Respondents Brief — Alaska v. Southeast Alaska Alaska Conservation Council (No. 07-990)

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

COEUR ALASKA, INC.,

Petitioner,

¥.

SOUTHEAST ALASKA CONSERVATION COUNCIL, ET AL.,

Respondents.

STATE OF ALASKA

Petitioner,

Vv.

SOUTHEAST ALASKA CONSERVATION COUNCIL, ET AL.,

Respondents.

On Writs of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS SOUTHEAST

ALASKA CONSERVATION COUNCIL, SIERRA

CLUB, AND LYNN CANAL CONSERVATION

THOMAS 8S. WALDO

Counsel of Record

EARTHJUSTICE

325 Fourth Street

Juneau, AK 99801

(907) 586-2751

Counsel for Respondents

ScoTT L. NELSON

PUBLIC CITIZEN

LITIGATION GROUP

1600 20™ St., NW

Washington, DC 20009

(202) 588-1000

Nos. 07-984, 07-990 7 ~ 2008

CLERK

> oa

Anne

QUESTION PRESENTED

Does the Army Corps of Engineers have authority

under section 404 of the Clean Water Act to grant a

“fill material” permit for an industrial process waste-

water discharge from a newly constructed ore benefi-

ciation mill, when the discharge is prohibited by a

new source performance standard adopted by the

Environmental Protection Agency under section 306

of the Act?

ll

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

Respondents Southeast Alaska Conservation

Council, Sierra Club, and Lynn Canal Conservation

concur in the State of Alaska’s statement of the Par-

ties to the Proceedings.

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

Respondents Southeast Alaska Conservation

Council, Sierra Club, and Lynn Canal Conservation

have no parent companies, subsidiaries, or affiliates

that have issued shares to the public.

iil

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ty OR 8 8 hy: ee i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS ......................... il

Bee BD Ee IIIS Eon csc ccccccesscsccccccccccscscosesscoseess il

GI td ccnccscassssscccsecscocecccossccesens ill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................06 vi

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

Nees snesiacscnannacl 1

EE en ee 1

a eessntaceasiensnbenaeuads 2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................... cece eeeeee eens 20

a scdindiasbinsantonese 23

I. UNDER THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF

THE CLEAN WATER ACT, THE

CORPS LACKS AUTHORITY TO PER-

MIT WASTEWATER DISCHARGES

FROM SOURCES SUBJECT TO EPA

PERFORMANCE STANDARDS. .................. 23

A. Section 306(e) Prohibits Any

Wastewater Discharge from the

EES REE ceo ee Oe 23

B. There Is No Conflict Between

Section 306(e) and Section 404................. 26

C. Section 306(e) Has No Imphed

Exception for Fill Material....................... 29

1. Courts Should Rarely Infer

EEG EL te eR 31

II.

iv

2. Sections 306 and 404 Reflect a

Deliberate Choice by Congress

Not to Include the Exception

Sought by the Corps............................ 32

3. Sections 301 and 306 Have

Independent Effect and Do Not

Depend on Other Provisions to

ied iadinisdinstintbcsevveessvese 33

4. Neither Section 402 nor Section

307 Establishes an Implied

Exception to Section 306(e)................. 36

5. The Ninth Circuit Correctly

Interpreted Section 301(a). ................. 38

D. The Language and History of the Act

Demonstrate That Congress

Intended Wastewater Discharges

from Ore Beneficiation Mills to Be

Governed by Section 402 Permits. ........... 40

E. Exempting Wastewater Discharges

Containing Solids from Effluent

Limitations Would Undermine

Congressional Goal. .........................ccce0 44

IF THE CLEAN WATER ACT WERE

AMBIGUOUS, THE COURT SHOULD

DEFER TO THE INTERPRETATION

STATED BY THE HEADS OF BOTH

AGENCIES UPON PROMULGATION

OF THE 2002 FILL RULE. .........................-. 46

Vv

A. The Agencies’ Regulations Reveal

that Some Discharges Meeting the

Definition of “Fill Material” Are

Subject to Effluent Limitations and

sg 46

B. EPA Intended the Effluent

Limitations for Ore Beneficiation

Mills to Be Applied in Permits

Under Section 402, Not 404. .................... 49

C. When the Agencies Adopted Their

New Definition of Fill Material in

2002, They Did Not Intend to

Change Past Practice...................0.ccccccceees 55

D. The Regas Memo Could Not Change

the Agencies’ Authoritative

Interpretation Published in the

NE IE cncciccsitinininnndinviianneanienimndaien 58

SO AT Ciincntisstosnnvscvtiinmeninenipinaiccndiineitiiaaaal 60

FE IED ecesicncmsisevecerenscsensccnitesetntcnmmecaiiaiainaaall la

: |

vl

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES

Alaska Prof'l Hunters Ass'n v. FAA,

177 F.3d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ..............cccceeeeeees 59

Andrus v. Glover Const. Co.,

446 U.S. 608 (1980) ............... "RLSEOE SO ae OEE 31-32

Auer v. Robbins,

I sc scnnsoseoosnonsesocsonsss 58

Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. NRDC,

I... cnccnccnenecesevccoovaccers 6

Chevron, U.S.A. v. NRDC,

467 U.S. 837 (1984) .............00.. cece eee 17, 20, 23, 46

E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train,

450 UB. 113 (1977) ..........0............-. 6, 7, 24, 31, 34

Garberding v. Jenkins,

io 8. ccsnacesecsvesosconseuens 59

Gonzales v. Oregon.,

RE TS 59

Helvering v. Hammel,

i ccenesvonseens 21

Hillsborough County v. Automated Med.

Labs., Inc.,

i cipslonesaonosousnaes 58

Kalur vu. Resor,

I OS, BID ED vccccccscsccecesscocccescese 41

vl

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Kentuckians for the Commonwealth v.

Rivenburgh,

317 F.3d 425 (4th Cir. 2003) ................... 11, 44, 52

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm

Mut. Auto. Ins. Co..,

I cbomennabinainile 18, 55, 58

Nat'l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of

Wildlife,

a ii cial eceesanccndmntonedt 29

Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Gulf

Power Co..,

IER ree 28

Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. U.S. Army Corps

of Eng'rs,

No, 3:05-0784, 2007 WL 2200686

i ar ek, ey Us SED... caccesencesesesenes 54

Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co.,

ee snimainnenne 49

Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA,

514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975)................. 42, 43, 51

S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Bd. of Envtl. Prot.,

gE SEE A ee 37

Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala,

I i lscnccanetuibomseness 58

TRW Inc. v. Andrews,

i 31

vill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

United States v. Mead Corp.,

a a ae nN 59

United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers'

Coop.,

I A ai sciccmettstabodeoeia 31, 32

United States v. Pa. Indus. Chem. Corp.,

ee 40, 41

United States v. Republic Steel Corp.,

a cc cnssccnduswonsndsvocssoncneonads 41

United States v. Rutherford,

Oe TE in 18, 21, 31, 32

STATUTES

Administrative Procedure Act,

a socnssmmionensenelte 58

Rivers and Harbors Act § 10,

ai a lai diaciacleentanpeegdilatie 41

Refuse Act,

I acini ecetciinliis aeagaiciiasnianel 22, 40

Federal Water Pollution Control Act

Amendments of 1972 (“Clean Water Act”)

as amended:

§ 101(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)

Pees lew eens Rota hwrere 5, 21, 30, 32, 44

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

§ 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a)

‘ideanedbiiadibaniitladiiats 7, 33, 34, 35, 38, 39

§ 301(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)................. 6, 7, 30, 34

§ 301(c), 33 U.S.C. § 181 166)...............ccccccccsceescee 35

§ 301(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(e)............... 7, 17, 26, 34

§ 301(f), 33 U.S.C. § 13811(f) ................cccccesseceeees 33

§ 301(h), 33 U.S.C. § 1311Q)) ......................0eeeees 35

§ 301), 33 U.S.C. § 1311Q))................ecceceeeeee 33, 35

§ 301¢k), 38 U.S.C. § 13110%)................0cccescecceses 35

ry ee Pes BD BIND BUD csesececccccercceesccccsecceses 33

§ 301(m), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(m) .......................00. 35

© BOi¢m), BB UBC. & LBL RG) ..0...0..ccccccccccccsescesss 35

§ 301(p), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(p).............. cece eee ees 35

§ 304(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)..........0.0 ee. 1, 30

§ 304(b)-(c), 33 U.S.C.§ 1314(b)-(c)..00 eee eee 6

Sa EY PPI ci caidadandccdtusencncsocnnneas 6, 38

§ 306(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(1)

sisaiiatiielpiaelilaeitinialctacibeizen 6, 8, 25, 30, 32

§ 306(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(2) ........0. ee. 29

§ 306(a)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(3) ..... ee. 25, 29

© Es Se CEG. © BRI cece ccccsccscccccocecsccese 29

§ 306(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(d)....... cece eeeees 33

x

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

§ 306(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(e)

sonliiadiods 7, 17, 20, 24, 25, 27, 33, 34

FM Gs 7 ef: : aoe aay snree 6

§ 307(a)(5), 33 U.S.C. § 131 7(a)(5) «0... eeeeerceeeeeees 37

§ 307(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1817(d).......... ccc eeeeeeeeeenens 7

F & Le Se 5) | eee 21, 28, 35

As i Ry TE BI a cccnniccpesiniseneancacndsunsestuuatess 33

fF 8 Lit | ef Serene 38

§ 402(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1)

ieieciasanaiaile 7, 33, 36, 37, 38, 39, 48

§ 402(a)(5), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(5).......... 22, 40, 43

§ 402(k), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k)..........00000.. 28, 37, 40

§ 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1B44..............0.0..ccescceeeees 7, 21, 36

§ 404(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a)

‘sieatilaaiieidinhctadibaiiceabalie 20, 21, 27, 29, 33

§ 404(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b) 0... ccececeeeeeeees 29, 37

§ 404(f), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f) «0.0.0.0... 32, 33, 37, 50

§ 404(h), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(h) ....... ee. 37, 50

§ 404(n), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(m) ........ ee. 21, 28, 35

§ 404(p), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(p)............. 21, 28, 37, 50

§ 404(r), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(r).....cccceeeeee. 32, 37, 50

§ 404(s), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(S)......ccccccscesesseseseeeees 28

§ 405(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1345(a).................ceceessceees 33

Xl

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

§ 502(6), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6).............. eee eee 29

§ 502(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1862(7).................ecceceeeseeeees 5

§ 502(11), 33 U.S.C. § 13862(11)........0 ee. 6

§ 502(12), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)......... ee 29

§ 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14)......... ee. 29

§ 504(a), 33 U.S.C. § 13864 (a)... eee ee eeeee eee 33

§ 505, 33 U.S.C. § 136B....................cccccccsserees 33, 35

§ 511d), 33 U.S.C. § 1371Gd)..............cccccsesceeceees 33

CONGRESSIONAL MATERIALS:

118 Cong. Rec. 33,705-06 (1972) 2.00.0... eeeeeee eee 43

118 Cong. Rec. 33,713 (1972)...................ssecccsscoseeee 43

118 Cong. Rec. 33,765 (1972).............ccccccccccssssccsseese 42

118 Cong. Rec. 36,780 (1972).............cccccceeeceveceeeeeees 42

S. Rep. No. 92-414 (1971) ........... ee. 6, 7, 24, 31, 41

REGULATIONS

33 C.F.R.

Part 320

I i te 27

Part 323

I 11, 46

EE Tamme aes 44, 46, 57

xll

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

40 C.F.R.

Part 122

ESSE Rae eae oR. 7 16, 53

I I oo ss ssc eesennanednnnenenesoes 47, 50

Part 230

ST 27

Section 230.10(a)(4)-(5) ............cccccececeeeeeeeeeeee 27

Section 230.10(b)(2).........0..cccccceeeceeeeeceeeee 50, 57

Section 230.10(b)(3)-(4) ..........ccccccceeeeeseeeeeeeeee 27

Part 401

I sds ccovnidsndpoceessenssetnnonesenatbeds 3

I II . .. ccccsssisecsdacosonnecousen 3, 49

ID ccirncisvesesuscnvndisenecocsersvasieseenniened 3

REE ne a 51

Part 412

ESE IS A ITEM Le 45

NS ETE TE ee RRR SERED om 57-58

Part 440

NN ie aT RE ae 10

I oi cicccccccccscccsecetctccsedeccstecneves 10

BI II oo ccccccccvcocsccsecsesconsecsneccesenes 57

Section 440.100(a)(2)...........ccccceecececeeeeeeeeceeees 24

Be MI ccs csunscsessececceocsersccccovonsassee 26

Xlll

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Section 440.104(b)(1)

Reactant 8, 15, 17, 24, 25, 47, 49

te SE UE viincctiocseidedsnicndeiandonbanniiiinn 57

RTE an ae ee SOc ene 2

ADMINISTRATIVE MATERIALS

33 Fed. Reg. 18,670 (Dec. 18, 1968) ........................ 41

36 Fed. Reg. 6564 (April 7, 1971)....................00. 40, 41

38 Fed. Reg. 24,462 (Sept. 7, 1973)...............sseceeeees 45

38 Fed. Reg. 29,008 (Oct. 18, 1973).............. eee 45

38 Fed. Reg. 33,170 (Nov. 30, 1973)...............cesseeeee 45

40 Fed. Reg. 51,722 (Nov. 6, 1975)...............0cccc000 8, 9

40 Fed. Reg. 51,748 (Nov. 6, 1975)..............c.scceseeeeees 7

42 Fed. Reg. 37,122 (July 19, 1977) ........................ 10

42 Fed. Reg. 37,294 (July 20, 1977) .............. cee ceeeees 45

44 Fed. Reg. 32,854 (June 7, 1979) ......................... 48

45 Fed. Reg. 33,290 (May 19, 1980)..................00.. 48

45 Fed. Reg. 44,926 (July 2, 1980) .................00....... 45

45 Fed. Reg. 68,328 (Oct. 14, 1980)...................0.0ee, 45

47 Fed. Reg. 25,682 (June 14, 1982)

jncccinendiemaiade 2, 3, 8, 9, 10, 50, 51, 55

47 Fed. Reg. 31,794 (July 22, 1982) ......ccccceseeee 54, 55

X1V

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

47 Fed. Reg. 54,598 (Dec. 3, 1982)

49 Fed. Reg. 9108 (March 9, 1984)...............c eee 45

51 Fed. Reg. 8871 (March 14, 1986)................... 10, 52

65 Fed. Reg. 21,292 (April 20, 2000)............ 12, 14, 56

66 Fed. Reg. 2960 (Jan. 12, 2001) ............. cee cee seen 45

67 Fed. Reg. 31,129 (May 9, 2002)............... 12, 13, 56

67 Fed. Reg. 57,872 (Sept. 12, 2002)....................... 45

MISCELLANEOUS

Army Corps of Engineers, Qs and As on the

CUES eee 13

Kate Golden, EPA puzzled by Coeur Alaska

pullout, Juneau Empire, Sept. 25, 2008............ 19

Robert W. Adler, Jessica C. Landman, &

Diane M. Cameron, The Clean Water Act

a siunsosnnatiansosse 30

The Chicago Manual of Style (15th ed. 2003)......... 47

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

Relevant portions of the statutes and regulations

involved in this case, including Clean Water Act sec-

tions 301, 304, 306, 307, 309, 402, 404, and 502 (33

U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1314, 1316, 1317, 1319, 1342, 1344,

1362), 33 C.F.R. § 323.2, and 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.2,

122.3, 230.10, 401.11, 440.100, 440.104, and 440.132,

are reproduced in the appendix to this brief.

INTRODUCTION

The Clean Water Act identifies by name just four

“conventional pollutants” that the Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA) must regulate, two of which

are suspended solids and pH. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(4).

One of the most common technologies for removing

suspended solids is the settling pond, an artificial

structure that allows solids to settle out before any

wastewater is discharged into navigable waters. In

adopting effluent limitations, the Act’s principal

regulatory mechanism for controlling pollution, EPA

has identified settling ponds as the best technology

for many industries to reduce or eliminate suspended

solids.

At issue here is whether a new source of pollution

may escape strict EPA performance standards by us-

ing a navigable lake as its settling pond. ‘I'he type of

source here—a newly constructed mill for processing

gold ores—has been subject to EPA effluent limita-

tions since 1975 and to a new source performance

standard prohibiting any wastewater discharges

since 1982. In an unprecedented decision, the Army

Corps of Engineers granted a permit to discharge the

2

mill’s process wastewater directly into a lake as “fill

material,” bypassing EPA’s no-discharge standard.

The Corps acknowledged that the mill would use the

lake as a “settling pond” to remove suspended solids

and dilute elevated pH. J.A. 360a.

While this approach is undeniably cheaper for the

mill owner, it defeats the purpose of the Clean Water

Act and EPA’s effluent limitations, which is to re-

duce or eliminate pollutants before they are dis-

charged to navigable waters. More to the point, it

violates both the plain language of the Act and the

stated intent of the agencies when they adopted the

relevant regulations. Upholding this approach would

vitiate the effluent limitations not only for ore mills,

but for the many other industrial sources whose

process wastewater contains significant quantities of

suspended solids.

STATEMENT

1. Beneficiation mills process ores to make them

suitable for refining or smelting. See 40 C.F.R.

§ 440.132(f). In the “froth-flotation” process, a mill

grinds large quantities of ore into fine particles and

introduces water, air, and chemicals in large tanks.

The mill at the Kensington Mine, for example, will

use potassium amyl xanthate (a conditioner), MIBC

(a frother), flocculants, polymers, surfactants, scale

inhibitors, and lime. This process creates a gold-

bearing froth that floats to the top and is removed for

further processing off-site. See J.A. 189a-9la; 47

Fed. Reg. 25,682, 25,684 (June 14, 1982).

Left in the tanks is process wastewater, a slurry

consisting of water, chemicals, metals, and sus-

3

pended solids (or “tailings”).' According to EPA,

process wastewater from froth-flotation mills “is

characterized by very high suspended solids levels

(often in the percent range rather than milligrams

per liter), high metals levels, and process reagents

such as cyanide.” 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,685. Metals

dissolved in the wastewater are reduced by raising

the pH, typically with lime, causing the metals to

precipitate. Jd. at 25,691, 25,692. The resulting ele-

vated pH levels can be toxic to aquatic life. See J.A.

206a.

The process wastewater from the froth-flotation

mill at the Kensington Mine will be 70% water and

30% solids by volume. See J.A. 304a (total slurry

' “Tailings” is an imprecise term, undefined in the statutes

and regulations at issue. Petitioners and the Corps most often

use it to refer to the solid component of the process wastewater.

See, e.g., Fed. Br. at 6; Coeur Br. at 6; State Br. at 12. How-

ever, record documents sometimes use it to refer to the entire

wastewater slurry. See, e.g., J.A. 192a (describing tailings as

material remaining in flotation tanks after processing and

transported as slurry), 206a (measuring tailings in gallons per

minute), 263a (requiring monitoring of dissolved solids in tail-

ings).

EPA’s regulations define “process wastewater” to include

any water that comes into contact with, or results from the pro-

duction of, any waste product. 40 C.F.R. § 401.11(q). It in-

cludes “pollutants,” such as “solid waste,” id. § 401.11(f),

“present in process waste water.” Jd. § 401.11(r). EPA uses the

term to describe discharges with high levels of suspended sol-

ids, see 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,685, “including mine tailings.” J.A.

291a.

There is no dispute that the discharge in this case is process

wastewater. The section 404 permit at issue authorizes dis-

charge of the entire wastewater slurry, not just the solids. See

J.A. 275a (4 10), 304a, 360a-61a.

4

throughput will be 354 gallons per minute, of which

247 will be water). By weight, it will be about 45%

water and 55% solids. Jd. It will be sufficiently liq-

uid to flow at a rate of 354 gallons per minute, by

gravity, for 3.5 miles through a 6-inch pipe without

clogging. See id.; J.A. 194a. At this rate, the dis-

charge would be about 510,000 gallons per day.?

If discharged into a lake, river, stream, or wet-

land, the process wastewater of the Kensington mill

would, like that of other such mills, cause substan-

tial pollution. The wastewater will have a pH of

about 10, which would be toxic to aquatic life and ex-

pected to dilute in the lake. J.A. 206a, 360a. It will

contain “trace concentrations of metals bearing sul-

fides, metal oxides, metal sulfates, and carbonate

salts.” J.A. 343a. Tests of decant water (wastewater

samples after the solids have settled) revealed vary-

ing traces of 18 metals, including aluminum, chro-

mium, copper, lead, and mercury. ER 334.°

The discharge would kill all fish in Lower Slate

Lake and most other aquatic life. J.A. 197a, 374a.

Whether aquatic life would be able to repopulate the

lake after discharges ceased is uncertain. Two tests

of the toxic effects of settled solids from the process

wastewater on freshwater organisms showed clear

2 An appendix to the Environmental Impact Statement as-

sumed that the volume would be abvuut 148 gallons per minute,

or 210,000 gallons per day. J.A. 206a. The record does not ex-

plain this discrepancy, but in any event there will be a substan-

tial volume of process wastewater containing a high level of

suspended solids.

3 ER stands for the Excerpts of Record in the Ninth Circuit.

SER stands for the Supplemental Excerpts of Record.

5

harm to biological productivity. In one test, only 5%

of tested organisms survived in the “tailings sedi-

ments,” far below the EPA’s minimum allowable rate

of 80%. J.A. 201la. In the other, organisms survived

but showed “a statistically significant reduced emer-

gence rate,” below EPA’s recommended endpoint. Id.

The agencies saw “some uncertainty” in these re-

sults, but found that a reasonable worst-case as-

sumption was that “the tailings would not support

macroinvertebrates after closure....” J.A. 202a. To

mitigate these toxic effects, the owner would be re-

quired to cap the lake bottom with four inches of na-

tive material when discharges cease. J.A. 309a. The

administrative record contains no studies demon-

strating the efficacy of this requirement. EPA, not-

ing the uncertainty, concluded that “the weight of

the evidence suggests that restoring and ‘improving’

the lake would take decades, not years.” ER 429.

2. In the Clean Water Act, Congress established

a “national goal that the discharge of pollutants into

the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985....”. 33

U.S.C. §1251(a)(1).4 Though the goal was not

achieved, the measures enacted to pursue it remain

in place.

To achieve this goal, Congress mandated the use

of different technologies and standards for different

sources of pollution. Section 301(b) requires EPA to

adopt technology-based effluent limitations for exist-

ing pollution sources, to become increasingly strin-

4 “Navigable waters” ‘« defined as “waters of the United

States,” 33 U.S.C. § 1362,,), and this brief uses the terms inter-

changeably.

6

gent over time. See id. § 1311(b); Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n

v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 470 U.S. 116, 118

(1985); EI. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430

U.S. 112, 121 (1977). Section 306 requires the

agency to adopt even more stringent effluent limita-

tions—called standards of performance'—for new

sources. 33 U.S.C. § 1316. Section 307 requires spe-

cial effluent limitations for toxic pollutants. /d.

§ 1317(a). Section 304 requires EPA to publish “ef-

fluent limitation guidelines” providing information

about technologies available to reduce and eliminate

pollution from different sources and to comply with

effluent limitations and performance standards. Id.

§ 1314(b)-(c).

The strictest standards are for new sources under

section 306, because those sources present the best

opportunity to achieve the Congressional goal of

eliminating discharges. These national performance

standards must reflect “the greatest degree of efflu-

ent reduction which [EPA] determines to be achiev-

able through application of the best available

demonstrated control technology....” Id. § 1316(a){1).

The Act directs EPA to adopt, “where practicable, a

standard permitting no discharge of pollutants.” Td.

With these standards, Congress “intended to insure

national uniformity and ‘maximum feasible control of

new sources.” Du Pont, 430 U.S. at 138 (quoting S.

Rep. No. 92-414, at 58 (1971), reprinted in 1972

U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3724). The Senate Report cited

in Du Pont states that “this section ... is among the

5 The Act’s definition of “effluent limitation” includes a

standard of performance. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1316(a)({1), 1362(11).

7

most significant in the legislation.” S. Rep. No.

92-414, at 57, 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3723-24. The fo-

cus on new construction “is considered by the Com-

mittee to be the most effective and, in the long run,

the least expensive approach to pollution control.”

Id. at 58, 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3724.

The Act’s reliance on technology means that there

are no limitations generally applicable to all pollu-

tion sources. Rather, limitations are different for

each source category, depending on what control

technologies are available and feasible. See generally

Du Pont, 430 U.S. at 126-30.

The Act requires all sources to comply with any

applicable effluent limitations under sections 301,

306, and 307. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), (b), (e), 1316(e),

1317(d). Section 402 of the Act directs EPA to estab-

lish the “National Pollutant Discharge Elimination

System” (NPDES), requiring individual sources to

obtain permits conditioned on compliance with these

limitations. Id. § 1342. Section 404 authorizes the

Army Corps of Engineers to issue permits for the dis-

charge of one type of pollutant, dredged or fill mate-

rial, subject to guidelines developed in conjunction

with EPA. Jd. § 1344. If a discharge is authorized by

a valid fill-material permit under section 404, a sec-

tion 402 permit is not required. ld. § 1342(a)(1)

(“Except as provided in sections [318] and [404]...”).

3. Recognizing the severe adverse effects of proc-

ess wastewater discharges from ore beneficiating

mills, EPA in 1975 identified “ore mining and dress-

ing” as a category of sources of pollution under the

Clean Water Act. 40 Fed. Reg. 51,748 (Nov. 6, 1975).

Simultaneously, the agency adopted rules describing

waste characteristics of various ore-processing mills,

8

identifying best technologies to control discharges,

and setting limits for total suspended solids, pH, and

various metals in discharges from existing sources.

See 40 Fed. Reg. 51,722 (Nov. 6, 1975). Included

were limitations for mills using the froth-flotation

process for gold ores. Jd. at 51,732 (adopting 40

C.F.R. § 440.22(a)(2)).

In 1982, EPA adopted a strict no-discharge stan-

dard, which remains in effect today, for new froth-

flotation mills: “there shall be no discharge of proc-

ess wastewater to navigable waters from mills that

use the froth-flotation process ... for the beneficiation

of ... gold ... ores....”. 40 C.F.R. § 440.104(b)(1); see

47 Fed. Reg. 54,598, 54,619 (Dec. 3, 1982). EPA ex-

plained the no-discharge standard for new facilities

as follows:

New facilities have the opportunity to im-

plement the best and most efficient ore min-

ing and milling processes and wastewater

technologies. Accordingly, Congress directed

EPA to consider the best demonstrated proc-

ess changes and end-of-pipe treatment tech-

nologies capable of reducing pollution to the

maximum extent feasible through a standard

of performance which includes, “where prac-

ticable, a standard permitting no discharge of

pollutants.”

47 Fed. Reg. at 25,696 (quoting 33 U.S.C.

§ 1316(a)(1)). The agency noted that while some ex-

isting sources would require expensive retrofitting to

achieve zero discharge, “[t]his concern does not apply

to new sources,” which can be designed to meet the

standard. Id. at 25,697.

9

In both the 1975 and 1982 rules, EPA identified

essentially the same best control technology: re-

moval of solids in large settling ponds, usually called

tailings ponds or impoundments, preceded by lime-

precipitation. See 40 Fed. Reg. at 51,724 (subpart

B(2)); 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,691. For new sources, the

agency found that it was possible to achieve zero dis-

charge by recycling water from tailings ponds back to

the mill: “Raw wastewater discharged from a typical

ore mill is usually routed to a settling pond for sus-

pended solids and metals removal. In complete recy-

cle, all treated water is routed back to the mill for

reuse in the beneficiating process.” 47 Fed. Reg.

at 25,692.

EPA found that 46 out of 90 existing facilities

were already achieving zero discharge through com-

plete recycling. 47 Fed. Reg. at 54,602. The agency

rejected arguments that zero discharge would be too

expensive in wet or mountainous areas (like Alaska),

finding that it had been successfully achieved in

both. Id.

Addressing permitting requirements, EPA ex-

plained that the effluent limitations and perform-

ance standards “will be applied to individual ore

mines and mills through NPDES permits issued by

EPA ... under Section 402 of the Act.” Jd. at 54,606

(emphasis added). Notwithstanding the high solid

content of process wastewater from these mills, see

47 Fed. Reg. at 25,685, EPA nowhere suggested that

the Corps could permit these discharges as “fill ma-

terial.” Nor did EPA suggest that a mill could use a

navigable lake as its settling pond, which would have

directly contradicted the plain language of the rule

prohibiting discharges to navigable waters.

10

4. Throughout most of the history of the Clean

Water Act, the Corps’ regulations explicitly pre-

cluded the use of a “fill material” permit to discharge

process wastewater. From 1977 until 2002, the

Corps’ regulatory definition of “fill material” ex-

cluded “any pollutant discharged into the water pri-

marily to dispose of waste, as that activity is

regulated under Section 402 of the Clean Water Act.”

J.A. 27a (quoting former 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e); em-

phasis added by agencies); see 42 Fed. Reg. 37,122,

37,145 (July 19, 1977). EPA had a much broader

definition of “fill material,” encompassing discharges

with the “effect” of fill, see J.A. 27a, but EPA does not

issue section 404 permits.

To resolve confusion created by their different

definitions of “fill material,” the two agencies entered

into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) in 1986.

See 51 Fed. Reg. 8,871 (March 14, 1986). The MOA

confirmed that “a pollutant ... will normally be con-

sidered by EPA and the Corps to be subject to section

402 if it is a discharge in liquid, semi-liquid, or sus-

pended form,” like the wastewater discharge from

the Kensington mill. /d. at 8,872 § B.5. The MOA

cited “titanium mining wastes” as one example of

such a discharge. Jd. EPA had adopted performance

standards for titanium mining wastes, including

those from mills using flotation methods, in the same

rulemaking that established the gold ore beneficia-

ting rule in this case. See 47 Fed. Reg. at 54,614-15

(adopting 40 C.F.R. §§ 440.52(b) and 440.54(b)).

Wastewater discharges from titanium mills, like

those from gold mills, are high in suspended solids

and metals, and require the use of settling ponds and

pH adjustment as primary treatment technologies.

See 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,687.

11

Under the MOA and the Corps’ former regula-

tions, the Corps did not grant section 404 permits for

discharges subject to EPA effluent limitations. See

Kentuckians for the Commonwealth v. Rivenburgh,

317 F.3d 425, 445, 448 (4th Cir. 2003). Rather, EPA

granted section 402 permits for these discharges,

even if they met EPA’s effect-based definition of “fill

material.” J.A. 83a-84a. This longstanding practice

recognized that even if a discharge could be defined

as “fill material,” it was not eligible for a section 404

permit if it was subject to an effluent limitation.

Acting in accordance with the performance stan-

dards and longstanding regulatory policies of the

agencies, Coeur Alaska applied for and obtained

permits in 1997 to open the Kensington Mine using a

“dry tailings facility” on land near Comet Beach.

J.A. 165a, 177a-78a; ER 232-39, 252-62. This design

“is a standard industry technology in use at other

mines in Alaska.” ER 450; see also SER 837 44 10-11

(describing other mines using dry tailings -facilities).

It would not have involved any discharge of process

wastewater into navigable waters. ER 235 (“Waste-

water from the milling process would be recycled.”).

These permits were never challenged in court. Nev-

ertheless, Coeur abandoned this option and never

opened the mine under these permits. J.A. 161la.

5. In 2000, the Corps and EPA jointly proposed a

new definition of “fill material’—finalized in 2002—

intended to harmonize the agencies’ differing defini-

tions. Following EPA’s approach, the new definition

includes any material that “has the effect of ...

[clhanging the bottom elevation of any portion of a

water of the United States.” 33 =C.F.R.

§ 323.2(e)(1)(Gi). In adopting the rule, the agencies

12

stated that it “is generally consistent with current

agency practice and so it does not expand the types

cf discharges that will be covered under section 404.”

67 Fed. Reg. 31,129, 31,133 (May 9, 2002); see also

id. at 31,130, 31,132, 31,135; J.A. 46a, 47a-48a, 83a-

84a.

The rule as proposed would have included an ex-

plicit exception for discharges subject to effluent

limitations:

The term fill material does not include

discharges covered by proposed or final efflu-

ent limitations guidelines and standards un-

der sections 301, 304 or section 306 of the

Clean Water Act (see generally, 40 CFR part

401), or discharges covered by an NPDES

permit issued under section 402 of the Clean

Water Act.

65 Fed. Reg. 21,292, 21,299 (April 20, 2000). The

agencies explained that this approach was consistent

with the approach they had taken for many years

under the 1986 MOA, and they specifically refer-

enced paragraph B.5 of the MOA, providing that dis-

charges “in liquid, semi-liquid, or suspended form”

require section 402 permits. Jd. at 21,297.

The agencies decided not to include the express

exception in the final rule, but they stated explicitly,

repeatedly, and consistently that they intended the

rule to retain the same effect. They deleted the pro-

vision because of concerns that it was vague, that it

inappropriately relied on “proposed” effluent limita-

tions, and that it was unclear whether it was in-

tended to cover future effluent limitations or only

those then in effect. 67 Fed. Rey. at 31,135. The

13

agencies explained: “[A]lthough we have removed

the language in question from the rule itself, we em-

phasize that today’s rule generally is intended to

maintain our existing approach to regulating pollut-

ants under either section 402 or 404 of the CWA.”

Id.; see also id. at 31,130, 31,133. Thus, “[iJf EPA

has previously determined that a discharge is cov-

ered by an |effluent limitation guideline], that de-

termination is not altered by today’s rule.” J.A. 46a;

see also J.A. 47a-48a, 83a-84a. They offered the

same explanation to the public in a document posted

on the Corps’ website: “Although the effluent guide-

line provision in the proposed regulatory language

was removed, because commenters found it confus-

ing, the approach that would be followed with re-

spect to effluent guidelines would remain the same

as in the proposal.” Qs and As on the “Fill” Rule at 2,

available at www.usace.army.mil/cw/cecwo/reg/

fillqas.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2008).

The agencies reiterated this point with reference

to the precise circumstances of this case, where mine

tailings meet the new definition of fill material and

are also subject to effluent limitations. Responding

to a comment expressing confusion over whether

“mine tailings” would be subject to section 402 or

404, the agencies first stated the general principle

that “slurry” and “tailings” are considered fill mate-

rial under the new definition. J.A. 47a-48a. The

6 The Response to Comments document, J.A. 22a-127a, was

part of the agencies’ explanation for the final rule, cited in the

Federal Register and incorporated into the administrative re-

cord. 67 Fed. Reg. at 31.131.

14

agencies immediately qualified that statement as fol-

lows:

Nevertheless, if EPA has previously deter-

mined that certain materials are subject to

an [effluent limitation guideline] under spe-

cific circumstances, then that determination

remains valid. Moreover, NPDES permits is-

sued pursuant to section 402 are intended to

regulate process water and provide effluent

limits that are protective of receiving water

quality. This distinction provides the frame-

work for today’s rule.

J.A. 48a.

The agencies reiterated this point by reference to

paragraph B.5. of the 1986 MOA, which provides

that mining wastewater with suspended solids is

subject to section 402. “As explained in the proposed

rule’s preamble (65 FR 21296), many of the dis-

charges referred to in Section B.5. of the 1986 MOA

are subject to effluent guidelines and NPDES per-

mitting, and today’s rule would not alter that exist-

ing scheme.” J.A. 83a-84a. The Federal Register

page cited in this sentence explained that discharges

subject to effluent hmitations and performance stan-

dards would continue to require section 402 permits

and listed titanium mining wastes—which are func-

tionally indistinguishable from gold mining wastes—

as an example. 65 Fed. Reg. at 21,296. The agencies

also stated that the 1986 MOA remains in effect,

even after adoption of the new rule. J.A. 87a.

Denying that they had weakened the regulation

to allow impermissible waste disposal, the agencies

stated that “the suggestion that this rulemaking now

15

provides a legal basis for previously illegal activities

is not the case—no discharges that were previously

prohibited are now authorized as a result of this

rulemaking.” J.A. 32a. Process wastewater dis-

charges from new gold ore beneficiation mills were,

of course, “previously prohibited.” IJd.; see 40 C.F.R.

§ 440.104(b)(1).

6. In 2001, while the proposed rule-change was

pending, Coeur Alaska submitted its application for

a revised plan of operations for the Kensington Mine,

which abandoned the dry tailings facility permitted

in 1997 in favor of the less expensive option of dis-

charging wastewater directly to Lower Slate Lake.

J.A. 165a, 175a, 182a-83a. As the Corps later ex-

plained in its Record of Decision, “Lower Slate Lake

will be used as the settling pond and disposal site for

the tailings generated from the mill.” J.A. 360a.

Two years after the 2002 rule-change, EPA and

the Corps decided to consider Coeur’s request for a

permit under section 404 rather than enforce EPA’s

no-discharge performance standard. Despite the

clear statements published in the Federal Register

by the heads of both agencies with the promulgation

of the final rule that EPA effluent hmitations would

govern such situations, lower-ranking officials re-

versed course in an internal agency memo (the “Re-

gas memo’) that was never published or made

available for public comment. J.A. 14la-49a. ‘lhe

memo purported to interpret the 2002 fill rule but

disregarded the agencies’ statements in adopting

that rule that they intended to continue their prac-

tice of requiring section 402 permits for discharges

subject to effluent hmitations. J.A. 143a-45a. Ignor-

ing those statements and section 306’s prohibition of

16

all discharges in violation of performance standards,

the memo concluded that the discharge of “tailings”

from the Kensington Mine could be permitted as a

discharge of “fill material” under section 404 and was

exempt from otherwise applicable effluent limita-

tions. Id.

In considering Coeur’s permit application, the

federal agencies disagreed among themselves as to

which alternative was environmentally preferable.

While the Corps concluded that lake disposal was the

best option, J.A. 366a, EPA argued that the dry tail-

ings alternative permitted in 1997 was preferable.

J.A. 295a, 298a-300a. EPA noted that the dry tail-

ings facility “is the only alternative that avoids the

habitat loss and the loss of natural ecological func-

tions in Lower Slate Lake during mine operations.”

J.A. 299a. While the Corps focused on the acreage of

forested wetlands lost with the dry tailings facility,

J.A. 364a-66a, EPA focused on the quality of habitat:

“EPA believes that forested wetlands are far more

plentiful, and of far less ecological value at this loca-

tion, than lacustrine and palustrine emergent wet-

lands, which are rare and ecologically important at

this location.” ER 455; see also J.A. 204a (“Lower

Slate Lake provides high values for fish habitat [and]

high values for wildlife habitat”). The Forest Service

found the alternatives equal. J.A. 224a-2da.

Importantly, both the Corps and EPA agreed that

discharges to Lower Slate Lake were not exempt

from Clean Water Act compliance on the ground that

the lake could be deemed a “waste treatment sys-

tem,” which would exclude it from “waters of the

United States” under the Act. See J.A. 145a-146a; 40

C.F.R. § 122.2 (definition of “Waters of the United

17

States”).? Recognizing that the lake is a navigable

water body under the Act, the Corps issued the sec-

tion 404 permit on June 17, 2005. J.A. 266a-86a.

7. Respondents Southeast Alaska Conservation

Council, et al., (collectively “SEACC”) promptly filed

this action, alleging that the permit violates sections

301(e) and 306(e) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.

§§ 1311(e), 1316(e), because it fails to comply with

the no-discharge performance standard for new

froth-flotation mills. See 40 C.F.R. § 440.104(b)(1);

J.A. 473a-75a. SEACC alleged in the alternative

that, if the 2002 revised definition of “fill material”

were interpreted to allow the direct discharge into

Lower Slate Lake, the rule itself would be arbitrary,

capricious, and contrary to the Act. J.A. 475a, § 72.

The district court entered summary judgment for

the Corps. J.A. 478a-96a. The premise of the court’s

holding was that the new “fill material” definition

includes mine tailings. The court dismissed sections

301 and 306 without analysis and did not address

the agencies’ intent regarding the relationship be-

tween effluent limitations and the new fill rule. J.A.

488a n.35, 490a-95a.

The Ninth Circuit reversed. The court began

with the language of the Act, as required by Chevron,

U.S.A. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). J.A.

527a. The court concluded that the plain language of

7 The Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation,

by contrast, was able to certify the discharge as consistent with

state water-quality standards only by deciding that the lake

would become a “treatment work” under state law, exempting it

from the standards. J.A. 258a.

18

sections 301(a), 301(e), and 306(e) prohibits any dis-

charge that does not comply with applicable effluent

limitations and performance standards. J.A. 531la.

Addressing Petitioners’ arguments that sections 402

and 404 of the Act implied an exception to these pro-

visions, the court applied this Court’s well-

established rule that “[e]xceptions to clearly deline-

ated statutes will be implied only where essential to

prevent ‘absurd results’ or consequences obviously at

variance with the policy of the enactment as a

whole.” J.A. 532a (quoting United States v. Ruther-

ford, 442 U.S. 544, 552 (1979)). The court reviewed

each of the Corps’ and Petitioners’ arguments for an

implied exception and found they did not meet this

standard. J.A. 532a-35a.

Although the court found the language of the Act

sufficient to decide the case, it also considered the

agencies intent when they adopted both relevant

regulations—the performance standard and the defi-

nition of fill material. The court reviewed the regu-

latory history and concluded that the new definition

of fill material was not intended to create an excep-

tion to effluent limitations. J.A. 535a-46a. “The

agencies could not have been more clear in articulat-

ing that this would be their preferred approach.”

J.A. 546a.

The court also concluded that if the agencies in-

tended to repeal or create an exception to the long-

standing regulations governing froth-flotation mills,

they were “obligated to supply a reasoned analysis

for the change.” J.A. 547a (quoting Motor Vehicle

Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,

463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983)). The court found that the

agencies had said just the opposite: that they in-

19

tended no change in their past practice. If the rule’s

effect differed from the agencies’ stated intent, the

rule would be arbitrary and capricious. J.A. 547a-

48a.

Finally, in addressing whether to apply the “fill

material” definition or the performance standard for

froth-flotation mills to the discharge, the court ap-

plied the familiar principle that the more specific

rule—here, the performance standard—governs.

J.A. 548a.

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for rehearing

en banc, with no active judge requesting a vote on

the petition. J.A. 552a-53a.

Shortly after the appellate court’s decision, Coeur

and SEACC entered into discussions mediated by the

mayor of Juneau for the purpose of finding a tailings

disposal site that would comply with the Clean Wa-

ter Act. As a result, Cocur agreed to pursue permits

for a facility on the upland site authorized in 1997.

The new proposal would deposit the tailings in

“paste” form and would not discharge process waste-

water into navigable waters. See http://www.juncau

org/clerk/misc/news_items/2007-11-15_Kensington_

Corrected_Version.pdf. Shortly after submitting its

opening brief in this Court, as the agencies neared

the end of their review process, Coeur abruptly with-

drew its application. See Kate Golden, EPA puzzled

by Coeur Alaska pullout, Juneau Empire, Sept. 25,

2008, at 1, available at http://www.juneauempire

.com/stories/092508/sta_3°S770591.shtml.

20

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The dispute in this case—whether a process

wastewater discharge meeting the agencies’ defini-

tion of “fill material” is exempt from EPA perform-

ance standards—turns on the interplay between

sections 306 and 404 of the Clean Water Act. Section

306(e) declares categorically that “it shall be unlaw-

ful” to operate any new source in violation of any ap-

plicable performance standard, and lists. no

exceptions. 33 U.S.C. § 1316(e). Section 404(a) pro-

vides that the Corps “may” issue permits for the dis-

charge of “fill material,” but does not exempt the

Corps from compliance with other provisions of law

in exercising this discretionary authority. Id.

§ 1344(a). In this case, the process wastewater dis-

charge from the Kensington Mine’s beneficiation mill

is prohibited by a new source performance standard

adopted by EPA, but it also meets the agencies’ new

definition of “fill material,” because its suspended

solids will settle and raise the bottom elevation of

Lower Slate Lake.

To resolve this question, the Court follows the

two-step approach articulated in Chevron, 467 U.S.

at 842-43, focusing first on the language of the stat-

ute and second, if necessary, on the agency's inter-

pretation of any statutory ambiguities or gaps that

Congress intended the agency to fill.

Congress has spoken directly to the question pre-

sented. Section 306(c) of the Clean Water Act de-

clares in plain terms a categorical prohibition,

unambiguously applicable to the Kensington mill.

See 33 U.S.C. § 1316(e). Section 404 does not set

forth any exceptions to the prohibition. but merely

21

authorizes the Corps to issue permits for fill-material

discharges. See id. § 1344. Section 404 explicitly al-

lows EPA to take enforcement actions for violations

of section 306, id. §§ 1344(n), 1319(a)(3), (b),

(c)(1)-(3), (d), (g)(1), and does not shield permittees

from enforcement of section 306. Jd. § 1344(p).

Petitioners and the Corps urge the Court to find

an imphed exception to section 306(e) for any dis-

charge that meets the agencies’ new definition of “fill

material,” but the Court will do so only if applying

the plain terms of the statute would cause “absurd

results’ or consequences obviously at variance with

the policy of the enactment as a whole.” Rutherford,

442 U.S. at 552 (quoting Helvering v. Hammel, 311

U.S. 504, 510-11 (1941)). Applying the plain lan-

guage of section 306(e) produces results that are nei-

ther absurd nor at variance with the Act’s purposes.

To the contrary, it much better serves the explicit

Congressional goal of eliminating all discharges of

pollutants to navigable waters. See 33 U.S.C.

§ 1251(a)(1).

This result does not conflict with section 404.

That section is merely a grant of discretionary au-

thority to the Corps. See id. § 1344(a). In exercising

this authority, the Corps must respect other applica-

ble laws, including section 306(e). Because section

404 makes no provision for the Corps to incorporate

applicable section 306 performance standards in its

permits, discharges from sources subject to perform-

ance standards must be permitted, if at all, under

section 402.

The legislative history of the Act supports this

plain-language interpretation. ‘The Act designates

the NPDES permit program administered by EPA

22

under section 402 as the successor to the Corps’ for-

mer permit program under the Refuse Act, 33 U.S.C.

§ 407. See id. § 1342(a)(5). EPA and the Corps had

required over 20,000 industrial sources to apply for

permits under that program, among them Reserve

Mining Company’s iron-ore beneficiation mill, which

was then discharging its process wastewater as a

tailings slurry into Lake Superior. Congress specifi-

cally discussed this case in its deliberations, reveal-

ing an intent that industrial sources like Reserve

Mining would be subject to permits under section

402, not 404.

Because the statute is clear, there is no need to

consider the agency’s interpretation under Chevron

step two. However. even if the Act were ambiguous,

the agencies directly addressed this question when

they adopted the 2002 fill rule and stated in no un-

certain terms that, in changing the definition of “fill

material,” they did not intend to authorize the Corps

to issue permits for discharges subject to effluent

limitations. Such an authorization would have been

a reversal of longstanding practice, which they made

clear they did not intend. This interpretation,

adopted by the heads of the agencies and published

in the Federal Register, is reasonable and entitled to

deference.

The subsequent reinterpretation of the 2002 fill

rule for the Kensington Mine is not entitled to defer-

ence. The Regas memo was written by subordinate

agency officials and neither published nor made

available for public comment. It purports to construe

the 2002 rule but ignores the repeated statements in

the Federal Register and the rulemaking record that

the agencies did not intend to change their long-

23

standing practice of applying effluent limitations—

specifically including those applicable to mine tail-

ings—through section 402 permits. The agencies’

new position would effectively nullify EPA’s per-

formance standard, again without explanation.

Thus, even if the Corps’ position in this case could be

squared with the text of the regulations at issue—

which it cannot—it would not be a construction wor-

thy of deference.

ARGUMENT

I. UNDER THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE

CLEAN WATER ACT, THE CORPS LACKS

AUTHORITY TO PERMIT WASTEWATER

DISCHARGES FROM SOURCES SUBJECT

TO EPA PERFORMANCE STANDARDS.

To determine whether the Clean Water Act ex-

empts discharges defined as “fill material” from sec-

tion 306(e), one must begin with the language of the

statute. “First, always, is the question whether Con-

gress has directly spoken to the precise question at

issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the

end of the matter....” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. The

Court uses “traditional tools of statutory construc-

tion” in making this determination. Jd. at 843 n.9.

A. Section 306(e) Prohibits Any Wastewater

Discharge from the Kensington Mill.

Section 306(e) of the Act provides in its entirety:

24

After the effective date of standards of per-

formance promulgated under this section, it

shall be unlawful for any owner or operator

of any new source to operate such source in

violation of any standard of performance ap-

plicable to such source.

33 U.S.C. § 1316(e). Because 306(e) contains no ex-

ceptions—a conspicuous absence in a statute other-

wise replete with highly detailed exceptions—this

Court has observed that performance standards are

“absolute prohibitions” and that “a variance provi-

sion would be inappropriate in a standard that was

intended to insure national uniformity and ‘maxi-

mum feasible control of new sources.” Du Pont, 430

U.S. at 138 (quoting S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 58, 1972

U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3724).

The no-discharge standard at 40 C.F.R.

§ 440.104(b)(1), adopted under section 306, unambi-

guously applies to the new mill at the Kensington

Mine. The regulation’s applicability provision leaves

no room for interpretation: “The provisions of this

subpart J are applicable to discharges from ... Mills

that use the froth-flotation process ... for the benefi-

cet of ... @On ... GOR... 40 C.F.R.

§ 440.100(a)(2). The standard itself further verifies

that it applies to the Kensington mill by prohibiting

discharges “from mills that use the froth-flotation

process ... for the beneficiation of ... gold ... ores....”

Id. § 440.104(b)(1). EPA confirmed that “the New

Source Performance Standards (NSPS) for gold

mines and mills are applicable to the [Kensington]

project (40 CFR 440.104).” JA. 291a.

Invoking language limiting section 306(e) to “any

standard of performance applicable to such source,”

25

33 U.S.C. § 13816(e), the Corps implausibly denies

that the performance standard for new froth-

flotation mills is “applicable” to the Kensington mill.

See Fed. Br. at 25. The agency reaches this conclu-

sion by misreading the quoted language, arguing

that “[t]o determine whether a performance standard

is applicable to a source, one must again refer back

to the Act as a whole and, in particular, to Section

404 when the discharge of fill material is at issue.”

Id. However, neither “the Act as a whole” nor section

404 addresses the sources to which section 306 stan-

dards are applicable. To determine whether a “stan-

dard of performance” is “applicable” to a “source,” 33

U.S.C. § 1316(e), one must examine the standard and

the source. Here, the standard (40 C.F.R.

§ 440.104(b)(1)) is plainly applicable to the source

(the Kensington mill). See also 33 U.S.C.

§ 1316(a)(1), (a)(3) (defining “standard of perform-

ance” and “source’”).

The Corps jumps the tracks by focusing on

whether the mill’s wastewater discharge meets the

definition of “fill material.” But that is irrelevant

under the plain language of section 306(e), which

says nothing about the composition of the discharge.

It refers only to standards and sources.

The Corps also argues that section 301(e) does not

require discharges meeting the definition of “fill ma-

terial” to comply with section 301 effluent limita-

tions, but the agency misinterprets the phrase “in

accordance with the provisions of this chapter.” Fed.

26

Br. at 25 (quoting 33 U.S.C. §1311(e)).2 Section

301(e) provides:

Effluent limitations established pursuant

to this section or section [302] shall be ap-

plied to all point sources of discharge of pol-

lutants in accordance with the provisions of

this chapter.

33 U.S.C. § 1311(e). Because the Corps infers an ex-

ception for fill material under section 404, the agency

concludes that the “provisions of this chapter” do not

require compliance with otherwise applicable efflu-

ent limitations. Section 301(e) precludes such an

implied exception by requiring that effluent limita-

tions be applied to “all point sources ... in accordance

with the provisions of this chapter.” Jd. (emphasis

added). The Corps reads the section as if it said “ex-

cept in accordance with the provisions of this chap-

ter,” but Congress did not say “except.” The section

is, literally, a requirement that any applicable efflu-

ent limitations be applied to ail point sources in ac-

cordance with the Act.

B. There Is No Conflict Between Section

306(e) and Section 404.

Petitioners mistakenly argue that sections 306(e)

and 404 are in conflict, requiring resort to canons of

statutory construction to determine which controls

8 In addition to the section 306 performance standard, EPA

has adopted effluent hmitations under section 301 for froth-

flotation mills. 410 C.F.R. § 440.102(b). The latter are less

strict, but the discharge authorized by the Corps here would

comply with neither.

27

the discharge in this case. See Coeur Br. at 13,

27-28. There is no conflict between the two sections.

While section 306(e) is a categorical prohibition, see

33 U.S.C. § 1316(e) (“it shall be unlawful”), section

404 is a permissive grant of discretionary authority

that does not exempt fill material discharges from

compliance with other applicable legal requirements.

See id. § 1344(a) (“The Secretary may issue per-

mits...”).

Section 306(e) is only one of many legal require-

ments the Corps must respect in exercising its dis-

cretionary authority under section 404. The Corps

and EPA have long recognized that section 404 does

not exempt fill-material discharges from other re-

quirements of law. The first sentence of the 404(b)

guidelines states, “Because other laws may apply to

particular discharges..., a discharge complying with

the requirement of these Guidelines will not auto-

matically receive a permit.” 40 C.F.R. § 230.10. The

agency's regulations identify over a dozen other stat-

utes that may limit the agency’s discretion. See id.

§ 230.10(a)(4)-(5), (b)(3)-(4); 33 C.F.R. § 320.3. In

some cases, these laws may prohibit the Corps from

issuing a permit. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(b)(3)

(prohibiting discharges that would jeopardize listed

species under Endangered Species Act).

Just as the Corps must comply with other appli-

cable laws in issuing or denying section 404 permits,

the agency must also refrain from authorizing dis-

cheucges that would violate section 306(e). Section

404’s enforcement provision—subsection (n)—makes

this particularly clear: “Nothing in this section shall

be construed to limit the authority of the [EPA] Ad-

ministrator to take action pursuant to section [309].”

28

33 U.S.C. § 1344(n). Section 309, in turn, authorizes

EPA to take enforcement actions for violations of

various provisions of the Act, including, explicitly,

section 306. Id. § 1319(a)(3), (b), (c)(1)-(3), (d), (g)(1).

This enforcement authority is in addition to, and

separate from, authority to enforce conditions in

permits issued under sections 402 and 404. See id.;

see also id. § 1344(s). Moreover, while compliance

with a section 404 permit shields the permittee from

actions enforcing sections 301 and 307, it does not

provide a shield for violators of section 306. See id.

§ 1344(p). In contrast, section 402 provides that

NPDES permittees are deemed to comply with sec-

tion 306. See id. § 1342(k).

In short, nothing in section 404 exempts fill ma-

terial discharges from compliance with section 306,

limits EPA’s authority to bring actions for violations

of section 306, or protects permittees from those ac-

tions. These features reveal unambiguously that

Congress did not intend section 404 to authorize the

Corps to permit discharges that violate performance

standards under section 306(e).

There is thus no conflict between the two sec-

tions. Absent a conflict, there is no need to resort to

the canon of construction, urged by Petitioners, that

specific provisions control over general ores. See

Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Gulf Power Co.,

534 U.S. 327, 335-36 (2002) (holding that the rule

does not apply when there is no conflict).

* Even uf the specific/general canon applied, section 306 ts

more specific than section 404 regarding the issues of greatest

concern to Congress. Although section 404 is more specific as to

(footnote continued...)

29

The absence of conflict distinguishes this case

from National Association of Home Builders v. De-

fenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518 (2007). That case

reconciled two mandatory statutes directing the

agency to take inconsistent actions, td. at 2531-32, by

deferring to the agency’s reasonable interpretation of

the conflicting provisions as expressed in regula-

tions. Jd. at 2534. The Court expressly distin-

guished a situation where Congress enacted

discretionary and mandatory provisions, holding that

the discretionary action was subject to the manda-

tory one, id. at 2536-37, and that there was “no clear

repugnancy between them. /d. at 2537 n.9. Sim1-

larly, the discretionary authority here (section 404)

must be exercised in compliance with the mandatory

(section 306(e)).

C. Section 306(e) Has No Implied Exception

for Fiil Material.

Petitioners and the Corps argue, in effect, that

various provisions of the Act and its structure as a

——

the form of discharges covered (dredged and fill material), sec-

tion 306 is much more specific as to the sources regulated and

standards applied. Section 404 applies to discharges from any

“point source,” see 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344(a), 1362(6), (12), a broadly

defined term, id. § 1362(14), while section 306(e) applies only to

“new sources,” a narrow subset of point sources. Id.

§ 1316(a)(2), (3). Section 306 also requires detailed standards

specific to each industry source category, while section 404 re-

quires only one set of general guidelines applicable to all dis-

charges. Compare id. § 1316(b) with id. § 1344(b). Congress

attached high importance to new sources. See supra pp. 6-7

Were there actually a conflict between sections 406(e) and 404,

Congress has expressed its intent that the more specific provi-

sions for new sources under section 306 control.

30

whole create an implied exception to the plain lan-

guage of section 306(e), and to effluent limitations

adopted under section 301, whenever a discharge

meets the agencies’ definition of “fill material.” This

argument cannot pass muster.

To begin with, Petitioners’ construction is highly

unlikely given the Act’s purposes. It would hinge the

entire regulatory structure on one term—“fill mate-

rial”—that Congress did not define and that was not

Congress’ central concern. Congressional delibera-

tions focused overwhelmingly on industrial and mu-

nicipal waste discharges.!° The Act seeks to

eliminate these discharges primarily through a sys-

tem of increasingly strict, technology-based effluent

limitations for industrial source categories that must

prohibit any discharges where practicable. See 33

U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(1), 1311(b)(2)(A), 1316(a)(Q1). To

allow a new industrial source to escape these re-

quirements because its wastewater contains a high

level of one pollutant—suspended solids—would be

contrary to this explicit legislative purpose and par-

ticularly anomalous given Congress’ explicit com-

mand that EPA regulate suspended solids. See 33

U.S.C. § 1314(a)(4). It would reward the worst in-

dustrial discharges by exempting them from the very

mechanism Congress adopted to achieve the national

goal. The use of a navigable lake as a wastewater

‘0 The Clean Water Act was enacted in the wake of highly

publictzed problems such as the Cuyahoga River fire, massive

fish kills, and contaminated drinking water supplies, all caused

by industrial pollution. See Robert W. Adler, Jessica C. Land-

man, & Diane M. Cameron, The Clean Water Act 2U Years Later

5-6 (1993).

31

settling pond is also contrary to the guiding principle

that “[t]he use of any river, lake, stream or ocean as

a waste treatment system is unacceptable.” S. Rep.

No. 92-414, at 7, 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3674. The

Act’s language and structure do not support this

unlikely outcome.

1. Courts Should Rarely Infer Excep-

tions.

“Exceptions to clearly delineated statutes will be

implied only where essential to prevent absurd re-

sults or consequences obviously at variance with the

policy of the enactment as a whole.” Rutherford, 442

U.S. at 552 (quotation marks omitted). “Only when a

literal construction of a statute yields results so

manifestly unreasonable that they could not fairly be

attributed to congressional design will an exception

to statutory language be judicially implied.” /d.

at 555. “Whether, as a policy matter, an exemption

should be created is a question for legislative judg-

ment, not judicial inference.” Jd. at 559, quoted in

United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop.,

532 U.S. 483, 490 (2001).

The presumption against implied exceptions has

particular force in a statute that, like the Clean Wa-

ter Act, contains highly detailed, explicit exceptions.

See Du Pont, 430 U.S. at 138 (reasoning that explicit

exception in section 301(c) reinforces conclusion that

Congress intended no exceptions to section 306(e));

TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 28 (2001) (“Where

Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to

a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not

to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary

legislative intent.”) (quoting Andrus v. Glover Constr.

32

Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17 (1980)); Oakland Cannabis

Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. at 489-90 (declining to find

implied exception where statute provided express ex-

ception).

Requiring a new source to comply with applicable

performance standards as provided in section 306(e),

even if its wastewater meets a broad definition of “fill

material,” is neither an “absurd result” nor “obvi-

ously at variance with the policy ef the enactment as

a whole.” Rutherford, 442 U.S. at 552. To the con-

trary, it is the result that best achieves the Act’s

purposes. Exempting new sources from performance

standards, which must prohibit any discharge

“where practicable,” 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(1), would

move in the opposite direction of the express Con-

gressional goal of eliminating all discharges. Id.

§ 1251(a)(1).

2. Sections 306 and 404 Reflect a Delib-

erate Choice by Congress Not te In-

clude the Exception Sought by the

Corps.

Sections 306 and 404, like the rest of the Act, in-

clude specific, detailed exceptions where Congress

intended them. The absence of an express exception

from section 306 for discharges meeting the agencies’

definition of “fill material” strongly suggests that

Congress did not intend any such exception.

While nothing in section 404 exempts fill-material

discharges from section 306(e), section 404 does con-

tain other specific exceptions, and exceptions to the

exceptions. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344(f), (r). Similarly,

while section 306 contains no exception for fill mate-

rial, it does exempt new sources from stricter stan-

33

dards for a ten-year period following completion of

construction. See id. § 1316(d).

Had Congress intended section 404 permits to ex-

empt new sources from compliance with performance

standards, it could have used a variety of devices

employed elsewhere in the Act to convey that intent.

It could, for example, have qualified section 306(c)

with the preface, “Except as provided in section

404....” That is exactly what the Act provides in sec-

tions 301(a) and 402(a)(1), but not in 306(e). Com-

pare id. §§ 1311(a), 1342(a)(1) with id. § 1316(e).

Congress used the same formulation repeatedly

throughout the Act, including in section 404(f). See,

e.g., id. §§ 1344(f, 1311G)(1)(A), (J), 1322(H, (n)(6)(A),

1365(a).

Another way to provide the exemption sought by

Petitioners in this case would have been to preface

section 404 with the phrase, “Notwithstanding sec-

tion 306....”. This type of formulation also appears

throughout the Act, including in section 306(d), but

not in section 404. Compare id. §§ 1316(d), 1311(f),

1345(a), 1364(a), 1371(d) with id. § 1344(a).

3. Sections 301 and 306 Have Independ-

ent Effect and Do Not Depend on

Other Provisions to Trigger Them.

Section 306, like the effluent-limitation provisions

of section 301, applies directly to discharges and is

enforceable independent of any other provisions in

the Clean Water Act. Petitioners repeatedly mis-

characterize the Act by asserting that EPA adopts

these limitations “under” or “as part of” the 402 per-

mit program, Coeur Br. at 3, 21, and that they apply

only “where other provisions of the CWA make them

34

applicable.” State Br. at 21. Several provisions of

the Act, including sections 306 and 301 themselves,

reveal that this view is incorrect. This Court has

drawn the same conclusion. Du Pont, 430 U.S.

at 133 n.24 (“a number of provisions of the Act seem

to assume that § 301 effluent limitations have some

existence apart from § 402 permits”).

The Act’s central prohibition against unlawful

discharges demonstrates that sections 301 and 306

have independent effect. Section 301(a) provides:

“Except as in compliance with this section and sec-

tions (302, 306, 307, 318, 402, and 404], the dis-

charge of any pollutant by any person shall be

unlawful.” 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (emphasis added). If

Congress intended the standards and limitations of

sections 301, 302, 306, and 307 to apply only to the

extent they were included as conditions in permits

under sections 402 or 404, section 301(a) would sim-

ply say, “Except as provided in sections 402 or

404....”. The inclusion of the other five provisions

would be pure surplusage. That Congress enumer-

ated all of these provisions demonstrates that each

was intended to have independent effect.

Moreover, sections 306 and 301 on their face re-

quire compliance with their limitations independent

of any permit conditions. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C.

§§ 1316(e) (prohibiting discharges in violation of per-

formance standards), 1311(b)(2)(E) (requiring, with-

out reference to permits, “compliance with effluent

limitations ... which ... shall require application of

the best conventional pollutant control technology as

determined in accordance with regulations issued by

the Administrator”), 1311(e) (requiring application of

effluent hmitations to “all point sources’),

35

1311G)(3)(B), (n)(7) (requiring, without reference to

permits, that discharges must comply with effluent

limitations when requests to modify limitations are

denied). EPA is authorized, under specified circum-

stances, to modify these requirements in permits.

Id. § 1311(c), (h), (k), (m), (p)(1). The contrast in the

wording of these subsections shows that the effluent

limitations are applicable on their own but that EPA

may modify them in a permit.

That sections 301 and 306 are independently en-

forceable underscores the point. EPA or a citizen can

bring an action to enforce sections 301 or 306, or,

separately, to enforce permit conditions. See 33

U.S.C. §§ 1319(a)(3), (6), (©)(1)-(3), (@d, (g)Q),

1365(a)(1), (Hh. Section 404 expressly preserves

EPA’s authority to bring enforcement actions under

these provisions. Jd. § 1344(n). The Act thus explic-

itly gives enforceable legal effect to effluent limita-

tions under sections 301 and 306 independent of any

permit.

The Act’s structure further supports the inde-

pendent applicability of sections 301 and 306. Those

sections are included in Subchapter III, “Standards

and Enforcement.” That subchapter includes section

301(a)’s general prohibition against discharges, id.

§ 1311(a), all the Act’s effluent limitations and wa-

ter-quality standards, id. §§ 1311-17, and its en-

forcement provisions. Jd. § 1319. Sections 402 and

404 are included separately in Subchapter IV, “Per-

mits and Licenses.” Had Congress intended effluent

limitations to be dependent entirely on permits, a

more logical organization would have been to group

sections 306 and the effluent lmitation provisions of

36

section 301 with sections 402 and 404, rather than

with the prohibition and enforcement provisions.

4. Neither Section 402 nor Section 307

Establishes an Implied Exception to

Section 306(e).

Petitioners and the Corps argue that section 402

implicitly exempts any discharge meeting the defini-

tion of “fill material” from the prohibition of section

306(e). They rely initially on section 402’s preface,

“Except as provided in sections [318 and 404]....” 33

U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1).

The preface does not create an exception to sec-

tion 306. It means that if a discharge is authorized

in a section 404 permit, it does not also need a sec-

tion 402 permit, but it says nothing about whether

the Corps may lawfully grant a section 404 permit in

any particular case. Indeed, that Congress used this

preface in section 402 but not 306 is strong evidence

that Congress did not intend it to apply to section

306.

Petitioners and the Corps rely heavily on the fact

that permits under section 402, but not 404, must

include conditions requiring compliance with effluent

limitations under sections 306 and 301. Compare id.

with id. § 1344. They then leap to the conclusion

that section 404 authorizes discharges otherwise

prohibited by sections 306 and 301. The Ninth Cir-

cuit aptly noted that they were relying on a negative

inference to find an implied exception, J.A. 531a,

and found a much simpler explanation for the differ-

ence between sections 402 and 404: Congress did not

intend the Corps to issue “fill material” permits for

discharges subject to effluent hmitations. J.A. 533a.

37

This interpretation gives full meaning to all the sec-

tions of the Act without resort to implied exceptions

from the plain language of sections 306 and 301.

All parties agree that Congress did not authorize

the Corps to issue section 404 permits incorporating

effluent limitations under sections 306 or 301. Sec-

tion 404 permits must comply with the 404(b) guide-

lines and with effluent standards for toxic pollutants

under section 307. Jd. § 1344(b), (H, (h)(1)(A)Q), (x);

see also id. § 1317(a)(5). In contrast, section 402

permits must include conditions requiring comphi-

ance with effluent limitations under sections 301,

306, 307, and others. See id. § 1342(a)(1). Similarly,

Congress provided a shield from enforcement under

section 306 for discharges complying with a section

402 permit, but not with a section 404 permit. Com-

pare id. § 1342(k) with id. § 1344(p). As Petitioners

note, the Court must presume Congress acted pur-

posely in writing the two provisions differently. See

S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547

U.S. 370, 384 (2006).

Petitioners and the Corps carry the argument too

far, however, when they infer that Congress intended

an exception from section 306 and 301 effluent limi-

tations for any discharge meeting a broad definition

of “fill material.” Sections 306 and 301 unambigu-

ously prohibit discharges in violation of the effluent

limitations they require, and only section 402 au-

thorizes the issuance of permits that can carry out

that command. Thus, the statutory text and struc-

ture compel the conclusion that the reason for the

different language in sections 402 and 404 is to en-

sure that all point sources subject to effluent limita-

tions under sections 306 or 301 be permitted, if at

38

all, under section 402, not section 404. This inter-

pretation is far preferable, because it honors the

plain language of sections 306 and 301 and the pre-

sumption against implied exceptions.!!

5. The Ninth Circuit Correctly Inter-

preted Section 301(a).

In a sideshow, the Corps and Petitioners take is-

sue with the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that the use

of Ose connector “and” in section 301(a) signifies

Congrese’ intent that discharges must comply with

each applieable provision. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a);

4 A. 53ia@ Mischaracterizing the opinion, they assert

that *his mterpretation would require compliance

with inapplicable provisions.

The Ninth Circuit recognized that discharges are

subject only to “applicable” provisions. J.A. 531a.

For example, an old source is not subject to section

306, which by its plain terms applies only to new

sources. See 33 U.S.C. § 1316. Similarly, a person

with a valid section 404 permit need not obtain a sec-

tion 402 permit for the same discharge, because sec-

tion 402 applies only “[e]xcept as provided in sections

[318 and 404]....” Id. § 1342(a)(1). The Ninth Circuit

did not suggest otherwise.

'! The difference between the language of section 404 and

that of section 318, 33 U.S.C. § 1328, on which the State of

Alaska relies, see State Br. at 28, reinforces the conclusion that

section 404 permits cannot be tssued for sources subject to ef.-

fluent limitations under sections 301 und 306. Section 318 spe-

cifically provides for the incorporation of such limits into

permits, see id. § 1328&(b), while section 104 does not.

39

This interpretation is entirely consistent with the

plain language of section 301(a) and the use of “and”

as a connector. If one of the listed sections has no

application to a particular discharge, then the dis-

charge cannot be in violation of it. In that sense, the

discharge is literally “in compliance” with that provi-

sion. Id. § 1311(a).

Moreover, Coeur cannot be correct in suggesting

that “and” actually means “or.” See Coeur Br. at 25.

As the Corps recognizes, this would eviscerate the

statute. See Fed. Br. at 25 n.6. However, the Corps

is equaily incorrect in suggesting that section 301(a)

simply requires compliance with “the overall body of

law.” Id. at 24. The statute enumerates seven sepa-

rate provisions, a plain statement that every dis-

charge must comply with every applicable provision.

33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). Indeed, the State of Alaska con-

cedes this point. State Br. at 31.

None of this, however, resolves the question in

this case. While section 301(a) clearly evinces a

Congressional intent that each of the enumerated

provisions has independent effect, it does not, by it-

self, answer whether a particular section applies to a

particular source or discharge. To do that, one must

consult the provision in question. As demonstrated

above, section 306(e) applies to and prohibits the dis-

charge at issue here.

40

D. The Language and History of the Act

Demonstrate That Congress Intended

Wastewater Discharges from Ore Benefi-

ciation Mills to Be Governed by Section

402 Permits.

Section 402(a)(5) of the Act further demonstrates

Congress’ intent that process wastewater discharges

from industrial sources—including, specifically, ore

beneficiation mills—were to be regulated under sec-

tion 402. Section 402(a)(5) terminated the Corps’ au-

thority to issue permits under the Refuse Act, 33

U.S.C. § 407, and provided that pending Refuse Act

permit applications be deemed applications for sec-

tion 402 permits. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(5); see also id.

§ 1342(k) (transition provisions for Refuse Act en-

forcement).

When the Clean Water Act was enacted, the

Corps had recently established a comprehensive

permit program under the Refuse Act, also known as

section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act. See 36

Fed. Reg. 6564 (April 7, 1971). Although the Refuse

Act dated from the 19th Century, the Corps histori-

cally had construed it as limited to discharges affect-

ing navigation and even then only rarely invoked it.

In response to severe and worsening water pollution,

the president in 1970 issued an executive order re-

quiring adoption of a Refuse Act permit program.

See United States v. Pa.. Indus. Chem. Corp., 411

U.S. 655, 659 n.9, 672 (1973). The resulting 1971

regulations for the first time encompassed “all direct

and indirect discharges or deposits” into navigable

waters. 36 Fed. Reg. at 6565 (§ 209.131(d)(1)).

In adopting these regulations, the Corps drew a

distinction between “discharges or deposits,” which

41

would require permits under the Refuse Act, see id.,

and “work” or “structures” in navigable waters,

which would require permits under section 10 of the

Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (a predeces-

sor to the section 404 permit program). See 33 Fed.

Reg. 18,670, 18,671 (Dec. 18, 1968) (adopting

§ 209.120, “Permits for work in navigable waters”);

36 Fed. Reg. at 6567 (adopting § 209.131(f), explain-

ing difference in programs); see also Pa.. Indus.

Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. at 672 (describing section 10

regulations as “dealing with construction and exca-

vation in navigable waters’”).}2

The Refuse Act permit program adopted in 1971

was the template for section 402 of the Clean Water

Act, a fact discussed repeatedly in the legislative his-

tory and formalized in section 402(a)(5). ‘The Senate

Report noted that Congress had made a conscious

“effort to weave the [Refuse Act] permit program into

this legislation.” S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 71, 1972

U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3737. While deliberations over the

Act were underway, a district court declared the Re-

fuse Act regulations unlawful. Kalur v. Resor, 335

IF. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1971). The Administrator of EPA

wrote in a letter published in the Congressional Re-

cord that “|t]he enrolled bill formalizes” the Refuse

Act permit program and “affords EPA the opportu-

‘2 This Court had previously held that an industrial waste

discharge containing solids could be considered both an “ob-

struction” under section 10 and a “discharge” under the Refuse

Act. See United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482,

485 (1960). However. in its later permitting regulations, the

Corps drew the line described above between permits under the

two provisions.

42

nity to extricate the Permit Program from its current

judicial morass.” 118 Cong. Rec. 36,780 (1972). Rep-

resentative Clark remarked:

At the present time, [the Refuse Act permit]

program has broken down completely and no

permits are being issued. Over 20,000 appli-

cations have been filed, but all discharges

could be considered in technical violation of

the law, because they have no permits. Sec-

tion 402 transfers the program from the

corps |sic] to EPA....

Id. at 33,765.

Members of Congress discussed one of these

20,000 applications specifically during deliberations

over the Clean Water Act’s final passage: the dis-

charge from Reserve Mining Company’s iron-ore

beneficiation plant into Lake Superior. The dis-

charge was a slurry containing 67,000 tons per day of

suspended tailings that settled on the lake bottom.

See Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 500

(8th Cir. 1975). It contained asbestos, posing a

threat to the drinking-water supply of Duluth, Min-

nesota, among other health concerns. Id. at 501. Al-

though Reserve held a section 10 permit under the

Rivers and Harbors Act addressing impediments to

navigation, id. at 530,.it had to apply for a Refuse

Act permit under the Corps’ new program in 1971.

ld. at 531. The permit was not granted before pas-

sage of the Clean Water Act, td., and in February

1972 EPA sued to abate the ongoing harm. /d.

at 501. EPA ultimately succeeded in forcing Reserve

to discontinue discharges into the lake and develop

an on-land tailings disposal site. Jd. at 537-38.

43

The situation was brought to Congress’ attention

as a result of some members’ concerns that passage

of the Clean Water Act not impede EPA’s lawsuit—

concerns that led to inclusion of an uncodified sav-

ings provision to ensure the Reserve Mining case and

others would continue. See id. at 531 n.75; 118 Cong.

Rec. 33,705-06, 33,713 (1972) (statements of Sens.

Griffin, Muskie and Hart). In light of Congress’ spe-

cific attention to the Reserve Mining situation, its

decision to transfer permitting authority for such

discharges from the Corps under the Refuse Act to

EPA under section 402(a) cannot be squared with Pe-

titioners’ view that such discharges fall outside

EPA’s authority. Indeed, Reserve’s application to

discharge the tailings slurry from its ore benefici-

ation mill was transferred to EPA under section

402(a), not to the Corps under section 404. See Re-

serve Mining, 514 F.2d at 531; 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(5).

The State of Alaska thus draws exactly the wrong

conclusion from the Reserve Mining case. See State

Br. at 37-38. It is true, as the State points out, that

Reserve had a permit under section 10 of the Rivers

and Harbors Act and that section 404 of the Clean

Water Act was a successor to the section 10 permit

program. But by the time of the Clean Water Act's

enactment, that permit was no longer sufficient to

authorize the discharge of tailings. A Refuse Act

permit was required, and the new permitting author-

ity was transferred to EPA, not retained by the

Corps.

Contrary to the assertions of Petitioners and the

Corps, continued enforcement of effluent limitations

by EPA is entirely consistent with the division of re-

sponsibilities intended by Congress. It will have no

44

impact on traditional regulation of fill material, be-

cause typical fill-material discharges do not come

from sources regulated by EPA effluent limitations.

Fill material is normally used to build roads, build-

ings, dams, causeways, levees, seawalls, and other

useful structures in waters. See 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(f).

Discharges of fill material also include placement of

overburden (the unprocessed rock overlying a coal

seam) and other mining-related materials that are

not subject to effluent limitations. See id.; Kentucki-

ans, 317 F.3d at 445, 448; J.A. 542a, 546a. As far as

the record reflects, this case is the first time the

Corps has tried to use a fill material permit to au-

thorize a wastewater discharge from an industrial

source subject to effluent limitations.

E. Exempting Wastewater Discharges Con-

taining Solids from Effluent Limitations

Would Undermine Congressional Goals.

If the Corps’ position in this case is upheld, any

source that generates wastewater with significant

suspended solids will be able to escape EPA effluent

limitations by labeling the discharge “fill material.”

Such sources will similarly seck to save money by

using navigable waters as “settling ponds,” defeating

the Congressional goal of eliminating all discharges

to navigable waters, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1), and re-

versing decades of progress in reducing pollution

through the Act’s scheme of technology-based efflu-

ent limitations. EPA has frequently identified set-

tling ponds as the best technology for removing

solids from process wastewater, allowing the agency

to set strict limits on suspended solids through efflu-

ent limitations. Examples include:

45

e aluminum smelting, 38 Fed., Reg. 33,170,

33,175 (Nov. 30, 1973) (noting that the solid portion

of untreated wastewater “approaches 70 percent by

volume’);

e copper smelting, 45 Fed. Reg. 44,926, 44,930

(July 2, 1980);

e inorganic chemicals manufacturing, 42 Fed.

Reg. 37,294, 37,296 (July 20, 1977);

e ferroalloy manufacturing, 38 Fed. Reg. 29,008,

29,010 (Oct. 18, 1973);

e cement manufacturing, 38 Fed. Reg. 24,462,

24,463 (Sept. 7, 1973);

e concentrated aquatic animal production, 67

Fed. Reg. 57,872, 57,888 (Sept. 12, 2002) (“Solids,

which come from feces and uneaten feed, are the

largest mass of pollutants generated in CAAP facili-

ties.”);

e beef cattle feedlots, 66 Fed. Reg. 2960, 2988

(Jan. 12, 2001); see also 40 C.F.R. § 412.31(a) (pro-

hibiting “discharge of manure, litter, or process

wastewater pollutants into waters of the U.S.”);

e coal-fired power plants, 45 Fed. Reg. 68,328,

68,337 (Oct. 14, 1980): and

e battery manufacturing, 49 Fed. Reg. 9108,

9122 (March 9, 1984).

46

Il. IF THE CLEAN WATER ACT WERE AM-

BIGUOUS, THE COURT SHOULD DEFER

TO THE INTERPRETATION STATED BY

THE HEADS OF BOTH AGENCIES UPON

PROMULGATION OF THE 2002 FILL RULE.

If the Court were to find the Clean Water Act

ambiguous as to whether all discharges meeting the

definition of “fill material” are exempt from section

306(e), the Court should defer to the reasonable in-

terpretation of the Act adopted by EPA and the

Corps when they adopted the relevant regulations,

see Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44, and not to the sub-

sequent mischaracterization of those regulations in

the Regas memo.

A. The Agencies’ Regulations Reveal that

Some Discharges Meeting the Definition

of “Fill Material” Are Subject to Effluent

Limitations and NPDES Permits.

The plain language and history of the relevant

regulations, and the practices of EPA and the Corps,

reveal that the agencies have long recognized that

some discharges defined as “fill material” are never-

theless subject to effluent limitations and NPDES

permits and not eligible for section 404 permits.

As an initial matter, the 2002 fill rule on its face,

though not ambiguous, does not answer the question

presented. It is merely a definition that does not, by

itself, purport to authorize anything. See 33 C.F.R.

§ 323.2(e)-(f). The question in this case is whether a

wastewater discharge mecting that definition is ex-

empt from otherwise applicable performance stan-

dards under section 306.

47

To be sure, the new definition did create the po-

tential for confusion because it is broad enough to

encompass many discharges that are subject to efflu-

ent limitations, like the one in this case. Were the

new fill definition construed to authorize the dis-

charge here, there would be a direct conflict between

that definition and the performance standard prohib-

iting the discharge. See 40 C.F.R. § 440.104(b)(1).

To resolve this potential conflict, it is necessary to

examine the agencies’ regulations, their history, and

what the agencies said in adopting them.

Petitioners and the Corps rely heavily on 40

C.F.R. § 122.3(b), but that regulation actually proves

the opposite of the point for which they cite it. It ex-

empts from NPDES _ permitting requirements

“(djischarges of dredged or fill material into waters of

the United States which are regulated under section

404 of the CWA.” 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(b). There is no

comma preceding “which.” By its plain terms, this

regulation provides that only those fill material dis-

charges that are regulated under section 404 are ex-

empt from section 402; its language assumes that

some “fill material” discharges are not regulated un-

der section 404.'° The regulation thus interprets and

applies the prefatory “except as provided” clause in

'* Were there a comma preceding “which,” the words follow-

ing the comma would be a “nonrestrictive clause,” i.e., one “that

could be omitted without essential loss of meaning....”. The Chi-

cago Manual of Stvle 250, § 6.38 (15th ed. 2003). The absence

of a comma makes it a “restrictive” clause, t.e., one that 1s “es-

sential to the meaning of the sertence....” Jd. While it is stvlis-

tically preferable to use “that” rather than “which” for a

nonrestrictive clause, it is the absence or presence of the comma

that determines whether the clause ts restrictive. jd.

48

section 402(a)(1): If a discharge is properly permit-

ted under section 404, it does not also require a 402

permit, but not all discharges of “fill material” are

properly permitted under section 404. See 33 U.S.C.

§ 1342(a)(1).

The history of section 122.3(b) confirms this in-

terpretation. As the Corps correctly points out, the

original regulation purported to exempt all fill mate-

rial, without restriction. See Fed. Br. at 27 (citing 40

C.F.R. § 125.4(d) (1973)). The Corps overlooks that

EPA changed this regulation just a few years later to

exempt only those discharges that are both

“{djischarges of dredged or fill material into waters of

the United States and regulated under section 404 of

the Act.” 44 Fed. Reg. 32,854, 32,902 (June 7, 1979)

(adopting 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(a)(2)) (emphasis added).

The following year, EPA changed “and” to “which

are,” the same language that remains today. 45 Fed.

Reg. 33,290, 33,442 (May 19, 1980) (adopting 40

C.F.R. § 122.51(c)(2)(i)). The preamble did not ex-

plain: this specific change but stated generally, “Mi-

nor editorial and stylistic changes ... have been made

in all sections and are not discussed.” /d. at 33,294.

This history reveals that the “which are” clause was

intended to be restrictive—requiring that the dis-

charge be both “fill material” and regulated under

section 404-——consistent with proper grammar."

'4 This interpretation was necessary when the rule in its

current form was adopted, because EPA and the Corps had dif.

fering definitions of “fill material.” Many discharges that EPA

considered “fill material” were not within the Corps’ definition

and were therefore ineligible for section 401 permits. See supra

p. 10; infra pp. 49-50.

49

That the new “fill material” definition did not

create an exception to EPA’s effluent limitations is

further compelled by the canon of construction that

“a statute dealing with a narrow, precise, and spe-

cific subject is not submerged by a later enacted

statute covering a more generalized spectrum.”

Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153

(1976). The 1982 performance standard is much

more “narrow, precise, and specific” than the “later

enacted” fill rule. The latter is a broad definition of

“fill material” without independent operative effect.

The 1982 performance standard is more specific as to

the discharges covered (“process wastewater,” as de-

fined at 40 C.F.R. § 401.11(q)), the source to which it

applies (new mills using the froth-flotation process

for the beneficiation of gold ores), and the effect of

the rule (“no discharge”). 40 C.F.R. § 440.104(b)(1).

B. EPA Intended the Effluent Limitations

for Ore Beneficiation Mills to Be Applied

in Permits Under Section 402, Not 404.

Longstanding practice confirms that the agencies

did not intend all discharges meeting the definition

of “fill material” to be exempt from EPA’s effluent

limitations. For decades, EPA issued NPDES per-

mits for discharges that met its effect-based defini-

tion of “fill material” but were also subject to effluent

limitations. See J.A. 83a-84a. Throughout that time,

EPA continued to adopt effluent limitations for

sources—including the ore mills at issue—whose

wastewater contained high concentrations of sus-

pended solids and would therefore have a filling ef-

fect if discharged directly to navigable waters. See

supra pp. 7-9, 44-45. Thus, EPA recognized that

some discharges meeting its definition of “fill mate-

50

rial” were not regulated under section 404 and there-

fore not exempt from NPDES permitting under 40

C.F.R. § 122.3(b). Indeed, even the Regas memo rec-

ognizes that some discharges—those with an “inci-

dental!” filling effect—would meet the new definition

of “fill material” but not be eligible for section 404

permits. J.A. 145a.

When adopting new source performance stan-

dards for ore mines and mills in 1982, EPA left no

doubt as to the intended permitting requirements:

“The ... [standards] in this regulation will be applied

to individual ore mines and mills through NPDES

permits issued by EPA ... under Section 402 of the

Act.” 47 Fed. Reg. at 54,606. Nowhere in the rule or

preamble, or in their predecessors or subsequent mi-

nor amendments, did EPA suggest that a mill could

escape these standards through a permit to dis-

charge wastewater as “fill material” under section

404. This was true even though EPA recognized that

the wastewater contained very high levels of sus-

pended solids, generally requiring the use of settling

ponds as a treatment technology. See supra pp. 3, 9.

Further evidence of EPA’s intent is that it used

limits on suspended solids as a surrogate for limits

on certain toxic pollutants. As Petitioners and the

Corps point out, the Corps must ensure that dis-

charges of fill material comply with any effluent

limitations for toxic pollutants adopted under section

307 of the Act. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f, (h)(1)(A)Q),

(p), (r); 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(b)(2). One of the toxic

substances of concern in the wastewater discharges

of many beneficiation mills is asbestos, as the Re-

serve Mining case illustrates. See 47 Fed. Reg. at

25.694 (“Asbestiform fibers’ are evident in dis-

51

charges from ore mining and milling facilities, and

chrysotile asbestos was detected in wastewaters in

all subcategories and _ subparts.”); 40 C.F.R.

§ 401.15(7) (isting asbestos as toxic pollutant under

CWA § 307(a)(1)); Reserve Mining, 514 F.2d at 501,

514-20. EPA did not adopt section 307 effluent limi-

tations for asbestos from beneficiation mills because

it found that limits on total suspended solids (TSS)

under sections 301 and 306 would effectively control

asbestos and obviate the significant expense of moni-

toring for it. See 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,694-95; see also

id. at 25,703-04; 47 Fed. Reg. at 54,605. If a mill

were allowed to escape the TSS limitations by ob-

taining a “fill material” permit under section 404, it

would effectively escape the intended limit on asbes-

tos, a result at odds with section 404’s intent to con-

trol discharges of toxic pollutants.

That EPA used this approach (rather than prom-

ulgating section 307 standards for asbestos that

could be enforced through section 404) shows that

the agency could not have intended section 404 per-

mits to be used to authorize discharges subject to its

ore-mill performance standards. It also illustrates

the potentially dangerous effects of the interpreta.

tion sought by the Corps in this case. Authorizing

ore beneficiation wastewater discharges with section

404 permits could reprise the Reserve Mining sce-

nario, one of the very problems Congress intended to

stop

In the decades following adoption of the first ef-

fluent limitations for ore beneficiation mills in 1975

and the new source performance standards in 1982,

the agencies repeatedly confirmed that section 404

permits were not available for process wastewater

52

discharges from these facilities. From 1977 to 2002,

the Corps’ regulations excluded discharges for the

primary purpose of waste disposal from the defini-

tion of “fill material.” See supra p. 10. The agencies’

1986 MOA provided that discharges “in liquid, semi-

liquid, or suspended form,” including various “mining

wastes,” would require section 402 permits.!5 See id.

The agencies interpreted their regulations to pre-

clude the use of section 404 permits for discharges

subject to effluent limitations. See Kentuckians, 317

F.3d at 445, 448.

‘5 Petitioners and the Corps rely on a sentence from the

MOA’s preamble that has no applicability to wastewater dis-

charges from ore mills for the purpose of waste disposal, which

were described in paragraph B.5. See Fed. Br. at 27; Alaska Br.

at 9. They quote the second sentence of the following para-

graph:

This agreement does not affect the regulatory re-

quirements for materials discharged into waters of the

United States for the primary purpose of replacing an

aquatic area or of changing the bottom elevation of a

water body. Discharges listed in the Corps definition of

“discharge of fill material,” 33 CFR 323.2(1) remain sub-

ject to section 404 even if they occur in association with

discharges of wastes meeting the criteria in the agree-

ment for section 402 discharges.

51 Fed. Reg. at 8.871. This explanation discussed and incorpo-

rated the Corps’ “fill material” defimtion, which at that time

required that the primary purpose of the discharge be to create

dry land or change the bottom of the water body, not to dispose

of waste. See id. Thus, the sentence merely clarified that dis-

charges meeting this definition were subject to section 404

permits even if they occurred in association with waste other-

wise subject to section 402. This clarification did not apply to

discharges like the one here, whose only purpose was to dispose

of process wastewater

53

Accordingly, as far as the record reflects, the

Corps never issued a permit to discharge process

wastewater into a navigable water body before the

2005 Kensington Mine permit. Cocur cites three

permits it holds out as counterexamples, see Coeur

Br. at 40-42, but all three miss the mark.

The Red Dog and Fort Knox permits were both

permits to use solid fill material to build tailings im-

poundments and associated structures; they did not

permit the ongoing discharge of wastewater into

navigable waters. See SER 979 (authorizing permit-

tee to “place ... mine tailings in the south fork of Red

Dog Creek and adjacent wetlands to construct a 150’

high x 2,400’ long dum”)'© (emphasis added);

SER 1099 (Red Dog Decision); SER 983 (authorizing

discharge of fill material for “construction of im-

poundment structures, stockpiles, rock dumps, cul-

verted road crossings, and other components” of Fort

Knox mine). Neither mine obtained a permit for dis-

charges into the tailings ponds themselves, because

the agencies determined that the tailings ponds were

“waste treatment systems” not considered “waters of

the United States” under the Clean Water Act. See

40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (definition of “Waters of the United

States”). Thus, the decision document for the Fort

Knox mine explicitly stated that “[n]lo discharge of

waste water to waters of the United States is ex-

pected....” SER 989 (emphasis added).

In contrast, EPA and the Corps rejected a sugges-

tion that Lower Slate Lake be deemed an exempt

'® Dewatered tailings are sometimes used as a construction

material in dams at mines.

54

“waste treatment system,” notwithstanding the con-

struction of a dam to expand its capacity. J.A. 145a-

46a. The Kensington Mine’s 404 permit, unlike

those for the Red Dog and Fort Knox mines, ex-

pressly authorizes discharges of process wastewater

into navigable waters. See J.A. 275a (€ 10), 283a

(Area 24), 266a (authorizing discharge to “navigable

waters of the United States”).!?

Nor did the other permit cited by Coeur—

Nationwide Permit 21, for minimal-impact surface

coal-mining work—authorize discharges of process

wastewater into navigable waters. It was originally

promulgated in the same Federal Register notice as a

re-promulgation of the Corps’ former “fill material”

definition, which precluded discharges for the pri-

mary purpose of waste disposal. See 47 Fed. Reg.

31,794, 31,811 (July 22, 1982) (adopting “fill mate-

rial” definition); id. at 31,833 (adopting Nationwide

Permit 21). Presumably, the Corps did not intend to

contradict itself within the same document. Thus,

'? There is a legal question whether, or under what circum-

stances, the Corps may deem an impoundment in a navigable

stream to be a “waste treatment system.” See, e.g., Ohio Valley

Envtl. Coal. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 3:05-0784, 2007

WL 2200686 (S.D. W.Va. June 13, 2007), appeals docketed, Nos.

07-1355, 07-1479, 07-1480, 07-1964 (consolidated) (4th Cir.).

Normally, the tailings pond can be constructed outside of any

stream by diverting the stream around the tailings pond, segre.

gating the waste treatment system from navigable waters. See,

e.g., SER 995; see also Pac. Legal Found. Amicus Br. at 14 (dia-

gramming “stream bypass”). This Court need not address these

questions here because the agencies expressly declined to deem

the lake a “waste treatment system” and recognized it as “wa-

ters of the United States.”

55

the “[s]tructures, work, and discharges,” id. at

31,833, authorized in Nationwide Permit 21 could

not have included wastewater discharges.

In short, if the Corps ever granted a “fill mate-

rial” permit to discharge process wastewater to navi-

gable waters before the Kensington permit, it has not

been brought to the attention of the Court, even

though Petitioners canvassed the country to find one.

SEACC is unaware of any such examples.

Granting section 404 permits for wastewater dis-

charges from ore beneficiation mills would, therefore,

be a substantial change in agency practice. It would

effectively repeal EPA’s effluent limitations for those

sources, because the wastewater from these mills is

inherently “very high” in suspended solids, 47 Fed.

Reg. at 25,685, and will therefore always raise the

bottom elevation of a water body when the solids set-

tle. In adopting the effluent limitations, EPA ex-

pected that solids would be removed in settling

ponds, not in navigable waters. See supra pp. 8-9.

If the agencies wished to reverse this practice,

they would be required to provide an explanation.

“(A]n agency changing its course by rescinding a rule

is obligated to supply a reasoned analysis for the

change....”. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42. The failure

to do so would render the decision arbitrary. /d.

at 42-43.

C. When the Agencies Adopted Their New

Definition of Fill Material in 2002, They

Did Not Intend to Change Past Practice.

In adopting the 2002 fill rule, the agencies did not

supply an analysis for changing course—"“reasoned”

or otherwise, td. at 42—because, as they repeatedly

56

explained, they did not intend to change course. See

supra pp. 11-15. The original proposal would have

expressly excluded discharges subject to effluent

limitations, consistent with longstanding agency

practice. See 65 Fed. Reg. at 21,297, 21,299. The

agencies stated that they removed that language

only because it was confusing as drafted and that the

deletion did not reflect any intention to change their

existing practice. See 67 Fed. Reg. at 31,135; J.A.

46a. They repeated this statement specifically in the

context of “mine tailings,” noting that mine tailing

discharges subject to effluent limitations would re-

main so and that section 402 permits would still be

needed for “process water” discharges. J.A. 47a-48a.

They reiterated the point by citing paragraph B.5 of

the 1986 MOA, J.A. 82a-84a, and explained that the

new definition would not authorize discharges that

were previously prohibited or expand the types of

discharges covered under section 404. 67 Fed. Reg.

at 31.133: J.A. 32a. They made these statements in

the Federal Register, in their response-to-comments

document incorporated in the Federal Register, and

in a document posted on the Corps’ website to ex-

plain the new rule to the public. See supra p. 13.

These statements were not isolated snippets, but

were critical to the agencies’ analysis and to their

explanation for deleting language from the proposed

regulation. Moreover, the agencies said nothing to

contradict this explanation. Petitioners and the

Corps cite general statements from the Federal Reg-

ister that mine tailings would be considered fill ma-

terial under the new rule and that EPA does not

regulate fill material. See Fed. Br. at 35-37. How-

ever, none of these general statements addresses the

specific question created where a wastewater dis-

57

charge, including one containing mine tailings, both

meets the new “fill material” definition and is subject

to a performance standard or other effluent limita-

tion. The agencies specifically foresaw this circum-

stance, addressed it several times, and stated each

time that the effluent limitation would govern.

The Corps argues that this interpretation would

render meaningless the regulation’s inclusion of

“tailings,” the placement of which is “generally” con-

sidered a discharge of fill material in the revised

definition. See Fed. Br. at 39-40; 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(f).

This is not so, because discharges of “slurry” or “tail-

ings” are still eligible for section 404 permits if they

are not covered by section 306 performance stan-

dards or section 301 effluent limitations. There are

many minerals whose tailings are not subject to such

limitations, including: platinum (40 C.F.R.

§ 440.110-.115)!8; antimony (id. § 440.90-.95); tin (no

regulation); and numerous minerals covered under

40 C.F.R. Part 436 such as mica and sericite (sub-

part 1), trona (subpart P), lithium (subpart U), atta-

pulgite and montmorillonite (subpart AB), kyanite

(subpart AC), aplite (subpart AE), kaolin § (sub-

part AG), feldspar (subpart Al), and talc, steatite,

‘* EPA has adopted effluent limitations under section 307

for toxic pollutants from froth-flotation mills for platinum ores,

40 C.F.R. § 440.113(b). but no effluent limitations for conven-

tional pollutants and no performance standards. See id.

§§ 440.112, .114, .115. Because the Corps may apply section

307 effluent limitations (but not section 301 or 306 limitations)

in section 404 permits, see 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(b)(2), the tailings

from a platinum beneficiation mill could be subject to a section

404 permit.

58

soapstone, and pyrophyllite (subpart AJ), among

others.

In short, when they adopted the new definition of

“fill material,” EPA and the Corps did not intend to

make any change in EPA’s effluent limitations or in

the agencies’ longstanding practice of applying those

limitations to the process wastewater from ore ben-

eficiation mills through section 402 permits. If the

Court finds that the 2002 fill rule has the effect of

reversing that practice, as the Corps now argues, see

Fed. Br. at 40, the Court should set the regulation

aside as arbitrary, since the agency did not provide a

“reasoned analysis” for—and actually denied the ex-

istence of—this change. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42;

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); see J.A. 475a, J 72.

D. The Regas Memo Could Not Change the

Agencies’ Authoritative Interpretation

Published in the Federal Register.

The Regas memo, which purported to construe

the 2002 fill rule, J.A. 143a-45a, could not reverse

the agency's interpretation explained in the Federal

Register upon adoption of the rule. An authoritative

expression of an agency’s interpretation of its rule is

entitled to deference as to the rule’s meaning. See

Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997). A clear

statement in the Federal Register upon promuiga-

tion of a rule is “dispositive” of the agency's intent.

See Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs.,

Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 714-16 (1985). Subsequent, in-

consistent interpretations of the regulation do not

receive deference. See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v.

Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (‘we must defer to

the Secretary's interpretation unless an ‘alternative

59

reading is compelled ... by other indications of the

Secretary's intent at the time of the regulation’s

promulgation”) (quoting Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485

U.S. 415, 430 (1988)); accord, Gonzales v. Ore-

gon, 546 U.S. 243, 258 (2006) (“That the current in-

terpretation runs counter to the ‘intent at the time of

the regulation's promulgation,’ is an additional rea-

son why Auer deference is unwarranted.”) (citation

omitted). Formal notice-and-comment rulemaking

procedures tend “to foster the fairness and delibera-

tion that should underlie a pronouncement of such

force.” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218,

230 (2001) (denying Chevron deference to informal

Customs classification rulings); see also Alaska Prof'l

Hunters Ass’n v. FAA, 177 F.3d 1030, 1033-34 (D.C.

Cir. 1999) (Randolph, J.) (agency may not change de-

finitive interpretation of rule without new notice-

and-comment rulemaking).

If subordinate officials could alter an agency’s in-

terpretation of regulations as published in the Fed-

eral Register by writing an internal, unpublished

memo, preambles to rules published in the Federal

Register would become largely meaningless. The

Regas memo reveals the lack of “fairness and delib-

eration,’ Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 230, in this ap-

proach. The memo neglects entirely the repeated

statements in the Federal Register and the rulemak-

ing record that the rule was not intended to exempt

discharges from applicable effluent limitations. See

J.A. 143a-45a. Instead, the Regas memo substitutes

a distinction between discharges whose filling effects

are “immediate” and those that are “incidental,” a

distinction with no clear boundary or basis in the

language of the rule and that was never mentioned

at the time of the rule’s promulgation. J.A. 144a-

60

45a. To give effect to the Regas memo would be in-

appropriate and inconsistent with this Court’s prece-

dents.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the court of appeals should be af-

firmed.

Respectfully submitted,

‘THOMAS S. WALDO

Counsel of Record

EARTHJUSTICE

325 Fourth Street

Juneau, AK 99801

(907) 586-2751

ScoTt L. NELSON

PUBLIC CITIZEN

LITIGATION GROUP

1600 20% St., NW

Washington, DC 20009

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APPENDIX

STATUTES INVOLVED

Section 101 of the Clean Water Act,

33 U.S.C. § 1251

§ 1251. Congressional declaration of goals

and policy

(a) Restoration and maintenance of chemical,

physical and biological integrity of Nation's waters;

national goals for achievement of objective

The objective of this chapter is to restore and

maintain the chemical, physical, and biological in-

tegrity of the Nation's waters. In order to achieve

this objective it is hereby declared that, consistent

with the provisions of this chapter—

(1) it is the national goal that the discharge of pol-

lutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by

1985;

Section 301 of the Clean Water Act,

33 U.S.C. § 1311

§ 1311. Effluent limitations

(a) Illegality of pollutant discharges except in

comphance with law

Except as in compliance with this section and sec-

tions 1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342, and 1344 of this

title, the discharge of any pollutant by any person

shall be unlawful.

2a

(b) Timetable for achievement of objectives

In order to carry out the objective of this chapter

there shall be achieved—

(1)(A) not later than July 1, 1977, effluent limita-

tions for point sources, other than publicly owned

treatment works, (i) which shall require the applica-

tion of the best practicable control technology cur-

rently available as defined by the Administrator

pursuant to section 1314(b) of this title, or (i) in the

case of a discharge into a publicly owned treatment

works which meets the requirements of subpara-

graph (B) of this paragraph, which shall require

compliance with any applicable pretreatment re-

quirements and any requirements under section

1317 of this title; and

(B) for publicly owned treatment works in exis-

tence on July 1, 1977, or approved pursuant to sec-

tion 1283 of this title prior to June 30, 1974 (for

which construction must be completed within four

years of approval), effluent lmitations based upon

secondary treatment as defined by the Administrator

pursuant to section 1314(d)(1) of this title; or,

(C) not later than July 1, 1977, any more strin-

gent limitation, including those necessary to meet

water quality standards, treatment standards, or

schedules of compliance, established pursuant to any

State law or regulations (under authority preserved

by section 1370 of this title) or any other Federal law

or regulation, or required to implement any applica-

ble water quality standard established pursuant to

this chapter.

3a

(2)(A) for pollutants identified in subparagraphs

(C), (D), and (F) of this paragraph, effluent limita-

tions for categories and classes of point sources,

other than publicly owned treatment works, which (1)

shall require application of the best available tech-

nology economically achievable for such category or

class, which will result in reasonable further pro-

gress toward the national goal of eliminating the dis-

charge of all pollutants, as determined in accordance

with regulations issued by the Administrator pursu-

ant to section 1314(b)(2) of this title, which such ef-

fluent hmitations shall require the elimination of

discharges of all pollutants if the Administrator

finds, on the basis of information available to him

(including information developed pursuant to section

1325 of this title), that such elimination is techno-

logically and economically achievable for a category

or class of point sources as determined in accordance

with regulations issued by the Administrator pursu-

ant to section 1314(b)(2) of this title, or (ii) in the

case of the introduction of a pollutant into a publicly

owned treatment works which meets the require-

ments of subparagraph (B) of this paragraph, shall

require compliance with any applicable pretreatment

requirements and any other requirement under sec-

tion 1317 of this title;

(B) Repealed. Pub.L. 97-117, § 21(b), Dec. 29,

1981, 95 Stat. 1632.

(C) with respect to all toxic pollutants referred to

in table 1 of Committee Print Numbered 95-30 of the

Committee on Public Works and Transportation of

the House of Representatives compliance with efflu-

ent limitations in accordance with subparagraph (A)

of this paragraph as expeditiously as practicable but

4a

in no case later than three years after the date such

hmitations are promu!gated under section 1314(b) of

this title, and in no case later than March 31, 1989;

(D) for all toxic pollutants listed under paragraph

(1) of subsection (a) of section 1317 of this title which

are not referred to in subparagraph (C) of this para-

graph compliance with effluent limitations in accor-

dance with subparagraph (A) of this paragraph as

expeditiously as practicable, but in no case later than

three years after the date such limitations are prom-

ulgated under section 1314(b) of this title, and in no

case later than March 31, 1989;

(E) as expeditiously as practicable but in no case

later than three years after the date such limitations

are promulgated under section 1314(b) of this title,

and in no case later than March 31, 1989, compliance

with effluent limitations for categories and classes of

point sources, other than publicly owned treatment

works, which in the case of pollutants identified pur-

suant to section 1314(a)(4) of this title shall require

application of the best conventional pollutant control

technology as determined in accordance with reguia-

tions issued by the Administrator pursuant to sec-

tion 1314(b)(4) of this title; and

(F) for all pollutants (other than those subject to

subparagraphs (C), (D), or (E) of this paragraph)

compliance with effluent limitations in accordance

with subparagraph (A) of this paragraph as expedi-

tiously as practicable but in no case later than 3

years after the date such limitations are established,

and in no case later than March 31, 1989.

(3)(A) for effluent hmitations under paragraph

(1)(A)Q) of this subsection promulgated after January

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1, 1982, and requiring a level of control substantially

greater or based on fundamentally different control

technology than under permits for an industrial

category issued before such date, compliance as ex-

peditiously as practicable but in no case later than

three years after the date such limitations are prom-

ulgated under section 1314(b) of this title, and in no

case later than March 31, 1989; and

(B) for any effluent limitation in accordance with

paragraph (1)(A)(i), (2)(A)(i), or (2)(E) of this subsec-

tion established only on the basis of section

1342(a)(1) of this title in a permit issued after Feb-

ruary 4, 1987, compliance as expeditiously as practi-

cable but in no case later than three years after the

date such limitations are established, and in no case

later than March 31, 1989.

(c) Modification of timetable

The Administrator may modify the requirements

of subsection (b)(2)(A) of this section with respect to

any point source for which a permit application is

filed after July 1, 1977, upon a showing by the owner

or operator of such point source satisfactory to the

Administrator that such modified requirements (1)

will represent the maximum use of technology within

the economic capability of the owner or operator; and

(2) will result in reasonable further progress toward

the elimination of the discharge of pollutants.

(d) Review and revision of effluent limitations

Any effluent limitation required by paragraph (2)

of subsection (b) of this section shall be reviewed at

least every five years and, if appropriate, revised

pursuant to the procedure established under such

paragraph.

6a

(e) All point discharge source application of efflu-

ent limitations

Effluent limitations established pursuant to this

section or section 1312 of this title shall be applied to

all point sources of discharge of pollutants in accor-

dance with the provisions of this chapter.

Section 304 of the Clean Water Act,

33 U.S.C. § 1314

§ 1314. Information and guidelines

(a) Criteria development and publication

(4) The Administrator shall, within 90 days after

December 27, 1977, and from time to time thereafter,

publish and revise as appropriate information identi-

fying conventional pollutants, including but not lim-

ited to, pollutants classified as biological oxygen

demanding, suspended solids, fecal coliform, and pH.

The thermal component of any discharge shall not be

identified as a conventional pollutant under this

paragraph.

(b) Effluent limitation guidelines

For the purpose of adopting or revising effluent

limitations under this chapter the Administrator

shall, after consultation with appropriate Federal

and State agencies and other interested persons,

publish within one year of October 18, 1972, regula-

tions, providing guidelines for effluent limitations,

7a

and, at least annually thereafter, revise, if appropri-

ate, such regulations. Such regulations shall

(1)(A) identify, in terms of amounts of constitu-

ents and chemical, physical, and biological character-

istics of pollutants, the degree of effluent reduction

attainable through the application of the best practi-

cable contro) technology currently available for

classes and categories of point sources (other than

publicly owned treatment works); and

(B) specify factors to be taken into account in de-

termining the control measures and practices to be

applicable to point sources (other than publicly

owned treatment works) within such categories or

classes. Factors relating to the assessment of best

practicable control technology currently available to

comply with subsection (b)(1) of section 1311 of this

title shall include consideration of the total cost of

application of technology in relation to the effluent

reduction benefits to be achieved from such applica-

tion, and shall also take into account the age of

equipment and facilities involved, the process em-

ployed, the engineering aspects of the application of

various types of control techniques, process changes,

non-water quality environmental impact (including

energy requirements), and such other factors as the

Administrator deems appropriate;

(2)(A) identify, in terms of amounts of constitu-

ents and chemical, physical, and biological character-

istics of pollutants, the degree of effluent reduction

attainable through the application of the best control

measures and practices achievable including treat-

ment techniques, process and procedure innovations,

operating methods, and other alternatives for classes

8a

and categories of point sources (other than publicly

owned treatment works); and

(B) specify factors to be taken into account in de-

termining the best measures and practices available

to comply with subsection (b)(2) of section 1311 of

this title to be applicable to any point source (other

than publicly owned treatment works) within such

categories or classes. Factors relating to the assess-

ment of best available technology shall take into ac-

count the age of equipment and facilities involved,

the process employed, the engineering aspects of the

application of various types of control techniques,

process changes, the cost of achieving such effluent

reduction, non-water quality environmental impact

(including energy requirements), and such other fac-

tors as the Administrator deems appropriate;

(3) identify control measures and practices avail-

able to eliminate the discharge of pollutants from

categories and classes of point sources, taking into

account the cost of achieving such elimination of the

discharge of pollutants; and

(4)(A) identify, in terms of amounts of constitu-

ents and chemical, physical, and biological character-

istics of pollutants, the degree of effluent reduction

attainable through the application of the best con-

ventional pollutant control technology (including

measures and practices) for classes and categories of

point sources (other than publicly owned treatment

works); and

(B) specify factors to be taken into account in de-

termining the best conventional pollutant control

technology measures and practices to comply with

section 1311(b)(2)(E) of this title to be applicable to

9a

any point source (other than publicly owned treat-

ment works) within such categories or classes. Fac-

tors relating to the assessment of best conventional

pollutant control technology (including measures and

practices) shall include consideration of the reason-

ableness of the relationship between the costs of at-

taining a reduction in effluents and the effluent

reduction benefits derived, and the comparison of the

cost and level of reduction of such pollutants from

the discharge from publicly owned treatment works

to the cost and level ot reduction of such pollutants

from a class or category of industrial sources, and

shall take into account the age of equipment and fa-

cilities involved, the process employed, the engineer-

ing aspects of the application of various types of

control techniques, process changes, non-water qual-

ity environmental impact (including energy require-

ments), and such other factors as the Administrator

deems appropriate.

(c) Pollution discharge elimination procedures

The Administrator, after consultation, with ap-

propriate Federal and State agencies and other in-

terested persons, shall issue to the States and

appropriate water pollution control agencies within

270 days after October 18, 1972 (and from time to

time thereafter) information on the processes, proce-

dures, or operating methods which result in the

elimination or reduction of the discharge of pollut-

ants to implement standards of performance under

section 1316 of this title. Such information shall in-

clude technical and other data, including costs, as

are available on alternative methods of elimination

or reduction of the discharge of pollutants. Such in-

formation, and revisions thereof, shall be published

10a

in the Federal Register and otherwise shall be made

available to the public.

Section 306 of the Clean Water Act,

33 U.S.C. § 1316

§ 1316. National standards of performance

(a) Definitions

For purposes of this section:

(1) The term “standard of performance” means a

standard for the control of the discharge of pollutants

which reflects the greatest degree of effluent reduc-

tion which the Administrator determines to be

achievable through application of the best available

demonstrated control technology, processes, operat-

ing methods, or other alternatives, including, where

practicable, a standard permitting no discharge of

pollutants.

(2) The term “new source” means any source, the

construction of which is commenced after the publi-

cation of proposed regulations prescribing a standard

of performance under this section which will be ap-

plicable to such source, if such standard is thereafter

promulgated in accordance with this section.

(3) The term “source” means any building, struc-

ture, facility, or installation from which there is or

may be the discharge of pollutants.

(4) The term “owner or operator” means any per-

son who owns, leases, operates, controls, or super-

vises a source.

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(5) The term “construction” means any placement,

assembly, or installation of facilities or equipment

(including contractual obligations to purchase such

facilities or equipment) at the premises where such

equipment will be used, including preparation work

at such premises.

(b) Categories of sources; Federal standards of

performance for new sources

(1)(A) The Administrator shall, within ninety

days after October 18, 1972, publish (and from time

to time thereafter shall revise) a list of categories of

sources, which shall, at the minimum, include:

pulp and paper mills;

paperboard, builders paper and board mills;

meat product and rendering processing;

dairy product processing;

grain mills;

canned and preserved fruits and vegetables proc-

essing;

canned and preserved seafood processing;

sugar processing;

textile mills;

cement manufacturing:

feedlots:

electroplating:

organic chemicals manufacturing;

inorganic chemicals manufacturing;

plastic and synthetic materials manufacturing;

12a

soap and detergent manufacturing;

fertilizer manufacturing;

petroleum refining;

iron and steel manufacturing;

nonferrous metals manufacturing;

phosphate manufacturing;

steam electric powerplants;

ferroalloy manufacturing;

leather tanning and finishing;

glass and asbestos manufacturing;

rubber processing; and

timber products processing.

(B) As soon as practicable, but in no case more

than one year, after a category of sources is included

in a list under subparagraph (A) of this paragraph,

the Administrator shall propose and publish regula-

tions establishing Federal standards of performance

for new sources within such category. The Adminis-

trator shall afford interested persons an opportunity

for written comment on such proposed regulations.

After considering such comments, he shall promul-

gate, within one hundred and twenty days after pub-

lication of such proposed regulations, such standards

with such adjustments as he deems appropriate. The

Administrator shall, from time to time, as technology

and alternatives change, revise such standards fol-

lowing the procedure required by this subsection for

promulgation of such standards. Standards of per-

formance, or revisions thereof, shall become effective

upon promulgation. In establishing or revising Fed-

13a

eral standards of performance for new sources under

this section, the Administrator shall take into con-

sideration the cost of achieving such effluent reduc-

tion, and any non-water quality, environmental

impact and energy requirements.

(2) The Administrator may distinguish among

classes, types, and sizes within categories of new

sources for the purpose of establishing such stan-

dards and shall consider the type of process em-

ployed (including whether batch or continuous).

(3) The provisions of this section shall apply to

any new source owned or operated by the United

States.

(c) State enforcement of standards of performance

Each State may develop and submit to the Ad-

ministrator a procedure under State law for applying

and enforcing standards of performance for new

sources located in such State. If the Administrator

finds that the procedure and the law of any State re-

quire the application and enforcement of standards

of performance to at least the same extent as re-

quired by this section, such State is authorized to

apply and enforce such standards of performance

(except with respect to new sources owned or oper-

ated by the United States).

(d) Protection from more stringent standards

Notwithstanding any other provision of this chap-

ter, any point source the construction of which is

commenced after October 18, 1972, and which is so

constructed as to meet all applicable standards of

performance shall not he subject to any more strin-

gent standard of performance during a ten-year pe-

riod beginning on the date of completion of such

l4a

construction or during the period of depreciation or

amortization of such facility for the purposes of sec-

tion 167 or 169 (or both) of Title 26, whichever period

ends first.

(e) Illegality of operation of new sources in viola-

tion of applicable standards of performance

After the effective date of standards of perform-

ance promulgated under this section, it shall be

unlawful for any owner or operator of any new source

to operate such source in violation of any standard of

performance applicable to such source.

Section 307 of the Clean Water Act,

33 U.S.C. § 1317

§ 1317. Toxic and pretreatment effluent

standards

(a) Toxic pollutant list; revision; hearing; promul-

gation of standards: effective date; consultation

(1) On and after December 27, 1977, the list of

toxic pollutants or combination of pollutants subject

to this chapter shall consist of those toxic pollutants

listed in table 1 of Committee Print Numbered 95-30

of the Committee on Public Works and Transporta-

tion of the House of Representatives, and the Admin-

istrator shall publish, not later than the thirtieth day

after December 27, 1977, that list. From time to time

thereafter, the Administrator may revise such list

and the Administrator is authorized to add to or re-

move from such list any pollutant. The Administra-

tor in publishing any revised list, including the

addition or removal of any pollutant from such list,

shall take into account toxicity of the pollutant, its

persistence, degradabilitvy, the usual or potential

lda

presence of the affected organisms in any waters, the

importance of the affected organisms, and the nature

and extent of the effect of the toxic pollutant on such

organisms. A determination of the Administrator

under this paragraph shall be fina! except that if, on

judicial review, such determination was based on ar-

bitrary and capricious action of the Administrator,

the Administrator shall make a redetermination.

(2) Each toxic pollutant listed in accordance with

paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be subject to

effluent limitations resulting from the application of

the best available technology economically achiev-

able for the applicable category or class of point

sources established in accordance with sections

1311(b)(2)(A) and 1314(b)(2) of this title. The Admin-

istrator, in his discretion, may publish in the Federal

Register a proposed effluent standard (which may

include a prohibition) establishing requirements for

« toxic pollutant which, if an effluent limitation is

applicable to a class or category of point sources,

shall be applicable to such category or class only if

such standard imposes more stringent requirements.

Such published effluent standard (or prohibition)

shall take into account the toxicity of the pollutant,

its persistence, degradability, the usual or potential

presence of the affected organisms in any waters, the

importance of the affected organisms and the nature

and extent of the effect of the toxic pollutant on such

organisms, and the extent to which effective control

is being or may be achieved under other regulatory

authority. The Administrator shall allow a period of

not less than sixty days following publication of any

such proposed effluent standard (or prohibition) for

written comment by interested persons on such pro-

posed standard. In addition, if within thirty days of

16a

publication of any such proposed effluent standard

(or prohibition) any interested person so requests,

the Administrator shall hold a public hearing in con-

nection therewith. Such a public hearing shall pro-

vide an opportunity for oral and_ written

presentations, such cross-examination as the Admin-

istrator determines is appropriate on disputed issues

of material fact, and the transcription of a verbatim

record which shall be available to the public. After

consideration of such comments and any information

and material presented at any public hearing held on

such proposed standard or prohibition, the Adminis-

trator shall promulgate such standard (or prohibi-

tion) with such modification as the Administrator

finds are justified. Such promulgation by the Admin-

istrator shall be made within two hundred and sev-

enty days after publication of proposed standard (or

prohibition). Such standard (or prohibition) shall be

final except that if, on judicial review, such standard

was not based on substantial evidence, the Adminis-

trator shall promulgate a revised standard. Effluent

limitations shall be established in accordance with

sections 1311(b)(2)(A) and 1314(b)(2) of this title for

every toxic pollutant referred to in table 1 of Com-

mittee Print Numbered 95-30 of the Committee on

Public Works and Transportation of the House of

Representatives as soon as practicable after Decem-

ber 27, 1977, but no later than July 1, 1980. Such ef-

fluent limitations or effluent standards (or

prohibitions) shall be established for every other

toxic pollutant listed under paragraph (1) of this

subsection as soon as practicable after it is so listed.

(3) Each such effluent standard (or prohibition)

shall be reviewed and, if appropriate, revised at least

every three years.

17a

(4) Any effluent standard promulgated under this

section shall be at that level which the Administrator

determines provides an ample margin of safety.

(5) When proposing or promulgating any effluent

standard (or prohibition) under this section, the Ad-

ministrator shall designate the category or categories

of sources to which the effluent standard (or prohibi-

tion) shall apply. Any disposal of dredged material

may be included in such a category of sources after

consultation with the Secretary of the Army.

(6) Any effluent standard (or prohibition) estab-

lished pursuant to this section shall take effect on

such date or dates as specified in the order promul-

gating such standard, but in no case, more than one

year from the date of such promulgation. If the Ad-

ministrator determines that compliance within one

year from the date of promulgation is technologically

infeasible for a category of sources, the Administra-

tor may establish the effective date of the effluent

standard (or prohibition) for such category at the ear-

lest date upon which compliance can be feasibly at-

tained by sources within such category, but in no

event more than three years after the date of such

promulgation.

(7) Prior to publishing any regulations pursuant

to this section the Administrator shall, to the maxi-

mum extent practicable within the time provided,

consult with appropriate advisory committees,

States, independent experts, and Federal depart-

ments and agencies.

18a

(d) Operation in violation of standards unlawful

After the effective date of any effluent standard

or prohibition or pretreatment standard promulgated

under this section, it shall be unlawful for any owner

or operator of any source to operate any source in

violation of any such effluent standard or prohibition

or pretreatment standard.

Section 309 of the Clean Water Act,

33 U.S.C. § 1319

§ 1319. Enforcement

(a) State enforcement; compliance orders

(3) Whenever on the basis of any information

available to him the Administrator finds that any

person is in violation of section 1311, 1312, 1316,

1317, 1318, 1328, or 1345 of this title, or is in viola-

tion of any permit condition or limitation implement-

ing any of such sections in a permit issued under

section 1342 of this title by him or by a State or ina

permit issued under section 1344 of this title by a

State, he shall issue an order requiring such person

to comply with such section or requirement, or he

shall bring a civil action in accordance with subsec-

tion (b) of this section.

(4) A copy of any order issued under this subsec-

tion shall be sent immediately by the Administrator

to the State in which the violation occurs and other

affected States. In any case in which an order under

this subsection (or notice to a violator under para-

graph (1) of this subsection) is issued to a corpora-

19a

tion, a copy of such order (or notice) shall be served

on any appropriate corporate officers. An order is-

sued under this subsection relating to a violation of

section 1318 of this title shall not take effect until

the person to whom it is issued has had an opportu-

nity to confer with the Administrator concerning the

alleged violation.

(5)(A) Any order issued under this subsection

shall be by personal service, shall state with reason-

able specificity the nature of the violation, and shall

specify a time for compliance not to exceed thirty

days in the case of a violation of an interim compli-

ance schedule or operation and maintenance re-

quirement and not to exceed a time _ the

Administrator determines to be reasonable in the

case of a violation of a final deadline, taking into ac-

count the seriousness of the violation and any good

faith efforts to comply with applicable requirements.

(B) The Administrator may, if he determines (i)

that any person who is a violator of, or any person

who is otherwise fot in compliance with, the time re-

quirements under this chapter or in any permit is-

sued under this chapter, has acted in good faith, and

has made a commitment (in the form of contracts or

other securities) of necessary resources to achieve

compliance by the earliest possible date after July 1,

1977, but not later than April 1, 1979; (ii) that any

extension under this provision will not result in the

imposition of any additional controls on any other

point or nonpoint source; (1) that an application for

a permit under section 1342 of this title was filed for

such person prior to December 31, 1974; and (iv) that

the facilities necessary for compliance with such re-

quirements are under construction, grant an exten-

20a

sion of the date referred to in section 1311(b)(1)(A) of

this title to a date which will achieve compliance at

the earliest time possible but not later than April 1,

1979.

(6) Whenever, on the basis of information avail-

able to him, the Administrator finds (A) that any

person is in violation of section 1311(b)(1)(A) or (C) of

this title, (B) that such person cannot meet the re-

quirements for a time extension under section

1311(i)(2) of this title, and (C) that the most expedi-

tious and appropriate means of compliance with this

chapter by such person is to discharge into a publicly

owned treatment works, then, upon request of such

person, the Administrator may issue an order requir-

ing such person to comply with this chapter at the

earliest date practicable, but not later than July 1,

1983, by discharging into a publicly owned treatment

works if such works concur with such order. Such or-

der shall include a schedule of compliance.

(b) Civil actions

The Administrator is authorized to commence a

civil action for appropriate relief, including a perma-

nent or temporary injunction, for any violation for

which he is authorized to issue a compliance order

under subsection (a) of this section. Any action under

this subsection may be brought in the district court

of the United States for the district in which the de-

fendant is located or resides or is doing business, and

such court shall have jurisdiction to restrain such

violation and to require compliance. Notice of the

commencement of such action shall be given imme-

diately to the appropriate State.

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(c) Criminal penalties

(1) Negligent violations

Any person who—

(A) negligently violates section 1311, 1312, 1316,

1317, 1318, 1321(b)(3), 1328, or 1345 of this title, or

any permit condition or limitation implementing any

of such sections in a permit issued under section

1342 of this title by the Administrator or by a State,

or any requirement imposed in a pretreatment pro-

gram approved under section 1342(a)(3) or 1342(b)(8)

of this title or in a permit issued under section 1344

of this title by the Secretary of the Army or by a

Stat»; or

(B) negligently introduces into a sewer system or

into a publicly owned treatment works any pollutant

or hazardous substance which such person knew or

reasonably should have known could cause personal

injury or property damage or, other than in compli-

ance with all applicable Federal, State, or local re-

quirements or permits, which causes such treatment

works to violate any effluent limitation or condition

in any permit issued to the treatment works under

section 1342 of this title by the Administrator or a

State;

shall be punished by a fine of not less than $2,500

nor more than $25,000 per day of violation, or by im-

prisonment for not more than 1 year, or by both. If a

conviction of a person is for a violation committed af-

ter a first conviction of such person under this para-

graph, punishment shall be by a fine of not more

than $50,000 per day of violation, or by imprison-

ment of not more than 2 years, or by both.

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(2) Knowing violations

Any person who—

(A) knowingly violates section 1311, 1312, 1316,

1317, 1318, 1321(b)(3), 1328, or 1345 of this title, or

any permit condition or limitation implementing any

of such sections in a permit issued under scction

1342 of this title by the Administrator or by a State,

or any requirement imposed in a pretreatment pro-

gram approved under section 1342(a)(3) or 1342(b)(8)

of this title or in a permit issued under section 1344

of this title by the Secretary of the Army or by a

State; or

(B) knowingly introduces into a sewer system or

into a publicly owned treatment works any pollutant

or hazardous substance which such person knew or

reasonably should have known could cause personal

injury or property damage or, other than in compli-

ance with all applicable Federal, State, or local re-

quirements or permits, which causes such treatment

works to violate any effluent limitation or condition

in a permit issued to the treatment works under sec-

tion 1342 of this title by the Administrator or a

State;

shall be punished by a fine of not less than $5,000

nor more than $50,000 per day of violation, or by 1m-

prisonment for not more than 3 years, or by both. If a

conviction of a person is for a violation committed af-

ter a first conviction of such person under this para-

graph, punishment shall be by a fine of not more

than $100,000 per day of violation, or by itmprison-

ment of not more than 6 years, or by both.

23a

(3) Knowing endangerment

(A) General rule

Any person who knowingly violates section 1311,

1312, 1313, 1316, 1317, 1318, 1321(b)(3), 1328, or

1345 of this title, or any permit condition or limita-

tion implementing any of such sections in a permit

issued under section 1342 of this title by the Admin-

istrator or by a State, or in a permit issued under

section 1344 of this title by the Secretary of the Army

or by a State, and who knows at that time that he

thereby places another person in imminent danger of

death or serious bodily injury, shall, upon conviction,

be subject to a fine of not more than $250,000 or im-

prisonment of not more than 15 years, or both. A

person which is an organization shall, upon convic-

tion of violating this subparagraph, be subject to a

fine of not more than $1,000,000. If a conviction of a

person is for a violation committed after a first con-

viction of such person under this paragraph, the

maximum punishment shall be doubled with respect

to both fine and imprisonment.

(d) Civil penalties; factors considered in determin-

ing amount

Any person who violates section 1311, 1312, 1316,

1317, 1318, 1328, or 1345 of this title, or any permit

condition or limitation implementing any of such sec-

tions in a permit issued under section 1342 of this

title by the Administrator, or by a State, ,'° or ina

permit issued under section 1344 of this title by a

'§ So in original.

24a

State, or any requirement imposed in a pretreatment

program approved under section 1342(a)(3) or

1342(b)(8) of this title, and any person who violates

any order issued by the Administrator under subsec-

tion (a) of this section, shall be subject to a civil pen-

alty not to exceed $25,000 per day for each violation.

In determining the amount of a civil penalty the

court shall consider the seriousness of the violation

or violations, the economic benefit (if any) resulting

from the violation, any history of such violations, any

good-faith efforts to comply with the applicable re-

quirements, the economic impact of the penalty on

the violator, and such other matters as justice may

require. For purposes of this subsection, a single op-

erational upset which leads to simultaneous viola-

tions of more than one pollutant parameter shall be

treated as a single violation.

(g) Administrative penalties

(1) Violations

Whenever on the basis of any information avail-

able—

(A) the Administrator finds that any person has

violated section 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318, 1328,

or 1345 of this title, or has violated any permit condi-

tion or limitation implementing any of such sections

in a permit issued under section 1342 of this title by

the Administrator or by a State, or in a permit issued

under section 1344 of this title by a State, or

(B) the Secretary of the Army (hereinafter in this

subsection referred to as the “Secretary”) finds that

any person has violated any permit condition or limi-

tation in a permit issued under section 1344 of this

25a

title by the Secretary, the Administrator or Secre-

tary, as the case may be, may, after consultation

with the State in which the violation occurs, assess a

class I civil penalty or a class II civil penalty under

this subsection.

Section 402 of the Clean Water Act,

33 U.S.C. § 1342

§ 1342. National pollutant discharge elimi-

nation system

(a) Permits for discharge of pollutants

(1) Except as provided in sections 1328 and 1344

of this title, the Administrator may, after opportu-

nity for public hearing, issue a permit for the dis-

charge of any pollutant, or combination of pollutants,

notwithstanding section 1311(a) of this title, upon

condition that such discharge will meet either (A) all

applicable requirements under sections 1311, 1312,

1316, 1317, 1318, and 1343 of this title, or (B) prior

to the taking of necessary implementing actions re-

lating to all such requirements, such conditions as

the Administrator determines are necessary to carry

out the provisions of this chapter.

(2) The Administrator shall prescribe conditions

for such permits to assure compliance with the re-

quirements of paragraph (1) of this subsection, in-

cluding conditions on data and _ information

collection, reporting, and such other requirements as

he deems appropriate.

(3) The permit program of the Administrator un-

der paragraph (1) of this subsection, and permits is-

26a

sued thereunder, shall be subject to the same terms,

conditions, and requirements as apply to a State

permit program and permits issued thereunder un-

der subsection (b) of this section.

(4) All permits for discharges into the navigable

waters issued pursuant to section 407 of this title

shall be deemed to be permits issued under this sub-

chapter, and permits issued under this subchapter

shall be deemed to be permits issued under section

407 of this title, and shall continue in force and effect

for their term unless revoked, modified, or suspended

in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.

(5) No permit for a discharge into the navigable

waters shall be issued under section 407 of this title

after October 18, 1972. Each application for a permit

under section 407 of this title, pending on October

18, 1972, shall be deemed to be an application for a

permit under this section. The Administrator shal]

authorize a State, which he determines has the ca-

pability of administering a permit program which

will carry out the objective of this chapter to issue

permits for discharges into the navigable waters

within the jurisdiction of such State. The Adminis-

trator may exercise the authority granted him by the

preceding sentence only during the period which be-

gins on October 18, 1972, and ends either on the

ninetieth day after the date of the first promulgation

of guidelines required by section 1314(i)(2) of this ti-

tle, or the date of approval by the Administrator of a

permit program for such State under subsection (b)

of this section, whichever date first occurs, and no

such authorization to a State shall extend beyond the

last day of such period. Each such permit shall be

subject to such conditions as the Administrator de-

27a

termines are necessary to carry out the provisions of

this chapter. No such permit shall issue if the Ad-

ministrator objects to such issuance.

(k) Compliance with permits

Compliance with a permit issued pursuant to this

section shall be deemed compliance, for purposes of

sections 1319 and 1365 of this title, with sections

1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, and 1343 of this title, except

any standard imposed under section 1317 of this title

for a toxic pollutant injurious to human health. Until

December 31, 1974, in any case where a permit for

discharge has been applied for pursuant to this sec-

tion, but final administrative disposition of such ap-

plication has not been made, such discharge shall not

be a violation of (1) section 1311, 1316, or 1342 of

this title, or (2) section 407 of this title, unless the

Administrator or other plaintiff proves that final

administrative disposition of such application has

not been made because of the failure of the applicant

to furnish information reasonably required or re-

quested in order to process the application. For the

180-day period beginning on October 18, 1972, in the

case of any point source discharging any pollutant or

combination of pollutants immediately prior to such

date which source is not subject to section 407 of this

title, the discharge by such source shall not be a vio-

lation of this chapter if such a source applies for a

permit for discharge pursuant to this section within

such 180-day period.

28a

Section 404 of the Clean Water Act,

33 U.S.C. § 1344

§ 1344. Permits for dredged or fill material

(a) Discharge into navigable waters at specified

disposal sites

The Secretary may issue permits, after notice and

opportunity for public hearings for the discharge of

dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at

specified disposal sites. Not later than the fifteenth

day after the date an applicant submits all the in-

formation required to complete an application for a

permit under this subsection, the Secretary shall

publish the notice required by this subsection.

(b) Specification for disposal sites

Subject to subsection (c) of this section, each such

disposal site shall be specified for each such permit

by the Secretary (1) through the application of guide-

lines developed by the Administrator, in conjunction

with the Secretary, which guidelines shall be based

upon criteria comparable to the criteria applicable to

the territorial seas, the contiguous zone, and the

ocean under sectionw 41343(c) of this title, and (2) in

any case where such guidelines under clause (1)

alone would prohibit the specification of a site,

through the application additionally of the economic

impact of the site on navigation and anchorage.

(f) Non-prohibited discharge of dredged or fill ma-

terial

(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this

subsection, the discharge of dredged or fill mate-

rial—

29a

(A) from normal farming, silviculture, and ranch-

ing activities such as plowing, seeding, cultivating,

minor drainage, harvesting for the production of

food, fiber, and forest products, or upland soil and

water conservation practices;

(B) for the purpose of maintenance, including

emergency reconstruction of recently damaged parts,

of currently serviceable structures such as dikes,

dams, levees, groins, riprap, breakwaters, cause-

ways, and bridge abutments or approaches, and

transportation structures;

(C) for the purpose of construction or mainte-

nance of farm or stock ponds or irrigation ditches, or

the maintenance of drainage ditches;

(D) for the purpose of construction of temporary

sedimentation basins on a construction site which

does not include placement of fill material into the

navigable waters;

(E) for the purpose of construction or mainte-

nance of farm roads or forest roads, or temporary

roads for moving mining equipment, where such

roads are constructed and maintained, in accordance

with best management practices, to assure that flow

and circulation patterns and chemical and biological

characteristics of the navigable waters are not im-

paired, that the reach of the navigable waters is not

reduced, and that any adverse effect on the aquatic

environment will be otherwise minimized:

(F) resulting from any activity with respect to

which a State has an approved program under sec-

tion 1288(b)(4) of this title which meets the require-

ments of subparagraphs (B) and (C) of such section,

30a

is not prohibited by or otherwise subject to regu-

lation under this section or section 1311(a) or 1342 of

this title (except for effluent standards or prohibi-

tions under section 1317 of this title).

(2) Any discharge of dredged or fill material into

the navigable waters incidental to any activity hav-

ing as its purpose bringing an area of the navigable

waters into a use to which it was not previously sub-

ject, where the flow or circulation of navigable wa-

ters may be impaired or the reach of such waters be

reduced, shall be required to have a permit under

this section.

(h) Determination of State's authority to issue

permits under State program; approval; notification;

transfers to State program

(1) Not later than the one-hundred-twenticth day

after the date of the receipt by the Administrator of a

program and statement submitted by any State un-

der paragraph (1) of this subsection, the Administra-

tor shall determine, taking into account any

comments submitted by the Secretary and the Secre-

tary of the Interior, acting through the Director of

the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, pursu-

ant to subsection (g) of this section, whether such

State has the following authority with respect to the

issuance of permits pursuant to such program:

(A) To issue permits which—

(i) apply, and assure compliance with, any appli-

cable requirements of this section, including, but not

3la

limited to, the guidelines established under subsec-

tion (b)(1) of this section, and sections 1317 and 1343

of this title;

(n) Enforcement authority not limited

Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit

the authority of the Administrator to take action

pursuant to section 1319 of this title.

(p) Compliance

Compliance with a permit issued pursuant to this

section, including any activity carried out pursuant

to a general permit issued under this section, shall

be deemed compliance, for purposes of sections 1319

and 1365 of this title, with sections 1311, 1317, and

1343 of this title.

(r) Federal projects specifically authorized by

Congress

The discharge of dredged or fill material as part

of the construction of a Federal project specifically

authorized by Congress, whether prior to or on or af-

ter December 27, 1977, is not prohibited by or other-

wise subject to regulation under this section, or a

State program approved under this section, or sec-

tion 1311(a) or 1342 of this title (except for effluent

standards or prohibitions under section 1317 of this

title), if information on the effects of such discharge,

including consideration of the guidelines developed

under subsection (b)(1) of this section, is included in

an environmental impact statement for such project

32a

pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act

of 1969 [42 U.S.C.A. § 4321 et seq.] and such envi-

ronmental impact statement has been submitted to

Congress before the actual discharge of dredged or

fill material in connection with the construction of

such project and prior to either authorization of such

project or an appropriation of funds for such con-

struction.

(s) Violation of permits

(1) Whenever on the basis of any information

available to him the Secretary finds that any person

is in violation of any condition or limitation set forth

in a permit issued by the Secretary under this sec-

tion, the Secretary shall issue an order requiring

such person to comply with such condition or limita-

tion, or

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