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No. 07-582
Title: Federal Communications Commission, et al., Petitioners
V.
Fox Television Stations, Inc., et al.
Docketed: November |, 2007
Lower Ct: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Case Nos:.: (06-1760-ag, 06-2750-ag, 06-5358-ag)
Decision Date: June 4, 2007
Questions
Presented
~~
~~~Date~~~ ~~ Proceedings and Orders
Aug 22 2007 Application (07A155) to extend the time to file a petition for a writ of
certiorari from September 2, 2007 to October 4, 2007, submitted to Justice
Ginsburg.
Aug 23 2007 Application (07A155) granted by Justice Ginsburg extending the time to
file until October 4, 2007.
Sep 24 2007 Application (07A155) to extend further the time from October 4, 2007 to
November 1, 2007, submitted to Justice Ginsburg.
Sep 24 2007 Application (07A155) granted by Justice Ginsburg extending the time to
file until November 1, 2007.
Nov | 2007 Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due December 3, 2007)
Nov 20 2007 Order extending time to file response to petition to and including January 2,
2008, for all respondents.
Dec 17 2007 Order further extending time to file response to petition to and including
February 1, 2008, for all respondents.
Feb 1 2008 Brief of respondents NBC Universal, Inc., and NBC Telemundo License
Company in opposition filed.
Feb 1 2008 Brief of respondents Fox Television Stations, Inc., CBS Broadcasting Inc.,
and ABC, Inc. in opposition filed.
Feb 13 2008 DISTRIBUTED for Conference of February 29, 2008.
Feb 15 2008 Reply of petitioners Federal Communications Commission, et al. filed.
(Distributed)
Mar 10 2008 DISTRIBUTED for Conference of March 14, 2008.
Mar 17 2008 Petition GRANTED.
Apr 10 2008 The time within which to file the joint appendix and petitioners’ brief on
the merits is extended to and including June 2, 2008.
Apr 22 2008 Consent to the filing of amicus briefs in support of either party, or neither
party, received from counsel for respondents, NBC Universal, Inc.,and
NBC Telemundo License Company.
Jun 2 2008 Joint appendix filed.
Jun 2 2008 _ Brief of petitioners Federal Communications Commission, et al. filed.
Jun 3 2008
Jun 6 2008
Jun 6 2008
Jun 9 2008
Jun 9 2008
Jun 9 2008
Jun 9 2008
Jun 9 2008
Jun 9 2008
Jun 20 2008
Jul 31 2008
Aug | 2008
Aug | 2008
Aug | 2008
Aug 6 2008
Aug 8 2008
Aug 8 2008
Aug 8 2008
Aug 8 2008
Aug 8 2008
Aug 8 2008
Aug 8 2008
Aug 8 2008
Brief amicus curiae of Decency Enforcement Center for Telvision filed.
Brief amicus curiae of National Religious Broadcasters filed.
Brief amicus curiae of Morality in Media, Inc. filed.
Brief amici curiae of Alliance Defense Fund and Family Research Council
filed.
Brief amicus curiae of Parents Television Council filed.
Brief amici curiae of American Center for Law & Justice, et al. filed.
Brief amicus curiae of Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence filed.
Brief amici curiae of Free Press, et al.in support of neither party filed.
Brief amici curiae of American Academy of Pediatrics, et al. filed.
The time to file respondents' briefs on the merits is extended to and
including August 1, 2008.
CIRCULATED
Brief of respondents NBC Universal, Inc., and NBC Telemundo License
Company filed. (Distributed)
Brief of respondent Center for Creative Voices in Media filed. (Distributed)
Brief of respondent Fox Television Stations, Inc. filed. (Distributed).
Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs in support of either or neither
party received from counsel for respondent ABC, Inc.
Brief amici curiae of National Assocation of Broadcasters and Radio-
Television News Directors filed. (Distributed)
Brief amicus curiae of Time Warner Inc. filed. (Distributed)
Brief amici curiae of Public Broadcasters filed. (Distributed)
Brief amici curiae of Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression
and the Media Institute filed. (Distributed)
Brief amici curiae of California Broadcasters Association, et al. filed.
(Distributed)
Brief amici curiae of American Civil Liberties Union, et al. filed.
(Distributed)
Srief amicus curiae of ABC Television Affiliates Association filed.
(Distributed)
Brief amici curiae of Former FCC Commissioners and Officials filed.
(Distributed)
Aug 18 2008 SET FOR ARGUMENT ON Tuesday, November 4, 2008.
Aug 20 2008 Brief amici curiae of Center for Democracy & Technology, et al. filed.
(Distributed).
Aug 26 2008 Record received from U.S.C.A. for the 2nd Circuit. (1 box)
Sep 2 2008
Nov 4 2008
Reply of petitioners Federal Communications Commission, et al. filed.
(Distributed)
Argued. For petitioners: Gregory G. Garre, Solicitor General, Department
of Justice, Washington, D.C. For respondents: Carter G. Phillips,
Washington, D.C
PETITION
FOR
WRIT OF
CERTIORARI
4!
52356
fo
VA
No.
Su e S.
ee g US
07-582NO0V 1 - 2007
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
Jn the Supreme Court of the Gnited States
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONERS
Vv.
FOX ‘TELEVISION STATIONS, INC., ET AL.
ON PETITION FORA WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STA: ES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
MATTHEW B. BERRY
Acting General Counsel
JOSEPH R. PALMORE
Deputy General Counsel
DANIEL M. ARMSTRONG
JACOB M. LEWIS
Associate General Counsels
NANDAN M. JOSHI
Counsel
Federal Communications
Commission
Washington, D.C. 20554
PAUL D. CLEMENT
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
JEFFREY S. BUCHOLTZ
Acting Assistant Attorney
General
THOMAS G. HUNGAR
Deyuty Solicitor General
ERIC D. MILLER
Assistant to the Solicitor
General
THOMAS M. BONDY
Attorney
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
(202) 514-2217
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the court of appeals erred in striking down
the Federal Communications Commission’s determin-
ation that the broadcast of vulgar expletives may violate
federal restrictions on the broadcast of “any obscene,
indecent, or profane language,” 18 U.S.C. 1464; see 47
C.F .R. 73.3999, when the expletives are not repeated.
(1)
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
Petitioners are the Federal Communications Com-
mission and the United States of America.
Respondents who were petitioners in the court of
appeals below are Fox Television Stations, Inc.; CBS
Broadcasting Inc.; WLS Television, Inc.; KTRK Tele-
vision, Inc.; KMBC Hearst-Argyle Television, Inc.; and
ABC Ince.
Respondents who were intervenors in the court of
appeals below are NBC Universal, Inc.; NBC Telemun-
do License Co.; NBC Television Affiliates; FBC Tele-
vision Affiliates Association; CBS Television Network
Affiliates; Center for the Creative Community, Inc., do-
ing business as Center for Creative Voices in Media,
Inc.; and ABC Television Affiliates Association.
(II)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ed eis a des a okn hk Ce baw ean we Kees 1
ee Se conde ewalaneesves ep0eeh 1
Statutes and regulations involved ....................---. 2
Cakes ans ae 0-866 06 bbb 0e 004 60 O8 2
Reasons for granting the petition ....................... 13
A. The decision below conflicts with this Court’s
ee head ce he ie we dineeeee see 15
B. The decision below is inconsistent with settled
principles of administrative law and conflicts with a
ree 19
C. The question presented is important and warrants” -
re kes oa Caw eek omen eh easahe 26
i etek a gn gobs ORS SOs AAS ANN OOS OES OS 31
AE Sdaseenedenes (dens anhdvabuteuesene viens la
EE oi rV6dhdusbdGbdb-00 spe Gov nsd.doseuesneusee 6la
CE v6 606.6 see be bi hedheedeeudenés ined weeks 148a
PE <i nackenushyncenedenedesuu ss ensee ecnwen 145a
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654
(D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1043
a rs id <b a a DA AER Wee 6 ke 6008 2, 15, 23
American Gas Ass’n v. FERC, 428 F.3d 255
NE See ee 26
Chevron USA Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) ....... 17
Kuclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) ..... . . 17
(IIT)
IV
Cases—Continued: Page
FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S.
FEO ho ncecidccecdiéguncenuseinsss ase 17
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) ...... passim
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) ............ 23
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841
(D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971) .... 22
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
owe ee ere 20, 22, 26
NCTA v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967
rey Perr ee 20, 22
Pacifica Found., Inc., In re, 2 ¥.C.C.R. 2698 (Apr. 16,
BED cee voces eo one 064665600000660RRRNes Te 4
Public Citizen, Inc. v. NHTSA, 374 F.3d 1251
ish. S ee bees $830 te eee 26
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 178 (1991) ................- 22
Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735 (1996) .... 20
Constitution, statutes and regulation:
CE Se, ee © ok so cnss0debe sentence 19, 29
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 551 et seg. .. 14, 21
Public Telecommunications Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-356, § 16(a), 106 Stat. 954 ................. 2, 148a
DUE seh devcsicedaksccevicseuue passim, 14ha
4 re TT Te 30
Ge A ha cc cesecccdccadsiadédveensns tae 2
GE CBA HEED cc cc cccccpeccceees 60seee sense 2
ee Pe 2, 147a
Regulations—Continued: Page
ee i chee eas eceweseevecwans 2, 147a
oo re 2, 148a
Miscellaneous:
Citizen’s Complaint Against Pacifica Found.
Station WBAI (FM), New York, N.Y., In re,
Be re Oe Os Bile RTO occ ccc ccccccccccscens 3
Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees
Regarding Their Airing of the “Golden Globe
Awards” Program, In re:
19 F.C.C.R. 4975 (Mar. 18, 2004) ........... passim
18 F’.C.C.R. 19,869 (Oct. 3, 2008) ................. 5
Complaints Against Various Television Licensees
Regarding Their Broadcast on November 11, 2004,
of the ABC Television Network's Presentation of
the Film “Saving Private Ryan”, In re,
20 F.C.C.R. 4507 (Feb. 3, 2005) ................. 16, 28
Complaints Regarding Various Television
Broadcasts Between February 2, 2002 and March
8, 2005, In re, 21 F .C.C.R. 2664 (Feb. 21, 2006) ..... 7,8
Industry Guidance on the Commission’s Case Law
Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 and Enforcement
Policies Regarding Broadcast Indecency, In re,
fg etes Be 0 S| rae 4,5
Barbara K. Kaye and Barry 8. Sapolsky, Watch Your
Mouth! An Analysis of Profanity Uttered by
Children on Prime-Time Television, 7 J. Mass
Comme’n & Soc’y 429 (2004) ..... PeNei stack wend nes 25
Jn the Supreme Court of the Gnited States
No.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONERS
Vv.
FOx TELEVISION STATIONS, INC., ET AL.
ON PETITION FORA WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
The Solicitor General, on behalf of the Federal Com-
munications Commission and the United States of Amer-
ica, respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to re-
view the judgment of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit in this case.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (App., infra, la-
60a) is reported at 489 F.3d 444. The order of the Fed-
eral Communications Commission (App., infra, 61a-
142a) is reported at 21 F.C.C.R. 13,299.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals (App., infra,
143a-144a) was entered on June 4, 2007. On August 23,
2007, Justice Ginsburg extended the time within which
(1)
2
to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to and including
October 4, 2007, and on September 24, 2007, Justice
Ginsburg further extended the time to and including
November 1, 2007. The jurisdiction of this Court is in-
voked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED
Pertinent provisions are set out in an appendix to
this petition. App., 7mfra, 145a-148a.
STATEMENT
1. a. Under 18 U.S.C. 1464, it is unlawful to “utter[]
any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of
radio communication.” As directed by Congress, the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commis-
sion) has adopted regulations specifying that the inde-
cency prohibition applies to radio and television broad-
casts aired between the hours of 6 a.m. and 10 p.m. 47
C.F .R. 73.3999(b) (adopted pursuant to Public Telecom-
munications Act of 1992 § 16(a), Pub. L. No. 102-356, 106
Stat. 954); see Action for Children’s Television v. FCC,
58 F.3d 654, 669-670 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 1043 (1996). The Commission does not
regulate indecent broadcasts outside that time period.
The FCC has authority to enforce the indecency prohibi-
tion by, among other things, imposing civil forfeitures,
see 47 U.S.C. 503(b)(1)(B) and (D), or taking violations
into account during license-renewal proceedings, see 47
U.S.C. 307, 309(k).
b. In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726
(1978) (Pacifica), this Court upheld the constitutionality
of the FCC’s authority to regulate indecent broadcasts.
At issue in Pacifica was the midday radio broadcast of
George Carlin’s monologue “Filthy Words.” Responding
to a listener complaint, the Commission determined that
3
the broadcast violated Section 1464. In reaching that
conclusion, it applied a “concept of ‘indecent’ [that] is
intimately connected with the exposure of children to
language that describes, in terms patently offensive as
measured by contemporary community standards for
the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and
organs, at times of the day when there is a reasonable
risk that children may be in the audience.” /d. at 731-
732 (quoting /n re Citizen’s Complaint Against Pacifica
Found. Station WBAI (FM), New York, N.Y., 56
F.C.C.2d 94, 98 (Feb. 12, 1975)). Under that definition,
the Court explained, “context is all-important.” /d. at
750.
In rejecting a constitutional challenge to the Commis-
sion’s enforcement of Section 1464, the Court observed
that “the broadcast media have established a uniquely
pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans” in that
“material presented over the airwaves confronts the
citizen, not only in public, but also in the privacy of the
home, where the individual’s right to be left alone
plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an in-
truder.” Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748. The Court further
observed that, because “broadcasting is uniquely acces-
sible to children,” indecent language can “enlarge[]| a
child’s vocabulary in an instant.” /d. at 749. The Court
concluded that “the government’s interest in the well-
being of its youth and in supporting parents’ claim to
authority in their own household justified the regulation
of otherwise protected expression.” /b?d. (internal quo-
tation marks and citation omitted); see zd. at 762 (Pow-
ell, J., concurring). The Court rejected the contention
that “one may avoid further offense by turning off the
radio when he hears indecent language,” comparing it to
z |
“saying that the remedy for an assault is to run away
after the first blow.” /d. at 748-749.
c. In subsequent orders, the Commission sought to
describe the circumstances under which non-repetitive
utterances of offensive sexual or excretory terms would
violate Section 1464. By 1987, the Commission had de-
termined that when “a complaint focuses solely on the
use of expletives, * * * repetitive use in a patently
offensive manner is a requisite to a finding of inde-
cency.” In re Pacifica Found., Inc., 2 F.C.C.R. 2698,
2699 1113 (Apr. 16, 1987). In contrast, when offensive
language “goes beyond the use of expletives” and in-
volves “the description or depiction of sexual or excre-
tory functions,” “repetition of specific words or phrases
is not necessarily an element critical to a determination
of indecency.” /bid.
The Commission further explained the indecency
standard in a 2001 policy statement. See /n re /ndustry
Guidance on the Commission’s Case Law Interpreting
18 U.S.C. § 1464 and Enforcement Policies Regarding
Broadcast Indecency, 16 F.C.C.R. 7999, 7999 7 1 (Mar.
14, 2001) (Industry Guidance). That statement set out
a two-part test for indecency. First, the material at is-
sue “must fall within the subject matter scope of [the]
indecency definition—that is, the material must describe
or depict sexual or excretory organs or activities.” /d.
at 8002 1 7. Second, “the broadcast must be patently
offensive as measured by contemporary community
standards for the broadcast medium.” /d. at 8002 1 8.
The policy statement explained that whether a
broadcast is “patently offensive” turns on the “full con-
text” in which the material was broadcast and is there-
fore “highly fact-specific.” IJndustry Guidance, 16
F.C.C.R. at 8002-8003 19. Three “principal factors” are
5
“significant”: “(1) the explicitness or graphic nature of
the description or depiction of sexual or excretory or-
gans or activities; (2) whether the material dwells on or
repeats at length descriptions of sexual or excretory
organs or activities; and (3) whether the material ap-
pears to pander or is used to titillate, or whether the
material appears to have been presented for its shock
value.” Jd. at 8003 1110 (emphases omitted). With re-
spect to the second factor, the policy statement noted
that “{rJlepetition of and persistent focus on sexual or
excretory material” may “exacerbate the potential offen-
siveness of broadcasts,” but “even relatively fleeting re-
ferences may be found indecent where other fac-
tors”—such as the use of “graphic or explicit” lan-
guage—“contribute to a finding of patent offensiveness.”
Id. at 8008-8009 99 17, 19.
d. In January 2003, the NBC network aired a live
broadcast of the Golden Globe Awards. In accepting the
award for Best Original Song, the rock singer Bono
stated: “This is really, really fucking brilliant. Really,
really great.” In re Complaints Against Various
Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the
“Golden Globe Awards” Program, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975,
4976 n.4 (Mar. 18, 2004) (Golden Globe Awards Order).
The Commission concluded that the broadcast of Bono’s
remark was indecent even though Bono’s use of the F-
Word was not “sustained or repeated.” /d. at 4980
1 12.' The Commission explained that, even when used
' The FCC’s Enforcement Bureau had initially ruled that the
broadcast was not indecent because Bono “used the word ‘fucking’ as
an adjective or expletive to emphasize an exclamation,” and because the
remarks were “fleeting and isolated.” See /n re Complaints Against
Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the “Golden
6
as an “intensifier,” the F-Word falls within the subject-
matter scope of indecency regulation because, given its
“core meaning,” the word “inherently has a sexual con-
notation.” /d. at 4978 1 8. The Commission also found
thet Bono’s remark was “patently offensive” because
“[t}he ‘F-Word’ is one of the most vulgar, graphic and
explicit descriptions of sexual activity in the English
language”; its use “invariably invokes a coarse sexual
image”; and its broadcast “on a nationally telecast
awards ceremony|] was shocking and gratuitous.” /d. at
4979 19. The Commission observed that NBC had not
claimed that its broadcast of the word had “any political,
scientific or cther independent value.” /bid.
Although the Commission concluded that Bono’s re-
mark was indecent, it did not impose a sanction. Be-
cause “prior Commission and staff action have indicated
that isolated or fleeting broadcasts of the ‘F-Word’ such
as that here are not indecent,” the Commission deter-
mined that NBC “did not have the requisite notice to
justify a penalty.” Golden Globe Awards Order, 19
F.C.C.R. at 4980-4982 19 12, 15.
2. This case arises out of two broadcasts that aired
before tie Commission released the Golden Globe
Awards Order. On December 9, 2002, the Fox television
network broadcast the 2002 Billboard Music Awards be-
ginning at 8 p.m. eastern standard time. During that
broadcast, the entertainer Cher received an “Artist
Achievement Award.” In her acceptance speech, she
said:
I’ve had unbelievable support in my life and I’ve
worked really hard. I’ve had great people to work
Globe Awards” Program, 18 F.C.C.R. 19,859, 19,861 99 5-6 (Oct. 3,
2003). The Golden Globe Awards Order reversed that staff decision.
7
with. Oh, yeah, you know what? I’ve also had critics
for the last 40 years saying that I was on my way out
every year. Right. So fuck ‘em. I still have a job
and they don’t.
App., infra, 115a-116a.
The following year, on December 10, 2003, Fox
broadcast the 2003 Billboard Music Awards beginning at
8 p.m. eastern standard time. Nicole Richie and Paris
Hilton, the stars of Fox’s show “The Simple Life,” pre-
sented one of the awards. During their presentation,
they engaged in the following exchange:
Paris Hilton: Now Nicole, remember, this is a live
show, watch the bad language.
Nicole Richie: Okay, God.
Paris Hiltor: It feels so good to be standing here
tonight.
Nicole Richie: Yeah, instead of standing in mud and
[audio blocked]. Why do they even call it “The Sim-
ple Life?” Have you ever tried to get cow shit out of
a Prada purse? It’s not so fucking simple.
App., infra, 69a-71a.
a. The Commission received complaints from view-
ers about both Billboard Music Awards broadcasts. It
addressed those and other complaints in an order in-
tended to provide “guidance to broadcasters and the
public about the types of programming that are imper-
missible under our indecency standard.” J/n re Com-
plaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Be-
tween February 2, 2002 and March 8, 2005, 21 F.C.C.R.
2664, 2665 7 2 (Feb. 21, 2006) (Omnibus Order). As rele-
vant here, the Omnibus Order addressed the 2002 and
8
2003 Billboard Music Awards, as well as two other pro-
grams: (1) several “NYPD Blue” episodes aired by the
ABC network in which, among other things, a character
on the show used the term “bullshit,” and (2) an episode
of CBS’s “The Early Show” in which a contestant on
CBS’s “Survivor: Vanuatu” referred to another contes-
tant as a “bullshitter” in a live interview. Jd. at 2690-
2700 I 100-145.
In the Omnibus Orcer, the Commission concluded
that each of those four programs contained indecent
language in violation of Section 1464 and the Commis-
sion’s indecency regulations. 21 F.C.C.R. at 2690 9 24.
As in the Golden Globe Awards Order, however, the
Commission did not impose any sanction because it con-
cluded that broadcast licensees lacked adequate notice
of its new policy regarding the airing of expletives.
lbid.; see id. at 2700 I 145.
b. Respondents sought review of the Omnibus Or-
der, and the cases were consolidated in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. App.,
infra, 66a. At the Commission’s request, the court of
appeals granted a remand in order to provide the agency
an opportunity to address in the first instance the broad-
casters’ specific challenges to the Commission’s determi-
nations with regard to their programs. /d. at 67a-68a.
ce. On remand, the Commission vacated the relevant
portions of the Omnibus Order. App., infra, 68a. It
dismissed the complaints against “NYPD Blue” on pro-
cedural grounds, id. at 129a-131a, and it concluded that
the use of the term “bullshitter” on “The Early Show”
was not indecent because it occurred in the context of a
“news interview,” id. at 125a-128a.
At the same time, the Commission reaffirmed its con-
clusion that the broadcast of the 2002 and 2003 Billboard
9
Music Awards violated the prohibitions against the
broadcast of indecent material. App., infra, 69a-142a.
Applying the framework set out in the 2001 /ndustry
Guidance, the Commission concluded that the expletives
aired during the Billboard Music Awards were sexuai or
excretory references that fell within the subject-matter
scope of the indecency definition. Fox did not dispute
that Richie’s use of the S-Word referred to excrement.
Id. at 73a. In addition, the Commission reaffirmed that
the “F-Word” (used by both Richie and Cher) inherently
“has a sexual connotation even if the word is not used
literally” because “the word’s power to ‘intensify’ and
offend derives from its implicit sexual meaning.” /d. at
73a-74a; see id. at 117a-118a. The Commission also con-
cluded that both broadcasts were “patently offensive.”
Id. at 74a, 118a. With respect to both broadcasts, the
Commission found that the language used was not only
graphic and shocking—particularly in the context of
nationally televised awards programs viewed by a sub-
stantial number of children—but was also gratuitous.
Id. at 75a-76a, 118a-120a. Indeed, the Commission
noted, Fox did not argue that the expletives at issue
“had any artistic merit or were necessary to convey any
message.” /d. at 76a n.44; see 2d. at 120a n.191.
The Commission also rejected the argument that the
isolated nature of the utterances should preclude a find-
ing that the language ‘vas indecent. App., infra, 82a-
83a. The Commission explained that it was “artificial”
to maintain a distinction between “expletives,” which
had to be repeated to be actionable, and literal “descrip-
tions or depictions of sexual or excretory functions,”
which did not. /d. at 82a. As the Commission observed,
“{iJn evaluating whether material is patently offensive,
the Commission’s approach has generally been to exam-
10
ine all factors relevant to that determination.” Jd. at
83a. The Commission accordingly found that “categori-
cally requiring repeated use of expletives in order to
find material indecent” would be “inconsistent with our
general approach to indecency enforcement, which
stresses the critical nature of context.” /bid. The Com-
mission noted that Pacifica did not require it to “ignore
‘the first blow’ to the television audience in the circum-
stances presented here.” /bid. The Commission also
observed that “granting an automatic exemption for ‘iso-
lated or fleeting’ expletives” would allow broadcasters
“to air any one of a number of offensive sexual or excre-
tory words, regardless of context, with impunity during
the middle of the afternoon provided they did not air
more than one expletive in any program segment.” /d.
at 84a-85a. Permitting “[sJuch a result,” the Commis-
sion explained, “would be inconsistent with [the] obliga-
tion to enforce the law responsibly.” /d. at 85a.
3. A divided panel of the court of appeals vacated
and remanded. App., infra, 1a-60a.
a. The court of appeals concluded that the Commis-
sion’s policy regarding isolated expletives was “arbi-
trary and capricious under the Administrative Proce-
dure Act” because the Commission had “failed to articu-
late a reasoned basis for [its] change in policy.” App.,
infra, 2a. Taking the view that the “primary reason for
the crackdown on fleeting expletives” was to protect
“viewers (including children)” from the “first blow” of an
expletive, the court of appeals stated that the Commis-
sion had failed to provide a “reasonable explanation for
why it has changed its perception that a fleeting exple-
tive was not a harmful ‘first blow’ for the nearly thirty
years between Pacifica and Golden Globes.” Id. at 25a.
The court faulted the Commission for failing to produce
11
“any evidence that suggests a fleeting expletive is harm-
ful,” much less that any such harm was “serious enough
to warrant government regulation.” /d. at 32a.
Even “[mlore problematic,” according to the court of
appeals, was the fact that “the Commission does noi
take the position that any occurrence of an expletive is
indecent or profane under its rules.” App., infra, 25a -
26a. Because the Commission did not flatly prohibit the
broadcast of vulgar expletives in every circumstance,
the court concluded that “the record simply does not
support the position that the Commission’s new policy
was based on its concern with the public’s mere expo-
sure to this language on the airwaves.” /d. at 27a-28a.
Even though the court recognized that, under Pacifica,
any “per se ban would likely raise constitutional ques-
tions above and beyond the concerns raised by the [Com-
mission’s] current policy,” 2d. at 26a n.7, the court none-
theless believed that it was arbitrary for the Commis-
sion to prohibit isolated expletives only in circumstances
where their utterance would be patently offensive.”
The court of appeals also took issue with the Commis-
sion’s determination that an expletive such as the F-
* The court also invalidated the Commission’s conclusion that non-
repeated expletives could be “profane.” App., infra, 33a-34a. In the
Golden Globe Awards Order, the FCC had held that Bono’s use of the
F-Word was “profane” within the meaning of Section 1464; in doing so,
it rejected an interpretation of “profane” that was limited to blasphe-
mous utterances, instead construing the term to mean “language * * *
so grossly offensive to members of the public who actually hear it as to
amount to a nuisance.” 19 F.C.C.R. at 4981 113. The court stated that
the Commission had failed to provide any “explanation of what harm
this separate enforcement against profane speech addresses that is not
already addressed by the FCC's indecency and obscenity enforcement.”
App., infra, 34a.
12
Word has an inescapably sexual connotation. The court
stated that “[t]his defies any commonsense understand-
ing of these words, which, as the general] public well
knows, are often used in everyday conversation without
any ‘sexual or excretory’ meaning.” App., infra, 29a. In
addition, the court dismissed as “divorced from reality”
the Commission’s concern that a “per se exemption for
fleeting expletives would ‘permit broadcasters to air
expletives at all hours of the day so long as they did so
one ata time.’” /d. at 30a (citation omitted).
Although the court of appeals “refrain[ed] from de-
ciding the various constitutional challenges to the Re-
mand Order raised by the Networks,” it made certain
“observations” regarding the constitutionality of the
Commission’s broadcast indecency policies. App., infra,
35a. The court “question[ed] whether the FCC’s inde-
cency test can survive First Amendment scrutiny,” 7ibid.,
and it expressed doubt “that by merely proffering a rea-
soned analysis for its new approach to indecency and
profanity, the Commission can adequately respond to
the constitutional and statutory challenges raised by the
Networks,” id. at 45a.
b. Judge Leval dissented. App., infra, 46a-60a. In
his view, the Commission had provided a “sensible” rea-
son for its “relatively modest change of standard.” /d.
at 49a. “{T|he Commission’s central explanation for the
change was essentially its perception that the ‘F-Word’
is not only of extreme and graphic vulgarity, but also
conveys an inescapably sexual connotation.” /bid. The
FCC therefore “concluded that the use” of that exple-
tive, “even in a single fleeting instance without repeti-
tion,” was “likely to constitute an offense to the decency
standards of § 1464.” /d at 50a. “In other words,”
Judge Leval stated, “the Commission found, contrary to
13
its earlier policy, that the word is of such graphic explic-
itness in inevitable reference to sexual activity that ab-
sence of repetition does not save it from violating the
standard of decency.” /d. at 52a.
Unlike the majority, Judge Leva! was not troubled
by the Commission’s decision not to “follow an all-or
nothing policy.” App., infra, 53a. Instead, he explained
that the Commission “attempt[ed] to draw context-
based distinctions, with the result that no violation will
be found in circumstances where usage is considered
sufficiently justified that it does not constitute inde-
cency.” /bid. Far from an example of “irrationality,”
Judge Leval stated, the policy “is an attempt on the part
of the Commission over the years to reconcile conflicting
values through standards which take account of con-
text.” Jd. at 54a-55a. As Judge Leval explained, the
Commission’s context-driven approach “is in no way a
consequence of the Commission’s change of standard for
fleeting expletives. It applies across the board to all
circumstances.” /d. at 53a. Thus, the “majority’s criti-
cism of inconsistency is not properly directed against
the change of standard here in question,” which “[iJf
anything * * * has made the Commission more consis-
tent rather than less” by ensuring that “the same
context-based iactors will apply to all circumstances.”
Id. at 54a.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
In vacating the FCC’s order, the court of appeals
adopted an analysis that directly conflicts with the ap-
proach toward broadcast-indecency regulation that this
Court mandated in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438
U.S. 726 (1978). The court of appeals criticized the Com-
mission for taking context into account and refusing to
14
treat a single use of an expletive, no matter how graphic
or gratuitous, as per se not indecent, even though, in
Pacifica, this Court emphasized that “context is all-im-
portant” in evaluating indecency. /d. at 750. Indeed,
while the court of appeals faulted the Commission for
_ not having the courage of its convictions and treating
expletives as per se indecent, it also recognized that in
light of Pacifica’s focus on context, a blanket prohibition
on all uses of particular words would almost certainly
violate the First Amendment. App., infra, 26a n.7. By
faulting the Commission for exercising the contextual
judgment that Pacifica mandated, the court of appeals
appears to have put the FCC to a choice between allow-
ing one free use of any expletive no matter how graphic
or gratuitous, or else adopting a (likely unconstitutional)
across-the-board prohibition against expletives. There
is no reason that the Commission must choose between
those per se rules.
The decision of the court of appeals is also inconsis-
tent with settled principles governing judicial review of
agency action. The court asserted that the Commission
had not adequately explained why it reversed its policy
of categorically exempting isolated expletives from the
federal restrictions on indecent broadcasts. In reality,
the Commission provided a thorough, reasoned explana-
tion for its change in policy. Under the deferential stan-
dard of review required by the Administrative Proce-
dure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 501 et seg., the Commission’s
judgment as to how best to enforce the federal prohibi-
tion on the broadcast of indecent material should have
been upheld, and the court’s contrary conclusion was
erroneous. And the court’s determination that the FCC
was required to provide “record evidence” showing that
expletives are harmful is in direct conflict with a holding
15
of the D.C. Circuit. See Action for Children’s Television
v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 662 (1995) (en banc), cert. denied,
516 U.S. 1043 (1996).
In most cases, a remand to an agency for a fuller ex-
planation of a policy would not merit this Court’s review.
Here, however, the court of appeals candidly acknowl-
edged that, under its decision, the Commission probably
will be unable to “adequately respond to the constitu-
tional and statutory challenges” in this case even by
“proffering a reasoned analysis for its new approach to
indecency.” App., infra, 45a. The court has thus sent
the Commission back to run a Sisyphean errand while
effectively invalidating much of the Commission’s au-
thority to enforce 18 U.S.C. 1464. In the meantime, the
Commission is left in the untenable position of having a
grant of authority that the public expects it to exercise,
and that Pacifica allows it to exercise, but that the Sec-
ond Circuit has indicated cannot be meaningfully exer-
cised consistently with that court’s view of the APA and
the First Amendment. Accordingly, this Court’s review
is warranted.
A. The Decision Below Conflicts With This Court’s Deci-
sion In Pacifica
The reasoning of the court of appeals conflicts di-
rectly with the context-driven approach governing
broadcast indecency that this Court upheld in Pacifica.
In its analysis of the FCC’s policy, the court of appeals
focused on the Commission’s statement, picking up on
Pacifica, that it sought to protect broadcast audiences
from the “first blow” resulting from the single utterance
of an expletive. App., infra, 84a. The court rejected
that rationale based on its view that “the ‘first blow’ the-
ory bears no rational connection to the Commission’s
16
actual policy regarding fleeting expletives” because “the
Commission does not take the position that any occur-
rence of an expletive” is indecent. /d. at 26a. Thus, the
court. emphasized that the broadcast of a vulgar exple-
tive on “The Early Show” was found not to be indecent
because it took place in the context of a “news inter-
view,” and that the expletives in “Saving Private Ryan”
did not make the broadcast of that movie indecent be-
cause, among other reasons, deleting the expletives
“would have * * * diminished the power, realism and
immediacy of the film experience for viewers.” /d. at
26a-27a (quoting id. at 128a, and /n re Complaints
Against Various Television Licensees Regarding Their
Broadcast on November 11, 2004, of the ABC Television
Network's Presentation of the Film “Saving Private
Ryan,” 20 F.C.C.R. 4507, 4513 9 14 (Feb. 3, 2005) (Sav-
ing Private Ryan Order)). According to the court, those
outcomes demonstrated that “the Commission’s new
policy was [not] based on its concern with the public’s
mere exposure to this language on the airwaves.” /d. at
27a-28a. But just because the “first blow” theory is rele-
vant does not mean that the Commission must ignore
context and treat any first blow as a knockout punch.
Contrary to the reasoning of the court of appeals, the
Commission’s consideration of context is appropriate for
three reasons. First, the context in which a word is used
is highly relevant in determining whether the word is
offensive. Judge Leval illustrated the point well when
he observed that the judges of the court of appeals had
used the F-Word at oral argument: “Had the case been
on another subject, such usage would surely have seem-
ed inappropriate. Because of the issues in this case, the
word was central to the issues being discussed. It is not
irrational to take context into account to determine
17
whether use of the word is indecent.” App., infra, 54a
n.16.
Second, when offensive language is used in certain
contexts—such as a news program—countervailing
First Amendment interests may be at stake, making it
appropriate for the Commission to “proceed with the
utmost restraint.” App., infra, 127a. Agencies are not
required to pursue their policies in complete disregard
of competing interests, nor are they prohibited from
recognizing that those interests may be greater in some
contexts than in others. /d. at 55a (Leval, J., dissenting)
(FCC has properly “reconcile[d] competing values
through standards which take account of context.”); see
FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S.
775, 809-811 (1978); ef. Chevron USA Inc. v. NRDC, 467
U.S. 837, 865-866 (1984).
Third, and most importantly, the court of appeals’
hostility to a contextual analysis is, at bottom, an attack
on this Court’s decision in Pacifica. In Pacifica, the
Court upheld the Commission’s authority to regulate
broadcast indecency precisely because “[{t]he Commis-
sion’s decision rested entirely on a nuisance rationale in
which context is all-important.” 438 U.S. at 750; see
ibid. (indecency determination “requires consideration
of a host of variables”). “[A] nuisance,” the Court ob-
served, “may be merely a right thing in the wrong
place,—like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard.”
Ibid. (quoting Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365, 388 (1926)).
As Justice Stevens explained, “the constitutional pro-
tection accorded to a communication containing such
patently offensive sexual and excretory language need
not be the same in every context.” Pacifica, 438 U.S. at
747 (plurality opinion). Instead, “[iJt is a characteristic
18
of speech such as this that both its capacity to offend,
and its ‘social value’ * * * vary with the circum-
stances”; thus, “[wjords that are commonplace in one
setting are shocking in another.” /bid. “Because con-
tent of that character is not entitled to absolute constitu-
tional protection under all circumstances,” Justice Ste-
vens wrote, “we must consider its context in order to
determine whether the Commission’s action was consti-
tutionally permissible.” /d. at 747-748; see id. at 742
(“indecency is largely a function of context” and “cannot
be adequately judged in the abstract”); id. at 761
(Powell, J., concurring) (agreeing that “on the facts of
this case, the Commission’s order did not violate respon-
dent’s First Amendment rights”) (emphasis added). In
short, the FCC’s contextual analysis was crucial to this
Court’s endorsement of the Commission’s determination
in Pacifica.
According to the court of appeals, a contextual ap-
proach to isolated expletives bears “no rational connec-
tion” to the goal of protecting broadcast audiences from
the “first blow.” App., infra, 26a. But there is no inher-
ent tension between a “first blow” theory and a consid-
eration of context. Indeed, it was this Court in Pacifica
that first analogized the broadcast of indecent language
to the “first blow” of an assault, 438 U.S. at 748-749,
even as it recognized a page later that the same lan-
guage in a different context—e.g., “a two-way radio con-
versation between a cab driver and a dispatcher, or a
telecast of an Elizabethan comedy,” id. at 750—might
not be legally indecent. Moreover, in the discussion of
Paul Cohen’s famous jacket, see zd. at 747 n.25, 749, Jus-
tice Stevens made clear that context could matter in
analyzing a single use of an expletive. See also id. at 750
n.29.
19
Consistent with Pacifica, the Commission in this
case reasonably concluded that Cher’s and Richie’s re-
marks constituted a “first blow” that could be redressed,
not only because of the words that were used but also
because of the context in which they were uttered: The
language was vulgar and graphic; the words were ut-
tered without any warning to parents during a live, na-
tionally broadeast awards program watched by millions
of children, App., infra, 76a, 119a; and it was undisputed
that Cher’s and Richie’s remarks were gratuitous and
unjustified by any artistic purpose, id. at 76a n.44, 120a
n.191. Nothing in the Administrative Procedure Act
required the Commission to prohibit the use of the same
words in all other contexts in order to reach the reason-
able conclusion that Cher’s and Richie’s comments were
indecent as broadcast. While the court of appeals be-
lieved that consideration of countervailing First Amend-
ment interests on a case-by-case basis undermined the
reasonableness of the Commission’s decision to abandon
the per se exemption for isolated expletives, the court’s
position cannot be reconciled with Pacifica. Once it is
recognized that (1) a particularly graphic utterance can
serve as a first blow that can cause immediate damage,
and (2) context matters, it follows logically that there is
no mandate for a per se rule of either prohibition or li-
cense.
B. The Decision Below Is Inconsistent With Settled Princi-
ples Of Administrative Law And Conflicts With A Deci-
sion Of The D.C. Circuit
The court of appeals gave several additional reasons
for its conclusion that “the FCC has failed to articulate
a reasoned basis for [its] change in policy” regarding
isolated expletives. App., infra, 2a. None withstands
20
scrutiny, and one is in direct conflict with a decision of
the D.C. Circuit.
1. “The scope of review under the ‘arbitrary and ca-
pricious’ standard is narrow and a court is not to substi-
tute its judgment for that of the agency.” Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983). Under that standard, “if the agency ade-
quately explains the reasons for a reversal of policy,
‘change is not invalidating, since the whole point of
Chevron is to leave the discretion provided by the ambi-
guities of a statute with the implementing agency.’”
NCTA v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981-982
(2005) (quoting Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S.
735, 742 (1996)).
The Commission here gave a reasonable explanation
for reaffirming its determination, first made in the
Golden Globe Awards Order, that the “mere fact that
specific words or phrases are not sustained or repeated
does not mandate a finding that material that is other-
wise patently offensive to the broadcast medium is not
indecent.” App., infra, 82a (quoting Golden Globe
Awards Order, 19 F.C.C.R. at 4980 1 12). The Commis-
sion explained that, “[i]n evaluating whether material is
patently offensive, [its] approach has generally been to
examine all factors relevant to that determination.” /d.
at 83a. Accordingly, the Commission reasoned, to “sug-
gest[] that one of these factors—whether material had
been repeated—would always be decisive in a certain
category of cases” would be “at odds with the Commis-
sion’s overall enforcement policy.” J/bid. As Judge
Leval explained, the Golden Globe Awards Order elimi-
nated the “nearly automatic pass” that the Commission
had previously given to isolated expletives, and recog-
nized that a brief sexual or excretory reference could be
21
patently offensive if uttered in certain contexts. Jd. at
49a; see 19 F.C.C.R. at 4980 1 12. That change in policy
“made the Commission more consistent rather than less,
because under the new rule, the same context-based
factors will apply to all circumstances.” App., infra, 54a.
The panel majority’s refusal to accept the Commission’s
reasoned and reasonable explanation for its change of
policy is inconsistent with the deferentia] standard man-
dated by State Farm.
2. The court of appeals refused to defer to the Com-
mission’s justifications for its policy because, in the
court’s view, the Commission was required to explain
“why it has changed its perception that a fleeting exple-
tive was not a harmful ‘first blow’ for the nearly thirty
years between Pacifica and Golden Globes.” App., in-
fra, 25a; see id. at 32a (“The agency asserts the same
interest in protecting children as it asserted thirty years
ago, but until the Golden Globes decision, it had never
banned fleeting expletives.”). In this regard, the court
repeatedly insisted that the agency should have pro-
vided “record evidence” to support its changed view of
the broadcast of single expletives. /d. at 29a n.10; see id
at 29a n.11, 32a. The hurdles that the court of appeals
erected to the Commission’s ability to make a change in
policy find no support in the Administrative Procedure
Act.?
* The court of appeals found it significant that broadcasters had
relied on the exemption that the Commission had provided for isolated
expletives. App., infra, 2a, 32a. The Commission, however, has consis-
tently declined to sanction broadcasters for isolated expletives that
were aired before the Commission announced its revised policy in the
Golden Globe Awards Order. Accordingly, the Commission's change in
policy does not undermine any reliance interests.
22
The court of appeals failed to appreciate that “[a]n
agency’s view of what is in the public interest may
change, either with or without a change in circum-
stances,” State Farm, 463 U.S. at 57 (quoting Greater
Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C.
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971)). Thus, an
agency has an obligation to reconsider “the wisdom of its
policy on a continuing basis” and may make adjust-
ments, whether “in response to changed factual circum-
stances, or a change in administrations.” Brand X, 545
U.S. at 981 (citation omitted). And an agency may ratio-
nally alter its policy for the straightforward reason that
its “prior policy failed to implement properly the stat-
ute.” Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 187 (1991).
Here, the Commission explained that its prior policy
on isolated expletives had “failed to implement” Section
1464 properly, ust, 500 U.S. at 173, because it rested
on an “artificial” distinction between “expletives” and
“descriptions or depictions of sexual or excretory activ-
ity” that ignored the fact that “an expletive’s power to
offend derives from its sexual or excretory meaning.”
App., infra, 82a-83a (internal quotation marks and cita-
tion omitted). The Commission also explained that
treating isolated expletives as automatically permissible
in every circumstance was inconsistent with the “critical
nature of context” in evaluating whether a sexual or ex-
cretory reference is “patently offensive.” /d. at 83a.
The court of appeals, however, believed that the
Commission was required to adduce “evidence that sug-
gests a fleeting expletive is harmful,” and that “this
harm is serious enough to warrant government regula-
tion.” App., infra, 32a. That argument is inconsistent
with Pacifica, in which this Court upheld the Commis-
sion’s indecency determination even though there was
23
no record evidence of any harm caused by the Carlin
monologue. Instead, the Court found a sufficient basis
for regulation in the commonsense cbservation that
“broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even
these too young to read,” and that written messages
“incomprehensible to a first grader,” when broadcast,
can “enlarge[] a child’s vocabulary in an instant.” Pacif-
ica, 438 U.S. at 749.
In addition, the reasoning of the court of appeals is
in direct conflict with that of the D.C. Circuit in Action
for Children’s Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (1995) (en
banc), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1043 (1996). That decision
affirmed the Commission’s authority to regulate broad-
cast indecency, holding that the government has an in-
terest in protecting children from material that would
have an adverse impact on their “ethical and moral de-
velopment.” /d. at 662. The court explained that “Con-
gress does not need the testimony of psychiatrists and
social scientists in order to take note of the coarsening
of impressionable minds that can result from a persis-
tent exposure to s# <ually explicit material just this side
of legal obscenity.” /bid. To the contrary, “the Supreme
Court has never suggested that a scientific demonstra-
tion of psychological harm:is required in order to estab-
lish the constitutionality of measures protecting minors
from exposure to indecent speech.” /d. at 661-662; cf.
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 641 (1968) (uphold-
ing statute prohibiting sale of material obscene as to
minors, even though the harmfulness of such material
was not “an accepted scientific fact”). Here,'the applica-
ble statute prohibits the broadcast of “any obscene, in-
decent, or profane language.” 18 U.S.C. 1464. Section
1464 does not require the Commission to show that the
24
language to which it applies is otherwise harmful; harm
has already been presumed by Congress.
3. The court of appeals also took issue with the i
mission’s conclusion that “in certain cases, it is difficult
(if not impossible) to distinguish whether a word is being
used as an expletive or as a literal description of sexual
or excretory functions,” App., infra, 83a (emphasis
added), because, in the court’s view, “the general public
well knows” that offensive sexual or excretory words
“are often used in everyday conversation without any
‘sexual or excretory’ meaning,” 7d. at 29a. But the Com-
mission made that statement in the context of its
broader observation that “an expletive’s power to offend
derives from its sexual or excretory meaning.” /d. at
83a (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover,
Cher’s reference to her critics is an example of a use of
an expletive in a way that at a minimum draws force
from its sexual or excretory origins, even if she was not
literally “suggesting that people engage in sexual activi-
ties” with her critics. /d. at 120a; see zd. at 58a (Leval,
J., dissenting) (“It is surely not irrational for the Com-
mission to conclude that * * * the F-Word is never
completely free of an offensive, sexual connotation”).
The court deemed the Commission’s conclusion unsup-
ported by “record evidence,” id. at 30a n.10, but that
assessment overlooks the evidence cited in the order, 7d.
at 74a & nn.39-40. Moreover, the court’s analysis is in-
consistent with Pacifica, in which the Court upheld the
Commission’s conclusion that the Carlin monologue “de-
picted sexual and excretory activities,” 438 U.S. at 732,
even though one of Carlin’s principal themes was that
many of the expletives he used had non-literal meanings,
see, e.g., id. at 754.
25
4. Finally, the court of appeals exceeded the proper
scope of its review when it concluded that the Commis-
sion had not shown that its revised policy was necessary.
The Commission had observed that a blanket exemption
for isolated expletives “would as a matter of logic permit
broadcasters to air expletives at all hours of a day so
long as they did so one at a time,” App., infra, 84a-
85a—a result that would seriously undermine the objec-
tives of Section 1464. But the court asserted that
“broadcasters have never barraged the airv aves with
expletives even prior to Golden Globes,” and it sug-
gested that the prediction that they might do so was
“both unsupported by any evidence and directly contra-
dicted by prior experience.” /d. at 30a & n.11.
As an initial matter, the Commission’s point was less
a prediction than a consideration of the logic of provid-
ing a per se exemption for isolated expletives. A poli-
cymaker is well-served to consider where the logic of an
argument would extend, even if the regulated commu-
nity might exercise self-restraint in the short run.
In any event, there is substantial support for the no-
tion that the failure to regulate “isolated and gratuitous
uses of [vulgar] language on broadcasts when children
were expected to be in the audience * * * would likely
lead to more widespread use of the offensive language.”
Golden Globe Awards Order, 19 F.C.C.R. at 4979 1 9.’
* In the Golden Globe Awards Order, the Commission cited an
academic study that found that “offensive” language had increased
significantly on broadcast television between 1990 and 2001. 19
F.C.C.R. at 4979 J 9 n.26; see Barbara K. Kaye and Barry S. Sapolsky,
Watch Your Mouth! An Analysts of Profanity Uttered by Children on
Prime-Time Television, 7 J. Mass Comme'’n & Soc’y 429, 441 (2004)
(finding that “offensive” language was used YS times on major broad-
cast networks between 8 and 9 p.m. in 1990, but 216 times on the same
networks during the same hour in 2001).
26
As Judge Leval explained, there was “good reason to
expect that a marked increase” in the broadcast of ex-
pletives “would occur if the old policy were continued.”
App., infra, 57a. The court erred in “substitut[ing] its
judgment for that of the agency,” State Farm, 463 U.S.
at 43, and its decision is in tension with decisions of the
D.C. Circuit recognizing that “(p]redictions regarding
the actions of regulated entities are precisely the type of
policy judgments that courts routinely and quite cor-
rectly leave to administrative agencies.” Public Citizen,
Inc. v. NHTSA, 374 F.3d 1251, 1260-1261 (1994); see
American Gas Ass’n v. FERC, 428 F.3d 255, 264 (2005)
(“[I]t is within the scope of the agency’s expertise to
make . . . a prediction about the market it regulates,
and a reasonable prediction deserves our deference.”)
(brackets in original).
C. The Question Presented Is Important And Warrants
This Court’s Review
On its face, the decision of the court of appeals does
nothing more than remand the case to the FCC to pro-
vide a new explanation for its change in policy. App.,
infra, 45a. In an ordinary case, such a decision would
not merit this Court’s review. Here, however, the Com-
mission has already fully explained its policy, and the
opinion of the court of appeals makes clear that the
Commission is unlikely to be able to say anything on
remand that the court would deem satisfactory to justify
that policy. On the one hand, the court of appeals found
the Commission’s regulation of isolated expletives un-
justified because it takes account of context, rather than
adopting a per se rule of prohibition. On the other hand,
the alternative—a flat ban on any use of expletives, re-
gardless of context—would almost certainly violate the
27
First Amendment. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 746 (plural-
ity opinion) (“Some uses of even the most offensive
words are unquestionably protected.”). Indeed, the
court of appeals recognized that “a per se ban would
likely raise constitutional questions above aid beyond
the concerns raised by the current policy.” App., infra,
26a n.7. Having established those parameters for the
remand, it is no wonder that the court predicted that the
FCC would be unable to “adequately respond to the con-
stitutional and statutory challenges” in this case even by
“proffering a reasoned analysis for its new approach to
indecency.” App., infra, 45a. As a result, the court’s
decision has an immediate and significant effect that
warrants review.
Nor can the consequences of the decision below be
confined to the FCC’s disposition of the complaints re-
garding the 2002 and 2003 Billboard Music Awards pro-
grams. Rather, the decision effectively reinstitutes «a
automatic per se exemption for the broadcast of isolated
expletives—an exemption that the Commission has ex-
pressly disavowed as inconsistent with its obligation to
enforce responsibly the prohib:tien on broadcast inde-
cency. Indeed, the decision calls into serious question
the Commission’s authority to regulate even repeated
uses of offensive sexual or excretory language. In dis-
agreeing with the Commission’s treatment of “non-lit-
eral” uses of expletives such as the “F-Word,” the court
of appeals opined that such expletives “are often used in
everyday conversation without any ‘sexual or excretory
meaning.’” App., infra, 29a. But the Commission has
sensibly held that “both literal and non-literal uses of
the ‘F-Word’ come within the subject matter scope of
[its] indecency definition” because the “core meaning” of
the “F-Word” has an inescapably “sexual connotation,”
28
and “the word’s power to insult and offend derives from
its sexual meaning.” /d. at 118a; see Golden Globe
Awards Order, 19 F.C.C.R. at 4979 9 9 (any use of the
word “invariably invokes a coarse sexual image”). Be-
cause the Commission’s authority to regulate broadcast
indecency has long been interpreted to depend upon a
connection to sexual or excretory matters, see, e.g.,
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 732, if, under the court of appeals’
reasoning, “non-literal” uses of even the most highly
offensive sexual expletives have no such connection, then
they would fall outside the Commission’s regulatory
power—no matter how many times those “non-literal”
uses are deliberately repeated.
More broadly, the court of appeals’ rejection of the
Commission’s contextual analysis strikes at the heart of
broadcast indecency regulatory framework. As Judge
Leval recognized, the FCC’s focus on context “is in no
way a consequence of the Commission’s change of stan-
dard” with respect to isolated expletives. App., infra,
53a. Instead, the contextual approach “applies across
the board to all circumstances,” whether or not the ma-
terial in question was repeated. /bid. The adoption of
a contextual approach to expletives is really just an ef-
fort to conform the treatment of expletives to the rest of
the regulatory regime. /d. at 54a. As a result, the major-
ity’s criticism of the Commission’s approach was in real-
ity directed against the entire structure of Section 1464.
Id. at 54a.
For example, the Commission took account of context
in finding that the repeated use of expletives in Carlin’s
monologue was indecent, but that the repeated use of
some of the same expletives in Saving Private Ryan was
not. Compare Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 732, with Saving
Private Ryan Order, 20 F.C.C.R. at 4512-4513 4 14-15
29
(noting that, in context, the expletives were “integral to
the film’s objective of conveying the horrors of war” and
were “neither gratuitous nor in any way intended or
used to pander, titillate or shock”). According to the
logic of the court of appeals, considering context in this
manner would make it irrational to find the Carlin
monologue (or a present-day expletive-filled rant by a
radio shock jock) indecent.
Thus, the court’s approach is difficult to square with
Pacifica, and effectively nullifies the prohibition on in-
decent language found in Section 1464, which was up-
held as constitutional in that decision. That result would
not be surprising, since the court of appeals made little
effort to hide its hostility to Pacifica’s reasoning. Com-
pare, e.g., Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-749 (describing “the
broadcast media” as “uniquely pervasive” and “uniquely
accessible to children”), with App., infra, 40a (question-
ing the accuracy of Pacifica’s holding to that effect). If
the Commission’s contextual analysis cannot survive the
court’s view of the FCC’s obligation to provide a rea-
soned explanation—and if, as the court of appeals sug-
gested, a per se prohibition on particular words is also
not permissible—the FCC may find itself unable to ful-
fill a large portion of its broadcast indecency enforce-
ment obligations.
The court of appeals’ decision places the Commission
in an untenable position. Although it orders a remand,
the decision signals that there is no way for the Commis-
sion to regulate isolated expletives consistent with the
parameters the court of appeals established. But Con-
gress gave the Commission authority to regulate; Pacif-
ica suggests that contextual regulation is not forbidden
by the First Amendment; and the public rightfully ex-
pects the Commission to exercise what authority it has
30
to keep broadcast television suitable for children during
certain hours. The court of appeals’ decision suggests
that the Commission retains some authority, but denies
the Commission any permissible scope to exercise it, and
leaves the Commission accountable for the coarsening of
the airwaves while simultaneously denying it effective
tools to address the problem.
At a minimum, the decision of the court of appeals is
likely to generate considerable confusion for the Com-
mission—which has pending before it hundreds of thou-
sands of complaints regarding the broadcast of exple-
tives, both isolated and repeated—and for broadcasters,
leaving them uncertain as to the standards that are to
govern the Commission’s enforcement of the statutory
prohibition on broadcast indecency. That confusion is
unlikely to be resolved by allowing further percolation
in the courts of appeals, because the possibility of fur-
ther development of a circuit conflict is limited, at least
as far as the major television networks are concerned.
All of the network respondents appear to have their cor-
porate headquarters in New York City, allowing them to
confine any future challenges to the Second Circuit. See
28 U.S.C. 2343 (providing for venue in the D.C. Circuit
and in the “circuit in which the petitioner resides or has
its principal office”). -Review by this Court is therefore
warranted.
31
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be
granted.
Respectfully submitted.
PAUL D. CLEMENT
MATTHEW B. BERRY Solicitor General
Acting General Counsel JEFFREY S. BUCHOLTZ
JOSEPH R. PALMORE Acting Assistant Attorney
Deputy General Counsel General
THOMAS G. HUNGAR
DANIEL M. ARMSTRONG we
JACOB M. LEwIs Deputy Solicitor General
Associate General Counsels ERIC D. MILLER a
NANDAN M. Jousui Assistant to the Solicitor
Counsel rar General
Federal Communications THOMAS M. BONDY
Commission Attorney
NOVEMBER 2007
APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
Docket Nos. 06-1760-ag (L), 06-2750-ag (CON),
06-5358-ag (CON)
Fox TELEVISION STATIONS, INC., CBS
BROADCASTING, INC., WLS TELEVISION, INC., KTRK
TELEVISION, INC., KMBC HEARST-ARGYLE
TELEVISION, INC., ABC, INC., PETITIONERS
Vv.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENTS
NBC UNIVERSAL, INC., NBC TELEMUNDO LICENSE
Co., NBC TELEVISION AFFILIATES, FBC TELEVISION
AFFILIATES ASSOCIATION, CBS TELEVISION
NETWORK AFFILIATES, CENTER FOR THE CREATIVE
COMMUNITY, ING., DOING BUSINESS AS CENTER FOR
CREATIVE VOICES IN MEDIA, INC., ABC TELEVISION
AFFILIATES ASSOCIATION, INTERVENORS
Decided: June 4, 2007
Before: LEVAL, POOLER, and HALL, Circuit Judges.
POOLER, Cicuirt Judge.
Fox Television Stations, Inc., along with its affiliates
FBC Television Affiliates Association (collectively
“Fox”), petition for review of the November 6, 2006, or-
(la)
2a
der of the Federal Communications Commission
(“FCC”) issuing notices of apparent liability against two
Fox broadcasts for violating the FCC’s indecency and
profanity prohibitions.* Fox, along with other broadcast
networks and numerous amici, raise administrative,
statutory, and constitutional challenges to the FCC’s
indecency regime. The FCC, also supported by several
amici, dispute each of these challenges. We find that the
FCC’s new policy regarding “fleeting expletives” repre-
sents a significant departure from positions previously
taken by the agency and relied on by the broadcast in-
dustry. We further find that the FCC has failed to artic-
ulate a reasoned basis for this change in policy. Accord-
ingly, we hold that the FCC’s new policy regarding
“fleeting expletives” is arbitrary and capricious under
the Administrative Procedure Act. The petition for re-
view is therefore granted, the order of the FCC is va-
cated, and the matter is remanded to the Commission
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Because we vacate the FCC’s order on this ground, we
do not reach the other challenges to the FCC’s inde-
cency regime raised by petitioners, intervenors, and
amici.
BACKGROUND
The FCC’s policing of “indecent” speech stems from
18 U.S.C. 1464, which provides that “[w]Jhoever utters
any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of
* The petitions for review filed by Fox and CBS in Docket No. 06-
1760 and ABC in Docket No. 06-2750 pertain to portions of a prior
order by the FCC that has since been vacated. Accordingly, those peti-
tions for review are denied as moot. The remainder of this opinion
addresses the petition for review filed by Fox in Decket No. 06-5358.
3a
radio communication shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than two years, or both.” The
FCC’s authority to regulate the broadcast medium is
expressly limited by Section 326 of the Communications
Act, which prohibits the FCC from engaging in censor-
ship. See 47 U.S.C. § 326. In 1960, Congress authorized
the FCC to impose forfeiture penalties for violations of
Section 1464. See 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(D). The FCC
first exercised its statutory authority to sanction inde-
cent (but non-obscene) speech in 1975, when it found
Pacifica Foundation’s radio broadcast of comedian
George Carlin’s “Filthy Words” monologue indecent and
subject to forfeiture. See Citizen’s Complaint Against
Pacifica Found. Station WBAI(FM), N.Y, N.Y., 56
F.C.C.2d 94 (1975). True to its title, the “Filthy Words”
monologue contained numerous expletives in the course
of a 12-minute monologue broadcast on the radio at 2:00
in the afternoon. In ruling on this complaint, the FCC
articulated the following description of “indecent” con-
tent:
(T]he concept of ‘indecent’ is intimately connected
with the exposure of children to language that de-
scribes, in terms patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards for the broad-
cast medium, sexual or excretory activities and or-
gans, at times of the day when there is a reasonable
risk that children may be in the audience. Obnox-
ious, gutter language describing these matters has
the effect of debasing and brutalizing human beings
by reducing them to their mere bodily functions, and
we believe that such words are indecent within the
meaning of the statute and have no place on radio
when children are in the audience.
4a
Id. at 11 (internal footnote omitted).
Pacifica appealed the FCC’s order to the Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. While that appeal was
pending, the FCC issued a “clarification” order in which
it specifically noted that its prior order was intended to
address only the particular facts of the Carlin mono-
logue as broadcast, and acknowledged the concern that
“in some cases, public events likely to produce offensive
speech are covered live, and there is no opportunity for
journalistic editing.” ‘Petition for Clarification or Re-
consideration of a Citizen’s Coreplaint against Pacifica
Foundation, Station WBAI(FM), N.Y., N.Y., 59
F.C.C.2d 892, at 1 4 n.1 (1976) (“Pacifica Clarification
Order”). The FCC stated that in such a situation, “we
believe that it would be inequitable for us to hold a li-
censee responsible for indecent language.” /d.
Although acknowledging the FCC’s additional clarifi-
cation, the D.C. Circuit nevertheless concluded that the
FCC’s indecency regime was invalid. See Pacifica
Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Labeling
the Commission’s actions censorship, the court found the
FCC’s order both vague and overbroad, noting that it
would prohibit “the uncensored broadcast of many of the
great works of literature including Shakespearian plays
and contemporary plays which have won critical acclaim,
the works of renowned classical and contemporary poets
and writers, and passages from the Bible.” Id. at 14.
The Commission appealed this decision to the Su-
preme Court, which reversed in a plurality opinion. In
its brief to the Supreme Court, the FCC stressed that
its ruling was a narrow one applying only to the specific
facts of the Carlin monologue. See Br. of FCC at 41-49,
FCC v. Pacifica Found., No. 77-528 (U.S. Mar. 3, 1978),
5a
available at 1978 WL 206838. The Court took the Com-
mission at its word and confined its review to the spe-
cific question of whether the Commission could find in-
decent the Carlin monologue as broadeast. See FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 732-35, 98 S. Ct. 3026, 57
L. Ed. 2d 1073 (1978). The Court first rejected Paci-
fica’s statutory argument that “indecent” in Section 1464
could not be read to cover speech that admittedly did
not qualify as obscenity. Jd. at 739, 98 S. Ct. 3026. Fin-
ding that obscene, indecent, and profane have distinct
meanings in the statute, the Court held that the FCC is
permitted to sanction speech without showing that it
satisfied the elements of obscenity. /d. at 739-41, 98 S.
Ct. 3026. The Court then rejected Pacifica’s constitu-
tional challenges. The Court stated that “of all forms of
communication, it is broadcasting that has received the
most limited First Amendment protection” because the
broadcast medium is a “uniquely pervasive presence in
the lives of all Americans” that extends into the privacy
of the home and is “uniquely accessible to children, even
those too young to read.” Jd. at 748-749, 98S. Ct. 3026.
The Court therefore found that the FCC could, consis-
tent with the First Amendment, regulate indecent mate-
rial like the Carlin monologue. The Court then once ag-
ain “emphasize|a] the narrowness of our holding . . .
We simply hold that when the Commission finds that a
pig has entered the parlor, the exercise of its regulatory
power does not depend on proof that the pig is obscene.”
Id. at 750-51, 98 S. Ct. 3026.
Justices Powell and Blackmun, who concurred in the
judgment and supplied two of the votes necessary for
6a
the 5-4 majority,* also emphasized in their concurring
opinion that the Court’s holding was a narrow one lim-
ited to the facts of the Carlin monologue as broadcast.
Id. at 755-56, 98 S. Ct. 3026 (Powell J., concurring).
Foreshadowing the question now before us, they explic-
itly noted that “{tJhe Commission’s holding, and cer-
tainly the Court’s holding today, does not speak to cases
involving the isolated use of a potentially offensive word
in the course of a radio broadcast, as distinguished from
the verbal shock treatment administered by respondent
here.” Jd. at 760-61, 98 S. Ct. 3026 (Powell J., coneur-
ring). Furthermore, citing the FCC’s brief to the Court,
Justice Powell stated that he did not foresee an undue
chilling effect on broadcasters by the FCC’s decision
because “the Commission may be expected to proceed
cautiously, as it has in the past.” /d. at 761 n.4, 98S. Ct.
3026 (Powell J., concurring).
The FCC took the Pacifica Court’s admonitions seri-
ously in its subsequent decisions.‘ Shortly after the
Pacifica ruling, the FCC stated the following in an opin-
ion rejecting a challenge to a broadcaster’s license re-
newal on the basis that the broadcaster had aired inde-
cent programming:
* The four dissenting justices would have held invalid any attempt by
the FCC to prohibit indecent (non-obscene) speech. See Pacifica, 438
JS. at 762-80, 98 S. Ct. 3026.
* At the time, the Commission interpreted Pacifica as involving a
situation “about as likely to occur again as Halley's Comet.” Br. of
Amici Curiae Former FCC Officials at 6 (quoting FCC Chairman
Charles D. Ferris, Speech to New England Broad. Assoc., Boston,
Mass. (July 21, 1978)).
Ta
With regard to ‘indecent’ or ‘profane’ utterances, the
First Amendment and the ‘no censorship’ provision
of Section 326 of the Communications Act severely
limit any role by the Commission and the courts in
enforcing the proscription contained in Section 1464.
The Supreme Court’s decision in FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation, 46 U.S.L.W. 5018 (1978), No. 77-528,
decided July 3, 1978, affords this Commission no
general prerogative to intervene in any case where
words similar or identical to those in Pacifica are
broadcast over a licensed radio or television station.
We intend strictly to observe the narrowness of the
Pacifica holding. In this regard, the Commission’s
opinion, as approved by the Court, relied in part
on the repetitive occurrence of the ‘indecent’ words
in question. The opinion of the Court specifically
stated that it was not ruling that ‘an occasional ex-
pletive . . . would justify any sanction . . .’ Fur-
ther, Justice Powell’s concurring opinion emphasized
the fact that the language there in issue had been ‘re-
peated over and over as a sort of verbal shock treat-
ment.’ He specifically distinguished ‘the verbal
shock treatment [in Pacifica]’ from ‘the isolated use
of a potentially offensive word in the course of a ra-
div broadcast.’
Application of WGBH Educ. Found., 69 F.C.C.2d 1250,
at 1 10 (1978) (emphasis added) (ellipses in original; in-
ternal footnotes and citations omitted). The FCC also
specifically held that the singie use of an expletive in a
program that aired at 5:30pm “should not call for us to
act under the holding of Pacifica.” 7d. at 110n.6. A few
years later, the Commission again rejected a challenge
to a license renewal that complained the broadcaster
8a
had aired indecent programming in violation of Section
1464. The FCC acknowledged the complaint that the
broadcaster on three separate occasions had aired pro-
gramming during the morning hours containing lan-
guage such as “motherfucker,” “fuck,” and “shit,” but
nevertheless concluded that “it is clear that the peti-
tioner has failed to make a prima facie case that [the
broadcaster] has violated 18 U.S.C. 1464” since the lan-
guage did not amount to “verbal shock treatment”
and the complainant had failed to show this was more
than “isolated use.” Application of Pacifica Found., 95
F.C.C.2d 750, at 19 16, 18 (1983).
It was not until 1987 that the FCC would find anoth-
er broadcast “indecent” under Section 1464. See Infin-
ity Broad. Corp., et al., 3 F.C.C.R. 930 (1987) (“Infinity
Order”). The Commission explained:
In cases decided subsequent to the Supreme Court’s
ruling {in Pacifica |, the Commission took a very lim-
ited approach to enforcing the prohibition against in-
decent broadcasts. Unstated, but widely assumed,
and implemented for the most part through staff rul-
ings, was the belief that only material that closely re-
sembled the George Carlin monologue would satisfy
the indecency test articulated by the FCC in 1975.
Thus, no action was taken unless material involved
the repeated use, for shock value, of words similar or
identical to those satirized in the Carlin “Filthy
Words” monologue ... Asaresult, the Commis-
sion, since the time of its ruling in 1975, has taken no
action against any broadcast licensee for violating
the prohibition against indecent broadcasts.
/d. at § 4 (internal footnotes omitted). The Infinity Or-
der affirmed on reconsideration three decisions issued
9a
simultaneously by the FCC in April 1987 that found cer-
tain programs indecent. See Pacifica Found., Inc., 2
F.C.C.R. 2698 (1987); The Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
2 F.C.C.R. 2703 (1987); Infinity Broad. Corp., 2
F.C.C.R. 2705 (1987). The FCC explained in the Infinity
Order that it would no longer take the narrow view that
a finding of indecency required the use of one of the
seven “dirty words” used in Carlin’s monologue. See
Infinity Order, at 1 5. The FCC instead would use the
generic definition of indecency it had articulated in con-
nection with its prior decision in Pacifica. Id. Under
the Commission’s definition, “indecent speech is lan-
guage that describes, in terms patently offensive as
measured by contemporary community standards for
the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and
organs. Such indecent speech is actionable when broad-
cast at times of the day when there is a reasonable risk
that children may be in the audience.” Regents of the
Univ. of Cal., 2 F.C.C.R. 2708, at 13 (internal footnote
omitted). The FCC also reaffirmed, however, the pre-
vailing view that a fleeting expletive would not be action-
able. See zd. (“Speech that is indecent must involve
more than an isolated use of an offensive word.”); Paci-
fica Found., Inc., 2 F.C.C.R. 2698, at 113 (“If a com-
plaint focuses solely on the use of expletives, we believe
that under the legal standards set forth in Pacifica, de-
liberate and repetitive use in a patently offensive man-
ner is a requisite to a finding of indecency.”). Notably,
in Pacifica Foundation, the Commission declined to
make a finding of indecency against a radio broadcast of
the program “Shocktime America,” which had contained
words and phrases such as “eat shit,” “mother-fucker”
and “fuck the U.S.A,” in part because, without a tran-
script or tape of the program, the FCC was unable to
10a
determine “whether the use of patently offensive speech
was isolated.” /d. at 19 3, 17.
Broadcasters appealed the Infinity Order to the D.C.
Circuit, challenging the FCC’s definition of indecency
as unconstitutionally vague. See Action for Child-
ren’s Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(“ACT I”), superseded in part by Action for Children’s
Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995) Gin banc).
The D.C. Circuit rejected this argument on the basis
that the definition at issue was “virtually the same defi-
nition the Commission articulated in the order reviewed
by the Supreme Court in the Pacifica case.” Jd. at 1338.
The court concluded that Pacifica implicitly rejected
any vagueness challenge to the FCC’s definition of “in-
decent,” which therefore foreclosed its ability to revisit
any such argument. /d. at 1339. The court then invited
correction from “Higher Authority” if its reading of
Pacifica was incorrect. Jd. Before leaving the First
Amendment issue, however, the court explicitly noted
that the “FCC has assured this court, at oral argument,
that it will continue to give weight to reasonable licensee
judgments when deciding whether to impose sanctions
in a particular case. Thus, the potential chilling effect of
the FCC’s generic definition of indecency will be tem-
pered by the Commission’s restrained enforcement pol-
icy.” /d. at 1340 n.14 (citing Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 761, 98
S. Ct. 3026 (Powell J., concurring)).
This restrained enforcement policy would continue.
In 2001, pursuant to a settlement agreement by which
the FCC agreed to ciarify its indecency standards, the
Commission issued a policy statement to “provide guid-
ance to the broadcast industry regarding our case law
interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 and our enforcement poli-
cies with respect to broadcast indecency.” /ndustry
lla
Guidance on the Commission’s Case Law Interpreting
18 U.S.C. § 1464, 16 F.C.C.R. 7999, at 11 & 130 n.23
(2001) (“Industry Guidance”). The FCC first noted that
“indecent speech is protected by the First Amendment,
and thus, the government must both identify a compel-
ling interest for any regulation it may impose on inde-
cent speech and choose the least restrictive means to
further that interest.” /d. at 1 3.
The FCC then explained that an indecency finding
involves the following two determinations: (1) whether
the material falls within the “subject matter scope of
[the] indecency definition—that is, the material must
describe or depict sexual or excretory organs or activi-
ties”; and (2) whether the broadcast is “patently offen-
sive aS measured by contemporary community stan-
dards for the broadcast medium.” /d. at 19 7-8. The
FCC considers the following three factors in determin-
ing whether the material is patently offensive: “(1) the
explicitness or graphic nature of the description or de-
piction of sexual or excretory organs or activities; (2)
whether the materials dwells on or repeats at length
descriptions of sexual or excretory organs or activities;
(3) whether the material appears to pander or is used to
titillate, or whether the material appears to have been
presented for its shock value.” Id. at 10. The policy
statement contained numerous examples of prior FCC
decisions evaluating whether certain material was inde-
cent in an attempt to provide guidance to broadcasters.
In discussing the second factor in the “patently offen-
sive” analysis, the FCC cited examples distinguishing
between material that “dwells” on the offensive content
(indecent) and material that was “fleeting and isolated”
(not indecent). /d. at 19 17-18.
12a
This restrained enforcement policy would soon
change. During NBC’s January 19, 2003, live broadcast
of the Golden Globe Awards, musician Bono stated in his
acceptance speech “this is really, really, fucking bril-
liant. Really, really, great.” Complaints Against Vari-
ous Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the
“Golden Globe Awards” Program, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, at
1 3 n.4 (2004) (“Golden Globes”). Individuals associated
with the Parents Television Council filed complaints that
the material was obscene and indecent under FCC regu-
lations. Jd. at 1 3. The FCC’s Enforcement Bureau,
however, denied the complaints on the basis that the
expletive as used in context did not describe sexual or
excretory organs or activities and that the utterance was
fleeting and isolated. See Complaints Against Various
broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the
“Golden Globe Awards” Program, 18 F.C.C.R. 19859, at
1 5-6 (Enforcement Bureau 2003) (“Golden Globes (Bu-
reau Decision)”). The Bureau accordingly found that the
speech “does not fall within the scope of the Commis-
sion’s indecency prohibition,” and reaffirmed FCC pol-
icy that “fleeting and isolated remarks of this nature do
not warrant Commission action.” /d. at 9 6.
Five months later, the full Commission reversed the
Bureau’s decision. First, the FCC held that any use of
any variant of “the F-Word” inherently has sexual con-
notation and therefore falls within the scope of the inde-
cency definition. Golden Globes, at "78. The FCC then
held that “the ‘F-Word?’ is one of the most vulgar, grap-
hic, and explicit descriptions of sexual activity in the
English language” and therefore the use of that word
was patently offensive under contemporary community
standards. Jd. at 19. The Commission found the fleet-
ing and isolated use of the word irrelevant and overruled
s
13a
all prior decisions in which fleeting use of an expletive
was held not indecent. /d. at {| 12 (“While prior Commis-
sion and staff action have indicated that isolated or fleet-
ing broadcasts of the ‘F-Word’ such as that here are not
indecent or would not be acted upon, consistent with our
decision today we conclude that any such interpretation
is no longer good law.”).
The FCC then held that the material in question was
also “profane” under Section 1464. Jd. at 113. The
Commission acknowledged that prior decisions inter-
preting “profane” had defined that term as blasphemy,
but found that nothing in its prior decisions limited the
definition of profane in such a manner. /d. at 114. The
Commission, however, declined to impose a forfeiture
because “existing precedent would have permitted this
broadcast” and therefore NBC and its affiliates “neces-
sarily did not have the requisite notice to justify a pen-
alty.” Jd. at 115. The Commission emphasized, though,
that licensees were now on notice that any broadcast of
the “F-Word” could subject them to monetary penalties
and suggested that implementing delay technology
would ensure future compliance with its policy. /d. at
417.
NBC, along with several other parties including Fox,
filed petitions for reconsideration of the Golden Globes
order, raising statutory and constitutional challenges to
the new policy. NBC, Fox, and Viacom Inc. also filed a
joint petition to stay the effect of the Golden Globes or-
der. These petitions have been pending for more than
two years without any action by the FCC. Nevertheless,
the FCC has applied the policy announced in Golden
Globes in subsequent cases.
14a
On February 21, 2006, the FCC issued an order re-
solving various complaints against several television
broadcasts. See Complaints Regarding Various Televi-
sion Broadcasts Between February 2, 2002 and March
8, 2005, 21 F.C.C.R. 2664 (2006) (“Omnibus Order”).
Through this order, the FCC intended to “provide sub-
stantial guidance to broadcasters and the public about
the types of programming that are impermissible under
our indecency standard.” Jd. at 1 2. In Section ITI.B of
the Omnibus Order, the Commission found four pro-
grams—Fox’s broadcast of the 2002 Billboard Music
Awards, Fox’s broadcast of the 2003 Billboard Music
Awards, various episodes of ABC’s NYPD Blue, and
CBS’s The Early Show— indecent and profane under the
policy announced in Golden Globes. The factual situa-
tions at issue are as follows:
¢ 2002 Billboard Music Awards: In her acceptance
speech, Cher stated: “People have been telling me
I’m on the way out every year, right? So fuck ‘em.”
* 2003 Billboard Music Awards: Nicole Richie, a pre-
senter on the show, stated: “Have you ever tried to
get cow shit out of a Prada purse? It’s not so fucking
simple.”
* NYPD Blue: In various episodes, Detective Andy
Sipowitz and other characters used certain exple-
tives including “bullshit,” “dick,” and “dickhead.”
¢ The Early Show: During a live interview of a con-
testant on CBS’s reality show Survivor: Vanuatu,
the interviewee referred to a fellow contestant as a
“bullshitter.”
15a
Id. at 11 101, 112 n.64, 125, 187. In finding these pro-
grams indecent and profane, the FCC reaffirmed its
decision in Golden Globes that any use of the word
“fuck” is presumptively indecent and profane. /d. at
17 102, 107. The Commission then concluded that any
use of the word “shit” was also presumptively indecent
and profane. /d. at 11 138, 143. Turning to the second
part of its indecency test, the FCC found that each of
the programs were “patently offensive” because the ma-
terial was explicit, shocking, and gratuitous. /d. at
1% 106, 120, 131, 141. Citing Golden Globes, the Com-
mission dismissed the fact that the expletives were fleet-
ing and isolated and held that repeated use is not neces-
sary for a finding of indecency. /d. at 11 104, 116, 129,
140. The FCC, however, declined to issue a forfeiture in
each case for the express reason that the broadcasts in
question occurred before the decision in Golden Globes,
and thus “existing precedent would have permitted this
broadcast.” /d. at 1% 111, 124, 136, 145.
Fox and CBS filed a petition for review of the Omni-
bus Order in this court. ABC filed a petition for review
in the D.C. Circuit, which was then transferred to this
court and consolidated with the petition for review filed
by Fox and CBS. Before any briefing took place, how-
ever, the FCC moved for a voluntary remand in order to
give the Commission the first opportunity to address
petitioners’ arguments and “ensure that all licensees are
afforded a full opportunity to be heard before the Com-
mission issues a final decision.” See FCC Mot. for Vol-
untary Remand at 2, No. 06-1760 (July 6, 2006). On
September 7, 2006, this court granted the FCC’s request
for remand and stayed enforcement of the Omnibus Or-
der. The Commission was given sixty days to issue a
l6a
final or appealable order, at which time the pending ap-
peal would be automatically reinstated.
The FCC promptly issued a public notice soliciting
comments on its decision in the Omnibus Order. Nu-
merous parties, including those who have participated in
the briefing in this appeal, submitted comments raising
various statutory and constitutional arguments against
the FCC’s indecency regime. The FCC then issued a
new order on November 6, 2006. See Complaints Re-
garding Various Television Broadcasts Between Febru-
ary 2, 2002 and March 8, 2005, FCC 06-166 (Nov. 6,
2006) (“Remand Order”). The Remand Order vacated
Section III.B of the Omnibus Order in its entirety and
replaced it with the Remand Order. /d. at 111. In the
Remand Order, the FCC reaffirmed its finding that the
2002 and 2003 Billboard Music Award programs were
indecent and profane, but reversed its finding against
The Early Show. It also dismissed on procedural
grounds the complaint against NYPD Blue.”
With regard to the 2003 Billboard Music Awards, the
Commission found that it would have been actionably
indecent even prior to the decision in Golden Globes be-
cause the potentially offensive material was “repeated,”
* The Commission dismissed the complaint against NYPD Blue be-
cause the only person who complained of the material resided in
the Eastern time zone, where NYPD Blue aired during the “safe
harbor” period after 10pm. Remand Order, at 175; see also 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.3999%b) (providing that broadcasting of indecent material is pro
hibited only between the hours of 6am and 10pm); Action for Chil-
dren's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“ACT IT”)
(“safe harbor” period is constitutionally required), sperseded in part
by Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(in banc). In light of the FCC’s revised decision regarding NYPD Blue,
ABC is no longer participating in this appeal.
17a
since Nic«”. Richie used “two extremely graphic and of-
fensive words © and was “deliberately uttered” because
of “Ms. Richie’s confident and fluid delivery of the
lines.” Jd. at 1 22. With regard to the 2002 Billboard
Music Awards, the Commission “acknowledge[d] that it
was not apparent that Fox could be penalized for Cher’s
comment at the time it was broadcast.” Jd. at 160. In
both cases, the FCC rejected Fox’s argument that fleet-
ing expletives were not actionable, now characterizing
its prior decisions on that issue as “staff letters and
dicta.” Jd. at 1 20. The Commission, however, declined
to impose a forfeiture for either broadcast. /d. at 19 53,
66.
Turning to The Early Show, the FCC reversed its
finding that the expletive used was indecent or profane
because it occurred in the context of a “bona fide news
interview.” Jd. at 1 68. The Commission stated that
in light of First Amendment concerns, “it is imperative
that we proceed with the utmost restraint when it
comes to news programming,” and found it “appropriate
. to defer to CBS’s plausible characterization of
its own programming” as a news interview. /d. at § 71-
72. Given this context, the FCC declined to find the
comment indecent or profane. /d. at 173.
In accordance with our : eptember 6th order, this
appeal was automatically reinstated on November 8,
2006. Fox then filed a petition for review of the Remand
Order and moved to consolidate that appeal with the one
already pending before this court. We granted the mo-
tion for consolidation as well as motions to intervene by
CBS Broadcasting Ine. (“CBS”) and NBC Universal Inc.
and NBC Telemundo License Co. (collectively, “NBC”).
We have also received several briefs from various amici.
18a
DISCUSSION
Fox, CBS, and NBC (collectively, “the Networks”),
supported by several amici, raise a variety of arguments
against the validity of the Remand Order, including:
(1) the Remand Order is arbitrary and capricious be-
cause the Commission’s regulation of “fleeting exple-
tives” represents a dramatic change in agency policy
without adequate explanation; (2) the FCC’s “commu-
nity standards” analysis is arbitrary and meaningless;
(3) the FCC’s indecency findings are invalid because the
Commission made no finding of scienter; (4) the FCC’s
definition of “profane” is contrary to law; (5) the FCC’s
indecency regime is unconstitutionally vague; (6) the
FCC’s indecency test permits the Commission to make
subjective determinations about the quality of speech in
violation of the First Amendment; and (7) the FCC’s
indecency regime is an impermissible content-based
regulation of speech that violates the First Amendment.
The FCC, also supported by several amici, dispute each
of these contentions. We agree with the first argument
advanced by the Networks, and therefore do not reach
any other potential problems with the FCC’s decision.
I. Scope of Review
Before turning to the merits of the Networks’ argu-
ments, we first nute that we reject the FCC’s contention
that our review here is narrowly confined to the specific
question of whether the two Fox broadcasts of the Bill-
board Music Awards were indecent and/or profane. The
Remand Order applies the policy announced in Golden
Globes. If that policy is invalid, then we cannot sustain
the indecency findings against Fox. Thus, as the Com-
mission conceded during oral argument, the validity of
the new “fleeting expletive” policy announced in Golden
19a
Globes and applied in the Remand Order is a question
properly before us on this petition for review. As the
D.C. Circuit explained in rejecting this precise argu-
ment in another proceeding, “the agency may not resort
to adjudication as a means of insulating a generic stan-
dard from judicial review.” ACT /, 852 F.2d at 1337.
Ii. Administrative Procedure Act
Courts will set aside agency decisions found to be
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or other-
wise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
As the Supreme Court has explained: “The scope of re-
view under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is
narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for
that of the agency. Nevertheless, the agency must exa-
mine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory ex-
planation for its action including a ‘rational connection
between the facts found and the choice made.’” Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S. Ct. 2856, 77 L. Ed.
2d 443 (1983). Ayency action is arbitrary and capricious
“if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has
not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an
important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation
for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before
the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be as-
cribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise.” /d. Reviewing courts “may not supply a
reasoned basis for the agency’s action that the agency
itself has not given.” /d. (quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
332 U.S. 194, 196, 67 S. Ct. 1575, 91 L. Ed. 1995 (1947)).
The Networks contend that the Remand Order is arbi-
trary and capricious because the FCC has made a 180-
degree turn regarding its treatment of “fleeting exple-
20a
tives” without providing a reasoned explanation justify-
ing the about-face. We agree.
First, there is no question that the FCC has changed
its policy. As outlined in detail above, prior to the
Golden Globes decision the FCC had consistently taken
the view that isolated, non-literal, fleeting expletives did
not run afoul of its indecency regime. See, e.g., Pacifica
Clarification Order, 59 F.C.C.2d 892, at 1 4 n.1 (advising
broadcasters that “it would be inequitable for us to hold
a licensee responsible for indecent language” that oc-
curred during a live broadcast without an opportunity
for journalistic editing); Application of WGBH Educ.
Found., 69 F.C.C.2d 1250, at 1 10 & n.6 (distinguishing
between the “verbal shock treatment” of the George
Carlin monologue and “the isolated use of a potentially
offensive word” and finding that the single use of an
expletive in a program “should not call for us to act un-
der the holding of Pacifica”); Pacifica Foundation, Inc.,
2 F.C.C.R. 2698, at 1 13 (“If a complaint focuses solely
on the use of expletives, we believe that under the legal
standards set forth in Pacifica, deliberate and repetitive
use in a patently offensive manner is a requisite to a
finding of indecency.” (emphasis added)); Industry
Guidance, 16 F.C.C.R. 7999, at 1% 17-18 (distinguishing
between material that is repeated or dwelled on and
material that is “fleeting and isolated’) (citing L.M.
Communications of S.C., Inc., 7 F.C.C.R. 1595 (Mass
Media Bureau 1992) (finding the single utterance of
“mother-fucker” not indecent because it was a “fleeting
and isolated utterance which, within the context of live
and spontaneous programming, does not warrant a Com-
mission sanction”); Lincoln Dellar, For Renewal of the
Licenses of Stations KPRL(AM) and KDDB(FM),
8 F.C.C.R. 2582 (Audio Serv. Div. 1993) (news an-
2la
nouncer’s remark that he “fucked that one up” not inde-
cent because the “use of a single expletive” did not war-
rant further review “in light of the isolated and acciden-
tal nature of the broadcast”)). This consistent enforce-
ment policy changed with the issuance of Golden Globes:
While prior Commission and staff action have indi-
cated that isolated or fleeting broadcasts of the “F-
Word” such as that here are not indecent or would
not be acted upon, consistent with our decision today
we conclude that any such interpretation is no longer
good law. . . . The staff has since found that the
isolated or fleeting use of the “F-Word” is not inde-
cent in situations arguably similar to that here. We
now depart from this portion of the Commission’s
1987 Pacifica decision as well as all of the cases cited
in notes 31 and 32 and any similar cases holding that
isolated or fleeting use of the “F-Word” or a variant
thereof in situations such as this is not indecent and
conclude that such cases are not good law to that ex-
tent.
Golden Globes, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, at 1 12 (internal foot-
note omitted); see also id. at 11 14 (providing new defini-
tion of “profane” speech). The Commission declined to
issue a forfeiture in Golden Globes precisely because its
decision represented a departure from its prior rulings.
See id. at 1 15 (“Given, however, that Commission and
staff precedent prior to our decision today permitted the
broadcast at issue, and that we take a new approach to
profanity, NBC and its affiliates necessarily did not
have the requisite notice to justify a penalty.” (emphasis
added)). The Omnibus Order similarly declined to issue
a forfeiture because “existing precedent would have per-
22a
mitted this broadeast.” Omnibus Order, 21 F.C.C.R.
2664, at 19 111, 124, 136, 145.
Although the Remand Order backpedals somewhat
on this clear recognition that the Commission was de-
parting from prior precedent,” in its brief to this court,
the FCC now concedes that Golden Globes changed the
landscape with regard to the treatment of fleeting exple-
tives. See Br. of Respondent FCC at 33 (“In the Golden
Globe Order, the Commission made clear that it was
changing course with respect to the treatment of iso-
lated expletives.”); see also Br. of Amici Curiae Former
FCC Officials at 9 (noting that the “extraordinary and
unprecedented” decision in Golden Globes represented
a radical change in policy that “greatly expanded the
scope of what constituted indecency”).
Agencies are of course free to revise their rules and
policies. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 81 L.
Ed. 2d 694 (1984) (“An initial agency interpretation is
not instantly carved in stone.”). Such a change, how-
ever, must provide a reasoned analysis for departing
from prior precedent. As this court has explained:
* In the Remand Order, the FCC “reject{[s] Fox’s suggestion that
Nicole Richie’s comments would not have been actionably indecent
prior to our Golden Globe decision,” and would only concede that it was
“not apparent” that Cher’s comment at the 2002 Billboard Music
Awards would have been actionably indecent at the time it was broad-
cast. Remand Order, at 1% 22, 60. Decisions expressly overruled in
Golden Globes were now dismissed as “staff letters and dicta,” and the
Commission even implied that the issue of fleeting expletives was one
of first impression for the FCC in Golden Globes. Id. at § 21 (“{I}n
2004, the Commission itself considered for the first time in an enforce-
ment action whether a single use of an expletive could be indecent.”).
23a
[W]hen an agency reverses its course, a court must
satisfy itself that the agency knows it is changing
course, has given sound reasons for the change, and
has shown that the rule is consistent with the law
that gives the agency its authority to act. In addi-
tion, the agency must consider reasonably obvious
alternatives and, if it rejects those alternatives, it
must give reasons for the rejection, sufficient to al-
low for meaningful judicial review. Although there
is not a “heightened standard of scrutiny . . . the
agency must explain why the original reasons for
adopting the rule or policy are no longer disposi-
tive.” Even in the absence of cumulative experience,
changed circumstances or judicial criticism, an
agency is free to change course after reweighing the
competing statutory policies. But such a flip-flop
must be accompanied by a reasoned explanation of
why the new rule effectuates the statute as well as or
better than the old rule.
N.Y. Council, Ass'n of Civilian Technicians v. Fed. La-
bor Relations Auth., 757 F.2d 502, 508 (2d Cir. 1985)
(second emphasis added; internal citations omitted); see
also State Farm, 463 U.S. at 41-42, 103 S. Ct. 2856 (“A
settled course of behavior embodies the agency’s in-
formed judgment that, by pursuing that course, it will
carry out the policies committed to it by Congress.
There is, then, at least a presumption that those policies
will be carried out best if the settled rule is adhered to.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Huntington Hosp.
v. Thompson, 319 F.3d 74, 79 (2d Cir. 2003) (“While an
agency is not locked into the first interpretation of a
statute it embraces, it cannot simply adopt inconsistent
positions without presenting ‘some reasoned analysis.’””’);
Mr. Sprout, Inc. v. United States, 8 F.3d 118, 129 (2d
24a
Cir. 1993) (“When the Commission departs from its own
settled precedent, as here, it must present a ‘reasoned
analysis’ that justifies its change of interpretation so as
to permit judicial review of its new policies.”). An
agency’s “failure to come to grips with conflicting prece-
dent constitutes an inexcusable departure from the es-
sential requirement of reasoned decision making.”
Ramaprakash v. FAA., 346 F.3d 1121, 1125 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly,
agency action will be set aside as arbitrary and capri-
cious if the agency fails to provide a reasoned explana-
tion for its decision. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA,
—U.S.—, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1463, 167 L. Ed. 2d 248 (2007)
(“EPA has offered no reasoned explanation for its re-
fusal to decide whether greenhouse gases cause or con-
tribute to climate change. Its action was therefore arbi-
trary, capricious, . . . or otherwise not in accordance
with law.”) (ellipses in original; internal quotation marks
omitted); State Farm, 463 U.S. at 34, 103 S. Ct. 2856
(agency’s rescinding of rule requiring passive restraints
in automobiles was arbitrary and capricious for failure
to provide a reasoned explanation justifying revocation);
see also Yale-New Haven Hosp. v. Leavitt, 470 F.3d 71,
72 (2d Cir. 2006) (agency action based on new rule gov-
erning Medicare reimbursement was arbitrary and ca-
pricious “because the Secretary did not satisfactorily
explain his reasons” for changing historical practice);
ANR Pipeline Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n,
71 F.3d 897, 901 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“[W here an agency
departs from established precedent without a reasoned
explanation, its decision will be vacated as arbitrary and
capricious.”).
25a
Our evaluation of the agency’s reasons for its change
in policy is confined to the reasons articulated by the
agency itself. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 50, 103 S. Ct.
2856 (“[C ]ourts may not accept appellate counsel’s post
hoc rationalizations for agency action. It is well-estab-
lished that an agency’s action must be upheld, if at all,
on the basis articulated by the agency itself.” (internal
citation omitted)); Yale-New Haven Hosp., 470 F.3d at
81 (“Generally speaking, after-the-fact rationalization
for agency action is disfavored.”). The primary reason
for the crackdown on fleeting expletives advanced by the
FCC is the so-called “first blow” theory described in the
Supreme Court’s Pacifica decision. In Pacifica, the
Supreme Court justified the FCC’s regulation of the
broadcast media in part on the basis that indecent mate-
rial on the airwaves enters into the privacy of the home
uninvited and without warning. 438 U.S. at 748, 98 S.
Ct. 3026. The Court rejected the argument that the au-
dience could simply tune-out: “To say that one may
avoid further offense by turning off the radio when he
hears indecent language is like saying that the remedy
for an assault is to run away after the first blow.” /d..at
748-49, 98 S. Ct. 3026. Relying on this statement in
Pacifica, the Commission attempts to justify its stance
on fleeting expletives on the basis that “granting an au-
tomatie exemption for ‘isolated or fleeting’ expletives
unfairly forces viewers (including children) to take ‘the
first blow.’” Remand Order, at "25.
We cannot accept this argument as a reasoned basis
justifying the Coimnmission’s new rule. First, the Com-
mission provides no reasonable explanation for why it
has changed its perception that a fleeting expletive was
not a harmful “first blow” for the nearly thirty years
between Pacifica and Golden Globes. More problematic,
26a
however, is that the “first blow” theory bears no rational
connection to the Commission's actual policy regarding
fleeting expletives. As the FCC itself stressed during
oral argument in this case, the Commission does not
take the position that any occurrence of an expletive is
indecent or profane under its rules.’ For example, al-
though “there is no outright news exemption from our
indecency rules,” Remand Order, at 1 71, the Commis-
sion will apparently excuse an expletive when it occurs
during a “bona fide news interview,” id. at {1 72-73 (de-
ferring to CBS’s “plausible characterization” of a seg-
ment of The Early Show interviewing a contestant on its
reality show Survivor: Vanuatu as news programming
and finding expletive uttered during that part of the
show not indecent or profane). Certainly viewers (in-
cluding children) watching the live broadcast of The~
Early Show were “force[d] . . . to take the ‘first blow”
of the expletive uttered by the Survivor: Vanuatu con-
testant. Yet the Commission emphasized during oral
argument that its news exception is a broad one and “the
Commission has never found a broadcast to be indecent
on the basis of an isolated expletive in the face of some
claim that the use of that language was necessary for
any journalistic or artistic purpose.” The Commission
further explained to this court that a broadcast of oral
argument in this case, in which the same language used
in the Fox broadcasts was repeated multiple times in the
” Such a per se ban would likely raise constitutional questions above
and beyond the concerns raised by the current policy. See Pacifica, 438
U.S. at 746, 98 S. Ct. 3026 (plu ality opinion) (“Although these words
ordinarily lack literary, political, or scientific value, they are not entirely
outside the protection of the First Amendment. Some uses of even the
most offensive words are unquestionably protected.”).
27a
courtroom, would “plainly not” be indecent or profane
under its standards because of the context in which it
occurred. The Commission even conceded that a re-
broadcast of precisely the same offending clips from the
two Billboard Music Award programs for the purpose of
providing background information on this case would
not result in any action by the FCC, even though in
those circumstances viewers would be subjected to the
same “first blow” that resulted from the original airing
of this material. Furthermore, the Commission has also
held that even repeated and deliberate use of numerous
expletives is not indecent or profane under the FCC’s
policy if the expletives are “integral” to the work. See
Complaints Against Various Television Licensees Re-
garding Their Broadcast on November 11, 2004, of the
ABC Televison Network's Presentation of the Film
“Saving Private Ryan”, 20 F.C.C.R. 4507, at 1 14 (2005)
(“Saving Private Ryan”) (finding numerous expletives
uttered during film Saving Private Ryan not indecent or
profane because deleting the expletives “would have
altered the nature of the artistic work and diminished
the power, realism and immediacy of the film experience
for viewers”). In all of these scenarios, viewers, includ-
ing children who may have no understanding of whether
expletives are “integral” to a program or whether the
interview of a contestant on a reality show is a “bonu
fide news interview,” will have to accept the alleged
“first blow” caused by use of these expletives. Thus, the
record simply does not support the position that the
Commission’s new policy was based on its concern with
the public’s mere exposure to this language on the air-
28a
waves. The “first blow” theory, therefore, fails to pro-
vide the reasoned explanation necessary to justify the
FCC’s departure from established precedent.”
* Thus, our rejection of the agency’s proffered rationale as the
required “reasoned explanation” is not that the “Commission’s change _
of standard is irrational because it is inconsistent” as the dissent sug-
gests, dissent op. at 471, but that the Commission’s proffered rationale
is disconnected from the actual policy implemented by the Commission.
See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43, 103 S. Ct. 2856 (Agency action is arbi-
trary and capricious if the agency fails to “articulate a satisfactory
explanation for its action including a ‘rational connection between the
facts found and the choice made.’”) (emphasis added).
* The dissent takes the position that the “reasoned analysis” underly-
ing the FCC’s change in policy is its statement in Golden Globes that
“given the core meaning of the ‘F-Word,’ any use of that word or a
variation, in any context, inherently has a sexual connotation. . . . The
‘F-Word’ is one of the most vulgar, graphic and explicit descriptions of
sexual activity in the English language. Its use invariably invokes a
coarse sexual image.” Dissent Op. at 468-69 (quoting Golden Globes, at
118-9). Much like the “first-blow” theory, however, this cannot provide
the requisite “reasoned analysis” because it is not consistent with the
Commission's actual policy. The FCC’s change in policy cannot be
based on a categorical view that “any use of that word or a variation, in
any context, inherently has a sexual connotation,” Golden Globes, at 18
(emphasis added), because, as discussed above, the Commission permits
even numerous and deliberate uses of that word in certain contexts.
Notably, the FCC did not rely on this statement from Golden Globes in
29a
The Remand Order makes passing reference to other
reasons that purportedly support its change in policy,
none of which we find sufficient. For instance, the Com-
mission states that even non-literal uses of expletives
fall within its indecency definition because it is “difficult
(if not impossible) to distinguish whether a word is being
used as an expletive or as a literal description of sexual
or excretory functions.” Remand Order, at 1123. This
defies any commonsense understanding of these words,
which, as the general public well knows, are often used
in everyday conversation without any “sexual or excre-
tory” meaning. Bono’s exclamation that his victory at
the Golden Globe Awards was “really, really fucking
brilliant” is a prime example of a non-literal use of the
“F-Word” that has no sexual connotation. See Golden
Globes (Bureau Decision), 18 F.C.C.R. 19859, at 71 5
(“As a threshold matter, the material aired during the
‘Golden Globe Awards’ program does not describe or
depict sexual] and excretory activities and organs. . . .
Rather, the performer used the word ‘fucking’ as an ad-
jective or expletive to emphasize an exclamation.”), rev'd
by Golden Globes, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975 (2004). Similarly, as
NBC illustrates in its brief, in recent times even the top
leaders of our government have used variants of these
expletives in a manner that no reasonable person would
believe referenced “sexual or excretory organs or activi-
ties.” See Br. of Intervenor NBC at 31-32 & n.3 (citing
President Bush’s remark to British Prime Minister Tony
Blair that the United Nations needed to “get Syria to
eet Hezbollah to stop doing this shit” and Vice President
Cheney’s widely-reported “Fuck yourself” comment to
arguing that it provided a reasoned explanation for its decision. See Br.
of Respondent FCC, at 36-37.
30a
Senator Patrick Leahy on the floor of the U.S. Senate).”°
Similarly, the Commission’s warning that a per se ex-
emption for fleeting expletives would “permit broadcast-
ers to air expletives at all hours of the day so long as
they did so one at a time,” Remand Order, at 1 25, is
equally divorced from reality because the Commission
itself recognizes that broadcasters have never barraged
the airwaves with expletives even prior to Golden
Globes, see Remand Order, at 1 29."' Finally, the Com
Contrary to the dissent’s view, our rejection of this proffered
rationale is not merely a “difference of opinion” with the agency. Dis-
sent op. at 473-74. We reject this reason not because we disagree with
it, but because it is both unsupported by any record evidence as well as
contradicted by evidence submitted by the Networks. Thus, we need
not consider whether the F'CC’s statement that “any use of [the F-
Word] or a variation, in any context, inherently has a sexual connota-
tion,” in actuality means, “even when the speaker does not intend a
sexual meaning, a substantial part of the community, and of the tele-
vision audience, will understand the word as freighted with an offensive
sexual connotation,” as the dissent suggests. /d. Even if we accept. the
dissent’s reading, the FCC still has failed to set forth the required
reasoned explanation because its proffered rationale remains unsup-
ported by any record evidence and contradicted by the evidence
submitted by the Networks. See Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S.
610, 626, 106 S. Ct. 2101, 90 L. Ed. 2d 584 (1986) (“Agency deference
has not come so far that we will uphold regulations whenever it is pos-
sible to ‘conceive a basis’ for administrative action.”) (plurality op).
'' We agree with the dissent that this proffered rationale “is at most
a small part. of the agency’s justification for its action,” dissent op. at
473, but because it is one of the reasons advanced by the agency, we
address it here. We disagree with the dissent, however, that our
rejection of this proffered rationale is a mere difference of opinion with
the agency in predicting the future. The FCC's obligation to provide a
“reasoned analysis” for its change in policy is not satisfied when the
proffered rationale that without its new policy the airwaves will be
overtaken by fleeting expletives—is both unsupported by any evidence
and directly contradicted by pnor experience. We further note while
3la
mission’s claim that “eategoricall quiring repeated
use . . . is inconsistent with ou: general approach to
indecency enforcement, which stresses the critical na-
ture of context,” Remand Order, at 4 23, also does not
provide sufficient justification for its departure from
prior precedent. First, the Commission’s own policy of
treating all variants of certain expletives as presump-
tively indecent and profane, whether used in a literal or
non-literal sense, also fails to comport with this “general
approach” that “stresses the critical nature of context.”
See, e.g., Golden Globes, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, at 1 8 (declar-
ing that “any use of [the F-Word] or a variation, in any
context, inherently has a sexual connotation, and there-
fore falls within the first prong of our indecency defini-
. tion”) (emphasis added). In addition, the Commission’s
indecency test itself remains unchanged, but the Com-
mission fails to provide a reasoned explanation for why
a single, isolated expletive now should fit within the ar-
ticulation of that test set forth in Golden Globes, see
Pacifica Found., Inc., 2 F.C.C.R. 2698, at 113 (“If a
complaint focuses solely on the use of expletives, we be-
lieve that under the legal standards set forth in Pacifica,
deliberate and repetitive use in a patently offensive
manner is a requisite to a finding of indecency.”).
the dissent attempts to provide support for the agency's prediction, in-
cluding broadcasters’ need to compete with cable “which increasingly
make liberal use of their freedom to fill programming with such exple-
tives,” dissent op. at 472, no evidence supporting this proposition is
contained in the record that was considered by the FCC when ren-
dering its decision. Sce, e.g., State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43, 103 8. Ct. 2856
(“The reviewing court should not attempt itself to make up for [the
agency's} deficiencies: ‘We may not supply a reasoned basis for the
agency’s action that the agency itself has not given.’”’) (quoting SEC v.
Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196, 67 S. Ct. 1575, 91 L. Ed. 1995 (1947)).
32a
For decades broadcasters relied on the FCC’s re-
strained approach to indecency regulation and its consis-
tent rejection of arguments that isolated expletives were
indecent. The agency asserts the same interest in pro-
tecting children as it asserted thirty years ago, but until
the Golden Globes decision, it had never banned fleeting
expletives. While the FCC is free to change its previ-
ously settled view on this issue, it must provide a rea-
soned basis for that change. Cf. State Farm, 463 U.S. at
42,103 S. Ct. 2856 (“[A]n agency changing its course by
rescinding a rule is obligated to supply a reasoned anal-
ysis for the change beyond that which may be required
when an agency does not act in the first instance.”) (em-
phasis added). The FCC’s decision, however, is devoid
of any evidence that suggests a fleeting expletive is
harmful, let alone establishes that this harm is serious
enough to warrant government regulation. Such evi-
dence would seem to be particularly relevant today
when children likely hear this language far more often
from other sources than they did in the 1970s when the
Commission first began sanctioning indecent speech.
Yet the Remand Order provides no reasoned analysis of
the purported “problem” it is seeking to address with its
new indecency policy from which this court can conclude
that such regulation of speech is reasonable. See, e.g.,
United States v. Playboy Enter. Group, Inc., 529 U.S.
803, 822-23, 120 S. Ct. 1878, 146 L. Ed. 2d 865 (2000)
(rejecting indecency regulation of cable television in
part because “|t]he question is whether an actual prob-
lem has been proved in this case. We agree that the
Government has failed to establish a pervasive, nation-
wide problem justifying its nationwide daytime speech
ban.”); Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664,
1148. Ct. 2445, 129 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1994) (remanding for
33a
additional fact finding to determine whether speech reg-
ulation justified because government had failed to dem-
onstrate “that the recited harms are real, not merely
conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate
these harms in a direct and material way”); Quincy Ca-
bie TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(invalidating FCC regulation because “the Commission
has failed entirely to determine whether the evil the
rules seek ic correct ‘is a real or merely a fanciful
threat’”); F orze Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 36
(D.C. Cir 19°7) (“{A] regulation perfectly reasonable
and appropriate in the face of a given problem may be
highly capricious if that problem does not exist.” (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)). The Commission has
similarly failed to explain how its current policy would
remedy the purported “problem” or to point to support-
ing evidence.
The Commission’s new approach to profanity is sup-
ported by even less analysis, reasoned or not. The Com-
mission sets forth no independent reasons that would
justify its newly-expanded definition of “profane”
speech, aside from merely stating that its prior prece-
dent does not prevent it from setting forth a new defini-
tion, see Golden Globes, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, at 114. To
the extent the Commission believes its arguments for
expanding its indecency enforcement support its new
policy regarding profanity, those arguments are re-
jected for the reasons stated above. Furthermore, the
Commission fails to provide any explanation for why this
separate ban on profanity is even necessary. Prior to
2004, the Commission never attempted to regulate “pro-
fane” speech. In fact, the Commission took the view that
a separate ban on profane speech was unconstitutional.
See 122 Cong. Rec. 33359, 33359, 33364-65 (1976) (ree-
34a
ommending Congress delete “profane” from Section
1464 “[b]jecause of the serious constitutional problems
involved”); FCC, The Public and Broadcasting, 1999
WL 391297 (June 1999) (“Profanity that does not fall
under one of the above two categories [indecent or ob-
scene] is fully protected by the First Amendment and
cannot be regulated.”). The Commission again has not
provided this court with a reasoned analysis of why it
has undertaken this separate regulation of speech. Fi-
nally, the Commission provides no explanation of what
harm this separate enforcement against profane speech
addresses that is not already addressed by the FCC’s
indecency and obscenity enforcement. Particularly con-
sidering that the scope of the FCC’s new profanity defi-
nition appears to be largely (if not completely) redun-
dant with its indecency prohibition, see infra Part IV, -
this would seem to be an important question for the
Commission to consider. The Remand Order, however,
provides no indication that the Commission has engaged
in any such analysis.
Accordingly, we find that the FCC’s new policy re-
garding “fleeting expletives” fails to provide a reasoned
analysis justifying its departure from the agency’s es-
tablished practice. For this reason, Fox’s petition for
review is granted, the Remand Order is vacated, and the
matter is remanded to the FCC for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. Because we have found
that the FCC’s new indecency regime, announced in
Golden Globes and applied in the Remand Order, is in-
valid under the Administrative Procedure Act, the stay
35a
of enforcement previously granted by this court in our
September 6th order is vacated as moot.”
III. Constitutional Challenges
“A fundamental and longstanding principle of judicial
restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitu-
tional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding
them.” Lyng v. N.W. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n,
485 U.S. 439, 445, 108 S. Ct. 1319, 99 L. Ed. 2d 534
(1988). Thus, we refrain from deciding the various con-
stitutional challenges to the Remand Order raised by
the Networks. We note, however, that in reviewing
these numerous constitutional challenges, which were
fully briefed to this court and discussed at length during
oral argument, we are skeptical that the Commission
can provide a reasoned explanation for its “fleeting ex-
pletive” regime that would pass constitutional muster.
Because we doubt that the Networks will refrain from
further litigation on these precise issues if, on remand,
the Commission merely provides further explanation
with no other changes to its policy, in the interest of ju-
dicial economy we make the following observations.
As an initial matter, we note that al/ speech covered
by the FCC’s indecency policy is fully protected by the
" We recognize that what follows is dicta, but we note that “dicta
often serve extremely valuable purposes. They can he!n clarify a com-
plicated subject. They can assist future courts to reach sensible, well-
reasoned results. They can help lawyers and society to predict the
future course of the court’s rulings. They can guide future courts to
adopt fair and efficient procedures. What is problematic is not the
utterance of dicta, but the failure to distinguish between holding and
dictum.”’ The Honorable Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitu-
tion’ Licta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1249, 1253 (2006).
36a
First Amendment. See Sable Comme’ns v. FCC, 492
U.S. 115, 126, 109 S. Ct. 2829, 106 L. Ed. 2d 93 (1989)
(noting that speech “which is indecent but not obscene
is protected by the First Amendment”); /ndustry Guid-
ance, 16 F.C.C.R. 7999, at 13 (“[I}Jndecent speech is pro-
tected by the First Amendment, and thus, the govern-
ment must both identify a compelling interest for any
regulation it may impose on indecent speech and choose
the least restrictive means to further that interest.”).
With that backdrop in mind, we question whether the
FCC’s indecency test can survive First Amendment
scrutiny. For instance, we are sympathetic to the Net-
works’ contention that the FCC’s indecency test is unde-
fined, indiscernible, inconsistent, and consequently, un-
constitutionally vague. Although the Commission has
declared that all variants of “fuck” and “shit” are pre-
sumptively indecent and profane, repeated use of those
words in “Saving Private Ryan,” for example, was nei-
ther indecent nor profane. And while multiple occur-
rences of expletives in “Saving Private Ryan” was not
gratuitous, Saving Private Ryan, 20 F.C.C.R. 4507, at
1 14, a single occurrénce of “fucking” in the Golden
Globe Awards was “shocking and gratuitous,” Golden
Globes, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, at 19. Parental ratings and
advisories were important in finding “Saving Private
Ryan” not patently offensive under contemporary com-
munity standards, Saving Private Ryan, 20 F.C.C.R.
4507, at 115, but irrelevant in evaluating a rape scene in
another fictional movie, see Omnibus Order, 21 F.C.C.R.
2664, at 1 38 (issuing maximum forfeiture penalty
against NBC Telemundo for movie “Con el Coraz6n en
la Mano”). The use of numerous expletives was “inte-
gral” to a fictional movie about war, Saving Private
Ryan, 20 F.C.C.R. 4507, at 1 14, but occasional exple-
37a
tives spoken by real musicians were indecent and pro-
fane because the educational pus pose of the documen-
tary “could have been fulfilled and all viewpoints ex-
pressed without the repeated broadcast of expletives,”
Omnibus Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 2664, at 7 82 (finding Mar-
tin Scorsese’s PBS documentary “The Blues: Godfa-
thers and Sons” indecent). The “S-Word” on The Early
Show was not indecent because it was in the context of
a “bona fide news interview,” but “there is no outright
news exemption from our indecency rules,” Remand
Order, at 19 68, 71-73. We can understand why the Net-
works argue that the FCC’s “patently offensive as mea-
sured by contemporary community standards” inde-
cency test coupled with its “artistic necessity” exception
fails to provide the clarity required by the Constitution,
creates an undue chilling effect on free speech, and re-
quires broadcasters to “steer far wider of the unlawful
zone,” Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526, 78 S. Ct.
1332, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1460 (1958).
The Networks’ position is further buttressea oy the
Supreme Court’s decision in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S.
844, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 138 L. Ed. 2d 874 (1997), which
struck down as unconstitutionally vague a similarly-
worded indecency regulation of the Internet." The
Court found that the statute’s use of the “general, unde-
fined terms ‘indecent’ and ‘patently offensive’ cover
large amounts of nonpornographic material with serious
educational or other value. Moreover, the ‘community
' Section 223(d) of the of the Communications Decency Act pro-
hibited material that “in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual
or excretory activities or organs.” Reno, 521 U.S. at 860, 1175S. Ct. 2329.
38a
standards’ criterion as applied to the Internet means
that any communication available to a nation wide audi-
ence will be judged by the standards of the community
most likely to be offended by the message.” /d. at 877-
78, 117 S. Ct. 2329. Because of the “vague contours” of
the regulation, the Court held that “it unquestionably
silences some speakers whose messages would be enti-
tled to constitutional protection,” and thus violated the
First Amendment. /d. at 874, 1178S. Ct. 2329. Because
Reno holds that a regulation that covers speech that “in
context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive
as measured by contemporary community standards,
sexual or excretory activities or organs” is unconstitu-
tionally vague, we are skeptical that the FCC’s iden-
tically-worded indecency test could nevertheless provide
the requisite clarity to withstand constitutional scrutiny.
Indeed, we are hard pressed to imagine a regime that is
more vague than one that relies entirely on consider-
ation of the otherwise unspecified “context” of a broad-
cast indecency.
We also note that the FCC’s indecency test raises the
separate constitutional question of whether it permits
the FCC to sanction speech based on its subjective view
of the merit of that speech. It appears that under the
FCC’s current indecency regime, any and all uses of an
expletive is presumptively indecent and profane with the
broadcaster then having to demonstrate to the satisfac-
tion of the Commission, under an unidentified burden of
proof, that the expletives were “integral” to the work.
In the licensing context, the Supreme Court has cau-
tioned against speech regulations tivat give too much
discretion to government officials. See, e.g., Forsyth
County, Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130,
112 S. Ct. 2395, 120 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1992) (“A government
39a
regulation that allows arbitrary application is inherently
inconsistent with a valid time, place, and manner regula-
tion because such discretion has the potential for becom-
ing a means of suppressing a particular point of view.”);
City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S.
750, 758, 108 S. Ct. 2138, 100 L. Ed. 2d 771 (1988) (find-
ing a permit scheme facially unconstitutional because
“post hoc rationalizations by the licensing official and
the use of shifting or illegitimate criteria are far too
easy, making it difficult for courts to determine in any
particular case whether the licensor is permitting favor-
able, and suppressing unfavorable, expression”). In suc-
ceeding on this challenge, the Networks need not prove
that the FCC “has exercised [its] discretion in a content-
based manner, but whether there is anything in [its pol-
icy] preventing [it] from doing so.” Forsythe, 505 U.S.
at 133 n.10, 112 S. Ct. 2395 (“It is not merely the spo-
radic abuse of power by the censor but the pervasive
threat inherent in its very existence that constitutes the
danger to freedom of discussion.”).
Finally, we recognize there is some tension in the law
regarding the appropriate level of First Amendment
scrutiny. In general, restrictions on First Amendment
liberties prompt courts to apply strict scrutiny. F'CC v.
League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376, 104 S. Ct.
3106, 82 L. Ed. 2d 278 (1984). Outside the broadcasting
context, the Supreme Court has consistently applied
strict scrutiny to indecency regulations. See, e.g., Play-
boy, 529 U.S. at 811-813, 120 S. Ct. 1878 (holding that
regulation proscribing indecent content on cable televi-
sion was content-based restriction of speech subject to
strict scrutiny); Sable, 492 U.S. at 126, 109 S. Ct. 2829
(holding that indecency regulation of telephone mes-
sages was content-based restriction subject to strict
40a
scrutiny); Reno, 521 U.S. at 868, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (holding
that indecency regulation of Internet was a content-
based restriction subject to strict scrutiny). At the same
time, however, the Supreme Court has also considered
broadcast media exceptional. “|B]ecause broadcast reg-
ulation involves unique considerations, our cases .. .
have never gone so far as to demand that such regula-
tions serve ‘compelling’ governmental interests.” Lea-
gue of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 376, 104 S. Ct. 3106.
Restrictions on broadcast “speech” have been upheld
“when we [are] satisfied that the restriction is narrowly
tailored to further a substantial governmental interest.”
Id. at 380, 104S. Ct. 3106.
The Networks contend that the bases for treating
broadcast media “different[ly]” have “eroded over time,”
particularly because 86 percent of American households
now subscribe to cable or satellite services, Remand
Order, at 1 49. As the Networks argue, this and other
realities have “eviscerated” the notion that broadcast
content is, as it was termed in Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-
49, 98 S. Ct. 3026, “uniquely pervasive” and “uniquely
accessible to children.” Whatever merit these argu-
ments may have, they cannot sway us in light of Su-
preme Court precedent. See, e.g., Reno, 521 U.S. at 867,
117 S. Ct. 2329 (noting that “as a matter of history”
broadcast television has enjoyed less First Amendment
protection than other media, including the internet);
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-50, 98S. Ct 3026.
Nevertheless, we would be remiss not to observe that
it is increasingly difficult to describe the broadcast me-
dia as uniquely pervasive and uniquely accessible to chil-
dren, and at some point in the future, strict scrutiny may
properly apply in the context of regulating broadcast
4la
television. In light of this possibility, the Networks
rightiy rest their constitutional argument in part on the
holding of Playboy, which involved a challenge to a stat-
ute requiring cable operators who provide channels pri-
marily dedicated to sexually explicit or otherwise inde-
cent programming to either fully scramble these chan-
nels or limit their transmission to the 10 pm to 6 am safe
harbor period. 529 U.S. at 806, 120 S. Ct. 1878. The
Supreme Court, applying strict scrutiny, invalidated the
statute because a less restrictive alternative to the pro-
hibition existed: “One plausible, less restrictive alterna-
tive could be found in another section of the [Telecom-
munications] Act [of 1996]: § 504, which requires a
cable operator, ‘upon request by a cable service sub-
scriber . . . without charge, [to] fully scramble or oth-
erwise fully block’ any channel the subscriber does not
wish to receive.” Jd. at 809-10, 120 S. Ct. 1878. The
Court held: This “targeted blocking is less restrictive
than banning, and the Government cannot ban speech if
targeted blocking is a feasible and effective means of
furthering its compelling interests.” /d. at 815, 1208S.
Ct. 1878. In so holding, the Court suggested its decision
might go beyond the mechanistic application of strict
scrutiny, and rely in part on a notional pillar of free
speech—namely, choice:
When a student first encounters our free speech ju-
risprudence, he or she might think it is influenced by
the philosophy that one idea is as good as any other,
and that in art and literature objective standards of
style, taste, decorum, beauty, and esthetics are
deemed by the Constitution to be inappropriate, in-
deed unattainable. Quite the opposite is true. The
Constitution no more enforces a relativistic philoso-
phy or moral nihilism than it does any other point of
42a
view. The Constitution exists precisely so that opin-
ions and judgments, including esthetic and moral
judgments about art and literature, can be formed,
tested, and expressed. What the Constitution says is
that these judgments are for the individual to make,
not for the Government to decree, even with the
mandate or approval of a majority. Technology ex-
pands the capacity to choose; and it denies the poten-
tial of this revolution if we assume the Government
is best positioned to make these choices for us.
Id. at 818, 120 S. Ct. 1878. The Court specifically re-
jected the arguments that parents’ ignorance of this
option, its underutilization, or its inability to be 100%
effective rendered targeted blocking an ineffective alter-
native: “It is no response that voluntary blocking re-
quires a consumer to take action, or may be inconve-
nient, or may not go perfectly every time. A court
should not assume a plausible, less restrictive alterna-
tive would be ineffeetive; and a court should not pre-
sume parents, given full information, will fail to act.” /d.
at 824, 1208S. Ct. 1878.
The Networks argue that the advent of the V-chip
and parental ratings system" similarly provide a less
In 1996, Congress mandated that every television, 13 inches or
larger, sold in the United States, come equipped with blocking tech-
nology commonly known as the V-chip. See 47 U.S.C. § 303(x) (stating
that in the case of an “apparatus” designed to receive television signals,
“such apparatus [shall] be equipped with a feature designed to enable
viewers to block display of all programs with a common rating”). To
implement V-chip technology, Congress also required a television
ratings system. The industry developed the “TV Parental Guidelines”
rating system, which was approved hy the FCC. See / the Matter of
Implementation of Section 551 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
13 F.C.C.R. 8232, at @ 2.
43a
restrictive alternative to the FCC’s indecency ban. The
FCC counters that the V-chip is an ineffective alterna-
tive because, in its view, few televisions feature a V-chip,
most parents do not know how to use it, programs are
often inaccurately rated, and fleeting expletives, such as
those witnessed at the programs at issue here, could
elude V-chip blocking even if the show during which
they occurred was otherwise accurately labeled. See
Remand Order, at 151 & n.162. The FCC’s arguments
are not without merit, but they must be evaluated in the
context of today’s realities. The proliferation of satellite
and cable television channels—not to mention internet-
based video outlets—has begun to erode the “unique-
ness” of broadcast media, while at the same time, block-
ing technologies such as the V-chip have empowered
viewers to make their own choices about what they do,
and do not, want to see on television. Playboy distin-
guished Pacifica on the grounds that “[cJable systems
have the capacity to block unwanted channels on a
household-by-household basis” and thus “[t]he option to
block reduces the likelihood, so concerning to the Court
in Pacifica, that traditional First Amendment scrutiny
would deprive the Government of all authority to ad-
dress this sort of problem.” 529 U.S. at 815, 120 S. Ct.
1878 (internal citation omitted). The FCC is free to reg-
ulate indecency, but its regulatory powers are bounded
by the Constitution. If the Piayboy decision is any
guide, technological advances may obviate the constitu-
tional legitimacy of the FCC’s robust oversight.
IV. The FCC's Construction of Profane
The Networks also argue that the FCC employed an
improper definition of “profane” under Section 1464.
Although we need not reach this argument to dispose of
44a
this appeal, on remand, the FCC may desire to explain
its gloss on the definition of “profane.” In the Remand
Order, the FCC applied its new definition of “profane”
as set forth in Golden Globes. The FCC now defines
“profane” as “those personally reviling epithets natu-
rally tending to provoke violent resentment or denoting
language which under contemporary community stan-
dards is so grossly offensive to members of the public
who actually hear it as to amount to a nuisance.” Golden
Globes, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, at 1 13 (quoting Tallman v.
United States, 465 F.2d 282, 286 (7th Cir. 1972)). The
FCC, noting that “shit” and “fuck” fall within this defini-
tion, ruled that Cher’s and Nicole Richie’s fleeting ex-
pletives were “profane,” as well as indecent. Most dic-
tionaries interpret the term “profane” to denote some-
thing that pertains to the irreligious, and since 1927,
courts—as well as the FCC itself—have assumed that
“profane” in the broadcast context refers to sacrilege,
and nothing more. See, e.g. Duncan v. United States, 48
F.2d 128, 134 (9th Cir. 1931) (collecting cases and hold-
ing defendant “was properly convicted of using profane
language” where he “referred to an individual as
‘damned,’ . . . used the expression ‘By God’ irrever-
ently, and . . . announced his intention to call down the
curse of God”); Gagliardo v. United States, 366 F.2d
720, 725 (9th Cir. 1966) (“the only words attributed to
appellants which could even remotely be considered as
being ‘profane’ . . . were ‘God damn it’”); /n re Com-
plaint by Warren B. Appleton, Brockton, Mass., 28
F.C.C.2d 36 (1971) (analyzing the word “damn” as a
matter of profanity). As the FCC notes, the Seventh
Circuit’s 1972 Tallman decision, 465 F.2d at 286, sug-
gested an alternate definition for this term, but we do
not believe the FCC can find refuge in this case. Tall-
45a
man concerned a prosecution for obscenity, not profan-
ity, and thus the Tallman court had no occasion to de-
termine conclusively how profane should be interpreted.
See id. (“The trial judge did not undertake to define the
terms ‘indecent’ and ‘profane,’ but he had no occasion to
do so because he determined that petitioner’s utterances
were properly classifiable as ‘obscene.’”). The Tallman
court’s brief reference to “profane” served only to dem-
onstrate that there may be a construction of “profane”
that could pass constitutional scrutiny.
But the FCC’s definition of “profane” here, would
substantially overlap with the statutory term “indecent.”
This overlap would be so extensive as to render the stat-
utory term “indecent” superfluous. Because our canons
of statutory construction do not permit such an interpre-
tation, see TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31, 1225S.
Ct. 441, 151 L. Ed. 2d 339 (2001), we do not believe the
FCC has proffered a reasonable construction of the
term “profane.” While we may owe Chevron deference
to the FCC’s construction, the FCC must still demon-
strate that its construction is reasonable, particularly in
light of Congressional intent, the canons of statutory
construction, and the historical view of the plain mean-
ing of this term.
CONCLUSION
As the foregoing indicates, we are doubtful that by
merely proffering a reasoned analysis for its new ap-
proach to indecency and profanity, the Commission can
adequately respond to the constitutional and statutory
challenges raised by the Networks. Nevertheless, be-
cause we can decide this case on this narrow ground, we
vacate and remand so that the Commission can set forth
that analysis. While we fully expect the Networks to
46a
raise the same arguments they have raised to this court
if the Commission does nothing more on remand than
provide additional explanation for its departure from
prior precedent, we can go no further in this opinion.
Accordingly, we grant the petition for review, vacate the
order of the FCC, and remand the case for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion. The stay previ-
ously granted by this court is vacated as moot.
LEVAL, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
1 respectfully dissent from my colleagues’ ruling be-
cause I believe the Federal Co 1amunications Commis-
sion (““FCC” or “Commission”) gave a reasoned explana-
tion for its change of standard and thus complied with
the requirement of the Administrative Procedures Act,
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
A television broadcaster, Fox Television Stations,
Inc., challenges the lawfulness of a small change made
by the FCC in its standards for adjudicating complaints
of indecency over the airwaves. The Commission exer-
cises the responsibility of determining, upon receipt of
public complaints, whether a licensed broadeaster has
violated 18 U.S.C. § 1464 by disseminating indecent ma-
terial over the airwaves. Beginning with its adjudication
of complaints arising from the broadcast of the Golden
Globe Awards in 2002, the Commission instituted a
change in its manner of dealing with “fleeting,” i.e. un-
repeated, expletives. During this broadcast, rock-musi-
cian Bono expressed delight over his receipt of an award
by saying, “[Tjhis is really, really, fucking brilliant.” In
a lengthy tradition of previous FCC rulings, absence of
repetition of an expletive had been virtually conclusive
against finding an indecency violation. The staff there-
fore recommended in Bono’s case, largely because the
47a
expletive was unrepeated, that no violation be found.
See Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees
Regarding Their Airing of the “Golden Globe Awards”
Program, 18 F.C.C.R. 19859, at 16 (Enforcement Bu-
reau 2003). The Commission reversed the recommenda-
tion of its staff. Adopting a new altered standard, which
diminished the significance of the fact that the poten-
tially offensive expletive was not repeated, the Commis-
sion concluded that the broadcast of Bono’s expletive
constituted indecency in violation of § 1464. See Com-
plaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regard-
ing Their Airing of the “Golden Globe Awards” Pro-
gram, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, at 191 12, 17 (2004) (“Golden
Globes”). |
The occurrences under review in this case followed
soon after the Bono incident, during live broadcasts by
Fox of Billboard Music Awards shows in 2002 and 2003.
In the 2002 Billboard Music Awards, the actress and
singer Cher, expressing triumphant delight upon her
receipt of an award, said, “People have been telling me
I’m on the way out every year, right? So fuck ‘em.” The
incident during the 2003 Billboard Music Awards in-
volved Nicole Richie and Paris Hilton, the co-stars of a
serialized televised comedy show entitled, “The Simple
Life,” as presenters of awards. In “The Simple Life,”
Richie and Hilton play themselves as two spoiled, rich
young women from Beverly Hills who cope with life on
a farm. In joking reference to their own show, Richie
said, “Why do they even call it ‘The Simple Life?’ Have
you ever tried to get cow shit out of a Prada purse? It’s
not so fucking simple.” The Commission received com-
plaints about each incident. Referring to its newly
changed policy developed in response to the Bono inci-
dent in Golden Globes, the Commission found that the
48a
two Billboard Music incidents were violations. See Com-
plaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Be-
tween February 2, 2002 and March 8, 2005, 21 F.C.C.R.
13299 (2006) (“Remand Order”). Fox brought this ac-
tion seeking to invalidate the Commission’s rulings.
In adjudicating indecency complaints the Commis-
sion generally employs a context-based evaluation to
determine whether the particular utterance is “patently
offensive as measured by contemporary community stan-
dards.” Industry Guidance on the Commission’s Case
Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464, 16 F.C.C.R. 7999, at
18 (2001) (“Industry Guidance”) (emphasis in original).
Factors weighing in favor of a finding of indecency are:
“(1) the explicitness or graphic nature of the description
or depiction of sexual or excretory organs or activities;
(2) whether the material dwells on or repeats at length
descriptions of sexual or excretory organs or activities;
(3) whether the material appears to pander or is used to
titillate, or whether the material appears to have been
presented for its shock value.” Industry Guidance, at
1 10 (emphasis in original). Especially in relation to the
“nandering” factor, a finding of violation is less likely if
the broadcast of the utterance involved a genuine news
report, or if censorship of the expletive would harm or
distort artistic integrity. Prior to the Bono incident, the
Jommission attached great importance to the second
factor, which focuses on whether an expletive was re-
peated. Under the pre-Golden Globes rulings, the fact
that an utterance was fleeting was virtually conclusive
in assuring it would not be deemed a violation (unless it
breached special barriers, such as by referring to sexual
activities with children). With its Golden Globes adjudi-
cation, however, the Commission adopted a less permis-
sive stance. It announced that henceforth fleeting exple-
49a
tives would be judged according to a standard more
closely aligned with repeated utterances of expletives.
Thus, the Commission has declared that it remains un-
likely to find a violation in an expletive that is broadcast
in the context of a genuine news report, or where cen-
sorship by bleeping out the expletive would compromise
artistic integrity, but it will no longer give a nearly auto-
matic pass merely because the expletive was not re-
peated. See Remand Order, at 9 23.
The Commission explained succinctly why lack
of repetition of the F-Word would no longer result in a
virtual free pass. “|WJe believe that, given the core-
meaning of the ‘F-Word,’ any use of that word or a vari-
ation, in any context, inherently has a sexual connota-
tion. . . . The ‘F-Word’ is one of the most vulgar,
graphic and explicit descriptions of sexual activity in the
English language. Its use invariably invokes a coarse
sexual image.” Golden Globes, at 19 8-9. “[AJny use of
that word has a sexual connotation even if the word is
not used literally.” Remand Order, at 1 16.
My colleagues find that in so altering its standards
the Commission has acted illegally. They rule that the
Commission failed to give a reasoned analysis explaining
the change of rule. They accordingly find that the
change of standard was arbitrary and capricious and
therefore violated the Administrative Procedure Act. I
disagree. In explanation of this relatively modest
change of standard, the Commission gave a sensible,
although not necessarily compelling, reason. In relation
to the word “fuck,” the Commission’s central explana-
tion for the change was essentially its perception that
the “F-Word” is not only of extreme and graphic vulgar-
ity, but also conveys an inescapably sexual connotation.
50a
The Commission thus concluded that the use of the F-
Word—even in a single fleeting instance without repeti-
tion—is likely to constitute an offense to the decency
standards of § 1464.
The standards for judicial review of administrative
actions are discussed in a few leading Supreme Court
opinions from which the majority quotes. Agencies op-
erate with broad discretionary power to establish rules
and standards, and courts are required to give deference
to agency decisions. See Chevron U.S.A., inc. v. Natu-
ral Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844, 104 S. Ct.
2778, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1984). A court must not “substi-
tute its judgment for that of the agency.” Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S. Ct. 2856, 77 L. Ed. 2d 443
(1983); see also Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558, 98
S. Ct. 1197, 55 L. Ed. 2d 460 (1978) (“Administrative
decisions should [not] be set aside . . . because the
court is unhappy with the result reached.”). In general,
an agency’s determination will be upheld by a court un-
less found to be “arbitrary and capricious.” See 5 U.S.C.
706(2)(A).
An agency is free furthermore to change its stan-
dards. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863, 104 S. Ct. 2778
(“An initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved
in stone.”); Huntington Hosp. v. Thompson, 319 F.3d 74,
79 (2d Cir.2003) (“[A]n agency is not locked into the first
interpretation of a statute it embraces.”); Ramaprakash,
346 F.3d at 1125 (“Agencies are free to change course as
their expertise and experience may suggest or re-
quire.”). The Supreme Court has made clear that when
an agency changes its standard or rule, it is “obligated
5la
to supply a reasoned analysis for the change.” State
Farm, 463 U.S. at 42, 103 S. Ct. 2856. If an agency with-
out explanation were to make an adjudication which is
not consistent with the agency’s previously established
standards, the truubling question would arise whether
the agency has lawfully changed its standard, or
whether it has arbitrarily failed to adhere to its stan-
dard, which it may not lawfully do.’ Accordingly our
court has ruled that “an agency . . . cannot simply
adopt inconsistent positions without presenting ‘some
reasoned analysis.’” Huntington Hosp., 319 F.3d at 79.
Such explanation, we have said, is necessary so that the
reviewing court may “be able to understand the basis of
the agency’s action so that it may judge the consistency
of that action with the agency’s mandate.” Mr. Sprout,
Inc. v. United Siates, 8 F.3d 118, 129 (2d Cir. 1993). The
District of Columbia Circuit has similarly reasoned that
an agency’s “failure to come to grips with conflicting
precedent constitutes an inexcusable departure from the
essential requirement of reasoned decision making.”
Ramaprakash, 346 F.3d at 1125 (quotation marks omit-
ted). In changing course, an agency must “provide a
reasoned analysis indicating that prior policies and stan-
Judge Friendly noted:
What gives concern is the manner, alas not atypical of the agencies,
in which [a] change was made—slipped into an opinion in such a
way that only careful readers would know what had happened,
without articulation of reasons, and with prior authorities not
overruled, so that the opinion writers remain free to pull them out
of the drawer whenever the agency wishes to reach a result
supportable by the old rule but not the new.
Henry J. Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies 63 (1962).
52a
dards are being deliberately changed, not casually ig-
nored.” fd. at 1124 (quotation marks omitted).
In my view, in changing its position on the repetition
of an expletive, the Commission complied with these
requirements. It,made clear acknowledgment that its
Golden Globes and Remand Order rulings were not con-
sistent with its prior standard regarding lack of repeti-
tion. It announced the adoption of a new standard. And
it furnished a reasoned explanation for the change. Al-
though one can reasonably disagree with the Commis-
sion’s new position, its explanation—at least with re-
spect to the F-Word—is not irrational, arbitrary, or ca-
pricious. The Commission thus satisfied the standards
of the Administrative Procedures Act.
The Commission explained that the F-Word is “one
of the most vulgar, graphic and explicit descriptions of
sexual activity in the English language [whose] use in-
variably invokes a coarse sexual image.” Golden Globes,
at 19. In other words, the Commission found, contrary
to its earlier policy, that the word is of such graphic ex-
plicitness in inevitable reference to sexual activity that
absence of repetition does not save it from violating the
standard of decency.
My colleagues offer several arguments in support of
their conclusion that the Commission’s explanation was
not reasonable and therefore arbitrary and capricious.
They argue (i) the Commission’s position is irrational
because of inconsistency resulting from the Commis-
sion’s willingness to allow viewers to be subjected to a
“first blow” if it comes in the context of a genuine news
broadcast; (ii) the Commission’s prediction that allow-
ance of fleeting expletives will result in a great increase
in their incidence is irrational because prior experience
53a
was to the contrary; and (iii) the Commission is “di-
vorced from reality” believing that the F-Word invari-
ably invokes a sexual connotation. I respectfully dis-
agree.
The majority argues that the Commission’s change
of standard is irrational because it is inconsistent. The
opinion goes on to explain:
[T]he Commission does not take the position that
any occurrence of an expletive is indecent.
[T]he Commission will apparently excuse an exple-
tive when it occurs
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