Reply Brief — Alaska v. Southeast Alaska Alaska Conservation Council (No. 07-990)
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IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
COEUR ALASKA, INC.,
Petitioner,
v.
SOUTHEAST ALASKA CONSERVATION COUNCIL, et al.,
Respondents.
STATE OF ALASKA,
Petitioner,
Vv.
SOUTHEAST ALASKA CONSERVATION COUNCIL, et al.,
Respondents.
On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER
STATE OF ALASKA
TALIS J. COLBERG JONATHAN S. FRANKLIN*
Attorney General TILLMAN J. BRECKENRIDGE
CAMERON M. LEONARD FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI L.L.P.
Assistant Attorney 801 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
General Washington, D.C. 20004
STATE OF AI.ASKA (202) 662-0466
Department of Law
P.O. Box 110300
Juneau, AK 99811
(907) 465-3600
Counsel for Petitioner
* Counsel of Record State of Alaska
WiLSON-EPES PRINTING CO. .INC -—- (202) 789-0096 -— WASHINGTON. D C 20002
Ar APRESS UnzymZ2 en
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I inittntcipembintasantensineiaiatnonnesesnceces 1
I. THE CWA UNAMBIGUOUSLY
AUTHORIZES THE CORPS TO
PERMIT THIS DISCHARGE................. 3
A. Effluent Limitations Are Not
Applicable To The Permitting Of
ee I aciiiiticinntinitscdecnesecsssescse 3
B. The Legislative History Confirms
The Agencies’ Interpretation. ........... 9
Il. THE AGENCIES REASONABLY
RESOLVED ANY AMBICUITY. ........... 11
II]. THE AGENCIES’ INTERPRETATION
OF THEIR OWN REGULATIONS IS
NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUBG. ............ 15
CNET sninnsocesecionnnsseninaitnistecntagszontesnsssoute 23
i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES:
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).............. 15
Fujitsu Ltd. v. NETGEAR, Inc., 576 F.
Supp. 2d 964 (W.D. Wis. 2008)..................... 17
Gamesa Eolica, S.A. v. General Electric
Co., 359 F. Supp. 2d 790 (W.D. Wis.
2005) dad aheiniedeldadihaaid cipdiaiaiainidaeswepnneehonetee 17
Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke,
gE _,_,_ , RENEE TOUT SU I IOEEE 21
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715
ESET PoE PRP RE OTe eve 12
Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492
i os 10, 11
Rhodes v. County of Darlington, 833 F.
Supp. 1163 (D.B.C. 1BBB).....ccccccssccccccsssvcessees 17
Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society, 503
aes aciacteniciaibhclsibinis 3
STATUTES:
Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972 (“Clean Water
Act”), Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816,
as amended:
§ 306(e), 33 U.S.C. § 191G(e).............ccccccccsees 4
$ 307(d), 38 U.S.C. § 1317(d)........................ 5
es Ae Es Ee MIE ertittensentnnséesinceneseentnoncs )
§ 401(aX1), 33 U.S.C. § 13841(a)(1).......00.0..... 14
Oe ee Or CI sieicepnctienicncscccsesiecnpatcn 7
§ 404(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c)......................00 14
ii
§ 404(n), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(n).....000.0 ee. 9,14
REGULATIONS:
TD ccissiscsscsicdivncansdnesecnioesaaiaen 14
ae Re ae eR 16
re ID oncccinsstcssrecsisncccssccaiccsces ty Me BU
Ee ea 16
ADMINISTRATIVE MATERIALS:
45 Fed. Reg. 85,336 (1980) .............cscccccssscsseees 18
47 Fed. Reg. 54,598 (1982) ............ccccccccsssccceees 5
ee i I Ie Oe CIID cceicccncesccccnceseneconsscices 17
67 Fed. Reg. 31,129 (2002) ................scccssssees passim
IN THE
Supreme Court of the Anited States
Nos. 07-984 & 07-990
COEUR ALASKA, Inc.,
Petitioner,
Vv.
SOUTHEAST ALASKA CONSERVATION COUNCIL, et al.,
Respondents.
STATE OF ALASKA,
Petitioner,
v.
SOUTHEAST ALASKA CONSERVATION COUNCIL, et al.,
Respondents.
On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER
STATE OF ALASKA
INTRODUCTION
The validity of the petitioners’ and the federal
agencies’ position is demonstrated by statements in
respondents’ own brief. The plaintiff-respondents
2
(“SEACC”) concede that the proposed discharge at
the Kensington mine meets the applicable definition
of fill material, and that Section 404 authorizes the
Corps to permit discharges of fill material subject
only to the guidelines specific to that section. See
SEACC Br. 20, 7. That should be the end of the
analysis, since SEACC also concedes that “Congress
did not authorize the Corps to issue section 404
permits incorporating effluent limitations under
sections 306 or 301”—in other words, that effluent
limitations are not applicable to Section 404
permitting decisions. Jd. at 37. Because there is no
dispute that the proposed discharge constitutes fill
material under the plain language of the governing
regulations, and that the Corps has fully complied
with every provision of Section 404, the permit is
valid and should be upheld.
But even if there were statutory ambiguity, SEACC
neither challenges the reasonableness of the
agencies’ asserted position nor overcomes the near-
absolute deference they are owed in interpreting
their own regulations. The agencies reasonably
concluded that all fill material should be treated
alike, subject to the stringent environmental controls
of Section 404. SEACC, by contrast, would require
Coeur to destroy a far greater area of U.S. waters in
order to erect a massive stack of tailings along the
Alaskan coastline. The expert agencies charged with
evaluating the issue—the Corps and the State—have
determined after extensive analysis that that
alternative would be more damaging than the
approved plan. There is no basis for this Court to
countermand that reasoned determination.
3
I. THE CWA UNAMBIGUOUSLY
AUTHORIZES THE CORPS TO PERMIT
THIS DISCHARGE.
A. Effluent Limitations Are Not Applicable
To The Permitting Of Fill Discharges.
The central issue in this case is which CWA
permitting scheme governs the proposed discharge:
Section 404 or Section 402. The parties agree that
only one of the two schemes can be applicable. See
SEACC Br. 7 (if a “discharge is authorized by a valid
fill-material permit under section 404, a section 402
permit is not required”). SEACC crncedes that the
discharge at issue meets the regulatory definition of
fill material. See id. at 20 (discharge “meets the
agencies’ new definition of ‘fill material”).! SEACC
further recognizes that Section 404 authorizes the
Corps to issue permits for the discharge of fill
material subject “to guidelines developed in
conjunction with EPA”—i.e., the Section 404(b)(1)
Guidelines. Jd. at 7. And SEACC does not dispute
that the discharge at issue meets those Guidelines,
which are the only standards imposed by the CWA
for issuance of a Section 404 permit. From this, the
validity of the Corps’ permit should follow
ineluctably. The discharge is concededly “fill
material”; it complies fully with the Guidelines and
all other criteria of Section 404; and EPA did not
veto the Corps’ permit.
I Some of SEACC’s amici question the legal validity of that
definition. See Mehan Amicus Br. 17-18; Members of Congress
Br. 17-18. But SEACC did not raise that argument in the
Ninth Circuit or in this Court, and the argument is thus not
properly before the Court. See, e.g., Robertson v. Seattle
Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 441 (1992).
4
SEACC, however, argues that another CWA provi-
sion—Section 306(e)—creates an exception to the
Corps’ authority to issue Section 404 permits for fill
material.2, SEACC places virtually all its eggs in this
basket, but the basket cannot bear the weight.
Section 306(e) states that a discharge cannot be “in
violation of” an “applicable” performance standard.
33 U.S.C. § 1316(e); see Alaska Br. 33-34. Looking to
its governing statutory mandate—Section 404—the
Corps correctly determined that the performance
standard now invoked by SEACC is not applicable to
the agency’s permitting of this proposed discharge of
fill material. Far from undermining that
determination, SEACC now expressly concedes thai
“Congress did not authorize the Corps to issue
section 404 permits incorporating effluent limita-
tions under sections 306 or 301.” SEACC Br. 37. In
other words, under SEACC’s own interpretation,
Section 306 performance standards are not appli-
cable to discharges of fill material permitted by the
Corps under Section 404. Fill permits are governed
instead by the separate Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines.
Id. at 7. Because this discharge is fill material not
governed by effluent limitations, it will not be “in
violation” of any “applicable” performance standard.
2 SEACC does not even attempt to defend a key ground for
the Ninth Circuit’s decision and instead mischaracterizes it to
avoid admitting to that concession. SEACC Br. 38. Whereas
the Ninth Circuit made Section 301(a) and its use of the word
“and” a centerpiece of its interpretation, see JA527-28a, 531a,
SEACC now concedes that “[njone of this [analysis} resolves the
question in this case” because Section 301l(a) merely provides
that discharges are subject to “applicable” provisions of the
CWA and “does not * * * answer whether a particular [CWA]
section applies to a particular source or discharge.” SEACC Br.
39. Section 301(a) therefore does not preclude The Corps’
permit.
5
It is not surprising that SEACC concedes that
performance standards are not applicable to
Section 404 permitting, since the plain language of
the CWA mandates that interpretation. See Alaska
Br. 24-30. As SEACC recognizes, whereas
Section 402 expressly requires that EPA permits
must comply with effluent limitations, “section 404
makes no provision for the Corps to incorporate
applicable section 306 performance standards in its
permits.” SEACC Br. 21. Thus, the very effluent
limitation relied on by SEACC was made applicable
only to the Section 402 permitting scheme. See 47
Fed. Reg. 54,598, 54,606 (1982) (eff! 1ent limitations
promulgated in that regulation “will be applied to
individual ore mines and mills through NPDES
permits issued by EPA or approved state agencies,
under Section 402”). Because Section 404 discharges
must comply only with the mandates of that section,
Coeur’s fill material permit was not required to
incorporate EPA performance standards.
Moreover, Congress has shown that it knows how
to apply effluent limitations to both fill material and
to other discharges otherwise exempt from Section
402, but it never directed the Corps to apply the
performance standard invoked by SEACC here.
Congress directed the Corps to apply Section 307
effluent limitations for toxic substances—but not
other effluent limitations—under Section 404. See
Alaska Br. 29. Under SEACC’s interpretation, this
was an unnecessary and redundant act, since Section
307(d) contains the same sort of prohibitory language
as Section 306(e). See 33 U.S.C. § 1317(d).
Congress also amended the aquaculture permitting
authority of Section 318—which, like Section 404, is
expressly excepted from Section 402—to require
6
application of effluent limitations, but made no
similar amendment to Section 404. See Alaska Br.
28. SEACC’s response that the disparate amend-
ment of Section 318 “reinforces” its position, SEACC
Br. 38 n.11, has no basis. Before the amendment,
discharges associated with approved aquaculture
projects—like discharges of fill material today—did
not need to comply with effluent limitations.
Discharges of fill material remain subject only to the
criteria of Section 404.
In short, the CWA nowhere requires the Corps to
reject a Section 404 application for a discharge of fill
material based on whether it meets effluent
limitations promulgated by EPA under Section 306.
As a result, SEACC is reduced to arguing that the
mere existence of EPA-promulgated_ effluent
limitations creates an unwritten exception to Section
404 that forbids the Corps from permitting a
discharge of what is concededly fill material, and
instead gives that responsibility to EPA. See
SEACC Br. 21 (Because Section 404 does not allow
the Corps to incorporate performance standards,
“discharges from sources subject to performance
standards must be permitted, if at all, under section
402”). Thus, it is SEACC, not the State, that is
impermissibly attempting to imply an exception that
Congress did not provide. Cf. SEACC Br. 29-32.
In any event, Section 402 refutes that argument.
Whereas Section 404 does not have any exceptions to
its permitting authority, Section 402 does. Under
Section 404, the Corps may permit all discharges of
fill material, provided the Section 404(b x1)
Guidelines are met and EPA does not veto. Nor does
the word “may” in Section 404 undercut the Corps’
authority. Cf. SEACC Br. 27. The Corps is not
7
required to issue every permit for fill material, but it
is plainly given the authority to do so whenever the
requirements of Section 404 are met.* By contrast,
EPA has no authority under Section 402 when fill
material is involved, because that authority applies
only “le]xcept as provided in * * * [Section 404].” 33
U.S.C. § 1342.4
Given the parties’ agreement that the Corps is
prohibited from incorporating EPA performance
standards into its Section 404 permitting decisions,
it is hard to understand how the Corps could even
determine that a proposed discharge of fill is subject
to SEACC’s unwritten exception, since that
determination would depend on EPA’s interpretation
of its performance standards. The agencies, by
contrast, hewed to Congress’ comparatively bright
line: if a discharge involves dredged or fill material,
it is permitted by the Corps under Section 404,
applying the criteria set forth in that section; if not,
it is permitted by EPA under Section 402.
3 Similarly, it is immaterial that Corps regulations refer to
other statutes that may apply. Jd. Those statutes may require
additional permits in some instances, but nothing in the
CWA—the only statute at issue here—divests the Corps of its
authority to permit this discharge under the CWA.
4 SEACC concedes that this language exempts discharges
subject to Section 404 from the Section 402 permitting scheme,
but nonetheless argues that Congress would have included a
similar exception in Section 306(e) if it had intended to allow
the Corps to grant the permit at issue. SEACC Br. 33. Given
SEACC’s agreement that Section 306 effluent limitations are
part of the Section 402 scheme but not the Section 404 scheme,
that claim unravels. There was simply no need for Congress to
write an exception into every provision relating to the Section
402 permitting scheme when it already did so in Section 402
itself.
8
Regardless, even under SEACC’s own theory, it is
EPA’s regulations, and not the CWA itself, that
determines when Section 306(e) prohibits a dis-
charge. The statute would not answer the question
because the permissibility of a discharge would turn
on the nature of EPA’s performance standards. In
other words, under SEACC’s theory EPA determines
when a discharge is in “violation” of an “applicable”
performance standard. But here, EPA has
determined, both as a general matter and as applied
to this mine, that the performance standard invoked
by SEACC is not applicable to this proposed
discharge, and that the proposed discharge will not
violate it.© As shown below, SEACC cannot over-
come the broad deference owed EPA in the interpre-
tation of its own regulations. Therefore, even if the
statute itself did not render the performance
standard inapplicable to this case, EPA’s own
regulations and decisions have. See Alaska Br. 34.
Finally, there is no merit to SEACC’s assertion
that Section 306(e) has an “independent” effect that
voids the Corps’ permit in this case. See SEACC Br.
33-36. Section 306(e) might conceivably be invoked
in an enforcement action where a discharge subject
to an applicable performance standard has received
no permit at all. But this case challenges a permit
for the discharge of fill material issued by the Corps
under Section 404, and the parties agree that the
Corps has no authority to incorporate Section 306
performance standards into that permitting decision.
5 See 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(b) (exempting discharges of fill from
NPDES permitting requirements); JAl44a-145a (EPA deter-
mination that “effluent limitations guidelines and standards,
such as those applicable to gold ore mining * * * do not apply to
the placement of the tailings into the proposed impoundment”).
9
Thus, there is no basis to void the Corps’ action
pursuant to the purported “independent” effect of a
provision that the Corps is concededly not authorized
to apply. SEACC’s reliance on Section 404(n), 33
U.S.C. § 1344(n), is similarly misplaced. See SEACC
Br. 27-28. That section merely preserves EPA’s
ability to institute enforcement actions under Section
309, 33 U.S.C. § 1319, where such actions would be
appropriate; it says nothing about whether effluent
limitations apply to fill material.®
The CWA is unambiguous that the Corps may
issue a permit for the discharge of fill material that
complies with the Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines and is
not vetoed by EPA. Since the discharge at issue
concededly meets all these criteria, the permit was
proper and the Ninth Circuit’s decision should be
reversed.
B. The Legislative History Confirms The
Agencies’ Interpretation.
Alaska explained in its opening brief that SEACC’s
position vitiates Congress’ key compromise in
enacting Section 404. See Alaska Br. 38-40. Under
that conference committee compromise, the Corps
retains the authority to permit all discharges of
dredged and fill material, subject to EPA environ-
6 Moreover, under Section 404(p), compliance with a Section
404 permit is “deemed” compliance with all of Section 301 for
purposes of enforcement, and Section 30l(a) in turn
incorporates a requirement to comply with Section 306 to the
extent applicable. That is yet another reason why the Corps’
permit is valid. See Alaska Br. 34. Although SEACC notes that
Section 404(p) does not refer to Section 306, that is not
surpiising given that all parties agree that Section 404 permits
need not comply with Section 306 performance standards. See
Fed. Resp. Br. 22 n.5.
10
mental oversight in the form of the Section 404(b)(1)
Guidelines and EPA’s veto right. Congress explicitly
rejected a version of the statute initially proposed by
the House—and urged by SEACC here—under which
discharges of dredged and fill material would be
subject to EPA effluent limitations. SEACC does not
respond to—and thus effectively concedes—this
understanding of the actual legislative history.
Instead, SEACC attempts to draw contrary
inferences from the minutiae of a pre-CWA dispute
involving a single mining company. See SEACC Br.
42-43 (discussing Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514
F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975)). That case, however, did
not implicate the CWA. See Reserve Mining, 514
F.2d at 526 n.65 (CWA is “not applicable to this
litigation”). SEACC notes that, prior to the CWA,
that company had elected to apply for tailings
discharge permits under both the Rivers and
Harbors Act (“RHA”) and the Refuse Act, and that
the CWA transferred the latter application to the
EPA. See SEACC Br. 42-43; cf. Alaska Br. 37
(discussing pre-CWA statutory scheme). But the
Refuse Act application was not even acted upon. See
Reserve Mining, 514 F.2d at 531. And there is no
indication anywhere in the legislative history that
this single company’s permit application decisions
were to inform the content of the CWA.
Rather, as Alaska has noted, the Reserve Mining
case shows the shortcomings in the Corps’ previous
permitting authority, which focused on navigational
rather than environmental concerns. See id.; Alaska
Br. 37-38. Thus, for example, there is no indication
that the RHA permit issued to the Reserve Mining
company involved secure impoundments, mitigation
measures, or any EPA environmental review—all of
11
which are mandated by the Section 404 permit at
issue here. See Reserve Mining, 514 F.2d at 500.
Nor is there any indication that the discharges would
have qualified as “fill material” under the new
CWA—pursuant to any definition of that term—
since they were unlikely to have raised the elevation
of Lake Superior. Congress’ solution to the
shortcomings in the Corps’ authority was to retain
the Corps’ pre-existing ability to permit discharges of
tailings that qualify as fill material, but to require
EPA environmental oversight within the Section 404
process, through application of the Section 404(b)(1)
Guidelines, effluent limitations for toxic substances,
and EPA’s absolute veto right. The permit at issue
faithfully carries out that mandate.
Il. THE AGENCIES REASONABLY
RESOLVED ANY AMBIGUITY.
Alaska has shown that even if the statute were
ambiguous, the federal agencies’ resolution of any
ambiguity would be entitled to dispositive deference
under Chevron. See Alaska Br. 41-49. This issue is
now easy to resolve, since SEACC nowhere
challenges the reasonableness of the agencies’
determination that EPA effluent limitations do not
apply to discharges of fill material permitted by the
Corps (in the event the statute itself does not dictate
the answer). Instead, SEACC contends (wrongly, as
shown below) that the agencies cannot even construe
their own regulations as endorsing that proposition.
Thus, in the event that the Court defers, as it should,
to the agencies’ interpretation of their own
regulations, there is no _ dispute that that
interpretation passes muster under the second step
of the Chevron analysis.
12
Rather than contest this issue directly, SEACC and
its amici attempt to impugn the agencies’ judgment
indirectly, by positing ea parade of environmental
horribles that will allegedly befall this project and
others in the future if all fill material remains
subject to the Corps’ authority. There is no basis for
these dire predictions. As the agencies determined,
there are sound reasons for subjecting all fill mat-
erial to a distinct regulatory scheme tailored to the
environmental issues posed by such discharges. See
Alaska Br. 44-49; Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S.
715, 744-45 (2006) (plurality).?, Moreover, the Corps
and the State—which have responsibility for en-
suring the environmental soundness of this project—
painstakingly examined this proposed project and
reasonably determined that the lake fill option is
more environmentally protective than permanently
destroying a far larger area of wetlands in order to
construct a large open-air tailings pile.
SEACC misleadingly asserts that the tailings fill
would be toxic to aquatic life due to its elevated pH
level. SEACC Br. 4. As SEACC’s own record
citations make clear, any elevated levels “are
expected to occur only in the immediate vicinity of
the tailings pipe outfall” and “will dissipate very
rapidly.” JA206a, 360a. See Alaska Br. 14.
Moreover, as SEACC admits, there will be only
“trace” concentrations of metals in the tailings,
SEACC Br. 4, and their toxicity will be no different
7 SEACC does not even cite Rapanos, much less distinguish
its statements regarding the differences between the regulation
of discharges of fill material and discharges of mobile water-
borne pollutants.
13
than that of the lake’s natural sediment, JA156a.®
Thus, the expected loss of aquatic life—which is to be
fully restored—would primarily occur from
organisms being covered with the discharged
material rather than from toxicity. JA483a. But
this is no reason to treat this discharge any
differently from other discharges of fill material. All
fill material, by definition, will cover whatever
organisms may be on or near the bottom.
Notably absent from SEACC’s brief is any defense
of the alternative that would likely occur if Coeur’s
permit is invalidated: the permanent destruction of
an area of wetlands five times the size of Lower Slate
Lake in order to facilitate an unsightly tailings stack
above Lynn Canal. As the Corps and the State
reasonably concluded—and SEACC does not dispute
here—this option would be more environmentally
harmful than the approved plan.
This fact also points out the logical fallacies in
SEACC’s | interpretation. Its reasoning would
absolutely prohibit the proposed tailings discharge,
but would still allow the Corps to permit Coeur to fill
the lake, or another waterbody, with material of the
same composition as the tailings, as long as it does
not come from a mine or some other source covered
by an effluent limitation. And Coeur could then
dump its tailings on top of what would then be dry
land, free from any further CWA oversight under
either permit program. Rather than adopt this
bizarre regime, the agencies reasonably concluded
that all fill material should be subjected to the same
rigorous permitting requirements under Section 404.
8 Although SEACC misleadingly implies otherwise (GSEACC
Br. 3), no cyanide will be used in this mine, SER853.
14
Given those requirements, there is no basis for
SEACC’s implication that the Corps would now begin
to permit fill discharges of such things as manure,
battery manufacturing waste, or asbestos. SEACC
Br. 45, 51. There is no indication that the Corps ever
has done or ever would do so. Section 404 permitting
is a rigorous process. The Corps examines myriad
factors including toxicity and water quality; it forbids
any discharge if there is a practicable and less
harmful alternative; and it requires extensive
mitigation efforts. See NAHB Amicus Br. 17-27. The
Corps also conducts an expansive public interest
inquiry, evaluating a vast array of concerns
including aesthetics, wildlife values, recreation,
water supply and conservation, and “in general, the
needs and welfare of the people.” 33 C.F.R. §
320.4(a)X(1). States such as Alaska may also impose
their own restrictions. See 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1).
And even if a discharge satisfies the Corps’ rigorous
process based on EPA’s own Section 404(b)(1)
Guidelines, EPA may still veto any permit based on
its own determination that the discharge will have
an “unacceptable adverse effect” on water supplies,
fisheries, or recreational areas. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c).
The solid material that Coeur proposes to discharge
is ground up earth and rock, not toxic sludge. The
governing regulations expressly allow this discharge
to be permitted as fill material because while tailings
may be in a “slightly different physical form from the
traditional rock and soil used as fill material,” they
nonetheless “can have the same effect on the aquatic
environment as those materials.”. JA93a. To the
extent there is any ambiguity in the statute, there is
no dispute that the agencies reasonably resolved it
by treating all fill material under the same statutory
and regulatory framework.
15
lll. THE AGENCIES’ INTERPRETATION OF
THEIR OWN REGULATIONS IS NOT
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
Although it does not dispute that the position
espoused by the agencies in their regulations is
entitled to Chevron deference, SEACC Br. 43,
SEACC nevertheless disputes the agencies’ view as
to what their regulations actually say. But SEACC
ignores the daunting legal standard that stands in
the way of that argument. Although it concedes that
“[aln authoritative expression of an agency’s
interpretation of its rule is entitled to deference as to
the rule’s meaning,” SEACC Br. 58, SEACC fails to
apply that standard to the central issue in this case.
SEACC cites a hodgepodge of agency statements
and actions over a 30-year period as if it were this
Court’s role to determine in the first instance what
the Corps and EPA intended in their own regula-
tions. It is not. The agencies have definitively
stated, in formal pronouncements rendered after
notice-and-comment, that “EPA has never sought to
regulate fill material under effluent guidelines” and
that “any mining-related material that has the effect
of fill when discharged will be regulated as ‘fill
material.” 67 Fed. Reg. 31,129, 31,135 (2002)
(emphases added). The agencies have likewise
espoused that view in their brief to this Court, which
independently warrants deference. See Auer v.
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997) (“Petitioners
complain that the Secretary’s interpretation comes to
us in the form of a legal brief; but that does not, in
the circumstances of this case, make it unworthy of
16
deference.”).2 Thus, in determining the meaning of
the agencies’ regulations, this Court’s task is an easy
one: this interpretation by the agencies of their own
regulations is “controlling” unless “plainly erroneous
or inconsistent with the regulation[s].” Jd. at 461.
As discussed below, SEACC does not even come close
to overcoming that controlling deference.
1. SEACC fails to show how the agencies’
interpretation of their own regulations conflicts with
the plain language of the regulations themselves. To
the contrary, the regulations provide that discharges
of fill material include the “placement of * * *
tailings,” 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(f); that a Section 404
permit may be granted for such discharges without
compliance with the effluent limitation relied on by
SEACC, see 40 C.F.R. Part 230; and that no EPA
permit is required for “discharges of dredged or fill
material into waters of the United States which are
regulated under section 404 of [the] CWA.” 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.3(b). And SEACC expressly concedes that the
discharge at issue “meets the agencies’ new
definition of fill material.” SEACC Br. 20. SEACC’s
inferences based on snippets from preambles and un-
published responses to comments—while mistaken—
are ultimately immaterial, since those statements
cannot override or displace the _ regulations
themselves. See Alaska Br. 50-51; Fed. Br. 34.
Also unavailing is SEACC’s attempt to play
grammarian with the lack of a comma before the
word “which” in EPA’s longstanding regulation
exempting discharges of fill material from NPDES
9 Although EPA is not a formal party to this case, its counsel
has joined the Federal respondents’ brief, and Alaska
understands that that brief represents the considered views of
both the Corps and EPA.
17
permitting. See SEACC Br. 48. There is an
“inherent ambiguity” in this usage because “the lack
of a comma suggests that the modifying clause is
restrictive” whereas “the word ‘which’ suggests that
the clause is nonrestrictive.” Rhodes v. County of
Darlington, 833 F. Supp. 1163, 1190 n.18 (D.S.C.
1992).!9 Thus, the regulation is, at a bare minimum,
ambiguous, meaning that EPA—not SEACC— is the
final arbiter of its meaning. And EPA stated unequi-
vocally in 2002, long after the comma went missing,
that the agency had “never sought to regulate fill
material under effluent guidelines.” 67 Fed. Reg. at
31,135. The agency had similarly concluded in 1986
that “discharges listed in the Corps’ definition of
‘discharge of fill material’ ** * remain subject to
section 404 even if they occur in association with
discharges of wastes meeting the criteria * * * for
section 402 discharges.” 51 Fed. Reg. 8,871 (1986).!!
Because these interpretations are consistent with
the regulation and not clearly erroneous, they control
here. Indeed, even SEACC admits that the original
1973 version of what is now 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(b)
unambiguously provided that all discharges of fill
10 See also Fujitsu Ltd. v. NETGEAR, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d
964, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28700, *12 (W.D. Wis. 2008)
(although absence of preceding comma generally denotes non-
restrictive phrase, drafters of patent at issue “did not intend the
word ‘which’ to be non-restrictive”); Gamesa Eolica, S.A. v.
General Elec. Co., 359 F. Supp. 2d 790, 802 (W.D. Wis. 2005)
(same).
11 In a footnote, SEACC states that the definition of fill
material was different when the 1986 statement was made.
SEACC Br. 52 n.15. But SEACC does not explain how that fact
is relevant. Although the agencies’ definition of fill material
evolved over the years, they consistently reaffirmed that ail fill
material falls under the Section 404 permit program.
18
material were exempt from EPA permitting. See
SEACC Br. 48. This fact renders implausible
SEACC’s assertion that the agency abruptly shifted
course many years later, without any explanation,
through grammatical sleight-of-hand.
SEACC simply ignores that the Section 404(b)(1)
Guidelines, jointly promulgated by EPA and the
Corps, have always provided that discharges of fill
material may be permitted without compliance with
Section 306 performance standards. The Guidelines
“provide a comprehensive means of evaluating
whether any discharge of fill material *** is
environmentally acceptable and therefore may be
discharged in accordance with the CWA.” 67 Fed.
Reg. at 31,133. Yet they have never required
application of Section 306 standards. Although the
Guidelines were amended in 1980 (consistent with
the statute) to require compliance with toxic effluent
limitations promulgated under Section 307, the
agencies did not even discuss including Section 306
effluent limitations under that mandate. See 45 Fed.
Reg. 85,336 et. seg. (1980).
Thus, the federal agencies’ interpretation that
discharges of fill material are not governed by
Section 306 standards of performance is fully
consistent with the plain language of both the
NPDES and Section 404 regulations. That should be
the end of the analysis, since SEACC does not
dispute that that interpretation passes muster under
Chevron in the event the statute itself does not
answer the question.
2. But even if one looks at the extra-regulatory
snippets cobbled together by SEACC, the answer is
no different. In none of those statements did either
EPA or the Corps state that discharges meeting the
19
operative definition of fill material would be subject
to EPA permitting or Section 306 performance stand-
ards. Rather, as explained in the opening briefs and
above, they consistently stated the opposite.
The weakness in SEACC’s argument is revealed by
its critical reliance on the agencies’ deletion of
language from the 2002 fill rule that would have
excluded discharges subject to effluent limitations.
SEACC Br. 56. An agency’s interpretation of its own
regulation cannot be overturned by adopting
language that was intentionally deleted from the
regulation itself. And SEACC ignores the actual
reason that language was removed. The agencies
excluded the provision partly in response to a
comment from the mining industry that the proposed
language “could inadvertently result in attempts by
regulators in the field to have discharges excluded
from section 404 coverage simply due to the presence
of constituents in the material for which effluent
limitation guidelines’ exist,” including “mine
drainage or process waste water.” JA45a-46a.
Nor did the agencies state that “mine tailing
discharges subject to effluent limitations would
remain so.” SEACC Br. 56 (citing JA47a-48a). The
cited commentary states that “any material that has
the effect of fill is regulated under section 404” and
that the placement of “tailings” is “considered a
discharge of fill material.” JA48a (emphasis added).
The agencies understood that the new fill rule, which
eliminated the “waste” exclusion and treats all fill
discharges consistently, might slightly increase the
number of discharges subject to Section 404. See
JA43a (stating that rule would not “greatly increase”
waste disposal activities regulated by section 404).
And although the agencies intended to preserve the
20
validity of any previous EPA “determin[ation] that
certain materials are subject to an [effluent
limitation guideline] under specific circumstances,”
JA48a, no such determination was ever made in the
specific circumstances of the Kensington project. In
fact, the agencies expressly made the opposite
determination. See JA141a-149a.
SEACC’s reliance on _ unrelated statements
involving the regulation of asbestos is equally wide of
the mark. See SEACC Br. 50-51. SEACC posits that
EPA must have intended to subject discharges of fill
material to effluent limitations because it allegedly
declined to issue Section 307 guidelines for asbestos
contained in mining discharges. This convoluted
theory collapses, given that the cited statements
nowhere refer to Section 404 or fill material, or even
Section 307. Nothing in this unrelated rulemaking
even remotely implies that fill material is subject to
Section 306 standards of performance, or that
asbestos in fill material would be otherwise
unregulated. In fact, the flexible process under
Section 404 is fully capable of protecting against
asbestos contamination, should it ever arise. See 67
Fed. Reg. at 31,133 (process “is expressly designed to
address the entire range of environmental concerns
arising from discharges of dredged or fill material”).
Faced with an absence of any agency statements
supporting its own position, SEACC resorts to
unsupported characterizations. It asserts that “(flor
decades, EPA issued NPDES permits for discharges
that met its effect-based definition of ‘fill material’
but were also subject to effluent limitations.”
SEACC Br. 49 (citing JA83a-84a). As support,
SEACC cites agency commentary on the 2002 fill
rule, but one will search the cited pages in vain for
21
any such statement. That is not surprising, given
EPA’s contemporaneous statement in the actual
regulations that “EPA has never sought to regulate
fill material under effluent guidelines.” 67 Fed. Reg.
at 31,135.
SEACC also asserts that the so-called Regas
Memorandum—which entirely rejects SEACC’s
position—recognizes that discharges with an
“incidental” filling effect “would meet the new
definition of ‘fill material’ but would not be eligible
for section 404 permits.” SEACC Br. 50. But that is
false. The agencies made clear that discharges with
such incidental effects would not meet the fill
definition. See 67 Fed. Reg. at 31,135 (“[W]e do not
consider such pollutants to be ‘fill material.”); JA46a
(same); Alaska Br. 53. The Regas memorandum
simply reflects that determination. See JA145a.}2
SEACC also disputes whether the Corps previously
had a practice of permitting discharges of fill mat-
erial that also implicated effluent limitations. The
Corps’ practice is of little import in interpreting its
12 That memorandum, issued in 2004 by the heads of all the
relevant EPA water regulation offices, embraces the inter-
pretation advanced by petitioners and the Federal respondents
in this case. See JAl4la-149a. SEACC, however, contends that
this pronouncement is not entitled to deference under either
Chevron or Auer because it allegedly changed agency policy.
SEACC Br. 59-60. As explained above and in Alaska’s opening
brief, the memorandum merely restated longstanding agency
policy reflected in regulations and statements made after
notice-and-comment, which unquestionably deserve deference.
In any event, the memorandum is itself entitled to deference
under this Court’s standards. See Alaska Br. 42 (quoting
Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002)) (Chevron
deference); Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 127 S. Ct.
2339, 2349 (2007) (Auer deference).
22
regulations, since the actual regulations have never
required application of EPA effluent limitations. But
regardless, in 1984 the Corps issued a Section 404
permit for the Red Dog Mine—which would have
been subject to the performance standard for process
wastewater relied on by SEACC here—to discharge
its tailings into waters of the United States. See
SER 979; Coeur Br. 40-41. SEACC notes that that
permit was to aid construction of a dam for the
impoundment, see SEACC Br. 53, but that is a
distinction without a difference. Under SEACC’s
theory, no fill permit can ever issue for any discharge
of mine tailings from a froth flotation mill into any
regulated waters for any purpose. Yet both in this
case and 24 years ago at the Red Dog Mine, the
Corps permitted a discharge of mine tailings as fill
material when those tailings originated at a mine
subject to that effluent limitation.
As explained in the opening briefs, while the
agencies’ definition of “fill material” has evolved over
the years, they have been entirely consistent on the
central point at issue in this case. If a discharge
meets the operative definition of fill material, it has
always been permitted by the Corps under Section
404, and has never been subject to permitting by
EPA under Section 402 or to the Section 306 effluent
limitations applied thereunder. The 2002 fill rule
confirmed that interpretation. The agencies decided
on a uniform definition of fill material, and
determined that “by establishing a program under
section 404 for authorizing discharges of fill material
into waters of the U.S., Congress sanctioned the
filling or elimination of waters where it can be done
in an environmentally acceptable manner, i.e., where
consistent with the 404(b\1) Guidelines.” JA51la.
Under that interpretation, the definition of “fill
23
material” is a bright-line test that “determines the
basic jurisdiction of the section 404 versus the
section 402 program.” 67 Fed. Reg. at 31,133.
* * *
This case is straightforward. There is no dispute
that the proposed discharges are fill material under
the applicable definition. The CWA is clear that the
Corps may permit this discharge, because it meets
the Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines and was not vetoed
by EPA. But even if the statute were ambiguous, the
expert agencies’ interpretation of the statute—which
in turn consists of valid interpretations of their own
regulations—is reasonable and therefore entitled to
dispositive deference under Chevron.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and those in Alaska’s
opening brief, the judgment below should be
reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
TALIS J. COLBERG JONATHAN S. FRANKLIN*
Attorney General TILLMAN J. BRECKENRIDGE
CAMERON M. LEONARD FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI L.L.P.
Assistant Attorney 801 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
General Washington, D.C. 20004
STATE OF ALASKA (202) 662-0466
Department of Law
P.O. Box 110300
Juneau, AK 99811
(907) 465-3600
Counsel for Petitioner
* Counsel of Record State of Alaska
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.