Amicus Curiae Brief — Utility Water Water Act Group Group v. Riverkeeper, Inc. (Nos. 07-597, 07-588, 07-589)

\ FILED

JUL 21 2008

(") «*) OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Nos. 67-588, 07-589, 07-597SPBBEMEGOMUNT. U.S._|

Hn the

Supreme Court of the Anited States

ENTERGY CORP.,

PSEG FossiIL LLC AND PSEG NUCLEAR LLC,

AND

UTILITY WATER ACT GROUP,

PETITIONERS,

V.

RIVERKEEPER INC, ET AL.

RESPONDENTS.

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

BRIEF OFAMIC! CURIAE THE AEI CENTER FOR

REGULATORY AND MARKET STUDIES AND 33

INDIVIDUAL ECONOMISTS IN SUPPORT OF

PETITIONERS

ROBERT E. LITAN

Counsel of Record

BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

1775 MASSACHUSETTS AVE, NW

WASHINGTON, DC 20036

202 797 6120

Full Names of Individual Amici Listed on Inside

Cover

JULY 21, 2008

AMICI CURIAE

KENNETH ARROW, WILLIAM J. BAUMOL,

JAGDISH BHAGWATI, MICHAEL J. BOSKIN,

ROBERT CRANDALL, MAUREEN L. CROPPER,

MICHAEL GREENSTONE, ROBERT W. HAHN,

DAVID HARRISON, JR., R. GLENN HUBBARD,

ALFRED E. KAHN, LESTER B. LAVE, ROBERT LITAN,

PAUL McAvoy, JAMES C. MILLER, III,

ALBERT L. NICHOLS, WILLIAM A. NISKANEN,

ROGER G. NOLL, WALLACE E. OATES, PETER PASSELL,

SAM PELTZMAN, PAUL R. PORTNEY, HARVEY S. ROSEN,

MILTON RUSSELL, THOMAS C. SCHELLING,

RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, CHARLES L. SCHULTZE,

V. KERRY SMITH, VERNON L. SMITH,

ROBERT N. STAVINS, KIP VISCUSI,

MURRAY WEIDENBAUM, LAWRENCE J. WHITE, AND

RICHARD ZECKHAUSER

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ne Wie I SI ii scccdcctsndncctsnctnientiirnasiiliniindiicnnta 1

| EE AAR OT a TOR RTO O EE NTRP Ee 2

A. Issue Presented to the Court .....................8. 2

B. Comparisons of Benefits and Costs

under Section 316(b) of the Clean

SURES CRP PECADO ae eee 3

EESTI. SELL FORTE ARTE ESD 5

NN encisissonnpinintsieancahiibilliaaeicimietusithpshbanibienbiidubinwsavnnenaneeiniii 6

A. Benefit-Cost Comparisons Are a

Well-Established Tool to Foster

Rational Decision Making............................ 6

B. A Group of Economists Has

Developed Consensus on the Use of

Benefit-Cost Assessments for

Environmental Regulation.......................+ 10

a a Ot cnainindiuieiabienel 13

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases:

Riverkeeper, Inc. v. United States EPA,

475 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 2007) ........0...cccrcsssscocseesesses 4

Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle,

597 F.2d 306 (18 Cir. 1979) ............cccccceseeeeeees 3,4

Statutes and Regulations:

Executive Order 12044, 43 Fed. Reg.

12,661 (Mar. 24, 1978)...... "EF et MN MORO: 7

Executive Order 12291, 46 Fed. Reg.

UI, ca ciecicsecscennncccnseccendseeee 7,8

Executive Order 12866, 58 Fed. Reg.

ee I MR TIED iciceniecscnssinnscapegsswesecenens 7,8,9

Executive Order 13422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2,763

RR RE aes ee aE 8

Miscellaneous:

Brief for the Federal Respondents in

ae caesmsebetinporemaasninl 2

Brief Amici Curiae for AEI-Brookings Joint

Center for Regulatory Studies et al. in

Whitman v. American Trucking

Associations, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) ........0...0...... 11

Cass Sunstein. Cost-Benefit Default

Principles, AEI-Brookings Joint Center

for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper

00-7 (2000)..............0065 idilinniiasdiatebdaaiiiniaianteeniaibina 9

EPA, Guidelines for Preparing Economic

I I iciindiiedntrhthnteniniticitiettiatinncininsonesenene 10

“Letter to Joseph Priestly” in Benjamin

Franklin: Representative Selections,

with Introduction, Bibliography and

Notes, Frank Luther Mott and Chester

E. Jorgenson, eds., (New York:

American Book Company, 1936,

pp. 348-349), as cited in Boardman et

al., Cost-Benefit Analysis: Concepts and

Practice, Second Edition, (New Jersey:

Prentice Hall, 2001, pp. 1-2).........2....000..000.002. 6,7

Office of Water, EPA, Economic and

Benefits Analysis for the Final Section

316(b) Phase II Existing Facilities Rule

SERRE EEUU A Jeet othe Oe ae SE ee a eae 4

Office of Management and Budget.

Circular A-4 to the Heads of Executive

Agencies and Establishments.

I aici acensorectnncveree 10

Kenneth J. Arrow, Maureen L. Cropper,

George C. Eads, Robert W. Hahn,

Lester B. Lave, Roger G. Noll, Paul R.

Portney, Milton Russell, Richard

Schmalensee, V. Kerry Smith, and

Robert N. Stavins. Benefit-Cost

Analysis in Environmental, Health, and

Safety Regulation: A Statement of

Principles. American Enterprise

Institute, The Annapolis Center, and

Resources for the Future (1996)...................... 11

Kenneth J. Arrow, Maureen L. Cropper,

George C. Eads, Robert W. Hahn,

Lester B. Lave, Roger G. Noll, Paul R.

Portney, Milton Russell, Richard

Schmalensee, V. Kerry Smith, and

Robert N. Stavins. Is There a Role for

Benefit-Cost Analysis in

Environmental, Health, and Safety

Regulation?. Science (Apr. 12, 1996).

ED, TE TE dcnscdusvicsininianebiassimisiediaimaaanl 11

|

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

This brief is being submitted on behalf of a group

of economists.' The purpose of this brief is to provide

information to the Court’ related to the

appropriateness of using benefit-cost comparisons in

the context of § 316(b) of the Clean Water Act, a

section regulating the cooling water intake

technology—in the interest of protecting fish and

shellfish—of electricity generating units and certain

other facilities that require large quantities of water

to cool equipment for operational and safety reasons.

We emphasize that the brief does not address the

legal question of whether the U.S. Environmental

Protection Agency (“EPA”) has statutory authority to

consider the benefits and costs of alternatives in

setting requirements for facilities covered under

§316(b). Nor does our brief discuss specifics of how

benefit-cost comparisons should be used under that

section or under the Clean Water Act more

generally. Rather, we provide an overview of the

extensive historical precedent for comparing benefits

and costs in evaluating environmental regulations

and the general principles’ regarding’ such

comparisons that are widely accepted by economists.

As practicing economists and citizens, we have a -

substantial interest in seeing that EPA is allowed to

compare benefits and costs to help it identify the

' No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part,

and no counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended

to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. No person

other than amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel made a

monetary contribution to its preparation or submission. The

parties have consented to the filing of Amicus bricts.

2

relevant tradeoffs and make sound decisions under

§316(b). The societal resources at stake are

substantial with regard both to §316(b) of the Clean

Water Act and environmental, health and safety

regulation more generally. Indeed, it is_ not

uncommon for permitting decisions concerning

individual plants under §316(b) to include fish-

protection measures that may cost hundreds of

millions of dollars. The economists who are

signatories to this brief have identified general

principles that we believe are appropriate in making

decisions regarding fish protection under §316(b)

and other environmental measures. We submit this

brief in the interest of improving environmental

decision-making.

BACKGROUND

A. Issue Presented to the Court

We understand that the issue before the Court is,

in the words of the Government’s bricf responding to

the petition for a writ of certiorari,

Whether Section 316(b) of the Clean

Water Act, 33 USC. _ 1326(b),

authorizes the Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA) to compare

costs with benefits in determining the

“best technology available for

minimizing adverse’ environmental

impact” at cooling water intake

structures.”

2 Br. for Federal Resp’ts in Opp'n at (I)

3

We further understand that the issue is not

whether EPA is required to base its decisions

regarding “best technology available” (or “BTA”) on a

benefit-cost test, but only whether the Agency is

allowed to weigh costs and benefits, among other

factors, in deciding what controls must be installed

to reduce fish and shellfish losses at the water

intake structures of affected facilities.

We further understand that this issue is before

the Court in part because of a difference among

circuit courts, with the current Second Circuit

decision in conflict with a prior First Circuit

interpretation of the legality of comparing benefits

and costs.*

As economists, we are not qualified to opine on

how to interpret the statutory language of §316(b) or

on how prior case law applies in this area. Rather,

we respectfully offer our observations on the

economic issues presented in this case in the hope

that the comments will prove useful to the Court.

B. Comparisons of Benefits and Costs

under Section 316(b) of the Clean

Water Act

Our understanding is that for several decades,

EPA (and the state agencies that have assumed

permitting authority in some states) implemented

§316(b) on a case-by-case basis that included

weighing costs and benefits and declining to require

technology “whose cost is wholly disproportionate to

the environmental benefit to be gained,” as affirmed

’ Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 597 F.2d 306 (1s

Cir. 1979)

4

in a 1979 decision by the First Circuit.4 We

understand that under the terms of a consent decree

requiring the issuance of regulations implementing

§316(b) on a national basis, in 2004 EPA issued its

“Phase II” rules (applying to about 550 existing

power plants) that are at issue in this case. EPA’s

Phase II rules set national performance standards

for BTA and also allowed facilities to request site-

specific standards for BTA where they could provide

information on costs and benefits and, if appropriate,

demonstrate that the costs of meeting the national

standards would be “significantly greater” than the

benefits.5 The technology selected by the permitting

authority under the site-specific provision has to

achieve an efficacy level that comes as close as

practicable to the national performance standards

without resulting in costs that are “significantly

greater” than the benefits.

As we understand it, Riverkeeper I] © found that

EPA is prohibited from comparing costs and benefits

in setting requirements under §316(b) or authorizing

site-specific determinations. EPA may consider costs

but only in determining whether a technology can be

“reasonably borne” by the industry as a whole or in

choosing among equally protective alternatives

(what Riverkeeper II calls a “cost-effectiveness”

analysis). EPA is not allowed under Riverkeeper II

to consider costs in relation to benefits—to consider,

4 Id.

5 Office of Water, EPA, Economic and Benefits Analysis for the

Final Section 316(b) Phase IT Existing Facilities Rule (2004)

6 Riverkeeper, Inc. v. United States EPA, 475 F.3d 83 (2d Cir.

2007)

5

for example, whether the costs of a_ slight

improvement in fish protection are disproportionate

to the benefits.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

As economists, we believe that the Second

Circuit’s ruling, by not allowing the consideration of

important information about the _ relationships

between the benefits and costs of alternatives, is

economically unsound. In particular, we believe that,

as a general principle, regulators cannot make

rational decisions unless they are allowed to

compare costs and benefits and to use the results,

along with other factors as appropriate, to choose

among xiternatives.

To the extent permissible under the statute and

case law, EPA should be allowed to consider benefits

and costs in establishing rules for implementing

§316(b). We believe it would not be sensible to

preclude the comparison of benefits and costs in

setting §316(b) requirements. The potential costs of

setting technology-based requirements for cooling

water intakes can be very large, on the order of

hundreds of millions of dollars for a single facility.

The Court’s allowing EPA to consider benefits

and costs would improve both the decision making

process—by making it more transparent—and the

regulatory decisions by allowing important relevant

information to be considered explicitly.

6

ARGUMENT

A. Benefit-Cost Comparisons Are a Well-

Established Tool to Foster Rational

Decision Making

The general concept of comparing benefits and

costs is familiar and long standing. Indeed, in 1772,

Benjamin Franklin wrote in a letter about a method

for making private decisions (which Franklin called

“Moral or Prudential Algebra”) that illustrates the

basic features of benefit-cost assessments.? He

recommended carefully listing pros (i.e., benefits)

and cons (i.e., costs), estimating weights (i.e., valuing

them in some common unit, such as dollars), and

then determining their balance (calculating net

benefits equal to benefits minus costs). Franklin’s

letter emphasizes the crucial importance of following

a systematic process in complex situations in which

there are a host of factors pointing one way or the

other for a given decision. Specifically, Franklin

writes:

When those difficult cases occur, they

are difficult chiefly because while we

have them under Consideration, all the

Reasons pro and con are not present to

the Mind at the same time: but

7 “Letter to Joseph Priestly” in Benjamin Franklin:

Representative Selections, with Introduction, Bibliography and

Notes, Frank Luther Mott and Chester E. Jorgenson, eds..,

(New York: American Book Company, 1936 pp. 348-349), as

cited in Boardman et al., Cost-Benefit Analysis: Concepts and

Practice, Second Edition, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2001,

pp. 1-2).

7

sometimes one Set present themselves,

and at other times another, the first

being out of sight. Hence the various

Purposes or Inclinations that

alternatively prevail, and the

Uncertainty that perplexes us.®

The basic logic of Franklin’s advice—that pros

and cons should be described and compared to one

another in making decisions—applies in the case of

important environmental and other government

regulatory decisions. Indeed, this basic logic and the

increase in the importance of environmental, health

and safety regulation cver the past three decades

has led all presidents since President Carter in 1978

to establish formal procedures - requiring the

preparation of benefit-cost assessments for various

federal regulations. President Carter issued

Executive Order 12044 in 1978 to require federal

agencies to conduct detailed regulatory analyses of

certain proposed rules. President Reagan’s 1981

Executive Order 12291 required agencies to evaluate

the costs and benefits of all major future rules.'° The

first President Bush continued Executive Order

12291 when he took office in 1989.

In 1993, President Clinton issued Executive

Order 12866, which also required that agencies

compare the benefits and costs of major rulemakings

and set guidelines for using the results of these

assessments in regulatory decision making.'! The

* Id.

* 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (1978)

10 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981)

11 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993)

8

current President Bush continued Executive Order

12866 with relatively minor changes although in

2007 he issued Executive Order 13422 that required

agencies to consider the need for and consequences

of regulatory “guidance” (i.e., agency interpretation

or policy on a regulatory issue that is generally non-

binding).!2

These executive orders have emphasized the

importance of balancing costs and benefits and

maximizing the net benefits (i.e., benefits minus

costs) in setting regulations. Executive Order 12866

requires that agencies “propose or adopt a regulation

only upon a reasoned determination that the

benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs.”!%

The similarity in the language of these executive

orders across decades indicates the bipartisan

support for comparing benefits and costs in making

regulatory decisions. President Reagan’s Executive

Order 12291 stated that,

Regulatory action should not be

undertaken unless’ the potential

benefits to socicty for the regulation

outweigh the potential costs to society

... Regulatory objectives shall be chosen

to maximize the net benefits. to

society. '4

In a similar vein, President Clinton’s Executive

Order 12866 notes that,

1272 Fed. Reg. 2,763 (2007)

19 58 Fed. Reg. 51,736 (1993)

446 Fed. Reg. 13.193 (1981)

9

In deciding whether and how to

regulate, agencies should assess all

costs and benefits of available

regulatory alternatives, including the

alternative of not regulating ... Further,

in choosing among alternative

regulatory approaches, agencies should

select those approaches that maximize

net benefits . . . unless a _ statute

requires another regulatory approach.'§

All presidents since Jimmy Carter have

emphasized the importance of weighing benefits and

costs in making regulatory decisions concerning the

environment and other areas. Indeed, a prominent

legal scholar writing in 2000 concluded that the

nation was nearing the end of a “first generation”

debate about balancing benefits and costs through

the development of benefit-cost “default principles”. '6

In this context, he argued, the issue of whether

benefit-cost analysis should be allowed to assist in

sound decision making has been resolved, with

“second generation” issues including details of how

to implement the benefit-cost methodologies.

The practical assessment of benefits and costs

has been furthered by detailed guidance on how it

can be applied in ervironmental regulatory settings.

KPA has provided important guidelines for assessing

benefits and costs, first in 1983 and more recently in

18 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993)

‘6 Cass Sunstein. Cost-Benefit Default Principles, AEI-

Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper

00-7 (2000).

10

2000.'? These guidelines provide detailed guidance

on the key concepts involved in implementing such

assessments. The EPA Guidelines were thoroughly

reviewed by the Environmental Economics Advisory

Committee of EPA’s Science Advisory Board,

comprised of thirteen well-recognized economists.

The Office of Management and Budget has

developed similar guidelines.!®

In summary, carefully considering the social

benefits and social costs of a given regulatory

decision makes good sense, as presidents over the

last three decades have recognized. Economists and

other analysts have developed methods for making

these assessments that fall under the general label

of benefit-cost analysis. Benefit-cost assessments do

not provide “answer machines” but rather provide a

useful framework for evaluation of regulatory

alternatives. As Franklin’s early example makes

clear, this framework is particularly important when

the factors involved are complicated and numerous.

B. A Group of Economists Has Developed

Consensus on the Use of Benefit-Cost .

Assessments for Environmental

Regulation

There is a wide consensus among economists on

various fundamental principles regarding the

assessment of benefits and costs. In 1996, a group of

distinguished economists assembled to develop

principles for assessing benefits and costs in

'7 EPA, Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses (2000).

18 Office of Management and Budget. Circular A-4 to the Heads

of Executive Agencies and Establishments. (Sept. 17 2003).

11

environmental, health and safety regulation. The

resulting Statement of Principles was published

jointly by the American Enterprise Institute, the

Annapolis Center, and Resources for the Future.!9

These same principles can inform what we

believe to be the appropriate use of benefit-cost

comparisons in making decisions under Section

316(b)..The following is a summary of principles that

we believe underlie the appropriate use of benefit-

cost comparisons in making decisions under this

section.”°

Benefit-cost assessments provide a useful means

of organizing a comparison of the favorable and

unfavorable effects of proposed policies. Systematic

comparisons of benefits and costs can help decision

makers better understand the implications of

various decisions. Such comparisons can provide

useful estimates of the overall benefits and costs of

19 Kenneth J. Arrow, Maureen L. Cropper, George C. Eads,

Robert W. Hahn, Lester B. Lave, Roger G. Noll, Paul R.

Portney, Milton Russell, Richard Schmalensee, V. Kerry Smith,

and Robert N. _ Stavins. Benefit-Cost Analysis in

Environmental, Health, and Satety Regulation: A Statement of

Principles. American Enterprise Institute, The Annapolis

Center, and Resources for the Future (1996). A similar statement

was published in Science magazine, Kenneth J. Arrow, Maureen L.

Cropper, George C. Eads, Robert W. Hahn, Lester B. Lave, Roger G.

Noll, Paul R. Portney, Milton Russell, Richard Schmalensee, V. Kerry

Smith, and Robert N. Stavins 7st There a@ Role for Benefit-Cost Analysis

in Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulation?. Science (Apr. 12,

1996) pp 221-222.

20 These principles also draw on similar ideas put forth in an

Amicus brief filed with this court in 2000. Brief Amici Curiae

for AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies in

Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. 457

(2001).

12

proposed decisions. In many _ cases,’ these

comparisons cannot be used to prove that the

economic benefits of a particular decision will exceed

or fall short of the costs because of uncertainties

involved. But comparisons of benefits and costs can

play an important role in informing the decision

process even when the results are not conclusive.

Agencies should not be bound by a strict benefit-

cost test, but should be allowed to consider available

estimates of benefits and costs. There may be factors

other than economic benefits and costs that agencies

will want to weigh in decisions, such as equity

within and across generations.

It is important to compare the benefits and costs

of a proposed regulatory requirement not only to the

status quo but also to alternative regulatory

approaches and levels of stringency that could be

adopted. Systematic review of benefits and costs can

often identify opportunities to modify proposed

requirements in ways that increase benefits at

relatively low cost or reduce costs substantially with

little loss in benefits.

The scale of the benefit-cost assessment should

be related to the importance of the decision. The

scale of the assessment should depend on both the

stakes involved and the likelihood that the resulting

information wil affect the ultimate decision.

Not all impacts of a decision can be quantified or

expressed in dollar terms. Care should be taken to

ensure that quantitative factors do not dominate

qualitative factors in decision making. A common

critique of benefit-cost comparisons is that they do

not emphasize factors that are not easily quantified

13

or monetized. That critique has merit. There are two

principal ways to address it: first, quantify as many

factors as reasonable and quantify or characterize

the relevant uncertainties; and second, give due

consideration to factors that defy quantification but

are thought to be important.

CONCLUSION

We believe that this case provides the Court with

an important opportunity to provide for sound

decision making in_- environmental matters.

Systematic comparisons of benefits and costs have

been important elements of government decision

making in_- environmental matters—including

§316(b) of the Clean Water Act—for many decades.

We believe that decisions on environmental matters

should be based upon a full assessment of benefits

and costs, taking into account elements that cannot

be quantified as well as uncertainties regarding

various costs and benefits. This information will

permit the appropriate balancing of benefits and

costs in key environmental decisions.

Respectfully Submitted,

Robert E. Litan

Counsel of Record

Brookings Institution

1775 Massachusetts Ave, NW

Wash, DC 20036

202 797 6120

14

LIST OF AMICI CURIAE

Kenneth Arrow

Professor of Economics Emeritus, Stanford

University

Wilham J. Baumol

Professor of Economics Emeritus, Princeton

University

Academic Director, Berkley Center for

Entrepreneurial Studies, New York University

Jagdish Bhagwati

University Professor, Economics and Law, Columbia

University

Michael J. Boskin

T.M. Friedman Professor of Economics and Hoover

Institution Senior Fellow, Stanford University

Former Chairman, President's Council of Economic

Advisers

Robert Crandall

Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution

Maureen L. Cropper

Professor of Economics, University of Maryland

Michael Greenstone

3M _ Professor of Environmental Economics,

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution

Robert W. Hahn

Executive Director, Center for Regulatory and

Market Studies and Senior Fellow, AEI

15

David Harrison, Jr.

Senior Vice President, National Economic Research

Associates

Former Senior Staff, President's Council of Economic

Advisers

R. Glenn Hubbard

Dean and Russell L. Carson Professor of Finance

and Economics, Graduate School of Business,

Columbia University

Former Chairman, President’s Council of Economic

Advisers

Alfred E. Kahn

Robert Julius Thorne Professor of Political Economy

Emeritus, Cornell University

Former Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board

Lester B. Lave

University -Professor and Higgins Professor of

Economics, Carnegie Mellon University

Former Member, EPA Advisory Council on Clean Air

Compliance Analysis

Robert Litan

Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution

Paul McAvoy

Wiliams Brothers Professor of Management Studies

Emeritus, Yale School of Management, Yale

University

Former Member, President's Council of Economic

Advisers

16

James C. Miller, III

Former Director, Office of Management and Budget

First Administrator, Office of Information and

Regulatory Affairs

Albert L. Nichols

Vice President, National Economic Research

Associates ,

Former Director, Economic Analysis Division, EPA

William A. Niskanen

Chairman, Cato Institute

Former Member, President’s Council of Economic

Advisers

Roger G. Noll

Professor of Economics Emeritus, Stanford

University

Wallace E. Oates |

Professor of Economics, University of Maryland

University Fellow, Resources for the Future

Peter Passell

Senior Fellow, Milken Institute

Sam Peltzman

Ralph and Dorothy Keller Distinguished Service

Professor Emeritus of Economics, Graduate

School of Business, University of Chicago

Paul R. Portney

Dean, Eller College of Management, University of

Arizona

Former Chief Economist, President’s Council on

Environmental Quality

17

Harvey S. Rosen

John L. Weinberg Professor of Economics and

Business Policy, Princeton University

Former Chairman, President's Council of Economic

Advisers

Milton Russell

Senior Fellow, Institute for a Secure and Sustainable

Environment

Professor Emeritus, Department of Economics,

University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Thomas C. Schelling

Distinguished University Professor Emeritus,

University of Maryland

Nobel Laureate in Economics

Richard Schmalensee

Howard W. Johnson Professor of Management and

Economics, Massachusetts Institute of

Technology

Former Member, President’s Council of Economic

Advisers

Charles L. Schultze

Senior Fellow Emeritus, Brookings Institution

Former Chairman, President's Council of Economic

Advisers

V. Kerry Smith

W.P. Carey Professor of Economics, W.P. Carey

School of Business, Arizona State University

18

Vernon L. Smith

Professor of Economics and Law, Chapman

University

Nobel Laureate in Economics

Robert N. Stavins

Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government,

John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard

University

Former Chairman, EPA Environmental Economics

Advisory Committee

Kip Viscusi

University Distinguished Professor of Law,

Economics and Management, Vanderbilt

University

Murray Weidenbaum

Edward Mallinckrodt Distinguished University

Professor, Washington University, St. Louis

Former Chairman, President's Council of Economic

Advisers

Lawrence J. White

Professor of Economics, Stern School of Business,

New York University

Richard Zeckhauser

Frank P. Ramsey Professor of Political Economy,

John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard

University