Respondents Brief — Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc.
Supreme Court brief2009
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
‘ me “
av EN “> (>
2 < ve
\\ * Nos. 07-588, 07°569'& 07°597 (Consolids
oth
=
In The
Supreme Court of the Gnited S
°
ENTERGY CORP., Petitioner,
V.
ENVIRONMEN'TAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.,
Respondents.
*
PSEG FOSSIL LLC AND PSEG NUCLEAR LLC,
Petitioners,
V.
RIVERKEEPER, INC., ET AL., Respondents.
@
UTILITY WATER ACT GROUP, Petitioner,
V.
RIVERKEEPER, INC., ET AL., Respondents.
ry
On Writ Of Certiorari To The
United States Court Of Appeals
For The Second Circuit
6
BRIEF FOR THE STATES AS RESPONDENTS
¢
PATRICK C. LYNCH
Attorney General of Rhode Island
TRICIA O'HARE JEDELE, Counsel of Record
Special Assistant Attorney General
150 South Main Street
Providence, RI 02903
(401) 274-4400
(Additional Counsel Listed On [Inside Cover)
COCKLE LAW BRIEF PHINTING CO tsOU) 225 O46
OR CALL COLLECT 402) 442-2851
“dé o.
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL
Attorney General
of Connecticut
KIMBERLY MASSICOTTE
MATTHEW LEVINE
Assistant Attorneys General
P.O. Box 120
55 Elm Street
Hartford, CT 06141-0120
(860) 808-5250
MARTHA COAKLEY
Attorney General
of Massachusetts
ANDREW GOLDBERG
Assistant Attorney General
1 Ashburton Place,
18th Floor
Boston, MA 02108
(617) 727-2200
ANDREW M. CUOMO
Attorney General of New York
BARBARA D. UNDERWOOD
Solicitor General
ANDY D. BING
Deputy Solicitor General
DENISE A. HARTMAN
Assistant Solicitor General
MAUREEN F. LEARY
Assistant Attorney General
The Capitol
Albany, NY 12224
(518) 473-6085
JOSEPH R. BIDEN III
Attorney General
of Delaware
KEVIN MALONEY
Deputy Attorney General
820 N. French Street,
6th Floor
Wilmington, DE 19801
(302) 577-8327
ANNE MILGRAM
Attorney General
of New Jersey
ELLEN BARNEY BALINT
Deputy Attorney General
P.O. Box 093
25 Market Street
Trenton, NJ 08625-0093
(609) 984-5065
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether § 316(b) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1326(b), authorizes the Environmental Protection
Agency to compare costs with benefits in determining
the “best technology available for minimizing adverse
environmental impact” at cooling water intake
structures?
il
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.....................cceeceeeees 1
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ....................... 15
TT cicitiniinieiiisiniddinitihiitiainidininsupucdicetnanminiin 17
SECTION 316(b) OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT
DOES NOT ALLOW EPA TO RELY ON A COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS AS THE BASIS FOR
ESTABLISHING A NATIONAL RULE FOR
INTAKE STRUCTURES OR FOR MAKING
SITE-SPECIFIC PERMITTING DECISIONS.. 17
A. The Plain Language of § 316(b) Requires
EPA to Promulgate a Rule That Minimizes
Adverse Environmental Impact.................. 18
B. Throughout the Clean Water Act, Congress
Told EPA When and How It Could
NI iin cenlicticeninestalieeiictadiiacaltidieaitahlcsdnnsecietid 31
C. The Legislative History Supports the
Conclusion That Congress Rejected a Cost-
Benefit Analysis in Section 316(b) .............. 38
ET eiiinsiiictlainasednouiaciniasdintaseanammniiendencedins 44
ADDENDUM
ill
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES:
American Textile Mfrs. Institute, Inc. v. Donovan,
Lt tener passim
Appalachian Power Co. v. Train,
ee ee Ss CEE GES BUDE DD vcscccccscccccccsccscesevecccosseses 7
BP Exploration & Oil, Inc. v. E.P.A.,
EE ON 28
Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115 (1994)...........000000.... 25
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)...18, 24, 31
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979)........... 38
Conoco Phillips Co. v. U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, (Docket No. 06-60662)
aa Ak il emsncounaniianats 9
Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v.
NYSDEC, 726 F.Supp. 1404 (S.D.N.-Y. 1989)........ ila
Consumer Product Safety Comm’n v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102 (1980)....................085. 39
Cronin v. Browner,
898 F.Supp. 1052 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) .................ceccceeeees 8
Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992)..................... 22
EPA v. Nat’l Crushed Stone Ass’n,
I nonin 14, 35
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
I isebbnene 25, 32
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2JOOL) .............ccceccesesvers 43
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued
Page
Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007)........... 24
MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Am. Tel. &
Bee Gan, GER Weak He Cet icteicssccestiiiciieniinnieniat 29
Nat'l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 127 S.Ct. 2618 (2007) ........cccccccsccossccsvereses 32
Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine
ef) NE 29
Nat'l Wildlife Fed’n v. EPA,
286 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2002)............ccccsscosscescessceses 14
Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA,
ot Be Ek | eee 4,9
Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA,
475 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2007)................. 2,12, 13, 14, 15
Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns,
— BS Fg, | Rn eee 22, 23, 25, 27, 36
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000)..................... 18
STATUTES:
Be WP ds © BIOO ccvesicccocecisncstiininisadinimbenmnmeeeeannneeee 1,4
SD WP TAD. ©] Bie aicvncecccncescosniessetassestecnsccssinmendiiiamal passim
BD WIBLS. | DR wccscenscvcsveccecssetenneed 6, 13, 34, 40
33 U.S.C. § ISLC MBNA)... cccccccosccsossssss 6, 27, 28, 34, 40
BD UA. B BSD csv ccncvcciccesssiscescnammenaan 6, 36
a EF ts Oe GO cas ccicnsenssnienetbactinesteamanenene 5, 33, 34
BD Wr TAs DB BIG encececiccisscscdencacscensennnsevennaena 33, 35
Vv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued
Page
Es OF MITE BEE csssccrescececcssceecessssencoseredesed 6, 34
a eo vnssensucscenscnsccoceesessensoveneesie 35
Se Rs OF PIII a cecsccscccsceccecccecescerocesees 6, 35, 36
ae icicntdinencasesocntcswnccsaniscercessneunie passim
I I TD cc civccccacsonsseconescoscocenesceoses 6, 35, 41
ED cc occnesecececsionenssasesecsenesscnanseus 35
ee PEs UF MEUED scsccccccsccccnccccccccssoscaes 5, 33, 36, 37, 42
I os cn cascnncgennscececesnseasscassnseoes passim
Be Es OF POEL BPvcccnascccevcscsccccsescosceses 22, 23, 24, 27
CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS:
a saree demnssenonsatinn 20
I ae MEINE DE Dccccccsccccccscoscecescscccsonccocessnssess 11
IS Ot MIDE BEE Das scccncccccescestvsccesccsecsssccssessess 11
ee Oe MIE TEIIME D vc ccccccccccccccsscccsccseescesscccesoveese 12
ad sadn nctnnennenesonssosee 12
Ae Ec cn ncocesccdconscccecoesscosoesceuseses 12
Es OF MPMI IE EE FLEE Pac cccccncccccccscccsscrecsesesceccecesesss 12
EE ce 12
FEDERAL REGISTER:
38 Fed. Reg. 34,410 (December 13, 1973).................... 7
41 Fed. Reg. 17,387 (April 26, 1976)..............000.0.. 7,19
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued
Page
66 Fed. Reg. 65,256 (December 18, 2001).................... 9
67 Fed. Reg. 17,122 (April 9, 2002).......... eee ee eeee 8
69 Fed Reg. 41,576-623 (July 9, 2004)............... passim
71 Fed. Reg. 35,006 (June 16, 2006).....................ce0eeee 9g
TB FOG. MO. ST, IST GRRG B, BOOT) ..cccvecveccccsccccscsccsess 15
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:
1 A Legislative History of the Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972 263 (93d
S.C re terse cccncitcncccanincesensicinesennns 38, 41
Senate Consideration of the Report of the
Conference Committee, 92d Cong., 170
(October 4, 1972), reprinted in 1 Legislative
History of the Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972 (Comm. Print 1973)....... 40, 41
Senate Report 92-414 (1971), reprinted in
Ces acRses GUT A MEETED cbsissctcscsceesisesncsstncesisecesaied 41
Conference Committee Report No. 92-1236
(accompanying S. 2770) (Sept. 28, 1972) ............... 42
3 Legislative History of the Clean Water Act of
1977 — A Continuation of the Legislative
History of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Committee
Print compiled for the Senate Committee on
Public Works by the Library of Congress),
427, Sen. No. 95-14 (1975) (Statement of
er IE its:iinchs sain tasiiaineneaidnlesnaainabiiaemratenshoantid 39
V1l
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued
Page
OTHER AUTHORITY:
American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language (Houghton Mij£fflin, 4th ed.
SD aiikicrsiitajeichnisieaabamieihieiiviaieesiicihddladaiuiicanipesp omibiigeitas 19, 21, 27
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
of the English Language, (Merriam-Webster
unabridged ed., 1981) .....................0e008 19, 20, 21, 31
In re Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Decision
of the General Counsel, No. 41 (1976) ..........00.00.... 20
“Development Document for Proposed Best
Technology Available for Minimizing Adverse
Environmental Impact of Cooling Water
Intake Structures” (“Development Document”)
available at http://nepis.epa.gov...............0...ccceeeeeeee 7
SAIC Background Paper Number 3: Cooling
Water Intake Technologies, EPA, April 4,
ITE chisiaisdisiedinnetsaibidabaiiniba plindinialdighlablinbictiipdhidsaianeniasianse 11
Hon. Stephen G. Breyer, Breaking the Vicious
Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulations
EI Ia liiseschssecinesseaiicibicheaeps cealuaehbiiciberiaibametaleeniiamsdlariaosbcesiiiitiigiigied 31
1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act’ addresses
the impact to fish and other aquatic life caused by the
massive withdrawal of water at cooling water intake
structures. Section 316(b) mandates that:
Any standard established pursuant to
section 1311 of this title or section 1316 of
this title and applicable to a point source
shall require that the location, design,
construction, and capacity of cooling water
intake structures reflect the best technology
available for minimizing adverse
environmental impact.
CWA § 316(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (emphasis added).
This case is about whether in selecting the best
technology available for minimizing adverse
environmental impact under section 316(b), the
United States Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”) may reject the best technology based on the
agencys comparison of costs with the value of
benefits. Specifically, the question is whether the
language or purpose of the statute supports EPA's
reliance upon a cost-benefit analysis in establishing a
national rule governing intake structures, or in
setting site-specific permitting alternatives for intake
structures.
' The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended, is
commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act (herein referred to
as “CWA” or “the Act”). See 86 Stat. 816, 33 U.S.C. § 1251, et seq.
2
The State-Respondents’ agree with the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals’ conclusion that, “[wJhile the
statutory language suggests that the EPA may
consider costs” in making this determination, “cost-
benefit analysis is not similarly supported by the
language or purpose of the [Act].” Pet. App. 24a
(Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 475 F.3d 83, 99) (2d Cir.
2007) (“Riverkeeper IT’).* Congress’ use of the word
“available” allows for a limited consideration of cost,
but when viewed in context, the technology standard
in section 316(b) bars EPA from relying on a cost-
benefit analysis when establishing the national rule
or site-specific permitting alternatives for intake
structures. In Riverkeeper II, the Second Circuit
properly understood the concept of “availability” in
terms of “feasibility,” and thus approved a type of
feasibility analysis rather than a cost-benefit analysis
as being consistent with section 316(b). See Pet. App.
27a (Riverkeeper II, id. at 100) (citing American
Textile Mfrs. Institute, Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490,
509-510 (1981) (“American Textile”) (“Congress itself
has defined the relationship between technology costs
and environmental benefits, and placed the emphasis
on minimizing environmental impacts.”).
* State-Respondents include: the States of Rhode Island,
Connecticut, Delaware, New Jersey, and New York, and the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
* Citations to “Pet. App.” refer to the Appendix to the
Petition for Certiorari filed by Entergy Corp. in No. 07-588.
“I.A.” refers to the Joint Appendix. “R.A.” refers to the
addendum included in the State-Respondents’ brief.
3
Thus, when promulgating national performance
standards to reflect the statutory mandate, EPA may
consider cost in assessing the “availability” of a
technology in terms of its economic and technological
feasibility, or in evaluating comparably effective
technologies. The language of the statute does not,
however, authorize EPA to require less than the top-
performing technology for minimizing impact based
on its view that the cost of the top-performing
technology outweighs the value of the benefits the
technology would achieve.
The Environmental Impact Caused By Intake
Structures
Electric power generating plants and other
facilities (“power plants”) withdraw hundreds of
billions of gallons of water daily from the Nation’s
waters through “intake structures” to cool nuclear
reactors, or coal or gas-fired turbines, and other
machinery and equipment. Pet. App. 169a-170a (69
Fed. Reg. 41,576, 41,586 (July 9, 2004)). After the
water is drawn, and used by the power plant for
cooling purposes, it is discharged back to the water
bodies as thermally polluted effluent.
A power plant’s intake of cooling water and
subsequent discharge of heated effluent causes two
distinct types of injuries to aquatic life and the
integrity of the Nation’s waters. The process of
withdrawing water through the intake structure
annually kills and injures trillions of fish, shellfish
4
and other aquatic organisms by trapping them
against the screens located at the mouth of the intake
structure (“impingement”), or by drawing them into
the facility with the cooling water (“entrainment”).*
Subsequently, heated effluent is discharged back into
the water body, fundamentally altering the water
body’s physical and chemical characteristics and
thereby making it potentially uninhabitable for fish
and other aquatic /ife.
The Clean Water Act
Congress enacted the Act in 1972 “to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the Nation’s waters.” CWA, as amended,
86 Stat. 816, 33 U.S.C. § 1251, et seg. In section 316
of the Act, Congress addressed environmental harm
caused by both intake structures and thermally
polluted effluent. In subsection (b), Congress directed
EPA, when it establishes effluent limitations for
these facilities, to require power plants to use the
best technology available for minimizing adverse
“ A single power plant may impinge more than a million
adult fish in a three-week period. Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 358
F.3d 174, 181 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Riverkeeper I”); and may impinge
and entrain trillions of aquatic organisms in a year. Pet. App.
179a (69 Fed. Reg. 41,576, 41,588 (July 9, 2004)). The number
killed or injured is largely corollary to the amount of water
withdrawn and the velocity at which it is being withdrawn, i.e.,
the more water withdrawn and the higher the velocity of the
withdrawal, the greater the harm. See Pet. App. 230a, 241a, and
288a (69 Fed. Reg. at 41,599, 41,601, and 41,612).
5
environmental impact at their intake structures.
CWA §&§ 316(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b). In contrast to this
unequivocal directive regarding intake structures, in
subsection (a) Congress authorized an exception to
compliance with the national effluent limitations for
thermal pollution where a power plant can
demonstrate that a less stringent limitation would
“assure the protection and propagation of a balanced,
indigenous population of shellfish, fish and wildlife on
that water body.” See CWA §316(a), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1326(a).
Because’ section 316(b) addresses’ intake
structures, not effluent, it stands apart from the
statutory provisions elsewhere in the Act that govern
effluent limitations for point source discharges. In
section 301, for instance, Congress established a
statutory framework for EPA to _ set effluent
limitations for existing facilities. 33 U.S.C. § 1311.
Likewise, section 306 of the Act provides EPA with
the statutory framework for setting effluent
limitations for new sources. 33 U.S.C. § 1316. In
these provisions, Congress established discrete
technology-based standards for different types of
pollutants and facilities.
With respect to each of the technology standards,
Congress expressly told EPA when and how to
consider costs depending on the technology standard
being applied. CWA §§ 301, 304, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311,
1314. Congress directed EPA to weigh costs in
relation to water quality benefits in only two
instances: when setting effluent limitations reflecting
best practicable control technology (“BPT”) — a
standard applicable to existing facilities only
until 1989 (see CWA §301(b)(1A), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311(b)1)(A)) and CWA § 304(bx1)B), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1314(b)(1)(B) (directing EPA to consider “total cost
of application of technology in relation to effluent
reduction benefits to be achieved from _ such
application”); and when setting effluent limitations
reflecting the best conventional technology (“BCT”) —
a standard enacted in the 1977 amendments to the
CWA applicable only to conventional pollutants (see
CWA § 301(b)2)E), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)E) and
CWA § 304(b)4)B), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(4)(B))
(directing EPA to consider “the reasonableness of the
relationship between the costs of attaining a
reduction in effluents and the effluent benefits
derived.”). With respect to all other point sources,
whether from existing or new facilities, Congress
directed EPA to take into account the cost of
achieving effluent reductions, but did not direct EPA
to weigh technology costs against reduction benefits.
See CWA § 301(bX2xA), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A);
CWA § 306(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a\(1).
Thus, while Congress expressly told EPA to
consider technology costs, and in two instances costs in
relation to reduction benefits, when setting national
effluent limitations, it did not expressly tell EPA to
consider costs when establishing national performance
standards for intake structures. Instead, section 316(b)
imposes on EPA the unqualified mandate that intake
structures at both new and existing facilities shall
reflect the best technology available for minimizing
adverse environmental impact.
7
EPA’s Historical Interpretation of Section
316(b)
A little more than a year after Congress passed
section 316(b), EPA issued a draft rule “to insure that
intake structures reflect the best technology available
for minimizing adverse environmental impact.” See
Proposed Rule, Preamble, 38 Fed. Reg. 34,410
(December 13, 1973). On April 26, 1976, EPA issued
the final rule, which incorporated (but did not publish
as part of the rule), a “Development Document for
Proposed Best Technology Available for Minimizing
Adverse Environmental Impact of Cooling Water
Intake Structures” (“Development Document”). See
Final Rule at 41 Fed. Reg. 17,387, 17,390 (April 26,
1976), and see Development Document at p. 175,
available at http://nepis.epa.gov. The Development
Document listed several different technologies that
were, at the time, “available.” Among the most
effective of these technologies was “recirculating
cooling water systems employing off stream means to
transfer heat directly to the atmosphere to minimize
* As a result of a successful industry challenge to EPA's
1976 Rule, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the
1976 Rule because the Development Document had not been
published with the i976 Rule. See Appalachian Power Co. v.
Train, 566 F.2d 451 (4th Cir. 1977).
* The technology available to address the adverse impact
associated with intake structures are relatively limited, and
have included essentially the same set of technologies for more
than thirty years. The technologies include vanous screening
methods, fish return or barrier systems, change of intake
location, and reductions in intake flow.
8
or in some cases eliminate the use of cooling water”
(known as “closed-cycle cooling”).
Closed-cycle cooling continues to be one of the top
technological performers at intake structures in the
industry, eliminating mortality from impingement
and entrainment by up to 98 percent when compared
with conventional once-through systems. Pet. App.
239a-240a (69 Fed. Reg. 41,601). EPA has construed
section 316(b) to require closed-cycle cooling
technology as the best technology available for
minimizing adverse impact at more than a dozen
existing power plants, both before it published the
1976 Rule and after it was remanded. See, e.g.,
Palisades Nuclear Power Plant, 67 Fed. Reg. 17,122,
17,155 (Apri! 9, 2002); Consolidated Edison Co. of
New York, Inc. v. NYSDEC, 726 F.Supp. 1404, 1406
(S.D.N-Y. 1989).
The Phase II Rule
In 1993, environmental groups challenged EPA’s
failure to re-issue regulations governing intake
structures. Pursuant to an amended consent decree
resolving the case, EPA agreed to issue the intake
structure regulations in three phases: the first for
new facilities (“Phase I Rule”); the second for existing
facilities (“Phase II Rule”); and the third for smaller
offshore and coastal facilities (“Phase III Rule”). See
Cronin v. Browner, 898 F.Supp. 1052 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
In December 2001, EPA issued its final Phase I Rule
9
for new facilities.’ In July 2004, EPA issued the final
Phase II Rule for existing facilities, at issue here.*
EPA issued its final Phase III Rule for smaller
facilities in June 2006.°
The final Phase II Rule applies only to existing
facilities “whose primary activity is to generate and
transmit electric power and who have a design
intake flow of 50 million gallons or greater, and that
use at least 25 percent of the water withdrawn for
cooling purposes.” Pet. App. 189a (69 Fed. Reg. at
41,590). The Phase II Rule establishes “performance
standards” —-— percentage ranges for reducing
impingement (80 to 95 percent) and entrainment (60
to 90 percent) — based on a “range of technologies
that EPA has determined to be commercially
available for the industry as a whole... .” Pet. App.
228a (69 Fed. Reg. at 41,599). In the Phase II Rule,
EPA interpreted “section 316(b) as authorizing it to
" 66 Fed. Reg. 65,256 (Dec. 18, 2001). The Phase I Rule was
challenged by environmental and industry groups, and portions
of it were upheld and others remanded to EPA. See Riverkeeper
I, supra, 358 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2004).
* Pet. App. 122a. 69 Fed. Reg. 41,576 (July 9, 2004).
* 71 Fed. Reg. 35,006 (June 16, 2006). In its Phase III Rule,
EPA decided not to issue regulations governing small existing
facilities. The Phase III Rule contains intake requirements for
new offshore and coastal oil and gas extraction facilities that
had been deferred from the Phase I Rule. The Phase III Rule
was challenged in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, Conoco
Phillips Co. v. EPA (Docket No. 06-60662), and on June 8, 2008,
that matter was stayed pending this Court’s resolution of the
challenge to the Phase II Rule.
10
consider not only technologies but also their effects on
and benefits to the water from which the cooling
water is withdrawn.” Pet. App. 157a (69 Fed. Reg. at
41,583); Pet. App. 249a-250a (69 Fed. Reg. at 41,603).
EPA also compared the efficacy of competing
technologies. Specifically, EPA compared _ the
effectiveness of various technologies in reducing
impingement and entrainment, and concluded that
other design and construction technologies, can
approach closed-cycle cooling at less costs. Pet. App.
260a-261la (69 Fed. Reg. at 41,606). EPA recognized
that closed-cycle cooling is the most effective
technology, see Pet. App. 239a-240a (69 Fed. Reg. at
41,601), but rejected closed-cycle cooling because of
its high costs. See Pet App. 255a (69 Fed. Reg. at
41,605).
EPA therefore set the low ends of the ranges in
the performance standards at 80 percent reduction
for impingement and 60 percent reduction for
entrainment — far less than the 98 percent reductions
that it recognized could be attained by closed-cycle
cooling. Pet. App. 239a (69 Fed. Reg. at 41,601). EPA
based the lower impingement and entrainment
reduction percentages on the performance of less
costly screening technologies. Pet. App. 244a (69 Fed.
Reg. at 41,602). All of the evidence in the record
indicated that screening technologies are far less
effective at reducing the impacts associated with
11
impingement and entrainment at major power
plants."
The Phase II Rule establishes various compliance
alternatives for achieving the performance standards.
Recognizing that closed-cycle cooling has been
installed at more than a dozen existing facilities, the
first alternative allows a facility to demonstrate
compliance with the impingement performance
standard by showing that it has reduced its flow
commensurate with closed-cycle cooling. Pet. App.
556a (40 C.FR. § 125.94(a)(1)(i)). As a _ second
compliance alternative, the Rule deems a facility in
compliance with the impingement performance
standard if it shows that it has reduced its intake
velocity to 0.5 feet per second or less. Pet. App. 556a
(40 C.FR. §125.94(aX1)Gi)). Under another
compliance alternative, a facility may demonstrate
compliance with both impingement and entrainment
performance standards through a combination of
design and construction technologies, commonly
* See Science Applications International Corporation
(“SAIC”), Background Paper Number 3, wherein SAIC, on behalf
of EPA, co::cluded:
The main finding with regard to intake screen
systems is that they are limited in their abilities to
minimize adverse aquatic impact ... and many of our
major power plants have been in serious trouble
because of cooling water conditions [with] which our
U.S. screening system cannot cope.
SAIC Background Paper Number 3: Cooling Water Intake
Technologies, EPA, April 4, 1994, at 3-5 (emphasis in original).
12
referred to by EPA as a “suite of technologies” that it
considered best technology available for minimizing
adverse environmental impact, including wedgewire
screens, barrier systems, fish return systems, Pet.
App. 592a (40 C.F.R. § 125.99(a)), and operational
measures and/or restoration measures." Pet. App.
556a-557a (40 C.F.R. § 125.94(a)(2-4)).
The Phase II Rule also allows two kinds of
site-specific “compliance alternatives” that do not
actually require compliance with the Rule’s
percentage reduction standards for impingement
and entrainment. Pet. App. 557a (40 C.FR.
§ 125.94(a)(5)). First, if the facility demonstrates that
compliance costs would be significantly greater than
the compliance costs considered by EPA in the Rule,
the facility may come “as close as practicable” to the
performance standard (“cost-cost variance”). Pet. App.
557a (40 C.F.R. § 125.94(a)(5)(i)). Second, if the
facility demonstrates that compliance costs would be
“significantly greater than the benefits of complying”
with the performance standards (“the cost-benefit
variance”), the facility may come “as close as
practicable” to the performance standard. Pet. App.
559a (40 C.F.R. § 125.94(a)(5)(ii)). EPA considered
" The Second Circuit struck down the Phase II Rule’s
provisions that allowed a power plant to comply with section
316(b) through the use of restoration measures in lieu of
technology. Pet. App. 43a-49a (Riverkeeper I], supra, 475 F.3d at
108-110). This Court limited the question presented to the cost-
benefit issue.
13
only the costs associated with installing submerged
cylindrical wedgewire screen technology to treat the
total cooling water intake flow; these “compliance
alternatives,” therefore, could preclude permitting
agencies from requiring the most effective intake
technology, closed-cycle cooling, at any power plant in
the country. Pet. App. 244a (69 Fed. Reg. at 41,602).
Riverkeeper II
On January 25, 2007, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals concluded that section 316(b) does not
authorize EPA to promulgate a rule in which the
best technology available for minimizing adverse
environmental impact is determined by comparing
the cost of a technology with the value of the
environmental benefit it will achieve, or to “consider
the relationship of a technology’s cost to the level of
reduction of adverse environmental impact it
produces.” Pet. App. 25a. (Riverkeeper I], supra, 475
F.3d at 99). The court prefaced its holding that EPA
can consider cost in “a limited fashion and not as a
primary consideration,” id., by highlighting the
difference between a cost-benefit analysis, like the
one prescribed by Congress for effluent standards in
section 301(b)(1)(A), and “cost-effectiveness.” Quoting
from Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”)
Circular A-94, Guidelines and Discount Rates for
Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs, Appendix
A (1992), the court explained the difference between
the two methods as follows:
14
“[Blenefit-cost analysis” [is] “[a] systematic
quantitative method of assessing’ the
desirability of government projects or policies
when it is important to take a long view of
future effects and a broad view of possible
side-effects” and “cost effectiveness” [is]
“{a] systematic quantitative method for
comparing the costs of alternative means of
achieving the same stream of benefits or a
given objective.”
Pet. App. 23a. (Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 98, n.10).
In other words, a cost-effectiveness analysis seeks the
least costly method of achieving a specified result,
while a cost-benefit analysis compares costs with the
value of benefits, and chooses the result where the
greatest value of net benefits is not outweighed by the
costs of achieving those benefits.
The Second Circuit concluded that section 316(b)
allows EPA, when it sets national standards for
intake structures, and when it establishes criteria for
site-specific permitting to consider costs only in terms
of feasibility and “cost-effectiveness.” The court
reached this conclusion based on the statute’s text,
the context provided by the CWA, historical
perspective expressed in documents like those
produced by OMB, and the reasoning and authority
found in various court opinions, including EPA uv.
Nat'l Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64, 71 (1980);
Nat'l Wildlife Fed’n v. EPA, 286 F.3d 554, 570 (D.C.
Cir. 2002); and American Textile, supra, 452 U.S. at
509.
15
The Second Circuit remanded the Phase II Rule
to EPA for reconsideration, stating that it was
“unclear whether the Agency improperly weighed the
benefits and the costs of requiring closed-cycle
cooling,” because EPA had explained that “its rejection
of closed-cycle cooling as [best technology available for
minimizing adverse environmental impact] was based
on ‘total social costs’ and ‘lack of cost-effectiveness.’”
Pet. App. 32a (Riverkeeper, 475 F.3d at 102) (citing 69
Fed. Reg. at 41,606). In July 2007, EPA suspended the
Phase II Rule pending further rulemaking. See 72 Fed.
Reg. 37,107 (July 9, 2007).
¢
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Congress’ intent in_ section 316(b) is
unambiguous. EPA must select the top-performing
technology available for the purpose of minimizing
adverse environmental impact.
The plain language of section 316(b) requires
EPA to promulgate a national rule that minimizes the
killing and injuring of fish and other aquatic life. By
using this language, Congress itself defined the
relationship between technology costs and the value
of environmental benefits. With calculated intention,
Congress directed EPA to minimize adverse
environmental impact, and EPA may not substitute
its own different policy choice. Congress did not
authorize EPA to compare the costs of the best
technology available with the value of the benefits
16
that the technology would achieve when establishing
a national rule for minimizing impact, or in setting
criteria applicable at the permitting level. Because
Congress did not expressly tell EPA to consider cost,
cost cannot be a primary consideration, and most
especially cannot be compared with benefits. Cost,
therefore, is only allowed as a secondary factor to
be considered by EPA when evaluating the best
technology’s “availability.” A finding of “availability”
will necessarily require EPA to determine the
feasibility of the top-performing technology, but a
feasibility analysis is not a cost-benefit analysis.
Reading section 316(b) in context confirms this
straightforward meaning. Throughout the CWA,
Congress told EPA when and how it could consider
costs. Congress drafted different technclogy
standards for different categories of pollutants and
facilities. In some cases, Congress required EPA to
consider costs in relation to benefits. In other
instances, Congress authorized only a consideration
of cost without comparison to benefits. What little
legislative history exists supports this plain meaning.
Allowing EPA to rely on its own cost-benefit
evaluation, where Congress already decided the
question, would not, as Petitioners suggest, be within
its “gap-filling” discretion. Congress did not acquiesce
or delegate any power to EPA to employ a cost-benefit
analysis in section 316(b). Instead, Congress
expressed its clear intent to minimize the adverse
environmental impact, even if minimizing impact
17
means that the selected technology will impose high
costs on the industry or at a particular facility.
Petitioners argue that because __ selected
definitions of key statutory terms can appear
ambiguous in contexts other than section 316(b), the
Court should presume ambiguity and defer to EPA’s
interpretation as reasonable. But the absence of an
express reference to cost-benefit analysis in section
316(b) does not create ambiguity where the language -
in the provision clearly expresses Congress’ intent.
¢
ARGUMENT
SECTION 316(b) OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT
DOES NOT ALLOW EPA TO RELY ON A COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS AS THE BASIS FOR
ESTABLISHING A NATIONAL RULE FOR
INTAKE STRUCTURES OR FOR MAKING
SITE-SPECIFIC PERMITTING DECISIONS.
The text of section 316(b) is unambiguous. The
language plainly expresses Congress’ intent that EPA
must select the best technology available for
minimizing adverse environmental impact associated
with intake structures. The statutory phrase
unambiguously precludes EPA from comparing costs
with the value of the benefits in selecting cooling
water intake technology that satisfies the statutory
mandate. Rather than weigh costs against benefits,
Congress clearly directed EPA to require technology
that surpasses al! others for achieving the goal of
18
minimizing the adverse impact associated with using
the intake structures to the extent that technology is
available. EPA may not substitute its policy views for
those of Congress.
The United States and Industry Petitioners
seek to add a cost-benefit comparison as a factor
in the section 316(b) statutory equation. Adding
this comparison would circumvent Congress’ intent,
to restore the Nation’s degraded waters by
implementing standards based on what the limits of
technology can achieve and would resurrect a policy
approach to water quality regulation long since
abandoned by Congress.
EPA’s interpretation therefore fails under step
one of the Chevron analysis. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-843 (1984) (“If the intent of Congress is
clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as
well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”).
A. The Plain Language of § 316(b) Requires
EPA to Promulgate a Rule That Minimizes
Adverse Environmental Impact.
The starting point for construing the statutory
standard — best technology available for minimizing
adverse environmental impact - is the language itself.
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 431 (2000) (“We
start, as always, with the language of the statute.”).
19
The first word in the standard, “best,” means
“excelling, or surpassing all others of its kind in
inherent quality or according to some standard.”
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the
English Language 208 (Merriam-Webster unabridged
ed., 1981) (“Webster’s Third”). In section 316(b), “best”
is used as a superlative to describe the technology
that must be selected to achieve the articulated
congressional objective; it must surpass all other
technologies for minimizing adverse environmental
impacts. The word “for” is often used to indicate “the
purpose or object of” a thing, action, or activity. Jd. at
886; see also American Heritage Dictionary of the
English Language 686 (Houghton Mifflin Co., 4th ed.,
2006) (“American Heritage Dictionary”) (“indicates
the object, aim, or purpose of an action or activity”).
The placement of the word “for” in section 316(b) is
the fulcrum of the statutory standard welding the
first clause, “best technology available,” with the goal
of the section, “minimizing adverse environmental
impact.” Read in conjunction with the prepositional
and objective-defining language — for minimizing
impacts — the word “best” means the top-performing
technology for achieving that objective.
The word “minimize” means “to reduce to the
smallest possible number, degree, or extent.”
Webster’s Third, at 1438. This is the definition EPA
gave the word “minimize” when it promulgated the
initial rule in 1976. See J.A. 41 (41 Fed. Reg. 17,387)
(April 26, 1976) (In the preamble discussing
“minimizing adverse environmental impact,” EPA
20
explained that, “[o]nce such adverse effects have been
identified (or in the case of new structures, predicted)
then the effort must be to select the most effective
means of minimizing (i.e., ‘reducing to the smallest
possible amount or degree’) those adverse effects.”)
(emphasis added). More recently in its promulgation
of the Phase I Rule governing intake structures at
new power plants, EPA again adopted the 1976
definition. See 40 C.F.R. § 125.83 (defining “minimize”
to mean “to reduce to the smallest amount, extent, or
degree reasonably possible”). The noun following the
verb “minimize” is “impact.” “Impact” is defined as
“the act of impinging or striking,” or “a concentrated
force producing change,” Webster’s Third, at 1131,
demonstrating Congress’ understanding of the nature
of the environmental injuries associated with intake
structures.
Under section 316(b), the best technology for
minimizing adverse environmental impact must also
'* Later in 1976, in Jn re Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, a
Decision of the General Counsel, EPA again consistently
discussed the »reaning of the word “minimize,” stating that:
The structures must reflect the best technology
available for minimizing (1.e. “reducing to the smallest
possible amount or degree”) adverse environmental
impact — significant or otherwise. ... In other words,
the goal of best technology available under § 316(b) is
to minimize all adverse impacts — not to reduce the
impact to a pre-determined level.
J.A. 60 Un re Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, EPA, Decision of
General Counsel No. 41) (emphasis added)
21
be “available.” The most quotidian meaning of the
word “available” is “capable of use for’ the
accomplishment of a purpose.” Webster’s Third, at
150; see also American Heritage Dictionary, at 123
(defining “available” as “present and ready for use; at
hand; accessible”). A technology is “available” to the
power plant industry, therefore, if it is accessible, or
capable of being used by power plants at the time it is
chosen.” Synonyms for “available,” like “practicable”
(i.e., “capable of being put into practice” or “capable of
being used,” Webster’s Third, at 1780; or “capable of
being effected, done, or put into practice; feasible,”
American Heritage Dictionary, at 1377), and
“feasible” (i.e., “capable of being done, executed, or
effected,” Webster’s Third, at 831 or “possible,”
American Heritage Dictionary, at 646), support the
concept that “availability” can be understood in terms
of “feasibility,” but not in terms of cost versus benefit.
These definitions comport fully with the secondary
consideration of cost, in terms of “cost-effectiveness”
and “feasibility” that the Second Circuit found to be ”
reasonable under section 316(b), and with this Court’s
view of the distinction between feasibility analysis
and cost-benefit analysis. See American Textile,
‘The Phase Il Rule recognizes that closed-cycle cooling is
capable of being used by existing power plants. Pet. App. 240a
(69 Fed. Reg. at 41,601 (“EPA is nonetheless aware that some
existing facilities have installed this highly effective technology
and has thus provided a streamlined alternative for such
facilities.”).
22
supra, 452 U.S. at 509 (distinguishing. feasibility
analysis from cost-benefit analysis).
When read together as an “indivisible term of
art,”"* the standard set by section 316(b) plainly
directs that, when establishing a national rule, EPA
must require the most effective technology at hand
for reducing to the smallest possible level the adverse
impact associated with intake structures. Congress’
use of the purpose-defining language -— “for
minimizing adverse environmental impact” — reflects
its unequivocal emphasis on minimizing impact.
Thus, whether the value of impact minimization
outweighs the cost associated with using the best
technology for that purpose is a question that
Congress has already answered.
This Court reached a similar conclusion in
Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S.
457, 467-468 (2001) (“American Trucking”). There the
Court considered whether the language of section
109(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act (“CAA”), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7409(b)(1), allowed EPA to consider costs in setting
ambient air quality standards. Section 109(b)(1)
instructs EPA to set air quality standards “the
attainment and maintenance of whichli,] ... allowing
an adequate margin of safety, are requisite to protect
‘* See Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 423 (1992) (Scalia,
J., dissenting, Souter, J., joining) (rejecting the majority’s position
that “the words ‘allowed secured claim’ in section 506(d) of the
Bankruptcy Code need not be read as an ‘indivisible term of
art’”).
mR: 23
the public health.” 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1). The Court
concluded that the text of section 109(b), “interpreted
in its statutory and historical context and with
appreciation for its importance to the CAA as a
whole, unambiguously bars cost consideration from
the [national ambient air quality standards]-setting
process.” American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 471.
Likewise, in American Textile, the Court
construed the phrase “to the extent feasible” to
preclude the agency’s reliance on cost-b-~2fit analysis
in setting the cotton dust standard under the
Occupational Safety and Health Act (“OSHA”).
American Textile, 452 U.S. at 512-513. The Court
recognized that “feasibility analysis” and “cost-benefit
analysis” are distinct concepts, and explained that
cost-benefit analysis imposes an additional and
overriding requirement that would countermand the
feasibility requirement. Jd. at 513. Discussing the
practical implications of allowing a_ cost-benefit
analysis to substitute for a feasibility analysis, the
Court reached the conclusion that “[s]tandards
would inevitably be set at the level indicated by cost-
benefit analysis, and not at the level specified by
[the Act].” Jd. See also id. at 519 (“Congress meant
‘feasible’ rather than ‘cost-benefit’”) (emphasis
added). The same result would obtain here if EPA
were to rely on cost-benefit analysis; “LaJdoption of
petitioners’ interpretation would effectively write
[the requirement for minimization of impact] out of
[section 316(b)].” Jd. at 513.
24
In section 316(b), Congress similarly instructed
EPA to set a national standard that would reduce the
killing of trillions of fish and other aquatic life to the
lowest level possible. The statutory language defines
the basic relationship between costs and benefits by
mandating the achievement of a particular goal and
limiting the achievement only in terms of
“availability.” Indeed, the Industry Petitioners
acknowledge that the courts evaluate’ the
permissibility of a cost-benefit analysis differently
where Congress has articulated a specific goal that
must be achieved. See Entergy Br. at 27 (“The few
circuit courts that have read American Textile to
prohibit cost-benefit analysis in the OSHA context
have emphasized the specific and inflexible worker
safety goal set by the statute”; and “|t|his Court held
that the language in [section] 109(b)\1) plainly
requires EPA to set the minimum § standards
“requisite” to achieve that goal, and that costs were
irrelevant.”). Here, Congress has in fact articulated
the specific goal to be achieved. EPA may not override
Congress’ choice based on the agency’s own policy
preference. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438,
1462-1463 (2007) (the exercise of EPA’s discretion
must fall within defined statutory limits, and “[t]o the
extent that this constrains agency discretion to pursue
other priorities ... this is the congressional design.”);
Chevron, supra, 467 U.S. at 865-866 (an agency may
base its judgments on its own policy choices only
where “Congress itself either inadvertently did not
resolve [the issue], or intentionally left [it] to be
resolved by the agency. . . .”).
25
The United States and Industry Petitioners
create a perception of ambiguity by parsing the words
in section 316(b). Petitioners then juxtapose a parsed
word with an unrelated scenario designed to produce
an absurd result, and suggest that acceptance of the
fringe definition or concession of deference from the
Court are the only means of avoiding the absurdity.
But legal ambiguity is not created by perception
alone, and absurd results can be avoided without
presuming congressiona! delegation or requiring
court-afforded deference to an agency’s_ policy
preference for setting intake structure standards
according to its own view that a cost-benefit analysis
is allowed.”
Petitioners’ approach to statutory interpretation,
arguing that each term listed in section 316(b) can
have a number of possible meanings when viewed in
isolation from the statutory standard overall, has
consistently been rejected by this Court. See Bre wn v.
Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994) (“Ambiguity is a
creature not of definitional possibilities but of
statutory context.”); American Trucking, supra, 531
U.S. at 466; FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132-133 (2000) (“Brown &
‘° Industry Petitioners mischaracterize and question the
policy goals set by Congress in section 316(b). See Entergy Br. at
49 (“a campaign to eliminate impingement and entrainment of
fish to the maximum extent possible without regard to cost, is
self-evidently unsound policy”); see also Entergy Br. at 57 (not
allowing consideration of cost versus benefit “places fish and
other aquatic organisms on a pedestal never erected by
Congress”).
26
Williamson”) (“While a word can have more than one
meaning in the abstract, that same word can be given
concrete meaning by the context in which it
appears.”). Petitioners’ reliance on possible and little-
used definitions of a single word cannot trump the
meaning of that word when it is viewed in its
statutory context.
For example, the United States defines the word
“best” as “a relative term capable of different
meanings.” It argues the “‘best’ way of pursuing a
goal is not always the one that most single-mindedly
achieves that goal at all costs.” EPA Br. at 16. To
illustrate this, it suggests that the best route home
might not be the quickest route. This example,
however, ignores the fact that in section 316(b), “best”
is relative to a specific Congressional objective — best
for minimizing impact. If the stated objective,
therefore, is to select the best route available for
arriving home as quickly as possible, then the
quickest route, if it is accessible, is indeed the best
route. If, on the other hand, the stated objective is to
select the best route available for arriving home in
the safest manner possible, then the best route home
might be the longer route with lower speed limits and
less traffic regardless of the additional cost in gas or
potential for additional wear and tear on the vehicle.
The superlative “best,” therefore, cannot’ be
disconnected from the stated objective. In this case,
the “best” technology is given its proper context by
27
the phrase that follows it in the statute: for
minimizing adverse environmental impact.”
Next, the United States argues that the
preposition “for” is “sometimes used to indicate
appropriateness or suitability,” EPA Br. at 16
(quoting American Heritage Dictionary 686 (4th ed.,
2006)). Petitioner relies, however, on the eighth listed
definition in that source, as opposed to the first listed
definition, i.e., “to indicate the object, aim, or purpose
of an action or activity.” Cf American Trucking, 531
U.S. at 466 (the Court rejected the second listed
definition as “making no sense” in the context of
section 109(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act). The United
States also suggests that, had Congress used the
word “at,” the legislative intent to demand that the
selected technology actually be the best technology
would have been clear. By way of example, the
Petitioner suggests that, “the best person at his trade
might not be the best person for a particular job,”
EPA Br. at 16, but fails to acknowledge that the
specifications of the particular job are relevant. For
‘© Congress’ use of this specific purpose-defining modifier in
section 316(b) contrasts with statutory standards that Congress
used elsewhere in the Act. For example, Congress directed
EPA to establish effluent limitations for toxic pollutants that
reflect “best available technology economically achievable.” CWA
§ 301(bM2KA), 33 U.S.C. §1311(b)2A). The words
“economically achievable” modify the phrase “best available
technology,” giving that phrase a different meaning, one that
expressly includes cost considerations. In stark contrast, the
modifying language in section 316(b) focuses on minimizing
environmental impact, not on costs.
28
example, if a particular job calls only for a person
with superior skills for repairing shoes, then the best
cobbler at his trade would also be the best person for
the job. If, however, the job calls for a cobbler who
also has good “people skills,” then a cobbler with poor
“people skills” may not be the best person for the job
even if he is the best at his trade. By detaching the
preposition from the legislative objective, however,
Petitioner again provides an example that is
inapplicable in the context of section 316(b), because
Congress did specify the objective.’ The use of “at” or
“for” in this context, therefore, is a distinction without
a difference.
In addressing the term “available,” the United
States suggests that just because a luxury item is
available does not mean that the cost is justified
or that it would be purchased. That would be true if
the person were not required to obtain the item.
Section 316(b), by contrast, requires the minimization
’ Relying also on BP Exploration & Oil, Inc. v. EPA, 66 F.3d
784 (6th Cir. 1995), to further its example, the United States
quotes the Sixth Circuit explaining that “the requirement that
EPA choose the ‘best’ technology does not mean that the chosen
technology must be the best pollutant removal.” BP Exploration,
66 F.3d at 796. The standard at issue in BP Oil was the best
available technology standard under section 301(bX2)A). As
discussed above, this standard for non-conventional effluent
requires that the best available technology also be economically
achievable. In this context, the Sixth Circuit’s dicta, conveys
only the obvious — the best technology does not necessarily have
to be the best at pollutant removal if the best at pollutant
removal is not also economically achievable.
29
of adverse environmental impact on an aquatic
ecosystem. Congress directed that the _ selected
technology be the best for accomplishing that
objective. Relying on an example that disputes the
“availability” of a luxury item on the basis of its
affordability misses the mark. Moreover, the question
presented in this case is not whether costs may be
considered at some secondary level in determining
“availability.” The question is whether EPA may
elevate cost considerations to the forefront of its
technology evaluation by relying on a cost-benefit
analysis.
The United States also proposes a definition of
“minimize” that does not withstand § scrutiny.
Departing from the definition that EPA itself has
used over the past three decades, the United States
cites a single source to justify its argument that “in
common usage, the terms “minimal” and “minimize”
often refer to a lesser degree of reduction.” EPA Br. at
17. But as discussed above, EPA applied the most
natural definition of “minimize” — “to reduce to the
smallest extent” — when it first promulgated intake
structure rules in 1976, and more recently when it
promulgated the Phase I Rule governing intake
structures at new facilities.
* MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel., 512
U.S. 218, 226 (1994) (When the Court spoke of alternative
dictionary definitions in Natl R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston &
Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 418-419 (1992), “it did not refer to
what we have here: one dictionary whose suggested meaning
contradicts virtually all others.”).
30
Moreover, the “risk assessment” example that the
United States gives is inapposite. The United States
relies on the following example:
(Ilf a person said that he was trying to
minimize the risk of being hit by a car while
crossing a street, he presumably would not
mean that he was staying inside his house
at all times. Instead the person would
presumably mean that he was trying to
reduce that risk consistent with other
practical considerations, including economic
ones such as the need to travel to work.
EPA Br. at 17-18 (emphasis added).
That analogy is flawed because its very premise
is that the person is engaged in a risk assessment.
The best technology available for minimizing adverse
environmental impact determination required by
section 316(b) does not, however, mandate a risk
assessment; it mandates minimizing the known
adverse impact. If, for example, a pedestrian had to
cross Interstate 95 to travel to work, the pedestrian,
undoubtedly, would do more than simply look both
ways before crossing to minimize the _ greater
likelihood that she could be injured or killed given the
nature of the road she was trying to cross. The
pedestrian would likely use every precautionary
measure available to her to reduce to the smallest
possible degree the likelihood that she could be struck
by a car.
31
In other words, when trying to assess whether
protecting society from an uncertain risk is worth the
cost of regulating, a cost-benefit analysis may be a
central consideration, but where the impact is certain
and the cost of minimizing it necessary, cost is not
necessarily a factor for consideration at all. When a
person says, “minimize impact X,” the only natural
meaning of that statement is to “reduce” impact X “to
the smallest possible number, degree, or extent.”
Webster’s Third, at 1438. For this reason, EPA’s
example and its reliance on Hon. Justice Breyer’s
book, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective
Risk Regulation, are misplaced. See EPA Br. at 14 and
18.
Thus, Congress’ decision in section 316(b), not to
refer to costs, or costs in relation to benefits, was not
an oversight, nor can it be construed as ambiguous
silence. It was deliberate subordination of cost
considerations to an emphasis on minimizing
environmental impact.
B. Throughout the Clean Water Act, Congress
Told EPA When and How It Could Consider
Costs.
In making a threshold determination under
Chevron, the Court should not “confine itself to
examining a particular provision in isolation,” but
should follow the “fundamental canon of statutory
construction that the words of a statute must be read
in their context and with a view to their place in the
32
overall statutory scheme.” Nat’ Ass’n of Home
Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S.Ct. 2518, 2534
(2007) (quoting Brown & Williamson, supra, 529 U.S.
at 132-133). Congress’ direction as to when and how
EPA could consider costs in sections 301 and 306 of
the Act confirms that EPA cannot balance costs with
benefits when selecting the best technology under
section 316(b).
As a preliminary matter, the express reference in
section 316(b) to sections 301 and 306 of the Act is not
a cross reference inviting EPA to apply the same
technology standards for discharges set forth in those
sections. Section 316(b) provides that “[aJny standard
established pursuant to [33 U.S.C.] section 1311
[section 301i) of this title, or [33 U.S.C.] section 1316
{section 306] and applicable to a point source” shall
require cooling water intake structures to reflect
best technology available for minimizing adverse
environmental tmpact. By the United States’ own
admission, “the only direct consequence of the cross-
reference is a procedural one: when any standard
under section 301 or 306 is made applicable to a point
source with an intake structure,” the standard must
also reflect the best technology available for
minimizing adverse environmental impact. EPA Br. at
19. The reference in section 316(b) to sections 301
and 306, therefore, means only that when EPA
promulgates or revises effluent limitations for
existing facilities under section 301, or for new
facilities under section 306, it must also include
national requirements for cooling water intake
33
structures. Moreover, section 316(b) does not
reference section 304, where the enumerated factors
for the technology standards for existing facilities are
found. See R.A. (chart comparing the factors Congress
directed EPA to consider when selecting the
best technology available for minimizing adverse
environmental impact under section 316(b), with the
factors EPA must consider when setting effluent
limitations standards for other politutant discharges
under sections 301 and 306 of the CWA, or when
justifying a variance from thermal discharge
limitations under section 316(a)).
A review of the technology standards for
discharges does, however, assist in understanding the
role of costs in the determination of best technology
available for minimizing adverse impact. Congress
decided to provide different standards for different
types of pollutants and facilities, and expressed
its view of when and how EPA should consider
technology costs when applying those statutory
standards. It used different technology phrases
throughout section 301 and then in section 306,
with specific modifying language — “practicable
technology,” “conventional technology,” and “technology
economically achievable” — and intended to give each
standard different meaning in its application. In
some cases, Congress required EPA to consider cost
in relation to environmental benefit. In other
instances, Congress told EPA to consider cost as a
factor, but not in relation to environmental benefit.
CWA § 304(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b). But in none of the
34
other technology standards in sections 301, 304, and
306 did Congress — as it did in section 316(b) —
altogether omit any reference to cost. See R.A. This
striking contrast between section 316(b) and the
Act’s technology standards for discharges provides
powerful confirmation that Congress did not intend
EPA to undertake a cost-benefit analysis when
selecting the best technology available for minimizing
adverse environmental impact.
Under section 301, EPA was initially required to
establish effluent limitations for existing industrial
facilities that required best practicable control
technology (“BPT”), which standards the facilities
were required to meet before 1989. CWA
§ 301(b)(1 A), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)1)(A). In setting
BPT, Congress required EPA to consider the “total
cost of application of technology in relation to effluent
reduction benefits to be achieved from such
application,” and the age of the equipment and
facilities involved, the process employed, engineering
aspects of the application of various types of control
techniques, process changes, non-water quality
environmental impacts, energy requirements, and
other factors EPA deems _ appropriate. CWA
§ 304(b\ 1B), 33 U.S.C. § 13814(b\ 1B). Since 1989,
existing facilities have been required to comply with
more stringent effluent limitations for most toxic
pollutants, including thermal pollution, that reflect
the best available technology economically achievable
(“BAT”). CWA § 301(b2)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A).
In transitioning from BPT to BAT, Congress directed
35
that “in assessing BAT total cost is no longer to be
considered in comparison to effluent reduction
benefits” of eliminating the discharge of pollutants.
EPA v. Nat’l Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64, 71
(1980) (discussing CWA § 304(b\(2)(B), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1314(b)(2)(B)).
For new facilities, required to meet the more
stringent standard “best available demonstrated
technology” (““BADT”), EPA was directed again, as
with BAT, to only consider the cost of achieving the
reduction.'® CWA § 306(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(1);
CWA § 304(b)(4)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(4)(B). In fact,
the reference in section 316(b) to section 306 (the
section applicable to new rather than existing
facilities) confirms Congress’ intent to eliminate
EPA’s authority to make cost-benefit comparisons
when it sets new source performance standards.
Consistent with its technology-forcing approach,
Congress did not direct EPA to consider the value of
the benefits to the receiving water body at all when
promulgating BADT regulations. /d.; See R.A.
For conventional pollutants, under a provision
added to the Act in 1977, existing facilities must
comply with effluent limitations that reflect “best
conventional pollutant control technology” (“BCT”).
"The CWA requires EPA to revise its regulations
periodically, with respect to both new and existing facilities, to
reflect advances in technology. See, e.g., CWA § 304(b), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1314(b); CWA § 306(b\( 1B), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b1 1B).
36
CWA § 301(b\2xE), 33 U.S.C. §1311(b)(2)E). In
setting BCT, like BPT, Congress directed EPA to
consider costs in relation to benefits. CWA § 304(b)(4)\(B),
33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(4)(B). See R.A. Petitioners argue
that because Congress has authorized EPA to
continue to compare costs with benefits when it
establishes BCT effluent limitations for conventional
pollutants, such as BOD, fecal coliform, total
suspended solids, pH, oil and grease, Congress has
also evinced an unambiguous intent to allow EPA to
compare costs with benefits under section 316(b). EPA
Br. at 24-25. But Congress’ express enumeration of a
cost-benefit comparison factor for BCT five years
after it enacted section 316(b) only confirms that
Congress made deliberate choices about when EPA
was to consider costs in relation to benefits, and when
it could not.
In section 316(b), Congress imposed on EPA the
single, unique mandate of requiring both new and
existing facilities to apply best technology available
for minimizing adverse’ environmental impact
associated with intake structures. This Court has
refused to find implicit authorization of certain
factors where Congress has been explicit elsewhere in
the same statute. See, e.g., American Trucking, 531
U.S., supra, at 467. Congress did not authorize EPA
to set national standards based on cost-benefit
analysis.
Congress’ intent to preclude cost-benefit analysis
in regulating intake structures is further shown by
examining section 316(a). In that provision, Congress
37
also does not allow for consideration of cost, even
when operators of a point source apply for a variance
from the otherwise-applicable effluent limitation.
Instead, a variance is authorized only when the
standards “are more stringent than necessary to
assure the projection and propagation of a balanced,
indigenous population of shellfish, fish, and wildlife”
in and on a particular water body. CWA § 316(a), 33
U.S.C. § 1326(a). As in section 316(b), the impact on
fish and wildlife is the paramount concern.
) Even the United States acknowledges that
Congress made deliberate choices about when EPA
may use cost-benefit comparisons and when it may
not. EPA Br. at 19 (“Congress specified the factors
that EPA must consider in promulgating each of the
various “best” standards found in sections 301 and
306. In doing so, it expressly required consideration of
costs for all of those standards, and specifically
required consideration of the relationship between
costs and benefits for two of them.”) (emphasis
added); see also EPA Br. at 21 (“The bottom line is
that each of the cross-referenced provisions requires
consideration of costs, and two of them (BPT and
BCT) specifically require comparison of costs and
benefits.”) (emphasis added). In marked contrast,
section 316(b) expressly requires that EPA choose a
technology that minimizes environmental impact,
and does not authorize EPA to consider cost in
relation to benefits.
38
C. The Legislative History Supports. the
Conclusion that Congress Rejected a Cost-
Benefit Analysis in Section 316(b).
The legislative history of section 316(b) is sparse
and undeserving of any significant weight. What little
there is, however, supports the conclusion that the
meaning of section 316(b) is plain on its face. In the
House Consideration of the Report of the Conference
Committee (Oct. 4, 1972) on the final version of the
1972 CWA Amendments, Representative Clausen
explained the meaning of section 316(b) by using the
language of section 316(b) itself, stating that
“(slection 316(b) requires the location, design,
construction and capacity of cooling water intake
structures of steam-electric generating plants to
reflect the best technology available for minimizing
any adverse environmental impact.” Congressional
Research Service, “A Legislative History of the Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Vol. 1,”
93d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 264 (“Legislative History”).
Petitioners, however, place a great deal of weight
on Representative Clausen’s one sentence remark in
which he suggested that the word “available” means
“commercially available at an economically
practicable cost.” This lone statement acts as the
springboard for Petitioners’ sometimes alternative
argument that a_ cost-benefit analysis’ is
unambiguously allowed by the “plain meaning” of
section 316(b). This remark is undeserving of such
weight. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281,
311 (1979) (“[T]he remarks of a single legislator, even
39
the sponsor, are not controlling in analyzing
legislative history.”); Consumer Product Safety
Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 118
(1980). But even this single statement underscores
the point that “availability” does not involve the
weighing of cost with benefits, even in Representative
Clausen’s mind, since he did not define the word that
way; rather, he defined the word “available” in terms
of “practicability.” See States’ Br, supra at 18
(definition of “practicable”).
The legislative history of sections 301, 304, and
306 also supports the literal reading of section 316(b)
because it establishes that Congress did not intend to
allow EPA to conduct a cost-benefit analysis in setting
any of the “best technology” standards where
“availability” was also a component. Specifically, the
legislative reports accompanying’ the 1972
amendments to the CWA confirm that Congress
intended a cost-benefit consideration to be made only
during the transitional period before 1989 when
establishing the effluent limitations under the BPT
standard.” For example, in the 1972 Senate
Consideration of the Report of the Conference
” The BCT standard, the only other provision directing EPA
to consider the relationship between costs and benefits, was not
added to the CWA until 1977. See 3 Legislative History of the
Clean Water Act of 1977 - A Continuation of the Legislative
History of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1972, at 427 (Committee Print compiled for the Senate
Committee on Public Works by the Library of Congress), Sen.
No. 95-14 (1975) (Statement of Senator Muskie).
40
Committee, the Chairman and the principal sponsor
of the Senate Bill, Senator Edmund Muskie,
discussed the difference between BPT to comply with
section 301(b)(1)(A) and BAT to comply with section
301(b)(2)(A) of the Act:
In making the determination of [BAT] for a
category or class, the Administrator is
expected to apply the same principles
involved in making the determination of
([BPT], except as to cost-benefit analysis. Also,
rather than establishing the range of levels
in reference to the average of the best
performers in an industrial category, the
range should, at a minimum, be established
with reference to the best performer in any
industrial category. The distinction between
([BPT] and [BAT] is intended to reflect the
need to press toward increasingly higher
levels of control. . . .
Senate Consideration of the Report of the Conference
Committee, 92d Congress, October 4, 1972, p. 170
(emphasis added), reprinted in Legislative History of
the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972
(Senate Public Works Comm.), Sen. No. 93-1 (1973).
Senator Muskie further elaborated on the limited
way Congress intended te Administrator to consider
cost in determining BAT:
As to the cost of [BAT] — While cost should be
a factor in the Administrator’s judgment,
no balancing test will be required. The
Administrator will be bound by a test of
41
reasonableness. In this case, the
reasonableness of what is ‘economically
achievable’ should reflect an evaluation of
what needs to be done to move toward the
elimination of the discharge of pollutants
and what is achievable through the
application of available technology — without
regard to cost.
Id. (emphasis added).”'
That Congress made deliberate choices about
when to require cost-benefit considerations is further
evidenced by the legislative history associated with
section 316 generally. The Conference Committee
Report for the CWA of 1972 explains that, while
the House bill had proposed a version of section 316
that would have called for the altogether separate
* The standard established in section 306(a\(1) is the most
stringent effluent limitation standard in the CWA and does not
allow for a comparison of costs and benefits. See Senate
Consideration of the Report of the Conference Committee, 92d
Congress, October 4, 1972 at 170, reprinted in 1 Legislative
History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972
(Senate Public Works Comm.), Sen. No. 93-1 (1973). See also
S. Rep. 92-414 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668,
3724 (“The implicit consideration of economic factors in
determining whether technology is ‘available’ should not affect
the usefulness of this section. The overriding purpose of this
section would be to prevent new water pollution problems, and
toward that end, maximum feasible control of new sources, at
the time of their construction, is considered by the Committee to
be the most effective and, in the long run, the least expensive
approach to pollution contro]l.”).
42
regulation of thermal discharges, including a case-by-
case variance based on a test involving a comparison
of costs against benefits, the final bill, as modified by
the Conference Committee, substituted the provision
that was finally enacted as section 316(a). Section
316(a) provided that heat would be treated like any
other pollutant, except for the creation of the limited
variance specified in section 316(a). Notably, cost-
benefit analysis was not included in any of the section
316 provisions. See Conference Committee Report
No. 92-1236 (accompanying S. 2770) (Sept. 28. 1972)
pp. 175 and 320 (CWA amendments 1972).
Reliance on a cost-benefit analysis, therefore, is
inconsistent with Congress’ intent, as confirmed by
the legislative history, to eliminate the impact on the
Nation’s waters by requiring EPA to implement
technology-forcing standards. Thus, in setting the
national standard for cooling water intake structures,
EPA must require that the technology achieve the
desired end, and must not modify the desired end as a
result of its consideration of the costs in relation to
benefits to achieve that end.
The Petitioners, Entergy Corp. and PSEG Fossil
(“Entergy”), mischaracterize the Second Circuit's
construction of section 316(b), as pronouncing a
“radical,” “unsound,” and “nonsensical” “clear
statement rule.” Entergy Br. at 21 and 24. Entergy
inaccurately asserts “the Second Circuit concluded
that cost-benefit analysis is_ prohibited unless
explicitly authorized, based solely on this Court’s
statement in American Textile that ‘when Congress
43
has intended that an agency engage in cost-benefit
analysis, it has clearly indicated such intent on the
face of the statute.’” Entergy Br at 24 (quoting
American Textile, 452 U.S. at 510) (emphasis added).
The Second Circuit’s reading of section 316(b),
however, was completely justified. Far from being
“radical” or establishing a “clear statement rule,” the
Second Circuit’s conclusion was reached using the
basic tools of statutory construction. The court held
only that Congress had set an unambiguous objective
in section 316(b), one that is incompatible with the
agency’ cost-benefit approach when setting a
national standard for Phase II facilities or addressing
permits at a site-specific level. The Second Circuit’s
conclusion was not based solely on this Court’s
statement in American Textile, but was based on a
thorough review of the text of section 316(b) itself, an
examination of section 316(b) in relation to and in
contrast to the other technology standards in the Act,
legislative history, and the policy goals of the Act.
The Court therefore should reject Entergy’s
invitation to “adopt a presumption or clear statement
rule that is the opposite of the one employed by the
Second Circuit.” Entergy Br. at 29 (emphasis in
original). See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320, n.45
(2001) (The cases and rules cited by Petitioner
are distinguishable because “[wJe only defer, however,
to agency interpretations of statutes that, applying
the normal ‘tools of statutory construction’ are
ambiguous.”). In essence all of the Petitioners are
asking the Court to presume ambiguity. Such a
44
presumption would allow agencies to second-guess
Congress’ intent even though the statutory language
plainly indicates that Congress has _ already
determined the relationship between the costs and
benefits. Here, this Court should find that Congress
deliberately precluded EPA from_ establishing
standards for intake structures based on a
cost-benefit analysis, and instead directed the
minimization of environmental impact with the factor
of cost as a subordinate consideration.
+
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
Patrick C. LYNCH
Attorney General of Rhode Island
TRICLA O’HARE JEDELE,
Counsel of Record
Special Assistant Attorney General
150 South Main Street
Providence, RI 02903
(401) 274-4400
(Additional Counsel Listed
On Inside Front Cover)
September 29, 2008
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.