Amicus Curiae Brief — Swedenburg v. Kelly, Chairman, New York Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control, State Liquor Authority
Supreme Court brief2004
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
(D («) (9 a
os. 03-1116 & 03- 0 & 03- 4
N
Jul 19 poy
IN THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK
Supreme Court of the United States
JENNIFER M. GRANHOLM, Governor, ef a/..
Petitioners,
Vv.
ELEANOR HEALD, ef al..
Respondents.
JUANITA SWEDENBURG, ef ai..
Petitioners.
Vv.
EDWARD D. KELLY, ef a/..
Respondents.
On Writs of Certiorari to the
United States Courts of Appeals
for the Sixth and Second Circuits
BRIEF FOR THE WINE AND SPIRITS
WHOLESALERS OF AMERICA, NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF BEVERAGE IMPORTERS,
AMERICAN BEVERAGE LICENSEES, THE
PRESIDENTS’ FORUM OF THE BEVERAGE
ALCOHOL INDUSTRY, AND THE ASSOCIATED
FOOD DEALERS OF MICHIGAN AS AMICI CURIAE
SUPPORTING PETITIONERS IN NOS. 03-1116 & 1120
AND RESPONDENTS iN NO. 03-1274
M. CRAIG WOLF H. BARTOW FARR, Ill
WINE AND SPIRITS Counsel of Record
WHOLESALERS OF AMERICA, INC. FARR & TARANTO
805 15th Street, N.W. 1220 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005 Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 371-9792 (202) 775-0184
VIET D. DINH
BANCROFT ASSOCIATES, PLLC
2121 Bancroft Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008
(202) 662-9324
WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. — (202) 789-0096 — WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001
at
)
-
ay
*
QUESTION PRESENTED
Does a State’s regulatory scheme that permits in-state
wineries directly to ship alcohol to consumers bu* restricts the
ability of out-of-state wineries to do so violate the dormant
Commerce Clause in light of Sec. 2 of the 21st Amendment?
(i)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTION PRESENTED. ......cssscsssesssesssesssecssecsseenseen
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE vcccccscesssesssessseesseesveesves l
STATEREIIUG acnnntihiiiniiee I
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT. .....ccccsssccsseesssessseesseessees 3
AITO cccccrcsenssiarsisisaisamaiaae ies Sa 6
I. THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT
AUTHORIZES STATES TO RESTRICT
RETAIL SALES OF ALCOHOLIC BEV-
ERAGES BY OUT-OF-STATE VENDORS... 6
Il. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
DOES NOT BAR STATES FROM
RESTRICTING RETAIL SALES BY OUT-
CPS TATE ViRPCIIIIOD ccccscsscsscsccsscssscnscsecssenesse 20
COAG cxneccessessscssssecssnesnsnssescssunesesmseninmensneass 30
(iii)
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES . Page
Bacchus Imports, Lid. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263
Ser isiutbdseninssitaitiaremanianiemninenmavannmveneiel 6, 13, 26, 27
Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848
8 Eee 17
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York
State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573 (1986) .... 28
C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511
Se ET ccetinintinstininnereeapecmniatenaniandiienin 13
California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980) .......cccccccee passim
Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691
EE Ser ee passim
Carter v. Virginia, 321 U.S. 131 (1944)... 12
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)...........ccccccc00 13, 28
Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390 (1941)....... 16
Fedway Associates v. U.S. Treasury, 976 F.2d
ees eS UTE icicietsisetineenititetncnieiiiiiiniabinings 8
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S.
UIT incticerectinsiiinesienapundennniineanmaniineiantiiesesi 24, 28
Healy v. The Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324 (1989) .... 28, 29
Heublein, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n.
ean Sa ierrreicreseneenpndiainepasiemminmpaeneets 23
Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp.,
i 5, 7, 23, 28
Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control
Comm'n, 305 U.S. 391 (1939)..o.cccccccccceeeeeeees 22
Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116
Ge tarssintncesemenncnssnerensninneiemnetinmnmminmannetinn 28
Lunding v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522
> Ge GUE ccnnassnnnintcicnnnesontnneiniansioniatiienies 28
Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 401
ET 22
-¥
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic
Beverages, 496 U.S. 18 (1990)..........cccccceeeeeeees 10
Milton S. Kronheim & Co. v. District of
Columbia, 91 F.3d 193 (D.C. Cir. 1996)........... 27
National Distributing Co., Inc. v. U.S. Treasury
Dept., 626 F.2d 997 (D.C. Cir. 1980)............004 8
North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423
OL 2, 6, 25, 26
Premier-Pabst Sales Co. v. Grosscup, 298 U.S.
0 Oe 11,22
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408
SS 5, 20
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298
(ee 17, 20
State Board of Equalization v. Young's Market
Can, BOGS. FC eens 21, 24
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) ............0+ 28
Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939).......... 23
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
AND RULES
OEE 6
Twenty-first Amendment Enforcement Act, 27
——————— passim
Webb-Kenyon Act, 27 U.S.C. §§ 121-122....5, 13, 20, 29
N.Y. Alco. Bev. Cont. Law § 100(1).............:c0000+ 2
§ 102(1) (C) .......ceeeees 2
ee EE l
OTHER MATERIALS
B. Bernard, Liquor Laws 26 (1949)... 10, 14, 15
E. Behr, Prohibition: Thirteen Years That
Changed America 232-33 (1996) ......000-00 18
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
Economic Localism in State Alcoholic Beverage
Laws—Experience Under the Twenty-First
Amendment, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1145 (1959)....... 10
L. V. Harrison & E. Laine, Afier Repeal 107-46
(SS ee passim
P. Johnson, A History of the American People
(ee 8
R. B. Fosdick & A. L. Scott, Toward Liquor
| 9,10, 11
Reiter, Citizens or Sinners? The Economic and
Political Inequity of ‘Sin Taxes'on Tobacco
and Alcohol Products, 29 Colum. J. of Law &
A ee 18
Shankar, Alcohol Direct Shipment Laws, The
Commerce Clause, and the Twenty-First
Amendment, 85 Va. L. Rev. 353 (1999)........ 11, 12,17
LS. Dept. Of Commerce, State Liquor Legisla-
S| | 15
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Wine and Spirits Wholesalers of America, Inc., founded in
1943, is a national trade organization representing more than
370 licensed wine and spirits wholesaler companies in 44
States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico that hold
state licenses to act as wine and/or spirits wholesalers. The
National Association of Beverage Importers, Inc. is a national
trade association that represents the interests of beer, wine,
and spirits importers. American Beverage Licensees, Inc. is
an association representing the interests of beer, wine, and
spirits retailers. The Presidents’ Forum of the Beverage
Alcohol Industry is a trade association that provides a forum
for members’ chief executives to respond to issues affecting
the beverage alcohol industry. The Associated Food Dealers
of Michigan, Inc. provides services to businesses engaged in
distribution of food and other products. Amici and their
members play significant roles in the distribution of alcoholic
beverages under state licensing systems. Amici thus have a
direct interest in the proper resolution of these cases, which
involve challenges to those longstanding systems.
STATEMENT
Like all States, Michigan and New York exercise strict
control over the sale of alcohol within their borders. As part
of their regulatory programs, each State restricts who tay
make retail sales to its citizens. Under Michigan law, “con-
sumers must purchase alcoholic beverages from licensed
retailers. Pet. App. (03-1116) at Sa. Licensed in-state
winemakers are likewise permitted to sell at retail, although
they may do so only with respect to their own products. /d. at
6a. Out-of-state retailers and wineries are not permitted-to
sell directly to Michigan consumers. /d. at 6a.
' The parties have consented to the filing of this brief. No party
authored this brief in whole or in part, and no person except amici and
their members made a monetary contribution to the preparation or
submission of this'brief. See S. Ct. R. 37.6.
—
2
The New York retail system is similar in most, though not
all, respects. New York law provides that no one may sell
alcoholic beverages at retail “without obtaining the appro-
priate license... .” N.Y. Alco. Bev. Cont. Law § 100(1),
quoted in Pet. App. (03-1274) at 6a. The law further provides
that “[n]o alcoholic beverages shall be shipped into the state
unless the same shall be consigned to a person duly licensed
hereunder to traffic in alcoholic beverages ... ,” id. § 102(1)
(c), quoted in Pet. App. (03-1274) at 6a, effectively barring
direct sales to consumers by out-of-state vendors. Licensed
wineries with an in-state physical presence may sell directly
to consumers. See Pet. App. (03-1274) at 7a-8a. Wineries
that do not meet that condition may not.
Plaintiffs challenged the regulatory systems in both States
on the ground that, by prohibiting direct sales from
unlicensed out-of-state wineries, the States impermissibly
discriminated against interstate commerce. The Sixth Circuit
upheld the challenge to Michigan's law, rejecting the idea
“that a state’s ‘virtually complete control” [see North Dakota
v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 431 (1990) (plurality opinion)
(internal quotation marks omitted)] over liquor regulation
enables it to discriminate against out-of-state interests in
favor of in-state interests.” Pet. App. (03-1116) at 12a The
Second Circuit took a different view with respect to the New
York law. After reviewing this Court's decisions addressing
the interplay between the Commerce Clause and Section 2 of
the Twenty-first Amendment, the court of appeals concluded
that “New York’s regulatory regime falls squarely within the
ambit of Section 2's grant of authority.” Pet. App. (03-1274)
at 25a. The court found that the provisions limiting the
privilege of direct selling to licensed in-state entities “serve{ |]
valid regulatory interests,” id. at 25a, “allow[ing] the state to
monitor the distribution and sale of alcoholic beverages by
permitting such distribution and sale only through state-
licensed entities supervised by, and accountable to, the [State
Liquor Authority].” /d. at 25a.
3
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The short answer to the question posed by this Court is no:
the statutory scheme described in the question does not
“violate the dormant Commerce Clause, in light of Sec. 2 of
the 21st Amendment.” Whatever may be the ultimate boun-
daries of state authority under the Twenty-first Amendment,
that authority necessarily includes—as it has for more than
seven decades—the power to limit retail sales of alcohol by
out-of-state vendors that are not subject to the full extent of
State regulatory and taxing powers. That conclusion controls
these cases. Plaintiff out-of-state wineries are not subject to
the same regulatory oversight as licensed in-state sellers, and,
like other out-of-state retail liquor vendors, they have no
overriding constitutional right, under the Commerce Clause
or any other provision, to disregard state regulatory pro-
hibitions on making direct sales to state citizens.
1. The theory advanced by the plaintiffs—that, if a State
permits in-state vendors to sell alcohol directly to consumers,
it must allow out-of-state vendors to do so as well—
contradicts more than 70 years of regulatory history under the
Twenty-first Amendment. During that period virtually every
State has required alcohol to be sold pursuant to either a state-
monopoly system or a state-licensing system, under which
retail sales to consumers (that is, sales for off-premises
consumption) are made by in-state vendors. Those systems
were implemented after the end of Prohibition precisely to
ensure that States would be able to exert the greatest possible
control, both as a legal and a practical matter, over those who
sold alcohol to their citizeis. Given the chaotic conditions
that had prevailed prior to ratification of the Twenty-first
Amendment, it would be historically anomalous to con-
clude that States, under compulsion of the dormant Com-
merce Clause, have been obligated all along to allow vendors
across the Nation to sell alcohol directly to consumers within
their borders.
4
Although plaintiffs seek to portray state restrictions on out-
of-state consumer sales (of which the laws now at issue are an
example) as nothing more than rank favoritism, those
restrictions in fact serve important state interests. To begin
with, they allow state and local officials to impose necessary
limits on the number of vendors licensed to sell alcoholic
beverages within the State and to conduct meaningful in-
vestigations, with direct community input, regarding who
those vendors will be. Furthermore, the licensed vendors’ in-
state locations, and the importance to them of maintaining
their state-granted licenses, give the States much greater
power to enforce their laws regarding illegal sales, particu-
larly sales to minors. Finally, the restriction on sales by out-
of-state vendors provides concrete assurance that those
privileged to sell alcohol actually collect and remit the taxes
that the laws impose. That assurance is of critical importance
to the States, whose support for the Twenty-first Amendment
was prompted in large part by a need for enhanced tax
revenues. See L.V. Harrison & E. Laine, Affer Repeal
173 (1936).
Plaintiffs attempt to sidestep these state interests, arguing
that “temperance” is the only legitimate interest served by the
Twenty-first Amendment. Because the laws here do serve to
inhibit sales of alcohol—especially illegal sales to underage
drinkers—the argument is beside the point. But it is also
incorrect. As the history of post-Prohibition regulation
clearly demonstrates, Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amend-
ment not only allowed States to ban liquor sales entirely, it
enabled so-called “wet” States to blunt the harmful influence
of unsupervised sellers by establishing strict local control
over the sale of alcohol. See Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v.
Crisp. 467 U.S. 691, 713 (1984) (“core § 2 power” is power
“to regulate the sale or use of liquor within its borders”)
(emphasis added). Plaintiffs’ alternative vision of a nation-
wide retail liquor market with thousands of vendors free to
5
sell directly to consumers—a vision that would sound the
death knell of the longstanding liquor distribution system—is
flatly inconsistent with that objective.
Il. Despite plaintiffs’ arguments to the contrary, the dor-
mant Commerce Clause does not prevent States from insti-
tuting local control over alcohol sales. First of all, Congress .
has enacted the Webb-Kenyon Act, 27 U.S.C. §§ 121-22,
which (in terms similar to the Twenty-first Amendment)
grants broad authority to the States to limit the “shipment or
transportation” of alcohol across their borders. That provi-
sion gives a federal imprimatur to state laws barring direct
out-of-state liquor sales. Furthermore, Congress extended
this authority at a time when it was well aware that States
were seeking to control alcohol sales by restricting shipments
from out-of-state vendors. Thus, even if the dormant
Commerce Clause would otherwise cast doubt on the laws at
issue here, Congress has effectively overridden its limitations
with respect to this kind of state regulation. See generally
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 429-30 (1946)
(Congress may narrow effect of dormant Commerce Clause).
In any event, the Twenty-first Amendment itself limits the
effect of the dormant Commerce Clause in these circum-
stances. Although the Court has rejected the proposition that
“the Twenty-first Amendment . . . somehow operated to
‘repeal’ the Commerce Clause [with respect to regulation of
alcohol],” Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp.,
377 U.S. 324, 331-32 (1964), it has continued to recognize
that, consistent with the original understanding, “[t]he
Twenty-first Amendment grants the States virtually complete
control over whether to permit importation or sale of liquor
and how to structure the liquor distribution system.”
California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum,
Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 110 (1980). That principle is sufficient to
decide these cases. Here, Michigan and New York have
promulgated laws that are directed to the most fundamental
6
aspect of any “liquor distribution system”: who miay sell
alcohol directly to their citizens. In limiting the right of direct
selling to in-state entities over whom the States can exercise
the greatest possible oversight, the States are employing just
the kind of regulatory authority that the Twenty-first
Amendment is meant to protect. See North Dakota v. United
States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1990) (plurality opinion): see also
id. at 447 (Scalia, J.. concurring in the judgment).
The decision in Bacchus Imports, Lid. v. Dias, 468 U.S.
263 (1984)—on which plaintiffs heavily rely—has little
bearing on this particular question. That case involved
neither impertation nor transportation, the subjects to which
the Twenty-first Amendment is principally addressed. More-
over. the State in that case defended its discriminatory law
solely on the ground that, by providing a competitive
advantage. it promoted local industry. While the Court found
that particular interest to fall outside the scope of the Twenty-
first Amendment, it specifically contrasted the greater defer-
ence that is given to “laws enacted to combat the perceived
evils of an unrestricted traffic in liquor.” /d. at 276. Here,
the States are seeking to combat those evils, and the Com-
merce Clause does not bar them from doing so.
ARGUMENT
I. THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT AUTH-
ORIZES STATES TO RESTRICT RETAIL
SALES OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES BY
OUT-OF-STATE VENDORS
Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment declares that
“{t}he transportation or importation into any State . . . for
delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of
the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.” U.S. Const. Am.
XXI. § 2. That language, on its face, indicates that the States’
power to control liquor traffic by restricting importation is
far-reaching. Furthermore, while this Court has said that the
7
Twenty-first Amendment does not give States absolute
authority over all matters pertaining to alcoholic beverages,
see, e.g., Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377
U.S. 324, 331-32 (1964), it has repeatedly recognized that
States may exercise extensive control over the physical
distribution of liquor within their borders. See, e.g., Cali-
fornia Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,
445 U.S. 97 (1980): Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467
U.S. 691 (1984). Thus, in Midcal, the Court observed that
“[t]he Twenty-first Amendment grants the States virtually
complete control over whether to permit importation or sale
of liquor and how to structure the liquor distribution system.”
445 U.S. at 110. Likewise, in Capital Cities, the Court noted
that “[t}he States enjoy broad power under § 2 of the Twenty-
first Amendment to regulate the importation and use of
intoxicating liquor within their borders.” 467 U.S. at 712.
The cases now before the Court fit squarely within those
basic principles. What is at issue is simply the authority of
States to control retail sales of alcohol—that is, sales for off-
premises consumption—by limiting, or even banning, direct
imports to consumers by out-of-state vendors. Numerous
States have exercised that authority since the end of Prohi-
bition, and it remains a significant part of most closely-
regulated liquor distribution systems today. Although plain-
tiffs argue that, if a State permits in-state vendors to sell
directity to consumers, it must allow the same for out-of-state
vendors—a theory that would effectively put an end to the
traditional liquor distribution system—the limitation on direct
out-of-state sales continues to serve important state interests
in controlling the sale of alcohol and in assuring effective tax
collection. It thus advances legitimate goals that are consis-
tent with, and protected by, the Twenty-first Amendment.’
? In our view, it does not matter whether the Court, in deciding the
constitutional question presented here, begins with analysis under the
Commerce Clause or analysis under the Twenty-first Amendment. See
8
A. The idea that States may regulate liquor traffic by re-
stricting sales from out-of-state vendors must be understood
in historical context. After the tumult of the 1920s, the end of
Prohibition brought with it the difficult problem of how to
regulate the newly-allowed sale of alcohol. The conditions at
the time were not promising. “[W]hat Prohibition did was to
transfer the manufacture, sale, and distribution of liquor from
legitimate to criminal forces.” P. Johnson, A //istory of the
American People (1999). Thus, “[iJn the early days after
repeal of prohibition the nation was infested with bootleggers
and racketeers anxious to continue their trade and willing to
thwart the tax and health laws.” National Distributing Co.,
Inc. v. U.S. Treasury Dept., 626 F.2d 997, 1004 (D.C. Cir.
1980). See Fedway Associates v. U.S. Treasury, 976 F.2d
1416. 1418 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (noting congressional concern
about “corruption of the newly-legal alcohol industry by
bootleggers, racketeers. and other criminal types who had
flourished during Prohibition.”)
lt fell primarily to the States, exercising their new consti-
tutionally-recognized powers under the Twenty-first Amend-
ment, to bring order out of this chaos. For the States, a
principal goal was to get and maintain control over who could.
sell alcohol, and thereby to dictate to whom (and under what
conditions) they could sell it. After experiencing the law-
lessness of the Prohibition era, States wanted to establish laws
that were aimed at controlling the excesses of liquor traffic
and. perhaps just as important, to enact laws that were
Pet. App. (03-1274) at 12a-l4a. Because we believe that state laws within
the scope of the Twenty-first Amendment do not violate the dormant
Commerce Clause—either because the Amendment directly limits the
dormant Commerce Clause or because, in any event, it “saves” certain
alcohol laws from invalidation—the order of analysis seems immaterial.
In the end. proper resolution of the issue turns upon whether the state laws
in question are within the scope of the Twenty-first Amendment. As we
discuss. the state laws here meet that standard.
9
enforceable. See R. B. Fosdick & A. L. Scott, Toward Liquor
Control 149 (1933) (also known as the Rockefeller Report)
(“[rJestrictive laws which cannot be enforced achieve success
only on paper.”) Furthermore, they sought to levy taxes on
the sale of liquor, an ambition that had been one of the
moving forces behind the repeal of Prohibition. See pages
17-18 infra.
In this environment, States saw a particular need for
stringent regulation with respect to retail sales of liquor. See
Toward Liquor Control 65 (“[v]irtually all the individual and
social evils of the liquor traffic arise from an inadequately
regulated and overstimulated retail sale.”) In general, the
States approached the problem of regulating sales to con-
sumers in one of two ways. Following the recommendation
of the influential Rockefeller Report, approximately 15 States
elected to establish state monopolies over the retail sale of
alcoholic beverages. In those States, “[t]he primary task of
the [State Alcohol] Authority would be the establishment of a
chain of its own retail stores for the sale of the heavier
alcoholic beverages by package only.” /d. 64-65. Some
States, while generally following the monopoly model,
provided for sales of specified products (often wine or beer)
by state-licensed entities. See L. V. Harrison & E. Laine,
Afier Repeal 110-11 (1936). By vesting control in the State
itself, the monopoly system of retail distribution naturally
tended to preclude direct sales to consumers by out-of-state
liquor vendors.
The remaining non-dry States followed a second course—
also recommended by the Rockefeller Report (but with
misgivings that it would not be rigorous enough), see Toward
Liquor Control 55-61—that focused, not upon state pro-
prietorship, but upon strict regulation and licensing of private
vendors. This system, then known as the licensing system,
established a three-tier method of distribution. Under that
system, producers were required to sell to licensed whole-
10
salers, who sold in turn to licensed retailers. See generally
McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages, 496 U.S.
18. 24 n.3 (1990) (describing three-tier system in Florida).
Under this type of system, the States closely monitored both
wholesalers and retailers, and only licensed retailers were
permitted to sell to consumers for off-premises consumption.
The licensing system, again, did not contemplate direct
interstate sales to state consumers. To the contrary, it was
founded Gn principles of tight state. and often local, control.
In particular, States and local governments sought to exert
control with regard to the physical locations at which liquor
would be available. Thus, for example, the authors of the
Rockefeller Report stated that “[s]uitable restrictions should
be established by the license law or by administrative
regulation with respect to the number and character of places
Where liquor may be sold.” Toward Liquor Control 44. The
authors further recommended that “[I]icenses issued for the
retail sale of liquor should run not only to the person who
sells. but to the premises where the liquor is sold,” id. 49,
thereby making revocation of the seller's license a more
powerful enforcement tool. The licensing States generally
followed this regulatory blueprint. See B. Bernard, Liguor
Laws 26 (1949) (“[a] license to sell alcoholic beverages”
provides authority to sell alcohol “in the premises set forth by
address or other description.)
The importance of local control was reinforced in many
licensing States by a further restriction: that retail licenses
would be issued only to residents of the State or to cor-
porations with resident officers or shareholders. See Liguor
Laws 25-26: see also Note, Economic Localism in State
Alcoholic Beverage Laws—Experience Under the Twenty-
First Amendment, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1145, 1148 (1959).
Indeed. in some places, state laws required residence in the
county or town where the retail business was located. See
Liquor Laws 25-26. These laws plainly assisted authorities in
evaluating the qualifications of licensees, providing a greater
likelihood that applicants would be known to the community
in which they sought to operate. See Afier Repeal 74-75
(“[t]wo processes are involved in determining the propriety of
issuing licenses, the investigation of applicants and of the
premises for which the licenses are requested, and the
obtaining of community sentiment toward proposed liquor
businesses.”) Although it is not clear whether the residence
qualification was necessary to other regulatory objectives—
given the extensive regulatory control already available over
the licensee and the premises themselves—it was accepted as
a common feature of post-repeal regulatory schemes. Indeed,
in an early case before this Court, its constitutionality was
regarded as a given. See Premier-Pabst Sales Co. v.
Grosscup, 298 U.S. 226 (1936) (discussed at page 22 infra).
Finally, the States bolstered local control by imposing
direct bans on retail shipments from out-of-state vendors. See
Shankar, Alcohol Direct Shipment Laws, The Commerce
Clause, and the Twenty-First Amendment, 85 Va. L. Rev.
353, 356 (1999) (“States . . . passed direct shipment laws to
protect the three-tier system, which otherwise could be
bypassed by interstate shipment of alcohol from producers
directly to consumers.”) These laws did not prevent all
importation of out-of-state products, but rather required that
the products be distributed through the three-tier system. See
id. at 355. In those States, the three-tier system thus served
several related regulatory purposes. Not only did it protect
against the notorious “tied house” between producer and
retailer—see Toward Liquor Control 43 (“[t}he ‘tied house’
system had all the vices of absentee ownership. The
manufacturer knew nothing and cared nothing about the
community.”)}—but it assured that direct sales to consumers
would be made by licensed local merchants.
]?
Following the end of Prohibition, therefore, it was widely
understood that retail sales of liquor, far from being part of a
wide-open national marketplace, instead were subject to strict
state and local control. See generally Carter v. Virginia, 321
U.S. 131, 138 (1944) (Black, J.. concurring) (“local, not
national, regulation of the liquor traffic is now the general
constitutional policy.”) After ratification of the Twenty-first
Amendment, the States took steps to assure that, if the State
was not itself the direct seller of liquor, it was at least in a
position to exercise the greatest possible authority over the
direct seller. No one expected that outlets in California or
Illinois would be free to sell liquor directly to consumers in
Michigan or New York. To the contrary, that kind of un-
restrained distribution scheme, with thousands of potential
sellers scattered about the Nation, was precisely what the
States were seeking to foreclose.
While contemporaneous practice does not conclusively
establish constitutionality, the historical evidence at least
demonstrates that those enacting alcohol laws after ratifica-
tion of the Twenty-first Amendment regarded limitations on
retail sales by out-of-state vendors as entirely natural and
legitimate under its terms. See Alcohol Direct Shipment
Laws, at 355 (noting that laws against direct shipment have
existed “in many states since the repeal of Prohibition.)
Indeed. if the Twenty-first Amendment had not countenanced
such restrictions, the regulatory systems of most States would
have immediately been constitutionally suspect—under
plaintiffs’ theory of compulsory equal treatment for out-ot-
state retail sellers—even though they were designed to serve
well-recognized, and widely heralded, regulatory goals. That
is an implausible conclusion. In their efforts to clean up the
liquor traffic. the States were entitled to lirnit direct sales by
out-of-state vendors precisely because their location outside
the particular regulating State made them less susceptible to
the reach of that State’s power.
13
That principle applies with full force to the laws challenged
here. Although plaintiffs try to limit the focus of these cases
to sales of wine alone, the distinction that they attack—
between direct sales by in-state wine producers (allowed) and
direct sales by out-of-state wine producers (prohibited)—‘s, at
bottom, nothing more than an example of the larger dis-
tinction made between in-state and out-of-state retail sellers
generally. Like other in-state retailers, licensed in-state wine
producers are, by virtue of their situs, subject to the complete
regulatory and taxing authority of their home States. By
contrast, like other out-of-state retailers, out-of-state wine
producers tend to operate largely beyond the authority of the
individual States in which they now seek to retail their
products. That difference, in our view, is decisive. Under the
Twenty-first Amendment, a State seeking to control the
liquor traffic within its borders need not allow retail sales
by out-of-state dealers over whom it has less than full regu-
latory authority.”
B. The Commerce Clause, of course, generally discour-
ages lines drawn between in-state and out-of-state businesses.
See, e.g., C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511
U.S. 383 (1994). But that rule has a diminished effect where
regulation of liquor distribution is in question. See Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 206 (1976) (“Twenty-first Amendment
primarily created an exception to the normal operation of the
Commerce Clause.”); see also pages 21-29 infra (discussing
effect of Twenty-first Amendment on dormant Commerce
Clause). Although the dormant Commerce Clause still
prohibits certain forms of pure “economic protectionism,”
Bacchus Imports, Lid. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276 (1984), it
* We note that any attempt by plaintiffs to fashion a wine-specific
constitutional rule would run head-long into the language of the Twenty-
first Amendment, which explicitly refers to “intoxicating liquors” without
making any distinctions. See also 27 U.S.C. § 122 (Webb-Kenyon Act)
(“vinous .. . or other intoxicating liquor of any kind.”)
14
necessarily accommodates state regulations that are designed
to promote legitimate interests protected by the Twenty-first
Amendment. Limitations on out-of-state retail sales directly
serve those interests.
1. To begin with, the capacity to limit direct out-of-state
sales allows States to exercise the greatest possible influence
over the lawful sale of liquor to their citizens. Most
immediately, it gives a State the threshold power to determine
how many retail liquor sellers there will be. No State allows
everyone who wants to sell liquor to do so: rather, in most
States, licenses have long been rationed in accordance with
population and local preferences. See Afier Repeal 50;
Liquor Laws 15-17. Although the laws and practices vary
among different States, it is common for States to allow local
communities to have a say (or even a veto) about the grant or
renewal of licenses in their vicinity. As a result, both state
and local governments are able to prevent the unrestrained
proliferation of retail outlets. By contrast, if States had to
allow retail sales by any and all liquor vendors nationwide—-
as plaintiffs insist—the benefits gained by limiting the
number of liquor licenses would necessarily be lost.*
The States also have an important interest in knowing as
much as possible about who will be selling alcohol to their
citizens. A central part of the traditional licensing system has
always involved a detailed investigation into the qualifi-
cations and character of persons entitled to sell liquor in a
* Although States theoretically could impose limits by apportioning
licenses between in-state and out-of-state businesses, that solution would
only make matters worse. Given the vastly greater number of potential
out-of-state sellers, any proportional system (i.¢., any system that did not
“favor” local applicants) would be severely weighted towards out-of-state
sellers, undermining state efforts to impose enforceable restrictions on
their licensees. It would also reduce dramatically the incidence of face-to-
face transactions between buyers and sellers, thus interfering with
enforcement of laws against prohibited sales.
15
particular community. Indeed, early observers of state regu-
latory systems remarked that “retail licensing” was “the most
important field of licensing activity.” Afier Repeal 52. Thus,
for example, notices are typically posted on site whenever a
retail seller seeks to obtain, renew, or transfer a retail liquor
license, permitting those in the surrounding community to
voice concerns about issiance of the license generally or
about the prospective licensee in particular. To compel a
State to review and investigate applications from all willing
sellers everywhere—or to rely on investigations by other
States applying their own criteria—would impose a signifi-
cant, and undesirable, reworking of the present locally-based
system. See Pet. App. (03-1274) at 28a.
The local licensing system not only addresses who may sell
liquor, it also leads to better control over who may buy it.
After Prohibition, experts took the view that “[w]hen liquor
licenses are placed in the hands of trustworthy and competent
persons the likelihood of subsequent liquor troubles is greatly
reduced.” Afier Repeal 74. In particular, the selection of
licensees is part of the process for seeing that state laws
barring sales to minors and the intoxicated are observed.
From the ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment to the
present day, all States have had laws prohibiting sales to’
minors. See U.S. Dept. of Commerce, State Liquor Legis-
lation 156-63 (1941); Liquor Laws 59. Virtually all States -
have restrictions on sales to intoxicated persons as well. See
State Liquor Legislation 156-63.
Proper enforcement of these laws, though concededly
challenging, remains a state interest of the highest impor- -
tance. But that enforcement necessarily begins with the
expectation that sellers will refuse to sell to those who are not
permitted to buy. To back up that expectation, States must
wield (and use) the threat that state-issued licenses will be
suspended or revoked for noncompliance. See Afier Repeal
215 (“[rjevocation is the only reliable complete remedy for
16
violations ....”) Thus, if in-state sellers violate the State's
alcohol control laws, they face the loss of their right to sell
and, often, of their businesses: for example, in-state wineries
would, at a minimum, forfeit their opportunity to sell directly
to consumers. The stakes of noncompliance would be very
different, however, for national retailers. National retail
vendors, doing business across a wide spectrum of States,
would have the capacity to spread, and thus minimize, the
risk of disregarding state laws. As a result, even if nation-
wide vendors could be compelled to get licenses for each
State in which they sold (a point that is by no means certain),
the potential loss of any single state license, and the inability
to sell directly in that S‘ate alone, would be relatively
unimportant.
Finally, as both a practical and legal matter, in-state sellers
are subject to far greater ongoing administrative oversight.
See Pet. App. (03-1274) at 25a (“[p]resence ensures account-
ability.”) By the very fact that licensees are physically
located in the regulating State, enforcement officials can
more readily investigate, through direct observation, whether
they are conforming to the requirements of state law. See
generally Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390, 396 (1941)
(noting “peculiar difficulties of controlling [intoxicating
liquor}”).° In addition, state laws call for licensed sellers to
keep detailed records on site, which are subject to review by
State regulatory officials. By contrast, if State enforcement
officials were forced to monitor and inspect a myriad of
sellers in all other States, that administrative exercise, even if
legally permissible, would be both highly impractical and
needlessly costly. See Pet. App. (03-1274) at 28a.
“Even without nationwide retail sales of alcoholic beverages, Congress
has recognized the difficulties that States face in seeking to enforce their
liquor laws against out-of-state entities. See The Twenty-first Amend-
ment Enforcement Act, 27 U.S.C. § 122a (providing federal jurisdiction
for suits by state attorneys general).
17
2. The limitation of out-of-state retail sales is also impor-
tant to another critical objective of alcohol control laws:
effective tax collection. Indeed, while plaintiff wineries
apparently suggest that they would be willing to collect and
remit applicable taxes, they can hardly speak for all liquor
vendors across the Nation, many of whom would presumably
try to gain a competitive advantage by skirting state tax
systems. As the Seventh Circuit has observed, “states have
insuperable problems collecting their use taxes when people
buy from out-of-state vendors that do not collect sales taxes.”
Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 850 (7th Cir.
2000). Thus, even if the States may constitutionally impose
their alcohol taxes on sales by out-of-state retailers, but see
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992), the
practical difficulties of enforcement would be enormous.
Advocates of nationwide sales thus choose a different tack,
arguing that the problem of tax collection exists with respect
to all direct out-of-state sales, not just sales of alcohol. See,
e.g., Alcohol Direct Shipment Laws, 85 Va. L. Rev. at 358.
Their point appears to be that the Court should not give
weight to a concern about collection of state alcohol taxes
because that concern, taken to its logical conclusion, would
allow States to restrict direct out-of-state sales of any product.
See id. But the history of the Twenty-first Amendment is
again relevant here. For taxes on alcohol are not just another
kind of fungible tax on goods. Rather than being an
incidental by-product of the end of Prohibition, alcohol taxes
were, in themselves, an important reason for the end of
Prohibition. Put another way, the imposition of state alcohol
taxes was part of the guid pro quo that led to enactment and
ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment in the first place.
The history itself is well-recognized. As early commen-
tators noted, “|t}he repeal of prohibition was brought about as
much by the need for revenue as by the desire to eradicate the
evils that grew out of that social experiment.” Afler Repeal
18
173: see also id. (advocates of repeal found motivatio.u in a
desire to “[t]urn the bootlegger’s profits into public reve-
nues”); E. Behr, Prohibition: Thirteen Years That Changed
America 232-33 (1996). But that goal can only be served, of
course, if States are actually able to collect the taxes; to
obtain the revenues that they looked for, States must have the
right to impose rational conditions to assure proper payment.
Thus, once it is recognized that the end of Prohibition was
partly set in motion by a need for alcohol taxes, it is plainly
counter-historical for liquor seilers to claim that the Con-
stitution denies the States the means of most effectively
obtaining them. That theory ultimately devalues one side of
the expected bargain. allowing sellers. but not States, the full
benefits of repeal. See Pet. App. (03-1274) at 28a (noting
“burden” of attempting to assure compliance with tax laws).
It is also clear that effective tax collection is important, not
just as an end in itself, but as a means of repressing alcohol
consumption within the State. While the overall impact is
debated, it is clear, at the very least, that States have intended
alcohol taxes to depress consumption, even as they deal with
the concern that excessive taxation would cause consumers to
seek out illegal sellers. Reiter, Citizens or Sinners? The
Economic and Political Inequity of ‘Sin Taxes’ on Tobacco
and Alcohol Products, 29 Colum. J. of Law & Soc. Prob. 443,
449 (1996). Moreover, the revenues from alcohol taxes,
taken along with license fees, fund enforcement of the state
liquor laws, and support programs that assist state citizens
suffering from alcohol-related illnesses. If those revenues are
diminished by lack of collection, it follows either that state
alcohol programs must be scaled back (at a time when, under
plaintiffs’ proposed nationwide distribution system, the
difficulties of enforcement will be vastly increased), or that
funds must be siphoned away from other competing state
programs. The restriction of out-of-state retail sales avoids
these unpalatable and unnecessary choices, assuring that local
19
licensees—holding seizable assets within the taxing juris-
diction—are responsible for collecting and remitting the taxes
that the laws impose.
3. Largely disregarding these state interests, plaintiffs sug-
gest that the only legitimate goal served by the Twenty-first
Amendment is “temperance.” But that suggestion, even if
correct, would not help them in these cases. Whatever may
be said about other kinds of state restrictions, the provisions
limiting sales by out-of-state sellers do promote temperance.
As we have discussed, the traditional licensing scheme neces-
sarily leads to sales made by local retail sellers concerned
about the threat of license revocation and other severe
sanctions, increasing the likelihood that they will deny sales
to those persons—in particular, to minors—for whom liquor
is inappropriate. That is an advancement of temperance in a
most specific and critical sense. And, insofar as taxes (if
collected) reduce consumption, the more general interest in
temperance is advanced as well.
In any event, the idea that temperance is the only real goal of
the Twenty-first Amendment rests upon a misreading of the
historical record. Quite apart from the importance of tax
revenues to its ratification, it is plain that the drafters and
ratifiers of the Twenty-first Amendment did not envision
anything approaching an open market in liquor, limited only by
laws specifically intended to shelter “dry” States. Quite the
opposite: as we have discussed, the focus of alcohol-related
efforts following repeal of Prohibition was upon identifying
and implementing effective forms of state regulation. See
Capital Cities Cable, 467 U.S. at 713 (“core § 2 power” is
power “to regulate the sale or use of liquor within its burders.”’)
What the States sought to do—and what the Twenty-first
Amendment permitted them to do—was to impose much
tighter means of control that would provide for sales of alcohol
but avoid the distribution problems of the past. The systems
that they chose, including restrictions on direct out-of-state
20
sales, were designed to meet that goal. While plaintiffs now
seek to replace those traditional systems—substituting a broad
national marketplace in which out-of-state liquor sellers enjoy
full benefits without being subject to full oversight—that view
of liquor sales is very different from the one embodied in the
Twenty-first Amendment.
Il. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE DOES
NOT BAR STATES FROM’ RESTRICTING
RETAIL SALES BY OUT-OF-STATE VENDORS
A. For several reasons, the dormant Commerce Clause
does not prevent States from serving their legitimate interests
in controlling alcohol distribution by limiting out-of-state
retail sales. First of all, it is well-established that Congress
may authorize state actions that the dormant Commerce
Clause would forec:ose. See Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 305;
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 429-30
(1946). The Webb-Kenyon Act, by its express terms, does
just that. In language similar to that of the Twenty-first
Amendment, the Act prohibits “[t]he shipment or trans-
portation ... of any . . . intoxicating liquor of any kind, from
one State . . . into any other State . . . in violation of any law
of such State... .” 27 U.S.C. § 122. That provision gives
state laws restricting “[t]he shipment or transportation” of
liquor the weight of explicit federal approval, thus remov-
ing whatever check the dormant Commerce Clause might
place on laws restricting sales to consumers by out-of-
state vendors.
We will not repeat the arguments made on this point by the
Michigan petitioners and New York respondents, which
demonstrate that the Act does what it purports to do. We note
only that Congress chose to reenact the Webb-Kenyon Act at
a time—1935—when it was well aware that States, under
both the monopoly and three-tier licensing models, would
typically be providing for retail sales only by State-controlled
entities or by licensed vendors subject to comprehensive state
21
oversight. (As we have noted, those were the alternative
systems proposed by the well-known Rockefeller Report.) It
seems highly improbable, therefore, that Congress, ir
affirmatively prohibiting shipments of alcohol in violation of
state law, somehow meant to allow free passage to retail
shipments that would have fallen afoul of virtually every state
regulatory system at the time. The more sensible reading of
the Act is that it intended to permit States to regulate the
heretofore untrammeled traffic in liquor by doing precisely
what they were doing: restricting the privilege of direct
selling to the State itself or to those under its full control.
B. In any event, the Twenty-first Amendment itself auth-
orizes the laws at issue here. By its plain language, ihe
Amendment focuses on two activities— “transportation” and
“importation” for delivery or use—declaring either to be
prohibited if conducted “in violation of the laws” of any
State. Under any normal construction of those words, the
Amendment would appear to authorize a law that bars out-of-
state sellers from directly importing their alcoholic products
for delivery to consumers, and the States plainly thought that
it did. See pages 9-13 supra. Without question, the Amend-
ment has that effect with respect to laws barring a// sales of
liquor. It should have the same effect as applied to regulatory
schemes aimed .at exercising strict control over the conditions
under which alcoholic beverages may be distributed and sold.
The early cases addressing the Twenty-first Amendment
certainly saw no grounds for a narrow interpretation.
Although the full vitality of those cases is open to question,
see pages 23-26 infra, those cases do, at least, reflect a more
or less contemporaneous interpretation of what the Amend-
ment was intended to do. Thus, in State Board of Equali-
zation v. Young’s Market Co., 299 U.S. 59 (1936), the Court
stated that “[t}]he words used [in the Twenty-first Amend-
ment] are apt to confer upon the state the power to forbid all
importations which do not comply with the conditions which
22
it prescribes.” /d. at 62. Shortly thereafter, the Court stated
flatly: “Since the Twenty-first Amendment, . . . the right of a
state to prohibit or regulate the importation of intoxicat-
ing liquor is not limited by the commerce clause... .”
Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 305
U.S. 391, 394 (1939). See also Mahoney v. Josepk Triner
Corp., 304 U.S. 401, 403 (1938).
The initial cases from this Court thus were highly re-
spectful of state regulatory authority under the Twenty-first
Amendment. In addition, the Court indirectly acknowledged
the important regulatory interest in having local control over
alcohol distributors. In a case involving a suit brought by an
out-cf-state corporation, the Court dismissed a challenge to
certain Pennsylvania licensing fees—which were substan-
tially higher for distributors that sold imported beer—on the
ground that the out-of-state plaintiff lacked standing to bring
the suit. See Premier-Pabst Sales Co. v. Grosscup, 298 U.S.
226 (1936). Addressing the applicable state law, the Court
noted that “no one may sell beer in Pennsylvania unless duly
licensed; and no license may issue to a corporation unless all
of its officers and directors, and fifty-one per cent of its
stockholders, have been residents of the State for the period
of at least two years prior to the application for a license.” /d.
at 227-28. The Court then observed that “/t/he constitutional
validity of that provision is conceded... .” Id. at 228
(emphasis added). Because the Court accepted that the State
could require in-state residence as a valid condition of
granting a license, it followed automatically that an ineligible
out-of-state business could not complain about how fees for
that license were determined.°
° We note that the constitutionality of “residence” requirements is not
before the Court in these cases. Plaintiff wineries were denied the right to
sell in Michigan and New York because they are not located in those
States. See Pet. App. (03-1116) at 6a; Pet. App. (03-1274) at 25a. The
cases thus do not involve a situation in which the location requirement is
23
Some years later, in Heublein, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax
Comm'n, 409 U.S. 275 (1972), the Court likewise upheld a
state law requiring an out-of-state liquor producer to have a
substantial presence within the State. The Court did so even
though it expressly recognized that the in-state presence
“served none of [the producer’s] business interests,” id. at
277, and that it made the producer subject to a South Carolina
tax that it otherwise could have avoided. Despite those
adverse effects, the Court found that the requirement of a
significant in-state presence was part of “a regulatory scheme
that serves legitimate State purposes other than assuring that
the State may tax the firm’s income ... .” /d. at
282. Seealso Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 139
(1939) (approving state policy of “limiting [liquor] traffic in
order to minimize well-known evils, and secure payment
of revenue.”)
It is true, of course, that the Court has since cast doubt on
the seemingly absolute language of its early decisions. Thus,
it is no longer possible to claim, if it ever was, that “the
Twenty-first Amendment has somehow operated to ‘repeal’
the Commerce Clause [with respect to regulation of
alcohol].” Hostetter, 377 U.S. at 331-32 (rejecting that view).
But our position here does not depend on that kind of
expansive reading of the Twerity-first Amendment. Rather, it
rests on the much more basic notion that the Twenty-first
Amendment, at its core, permits the States to exercise strict
control over how, and where, liquor is distributed to their
citizens. That is, under the Amendment, a State may
constitutionally impose restrictions on importation that -
rationally advance its interests in protecting against
uncontrolled distribution and in safeguarding its claim to
important revenues.
satisfied but a right to sell is nonetheless denied on the ground of lack of
citizenship.
24
That more limited principle. far from being eroded by
decisions of this Court, has received repeated approval.
While recent cases have struck down state laws that interfere
with congressional power under the Commerce Clause, or
that are incompatible with principles of other constitutional
amendments, or that violate the dormant Commerce Clause
by imposing a discriminatory tax, see pages 26-29 infra, no
case has repudiated, or even cast serious doubt upon, the
States’ authority to dictate how liquor is sold within their
borders. Indeed. in addressing various other questions, the
Court has made clear that the power to control distribution of
liquor lies at the heart of the authority that the Twenty-first
Amendment grants to the States. Thus, in 44 Liguormart,
Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996), the Court
recognized that “the Twenty-first Amendment limits the
effect of the dormant Commerce Clause on a State’s regu-
latory power over the delivery or use of intoxicating
beverages within its borders.” /d. at 516. And, as we pointed
out earlier, see page 7 supra, the Court in Midcal regarded the
States as having “virtually complete control” over “how to
structure the liquor distribution system.” 445 U.S. at 110.
See also Capital Cities Cable, 467 U.S. at 712.
Plaintiffs thus are only partly correct in asserting that the
later cases of this Court have recognized an expanded role for
the Commerce Clause and a less extensive role for the
Twenty-first Amendment. While it is certainly true that the
latter does not displace the former with respect to any and all
matters involving treatment of aleohol—as it might have done
in the Young's Market era—that does not mean that the
Twenty-first Amendment takes a back seat with respect to
laws within its legitimate scope. To the contrary, where the
right to contro] how liquor is sold is at issue, the Twenty-first
Amendment continues to have decisive force.
—
25
The decision in North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S.
423 (1990), makes this apparent. There, the Court upheld a
North Dakota statute requiring out-of-state shippers to file
monthly reports and to affix labels to liquor for sale in federal
enclaves within the State. Citing the “virtually complete
control” standard set forth in Midcal, the plurality found that
“{iJn the interest of promoting temperance, ensuring orderly
market conditions, and raising revenue, the State has estab-
lished a comprehensive system for the distribution of liquor
within its borders. That system is unquestionably legitimate.”
Id. at 432 (plurality opinion); see id at 438-39 (noting
“extensive system of statewide regulation that furthers legiti-
mate interests in promoting temperance and controlling the
distribution of liquor, in addition to raising revenue.)
Concluding that the North Dakota regulations did not
improperly single out the United States for unfavorable
treatment, the plurality pointed out that under the State’s
three-tier system “[a]ll other liquor retailers are required to
purchase from state-licensed wholesalers, who are legally
bound to comply with the State’s liquor distribution system.”
Id. at 439.
In a separate opinion, Justice Scalia, concurring in the
judgment, addressed a question close to that presented here:
whether North Dakota could require the United States to
purchase its liquor from in-state wholesalers rather than from
out-of-state suppliers. His conclusion was that it could.
Justice Scalia first noted that “[t]he Twenty-first Amendment
. . . is binding on the Federal Government like everyone else
.... Id at 447. He then stated flatly that the Amendment
“empowers North Dakota to require that all liquor sold for
use in the State be purchased from a licensed in-state
wholesaler.” Id. (emphasis added).
The reasoning of both those opinions is directly relevant
here. Like the North Dakota laws, the Michigan and New
York restrictions against out-of-state retail sales serve
26
legitimate state interests in “controlling the distribution of
liquor” and “raising revenue.” See 495 U.S. at 439 (plurality
opinion). Furthermore, they stand on the same footing as the
North Dakota requirement that all retailers purchase their
liquor from “licensed in-state wholesaler|s].” See id. at 447
(Scalia, J.. concurring in the judgment). If the Twenty-first
Amendment empowers a State to require all retailers
(including the Federal Government) to purchase liquor only
from licensed in-state vendors, it seems evident that it would
also empower a State to require that its own citizens purchase
liquor only from licensed in-state vendors. Although one
requirement applies at the wholesale level, the other at retail,
they constitute interrelated parts of a comprehensive regu-
latory program aimed at exercising vigorous control over the
sale of liquor.’
C. To counter the decision in North Dakota, plaintiffs rely
heavily on Bacchus Imports, which struck down part of a
state tax scheme on dormant Commerce Clause grounds.
But. in Bacchus, the tax law in question—which exempted
certain local alcoholic products from a general state tax—
bore. at best. an attenuated connection to the act of impor-
tation. and none at all to transportation, the two activities to
which the Twenty-first Amendment is primarily addressed.
Morever. the State never contended (and, seemingly, could
not have contended) that the tax was an integral part of a
traditional regulatory system or that it served important state
interests in controlling liquor traffic and raising needed
revenue. Instead, the State justified the differential treatment
* Although Justice Scalia. in his opinion, did not refer to the Commerce
Clause. it is fair to assume that his conclusion regarding the in-state sale
requirement takes it into account. Even apart from the unqualified nature
of the statement that the Twenty-first Amendment “empowers North
Dakota to require that all liquor sold for use in the State be purchased
from a licensed in-state wholesaler” (495 U.S. at 447), the United States’
option of complying with that requirement would be of no significance if
it was invalid under the Commerce Clause.
27
solely on the ground that it promoted local industry. See 468
U.S. at 270-71. The Court found that particular explanation
to fit poorly with the objectives safeguarded by the Twenty-
first Amendment, saying that “[s]tate laws that constitute
mere economic protectionism are . . . not entitled to the same
deference as laws enacted to combat the perceived evils of an
unrestricted traffic in liquor.” /d. at 276.
The laws at issue here, however, are designed to combat
the evils of unrestricted liquor traffic. Like most States—
whether they have chosen to implement the monopoly system
or the three-tier system—-Michigan and New York impose
strict regulations limiting who can sell alcohol and under
what conditions they can do so. Faced with the prospect of
sales by thousands of producers and resellers—most of whom
are beyond the full regulatory authority of any given State—
the States have elected to bring the sale of liquor as close to
home as possible, limiting direct sales by out-of-state dealers.
That goal, unlike “mere economic protectionism,” is one
properly recognized and protected by the Twenty-first
Amendment. See Milton S. Kronheim & Co. v. District of
Columbia, 91 F.3d 193, 203 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (upholding
local liquor warehousing requirement on the ground that it
served valid enforcement objectives.)
To be sure, a law specifically restricting sales by out-of-
State entities will, by its very nature, tend to benefit in-state
entities. But, contrary to what plaintiffs appear to believe,
that is the beginning, not the end, of the relevant consti-
tutional analysis. The critical question remains whether the
law properly serves ends cognizable under the Twenty-first
Amendment. If not, as was the case in Bacchus, the law
cannot be “saved” by that Amendment. But if the law does
serve legitimate ends, as it does here, it is not rendered
invalid simply because, to serve those ends, its provisions
must be directed towards out-of-state businesses. See
28
generally Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948) (under
Privileges and Immunities Clause, States may favor their
citizens “where there are perfectly valid independent reasons
for it.”): Lunding v- New York Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522
U.S. 287, 298 (1998) (applying Zoomer standard).
The other cases relied on by plaintiffs deserve only brief
mention. For the most part. the cases involve conflicts
between state laws regulating some aspect of the liquor trade
and constitutional provisions other than the Commerce
Clause. See. e.g.. 44 Liquormart, Inc., supra: Capital Cities
Cable. supra. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116
(1982): Craig v. Boren, supra. Hostetter, supra. \n resolving
those conflicts. this Court has taken the unstartling position
that. however broad the authority conferred by the Twenty-
first Amendment, it does not permit States to regulate liquor
traffic without regard to values embodied in other consti-
tutional provisions like the First Amendment. As the Court
observed in Craig. “[o}nce passing beyond consideration of
the Commerce Clause. the relevance of the Twenty-first
Amendment to other constitutional provisions becomes
increasingly doubtful.” 429 U.S. at 206. The reverse is also
true: given that their challenges are specifically grounded in
the Commerce Clause. plaintiffs can find little support in
decisions with respect to different constitutional provisions.
The remaining few cases, though they do at least involve
the Commerce Clause. are scarcely more on point. To the
extent that States have argued that the Twenty-first Amend-
ment allows them to take actions affecting liquor pricing in
other States. see Healy v. The Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324
(1989): Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State
Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573 (1986), the Court has
expressed an obvious reluctance to endorse the authority of
one State to export its pricing structure to other States (who,
of course. have their own regulatory powers under the
Twenty-first Amendment). There is no such problem here:
29
nothing in the Michigan or New York laws “has the unde-
niable effect of controlling commercial activity occurring
wholly outside the boundary of the State.” Healy, 491 U.S. at
337. To the contrary, each State seeks only to exercise the
fullest control over what happens within the State itself,
protecting its ability to control distribution of alcohol against
the prospect of unrestrained direct sales from outside its
borders. And nothing in the Michigan or New York laws
brings into question the power of the Federal Government to
regulate interstate commerce with regard to alcoholic
beverages, an issue that necessarily requires definition of the
residual Commerce Clause power left to the Federal
Government after ratification of the Twenty-first Amend-
ment. See, e.g., Midcal Aluminum, supra. \ndeed, to the
extent that federal power is implicated here, it supports, in the
form of the Webb-Kenyon Act, the proposition that in-state
sales requirements are constitutionally permissible.
In short, plaintiffs are simply mistaken that, except for laws
directly promoting temperance, the Commerce Clause re-
quires an open national marketplace for retail sale of alcohol
to consumers. To the contrary: the Twenty-first Amendment
authorized the States, not just to prohibit or depress sales of
alcohol, but to exercise strict control in order to combat the
well-known problems of unregulated sales. Rather than being
forced to deal with all potential liquor sellers nationwide,
States have the authority to insist that sales to consumers be
made only by those within the full reach of their regulatory
and taxing powers. The regulations at issue here plainly are a
legitimate exercise of that authority, and the Twenty-first
Amendment assures their validity.
30
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the Sixth Circuit in Nos. 03-1116 and 03-
1120 should be reversed. The judgment of the Second Circuit
in No. 03-1274 should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
M. CRAIG WOLF H. BARTOW FARR, III
WINE AND SPIRITS Counsel of Record
WHOLESALERS OF AMERICA, INC. FARR & TARANTO
805 15th Street, N.W. 1220 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005 Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 371-9792 (202) 775-0184
Viet D. DINH
BANCROFT ASSOCIATES, PLLC
2121! Bancroft Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008
(202) 662-9324
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.