Record and brief — Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc.

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Text

DOCKET

No 07-888

Vide 07-589, 07-

$97

Title

Docketed

Lower Ct

Case Nos

Entergy Corporation. Petitioner

\

Riverkeeper. Inc . et al

November 2, 2007

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

(04-6692 ag - 04-0099ag)

Decision Date January 25, 2007

Rehearing

Denied.

Questions

Presented

~Date~-

Sep 20 2007

Sep 25 2007

Nov 2 2007

Nov 2 2007

Nov 20 2007

Nov 29 2007

Nov 30 2007

Dec 3 2007

Dec 3 2007

Jan 14 2008

Feb 25 2008

Feb 29 2008

Mar 3 2008

Mar 3 2008

Mar 18 2008

Mar 19 2008

Apr 14 2008

July $, 2007

~~~Proceedings and Orders~~-

Application (07 4257) to extend the time to file a petition for a wnt of

certiorari from October 3. 2007 to November 2. 2007. submitted to Justice

Ginsburg

Application (074257) granted by Justice Ginsburg extending the time to

file until November 2, 2007

Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due December 3, 2007)

Appendix of Entergy Corporation filed.

Order extending time to file response to petition to and including February

1, 2008. for all respondents

Waiver of right of respondent Utility Water Act Group to respond filed

Waiver of right of respondents PSEG Fossil LLC and PSEG Nuclear LLC

to respond filed.

Brief amicus curiae of Nuclear Energy Institute filed VIDED

Briet amici curiae of Nebraska, et al filed VIDED

Order further extending time to file response to petition to and including

February 29, 2008, for all respondents.

Order further extending time to file response to petition to and including

March 3, 2008. for all respondents

Brief of respondents Riverkeepers, Inc . et al. in opposition tiled VIDED.

Brief of Federal Respondents in opposition filed VIDED

Brief of respondents Rhode Island. et al. in opposition filed. VIDED

Reply of petitioner Entergy Corporation filed.

DISTRIBUTED for Conterence of April 11, 2008

Petition GRANTED and is consolidated with No 07-589 and No 07-597.

limited to the following question Whether Section 316(b) of the Clean

Water Act. 33 U SC. 1326(b). authorizes the Environmental Protection

May 9 2008

Agency (EPA) to compare costs with benefits in determining the "best

technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact” at

cooling water intake structures. A total of one hour is allotted for oral

argument

The time within which to file the joint appendix and petitioners’ briefs on

the merits is extended to and including June 30, 2008 VIDED

May 14 2008 The time within which to file respondents’ briefs on the merits is extended

Jun 5 2008

Jun § 2008

Jun 23 2008

Jun 24 2008

Jun 24 2008

Jun 30 2008

Jul 11 2008

Jul 14 2008

Jul 14 2008

Jul 14 2008

Jul 14 2008

Jul 18 2008

Jul 18 2008

Jul 21 2008

Jul 21 2008

Jul 2) 2008

Jul 21 2008

Jul 21 2008

Jul 2) 2008

Sep 8 2008

to and including September 15, 2008. VIDED

The time within which to file the joint appendix and petitioners’ briefs on

the merits is further extended to and including July 14, 2008 VIDED

The time within which to file respondents’ briefs on the merits is further

extended to and including September 29. 2008. VIDED

Application (074A 1032) for leave to file a consolidated petitioners brief on

the merits in excess of the word limitation, submitted to Justice Ginsburg

Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs in support of either or neither

party received trom counsel for respondents Riverkeeper, Inc , et al

VIDED

Application (07A 1032) denied by Justice Ginsburg

Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs in support of either or neither

party received from counsel for petitioners’ in case Nos. 07-588, 07-589 &

07-597. VIDED

Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs in support of either or neither

party received from counsel for the State respondents. VIDED

Joint appendix filed (statement of costs received) VIDED

Brief of petitioner Entergy Corp. and petitioners PSEG Fossil LLC, et al

filed VIDED

Brief of respondents Environmental Protection Agency, et al. in support of

petitioners filed VIDED

Brief of petitioner Utility Water Act Group filed VIDED

Brief amicus curiae of National Association of Home Builders filed

VIDED.

Brief amicus curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation filed. VIDED

Brief amicus curiae of Nuclear Energy Institute filed VIDED

Brief amicus curiae of American Petroleum Institute tiled VIDED

Brief amici curiae of American Chemistry Council, et al. filed VIDED

Brief amici curiae of Nebraska, et al. filed VIDED

Brief amicus curiae of California Council for Environmental and Economic

Balance filed

Brief amici curiae of AEI Center For Regulatory and Market Studies. et al

filed VIDED

SET FOR ARGUMENT ON Tuesday. December 2. 2008

Sep 12 2008

Sep 23 2008

Sep 29 2008

Sep 29 2008

Sep 29 2008

Oct | 2008

Oct | 2008

Oct 6 2008

Oct 6 2008

Oct 6 2008

Oct 6 2008

Oct 6 2008

Oct 6 2008

Oct 6 2008

Oct 6 2008

Oct 6 2008

Oct 6 2008

Oct 14 2008

Oct 14 2008

Oct 28 2008

Oct 29 2008

Oct 29 2008

Oct 29 2008

Nov 18 2008

CIRCLLATED

Motion for divided argument filed by the Solicitor General. VIDED

Brief of respondents State-Respondents filed VIDED (Distributed)

Briet of respondents Riverkeeper, Inc . et al. tiled VIDED. (Distributed)

Letter from counsel for respondents Riverkeeper, Inc . et al. proposing to

lodge six documents from the records of the Senate Committee on Public

Works related to congressional consideration of the Federal Water

Pollution Control Act of 1972

Motion for divided argument filed by respondents Rhode Island. et al

VIDED

Letter of respondents Riverkeeper. Inc.. et al. in support of State-

Respondents motion for divided argument filed

Briet amici curiae of Environment America. et al filed VIDED

(Distributed)

Letter requesting caption change received

Briet amicus curiae of OMB Watch filed

Briet amici curiae of Commercial Fisherman of America. et al. filed

VIDED (Distributed)

Brief amici curiae of Economists Frank Ackerman. et al filed VIDED

(Distributed)

Briet amici curiae of Clean Air Task Force. et al. filed VIDED

(Distributed)

Briet amici curiae of National Wildlife Federation. and Sierra Club filed

VIDED (Distributed)

Briet amici curiae of Voices of the Wetlands. et al. filed VIDED

(Distributed)

Briet amici curiae of Illinois. et al. tiled VIDED. (Distributed)

Briet amici curiae of Environmental Law Professors filed VIDED

(Distributed)

Motion for divided argument filed by respondents Rhode Island. et al

DENIED VIDED

Motion for divided argument filed by the Solicitor General GRANTED

VIDED

Reply of respondent Utility Water Act Group filed VIDED (Distributed)

Reply brief of respondents The Federal Parties in support of petitioners

tiled VIDED. (Distributed)

Reply of petitioners Entergy Corp, PSEG Fossil LLC. and PSEG Nuclear

LLC filed. VIDED (Distributed)

Record received from the L SC A. for the Second Circuit. (3 boxes)

The Clerk has approved respondents’ proposed lodging Lodging consisting

of six documents from the National Archives, received from counsel for

Dec 2 2008

respondents Riverkeeper, et al. VIDED. (Circulated)

Argued. For Environmental Protection Agency, et al. in support of

petitioners: Daryl! Joseffer, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of

Justice, Washington, D.C. For petitioners: Maureen E. Mahoney,

Washington, D.C. For respondents: Richard J. Lazarus, Cambridge, Mass

PETITION

FOR

WRIT OF

CERTIORARI

Supreme Court

FILED sis

07-58 Rr i 1 - 20N7

Cl OOFFICE OF THE CLERK

No. 07-

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

ENTERGY CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

V.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY ET AL.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United

States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

CHUCK D. BARLOW ELISE N. ZOLI

ENTERGY SERVICES, INC. Counsel of Record

308 E. Pearl Street KEVIN P. MARTIN

Jackson, MS 39201 GOODWIN PROCTER LLP

(601) 969-2542 53 State Street

Boston, MA 02109

(617) 570-1000

Counsel for the Petitioner

November 2, 2007

Questions Presented

This case involves regulation under the Clean

Water Act (“CWA”) of the intake structures used by

power plants to take in cooling water. After 30 years

of regulating new facilities, the Environmental

Protection Agency (“EPA”) promulgated a regulation

requiring existing cooling water intake structures to

be retrofitted to comply with EPA’s latest

determination of the “best technology available for

minimizing adverse environmental impact,”

measured in terms of the potential effects on early

life stages of fish. The Second Circuit, deferring to

EPA, held that EPA has authority to retrofit existing

facilities. Siding with environmental petitioners and

against EPA, the court also held that EPA’s weighing

of costs and benefits is limited to a narrow “cost-

effectiveness” test. The questions presented, all of

which implicate splits in circuit court authority, are:

1. Whether the CWA provides EPA authority to

impose new requirements under Section 316(b) of the

Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b), with respect to existing

cooling water intake structures?

2. Whether a court should accord Chevron

deference to an agency's interpretation of its own

statutory jurisdiction?

3. Whether Sections 301 and 316(b) of the CWA,

33 U.S.C. §§ 1301, 1326(b), limit EPA’s weighing of

costs and benefits only to the Second Circuit's “cost

effectiveness” test?

ll.

Parties to the Proceeding

Petitioner Entergy Corp. (“Entergy”) was a

petitioner in the court of appeals. Utility Water Act

Group, PSEG Fossil LLC, and PSEG Nuclear LLC,

expected to be separate petitioners in this Court.

were also petitioners in the court of appeals.

Respondents are the United States

Environmental Protection Agency, a respondent in

the court of appeals, and the following petitioners in

the court of appeals: Riverkeeper, Inc.; Natural

Resources Defense Council: Waterkeeper Alliance:

Soundkeeper,. Inc.: Scenic Hudson, Inc.: Save the

Bay-People for Narragansett Bay: Friends of Casco

Bay: American Littoral Society: Delaware

Riverkeeper Network: Hackensack Riverkeeper, Inc.:

New York/New Jersey Baykeeper: Santa Monica

Baykeeper: San Diego Baykeeper; California

Coastkeeper: Columbia Riverkeeper: Conservation

Law Foundation: Surfrider Foundation: Appalachian

Power Company: and Illinois Energy Association;

and the States of Connecticut... Delaware,

Massachusetts. New Jersey. New York, and Rhode

Island.

Corporate Disclosure Statement

Entergy. a Delaware corporation. is a publicly

traded company, and no publicly-held company has a

10°. or greater ownership interest in Entergy.

Page

I a endian ane eieipiieeibindal 1.

RE: Ol BIND FRUIT 30. nce .c cece cncceiccccsescccccsesessesese ll.

ELIE IIE TORT RT EE RIOT iV.

a ciaseninsleseaicmnininndadsiomaiiices |

SERIE SE OCT AE RS CERNE TOT 1

Statutory Provision Involved ....................ccececseeseseeeeees l

EET TT ETT 2

A. Statutory Background. ................0..sccccccoccesce 4

B. Environmental Protection Agency

ESI, eS OnE ne 7

Ee The Second Circuit’s Decision.................... 10

Reasons for Granting the Petition............................. 13

A. The Second Circuit's Holding that

EPA Has Authority under Section

402 to Impose Section 316(b)

Regulations on Existing Facilities

Conflicts with the Decisions of Two

Other Circuit Courts of Appeal.................. 15

B. The Second Circuit’s Deference to

111.

Table of Contents

EPA on the Existing Facilities Issue

Implicates a Split Among the Courts

of Appeal Over Deference to Agency

Assertions of Jurisdiction ...................

panes 22

IV.

c. The Second Circuit’s Holding

Limiting EPA to a Narrow “Cost-

Effectiveness” Test under Sections

301 and 316(b) Conflicts with the

Holdings of Other Courts of Appeal .......... 25

RNIN is 5 scons igasherncliens dikieideesinibnteieidadineepneioenteiiaide 36

Appendices:

A. 2007 Court of Appeals opinion ....................000200 la

B. Court of Appeals order denying petition for

ee a 95a

C. Relevant statutory provisions ................6..0.c0008 97a

Clean Water Act § 301(a)-(c), 33 U.S.C.

a lit a reds cialna 97a

Clean Water Act § 304(a)—(b), 33 U.S.C.

ca i aia aaa iteiscia iteictaiasiitaiealh 10la

Clean Water Act § 306, 33 U.S.C. § 1316....... 108a

Clean Water Act § 316, 33 U.S.C. § 1326....... ll2a

Clean Water Act § 401, 33 U.S.C. § 1341....... ll3a

Clean Water Act § 402(a), 33 U.S.C.

EES ae Se eee Seno TD 119a

I ial 122a

I Giitinitcnsiitecs addtihtintilieibositielvctiebinlbasinecsnauetinenniinapt 122a

Amendments to 40 C.F.R.........................000000: 542a

Vv.

Table of Authorities

CASES:

ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554 (D.C. Cir.

IT siicescetsiiaiusasiinieneannsaaieiehiensindeaiaamaiibiannadtl Aan

Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc..,

EE OF a Te Ci ivivccdkcincdvcttneceen 16, 22, 23,

Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 858 F.2d 261

ne arta SUMO caesinecitlaincecinsacasteelaaiealietteseadiaaee aaticaere Raa

Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan,

Se ee ee iiiictvnlnscccccciobintinamness 12, 33,

American Corn Growers Ass'n v. EPA,

SE Fe 2 GK AR, Bi cccvccseccccnecssscstes 32,

Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 566 F.2d

Be Cas Ga. Fe Pickin cesecsvessntiddioncsencreaniennaes

BP Exploration & Oil v. EPA, 66 F.3d 784

Ee SA, nisi dnsiceiindnditiniabaciipdiumheniaecatiee 30,

Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406

Tl ag RI le esters svi oR rs a

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.

rouncil, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)....................08 4,

Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading

Comm hn. 519 U.S. 465 (1907).............c.scccc.ccee0.

E.E.O.C. v. Seafarer’s Intl Union, 394 F.3d

Cr COs GA, Be icitdstccmarcisictticeeeneee

25

25

31

34

31

29

34

28

24

V1.

EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449

ie 29, 30, 31

First Gibraltar Bank, FSB v. Morales, 42

BP ee ED CUED GEM. BUDUIUDD ..-ccccccccccccccccccccscccccccecs 24

Gulf Restoration Network v. United States

Dept. of Trans., 452 F.3d 362 (5th Cir.

Holderfield v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 326

if ey of) |” Bo | nee 24

Mississippi Power & Light Co. v.

Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354 (1988)............... 23, 24

Nat! Wildlife Fed’n v. EPA, 286 F.3d 554

ESO PSO 31

Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 859 F.2d

I i spataccenencsoe 19

Newton v. FAA, 457 F.3d 1133 (10th Cir.

a csmsesene 24

NLRB vy. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S.

EEN LESSER 23

Northern Illinois Steel Supply Co. v.

Secretary of Labor, 294 F.3d 844 (7th

es cauweceueuneins 24, 25

Puerto Rico Mar. Shipping Auth. v. Valley

Freight Svsts., Inc., 856 F.2d 546 (3rd

Ns 24

Vil.

Reynolds Metal Co. v. United States EPA,

760 F.2d 549 (4th Cir. 1066) .....................0002.. 31

Rybachek v. EPA, 904 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir.

Seri sisccscisesdieieicinsiecietcadabh leibedisiciiadiad Renieionasded eiebadilehde 31

Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle,

BOT Fe BOS Chak Cie. BOTBD cccccessccssccccccsccccsess 27

U.S. Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822 (7th

TENE CITI ins jndssicencebicsiunchiaiaanaienuiiamatabiniadaimmaaandianda: 20

Va. Elec. & Power Co. v. Costle, 566 F.2d

NS. Se neni csiicinnnsseiniadaiitibesetians 18, 19

W. Chicago v. NRC, 701 F.2d 632 (7th Cir.

See insintiisatinslichagaadaacadescmatidianadinndasamhemasuseiata 20

Wevyerhauser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011

Gs ERs MUI ccschiecionieineesiteiseadadiadeadilasidnstinadnineneadall 31

Whitman v. American Trucking Ass ‘ns,

i Se rs Se Ce rincascencécnsescatatnaddoocadinnl 21

STATUTES:

Be as Oe TE nicistiictnsidachenksondindilidhaadensoastoummadadainis 1

Be rs ae IID sccesicisnicoteiccialiesunciaiansalstinenineeaenie 22

Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq

Section 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1371 ................. passim

Section 304, 33 U.S.C. § 1314 ..................... 6, 28

Section 306, 33 U.S.C. § 1316 0.0... passim

Vill.

Section 316(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1326(a)....... 5, 21, 35

Section 316(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b)......... passim

Section 316(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1326(c).............. 5, 21

Section 401, 33 U.S.C. § 13411 ..................... 7,18

Section 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 ................. passim

EE Oe ET aisieniese pttiscniteeiteentcinnticibeiapadaliblietia 10

Ee Le nea ee 31

REGULATIONS:

ee NE IID scchinrectesicsiiensiivintiniensioniisiewiinitienniiiciiniebiieansin 8

ee ee irdcitncintiindcinneaiinnminimennvtinanetiaibindd 9,10

44 Fed. Reg. 32,956 (June 7, 1979) .......... cee eeeeee 7

69 Fed. Reg. 41,576 (July 9, 2004) ............... 8, 9, 20

OTHER AUTHORITIES:

American Heritage Dictionary (3d ed. 1992)....... 16

Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) ........... 15, 16

Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989).............. 16

Petitioner Entergy respectfully seeks a writ of

certiorari to the United States Court of Anpeals for

the Second Circuit.

Opinion Below

The opinion of the court of appeals (App. la—94a)

is reported at 475 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2007).

Jurisdiction

The court of appeals entered its judgment on

January 25, 2007. An order denying petitions for

rehearing en banc was entered on July 5, 2007. An

order extending the time for filing a petition for

certiorari to November 2, 2007 was granted on

September 25, 2007. The jurisdiction of this Court is

invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

Statutory Provisions Involved

This case generally involves the Clean Water Act,

33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq., and in particular concerns

Section 316(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b). Relevant

statutory provisions are set forth in the appendix.

Statement of the Case

This case presents three questions of importance

beyond the confines of the present dispute, with

respect to which the opinion of the Second Circuit

below is in conflict with decisions of several other

courts of appeal. Unless reviewed and reversed, the

Second Circuit’s decision will overthrow decades of

settled regulatory practice under the Clean Water

Act (the “CWA” or the “Act”). It will also impose

upon the nation’s electric-generating sector a regime

of potentially continuous retrofitting of power plants,

costing—by EPA's reckoning—billions of dollars each

(1)

2

a

year, even where such retrofitting cannot be shown,

in the case of a particular plant, to provide any

environmental benefits.

The case concerns the infrastructure used by

power plants, including nuclear plants, to bring

surface water into their facilities. Such water is

necessary to offset the heat created by power

generation, thereby permitting the safe operation of

such plants. The means by which cooling water is

drawn into, and circulated through, a plant is a

fundamental factor in plant design, and the amount

of cooling water a power plant can utilize necessarily

affects the amount of power a plant can generate. '

While cooling water ts necessary for plant

operation, the intake structure through which water

is drawn may pose a risk of mortality to early life

stages of fish through “entrainment” (passage of

juvenile fish or larvae through the intake structure)

and “impingement” (contact by fish with the screens

or exterior of the intake structure).

To address these potential impacts from the

intake of cooling water, Congress, in Section 316(b)

of the CWA, authorized EPA (and delegated state

authorities) to regulate the “location, design,

construction, and capacity of cooling water intake

structures,” to ensure that such structures “reflect

the best technology available for minimizing adverse

environmental impact,” or “BTA.” 33 U.S.C.

§ 1326(b).

! Broadly speaking, some electric-generating facilities draw

in water, circulate it once through the plant, and then release it

back into the environment (‘once-through cooling”); other

plants draw water and then consume it through cooling towers

(“closed-cycle cooling”).

3

In its decision below, the Second Circuit

interpreted Section 316(b) and other provisions of the

CWA in a manner inconsistent with the plain

meaning of the Act and in conflict with other circuit

courts on numerous. issues. First, the court

interpreted Section 316(b) to create a regime under

which regulators must select as BTA the technology

that is most effective even by a single fish larvae

at reducing impingement and entrainment, unless

the cost of that technology either cannot be

reasonably borne by the electric generating sector as

a whole, or a_ substitute technology, capable of

achieving at least one identical result, is available at

a “markedly lower” cost. Other than in this limited

manner, EPA is entirely forbidden from inquiring

whether the environmental benefits of the selected

BTA are outweighed by its costs. In so holding, the

Second Circuit also interpreted a separate provision

of the CWA applicable to all industry, Section 301, as

similarly restraining EPA’s authority to weigh costs

and benefits in regulating the discharge of

pollutants.

Second, the court deferred to EPA’s interpretation

of Section 316(b) as permitting regulators to revisit

their preconstruction approvals of power plants’

cooling water intake structures. Under this holding

such facilities are in perpetual risk of being required

to retrofit fundamental plant infrastructure

constructed in rehance on _ initial regulatory

approvals. In validating this portion of its opinion

and reconciling it with the remainder of the Act, the

Second Circuit interpreted the CWA’s pollutant

“discharge” permitting provision to permit regulation

of the “intake” of ambient water. In combination

with the Second Circuit's restrictive reading of what

constitutes BTA, the holding below creates a regime

4

under which the nation’s existing electric supply may

be forced to shut down during lengthy retrofits—

costing hundreds of millions or even billions of

dollars for nuclear facilities—with no assurance that

EPA will not force another round of retrofits if the

agency concludes it would guaranty the survival of a

single additional fish egg or larvae.

The Second Cuircuit’s decision is wrong as a

matter of law, rests on a flawed understanding of

this Court's pre-Chevren precedent,? and conflicts

with the decisions of other courts of appeal on

several issues, including: Whether regulators have

authority under Section 402 of the CWA to regulate

cooling water intake structures and the intake of

water; whether a court should defer to an agency's

interpretation of its own statutory authority; and the

meaning of BTA under Section 316(b) and the term

“best available technology” (“BAT”) under Section

301. For the reasons given herein, this Court should

grant the writ of certiorari to review and reverse the

decision below.

A. Statutory Background

This case centers around the interpretation of

Section 316 of the CWA, “Thermal Discharges,” and

in particular Section 416(b), “Cooling Water Intake

Structures.”

Section 316, uniquely within the CWA, targets

power plants and aquatic ecosystems, for the most

part /imiting EPA’s authority to impose restrictions

on the former for the benefit of the latter. Section

316(a) requires EPA to relax otherwise applicable

See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natura: Res. Def. Council, 467

US. 837 (1984).

oO

thermal discharge requirements if the discharger

demonstrates that a proposed relaxed requirement

“will assure the protection and propagation of a

balanced, indigenous population of shellfish, fish,

and wildlife.” Section 316(c), meanwhile, prohibits

regulators from imposing new thermal discharge

requirements on previously modified facilities for the

shorter of either 10 years or until the cost of the

modification is amortized or depreciated. 33 U.S.C. §

1326(a), (c).

Between these two subsections concerning the

“protection and _ propagation of a_ balanced,

indigenous population of shellfish, fish and wildlife”

is sandwiched the single sentence of Section 316(b),

which provides, in full:

Any standard established pursuant to section

301 or section 306 of this Act and applicable to

a point source shall require that the location,

design, construction, and capacity of cooling

water intake structures reflect the best

technology available for minimizing adverse

environmental impact.

33 U.S.C. § 1326(b). The CWA says nothing about

how EPA is to consider costs in selecting BTA under

Section 316(b).

. The sections of the Act cross-referenced by the

Section 316(b)—Sections 301 and 306—do not

address the intake of water. Instead, both govern

the discharge of pollutants. Section 301 requires

EPA to- establish pollutant-specific effluent

limitations that “shall be applied to all point sources

of discharge of pollutants,” whether existing or new.

See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(e). Section 306 required EPA to

begin a rolling process of issuing “standards of

6

performance” exclusively for new point sources of

pollution on a category by category basis, with the

standards of performance applied to new facilities

“the construction of which is commenced after the

publication of proposed regulations * * * which will

be applicable to such source.” See 3? U.S.C. § 1316.

Sections 301 and 306 contribute to the CWA’s

alphabet soup of technological standards. Section

301 initially called for “the application of the best

practicable control technology currently available”

(“BPT”), but required, by March 31, 1989, the

implementation of a “best available technology

economically achievable” standard (“BAT”). 33

U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(A). (b)(2)(A). Section 306,

meanwhile, requires standards of performance to be

set under a “best available demonstrated control

technology” standard, or “BADCT.” 33 U-S.C.

§ 1316(a)(1).

Both Sections 301 and 306 expressly incorporate

Section 304, in which Congress provided some

guidance on how regulators may consider the cost

and benefits of comphance in selecting one or

another technology. Section 304 of the Act provides

that, in selecting BPT under Section 301, EPA

should consider “the total cost of application of

technology in relation to the effluent reduction

benefits to be achieved by such application,” while in

selecting the more stringent BAT, the agency must

still consider “the cost of achieving such effluent

reduction * * * and such other factors as the

Administrator deems appropriate.” 33 U.S.C. §§

1314(b)(1)(B), (b)(2)(B). Section 306 states that, in

selecting BADCT, EPA is required to consider “the

cost of achieving * * * effluent reduction, and any

7

non-water quality environmental impact and energy

requirements.” 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b)(1)(B).

Under Section 401 of the CWA, proposed facilities

requiring a_ federal license must obtain a

preconstruction certificate that “shall set forth any

effluent limitations and other limitations” specific to

the facility, including, where appropriate, facility-

specific requirements under Section 316(b). See 33

U.S.C. § 1341 (emphasis added). Section 402 of the

Act further provides that operating facilities must

obtain, subject to renewal every five years, a

National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System

(“NPDES”) permit with respect to the “discharge of

any pollutant,” which may contain § different

discharge limitations than found in_ the

preconstruction Section 401 permit. See 33 U.S.C. §

1342(a)(1). Unhke Section 401, however, Section 402

refers only and specifically to “discharges,” not to

“other limitations.”

3. Environmental Protection Agency

Rulemaking

EPA's initial attempt at implementing Section

316(b) was abandoned following procedural missteps.

See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 566 F.2d 451.

457 (4th Cir. 1977); 44 Fed. Reg. 32956 (June 7.

1979). EPA did not go gently back to. the drawing

board. Rather, for nearly thirty years, EPA

addressed potential impacts on fis.i attributable to

new power plants by making preconstruction BTA

determinations on a site-specific basis. Power plants

then were constructed with the approved cooling

water intake structures. which determined the

design of, and that were integrated with. the hearts

of the plants.

8

The rulemaking at issue here has its origin in a

consent decree between EPA and environmental

groups requiring the issuance of regulations

implementing Section 316(b). The rulemaking was

conducted in three phases. In Phase I, EPA set forth

standards for cooling water intake structures at new

steam-electric generating facilities, and in Phase III,

EPA promulgated regulations for new industrial

facilities, as well as certain existing industrial and

steam-electric generating facilities below a threshold

size of cooling water use (among other factors).

At issue in this case is the Phase II rulemaking,

which concerns existing electric-generating facilities

above the threshold size. See 69 Fed. Reg. 41576

(July 9, 2004). codified at 40 C.F.R. Part 125,

Subpart J (the “Rule”) (App. 122a—593a). The Rule is

targeted exclusively at the reduction in assumed

mortality of aquatic organisms through entrainment

and impingement. under the assumption that

offsetting assumed mortality from those causes may

assist aquatic populations taxed by over-fishing. See

td. at 41590 (App. 188a).

EPA crafted the Rule to require “technology that

is technically available, economically practicable,

and cost-effective while at the same time authorizing

a range of technologies that achieve comparable

reductions in adverse environmental impact.” 69

Fed. Reg. at 41583 (App. 157a—158a). To evaluate

the costs and benefits of the Rule. EPA developed

facility-specific estimates of the costs, along with

estimated benefits to, eg.. commercial and

recreational fishermen. See id. at 41648~-55, 41655—

64 (App. 439a-51ada). These analyses were

supported by voluminous technical documents

setting forth EPA’s methodologies and estimated

9

costs and benefits of the Rule. See id. at 41577 (App.

127a).

In formulating the Rule, EPA rejected as BTA a

requirement that all existing facilities replace their

cooling systems (not just their intake structures)

with closed-cycle cooling, i.e., cooling towers. Cf.

supra, 2 & n. 1. EPA reasoned, inter alia, that: (a)

closed-cycle cooling, with a _ total social cost

conservatively estimated at about $3.5 billion

annually, “is not the most cost-effective approach for

many existing facilities’; (b) decreased energy

production associated with retrofits would

necessitate the construction of 20 new power plants;

(c) a cooling-tower mandate would increase fossil fuel

consumption, with resulting air-quality impacts from

those new plants; (d) inadequate data existed on

cooling-system conversions at existing facilities; and

(e) non-water quality impacts, such as water loss,

icing, fogging and noise, would be associated with

closed-cycle cooling. 69 Fed. Reg. at 41605—06 (App.

255a—60a).

Instead of selecting a single technology as BTA

for use in all facilities, EPA designated a suite of

technologies, including, inter alia, fine- and wide-

mesh screens, aquatic filter barrier systems, barrier

nets, and fish return systems. 69 Fed. Reg. at 41599

(App. 228a). The Rule requires the use of technology

to reduce entrainment by 60 to 90% from a defined

baseline condition, and impingement mortality by 80

to 95% from the same baseline. See 40 C.F.R.

§ 125.94(b)(1), (2). EPA also provided a variance

from these requirements for facilities where the costs

of achieving the performance’ standards are

significantly greater than, inter alia, the fisheries

benefits of compliance. See id., § 125.94.

10

C. The Second Circuit’s Decision

EPA’s rule was challenged in petitions filed under

33 U.S.C. § 1369(b) by environmental, State, and

industry __— petitioners, with the challenges

consolidated before the Second Circuit.

1. In its petition, Entergy argued that Congress

did not intend Section 316(b) to apply to existing

facilities. In particular, Entergy contended that the

integrated phrase “location, design, construction, and

capacity” limit the section’s application solely to new

facilities, t.e., facilities that have not yet been

located, designed, constructed or sized with respect

to their intake structures. Entergy further argued

that this reading of Section 316(b) is supported by

the structure of the CWA: The Act provides no

continuing mechanism for imposing new

requirements on existing cooling water intake

structures, since the NPDES permitting system—

through which the other recuirements of the CWA

are amended for existing facilities—only pertains to

the regulation of “discharges” of pollutants.

The Second Circuit found Entergy’s plain

language argument “superficially appealing,” App.

63a, and its argument that Section 316(b)

requirements have no place in NPDES discharge

permits “a closer question.” App. 75a. Nevertheless,

brushing aside the absence of any clear authority in

the Act for regulating existing cooling water intake

structures as a mere “textual hiccup,” see ibid., the

Second Circuit ultimately rejected Entergy’s

arguments by deferring to EPA on the scope of its

authority. See id. 77a. The court adopted EPA's

assertion of jurisdiction, based largely on 316(b)’s

cross-reference to Section 301 of the Act. which

allows EPA to regulate discharges from new and

11

existing facilities. See id. 76a—77a. It also concluded

that EPA could impose new Section 316(b)

requirements on existing facilities via NPDES

permits. See id. 75a—76a (“EPA's decision to use the

NPDES process to enforce section 316(b) is not

unreasonable.”).

2. Ruling in favor of the Environmental and

State petitioners, the Second Circuit also rejected

EPA’s designation of a suite of technologies—not

closed-cycle cooling—as BTA. The court held that

the plain language of Section 316(b), in the context of

the CWA, requires EPA to select as BTA the one

technology most effective at reducing impingement

or entrainment, unless (1) that “benchmark”

technology is not affordable to the industry as a

whole, or (2) use of another technology is justified

under a “cost-effectiveness test.” Accusing EPA of

inappropriately considering costs and benefits in a

different manner (characterized by the court as “cost-

benefit analysis’), the court remanded for EPA to

apply the court’s own standard.

In detailing the mechanics of its novel “cost-

effectiveness” test, the Second Circuit initially

suggested that the new test permits substitution of a

less expensive technology that “achieves essentially

the same results as the benchmark” technology.

App. 26a. The court, however, then went on to

demonstrate its test, confirming that the substitute

technology must in fact be capable of achieving, in at

least some cases, an_ identical result as the

benchmark technology:

Assuming the EPA has determined that power

plants governed by the Phase II rule can

reasonably bear the price of technology that

saves between 100-105 fish, the EPA, given a

12

choice between a technology that costs $100 to

save 99-101 fish and one that costs $150 to

save 100-103 fish (with all other

considerations, like energy production or

efficiency, being equal), could appropriately

choose the cheaper technology on_ cost-

effectiveness grounds.

x“**

[T]he EPA could not choose the cheaper

technology on cost considerations under

section 316(b) if the EPA had first determined

that the power plants could reasonably bear

the cost of technology that could save at least

102 fish.

App. 27a—28a.

In interpreting Section 316(b) to permit only this

cost-effectiveness test, the Second Circuit conceded

that “Section 316) does not itself set forth or cross-

reference another statutory provision enumerating

the specific factors that EPA must consider in

determining BTA.” See App. 20a; see also id., 23a

(same). The court, however, reached its holding in

reliance on two principal factors. First, the Second

Circuit invoked this Court’s pre-Chevron decision in

Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 USS.

490, 510 (1981), on which the court reled for the

proposition that “[w]hen Congress has intended that

an agency engage in cost-benefit analysis, it has

clearly indicated such intent on the face of the

statute.” App. 25a. The court also relied upon the

purported “linguistically similar” wording of Section

316(b)'s BTA standard compared with Section 3801's

BAT standard, concluding that because—in the

Second Circuit's understanding—cost-benefit

13

analysis is forbidden under the BAT standard, it

must be forbidden for BTA as well. See id., 23a

Bypassing what it acknowledged as EVDA’s

veneral authority to issue variances, the court also

intuited a plain meaning in the Act barring EPA

from instituting the Rule's site-specific variance

program based on a weighing of costs and benefits.

In rejecting this particular provision, the court

rationalized that the plain language of Section 316(b)

does not permit consideration of “the degraded

quality of waterways in selecting a_ site-specific

BTA,” i.e., the fact that no fish hve in a particular

body of water is irrelevant to whether BTA must be

implemented at a facility drawing water from that

source. See App. 58a.

Reasons for Granting the Petition

This case presents three important questions for

this Court’s review, each of which implicates a split

in authority among the courts of appeal. and each of

which has implications beyond the case at hand.

First is the question whether EPA has authority,

under Section 316(b), to compel the retrofitting of

existing cooling water intake structures. a process

that would be disruptive of the nation’s electric

supply and that could cost billions of dollars

annually. The Second Circuit, pointing to the

NPDES program, found that the agency does have

such authority, and in doing so placed itself squarely

into conflict with both the DC and Fourth Circuits.

Those courts of appeal previously had held,

respectively, that the NPDES permitting system

applies only to “effluent,” i.e., discharge limitations,

and that Section 316(b) regulations are not discharge

limitations. If not reviewed and reversed, the Second

14

Circuit's decision will extend EPA authority to a

panoply of activities not authorized, or even

contemplated, by Congress.

Second, the court of appeals explicitly deferred to

EPA on the scope of the agency’s own authority.

This deference implicates a robust split among

multiple circuits on the question whether agency

assertions of jurisdiction are entitled to deference,

with three other courts of appeal holding, as did the

Second Circuit, that such deference is warranted,

and at least two courts of appeal holding that it is

not.

The third question presented by this case is

whether EPA’s discretion to weigh costs and benefits

in selecting BTA under Section 316(b) is limited to

the Second Circuit’s rigidly defined, and wholly

manufactured, “cost effectiveness” test. The court’s

refusal to allow EPA to weigh costs and benefits in

any other fashion is in direct conflict with the

previously authoritative interpretation of Section

316(b) by the First Circuit. Furthermore, the Second

Circuit reached its reading of Section 316(b) in part

by concluding that EPA’s discretion in selecting BAT

under Section 301 of the CWA is. similarly

constrained. That interpretation of Section 301 is

squarely in conflict with the Sixth Circuit’s reading

of the section, inconsistent with other circuit courts’

reading of the section, and incongruent with the

reading by other courts of similar language in other

environmental statutes. The Second Circuit's

holding on this question should be reviewed and

reversed to preserve the previously — settled

understanding of EPA’s discretion to weigh costs and

benefits under both Sections 316(b) and 301 of the

Act.

15

A. The Second Circuit's Holding that EPA

Has Authority under Section 402 to

Impose Section 316(b) Regulations on

Existing Facilities Conflicts with the

Decisions of Two Other Circuit Courts of

Appeal

The Court should take this case to review the

Second Circuit's erroneous conclusion that Section

316(b) allows EPA to require the retrofitting of

existing cooling water intake structures. The Second

Circuit’s reading of Section 316(b) runs counter to

Congress's clear intent, is in conflict with decisions

from two other courts of appeal, and threatens the

stability of the nation’s supply of electricity.

1. Nothing in the text of the CWA reasonably can

be read to authorize EPA to require the retrofitting

of existing cooling water intake structures.

As an initial matter, the plain meaning of Section

316(b) itself limits its application to cooling water

intake structures that have yet to be built. This is

seen in the Section’s reference to “the location,

design, construction, and capacity of cooling water

intake structures.” 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (emphasis

added). The ordinary meaning of this phrase—held

together with the conjunction “and’—limits

application of Section 316(b) to prospective

equipment, i.e.. those intake structures not yet

constructed, designed, located. and sized to a

particular capacity, and does not make sense when

applied to existing structures. See, e.g., Black’s Law

Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) (“Construction” means “the

creation of something new, as distinguished from the

16

repair or improvement of something already

existing’ ).3

There are many ways Congress could have

expressed an intent to mandate perpetual

retrofitting of major power plant infrastructure.

Congress might have omitted the Act's specific

reference to the “location, design, construction, and

capacity” of cooling water intake structures and

instead simply provided that EPA “shall require that

cooling water intake structures reflect the best

technology available.” The Second Circuit, however,

cannot attain such a reading of the Act by applying a

“blue pencil” to the statute as written. Addison v.

Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 617

(1944).

In concluding that Section 316(b) applies to

existing facilities, the Second Circuit relied, in part.

on Section 316(b)’s cross-reference to Section 301.

Section 301, as the Second Circuit noted, does apply

to existing facilities. That, however, ts only because

Section 301 allows EPA to regulate “al/ point sources

of discharge of pollutants” including newly

constructed facilities not within a category subject to

a more stringent standard of performance under

Section 306. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(e) (emphasis

’ Definitions of the other statutory terms are to similar effect.

See, e.g.. Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) (“Design™ means

“the plan or scheme conceived in mind and intended for

subsequent execution..) (emphasis added); Oxford English

Dictionary (2d ed. 1989) (“Design™ means “a plan or scheme

conceived in the mind and intended for subsequent execution:

the preliminary conception of an idea that is to be carried into

effect by action; a project.”) (emphasis added); American

Heritage Dictionary (3d ed. 1992) (“Location” means “the act or

process of locating.”).

17

added). Given the language of Section 316(b) itself,

the most natural reading of Section 316(b)’s cross

reference to both Sections 301 and 306 is that

Congress intended Section 316(b) requirements to be

applied to all new facilities, irrespective of whether a

given facility's discharges happen to be regulated

primarily under Section 301 or Section 306.

2. That Section 316(b) does not provide EPA

authority to require the retrofitting of existing

cooling water intake structures is confirmed by the

absence of any CWA mechanism for imposing new

requirements relating to the intake of water on

existing facilities. While the Second Circuit

ultimately deferred to EPA’s argument that such

authority does exist, that conclusion conflicts with

earlier decisions from both the D.C. Circuit and the

Fourth Circuit.

EPA and the Second Circuit purport to find

authority for EPA to impose new requirements on

existing cooling water intake structures in the

NPDES permitting process of Section 402 of the Act,

which requires existing facilities to apply to receive a

discharge permit every five years. The limited scope

of the NPDES program, however, is evident from the

plain language of the Act. Section 402 of the Act,

which establishes the NPDES program, states in

pertinent part that:

{t}he Administrator may, after opportunity for

public hearing, issue a permit for the

discharge of any pollutant, or combination of

pollutants, notwithstanding section 131 1(a) of

this title, upon condition that such discharge

will meet either (A) all applicable

requirements under sections 1311, 1312, 1316,

1317, 1318, and 1343 of this title, or (B) prior

18

‘ to the taking of necessary implementing

actions relating to all such requirements, such

conditions as the Administrator determines

are necessary to carry out the provisions of

this chapter.

33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (emphases added). No

reference to Section 316(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b), is

made in Section 402. Further, no reasonable

analysis of its language allows a requirement related

to the intake of water under Section 316(b) to be

transformed into a requirement relating to the

“discharge of any pollutant, or combination of

pollutants.” This is confirmed by the Section 401

preconstruction pe.mitting process’s _ broader

reference to “effluent limitations and _ other

limitations,” including, where appropriate, Section

316(b) limitations. See 338 U.S.C. § 1341(d)

(emphasis added); see also supra at 6—7. If Congress

intended NPDES permits to cover more than

limitations pertaining to “discharges,” it knew how to

Sav so.

The Second Circuit dismissed the permitting

process's limitation to “discharge” requirements as a

mere “textual hiccup.” See App. 75a. In glossing

over the plain language of the Act. however. the

Second Circuit placed itself into conflict with two

other courts of appeal.

First, in Va. Elec. & Power Co. v. Costle, 566 F.2d

446 (4th Cir. 1977). the Fourth Circuit considered

whether it possessed jurisdiction to hear appeals

from an EPA rulemaking promulgating regulations

under Section 316(b), an issue which required the

court to consider, inter alia, whether Section 316(b)

regulations are “effluent limitations” or “other

19

limitations.” ‘n concluding that they are not

“effluent limitations,” the court explained:

No contention is raised that the § 316(b)

regulations are themselves effluent

limitations. /t is obvious that they are not, for

the statute defines “effluent limitation” as any

restriction established by a State or the

Administrator on‘ quantities, rates, and

concentrations of chemical, physical,

biological, and other constituents which are

discharged from point sources into navigable

waters. * * * The regulations involved here

are concerned with structures used _ to

withdraw water for cooling purposes, not the

discharge of pollutants into the water.

Id. at 449 (emphases added).

Second, in Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 859

F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1988), the D.C. Circuit considered

challenges to EPA’s issuance of regulations

governing the NPDES permitting process. Industry

petitioners challenged EPA’s attempt to implement

requirements unrelated to “water quality” through

NPDES permits. The D.C. Circuit sided with

petitioners, rejecting an argument by EPA that the

agency can use NPDES permits “to impose permit

conditions unrelated to effluents,” i.e., discharges. Id.

at 170 (emphasis added).

Thus, the courts of appeal are divided on the

question whether Section 316(b) requirements can be

implemented through the NPDES permitting process

of Section 402. On the one hand. the Fourth Circuit

has concluded that Section 316(b) regulations are not

effluent limitations, and the DC Circuit has held that

only effluent limitations may be imposed through

20

NPDES permits. On the other hand, the Second and,

arguably, Seventh Circuits have held that NPDES

permits can be used to impose Section 316(b) intake

requirements on existing facilities.1 Whether EPA

has authority to impose non-effluent requirements,

including Section 316(b) requirements, under Section

402 is a matter of broad import, implicating the very

purpose and scope of the CWA, and should be

reviewed and answered by this Court.

3. The Second Circuit's conclusion that EPA has

authority to require the retrofitting of existing

cooling water infrastructure is not only incorrect as a

matter of law, it poses significant risks to the

nation’s electric supply. Retrofitting the cooling

svstems of existing facilities is no simple or

inexpensive proposition. With respect to nuclear

facilities, EPA concluded that retrofitting with

cooling towers, if possible at all, would be a long

process of several years. with at least ten months

during which the facilities that currently power

American homes and businesses could produce no

electricity, and after which the retrofits would

precipitate compromised electric-system reliability,

escalating electricity prices and increases in harmful

air emissions. See 69 Fed. Reg. at 41605—07 (App.

254a—263a). EPA conceded that annual costs of the

Rule, in excess of potential benefits, could exceed

$3.5 billion annually. See td. ai 41605 (App. 256a).

These serious health, safety and economic

impacts not only underscore the need for this Court's

review, but confirm the flaws in the Second Circuit's

+ See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 850 (7th Cir.

1977), abandoned on other grounds, W. Chicago v. NRC. 701

F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1983).

21

interpretation of the Act. Section 316 embodies

Congress's concern that the protection of fish not

impose unreasonable costs on the electric-generating

sector and, correspondingly, the essential service

those facilities provide. Congress specifically added

Sections 316(a) and 316(c) to allow power plants to

employ alternative, less stringent thermal limits, if

those discharges nonetheless protect a balanced

indigenous fish community. See supra at 4—5. It

beggars belief that Congress, so careful to restrain

EPA’s hand with respect to thermal discharges,

contemplated the retrofitting of the intake structures

of that same sector over the very same aquatic

impacts.

As this Court has cautioned, Congress “does not

* ** hide elephants in mouse holes.” Whitman v.

American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 551 U.S. 457, 468

(2001). If Congress intended to impose on the

electric-generating sector a perpetual retrofitting

regime, it would have done so more clearly than

through a provision limiting EPA’s authority to

regulating the “location, des‘gn, construction, and

capacity of cooling water «take structures.” or

through a licensing provision directed to “the

discharge of any pollutant.”. The Court should take

this case to resolve the split among the courts of

appeal over EPA’s authority through the NPDES

permitting program to require retrofitting of power

plants for anything other than pollutant-discharge

requirements, particularly requirements under

Section 316(b).

22

B. The Second Circuit’s Deference to EPA on

the Existing Facilities Issue Implicates a

Split Among the Courts of Appeal Over

Deference to Agency Assertions of

Jurisdiction

1. As described above, while the Second Circuit

disagreed with Petitioner that the plain language of

the Act deprives EPA of jurisdiction to require the

retrofitting of existing cooling water’ intake

structures. it did find some ambiguity—i.e., the

“textual hiccup’—on this point. The court ultimately

concluded that it would defer to EPA’s assumption of

authority over existing structures. App. 72a (“We

conclude * * * that, at the very least, the EPA

permissibly interpreted the statute to cover existing

facilities and that its interpretation is therefore

entitled to deference under Chevron’). In deferring

to EPA’s determination of its own jurisdiction over

existing facilities. the Second Circuit placed itself in

the middle of a well-developed circuit split on the

appropriate level of deference to agencies making

determinations of the scope of their own jurisdiction.

2. For decades. this Court's precedent had

suggested that courts should not grant agencies

deference on the subject of agency jurisdiction. In

Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S.

607. 608 (1944), this Court considered the validity of

a regulation passed pursuant to the Fair Labor

Standards Act. The Act exempted employees “within

the area of production (as defined by _ the

Administrator). engaged in * * * canning of

agricultural * * * commodities for market” from

certain regulation /d. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 210(a)(10)).

The Administrator issued a regulation defining “area

of production’ to include those employees (1) engaged

23

in canning of goods that were obtained by farms in

the immediate locality of the place of employment,

and (2) who are employed at an establishment with

no more than seven employees. Jd. at 609-10.

The Court struck down the regulation, holding

that the Administrator's attempt to regulate some

workers engaged in the canning of agricultural

commodities (those at establishments employing

more than seven employees) exceeded its authority

under the Act. /d. at 616~—19. In refusing to defer to

the Administrator’s interpretation of “area of

production,” the Court explained that “[t]he

determination of the extent of authority given to a

delegated agency by Congress is not left for the

decision of him in whom authority is vested.” /d. at

616.

However, in NLRB vy. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465

U.S. 822 (1984), decided earlier in October Term

1983 than Chevron, the Court rejected the argument

that it should not defer to NLRB’s determination

that certain labor conduct came within the scope of

“concerned activities” protected under the National

Labor Relations Act. The respondent in that case

had argued that no deference should be granted,

because such a determination was “essentially a

jurisdictional or legal question concerning the

coverage of the Act.” Jd. at 830 n. 7. This Court

stated, without citing Addison, that it had “never

* * * held that such an exception exists to the normal

standard of review of Board interpretations of the

Act.” Ibid.

The tension between Addison and City Disposal

has not, since Chevron, been conclusively resolved by

the Court. The issue. however, has been addressed

by individual justices. most notably in Mississippi

24

Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354

(1988). In his concurrence in that case. Justice

Scalia stated that “it is settled law that the rule of

deference applies even to an agency's interpretation

of its own statutory authority or jurisdiction.” Jd. at

381. <A three-Justice dissent, on the other hand,

contended that “we cannot presume that Congress

implicitly intended an agency to fill ‘gaps in a

statute confining the agency's jurisdiction, since by

its nature such a statute manifests an unwillingness

to give the agency the freedom to define the scope of

its own power.” /d. at 387.

3. The lack of definitive guidance from this Court

has led the circuit courts to adopt conflicting rules.

See Newton v. FAA, 457 F.3d 1133, 1137 (10th Cir.

2006) (noting that “the extent to which such

deference should be accorded to an agency's

interpretation of its own jurisdictional statute has

been a matter of dispute”). The Third, Fourth, and

Fifth Circuits, hke the Second in the instant case,

have deferred to an agency determination of its own

jurisdiction. See, eg., E.E.O.C. v. Seafarer’s Int'l

Union, 394 F.3d 197, 201 (4th Cir. 2005): First

Gibraltar Bank, FSB v. Morales, 42 F.3d 895, 901

(5th Cir. 1995); Puerto Rico Mar. Shipping Auth. v.

Valley Freight Systs., Inc.. 856 F.2d 546, 552 (3rd

Cir. 1988).

Other circuit courts, however, since Chevron and

also since Mississippi Power & Light, have refused to

apply deference—Petitioner believes correctly—to an

agencys view of its own jurisdiction. ‘This no-

deference rule has been repeatedly employed in both

the Seventh and Federal Circuits, see. e.g.,

Holderfield v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 326 F.3d 1207.

1208 (Fed. Cir. 2003), Northern Illinois Steel Suppiy

25

Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 294 F.3d 844, 846—47 (7th

Cir. 2002), and has also found some support in the

D.C. Circuit. see Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905

F.2d 406, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1990); ACLU v. FCC, 823

F.2d 1554, 1567 n.32 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

The question whether agencies should _ be

accorded deference with respect to determinations of

their own jurisdiction is an important one even

beyond the context of this case and is squarely

presented by the decision below. The Court should

take the case to resolve that issue in a manner

consistent with its earlier decision in Addison and

the approach adopted by the Seventh and Federal,

Circuits.

C. The Second Circuit’s Holding Limiting

EPA to a Narrow “Cost-Effectiveness”

Test under Sections 301 and 316(b)

Conflicts with the Holdings of Other

Courts of Appeal

The Second Circuit erred not only in holding that

EPA has authority to require the retrofitting of

existing cooling water intake structures, but also in

holding that, in selecting BTA, EPA can oniv employ

the cramped “cost-effectiveness” test made up that

court. As with the court’s decision on EPA's

authority, this decision is incorrect as a matter of

law, conflicts with earlier holdings of other courts of

appeal, and should be reviewed, and reversed, by

this Court.

1. The Second Circuit’s suggestion that Section

316(b) has a plain meaning requiring that court's

cost-effectiveness test is wholly unfounded. Section

316(b) does not expressly or implicitly provide a

standard requiring technology that would save 101-

26

103 fish for $150, unless another technology would

save 99-101 fish for $100, unless the industry as a

whole could “reasonably bear” a technology saving

102 fish. See supra at 11-12. If anything, the

Second Circuit’s awkward grappling with how to

save a single additional fish reveals not a_ plain

meaning in Section 316(b), but the wisdom of

deferring to agency expertise on the highly technical

question of BTA selection. Indeed, the Second

Circuit’s failure to defer to EPA on this technical

question is even more striking given the court's

deference to EPA on the scope of its jurisdiction, an

assuredly non-technical question.

In a world of finite resources on which competing

demands are placed, consideration of what is “best”

necessarily includes a weighing of factors broader

than the Second Circuit's “cost effectiveness” test

allows. ‘The court’s conclusion that BTA is the

technology that saves 102 fish, instead of 99-101

fish. so long as it does not bankrupt the industry,

disregards the plain fact that electricity is an

essential service, not to mention the sensible

possibility that the money spent saving that extra

fish might someday be needed for other purposes,

e.g., ensuring the reliability of the nation’s electricity

supply. Clearly. the “best” technology is _ not

necessarily that which leaves industry unduly

financially burdened. The decision below

underscores the judiciary’s unsuitability to manage

these highly technical and policy-laden trade-offs in

any kind of systematic fashion.

2. Unsurprisingly, the Second Circuit's strained

plain-meaning interpretation of Section 316(b)

conflicts with the reading given that Section by the

only other circuit court to have directly considered

27

the issue in the past 35 years. In 1979, during the

Act’s early implementation, the First Circuit

considered a challenge by environmental! petitioners

to EPA’s approval of the location and design of a

then-proposed cooling water intake structure at the

Seabrook nuclear facility in New Hampshire. See

Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 597 F.2d

306 (1st Cir. 1979). In rejecting the challenge, the

First Circuit explained:

The Administrator decided that moving the

intake further offshore might further

minimize the entrainment of some plankton,

but only shghtly, and the costs would be

“wholly disproportionate to any environmental

benefit.” * * * Petitioners, wisely, do not argue

that the cost may not be considered, and no

harm is done by noting that there would be

other costs. ‘The legislative history clearly

makes cost an acceptable consideration in

determining whether the intake design

“reflect(s) the best technology available.”

Id. at 311 (citation omitted).

What the First Circuit, relatively soon after

passage of the Act, considered a “wise” reading of the

Act, the Second Circuit, decades later, has deemed a

forbidden reading. Clearly one court is not right, and

this Court should grant review to resolve the split.

3. The Second Circuit buttressed its reading of

Section 316(b) by resorting to Sections 301 and 306.

The court concluded that the “best technology

available” language in_ Section 316(b) is

“linguistically similar” to the “best available

technology” language of Section 301(b)(2)(A). and

held that, because a weighing of costs and benefits is

28

not permitted with respect to BAT, neither is it

permitted with respect to BTA. App. 23a.

This analysis based on Section 301 misreads the

statutory text. As an initial matter, the Second

Circuit’s analysis ignores the fact that it is not

Section 301(b)(2)(A), but Section 304, that governs

consideration of costs and benefits in determining

BAT. See supra at 6. The interplay of Section 301

and Section 304 demonstrates that the word

combination “best,” “available,” and “technology”

does not itself dictate how EPA may consider costs

and benefits. If it did, the pertinent language in

Section 304 would be mere surplusage, and it 1s

axiomatic that every word in a statute must be read

to have some meaning. See Dunn v. Commodity

Futures Trading Comm'n, 519 U.S. 465, 472 (1997).

Moreover, in finding that Section 301 prohibited

any weighing of costs and benefits in determining

BAT, the Second Circuit based its conclusion

principally on the structure and purpose of Section

301 as initially passed in 1972. According to the

Second Circuit, the Act envisions a shift from a BPT

standard, under which a weighing of costs and

benefits is permitted, to a BAT standard, under

which such weighing is forbidden. See App. 20a—

22a. Congress. however, changed that structure in

1977 precisely to avoid the result the Second Circuit

mandates here.

While under the 1972 Act Section 301 treated all

effluents alike, the 1977 amendments created a

three-tiered regulatory system. First, Congress

lowered the control requirement for all “conventional

pollutants,” namely those that EPA concluded were

adequately regulated under the 1972 Act given

projected expenditures for additional control

29

technology, from BAT to “best conventional pollutant

control technology.” See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(E).

Second, the amendments retained the BAT standard

for toxic chemicals not implicated here. Id.

§ 1311(b)(2)(C). ~— Finally, and importantly, while

Congress retained BAT for the third tier of

“nonconventional pollutants,” the amendments

created a waiver provision based expressly on a

consideration of environmental benefit. Id.

§§ 1311(b)(2)(F); 1311(g).

Viewed in light of the 1977 amendments, it is

clear that the Second Circuit’s reliance on _ the

supposedly tightening standards of the Act leading

up to implementation of the BTA standard does not

support the holding below. Under the 1977

Amendments, standards were actually relaxed for all

but the most dangerous toxic chemicals released into

the water, a change enacted for the very purpose of

avoiding uneconomic regulation of the sort mandated

by the Second Circuit’s decision.

4. In addition to misconstruing the actual text of

the CWA, the Second Circuit misconstrued precedent

from this Court, and in doing so placed itself into

conflict with numerous other courts of appeal.

To buttress its holding, the Second Circuit relied

upon dicta in this Court's decision in EPA vy.

National Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64 (1980),

which the circuit court found “strongly suggests” that

a weighing of costs and benefits “is no longer

permitted” in determining BAT, and hence (in the

Second Circuit's view) BTA. App 23a. The language

relied upon by the circuit court is found in the

National Crushed Stone decision’s background

section: this Court noted, after describing the factors

used by EPA in determining BPT, that “[s]imilar

30

directions are given the Administrator for

determining effluent reductions attainable from the

BAT except that in assessing BAT total cost is no

longer to be considered in comparison to effluent

reduction benefits.” 449 U.S. at 71. To reach its

holding in the case, however, the Court did not, nor

did it need to, reach the question whether the BAT

standard forbids any comparison of cost to benefits in

selecting BAT.

Because this Court’s description of BAT in

National Crushed Stone was far from a holding, the

Second Circuit appears alone in concluding that a

comparison of costs and benefits, outside that court's

very limited “cost-effectiveness” test, is forbidden for

BAT and, by extension, for BTA. Indeed, that court's

decision is squarely in conflict with the Sixth

Circuit's decision in BP Exploration & Oil v. EPA, 66

F.3d 784 (6th Cir. 1995). In BP exploration, the

Sixth Circuit stated quite unambiguously:

the CWA’s requirement that EPA choose the

best technology does not mean that the chosen

technology must be the best pollutant removal.

Obvivusly, BAT * * * must be acceptable on

the basis of numerous factors, only one of

which is pollution control. NRDC ignores the

statutory language, which sets up a ‘limited’

balancing test. In enacting the CWA,

Congress did not mandate any particular

structure or weight for the many consideration

factors. Rather, it left EPA with discretion to

decide how to account for the consideration

factors, and how much weight to give each

factor. Consequently, NRDC is wrong to

contend that EPA is not permitted to balance

31

factors such as cost against effluent reduction

benefits.

Id. at 796 (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted). Similarly. in the pre-National Crushed

Stone case Weverhauser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011.

1045 (D.C. Cir. 1978), the D.C. Circuit concluded

that Congress “left EPA with discretion to decide

how to account for the consideration factors,” such as

cost, under Section 30:(b)(2)(B). “and how much

weight to give each factor.” See also Natl Wildlife

Fed'n v. EPA, 286 F.3d 554, 570 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

Other circuit courts have rejected arguments that

a formal cost-benefit analysis is required in selecting

BAT under Section 301, but none have done so on the

basis that under National Crushed Stone a weighing

of costs and benefits is impermissible—as one would

expect, if indeed this Court had so held. See, e.g.,

Rybachek v. EPA, 904 F.2d 1276, 1290-91 (9th Cir.

1990); Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 858 F.2d 261, 264

(5th Cir. 1988); Reynolds Metal Co. v. United States

EPA, 760 F.2d 549, 565 (4th Cir. 1985).

All told, the Second Circuit’s decision below not

only misconstrued Section 316(b), it also inflicted

collateral damage on Section 301. As numerous

courts of appeal have recognized, neither section

limits EPA to the extremely narrow cost-

effectiveness test approved by the Second Circuit.

5. In addition to directly conflicting with the

interpretation of Sections 301 and 316(b) by other

courts of appeal, the Second Circuit's reading of

those sections is also inconsistent with the

interpretation given by courts of appeal to similar

language in other environmental statutes.

32

For example, in Gulf Restoration Network v.

United States Dept. of Trans., 452 F.3d 362 (5th Cir.

2006), the Fifth Circuit considered a_ licensing

provision in the Deepwater Port Act requiring a

demonstration that the port “will be constructed and

operated using best available technology. so as to

prevent or minimize adverse impact on the marine

environment.” id. at 371, quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1503(c),

language quite similar to that in Sections 301 and

316(b). There, as here. environmental petitioners

complained that the Secretary of Transportation

erred in permitting use of a technology providing

lesser environmental benefits because it had “lower

operating costs’; the Secretary responded that the

statutory language was “best read to require

construction that reasonably minimizes adverse

impact to a reasonable degree given all relevant

circumstances,” a reading of the statute upheld by

the Fifth Circuit. See id. at 372.

Likewise, in American Corn Growers Ass'n v.

EPA, 291 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2002), the D.C. Circuit

considered an EPA rule implementing a provision in

the Clean Air Act calling for “reasonable progress

toward meeting the national visibility goal” of the

“prevention of any future, and the remedying of any

existing, impairment in visibility.” /d.. at 3. Under

the Act, state authorities were required to consider

five factors in deciding what “best available retrofit

technology, or “BART.” controls to place on a source:

The costs of compliance, the energy and non-

air quality environmental impacts of

compliance, any existing pollution control

technology in use at the source, the remaining

useful life of the source, and the degree of

improvement in visibility which may

33

reasonably be anticipated to result from the

use of such technology.

Id., at 5.

EPA’s rule, at its core, required the adoption of

BART by individual point sources to remedy haze

problems in distant areas, even absent a shewing

that adoption of BART by the particular point source

would reduce the haze. The D.C. Circuit rejected

this rule as inconsistent with the Act. After noting

that “the factors were meant to be considered

together by the states,” the court negatively observed

that “jujnder EPA’s take on the statute, it is

therefore entirely possible that a source may .be

forced to spend millions of dollars for new technology

that will have no appreciable effect on the haze in

any Class I area.” IJd., at 6-7.

6. To support its plain-meaning analysis, the

Second Circuit also cited this Court’s decision in

Donovan for the proposition that an agency can

weigh costs and benefits only where Congress has

explicitly provided for such an approach. This

Court’s Donovan opinion, however, said no such

thing. In Donovan, petitioners argued that cost-

benefit analysis was required under a section of the

Occupational Safety and Health Act providing “[t]he

Secretary * * * shall set the standard which most

adequately assures, to the extent feasible. on the

basis of the best available evidence, that no employee

will suffer material impairment of health or

functional capacity.” Donovan, 452 U.S. at 506—08.

While this Court did observe that “|w]hen Congress

has intended that an agency engage in cost-benefit

analysis, it has clearly indicated such intent on the

face of the st ite.” id. at 510, that was in the

context of determining whether Congress had

34

intended to require cost-benefit analysis, not

whether Congress intended to leave the issue to

agency discretion. What this Court said in Donovan

concerning discerning congressional intent to require

cost-benefit analysis is wholly beside the point.

Even if the majority opinion in Donovan did stand

for the principle drawn from it by the Second Circuit,

that principle would be clearly inconsistent with this

Court's subsequent analysis in Chevron and should

be revisited. Under Chevron, statutory ambiguity

connotes a gap to be filled by the agency, not a court.

See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44. Thus, the Court

should in any event review this case to clarify the

relationship between Chevron and Donovan.

7. Unless reviewed and reversed, the Second

Circuit's holding that Section 316(b) forbids a

weighing of costs and benefits threatens to impose

billions of dollars in costs on the electric-generating

sector for no appreciable benefit. Indeed, because

the Second Circuit reached this result by misreading

the BAT standard applicable to all industries under

Section 301, the Second Circuit's decision has the

potential to impose significant, unnecessary burdens

on the entire economy.

The Second Cireuit’s conclusion that Congress

intended to mandate a “technology forcing” policy for

the benefit of fish finds no support in the text of the

Act. Indeed, Section 301(g) of the Act requires EPA

to permit facilities to operate under the less

stringent BPT standard, rather than BAT, as long as

doing so will not interfere with “the protection and

propagation of a balanced population of shelifish.

fish, and wildlife.” 33 U.S.C. § 1311(g)(1), (g)(2)(C).

Similarly, EPA is required to provide point sources

with variances from thermal discharge requirements

35

under Section 316(a) so long as the relaxed

requirement “will assure the _ protection and

propagation of a balanced, indigenous population of

shellfish, fish, and wildlife.” 33 U.S.C. § 1326(a).

These provisions, particularly in light of their

legislative history, make clear that the CWA does not

reflect a Congressional obsession with saving every

aquatic organism possible; the Act is not a legislative

analog to Finding Nemo. Rather, when it comes to

aquatic life, Congress repeatedly directed EPA to

pursue reasonable policies. EPA's limited weighing

of costs and benefits in Section 316(b) is consistent

with that theme; the Second Circuit's approach is

not. Simply put, the sheer implausibility of the

Second Circuit's reading of congressional intent

confirms the textual evidence of EPA discretion in

deciding how to weigh costs and benefits.

In summary, the Second Circuit interpreted

Section 316(b) in a manner that is_ facially

implausible and in direct conflict with the First

Circuit's interpretation of that Section. It

interpreted Section 301 in a manner conflicting with

at least the Sixth Circuit’s reading of that section.

Review and reversal of the Second Circuit's

interpretations of Sections 316(b) (and Section 301)

is not only merited as a matter of law, but. given the

disruption retrofitting of existing power plants would

entail for public safety and the national economy, is

also a matter of unquestionable importance.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ

of certiorari should be granted.

36

Respectfully submitted,

CHUCK D. BARLOW ELISE N. ZOLI

ENTERGY SERVICES, INC. Counsel of Record

308 E. Pearl Street KEVIN P. MARTIN

Jackson. MS 39201 GOODWIN PROCTER I.].P

(601) 969-2542 53 State Street

Boston, MA 02109

(617) 570-1000

Counsel for Petitioner

November 2. 2007

APPENDIX

-) Supreme Court, U.S.

LED

07-588h0V1- 2007

6 OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Y

No. i?

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

ENTERGY CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

Vv.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY ET AL.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United

States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

APPENDIX

CHUCK D. BARLOW ELISE N. ZOLI

ENTERGY SERVICES, INC. Counsel of Record

308 E. Pearl Street KEVIN P. MARTIN

Jackson, MS 39201 GOODWIN PROCTER LLP

(601) 969-2542 53 State Street

Boston, MA 02109

(617) 570-1000

Counsel for the Petitioner

November 2007

Appendices:

A. 2007 Court of Appeals opinion ...................0...005. la

B. Court of Appeals order denying petitions for

ERE EA TEC Pea I tae 7 RR OC eT 95a

C. Relevant statutory provisions .......................... 97a

Clean Water Act § 301(a)-(c). 33 U.S.C.

SE aT ee 97a

Clean Water Act § 304(a)-(b), 33 U.S.C.

I 10la

Clean Water Act § 306, 33 U.S.C. § 1316....... 108a

Clean Water Act § 316, 33 U.S.C. § 1326....... 112a

Clean Water Act § 401, 33 U.S.C. § 1341....... 113a

Clean Water Act § 402(a), 33 U.S.C.

TEETER Ts ee NT NRERT I 119a

I a a eeenaeusannmniial 122a

ae, 2 iaensidionain 122a

la

APPENDIX A

2007 COURT OF APPEALS OPINION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

August Term, 2005

(Argued: June 8, 2006 Decided: January 25. 2007

Docket Nos. 04-6692-ag(L), 04-6693-ag(CON),

04-6694-ag(CON). 04-6695-ag(CON),

04-6696-ag(CON). 04-6697-ag(CON),

04-6698-ag(CON), 04-6699-ag(CON).

RIVERKEEPER. INC... NATURAL RESOURCES

DEFENSE COUNCIL, WATERKEEPER

ALLIANCE, SOUNDKEEPER. INC., SCENIC

HUDSON, INC., SAVE THE BAY-PEOPLE FOR

NARRAGANSETT BAY, FRIENDS OF CASCO BAY,

AMERICAN LITTORAL SOCIETY, DELAWARE

RIVERKEEPER NETWORK, HACKENSACK

RIVERKEEPER, INC.. NEW YORK/NEW JERSEY

BAYKEEPER, SANTA MONICA BAYKEEPER,

SAN DIEGO BAYKEEPER, CALIFORNIA

COASTKEEPER, COLUMBIA RIVERKEEPER.

CONSERVATION LAW FOUNDATION,

SURFRIDER FOUNDATION, STATE OF RHODE

ISLAND, STATE OF CONNECTICUT. STATE OF

DELAWARE, COMMONWEALTH OF

MASSACHUSETTS. STATE OF NEW JERSEY.

STATE OF NEW YORK. APPALACHIAN POWER

COMPANY. ILLINOIS ENERGY ASSOCIATION,

UTILITY WATER ACT GROUP. PSEG FOSSIL

LLC. PSEG NUCLEAR LLC, ENTERGY

CORPORATION,

Petitioners.

Vv.

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION AGENCY, STEPHEN L. JOHNSON,

in his official capacity as ADMINISTRATOR OF

THE UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION AGENCY,

Respondents.

Before: STRAUB, SOTOMAYOR, and HALL,

Circuit Judges.

Petitioners challenge a final rule promulgated by

the Environmental Protection Agency pursuant to

section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.

§ 1326(b), that is intended to protect aquatic

organisms from being harmed or killed by cooling

water intake structures at large. existing power-

producing facilities. While we conclude that certain

aspects of the rule are [2]* based on a reasonable

interpretation of the Clean Water Act and supported

by substantial evidence in the administrative record,

several aspects of the rule are not consistent with the

statute, are not supported by sufficient evidence, or

were not properly subject to notice and comment.

We therefore grant in part and deny in part the

petitions for review and dismiss in part one aspect of

‘ [Numbers of the form “[2]” indicate the pagination of the

original slip opinion. Numbers of the form “[*&89]" indicate the

pagination in 475 F.3d.]} The introductory paragraph does not

appear in F.3d or in the Westlaw version of the decision.

3a

the petitions for lack of jurisdiction because there 1s

not final agency action to review.

[List of counsel omitted]

[5] [*89JSOTOMAYOR, Circuit Judge.

This is a case about fish and other aquatic

organisms. Power plants and other industrial

operations withdraw bilhons of gallons of water from

the nation’s waterways each day to cool their

facilities. The flow of water into these plants traps

(or “impinges’) large aquatic organisms against grills

or screens, which cover the intake structures, and

draws (or “entrains’) small aquatic organisms into

the cooling mechanism; the resulting impingement

and entrainment from these operations kill or injure

billions of aquatic organisms every vear. Petitioners

here challenge a rule’ promulgated by _ the

Environmental Protection Agency (“the EPA” or “the

Agency’) pursuant to section 316(b) of the Clean

Water Act (“CWA” or “the Act”), 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b),!

that is intended to protect fish, shellfish. and other

aquatic organisms from being harmed or killed by

regulating “cooling water intake structures” at large.

existing power-producing facilities.

For the reasons that follow, we grant in part and

deny in part the petitions for review. concluding that

certain aspects of the EPA’s rule are based on a

reasonable interpretation of the Act and supported

by substantial evidence in the administrative record,

but remanding several aspects of the rule because

they are inadequately explained or inconsistent with

l We refer te s<tatuters previsron= mentioned mm the text tn their section on the CW \ and

le

presi nm citativon~ beth the sectren of the Aer and the parallel section of the L noted State< ( ad

da

the statute, or because the EPA failed to give

adequate notice of its rulemaking. We also dismiss

for lack of jurisdiction one aspect of the petitions

because there is no final agency action to review.

BACKGROUND

Our decision in Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 358 F.3d

174 (2d. Cir. 2004) [6] (“River-[*90] keeper I’), which

addressed challenges to the EPA’s rule governing

cooling water intake structures at new—as opposed

to existing—facilities discusses at length the

procedural and factual background of the rulemaking

pursuant to section 316(b). We presume familiarity

with Riverkeeper I and provide here only a brief

overview of the statute and the various stages of the

rulemaking.

These consolidated petitions for review concern a

final rule promulgated by the EPA regarding the

water that large. existing power plants withdraw

from rivers, lakes, and other waterways of the

United States to cool their facilities. See 40 C.F.R.

§ 125.9l(a). This cooling process requires power

plants to extract billions of gallons of water per day

from the nation’s waters, tnereby impinging and

entraining a huge number of aquatic organisms.

Riverkeeper J, 358 F.3d at 181. Indeed. a single

power plant can kill or injure billions of aquatic

organisms in a single vear. /d.

Cognizant of this problem. Congress in 1972

amended the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § § 1251-1387. to

regulate cooling water intake structures. See

Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of

1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972). We

have described Congress's regulation of such

5a

structures as “something of an _ afterthought.”

Riverkeeper I, 358 F.3d at ‘86 n.12. given that the

directive appears in a section of the Act addressing

the seemingly unrelated issue of thermal pollution,

see CWA § 316(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1326(a). The Act, as

amended, provides that “[a]ny standard established

pursuant to section 1311 of this title [CWA section

301] or section 1316 of this title [CWA section 306]

and applicable to a point source shal] require that

the location, design. construction, and capacity of

cooling water intake structures reflect the best

technology available for minimizing’ adverse

environmental impact.” [7] CWA § 316(b), 33 U.S.C.

§ 1326(b).

The provisions of the Act cross-referenced in

section 316(b) direct the EPA to issue rules

regulating the discharge of pollution from existing

point sources, CWA § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311, and new

point sources, CWA § 306, 33 U.S.C. § 1316.2. As we

noted in Riverkeeper 1,”"|w|hen the EPA established

new source performance discharge standard|[s] ... it

ought then to have regulated ... intake structures

358 F.3d at 185 (internal quotation marks

omitted: emphasis in original). Put differently,

section 316(b) required the EPA to promulgate

regulations for cooling water intake structures at the

same time that it established pollution discharge

standards pursuant to sections 301 and 306. The

EPA's first attempt at regulation under section

316(b), however. was remanded by the Fourth

- A “point source” is “any discernible. confined and discrete

conveyance ... from which pollutants are or may be

discharged.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).

6a

Circuit in 1977 on procedural grounds, and years

passed without the EPA issuing new rules. /d. at

181 (citing Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 566 F.2d

451 (4th Cir. 1977)). Environmental groups

ultimately sued the EPA and won a consent decree,

pursuant to which the Agency established a

timetable to issue rules pursuant to Section 316(b) in

three “phases. Jd. & n.3. Phase I—addressed in

Riverkeeper J—governs new facilities; Phase H—

addressed here—covers large, existing power plants;

and Phase III will regulate existing power plants not

governed by Phase II, as well as other industrial

facilities. See Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Whitman, 2001 WL

1505497, at *1 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.27, 2001).

{[*91] Our interpretation of section 316(b) is

informed by the two provisions it cross-references,

CWA sections 301 and 306. Section 301 sets forth a

framework under which [8] limitations on the

discharge of pollutants from existing sources would

become more stringent over time. CWA § 301(b), 33

U.S.C. § 1311(b); see Riverkeeper I, 358 F.3d at 185.

Section 3801(b)(1)(A) required the EPA, beginning

in 1977, to set effluent lmitations for existing

sources based on “the best practicable control

technology currently available.” or “BPT.” CWA

§ 301(b)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A). By 1989.

existing source effluent limitations were to be based

on the more stringent “best available technology

economically achievable” or “BAT.” CWA

§ 301(b)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A).

Additionally, section 306 requires the EPA to

establish “standards of performance” for the control

of the discharge of pollutants from new sources based

on “the best available demonstrated control

7a

technology,” a standard that “reflects the greatest

degree of effluent reduction.” CWA § 306(a)(1), 33

U.S.C. § 1316(a)(1).

In section 316(b), Congress established yet another

standard to govern cooling water intake structures,

which requires such structures to reflect the “best

technology available for minimizing = adverse

environmental impact.” or “BTA.” CWA § 316(b), 33

U.S.C. § 1326(b). We noted in Riverkeeper I that

“lajlthough the EPA is permitted to consider a

technology's cost in determining whether it is

‘practicable, ‘economically achievable, or ‘available,’

it should give decreasing weight to expense as

facilities have time to plan ahead to meet tougher

restrictions.” 358 F.3d at 185 (citations omitted).

Additionally, we observed that “|bJecause section

316(b) refers to sections 301 and 306 but provides a

different standard (‘best technology available for

minimizing adverse environmental impact’ instead

of, for example, ‘best available demonstrated control

technology’) and does not explicitly provide that

regulations pursuant to section 316(b) are subject to

the requirements of sections 301 and 306, we think it

is permissible for the EPA to look to those sections

for guidance but to decide that not every statutory

directive [9] contained therein is applicable” to

rulemaking under section 316(b). /d. at 187. With

this general background in mind, we consider Phases

I and II of the EPA’s rulemaking.

l. The Phase I Riile

On December 18, 2001, the EPA issued its first

rule (‘the Phase | Rule”) governing cooling water

intake structures for new—as opposed to existing—

facilities. Regulations Addressing Cooling Water

Sa

Intake Structures for New Facilities; Final Rule, 66

Fed. Reg. 65,256 (Dec. 18. 2001) (codified at 40

C.F.R. pts. 9, 122—25). The Phase I Rule established

a two-track approach to regulating cooling water

intake systems at new facilities, under which a new

facility could choose one of two “tracks” to comply

with the statute. Track I created national intake

capacity and velocity standards based on closed-cycle

cooling technology.’ which the EPA [*92] deemed the

best technology available for minimizing adverse

environmental impacts. See Riverkeeper I, 358 F.3d

at 182-83. Track II did not require the use of any

specific technology so long as the facility “can show,

in a demonstration study, ‘that the technologies

employed will reduce the level of adverse

environmental impact ... to a comparable level to

that which’ would be achieved applying Track I's

capacity and velocity requirements.” /d. at 183

(quoting 40 C.F.R. § 125.84(d)(1)).

{10} Environmental and _ industry — groups

challenged certain aspects of the rule, including,

inter alia, the part of the Track II procedure allowing

‘+ As we noted in Riverkeeper I,

Cooling water systems fal] into three groups. “Once-

through” systems take water in, use it to absorb heat, and

return the water to its source at a higher temperature.

“Closed-cycle” systems recirculate the water (after allowing

it to cool off in a reservoir or tower before being reused)

and add water to the system only to replace that which is

lost through evaporation. Closed-cycle systems, therefore,

withdraw far less water than once-through systems. Dry

cooling systems ... use air drafts to transfer heat. and. as

their name implies, they use little or no water.

358 F.3d at 182 n. 5 (internal citations omitted).

9a

power plants to comply with section 316(b) by

undertaking so-called “restoration measures,” such

as restocking the waterbody with fish, reclaiming

abandoned mines to reduce drain-off, or removing

barriers to fish migration, to maintain fish and

shellfish in a waterbody at certain levels. In

Riverkeeper 1, we upheld most aspects of the Phase I

Rule, but remanded the provisions relating to the

Track Il restoration option. We found that the

restoration option was inconsistent with section

316(b)’s requirement that the EPA minimize adverse

environmental impacts by regulating the “ ‘location,

design, construction, and capacity of cooling water

intake structures “ because this option has nothing

to do with the location, design, construction, or

capacity of such structures. /d. at 189 (quoting CWA

§ 316(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b)). Given this, we held

that the EPA had impermissibly exceeded its

authority in allowing Phase I facilities to use these

restoration measures to comply with regulations

implementing the statute. /d.

Il. The Phase II Rule

On July 9, 2004, the EPA issued a final rule.

pursuant to the second phase of the consent decree

(“the Phase II Rule” or “the Rule”), that governs

cooling water intake structures at large, existing

power plants. See Final Regulations to Establish

Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures at

Phase II Existing Facilities, 69 Fed. Reg. 41.576

(July 9, 2004) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122-125).

The Phase II Rule covers existing facilities that are

“point sources’ and that, as their primary activity.

“both generate|| and transmit[] electric power, or

generate[ ] electric power but sell[] it to another

10a

entity for transmission,” “use[] or propose[] to use

cooling water intake structures with a total design

intake flow of 50 million gallons per day (MGD) or

[11] more,” and “use[] at least 25 percent of water

withdrawn exclusively for cooling purposes.” 40

C.F.R. § 125.91. Although we will discuss the

specifics of the Rule with respect to each challenge,

we provide here an overview of the Rule.

The Phase II Rule sets forth five compliance

alternatives. See 40 C.F.R. § 125.94(a). Section

125.94(a) requires that a facility select and

implement one of the following “for establishing best

technology available for minimizing’ adverse

environmental impact”:

(1)4) You may demonstrate to the Director that

you have reduced. or will reduce. your flow

commensurate with a closed-cycle recirculating

system. In this case, you are deemed to have met

the applicable performance standards and will

not be required to demonstrate further that vour

facility meets the impingement mortality and

entrainment performance standards specified in

paragraph (b) of this section... .[:] or

(41) You may demonstrate to the Director that

vou have reduced, or will reduce, your maximum

through-screen [*93] design intake velocity to 0.5

ft/s or less. In this case. you are deemed to have

met the impingement mortality performance

standards and will not be required to

demonstrate further that vour facility meets the

performamee standards for impingement morta-

lity specified in paragraph (b) of this section and

you are not subject to the requirements in

34 125.95, 125.96, 125.97, or 125.98 as they apply

lla

to impingement mortality. However. vou are still

subject to any applicable requirements for

entrainment reduction... .:]

(2) You may demonstrate to the Director that

your existing design and construction techno-

logies, operational measures, and/or restoration

measures meet the performance’ standards

specified in paragraph (b) of this section and/or

the restoration requirements in paragraph (c) of

this section[:]

(3) You may demonstrate to the Director that you

have selected. and will install and properly

operate and maintain, design and construction

technologies, operational measures, and/or resto-

ration measures that will, in combination with

any existing design and construction

technologies, operational measures. and/or resto-

ration measures, meet the performance stan-

dards specified in paragraph (b) of this section

and/or the restoration requirements’ in

paragraph (c) of this section;

(4) You may demonstrate to the Director that you

have installed, or will install, and properly

operate and maintain an approved design and

construction technology in accordance with

§ 125.99(a) or (b): or

{12} (5) You may demonstrate to the Director

that vou have selected. installed. and are

properly operating and maintaining. or will

install and properly operate and maintain design

and construction technologies. operational

measures, and/or restoration measures that the

Director has determined to be the _ best

l2a

technology available to minimize _ adverse

environmental impact for your facility” in

accordance with paragraphs (a)(5)(i) or (11) of this

section. ...

40 C.F.R. § 125.94(a).

The Phase II Rule does not require large, existing

power plants to install closed-cycle cooling systems,

although a facility with such a system (or one whose

intake flow is commensurate with that of a closed-

cycle system) will be considered in compliance with

the Rule. 40 C.F.R. § 125.94(a)(1)G). The Rule

instead references national performance standards,

discussed below, that “are based on consideration of

a range of technologies that EPA has determined to

be commercially available for the industries affected

as a whole.” 69 Fed. Reg. at 41,598-99. And rather

than limiting BTA to technologies based on closed-

cycle cooling systems, the EPA designated a “suite”

of technologies—including fine- and wide-mesh

wedgewire screens, aquatic filter barrier systems,

barrier nets, and fish return systems, among others,

id. at 41,599; see also 40 C.F.R. § 125.99(a)—as BTA

for large, existing power plants.

Section 125.94(d) establishes national performance

standards to be achieved through one of the

compliance alternatives set forth in _— section

125.94(a). With respect to impingement mortality, it

provides that facilities choosing “compliance

alternatives in paragraphs (a)(2), (a)(3), or (a)(4) of

this section ... must reduce impingement mortality

for all life stages of fish and sheilfish by 80 to 95

13a

percent from the calculation baseline.”' Jd. [*94]

§ 125.94(b)(1). With [13] respect to entrainment,

facilities that choose

compliance alternatives in paragraphs (a)(1)(ii),

(a){2), (a)(3), or (a)(4) of this section ... must also

reduce entrainment of all life stages of fish and

shellfish by 60 to 90 percent from the calculation

baseline if:

(i) [the] ‘ac. hty has a capacity utilization rate

of 15 peice at or greater, and

(i)(A) ... uses cooling water withdrawn

from a tidal river, estuary, ocean, or one of

the Great Lakes; or (B) ... uses cooling

water withdrawn from a freshwater river or

stream and the design intake flow of your

cooling water intake structures is greater

than five percent of the mean annual flow.

Id. § 125.94(b)(2).

Section 125.94(c) permits facilities to comply with

the Rule by implementing restoration measures “in

place of or as a supplement to installing design and

control technologies and/or adopting operational

measures that reduce impingement mortality and

entrainment. /d. § 125.94(c). In order to adopt

restoration measures under the Rule. a facility must

' The “calculation baseline” is “an estimate of impingement

mortality and entrainment that would occur’ at a specific site

based on a number of quantitative assumptions regarding

intake velocity and the location and design of the site's intake

structures. 40 C.F.R. § 125.93. The regulation also permits a

site's specific historical and current data on impingement and

entrainment to serve as a basis for this baseline. /d

l4a

demonstrate that “meeting the applicable

performance standards or site-specific requirements

through the use of design and_ construction

technologies and/or operational measures alone is

less feasible, less cost-effective. or less

environmentally desirable than meeting the

standards ... through the use of restoration

measures.” Id. § 125.94(c)(1). Moreover. the

restoration measures implemented by the facility

must produce ecological benefits “at a level that is

substantially similar” to what would be achieved by

meeting the national performance standards of

section 125.94(b). Id. § 125.94(c)(2).

The compliance provision of section 125.94(a)(5)

permits what is in effect a site-specific compliance

alternative to the generally applicable performance

standards in two [14] circumstances. In the first

circumstance (“the cost-cost compliance alternative”

or “the cost-cost variance”), if a facility demonstrates

that its compliance costs “would be significantly

greater than the costs considered by the

Administrator,” the permitting authority must make

a site-specific determination of BTA that is “as close

as practicable to the applicable performance

standards ... without resulting in costs that are

significantly greater than the costs considered by the

Administrator” in establishing those standards. 40

C.F.R. § 125.94(a)(5)(i). In the second circumstance

(“the cost-benefit compliance alternative” or “the

cost-benefit variance”), the permitting authority

must make a site-specific determination of BTA that

is “as close as_ practicable” to the _ national

performance standards if a facility demonstrates

that its compliance costs would be “significantly

greater than the benefits of complying” with the

ld5a

performance standards at the facility. ld.

§ 125.94(a)(5)fii).

For those facilities installing technologies

designated as BTA, section 125.94(d) allows the

national performance standards set forth in section

125.94(b) to be satisfied by demonstrating

compliance with a _ technology installation and

operation plan (“TLOP”). which concerns. inter alia, a

facility's installation. operation and maintenance of

BTA. As the Rule is enforced through the permitting

process under the National Pollutant Discharge

Elimination [*95] Svstem (NPDES’”).5 section

125.94(d)(1) provides that a facility that uses one of

the complhance methods other than closed-cycle

cooling may request that compliance with the

national performance standards during the first

permit cycle be determined with respect to whether

the facility has complied with the TIOP it submitted

with its permit application. Section [15] 125.94(d)(2)

authorizes facilities to request that compliance

during subsequent permit terms be determined

based on whether a facility remains in compliance

with its TIOP. and in accordance with anv necessary

revisions, “if applicable performance standards are

not being met.” 40 C.F.R. § 125.94(d)(2).

Finally, section 125.94(f) applies solely to nuclear

power facilities. It provides that if a nuclear

facility's compliance with the Rule would conflict

with a safety requirement established by the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission. the EPA must make a site-

specific determination of BTA that would not conflict

' The NPDES process is promulgated under CWA section

Wan). 33 USC. § 1342and)

16a

with the Commission's safety requirement. 40

C.F.R. § 125.94(f).

For purposes of judicial review, the Phase II Rule

was promulgated on July 23, 2004. See 69 Fed. Reg.

at 41.576. Three sets of petitioners,.discussed below,

brought timely challenges to the Rule.®

DISCUSSION

1. Standard of Review

We have jurisdiction to review this Rule pursuant

to CWA section 509(b)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1). See

Riverkeeper I, 358 F.3d at 183 (stating that the

Phase I Rule is covered by the jurisdictional grant of

§ 1369(b)(1)). As we explained in Riverkeeper 1, our

substantive review is twofold. “First, we examine

the regulation against the statute that contains the

EPA’s charge.” Jd. at 184. If Congress “has directly

spoken to the precise question at issue” and its [16]

intent is clear. we “must give effect to the

unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,

Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842—43 (1984). If, however, the

statute is silent or ambiguous, we ask whether “the

agencys answer is based on a_ permissible

construction of the statute.” Jd. at 843.

Second, if the agency has followed Congress's

unambiguously expressed intent or permissiblyv

* The parties filed petitions for review here as well as in

several of our sister circuits. The petitions were consolidated in

the Ninth Circuit by order of the judicial panel on multi-district

litigation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1407 and 2112(a)(3). The

Ninth Circuit thereafter transferred the case here pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2112(an(5).

l7a

construed an ambiguous statute. “we measure the

regulation against the record developed during the

rulemaking, but we ‘hold unlawful the agency's

regulation only if it is ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse

of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with

law. “Riverkeeper I, 358 F.3d at 184 (quoting 5

U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)). “Normally. we must deem

arbitrary and capricious an agency rule where ‘the

agency has relied on factors which Congress has not

intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an

important aspect of the problem. offered an

explanation for its decision that runs counter to the

evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that

it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the

produc’ of agency expertise. “Waterkeeper Alliance,

Inc. v. EPA, 399 F.3d 486, 498 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting

{[*96] Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut.

Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, (1983) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted)).

Finally, our review has a procedural dimensior

The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) requires

that notice of proposed rulemaking be published in

the Federal Register. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3), and that

interested parties be allowed an opportunity to

comment on proposed rules. id. § 553(c). Where an

agency fails to comply with the APA's notice and

comment vrovisions, we remand to the agency for

further proceedings. See Sprint Corp. v. FCC, 315

F.3d 369, 371 (D.C. Cir.2003) (“Because the [agency]

failed to provide adequate notice and [17]

opportunity to comment. we grant the petition and

remand the case to the [agency].’).

18a

Il. The Petitions for Review

The state petitioners’ and the self-stvled environ-

mental petitioners® challenge the Rule on similar

grounds. Their petitions contain the following

arguments: (1) the EPA exceeded its authority in

rejecting closed-cycle cooling as BTA for existing

facilities generally, and the Agency's rejection of

closed-cycle cooling as BTA for facilities on sensitive

waterbodies is not entitled to deference because the

decision was made at the direction of the Office of

Management and Budget (“OMB”): (2) the EPA

exceeded its authority by establishing ranges of

acceptable performance rather than a single-numeric

performance standard: (3) the CWA does not allow

restoration measures as a means of compliance: (4)

the EPA failed to give adequate notice that it would

allow site-specific determinations of BTA based on

cost-cost analysis, and the EPA impermissibly

construed the statute to allow © site-specific

determinations of BTA _ based on _ cost-benefit

analysis: (5) the provision allowing that compliance

with the performance standards be determined by

establishing compliance with a facilitvs TIOP is

unauthorized and violates the rulemaking require-

> Rhode Island. Connecticut. Delaware. Massachusetts. New

Jersey, and New York.

~ Riverkeeper. Inc.. Natural Resources Defense Council.

Waterkeeper Alliance. Soundkeeper. Inc... Scenic Hudson, Inc..

Save the Bay People for Narragansett Say, Friends of Casco

Bay. American [attoral Society. . elaware Riverkeeper

Network. Hackensack Riverkeeper. Inc.. New York/Now Jersey

Baykeeper. Santa Monica Baykeeper. San Diego Baykeeper.

California Coastkeeper. Columbia Riverkeeper, Conservation

Law Foundation. and Surfrider Foundation

19a

ment of notice and comment; and (6) the Agency has

classified certain new constructions as “existing

facilities” contrary to the definitions set forth in the

Phase 1 Rule without providing adequate notice and

opportunity for comment.

[18] Three groups of industry petitioners, which we

will refer to collectively as the “industry petitioners”

or individually as Entergy Corporation (“Entergy”).

the Utility Water Act Group (““UWAG’),° and PSEG

Fossil LLC and PSEG Nuclear LLC (“PSEG’),

advance various challenges to the Phase Il Rule.

Their challenges raise the following arguments: (1)

section 316(b) of the CWA does not apply to existing

facilities; (2) the Agency's definition of “adverse

environmental impact” is insufficiently supported by

the record; (3) the EPA’s assumption of zero

entrainment survival is insufficiently supported by

the record; (4) the EPA improperly requires

evaluation of qualitative non-use benefits in site-

specific cost-benefit analyses; (5) the Agency failed

to account for the Rule's disproportionate impact on

nuclear facilities; [*97] (6) the EPA gave inadequate

notice of the independent-suppher provision: and (7)

the Agency provided no notice of its post-rulemaking

definition of “Great Lakes.” The industry petitioners

also seek to preserve the right on this petition for

review to raise new challenges to the Rule if we

remand significant aspects of it. We consider first

the challenges raised by the state and environmental

UWAG petitions this court in conjunction with = the

Appalachian Power Company and the Illinois” Energy

Association.

20a

petitioners and then will turn to the industry

petitioners’ challenges.

Ill. The State and Environmental Petitioners

A. Determination of BTA

Perhaps the most significant challenge to the

Phase II Rule is the petitioners’ contention that the

EPA exceeded its authority in rejecting closed-cycle

cooling, and selecting instead the = suite of

technologies, as the “best technology available” as

required by section 316(b), 38 U.S.C. § 1326(b), in

large part because the Agency engaged in improper

cost considerations.

[19] This challenge requires us at the outset to

determine to what extent, if any, the EPA can

consider cost when selecting “the best technology

available for minimizing adverse environmental

impact” under the statute.

1. Cost Analysis Pursuant to Sections 301 and

306

Section 316(b) does not itself set forth or cross-

reference another statutory provision enumerating

the specific factors that the EPA must consider in

determining BTA. The statute, however, does make

specific reference to CWA sections 301 and 306,

which we have taken previously as “an invitation” to

look to those sections for guidance in “discerning

what factors Congress intended the EPA to consider

in determining” BTA. Riverkeeper /, 358 F.3d at 186.

We look to each of these statutes in turn.

Section 301(b)(1)(A) established the BPT standard

that governed the effluent limitations applicable to

existing sources through 1989. Congress provided

Pia

that, in determining BPT. the Agency could consider

“the total cost of application of technology in relation

to the effluent reduction benefits to be achieved from

such application.” CWA § 304(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C.

§ 1314(b)(1)(B). As noted above, however, the CWA

created standards that were to become increasingly

stringent over time. and in 1989, the more lenient

BPT standard for existing sources was replaced by

the BAT standard of section 301(b)(2)(A), in which

Congress provided that the EPA could consider only

“the cost of achieving such effluent reduction.” CWA

§ 304(b)(2)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2)(B). Notably

omitted from the list of permissible factors to which

the EPA could look in determining BAT was the cost

of technology in relation to the benefits that

technology could achieve.

This shift from BPT to BAT fundamentally @” »red

the way in which the EPA [20] could factor cost into

its CWA determinations. Indeed, in analyzing BPT

and BAT. the Supreme Court stated that in

“assessing BAT{,] total cost is no longer to be

considered in comparison to effluent reduction

benefits.” as it had been in assessing BPT. EPA v.

Nat? Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64, 71, 101 S. Ct.

295, 66 L. Ed. 2d 268 (1980). The Court indicated

that the less stringent BPT standard had allowed for

a “limited cost-benefit analysis” intended to “ ‘limit

the application of technology only where the

additional degree of effluent reduction is wholly out

of proportion to the costs of achieving such marginal!

level of reduction. “/d. at 71 n. 10, 101 S. Ct. 295

(quoting Remarks of Senator Muskie reprinted in

Legislative [*98] History of the Water Pollution

Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Committee Print

compiled for the Senate Committee on Public Works

22a

by the Library of Congress) Ser. No. 93-1, p. 170

(1973)). In determining BAT, by contrast, the EPA

may consider cost as a factor to a limited degree, see

id., but only as to whether the cost of a given

technology could be reasonably borne by the industry

and not the relation between that technology's cost

and the benefits it achieves, Riverkeeper I, 358 F.3d

at 195.

Section 306, which governs the effluent limitations

that apply to new sources, provides that a “standard

of performance” established by the EPA must reflect

the “best available demonstrated control technology.”

CWA § 306(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(1). In language

identical to the text of § 304(b)(2)(B) governing BAT,

Congress provided that in establishing standards of

performance, the EPA “shall take into consideration

the cost of achieving such effluent reduction,” CWA

§ 306(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b)(1)(B), but did not

require the EPA to conduct cost-benefit analysis.

Nat! Wildlife Fed’n v. EPA, 286 F.3d 554, 570 (D.C.

Cir. 2002) (“[S]eetion 306 requires that, when setting

the [new source performance standards], the

Administrator must take costs into consideration,

but does not require that she conduct a [21] cost-

benefit analysis.”). Sections 301 and 306 of the CWA

thus demonstrate that. after 1989, cost is a lesser,

more ancillary consideration in determining what

technology the EPA should require for comphance

under those sections.

The shift from the BPT standard to the more

stringent BAT one clearly signaled Congress's intent

to move cost considerations under the CWA from a

cost-benefit analysis to a cost-effectiveness one. We

understand the difference between these two

23a

analyses to turn en the difference between means

and ends. Cost-benefit analysis, like BPT. compares

the eosts and benefits of various ends, and chooses

the end with the best net benefits. By contrast, cost-

effectiveness considerations, lke BAT, determine

which means will be used to reach a specified level of

benefit that has already been established.'° Given

the above and considering the parallel language of

sections 304(b)(2)(B) and 306(b)(1)(B), the reasoning

of National Crushed Stone strongly suggests that

cost-benefit analysis is no longer permitted under

those sections of the CWA.

2. Cost Analysis Pursuant to Section 316(b)

As already noted, section 316(b) does not itself set

forth the factors that the Agency can consider in

determining the “best technology available for

minimizing adverse environmental impact.” The

BTA standard of section 316(b), however, is

linguistically similar to the BAT standard of section

301 and the standard that applies to new sources

under [22] section 306, and to the extent that cost-

benefit analysis is precluded under those statutes.

one might reasonably conclude that it is similarly not

permitted under section 316(b). We conclude in any

event that the language of section 316(b) itself

See, e.g.. OMB Circular A-94. Guidelines and Discount

Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs, Appendix

A (1992) (defining “benefit-cost analysis” as “|a!] systematic

quantitative method of assessing the desirability of government

projects or pohcies when it is important to take a long view of

future effects and a broad view of possible side-effects” and

“cost-effectiveness” as “|a] svstematic quantitative method for

comparing the costs of alternative means of achieving the same

stream of benefits or a given objective ).

Yd4a

plainly indicates that facilities must adopt the dest

technology available and that cost-benefit analysis

[*99] cannot be justified in light of Congress's

directive.

We stated in Riverkeeper J] that the EPA can

consider cost in establishing BTA. but only in a

limited fashion and not as a primary consideration.

Indeed, “[w]ith respect to costs, ‘the Administrator

must inquire into the initial and annual costs of

applying the technology and make an affirmative

determination that those costs can be reasonably

borne by the industry. “Riverkeeper I, 358 F.3d at

195 (quoting Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 870 F.2d 177,

262 (5th Cir. 1989)) (emphasis added). While the

statutory language suggests that the EPA may

consider costs in determining BTA, in that a

technology that cannot not be reasonably borne by

the industry is not “available” in any meaningful

sense. cost-benefit analysis is not similarly supported

by the language or purpose of the statute. Section

316(b) expressly requires a technology-driven result,

cf. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 822 F.2d

104, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("[T]he most salient

characteristic of [the CWA’s] statutory scheme,

articulated time and again by its architects and

embedded in the statutory language. is that it 1s

technology-forcing.”). not one driven. by cost

considerations or an assessment of the desirability of

reducing adverse environmental impacts in light of

the cost of doing so. A selection of BTA based on

cost-benefit considerations is thus impermissibly

cost-driven, but a selection based in part on cost-

effectiveness considerations. while taking cost into

account, remains technology-driven. The statute

therefore precludes cost-benefit analysis because

25a

“Congress itself defined the basic relationship

between costs and [23] benefits.” Am. Textile Mfrs.

Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 509. (1981).

Moreover. this conclusion is further supported by the

fact that Congress in establishing BTA did not

expressly permit the Agency to consider the

relationship of a technology's cost to the level of

reduction of adverse environmental impact it

produces.'!' “When Congress has intended that an

agency engage in cost-benefit analysis. it has clearly

indicated such intent on the face of the statute.” Jd.

at 510. 101 S. Ct. 2478.

' This conclusion accords with the analysis mm Riverkeeper !

that the EPA may consider cost in establishing BTA pursuant

tu section 316(b), but only in a himited way. In our discussion of

the EPA's choice of closed-cycle. rather than dry. cooling as BTA

for Phase | facilities. see358 F.3d at 194-95. 194 n. 22. we noted

that “dry cooling costs more than ten times as much per year as

closed-cycle wet cooling.” but emphasized that “it is estimated

to reduce water intake by only an additional 5 percent relative

to once-through cooling” Id. at 194 (Gnternal footnotes

omitted). We acknowledged that drv cooling is both much more

effective and much more expensive than closed-cvycle cooling in

absolute terms. but stressed that. as compared to the baseline

of once-through cooling systems. the marginal benefits of drv

cooling were small: “it is undeniably relevant that that

difference represents a relatively small improvement over

closed-cycle cooling at a very significant cost.” Id. at 194 n 22

In dicta. we characterized this mode of analvsis as “relevant

and stated that it “adds a useful perspective.” id., but did not

treat it as the fulcrum of our analysis. Ultimately. we deferred

to the EPA’s determination insofar as it was based on the

grounds that dry cooling was too expensive for industry

reasonably to bear and that dry cooling has negative

environmental effects best left to the considered judgment of

the Agency. Jd. at 195-96

2boa

Given the above, the EPA may _permissibly

consider cost in two ways: (1) to determine what

technology can be “reasonably borne” by the industry

and (2) to engage in cost-effectiveness analysis in

determining BTA. Thus, the EPA must first

determine what is the most effective technology that

may reasonably be borne by the industry. In making

this initial determination, [*100] the most effective

technology must be based not on the average Phase

Il facility but on the optimally best performing Phase

II facilities, see, e.g., Kennecott v. United States EPA,

780 F.2d 445, 448 (4th Cir. 1985) (“In setting BAT,

EPA uses not the average pant, but the [24]

optimally operating plant, the pilot plant which acts

as a beacon to show what is possible.”), although, of

course, the EPA must still ascertain whether the

industry as a whole can reasonably bear the cost of

the adoption of the technology, bearing in mind the

aspirational and technology-forcing character of the

CWA. This technology constitutes the benchmark for

performance. Once this determination has been

made, the EPA may then consider other factors,

including cost-effectiveness, to choose a_ less

expensive technology that achieves essentially the

same results as the benchmark.'2 For example,

'’ We note that the EPA ts by no means required to engage in

cost-effectiveness analysis. Indeed, to require the Agency to

conduct cost-effectiveness analysis would transform such

analysis into a primary factor in choosing BTA, which clearly is

contrary to the technology-forcing principle that animates the

CWA. Equally important, we note that the Agency may also

depart from this performance benchmark because of other

permissible considerations aside from cost, for instance, energy

efficiency or environmental impact. See Riverkeeper 1, 358 F.3d

at 195-96 (noting “the EPA was permitted to consider

27a

assuming the EPA has determined that power plants

governed by the Phase II Rule can reasonably bear

the price of technology that saves between 100-105

fish, the EPA, given a choice between a technology

that costs $100 to save 99-101 fish and one that

costs $150 to save 100-103 fish (with all other

considerations, like energy production or efficiency,

being equal), could appropriately choose the cheaper

technology on _ cost-effectiveness grounds. Cost-

benefit analysis, however, is not permitted under the

statute because, as noted, Congress has already

specified the relationship between cost and benefits

in requiring that the [25] technology designated by

the EPA be the best available.'* Cf. Am. Textile

Mfrs. Inst., 452 US. at 509-10. The Agency

accordingly could not make the policy decision, in the

face of Congress’s determination that facilities use

the best technology available, that an economically

feasible level of reduction of impingement mortality

and entrainment is not desirable in lght of its cost.

. Indeed, in the example above, the EPA could not

choose the cheaper technology on cost considerations

under section 316(b) if the EPA had first determined

energy efficiency in determining the ‘best technology available’ “

and could also factor in environmental impact). While the EPA

has indicated throughout the record and its briefing before us

that its determination of BTA here’ included = such

considerations as energy efficiency and production concerns, we

nevertheless must remand, as we explain below, for further

explanation from the Agency. Accordingly, we express no view

on the merits of the EPA's determination regarding the other

factors it claims influenced its decision.

'\' For this reason, we reject Entergy’s argument that the

Rule is improper because its cost exceeds its benefits.

28a

that the power plants could reasonably bear the cost

of technology that could save at least 102 fish.

We nevertheless acknowledge that the comparable

technologies considered by the Agency need not be

identically effective for the Agency to engage in cost-

effectiveness analysis. Were that the case, all that

would be required would be the simple determination

of which among competing technologies that

achieved the same degree of reduction of adverse

environmental impacts is the cheapest. Instead, the

specified level of benefit is more properly understood

as a narrowly bounded range, within which the EPA

may permissibly [*101] choose between two (or

more) technologies that produce essentially the same

benefits but have markedly different costs. With

these considerations in mind, we turn to the Rule as

promulgated.

3. The Determination of BTA under the Phase Il

Rule

As noted previously, unlike the Phase I Rule, the

Phase II Rule does not require facilities to reduce

intake flow to a level commensurate with the intake

of closed-cycle systems. Instead, the Rule requires

facilities to meet the national performance standards

associated with the suite of technologies the EPA

identified as BTA. Petitioners’ challenge here has

two [26] components. First, the state petitioners

contend that closed-cycle cooling is the _ best

technology available and that the EPA has exceeded

its authority by promulgating a rule that does not

require closed-cycle cooling, or the use. of

technologies producing a commensurate reduction of

water usage for existing facilities in the same

manner as the Phase | Rule required for new

29a

facilities.'' Second, the environmental petitioners

argue that the EPA improperly rejected closed-cycle

cooling as BTA for the largest facilities on the most

sensitive waterbodies at the direction of OMB

because it sought to maximize net economic benefits

rather than to minimize adverse environmental

impact. They further argue that the BTA standard

of section 316(b) requires a commitment of the

maximum resources economically feasible to the goal

of eliminating adverse environmental impacts and

that the statute does not permit the EPA to select

BTA on the basis of cost-benefit analysis.

For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the

statute's “best technology § available” standard

permits cost-effectiveness considerations to influence

the choice among technologies whose performance

does not essentially differ from the performance of

the best-performing technology whose cost the

industry reasonably can bear, but that the statute

does not permit the EPA to choose BTA on the basis

of cost-benefit analysis. As we explain below,

however, the record is unclear as to the basis for the

EPA’s selection of the suite of technologies as BTA,

and we therefore remand for clarification of the basis

for the Agency's decision and potentially for a

reassessment of BTA.

[27] The EPA stated in the Rule's preamble that

the BTA standard should be interpreted as “best

' While the state petitioners trame their argument as a

challenge to the site-specific compliance alternatives, their bref

presses the view that closed-cycle cooling is the best technology

available and that the EPA exceeded its authority in failing to

require Phase II facilities to adopt it.

30a

technology available commercially at an

economically practicable cost,” and explained that

“an important component of economic practicability”

is “the relationship of costs to environmental

benefits.” 69 Fed. Reg. at 41,604. The EPA further

explained that this inquiry required that “there

should be some reasonable relationship between the

cost of cooling water intake structure control

technology and the environmental benefits associated

with its use.” Id. (emphasis added).

The EPA took this “economically practicable”

concept directly from the text of a floor speech of a

single representative—the only specific reference to

section 316(b) in the congressional debates. See »

Riverkeeper I, 358 F.3d at 186 n.12. We noted in

Riverkeeper I that the “paucity” of legislative history

“counsels against imputing much specific intent to

Congress beyond the section's words themselves.”

Id. |*102] Moreover, we _ find the EPA's

interpretation of section 316(b) problematic because

its construction significantly resembles the less

stringent, and now obsolete, BPT standard of section

301(b)(1)(A). As noted earlier, in setting forth the

factors for the EPA to consider in establishing BPT

under section 301(b)(1)(A) and the more stringent

BAT under section 301(b)(2)(A), Congress made only

one distinction: while the Agency could consider the

relationship between cost and_ benefits in

establishing BPT, CWA § 304(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C.

§ 1314(b)(1)(B), it could consider cost insofar as it can

be “reasonably borne” by the industry, but not the

relationship between cost and_ benefits, in

establishing BAT, CWA § 304(b)(2)(B), 33 U.S.C.

§ 1314(b)(2)(B). Riverkeeper 1, 358 F.3d at 195.

Sla

This difference in how the EPA can consider cost

under section 304(b) in establishing BPT and BAT is

directly mirrored by the most significant textual

distinction [28] between sections 301(b)(1)(A) and

301(b)(2)(A)—the requirement that a technology be

“practicable” under only the less stringent BPT

standard. Compare CWA § 301(b)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C.

§ 1311(b)(1)(A) (BPT is the “best practicable control

technology”) with CWA § 301(b)(2)(A), 33° U.S.C.

1311(b)(2)(A) (BAT is the “best available techno-

logy”). The use of the word “practicable,” therefore,

when coupled with the ~ permissible cost

considerations under section 304, signals. that

Congress intended the EPA to strike a_ balance

between cost and benefits in determining BPT. But

the word “practicable” is missing from the more

stringent BAT standard, under which Congress

prohibited the EPA from considering the relation of

cost to benefits. This omission is thus significant.

See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23, 104 S.

Ct. 296, 78 L. Ed. 2d 17 (1983) ¢[W]here Congress

includes particular language in one section of a

statute but omits it in another section of the same

Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts

intentionally and purposely in the disparate

inclusion or exclusion.” (quotation marks and

citation omitted; alteration in original)). Because

Congress also omitted “practicable” from section

316(b), we are troubled by the Agency's

interpretation of the statute to require

“practicability’ analysis here and _ its implicit

corollary that the Agency can undertake a_cost-

benefit analysis in establishing BTA under section

316(b).

32a

Our concern with the EPA’s determination with

respect to section 316(b) is further deepened by the

Agency's rejection of closed-cycle cooling and

selection of a suite of technologies as the basis for

BTA for existing facilities because the suite of

technologies were the most “cost effective” option. 69

Fed. Reg. at 41,667. The EPA explained this decision

on several grounds. It first noted that it was

rejecting closed-cycle cooling as BTA because of (1)

“its generally high costs (due to conversions),” (2)

“the fact that other technologies approach the

performance of this [29] option,” and (3) “concerns

for energy impacts due to retrofitting existing

facilities, and other considerations.” /d. at 41,605.

The EPA emphasized that it selected BTA based on

its determination that “a national requirement to

retrofit existing systems is not the most cost-effective

approach and at many existing facilities, retrofits

may be impossible or not economically practicable.”

Id. It further explained that its rejection of closed-

cycle cooling as BTA was based on “total social costs”

and “lack of cost-effectiveness,” as well as “concerns

regarding potential energy impacts.” /d. at 41,606.

Given the EPA’s discussion, noted above, of

economically practicability, it is unclear whether the

Agency improperly weighed the benefits and the

costs of requiring closed-cycle cooling. Indeed, a

[*103] comparison between the cost of closed-cycle

coohng and the monetized benefits of this technology

appears to have played some role in the EPA's

rejection of this option as BTA. In the preamble to

the proposed Rule, for instance, the EPA examined

whether to require closed-cycle cooling on specific

large bodies of waters and_ stated that “the

incremental costs of [this closed-cycle cooling] option

33a

relative to the proposed option ($413 mulhon)

significantly outweigh the incremental benefits ($146

million).” 67 Fed. Reg. at 17,158. Other record

evidence on the EPA's rejection of closed-cycle

cooling as BTA is a terse EPA memorandum

indicating that a requirement commensurate with

closed-cycle cooling for facilities on _ sensitive

waterbodies would cost three times as much as the

option ultimately adopted by the EPA and reduce

entrainment, at most, by 1.33 times that option.

Given the above indications that the EPA engaged

in cost-benefit analysis, we remand for the EPA to

explain its conclusions. At the outset, it is difficult to

discern from the record how the EPA determined

that the cost of closed-cycle cooling could not be

reasonably [30] borne by’ the — industry.!®

Additionally, the EPA did not explain its statement

that the suite of technologies “approachles|” the

performance of closed-cycle cooling. We see no

adequate comparison in the Rule's proposal, the final

Indeed, at one point in the Rule's proposal. the EPA

mentions that requiring closed-cycle cooling at 539 existing

power plants nationwide subject to the Phase J] Rule would cost

upwards of $2.26 billion and could close nine power plants

(about 1.6". of all Phase 1) facilities). 67 Fed. Keg. at 17.155.

There is little discussion about whether the industry could

reasonably bear this burden. We note that in Riverkeeper 1. it

appears the EPA supplied the court with better data on this

question, noting that of the 83 facilities subject to the Phase |

Rule. dry cooling compliance costs would equal on average more

than 4°. of revenue for all 83 producers and more than 10’.o of

the revenue at 12 facilities (nearly 15". of all Phase I facilities).

presenting a possibly high barrier to entry for new facilities

See Riverkeeper I, 358 F.3d at 194. We have found no

comparable data in the record, nor has the EPA cited any.

34a

Rule or its preamble, or the EPA's submissions to

this Court of the effectiveness of closed-cycle cooling

and the group of technologies whose effectiveness

provided the basis for the Phase II Rule's

performance standards.'® In a [*104] technical [31]

'* Some limited evidence, however, is available in the record

in intelligible form. In the Rule's proposal, the EPA noted that

closed-cycle systems “generally reduce the water flow from 72

percent to 98 percent, thereby using only 2 percent to 28

percent of the water used by once-through systems.” Proposed

Regulations to Establish Requirements for Cooling Water Intake

Structures at Phase I] Existing Facilities; Proposed Rule, 67

Fed. Reg. 17.122, 17,189 (Apr. 9, 2002). The Agency went on to

state that “i]t is generally assumed that this would result in a

comparable reduction in impingement and entrainment,” id.,

indicating that closed-cycle systems reduce the adverse impacts

of impingement and entrainment by 72 to 98 percent. In a

technical development document (“TDD”) for the proposal.

however, the EPA disaggregated these data, stating that closed

cycle cooling systems use 96 to 98 percent less fresh water and

70 to 96 percent less salt water than once-through systems.

TDD for the Proposed § 316(b) Phase II Existing Facilities Rule

4-1, see also Riverkeeper 1, 358 F.3d at 194 n. 22 (“(C}losed-

cycle wet cooling systems use 96 to 98 percent less fresh water

(and 70 to 96 percent less salt water) than similarly situated

once-through systems. (citing 66 Fed. Reg. at 65,273)). The

EPA's analysis in its proposal suggests that the disaggregated

data indicate that closed-cvcle cooling would reduce

impingement mortality and entrainment by 96 to 98 percent at

facihties that use fresh water and by 70 to 96 percent at

facilities that use salt water. A 72 to 9&8 percent reduction of

impingement mortality and entrainment, and the

corresponding disaggregated percent reductions for facilities

using salt and fresh water, differs from the Phase II

requirement that facilities reduce impingement mortality by 80

to 95 percent and entrainment by 60 to 90 percent. These

differences seem potentially significant, especially in

determining whether this suite of BTA technologies achieve

essentially the same result as closed-cycle cooling, but are

35a

area of this sort, it is difficult for judges or interested

parties to determine the propriety of the Agency's

action without a justification for the action supported

by clearly identified substantial evidence whose

import is explained. The record evidence alone here,

which consists in large part of a voluminous

database compilation of studies that assess the

efficacy of various technologies at different locations,

is oblique, complicated, and insufficient to permit us

to determine what the EPA relied upon in reaching

its conclusion. As the Supreme Court has

emphasized, “[oJur recognition of Congress’ need to

vest administrative agencies with ample power to

assist in the difficult task of governing a vast and

complex industrial Nation carries with it the

correlative responsibility of the agency to explain the

rationale and factual basis for its decision, even

though we show respect for the agency’s judgment in

both.” Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 627,

106 S. Ct. 2101, 90 L. Ed. 2d 584 (1986) (plurality

opinion).

The EPA was required to explain its judgment and

the basis for it. Because the EPA purported to base

its decision in large part on _ cost-effectiveness

considerations, it was required to identify and

explain any evidence indicating a minimal

performance difference between comparable

technologies, but it did not do so here. It stated only

neither explained nor adequately compared for purposes of our

review here. For instance. there does not appear to be any

discussion regarding the seemingly large differences in the

rates of impingement and entrainment reduction between

closed-cycle cooling and the Phase II national performance

standards

36a

that the performance of the technologies it identified

as BIA “approach” the performance of closed-cycle

cooling.!’

{32} We therefore find it impossible to judge

whether the performance of these technologies is

essentially the same as the performance of closed-

cycle cooling, or whether they simply are cheaper per

percentage point of reduction in entrainment and

impingement mortality. That is, on the record before

us, it is impossible to tell whether the EPA based its

decision on permissible cost-effectiveness analysis or

exceeded its authority by relying impermissibly upon

a cost-benefit analysis. To the extent that the record

does not indicate the EPA’s basis, however, its

statement that “the relationship of costs to

environmental benefits is an important component of

economic practicability,” 69 Fed. Reg. at 41,604,

indicates that cost-benefit analysis, under the cover

of considerations of “practicability.” was central to

the Agency’s decisionmaking.

In short, the EPA’s failure to explain its decision

frustrates effective judicial review. If the EPA

construed the statute to permit cost-benefit analysis.

its action was not “based on a_ permissible

construction of the statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at

843. It may also be that the EPA misunderstood or

misapplied cost-effectiveness analysis. If so, its

' The Agency. however, did provide some indication of the

relative costs of closed cycle cooling and the suite of

technologies identified as BTA. The EPA stated in the preamble

to the Rule that the “total social cust” of closed-cycle cooling

would be “$3.5 billion per year,” 69 Fed. Reg. at 41.605, and .

that the “final rule will have total annualized social (pre-tax)

costs of $389 million.” id. at 41.650.

37a

decision was arbitrary and capricious because the

Agency relied on factors Congress has not intended it

to consider. See Waterkeeper Alliance, 399 F.3d at

498. Finally, the [*105] EPA may have simply failed

either to perform the required analysis or to explain

adequately a decision that was within its authority

to make. We cannot opine on this subject, because

we must consider only those justifications that the

EPA offered at the time of the rulemaking. See SEC

v. Chenery, 318 U.S. 80, 87-88. Moreover, while the

EPA could rely on factors other than impingement

and entrainment in establishing BTA, such as

negative environmental impacts or concerns about

energy production and efficiency, see Riverkeeper 1,

358 F.3d at 195-96, we are unable to determine, on

the record before us, whether the EPA gave

paramount consideration to an improper factor in

determining [33] BTA. We therefore remand for

clarification of the basis for the Agency's action and

possibly for a new determination of BTA.'®

'' As previously noted, the environmental petitioners, sup-

ported by amicus curiae OMB Watch, have challenged the

EPA's decision to reject closed-cycle cooling as BTA for 59

facilities on the most sensitive waterbodies in part because of

OMB’s participation in the rulemaking precess. They contend

that the EPA’s action ts not entitled to deference because the

EPA was improperly influenced by OMB tn promulgating this

aspect of the Phase II Rule. The petitioners and the EPA have

also sought either to strike from the record or to supplement

the record with certain OMB review documents. Because we

have granted the petitioners challenge to the EPA's

determination of BT.\ without considering OMB’s role in

interagency review, we do not reach the petitioner's arguments

regarding OMB’'s.involvement in the rulemaking and deny the

motions to strike and to supplement as moot. See Waterkeeper

Alliance, 399 F.3d at 524 n.34 (denying petitioners’ motion to

38a

4. Performance Standards Expressed as Ranges

The Phase II Rule establishes performance

standards expressed as an 80 to 95 percent reduction

in impingement mortality and a 60 to 90 percent

reduction in entrainment, which existing power

plants must achieve, subject to certain exceptions, in

order to be considered in comphance with the Rule.

40 C.F.R. § 125.94(b)(1), (2). The environmental

petitioners challenge the Rule's “wide and indeter-

minate ranges” as failing to constitute “precise

single-level limitations based on the best technology

available for minimizing adverse environmental

impact” and argue that these ranges are inconsistent

with Congress's intent that there be a national

standard under section 316(b). We agree in part

and, because the EPA in reconsidering its selection of

BTA on remand may alter the suite of technologies it

originally selected, thereby causing a coordinate

alteration in the performance ranges, we provide

some guidance to the EPA insofar as the petitioners’

challenge touches on the limits of the Agency's

authority. Although the EPA may, in the circum-

stances to be discussed, set performance standards

as ranges, it must [34] require facilities to minimize

the adverse environmental impacts attributable to

their cooling water intake structures to the best

degree they can.

The petitioners note that the EPA has found that

certain screens and filter systems can reduce

impingement mortality by up to 99 percent and that

supplement the record with OMB review documents as moot

where the Court granted the petitions without considering the

OMB review documents).

39a

similar technologies can produce 80 to 90 percent

reduction in entrainment. 69 Fed. Reg. at 41.599. °

They contend that the CWA therefore requires the

EPA to set BTA standards reflecting these best

performers, see Texas Oil & Gas Ass'n v. EPA, 161

F.3d 923, 928 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Congress intended

these [BAT] limitations to be based on the perfor

mance of the single best-performing plant in an

industrial field."(citation and internal quotation

{[*106] marks omitted)), particularly given the EPA's

acknowledgment that “|t]he higher end of the range

is a percent reduction that available data show many

facilities can and have achieved with the available

technologies upon which the performance standards

are vased.” 69 Fed. Reg. at 41,600. The petitioners

emphasize that the Rule’s ranges impermissibly fail

to require facilities even to attempt to achieve

performance equal to the upper bound of the

prescribed ranges.

According to the EPA, section 316(b) does not

require a single-numeric standard applicable to all

Phase II existing facilities, and expressing the

performance standards as ranges is necessary to

account for the variables involved in reducing

impingement mortality and entrainment under loca!

conditions at particular facilities. The EPA contends

that “[blecause the Phase I] requirements are

applied in a variety of settings and to existing

facilities of different types and sizes, no. single

technology is most effective for all facilities subject to

the Rule.” The Agency argues that the technologies

do not provide a fixed level of performance at all

facilities and that their performance is affected by

the nature of the waterbody, facility intake [35]

requirements, climatic conditions, and _ the

40a

waterbody's biology. The EPA argues also that the

permit process requires facilities to reduce

impingement mortality and entrainment

commensurate with the efficacy of the installed

technologies, which it claims ensures that the

installed technologies will be maintained to ensure

their utmost efficacy.'° The difficulty with the EPA’s

arguments is that the Rule does not require facilities

to choose technologies that produce the greatest

reduction possible.

Our decision in Riverkeeper I sheds some light on

the parties arguments. In that case, we discussed

the differences between the two tracks in the Phase I

Rule: Track I set forth precise velocity and capacity

requirements while Track I] permitted compliance

via technologies that would achieve at least 90

percent of the reduction in impingement mortality

and entrainment that compliance with Track | would

yield. See358 F.3d at 182-83. The petitioners in

that case challenged the Track II provision on the

ground that it deviated from the — statutory

requirement that the EPA establish a single level of

performance applicable to all facilities. Jd. at 187.

The EPA argued that Tracks I and II reflected the

same standard and that 10 percent is an acceptable

margin of error given that measurements of

reduction of impingement mortality and entrainment

'' The specific provision requires that when a facility's permit

expires, any reissued permit must contain a requirement that

“the facility ... reduce impingement mortality and

entrainment ... commensurate with the efficacy at the facility

of the installed design and construction technologies,

operational measures. and/or restoration measures.” 40 C.F.R.

§ 125.98(b)(1)(in).

4la

are necessarily inexact and depend upon natural

fluctuations in animal] populations and sampling

errors. Jd. at 188. In assessing the parties’

arguments, we stated that “the EPA, consistent with

Congress's intention that there be a_ national

standard governing the discharge of pollutants, must

[36] promulgate precise effluent limitations under

sections 301 and 306... .” Jd. (emphasis added). We

went on to note, however, that while pollutant

concentration and the velocity and volume of water

withdrawn can be measured accurately,

impingement mortality and entrainment “cannot

always be measured directly and with mathematical

precision.” Jd. at 189. We concluded that the EPA

acted reasonably in specifying “how much ambiguity

it is willing to tolerate in measuring compliance and

what it considers a reasonable [*107] margin of

error in comparing the performance of different

technologies.” Jd. In short, we acknowledged that

the Track Il performance requirements, unlike the

Track I requirements, could not be measured

precisely and that it was therefore reasonable to

consider a margin of error in comparing performance

under the two standards.

This case is not entirely similar to Riverkeeper /

because of the rationales that animate the EPA’s

creation of the performance ranges in Phases I and

II. The Phase I] Rule generally requires facilities to

reduce impingement mortality and entrainment by

the specified percent ranges from the calculation

baseline. 40 C.F.R. § 125.94(b). These ranges, as

explained by the EPA, are based on the reductions

achievable by using various technologies. See 69

Fed. Reg. at 41.599. The EPA explained that it

expressed the performance standards “in the form of

4%a

ranges rather than a single performance benchmark

because of the uncertainty inherent in predicting the

efficacy of any one of these technologies.” Jd. at

41,600. It stated further that the lower end of the

range is the percent reduction it “expects all facilities

could eventually achieve if they were to implement

and optimize available design and _ construction

technologies and operational measures on which the

performance standards are based” and that the

higher end of the range “is a percent reduction that

available data show many facilities can and have

achieved [37] with the available technologies upon

which the performance standards are based.” Id.

Unlike Riverkeeper I, therefore, a margin of error

from a relatively precise benchmark that is tolerable

given measurement difficulties is not at issue here.

Instead, the performance standards reflect the range

of performance associated with various technologies

identified as BTA. That performance. in turn,

depends in part on local conditions and natural

fluctuations. Id.

Record evidence supports the EPA’s conclusion

that the percent reduction of impingement mortality

and entrainment is not completely within the control

of a facility and therefore may not be precisely

achieved by a facility. See TDD for the Final § 316(b)

Phase I] Existing Facilities Rule 4-3. Reducing these

adverse environmental impacts is not as easily

measured and controlled as are the discharge of

pollutants and the capacity and flow rate of water

intake.” We therefore acknowledge that in many

“" Nothing in Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537

F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1976), suggests the contrary. While we did

announce in that case that performance ranges did not comport

43a

cases it may be difficult, as a practical matter, for the

EPA or other permitting authority to predict which

plants will be able to achieve the upper, as opposed

to the lower, end of the ranges. This uncertainty,

however, does not justify a rule that permits even

those facilities that could achieve the upper end of a

range to be deemed in complhance if they reach only

the lower end, particularly when the EPA has

acknowledged that many facilities “can and have”

achieved reductions at the high end of the range. 69

Fed. Reg. at 41,600. Congress's use of the

superlative “best” in the statute cannot be read to

mean that a facility that achieves the lower end of

the ranges, but could do better, has complied with

the law. [37] The statutory directive requiring

facilities to adopt the best technology cannot be

construed to permit a facility to take measures

[*108] that produce second-best results, see Chevron,

467 U.S. at 843, especially given the technology-

forcing imperative behind the Act, Natural Res. Def.

Council,* 822 F.2d at 123. Insofar as the EPA

establishes performance standards instead = of

requiring facilities to adopt particular technologies,

it must require facilities to choose the technology

that permits them to achieve as much reduction of

adverse environmental impacts as is technologically

possible“! For this reason, the EPA on remand

— ——~—— — ————

with the effluent limitations established by the CWA, id. at

630, the discharge limitations at issue there were easily

measured, unlike the reductions in = impingement and

entrainment at issue in both this case and Riverkeeper 1, which

“cannot always be measured directly and with mathematical

precision,” Riverkeeper [, 358 F.3d at 189.

“* Although it may be difficult to know ex ante which plants

can achieve the upper end of the range. this ts at least in part

44a

should address these concerns if in its BTA

determination, it retains performance ranges.

B. Restoration Measures

The Phase II Rule allows a facility to meet the

national performance standards set [39] forth in 40

C.F.R. § 125.94(b) through the use of restoration

measures such as restocking fish killed by a cooling

because the technologies preferred by the EPA are somewhat

new and untested. In future permitting cycles, permitting

authorities will be lhkely to have a clearer notion of which

facilities can feasibly achieve the upper end of the range.

Finally, the upper end of the range established by the EPA,

should it retain this provision on remand, should not be set at a

level that many facilities “have achieved” with the installation

of one or more of the technologies determined to be BTA but, as

we noted earlier, at the best possible level of impingement and

entrainment reduction the EPA determines these technologies

can achieve. See, e.g., Kennecott, 780 F.2d at 448 (“In setting

BAT, EPA uses not the average plant. but the optimally

operating plant, the pilot plant which acts as a beacon to show

what is possible.”). If, at a particular Phase II facility, the

adoption of BTA technologies can achieve a 95"o reduction in

entrainment and impingement, it is unclear why, under our

jurisprudence and the clear dictates of the CWA, the EPA could

establish a performance standard that has placed the ceiling at

the 90% threshold which “many” Phase II facilities “can and

have” achieved with the same technology. See Am. Iron & Steel

Institute v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1051 (3d Cir. 1975) (“It will be

sufficient, for the purpose of setting the level of control under

available technology, that there be one operating facility which

demonstrates that the level can be achieved.”) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). This would not require

every Phase II facility to meet the upper end of the ranges, but

only that each Phase I facility achieve the highest reduction it

can with the installation of technologies determined by the EPA

to be BTA. The performance ranges, if retained on remand,

should accordingly reflect this understanding.

Ada

water system and improving the habitat surrounding

the intake structure in order, as the EPA explains,

“to provide additional flexibility to facilities in

complying with the rule by’ eliminating” or

significantly offsetting the adverse environmental

impact caused by the operation of a cooling water

intake structure.” 69 Fed. Reg. at 41,609; 40 C.F.R.

§ 125.94(c). The state and environmental petitioners

contend that the EPA exceeded its authority by

allowing compliance with section 316(b) through

restoration measures because Riverkeeper | held that

the statute’s meaning is plain and that restoration

measures cannot substitute for the “best technology

available for minimizing adverse environmental

impact” in cooling water intake structures. The EPA

contends that its interpretation of the statute to

permit restoration measures as a means. of

compliance is entitled to deference because it defined

certain statutory terms in the Phase II Rule that it

had not defined in the Phase I Rule. The EPA also

relies on the Supreme Court’s holding in National

Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X

Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967, 125 S. Ct. 2688, 162

L. Ed. 2d 820 (2005), and our statement in

Riverkeeper / \imiting the decision’s reach to the

Phase I Rule, to argue that our prior interpretation

of the statute does not [*109] trump the Agency's

construction. We agree with the petitioners that

Riverkeeper I held that the Agency's decision to

permit restoration measures in the Phase | Rule was

not “based on a»permissible construction of the

statute,” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S. Ct. 2778,

and that this holding applies equally here.

We began Riverkeeper I by noting that we were

remanding the Phase I restoration provision because

46a

it “contradicts Congress's clearly expressed intent.”

358 F.3d at 181. We went on to state that “however

beneficial to the environment, [restoration measures]

have nothing to do with the location, the design, the

construction, or the capacity of cooling water intake

{40] structures, because they are unrelated to the

structures themselves.” /d. at 189. “Restoration

measures correct for the adverse environmental

impacts of impingement and entrainment,” we noted,

but “they do not minimize those impacts in the first

place.” Jd. (emphasis added). For this reason and

others, we concluded in Riverkeeper T that the EPA

had exceeded its authority in promulgating the

Phase | Rule by allowing comphance with section

316(b) through restoration measures because this

Rule was “plainly inconsistent” with the statute's

text and Congress's intent. Jd. at 189, 191.

The EPA’s argument that Riverkeeper J is not

binding on this issue here has three components.

First, the EPA contends that our rejection of the

restoration measures at issue in Riverkeeper I did

not turn on the statute's text, but instead was based

on various other indicators of Congressional intent.

The Agency makes much of Riverkeeper I's brief

discussion of Congress's rejection of a proposed

amendment to section 316(b) that would have

explicitly allowed restoration measures and of the

KPA’s support of that amendment because in its

opinion, the existing language did not authorize

restoration measures. /d. at 190-91. Seeond, the

EPA argues that its interpretation of section 316(b)

in the Phase II Rule is entitled to deference because

the Rule defined certain statutory terms it had not

defined in the previous rulemaking phase and that

its reasonable interpretation of these terms 1s

47a

entitled to deference. Specifically, the Agency

“defined” three statutory terms in the preamble: it

(1) read the phrase ‘“minimizie}] adverse

environmental impact” to let facilities “minimize

adverse environmental impact by reducing impinge-

ment and entrainment, or to minimize adverse

environmental impact by compensating for those

impacts after the fact.” 69 Fed. Reg. at 41,628; (2)

interpreted “reflect” to authorize it to consider the

full range of technologies, including restoration

measures, that [41] minimize adverse environmental

impact; and (3) viewed “restoration measures as

part of the ‘design’ of a cooling water intake

structure,” and “one of several technologies that may

be employed ... to minimize adverse environmental

impact,"69 Fed. Reg. at 41,637. Finally, the EPA

relies on our statement in Riverkeeper J] that our

ruling on the Phase I Rule was not meant to

“predetermine the factors and standard|s] applicable

to Phases II and ; of the rulemaking,”358 F.3d at

186 n.13, and on the Supreme Court’s holding in

Brand X that “[a] court’s prior judicial construction

of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise

entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court

decision holds that its construction follows from the

unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no

room for agency discretion.” 545 US. at 982, 125 S.

Ct. at 2700.

We reject each of the EPA’s contentions. First, our

primary conclusion in Riverkeeper 1 was_ that

restoration measures are “plainly inconsistent” with

the statute's text, 358 F.3d at 189, and our

statements regarding the legislative history [*110] of

> .

a proposed amendment, which we offered as

ancillary, but not dispositive, support for our

48a

construction of the statute, in no way diminish the

force of our conclusion that Congress unambiguously

expressed its intent in the statute. See Chevron, 467

U.S. at 842-43, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (“If the intent of

Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for

the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to

the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”).

Second, as to the EPA’s claim that ats construction of

the statute is entitled to deference because it has

now interpreted certain statutory terms, our holding

in Riverkeeper I was and remains clear: restoration

measures contradict the unambiguous language of

section 316(b). The EPA’s promulgation of the Phase

Il Rule obviously did nothing to alter the text of

section 316(b), and the Agency cannot create

ambiguity where none otherwise exists by defining

statutory terms contrary to their plain meaning.

Finally, as the foregoing analysis [42] suggests, our

decision in Riverkeeper I foreclosed the EPA from

interpreting section 316(b) in the Phase II Rule to

permit restoration measures as a means of

complying with the statute, and, therefore, nothing

in Brand X undermines the precedential value of our

prior holding. Our statement in Riverkeeper | that

we did not “mean to predetermine the factors and

standard applicable to Phases I] and III of the

rulemaking,” was made in the narrow context of

identifying “one reasonable reading” of particular

statutory language relating to the standard for new

and existing sources, not the restoration measures.

358 F.3d at 186 n. 13. Where we held that the

statutory language is unambiguous, Riverkeeper I is

binding.

Even assuming arguendo that we did not consider

ourselves bound by Riverkeeper I, we are persuaded

49a

by its reasoning as applied here. Restoration

measures are not part of the location, design,

construction, or capacity of cooling water intake

structures, Riverkeeper [, 358 F.3d at 189, and a rule

permitting comphance with the statute through

restoration measures allows facilities to avoid

adopting any cooling water intake — structure

technology at all, in contravention of the Act’s clear

language as well as its technology-forcing principle.

As we noted in Riverkeeper I, restoration measures

substitute after-the-fact compensation for adverse

environmental impacts that have al

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Record and brief — Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc. · 556 U.S. 208 | Frix