

port for the district court’s assumption that each party’s

contribution to the overall harm is proportional to the

relative volume of hazardous substances attributable to

it. As a result, the district court lacked a reasonable

basis for apportioning the harm based on the volumes of

contamination attributable to each petitioner.”

2. There is no reasonable basis to assume that the Raii-

roads’ contribution to the contamination was propor-

tional to its land area and duration of ownership

Even assuming that the volume of the Railroads’

contribetion to the contamination is a sufficient basis on

which to apportion harm, the district court’s estimate

for that contribution lacks a reasonable basis.

a. The Railroads assert (Br. 41-45) that the district

court’s analysis falls within the “long tradition” of ap-

portionment of harm based on geography and time.

That is incorrect. With respect to geography, the court

concluded that, because the Railroads owned only 19.1%

“ The district court’s reliance on /n re Bell Petroleum Services, Inc.

to support such an assumption is misplaced, because that case involved

a single hazardous substance (such that potential variations among the

toxicities and costs of remediation of various constituents were not at

issue). See Pet. App. 248a (citing 3 F.3d 889, 903-904 (5th Cir. 1993)).

The Restatement’s illustrations (see p. 32, supra) of trespassing cattle

damaging crops, or two factories polluting a stream and interfering

with another's use of the water, are similarly inapt. The presumption

underlying those examples—that each cause of the harm has roughly

the same effect—does not apply here. As noted above, the plume con-

tains various hazardous substances, but there is no evidence as to

relative toxicities of those substances or the relative costs of remedi-

ating them.

46

of the facility, the Railroads’ liability should be reduced

proportionally. But that is not an appropriate use of

geographic divisibility. Geographic divisibility is used

to differentiate between two or more distinct harms,

such as non-contiguous areas of contamination or dis-

tinct plumes of groundwater contamination, rather than

to apportion responsibility for a single harm. See, e.g.,

Hercules, Inc., 247 F.3d at 717-718. For example, if two

portions of a landfill are contaminated with hazardous

substances and remediated, a liable party could demon-

strate that none of its hazardous substances contami-

nated one of those portions. Indeed, that principle ex-

plains why Shell was not liable for the geographically-

isolated dinoseb hot spot, which did not contain Shell

chemicals. Pet. App. 56a & n.35.

The Railroads identify no case where a court has

divided a single harm based on the percentage of the

facility that a liable party owned. The most analogous

case of which the government is aware confirms that the

fraction of the facility that the Railroads owned is not a

reasonable basis to determine the harm attributable to

it. See United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1265

(3d Cir. 1993), overruled on other grounds by United

States v. EJ. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 432 F.3d 161,

162-163 (3d Cir. 2005) (en banc). In Rohm & Haas Co.,

the Third Circuit held jointly and severally liable a

party that owned only 10% of the land area of the facil-

ity atissue. 2 F.3d at 1280-1281. In doing so, the Third

Circuit rejected the party’s request for apportionment

based on its percentage of ownership, explaining that

“(tjhe fact that [defendant] only owns a portion of the

site says nothing about what portion of the harm may

47

fairly be attributed to it.” /d. at 1280. The same is true

here.

Even assuming that there was a reasonable basis to

find that spills on the Railroad parcel were proportional

to its size, the district court had no reasonable basis for

assuming whether those spills were more or less likely

to contaminate the subsurface. That would depend on

a number of variables—e.g., the presence of water,

properties of the particular contaminant, porosity of the

surface and soil, wind and temperature—for which the

district court failed to account. Without knowing more

“ The Railroads’ contention (Rr. 48-51) that divisibility based on

geography is particularly appropriate given EPA’s latitude in defining

a CERCLA “facility” misses the mark. First, the text of Section

107(a)(1)-(2) makes clear that Congress chose to assign liability for con-

tamination based on ownership of a facility rather than on ownership of

a particular tract of land. The Railroads do not dispute that ownership

of part of the facility brings them within the statute's coverage. Second,

while landowners are free to argue that EPA’s designation of a partic-

ular “facility” is overly broad, the Railroads here failed to challenge

EPA’s inclusion of their parcel in its initial designation of the facility

(despite actual knowledge of that designation), and they did not appeal

the district court’s conclusion that the Railroad and B&B parcels are a

single facility. Pet. App. 113a, 172a-173a. Third, the Railroads did not

attempt at trial to show that they caused contamination in one isolated

part of the facility but not another. Fourth, the Railroads’ characteriza-

tion (Br. 4) of themselves as innocent landowners ignores the fact that

the Railroads profited from their lease with B&B and stood by while

B&B released hazardous wastes into the environment. As the district

court noted, “[a]s the lessor-land owner, the Railroads had a responsi-

bility to ensure that all activities affecting their leased parcel complied

with all applicable environmental laws.” /d. at 258a-259a. It is also sig-

nificant in that regard that, although CERCLA provides a form of “in-

nocent owner” defense in certain cases where contamination is caused

by “an act or omission of a third party,” the defense is unavailable if the

relevant “act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual rela-

tionship” with the landowner. 42 U.S.C. 9607(b)(3).

48

about those variables, in conjunction with the timing

and location of the releases, the relative level of spills

on each parcel says little about the relative level of ac-

tual contribution to the harm from each parcel. Where

the Railroads’ only trial evidence that the activity on

the Railroad parcel did not contribute at all to the harm

at the facility—was rejected by the district court, there

is no reasonable basis for determining the relative volu-

metric contribution from the Railroad parcel to the

overall contamination. See Pet. App. 248a (“no party

has specifically documented the relative contributions of

contamination from either parcel”); id. at 252a (“no evi-

dence to quantify the difference in volume of the re-

leases” from the Railroad and B&B parcels).

b. Nor is this a situation where, as the Railroads as-

sert (Br. 44-45), the harm is divisible based on time (7.e.,

based on the fact that the Railroads were owners for

45% of the facility’s lifespan). The Restatement’s con-

ception of temporal divisibility is very different from

that adopted by the district court and now endorsed by

the Railroads. The Restatement provides that “if two

defendants, independently operating the same plant,

pollute a stream over successive periods, it is clear that

each has caused a separate amount of harm, limited in

time, and that neither has any responsibility for the

harm caused by the other.” Restatement § 433A cmt. c.

In that example, it is the same plant—presumably gen-

erating the same pollution at the same rate such that

the time each defendant operated the plant may be a

reasonable approximation of the harm to the stream it

caused.

The harm here, however, was not caused by succes-

sive operation of the same harm-causing activity.

Rather, the addition of the Railroad parcel permitted

49

B&B’s facility to expand—presumably expanding its

harm-causing activities. Thus, unlike in the Restate-

ment example, there is no reasonable basis to assume

that the harm is proportional to the duration of opera-

tion. To the contrary, it is more reasonable to assume

that the facility «xcreased its contaminating activities

after the Railroads became involved, such that temporal

divisibility would underestimate their contribution.

The district court’s approach also cannot be recon-

ciled with the fact that Section 107(a)(1) makes the cur-

rent owner and operator of a facility liable, even if all

the contamination occurred before its ownership. Un-

der the district court’s temporal approach, that owner’s

share of liability would always be zero. That could not

have been what Congress had in mind. The prospect of

that anomalous result shows not only that the district

court’s use of temporal divisibility was flawed, but also

that landowner liability is not readily divisible in the

same way as operator or arranger liability.

3. There is no reasonable basis for the district court to

assume that 2/3 of the contamination was from

dinoseb and Nemagon (and thus discount the Rail-

roads’ liability by 1/3)

The district court discounted the Railroads’ liability

by 1/3 based on its assumptions that none of the D-D

contamination requiring remediation originated on the

Railroad parcel and that the other two chemicals (dino-

seb and Nemagon) contributed to 2/3 of the overall con-

tamination. Pet. App. 25la. The first premise is dubi-

ous at best,” and the court identified no record sup-

* The district court's premise that no D-D originated from the Rail-

road parcel conflicts with its other findings. For example, the court cal-

culated that the checking of filters on D-D rigs resulted in D-D spills

50

port for the proposition that dinoseb and Nemagon con-

stituted 2/3 of the total contamination. The supposition

(even if true) that two of three contaminants came from

the Railroad parcel does not support the district court’s

conclusion that those two chemicals caused two-thirds

of the harm.

4. There is no reasonable basis for using spillage esti-

mates from anecdotes and incomplete records to de-

termine Shell’s contribution to the contamination

The district court erred in two ways in its calculation

of Shell’s volumetric contribution to the contamination.

First, the court piled one unsupported assumption onto

another to craft its own estimate of the amount of D-D

spilled during Shell-controlled deliveries as compared to

the total amount of D-D spilled at the facility. Second,

the district court’s calculation depends on the assump-

tion that every spill of D-D caused the same amount of

contamination—an assumption contradicted by the evi-

dence.

a. The district court’s estimate of D-D spilled during

Shell-controlled deliveries hinges on its assumption that

three gallons were spilled during every delivery. See

Pet. App. 254a (“It is further assumed that, on average,

three gallons spilled during every delivery.”). The

court’s assumption, based on sparse anecdotal evidence

(e.g., J.A. 125), fails to account for the obvious possibil-

totaling 20,470 or more gallons, by far the single largest component of

the court’s total estimated D-D spills of 31,212 gallons. Pet. App. 256a.

In turn, the court found that “D-D rigs were parked on the Railroad

parcel” (id. at 91a); that “[blefore taking D-D rigs to the field, B&B

servicemen put on rubber gloves, opened the strainer caps and checked

the filters;” and that such filter checks “resulted in spills of D-D onto

the ground” (ibid.). The court’s own findings therefore indicate that

significant D-D spills occurred on the Railroad parcel.

51

ity that such D-D spills could have been larger on a reg-

ular basis. The district court’s further estimate that

there were 27 Shell-controlled D-D deliveries per year

lacks a reasonable basis as well. See Pet. App. 253a-

254a. To reach that figure, the court concluded that

Shell D-D sales “average[d]” 122,390 gallons per year

over the entire 23-year period for which Shell sold agri-

cultural chemicals to B&B at the Arvin Site. Jbid. (The

court then divided that by an estimated tanker truck

delivery capacity of 4,500 gallons to conclude that there

were 27 deliveries per year.) /bid. The court based its

“average,” however, on just a few years of sales data.

Id. at 89a-90a, 253a. The court did not explain on what

basis it assumed that those years were representative of

the entire 23 years, and it failed to address potential

variables such as market conditions or customer de-

mand. /bid. The court’s reliance on that potentially

unrepresentative sample was particularly misplaced

because Shell bore the burden of proof on apportion-

ment and was in the best position to produce the full

complement of sales records.

The district court applied the same kinds of assump-

tions to “calculate” that D-D spills from non-Shell con-

trolled activities totaled 29,349 gallons, despite acknowl-

edging that such spills “are not quantified.” Pet. App.

254a (“it is assumed that a spill ranged from a cup to a

quart” during transfer to bobtail from storage tanks);

id. at 255a (assuming a 7.5 gallon spill where bobtail

truck was washed out); id. at 256a (spills “of a quart or

less occurred as a result of checking filters on D-D

rigs”). The estimates as to non-Shell controlled spills of

D-D are flawed in other ways as well. For example, for

non-Shell controlled spills from bobtail washing, the

district court “assumed that the bobtails were washed

52

out 70% of the time.” Pet. App. 255a. There is no re-

cord evidence for the 70% figure. To the contrary, the

testimony of a B&B field serviceman (Merryman) sug-

gests that the figure is far lower—resulting in an over-

estimate of the amount of D-D spilled in non-Shell con-

trolled deliveries and thus underestimating Shell’s lia-

bility. J.A. 130-133.

b. The court’s simplistic calculation also assumes

that every gallon of D-D spilled would lead to the same

amount of contamination in the subsurface. But that

ignores the reality that spill impacts could vary consid-

erably depending on various variables, such as the po-

rosity of the spill site and timing in relation to rainfall or

other water events. See Pet. App. 248a (acknowledging

that even a “small spill of 1,2-DCP [D-D] could cause

substantial groundwater contamination”); see also pp.

47-48, supra. For example, the district court’s analysis

ignores the lining of the sump (one of the sources of con-

tamination) in 1979, where the bobtail trucks were

washed out. See Pet. App. 95a (“the sump near the B&B

wash rack was lined in 1979”). Rather than account for

the much lesser likelihood of groundwater contamina-

tion from such non-Shell-controlled activities after 1979,

the district court applied the same assumption that ev-

ery gallon of D-D spilled would result in the same

amount of contamination thereby underestimating the

percentage of D-D contamination attributable to Shell-

controlled deliveries.

In sum, the district court’s decision to proceed with

an “equitable apportionment” on the sparse record left

by petitioners resulted in several critically flawed as-

sumptions. Those assumptions, taken together, do not

comprise a reasonable basis for apportioning the harm

in this case.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the court of appeals should be af-

firmed.

Respectfully submitted.

PATRICIA K. HIRSCH

Acting General Counsel

Environmental Protection

Agency

DECEMBER 2008

GREGORY G. GARRE

Solicitor General

MICHAEL J. GUZMAN

Acting Assistant Attorney

General

MALCOLM L. STEWART

Deputy Solicitor General

PRATIK A. SHAH

Assistant to the Solicitor

General

LISA E. JONES

JAMES R. MACAYEAL

AARON P. AVILA

Attorneys

APPENDIX

1. 42 U.S.C. 9601(29) provides:

The terms “disposal”, “hazardous waste”, and “treat-

ment” shall have the meaning provided in section 1004

of the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C. 6903].

2. 42 U.S.C. 6903(3) provides:

The term “disposal” means the discharge, deposit,

injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any

solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or

water so that such solid waste or hazardous waste or any

constituent thereof may enter the environment or be

emitted into the air or discharged into any waters, in-

cluding ground waters.

3. 42 U.S.C. 9607 provides in pertinent part:

Liability

(a) Covered persons; scope; recoverable costs and dam-

ages; interest rate; “comparable maturity” date

Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law,

and subject only to the defenses set forth in subsection

(b) of this section—

(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facil-

ity,

(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any

hazardous substance owned or operated any facility

at which such hazardous substances were disposed

of,

(la)

2a

(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or

otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or ar-

ranged with a transporter for transport for disposal

or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or pos-

sessed by such person, by any other party or entity,

at any facility or incineration vessel owned or oper-

ated by another party or entity and containing such

hazardous substances, and

(4) any person who accepts or accepted any haz-

ardous substances for transport to disposal or treat-

ment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected

by such person, from which there is a release, or a

threatened release which causes the incurrence of

response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be

liable for—

(A) all costs of removal or remedial action in-

curred by the United States Government or a

State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the

national contingency plan;

(B) any other necessary costs of response in-

curred by any other person consistent with the

national contingency plan;

(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or

loss of natural resources, including the reason-

able costs of assessing such injury, destruction,

or loss resulting from such a release; and

(D) the costs of any health assessment or

health effects study carried out under section

9604(i) of this title.

The amounts recoverable in an action under this section

shall include interest on the amounts recoverable under

3a

subparagraphs (A) through (D). Such interest shall ac-

crue from the later of (i) the date payment of a specified

amount is demanded in writing, or (ii) the date of the

expenditure concerned. The rate of interest on the out-

standing unpaid balance of the amounts recoverable un-

der this section shall be the same rate as is specified for

interest on investments of the Hazardous Substance

Superfund established under subchapter A of chapter 98

of Title 26. For purposes of applying such amendments

to interest under this subsection, the term “comparable

maturity” shall be determined with reference to the date

on which interest accruing under this subsection com-

mences.

(b) Defenses

There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this

section for a person otherwise liable who can establish

by a preponderance of the evidence that the release or

threat of release of a hazardous substance and the dam-

ages resulting therefrom were caused solely by—

(1) an act of God;

(2) an act of war;

(3) an act or omission of a third party other than

an employee or agent of the defendant, or than one

whose act or omission occurs in connection with a

contractual relationship, existing directly or indi-

rectly, with the defendant (except where the sole

contractual arrangement arises from a published

tariff and acceptance for carriage by a common ¢car-

rier by rail), if the defendant establishes by a pre-

ponderance of the evidence that (a) he exercised due

care with respect to the hazardous substance con-

4a

cerned, taking into consideration the characteristics

of such hazardous substance, in light of all relevant

facts and circumstances, and (b) he took precautions

against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such

third party and the consequences that could foresee-

ably result from such acts or omissions; or

(4) any combination of the foregoing paragraphs.

* * * * *

4. 42 U.S.C. 9613(f)(1) provides:

Contribution

(1) Contribution

Any person may seek contribution from any other

person who is liable or potentially liable under section

9607(a) of this title, during or following any civil ac-

tion under section 9606 of this title or under section

9607(a) of this title. Such claims shall be brought in

accordance with this section and the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, and shall be governed by Federal

law. In resolving contribution claims, the court may

allocate response costs among liable parties using

such equitable factors as the court determines are

appropriate. Nothing in this subsection shall dimin-

ish the right of any person to bring an action for con-

tribution in the absence of a civil action under section

9606 of this title or section 9607 of this title.

* * * * +

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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