Opposition Brief — Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc.

Supreme Court brief2009

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

BI Oa @OW - FILED

Nos. 07-588, 07-589 & 07-597

ee a |

Supreme Comte ot th a Unitey Pita eats

ENTERGY CORPORATION, Petitioner,

Vv.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.,

Respondents.

+

PSEG FOSSIL LLC AND PSEG NUCLEAR LLC,

Petitioners,

v.

RIVERKEEPER, INC., ET AL., Respondents.

--— o

UTILITY WATER ACT GROUP, Petitioner,

V.

RIVERKEEPER, INC., ET AL., Respondents.

SJ

On Petitions For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Second Circuit

¢

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION FOR THE STATES OF

RHODE ISLAND, CONNECTICUT, DELAWARE,

NEW JERSEY, NEW YORK AND THE

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

¢

PATRICK C. LYNCH

Attorney General of Rhode Island

TRICLA O’HARE JEDELE

Special Assistant Attorney General

Counsel of Record

150 South Main Street

Providence, RI 02903

(401) 274-4400, Ext. 2400

| Additional Counsel For The States Listed On Inside Cover]

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO (800) 225 6964

OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL

Attorney General of Connecticut

KIMBERLY MASSICOTTE

MATTHEW LEVINE

Assistant Attorneys General

P.O. Box 120

55 Elm Street

Hartford, CT 06141-0120

(860) 808-5250

JOSEPH R. BIDEN III

Attorney General of Delaware

KEVIN MALONEY

Deputy Attorney General

820 N. French Street, 6th Floor

Wilmington, DE 19801

(302) 577-8327

MARTHA COAKLFY

Attorney General of Massachusetts

ANDREW GOLDBERG

Assistant Attorney General

1 Ashburton Place, 18th Floor

Boston, MA 02108

(617) 727-2200

ANNE MILGRAM

Attorney General of New Jersey

ELLEN BARNEY BALINT

Deputy Attorney General

P.O. Box 093

25 Market Street

Trenton, NJ 08625-0093

(609) 984-5065

ANDREW M. CUOMO

Attorney General of New York

MAUREEN F. LEARY

Assistant Attorney General

THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION BUREAU

DENISE A. HARTMAN

Assistant Solicitor General

The Capitol

Albany, 12224

(518) 474-7154

ISSUES PRESENTED

1. Whether the Second Circuit, consistent with

the opinions of other circuit courts, correctly

interpreted the plain language of the Clean Water Act

to preclude the use of a cost-benef t analysis as the

basis for the Environmental Protection Agency’s “best

technology available” determination under section

316(b), and properly remanded the Phase II rule for

further explanation of the cost considerations relied

upon by the Environmental Protection Agency in

setting the technology standards.

2. Whether the Second Circuit, consistent with

the opinions of other circuit courts, correctly

interpreted the plain language of the Clean Water Act

to preclude the provisions of Phase II rule that allow

existing power plants to comply with section 316(b)

by substituting restoration measures for technology

at the cooling water intake, and properly remanded

the restoration provisions to the Environmental

Protection Agency.

3. Whether the Second Circuit, consistent with

the opinions of other circuit courts, correctly decided

that the technology requirement in section 316(b) of

the Clean Water Act applies to both new and existing

facilities, and that those requirements may be

implemented through discharge permits.

il

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

In NT i

REE GE GF BRIERE EEE occccecscnssvcssscccseccvscoscosece ili

alae datadonioninniades 2

Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Acct.................... 2

Sn i aiciivtisntsiciianinintiiicsdenicininidiniiinonaddnatenenies 3

The Second Circuit’s Decision in Riverkeeper I1..... 5

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITIONS ..... 10

I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF RIVERKEEPER

II IS UNCERTAIN BECAUSE EPA IS

RECONSIDERING THE PHASE II RULE

BE inicsnocenscosennsunonnsnnsivngpenadanitionsins 11

Il. RIVERKEEPER II IS A ROUTINE

APPLICATION OF ESTABLISHED

PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY

I inicintescncnnnsossnniiciimaiianyiiatnies 14

Fe III cccccccspacssonsciosesssisdpasennenans 14

hii iate cnn ietehacinhianpaeindiebembesnnoen 18

Application to Existing Facilities................ 20

Ill. THERE IS NO SPLIT IN THE CIRCUIT

COURTS ON ANY OF THE ISSUES

RAISED BY INDUSTRY PETITIONERS .. 22

The Cost-Benefit Analysis ......................000+ 22

SI ii sncadinin ccetdiianinastaninagianimmesmiaetoae 26

ETERS aa RR T SN Eto 27

ee benctccnimisteneioniisiscnssdudiuiitnisaiibeasionnidiboen 30

iil

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

American Corn Growers Ass’n v. EPA, 291 F.3d

iis MEG el iicnddncsmactuniacaniackarsncaneutanddanasssscecsaem 25

American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc.

v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981)............... cee eeeee 16, 17

Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351

SII STII cies laiteisiattatinnecaubinelincniinessminnnidinaeneneeie 28

Bowen v. American Hospital Ass’n, 476 U.S.

I caideieeaeieanniadiians 12

BP Exploration & Oil, Inc. v. U.S.E.PA., 66

Ey Ey MD REED STIEED cnsstdinnencdsncincacetetissnaccesees 24, 25

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837

iT ciiecheissiiminaeandnditateneadabimuatiaiadentiies 8, 14, 17, 18, 21

Cronin v. Browner, 90 F.Supp.2d 364 (S.D.N_-Y.

TIE sili itiedetaiipeadadniatiguninegiiiesiaapreadanenioanneuiinniiide 2,21

E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430

| ____, EINETS er aia ae ETD OU TER RIT 28

EPA v. National Crushed Stone Association,

RE I TI ricisctichieiscaphaeteniscinasingestiiaianmnend 23, 25

Gulf Restoration Network v. United States

Department of Transportation, 452 F.3d 362

INT TIE iniissnsadiinnadiehaddanniiendeiiiahimalindsenimuienunbeiis 25

Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200

RSPEI BERR psd Semen Ne Ore SOLAR Tae 17

Kennecott v. United States EPA, 780 F.2d 445

ii i 16

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA,

GER FG BOG CL.. Gi BIE) cece escccccescrciccntioninescsess 16

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA,

SED FG BEG GAG. GOR, Be accvccscevsciccsssiccctotsvccssass 29

Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 174 (2d Cir.

GEEPEIELD sncconevesccosnsesonacessinsiendsiiiascdiiamenieaiianaaal passim

Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 475 F.3d 83 (2d Cir.

IDET P nevseenicnsenetionseneummnpusonsiniiamiemaimiiadaaa aaa passim

Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983)............ 17

Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 597

Fa ee CI I FI ciececeestnecosiniussianninan 22, 23, 26

United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822

Lt DS ; ; eee Eanr Ese ree 25, 28

Virginia Electric Power Co. v. Costle, 566 F.2d

tg | PENNE Sern 28, 29

Weyerhauser v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir.

TP TTED sctcstentetuciccenninevntinenninetinigininiccaemdaaanna 24, 25

Whitman v. American Trucking Association,

Bee... TO WT. GG Ge iccccsnisssicticinenitumadabiaaeamn 17

OTHER DECISIONS

ConocoPhillips, et al. v. EPA, No. 06-60662

(and consolidated cases) (5th Cir. 2006)................... 3

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

STATUTES

Ee 2, 6, 24, 28

cnr ssnsenmneanasennagneie 7

EI soon. sccasccccesecccesecesscscccscesecs 7, 23

aa anatenmamnapensnsessiniee 24

Se ee IE BED cccccecccccccsccscccoccsenssceccesesoeses 7, 23

a ecensenmonenons 7

cca si ctnenadadnienbonescccoosesoes 2, 6, 24, 28

Tee ia i intiscetnatonetansenseness passim

CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS

as cremmenensstonnnnnas 2

a scesnsponensocensions 4

FEDERAL REGISTER

66 Fed. Reg. 65,256 (Dec. 18, 2001) .......... cee eeeeeeeeee 2

69 Fed. Reg. 41,576 (July 9, 2004)...........0000..... 3, 4,19

71 Fed. Reg. 35,006 (June 16, 2006) ............... cee 3

72 Fed. Reg. 37,107 (July 9, 2007)...................006 11, 13

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Webster’s Third New Int'l Dictionary 1438

a crnspenosensoonnnens 20

1

RESPONDENT STATES’

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

The States of Rhode Island, Connecticut, Delaware,

' New Jersey, and New York and the Commonwealth of

Massachusetts submit this brief in opposition to the

certiorari petitions filed by Entergy Corporation,

Utility Water Act Group (“UWAG”), and PSEG Fossil

LLC and PSEG Nuclear LLC (“Industry Petitioners”)

seeking review of the unanimous decision of the

United States Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit.. The Second Circuit invalidated and

remanded various aspects of a rule promulgated by

the United States Environmental Protection Agency

(“EPA”) to regulate cooling water intake structures at

certain power plants under the federal Clean Water

Act. The Industry Petitioners unsuccessfully sought

rehearing and consideration en banc below. EPA did

not seek rehearing in the Second Circuit and has not

sought this Court’s review. Instead, EPA reopened its

rulemaking proceedings to-address the remanded

provisions identified by the Second Circuit. The

States submit this brief as a consolidated opposition

to the petitions.

' Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 475 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2007)

(“Riverkeeper II”), App. la-94a (all references to “App.” are to

Petitioner Entergy’s Appendix).

2

STATEMENT

Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act

When cooling water intake structures at existing

power plants withdraw significant amounts of water

from associated water bodies, they impinge and

entrain large quantities of fish and fish larvae. This

can have severe consequences on aquatic life and

ecosystems. Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act

directs EPA to establish technology requirements for

these intake structures at power plants that use

water to cool their electricity-generating equipment.

In a single sentence, section 316(b) provides that

“[aJny standard established pursuant to section 301

or section 306 of this Act and applicable to a point

source shall require that the location, design,

construction, and capacity of cooling water intake

structures reflect the best technology available for

minimizing adverse environmental impact.” 33 U.S.C.

§1326(b), App. 112a-13a. In other words, discharge

permits and other standards applicable to new and

existing point sources should also control intake

structures with technology-based requirements.

In 1995, EPA entered a consent decree requiring

it to create regulations to implement section 316(b).

The consent decree, as amended, required EPA to

draft the regulations in three phases.’ Phase I of the

* See Cronin v. Browner, 90 F.Supp.2d 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2000);

Phase I (new electricity generating facilities), 66 Fed. Reg.

65,256 (Dec. 18, 2001), codified at 40 C.F.R. Section 125.80

3

rulemaking, which applied to cooling water intake

structures at new facilities, was challenged in the

Second Circuit by environmental groups and various

industry petitioners. The Second Circuit upheld most

of the Phase I rule, but remanded EPA’s restoration

provision, which allowed power plants to use

restoration measures in lieu of technology, as “plainly

inconsistent with the statute’s text.” Riverkeeper, Inc.

v. EPA (“Riverkeeper I”), 358 F.3d 174, 181, 189 (2d

Cir. 2004). Riverkeeper I was not appealed, and, is

final. Riverkeeper IJ and the pending industry

petitions for certiorari concern Phase II of the EPA

rulemaking. In 2006, EPA promulgated Phase III of

the rule, which is not the subject of this challenge.

The Phase II rule

EPA issued its final rule pursuant to the second

phase of the consent decree on July 9, 2004 (“the

Phase II rule”). The Phase II rule is a unique agency

rule designed to implement section 316(b), and is

limited in its application to one specific activity — the

intake of water at structures used at power plants

et seq., see Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 174, 189-91 (2d Cir.

2004) (“Riverkeeper I”); Phase II (electric power plants built

before 2002 that withdraw over 50 million gallons per day of

cooling water), 69 Fed. Reg. 41,583, codified at 40 C.F.R. Pts. 9,

122-25, see Riverkeeper II; and, Phase III (existing power plants

and industrial facilities not subject to Phase II), 71 Fed. Reg.

35,006 (June 16, 2006), codified at 40 C.F.R. Section 125,

Subpart N, see ConocoPhillips, et al. v. EPA, No. 06-60662 (and

consolidated cases) (5th Cir. 2006).

4

built before 2002 that withdraw 50 million gallons of

water per day or more, of which at least twenty-five

percent is used for cooling. See Final Regulations to

Establish Requirements for Cooling Water Intake

Structures at Phase II Existing Facilities, 69 Fed.

Reg. 41,576 (July 9, 2004) (codified at 40 C.F.R. Pts.

9, 122-25), App. 122a-540a. Riverkeeper II is the first

decision to address section 316(b) regulations as

applied to existing facilities.

The Phase II rule identified various options for

power plants to meet the statute’s requirement that the

plants use the “best technology available to minimize

adverse environmental impacts.” 33 U.S.C. §1326(b),

App. 112a-13a. EPA then used these selected methods

to establish performance standards keyed to required

percentage reductions in fish kills associated with

intake structures.’ The Phase II rule provided existing

facilities with five separate options to demonstrate

compliance with the performance standards established

in the rule. See 40 C.F.R. §125.94(a), App. 555a. While it

does not require existing power plants to install closed

cycle cooling systems, the Phase II rule provides that

the installation of a closed cycle cooling system or one

that reduces inflow commensurate with such a cooling

system will be considered in compliance with the rule.

* The Phase II rule establishes as a national performance

standard reduction of impingement mortality for all life stages

of fish and shellfish by 80 to 95 percent. Certain facilities are

also required to reduce entrainment for all life stages of fish and

shellfish by 60 to 90 percent.

5

Alternatively, facilities can comply with the rule by

installing one or more of a “suite” of technologies —

including fine- and wide-mesh wedgewire screens,

aquatic filter barrier systems, barrier nets, and fish

return systems — that meet national performance

standards. Several of the compliance options allow a

facility to meet the national performance standards

through the use of restoration measures, such as

improving the habitat surrounding the intake

structure. Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 108, App. 13a-14a.

Each of the compliance options in the rule was

either based on EPA’s “best technology available”

determination, which was remanded, or on EPA's

authorization of the use of restoration measures to

meet the standard, which was rejected and

remanded. While EPA addresses the Second Circuit’s

remand order and until it promulgates a new Phase

II rule consistent with Riverkeeper II, none of the

compliance options identified in the rule are

presently operative.

The Second Circuit’s Decision in Riverkeeper II

In Riverkeeper II, the States, environmental

groups, and Industry Petitioners challenged various

aspects of the Phase II rule. In that context, the

Second Circuit’s opinion addressed a number of issues.

Industry Petitioners seek to raise three of those issues

again here. Specifically, Industry Petitioners seek

review of the Second Circuit’s conclusions regarding:

6

(i) the cost-benefit analysis EPA used to select the

“best technology available” (“BTA”); (ii) EPA’s

authorization of the use of restoration methods in lieu

of BTA; and (iii) whether section 316(b) applies to

existing facilities, and, in turn, whether it can be

implemented through the Clean Water Act’s pollution

discharge provisions.

As to whether costs may be considered by EPA in

selecting the “best technology available” for cooling

water intakes, the Second Circuit did not hold that

costs are irrelevant to a BTA determination. Rather,

the court held that an ordinary interpretation of

section 316(b) “does not permit the EPA to choose

BTA on the basis of cost-benefit analysis.” Riverkeeper

Il, 475 F.3d at 101, App. 29a. The Second Circuit

agreed with EPA that the cross-reference to sections

301 and 306 “invites EPA to consider those sections

when establishing BTA for cooling water intake

systems.” Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 97, citing

Riverkeeper I, 358 F.3d at 186, App. 20a. The court’s

review of section 316(b), therefore, was “informed by

the two provisions it cross-references, CWA sections

301 and 306.” See Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 102,

citing Riverkeep r I, 358 F.3d at 195, App. 20a (the

court explaining that, “[slection 301 sets forth a

framework under which limitations on the discharge

of pollutants from existing sources would become

more stringent over time.”)

Section 301 of the Clean Water Act provides that

all effluent discharge limitations established before

March 31, 1989, require the application of the “best

7

practicable control technology currently available”

(“BPT”). See 33 U.S.C. §1311(b)(1)(A), App. 97a. BPT

determinations were to be made by the Administrator

of EPA in consideration of factors referenced in

section 304(b)(1)(B) of the Clean Water Act. See 33

U.S.C. §1314(b)(1)(B), App. 105a. In contrast, all

effluent limitations established for point sources after

March 31, 1989, were to apply “the best available

technology economically achievable ... , which will

result in the reasonable further progress toward the

national goal of eliminating the discharge of all

pollutants (“BAT”).” See 33 U.S.C. §1311(b\(2)(A),

App. 98a-99a. The statute directs that BAT

determinations are to be made by the Administrator

of EPA in consideration of factors referenced in section

304(b\2\B). Section 304 identifies one set of factors to

be considered for technology determinations for existing

facilities pre-1989, and those factors allow for a

comparison between costs and benefits. It identifies an

entirely separate set of factors to be considered for

technology determinations for existing facilities post-

1989, and those factors conspicuously do not include

the factor requiring a cost to benefit analysis, and

instead list only the factor of cost. See 33 U.S.C.

§1314(b)(2)(B), App. 106a-07a.

With this framework in mind, the court held “the

EPA's interpretation of section 316(b) problematic

because its construction significantly resembles the

less stringent, now obsolete, BPT standard of section

301(b)1)(A).” Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 102, citing

Riverkeeper I, 358 F.3d at 195, App. 30a. Ultimately,

8

the court rejected the cost-benefit analysis because it

was precluded both by the plain language of section

316(b) and by the plain language of the cross-

referenced sections. In any event, the Second Circuit

could not discern EPA's basis for its BTA selection in

either the language of the Phase II rule itself or the

administrative record. Thus, the Second Circuit

remanded the Phase II rule to EPA to clarify the role

and extent that any cost-benefit analysis, or other

cost considerations played in EPAs BTA

determination. Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 103, App.

33a (“it is unclear whether the Agency improperly

weighed the benefits and the costs of requiring

closed-cycle cooling. ... Given the above indications

that the EPA engaged in a cost-benefit analysis, we

remand for the EPA to explain its conclusions.”) In

light of the remand, the practical significance of the

Court’s rejection of EPA’s cost-benefit analysis, and

the effect, if any, that the opinion will have on EPA’s

BTA determination is unclear.

Riverkeeper II also invalidated the restoration

provisions in the Phase II rule, and remanded those

provisions to EPA. The Second Circuit reached the

conclusion that restoration measures are not

authorized by section 316(b) in step-one of the

Chevron analysis. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural

Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

The court found first that language in section 316(b)

established nexus between certain characteristics of

the intake structure and the selected technology. See

Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 109, quoting Riverkeeper I,

9

358 F.3d at 189, App. 46a-47a (“[rlestoration measures

are not part of the location, design, construction, or

capacity of cooling water intake structures.”) The court

also found that the statute’s use of the word “minimize”

precluded the use of “mitigation” to satisfy the

technology requirement with after-the-fact restoration

measures. Id. (discussing that Webster’s dictionary

defines “minimize” as meaning to reduce to the smallest

extent possible.) Thus, the Second Circuit rejected the

restoration provisions in the rule, because “EPA

impermissibly construed [an unambiguous] statute by

allowing compliance with section 316(b) via

restoration measures,” such as restocking fish killed

by a cooling water intake structure. Riverkeeper II,

475 F.3d at 108-10, App. 43a-50a; see also Riverkeeper

I, 358 F.3d at 189. The court remanded this aspect of

the Phase II rule to EPA as well.

Finally, based on a plain reading of section 316(b)

and the opinions of its sister circuit courts on this

point, the Second Circuit rejected Industry Petitioners’

argument that section 316(b) is not applicable to

existing facilities, and further held that EPA could

reasonably choose to implement section 316(b)

requirements through discharge permits. Riverkeeper II,

475 F.3d at 122, App. 74a (“given the cross-references in

section 316(b) to provisions governing both new and

existing facilities, the EP/’’s reading is far more

reasonable than Entergy’s.”)

+

10

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITIONS

There are no compelling reasons to grant

the petitions. First, the Second Circuit properly

remanded the Phase II rule to EPA for further

consideration. Significantly, EPA is _ actively

addressing the Second Circuit’s remand order,

and thus, the reach and import of the opinion in

Riverkeeper IT is unclear with respect to the question

of whether EPA’s cost analysis will affect its BTA

determination. Moreover, and, importantly, the fact

that EPA did not seek either rehearing or an en banc

consideration before the Second Circuit, and has not

petitioned for certiorari, reflects the United States’

judgment that the Second Circuit’s decision does not

merit review at this time.

Second, Riverkeeper II is the first decision to

construe the technology requirement set forth in

section 316(b) as it relates to cooling water intake

structures at existing facilities. The court used accepted

and usual principles of statutory construction to reject

EPA’s outdated cost-benefit analysis; to reject the use

of restoration measures as a substitute for technology-

forcing standards applied at the intake, and to

conclude that section 316(b) applies to existing

facilities as well as to new.

Finally, the decision in Riverkeeper IT is not in

conflict with any other circuit court or with this Court

on any issue raised in the petitions. No other court

has construed this language differently. Indeed, all

of the conclusions reached in Riverkeeper Il are

11

consistent with section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act,

consistent with other circuit court opinions and

consistent with the precedents of this Court.

For these reasons, this case does not warrant

consideration by this Court.

I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF RIVERKEEPER

II IS UNCERTAIN BECAUSE EPA IS

RECONSIDERING THE PHASE II RULE

ON REMAND.

The Second Circuit properly remanded the Phase

II rule to EPA, and significantly, EPA neither sought

rehearing, or consideration en banc below, nor has it

filed its own certiorari petition here. Instead, EPA

suspended the Phase II rule, almost in its entirety,

while it “considers how to address the remanded

issues.” 72 Fed. Reg. 37,107/2 (July 9, 2007).

The Second Circuit’s remand was proper with

respect to EPA’s BTA and EPA’s authorization of the

use of restoration measures. With respect to EPA’s

BTA determination, the primary basis for the Second

Circuit’s remand was that it properly could not

review EPA’s selection of compliance options because

both EPA’s explanation for its underlying BTA

determination in the rule, and the administrative

record itself lacked the information needed to review

12

the rule.‘ Thus, the Second Circuit remanded these

central cost provisions of the Phase II rule to EPA.

See Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 101-05, App. 28a-38a.

The Second Circuit explained that EPA has the

“correlative responsibility to explain the rationale

and factual basis for its decision, even though we

show respect for the agency’s judgment in both.” Jd.

at 104, citing Bowen v. American Hospital Ass’n, 476

U.S. 610, 627 (1986), App. 35a. Absent such an

explanation here, the Second Circuit directed EPA to

provide “either a reasoned explanation of its decision

or a new determination of BTA based on permissible

considerations.” Jd. at 130, App. 93a; see also id. at

105, App. 37a (Second Circuit suggesting that, “EPA

in reconsidering its selection of BTA on remand may

alter the suite of technologies it originally selected.”)

Thus, the result of the cost analysis that EPA will

perform in determining BTA, and whether the

resulting BTA determination will change is uncertain.

* Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 101 (“the record is unclear as to

the basis for the EPA’s selection of the suite of technologies as

BTA. ...”); id. at 104 (“In a technical area of this sort, it is

difficult for judges or interested parties to determine the

propriety of the Agency’s action without a justification for the

action supported by clearly identified substantial evidence

whose import is explained. The record evidence alone here, . . . is

oblique, complicated, and insufficient to permit us to determine

what the EPA relied upon in reaching its conclusion.”); id. (“The

EPA was required to explain its judgment and the basis for it. /t

did not do so here.”) (“In short the EPA’s failure to explain its

decision frustrates effective judicial review.”) (Emphasis added),

App. 28a-36a.

13

With respect to the use of restoration, the Second

Circuit correctly f-und the provisions of the Phase II

rule that allowed facilities to comply with BTA

requirements through after-the-fact attempts to

restore already degraded water resources, to be

inconsistent with the plain meaning of section 316(b).

Still, the Second Circuit remanded the restoration

provisions to be rewritten consistent with its decision.

While Riverkeeper IJ makes it clear that EPA

cannot employ a cost-benefit analysis to determine

BTA, or allow existing facilities to the use restoration

measures in lieu of technology at the intake, to what

degree or how these findings will affect EPA’s final

BTA determination is unclear. Only when the remand

considerations are final, and the regulatory process

complete, will the new requirements of the Phase II

rule be potentially applicable to existing facilities.

Only then, therefore, will the practical effect of the

Second Circuit's decision on states, regulatory

agencies, and permitted facilities be known.

Moreover, EPA has acknowledged that it “is

precluded from applying the rule unless and until it

takes further action to address the decision,” stating

directly, “[t]hus, today’s action simply effectuates the

legal status quo....” 72 Fed. Reg. 37,107/3. Until

EPA addresses the remand issues and promulgates a

new final Phase II rule in response to the remand,

Industry Petitioners are in the same position as a

regulated community as they were before the Phase

II rule was issued — as are the States. Jd. (EPA

directing that “until the Agency has considered and

14

resolved the issues raised by the Second Circuit’s

remand|[,] [plermit requirements for cooling water

intake structures at Phase II facilities should be

established on a _ case-by-case best professional

judgment (BPJ) basis.”) Thus, the Phase II rule is in

flux, and should not now be reviewed by this Court.

In short, prudence and discretion dictate that

EPA be allowed to complete its reassessment of the

cost-based determinations and restoration provisions in

the Phase II rule before additional judicial resources

are used in reviewing the evolving rule. Accordingly,

this case does not merit this Court’s attention.

Il. RIVERKEEPER II IS A _ ROUTINE

APPLICATION OF ESTABLISHED

PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY

CONSTRUCTION.

The decision below involves an unexceptional,

case-specific application of the principles that control

when a court must defer to an agency interpretation.

These guiding principles were articulated by this

Court in Chevron and followed by the Second Circuit

in Riverkeeper II. See Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 95,

App. 16a (starting its discussion with a correct

statement of Chevron’s two-step analysis).

Cost Considerations

In undertaking step-one of the Chevron analysis,

the Second Circuit concluded that section 316(b) is

unambiguous and does not permit EPA to conduct a

15

cost-benefit analysis in determining BTA for cooling

water intake structures. The Second Circuit’s opinion

that a cost-benefit analysis is precluded under a

routine construction of section 316(b) was based, in

the first instance, on the language of section 316(b)

itself, which the court stated, “plainly indicates that

facilities must adopt the best technology available

and that cost-benefit analysis cannot be justified in

light of Congress’ directive.” Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d

at 98-99, App. 2la-26a. The court did not preclude

EPA from all forms of cost consideration, but found

nothing in the unique text of section 316(b) itself that

provides EPA with the authority to balance costs and

environmental benefits when selecting BTA.

The Second Circuit also examined the ordinary

meaning of the discharge provisions cross-referenced

in section 316(b), and observed that, in light of the

cross-references its ordinary reading cf _ the

technology standard in section 316(b) is also

consistent with the technology-forcing nature of the

discharge provisions. See Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at

98-99, App. 23a (“The BTA standard of section 316(b),

. , is linguistically similar to the BAT standard of

section 301 and the standard that applies to new

sources under section 306”); see also Riverkeeper II,

* The Second Circuit held that EPA may permissibly

consider costs in two ways: (1) to determine what technology can

be “reasonably borne” by the industry, and, (2) to engage in a

cost-effectiveness analysis in determining BTA. Riverkeeper II,

475 F.3d at 99, App. 22a.

16

475 F.3d at 99-100, citing Kennecott v. United States

EPA, 780 F.2d 445, 448 (4th Cir. 1985), App. 24a-26a

(“In setting BAT, EPA uses not the average plant, but

the optimally operating plant, the pilot plant which

acts as a beacon to show what is possible”); Natural

Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 822 F.2d 104,

123 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“The most salient characteristic

of the Clean Water Act’s statutory scheme, articulated

time and again by its architects and embedded in the

statutory language, is that it is technology forcing.”)

The Second Circuit’s construction of the statute

with regard to the cost-benefit analysis does not

break any new ground. Moreover, PSEG exaggerates

the extent to which the Second Circuit relied on this

Court’s decision in American Textile Manufacturers

Institute, Inc. v. Donovan (“Donovan”), 452 U.S. 490

(1981) to conclude that a cost-benefit analysis is not

allowed under section 316(b). Even before referring to

Donovan the court concluded that, “cost benefit

analysis is not ... supported by the language or the

purpose of the statute.” Riverkeeper IT, 475 F.3d at 99,

App. 24a. Section 316(b) directs EPA to select the

best available technology for minimizing adverse

environmental impact. The technology-forcing

standard established in section 316(b) focuses on

“available” technology and “minimization.” Not

straying from the textual reading of section 316(b),

the Second Circuit turned to this Court’s reasoning in

Donovan and other opinions of this Court to provide

support for the basic construction principle that

Congress knows how to direct an agency to consider

17

costs and benefits. See Donovan, 452 U.S. at 509

(“When Congress has intended that an agency engage

in cost-benefit analysis, it has clearly indicated such

intent on the face of the statute.”) The Second

Circuit’s decision is also consistent with the ordinary

rule of statutory construction that “[wJhen Congress

includes particular language in one section of a

statute but omits it in another section of the same

Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts

intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion

or exclusion.”) See Keene Corp. v. United States, 508

U.S. 200, 208 (1993) (internal quotation marks

omitted) (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S.

16, 23 (1983)).°

The Second Circuit’s conclusion that EPA may

consider costs in a limited fashion when selecting

BTA, but that a cost-benefit analysis is prohibited

under the statute, was reached because the unique

language in section 316(b) calls for the “minimization

of adverse environmental impacts,” and technology-

forcing nature of the sections cross-referenced in

section 316(b) unambiguously reflect Congress’ intent

to do away with the cost-benefit analysis. The court’s

opinion was the result of a textbook application of

ordinary Chevron step-one principles. The Second

* In Whitman v. American ‘rucking Associations, Inc., 531

U.S. 457, 467-68, 121 S.Ct. 903, 909-10 (2001), this Court held

that, “Congress does not alter the fundamental details of a

regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions ~ it

does not one might say hide elephants in mouseholes.”

18

Circuit’s opinion, on this point, does not warrant this

Court’s review.

Restoration

Section 316(b) provides that the “location, design,

construction, or capacity of cooling water intake

structures” must “reflect the best technology

available for minimizing adverse environmental

impacts.” In concluding that section 316(b) does not

authorize the use of restoration measures as a

substitute for BTA, the Second Circuit again adhered

to a _ step-one Chevron analysis, holding that

“Congress unambiguously expressed its intent in the

statute.” Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 110, quoting

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, App. 48a

(“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of

the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must

give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of

Congress.”) Based om a straightforward Chevron

analysis, the court rejected the use of restoration

measures for two reasons: (1) restoration measures

cannot be used to curtail or reduce the impacts

caused by the intake itself, as is required by section

316(b); and (ii) restoration measures do not minimize

impacts, as is required by the statute, but rather are

implemented with the hope that they will mitigate

impacts after they have already occurred.

Industry Petitioners argue that the use of the

word “reflect” in section 316(b) means that the

approved technology does not have to be incorporated

19

into the intake structure itself. From here, Industry

Petitioners imply that because other permissible

technologies, such as barrier nets and cooling towers,

are likewise not part of the intake structure,

restoration measures are no different and should

have been permitted. The Second Circuit addressed

this argument squarely when it was raised by EPA in

Riverkeeper II — the statute is clear, restoration

measures simply are neither related to the intake

characteristics listed in section 316(b), nor do they

constitute technology that minimizes environmental

impact. See Riverkeeper Il, 475 F.3d at 110, App. 49a

(“[A] rule permitting compliance with the statute

through restoration measures allows facilities to

avoid adopting any cooling water intake structure

technology at all, in contravention of the Act’s clear

language as well as its technology-forcing principle.”)

Moreover. the Second Circuit observed that it had

decided this very statutory construction issue in

Riverkeeper I with respect to EPA’s regulation of

cooling water intake structures at new facilities:

As we noted in Riverkeeper I, restoration

measures substitute after-the-fact compensation

for adverse environmental impacts that have

already occurred for the minimization of

those impacts in the first instance. The

Agency’s attempt to define the word

“minimize” to include “compensatifon] ...

after the fact,” 69 Fed. Reg. 41,628 is simply

inconsistent with that word’s dictionary

definition: “to reduce to the smallest possible

20

extent,” Webster’s Third New Int’) Dictionary

1438 (1986).

Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 110 (emphasis added),

citing Riverkeeper I, 358 F.3d at 189, App. 49a.

After this conventional textual analysis of section

316(b), the Second Circuit unanimously held, consistent

with Riverkeeper I, that “EPA impermissibly construed

the statute by allowing compliance with section

316(b) via restoration measures.” [d.

Application to Existing Facilities

Entergy suggests that this case presents the

opportunity for this Court to resolve whether an

agency should be given deference when it interprets a

statute that defines the scope of its authority.

Entergy Pet. at 22. The question of whether section

316(b) applies to existing facilities is not a scope of

authority issue — it simply required a straightforward

reading of section 316(b) to determine whether

Congress intended it to apply to existing facilities.

Thus, EPA did not improperly assert, nor did it

attempt to redefine the scope of its authority when it

promulgated the Phase II rule pursuant to section

316(b).

Throughout the Clean Water Act, EPA’s authority

to regulate discharges indisputably extends to new

and existing facilities alike. Indeed, it is_ well

established that EPA is required by section 316(b) to

promulgate regulations governing cooling water

21

intake structures at existing facilities in Phase II and

III of its rulemaking process. See Cronin v. Browner,

90 F.Supp.2d 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).

The Second Circuit rejected Entergy’s argument

that the phrase “location, design, construction, and

capacity,” implicitly limits the applicability of section

316(b) to new facilities. It relied on the textual cross-

references in section 316(b) to provisions that govern

both new and existing facilities to conclude that

section 316(b) articulates a single standard for both

new and existing facilities. Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at

122, App. 74a-75a.

Entergy likewise argues that because section

316(b) neither dictates particular technologies to be

used for cooling water intake structures, nor specifies

a particular mechanism by which EPA is to

implement its technology determinations under

section 316(b), EPA is reaching beyond the scope of its

authority in applying its regulations to existing

facilities. This argument, too, is nothing more than a

challenge to the deference that is afforded to EPA

under step-two of its Chevron analysis. EPA has

imposed intake requirements through discharge

permits and the circuit courts have supported this

implementation mechanism since the inception of the

Clean Water Act.

In short, Riverkeeper II did not address the scope

of EPA’s authority, it addressed the applicability of

section 316(b).

22

Ill, THERE IS NO SPLIT IN THE CIRCUIT

COURTS ON ANY OF THE ISSUES RAISED

BY INDUSTRY PETITIONERS.

Industry Petitioners argue that the Second

Circuit’s opinion in Riverkeeper II conflicts with the

decisions of other circuit courts on three issues:

whether section 316(b) precludes a cost-benefit analysis

in determining BTA; whether section 316(b) sanctions

the use of restoration measures as a substitute for

technology-forcing standards; and whether section

316(b) applies to existing facilities, and in turn, can

be implemented through discharge permits.

The Cost-Benefit Analysis

Industry Petitioners assert that the Second

Circuit’s opinion disregards a longstanding practice to

allow cost-benefit analysis with respect to water

intake regulation under section 316(b). PSEG Pet. at

24, 30. To support this assertion Industry Petitioners

rely on Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 597

F.2d 306 (1st Cir. 1979) (“Seacoast”). Specifically,

PSEG and UWAG cite Seacoast for the principle that

the use of a cost-benefit analysis in determining BTA

has always been the norm. UWAG Pet. at 25-28;

PSEG Pet. at 24-25 Seacoast however, did not

address the permissibility of a cost-benefit analysis at

all. Rather, the First Circuit concluded only that the

statute’s legislative history indicates that cost is an

acceptable consideration in determining whether the

intake design “reflects the best technology available.”

Seacoast, 597 F.2d at 311. Contrary to the Industry

23

Petitioners’ arguments, Seacoast does not endorse a

cost-benefit analysis nor prescribe one.

Moreover, in citing Seacoast, Industry Petitioners

fail to recognize that the cost-benefit analysis for

setting effluent limitations under section 301(b)(2)(A)

was replaced by the more stringent “best available

technology” standard, under which EPA may consider

the cost of achieving a reduction in effluent, but not

the cost of achieving the effluent reduction as

compared to the benefit achieved by the reduction. In

the context of section 316(b), the Second Circuit

recognized the distinction between considering cost in

determining BTA and balancing cost against the

benefit to be achieved by BTA.’ The Second Circuit

found support for this distinction in this Court’s

decision in EPA v. Nationai Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449

U.S. 64 (1980), where it recognized that the shift to

BAT in section 301 fundamentally altered the way in

which the EPA could factor cost into its Clean Water

Act determinations. App. 2la. Thus, the Second

Circuit’s decision is ** at variance with the Seacoast

Court’s dicta that cost 1s an “acceptable consideration”

in determining whether an intake design reflects the

best technology available. Seacoast, 597 F.2d at 311.

" Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 102, citing Riverkeeper I, 358

F.3d at 195, App. 30a (“Congress made only one distinction:

while the Agency could consider the relationship between cost

and benefits in establishing BPT, CWA Section 304(b\1)(B), 33

U.S.C. § 1314(b\(1\B), it could consider cost insofar as it can be

‘reasonably borne’ by the industry, but not the relationship

between cost and benefits, in establishing BAT.”)

24

The Industry Petitioners also cite BP Exploration

& Oil, Inc., 66 F3d 784 (6th Cir. 1995) and

Weyerhaeuser v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978)

in support of their claim of conflict among the circuits

on the cost-benefit analysis issue. Entergy Pet. at 25-

30; PSEG Pet. at 20-21. Neither case addressed the

applicability of a cost-benefit analysis when

establishing BTA under section 316(b).

In BP Oil, oil and gas industry petitioners

challenged an EPA rulemaking that established

pollution (effluent) discharge limitations promulgated

under sections 301, 304 and 306. BP Oil, 66 F.3d at

789. Petitioners also challenged EPA’s calculation of

the cost of achieving the effluent limitations, but not

EPA’s failure to properly consider cost. In upholding

EPA’s rulemaking, the Sixth Circuit noted the factors,

including cost, that EPA may consider in setting

effluent limitations for an industry subject to “best

available technology,” and recognized that EPA was

required to “institute progressively more stringent

effluent discharge guidelines in stages.” Jd. Notably,

the Court did not hold, or even suggest, that a cost-

benefit analysis was proper in establishing such

limitations and simply did not address the question of

whether section 316(b) authorizes such an approach

when determining BTA at an intake structure. Thus,

BP Oil does not conflict with Riverkeeper II on the

issue of cost-benefit analysis.

Similarly, there is no conflict presented by

Weyerhaeuser, where petitioners challenged an EPA

rulemaking setting effluent discharge limitations and

25

the calculated costs of implementation. Like BP Oil,

the court in Weyerhaeuser did not address the

question of whether a cost-benefit analysis under

Section 316(b) is appropriate when establishing BTA

for intake structures. Moreover, Weyerhaeuser

predated the shift to best available technology

recognized in National Crushed Stone _ Ass’n.

Weyerhaeuser therefore presents no conflict with the

decision in Riverkeeper I].

Nor do any of the other cases cited by the

Industry Petitioners address the issue of whether

Section 316(b) authorizes a cost-benefit analysis.”

Thus they do not support the conclusion that there is

a split among the circuit courts.

* See UWAG Pet. at. 21, citing United States Steel Corp. v.

Train, 556 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1977) (upholding EPA NPDES

permit against challenge that State law should apply); Entergy

Pet. at 32, citing Gulf Restoration Network v. United States Dept.

of Transportation, 452 F.3d 362, 372 (5th Cir. 2006) (upholding

environmental review and license issuance under Deepwater

Port Act); Entergy Pet. at 32-33, citing American Corn Growers

Ass'n v. EPA, 291 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (upholding EPA

regional haze rulemaking under Clean Air Act); UWAG Pet. at

21, citing United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 850

(7th Cir. 1977) (upholding EPA NPDES permit requiring

monitoring at intake pursuant to Section 316(b) and finding

assertion that EPA failed to compare costs and benefits of intake

technologies not ripe).

26

Restoration

Industry Petitioners argue that there is also a

conflict among the circuit courts with respect to

whether restoration measures are a_ permissible

substitute for technology at the intake structure

under section 316(b). In fact, the Second Circuit in

Riverkeeper I was the first to directly address this

issue. Riverkeeper I, 358 F.3d at 189-91. Riverkeeper I

rejected inclusion of restoration measures in lieu of

technology at the intake at new facilities under the

Phase I rule in light of the plain language of section

316(b). Id. at 191. The Second Circuit’s decision to

reject restoration here in the Phase II rule is based on

the same analysis.

Industry Petitioners cite Seacoast, 597 F.2d at

309-11, in support of their claim that there is a split

between the First and Second Circuits. PSEG Pet. at

28-29. Because Seacoast does not address whether

section 316(b) authorizes restoration measures in lieu

of technology at the intake, however, it is not in

conflict with Riverkeeper I and Riverkeeper I.

Industry Petitioners also suggest that the Second

Circuit is departing from a broad national consensus

and that the Second Circuit decision threatens EPA's

practice of requiring restoration measures in many

environmental contexts, including the National

Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), the Clean Water

Act Section 404, the Endangered Species Act, and the

Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act. PSEG Pet. at 30-

31. Petitioners argue that many courts have affirmed

27

a federal agency’s discretion to consider restoration in

those contexts. This argument is erroneous. These

decisions, which address restoration measures under

distinct federal statutes, do not give rise to a conflict

among the circuit courts on whether section 316(b)

allows restoration measures in lieu of best technology

available at intake structures. Moreover, none of the

referenced statutes have the distinct and isolated

provision mandating that EPA select a technology

based on its ability to “minimize” adverse

environmental impacts.

Petitioners also misconstrue the Second Circuit’s

holding with respect to restoration as a policy matter.

The Court recognized that restoration measures could

be beneficial, but held that EPA could not substitute

restoration measures in place of technology at an

intake structure. That holding does not undermine

the importance of restoration or the ability of EPA or

the States to use restoration measures in addition to

the appropriate technology requirements at the

intake as mandated by section 316(b).

Existing Facilities

Petitioner Entergy argues that there is a split

among the circuit courts with respect to whether

section 316(b) applies to existing facilities, and

whether cooling water intake standards can be

regulated in discharge permits. Contrary to Entergy’s

claim, the Second Circuit’s holding did not expand the

application of section 316(b) beyond its text, nor did it

28

equate the intake requirements of section 316(b) with

discharge requirements of sections 301 and 306.

The courts have long recognized that section

316(b) applies to “existing” cooling water intake

structures as well as to “new” structures, and that the

National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System

(“NPDES”) permitting program is an appropriate

mechanism for implementation. See Riverkeeper II,

475 F.3d at 122, quoting E.J. du Pont de Nemours &

Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 121 (1977), App. 74a

(“Section 301(b), to which section 316(b) expressly

refers, defines the effluent limitations that shall be

achieved by existing point sources.”); see also United

States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 850 (7th Cir.

1977). The plaintiff, like Industry Petitioners here,

argued that the requirements of section 316(b)

applied only to a certain category of power plants,

and that EPA could not impose section 316(b)

requirements as a condition of NPDES permits. See

id. at 849. The Seventh Circuit disagreed, holding

that section 316(b) applies on its face to all

technology-based requirements of the Clean Water

Act. Id. at 849-50. The Seventh Circuit went on to

confirm that the proper mechanism for implementing

the requirements of section 316(b) was through

conditions imposed in NPDES permits. /d., citing

Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351, 1371-

72 (4th Cir. 1976).

Entergy’s contention that Riverkeeper II creates a

conflict with Virginia Electric Power Co. v. Costle, 566

F.2d 446 (4th Cir. 1977) is also incorrect. The issue in

29

Virginia Electric was a narrow one — whether the

circuit courts had jurisdiction to review agency

regulations issued pursuant to section 316(b) of the

Clean Water Act. Entergy cites isolated language in

the case for the proposition that section 316(b)

regulations are not effluent limitations. But that

issue was not in dispute there, see id. at 449, nor is it

in dispute here. In fact, the Fourth Circuit’s decision

supports the proposition that section 316(b) intake

technology requirements apply to existing facilities.

Furthermore, the court, and the industry petitioners

in that case, implicitly recognized that section 316(b)

regulations could be implemented for existing

facilities through NPDES permitting processes. See

id. at 449.

Nor does Riverkeeper II create a conflict with

Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 859 F.2d

156 (D.C. Cir. 1988), as Entergy maintains. The issue

before the D.C. Circuit there was whether EPA could

impose non-water quality permit conditions in a

NPDES discharge permit. EPA asserted that the

National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) provides

it with “supplemental authority” not only to consider

additional environmental factors, “but to act on these

factors by imposing any condition necessary to

account for the environmental effects of the new

facility.” Id. at 169. The court concluded that EPA

could not look to NEPA to expand its substantive

powers. It held that “[aJny action taken by a federal

agency must fall within the agency’s appropriate

province under its organic statute(s).” Jd. In contrast,

30

EPA here is acting within its express authority under

section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act in promulgating

standards that require “cooling water intake

structures [to] reflect the best technology available

for minimizing adverse environmental impact.” 33

U.S.C. §1326(b).

¢

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Industry petitions

for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

For the State Respondents

PATRICK C. LYNCH

Attorney General

TRICIA O’HARE JEDELE

Special Assistant Attorney General

Counsel of Record

150 South Main Street

Providence, RI 02903

Phone: (401) 274-4400, Ext. 2400

Fax: (401) 222-3016

Dated: March 3, 2008

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.

Opposition Brief — Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc. · 556 U.S. 208 | Frix