Reply Brief — Alaska v. Southeast Alaska Alaska Conservation Council (No. 07-990)

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

COEUR ALASKA, INC.,

Petitioner,

v.

SOUTHEAST ALASKA CONSERVATION COUNCIL, et al.,

Respondents.

STATE OF ALASKA,

Petitioner,

Vv.

SOUTHEAST ALASKA CONSERVATION COUNCIL, et al.,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

STATE OF ALASKA

TALIS J. COLBERG JONATHAN S. FRANKLIN*

Attorney General TILLMAN J. BRECKENRIDGE

CAMERON M. LEONARD FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI L.L.P.

Assistant Attorney 801 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.

General Washington, D.C. 20004

STATE OF AI.ASKA (202) 662-0466

Department of Law

P.O. Box 110300

Juneau, AK 99811

(907) 465-3600

Counsel for Petitioner

* Counsel of Record State of Alaska

WiLSON-EPES PRINTING CO. .INC -—- (202) 789-0096 -— WASHINGTON. D C 20002

Ar APRESS UnzymZ2 en

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I inittntcipembintasantensineiaiatnonnesesnceces 1

I. THE CWA UNAMBIGUOUSLY

AUTHORIZES THE CORPS TO

PERMIT THIS DISCHARGE................. 3

A. Effluent Limitations Are Not

Applicable To The Permitting Of

ee I aciiiiticinntinitscdecnesecsssescse 3

B. The Legislative History Confirms

The Agencies’ Interpretation. ........... 9

Il. THE AGENCIES REASONABLY

RESOLVED ANY AMBICUITY. ........... 11

II]. THE AGENCIES’ INTERPRETATION

OF THEIR OWN REGULATIONS IS

NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUBG. ............ 15

CNET sninnsocesecionnnsseninaitnistecntagszontesnsssoute 23

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES:

Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).............. 15

Fujitsu Ltd. v. NETGEAR, Inc., 576 F.

Supp. 2d 964 (W.D. Wis. 2008)..................... 17

Gamesa Eolica, S.A. v. General Electric

Co., 359 F. Supp. 2d 790 (W.D. Wis.

2005) dad aheiniedeldadihaaid cipdiaiaiainidaeswepnneehonetee 17

Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke,

gE _,_,_ , RENEE TOUT SU I IOEEE 21

Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715

ESET PoE PRP RE OTe eve 12

Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492

i os 10, 11

Rhodes v. County of Darlington, 833 F.

Supp. 1163 (D.B.C. 1BBB).....ccccccssccccccsssvcessees 17

Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society, 503

aes aciacteniciaibhclsibinis 3

STATUTES:

Federal Water Pollution Control Act

Amendments of 1972 (“Clean Water

Act”), Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816,

as amended:

§ 306(e), 33 U.S.C. § 191G(e).............ccccccccsees 4

$ 307(d), 38 U.S.C. § 1317(d)........................ 5

es Ae Es Ee MIE ertittensentnnséesinceneseentnoncs )

§ 401(aX1), 33 U.S.C. § 13841(a)(1).......00.0..... 14

Oe ee Or CI sieicepnctienicncscccsesiecnpatcn 7

§ 404(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c)......................00 14

ii

§ 404(n), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(n).....000.0 ee. 9,14

REGULATIONS:

TD ccissiscsscsicdivncansdnesecnioesaaiaen 14

ae Re ae eR 16

re ID oncccinsstcssrecsisncccssccaiccsces ty Me BU

Ee ea 16

ADMINISTRATIVE MATERIALS:

45 Fed. Reg. 85,336 (1980) .............cscccccssscsseees 18

47 Fed. Reg. 54,598 (1982) ............ccccccccsssccceees 5

ee i I Ie Oe CIID cceicccncesccccnceseneconsscices 17

67 Fed. Reg. 31,129 (2002) ................scccssssees passim

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

Nos. 07-984 & 07-990

COEUR ALASKA, Inc.,

Petitioner,

Vv.

SOUTHEAST ALASKA CONSERVATION COUNCIL, et al.,

Respondents.

STATE OF ALASKA,

Petitioner,

v.

SOUTHEAST ALASKA CONSERVATION COUNCIL, et al.,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

STATE OF ALASKA

INTRODUCTION

The validity of the petitioners’ and the federal

agencies’ position is demonstrated by statements in

respondents’ own brief. The plaintiff-respondents

2

(“SEACC”) concede that the proposed discharge at

the Kensington mine meets the applicable definition

of fill material, and that Section 404 authorizes the

Corps to permit discharges of fill material subject

only to the guidelines specific to that section. See

SEACC Br. 20, 7. That should be the end of the

analysis, since SEACC also concedes that “Congress

did not authorize the Corps to issue section 404

permits incorporating effluent limitations under

sections 306 or 301”—in other words, that effluent

limitations are not applicable to Section 404

permitting decisions. Jd. at 37. Because there is no

dispute that the proposed discharge constitutes fill

material under the plain language of the governing

regulations, and that the Corps has fully complied

with every provision of Section 404, the permit is

valid and should be upheld.

But even if there were statutory ambiguity, SEACC

neither challenges the reasonableness of the

agencies’ asserted position nor overcomes the near-

absolute deference they are owed in interpreting

their own regulations. The agencies reasonably

concluded that all fill material should be treated

alike, subject to the stringent environmental controls

of Section 404. SEACC, by contrast, would require

Coeur to destroy a far greater area of U.S. waters in

order to erect a massive stack of tailings along the

Alaskan coastline. The expert agencies charged with

evaluating the issue—the Corps and the State—have

determined after extensive analysis that that

alternative would be more damaging than the

approved plan. There is no basis for this Court to

countermand that reasoned determination.

3

I. THE CWA UNAMBIGUOUSLY

AUTHORIZES THE CORPS TO PERMIT

THIS DISCHARGE.

A. Effluent Limitations Are Not Applicable

To The Permitting Of Fill Discharges.

The central issue in this case is which CWA

permitting scheme governs the proposed discharge:

Section 404 or Section 402. The parties agree that

only one of the two schemes can be applicable. See

SEACC Br. 7 (if a “discharge is authorized by a valid

fill-material permit under section 404, a section 402

permit is not required”). SEACC crncedes that the

discharge at issue meets the regulatory definition of

fill material. See id. at 20 (discharge “meets the

agencies’ new definition of ‘fill material”).! SEACC

further recognizes that Section 404 authorizes the

Corps to issue permits for the discharge of fill

material subject “to guidelines developed in

conjunction with EPA”—i.e., the Section 404(b)(1)

Guidelines. Jd. at 7. And SEACC does not dispute

that the discharge at issue meets those Guidelines,

which are the only standards imposed by the CWA

for issuance of a Section 404 permit. From this, the

validity of the Corps’ permit should follow

ineluctably. The discharge is concededly “fill

material”; it complies fully with the Guidelines and

all other criteria of Section 404; and EPA did not

veto the Corps’ permit.

I Some of SEACC’s amici question the legal validity of that

definition. See Mehan Amicus Br. 17-18; Members of Congress

Br. 17-18. But SEACC did not raise that argument in the

Ninth Circuit or in this Court, and the argument is thus not

properly before the Court. See, e.g., Robertson v. Seattle

Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 441 (1992).

4

SEACC, however, argues that another CWA provi-

sion—Section 306(e)—creates an exception to the

Corps’ authority to issue Section 404 permits for fill

material.2, SEACC places virtually all its eggs in this

basket, but the basket cannot bear the weight.

Section 306(e) states that a discharge cannot be “in

violation of” an “applicable” performance standard.

33 U.S.C. § 1316(e); see Alaska Br. 33-34. Looking to

its governing statutory mandate—Section 404—the

Corps correctly determined that the performance

standard now invoked by SEACC is not applicable to

the agency’s permitting of this proposed discharge of

fill material. Far from undermining that

determination, SEACC now expressly concedes thai

“Congress did not authorize the Corps to issue

section 404 permits incorporating effluent limita-

tions under sections 306 or 301.” SEACC Br. 37. In

other words, under SEACC’s own interpretation,

Section 306 performance standards are not appli-

cable to discharges of fill material permitted by the

Corps under Section 404. Fill permits are governed

instead by the separate Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines.

Id. at 7. Because this discharge is fill material not

governed by effluent limitations, it will not be “in

violation” of any “applicable” performance standard.

2 SEACC does not even attempt to defend a key ground for

the Ninth Circuit’s decision and instead mischaracterizes it to

avoid admitting to that concession. SEACC Br. 38. Whereas

the Ninth Circuit made Section 301(a) and its use of the word

“and” a centerpiece of its interpretation, see JA527-28a, 531a,

SEACC now concedes that “[njone of this [analysis} resolves the

question in this case” because Section 301l(a) merely provides

that discharges are subject to “applicable” provisions of the

CWA and “does not * * * answer whether a particular [CWA]

section applies to a particular source or discharge.” SEACC Br.

39. Section 301(a) therefore does not preclude The Corps’

permit.

5

It is not surprising that SEACC concedes that

performance standards are not applicable to

Section 404 permitting, since the plain language of

the CWA mandates that interpretation. See Alaska

Br. 24-30. As SEACC recognizes, whereas

Section 402 expressly requires that EPA permits

must comply with effluent limitations, “section 404

makes no provision for the Corps to incorporate

applicable section 306 performance standards in its

permits.” SEACC Br. 21. Thus, the very effluent

limitation relied on by SEACC was made applicable

only to the Section 402 permitting scheme. See 47

Fed. Reg. 54,598, 54,606 (1982) (eff! 1ent limitations

promulgated in that regulation “will be applied to

individual ore mines and mills through NPDES

permits issued by EPA or approved state agencies,

under Section 402”). Because Section 404 discharges

must comply only with the mandates of that section,

Coeur’s fill material permit was not required to

incorporate EPA performance standards.

Moreover, Congress has shown that it knows how

to apply effluent limitations to both fill material and

to other discharges otherwise exempt from Section

402, but it never directed the Corps to apply the

performance standard invoked by SEACC here.

Congress directed the Corps to apply Section 307

effluent limitations for toxic substances—but not

other effluent limitations—under Section 404. See

Alaska Br. 29. Under SEACC’s interpretation, this

was an unnecessary and redundant act, since Section

307(d) contains the same sort of prohibitory language

as Section 306(e). See 33 U.S.C. § 1317(d).

Congress also amended the aquaculture permitting

authority of Section 318—which, like Section 404, is

expressly excepted from Section 402—to require

6

application of effluent limitations, but made no

similar amendment to Section 404. See Alaska Br.

28. SEACC’s response that the disparate amend-

ment of Section 318 “reinforces” its position, SEACC

Br. 38 n.11, has no basis. Before the amendment,

discharges associated with approved aquaculture

projects—like discharges of fill material today—did

not need to comply with effluent limitations.

Discharges of fill material remain subject only to the

criteria of Section 404.

In short, the CWA nowhere requires the Corps to

reject a Section 404 application for a discharge of fill

material based on whether it meets effluent

limitations promulgated by EPA under Section 306.

As a result, SEACC is reduced to arguing that the

mere existence of EPA-promulgated_ effluent

limitations creates an unwritten exception to Section

404 that forbids the Corps from permitting a

discharge of what is concededly fill material, and

instead gives that responsibility to EPA. See

SEACC Br. 21 (Because Section 404 does not allow

the Corps to incorporate performance standards,

“discharges from sources subject to performance

standards must be permitted, if at all, under section

402”). Thus, it is SEACC, not the State, that is

impermissibly attempting to imply an exception that

Congress did not provide. Cf. SEACC Br. 29-32.

In any event, Section 402 refutes that argument.

Whereas Section 404 does not have any exceptions to

its permitting authority, Section 402 does. Under

Section 404, the Corps may permit all discharges of

fill material, provided the Section 404(b x1)

Guidelines are met and EPA does not veto. Nor does

the word “may” in Section 404 undercut the Corps’

authority. Cf. SEACC Br. 27. The Corps is not

7

required to issue every permit for fill material, but it

is plainly given the authority to do so whenever the

requirements of Section 404 are met.* By contrast,

EPA has no authority under Section 402 when fill

material is involved, because that authority applies

only “le]xcept as provided in * * * [Section 404].” 33

U.S.C. § 1342.4

Given the parties’ agreement that the Corps is

prohibited from incorporating EPA performance

standards into its Section 404 permitting decisions,

it is hard to understand how the Corps could even

determine that a proposed discharge of fill is subject

to SEACC’s unwritten exception, since that

determination would depend on EPA’s interpretation

of its performance standards. The agencies, by

contrast, hewed to Congress’ comparatively bright

line: if a discharge involves dredged or fill material,

it is permitted by the Corps under Section 404,

applying the criteria set forth in that section; if not,

it is permitted by EPA under Section 402.

3 Similarly, it is immaterial that Corps regulations refer to

other statutes that may apply. Jd. Those statutes may require

additional permits in some instances, but nothing in the

CWA—the only statute at issue here—divests the Corps of its

authority to permit this discharge under the CWA.

4 SEACC concedes that this language exempts discharges

subject to Section 404 from the Section 402 permitting scheme,

but nonetheless argues that Congress would have included a

similar exception in Section 306(e) if it had intended to allow

the Corps to grant the permit at issue. SEACC Br. 33. Given

SEACC’s agreement that Section 306 effluent limitations are

part of the Section 402 scheme but not the Section 404 scheme,

that claim unravels. There was simply no need for Congress to

write an exception into every provision relating to the Section

402 permitting scheme when it already did so in Section 402

itself.

8

Regardless, even under SEACC’s own theory, it is

EPA’s regulations, and not the CWA itself, that

determines when Section 306(e) prohibits a dis-

charge. The statute would not answer the question

because the permissibility of a discharge would turn

on the nature of EPA’s performance standards. In

other words, under SEACC’s theory EPA determines

when a discharge is in “violation” of an “applicable”

performance standard. But here, EPA has

determined, both as a general matter and as applied

to this mine, that the performance standard invoked

by SEACC is not applicable to this proposed

discharge, and that the proposed discharge will not

violate it.© As shown below, SEACC cannot over-

come the broad deference owed EPA in the interpre-

tation of its own regulations. Therefore, even if the

statute itself did not render the performance

standard inapplicable to this case, EPA’s own

regulations and decisions have. See Alaska Br. 34.

Finally, there is no merit to SEACC’s assertion

that Section 306(e) has an “independent” effect that

voids the Corps’ permit in this case. See SEACC Br.

33-36. Section 306(e) might conceivably be invoked

in an enforcement action where a discharge subject

to an applicable performance standard has received

no permit at all. But this case challenges a permit

for the discharge of fill material issued by the Corps

under Section 404, and the parties agree that the

Corps has no authority to incorporate Section 306

performance standards into that permitting decision.

5 See 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(b) (exempting discharges of fill from

NPDES permitting requirements); JAl44a-145a (EPA deter-

mination that “effluent limitations guidelines and standards,

such as those applicable to gold ore mining * * * do not apply to

the placement of the tailings into the proposed impoundment”).

9

Thus, there is no basis to void the Corps’ action

pursuant to the purported “independent” effect of a

provision that the Corps is concededly not authorized

to apply. SEACC’s reliance on Section 404(n), 33

U.S.C. § 1344(n), is similarly misplaced. See SEACC

Br. 27-28. That section merely preserves EPA’s

ability to institute enforcement actions under Section

309, 33 U.S.C. § 1319, where such actions would be

appropriate; it says nothing about whether effluent

limitations apply to fill material.®

The CWA is unambiguous that the Corps may

issue a permit for the discharge of fill material that

complies with the Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines and is

not vetoed by EPA. Since the discharge at issue

concededly meets all these criteria, the permit was

proper and the Ninth Circuit’s decision should be

reversed.

B. The Legislative History Confirms The

Agencies’ Interpretation.

Alaska explained in its opening brief that SEACC’s

position vitiates Congress’ key compromise in

enacting Section 404. See Alaska Br. 38-40. Under

that conference committee compromise, the Corps

retains the authority to permit all discharges of

dredged and fill material, subject to EPA environ-

6 Moreover, under Section 404(p), compliance with a Section

404 permit is “deemed” compliance with all of Section 301 for

purposes of enforcement, and Section 30l(a) in turn

incorporates a requirement to comply with Section 306 to the

extent applicable. That is yet another reason why the Corps’

permit is valid. See Alaska Br. 34. Although SEACC notes that

Section 404(p) does not refer to Section 306, that is not

surpiising given that all parties agree that Section 404 permits

need not comply with Section 306 performance standards. See

Fed. Resp. Br. 22 n.5.

10

mental oversight in the form of the Section 404(b)(1)

Guidelines and EPA’s veto right. Congress explicitly

rejected a version of the statute initially proposed by

the House—and urged by SEACC here—under which

discharges of dredged and fill material would be

subject to EPA effluent limitations. SEACC does not

respond to—and thus effectively concedes—this

understanding of the actual legislative history.

Instead, SEACC attempts to draw contrary

inferences from the minutiae of a pre-CWA dispute

involving a single mining company. See SEACC Br.

42-43 (discussing Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514

F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975)). That case, however, did

not implicate the CWA. See Reserve Mining, 514

F.2d at 526 n.65 (CWA is “not applicable to this

litigation”). SEACC notes that, prior to the CWA,

that company had elected to apply for tailings

discharge permits under both the Rivers and

Harbors Act (“RHA”) and the Refuse Act, and that

the CWA transferred the latter application to the

EPA. See SEACC Br. 42-43; cf. Alaska Br. 37

(discussing pre-CWA statutory scheme). But the

Refuse Act application was not even acted upon. See

Reserve Mining, 514 F.2d at 531. And there is no

indication anywhere in the legislative history that

this single company’s permit application decisions

were to inform the content of the CWA.

Rather, as Alaska has noted, the Reserve Mining

case shows the shortcomings in the Corps’ previous

permitting authority, which focused on navigational

rather than environmental concerns. See id.; Alaska

Br. 37-38. Thus, for example, there is no indication

that the RHA permit issued to the Reserve Mining

company involved secure impoundments, mitigation

measures, or any EPA environmental review—all of

11

which are mandated by the Section 404 permit at

issue here. See Reserve Mining, 514 F.2d at 500.

Nor is there any indication that the discharges would

have qualified as “fill material” under the new

CWA—pursuant to any definition of that term—

since they were unlikely to have raised the elevation

of Lake Superior. Congress’ solution to the

shortcomings in the Corps’ authority was to retain

the Corps’ pre-existing ability to permit discharges of

tailings that qualify as fill material, but to require

EPA environmental oversight within the Section 404

process, through application of the Section 404(b)(1)

Guidelines, effluent limitations for toxic substances,

and EPA’s absolute veto right. The permit at issue

faithfully carries out that mandate.

Il. THE AGENCIES REASONABLY

RESOLVED ANY AMBIGUITY.

Alaska has shown that even if the statute were

ambiguous, the federal agencies’ resolution of any

ambiguity would be entitled to dispositive deference

under Chevron. See Alaska Br. 41-49. This issue is

now easy to resolve, since SEACC nowhere

challenges the reasonableness of the agencies’

determination that EPA effluent limitations do not

apply to discharges of fill material permitted by the

Corps (in the event the statute itself does not dictate

the answer). Instead, SEACC contends (wrongly, as

shown below) that the agencies cannot even construe

their own regulations as endorsing that proposition.

Thus, in the event that the Court defers, as it should,

to the agencies’ interpretation of their own

regulations, there is no _ dispute that that

interpretation passes muster under the second step

of the Chevron analysis.

12

Rather than contest this issue directly, SEACC and

its amici attempt to impugn the agencies’ judgment

indirectly, by positing ea parade of environmental

horribles that will allegedly befall this project and

others in the future if all fill material remains

subject to the Corps’ authority. There is no basis for

these dire predictions. As the agencies determined,

there are sound reasons for subjecting all fill mat-

erial to a distinct regulatory scheme tailored to the

environmental issues posed by such discharges. See

Alaska Br. 44-49; Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S.

715, 744-45 (2006) (plurality).?, Moreover, the Corps

and the State—which have responsibility for en-

suring the environmental soundness of this project—

painstakingly examined this proposed project and

reasonably determined that the lake fill option is

more environmentally protective than permanently

destroying a far larger area of wetlands in order to

construct a large open-air tailings pile.

SEACC misleadingly asserts that the tailings fill

would be toxic to aquatic life due to its elevated pH

level. SEACC Br. 4. As SEACC’s own record

citations make clear, any elevated levels “are

expected to occur only in the immediate vicinity of

the tailings pipe outfall” and “will dissipate very

rapidly.” JA206a, 360a. See Alaska Br. 14.

Moreover, as SEACC admits, there will be only

“trace” concentrations of metals in the tailings,

SEACC Br. 4, and their toxicity will be no different

7 SEACC does not even cite Rapanos, much less distinguish

its statements regarding the differences between the regulation

of discharges of fill material and discharges of mobile water-

borne pollutants.

13

than that of the lake’s natural sediment, JA156a.®

Thus, the expected loss of aquatic life—which is to be

fully restored—would primarily occur from

organisms being covered with the discharged

material rather than from toxicity. JA483a. But

this is no reason to treat this discharge any

differently from other discharges of fill material. All

fill material, by definition, will cover whatever

organisms may be on or near the bottom.

Notably absent from SEACC’s brief is any defense

of the alternative that would likely occur if Coeur’s

permit is invalidated: the permanent destruction of

an area of wetlands five times the size of Lower Slate

Lake in order to facilitate an unsightly tailings stack

above Lynn Canal. As the Corps and the State

reasonably concluded—and SEACC does not dispute

here—this option would be more environmentally

harmful than the approved plan.

This fact also points out the logical fallacies in

SEACC’s | interpretation. Its reasoning would

absolutely prohibit the proposed tailings discharge,

but would still allow the Corps to permit Coeur to fill

the lake, or another waterbody, with material of the

same composition as the tailings, as long as it does

not come from a mine or some other source covered

by an effluent limitation. And Coeur could then

dump its tailings on top of what would then be dry

land, free from any further CWA oversight under

either permit program. Rather than adopt this

bizarre regime, the agencies reasonably concluded

that all fill material should be subjected to the same

rigorous permitting requirements under Section 404.

8 Although SEACC misleadingly implies otherwise (GSEACC

Br. 3), no cyanide will be used in this mine, SER853.

14

Given those requirements, there is no basis for

SEACC’s implication that the Corps would now begin

to permit fill discharges of such things as manure,

battery manufacturing waste, or asbestos. SEACC

Br. 45, 51. There is no indication that the Corps ever

has done or ever would do so. Section 404 permitting

is a rigorous process. The Corps examines myriad

factors including toxicity and water quality; it forbids

any discharge if there is a practicable and less

harmful alternative; and it requires extensive

mitigation efforts. See NAHB Amicus Br. 17-27. The

Corps also conducts an expansive public interest

inquiry, evaluating a vast array of concerns

including aesthetics, wildlife values, recreation,

water supply and conservation, and “in general, the

needs and welfare of the people.” 33 C.F.R. §

320.4(a)X(1). States such as Alaska may also impose

their own restrictions. See 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1).

And even if a discharge satisfies the Corps’ rigorous

process based on EPA’s own Section 404(b)(1)

Guidelines, EPA may still veto any permit based on

its own determination that the discharge will have

an “unacceptable adverse effect” on water supplies,

fisheries, or recreational areas. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c).

The solid material that Coeur proposes to discharge

is ground up earth and rock, not toxic sludge. The

governing regulations expressly allow this discharge

to be permitted as fill material because while tailings

may be in a “slightly different physical form from the

traditional rock and soil used as fill material,” they

nonetheless “can have the same effect on the aquatic

environment as those materials.”. JA93a. To the

extent there is any ambiguity in the statute, there is

no dispute that the agencies reasonably resolved it

by treating all fill material under the same statutory

and regulatory framework.

15

lll. THE AGENCIES’ INTERPRETATION OF

THEIR OWN REGULATIONS IS NOT

CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.

Although it does not dispute that the position

espoused by the agencies in their regulations is

entitled to Chevron deference, SEACC Br. 43,

SEACC nevertheless disputes the agencies’ view as

to what their regulations actually say. But SEACC

ignores the daunting legal standard that stands in

the way of that argument. Although it concedes that

“[aln authoritative expression of an agency’s

interpretation of its rule is entitled to deference as to

the rule’s meaning,” SEACC Br. 58, SEACC fails to

apply that standard to the central issue in this case.

SEACC cites a hodgepodge of agency statements

and actions over a 30-year period as if it were this

Court’s role to determine in the first instance what

the Corps and EPA intended in their own regula-

tions. It is not. The agencies have definitively

stated, in formal pronouncements rendered after

notice-and-comment, that “EPA has never sought to

regulate fill material under effluent guidelines” and

that “any mining-related material that has the effect

of fill when discharged will be regulated as ‘fill

material.” 67 Fed. Reg. 31,129, 31,135 (2002)

(emphases added). The agencies have likewise

espoused that view in their brief to this Court, which

independently warrants deference. See Auer v.

Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997) (“Petitioners

complain that the Secretary’s interpretation comes to

us in the form of a legal brief; but that does not, in

the circumstances of this case, make it unworthy of

16

deference.”).2 Thus, in determining the meaning of

the agencies’ regulations, this Court’s task is an easy

one: this interpretation by the agencies of their own

regulations is “controlling” unless “plainly erroneous

or inconsistent with the regulation[s].” Jd. at 461.

As discussed below, SEACC does not even come close

to overcoming that controlling deference.

1. SEACC fails to show how the agencies’

interpretation of their own regulations conflicts with

the plain language of the regulations themselves. To

the contrary, the regulations provide that discharges

of fill material include the “placement of * * *

tailings,” 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(f); that a Section 404

permit may be granted for such discharges without

compliance with the effluent limitation relied on by

SEACC, see 40 C.F.R. Part 230; and that no EPA

permit is required for “discharges of dredged or fill

material into waters of the United States which are

regulated under section 404 of [the] CWA.” 40 C.F.R.

§ 122.3(b). And SEACC expressly concedes that the

discharge at issue “meets the agencies’ new

definition of fill material.” SEACC Br. 20. SEACC’s

inferences based on snippets from preambles and un-

published responses to comments—while mistaken—

are ultimately immaterial, since those statements

cannot override or displace the _ regulations

themselves. See Alaska Br. 50-51; Fed. Br. 34.

Also unavailing is SEACC’s attempt to play

grammarian with the lack of a comma before the

word “which” in EPA’s longstanding regulation

exempting discharges of fill material from NPDES

9 Although EPA is not a formal party to this case, its counsel

has joined the Federal respondents’ brief, and Alaska

understands that that brief represents the considered views of

both the Corps and EPA.

17

permitting. See SEACC Br. 48. There is an

“inherent ambiguity” in this usage because “the lack

of a comma suggests that the modifying clause is

restrictive” whereas “the word ‘which’ suggests that

the clause is nonrestrictive.” Rhodes v. County of

Darlington, 833 F. Supp. 1163, 1190 n.18 (D.S.C.

1992).!9 Thus, the regulation is, at a bare minimum,

ambiguous, meaning that EPA—not SEACC— is the

final arbiter of its meaning. And EPA stated unequi-

vocally in 2002, long after the comma went missing,

that the agency had “never sought to regulate fill

material under effluent guidelines.” 67 Fed. Reg. at

31,135. The agency had similarly concluded in 1986

that “discharges listed in the Corps’ definition of

‘discharge of fill material’ ** * remain subject to

section 404 even if they occur in association with

discharges of wastes meeting the criteria * * * for

section 402 discharges.” 51 Fed. Reg. 8,871 (1986).!!

Because these interpretations are consistent with

the regulation and not clearly erroneous, they control

here. Indeed, even SEACC admits that the original

1973 version of what is now 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(b)

unambiguously provided that all discharges of fill

10 See also Fujitsu Ltd. v. NETGEAR, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d

964, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28700, *12 (W.D. Wis. 2008)

(although absence of preceding comma generally denotes non-

restrictive phrase, drafters of patent at issue “did not intend the

word ‘which’ to be non-restrictive”); Gamesa Eolica, S.A. v.

General Elec. Co., 359 F. Supp. 2d 790, 802 (W.D. Wis. 2005)

(same).

11 In a footnote, SEACC states that the definition of fill

material was different when the 1986 statement was made.

SEACC Br. 52 n.15. But SEACC does not explain how that fact

is relevant. Although the agencies’ definition of fill material

evolved over the years, they consistently reaffirmed that ail fill

material falls under the Section 404 permit program.

18

material were exempt from EPA permitting. See

SEACC Br. 48. This fact renders implausible

SEACC’s assertion that the agency abruptly shifted

course many years later, without any explanation,

through grammatical sleight-of-hand.

SEACC simply ignores that the Section 404(b)(1)

Guidelines, jointly promulgated by EPA and the

Corps, have always provided that discharges of fill

material may be permitted without compliance with

Section 306 performance standards. The Guidelines

“provide a comprehensive means of evaluating

whether any discharge of fill material *** is

environmentally acceptable and therefore may be

discharged in accordance with the CWA.” 67 Fed.

Reg. at 31,133. Yet they have never required

application of Section 306 standards. Although the

Guidelines were amended in 1980 (consistent with

the statute) to require compliance with toxic effluent

limitations promulgated under Section 307, the

agencies did not even discuss including Section 306

effluent limitations under that mandate. See 45 Fed.

Reg. 85,336 et. seg. (1980).

Thus, the federal agencies’ interpretation that

discharges of fill material are not governed by

Section 306 standards of performance is fully

consistent with the plain language of both the

NPDES and Section 404 regulations. That should be

the end of the analysis, since SEACC does not

dispute that that interpretation passes muster under

Chevron in the event the statute itself does not

answer the question.

2. But even if one looks at the extra-regulatory

snippets cobbled together by SEACC, the answer is

no different. In none of those statements did either

EPA or the Corps state that discharges meeting the

19

operative definition of fill material would be subject

to EPA permitting or Section 306 performance stand-

ards. Rather, as explained in the opening briefs and

above, they consistently stated the opposite.

The weakness in SEACC’s argument is revealed by

its critical reliance on the agencies’ deletion of

language from the 2002 fill rule that would have

excluded discharges subject to effluent limitations.

SEACC Br. 56. An agency’s interpretation of its own

regulation cannot be overturned by adopting

language that was intentionally deleted from the

regulation itself. And SEACC ignores the actual

reason that language was removed. The agencies

excluded the provision partly in response to a

comment from the mining industry that the proposed

language “could inadvertently result in attempts by

regulators in the field to have discharges excluded

from section 404 coverage simply due to the presence

of constituents in the material for which effluent

limitation guidelines’ exist,” including “mine

drainage or process waste water.” JA45a-46a.

Nor did the agencies state that “mine tailing

discharges subject to effluent limitations would

remain so.” SEACC Br. 56 (citing JA47a-48a). The

cited commentary states that “any material that has

the effect of fill is regulated under section 404” and

that the placement of “tailings” is “considered a

discharge of fill material.” JA48a (emphasis added).

The agencies understood that the new fill rule, which

eliminated the “waste” exclusion and treats all fill

discharges consistently, might slightly increase the

number of discharges subject to Section 404. See

JA43a (stating that rule would not “greatly increase”

waste disposal activities regulated by section 404).

And although the agencies intended to preserve the

20

validity of any previous EPA “determin[ation] that

certain materials are subject to an [effluent

limitation guideline] under specific circumstances,”

JA48a, no such determination was ever made in the

specific circumstances of the Kensington project. In

fact, the agencies expressly made the opposite

determination. See JA141a-149a.

SEACC’s reliance on _ unrelated statements

involving the regulation of asbestos is equally wide of

the mark. See SEACC Br. 50-51. SEACC posits that

EPA must have intended to subject discharges of fill

material to effluent limitations because it allegedly

declined to issue Section 307 guidelines for asbestos

contained in mining discharges. This convoluted

theory collapses, given that the cited statements

nowhere refer to Section 404 or fill material, or even

Section 307. Nothing in this unrelated rulemaking

even remotely implies that fill material is subject to

Section 306 standards of performance, or that

asbestos in fill material would be otherwise

unregulated. In fact, the flexible process under

Section 404 is fully capable of protecting against

asbestos contamination, should it ever arise. See 67

Fed. Reg. at 31,133 (process “is expressly designed to

address the entire range of environmental concerns

arising from discharges of dredged or fill material”).

Faced with an absence of any agency statements

supporting its own position, SEACC resorts to

unsupported characterizations. It asserts that “(flor

decades, EPA issued NPDES permits for discharges

that met its effect-based definition of ‘fill material’

but were also subject to effluent limitations.”

SEACC Br. 49 (citing JA83a-84a). As support,

SEACC cites agency commentary on the 2002 fill

rule, but one will search the cited pages in vain for

21

any such statement. That is not surprising, given

EPA’s contemporaneous statement in the actual

regulations that “EPA has never sought to regulate

fill material under effluent guidelines.” 67 Fed. Reg.

at 31,135.

SEACC also asserts that the so-called Regas

Memorandum—which entirely rejects SEACC’s

position—recognizes that discharges with an

“incidental” filling effect “would meet the new

definition of ‘fill material’ but would not be eligible

for section 404 permits.” SEACC Br. 50. But that is

false. The agencies made clear that discharges with

such incidental effects would not meet the fill

definition. See 67 Fed. Reg. at 31,135 (“[W]e do not

consider such pollutants to be ‘fill material.”); JA46a

(same); Alaska Br. 53. The Regas memorandum

simply reflects that determination. See JA145a.}2

SEACC also disputes whether the Corps previously

had a practice of permitting discharges of fill mat-

erial that also implicated effluent limitations. The

Corps’ practice is of little import in interpreting its

12 That memorandum, issued in 2004 by the heads of all the

relevant EPA water regulation offices, embraces the inter-

pretation advanced by petitioners and the Federal respondents

in this case. See JAl4la-149a. SEACC, however, contends that

this pronouncement is not entitled to deference under either

Chevron or Auer because it allegedly changed agency policy.

SEACC Br. 59-60. As explained above and in Alaska’s opening

brief, the memorandum merely restated longstanding agency

policy reflected in regulations and statements made after

notice-and-comment, which unquestionably deserve deference.

In any event, the memorandum is itself entitled to deference

under this Court’s standards. See Alaska Br. 42 (quoting

Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002)) (Chevron

deference); Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 127 S. Ct.

2339, 2349 (2007) (Auer deference).

22

regulations, since the actual regulations have never

required application of EPA effluent limitations. But

regardless, in 1984 the Corps issued a Section 404

permit for the Red Dog Mine—which would have

been subject to the performance standard for process

wastewater relied on by SEACC here—to discharge

its tailings into waters of the United States. See

SER 979; Coeur Br. 40-41. SEACC notes that that

permit was to aid construction of a dam for the

impoundment, see SEACC Br. 53, but that is a

distinction without a difference. Under SEACC’s

theory, no fill permit can ever issue for any discharge

of mine tailings from a froth flotation mill into any

regulated waters for any purpose. Yet both in this

case and 24 years ago at the Red Dog Mine, the

Corps permitted a discharge of mine tailings as fill

material when those tailings originated at a mine

subject to that effluent limitation.

As explained in the opening briefs, while the

agencies’ definition of “fill material” has evolved over

the years, they have been entirely consistent on the

central point at issue in this case. If a discharge

meets the operative definition of fill material, it has

always been permitted by the Corps under Section

404, and has never been subject to permitting by

EPA under Section 402 or to the Section 306 effluent

limitations applied thereunder. The 2002 fill rule

confirmed that interpretation. The agencies decided

on a uniform definition of fill material, and

determined that “by establishing a program under

section 404 for authorizing discharges of fill material

into waters of the U.S., Congress sanctioned the

filling or elimination of waters where it can be done

in an environmentally acceptable manner, i.e., where

consistent with the 404(b\1) Guidelines.” JA51la.

Under that interpretation, the definition of “fill

23

material” is a bright-line test that “determines the

basic jurisdiction of the section 404 versus the

section 402 program.” 67 Fed. Reg. at 31,133.

* * *

This case is straightforward. There is no dispute

that the proposed discharges are fill material under

the applicable definition. The CWA is clear that the

Corps may permit this discharge, because it meets

the Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines and was not vetoed

by EPA. But even if the statute were ambiguous, the

expert agencies’ interpretation of the statute—which

in turn consists of valid interpretations of their own

regulations—is reasonable and therefore entitled to

dispositive deference under Chevron.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, and those in Alaska’s

opening brief, the judgment below should be

reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

TALIS J. COLBERG JONATHAN S. FRANKLIN*

Attorney General TILLMAN J. BRECKENRIDGE

CAMERON M. LEONARD FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI L.L.P.

Assistant Attorney 801 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.

General Washington, D.C. 20004

STATE OF ALASKA (202) 662-0466

Department of Law

P.O. Box 110300

Juneau, AK 99811

(907) 465-3600

Counsel for Petitioner

* Counsel of Record State of Alaska

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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