Respondents Brief — Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc.

Supreme Court brief2009

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\\ * Nos. 07-588, 07°569'& 07°597 (Consolids

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In The

Supreme Court of the Gnited S

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ENTERGY CORP., Petitioner,

V.

ENVIRONMEN'TAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.,

Respondents.

*

PSEG FOSSIL LLC AND PSEG NUCLEAR LLC,

Petitioners,

V.

RIVERKEEPER, INC., ET AL., Respondents.

@

UTILITY WATER ACT GROUP, Petitioner,

V.

RIVERKEEPER, INC., ET AL., Respondents.

ry

On Writ Of Certiorari To The

United States Court Of Appeals

For The Second Circuit

6

BRIEF FOR THE STATES AS RESPONDENTS

¢

PATRICK C. LYNCH

Attorney General of Rhode Island

TRICIA O'HARE JEDELE, Counsel of Record

Special Assistant Attorney General

150 South Main Street

Providence, RI 02903

(401) 274-4400

(Additional Counsel Listed On [Inside Cover)

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PHINTING CO tsOU) 225 O46

OR CALL COLLECT 402) 442-2851

“dé o.

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL

Attorney General

of Connecticut

KIMBERLY MASSICOTTE

MATTHEW LEVINE

Assistant Attorneys General

P.O. Box 120

55 Elm Street

Hartford, CT 06141-0120

(860) 808-5250

MARTHA COAKLEY

Attorney General

of Massachusetts

ANDREW GOLDBERG

Assistant Attorney General

1 Ashburton Place,

18th Floor

Boston, MA 02108

(617) 727-2200

ANDREW M. CUOMO

Attorney General of New York

BARBARA D. UNDERWOOD

Solicitor General

ANDY D. BING

Deputy Solicitor General

DENISE A. HARTMAN

Assistant Solicitor General

MAUREEN F. LEARY

Assistant Attorney General

The Capitol

Albany, NY 12224

(518) 473-6085

JOSEPH R. BIDEN III

Attorney General

of Delaware

KEVIN MALONEY

Deputy Attorney General

820 N. French Street,

6th Floor

Wilmington, DE 19801

(302) 577-8327

ANNE MILGRAM

Attorney General

of New Jersey

ELLEN BARNEY BALINT

Deputy Attorney General

P.O. Box 093

25 Market Street

Trenton, NJ 08625-0093

(609) 984-5065

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether § 316(b) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.

§ 1326(b), authorizes the Environmental Protection

Agency to compare costs with benefits in determining

the “best technology available for minimizing adverse

environmental impact” at cooling water intake

structures?

il

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.....................cceeceeeees 1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ....................... 15

TT cicitiniinieiiisiniddinitihiitiainidininsupucdicetnanminiin 17

SECTION 316(b) OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT

DOES NOT ALLOW EPA TO RELY ON A COST-

BENEFIT ANALYSIS AS THE BASIS FOR

ESTABLISHING A NATIONAL RULE FOR

INTAKE STRUCTURES OR FOR MAKING

SITE-SPECIFIC PERMITTING DECISIONS.. 17

A. The Plain Language of § 316(b) Requires

EPA to Promulgate a Rule That Minimizes

Adverse Environmental Impact.................. 18

B. Throughout the Clean Water Act, Congress

Told EPA When and How It Could

NI iin cenlicticeninestalieeiictadiiacaltidieaitahlcsdnnsecietid 31

C. The Legislative History Supports the

Conclusion That Congress Rejected a Cost-

Benefit Analysis in Section 316(b) .............. 38

ET eiiinsiiictlainasednouiaciniasdintaseanammniiendencedins 44

ADDENDUM

ill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES:

American Textile Mfrs. Institute, Inc. v. Donovan,

Lt tener passim

Appalachian Power Co. v. Train,

ee ee Ss CEE GES BUDE DD vcscccccscccccccsccscesevecccosseses 7

BP Exploration & Oil, Inc. v. E.P.A.,

EE ON 28

Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115 (1994)...........000000.... 25

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)...18, 24, 31

Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979)........... 38

Conoco Phillips Co. v. U.S. Environmental

Protection Agency, (Docket No. 06-60662)

aa Ak il emsncounaniianats 9

Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v.

NYSDEC, 726 F.Supp. 1404 (S.D.N.-Y. 1989)........ ila

Consumer Product Safety Comm’n v. GTE

Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102 (1980)....................085. 39

Cronin v. Browner,

898 F.Supp. 1052 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) .................ceccceeeees 8

Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992)..................... 22

EPA v. Nat’l Crushed Stone Ass’n,

I nonin 14, 35

FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,

I isebbnene 25, 32

INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2JOOL) .............ccceccesesvers 43

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007)........... 24

MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Am. Tel. &

Bee Gan, GER Weak He Cet icteicssccestiiiciieniinnieniat 29

Nat'l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of

Wildlife, 127 S.Ct. 2618 (2007) ........cccccccsccossccsvereses 32

Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine

ef) NE 29

Nat'l Wildlife Fed’n v. EPA,

286 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2002)............ccccsscosscescessceses 14

Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA,

ot Be Ek | eee 4,9

Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA,

475 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2007)................. 2,12, 13, 14, 15

Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns,

— BS Fg, | Rn eee 22, 23, 25, 27, 36

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000)..................... 18

STATUTES:

Be WP ds © BIOO ccvesicccocecisncstiininisadinimbenmnmeeeeannneeee 1,4

SD WP TAD. ©] Bie aicvncecccncescosniessetassestecnsccssinmendiiiamal passim

BD WIBLS. | DR wccscenscvcsveccecssetenneed 6, 13, 34, 40

33 U.S.C. § ISLC MBNA)... cccccccosccsossssss 6, 27, 28, 34, 40

BD UA. B BSD csv ccncvcciccesssiscescnammenaan 6, 36

a EF ts Oe GO cas ccicnsenssnienetbactinesteamanenene 5, 33, 34

BD Wr TAs DB BIG encececiccisscscdencacscensennnsevennaena 33, 35

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

Es OF MITE BEE csssccrescececcssceecessssencoseredesed 6, 34

a eo vnssensucscenscnsccoceesessensoveneesie 35

Se Rs OF PIII a cecsccscccsceccecccecescerocesees 6, 35, 36

ae icicntdinencasesocntcswnccsaniscercessneunie passim

I I TD cc civccccacsonsseconescoscocenesceoses 6, 35, 41

ED cc occnesecececsionenssasesecsenesscnanseus 35

ee PEs UF MEUED scsccccccsccccnccccccccssoscaes 5, 33, 36, 37, 42

I os cn cascnncgennscececesnseasscassnseoes passim

Be Es OF POEL BPvcccnascccevcscsccccsescosceses 22, 23, 24, 27

CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS:

a saree demnssenonsatinn 20

I ae MEINE DE Dccccccsccccccscoscecescscccsonccocessnssess 11

IS Ot MIDE BEE Das scccncccccescestvsccesccsecsssccssessess 11

ee Oe MIE TEIIME D vc ccccccccccccccsscccsccseescesscccesoveese 12

ad sadn nctnnennenesonssosee 12

Ae Ec cn ncocesccdconscccecoesscosoesceuseses 12

Es OF MPMI IE EE FLEE Pac cccccncccccccscccsscrecsesesceccecesesss 12

EE ce 12

FEDERAL REGISTER:

38 Fed. Reg. 34,410 (December 13, 1973).................... 7

41 Fed. Reg. 17,387 (April 26, 1976)..............000.0.. 7,19

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

66 Fed. Reg. 65,256 (December 18, 2001).................... 9

67 Fed. Reg. 17,122 (April 9, 2002).......... eee ee eeee 8

69 Fed Reg. 41,576-623 (July 9, 2004)............... passim

71 Fed. Reg. 35,006 (June 16, 2006).....................ce0eeee 9g

TB FOG. MO. ST, IST GRRG B, BOOT) ..cccvecveccccsccccscsccsess 15

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:

1 A Legislative History of the Water Pollution

Control Act Amendments of 1972 263 (93d

S.C re terse cccncitcncccanincesensicinesennns 38, 41

Senate Consideration of the Report of the

Conference Committee, 92d Cong., 170

(October 4, 1972), reprinted in 1 Legislative

History of the Water Pollution Control Act

Amendments of 1972 (Comm. Print 1973)....... 40, 41

Senate Report 92-414 (1971), reprinted in

Ces acRses GUT A MEETED cbsissctcscsceesisesncsstncesisecesaied 41

Conference Committee Report No. 92-1236

(accompanying S. 2770) (Sept. 28, 1972) ............... 42

3 Legislative History of the Clean Water Act of

1977 — A Continuation of the Legislative

History of the Federal Water Pollution

Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Committee

Print compiled for the Senate Committee on

Public Works by the Library of Congress),

427, Sen. No. 95-14 (1975) (Statement of

er IE its:iinchs sain tasiiaineneaidnlesnaainabiiaemratenshoantid 39

V1l

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

OTHER AUTHORITY:

American Heritage Dictionary of the English

Language (Houghton Mij£fflin, 4th ed.

SD aiikicrsiitajeichnisieaabamieihieiiviaieesiicihddladaiuiicanipesp omibiigeitas 19, 21, 27

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary

of the English Language, (Merriam-Webster

unabridged ed., 1981) .....................0e008 19, 20, 21, 31

In re Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Decision

of the General Counsel, No. 41 (1976) ..........00.00.... 20

“Development Document for Proposed Best

Technology Available for Minimizing Adverse

Environmental Impact of Cooling Water

Intake Structures” (“Development Document”)

available at http://nepis.epa.gov...............0...ccceeeeeeee 7

SAIC Background Paper Number 3: Cooling

Water Intake Technologies, EPA, April 4,

ITE chisiaisdisiedinnetsaibidabaiiniba plindinialdighlablinbictiipdhidsaianeniasianse 11

Hon. Stephen G. Breyer, Breaking the Vicious

Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulations

EI Ia liiseschssecinesseaiicibicheaeps cealuaehbiiciberiaibametaleeniiamsdlariaosbcesiiiitiigiigied 31

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act’ addresses

the impact to fish and other aquatic life caused by the

massive withdrawal of water at cooling water intake

structures. Section 316(b) mandates that:

Any standard established pursuant to

section 1311 of this title or section 1316 of

this title and applicable to a point source

shall require that the location, design,

construction, and capacity of cooling water

intake structures reflect the best technology

available for minimizing adverse

environmental impact.

CWA § 316(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (emphasis added).

This case is about whether in selecting the best

technology available for minimizing adverse

environmental impact under section 316(b), the

United States Environmental Protection Agency

(“EPA”) may reject the best technology based on the

agencys comparison of costs with the value of

benefits. Specifically, the question is whether the

language or purpose of the statute supports EPA's

reliance upon a cost-benefit analysis in establishing a

national rule governing intake structures, or in

setting site-specific permitting alternatives for intake

structures.

' The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended, is

commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act (herein referred to

as “CWA” or “the Act”). See 86 Stat. 816, 33 U.S.C. § 1251, et seq.

2

The State-Respondents’ agree with the Second

Circuit Court of Appeals’ conclusion that, “[wJhile the

statutory language suggests that the EPA may

consider costs” in making this determination, “cost-

benefit analysis is not similarly supported by the

language or purpose of the [Act].” Pet. App. 24a

(Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 475 F.3d 83, 99) (2d Cir.

2007) (“Riverkeeper IT’).* Congress’ use of the word

“available” allows for a limited consideration of cost,

but when viewed in context, the technology standard

in section 316(b) bars EPA from relying on a cost-

benefit analysis when establishing the national rule

or site-specific permitting alternatives for intake

structures. In Riverkeeper II, the Second Circuit

properly understood the concept of “availability” in

terms of “feasibility,” and thus approved a type of

feasibility analysis rather than a cost-benefit analysis

as being consistent with section 316(b). See Pet. App.

27a (Riverkeeper II, id. at 100) (citing American

Textile Mfrs. Institute, Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490,

509-510 (1981) (“American Textile”) (“Congress itself

has defined the relationship between technology costs

and environmental benefits, and placed the emphasis

on minimizing environmental impacts.”).

* State-Respondents include: the States of Rhode Island,

Connecticut, Delaware, New Jersey, and New York, and the

Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

* Citations to “Pet. App.” refer to the Appendix to the

Petition for Certiorari filed by Entergy Corp. in No. 07-588.

“I.A.” refers to the Joint Appendix. “R.A.” refers to the

addendum included in the State-Respondents’ brief.

3

Thus, when promulgating national performance

standards to reflect the statutory mandate, EPA may

consider cost in assessing the “availability” of a

technology in terms of its economic and technological

feasibility, or in evaluating comparably effective

technologies. The language of the statute does not,

however, authorize EPA to require less than the top-

performing technology for minimizing impact based

on its view that the cost of the top-performing

technology outweighs the value of the benefits the

technology would achieve.

The Environmental Impact Caused By Intake

Structures

Electric power generating plants and other

facilities (“power plants”) withdraw hundreds of

billions of gallons of water daily from the Nation’s

waters through “intake structures” to cool nuclear

reactors, or coal or gas-fired turbines, and other

machinery and equipment. Pet. App. 169a-170a (69

Fed. Reg. 41,576, 41,586 (July 9, 2004)). After the

water is drawn, and used by the power plant for

cooling purposes, it is discharged back to the water

bodies as thermally polluted effluent.

A power plant’s intake of cooling water and

subsequent discharge of heated effluent causes two

distinct types of injuries to aquatic life and the

integrity of the Nation’s waters. The process of

withdrawing water through the intake structure

annually kills and injures trillions of fish, shellfish

4

and other aquatic organisms by trapping them

against the screens located at the mouth of the intake

structure (“impingement”), or by drawing them into

the facility with the cooling water (“entrainment”).*

Subsequently, heated effluent is discharged back into

the water body, fundamentally altering the water

body’s physical and chemical characteristics and

thereby making it potentially uninhabitable for fish

and other aquatic /ife.

The Clean Water Act

Congress enacted the Act in 1972 “to restore and

maintain the chemical, physical, and biological

integrity of the Nation’s waters.” CWA, as amended,

86 Stat. 816, 33 U.S.C. § 1251, et seg. In section 316

of the Act, Congress addressed environmental harm

caused by both intake structures and thermally

polluted effluent. In subsection (b), Congress directed

EPA, when it establishes effluent limitations for

these facilities, to require power plants to use the

best technology available for minimizing adverse

“ A single power plant may impinge more than a million

adult fish in a three-week period. Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 358

F.3d 174, 181 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Riverkeeper I”); and may impinge

and entrain trillions of aquatic organisms in a year. Pet. App.

179a (69 Fed. Reg. 41,576, 41,588 (July 9, 2004)). The number

killed or injured is largely corollary to the amount of water

withdrawn and the velocity at which it is being withdrawn, i.e.,

the more water withdrawn and the higher the velocity of the

withdrawal, the greater the harm. See Pet. App. 230a, 241a, and

288a (69 Fed. Reg. at 41,599, 41,601, and 41,612).

5

environmental impact at their intake structures.

CWA §&§ 316(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b). In contrast to this

unequivocal directive regarding intake structures, in

subsection (a) Congress authorized an exception to

compliance with the national effluent limitations for

thermal pollution where a power plant can

demonstrate that a less stringent limitation would

“assure the protection and propagation of a balanced,

indigenous population of shellfish, fish and wildlife on

that water body.” See CWA §316(a), 33 U.S.C.

§ 1326(a).

Because’ section 316(b) addresses’ intake

structures, not effluent, it stands apart from the

statutory provisions elsewhere in the Act that govern

effluent limitations for point source discharges. In

section 301, for instance, Congress established a

statutory framework for EPA to _ set effluent

limitations for existing facilities. 33 U.S.C. § 1311.

Likewise, section 306 of the Act provides EPA with

the statutory framework for setting effluent

limitations for new sources. 33 U.S.C. § 1316. In

these provisions, Congress established discrete

technology-based standards for different types of

pollutants and facilities.

With respect to each of the technology standards,

Congress expressly told EPA when and how to

consider costs depending on the technology standard

being applied. CWA §§ 301, 304, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311,

1314. Congress directed EPA to weigh costs in

relation to water quality benefits in only two

instances: when setting effluent limitations reflecting

best practicable control technology (“BPT”) — a

standard applicable to existing facilities only

until 1989 (see CWA §301(b)(1A), 33 U.S.C.

§ 1311(b)1)(A)) and CWA § 304(bx1)B), 33 U.S.C.

§ 1314(b)(1)(B) (directing EPA to consider “total cost

of application of technology in relation to effluent

reduction benefits to be achieved from _ such

application”); and when setting effluent limitations

reflecting the best conventional technology (“BCT”) —

a standard enacted in the 1977 amendments to the

CWA applicable only to conventional pollutants (see

CWA § 301(b)2)E), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)E) and

CWA § 304(b)4)B), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(4)(B))

(directing EPA to consider “the reasonableness of the

relationship between the costs of attaining a

reduction in effluents and the effluent benefits

derived.”). With respect to all other point sources,

whether from existing or new facilities, Congress

directed EPA to take into account the cost of

achieving effluent reductions, but did not direct EPA

to weigh technology costs against reduction benefits.

See CWA § 301(bX2xA), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A);

CWA § 306(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a\(1).

Thus, while Congress expressly told EPA to

consider technology costs, and in two instances costs in

relation to reduction benefits, when setting national

effluent limitations, it did not expressly tell EPA to

consider costs when establishing national performance

standards for intake structures. Instead, section 316(b)

imposes on EPA the unqualified mandate that intake

structures at both new and existing facilities shall

reflect the best technology available for minimizing

adverse environmental impact.

7

EPA’s Historical Interpretation of Section

316(b)

A little more than a year after Congress passed

section 316(b), EPA issued a draft rule “to insure that

intake structures reflect the best technology available

for minimizing adverse environmental impact.” See

Proposed Rule, Preamble, 38 Fed. Reg. 34,410

(December 13, 1973). On April 26, 1976, EPA issued

the final rule, which incorporated (but did not publish

as part of the rule), a “Development Document for

Proposed Best Technology Available for Minimizing

Adverse Environmental Impact of Cooling Water

Intake Structures” (“Development Document”). See

Final Rule at 41 Fed. Reg. 17,387, 17,390 (April 26,

1976), and see Development Document at p. 175,

available at http://nepis.epa.gov. The Development

Document listed several different technologies that

were, at the time, “available.” Among the most

effective of these technologies was “recirculating

cooling water systems employing off stream means to

transfer heat directly to the atmosphere to minimize

* As a result of a successful industry challenge to EPA's

1976 Rule, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the

1976 Rule because the Development Document had not been

published with the i976 Rule. See Appalachian Power Co. v.

Train, 566 F.2d 451 (4th Cir. 1977).

* The technology available to address the adverse impact

associated with intake structures are relatively limited, and

have included essentially the same set of technologies for more

than thirty years. The technologies include vanous screening

methods, fish return or barrier systems, change of intake

location, and reductions in intake flow.

8

or in some cases eliminate the use of cooling water”

(known as “closed-cycle cooling”).

Closed-cycle cooling continues to be one of the top

technological performers at intake structures in the

industry, eliminating mortality from impingement

and entrainment by up to 98 percent when compared

with conventional once-through systems. Pet. App.

239a-240a (69 Fed. Reg. 41,601). EPA has construed

section 316(b) to require closed-cycle cooling

technology as the best technology available for

minimizing adverse impact at more than a dozen

existing power plants, both before it published the

1976 Rule and after it was remanded. See, e.g.,

Palisades Nuclear Power Plant, 67 Fed. Reg. 17,122,

17,155 (Apri! 9, 2002); Consolidated Edison Co. of

New York, Inc. v. NYSDEC, 726 F.Supp. 1404, 1406

(S.D.N-Y. 1989).

The Phase II Rule

In 1993, environmental groups challenged EPA’s

failure to re-issue regulations governing intake

structures. Pursuant to an amended consent decree

resolving the case, EPA agreed to issue the intake

structure regulations in three phases: the first for

new facilities (“Phase I Rule”); the second for existing

facilities (“Phase II Rule”); and the third for smaller

offshore and coastal facilities (“Phase III Rule”). See

Cronin v. Browner, 898 F.Supp. 1052 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).

In December 2001, EPA issued its final Phase I Rule

9

for new facilities.’ In July 2004, EPA issued the final

Phase II Rule for existing facilities, at issue here.*

EPA issued its final Phase III Rule for smaller

facilities in June 2006.°

The final Phase II Rule applies only to existing

facilities “whose primary activity is to generate and

transmit electric power and who have a design

intake flow of 50 million gallons or greater, and that

use at least 25 percent of the water withdrawn for

cooling purposes.” Pet. App. 189a (69 Fed. Reg. at

41,590). The Phase II Rule establishes “performance

standards” —-— percentage ranges for reducing

impingement (80 to 95 percent) and entrainment (60

to 90 percent) — based on a “range of technologies

that EPA has determined to be commercially

available for the industry as a whole... .” Pet. App.

228a (69 Fed. Reg. at 41,599). In the Phase II Rule,

EPA interpreted “section 316(b) as authorizing it to

" 66 Fed. Reg. 65,256 (Dec. 18, 2001). The Phase I Rule was

challenged by environmental and industry groups, and portions

of it were upheld and others remanded to EPA. See Riverkeeper

I, supra, 358 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2004).

* Pet. App. 122a. 69 Fed. Reg. 41,576 (July 9, 2004).

* 71 Fed. Reg. 35,006 (June 16, 2006). In its Phase III Rule,

EPA decided not to issue regulations governing small existing

facilities. The Phase III Rule contains intake requirements for

new offshore and coastal oil and gas extraction facilities that

had been deferred from the Phase I Rule. The Phase III Rule

was challenged in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, Conoco

Phillips Co. v. EPA (Docket No. 06-60662), and on June 8, 2008,

that matter was stayed pending this Court’s resolution of the

challenge to the Phase II Rule.

10

consider not only technologies but also their effects on

and benefits to the water from which the cooling

water is withdrawn.” Pet. App. 157a (69 Fed. Reg. at

41,583); Pet. App. 249a-250a (69 Fed. Reg. at 41,603).

EPA also compared the efficacy of competing

technologies. Specifically, EPA compared _ the

effectiveness of various technologies in reducing

impingement and entrainment, and concluded that

other design and construction technologies, can

approach closed-cycle cooling at less costs. Pet. App.

260a-261la (69 Fed. Reg. at 41,606). EPA recognized

that closed-cycle cooling is the most effective

technology, see Pet. App. 239a-240a (69 Fed. Reg. at

41,601), but rejected closed-cycle cooling because of

its high costs. See Pet App. 255a (69 Fed. Reg. at

41,605).

EPA therefore set the low ends of the ranges in

the performance standards at 80 percent reduction

for impingement and 60 percent reduction for

entrainment — far less than the 98 percent reductions

that it recognized could be attained by closed-cycle

cooling. Pet. App. 239a (69 Fed. Reg. at 41,601). EPA

based the lower impingement and entrainment

reduction percentages on the performance of less

costly screening technologies. Pet. App. 244a (69 Fed.

Reg. at 41,602). All of the evidence in the record

indicated that screening technologies are far less

effective at reducing the impacts associated with

11

impingement and entrainment at major power

plants."

The Phase II Rule establishes various compliance

alternatives for achieving the performance standards.

Recognizing that closed-cycle cooling has been

installed at more than a dozen existing facilities, the

first alternative allows a facility to demonstrate

compliance with the impingement performance

standard by showing that it has reduced its flow

commensurate with closed-cycle cooling. Pet. App.

556a (40 C.FR. § 125.94(a)(1)(i)). As a _ second

compliance alternative, the Rule deems a facility in

compliance with the impingement performance

standard if it shows that it has reduced its intake

velocity to 0.5 feet per second or less. Pet. App. 556a

(40 C.FR. §125.94(aX1)Gi)). Under another

compliance alternative, a facility may demonstrate

compliance with both impingement and entrainment

performance standards through a combination of

design and construction technologies, commonly

* See Science Applications International Corporation

(“SAIC”), Background Paper Number 3, wherein SAIC, on behalf

of EPA, co::cluded:

The main finding with regard to intake screen

systems is that they are limited in their abilities to

minimize adverse aquatic impact ... and many of our

major power plants have been in serious trouble

because of cooling water conditions [with] which our

U.S. screening system cannot cope.

SAIC Background Paper Number 3: Cooling Water Intake

Technologies, EPA, April 4, 1994, at 3-5 (emphasis in original).

12

referred to by EPA as a “suite of technologies” that it

considered best technology available for minimizing

adverse environmental impact, including wedgewire

screens, barrier systems, fish return systems, Pet.

App. 592a (40 C.F.R. § 125.99(a)), and operational

measures and/or restoration measures." Pet. App.

556a-557a (40 C.F.R. § 125.94(a)(2-4)).

The Phase II Rule also allows two kinds of

site-specific “compliance alternatives” that do not

actually require compliance with the Rule’s

percentage reduction standards for impingement

and entrainment. Pet. App. 557a (40 C.FR.

§ 125.94(a)(5)). First, if the facility demonstrates that

compliance costs would be significantly greater than

the compliance costs considered by EPA in the Rule,

the facility may come “as close as practicable” to the

performance standard (“cost-cost variance”). Pet. App.

557a (40 C.F.R. § 125.94(a)(5)(i)). Second, if the

facility demonstrates that compliance costs would be

“significantly greater than the benefits of complying”

with the performance standards (“the cost-benefit

variance”), the facility may come “as close as

practicable” to the performance standard. Pet. App.

559a (40 C.F.R. § 125.94(a)(5)(ii)). EPA considered

" The Second Circuit struck down the Phase II Rule’s

provisions that allowed a power plant to comply with section

316(b) through the use of restoration measures in lieu of

technology. Pet. App. 43a-49a (Riverkeeper I], supra, 475 F.3d at

108-110). This Court limited the question presented to the cost-

benefit issue.

13

only the costs associated with installing submerged

cylindrical wedgewire screen technology to treat the

total cooling water intake flow; these “compliance

alternatives,” therefore, could preclude permitting

agencies from requiring the most effective intake

technology, closed-cycle cooling, at any power plant in

the country. Pet. App. 244a (69 Fed. Reg. at 41,602).

Riverkeeper II

On January 25, 2007, the Second Circuit Court of

Appeals concluded that section 316(b) does not

authorize EPA to promulgate a rule in which the

best technology available for minimizing adverse

environmental impact is determined by comparing

the cost of a technology with the value of the

environmental benefit it will achieve, or to “consider

the relationship of a technology’s cost to the level of

reduction of adverse environmental impact it

produces.” Pet. App. 25a. (Riverkeeper I], supra, 475

F.3d at 99). The court prefaced its holding that EPA

can consider cost in “a limited fashion and not as a

primary consideration,” id., by highlighting the

difference between a cost-benefit analysis, like the

one prescribed by Congress for effluent standards in

section 301(b)(1)(A), and “cost-effectiveness.” Quoting

from Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”)

Circular A-94, Guidelines and Discount Rates for

Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs, Appendix

A (1992), the court explained the difference between

the two methods as follows:

14

“[Blenefit-cost analysis” [is] “[a] systematic

quantitative method of assessing’ the

desirability of government projects or policies

when it is important to take a long view of

future effects and a broad view of possible

side-effects” and “cost effectiveness” [is]

“{a] systematic quantitative method for

comparing the costs of alternative means of

achieving the same stream of benefits or a

given objective.”

Pet. App. 23a. (Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 98, n.10).

In other words, a cost-effectiveness analysis seeks the

least costly method of achieving a specified result,

while a cost-benefit analysis compares costs with the

value of benefits, and chooses the result where the

greatest value of net benefits is not outweighed by the

costs of achieving those benefits.

The Second Circuit concluded that section 316(b)

allows EPA, when it sets national standards for

intake structures, and when it establishes criteria for

site-specific permitting to consider costs only in terms

of feasibility and “cost-effectiveness.” The court

reached this conclusion based on the statute’s text,

the context provided by the CWA, historical

perspective expressed in documents like those

produced by OMB, and the reasoning and authority

found in various court opinions, including EPA uv.

Nat'l Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64, 71 (1980);

Nat'l Wildlife Fed’n v. EPA, 286 F.3d 554, 570 (D.C.

Cir. 2002); and American Textile, supra, 452 U.S. at

509.

15

The Second Circuit remanded the Phase II Rule

to EPA for reconsideration, stating that it was

“unclear whether the Agency improperly weighed the

benefits and the costs of requiring closed-cycle

cooling,” because EPA had explained that “its rejection

of closed-cycle cooling as [best technology available for

minimizing adverse environmental impact] was based

on ‘total social costs’ and ‘lack of cost-effectiveness.’”

Pet. App. 32a (Riverkeeper, 475 F.3d at 102) (citing 69

Fed. Reg. at 41,606). In July 2007, EPA suspended the

Phase II Rule pending further rulemaking. See 72 Fed.

Reg. 37,107 (July 9, 2007).

¢

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Congress’ intent in_ section 316(b) is

unambiguous. EPA must select the top-performing

technology available for the purpose of minimizing

adverse environmental impact.

The plain language of section 316(b) requires

EPA to promulgate a national rule that minimizes the

killing and injuring of fish and other aquatic life. By

using this language, Congress itself defined the

relationship between technology costs and the value

of environmental benefits. With calculated intention,

Congress directed EPA to minimize adverse

environmental impact, and EPA may not substitute

its own different policy choice. Congress did not

authorize EPA to compare the costs of the best

technology available with the value of the benefits

16

that the technology would achieve when establishing

a national rule for minimizing impact, or in setting

criteria applicable at the permitting level. Because

Congress did not expressly tell EPA to consider cost,

cost cannot be a primary consideration, and most

especially cannot be compared with benefits. Cost,

therefore, is only allowed as a secondary factor to

be considered by EPA when evaluating the best

technology’s “availability.” A finding of “availability”

will necessarily require EPA to determine the

feasibility of the top-performing technology, but a

feasibility analysis is not a cost-benefit analysis.

Reading section 316(b) in context confirms this

straightforward meaning. Throughout the CWA,

Congress told EPA when and how it could consider

costs. Congress drafted different technclogy

standards for different categories of pollutants and

facilities. In some cases, Congress required EPA to

consider costs in relation to benefits. In other

instances, Congress authorized only a consideration

of cost without comparison to benefits. What little

legislative history exists supports this plain meaning.

Allowing EPA to rely on its own cost-benefit

evaluation, where Congress already decided the

question, would not, as Petitioners suggest, be within

its “gap-filling” discretion. Congress did not acquiesce

or delegate any power to EPA to employ a cost-benefit

analysis in section 316(b). Instead, Congress

expressed its clear intent to minimize the adverse

environmental impact, even if minimizing impact

17

means that the selected technology will impose high

costs on the industry or at a particular facility.

Petitioners argue that because __ selected

definitions of key statutory terms can appear

ambiguous in contexts other than section 316(b), the

Court should presume ambiguity and defer to EPA’s

interpretation as reasonable. But the absence of an

express reference to cost-benefit analysis in section

316(b) does not create ambiguity where the language -

in the provision clearly expresses Congress’ intent.

¢

ARGUMENT

SECTION 316(b) OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT

DOES NOT ALLOW EPA TO RELY ON A COST-

BENEFIT ANALYSIS AS THE BASIS FOR

ESTABLISHING A NATIONAL RULE FOR

INTAKE STRUCTURES OR FOR MAKING

SITE-SPECIFIC PERMITTING DECISIONS.

The text of section 316(b) is unambiguous. The

language plainly expresses Congress’ intent that EPA

must select the best technology available for

minimizing adverse environmental impact associated

with intake structures. The statutory phrase

unambiguously precludes EPA from comparing costs

with the value of the benefits in selecting cooling

water intake technology that satisfies the statutory

mandate. Rather than weigh costs against benefits,

Congress clearly directed EPA to require technology

that surpasses al! others for achieving the goal of

18

minimizing the adverse impact associated with using

the intake structures to the extent that technology is

available. EPA may not substitute its policy views for

those of Congress.

The United States and Industry Petitioners

seek to add a cost-benefit comparison as a factor

in the section 316(b) statutory equation. Adding

this comparison would circumvent Congress’ intent,

to restore the Nation’s degraded waters by

implementing standards based on what the limits of

technology can achieve and would resurrect a policy

approach to water quality regulation long since

abandoned by Congress.

EPA’s interpretation therefore fails under step

one of the Chevron analysis. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc.

v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.

837, 842-843 (1984) (“If the intent of Congress is

clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as

well as the agency, must give effect to the

unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”).

A. The Plain Language of § 316(b) Requires

EPA to Promulgate a Rule That Minimizes

Adverse Environmental Impact.

The starting point for construing the statutory

standard — best technology available for minimizing

adverse environmental impact - is the language itself.

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 431 (2000) (“We

start, as always, with the language of the statute.”).

19

The first word in the standard, “best,” means

“excelling, or surpassing all others of its kind in

inherent quality or according to some standard.”

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the

English Language 208 (Merriam-Webster unabridged

ed., 1981) (“Webster’s Third”). In section 316(b), “best”

is used as a superlative to describe the technology

that must be selected to achieve the articulated

congressional objective; it must surpass all other

technologies for minimizing adverse environmental

impacts. The word “for” is often used to indicate “the

purpose or object of” a thing, action, or activity. Jd. at

886; see also American Heritage Dictionary of the

English Language 686 (Houghton Mifflin Co., 4th ed.,

2006) (“American Heritage Dictionary”) (“indicates

the object, aim, or purpose of an action or activity”).

The placement of the word “for” in section 316(b) is

the fulcrum of the statutory standard welding the

first clause, “best technology available,” with the goal

of the section, “minimizing adverse environmental

impact.” Read in conjunction with the prepositional

and objective-defining language — for minimizing

impacts — the word “best” means the top-performing

technology for achieving that objective.

The word “minimize” means “to reduce to the

smallest possible number, degree, or extent.”

Webster’s Third, at 1438. This is the definition EPA

gave the word “minimize” when it promulgated the

initial rule in 1976. See J.A. 41 (41 Fed. Reg. 17,387)

(April 26, 1976) (In the preamble discussing

“minimizing adverse environmental impact,” EPA

20

explained that, “[o]nce such adverse effects have been

identified (or in the case of new structures, predicted)

then the effort must be to select the most effective

means of minimizing (i.e., ‘reducing to the smallest

possible amount or degree’) those adverse effects.”)

(emphasis added). More recently in its promulgation

of the Phase I Rule governing intake structures at

new power plants, EPA again adopted the 1976

definition. See 40 C.F.R. § 125.83 (defining “minimize”

to mean “to reduce to the smallest amount, extent, or

degree reasonably possible”). The noun following the

verb “minimize” is “impact.” “Impact” is defined as

“the act of impinging or striking,” or “a concentrated

force producing change,” Webster’s Third, at 1131,

demonstrating Congress’ understanding of the nature

of the environmental injuries associated with intake

structures.

Under section 316(b), the best technology for

minimizing adverse environmental impact must also

'* Later in 1976, in Jn re Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, a

Decision of the General Counsel, EPA again consistently

discussed the »reaning of the word “minimize,” stating that:

The structures must reflect the best technology

available for minimizing (1.e. “reducing to the smallest

possible amount or degree”) adverse environmental

impact — significant or otherwise. ... In other words,

the goal of best technology available under § 316(b) is

to minimize all adverse impacts — not to reduce the

impact to a pre-determined level.

J.A. 60 Un re Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, EPA, Decision of

General Counsel No. 41) (emphasis added)

21

be “available.” The most quotidian meaning of the

word “available” is “capable of use for’ the

accomplishment of a purpose.” Webster’s Third, at

150; see also American Heritage Dictionary, at 123

(defining “available” as “present and ready for use; at

hand; accessible”). A technology is “available” to the

power plant industry, therefore, if it is accessible, or

capable of being used by power plants at the time it is

chosen.” Synonyms for “available,” like “practicable”

(i.e., “capable of being put into practice” or “capable of

being used,” Webster’s Third, at 1780; or “capable of

being effected, done, or put into practice; feasible,”

American Heritage Dictionary, at 1377), and

“feasible” (i.e., “capable of being done, executed, or

effected,” Webster’s Third, at 831 or “possible,”

American Heritage Dictionary, at 646), support the

concept that “availability” can be understood in terms

of “feasibility,” but not in terms of cost versus benefit.

These definitions comport fully with the secondary

consideration of cost, in terms of “cost-effectiveness”

and “feasibility” that the Second Circuit found to be ”

reasonable under section 316(b), and with this Court’s

view of the distinction between feasibility analysis

and cost-benefit analysis. See American Textile,

‘The Phase Il Rule recognizes that closed-cycle cooling is

capable of being used by existing power plants. Pet. App. 240a

(69 Fed. Reg. at 41,601 (“EPA is nonetheless aware that some

existing facilities have installed this highly effective technology

and has thus provided a streamlined alternative for such

facilities.”).

22

supra, 452 U.S. at 509 (distinguishing. feasibility

analysis from cost-benefit analysis).

When read together as an “indivisible term of

art,”"* the standard set by section 316(b) plainly

directs that, when establishing a national rule, EPA

must require the most effective technology at hand

for reducing to the smallest possible level the adverse

impact associated with intake structures. Congress’

use of the purpose-defining language -— “for

minimizing adverse environmental impact” — reflects

its unequivocal emphasis on minimizing impact.

Thus, whether the value of impact minimization

outweighs the cost associated with using the best

technology for that purpose is a question that

Congress has already answered.

This Court reached a similar conclusion in

Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S.

457, 467-468 (2001) (“American Trucking”). There the

Court considered whether the language of section

109(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act (“CAA”), 42 U.S.C.

§ 7409(b)(1), allowed EPA to consider costs in setting

ambient air quality standards. Section 109(b)(1)

instructs EPA to set air quality standards “the

attainment and maintenance of whichli,] ... allowing

an adequate margin of safety, are requisite to protect

‘* See Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 423 (1992) (Scalia,

J., dissenting, Souter, J., joining) (rejecting the majority’s position

that “the words ‘allowed secured claim’ in section 506(d) of the

Bankruptcy Code need not be read as an ‘indivisible term of

art’”).

mR: 23

the public health.” 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1). The Court

concluded that the text of section 109(b), “interpreted

in its statutory and historical context and with

appreciation for its importance to the CAA as a

whole, unambiguously bars cost consideration from

the [national ambient air quality standards]-setting

process.” American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 471.

Likewise, in American Textile, the Court

construed the phrase “to the extent feasible” to

preclude the agency’s reliance on cost-b-~2fit analysis

in setting the cotton dust standard under the

Occupational Safety and Health Act (“OSHA”).

American Textile, 452 U.S. at 512-513. The Court

recognized that “feasibility analysis” and “cost-benefit

analysis” are distinct concepts, and explained that

cost-benefit analysis imposes an additional and

overriding requirement that would countermand the

feasibility requirement. Jd. at 513. Discussing the

practical implications of allowing a_ cost-benefit

analysis to substitute for a feasibility analysis, the

Court reached the conclusion that “[s]tandards

would inevitably be set at the level indicated by cost-

benefit analysis, and not at the level specified by

[the Act].” Jd. See also id. at 519 (“Congress meant

‘feasible’ rather than ‘cost-benefit’”) (emphasis

added). The same result would obtain here if EPA

were to rely on cost-benefit analysis; “LaJdoption of

petitioners’ interpretation would effectively write

[the requirement for minimization of impact] out of

[section 316(b)].” Jd. at 513.

24

In section 316(b), Congress similarly instructed

EPA to set a national standard that would reduce the

killing of trillions of fish and other aquatic life to the

lowest level possible. The statutory language defines

the basic relationship between costs and benefits by

mandating the achievement of a particular goal and

limiting the achievement only in terms of

“availability.” Indeed, the Industry Petitioners

acknowledge that the courts evaluate’ the

permissibility of a cost-benefit analysis differently

where Congress has articulated a specific goal that

must be achieved. See Entergy Br. at 27 (“The few

circuit courts that have read American Textile to

prohibit cost-benefit analysis in the OSHA context

have emphasized the specific and inflexible worker

safety goal set by the statute”; and “|t|his Court held

that the language in [section] 109(b)\1) plainly

requires EPA to set the minimum § standards

“requisite” to achieve that goal, and that costs were

irrelevant.”). Here, Congress has in fact articulated

the specific goal to be achieved. EPA may not override

Congress’ choice based on the agency’s own policy

preference. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438,

1462-1463 (2007) (the exercise of EPA’s discretion

must fall within defined statutory limits, and “[t]o the

extent that this constrains agency discretion to pursue

other priorities ... this is the congressional design.”);

Chevron, supra, 467 U.S. at 865-866 (an agency may

base its judgments on its own policy choices only

where “Congress itself either inadvertently did not

resolve [the issue], or intentionally left [it] to be

resolved by the agency. . . .”).

25

The United States and Industry Petitioners

create a perception of ambiguity by parsing the words

in section 316(b). Petitioners then juxtapose a parsed

word with an unrelated scenario designed to produce

an absurd result, and suggest that acceptance of the

fringe definition or concession of deference from the

Court are the only means of avoiding the absurdity.

But legal ambiguity is not created by perception

alone, and absurd results can be avoided without

presuming congressiona! delegation or requiring

court-afforded deference to an agency’s_ policy

preference for setting intake structure standards

according to its own view that a cost-benefit analysis

is allowed.”

Petitioners’ approach to statutory interpretation,

arguing that each term listed in section 316(b) can

have a number of possible meanings when viewed in

isolation from the statutory standard overall, has

consistently been rejected by this Court. See Bre wn v.

Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994) (“Ambiguity is a

creature not of definitional possibilities but of

statutory context.”); American Trucking, supra, 531

U.S. at 466; FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco

Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132-133 (2000) (“Brown &

‘° Industry Petitioners mischaracterize and question the

policy goals set by Congress in section 316(b). See Entergy Br. at

49 (“a campaign to eliminate impingement and entrainment of

fish to the maximum extent possible without regard to cost, is

self-evidently unsound policy”); see also Entergy Br. at 57 (not

allowing consideration of cost versus benefit “places fish and

other aquatic organisms on a pedestal never erected by

Congress”).

26

Williamson”) (“While a word can have more than one

meaning in the abstract, that same word can be given

concrete meaning by the context in which it

appears.”). Petitioners’ reliance on possible and little-

used definitions of a single word cannot trump the

meaning of that word when it is viewed in its

statutory context.

For example, the United States defines the word

“best” as “a relative term capable of different

meanings.” It argues the “‘best’ way of pursuing a

goal is not always the one that most single-mindedly

achieves that goal at all costs.” EPA Br. at 16. To

illustrate this, it suggests that the best route home

might not be the quickest route. This example,

however, ignores the fact that in section 316(b), “best”

is relative to a specific Congressional objective — best

for minimizing impact. If the stated objective,

therefore, is to select the best route available for

arriving home as quickly as possible, then the

quickest route, if it is accessible, is indeed the best

route. If, on the other hand, the stated objective is to

select the best route available for arriving home in

the safest manner possible, then the best route home

might be the longer route with lower speed limits and

less traffic regardless of the additional cost in gas or

potential for additional wear and tear on the vehicle.

The superlative “best,” therefore, cannot’ be

disconnected from the stated objective. In this case,

the “best” technology is given its proper context by

27

the phrase that follows it in the statute: for

minimizing adverse environmental impact.”

Next, the United States argues that the

preposition “for” is “sometimes used to indicate

appropriateness or suitability,” EPA Br. at 16

(quoting American Heritage Dictionary 686 (4th ed.,

2006)). Petitioner relies, however, on the eighth listed

definition in that source, as opposed to the first listed

definition, i.e., “to indicate the object, aim, or purpose

of an action or activity.” Cf American Trucking, 531

U.S. at 466 (the Court rejected the second listed

definition as “making no sense” in the context of

section 109(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act). The United

States also suggests that, had Congress used the

word “at,” the legislative intent to demand that the

selected technology actually be the best technology

would have been clear. By way of example, the

Petitioner suggests that, “the best person at his trade

might not be the best person for a particular job,”

EPA Br. at 16, but fails to acknowledge that the

specifications of the particular job are relevant. For

‘© Congress’ use of this specific purpose-defining modifier in

section 316(b) contrasts with statutory standards that Congress

used elsewhere in the Act. For example, Congress directed

EPA to establish effluent limitations for toxic pollutants that

reflect “best available technology economically achievable.” CWA

§ 301(bM2KA), 33 U.S.C. §1311(b)2A). The words

“economically achievable” modify the phrase “best available

technology,” giving that phrase a different meaning, one that

expressly includes cost considerations. In stark contrast, the

modifying language in section 316(b) focuses on minimizing

environmental impact, not on costs.

28

example, if a particular job calls only for a person

with superior skills for repairing shoes, then the best

cobbler at his trade would also be the best person for

the job. If, however, the job calls for a cobbler who

also has good “people skills,” then a cobbler with poor

“people skills” may not be the best person for the job

even if he is the best at his trade. By detaching the

preposition from the legislative objective, however,

Petitioner again provides an example that is

inapplicable in the context of section 316(b), because

Congress did specify the objective.’ The use of “at” or

“for” in this context, therefore, is a distinction without

a difference.

In addressing the term “available,” the United

States suggests that just because a luxury item is

available does not mean that the cost is justified

or that it would be purchased. That would be true if

the person were not required to obtain the item.

Section 316(b), by contrast, requires the minimization

’ Relying also on BP Exploration & Oil, Inc. v. EPA, 66 F.3d

784 (6th Cir. 1995), to further its example, the United States

quotes the Sixth Circuit explaining that “the requirement that

EPA choose the ‘best’ technology does not mean that the chosen

technology must be the best pollutant removal.” BP Exploration,

66 F.3d at 796. The standard at issue in BP Oil was the best

available technology standard under section 301(bX2)A). As

discussed above, this standard for non-conventional effluent

requires that the best available technology also be economically

achievable. In this context, the Sixth Circuit’s dicta, conveys

only the obvious — the best technology does not necessarily have

to be the best at pollutant removal if the best at pollutant

removal is not also economically achievable.

29

of adverse environmental impact on an aquatic

ecosystem. Congress directed that the _ selected

technology be the best for accomplishing that

objective. Relying on an example that disputes the

“availability” of a luxury item on the basis of its

affordability misses the mark. Moreover, the question

presented in this case is not whether costs may be

considered at some secondary level in determining

“availability.” The question is whether EPA may

elevate cost considerations to the forefront of its

technology evaluation by relying on a cost-benefit

analysis.

The United States also proposes a definition of

“minimize” that does not withstand § scrutiny.

Departing from the definition that EPA itself has

used over the past three decades, the United States

cites a single source to justify its argument that “in

common usage, the terms “minimal” and “minimize”

often refer to a lesser degree of reduction.” EPA Br. at

17. But as discussed above, EPA applied the most

natural definition of “minimize” — “to reduce to the

smallest extent” — when it first promulgated intake

structure rules in 1976, and more recently when it

promulgated the Phase I Rule governing intake

structures at new facilities.

* MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel., 512

U.S. 218, 226 (1994) (When the Court spoke of alternative

dictionary definitions in Natl R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston &

Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 418-419 (1992), “it did not refer to

what we have here: one dictionary whose suggested meaning

contradicts virtually all others.”).

30

Moreover, the “risk assessment” example that the

United States gives is inapposite. The United States

relies on the following example:

(Ilf a person said that he was trying to

minimize the risk of being hit by a car while

crossing a street, he presumably would not

mean that he was staying inside his house

at all times. Instead the person would

presumably mean that he was trying to

reduce that risk consistent with other

practical considerations, including economic

ones such as the need to travel to work.

EPA Br. at 17-18 (emphasis added).

That analogy is flawed because its very premise

is that the person is engaged in a risk assessment.

The best technology available for minimizing adverse

environmental impact determination required by

section 316(b) does not, however, mandate a risk

assessment; it mandates minimizing the known

adverse impact. If, for example, a pedestrian had to

cross Interstate 95 to travel to work, the pedestrian,

undoubtedly, would do more than simply look both

ways before crossing to minimize the _ greater

likelihood that she could be injured or killed given the

nature of the road she was trying to cross. The

pedestrian would likely use every precautionary

measure available to her to reduce to the smallest

possible degree the likelihood that she could be struck

by a car.

31

In other words, when trying to assess whether

protecting society from an uncertain risk is worth the

cost of regulating, a cost-benefit analysis may be a

central consideration, but where the impact is certain

and the cost of minimizing it necessary, cost is not

necessarily a factor for consideration at all. When a

person says, “minimize impact X,” the only natural

meaning of that statement is to “reduce” impact X “to

the smallest possible number, degree, or extent.”

Webster’s Third, at 1438. For this reason, EPA’s

example and its reliance on Hon. Justice Breyer’s

book, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective

Risk Regulation, are misplaced. See EPA Br. at 14 and

18.

Thus, Congress’ decision in section 316(b), not to

refer to costs, or costs in relation to benefits, was not

an oversight, nor can it be construed as ambiguous

silence. It was deliberate subordination of cost

considerations to an emphasis on minimizing

environmental impact.

B. Throughout the Clean Water Act, Congress

Told EPA When and How It Could Consider

Costs.

In making a threshold determination under

Chevron, the Court should not “confine itself to

examining a particular provision in isolation,” but

should follow the “fundamental canon of statutory

construction that the words of a statute must be read

in their context and with a view to their place in the

32

overall statutory scheme.” Nat’ Ass’n of Home

Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S.Ct. 2518, 2534

(2007) (quoting Brown & Williamson, supra, 529 U.S.

at 132-133). Congress’ direction as to when and how

EPA could consider costs in sections 301 and 306 of

the Act confirms that EPA cannot balance costs with

benefits when selecting the best technology under

section 316(b).

As a preliminary matter, the express reference in

section 316(b) to sections 301 and 306 of the Act is not

a cross reference inviting EPA to apply the same

technology standards for discharges set forth in those

sections. Section 316(b) provides that “[aJny standard

established pursuant to [33 U.S.C.] section 1311

[section 301i) of this title, or [33 U.S.C.] section 1316

{section 306] and applicable to a point source” shall

require cooling water intake structures to reflect

best technology available for minimizing adverse

environmental tmpact. By the United States’ own

admission, “the only direct consequence of the cross-

reference is a procedural one: when any standard

under section 301 or 306 is made applicable to a point

source with an intake structure,” the standard must

also reflect the best technology available for

minimizing adverse environmental impact. EPA Br. at

19. The reference in section 316(b) to sections 301

and 306, therefore, means only that when EPA

promulgates or revises effluent limitations for

existing facilities under section 301, or for new

facilities under section 306, it must also include

national requirements for cooling water intake

33

structures. Moreover, section 316(b) does not

reference section 304, where the enumerated factors

for the technology standards for existing facilities are

found. See R.A. (chart comparing the factors Congress

directed EPA to consider when selecting the

best technology available for minimizing adverse

environmental impact under section 316(b), with the

factors EPA must consider when setting effluent

limitations standards for other politutant discharges

under sections 301 and 306 of the CWA, or when

justifying a variance from thermal discharge

limitations under section 316(a)).

A review of the technology standards for

discharges does, however, assist in understanding the

role of costs in the determination of best technology

available for minimizing adverse impact. Congress

decided to provide different standards for different

types of pollutants and facilities, and expressed

its view of when and how EPA should consider

technology costs when applying those statutory

standards. It used different technology phrases

throughout section 301 and then in section 306,

with specific modifying language — “practicable

technology,” “conventional technology,” and “technology

economically achievable” — and intended to give each

standard different meaning in its application. In

some cases, Congress required EPA to consider cost

in relation to environmental benefit. In other

instances, Congress told EPA to consider cost as a

factor, but not in relation to environmental benefit.

CWA § 304(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b). But in none of the

34

other technology standards in sections 301, 304, and

306 did Congress — as it did in section 316(b) —

altogether omit any reference to cost. See R.A. This

striking contrast between section 316(b) and the

Act’s technology standards for discharges provides

powerful confirmation that Congress did not intend

EPA to undertake a cost-benefit analysis when

selecting the best technology available for minimizing

adverse environmental impact.

Under section 301, EPA was initially required to

establish effluent limitations for existing industrial

facilities that required best practicable control

technology (“BPT”), which standards the facilities

were required to meet before 1989. CWA

§ 301(b)(1 A), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)1)(A). In setting

BPT, Congress required EPA to consider the “total

cost of application of technology in relation to effluent

reduction benefits to be achieved from such

application,” and the age of the equipment and

facilities involved, the process employed, engineering

aspects of the application of various types of control

techniques, process changes, non-water quality

environmental impacts, energy requirements, and

other factors EPA deems _ appropriate. CWA

§ 304(b\ 1B), 33 U.S.C. § 13814(b\ 1B). Since 1989,

existing facilities have been required to comply with

more stringent effluent limitations for most toxic

pollutants, including thermal pollution, that reflect

the best available technology economically achievable

(“BAT”). CWA § 301(b2)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A).

In transitioning from BPT to BAT, Congress directed

35

that “in assessing BAT total cost is no longer to be

considered in comparison to effluent reduction

benefits” of eliminating the discharge of pollutants.

EPA v. Nat’l Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64, 71

(1980) (discussing CWA § 304(b\(2)(B), 33 U.S.C.

§ 1314(b)(2)(B)).

For new facilities, required to meet the more

stringent standard “best available demonstrated

technology” (““BADT”), EPA was directed again, as

with BAT, to only consider the cost of achieving the

reduction.'® CWA § 306(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(1);

CWA § 304(b)(4)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(4)(B). In fact,

the reference in section 316(b) to section 306 (the

section applicable to new rather than existing

facilities) confirms Congress’ intent to eliminate

EPA’s authority to make cost-benefit comparisons

when it sets new source performance standards.

Consistent with its technology-forcing approach,

Congress did not direct EPA to consider the value of

the benefits to the receiving water body at all when

promulgating BADT regulations. /d.; See R.A.

For conventional pollutants, under a provision

added to the Act in 1977, existing facilities must

comply with effluent limitations that reflect “best

conventional pollutant control technology” (“BCT”).

"The CWA requires EPA to revise its regulations

periodically, with respect to both new and existing facilities, to

reflect advances in technology. See, e.g., CWA § 304(b), 33 U.S.C.

§ 1314(b); CWA § 306(b\( 1B), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b1 1B).

36

CWA § 301(b\2xE), 33 U.S.C. §1311(b)(2)E). In

setting BCT, like BPT, Congress directed EPA to

consider costs in relation to benefits. CWA § 304(b)(4)\(B),

33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(4)(B). See R.A. Petitioners argue

that because Congress has authorized EPA to

continue to compare costs with benefits when it

establishes BCT effluent limitations for conventional

pollutants, such as BOD, fecal coliform, total

suspended solids, pH, oil and grease, Congress has

also evinced an unambiguous intent to allow EPA to

compare costs with benefits under section 316(b). EPA

Br. at 24-25. But Congress’ express enumeration of a

cost-benefit comparison factor for BCT five years

after it enacted section 316(b) only confirms that

Congress made deliberate choices about when EPA

was to consider costs in relation to benefits, and when

it could not.

In section 316(b), Congress imposed on EPA the

single, unique mandate of requiring both new and

existing facilities to apply best technology available

for minimizing adverse’ environmental impact

associated with intake structures. This Court has

refused to find implicit authorization of certain

factors where Congress has been explicit elsewhere in

the same statute. See, e.g., American Trucking, 531

U.S., supra, at 467. Congress did not authorize EPA

to set national standards based on cost-benefit

analysis.

Congress’ intent to preclude cost-benefit analysis

in regulating intake structures is further shown by

examining section 316(a). In that provision, Congress

37

also does not allow for consideration of cost, even

when operators of a point source apply for a variance

from the otherwise-applicable effluent limitation.

Instead, a variance is authorized only when the

standards “are more stringent than necessary to

assure the projection and propagation of a balanced,

indigenous population of shellfish, fish, and wildlife”

in and on a particular water body. CWA § 316(a), 33

U.S.C. § 1326(a). As in section 316(b), the impact on

fish and wildlife is the paramount concern.

) Even the United States acknowledges that

Congress made deliberate choices about when EPA

may use cost-benefit comparisons and when it may

not. EPA Br. at 19 (“Congress specified the factors

that EPA must consider in promulgating each of the

various “best” standards found in sections 301 and

306. In doing so, it expressly required consideration of

costs for all of those standards, and specifically

required consideration of the relationship between

costs and benefits for two of them.”) (emphasis

added); see also EPA Br. at 21 (“The bottom line is

that each of the cross-referenced provisions requires

consideration of costs, and two of them (BPT and

BCT) specifically require comparison of costs and

benefits.”) (emphasis added). In marked contrast,

section 316(b) expressly requires that EPA choose a

technology that minimizes environmental impact,

and does not authorize EPA to consider cost in

relation to benefits.

38

C. The Legislative History Supports. the

Conclusion that Congress Rejected a Cost-

Benefit Analysis in Section 316(b).

The legislative history of section 316(b) is sparse

and undeserving of any significant weight. What little

there is, however, supports the conclusion that the

meaning of section 316(b) is plain on its face. In the

House Consideration of the Report of the Conference

Committee (Oct. 4, 1972) on the final version of the

1972 CWA Amendments, Representative Clausen

explained the meaning of section 316(b) by using the

language of section 316(b) itself, stating that

“(slection 316(b) requires the location, design,

construction and capacity of cooling water intake

structures of steam-electric generating plants to

reflect the best technology available for minimizing

any adverse environmental impact.” Congressional

Research Service, “A Legislative History of the Water

Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Vol. 1,”

93d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 264 (“Legislative History”).

Petitioners, however, place a great deal of weight

on Representative Clausen’s one sentence remark in

which he suggested that the word “available” means

“commercially available at an economically

practicable cost.” This lone statement acts as the

springboard for Petitioners’ sometimes alternative

argument that a_ cost-benefit analysis’ is

unambiguously allowed by the “plain meaning” of

section 316(b). This remark is undeserving of such

weight. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281,

311 (1979) (“[T]he remarks of a single legislator, even

39

the sponsor, are not controlling in analyzing

legislative history.”); Consumer Product Safety

Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 118

(1980). But even this single statement underscores

the point that “availability” does not involve the

weighing of cost with benefits, even in Representative

Clausen’s mind, since he did not define the word that

way; rather, he defined the word “available” in terms

of “practicability.” See States’ Br, supra at 18

(definition of “practicable”).

The legislative history of sections 301, 304, and

306 also supports the literal reading of section 316(b)

because it establishes that Congress did not intend to

allow EPA to conduct a cost-benefit analysis in setting

any of the “best technology” standards where

“availability” was also a component. Specifically, the

legislative reports accompanying’ the 1972

amendments to the CWA confirm that Congress

intended a cost-benefit consideration to be made only

during the transitional period before 1989 when

establishing the effluent limitations under the BPT

standard.” For example, in the 1972 Senate

Consideration of the Report of the Conference

” The BCT standard, the only other provision directing EPA

to consider the relationship between costs and benefits, was not

added to the CWA until 1977. See 3 Legislative History of the

Clean Water Act of 1977 - A Continuation of the Legislative

History of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments

of 1972, at 427 (Committee Print compiled for the Senate

Committee on Public Works by the Library of Congress), Sen.

No. 95-14 (1975) (Statement of Senator Muskie).

40

Committee, the Chairman and the principal sponsor

of the Senate Bill, Senator Edmund Muskie,

discussed the difference between BPT to comply with

section 301(b)(1)(A) and BAT to comply with section

301(b)(2)(A) of the Act:

In making the determination of [BAT] for a

category or class, the Administrator is

expected to apply the same principles

involved in making the determination of

([BPT], except as to cost-benefit analysis. Also,

rather than establishing the range of levels

in reference to the average of the best

performers in an industrial category, the

range should, at a minimum, be established

with reference to the best performer in any

industrial category. The distinction between

([BPT] and [BAT] is intended to reflect the

need to press toward increasingly higher

levels of control. . . .

Senate Consideration of the Report of the Conference

Committee, 92d Congress, October 4, 1972, p. 170

(emphasis added), reprinted in Legislative History of

the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972

(Senate Public Works Comm.), Sen. No. 93-1 (1973).

Senator Muskie further elaborated on the limited

way Congress intended te Administrator to consider

cost in determining BAT:

As to the cost of [BAT] — While cost should be

a factor in the Administrator’s judgment,

no balancing test will be required. The

Administrator will be bound by a test of

41

reasonableness. In this case, the

reasonableness of what is ‘economically

achievable’ should reflect an evaluation of

what needs to be done to move toward the

elimination of the discharge of pollutants

and what is achievable through the

application of available technology — without

regard to cost.

Id. (emphasis added).”'

That Congress made deliberate choices about

when to require cost-benefit considerations is further

evidenced by the legislative history associated with

section 316 generally. The Conference Committee

Report for the CWA of 1972 explains that, while

the House bill had proposed a version of section 316

that would have called for the altogether separate

* The standard established in section 306(a\(1) is the most

stringent effluent limitation standard in the CWA and does not

allow for a comparison of costs and benefits. See Senate

Consideration of the Report of the Conference Committee, 92d

Congress, October 4, 1972 at 170, reprinted in 1 Legislative

History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972

(Senate Public Works Comm.), Sen. No. 93-1 (1973). See also

S. Rep. 92-414 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668,

3724 (“The implicit consideration of economic factors in

determining whether technology is ‘available’ should not affect

the usefulness of this section. The overriding purpose of this

section would be to prevent new water pollution problems, and

toward that end, maximum feasible control of new sources, at

the time of their construction, is considered by the Committee to

be the most effective and, in the long run, the least expensive

approach to pollution contro]l.”).

42

regulation of thermal discharges, including a case-by-

case variance based on a test involving a comparison

of costs against benefits, the final bill, as modified by

the Conference Committee, substituted the provision

that was finally enacted as section 316(a). Section

316(a) provided that heat would be treated like any

other pollutant, except for the creation of the limited

variance specified in section 316(a). Notably, cost-

benefit analysis was not included in any of the section

316 provisions. See Conference Committee Report

No. 92-1236 (accompanying S. 2770) (Sept. 28. 1972)

pp. 175 and 320 (CWA amendments 1972).

Reliance on a cost-benefit analysis, therefore, is

inconsistent with Congress’ intent, as confirmed by

the legislative history, to eliminate the impact on the

Nation’s waters by requiring EPA to implement

technology-forcing standards. Thus, in setting the

national standard for cooling water intake structures,

EPA must require that the technology achieve the

desired end, and must not modify the desired end as a

result of its consideration of the costs in relation to

benefits to achieve that end.

The Petitioners, Entergy Corp. and PSEG Fossil

(“Entergy”), mischaracterize the Second Circuit's

construction of section 316(b), as pronouncing a

“radical,” “unsound,” and “nonsensical” “clear

statement rule.” Entergy Br. at 21 and 24. Entergy

inaccurately asserts “the Second Circuit concluded

that cost-benefit analysis is_ prohibited unless

explicitly authorized, based solely on this Court’s

statement in American Textile that ‘when Congress

43

has intended that an agency engage in cost-benefit

analysis, it has clearly indicated such intent on the

face of the statute.’” Entergy Br at 24 (quoting

American Textile, 452 U.S. at 510) (emphasis added).

The Second Circuit’s reading of section 316(b),

however, was completely justified. Far from being

“radical” or establishing a “clear statement rule,” the

Second Circuit’s conclusion was reached using the

basic tools of statutory construction. The court held

only that Congress had set an unambiguous objective

in section 316(b), one that is incompatible with the

agency’ cost-benefit approach when setting a

national standard for Phase II facilities or addressing

permits at a site-specific level. The Second Circuit’s

conclusion was not based solely on this Court’s

statement in American Textile, but was based on a

thorough review of the text of section 316(b) itself, an

examination of section 316(b) in relation to and in

contrast to the other technology standards in the Act,

legislative history, and the policy goals of the Act.

The Court therefore should reject Entergy’s

invitation to “adopt a presumption or clear statement

rule that is the opposite of the one employed by the

Second Circuit.” Entergy Br. at 29 (emphasis in

original). See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320, n.45

(2001) (The cases and rules cited by Petitioner

are distinguishable because “[wJe only defer, however,

to agency interpretations of statutes that, applying

the normal ‘tools of statutory construction’ are

ambiguous.”). In essence all of the Petitioners are

asking the Court to presume ambiguity. Such a

44

presumption would allow agencies to second-guess

Congress’ intent even though the statutory language

plainly indicates that Congress has _ already

determined the relationship between the costs and

benefits. Here, this Court should find that Congress

deliberately precluded EPA from_ establishing

standards for intake structures based on a

cost-benefit analysis, and instead directed the

minimization of environmental impact with the factor

of cost as a subordinate consideration.

+

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Second Circuit should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

Patrick C. LYNCH

Attorney General of Rhode Island

TRICLA O’HARE JEDELE,

Counsel of Record

Special Assistant Attorney General

150 South Main Street

Providence, RI 02903

(401) 274-4400

(Additional Counsel Listed

On Inside Front Cover)

September 29, 2008

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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