Respondents Brief — Shell Oil Co. v. United States (Nos. 07-1607, 07-1601)
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Me, \ <a , ey AN alal
WA CV j 3) EW Ces,
d Nos. 07-1601 and 07-1607
Jn the Supreme Court of the Anited States
BURLINGTON NORTHERN AND SANTA FE RAILWAY
COMPANY, ET AL., PETITIONERS
Vv.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FT AL.
SHELL OIL COMPANY, PETITIONER
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES
GREGORY G. GARRE
Solicitor Gencral
Counsel of Record
MICHAEL J. GUZMAN
Acting Assistant Attorney
General
MALCOLM L. STEWART
Deputy Solicitor General
PRATIK A. SHAH
Assistant to the Solicitor
General
LISA E. JONES
JAMES R. MACAYEAL
AARON P. AVILA
Attorneys
PATRICIA K. HIRSCH
Acting General Counsel
Environmental Protection
Anency
Washington, D.C. 20460
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20580-0001
(202) 514-2217
ie
tte
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether the court of appeals correctly affirmed
the district court’s determination that petitioner Shell
Oil Company is liable under Section 107(a)(3), 42 U.S.C.
9607(a)(3), of the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601 et seg., as an entity that “ar-
ranged for disposal” of hazardous substances.
2. Whether the court of appeals properly held peti-
tioners jointly and severally liable under CERCLA for
the response costs of the United States and California
governments, based on the court’s conclusion that peti-
tioners did not satisfy their evidentiary burden of pro-
viding a reasonable basis to apportion liability.
(1)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
‘
Page
RETA ae ROE hE PP eee ie Pant 1
EEE PPR SSE L TEE Pe 12
A stadia aud ok 4d Renee Head eekNe een kaw’ 16
I. Shell is liable under the terms of CERCLA because it
“arranged for disposal” of a hazardous substance and
ois a cid cteedanewcdeceesess
A. Shell was properly held liable as an arranger
under Section 107(a)<3), based on its entry into
transactions that it knew would directly result
in disposals of hazardous substances .............
1. Arranger liability is not limited to trans-
actions designed primarily for disposal ........
2. Shell’s knowledge and role in the disposal of its
hazardous substances during its arrangement
with B&B creates arranger liability ...........
B. Shell identifies no sound basis for limiting
arranger liability where a manufacturer engag-
es in transactions that it knows will directly
result in disposals of its hazardous substances .....
1. Lack of intent to dispose of a hazardous sub-
stance during a transaction does not
preclude arranger liability where the
arranger has advance knowledge of the
EE ca eLu CCU UO RSE EGh US eke s in0s0 000+
2. Section 107(a)(3) encompasses the disposal
of hazardous substances through spills and
PE Rabun cade s 6 eked Obs Ob ube ONE bic 09 000
3. Arranger liability does not require owner-
ship or actual control of the hazardous sub-
stance at the time of disposal .................
(IIT)
26
IV
Table of Contents—Continued:
II. The district court erred in refusing to hold petitioners
jointly and severally liable when petitioners failed to
establish a reasonable basis for apportionment
A. Consistent with Restatement principles,
CERCLA liability for a single harm is joint
and several unless the liable party proves a
reasonable basis for apportionment ........
. The district court erred as a matter of law
by declining to impose joint and several
liability after petitioners failed to establish
any reasonable basis to apportion liability . . .
. The district court’s unsubstantiated
assumptions and gross approximations do
not constitute a reasonable basis to
apportion the harm in this case ............
1. There is no reasonable basis to assume
that each petitioner’s share of the ulti-
mate harm is proportional to its volum-
tric contribution to the contamination ....
2. There is no reasonable basis to assume
that the Railroads’ contribution to the
contamination was proportional to its
land area and duration of ownership. ....
3. There is no reasonable basis for the
district court to assume that 2/3 of the
contamination was from dinoseb and
Nemagon (and thus discount the Rail-
Ce Ey os kwddccavecccce.
4. There is no reasonable basis for using
spillage estimates from anecdotes and
incomplete records to determine Shell’s
contribution to the contamination .......
ooo &
Vv
Table of Contents—Continued: Page
SIDE 4-5 4.5: 4 weed ours nbd odinie be adch dace ee 53
PI so hv accenncndnegstenbeetGheneeebeneeesennens la
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 2 F.3d 746 (7th
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1044 (1994) ........ 25
Bell Petroleum Servs., Inc., In re, 3 F.3d 889 (5th Cir.
GE. duce ckdewcanesecbpescenenseeucelss 45
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Ill., Inc. v. Ter Maat, 195
F.3d 953 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1098
Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375 (7th Cir. 1992) ........
Catellus Dev. Corp. v. United States., 34 F.3d 748 (9th
SRG c odo'y cele camunwaeens eases onsiee
Centerior Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal
Corp., 153 F.3d 344 (6th Cir. 1998) ..............4..
Chem-Nuclear Sys., Inc. v. Bush, 292 F.3d 254 (D.C.
I io xU-din vk wb ews eae cae ee uae aie cea bulks
Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp.,
808 F.2d 1313 (llth Cir. 1900) ........ cc cccccccce
Freeman v. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., 189 F.3d 160
ME i Cvs cae eu eb eneeheece ee enebens
Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552 (1941) .............
Louisiana & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467
DE s 2:6 5ane cabaeuhoeswwoeeeneeesee tee
Morton Int'l, Inc. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 343 F.3d
Se A EE os cok cdscdepecceecnuacentaeeeael
VI
Cases—Continued: Page
Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135 (2008) ......... 31
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989) ..... 2,3
Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville &
Denton R.R., 142 F.3d 769 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
re he Bs cht bd eae 6 06's 000s 24
South Fla. Water Mgmt. v. Montalvo, 84 F.3d 402
i dS oli eeaeeeweudbeaeep eves ey 19
United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d
ee seca cab eevee cases 3, 17, 18, 19
United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp.:
I, BED og ccc cccccccescecccece 3
315 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540
ee eee henceeees 38
United States v. Alean Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d
Tee eka vesesbenes 3
United States v. Atlantic Research Corp., 127 S. Ct.
I ee OL, ake we hc seeesenséee 34
United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51
ESE Ne ee ee a a 2, 3, 18, 19, 30
United States v. Capital Tax Corp., 545 F.3d 525 (7th
United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802
EEE ee ey a 4
United States v. Hercules, Inc., 247 F.3d 706 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1065 (2001) ..... 4, 33, 35, 46
United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989) .......... 3, 33
Vil
Cases—Continued: Page
United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1265 (3d
Cir. 1993), overruled on other grounds, [/nited
States v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 432 F.3d
Pe ES bo Seb oeievedece ‘ideadeues 34, 46, 47
United States v. Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d 307
ee oa be ee anes 33
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000) ............... 27
Statutes:
Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C.
9601 et seq.:
IE nonce us cctocvenetéeee 17, 26, la
de oc os oi voneeceucee beans 2
42 U.S.C. 9607(a) (§ 107(a)) ...........0206. passim
42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(1)-(2) (§ 107(a)(1)-(2)) ..... 6,47, la
Se 3, la
42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(1) (§ 107(a)(1)) .......... 15, 49, la
42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(2) (§ 107(a)(2)) .... 2.6.2.2... 27, 1a
42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(3) (§ 107(a)(3)) .. 2.2... passim
42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(4)(A)
ne Sa nc dvbe wéan vanes passim
ia edu tinccnveneueeds 3, 3a
42 U.S.C. 9607(b)(3) (§ 107(b)(3)) .. 2.2.26... 6, 47, 3a
42 U.S.C. 9607(0)-(r) (§ 107(0)-(r) (Supp V.
42 U.S.C. 9607(0) (§ 107(0)) (Supp. V 2005) ........ 4
42 U.S.C. 9607(p) (§ 107(p)) (Supp. V 2005) ........ 4
42 U.S.C. 9607(q) (§ 107(q)) (Supp. V 2005) ........5
Vill
Statutes—Continued: Page
42 U.S.C. 9607(r) (§ 107(r)) (Supp. V 2005) ......... 5
42 U.S.C. 9613(f) (§ 113(f)) ............. 4, 14, 34, 40
42 U.S.C. 9613(f)(1) (§ 118(f))) .. 6... 4, 15, 34, 4a
42 U.S.C. 9622(g) (2000 & Supp. V 2005) .......... 5
I ce i cacccndonesthecesademeuss 17, 27, la
i, dwh a ceunepewnetencekeeswwel 3
Miscellaneous:
126 Cong. Rec. (1980):
PE Shee es wee wege nkeeendend.eee be dite 39
es ee aie de due k ee E Nenad ewes 30
H.R. Rep. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. Pt. I (1985) ...31
Letter from Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legislative Affairs to Chairman, Subecomm. on
Transportation and Commerce, House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. (Dec. 1, 1980), 126 Fed. Reg. 31,966 n.*
as han wads ce ocak Ad dei eae eae 00s e000 0% 33
Letter from GAO to Hon. James M. Jeffords
regarding the GAO-04-475R Superfund Program
Se rin ddebens cused idavcuncebsscens « 31
Random House Dictionary of the English Language
SE Rebdiadedeeendsds qeasesenvesseeswsaes 17
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) ........... passim
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of
Se eee eleees eckec ns hensekabue 31
S. Rep. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) ......3, 28, 30
U.C.C. § 2-319(1)(b) (14th ed. 1995) ................... 21
4 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States
No. 07-1601
BURLINGTON NORTHERN AND SANTA FE RAILWAY
COMPANY, ET AL., PETITIONERS
Vz.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.
No. 07-1607
SHELL OIL COMPANY, PETITIONER
Vv.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES
STATEMENT
This case arises from actions taken by the United
States and the State of California to address hazardous-
substance contamination at a former agricultural chemi-
cal storage and distribution facility located in Arvin,
California. The United States and the State brought a
cost-recovery action against petitioners, two railroad
companies (the Railroads) and a chemical] manufacturer
(Shell), under CERCLA Section 107(a), 42 U.S.C.
(1)
2
9607(a), which authorizes federal and state governments
to recover their response costs from persons who have
a statutorily specified nexus to the contamination. After
a bench trial, the district court found the Railroads and
Shell to be liable parties under CERCLA, and further
found that the Railroads and Shell were liable for 9%
and 6% of the response costs, respectively. Pet. App.
82a-262a. The court of appeals affirmed in part and re-
versed in part, holding that Shell was a liable party and
that petitioners were jointly and severally liable for the
full costs of the cleanup activities undertaken by the
United States and California. /d. at la-57a.
1. Congress enacted CERCLA “in response to the
serious environmental and health risks posed by indus-
trial pollution.” United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51,
55 (1998). CERCLA “both provides a mechanism for
cleaning up hazardous-waste sites, and imposes the
costs of the cleanup on those responsible for the contam-
ination.” Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1,7
(1989) (citation omitted).
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is au-
thorized to clean up a contaminated site, drawing
from the federal government’s Superfund, and then to
sue to recover its cleanup costs. 42 U.S.C. 9604(a),
9607(a)(4)(A). To establish a prima facie case, the Uni-
ted States must show that a “release” or “threatened
release” of a “hazardous substance” from a “facility” has
caused the United States to incur cleanup costs. 42
U.S.C. 9607(a). The United States must further estab-
lish that the defendant falls within at ieast one of four
classes of covered persons: (1) the owner and operator
of the facility, (2) the owner or operator of the facility at
the time that disposal of hazardous substances occurred,
(3) persons who “arranged for disposal” or treatment of
3
hazardous substances, and (4) certain transporters of
hazardous substances. 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(1)-(4).
Subiect to limited defenses not implicated in these
cases, any person within the categories described above
is liable to the government for “all costs of removal or
remedial action incurred” by the United States “not in-
consistent with the national contingency plan.” 42 U.S.C.
9607(a)(4)(A) and (b); 40 C.F.R. Pt. 300. Under the ap-
portionment rules developed by lower federal courts
pursuant to pre-existing common-law principles, a cov-
ered party is jointly and severally liable to the govern-
ment for the entire amount of response costs unless it
proves that the harm from the release of hazardous sub-
stances is divisible.’ That rule furthers Congress’s pur-
pose of ensuring that the costs of remediation are borne
by those with a defined nexus to the contamination,
rather than by the general public. See Bestfoods, 524
U.S. at 56 n.1 (“The remedy that Congress felt it needed
in CERCLA is sweeping: everyone who is potentially
responsible for hazardous-waste contamination may be
forced to contribute to the costs of cleanup.”) (quoting
Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. at 21 (plurality opinion of
Brennan, J.)); S. Rep. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13
(1980) (stating Congress’s “goal of assuring that those
who caused chemical harm bear the cost of that harm”).
In analyzing divisibility of harm in Section
107(a)(4)(A) actions, courts follow the Restatement (Sec-
' See, e.g., Centerior Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp.,
153 F.3d 344, 348 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Alcan Aluminum
Corp., 990 F.2d 711, 721-722 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Alcan
Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 268-269 (3d Cir. 1992); United States
v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1377 (8th Cir. 1989), Uni-
ted States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 167, 171-172 (4th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989).
4
ond) of Torts (1965) (Restatement). See, e.g., United
States v. Hercules, Inc., 247 F.3d 706, 717 (8th Cir. 2001)
(recognizing Restatement as the “universal starting
point”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1065 (2001); United States
v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D. Ohio
1983) (establishing framework). Restatement § 433A
provides that damages may be apportioned where there
are distinct harms or where there is a “reasonable basis
for determining the contribution of each cause to a sin-
gle harm.” The party seeking apportionment has the
burden of proof. See Restatement § 433B(2); see also,
e.g., Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 810. Where a liable
party cannot meet its burden, it is jointly and severally
liable “for the full amount of the harm.” Chem-Nuclear
Sys., Inc. v. Bush, 292 F.3d 254, 260 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
A party held jointly and severally liable may file a
separate contribution action pursuant to CERCLA Sec-
tion 113(f)(1) against other liable or potentially liable
parties. 42 U.S.C. 9613(f)(1). Section 113(f), added six
years after CERCLA’s enactment, reflects Congress’s
compromise response to the potentially disproportionate
burden placed on certain covered parties by CERCLA’s
liability provisions. Section 113(f)(1) provides that “[iJn
resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate
response costs among liable parties using such equitable
factors as the court determines are appropriate.” /bid.*
* Congress has also amended CERCLA in other ways to limit the
breadth of CERCLA liability. In January 2002, for example, Congress
enacted an exemption from liability at National Priority List (NPL)
sites for those persons who sent less than 110 gallons of liquid materials
or less than 200 pounds of solid materials to the site (§ 107(0)); an ex-
emption for certain categories of persons from liability at NPL sites for
disposing of municipal solid waste (§ 107(p)); a defense to liability for
certain owners of property located contiguous to, and contaminated by,
5
2. In 1960, Brown & Bryant, Inc. (B&B) began to
operate an agricultural chemical! distribution business
on a 3.8-acre parcel of land (the B&B parcel). Pet. App.
12a. In 1975, B&B expanded its operations by leasing a
0.9-acre parcel owned by the Railroads (the Railroad
parcel) that adjoined the B&B parcel to the west. /bid.
B&B used the Railroad parcel as an “integral part” of
its agricultural chemical operations and treated the two
parcels as a single facility. 7d. at 86a. The Railroad par-
cel was graded toward a pond on the B&B parcel. /d. at
12a. B&B ceased operating the facility in 1989 and is
now insolvent. /d. at 83a-84a.
Among the Shell-manufactured products stored and
distributed at B&B’s facility were two pesticides, D-D
and Nemagon. Pet. App. 13a. B&B also stored dinoseb,
a weed killer, supplied by another company. /bid.
Chemical constituents of all three products have been
banned by EPA or withdrawn from use as pesticides due
to threats to human health and the environment. Gov’t
C.A. E.R. 69-70. EPA has also listed the relevant con-
stituents to be hazardous substances for CERCLA pur-
poses. Pet. App. 174a.
During their transfer and storage, the chemicals rou-
tinely spilled and leaked onto both parcels. Pet. App.
13a-14a, 1380a. Over the course of the facility’s opera-
tion, hazardous substances entered the subsurface, cre-
hazardous waste sites (§ 107(q)); and a defense to liability for bona fide
prospective purchasers of contaminated property (§ 107(r)). 42 U.S.C.
9607(0)-(r) (Supp. V 2005). In addition, those who do not qualify for
Section 107(0)’s exemption, but who sent a relatively small amount of
hazardous substances to a site, may enter into a de minimis settlement,
under which they make a limited cash payment to EPA in exchange for
an immediate release from past and future liability at the site. 42
U.S.C. 9622(g¢) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
6
ating areas of contaminated soil and, of particular con-
cern, a plume of contaminated groundwater that threat-
ens municipal drinking water supplies. /d. at 14a, 172a-
174a, 245a-246a. After investigations, the United States
and the State began to clean up the contamination at the
facility pursuant to their response authority under
CERCLA. /d. at 14a-15a.
3. In 1996, the United States and the State filed suit
under CERCLA Section 107(a) to recover their response
costs, naming as defendants B&B, the Railroads, and
Shell. In 2003, after a bench trial, the district court is-
sued its Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law. Pet. App. 82a-262a. |
a. The district court held that the United States and
the State had established a prima facie case of CERCLA
liability. Pet. App. 163a-219a. The court determined
that the entire site, encompassing both the B&B and
Railroad parcels, constitutes a single “facility.” Jd. at
172a-173a. The court found that site operations released
hazardous substances “from and located throughout the
facility, particularly in the form of contaminated ground-
water,” and that the plume “poses an indivisible threat
of leaching and diffusing contaminants to lower ground-
water suitable for drinking.” /d. at 172a. The court fur-
ther found that the soil and groundwater at the facility
are contaminated with, among other hazardous sub-
stances, the constituents of the two Shell products as
well as dinoseb. /d. at 88a, 174a.
The district court found that the Railroads were re-
sponsible parties under CERCLA Section 107(a)(1)-(2),
42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(1)-(2), as owners of the facility and as
owners of the facility at the time of disposal. Pet. App.
176a-179a, 186a-187a. The court rejected the Railroads’
proffered defense under CERCLA Section 107(b)(3), 42
7
U.S.C. 9607(b)(3), under which a defendant must show
that “the release or threatened release was caused
solely by an unrelated third party.” Pet. App. 180; see
id. at 184a-187a. The court explained that “[a] ‘contrac-
tual relationship’ between the Railroads and B&B ex-
isted,” that the Railroads “periodically inspected B&B’s
plant and had actual knowledge” of B&B’s operations,
and that “B&B used the leased parcel to store chemicals
where leaks would often occur.” /d. at 184a-185a; see id.
at 176a, 178a-179a. The court further determined that
the Railroads had “submitted no evidence that they took
any action to prevent or mitigate their lessee’s conduct
on the Site, which ignored the hazards of continuous
spills, releases and reckless practices in the unloading,
storage, formulating and loading of toxic ag-chemicals.”
Id. at 185a. The court found that the Railroads had
“failed to show that they acted with due care” or “took
any precautionary actions against the foreseeable re-
sults of B&B’s activities in storing and handling hazard-
ous ag chemicals on the Railroad parcel.” /bid.
The district court also held that Shell was liable pur-
suant to CERCLA Section 107(a)(3), 42 U.S.C.
9607(a)(3), as a party who had “arranged for disposal” of
hazardous substances. Pet. App. 204a, 208a-213a. The
court found that Shell had “determined and arranged for
the means and methods of delivery of the D-D to the
Arvin plant”; that Shell had “hired common carrier de-
livery trucks to haul D-D to B&B’s Arvin plant”; that
B&B was required to follow the Shell manual which pro-
vided “detailed loading and unloading procedures”; and
that over one period Shell had “required B&B to store
highly corrosive D-D in bulk tanks, at a time when the
distributors did not have the equipment or capital to
deal with the corrosive D-D.” /d. at 208a-209a. The
8
court further found that Shell “was an active participant
in the D-D shipment, delivery and receiving process at
Arvin with knowledge that spills and leaks of hazardous
D-D were inherent and inevitable,” and that such spills
and leaks “occurred throughout the period Shell sold
D-D to B&B.” Jd. at 204a.
b. The district court then addressed whether the
Railroads and Shell should be held jointly and severally
liable for the response costs incurred by the United
States and the State.
The district court found that the harm at the site “is
a single harm which consists of contaminated soil at var-
ious locations and depths around the Site and one mass
(plume) of contaminated groundwater.” Pet. App. 245a-
246a. The court also explained that the Railroads and
Shell had presented no evidence or argument to demon-
strate a reasonable basis for apportioning that harm:
Apportionment in this case is exacerbated by defen-
dants’ “scorched earth,” all-or-nothing approach to
liability. Neither acknowledged an iota of responsi-
bility, in the case of Shell, for causing “releases of
hazardous substances,[”] and in the case of the Rail-
roads, that any release of hazardous substance that
required response occurred on [the} Railroad parcel
throughout the 13 year lease terms.
Id. at 236a. The court further found that “no party has
specifically documented the relative contributions of
contamination from either parcel,” id. at 248a, and that
there is “no evidence to quantify the difference in vol-
ume of the releases” from the Railroad and B&B par-
cels, 2d. at 252a.
The district court summarized the situation before it
by stating that “[a]ll parties” to the suits had “effec-
9
tiveiy abdicated providing any helpful arguments to the
court.” Pet. App. 236a-237a. In the court’s view, that
dearth of assistance from the parties had “left the court
to independently perform the equitable apportionment
analysis demanded by the circumstances of the case.”
Id. at 237a. In determining the percentage of the total
response costs for which the Railroads would be held
liable, the district court calculated the surface area of
the Railroad parcel to be 19.1% of the total site surface
area and the 13-year duration of the B&B-Railroad lease
to be 45% of the site’s total 29 years of operation. /d. at
247a. The court assumed that none of the D-D contami-
nation originated from the Railroad parcel and that
Nemagon and dinoseb “contributed to 2/3 of overall Site
contamination.” /d. at 25la. The court then multiplied
the three percentages and arrived at 6%. Id. at 252a.
The court adjusted the Railroads’ liability, “[a]Jllowing
for calculation errors up to 50%,” to 9% of the total re-
sponse costs. /bid.
The district court acknowledged that “Shell did not
present evidence how its products’ contribution to the
contamination at the Arvin facility can be apportioned.”
Pet. App. 252a. The court nonetheless estimated
the amount of D-D spilled during “Shell controlled” de-
liveries and then the amount of D-D spilled for al) other
activities. Jd. at 256a. Dividing the estimated volume
spilled during Shell-controlled deliveries by the total
estimated volume of D-D spills, the court held Shell sev-
erally liable for 6% of the response costs. /d. at
256a-257a.
4. The court of appeals affirmed in part and re-
versed in part. Pet. App. la-81la.
a. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s
ruling that Shell is a liable party under CERCLA as one
10
who “arranged for disposal” of hazardous substances.
Pet. App. 44a-55a. The court observed that “arranger”
liability extends not only to direct arrangements for dis-
posal of hazardous substances, but also to arrangements
in which such disposal is a foreseeable byproduct
(though not the purpose) of the transaction. Jd. at
48a-50a. The court noted that CERCLA’s definition of
“disposal” includes the unintentional processes of “spill-
ing” and “leaking.” /d. at 50a-5la. The court inferred ©
from that definition that “an entity can be an arranger
even if it did not intend to dispose of the product. Ar-
ranging for a transaction in which there necessarily
would be leakage or some other form of disposal of haz-
ardous substances is sufficien:.” /d. at 51a.
The court of appeals then recounted the evidence
supporting “arranger” liability here:
(1) Spills occurred every time the deliveries were
made; (2) Shell arranged for delivery and chose the
common carrier that transported its product to the
Arvin site; (3) Shell changed its delivery process so
as to require the use of large storage tanks, thus ne-
cessitating the transfer of large quantities of chemi-
cals and causing leakage from corrosion of the large
stee] tanks; (4) Shell provided a rebate for improve-
ments in B & B’s bulk handling and safety facilities
and required an inspection by a qualified engineer;
(5) Shell regularly would reduce the purchase price
of the D-D, in an amount the district court concluded
was linked to loss from leakage; and (6) Shell distrib-
uted a manual and created a checklist of the manual
requirements, to ensure that D-D tanks were being
operated in accordance with Shell’s safety instruc-
tions.
11
Pet. App. 53a-54a. The court held that the district
court’s findings “demonstrate that Shell had sufficient
control over, and knowledge of, the transfer process to
be considered an ‘arranger,’ within the meaning of
CERCLA, for the disposal of the chemicals that leaked.”
Id. at 55a. }
b. The court of appeals reversed the district court’s
apportionment of harm and held petitioners jointly and
severally liable for the full costs of the response actions,
except for a “Dinoseb hot spot” for which Shell was not
liable. Pet. App. 19a-47a, 56a-57a.
After agreeing that the harm in this case was theo-
retically capable of apportionment, the court of appeals
reviewed the district court’s actual apportionment for
clear error, using Restatement § 433A as its starting
point. Pet. App. 22a, 36a-37a. With respect to the Rail-
roads, it held that the district court’s apportionment
calculation (based solely on percentage of land area,
duration of ownership, and the Railroads’ responsibility
for two of the three distinct contaminants at the site)
lacked a reasonable basis in the record. /d. at 37a-44a.
The court concluded that the numbers the district court
had used “bore insufficient logical connection to the per-
tinent question: What part of the contaminants found on
the Arvin parcel were attributable to the presence of
toxic substances or to activities on the Railroad parcel?”
Id. at 43a.
With respect to Shell, the court of appeals held that
the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to formu-
late even a rough approximation of Shell’s proportional
share of the site contamination. Pet. App. 44a-45a. The
court found that the leakage evidence in the record did
not provide a reasonable basis to sustain the district
court’s analysis because the site was contaminated with
12
a number of chemicals, and because Shell had failed to
introduce any evidence from which a court could identify
the percentage of the soil contamination that was attrib-
utable to its leaked chemicals. /bid. As the court ex-
plained, the record lacked that evidence “most likely
because Shell put its eggs in the no-liability basket.” Jd.
at 47a.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
CERCLA’s critical cost-recovery remedy is designed
to place the costs of cleaning up contamination from haz-
ardous substances on parties who have a demonstrated
nexus to the contamination, rather than on the general
public. Because Shell knew that its contract to supply
B&B with agricultural chemicals directly and routinely
resulted in spills and leaks that expressly qualify as dis-
posals of hazardous substances covered by CERCLA,
Shell is liable as an “arranger” of those disposals. And
because neither Shell nor the Railroads established a
reasonable evidentiary basis for apportioning the single
harm at issue here, the court of appeals correctly held
that those parties were jointly and severally liable for
the response costs at issue.
I. A. Congress specified that a party may be liable
under CERCLA if it “arrange[s] for” activities whose
direct and anticipated consequence is the “disposal” of
hazardous substances, even if that disposal is not the
purpose of the transaction. Although CERCLA does not
define the term “arrange for,” it defines “disposal” to
include the acts of spilling and leaking. That definition
implies that arranger liability is not limited to transac-
tions involving intentional disposals. That interpreta-
tion is consistent both with the common law (under
which a party may be held liable for arranging a trans-
13
action that it knows will create a nuisance, see Restate-
ment § 427B), and with CERCLA’s purpose of placing
the costs of remediation on those responsible for the
disposal of hazardous substances.
As the courts below found, the record in this case
amply demonstrates that Shell arranged for and was an
active participant in the delivery of its agricultural
chemicals to B&B. Those deliveries directly and rou-
tinely resulted in disposals of hazardous substances
(through spills and leaks) for more than 20 years, and
Shell had actual knowledge of that fact. Under those
circumstances, both the district court and court of ap-
peals correctly determined that Shell had “arranged for
disposal” of hazardous substances, and relieving Shell of
its obligation to pay for response costs would directly
contravene CERCLA’s objective of holding responsible
parties—rather than the taxpaying public—acountable
for their activities.
B. Shell’s proffered bases for avoiding arranger lia-
bility lack merit. The fact that a transaction involves the
delivery of a useful product does not preclude arranger
liability where (as here) the arranger knows that dis-
posal of a hazardous substance—through spills and
leaks, or otherwise—will occur during the course of the
transaction. Moreover, contrary to Shell’s contention,
Section 107(a)(3) imposes liability if a person “arranged
for disposal * * * of hazardous substances,” not just haz-
ardous waste.
Shell is also wrong in arguing that Section 107(a)(3)
limits arranger hability to circumstances in which the
defendant retains ownership, possession, or actual con-
trol of its hazardous substances at the time of disposal.
That provision broadly encompasses “any person who by
contract, agreement, or otherwise” arranges for some
14
“other party or entity” to dispose of its hazardous sub-
stances. Although Section 107(a)(3) refers to “hazard-
ous substances owned or possessed by” the arranger,
that language refers to ownership or possession at the
time the arrangement is made. Shell’s contrary rule,
under which an arranger could escape liability simply by
transferring ownership and control of its hazardous sub-
stances to another party who agrees to carry out the
actual disposal, would render Section 107(a)(3) ineffec-
tual in the paradigmatic arranger case.
II. A. Consistent with Restatement principles, the
courts of appeals uniformly have held that Section
107(a)(4)(A) liability for a single harm is joint and sev-
eral unless the defendant establishes a reasonable basis
for apportioning the harm. At the same time, however,
lower courts have uniformly recognized that, after joint
and several liability has been imposed, a defendant may
invoke the separate CERCLA provision authorizing
suits for contribution, under which the court may weigh
equitable factors in allocating costs, to seek from other
responsible parties the portion of costs paid beyond its
fair share. See 42 U.S.C. 9613(f)(1). That settled frame-
work is consistent with the common law and permits
courts fairly to divide response costs among responsible
parties.
B. Rather than attempt to establish an evidentiary
basis for apportioning costs in this case, the Railroads
and Shell made a strategic choice to pursue a “‘scorched
earth,’ all-or-nothing approach to liability.” Pet.
App. 236a. Nevertheless, despite acknowledging that
neither the Railroads nor Sheil had provided any eviden-
tiary basis for apportionment, the district court per-
formed what it called “the equitable apportionment anal-
ysis demanded by the circumstances of this case.” /d. at
15
237a. That was error. The district court conflated its
task of apportionment under Section 107(a) with the
court’s role in a separate contribution action under Sec-
tion 113(f)(1), which authorizes consideration of a broad
range of equitable factors. As a result, the district court
felt compelled to apportion the harm in this case out of
a sense of equity because the primary polluter was
insolvent—notwithstanding the lack of a reasonable ba-
sis for apportionment. That approach was seriously
flawed, both because it absolved petitioners of their bur-
den of establishing a sound evidentiary basis for appor-
tionment, and because under Restatement principles the
insolvency of another responsible party weighs against
rather than in favor of apportionment.
C. The district court’s equitable apportionment re-
lied on numerous unsubstantiated assumptions and
gross approximations. First, there is no reasonable ba-
sis to assume that each petitioner’s share of the ultimate
harm is proportional to its volumetric contribution to the
contamination. Each source of contamination may have
been independently sufficient to have caused the harm
requiring remediation, and the district court failed to
account for the relative toxicities or costs of remediation
of the different constituents—presumably because the
record lacked that information. Seeond, there is no rea-
sonable basis to assume that the Railroads’ contribution
to the contamination was proportional to their land area
and duration of ownership. Geographic divisibility dees
not mean that a landowner is liable only for the percent-
age of the facility it owned. And temporal divisibility
for landowners is inherently problematic (indeed, it can
have the extreme consequence of negating landewner
liability under Section 107(4)(1) altogether), especially
where (as here) there is no reason to béheve that the
16
degree of contamination remained constant over time.
Third, there is no reasonable basis for the district court
to have assumed that 2/8 of the total contamination was
from dinoseb and Nemagon. Fourth, there is no reason-
able basis for using estimates from anecdotes and in-
complete records to determine the relative volume of
Shell’s spills, and the district court failed to account for
various factors (¢.g., water, porosity, solubility) neces-
sary to correlate those spill volumes with the actual con-
tamination. The upshot is that the district court’s ap-
portionment analysis, on which petitioners rely, has no
foundation in the record, or CERCLA.
ARGUMENT
I. SHELL IS LIABLE UNDER THE TERMS OF CERCLA
BECAUSE IT “ARRANGED FOR DISPOSAL” OF A HAZ-
ARDOUS SUBSTANCE AND NOT MERELY FOR A SALE
CERCLA Section 107(a)(3) imposes liability on:
any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise
arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with
a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment,
of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such
person, by any other party or entity, at any facility
or incineration vessel owned or operated by another
party or entity and containing such hazardous sub-
stances.
42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(3). Shell agreed to supply agricultural
chemicals to B&B, knowing that its chemicals were rou-
timely spilled and leaked (i.e., disposed of) during the
delivery process. The court of appeals properly con-
cluded that, by arranging that transaction, Shell “ar-
17
ranged for” the “disposal” (through the attendant spill-
ing and leakage) of its hazardous substances."
A. Shell Was Properly Held Liable As An Arranger Under
Section 107(a)(3), Based On Its Entry Into Transactions
That It Knew Would Directly Result In Disposals Of
Hazardous Substances
1. Arranger liability is not limited to transactions de-
signed primarily for disposal
CERCLA provides that individuals or entities that
“arranged for” the disposal of hazardous substances
may be held accountable for the costs of cleaning up
those substances. 42 U.S.C. 107(a)(3). The dictionary
defines “arrange” as “to prepare or plan.” Random
House Dictionary of the English Language 116 (2d ed.
1987); see Webster’s Third New International Dictio-
nary 120 (1976) (“to make preparations”). The term
“disposal” is defined specifically in CERCLA, and it in-
cludes the unintentional acts of spilling and leaking. 42
U.S.C. 6903(3) (“The term ‘disposal’ means the dis-
charge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or
placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on
any land or water.”); see 42 U.S.C. 9601(29) (adopting
definition of “disposal” in Section 6903(3)). If a party
enters into a transaction that it knows will directly re-
sult in disposal of its hazardous substances including
through spilling or leaking then it is naturally said to
“arrange for” the disposal itself. See United States v.
Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1380 (8th Cir.
* The Railroads’ brief in this Court does not address whether Shell's
conduet gave rise to arranger liability under Section 107(a)(3). In the
court of appeals, however, the Railroads argued that the district court
had correctly held Shell liable as an arranger, for several of the reasons
explained herein. See Railroads Second C.A. Br. 16-38.
18
1989) (rejecting argument that defendants could be lia-
ble as arrangers “only if they intended to dispose of a
waste”) (emphasis added). Section 107(a)(3)’s use of the
phrase “by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged
for,” 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(3) (emphasis added), reinforces
that reading by making clear that the provision covers
modes of “arrangling]” that do not involve an express
contractual commitment.
That understanding of arranger liability also accords
with the common-law background against which
CERCLA was enacted, of which Congress was presum-
ably aware. See, e.g., United States v. Bestfoods, 524
U.S. 51, 63 (1998) (holding that common-law principles
are to apply unless CERCLA “speak{s] directly to the
question”); Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1382 (approving use of the
common law to interpret CERCLA’s arranger-liability
provision). Restatement § 427B, for example, provides:
“One who employs an independent contractor to do work
which the employer knows or has reason to know to be
likely to * * * creati(e]* * * a private nuisance, is sub-
ject to liability for harm resulting * * * from such
* * * nuisance.” Cf. Restatement §§ 413, 416, 427,
427A. Arranger liability rests on the same principles.
In this case, Shell employed commo~ carriers (and con-
tracted with B&B) to deliver hazardous substances that
it knew would spill and leak during every delivery. See
Pet. App. 259a; infra, pp. 20-23. Common-law under-
standings therefore support the imposition of liability on
a party who arranges a transaction that it knows will
directly result in the disposal of hazardous substances.*
* As the quotation from Restatement § 427B in the text indicates, a
person whu employed an independent contractor was traditionally liable
not. only when the employer possessed actual knowledge that the work
would create a nuisance, but also when he “hald| reason to know” that
19
That construction of Section 107(a)(3) is also consis-
tent with CERCLA’s “sweeping” remedial purposes.
Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 56 n.1 (citation omitted); see, e.g.,
Morton Int'l, Inc. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 343 F.3d 669,
676 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Our view that ‘arranged for’ is to be
broadly construed is consistent with Congress’s overall
purpose in enacting CERCLA.”). When an entity ar-
ranges for activities that it knows will result in the dis-
posal of hazardous substances, the imposition of liability
under Section 107(a)(3) ensures that the costs of reme-
diation can be placed on those who are responsible for,
or who benefit from, the disposal of hazardous wastes.
See p. 3, supra; South Fla. Water Mgmt. v. Montalvo, 84
F.3d 402, 407-409 (11th Cir. 1996) (noting importance for
Section 107(a)(3) purposes of defendant’s knowledge (or
lack thereof) that hazardous substances would be spilled
incident to pesticide spraying, because such knowledge
would demonstrate that defendant “implicitly agreed to
the disposal”).°
such a result was “likely.” Similarly, under Section 107(a)(3), the owner
of hazardous substances may be liable as an “arranger” if he enters into
a transaction whose likely consequence is the disposal of hazardous sub-
stances, even if the owner lacks actual knowledge that a disposal will
oecur. Because Shell was shown to have actual knowledge that spills
and leaks routinely occurred during the deliveries, the Court need not
determine in what additional circumstances arranger liability would be
proper.
* Similarly, in Aceto, a pesticide manufacturer arranged to send its
product to a formulator for processing (7.e., converting from technical-
grade to commercial-grade pesticide). 872 F.2d at 1375. As an “inher-
ent” byproduct of the processing, the formulator generated hazardous
substances, which the formulator disposed of contemporaneously
(thereby creating the contaminated site). /d. at 1375-1376, 1381. Al-
though disposal of the byproduct was not the purpose of the transaction
(like Shell, both parties to the transaction in Aceto presumably would
20
2. Shell’s knowledge and role in the disposal of its haz-
ardous substances during its arrangement with BEB
creates arranger liability
In contesting its liability, Shell relies on a character-
ization of the arrangement that was rejected by both the
district court and court of appeals. Shell asserts (Br. 2,
14-15) that it merely sold a useful product, transported
that product to B&B (its customer) by common carrier,
and transferred ownership of the product to the cus-
tomer when the common carrier arrived at the cus-
tomer’s facility. But that is not all that Shell did. As the
courts below found, Shell arranged for the delivery and
transfer process in which Shell was “deeply involved,”
Pet. App. 13an.5 during which Shell knew disposals of
its hazardous substances were a routine occurrence.
E.g., id. at 259a (noting Shell’s “actual knowledge” that
spills and leaks of D-D were “inherent in the unloading
process”). Accordingly, this was not a situation where
disposal of Shell’s product was an unantici; ated acci-
dent; the disposal was a known and inevitable (albeit
unwanted) consequence of the transaction that Shell
arranged. Shell’s conduct therefore falls within the four
corners of CERCLA’s ‘arranger liability” provision.
a. It is undispute-~ that Shell arranged for the deliv-
ery of its D-D to bé ’s facility. The “Conditions of
Sale” between Shell and B&B provided that the “Seller
may deliver any Product in any delivery equipment, by
any means of transportation and from any shipping
have preferred no byproduct or disposal), the court of appeals held that
the manufacturer was liable as an arranger under Section 107(a)(3). /d.
at 1382. It explained that a contrary result “would allow defendants to
simply ‘close their eyes’ to the method of disposal of their hazardous
substances, a result contrary to the policies underlying CERCLA.”
Ibid
21
point that Seller may select.” J.A. 583. Shell thus con-
tractually reserved the exclusive authority to, and in
fact did, arrange for the delivery of D-D by common
carrier tanker trucks to B&B’s facility. Pet. App. 124a.
Shell owned the D-D at the time such arrangements
were made. /d. at 124a-125a. The deliveries were made
F.O.B. destination, but “Shell still controlled the process
of deliveries, regardless.” Jd. at 124a."
Shell also actively inserted itself into, and exercised
significant control over, the transfer process-when the
tanker trucks it hired arrived at B&B’s facility. At least
until the early 1980s, the common carriers that Shell
hired and paid participated in the D-D transfer process
and used equipment required by Shell. See, e.g., Pet.
App. 119a-120a (relying on testimony of tanker-truck
drivers and others in the field that the drivers would
unload D-D into B&B’s tanks using the truck’s equip-
ment); 7d. at 208a-209a (“Before the early 1980s, Shell
required the tanker truck driver to have a 30 foot hose
and certain couplings and other equipment,” and “[{b]y
the early 1980s, Shell dictated that B&B personnel un-
load the tanker truck and purchase the 30 foot hose
among other unloading equipment.”). Shell documenta-
tion “referenced the fact that the drivers of the tanker
trucks had to have certain equipment for transferring
the D-D into the storage tank, evidencing direction and
control by Shell.” /d. at 124a. B&B was also required to
follow Shell’s manual on handling D-D, which provided
“ “F_O.B. destination” generally means that “the seller must at his
own expense and risk transport the goods to that place and there
tender delivery of them.” U.C.C. § 2-319(1)(b) (14th ed. 1995).
22
detailed loading and unloading procedures, subject to an
inspection program. /d. at 127a-128a.’
b. The record establishes that spills of D-D “were
inherent in the common carrier deliveries that Shell ar-
ranged for and occurred in the course of every delivery.”
Pet. App. 252a; see id. at 119a-122a. The trial evidence
also showed, and the district court found, that “Shell
knew that spills and leaks were inherent in the unload-
ing process.” /d. at 259a. For example, Robert Swain,
a former Shell employee responsible for helping to im-
plement Shell’s manual on handling D-D, testified that
the delivery of Shell D-D to bulk storage “always” re-
sulted in spills. J.A. 64. Swain noted that, while spills
during the truck-transfer process can be collected in a
little bucket, “[mJost often, though, back in those days,
[the workers] just let it dump on the ground.” Jbid.
Shell went so far as to account for the spilling and
leakage of D-D in its contracts with B&B. Pet. App.
122a, 252a-253a. A Shell marketing agreement with
B&B states, in a section entitled “Shrinkage,” that
“{slingle and multiple destination deliveries by common
carrier will be allowed 0.5 percent on a weight basis for
shrinkage that may occur at the time of unloading,” and
that the “shrinkage allowance will be deducted off the
* To the extent the courts below relied on Shell’s imposition of
various requirements, treatment of that fact as relevant to the Section
107(a)(3) analysis does not (as Shell suggests, Br. 31) create a disincen-
tive to the adoption of such safeguards. To the contrary, if shippers
know that the process by which their products are delivered results in
spills of hazardous substances, they will have greater incentive to
prevent such disposals to limit the contamination if they are potentially
subject to arranger liability. In any event, abundant evidence beyond
Shell's imposition of safety precautions established Shell’s awareness
that spills and leaks occurred routinely during the deliveries at issue
here.
23
billing invoice.” J.A. 498; see J.A. 209 (shrinkage allow-
ances in Shell’s bulk-liquid contracts applied to D-D).
Based on trial testimony, the district court construed
such agreements as providing “a monetary allowance to
B&B for product Shell expected to be lost in the process
of delivery and storage.” Pet. App. 122a; see id. at 252a-
253a (referring to “spillage allowance” in the Shell-B&B
contract).®
In sum, based on the extensive trial record, the dis-
trict court correctly found that “[flor over twenty years,
Shell ‘arranged for’ the sale for profit of D-D with actual
knowledge that D-D would spill and be released into the
soil during the delivery and unloading process,” Pet.
App. 259a, in which “Shell was an active participant,” id.
at 204a. The court of appeals correctly affirmed the dis-
trict court’s decision that Shell is liable under CERCLA
because, in light of those circumstances, Shell “arranged
for disposal” of hazardous substances.
B. Shell Identifies No Sound Basis For Limiting Arranger
Liability Where A Manufacturer Engages In Transac-
tions That It Knows Will Directly Result »« Disposals Of
Its Hazardous Substances
In addition to contending that Section 107(a)(3) is
limited to transactions whose purpose is to dispose of
* Although Shell describes that allowance as “a price discount to
meet competition” (Br. 30), that explanation is inherently unlikely, since
an allowance for “shrinkage” at the time of unloading would be a highly
unusual way of providing a discount to adjust for competitors’ prices.
The district court rejected essentially the same argument, explaining
that Shell's “characterization of the spill allowance as a ‘pricing’
strategy to meet competition is not persuasive,” Pet. App. 259a-260a,
and Shell identifies no basis for this Court to reject the district court's
reasonable interpretation of the documentary record.
24
hazardous substances, Shell offers three further bases
for avoiding arranger liability. Each lacks merit.
1. Lack of intent to dispose of a hazardous substance
during a transaction does not preclude arranger lia-
bility where the arranger has advance knowledge of
the disposal
Shell contends (Br. 18-21) that it cannot be liable
under Section 107(a)(3) because its objective was to sup-
ply a useful product rather than to dispose of a hazard-
ous substance. As discussed above (pp. _, supra), that
argument ignores the fact that spills and leaks of haz-
ardous substances were a known and recurring conse-
quence of the deliveries for which Shell arranged. Al-
though the delivery of a useful product was the ultimate
purpose of the arrangement, Shell’s continued participa-
tion in the delivery, with knowledge that spills and leaks
would result, was sufficient to establish Shell’s intent to
dispose of hazardous substances.
Shell’s invocation (Br. 19) of circuit-court cases in-
volving the “mere sale of a useful product” is therefore
misplaced. The question in those cases was whether
sellers could be held liable as arrangers for the ultimate
disposal of the product after the purchaser had incorpo-
rated it into another product or had put it to its intended
use. In that context, some courts of appeals have held
that the seller is not liable as an arranger for the ulti-
mate disposal absent evidence that the sale included an
arrangement for that ultimate disposal. See Freeman v.
Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., 189 F.3d 160, 164 (2d Cir. 1999);
Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville &
Denton R.R., 142 F.3d 769, 775 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
525 U.S. 963 (1998); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis
Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1317 (11th Cir. 1990);
f
25
but ef. Catellus Dev. Corp. v. United States, 34 F.3d 748,
750-752 (9th Cir. 1994) (arranger liability from sale of
spent batteries for extraction of lead plates).
Here, by contrast, Shell was not held liable for con-
tamination resulting from the application of its pesti-
cides (the useful product) to a farmer’s fields or the sub-
sequent disposal of the contaminated soil. Rather, its
liability is for the portion of product that was never used
for its intended purpose but was disposed of at the time
of delivery through spilling or leaking. See Pet. App.
52a-53a. The decisions on which Shell relies simply rec-
ognize that the causal link between a transaction and a
subsequent disposal of the relevant product may some-
times be too attenuated to support arranger liability.
That potential limit on Section 107(a)(3) liability has no
application here, where the disposal of hazardous sub-
stances occurred during deliveries that Shell closely
monitored and superintended.”
* Shell's reliance (Br. 20-21) on Amcast Industrial Corp. v. Detrex
Corp., 2 F.3d 746 (1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1044 (1994), is also
misplaced. In Amcast, the Seventh Circuit held a manufacturer liable
as an owner for spills of a hazardous substance that veccurred during
deliveries from its own trucks to a customer. See id. at 750. The court
also held that the manufacturer was not liable as an arranger for spills
that occurred during a common carrier’s delivery of the same sub-
stance. See id. at 751. The court did not suggest, however, that the
manufacturer had exercised any control over the latter deliveries other
than hiring the carrier, let alone the extent of control found to have
been exercised by Shell here.. Nor did it suggest that the manufacturer,
like Shell, was aware that disposals (in the form of spills and leakage)
of hazardous substances ever occurred during those deliveries, let alone
during every delivery. See ibid. (limiting arranger liability for “acci-
dents” by transporters hired “in good faith”).
26
2. Section 107(a)(3) encompasses the disposal of hazard-
ous substances through spills and leaks
Shell contends (Br. 21-25) that liability under Section
107(a)(3) requires disposal of hazardous waste, and that
the term “waste” does not encompass “useful products
sold new for consumer use.” That argument lacks merit.
Section 107(a)(3) provides that a person is liable if he
“arranged for disposal * * * of hazardous substances
owned or possessed by such person.” 42 U.S.C.
9607(a)(3). There is no dispute that Shell’s products
constituted “hazardous substances.” In arguing that
arranger liability may not be premised on disposal of the
products at issue here, Shell relies not on Section
107(a)(3), but on definitional provisions under which the
term “disposal” is defined to mean “the discharge, de-
posit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of
any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land
or water.” 42 U.S.C. 6903(3); see 42 U.S.C. 9601(29)
(providing that the term “disposal” as used in CERCLA
shall have the meaning provided in 42 U.S.C. 6903(3)).
To the extent that the term “hazardous waste” has a
narrower reach than the term “hazardous substance,”
Congress’s decision to use the latter term in Section
107(a)(3) must be treated as advertent. Because Section
107(a)(3) specifies the type of material (“hazardous sub-
stances”) whose disposal is covered, the Court should
not ascribe to Congress the self-defeating intent to nar-
row the range of covered materials through the defini-
tion of “disposal.” See, e.g., Lowisiana & Nashville R.R.
v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467, 475 (1911) (“We must have re-
gard to all the words used by Congress, and as far as
possible give effeet to them.”). The most natural read-
ing of the various provisions taken together is that, for
purposes of determining arranger liability under Section
i —~- i. rT.
27
107(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. 6903(3) identifies the actions that
constitute “disposal,” but Section 107(a)(3) identifies the
object of those actions, i.e., the materials whose disposal
is covered. See Pet. App. 216a-217a."°
3. Arranger liability does not require ownership or ac-
tual control. of the hazardous substance at the time of
disposai
Shell contends (Br. 26-27) that, in order te be liable
as an arranger under Section 107(a)(3), a manufacturer
must either own or have “actual contro!” of the hazard-
ous substance at the time of its disposal. That is incor-
rect.
Section 107(a)8) imposes liability on a person who
“by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for dis-
posal * * * of hazardous substances owned or pos-
sessed by such person.” 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(3). By its
terms, that provision applies if the person upon whom
liability is imposed ewned or possessed the relevant sub-
stances when the arrangement for disposal was made.
Liability under Section 107(a)(3) does not turn on
whether the arranger retained ownership or possession
at the time of disposal. The provision also clearly con-
templates that some “other party or entity” may dispose
Shell’s argument, if accepted, could not be limited to arranger lia-
vility under Section 107(a)(3). For example, Section 107(a)(2) imposes
liability on “any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous
substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous sub-
stanees were disposed of.” 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(2). Under Shell's reading,
spills or leaks of a potentially useful product (e.g., cyanide) into the soil
or water would not constitute “disposal” of that substance, and Section
107(a)(2) would not apply. That reading would undermine Congress's
effort to cover inadvertent spills and leaks by including them within the
definition of “disposal,” and it would leave a substantial unintended gap
in CERCLA'’s remedial scheme.
|
|
es Ss
= = aa see .
28
of the hazardous substance. /bid. Accordingly, a person
who arranges to have his hazardous substances disposed
of by another is liable for the consequences of that dis-
posal arrangement, regardless of which entity (the
source or disposer) has title or possession when disposal
occurs.
Shell’s further contention (Br. 26-27) that, at a mini-
mum, an arranger must exercise “actual control” of the
) hazardous substances at the time of disposal is also in-
consistent with the statutory text. Such a requirement
would read the phrase “by contract, agreement, or oth-
erwise arranged for” out of Section 107(a)(3). In any
event, as discussed above (pp. 20-23, supra), Shell did
exercise substantial control over the hazardous sub-
stances at the time of disposal. |
If ownership or actual control at the time of disposal
were legally dispositive, an arranger could easily avoid
liability under Section 107(a)(3). In the ordinary case
when a waste hauler picks up a drum of hazardous sub-
stances from the arranger, the drum is no longer pos-
sessed or controlled by the arranger. And the parties
could readily provide by contract for the immediate
transfer of title to the hauler at the time of pickup. Con-
gress surely did not intend for arrangers to escape
CERCLA liability in that prototypical arrangement for
disposal of hazardous substances. See S. Rep. No. 848,
supra, 31, 33-34 (CERCLA’s liability regime “provides
incentives to all involved with hazardous substances to
assure that such substances are handled with the utmost
care”).''
'' Neither the district court nor the court of appeals based its arrang-
er liability holding on a determination of which entity (Shell or B&B)
held title to the D-D after its tender for delivery. The district court
found that the point at which title to the D-D transferred from Shell to
29
Il. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO HOLD
PETITIONERS JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE
WHEN PETITIONERS FAILED TO ESTABLISH A REA-
SONABLE BASIS FOR APPORTIONMENT
The court of appeals correctly held that, although the
single harm at B&B’s facility was theoretically capable
of apportionment under established common-law princi-
ples, petitioners which elected to pursue a “‘scorched
earth,’ all-or-nothing approach to liability,” Pet.
App. 236a had failed to prove any reasonable basis for
determining their respective contributions to that harm.
The thrust of the court of appeals’ analysis was not that
a more precise and defensible apportionment could have
been made based on the record before the district court.
Rather, the court of appeals explained that, largely be-
cause petitioners had pursued a trial strategy of denying
any liability for the costs of the governments’ cleanup
activities, the existing evidentiary record did not provide
a reliable basis for apportionment. There is no basis for
the Court to overturn that determination.
——
B&B was not as clear-cut as Shell suggests (Br. 5, 26). As the court ex-
plained, if a tanker truck arrived at B&B's facility and began unloading
the D-D, but it subsequently became apparent that the bulk storage
tank was inadequate for receiving and storing the D-D, Shell had the
right to direct the tanker truck to return to Shell's facility. Pet. App.
212a. Thus, although B&B gained “stewardship” once Shell’s tanker
truck arrived at the facility, legal title did not necessarily pass to B&B
at that time. /d. at 124a, 212a.
,
|
|
|
30
A. Consistent With Restatement Principles, CERCLA Lia-
bility For A Single Harm Is Joint And Several Unless
The Liable Party Proves A Reasonable Basis For Appor- |
tionment
1. When the government performs its own cleanup
of a facility, Congress provided, subject to limited affir-
mative defenses not applicable here, that four classes of
persons are liable for “all costs of removal or remedial
action incurred by the United States Government * * *
not inconsistent with the national contingency plan.” 42
U.S.C. 9607(a)(4)(A) (emphasis added).'"* That provision
reflects Congress’s considered judgment that, as be-
tween those with a specified connection to hazardous
substances and those with none (i.e., the taxpaying pub-
lic), the former should be responsible for the costs of
cleanup. See 126 Cong. Rec. 31,978 (1980) (statement of
Rep. Jeffords) (CERCLA “places the costs of releases
of hazardous waste on the sector most responsible for
pollution and which benefits most from chemical produc-
tion rather than on the victim or taxpayers.”); p. 3, su-
pra."®
Petitioners do not contend that the United States’ costs were “in-
consistent with the national contingency plan.”
“ Contrary to Shell's suggestion (Br. 25 n.7, 43), the availability of the
Superfund to finance cleanups does not demonstrate that Congress in-
tended the Superfund, rather than the parties liable under CERCLA,
to bear the cost of cleanups when one responsible party is insolvent. Al-
though the United States may use the Superfund (when certain statu-
tory conditions are met) to finance cleanup efforts, Congress intended
that the fund would be replenished through cost-recovery suits brought
under CERCLA Section 107(a) so that the covered parties that
CERCLA deems responsible for contamination bear the cost. See Best-
foods, 524 U.S. at 55-56; cf. S. Rep. No. 848, supra, 13. Congress sim-
ilarly did not intend the now-expired taxing regime for the Superfund
to release from liability manufacturers who otherwise qualify as liable
31
CERCLA does not specifically address the proper
allocation of cleanup costs in cases where multiple par-
ties share responsibility for contamination at a particu-
lar facility. The courts of appeals have uniformly held,
however, and petitioners agree, that the decision whe-
ther te impese joint and several liability under those
circumstances, or instead to apportion the costs of clean-
up ameng the various responsible parties, should be
guided by common-law principles. See pp. 34, swpra;
Shell Br. 32: Railroads Br. 7. Petitioners also agree
(Shell Br. 37; Railroads Br. 6), comsastent with Con-
gress’s apparent endorsement of the appreach taken in
the semunal case of Chem-Dyne (HR. Rep. No. 253, 99th
Cong., lst Sess. Pt. I, at 74 (1985)), that Restatement
principles provide the starting point for that inquiry.”
2. Umder the Restatement, damages for a single
harm can be apportioned among multiple causes only if
“there is a reasonable basis for determining the contri-
parties under CERCLA. See Letter from GAO to Hon. James M.
Jeffords regarding the GAO-04-475R Superfund Program 1 (Feb. 18,
2004).
' As noted above, all references to the Restatement refer to the Re-
statement (Second). In May 1999, the American Law Institute adopted
the Restatement (Third) Turts: Apportionment of Liability (Third Re-
statement), primarily in response to the increased use of comp erative
responsibility. See id. § 1,cmt. a. The Third Restatement employs the
same basic approach to apportionment as the Restatement. Compare
Third Restatement § 26 with Restatement § 433A. In any event, the
Restatement was in effect both when CERCLA was originally enacted
and when it was amended in 1986, and it is therefore the relevant source
of common-law norms. In addition, many States still retain full joint
and several liability, and most of the recent departures from that tra-
ditional rule have come through legislative enactments, not judicial de-
cisions developing common-law principles. See Norfolk & W. Ry. v.
Ayers, 5388 U.S. 135, 164-165 (2003).
32
bution of each cause to a single harm.” Restatement
§ 433A(1)(b). When two or more liable parties bring
about a single harm, and one or more of them seeks to
limit its liability on the basis that the harm is capable of
apportionment, the burden of proof as to the apportion-
ment is on such party. Restatement § 433B(2). That
burden includes both the burden of production (7.e., of
presenting evidence sufficient to establish its share of
the harm) and the burden of persuasion (7.e., of demon-
strating by a preponderance of the evidence that appor-
tionment is warranted). Restatement § 433B cmt d.
That is because, “[a]s between the proved tortfeasor who
has clearly caused some harm, and the entirely innocent
plaintiff, any hardship due to lack of evidence as to the
extent of the harm caused should fall upon the former.”
Ibid. Petitioners do not dispute that the burden of prov-
ing a reasonable basis for apportionment is on CERCLA
defendants. See Shell Br. 37; Railroads Br. 30.
The Restatement recognizes that “[t]here are kinds
of harm which, while not so clearly marked out as sever-
able into distinct parts, are still capable of division upon
a reasonable and rational basis, and of fair apportion-
ment among the causes responsible.” Restatement
§ 433A emt. d. The Restatement also gives various ex-
amples of situations where “reasonable assumption[s]”
may be made, explaining, inter alia, that if cattle of two
or more owners trespass and destroy a crop, the harm
may be apportioned among the owners on the basis of
the number of cattle owned by each. /bid. Similarly, if
two factories pollute a stream and interfere with an-
other’s use of the water, the harm may be apportioned
“on the basis of evidence of the respective quantities of
pollution discharged into the stream.” /bid.
33
The Restatement also recognizes, however, that
“(cjertain kinds of harm, by their very nature, are nor-
mally incapable of any logical, reasonable, or practical
division.” Restatement § 433A, cmt.i. As Congress was
well aware, that will often be the case for the harms tar-
geted by CERCLA: “An indivisible harm is frequently
the situation at hazardous waste sites where many par-
ties have coniributed to the contamination or other en-
dangerment and there are no reliable records indicating
who disposed of the hazardous wastes (or in what quanti-
ties).” 126 Cong. Rec. at 31,966 n.* (Letter from Assis-
tant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs to
Chairman, Subcomm. on Transportation and Commerce,
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. (Dec. 1, 1980)). Thus, while the
Restatement allows for the limited use of assumptions to
determine the contribution of each cause to a single
harm, those assumptions must be reasonable, based on
the evidence, and grounded in principles of causation.
The Restatement makes clear that, where harms
cannot be apportioned on a reascnable basis, the court
should not make “an arbitrary apportionment for its own
sake” or simply to mitigate the severity of joint and sev-
eral liability. Restatement § 433A cmt. i. Indeed, the
Restatement contemplates that joint and several liabil-
ity may be imposed even when “some of the causes are
innocent.” /b7d. Accordingly, the courts of appeals have
recognized that apportionment under the Restatement
“is guided not by equity” but “by principles of causation
alone.” United States v. Hercules, Inc., 247 F.3d 706,
718 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1065 (2001); see,
e.g., United States v. Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d
397, 319 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Monsanto, 858
F.2d 160, 171 n.22 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
34
1106 (1989); United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 2 F.3d
1265, 1280 (3d Cir. 1993); ef. United States v. Atlantic
Research Corp., 127 S. Ct. 2331, 2339 (2007) (“a defen-
dant PRP in such a § 107(a) suit could blunt any inequi-
table distribution of costs by filing a § 113(f) counter-
claim”).
If a party found liable under Section 107(a)(4)(A)
cannot establish a basis for apportionment with the reli-
ability that Restatement principles require, but never-
theless maintains that joint and several liability is unfair
or disproportionate under the particular circumstances
of the case, it may pursue a contribution action against
other responsible parties under CERCLA Section
113(f)(1). Section 113(f)(1) provides that, “[iJn resolving
contribution claims, the court may allocate response
costs among liable parties using such equitable factors
as the court determines are appropriate.” 42 U.S.C.
9613(f)(1); see Restatement § 886A(2) (right of contribu-
tion exists for tortfeasor “paying more than his equita-
ble share of the common liability”). That provision gives
the court broad authority to devise a fair allocation of
costs among the responsible parties without transfer-
ring those costs to taxpayers who have no particularized
nexus to the relevant contamination. That provision
would be largely superfluous if the court had similar
equitable discretion in making the initial determination
of liability under Section 107(a)(4)(A).
To be sure, the availability of a Section 113(f)(1) con-
tribution action may be of little practical benefit to peti-
Lioners here in light of B&B’s insolvency. The Restate-
ment does not suggest, however, that the standards for
proving apportionment may be relaxed in such cases in
order to compensate for the diminished likelihood of
obtaining contribution. To the contrary, the Restate-
35
ment specifically identifies the insolvency cf a co-defen-
dant as a factor weighing against apportionment. The
Restatement provides that, even if a defendant carries
its burden on apportionment, the defendant may still be
held jointly and severally liable if the circumstances are
exceptional, as when “one of two tortfeasors is so hope-
lessly insolvent that the plaintiff will never be able to
collect from him the share of the damages allocated to
him.” Restatement § 433A emt. h.”” That principle is
consistent with CERCLA’s purpose of protecting the
public fise.'®
B. The District Court Erred As A Matter Of Law By De-
clining To Impose Joint And Several Liability After Pe-
titioners Failed To Establish Any Reasonable Basis To
Apportion Liability
It is undisputed that this case involves a single harm,
consisting primarily of a plume of contaminated ground-
water that threatens the drinking water supply. Pet.
'’ Because the court of appeals concluded that petitioners had failed
to establish a sufficient basis for apportionment under general Restate-
ment principles, it declined to determine what effect Restatement
§ 433, comment h, might otherwise have on the apportionment analysis.
See Pet. App. 32a n.27. This Court likewise need not consider comment
h if it agrees that the district court's apportionment lacked a reasonable
evidentiary basis. If this Court disagrees, hewever, and concludes that
the district court’s apportionment was otherwise sound, comment h
provides an alternative basis for affirming the judgment below.
Some courts have suggested that, in light of that purpose and
CERCLA'’s strict-liability regime, the burden of proving divisibility in
CERCLA cases should be more demanding than under general Re-
statement principles. See, e.g., U/nited States v. Capital Tax Corp., 545
F.3d 525, 535 & nn.8-9 (7th Cir. 2008); Hercules, Inc., 247 F.3d at 715-
717. The Court need not decide whether that view is correct because
petitioners failed (indeed, made no meaningful effort) to establish bases
for apportionment that would satisfy Restatement standards.
36
App. 245a-246a. At trial, both the Railroads and Shell
contended that they did not cause any part of that
harm. Neither the Railroads nor Shell attempted (even
in the alternative) to present or prove a reasonable basis
for determining the contribution of each to the contami-
nation.
Once the district court rejected petitioners’ theory of
the case and determined that petitioners were liable
parties, the imposition of joint and several liability
should have followed naturally from petitioners’ failure
even to attempt to identify and prove any reasonable
basis for apportionment. Instead, the district court,
believing that the imposition of joint and several liability
would be inequitable under the circumstances of this
case, scoured the record for evidence on which very
rough approximations of petitioners’ comparative re-
sponsibilities might be based. It may well be that no
demonstrably better apportionment could have been
made given the record before the court. The absence of
evidence from which a sufficiently reliable apportion-
ment could be drawn, however, was the direct result of
petitioners’ own litigation strategy, and there is no basis
for this Court to relieve petitioners of the consequences
of that strategy now that it has failed to absolve them of
all liability. In any event, under established Restate-
ment principles, the party seeking apportionment bears
the burden of proof, and the court of appeals correctly
held that petitioners failed to carry their burden here.
1. The Railroads’ trial theory was that no activity on
the Railroad parcel resulted in contamination at the
facility. Although the Railroads provided expert testi-
mony purporting to estirnate the total amount of con-
tamination in the facility’s subsurface, that testimony
assumed that none of the facility’s contamination was
37
caused by disposals on the Railroad parcel. J.A. 304-
305; Railroads C.A. E.R. 188-191. Accordingly, the Rail-
roads’ only argument and evidence as to their contribu-
tion to the harm was that they contributed zero.
Shell took a similar tack. Shell’s expert testified that
it was “infinitely more likely than not” that D-D could
not get from the delivery areas to the areas from which
it posited that the contamination had originated. J.A.
283-284. Thus, Shell’s trial theory was that Shell was
not a cause of the harm at all.
The district court, however, rejected the Railroads’
and Shell’s theories and evidence. The court further
found that Shell “did not present evidence how its prod-
ucts’ contribution to the contamination at the Arvin fa-
cility can be apportioned.” Pet. App. 252a. Rather, the
court explained, the Railroads’ and Shell’s trial strategy
was a “‘scorched earth,’ all-or-nothing approach to lia-
bility,” in which “[nJeither acknowledged an iota of re-
sponsibility.” /d. at 236a.
That should have been the end of the matter. Liti-
gants must live with the consequences of their own stra-
tegic choices in the adversarial system. See, e.g., Hor-
mel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556 (1941) (“[OJur proce-
dural scheme contemplates that parties shall come to
issue in the trial forum vested with authority to deter-
mine questions of fact. This is essential in order that
parties may have the opportunity to offer all the evi-
dence they believe relevant to the issues which the trial
tribunal is alone competent to decide.”). This Court has
so held in many contexts, including in capital cases. See,
e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 437 (2000) (state
prisoner “must be diligent in developing the record and
presenting, if possible, all claims of constitutional error”
and cannot pursue on habeas “facts and issues which a
38
prisoner made insufficient effort to pursue” earlier).
There is no reason for a different rule in this context,
where (as here) sophisticated parties are represented by
sophisticated counsel.'" When a CERCLA defendant
categorically denies liability and the court rejects that
position, the defendant faces the prospect of joint and
several liability and cannot go back and claim an entitle-
ment to apportionment based on a record that does not
support apportionment.
2. Rather than hold petitioners to the consequence
of their own litigation strategy, the district court “inde-
pendently” performed what it called “the equitable ap-
portionment analysis demanded by the circumstances of
the case.” Pet. App. 236a-237a. The district court’s de-
cision to undertake that apportionment without the par-
ties’ assistance rested on three interrelated legal errors.
In United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 315 F.3d 179, 186-187
(2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1103 (2004), the CERCLA defen-
dant (like petitioners) argued that its liability was zero. The Second
Circuit rejected that argument, determined that the defendant had in-
troduced no evidence on the limited nature of its liability, and therefore
held it jointly and severally liable. /bid.
'* Largely for the reasons stated in the text, the Railroads are wrong
in suggesting (Br. 57-59) that the imposition of joint and several liability
in this case raises serious constitutional concerns. Contrary to the
Railroads’ assertion (Br. 58), the court of appeals did not “interpret{]
CERCLA to impose joint and several liability in all but extraordinary
cases,” and any constitutional issues that such a scheme might implicate
are not presented here. Rather, petitioners pursued a deliberate stra-
tegy of disclaiming a// liability and forgoing any effort to establish the
share of the harm for which they could properly be held responsible.
See Pet. App. 47a (noting that Shell likely could have provided evidence
supporting apportionment but declined to do so, “most likely because
Shell put its eggs in the no-liability basket”). Holding petitioners to the
consequences of that choice creates no meaningful constitutional diffi-
culties.
!
39
First, the district court assumed that the “circum-
stances of this case” primarily the insolvency of the
party (B&B) most responsible for the contamination
“demanded” apportionment. Pet. App. 237a; see 7d. at
245a (deeming it “manifestly inequitable” to allocate
B&B’s orphan share to petitioners). That was incorrect.
As explained above (pp. 34-35, supra), the Restatement
specifically discusses the example of an insolvent co-
defendant. Rather than identifying that circumstance
as a ground for relaxing the standards governing appor-
tionment, the Restatement treats the insolvency of a co-
defendant as a factor that may support joint and several
liability even if apportionment would be otherwise justi-
fied. That approach furthers CERCLA’s purpose of
ensuring that governmental plaintiffs (and the taxpay-
ers they represent) are not required to bear cleanup
costs when there exists a solvent party with a cognizable
nexus to the contamination. See p. 3, supra.'” Although
the Restatement does not preclude apportionment in
cases involving insolvent co-defendants, it is flatly in-
consistent with the district court’s treatment of such
insolvency as a factor supporting apportionment.
Second, the district court treated petitioners and the
United States and the State as equally responsible for
the absence of evidence and argument directed at the
question of apportionment. In explaining its decision
“to independently perform the equitable apportionment
analysis,” the court stated that “[a]ll parties” had “ef-
™ See 126 Cong. Rec. at 26,788 (statement of Rep. Jeffords) (“The
imposition of mandatory apportionment could result in attempts by the
parties liable for a release of hazardous waste to allocate a large portion
of the liability to insolvent defendants. * * * We should not allow the
responsible parties to evade the costs of cleanup at the expense of the
taxpayers.”’).
40
fectively abdicated providing any helpful arguments to
the court.” Pet. App. 236a-237a. As the district court
elsewhere recognized, however, “[o]nce [CERCLA] lia-.
bility has been established, the burden shifts to the de-
fendant to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, that there exists a reasonable basis for divis-
ibility.” /d. at 235a. Because petitioners bore the bur-
den of proof on this issue, the governments’ failure to
provide evidence and argument supporting a different
apportionment (or establishing that apportionment was
infeasible) could not justify the court’s use of estimates
that would otherwise have been insufficiently precise.
Third, the district court conflated the present cost-
recovery suit under Section 107(a)(4)(A) with the dis-
tinct, equitable contribution action available to petition-
ers under Section 113(f). The court stated that, “[wJhile
§ 1138(f)(1) directs courts to allocate cleanup costs be-
tween responsible parties ‘using such equitable factors
as the court determines are appropriate,’ it does not
limit courts to any particular list of factors. The stat-
ute’s expansive language instead affords a district court
broad discretion to balance the equities in the interests
of justice.” Pet. App. 239a. The district court’s evident
premise—.é., that the court possessed the same “broad
discretion” in determining whether and how liability
should be apportioned in the cost-recovery suit under
Section 107(a)(4)(A) is wholly incorrect. See pp. 33-
35, supra.”
* The district court repeatedly confirmed throughout the post-trial
proceedings that its entire apportionment analysis—including but not
limited to the decision to undertake it—was driven by its view that the
imposition of joint and several liability would be inequitable under the
circumstances of this case. At the hearing on the parties’ motions to
amend the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, for example,
41
The legal errors described above led the district
court to undertake an intricate apportionment analysis
despite the failure of the parties who bore the burden of
proof to offer any pertinent evidence or argument. The
court’s mode of procedure also deprived the government
of a fair opportunity to respond to the court’s theories
of apportionment and to rebut their factual underpin-
nings an opportunity the governments would have had
if those theories had been advanced by petitioners them-
selves. See, e.g., Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1380
(7th Cir. 1992) (reversing the trial court where it
“changed the plaintiffs theory of the case after the time
had passed for the defendant to present contrary evi-
dence”).
Petitioners suggest that, despite the rough nature of
the district court’s approximations, the ultimate appor-
tionment should be sustained because the court chose to
err on the side of overestimating petitioners’ contribu-
tions to the harm at the relevant facility. See Railroads
Br. 46-47. The Railroads emphasize (zbid.) that the dis-
trict court provided an adequate “safety margin,” in-
creasing the Railroads’ estimated share from 6% to 9%
to allow for calculation errors. Because the correct
number is likely lower than 9%, the Railroads argue
(Br. 47), imposing joint and several liabilty is unjustifi-
able.
That line of argument fails on two levels. First, giv-
en the significant gaps in the district court’s apportion-
the court stated that it “did what [it] thought was right in accordance
with the law and equity because we still have an allocation and equitable
proceeding.” J.A. 612. But to the extent the court perceived an over-
riding equitable imperative to proceed with apportionment notwith-
standing the sparseness of the record before it, those evidentiary gaps
were the result of petitioners’ own litigation choices.
42
ment analysis as discussed in Pt. II(C), znfra, it is spec-
ulative whether the court’s apportionment actually over-
states petitioners’ appropriate shares of the total liabil-
ity. Second, under applicable Restatement principles,
the propriety of apportionment turns or. whether the
liable party has established through evidence the por-
tion of the harm that it caused. Petitioners cite no au-
thority for the proposition that a liable party car in ef-
fect stipulate to a percentage share that lacks such an
evidentiary foundation simply because it appears likely
that the share overstates its actual contribution to the
overall harm.
C. The District Court’s Unsubstantiated Assumptions And
Gross Approximations Do Not Constitute A Reasonable
Basis To Apportion The Harm In This Case
The district court’s equitable apportionment analy-
sis, conducted on a sparse record without meaningful
argument from petitioners, involved an array of unsub-
stantiated assumptions and gross approximations.
Those include: (1) that each party’s share of the ulti-
mate harm is proportional to each’s party’s volumetric
contribution to the contamination (irrespective of the
relative toxicities and costs of remediation of the differ-
ent chemicals); (2) that the Railroads’ volumetric contri-
bution to the contamination is proportional to the per-
centage of its land area and duration of ownership;
(3) that dinoseb and Nemagon comprised 2/3 of the con-
tamination, so that the Railroads’ liability should be
further reduced by 1/3 (because no D-D originated from
their parcel); and (4) that Shell’s volumetric contribu-
tion to the contamination can be estimated from anec-
dotal evidence and incomplete sales records. As dis-
cussed below, the district court’s assumptions and ap-
43
proximations do not provide a reasonable basis for ap-
portioning the harm in this case.
I. There is no reasonable basis to assume that each peti-
tioner’s share of the ultimate harm is proportional to
its volumtric contribution to the contamination
As an initial matter, there is no reasonable basis to
assume that the harm in this case is divisible. See Pet.
App. 172a (“plume poses an indivisible threat”). Under
the Restatement, joint and several liability is appropri-
ate “where either cause would have been sufficient in
itself to bring about the result,” as in the case of “merg-
ing fires which burn a building” or two companies pol-
luting a stream from which cattle drink and die. Re-
statement § 433A cmt. i.
In this case, the threat to drinking water and need
for remediation presumably would exist even if
the plume contained only the hazardous substances
traceable to Shell’s spillage or only the hazardous sub-
stances from the Railroad parcel. Either source of con-
tamination therefore likely was “sufficient in itself to
bring about the result” (7.e., contamination requiring
CERCLA remediation) here. See Restatement § 433A
emt. i.” It is possible that, even if pollution from either
“' As the Seventh Circuit has explained for cases in which contamina-
tion may be attributable to multiple sources:
It is easy to imagine a case in which, had X not polluted a site, no
clean-up costs would have been incurred; X's pollution would be a
necessary condition to those costs and it would be natural to think
that he should pay at least a part of them. But suppose that even if
X had not polluted the site, it would have to be cleaned up—and at the
same cost—because of the amount of pollution by Y. * * * [T]hat
should not necessarily let X off the hook. * * * In that case, the
conduct of X and the conduct of Y would each be a sufficient but not
44
Shell or the Railroads standing alone would have in-
duced EPA to undertake remediation, the presence of
contaminants from multiple sources compounded the
environmental harm or caused the remediation to be
more costly. Petitioners made no effort, however, to
prove at trial that this was so. EPA based its remedi-
ation decisions at the facility not on the total mass or
volume of the contaminants, but rather on the fact that
the level of contamination from each primary contami-
nant greatly exceeded the applicable maximum concen-
tration levels set by the EPA and State. Pet. App. 97a.
Accordingly, absent a reasonable basis in the record to
find otherwise (and petitioners failed to provide one),
petitioners should be jointly and severally liable for the
entire harm on that ground alone.
Even assuming that petitioners’ respective contribu-
tions were not independently sufficient to have caused
the harm, there is no reason to assume that the ultimate
harm is directly proportional to the volume of hazardous
substances in the plume attributable to each petitioner.
The plume of contamination underlying the facility con-
tains multiple substances, including dinoseb and constit-
uents of D-D and Nemagon. Pet. App. 174a. The share
of harm from a particular volume of waste therefore
depends on a number of variables, including the respec-
tive levels of toxicity and cost of remediation for each
constituent present. (For example, if dinoseb were
much more toxic or much more expensive to extract
than D-D or Nemagon, that might be a basis to conclude
a necessary condition of the clean up, and it would be entirely arbi-
trary to let either (or, even worse, both) off the hook on this basis.
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Ill., Inc. v. Ter Maat, 195 F.3d 953, 958 (7th
Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1098 (2000).
45
that the Railroads are responsible for more of the
harm.) Consistent with their trial strategy of simply
denying all liability, petitioners identify no record sup-
port for the district court’s assumption that each party’s
contribution to the overall harm is proportional to the
relative volume of hazardous substances attributable to
it. As a result, the district court lacked a reasonable
basis for apportioning the harm based on the volumes of
contamination attributable to each petitioner.”
2. There is no reasonable basis to assume that the Raii-
roads’ contribution to the contamination was propor-
tional to its land area and duration of ownership
Even assuming that the volume of the Railroads’
contribetion to the contamination is a sufficient basis on
which to apportion harm, the district court’s estimate
for that contribution lacks a reasonable basis.
a. The Railroads assert (Br. 41-45) that the district
court’s analysis falls within the “long tradition” of ap-
portionment of harm based on geography and time.
That is incorrect. With respect to geography, the court
concluded that, because the Railroads owned only 19.1%
“ The district court’s reliance on /n re Bell Petroleum Services, Inc.
to support such an assumption is misplaced, because that case involved
a single hazardous substance (such that potential variations among the
toxicities and costs of remediation of various constituents were not at
issue). See Pet. App. 248a (citing 3 F.3d 889, 903-904 (5th Cir. 1993)).
The Restatement’s illustrations (see p. 32, supra) of trespassing cattle
damaging crops, or two factories polluting a stream and interfering
with another's use of the water, are similarly inapt. The presumption
underlying those examples—that each cause of the harm has roughly
the same effect—does not apply here. As noted above, the plume con-
tains various hazardous substances, but there is no evidence as to
relative toxicities of those substances or the relative costs of remedi-
ating them.
46
of the facility, the Railroads’ liability should be reduced
proportionally. But that is not an appropriate use of
geographic divisibility. Geographic divisibility is used
to differentiate between two or more distinct harms,
such as non-contiguous areas of contamination or dis-
tinct plumes of groundwater contamination, rather than
to apportion responsibility for a single harm. See, e.g.,
Hercules, Inc., 247 F.3d at 717-718. For example, if two
portions of a landfill are contaminated with hazardous
substances and remediated, a liable party could demon-
strate that none of its hazardous substances contami-
nated one of those portions. Indeed, that principle ex-
plains why Shell was not liable for the geographically-
isolated dinoseb hot spot, which did not contain Shell
chemicals. Pet. App. 56a & n.35.
The Railroads identify no case where a court has
divided a single harm based on the percentage of the
facility that a liable party owned. The most analogous
case of which the government is aware confirms that the
fraction of the facility that the Railroads owned is not a
reasonable basis to determine the harm attributable to
it. See United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1265
(3d Cir. 1993), overruled on other grounds by United
States v. EJ. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 432 F.3d 161,
162-163 (3d Cir. 2005) (en banc). In Rohm & Haas Co.,
the Third Circuit held jointly and severally liable a
party that owned only 10% of the land area of the facil-
ity atissue. 2 F.3d at 1280-1281. In doing so, the Third
Circuit rejected the party’s request for apportionment
based on its percentage of ownership, explaining that
“(tjhe fact that [defendant] only owns a portion of the
site says nothing about what portion of the harm may
47
fairly be attributed to it.” /d. at 1280. The same is true
here.
Even assuming that there was a reasonable basis to
find that spills on the Railroad parcel were proportional
to its size, the district court had no reasonable basis for
assuming whether those spills were more or less likely
to contaminate the subsurface. That would depend on
a number of variables—e.g., the presence of water,
properties of the particular contaminant, porosity of the
surface and soil, wind and temperature—for which the
district court failed to account. Without knowing more
“ The Railroads’ contention (Rr. 48-51) that divisibility based on
geography is particularly appropriate given EPA’s latitude in defining
a CERCLA “facility” misses the mark. First, the text of Section
107(a)(1)-(2) makes clear that Congress chose to assign liability for con-
tamination based on ownership of a facility rather than on ownership of
a particular tract of land. The Railroads do not dispute that ownership
of part of the facility brings them within the statute's coverage. Second,
while landowners are free to argue that EPA’s designation of a partic-
ular “facility” is overly broad, the Railroads here failed to challenge
EPA’s inclusion of their parcel in its initial designation of the facility
(despite actual knowledge of that designation), and they did not appeal
the district court’s conclusion that the Railroad and B&B parcels are a
single facility. Pet. App. 113a, 172a-173a. Third, the Railroads did not
attempt at trial to show that they caused contamination in one isolated
part of the facility but not another. Fourth, the Railroads’ characteriza-
tion (Br. 4) of themselves as innocent landowners ignores the fact that
the Railroads profited from their lease with B&B and stood by while
B&B released hazardous wastes into the environment. As the district
court noted, “[a]s the lessor-land owner, the Railroads had a responsi-
bility to ensure that all activities affecting their leased parcel complied
with all applicable environmental laws.” /d. at 258a-259a. It is also sig-
nificant in that regard that, although CERCLA provides a form of “in-
nocent owner” defense in certain cases where contamination is caused
by “an act or omission of a third party,” the defense is unavailable if the
relevant “act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual rela-
tionship” with the landowner. 42 U.S.C. 9607(b)(3).
48
about those variables, in conjunction with the timing
and location of the releases, the relative level of spills
on each parcel says little about the relative level of ac-
tual contribution to the harm from each parcel. Where
the Railroads’ only trial evidence that the activity on
the Railroad parcel did not contribute at all to the harm
at the facility—was rejected by the district court, there
is no reasonable basis for determining the relative volu-
metric contribution from the Railroad parcel to the
overall contamination. See Pet. App. 248a (“no party
has specifically documented the relative contributions of
contamination from either parcel”); id. at 252a (“no evi-
dence to quantify the difference in volume of the re-
leases” from the Railroad and B&B parcels).
b. Nor is this a situation where, as the Railroads as-
sert (Br. 44-45), the harm is divisible based on time (7.e.,
based on the fact that the Railroads were owners for
45% of the facility’s lifespan). The Restatement’s con-
ception of temporal divisibility is very different from
that adopted by the district court and now endorsed by
the Railroads. The Restatement provides that “if two
defendants, independently operating the same plant,
pollute a stream over successive periods, it is clear that
each has caused a separate amount of harm, limited in
time, and that neither has any responsibility for the
harm caused by the other.” Restatement § 433A cmt. c.
In that example, it is the same plant—presumably gen-
erating the same pollution at the same rate such that
the time each defendant operated the plant may be a
reasonable approximation of the harm to the stream it
caused.
The harm here, however, was not caused by succes-
sive operation of the same harm-causing activity.
Rather, the addition of the Railroad parcel permitted
49
B&B’s facility to expand—presumably expanding its
harm-causing activities. Thus, unlike in the Restate-
ment example, there is no reasonable basis to assume
that the harm is proportional to the duration of opera-
tion. To the contrary, it is more reasonable to assume
that the facility «xcreased its contaminating activities
after the Railroads became involved, such that temporal
divisibility would underestimate their contribution.
The district court’s approach also cannot be recon-
ciled with the fact that Section 107(a)(1) makes the cur-
rent owner and operator of a facility liable, even if all
the contamination occurred before its ownership. Un-
der the district court’s temporal approach, that owner’s
share of liability would always be zero. That could not
have been what Congress had in mind. The prospect of
that anomalous result shows not only that the district
court’s use of temporal divisibility was flawed, but also
that landowner liability is not readily divisible in the
same way as operator or arranger liability.
3. There is no reasonable basis for the district court to
assume that 2/3 of the contamination was from
dinoseb and Nemagon (and thus discount the Rail-
roads’ liability by 1/3)
The district court discounted the Railroads’ liability
by 1/3 based on its assumptions that none of the D-D
contamination requiring remediation originated on the
Railroad parcel and that the other two chemicals (dino-
seb and Nemagon) contributed to 2/3 of the overall con-
tamination. Pet. App. 25la. The first premise is dubi-
ous at best,” and the court identified no record sup-
* The district court's premise that no D-D originated from the Rail-
road parcel conflicts with its other findings. For example, the court cal-
culated that the checking of filters on D-D rigs resulted in D-D spills
50
port for the proposition that dinoseb and Nemagon con-
stituted 2/3 of the total contamination. The supposition
(even if true) that two of three contaminants came from
the Railroad parcel does not support the district court’s
conclusion that those two chemicals caused two-thirds
of the harm.
4. There is no reasonable basis for using spillage esti-
mates from anecdotes and incomplete records to de-
termine Shell’s contribution to the contamination
The district court erred in two ways in its calculation
of Shell’s volumetric contribution to the contamination.
First, the court piled one unsupported assumption onto
another to craft its own estimate of the amount of D-D
spilled during Shell-controlled deliveries as compared to
the total amount of D-D spilled at the facility. Second,
the district court’s calculation depends on the assump-
tion that every spill of D-D caused the same amount of
contamination—an assumption contradicted by the evi-
dence.
a. The district court’s estimate of D-D spilled during
Shell-controlled deliveries hinges on its assumption that
three gallons were spilled during every delivery. See
Pet. App. 254a (“It is further assumed that, on average,
three gallons spilled during every delivery.”). The
court’s assumption, based on sparse anecdotal evidence
(e.g., J.A. 125), fails to account for the obvious possibil-
totaling 20,470 or more gallons, by far the single largest component of
the court’s total estimated D-D spills of 31,212 gallons. Pet. App. 256a.
In turn, the court found that “D-D rigs were parked on the Railroad
parcel” (id. at 91a); that “[blefore taking D-D rigs to the field, B&B
servicemen put on rubber gloves, opened the strainer caps and checked
the filters;” and that such filter checks “resulted in spills of D-D onto
the ground” (ibid.). The court’s own findings therefore indicate that
significant D-D spills occurred on the Railroad parcel.
51
ity that such D-D spills could have been larger on a reg-
ular basis. The district court’s further estimate that
there were 27 Shell-controlled D-D deliveries per year
lacks a reasonable basis as well. See Pet. App. 253a-
254a. To reach that figure, the court concluded that
Shell D-D sales “average[d]” 122,390 gallons per year
over the entire 23-year period for which Shell sold agri-
cultural chemicals to B&B at the Arvin Site. Jbid. (The
court then divided that by an estimated tanker truck
delivery capacity of 4,500 gallons to conclude that there
were 27 deliveries per year.) /bid. The court based its
“average,” however, on just a few years of sales data.
Id. at 89a-90a, 253a. The court did not explain on what
basis it assumed that those years were representative of
the entire 23 years, and it failed to address potential
variables such as market conditions or customer de-
mand. /bid. The court’s reliance on that potentially
unrepresentative sample was particularly misplaced
because Shell bore the burden of proof on apportion-
ment and was in the best position to produce the full
complement of sales records.
The district court applied the same kinds of assump-
tions to “calculate” that D-D spills from non-Shell con-
trolled activities totaled 29,349 gallons, despite acknowl-
edging that such spills “are not quantified.” Pet. App.
254a (“it is assumed that a spill ranged from a cup to a
quart” during transfer to bobtail from storage tanks);
id. at 255a (assuming a 7.5 gallon spill where bobtail
truck was washed out); id. at 256a (spills “of a quart or
less occurred as a result of checking filters on D-D
rigs”). The estimates as to non-Shell controlled spills of
D-D are flawed in other ways as well. For example, for
non-Shell controlled spills from bobtail washing, the
district court “assumed that the bobtails were washed
52
out 70% of the time.” Pet. App. 255a. There is no re-
cord evidence for the 70% figure. To the contrary, the
testimony of a B&B field serviceman (Merryman) sug-
gests that the figure is far lower—resulting in an over-
estimate of the amount of D-D spilled in non-Shell con-
trolled deliveries and thus underestimating Shell’s lia-
bility. J.A. 130-133.
b. The court’s simplistic calculation also assumes
that every gallon of D-D spilled would lead to the same
amount of contamination in the subsurface. But that
ignores the reality that spill impacts could vary consid-
erably depending on various variables, such as the po-
rosity of the spill site and timing in relation to rainfall or
other water events. See Pet. App. 248a (acknowledging
that even a “small spill of 1,2-DCP [D-D] could cause
substantial groundwater contamination”); see also pp.
47-48, supra. For example, the district court’s analysis
ignores the lining of the sump (one of the sources of con-
tamination) in 1979, where the bobtail trucks were
washed out. See Pet. App. 95a (“the sump near the B&B
wash rack was lined in 1979”). Rather than account for
the much lesser likelihood of groundwater contamina-
tion from such non-Shell-controlled activities after 1979,
the district court applied the same assumption that ev-
ery gallon of D-D spilled would result in the same
amount of contamination thereby underestimating the
percentage of D-D contamination attributable to Shell-
controlled deliveries.
In sum, the district court’s decision to proceed with
an “equitable apportionment” on the sparse record left
by petitioners resulted in several critically flawed as-
sumptions. Those assumptions, taken together, do not
comprise a reasonable basis for apportioning the harm
in this case.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the court of appeals should be af-
firmed.
Respectfully submitted.
PATRICIA K. HIRSCH
Acting General Counsel
Environmental Protection
Agency
DECEMBER 2008
GREGORY G. GARRE
Solicitor General
MICHAEL J. GUZMAN
Acting Assistant Attorney
General
MALCOLM L. STEWART
Deputy Solicitor General
PRATIK A. SHAH
Assistant to the Solicitor
General
LISA E. JONES
JAMES R. MACAYEAL
AARON P. AVILA
Attorneys
APPENDIX
1. 42 U.S.C. 9601(29) provides:
The terms “disposal”, “hazardous waste”, and “treat-
ment” shall have the meaning provided in section 1004
of the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C. 6903].
2. 42 U.S.C. 6903(3) provides:
The term “disposal” means the discharge, deposit,
injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any
solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or
water so that such solid waste or hazardous waste or any
constituent thereof may enter the environment or be
emitted into the air or discharged into any waters, in-
cluding ground waters.
3. 42 U.S.C. 9607 provides in pertinent part:
Liability
(a) Covered persons; scope; recoverable costs and dam-
ages; interest rate; “comparable maturity” date
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law,
and subject only to the defenses set forth in subsection
(b) of this section—
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facil-
ity,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any
hazardous substance owned or operated any facility
at which such hazardous substances were disposed
of,
(la)
2a
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or
otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or ar-
ranged with a transporter for transport for disposal
or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or pos-
sessed by such person, by any other party or entity,
at any facility or incineration vessel owned or oper-
ated by another party or entity and containing such
hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any haz-
ardous substances for transport to disposal or treat-
ment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected
by such person, from which there is a release, or a
threatened release which causes the incurrence of
response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be
liable for—
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action in-
curred by the United States Government or a
State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the
national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response in-
curred by any other person consistent with the
national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or
loss of natural resources, including the reason-
able costs of assessing such injury, destruction,
or loss resulting from such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or
health effects study carried out under section
9604(i) of this title.
The amounts recoverable in an action under this section
shall include interest on the amounts recoverable under
3a
subparagraphs (A) through (D). Such interest shall ac-
crue from the later of (i) the date payment of a specified
amount is demanded in writing, or (ii) the date of the
expenditure concerned. The rate of interest on the out-
standing unpaid balance of the amounts recoverable un-
der this section shall be the same rate as is specified for
interest on investments of the Hazardous Substance
Superfund established under subchapter A of chapter 98
of Title 26. For purposes of applying such amendments
to interest under this subsection, the term “comparable
maturity” shall be determined with reference to the date
on which interest accruing under this subsection com-
mences.
(b) Defenses
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this
section for a person otherwise liable who can establish
by a preponderance of the evidence that the release or
threat of release of a hazardous substance and the dam-
ages resulting therefrom were caused solely by—
(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war;
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than
an employee or agent of the defendant, or than one
whose act or omission occurs in connection with a
contractual relationship, existing directly or indi-
rectly, with the defendant (except where the sole
contractual arrangement arises from a published
tariff and acceptance for carriage by a common ¢car-
rier by rail), if the defendant establishes by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that (a) he exercised due
care with respect to the hazardous substance con-
4a
cerned, taking into consideration the characteristics
of such hazardous substance, in light of all relevant
facts and circumstances, and (b) he took precautions
against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such
third party and the consequences that could foresee-
ably result from such acts or omissions; or
(4) any combination of the foregoing paragraphs.
* * * * *
4. 42 U.S.C. 9613(f)(1) provides:
Contribution
(1) Contribution
Any person may seek contribution from any other
person who is liable or potentially liable under section
9607(a) of this title, during or following any civil ac-
tion under section 9606 of this title or under section
9607(a) of this title. Such claims shall be brought in
accordance with this section and the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, and shall be governed by Federal
law. In resolving contribution claims, the court may
allocate response costs among liable parties using
such equitable factors as the court determines are
appropriate. Nothing in this subsection shall dimin-
ish the right of any person to bring an action for con-
tribution in the absence of a civil action under section
9606 of this title or section 9607 of this title.
* * * * +
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.