Opposition Brief — Utility Water Water Act Group Group v. Riverkeeper, Inc. (Nos. 07-597, 07-588, 07-589)
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Nos. 07-588, 07-589 & 07-597 _
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F THE CLERK
Supreme Court o of th ‘the Hniten States’ ASAT OS.
ENTERGY CORPORATION, Petitioner,
V.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.,
Respondents.
>
PSEG FOSSIL LLC AND PSEG NUCLEAR LLC,
Petitioners,
V.
RIVERKEEPER, INC., ET AL., Respondents.
o
UTILITY WATE! ACT GROUP, Petitioner,
V.
RIVERKEEPER, INC., ET AL., Respondents.
¢
On Petitions For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Second Circuit
¢
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION FOR THE STATES OF
RHODE ISLAND, CONNECTICUT, DELAWARE,
NEW JERSEY, NEW YORK AND THE
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
e
PATRICK C. LYNCH
Attorney General of Rhode Island
TRICIA O’HARE JEDELE
Special Assistant Attorney General
Counsel of Record
150 South Main Street
Providence, RI 02903
(401) 274-4400, Ext. 2400
{Additional Counsel For The States Listed On Inside Cover]
COCKLE LAW BRIFF PRINTING CO (800) 225.6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL
Attorney General of Connecticut
KIMBERLY MASSICOTTE
MATTHEW LEVINE
Assistant Attorneys General
P.O. Box 120
55 Elm Street
Hartford, CT 06141-0120
(860) 808-5250
JOSEPH R. BIDEN III
Attorney General of Delaware
KEVIN MALONEY
Deputy Attorney General
820 N. French Street, 6th Floor
Wilmington, DE 19801
(302) 577-8327
MARTHA COAKLEY
Attorney General of Massachusetts
ANDREW GOLDBERG
Assistant Attorney General
1 Ashburton Place, 18th Floor
Boston, MA 02108
(617) 727-2200
ANNE MILGRAM
Attorney General of New Jersey
ELLEN BARNEY BALINT
Deputy Attorney General
P.O. Box 093
25 Market Street
Trenton, NJ 08625-0093
(609) 984-5065
ANDREW M. CUOMO
Attorney General of New York
MAUREEN F. LEARY
Assistant Attorney General
THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION BUREAU
DENISE A. HARTMAN
Assistant Solicitor General
The Capitol
Albany, 12224
(518) 474-7154
ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Whether the Second Circuit, consistent with
the opinions of other circuit courts, correctly
interpreted the plain language of the Clean Water Act
to preclude the use of a cost-benefit analysis as the
basis for the Environmental Protection Agency’s “best
technology available” determination under section
316(b), and properly remanded the Phase II rule for
further explanation of the cost considerations relied
upon by the Environmental Protection Agency in
setting the technology standards.
2. Whether the Second Circuit, consistent with
the opinions of other circuit courts, correctly
interpreted the plain language of the Clean Water Act
to preclude the provisions of Phase II rule that allow
existing power plants to comply with section 316(b)
by substituting restoration measures for technology
at the cooling water intake, and properly remanded
the restoration provisions to the Environmental
Protection Agency.
3. Whether the Second Circuit, consistent with
the opinions of other circuit courts, correctly decided
that the technology requirement in section 316(b) of
the Clean Water Act applies to both new and existing
facilities, and that those requirements may be
implemented through discharge permits.
il
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Se I ic sien icessecsneiinlinidaiehanionibanenned i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................ccccccccsseeeese iii
TTT iicicsiueisiclicenniiciahsinnaisisuliiinbatiniinipiniiiatiauniaatiiiees 2
Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act.................... 2
Pe ye iiciicnicccniicgsstainietnisniatiniaeinmiinenenitanne 3
The Second Circuit’s Decision in Riverkeeper I1..... 5
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITIONSG..... 10
I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF RIVERKEEPER
II IS UNCERTAIN BECAUSE EPA IS
RECONSIDERING THE PHASE II RULE
Fe Ne ie dosemecssenonnssconsonsnncntnsneninimiesee 11
Il. RIVERKEEPER II IS A ROUTINE
APPLICATION OF ESTABLISHED
PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY
ED iicinisccsscuicncnineneneebenitimenuns 14
III secs cccisisccatavevdscctuiehccbnsebecnenies 14
TN iscwsinstidasecasesciitaceniiinnsiitaieibniiaiindstinhimssaitiiaibieii 18
Application to Existing Facilities................ 20
Ill. THERE IS NO SPLIT IN THE CIRCUIT
COURTS ON ANY OF THE ISSUES
RAISED BY INDUSTRY PETITIONERS .. 22
The Cost-Benefit Analysis ......................006 22
Ia icici ints diccuhiesasincssipctonenidisniiathaisigsiniitndin 26
I ar innaeinieeietatigaenlalel 27
ee iiatapinieduenininnasevsnsineniatisearnvsucmnigeniiia 30
lil
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
American Corn Growers Ass’n v. EPA, 291 F.3d
ee nid ricci niinsinicciesepiatiliibiaitiniditendianseniondin 25
American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc.
v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981)...................08.. 16, 17
Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351
I UN, CITI iinet ee pa daaaiatrhiniiiiimaaniatied 28
Bowen v. American Hospital Ass'n, 476 U.S.
ET oe eT TT nen 12
BP Exploration & Oil, Inc. v. U.S.E.PA., 66
Pe IG SEITE cercecceccnsnvexsnessnnscnmvenstined 24, 25
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 8237
aaa aca ileal italiane 8, 14, 17, 18, 21
Cronin v. Browner, 90 F.Supp.2d 364 (S.D.N_Y.
Sa iiiiliiiiadelideieiinaeinsibiapininiendapaddbenedieinaceniaeaidiidoaabes 2,21
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430
| __ RERAR IT Sre ea atee Nephew TORE 28
EPA v. National Crushed Stone Association,
Se SN I i cicineniesinicncmiteinnibansabeieabadiiinie 23, 25
Gulf Restoration Network v. United States
Department of Transportation, 452 F.3d 362
as aes 25
Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200
sr atlitahiesniahicinconcacianetiaiaciinaaniaseabeaasnisacakoiibidbbienitailiddanies 17
Kennecott v. United States EPA, 780 F.2d 445
RE Ree Ra eae TRE ea er eR 16
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued
Page
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA,
GE TB BOG CEAG. GER BG dancecccccnescncesssntscstevcssonsn 16
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA,
860 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1968)...........ccccccscoscccssccsceeee 29
Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 174 (2d Cir.
RIED cnccesctssnrcccnsnsinnsiasasinniastaiuidinciamaaalaal passim
Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 475 F.3d 83 (2d Cir.
BIUIEEY PD ccncicnscinssovcanseustansianssaieiinbinsdinaimmamnaiaa passim
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983)............ 17
Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 597
ees CE GE Pe incicrecccnssivtinniniinaiuain 22, 23, 26
United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822
CUE SL EG OP cicccvenicesiincssnenictiniiataaamaee 25, 28
Virginia Electric Power Co. v. Costle, 566 F.2d
GE CGR GR Be OP cecescecttcieniieamee 28, 29
Weyerhauser v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir.
SITE cvssnnscesutinesienietntnisitapapneansesipentiniieuiaaaaae 24, 25
Whitman v. American Trucking Association,
we BR EF of . | Seen nn 17
OTHER DECISIONS
ConocoPhillips, et al. v. EPA, No. 06-60662
(and consolidated cases) (5th Cir. 2006)...............0.. 3
Vv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued
Page
STATUTES
i carisciarcnnctnscndntuonscnconsn 2,6, 24, 28
So te WII BIND s snccceseccovecescoccccvscovscnnasesconoceesees 7
Be le MII ccccccccccosascocesccccccsecceoscsoncoces 7, 23
aise ccnteneneesponsnncnnnnnte 24
Be Ss SPIE BP accccscnsccscoscecoesssvccnsccsccsseoaces 7, 23
ee IED oc csccccvnccccnsccnessevencececsescesousons 7
ET 2, 6, 24, 28
SE passim
CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
I ss ccinctpsiaseineaiion 2
I sid cpseiaeiinintinnal 4
FEDERAL REGISTER
66 Fed. Reg. 65,256 (Dec. 18, 2001)..............0cccccceeeeeees 2
69 Fed. Reg. 41,576 (July 9, 2004)..............00..... 3, 4, 19
71 Fed. Reg. 35,006 (June 16, 2006)..................00000000.. 3
72 Fed. Reg. 37,107 (July 9, 2007)..................0680. 11, 13
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Webster’s Third New Int'l Dictionary 1438
aac aesssemisinasncnndnensinnn 20
1
RESPONDENT STATES’
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
The States of Rhode Island, Connecticut, Delaware,
New Jersey, and New York and the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts submit this brief in opposition to the
certiorari petitions filed by Entergy Corporation,
Utility Water Act Group (“UWAG”), and PSEG Fossil
LLC and PSEG Nuclear LLC (“Industry Petitioners”)
seeking review of the unanimous decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit.. The Second Circuit invalidated and
remanded various aspects of a rule promulgated by
the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”) to regulate cooling water intake structures at
certain power plants under the federal Clean Water
Act. The Industry Petitioners unsuccessfully sought
rehearing and consideration en banc below. EPA did
not seek rehearing in the Second Circuit and has not
sought this Court’s review. Instead, EPA reopened its
rulemaking proceedings to address the remanded
provisions identified by the Second Circuit. The
States submit this brief as a consolidated opposition
to the petitions.
‘ Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 475 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2007)
(“Riverkeeper IT”), App. la-94a (all references to “App.” are to
Petitioner Entergy’s Appendix).
2
STATEMENT
Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act
When cooling water intake structures at existing
power plants withdraw significant amounts of water
from associated water bodies, they impinge and
entrain large quantities of fish and fish larvae. This
can have severe consequences on aquatic life and
ecosystems. Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act
directs EPA to establish technology requirements for
these intake structures at power plants that use
water to cool their electricity-generating equipment.
In a single sentence, section 316(b) provides that
“[alny standard established pursuant to section 301
or section 306 of this Act and applicable to a point
source shall require that the location, design,
construction, and capacity of cooling water intake
structures reflect the best technology available for
minimizing adverse environmental impact.” 33 U.S.C.
§1326(b), App. 112a-13a. In other words, discharge
permits and other standards applicable to new and
existing point sources should also control intake
structures with technology-based requirements.
In 1995, EPA entered a consent decree requiring
it to create regulations to implement section 316(b).
The consent decree, as amended, required EPA to
draft the regulations in three phases.” Phase I of the
* See Cronin v. Browner, 90 F.Supp.2d 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2000);
Phase | (new electricity generating facilities), 66 Fed. Reg.
65,256 (Dec. 18, 2001), codified at 40 CFR. Section 125.80
3
rulemaking, which applied to cooling water intake
structures at new facilities, was challenged in the
Second Circuit by environmental groups and various
industry petitioners. The Second Circuit upheld most
of the Phase I rule, but remanded EPA’s restoration
provision, which allowed power plants to use
restoration measures in lieu of technology, as “plainly
inconsistent with the statute’s text.” Niverkeeper, Inc.
v. EPA (“Riverkeeper I”), 358 F.3d 174, 181, 189 (2d
Cir. 2004). Riverkeeper I was not appealed, and, is
final. Riverkeeper II and the pending industry
petitions for certiorari concern Phase II of the EPA
rulemaking. In 2006, EPA promulgated Phase III of
the rule, which is not the subject of this challenge.
The Phase II rule
EPA issued its final rule pursuant to the second
phase of the consent decree on July 9, 2004 (“the
Phase II rule”). The Phase II rule is a unique agency
rule designed to implement section 316(b), and is
limited in its application to one specific activity — the
intake of water at structures used at power plants
et seq., see Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 174, 189-91 (2d Cir.
2004) (“Riverkeeper I”); Phase II (electric power plants built
before 2002 that withdraw over 50 million gallons per day of
cooling water), 69 Fed. Reg. 41,583, codified at 40 C.F.R. Pts. 9,
122-25, see Riverkeeper II; and, Phase III (existing power plants
and industrial facilities not subject to Phase II), 71 Fed. Reg.
35,006 (June 16, 2006), codified at 40 C.F.R. Section 125,
Subpart N, see ConocoPhillips, et al. v. EPA, No. 06-60662 (and
consolidated cases) (5th Cir. 2006).
4
<— built before 2002 that withdraw 50 million gallons of
water per day or more, of which at least twenty-five
percent is used for cooling. See Final Regulations to
Establish Requirements for Cooling Water Intake
Structures at Phase II Existing Facilities, 69 Fed.
Reg. 41,576 (July 9, 2004) (codified at 40 C.F.R. Pts.
9, 122-25), App. 122a-540a. Riverkeeper II is the first
decision to address section 316(b) regulations as
applied to existing facilities.
The Phase II rule identified various options for
power plants to meet the statute’s requirement that the
plants use the “best technology available to minimize
adverse environmental impacts.” 33 U.S.C. §1326(b),
App. 112a-13a. EPA then used these selected methods
to establish performance standards keyed to required
percentage reductions in fish kills associated with
intake structures.’ The Phase II rule provided existing
facilities with five separate options to demonstrate
compliance with the performance standards established
in the rule. See 40 C.F.R. §125.94(a), App. 555a. While it
does not require existing power plants to install closed
cycle cooling systems, the Phase II rule provides that
the installation of a closed cycle cooling system or one
that reduces inflow commensurate with such a cooling
system will be considered in compliance with the rule.
* The Phase II rule establishes as a national performance
standard reduction of impingement mortality for all life stages
of fish and shellfish by 80 to 95 percent. Certain facilities are
also required to reduce entrainment for all life stages of fish and
shellfish by 60 to 90 percent.
5
Alternatively, facilities can comply with the rule by
installing one or more of a “suite” of technologies —
including fine- and wide-mesh wedgewire screens,
aquatic filter barrier systems, barrier nets, and fish
return systems — that meet national performance
standards. Several of the compliance options allow a
facility to meet the national performance standards
through the use of restoration measures, such as
improving the habitat surrounding the intake
structure. Riverkeeper IT, 475 F.3d at 108, App. 13a-14a.
Each of the compliance options in the rule was
either based on EPA’s “best technology available”
determination, which was remanded, or on EPA’s
authorization of the use of restoration measures to
meet the standard, which was rejected and
remanded. While EPA addresses the Second Circuit’s
remand order and until it promulgates a new Phase
II rule consistent with Riverkeeper II, none of the
complie..ce options identified in the rule are
presently operative.
The Second Circuit’s Decision in Riverkeeper II
In Riverkeeper II, the States, environmental
groups, and Industry Petitioners challenged various
aspects of the Phase II rule. In that context, the
Second Circuit’s opinion addressed a number of issues.
Industry Petitioners seek to raise three of those issues
again here. Specifically, Industry Petitioners seek
review of the Second Circuit’s conclusions regarding:
6
(i) the cost-benefit analysis EPA used to select the
“best technology available” (“BTA”); (ii) EPA’s
authorization of the use of restoration methods in lieu
of BTA; and (iii) whether section 316(b) applies to
existing facilities, and, in turn, whether it can be
implemented through the Clean Water Act’s pollution
discharge provisions.
As to whether costs may be considered by EPA in
selecting the “best technology available” for cooling
water intakes, the Second Circuit did not hold that
costs are irrelevant to a BTA determination. Rather,
the court held that an ordinary interpretation of
section 316(b) “does not permit the EPA to choose
BTA on the basis of cost-benefit analysis.” Riverkeeper
II, 475 F.3d at 101, App. 29a. The Second Circuit
agreed with EPA that the cross-reference to sections
301 and 306 “invites EPA to consider those sections
when establishing BTA for cooling water intake
systems.” Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 97, citing
Riverkeeper I, 358 F.3d at 186, App. 20a. The court’s
review of section 316(b), therefore, was “informed by
the two provisions it cross-references, CWA sections
301 and 306.” See Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 102,
citing Riverkeeper I, 358 F.3d at 195, App. 20a (the
court explaining that, “[slection 301 sets forth a
framework under which limitations on the discharge
of pollutants from existing sources would become
more stringent over time.”)
Section 301 of the Clean Water Act provides that
all effluent discharge limitations established before
March 31, 1989, require the application of the “best
7
practicable control technology currently available”
(“BPT”). See 33 U.S.C. §1311(b)\(1)(A), App. 97a. BPT
determinations were to be made by the Administrator
of EPA in consideration of factors referenced in
section 304(b)(1)(B) of the Clean Water Act. See 33
U.S.C. §1314(b\1)(B), App. 105a. In contrast, all
effluent limitations established for point sources after
March 31, 1989, were to apply “the best available
technology economically achievable ... , which will
result in the reasonable further progress toward the
national goal of eliminating the discharge of all
pollutants (“BAT”).” See 33 U.S.C. §1311(b)(2)(A),
App. 98a-99a. The statute directs that BAT
determinations are to be made by the Administrator
of EPA in consideration of factors referenced in section
304(b\(2)(B). Section 304 identifies one set of factors to
be considered for technology determinations for existing
facilities pre-1989, and those factors allow for a
comparison between costs and benefits. It identifies an
entirely separate set of factors to be considered for
technology determinations for existing facilities post-
1989, and those factors conspicuously do not include
the factor requiring a cost to benefit analysis, and
instead list only the factor of cost. See 33 U.S.C.
§1314(bX2)(B), App. 106a-07a.
With this framework in mind, the court held “the
EPA’s interpretation of section 316(b) problematic
because its construction significantly resembles the
less stringent, now obsolete, BPT standard of section
301(b)1A).” Riverkeeper Ii, 475 F.3d at 102, citing
Riverkeeper I, 358 F.3d at 195, App. 30a. Ultimately,
8
the court rejected the cost-benefit analysis because it
was precluded both by the plain language of section
316(b) and by the plain language of the cross-
referenced sections. In any event, the Second Circuit
could not discern EPA's basis for its BTA selection in
either the language of the Phase II rule itself or the
administrative record. Thus, the Second Circuit
remanded the Phase II rule to EPA to clarify the role
and extent that any cost-benefit analysis, or other
cost considerations played in EPAs BTA
determination. Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 103, App.
33a (“it is unclear whether the Agency improperly
weighed the benefits and the costs of requiring
closed-cycle cooling. ... Given the above indications
that the EPA engaged in a cost-benefit analysis, we
remand for the EPA to explain its conclusions.”) In
light of the remand, the practical significance of the
Court’s rejection of EPA’s cost-benefit analysis, and
the effect, if any, that the opinion will have on EPA’s
BTA determination is unclear.
Riverkeeper II also invalidated the restoration
provisions in the Phase II rule, and remanded those
provisions to EPA. The Second Circuit reached the
conclusion that restoration measures are not
authorized by section 316(b) in step-one of the
Chevron analysis. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
The court found first that language in section 316(b)
established nexus between certain characteristics of
the intake structure and the selected technology. See
Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 109, quoting Riverkeeper I,
9
358 F.3d at 189, App. 46a-47a (“[rjestoration measures
are not part of the location, design, construction, or
capacity of cooling water intake structures.”) The court
also found that the statute’s use of the word “minimize”
precluded the use of “mitigation” to satisfy the
technology requirement with after-the-fact restoration
measures. Id. (discussing that Webster’s dictionary
defines “minimize” as meaning to reduce to the smallest
extent possible.) Thus, the Second Circuit rejected the
restoration provisions in the rule, because “EPA
impermissibly construed [an unambiguous] statute by
allowing compliance with section 316(b) via
restoration measures,” such as restocking fish killed
by a cooling water intake structure. Riverkeeper I],
475 F.3d at 108-10, App. 43a-50a; see also Riverkeeper
I, 358 F.3d at 189. The court remanded this aspect of
the Phase II rule to EPA as well.
Finally, based on a plain reading of section 316(b)
and the opinions of its sister circuit courts on this
point, the Second Circuit rejected Industry Petitioners’
argument that section 316(b) is not applicable to
existing facilities, and further held that EPA could
reasonably choose to implement section 316(b)
requirements through discharge permits. Riverkeeper II,
475 F.3d at 122, App. 74a (“given the cross-references in
section 316(b) to provisions governing both new and
existing facilities, the EPA’s reading is far more
reasonable than Entergy’s.”)
°
10
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITIONS
There are no compelling reasons to grant
the petitions. First, the Second Circuit properly
remanded the Phase II rule to EPA for further
consideration. Significantly, EPA is _ actively
addressing the Second Circuit’s remand order,
and thus, the reach and import of the opinion in
Riverkeeper II is unclear with respect to the question
of whether EPA’s cost analysis will affect its BTA
determination. Moreover, and, importantly, the fact
that EPA did not seek either rehearing or an en banc
consideration before the Second Circuit, and has not
petitioned for certiorari, reflects the United States’
judgment that the Second Circuit’s decision does not
merit review at this time.
Second, Riverkeeper II is the first decision to
construe the technology requirement set forth in
section 316(b) as it relates to cooling water intake
structures at existing facilities. The court used accepted
and usual principles of statutory construction to reject
EPA’s outdated cost-benefit analysis; to reject the use
of restoration measures as a substitute for technology-
forcing standards applied at the intake, and to
conclude that section 316(b) applies to existing
facilities as well as to new.
Finally, the decision in Riverkeeper II is not in
conflict with any other circuit court or with this Court
on any issue raised in the petitions. No other court
has construed this language differently. Indeed, all
of the conclusions reached in Riverkeeper II are
11
consistent with section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act,
consistent with other circuit court opinions and
consistent with the precedents of this Court.
For these reasons, this case does not warrant
consideration by this Court.
I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF RIVERKEEPER
II IS UNCERTAIN BECAUSE EPA IS
RECONSIDERING THE PHASE II RULE
ON REMAND.
The Second Circuit properly remanded the Phase
II rule to EPA, and significantly, EPA neither sought
rehearing, or consideration en banc below, nor has it
filed its own certiorari petition here. Instead, EPA
suspended the Phase II rule, almost in its entirety,
while it “considers how to address the remanded
issues.” 72 Fed. Reg. 37,107/2 (July 9, 2007).
The Second Circuit’s remand was proper with
respect to EPA’s BTA and EPA’s authorization of the
use of restoration measures. With respect to EPA’s
BTA determination, the primary basis for the Second
Circuit's remand was that it properly could not
review EPA’s selection of compliance options because
both EPA’s explanation for its underlying BTA
determination in the rule, and the administrative
record itself lacked the information needed to review
12
the rule.‘ Thus, the Second Circuit remanded these
central cost provisions of the Phase II rule to EPA.
See Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 101-05, App. 28a-38a.
The Second Circuit explained that EPA has the
“correlative responsibility to explain the rationale
and factual basis for its decision, even though we
show respect for the agency’s judgment in both.” Jd.
at 104, citing Bowen v. American Hospital Ass’n, 476
U.S. 610, 627 (1986), App. 35a. Absent such an
explanation here, the Second Circuit directed EPA to
provide “either a reasoned explanation of its decision
or a new determination of BTA based on permissible
considerations.” Jd. at 130, App. 93a; see also id. at
105, App. 37a (Second Circuit suggesting that, “EPA
in reconsidering its selection of BTA on remand may
alter the suite of technologies it originally selected.”)
Thus, the result of the cost analysis that EPA will
perform in determining BTA, and whether the
resulting BTA determination will change is uncertain.
* Riverkeeper IT, 475 F.3d at 101 (“the record is unclear as to
the basis for the EPA's selection of the suite of technologies as
BTA... .”); id. at 104 (“In a technical area of this sort, it is
difficult for judges or interested parties to determine the
propricty of the Agency’s action without a justification for the
action supported by clearly identified substantial evidence
whose import is explained. The record evidence alone here, . . . is
oblique, complicated, and insufficient to permit us to determine
what the EPA relied upon in reaching its conclusion ”); id. (“The
EPA was required to explain its judgment and the basis for it. It
did not do so here.”) (“In short the EPA's failure to explain its
decision frustrates effective judicial review.”) (Emphasis added),
App. 28a-36a.
13
With respect to the use of restoration, the Second
Circuit correctly found the provisions of the Phase II
rule that allowed facilities to comply with BTA
requirements through after-the-fact attempts to
restore already degraded water resources, to be
inconsistent with the plain meaning of section 316(b).
Still, the Second Circuit remanded the restoration
provisions to be rewritten consistent with its decision.
While Riverkeeper II makes it clear that EPA
cannot employ a cost-benefit analysis to determine
BTA, or allow existing facilities to the use restoration
measures in lieu of technology at the intake, to what
degree or how these findings will affect EPA’s final
BTA determination is unclear. Only when the remand
considerations are final, and the regulatory process
complete, will the new requirements of the Phase II
rule be potentially applicable to existing facilities.
Only *hen, therefore, will the practical effect of the
Second Circuit’s decision on states, regulatory
agencies, and permitted facilities be known.
Moreover, EPA has acknowledged that it “is
precluded from applying the rule unless and until it
takes further action to address the decision,” stating
directly, “[t]hus, today’s action simply effectuates the
legal status quo....” 72 Fed. Reg. 37,107/3. Until
EPA addresses the remand issues and promulgates a
new final Phase II rule in response to the remand,
Industry Petitioners are in the same position as a
regulated community as they were before the Phase
II rule was issued — as are the States. Jd. (EPA
directing that “until the Agency has considered and
14
resolved the issues raised by the Second Circuit's
remand(,] [plermit requirements for cooling water
intake structures at Phase II facilities should be
established on a case-by-case best professional
judgment (BPJ) basis.”) Thus, the Phase II rule is in
flux, and should not now be reviewed by this Court.
In short, prudence and discretion dictate that
EPA be allowed to complete its reassessment of the
cost-based determinations and restoration provisions in
the Phase II rule before additional judicial resources
are used in reviewing the evolving rule. Accordingly,
this case does not merit this Court’s attention.
Il. RIVERKEEPER II IS A ROUTINE
APPLICATION OF ESTABLISHED
PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION.
The decision below involves an unexceptional,
case-specific application of the principles that control
when a court must defer to an agency interpretation.
These guiding principles were articulated by this
Court in Chevron and followed by the Second Circuit
in Riverkeeper Il. See Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 95,
App. 16a (starting its discussion with a _ correct
statement of Chevron’s two-step analysis).
Cost Considerations
In undertaking step-one of the Chevron analysis,
the Second Circuit concluded that section 316(b) is
unambiguous and does not permit EPA to conduct a
15
cost-benefit analysis in determining BTA for cooling
water intake structures. The Second Circuit’s opinion
that a cost-benefit analysis is precluded under a
routine construction of section 316(b) was based, in
the first instance, on the language of section 316(b)
itself, which the court stated, “plainly indicates that
facilities must adopt the best technology available
and that cost-benefit analysis cannot be justified in
light of Congress’ directive.” Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d
at 98-99, App. 2la-26a. The court did not preclude
EPA from all forms of cost consideration,’ but found
nothing in the unique text of section 316(b) itself that
provides EPA with the authority to balance costs and
environmental benefits when selecting BTA.
The Second Circuit also examined the ordinary
meaning of the discharge provisions cross-referenced
in section 316(b), and observed that, in light of the
cross-references its ordinary reading of the
technology standard in_ section 316(b) is also
consistent with the technology-forcing nature of the
discharge provisions. See Riverkeeper I], 475 F.3d at
98-99, App. 23a (“The BTA standard of section 316(b),
.. , iS linguistically similar to the BAT standard of
section 301 and the standard that applies to new
sources under section 306”); see also Riverkeeper II,
* The Second Circuit held that EPA may permissibly
consider costs in two ways: (1) to determine what technology can
be “reasonably borne” by the industry, and, (2) to engage in a
cost-effectiveness analysis in determining BTA. Riverkeeper I],
475 F.3d at 99, App. 22a.
16
475 F.3d at 99-100, citing Kennecott v. United States
EPA, 780 F.2d 445, 448 (4th Cir. 1985), App. 24a-26a
(“In setting BAT, EPA uses not the average plant, but
the optimally operating plant, the pilot plant which
acts as a beacon to show what is possible”); Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 822 F.2d 104,
123 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“The most salient characteristic
of the Clean Water Act’s statutory scheme, articulated
time and again by its architects and embedded in the
statutory language, is that it is technology forcing.”)
The Second Circuit’s construction of the statute
with regard to the cost-benefit analysis does not
break any new ground. Moreover, PSEG exaggerates
the extent to which the Second Circuit relied on this
Court’s decision in American Textile Manufacturers
Institute, Inc. v. Donovan (“Donovan”), 452 U.S. 490
(1981) to conclude that a cost-benefit analysis is not
allowed under section 316(b). Even before referring to
Donovan the court concluded that, “cost benefit
analysis is not ... supported by the language or the
purpose of the statute.” Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 99,
App. 24a. Section 316(b) directs EPA to select the
best available technology for minimizing adverse
environmental impact. The _ technology-forcing
standard established in section 316(b) focuses on
“available” technology and “minimization.” Not
straying from the textual reading of section 316(b),
the Second Circuit turned to this Court’s reasoning in
Donovan and other opinions of this Court to provide
support for the basic construction principle that
Congress knows how to direct an agency to consider
17
costs and benefits. See Donovan, 452 U.S. at 509
(“When Congress has intended that an agency engage
in cost-benefit analysis, it has clearly indicated such
intent on the face of the statute.”) The Second
Circuit’s decision is also consistent with the ordinary
rule of statutory construction that “[w]hen Congress
includes particular language in one section of a
statute but omits it in another section of the same
Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion
or exclusion.”) See Keene Corp. v. United States, 508
U.S. 200, 208 (1993) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S.
16, 23 (1983)).°
The Second Circuit’s conclusion that EPA may
consider costs in a limited fashion when selecting
BTA, but that a cost-benefit analysis is prohibited
under the statute, was reached because the unique
language in section 216(b) calls for the “minimization
of adverse environmental impacts,” and technology-
forcing nature of the sections cross-referenced in
section 316(b) unambiguously reflect Congress’ intent
to do away with the cost-benefit analysis. The court’s
opinion was the result of a textbook application of
ordinary Chevron step-one principles. The Second
* In Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., 531
U.S. 457, 467-68, 121 S.Ct. 903, 909-10 (2001), this Court held
that, “Congress does not alter the fundamental details of a
regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions — it
does not one might say hide elephants in mouseholes.”
18
Circuit’s opinion, on this point, does not warrant this
Court’s review.
Restoration
Section 316(b) provides that the “location, design,
construction, or capacity of cooling water intake
structures” must “reflect the best technology
available for minimizing adverse environmental
impacts.” In concluding that section 316(b) does not
authorize the use of restoration measures as a
substitute for BTA, the Second Circuit again adhered
to a step-one Chevron analysis, holding that
“Congress unambiguously expressed its intent in the
statute.” Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 110, quoting
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, App. 48a
(“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of
the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress.”) Based on a straightforward Chevron
analysis, the court rejected the use of restoration
measures for two reasons: (i) restoration measures
cannot be used to curtail or reduce the impacts
caused by the intake itself, as is required by section
316(b); and (ii) restoration measures do not minimize
impacts, as is required by the statute, but rather are
implemented with the hope that they will mitigate
impacts after they have already occurred.
Industry Petitioners argue that the use of the
word “reflect” in section 316(b) means that the
approved technology does not have to be incorporated
19
into the intake structure itself. From here, Industry
Petitioners imply that because other permissible
technologies, such as barrier nets and cooling towers,
are likewise not part of the intake structure,
restoration measures are no different and should
have been permitted. The Second Circuit addressed
this argument squarely when it was raised by EPA in
Riverkeeper II — the statute is clear, restoration
measures simply are neither related to the intake
characteristics listed in section 316(b), nor do they
constitute technology that minimizes environmental
impact. See Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 110, App. 49a
(“[A] rule permitting compliance with the statute
through restoration measures allows facilities to
avoid adopting any cooling water intake structure
technology at all, in contravention of the Act’s clear
language as well as its technology-forcing principle.”)
Moreover, the Second Circuit observed that it had
decided this very statutory construction issue in
Riverkeeper I with respect to EPA’s regulation of
cooling water intake structures at new facilities:
As we noted in Riverkeeper I, restoration
measures substitute after-the-fact compensation
for adverse environmental impacts that have
already occurred for the minimization of
those impacts in the first instance. The
Agency’s attempt to define the word
“minimize” to include “compensatilon] ...
after the fact,” 69 Fed. Reg. 41,628 is simply
inconsistent with that word’s dictionary
definition: “to reduce to the smallest possible
20
extent,” Webster’s Third New Iat’l Dictionary
1438 (1986).
Riverkeeper Il, 475 F.3d at 110 (emphasis added),
citing Riverkeeper I, 358 F.3d at 189, App. 49a.
After this conventional textual analysis of section
316(b), the Second Circuit unanimously held, consistent
with Riverkeeper I, that “EPA impermissibly construed
the statute by allowing compliance with section
316(b) via restoration measures.” Jd.
Application to Existing Facilities
Entergy suggests that this case presents the
opportunity for this Court to resolve whether an
agency should be given deference when it interprets a
statute that defines the scope of its authority.
Entergy Pet. at 22. The question of whether section
316(b) applies to existing facilities is not a scope of
authority issue — it simply required a straightforward
reading of section 316(b) to determine whether
Congress intended it to apply to existing facilities.
Thus, EPA did not improperly assert, nor did it
attempt to redefine the scope of its authority when it
promulgated the Phase II rule pursuant to section
316(b).
Throughout the Clean Water Act, EPA’s authority
to regulate discharges indisputably extends to new
and existing facilities alike. Indeed, it is well
established that EPA is required by section 316(b) to
promulgate regulations governing cooling water
21
intake structures at existing facilities in Phase II and
III of its rulemaking process. See Cronin v. Browner,
90 F.Supp.2d 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
The Second Circuit rejected Entergy’s argument
that the phrase “location, design, construction, and
capacity,” implicitly limits the applicability of section
316(b) to new facilities. It relied on the textual cross-
references in section 316(b) to provisions that govern
both new and existing facilities to conclude that
section 316(b) articulates a single standard for both
new and existing facilities. Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at
122, App. 74a-75a.
Entergy likewise argues that because section
316(b) neither dictates particular technologies to be
used for cooling water intake structures, nor specifies
a particular mechanism by which EPA is to
implement its technology determinations under
section 316(b), EPA is reaching beyond the scope of its
authority in applying its regulations to existing
facilities. This argument, too, is nothing more than a
challenge to the deference that is afforded to EPA
under step-two of its Chevron analysis. EPA has
imposed intake requirements through discharge
permits and the circuit courts have supported this
implementation mechanism since the inception of the
Clean Water Act.
In short, Riverkeeper II did not address the scope
of EPA’s authority, it addressed the applicability of
section 316(b).
22
Ill. THERE IS NO SPLIT IN THE CIRCUIT
COURTS ON ANY OF THE ISSUES RAISED
BY INDUSTRY PETITIONERS.
Industry Petitioners argue that the Second
Circuit’s opinion in Riverkeeper II conflicts with the
decisions of other circuit courts on three issues:
whether section 316(b) precludes a cost-benefit analysis
in determining BTA; whether section 316(b) sanctions
the use of restoration measures as a substitute for
technology-forcing standards; and whether section
316(b) applies to existing facilities, and in turn, can
be implemented through discharge permits.
The Cost-Benefit Analysis
Industry Petitioners assert that the Second
Circuit’s opinion disregards a longstanding practice to
allow cost-benefit analysis with respect to water
intake regulation under section 316(b). PSEG Pet. at
24, 30. To support this assertion Industry Petitioners
rely on Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 597
F.2d 306 (is Cir. 1979) (“Seacoast”). Specifically,
PSEG and UWAG cite Seacoast for the principle that
the use of a cost-benefit analysis in determining BTA
has always been the norm. UWAG Pet. at 25-28;
PSEG Pet. at 24-25. Seacoast however, did not
address the permissibility of a cost-benefit analysis at
all. Rather, the First Circuit concluded only that the
statute’s legislative history indicates that cost is an
acceptable consideration in determining whether the
intake design “reflects the best technology available.”
Seacoast, 597 F.2d at 311. Contrary to the Industry
23
Petitioners’ arguments, Seacoast does not endorse a
cost-benefit analysis nor prescribe one.
Moreover, in citing Seacoast, Industry Petitioners
fail to recognize that the cost-benefit analysis for
setting effluent limitations under section 301(b)(2)(A)
was replaced by the more stringent “best available
technology” standard, under which EPA may consider
the cost of achieving a reduction in effluent, but not
the cost of achieving the effluent reduction as
compared to the benefit achieved by the reduction. In
the context of section 316(b), the Second Circuit
recognized the distinction between considering cost in
determining BTA and balancing cost against the
benefit to be achieved by BTA.’ The Second Circuit
found support for this distinction in this Court’s
decision in EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449
U.S. 64 (1980), where it recognized that the shift to
BAT in section 301 fundamentally altered the way in
which the EPA could factor cost into its Clean Water
Act determinations. App. 2la. Thus, the Second
Circuit’s decision is not at variance with the Seacoast
Court’s dicta that cost is an “acceptable consideration”
in determining whether an intake design reflects the
best technology available. Seacoast, 597 F.2d at 311.
" Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 102, citing Riverkeeper I, 358
F.3d at 195, App. 30a (“Congress made only one distinction:
while the Agency could consider the relationship between cost
and benefits in establishing BPT, CWA Section 304(b\1)\B), 33
U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B), it could consider cost insofar as it can be
‘reasonably borne’ by the industry, but not the relationship
between cost and benefits, in establishing BAT.”)
24
The Industry Petitioners also cite BP Exploration
& Oil, Inc., 66 F.3d 784 (6th Cir. 1995) and
Weyerhaeuser v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
in support of their claim of conflict among the circuits
on the cost-benefit analysis issue. Entergy Pet. at 25-
30; PSEG Pet. at 20-21. Neither case addressed the
applicability of a cost-benefit analysis when
establishing BTA under section 316(b).
In BP Oil, oil and gas industry petitioners
challenged an EPA rulemaking that established
pollution (effluent) discharge limitations promulgated
under sections 301, 304 and 306. BP Oil. 66 F.3d at
789. Petitioners also challenged EPA’s calculation of
the cost of achieving the effluent limitations, but not
EPA’s failure to properly consider cost. In upholding
EPA’s rulemaking, the Sixth Circuit noted the factors,
including cost, that EPA may consider in setting
effluent limitations for an industry subject to “best
available technology,” and recognized that EPA was
required to “institute progressively more stringent
effluent discharge guidelines in stages.” Jd. Notably,
the Court did not hold, or even suggest, that a cost-
benefit analysis was proper in establishing such
limitations and simply did not address the question of
whether section 316(b) authorizes such an approach
when determining BTA at an intake structure. Thus,
BP Oil does not conflict with Riverkeeper II on the
issue of cost-benefit analysis.
Similarly, there is no conflict presented by
Weyerhaeuser, where petitioners challenged an EPA
rulemaking setting effluent discharge limitations and
25
the calculated costs of implementation. Like BP Oil,
the court in Weyerhaeuser did not address the
question of whether a cost-benefit analysis under
Section 316(b) is appropriate when establishing BTA
for intake structures. Moreover, Weyerhaeuser
predated the shift to best available technology
recognized in National Crushed Stone _ Ass’n.
Weyerhaeuser therefore presents no conflict with the
decision in Riverkeeper IT.
Nor do any of the other cases cited by the
Industry Petitioners address the issue of whether
Section 316(b) authorizes a cost-benefit analysis.”
Thus they do not support the conclusion that there is
a split among the circuit courts.
* See UWAG Pet. at. 21, citing United States Steel Corp. v.
Train, 556 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1977) (upholding EPA NPDES
permit against challenge that State law should apply); Entergy
Pet. at 32, citing Gulf Restoration Network v. United States Dept.
of Transportation, 452 F.3d 362, 372 (5th Cir. 2006) (upholding
environmental review and license issuance under Deepwater
Port Act); Entergy Pet. at 32-33, citing American Corn Growers
Ass'n v. EPA, 291 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (upholding EPA
regional haze rulemaking under Clean Air Act); UWAG Pet. at
21, citing United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 850
(7th Cir. 1977) (upholding EPA NPDES permit requiring
monitoring at intake pursuant to Section 316(b) and finding
assertion that EPA failed to compare costs and benefits of intake
technologies not ripe).
26
Restoration
Industry Petitioners argue that there is also a
conflict among the circuit courts with respect to
whether restoration measures are a_ permissible
substitute for technology at the intake structure
under section 316(b). In fact, the Second Circuit in
Riverkeeper I was the first to directly address this
issue. Riverkeeper I, 358 F.3d at 189-91. Riverkeeper I
rejected inclusion of restoration measures in lieu of
technology at the intake at new facilities under the
Phase I rule in light of the plain language of section
316(b). Id. at 191. The Second Circuit’s decision to
reject restoration here in the Phase II rule is based on
the same analysis.
Industry Petitioners cite Seacoast, 597 F.2d at
309-11, in support of their claim that there is a split
between the First and Second Circuits. PSEG Pet. at
28-29. Because Seacoast does not address whether
section 316(b) authorizes restoration measures in lieu
of technology at the intake, however, it is not in
conflict with Riverkeeper I and Riverkeeper IT.
Industry Petitioners s'8o suggest that the Second
Circuit is departing from 4 broad national consensus
and that the Second Circuit decision threatens EPA's
practice of requiring restoration measures in many
environmental contexts, including the National
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), the Clean Water
Act Section 404, the Endangered Species Act, and the
Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act. PSEG Pet. at 30-
31. Petitioners argue that many courts have affirmed
27
a federal agency’s discretion to consider restoration in
those contexts. This argument is erroneous. These
decisions, which address restoration measures under
distinct federal statutes, do not give rise to a conflict
among the circuit courts on whether section 316(b)
allows restoration measures in lieu of best technology
available at intake structures. Moreover, none of the
referenced statutes have the distinct and isolated
provision mandating that EPA select a technology
based on its ability to “minimize” adverse
environmental impacts.
Petitioners also misconstrue the Second Circuit’s
holding with respect to restoration as a policy matter.
The Court recognized that restoration measures could
be beneficial, but held that EPA could not substitute
restoration measures in place of technology at an
intake structure. That holding does not undermine
the importance of restoration or the ability of EPA or
the States to use restoration measures in addition to
the appropriate technology requirements at the
intake as mandated by section 316(b).
Existing Facilities
Petitioner Entergy argues that there is a split
among the circuit courts with respect to whether
section 316(b) applies to existing facilities, and
whether cooling water intake standards can be
regulated in discharge permits. Contrary to Entergy’s
claim, the Second Circuit’s holding did not expand the
application of section 316(b) beyond its text, nor did it
28
equate the intake requirements of section 316(b) with
discharge requirements of sections 301 and 306.
The courts have long recognized that section
316(b) applies to “existing” cooling water intake
structures as well as to “new” structures, and that the
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(“NPDES”) permitting program is an appropriate
mechanism for implementation. See Riverkeeper II,
475 F.3d at 122, quoting E.J. du Pont de Nemours &
Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 121 (1977), App. 74a
(“Section 301(b), to which section 316(b) expressly
refers, defines the effluent limitations that shall be
achieved by existing point sources.”); see also United
States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 850 (7th Cir.
1977). The plaintiff, like Industry Petitioners here,
argued that the requirements of section 316(b)
applied only to a certain category of power plants,
and that EPA could not impose section 316(b)
requirements as a condition of NPDES permits. See
id. at 849. The Seventh Circuit disagreed, holding
that section 316(b) applies on its face to all
technology-based requirements of the Clean Water
Act. Id. at 849-50. The Seventh Circuit went on to
confirm that the proper mechanism for implementing
the requirements of section 316(b) was through
conditions imposed in NPDES permits. /d., citing
Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351, 1371-
72 (4th Cir. 1976).
Entergy’s contention that Riverkeeper Il creates a
conflict with Virginia Electric Power Co. v. Costle, 566
F.2d 446 (4th Cir. 1977) is also incorrect. The issue in
29
Virginia Electric was a narrow one — whether the
circuit courts had jurisdiction to review agency
regulations issued pursuant to section 316(b) of the
Clean Water Act. Entergy cites isolated language in
the case for the proposition that section 316(b)
regulations are not effluent limitations. But that
issue was not in dispute there, see id. at 449, nor is it
in dispute here. In fact, the Fourth Circuit’s decision
supports the proposition that section 316(b) intake
technology requirements apply to existing facilities.
Furthermore, the court, and the industry petitioners
in that case, implicitly recognized that section 316(b)
regulations could be implemented for existing
facilities through NPDES permitting processes. See
id. at 449.
Nor does Riverkeeper II create a conflict with
Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 859 F.2d
156 (D.C. Cir. 1988), as Entergy maintains. The issue
before the D.C. Circuit there was whether EPA could
impose non-water quality permit conditions in a
NPDES discharge permit. EPA asserted that the
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) provides
it with “supplemental authority” not only to consider
additional environmental factors, “but to act on these
factors by imposing any condition necessary to
account for the environmental effects of the new
facility.” Id. at 169. The court concluded that EPA
could not look to NEPA to expand its substantive
powers. It held that “[alny action taken by a federal
agency must fall within the agency’s appropriate
province under its organic statute(s).” Jd. In contrast,
30
EPA here is acting within its express authority under
section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act in promulgating
standards that require “cooling water intake
structures [to] reflect the best technology available
for minimizing adverse environmental impact.” 33
U.S.C. §1326(b).
Sd
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Industry petitions
for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
For the State Respondents
PATRICK C. LYNCH
Attorney General
TRICIA O’HARE JEDELE
Special Assistant Attorney General
Counsel of Record
150 South Main Street
Providence, RI 02903
Phone: (401) 274-4400, Ext. 2400
Fax: (401) 222-3016
Dated: March 3, 2008
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.