Joint Appendix — IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez

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No. 03-1238 | MAY 1 6 2095

—_—_——————————————————————————————————————————

IN THE |

Supreme Court of the United States

IBP. INC..,

Petitioner,

V.

GABRIEL ALVAREZ, individually and as a class representative;

RANULFO GUTIERREZ, individually and as a class

representative; PEDRO HERNANDEZ, individually and as a

class representative; MARIA MARTINEZ; RAMON MORENO;

ISMAEL RODRIQUEZ,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

JOINT APPENDIX

CARTER G. PHILLIPS*

JOSEPH R. GUERRA

REBECCA K. WOOD

NORINA IRANI EDELMAN

SIDLEY AUSTIN BROWN

& WOOD LLP

1501 K Street, NW

Washington, DC 20005

(202) 736-8000

MICHAEL J. MUELLER

JOEL M. COHN

AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER

& FELD LLP

1333 New Hampshire

Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20036

(202) 887-4000

Counsel for Petitioner

May 16, 2005

WILLIAM RUTZICK*

KATHRYN GOATER

SCHROETER GOLDMARK

& BENDER

810 Third Avenue #500

Seattle, WA 98104

(206) 622-8000

DAVID MARK

LAW OFFICE OF DAVID MARK

810 Third Avenue #500

Seattle, WA 98104

(206) 340-1840

Counsel for Respondents

* Counsel of Record

od

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED FEBRUARY 26, 2004

CERTIORARI GRANTED FEBRUARY 22, 2005

WiItSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. — (202) 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D. C. 20001

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

United States District Court, Eastern District of

Washington, Relevant Docket Entries

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit,

Relevant Docket Entries :

Second Amended Complaint, Alvarez v. /BP,

Inc., No. CT-98-5005 RHW (E.D. Wash. filed

Sept. 10, 1999)

Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., No. CT-98-5005 RHW (E.D.

Wash. Aug. 3, 2001) (Order on Objections)

Order Granting Certiorari, /BP, Inc. v. Alvarez,

No. 03-1238 (U.S. Feb. 24, 2005)

NOTICE

The following documents have been omitted in the printing of

this Joint Appendix. They may be found in the Petitioner’s

Appendix to the 03-1238 Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari at

the following pages:

Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894 (9th Cir.

Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., No. CT-98-5005-RHW (E.D.

Wash. Sept. 14, 2001)

l

WASHINGTON EASTERN DISTRICT COURT

Case No. 2:98-cv-5005

GABRIEL ALVAREZ, et al.,

Plaintiff,

v.

IBP, INC.

Defendant.

RELEVANT DOCKET ENTRIES

DATE NO. PROCEEDINGS

06/30/1998 1 COMPLAINT FOR MINIMUM WAGE

ACT AND FAIR LABOR STANDARDS

ACT VIOLATIONS (Summons(es) issued)

Fee-status: pd Receipt #: 039823 (KH)

(Entered: 06/30/1998)

* * * *

08/17/1998 4 Defendant IBP, Inc..s ANSWER To

Plaintiffs’ Complaint (ECH) (Entered:

08/18/1998)

* * * *

03/08/1999 59 Firs’ AMENDED COMPLAINT for Mini-

mum Wage Act and Fair Labor Standards

Act violations [1-1] (KH) Modified on

04/23/1999 (Entered: 03/08/1999)

* * * &*

05/07/1999 70 ANSWER by defendant IBP Inc to Plain-

tiffs First Amended Complaint (KH)

(Entered: 05/10/1999)

2

Ee erTETEEEEEEEEEEEEEEe

DATE NO. PROCEEDINGS

* * * *

06/11/1999 72 Stipulation re: class certification (KH)

(Entered: 06/15/1999)

* * * *

08/02/1999 101 Response by defendant to Plaintiff's motion

to file a second amended complaint [94-1]

(KH) (Entered: 08/05/1999)

* * * *

08/25/1999 102 ORDER Granting Motion to Amend And

Class Certification by Judge Robert H.

Whaley (granting motion to amend com-

plaint to add class representatives [94-1]

granting motion for (order) Resolving

Disputed Class Certification Issues [71-1])

(cc: all counsel) (KH) (Entered: 08/26/1999)

09/10/1999 103 Second AMENDED COMPLAINT for

Minimum Wage Act and Fair Labor

Standards Act Violations [59-1], [1-1] (KH)

(Entered: 09/10/1999)

* * *& *

04/12/2001 664 Findings of fact and conclusions of law by

Judge Robert H. Whaley; pltfs to submit

obj or clarifications to these findings by

4/27/01; proposed jgm ddl 4/27/01; deft obj

ddl 5/11/01; rply ddl 5/18/01; following obj

hrg to be set; all outstanding motions are

denied as moot except mtn #574 to recon-

sider rest break claims; parties to submit

briefing re issue of injunctive relief COB-

179-93 (cc: all counsel) (SAP) (Entered:

04/12/2001)

* * *& *

3

SS mm a ee

DATE NO. PROCEEDINGS

05/18/2001 66° ORDER by Judge Robert H. Whaley

granting pltf’s motion for reconsideration of

rest break claims [574-1]; w/in 3 wks of this

order pltfs to brief re evidence & pro-

vide damage figures; parties to schedule 1/2

day of trial time (cc: all counsel) (SAP)

(Entered: 05/21/2001)

* * * *

06/26/2001 718 DAMAGES REPORT by plaintiff (at-

tachments not scanned, filed in separate

expando file, Vols. 104-105) (LE) Modified

on 06/28/2001 (Entered: 06/26/2001)

* * * *

07/10/2001 775 Revised Damages Reports by plaintiffs {See

Expando File for Attachments) (SAP)

(Entered: 07/10/2001)

*_ * * *

08/03/2001 828 ORDER on Objections by Judge Robert H.

Whaley, plaintiff's objections and clarifi-

cations to the court’s proposed findings is

granted in part and denied in part, [ct. rec.

716] defendant’s objections and clarifica-

tions to the court’s proposed findings is

granted in part and denied in part {ct.

rec.793] (cc: all counsel) (VR) (Entered:

08/03/2001)

*_ * * *

08/28/2001 834 Stipulation for Purposes of Facilitating

Rest Break Hearing & Admissibility of

Overall Damage Calculations (SAP) (En-

tered: 08/28/2001)

4

DATE NO. PROCEEDINGS

* * * *

09/14/2001 844 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by

09/14/2001 845

Judge Robert H. Whaley: pltfs to present

proposed jgm consistent with this Order and

w/Court’s Order on Objections; court will

hear tele oral arg on issue of injunctive

relief 10/4/01 at 1:30 p.m.; if parties request

oral arg in person, they shall notify Court-

room Dep MF by 10/1/01 COB: 182-95 (cc:

all counsel) (LE) (Entered: 09/14/2001)

JUDGMENT: by Judge Robert H. Whaley:

pltfs recover of dft IBP sum of

$3,098,517.00 w/interest thereon at the rate

provided by 29 USC 1961, 3.43%. This jgm

based on damages calculated through

5/14/00 and is comprised of $1,751,126.00

in Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)

overtime damages, $156,344.00 in Wash-

ington Minimum Wage Act (MWA)

overtime damages for periods preceding the

FLSA limitations period, $286,119 in MWA

minimum wage damages, and $904,928.00

in rest break damages under Washington

law (which includes rest break prejudgment

interest); pltfs entitled to costs of action and

reasonable attys’ fees and costs under

applicable state and fed law; pltfs to file mtn

to establish these attys’ fees w/in 4 weeks

from entry of this jgm and to file a cost bill

with the Clerk (cc: all counsel) COB: 182-

94 (LE) Modified on 11/27/2001 (Entered:

09/14/2001)

5

DATE NO.

PROCEEDINGS

01/18/2002 988

02/26/2002 998

02/26/2002 999

* * * *

ORDER by Judge Robert H. Whaley grant-

ing motion for stay of execution of judg-

ment pending appeal & for approval of

supersedeas bond pursuant to FRCP 62(d) &

FRAP 8(a)(1) [967-2]; order is without

prejudice to any right of pltfs to apply for

further relief under FRAP 8(a) (cc: all

counsel) (SAP) (Entered: 01/22/2002)

* * * *

REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:

Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley

City: Richland, WA Date: 9/27/00 Type of

Proceeding: Bench Trial, Vol 6 of 43,

Pgs 81-162 [See Expando File Vol 113]

(SAP) Modified on 02/28/2002 (Entered:

02/27/2002)

REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:

Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley

City: Richland, WA Date: 9/28/00 Type of

Proceeding: Bench Trial, Morning Pro-

ceedings, Vol 7 of 43, Pgs 163-243 [See

Expando File Vol 113] (SAP) Modified on

02/28/2002 (Entered: 02/27/2002)

02/26/2002 1000 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:

Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley

City: Richland, WA Date: 9/28/00 Type of

Proceeding: Bench Trial, Afternoon Pro-

ceedings, Vol 8 of 43, Pgs 244-321 [See

Expando File Vol 113] (SAP) Modified on

02/28/2002 (Entered: 02/27/2002)

6

DATE NO. PROCEEDINGS

02/26/2002 1001 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:

Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley

City: Richland, WA Date: 9/29/00 Type of

Proceeding: Bench Trial, Vol 9 of 43,

Pgs 322-480 [See Expando File Vol 113]

(SAP) Modified on 02/28/2002 (Entered:

02/27/2002)

02/26/2002 1002 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:

Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley

City: Richland, WA Date: 10/3/00 Type of

Proceeding: Bench Trial, Morning Pro-

ceedings, Vol 10 of 43, Pgs 481-570 [See

Expando File Vol 114] (SAP) Modified on

02/28/2002 (Entered: 02/27/2002)

02/26/2002 1003 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:

Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley

City: Richland, WA Date: 10/3/00 Type of

Proceeding: Bench Trial, Afternoon Pro-

ceedings, Vol 11 of 43, Pgs 571-677 [See

Expando File Vol 114] (SAP) Modified on

02/28/2002 (Entered: 02/27/2002)

J2/26/2002 1004 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:

Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley

City: Richland, WA Date: 10/4/00 Type of

Proceeding: Bench Trial, Morning Pro-

ceedings, Vol 12 of 43, Pgs 678-771 [See

Expando File Vol 114] (SAP) Modified on

02/28/2002 (Entered: 02/27/2002)

7

DATE NO. PROCEEDINGS

02/26/2002 1005 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:

Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley

City: Richland, WA Date: 10/4/00 Type of

Proceeding: Bench Trial, Afternoon Pro-

ceedings, Vol 13 of 43, Pgs 772-888 [See

Expando File Vol 114] (SAP) Modified on

02/28/2002 (Entered: 02/27/2002)

02/26/2002 1006 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:

Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley

City: Richland, WA Date: 10/5/00 Type of

Proceeding: Bench Trial, Morning Pro-

ceedings, Vol 14 of 43, Pgs 889-1020 [See

Expando File Vol 114] (SAP) Modified on

02/28/2002 (Entered: 02/27/2002)

02/26/2002 1007 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:

Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley

City: Richland, WA Date: 10/5/00 Type of

Proceeding: Bench Trial, Afternoon Pro-

ceedings, Vol 15 of 43, Pgs 1021-1109 [See

Expando File Vol 115] (SAP) Modified on

02/28/2002 (Entered: 02/27/2002)

02/26/2002 1008 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:

Debra Clark before Judge Robert H, Whaley

City: Richland, WA Date: 10/6/00 Type of

Proceeding: Bench Trial, Vol 16 of 43, Pgs

111 1257 [See Expando File Vol 115]

(SAP) Modified on 02/28/2002 (Entered:

02/27/2002)

8

DATE NO. PROCEEDINGS

02/26/2002 1009 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:

Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley

City: Richland, WA Date: 10/9/00 Type of

Proceeding: Bench Trial, Morning Pro-

ceedings, Vol 17 of 43, Pgs 1258-1448 [See

Expando File Vol 115] (SAP) Modified on

02/28/2002 (Entered: 02/27/2002)

02/26/2002 1010 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:

Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley

City: Richland, WA Date: 10/9/00 Type of

Proceeding: Bench Trial, Afternoon Pro-

ceedings, Vol 18 of 43, Pgs 1449-1523 [See

Expando File Vol 115] (SAP) Modified on

02/28/2002 (Entered: 02/27/2002)

02/26/2002 1011 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:

Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley

City: Richland, WA Date: 10/10/00 Type

of Proceeding: Bench Trial, Morning Pro-

ceedings, Vol 19 of 43, Pgs 1524-1691 [See

Expando File Vol 115] (SAP) Modified on

02/28/2002 (Entered: 02/27/2002)

02/26/2002 1012 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:

Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley

City: Richland, WA Date: 10/10/00 Type of

Proceeding: Bench Trial, Afternoon Pro-

ceedings, Vol 20 of 43, Pgs 1692-1762 [See

Expando File Vol 116] (SAP) Modified on

02/28/2002 (Entered: 02/27/2002)

9

DATE NO. PROCEEDINGS

02/26/2002 1013 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:

Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley

City: Richland, WA Date: 10/11/00 Type of

Proceeding: Bench Trial, Vol 21 of 43, Pgs

1763-1932 [See Expando File Vol 116]

(SAP) Modified on 02/28/2002 (Entered:

02/27/2002)

02/26/2002 1°! } REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:

Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley

City: Richland, WA Date: 10/12/00 Type

of Proceeding: Bench Trial, Morning Pro-

ceedings, Vol 22 of 43, Pgs 1933-2097 [See

Expando File Vol 116] (SAP) Modified on

02/28/2002 (Entered: 02/27/2002)

02/26/2002 1015 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:

Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley

City: Richland, WA Date: 10/12/00 Type of

Proceeding: Bench Trial, Afternoon Pro-

ceedings, Vol 23 of 43, Pgs 2098-2316 [See

Expando File Vol 116] (SAP) Modified on

02/28/2002 (Entered: 02/27/2002)

02/26/2002 1016 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:

Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley

City: Richland, WA Date: 10/13/00 Type of

Proceeding: Bench Trial, Vol 24 of 43, Pgs

2317-2501 [See Expando File Vol 117]

(SAP) Modified on 02/28/2002 (Entered:

02/27/2002)

10

DATE NO. PROCEEDINGS

02/26/2002 1017 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:

Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley

City: Richland, WA Date: 10/17/00 Type

of Proceeding: Bench Trial, Morning Pro-

ceedings, Vol 25 of 43, Pgs 2502-2601 [See

Expando File Vol 117] (SAP) Modified on

02/28/2002 (Entered: 02/27/2002)

02/26/2002 1018 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:

Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley

City: Richland, WA Date: 10/17/00 Type of

Proceeding: Bench Trial, Afternoon Pro-

ceedings, Vol 26 of 43, pgs 2602-2674 [See

Expando File Vol 117] (SAP) Modified on

02/28/2002 (Entered: 02/28/2002)

02/26/2002 1019 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:

Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley

City: Yakima, WA Date: 10/19/00 Type

of Proceeding: Bench Trial, Morning Pro-

ceedings, Vol 27 of 43, Pgs 2675-2814 [See

Expando File Vol 117] (SAP) Modified on

02/28/2002 (Entered: 02/28/2002)

02/26/2002 1020 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:

Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley

City: Yakima, WA Date: 10/19/00 Type of

Proceeding: Bench Trial, Afternoon Pro-

ceedings, Vol 28 of 43, Pgs 2815-2966 [See

Expando File Vol 117] (SAP) Modified on

02/28/2002 (Entered: 02/28/2002)

1]

DATE NO. PROCEEDINGS

02/26/2002 1021 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:

Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley

City: Richland, WA Date: 10/20/00 Type

of Proceeding: Bench Trial, Morning Pro-

ceedings, Vol 29 of 43, Pgs 2967-3137 [See

Expando File Vol 118] (SAP) Modified on

02/28/2002 (Entered: 02/28/2002)

02/26/2002 1022 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:

Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley

City: Richland, WA Date: 10/20/00 Type of

Proceeding: Bench Trial, Afternoon Pro-

ceedings, Vol 30 of 43, Pgs 3138-3262 [See

Expando File Vol 118] (SAP) Modified on

02/28/2002 (Entered: 02/28/2002)

02/26/2002 1023 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:

Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley

City: Richland, WA Date: 10/24/00 Type

of Proceeding: Bench Trial, Morning Pro-

ceedings, Vol 31 of 43, Pgs 3263-3405 [See

Expando File Vol 118] (SAP) Modified on

02/28/2002 (Entered: 02/28/2002)

02/26/2002 1024 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:

Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley

City: Richland, WA Date: 10/24/00 Type of

Proceeding: Bench Trial, Afternoon Pro-

ceedings, Vol 32 of 43, Pgs 3406-3547 [See

Expando File Vol 118] (SAP) Modified on

02/28/2002 (Entered: 02/28/2002)

12

DATE NO. PROCEEDINGS

02/26/2002 1025 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:

Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley

City: Richland, WA Date: 10/25/00 Type of

Proceeding: Bench Trial, Vol 33 of 43, Pgs

3548-3681 [See Expando File Vol 119]

(SAP) Modified on 02/28/2002 (Entered:

02/28/2002)

02/26/2002 1026 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:

Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley

City: Richland, WA Date: 10/26/00 Type of

Proceeding: Bench Trial, Morning Pro-

ceedings, Vol 34 of 43, Pgs 3682-3872 [See

Expando File Vol 119] (SAP) Modified on

02/28/2002 (Entered: 02/28/2002)

02/26/2002 1027 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:

Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley

City: Richiand, WA Date: 10/26/00 Type

of Proceeding: Bench Trial, Afternoon Pro-

ceedings, Vol 35 of 43, Pgs 3873-3979 [See

Expando File Vol 119] (SAP) Modified on

02/28/2002 (Entered: 02/28/2002)

02/26/2002 1028 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:

Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley

City: Richland, WA Date: 10/27/00 Type of

Proceeding: Bench Trial, Vol 36 of 43, Pgs

3980-4216 [See Expando File Vol 119]

(SAP) Modified on 02/28/2002 (Entered:

02/28/2002)

——[== IT

i3

DATE NO. PROCEEDINGS

02/26/2002 1029 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:

Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley

City: Spokane, WA Date: 11/3/00 Type of

Proceeding: Bench Trial, Vol 37 of 43, Pgs

4217-4350 [See Expando File Vol 120]

(SAP) Modified on 02/28/2002 (Entered:

02/28/2002)

* * * *

02/28/2002 1037 Copy 9CCA certificate of record - Original

forwarded to 9CCA 9CCA: 02-35042 (SAP)

(Entered: 02/28/2002)

* * * *

14

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

NINTH CIRCUIT

Court of Appeals Docket No. 02-35042

GABRIEL ALVAREZ, individually and as class representatives;

RANULFO GUTIERREZ, individually and as class repre-

sentatives; PEDRO HERNANDEZ, individually and as class

representatives; MARIA MARTINEZ; RAMON MORENO;

ISMAEL RODRIQUEZ,

Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Vv.

IBP, INC., a Delaware corporation

Defendant-Appellant,

RELEVANT DOCKET ENTRIES

DATE PROCEEDINGS

1/9/02 DOCKETED CAUSE AND ENTERED AP-

PEARANCES OF COUNSEL. CADS SENT

(Y/N): no. setting schedule as follows: appel-

lant’s designation of RT is due 1/7/02; appellee’s

designation of RT is due 1/17/02; appellant shall

order transcript by 1/28/02; court reporter shall

file transcript in DC by 2/27/02; certificate of

record shall be filed by 3/6/02; appellant’s

opening brief is due 4/15/02; appellees’ brief

is due 5/15/02; appellants’ reply brief is due

5/29/02; [02-35042] (crw) [02-35042]

* * * *

6/6/02 Filed original and 15 copies IBP, Inc.’s first brief

on cross-appeal, (Informal : no ) of 60 pages and

2 excerpts of record; served on 6/3/02 [02-35042,

02-35110] (dg) [02-35042 02-351 10]

15

DATE PROCEEDINGS

* * * *

7/24/02 Filed original and 15 copies plaintiffs second

brief on cross-appeal ( Informal : no ) of 62

pages and 3 vols excerpts of record; served on

7/22/02 [(02-35042, 02-35110] (dg) [02-35042

02-35110)

* * * *

10/8/02 Filed original and 15 copies IBP, Inc.’s third

brief on cross-appeal ( Informal : no ) of 69

pages and 5 copies | excerpts of record; served

on 10/4/02 [02-35042, 02-35110] (dg) [02-35042

02-351 10}

* * * *

11/19/02 ‘Filed original and 15 copies IBP, Inc.’s [sic]

reply brief, ( Informal : no ) of 30 pages & 5

supp exc of record; served on 11/18/02 [02-

35042, 02-351 10] (dg) [(02-35042 02-35110]

* * * *

4/22/03 FILED CERTIFIED RECORD ON APPEAL

IN: 45 clerk’s records, 42 reporter’s transcripts, 9

under seal exhibits in envs. From dc transmittal.

[02-35042] (jk) [02-35042}

* * * *

8/5/03 FILED OPINION: AFFIRMED IN PART,

REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

Each party to bear their own costs. (Terminated

on the Merits after Oral Hearing; Affirmed (in

part) and Reversed (in part); Written, Signed,

Published. Dorothy W. NELSON; Sidney R.

THOMAS, author; Susan Y. Illston.) FILED

AND ENTERED JUDGMENT. § [02-35042,

02-351 10] (dg) [(02-35042 02-351 10]

11/28/03

16

See BS

Filed order (Dorothy W. NELSON, Sidney R.

THOMAS, Susan Y. Illston): .. . . The petn for

rhrg is denied and the suggestion for rhrg en banc

is rejected. [02-35042, 02-35110] (crw) [02-

35042 02-351 10)

* * * *

17

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

[Filed Sep. 10, 1999]

No. CT-98-5005 RHW

CLASS ACTION

GABRIEL ALVAREZ, VIRGINIA ALVAREZ, MARIA CHAVEZ,

RANULFO GUTIERREZ, PEDRO HERNANDEZ, MARIA

MARTINEZ, RAMON MORENO, and ISMAEL RODRIQUEZ,

individually and as class representatives,

Plaintiffs,

Vv.

IBP, INC., a Delaware Corporation,

Defendant.

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR MINIMUM

WAGE ACT AND FAIR LABOR STANDARDS

ACT VIOLATIONS

Jurisdiction

1. The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) over plaintiffs’ Fair Labor

Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (“FLSA”) claims. The

Court has supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367 over plaintiffs’ state law claims which are based on

the Minimum Wage Act, RCW chapter 49.42 (“MWA”),

Industrial Welfare Act, RCW chapter 49.12, Wages-

Deductions-Contribution-Rebates Act, RCW chapter 49.52

and regulations issued thereunder.

Parties

2. Plaintiffs Gabriel Alvarez, Maria Chavez, Ranulfo

Gutierrez, Pedro Hernandez, Maria Martinez, Ramon Moreno,

18

and Ismael Rodriquez are adults employed at defendant's

Pasco, Washington plant and have been so employed during

the three years prior to the filing of this complaint. Virginia

Alvarez is adult who was employed at defendant’s Pasco,

Washington plani from approximately 1991 until early i999.

3. Defendant IBP, Inc. is a Delaware Corporation head-

quartered in Dakota City, Nebraska. It is the world’s largest

producer of fresh beef, pork and related allied products. It

operates a beef slaughtering and processing plant that it

commonly refers to as its Pasco plant.

Facts

4. Plaintiffs are employed by defendant at its Pasco

plant, with the exception of Virginia Alvarez whose employ-

ment with defendant ceased in early 1999.

5. Plaintiffs have been employed by defendant at the

Pasco plant for periods ranging from approximately 5 years to

more than 15 years.

6. During the past 5 to 15 years, plaintiffs have worked

and continue to work in the Pasco plant processing or slaugh-

tering divisions.

7. Plaintiffs are employed and have been employed by

defendant during the past three years in an enterprise engaged

in commerce and in the production of goods for commerce, as

these terms are used in Sections 6 and 7 of the FLSA, 29

U.S.C. §§ 206-207.

8. Plaintiffs perform unpaid work each morning, includ-

ing, but not limited to, activities such as donning protective

equipment (wire mesh gloves, wire mesh aprons, protective

sleeves, rubber gloves, cloth gloves, plastic gloves, safety

boots, scabbards, hard hats, safety glasses, hairnet, earplugs

and other equipment), receiving and donning outer gloves,

obtaining sand paper, obtaining knives, sanding their steel

(equipment used to sharpen knives), waiting in line dur-

19

ing these previous activities, and performing production

floor work.

9. Plaintiffs have thirty-minute meal periods deducted

from their pay, even though a substantial amount of their

meal period is devoted to work activities such as production

floor work after the start of the meal period, doffing safety

equipment and related garments, cleaning themselves and

equipment, donning safety equipment and related garments,

and returning to work on the production floor prior to the end

of the thirty-minute meal period.

10. Plaintiffs work more than 8 hours in a day without

receiving a second paid rest break.

11. Plaintiffs perform unpaid work after the official end of

the paid work day, including but not limited to activities such

as completing production floor work, doffing safety equip-

ment and related garments, cleaning safety equipment,

bagging gloves and garments, storing safety equipment in

lockers and waiting in line at various steps in the above-

described process.

12. Plaintiffs clock in at or near the beginning of the

workday and clock out at or near the end of their workday,

but are paid based on the official start and stop time, which

excludes work performed before and after official hours.

13. Much of plaintiffs’ off-the-clock work is performed in

workweeks in which plaintiffs work in excess of forty hours.

14. Plaintiff Ramon Moreno works in the slaughter divi-

sion and for approximately 2 years has worked under an

incentive wage, where employees are paid a daily pro-

ductivity bonus to the extent that they complete assigned

work in advance of allowed time for the work. That pro-

ductivity bonus is not included as part of Mr. Moreno regular

rate of pay for purposes of calculating state and federal

overtime premium pay.

20

15. Plaintiffs have been and continue to be subject to a

rule under which deductions are made from their wages for

company equipment that is lost or stolen without their being

involved in any dishonest or willful act. For example, in July

1996, plaintiff Ranulfo Guttierez suffered such a $197

equipment deduction that brought his pay to below state and

federal minimum wage. The equipment deduction does not

accrue to the benefit of the plaintiffs. Instead, the employer

derives a financial benefit by obtaining wage rebates to cover

missing company equipment, much of which is found and

used in production work without reimbursing the employees

who paid for the equipment.

16. The events described hereinabove were continuing at

the time of the complaint and amended complaint, and, on

information and belief, will continue.

17. Defendant has been and continues to willfully violate

state and federal wage and hour statutes and regulations with

the intent to deprive plaintiffs of a part of their wages.

18. Defendant has been engaged in extensive similar liti-

gation with the United States Department of Labor and with

private parties, resulting in final judgment affirmed in Metzler

v. IBP, Inc., 127 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1997) and Bernard v.

IBP, Inc., 154 F.3d 259 (Sth Cir. 1998), such that collateral

estoppel should be applied against defendant from these

judgments and other judgments presently unknown to plain-

tiffs on issues that will likely arise during this litigation.

Class Facts

19. Plaintiffs file this action on behalf of themselves and a

class defined as follows:

All individuals performing production work in defen-

dant’s Pasco plant processing and slaughtering divisions,

during any time between June 30, 1995 to the present

time, excluding supervisors, managers, quality control

21

employees, guards, mechanics, laundry room employees,

janitors, knife room employees, rendering employees,

and packaging work performed outside the production

line vicinity.

20. Class members are employed and have been em-

ployed by defendant during the past three years in an enter-

prise engaged in commerce and in the production of goods for

commerce, as these terms are used in Sections 6 & 7 of the

FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-207.

21. Class members perform unpaid work each morning,

including, but not limited to, activities such as donning

protective equipment (wire mesh gloves, wire mesh aprons,

rubber aprons, protective sleeves, rubber gloves, cloth gloves,

plastic gloves, safety boots, scabbards, hard hats, safety

glasses, hairnets, ear plugs and other equipment), receiving

and donning outer gloves, obtaining sand paper, obtaining

knives, sanding their steel (equipment used to sharpen

knives), waiting in line during these previous activities, and

performing production floor work.

22. Class members have thirty minute meal periods de-

ducted from their pay, even though a substantial amount of

their meal period is devoted to work activities such as

production floor work after the start of the meal period,

doffing safety equipment and related garments, cleaning

themselves and equipment, donning safety equipment and

related garments, and returning to work on the produciion

floor prior to the end of the thirty-minute meal period.

23. Class members work more than 8 hours in a day

without receiving a second paid rest break.

24. Class members perform unpaid work after the official

end of the paid work day, including but not limited to

activities such as completing production floor work, doffing

safety equipment and related garments, cleaning safety equip-

ment, bagging gloves and garments, storing safety equipment

22

in lockers and waiting in line at various steps in the above-

described process.

25. Class members clock in at the beginning of their work

day and clock out at the end of their work day, but are

nonetheless paid based on the official start and stop time,

which excludes work performed before and after official

hours.

26. Much of the class members’ off-the-clock work is

performed in workweeks in which class members work in

excess of forty hours.

27. For approximately two years, class members in the

slaughter division have worked under an incentive wage,

where employees are paid a daily productivity bonus to the

extent that they complete assigned work in advance of

allowed time for the work. That productivity bonus is

not included as part of the employees’ regular rate of pay

for purposes of calculating state and federal overtime

premium pay.

28. Class members have been and continue to be subject

to a rule under which deductions are made from their wages

for company equipment that is lost or stolen without their

being involved in any dishonest or willful act. Such deduc-

tions sometimes reduce pay to below state and federal

minimum wage. The equipment deduction does not accrue to

the benefit of the plaintiffs. Instead, the employer derives a

financial benefit by obtaining wage rebates to cover missing

company equipment, much of which is found and used in

production work without reimbursing the employees who

paid for the equipment.

29. The events described hereinabove were continuing at

the time of filing of the complaint and first amended com-

plaint, and, on information and belief, will continue.

23

30. Defendant has been and continues to willfully violate

state and federal wage and hour statutes and regulations with

the intent to deprive class members of a part of their wages.

31. Defendant has been engaged in extensive similar

litigation with the United States Department of Labor and

with private parties, resulting in final judgment affirmed in

Metzler v. IBP, Inc., 127 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1997) and

Bernard v. IBP, Inc., 154 F.3d 259 (Sth Cir. 1998), such that

collateral estoppel should be applied against defendant on

these judgments and other judgments presently unknown

to the class members on issues that will likely arise during

this litigation.

32. The proposed class numbers in excess of 2,000

individuals and, therefore, joinder of all members _ is

impracticable.

33. There are questions of law and fact common to the

class.

34. Virtually all legal issues in this case will be common

class issues, such as state law lunch and rest break issues,

MWA statute of limitations issues, legal similarities and

dissimilarities between the MWA and FLSA, FLSA work and

Portal-to-Portal act issues, FLSA meal break issues, inter-

pretation of 29 U.S.C. § 203(0), deference to be given to the

Wage and Hour Opinion entitled “Hours Worked/Cleaning,

Putting on Safety Gear” (December 3, 1997), collateral

estoppel issues based on Metzler v. IBP, Inc., and Bernard v.

IBP, Inc., supra, legal issues raised by affirmative defenses

advanced by defendant, and other legal issues which will

arise during this litigation.

35. Class members share numerous common issues of

fact, involving matters such as amounts of time it takes to do

various activities, the time that production floor work begins

and ends in relation to paid starting and stopping time,

liability and damages issues which will be tried applying

24

MWA and FLSA principles of representative evideace, and

the willfulness of defendant’s violations for purposes of RCW

49.52.050 & .070 exemplary damages and the FLSA 3-year

statute of limitations, 29 U.S.C. § 254.

36. The claims of the representative parties are similar to

the class claims. See allegations supra and infra.

37. The named plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect

the interests of the class and have made arrangements with

experienced counsel to represent the class members with

vigor and zeal within the bounds of the law.

38. The questions of law and fact common to the mem-

bers predominate over any questions affecting only individual

members, particularly in light of the rules of representative

evidence and the relaxed burdens of proof in MWA and

FLSA cases.

39. A class action is superior to other available methods

for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.

40. Individual class members have little interest in indi-

vidually controlling the prosecution of their claims given the

relatively small amounts of each claim, their relative lack of

sophistication, and the difficulties involved in bringing indi-

vidual litigation against one’s current employer.

41. Plaintiffs are unaware of any other litigation concern-

ing this controversy commenced by or for other class

members.

42. This litigation should be concentrated in this forum

because all class members were employed in defendant’s

Pasco plant, located within this forum.

43. The Court has the resources, abilities and procedures

to effectively manage this class action, particularly with

application of the substantive wage and hour law of repre-

sentative evidence and relaxed burdens of proof.

25

44. Defendant has been and continues to willfully violate

state and federal wage and hour statutes and regulations with

the intent to deprive class members of a part of their wages.

First Claim—State Wage and Hour Law Violations

45. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the prior allegations of

the complaint as if repeated completely.

46. Defendant violates RCW 49.46.020 by permitting un-

paid work to be performed prior to and after the start of the

paid workday.

47. Defendant violates RCW 49.46.130 by permitting

plaintiffs and class members to perform off-the-clock over-

time work, i.e., unpaid work performed by an employee who

has worked in excess of forty hours during a week.

48. Defendant violates RCW 49.46.130 by failing to

include slaughter division incentive pay as part of the regular

rate for purposes of calculating overtime premium pay.

49. Defendant violates RCW 49.46.020, RCW 49.46.130,

RCW 49.12.0005 and WAC 296-126-092 by failing to pay

for meal breaks that are less than 30 minutes, the minimum

length for an unpaid meal break under state law.

50. Defendant violates RCW 49.12.0005 and WAC 296-

126-092 by failing to provide a second 10-minute rest break

on days when plaintiffs work 8 hours or more.

51. Defendam violates RCW chapter 49.12, RCW

49.52.050-49.52.070 and, WAC 296-126-025 by deducting

the cost of lost or stolen equipment from wages of employees

who have not been engaged in any dishonest or willful act

relative to the lost or stolen equipment, a deduction that is not

for the benefit of employees and on which defendant derives

financial gain. Defendant violates RCW 49.46.020 when

the deduction brings the employee’s realized wages below

minimum wage.

26

52. Defendant violates RCW 49.52.050 and RCW

49.52.070 by willfully and with intent to deprive class mem-

bers of wages, failing to pay wages owed pursuant to statute.

Second Claim—Fair Labor Standards Act Violations

53. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the prior allegations of

the complaint.

54. Plaintiffs and class members are similarly situated

with regard to the claims made in this complaint.

55. Defendants violates Section 6 of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C.

§ 206, by deducting equipment cost from wages and not

paying for hours worked, when the net effect of these

violations is to effectively reduce the employee’s average

hourly earnings for the workweek to below the FLSA mini-

mum hourly wage.

56. Defendant violates the overtime provisions of Section

7 of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207, by permitting unpaid

overtime work, including unpaid overtime work prior to the

start of the paid work day, during meal periods that do

not qualify as bona fide meal periods pursuant to FLSA

regulations and case law, and after the end of the paid

work day.

57. Defendant violates the overtime provisions of Section

7 of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207, by failing to include

slaughter division incentive pay in the regular rate for pur-

poses of calculating the overtime premium.

Prayer for Relief

Wherefore, plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of the

class, pray for relief as follows:

1. With regard to the state law claims, plaintiffs pray for

Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) class certification, dam-

ages, exemplary damages, prejudgment interest, costs, attor-

ney fees pursuant to RCW 49.46.090, RCW 49.48.030, RCW

27

49.52.070 and equitable grounds, and for such other and

further relieve[sic], inctuding final injunctive relief, as the

Court deems just and equitable;

2. With regar¢e to the FLSA claims, plaintiffs pray for

FLSA class certification pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b),

damages, liquidated damages, prejudgment interest, costs,

attorney fees pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and such other

and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable.

DATED this 20th day of July 1999.

LAW OFFICE OF DAVID N. MARK

/s/ David N. Mark

by: DAVID N. MARK (WSBA #13908)

SCHROETER, GOLDMARK & BENDER

/s/ William J. Rutzick

by: WILLIAM J. RUTZICK (WSBA# 11533)

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

[Filed Aug. 3, 2001]

NO. CT-98-5005-RHW

GABRIEL ALVAREZ, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

Vv.

IBP, INC., a Delaware corporation,

Defendant.

ORDER ON OBJECTIONS

A hearing was held on July 27, 2001. Before the Court are

Plaintiffs’ Objections and Clarifications to the Court's Pro-

posed Findings (Ct. Rec. 716) and Defendant's Objections

and Clarifications to the Court’s Proposed Findings (Ct. Rec.

793). Plaintiffs were represented by William Rutzick; Defen-

dant by Barbara Duffy and Nancy Anderson. This will

memorialize the Court’s oral rulings.

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiffs’ Objections

A. Meal Break Damages

Plaintiffs request that the Court clarify or, in the alter-

native, reconsider its Findings and Conclusions related to the

amount of recovery for meal-break violations. Plaintiffs con-

tend that the entire 30 minutes of the meal break should be

recovered. Additionally, Plaintiffs argue that Wingert v. Yellow

Freight, 104 Wash. App. 583 (2000), which holds that WAC

296-126-092 does provide a private right of action for rest

break violations, also would apply to meal-break violations

and, therefore, recovery of the full 30 minutes is required.

29

The Court clarifies its conclusion to only allow recovery

for the time spent working during the meal break up to 10

minutes under the state law claim. If the time spent working

during the meal break exceeds 10 minutes, so that the total

uninterrupted meal break is less than 20 minutes, the entire 30

minute period shall be recoverable. This conclusion is based

on the fact that the Plaintiffs’ claim under the MWA is

brought to compensate employees for time worked for which

they were not compensated. The interpretive guideline under

the WAC 296-126-092 indicates that if an employee works

during the meal period, the period is to be extended to give

the employee a 30-minute meal break. This indicates to the

Court that the purpose of both the MWA and the regulation

are to allow for time as a remedy for a violation, not

necessarily monetary compensation for the entire meal break,

when only a portion of the meal break is spent working. This

finding is also consistent with the FLSA provision for meal-

break violations.

B. Class Work Codes

Plaintiffs move for the class member damages to be based

on work codes set forth in exhibits 74 and 75, which were the

documents relied upon in the Proposed Findings, and wish to

include those codes in “exhibit 1048 and the record herein.”

Ex. 1048 was a stipulated exhibit, which set forth which

packaging department jobs are in the class and which are not.

IBP does not object to the inclusion of packaging jobs

referenced in exhibit 1048, and these work codes will be

included.

Additionally, Plaintiffs wish to include class codes that are

not in exhibits 74, 75, and 1048, but which were testified to at

trial and are contained in exhibits. These codes involve saw

operator jobs and other jobs appearing on IBP’s list of jobs

(Ex. 369a and 370a-d} and were testified to by Superin-

tendents Salter and Johnson. Plaintiffs are permitted to rely

upon representative testimony to establish the equipment used

30

and work performed by class members in job codes, as long

as the evidence was introduced at trial. Plaintiffs provided a

list in Appendix A, which includes references to testimony

and exhibits that support inclusion of these job categories.

These work codes will be included if admissible evidence

was introduced at trial about the job so that the appropriate

equipment can be determined from the admitted evidence.

Defendant objects on the grounds that because the Court

ordered that damages should be awarded on an individualized

basis, the Plaintiff should not be able to use representative

evidence to demonstrate what work was performed by what

job codes. This argument rests on a fundamental misun-

derstanding of the Court's proposed Findings and Conclu-

sions. The Court’s proposed Findings and Conclusions,

although concluding that damages should be determined on

an individualized basis, also held that the foundation for

determining what job categories were entitled to damages and

in what amount, were to be deiermined by reference to the

representational evidence. The Court held that the repre-

sentational evidence was adequate to determine what work

was done and in what amounts. To read the Court’s holding

consistent with the Defendant's interpretation would mean

that only those Plaintiffs who testified at trial are entitled to

recovery. That was clearly not the Court’s intent. As the

Court stated in the Proposed Findings and Conclusions “the

documentary and expert testimony provide the evidence for

jobs not testified to by employees. IBP documents identify

which jobs at the Pasco plant require protective equipment.

(Ex. 74.) Documents also identify jobs for which protective

equipment is not required. (Ex. 75.) Internal documents

demonstrate which equipment must be removed prior to

employees going to lunch or to break. (Exs. 82 and 83.) Other

evidence presented indicated which jobs require which items

of personal safety equipment. (Exs. 90-93.) Plaintiffs’ expert

developed average observed times for most activities per-

formed by employees. (Ex. 1035.) Both IBP’s and Plaintiffs’

31

experts performed auditing exercises for certain activities for

each position. (Ex. 358-363.)” What the Court intended by

referencing individualized damage calculations was to de-

velop more narrow categories than ihe ones proposed by the

parties, of slaughter and processing or knife-carrying and

nonknife-carrying job categories. The Court believes that the

evidence presented at trial allows for more narrow definitions

of job categories, and that calculating damages on

the more narrow categories is the most accurate method of

determining damages. It was for this reason that the Court

determined that the day began with the donning of the first

compensable piece of equipment, and also allotted average

times for various equipment donning and doffing. It was also

for this reason that the Court indicated that even as to jobs

for which there was no testimony, recovery would be per-

mitted and could be determined from the expert testimony

and trial exhibits.

C. Damage Calculat.ons

Plaintiffs’ damage calculations are based on CD-ROM data

through January 30, 2000 and the Mobius payroll data from

February 6, 2000 to May 14, 2000.

1. Dr. Abbot's calculations

Defendant objects to the use of Dr. Abbot’s calculations on

the grounds that the calculations are new evidence. The Court

overrules this objection. Defendant argues that the calcu-

lations are based on new evidence, new job codes, new

assumptions about minimum equipment requirements, and

new testimony from class members. The Court has resolved

these issues and determines that Dr. Abbot is simply using the

information already in evidence and ruled on by this Court to

determine damage calculations. Furthermore, according to

Dr. Abbot, the Mobius data includes the same information as

the CD-ROM, (which was admitted into evidence) but, unlike

the CD-ROM, it covers pay periods after January 30, 2000.

32

Dr. Abbot’s manipulation of the admitted data is not new

evidence. If the Defendant has objections to the calculations

the Court will consider a motion to repopen the testimony on

this limited issue.

2. Mobius Data

Defendant objects that Plaintiffs failed to identify what

Mobius data they intend to rely upon to form the basis for

judgment from January 30 through May 14, 2000, and that

Mobius data for the 4 months from January 30, 2000 to May

14, 2000 was never introduced at trial and never admitted into

evidence. Defendant asserts that this evidence was not pro-

duced by IBP, as it was altered by counsel for Plaintiffs at

one time. The Court overrules these objections. Plaintiffs

identify Exhibit 178(b), which indicates that it calculates

damages for “[wJeek ending dates February 6, 2000 through

May 14, 2000 based upon Mobius (PFA) reports.” If, after the

re-calculations have been performed, the Defendant iden-

tifies problems in the data or calculations for the Court, the

Court will consider a motion to reopen the testimony on this

limited issue.

3. Pre-judgment Interest

Preiudgment interest is allowable only when (1) an ammount

claimed is “liquidated;” or (2) the amount of an “wnliqui-

dated” claim is for an amount of money that is “determinable

by computation with reference to a fixed standard contained

in [a] contract, without reliance on opinion or discretion.”

Prier v. Refrigeration Eng’g Co., 74 Wash. 2d 25, 32, 442

P.2d 621 (1968). A “liquidated” claim is defined as one

whose “exact amount is fixed and known.” Prier, 74 Wash.

2d at 32, citing Charles T. McCormick, Damages (Hornbook

Series), § 54 (1935); See also Taylor v. Shigaki, 84 Wash.

App. 723, 732 (1997). Defendant argues that the meal-break

claims are not for a sum determinable without reliance on

opinion or discretion as there is no precedent in this area. This

argument rests on a misperception of the requirement of a

33

fixed standard and of what pre-judgment interest is designed

to accomplish.

Prejudgment interest is not awarded only in those cases

where the law is clear on whether the amount claimed is

owed but, rather, once it is determined that the amount is

owed, whether the amount can be determined with exactness.

“The fact that a dispute exists over all or part of a claim does

not make the claim unliquidated. This is true ‘even thought

the adversary successfully challenges the amount and suc-

ceeds in reducing it.” Aker Verdal v. Neil F. Lampson, Inc.,

65 Wash. App. 177, 190 (1992), quoting Pier at 33. “It

follows from the foregoing that, where the amount sued for

may be arrived at by a process of measurement or computa-

tion from the data given by the proof, without any reliance

upon opinion or discretion after the concrete facts have been

determined, the amount is liquidated and will bear interest.”

Prier at 33-34. Here, the amount of recovery for the time

spent working during the meal period is the time spent work-

ing, and if that time extends beyond 10 minutes, the entire 30-

minute period is recoverable. The compensable time is easily

determined by looking to the pay rates for employees and

calculating the time spent working during the meal break on

days where a meal break was required. Finally, prejudgment

interest is not to punish Defendant but, rather, to compensate

the Plaintiffs for money wrongfully withheld. “Prejudgment

interest is not a penalty imposed on a defendant for wrong-

doing nor is its purpose to deter wrongdoing.” Hansen v.

Rothaus, 107 Wash. 2d 468, 475 (1987).

Defendant claims that pre-judgment interest is also part of

the Plaintiffs’ damage calculation on the rest break—this will

be addressed at the hearing on the rest break evidence.

4. Damages to May 14, 2000—No Judgment Bar Thereafter

Plaintiffs indicate that they have detailed electronic payroll

data only through the week ending May 14, 2000, which was

34

near the end of discovery. They request that the Court’s final

findings calculate damages through this period and hold that

work performed thereafter is not being subject to any judg-

ment bar. Plaintiffs are capable of running projections, but do

not want to do so as it raises various issues for appeal.

Defendant objects to Plaintiffs’ damage calculations, which

would allow a future supplemental order as the Court’s find-

ings in this case would not be a final order. The Court will

issue a final judgment on the issue with damages calculated

through May 14, 2000. The Court will not hold that work

performed thereafter is or is not subject to any judgment bar.

5. May Provide Duplicate Recovery

Defendant objects that Plaintiffs’ damage calculations may

provide for duplicate recovery under FLSA and MWA be-

cause where the MWA damages are not higher than the FLSA

damages, Dr. Abbot has applied a calculation to attempt to

factor in the MWA’s statute of limitation and other differ-

ences with the FLSA. Defendants argue thai this results in a

rough estimate, in violation of the individualized damages

notion. As outlined above, the Court does mot see a rough

estimate of damages a violation of its order that damages

should be considered on an individualized basis. However,

the Court reiterates that Plaintiffs are entitled to recovery on

one theory only.

D. Equipment Beyond the Minimal Equipment List

Plaintiffs have matched work codes with the equipment

sets in IBP’s Required Equipment Lists in Exhibits 90-93.

Plaintiffs also indicate that certain job codes require addi-

tional safety equipment, which is not identified on IBP’s

Required Equipment List, but about which there was testi-

mony and other evidence: introduced at trial. Plaintiffs seek to

have these other activities included in damages calculations.

The requested additional activities are outlined below. The

Court finds that the representational testimony was adequate

35

in proving what additional equipment was required beyond

the Required Equipment Lists. As the Court indicated in its

Proposed Findings and Conclusions on the representational

evidence, “[t}he combination of this evidence convinces the

Court that employees have, in fact, performed work for which

they were improperly compensated, and that they have pro-

duced sufficient evidence to show the amount and extent of

that work as a matter of just and reasonable inference.”

While the Court concluded that the MWA and the FLSA

protect individual rights and that damages should be calcu-

lated on an individualized basis, it also determined that it. was

satisfied by the amount and quality of representational evi-

dence and that it was “untroubled here, based om the combi-

nation of employee testimony, documentary evidence, and

expert testimony.” McLaughlin v. Ho Fat Seto, 850 F.2d 586,

589 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that while the testimony of the

five employee witnesses was inconsistent in terms of exact

days and hours of overtime, they had established “‘as a matter

of just and reasonable inferenge’ that all of the employees

regularly worked over eight hours on weekdays and over six

hours on many Saturdays.”)

“The employee testimony established that pre- and post-

shift and meal-time work activities were unpaid, what activi-

ties were being performed during these times, and the time

each activity takes to complete. Just over 40 employees

of IBP’s Pasco Plant testified at trial; 25 employees from

the Processing Division testified, and employees from the

Slaughter Division testified to over 40 job positions. Each

employee testified to their various pre- and post-shift activ-

ities, as well as their donning and doffing practices during the

30-minute meal break period. While it is true that employees

vary in some of the equipment they are required to don and

doff, each employee spent some uncompensated time both

pre- and post-shift and during the 30-minute meal break.

Most employees share at least some of the required protective

36

equipment.” The Court also had the benefit of visiting and

viewing the operations at the IBP Plant in Pasco, Washington.

1. Scabbards and steels in straight knife user equipment

sets.

The Court grants Plaintiffs’ request to include scehbards

and steels in straight knife user equipment sets. Straight knife

usage is determined from the record of testimony from Salter

and Johnson. Defendant does not object to this inclusion.

2. Two cloth gloves for every job code in processing.

Plaintiffs’ request to include two cloth gloves for every job

code in processing is granted. Defendant objects and cites to

the Plaintiffs’ excluded declarations, which do not indicate

cloth gloves on equipment lists. The Court will include the

two cloth gloves, as the evidence at trial was that the gloves

are “integral and indispensable.” As the Court indicated in its

proposed findings “[t}he workers testified that they could not

hold the knives safely without the clean gloves because of the

blood and fat that made them slip. Many workers changed

their gloves multiple times a day in order to keep them clean.

Some had as many as six to eight pair that they changed

throughout the day. In addition to safety concerns, the em-

ployees testified that the gloves were necessary as insulation

from the cold of the refrigerated carcasses and the cold

temperature of the processing floor. Cold hands made it *..ore

dangerous to use knives, saws, and other types of cutting

equipment.”

3. Three cloth gloves for knife users in processing.

Plaintiffs’ request to include three cloth gloves for knife

users in processing is granted. The Defendant objects on the

grounds that these are not indicated in the Plaintiffs’ excluded

post-trial declarations. Plaintiffs have identified particular

page numbers of testimony and equipment list exhibits, which

indicate three cloth gloves were used by knife carriers in

37

processing. (Maria Salvi p. 31, 41-42, 43-44, 45-46, Ex.

1000; Rufino Vasquesz p. 30, Ex. 1001; Modesto Reynaga

p. 14-15, Ex. 1002; Martina Sanchez p. 15, Ex. 1004.) Defen-

dant points to no admitted evidence that refutes that knife

users in processing do not use three cloth gloves.

| The Court finds that three cloth gloves are “integral and

indispensable” to knife users in processing, and this time is

compensable.

4. A rubber apron for saw operators in processing.

Plaintiffs’ request to include a rubber apron for saw opera-

tors in processing is granted. The Defendant objects on the

grounds that this information is, again, not indicated in the

Plaintiffs’ excluded declarations of saw operators. Plaintiffs

have identified particular page numbers of testimony and

equipment list exhibits which indicate a rubber apron was

worn by saw operators. ( Jose Zamora p. 47, Ex. 1003; Victor

Rangel Ex. 1016; Pedro Piceno p. 18.) Defendant points to no

admitted evidence that refutes that saw operators in proc-

essing wear rubber gloves. The Court finds a rubber apron is

“integral and indispensable” to saw operators in processing,

and this time is compensable.

5. Two yellow plastic sleeves and a weight belt for pack-

aging workers in processing.

Plaintiffs’ request to include two yellow plastic sleeves and

a weight belt for packaging workers in processing is granted

in part and denied in part. The Defendant objects on the

grounds that this equipment is not required, and that many of

Plaintiffs’ excluded declarations cite only one or the other.

The Court concludes that two yellow plastic sleeves are

“integral and indispensable” to packaging workers in proc-

essing, and that this time is compensable, but does not find

the same for the weight belt, as testimony regarding the

weight belt varied for individual workers.

38

6. Two rubber gloves to workers on the hamburger codes

in processing.

Plaintiffs’ request to include two rubber gloves for workers

on the hamburger codes in processing is granted. Defendant

objects again, pointing to Plaintiffs’ excluded declarations.

Plaintiffs have identified particular page numbers of testi-

riony and equipment list exhibits that indicate hamburger

workers in processing wear two rubber gloves. (Maria

Espinoza p. 13, Ex. 1023; Sofia Gutierrez, Ex. 1014; Victoria

Vaca. Ex. 1019.) Defendant points to no admitted evidence

that refutes that hamburger workers in processing wear two

rubber gloves. The Court finds that two rubber gloves are

“integral and indispensable” to workers on the hamburger

codes in processing and this time is compensable.

7. Two cloth gloves to steam vac operators in the

slaughter division.

Plaintiffs’ request to include two cloth gloves to steam vac

operators in the slaughter division is granted. Plaintiffs have

identified particular page numbers of testimony and equip-

ment list exhibits that indicate steam vac operators In the

slaughter division wear two cloth gloves. (Patsy Tovar P. 16-

17: Ex. 1039; Rosario Robles Ex. 1042; Enedina Ramirez p.

14. Ex. 1043.) Defendant points to no admitted evidence that

refutes that steam vac operators in the slaughter division wear

two cloth gloves. The Court finds that two cloth gloves are

“integral and indispensable” for steam vac operators in the

slaughter division, and that this time is compensable.

8. Two rubber gloves and a rubber apron to straight knife,

whizzard, and air knife users in slaughter.

Plaintiffs’ request to include two rubber gloves and a rub-

ber apron to straight knife, whizzard, and air knife users in

slaughter is granted. Plaintiffs have identified particular page

numbers of testimony and equipment list exhibits which in-

39

dicate that particular knife users in slaughter wear two rubber

gloves and a rubber apron. (Air Knife Users—Arturo Aguillar

Ex. 1034; Miguel Lopez Ex. 1033; Luis Moreno p. 34, Ex.

1024, Antonio Martinez p. 7, Ex. 1045; Rosario Robles, p. 6,

Ex. 1042; Jose Santiago Ex. 1027. Knife Users Patsy Tovar

p. 5, 11, Ex. 1039; Miguel Alvarado Ex. 1030; Paz Arroyo

Ex. 1041; Cruz Escobar Ex. 1029; Pedro Galvan, Ex. 1047;

Salvador Guzman Ex. 1031; Miguel Lopez Ex. 1033, etc.)

Defendant points to no admitted evidence that refutes that

knife users in slaughter wear two rubber gloves and a rubber

apron. The Court finds that two rubber gloves and a rubber

apron are “integral and indispensable” to straight knife, whiz-

zard, and air knife users in slaughter, and that this time is

compensable.

F. Allocation of Activities to Work Codes

1. Walk time from the locker to work station and work

station to locker

Defendant objects to walk time from the locker to work

station and work station to locker for all class members. The

Court rejects this objection as to employees who wear com-

pensable protective equipment. As noted in the proposed

findings, most processing and slaughter employees don com-

pensable safety equipment in the locker room. Thus, if the

employees’ first compensable activity is donning equipment

in the locker room, they are to be compensated from then on.

As the Court’s Findings and Conclusions held

[t]he employee is, thus, to be paid upon arrival at his

or her locker when he or she dons his or her first piece

of compensable safety equipment. The employee’s day

ends when he or she has washed and removed his or her

last piece of equipment and placed it in his or her locker.

The employer has chosen to store the items in the

employees’ lockers and, thus, the employees will be paid

from the time of arrival at their locker until the last piece

40

of equipment is put away. This time is not based on a

locker-to-locker theory of the work day, but rather on the

reality that the worker dons his or her first piece of

equipment upon arrival at his or her locker.

The Court finds that this time is not compensable for cloth

glove wearers who do not wear any other compensable equip-

ment. These employees are to be compensated for the time

spent waiting for gloves and from then on, including walking

from the cafeteria, where gloves are retrieved, to the work

station.

Defendant seeks to exclude walk time to the cafeteria to get

gloves from processing employees who are compensated for

locker-to-work-station walk time. Defendant identifies these

as mostly knife-carriers. The Court rejects this objec-

tion, as the evidence demonstrated that the gloves were

distributed in the cafeteria, and that employees were required

to go their locker and then go to the cafeteria to retrieve

gloves. Since compensable time begins with the donning of

compensable equipment at the locker, walk time to the cafete-

ria to get gloves is included for processing employees, except

B-shift employees, who only wear gloves, where the evidence

indicated that employees do not wait to get gloves in the

cafeteria’. As the Court held in its Findings and Conclusions

“(wJalking time is compensable if it occurs after the start of

the work day. 29 U.S.C. § 254(a). Walking time is excluded

under the Portal to Portal Act only if it occurs ‘either prior to

the time on any particular work day at which such employee

commences, or subsequent to the time on any particular work

day at which he ceases, such principal activity or activities.”

Id. The work day begins with the commencement of an

employee’s principal activity or activities and ends with the

completion of the employee's activity; thus, the inclusion of

Dr. Mericle’s walking time as compensable time.”

' Although the Court does hold that these employees are entitled to

compensation for time waiting to get gloves.

4]

3. [sic] Walk from work station to cafeteria and walk from

cafeteria to wort station

Defendant objects to the inclusion of time for walking from

work station to cafeteria and walking from cafeteria to work

station to all class members. IBP argues that walking to the

cafeteria at meal break is primarily for the employees’ bene-

fit, per Anderson v. Mt. Clemons Pottery Co., 69 F. Supp.

710, 719 (1947) and is, therefore, not compensable. The

Court accepts this objection, in part, and orders that em-

ployees will not be compensated for walk time to the cafeteria

at the meal break, but will be compensated for the time it

takes to don and doff equipment during the meal break.

4. Wait for wash to all class members

Defendant objects to wait for wash time to all class mem-

bers. Where any compensable equipment is required, wait for

wash time will be included. The Court will not limit wait to

wash time to mesh equipment. The Court found that workers

“hose down and scrub aprons, sleeves, rubber gloves,” and

the evidence indicated an average wait for wash time is re-

quired. Wait to wash time shall be given to all employees

wearing compensable protective equipment.

5. Wash and Clean Equipment

Defendant objects to the wash and clean equipment time

for all class members. Where any compensable equipment is

required, wait for wash time will be included. The Court will

not limit wait to wash time to mesh equipment. The Court

found that workers “hose down and scrub aprons, sleeves,

rubber gloves,” and the evidence indicated an average wait

for wash time is required. Wash and clean equipment time

will be given to all employees wearing compensable pro-

tective equipment.

42

6. Handle equipment, get ready, pul away

Defendant objects to the inclusion of time for “handle

equipment, get ready and put away” for all class members.

All job categories using compensable equipment on the

slaughter or processing floor will be compensated for this

time.

7. Wait and Obtain Gloves

Defendant objects to time given to processing employees

on the B shift for wait and obtain gloves time, as distribution

is different from the A shift. The Court finds that gloves are

integral and indispensable, and the wait time is compensable

for employees on both processing shifts.

F. Clarifications

Plaintiffs withdrew their request that the Court correct the

proposed findings by indicating on Page 6, line 22 that proc-

essing employees get a frock after going to their locker room.

Plaintiffs request that the Court amend Page 11, line 5 to

indicate a total of 815 class members. The Court will amend

the Order with this number.

Plaintiffs request the Court to fill in blank exhibit numbers

with specific exhibits they have identified. The Court will

supplement the Order with these exhibit numbers.

Il. Defendant’s Objections

A. Willfulness, Statute of Limitation, Double Damages and

Representative Evidence

Defendant objects to the Court’s findings on willfulness,

the statute of limitation, double damages, and the adequacy of

the representative testimony. The Court is not in a posture to

reconsider its substantive legal conclusions and will not con-

sider these arguments at this time.

43

The Court also will not reconsider arguments relating to

the factual showings. The Court will address any mistakes or

clarifications, but will not consider the same arguments that

were made at trial and in motion practice on which a ruling

already has been made.

B. Objections Related to Pasco Plant

Il. Page |, Footnote |: job classifications are staffed with

multiple workers, and workers who work alongside each

other .. . using virtually the same equipment.

The Court rejects Defendant's objection to Page |, foot-

note | which indicates that job classifications are staffed with

multiple workers, and workers who work alongside each

other . . . using virtually the same equipment. The Defendant

argues that the evidence was that employees wear different

types as well as quantities of protective clothing. The entire

text of the footnote does not indicate that the Court was

concluding that workers who work alongside each other wear

virtually identical protective clothing but, rather, that work-

ers who do work side by side have different work code

classifications. Additionally, the Court found the represen-

tational evidence adequate, and that many class members

wear the same equipment.

2. Page 3, line 10-12: Sunshine pay is extra compensation

for working more efficiently and more quickly.

Defendant objects to this description of Sunshine Pay. The

ae rejects this objection, based on the testimony received

at trial.

C. Objections Related to “Bargaining History” Section

1. Page 3, line 13: The majority of workers at IBP’s Pasco

plant are Hispanic.

Defendant objects that there was no testimony relating to

the overall characteristics of the class. The Court rejects this

objection, based on the testimony received at trial.

44

D. Objections Related to “DOL Litigation”

1. Page 4, line 5-9: The courts also held IBP liable for un-

paid pre-shift and post-shift donning, doffing, and cleaning of

special packinghouse industry safety equipment.

IBP objects that only some equipment was found com-

pensable, and that walking and waiting was found to be not

compensable. The Court rejects this objection, as the state-

ment accurately reflects the Reich court holding.

2. Page 4-5. Footnote 3: /BP claimed to have reduced

compensable time from 14 minutes to 4 minutes by moving

knife distribution and by installing additional equipment

washing sinks to reduce waiting time. In late 1998 and early

1999. IBP and DOL negotiated and agreed to 4 minutes of

compensation at the non-union plants for pre- and post-shift

activities.

The Court rejects IBP’s objection that this mischaracterizes

the evidence that the DOL indicated in a stipulation dis-

missing with prejudice its claims against IBP, that IBP had

fully satisfied the DOL.

E. Objections to “Pre- and Post-Shift Activities .

1. Page 6, lines 14-15: Most Slaughter employees don most

of their safety equipment in the locker room.

The Court rejects IBP’s objection that the testimony varied

about where employees donned safety equipment. The state-

ment indicates most employees, and the finding was based on

adequate representative evidence.

2. Page 6, line 24-26: Much of the pre-shift routine for

processing surrounds the distribution of glove pins with yel-

low cotton gloves, and protective sleeves and gloves.

The Court rejects IBP’s objection related to the variety

of distribution methods. Again, the Court’s conclusion was

based on adequate representative testimony.

45

3. Page 7, line 8-9: A majority of employees do use the

restroom during the meal break.

The Court rejects IBP’s objection relating to the adequacy

of the representative testimony. Again the Court's conclusion

was based on adequate representative testimony.

F. Objections to “Uncompensated Activities”

1. Page 8, line 11-14: During the 30 minute meal break

employees are required to doff and hang up the safety

equipment they were wearing before they can begin to use the

break as their own time.

The Court rejects IBP’s objection that employees are not

required to doff all safety equipment at meal break times, as

that is also indicated clearly in the findings.

2. Page 8, line 15-18: After working on their last piece of

meat, the workers are on the production floor and are

required to wash their equipment and doff and store their

equipment upon returning to their lockers.

The Court rejects IBP’s objection relating to the adequacy

of the representative testimony. Again the Court’s conclusion

was based on adequate representative testimony.

3. Page 9, lines 7-14: JBP urges that it relied on DOL’s

exclusion of union plants in this litigation to conclude

that clothes changing time was not compensable at union

plants . . . (negotiated settlement of 4 minutes clothes changing

time ).

The Court rejects IBP’s objection that their reliance on

DOL includes the Reich decision, and that IBP re-engineered

their plants to reduce clothes changing time. IBP also objects

that referring to the 4 minutes as negotiated implies that it

was a compromise of a disputed claim, and that this im-

plication is wrong as this was the reality of how long it took

to actually don and doff the protective clothing. The Court

rejects these objections as the factual recitation in the Court’s

46

Findings and Conclusions indicates the thrust of IBP’s

reliance argument at trial and the extra facts relayed by

Defendant in this objection are not relevant to the Court's

determination that they were not, in fact, relying on DOL.

The facts surrounding IBP’s claim of reliance are further

outlined in the section on Good Faith Reliance.

G. Objections to “Other Claims Re: Noncompensability ©

The Court rejects IBP’s objections to “Other Claims Re:

Noncompensability” as the listed items, arguments by IBP

about why certain items are noncompensable, are dealt with

elsewhere in the order. The specific arguments listed by IBP

in objection are each addressed elsewhere in the Court's

proposed Order.

H. Objections to “The Class”

IBP claims there is not a definite class number. The Court

is amending the findings to include a total class number of

815, calculated as follows: From Ex. 266-816 opt ins + 5 of

the 6 original named Plaintiffs (Pedro Hernandez is #346 on

Ex. 266 and should not be counted twice) -5 for five Ex. 266

opt ins stipulated as untimely and -1 Ex. 266 who is double

counted (Ms. Hernandez, #’s 338 and 341), for a total of 815

class members.

I. Objections re: Representative Evidence

The Court rejects objections by IBP to the legal conclu-

sions in the proposed Findings and Conclusions regarding the

adequacy of the representative evidence. The Court is not in a

posture to reconsider its substantive legal conclusions, and

will not consider these arguments at this time.

J. Objections re: Employer Rebuttal

The Court rejects objections by IBP to the legal con-

clusions in the proposed Findings and Conclusions regarding

the adequacy of IBP’s rebuttal of the representational evi-

47

dence. The Court is not in a posture to reconsider its substan-

tive legal conclusions, and will not consider these arguments

at this time.

K. Objections re: Statute of Limitation

| The Court rejects objections by IBP to the legal conclu-

sions in the proposed Findings and Conclusions relating to

the statute of limitation and willfulness. The Court is not in a-

posture to reconsider its substantive legal conclusions, and

will not consider these arguments at this time.

L. Objections re: Overtime Under the FLSA

1. Page 17, line 8-10 re: 29 CFR. § 785.7.

The Court rejects Defendant's objection that the Court does

not indicate that the Portal to Portal Act provides an excep-

tion for preliminary and postliminary activities.

M. Objections re: Compensable Time

Defendant's objections under this section, based on their

argument that there was not adequate representative evidence

for these findings, are rejected by the Court.

The Court rejects IBP’s objection relating to the adequacy

of the representative testimony. Again, the Court’s conclusion

was that the representational evidence was adequate.

Item 5, which notes that the Court should include hair net

in the list at Page 19, line 5-8, is well taken, and hair net will

be added to the list of noncompensable activities as is indi-

cated elsewhere in the Findings and Conclusions.

Item 8, which requests clarification re: polar and clean cut

gloves. Plaintiffs concede that polar and clean cut gloves are

identical, and the Order will be changed to reflect this.

ltem 9, which requests clarificatior regarding cloth gloves.

The Court has determined that two cloth gloves will be

48

awarded to all processing members, and is not limited to only

those Plaintiffs who testified at trial.

Item 10 which requests a “*” by hair net and cloth gloves.

The Court will add a “*” by hair net. No such amendment

will be made for cloth gloves, as the Court has found these to

be “integral and indispensable” and compensable.

Item 11, which requests that it be noted at page 21,

footnote 9 that no compensation is required at lunch for

boots, safety glasses, hard hat, ear plugs, etc. The Court

rejects this request, as the point of the footnote is to indicate

what is excluded under 3(0), which does not exclude the time

during meal periods.

Items 12-22, which request clarification on recovery for

certain items for certain job categories. This is dealt with

above on the issue of what will be included in damages

calculations.

Item 23, Page 23, line 10-11: /BP furnishes new gloves to

the workers on a weekly basis. IBP objects that there was no

evidence on this. The Court recalls this evidence and

testimony and rejects this objection.

N. Objections re: walk and wait time

The Court rejects objections by IBP to the legal conclu-

sions in the proposed Findings and Conclusions regarding

walk and wait time. The Court is not in a posture to recon-

sider its substantive legal conclusions and will not consider

these arguments at this time. Many of these objections are

considered in the Plaintiffs’ objections and requests for

clarifications outlined above.

O. Objections re: Meal Breaks

Defendant's objections regarding meal breaks are addressed

in the section regarding Plaintiffs’ objections. Again, Defen-

dant objects to the recitation that employees are required to

49

use the restroom. Again, the Court will not reconsider the

adequacy of the representative evidence on this issue.

P. Objections re: Affirmative Defenses

The Court rejects objections by IBP to the legal conclu-

sions in the proposed Findings and Conclusions regarding the

adequacy of their affirmative defenses. The Court is not in a

posture to reconsider its substantive legal conclusions and

will not consider these arguments at this time.

The objections that do not argue legal conclusions are as

follows:

1. Page 29, line 4-7. . . clothes changing is limited to

changing into and out of the frock and wash time is limited to

washing of the person.

The Court adopts Defendant’s clarification and will include

the listed items; hard hat, ear plugs, safety glasses, boots, and

hairnet in this excluded category as well.

Q. Objections Re: Portal to Portal

The Court rejects objections by IBP to the legal conclu-

sions in the proposed Findings and Conclusions regarding

the Portal to Portal Act. The Court js not in a posture to

reconsider its substantive legal conclusions, and will not

consider these arguments at this time.

Item 2: the Court will add hair net to the items excluded

under 3(0).

R. Objections re: “Overtime Claims”

The Court rejects objections by IBP to the legal con-

clusions in the proposed Findings and Conclusions regarding

overtime claims. The Court is not in a posture to reconsider

its substantive legal conclusions, and will not consider these

arguments at this time.

50

S. Objections re: Damages

The Court rejects objections by IBP to the legal con-

clusions in the proposed Findings and Conclusions regarding

damages. The Court is not in a posture to reconsider its

substantive legal conclusions, and will not consider these

arguments at this time.

IBP objects to the Court requiring Plaintiffs to go outside

the record to prove damages. This has been addressed in the

Court’s order striking the Plaintiffs’ post-trial declarations.

T. Other Items Not Considered by the Court

1. Four Minutes of Clothing Time Paid Since July 1998.

Plaintiffs indicate that they have given 4 minutes of

clothes-changing time credit since July 1998 in their damages

calculations. The offset will be expressly referred to in the

judgment regarding damages calculations.

2. Form of Judgment

IBP queries whether each individual employee will be a

judgment creditor. The Court will enter one judgment, with

an overall damages calculation.

3. Occurrence of Simultaneous Activity

IBP argues that many acts are performed simultaneously.

The Court adopts Dr. Mericle’s findings on the time required

for each activity. As the Court’s proposed Findings and

Conclusions held “[t}]he Court acknowledges that there are

considerable differences in how and where each employee

dons and doffs his or her equipment. Given these differences,

the compensable time for each activity is on the basis of a

reasonable time, rather than the actual time required for each

activity. Evidence of reasonable time was supplied by

employee and expert testimony supplied by the Plaintiff, and

not rebutted by IBP.”

51

4. Meal Break

IBP requests several clarifications regarding meal-break

time, which are addressed above in this order.

5. Preemption |

IBP states that the Court does not address federal labor law

preemption. This objection is rejected, and the Court refers

Defendant to the Proposed Findings at page 28-29. “Union

representatives may not bargain away employee rights under

the FLSA. See Featsent v. City of Youngstown, 70 F.3d 900,

905 (6th Cir. 1995), citing Walling v. Harnischfeger Corp.,

325 U.S. 427, 431-32 (1945). The Ninth Circuit has held “that

the FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime provisions . . . are

guarantees to individual workers that may not be waived

through collective bargaining.” Albertson's, Inc., v. United

Food & Commercial Workers Union, AFL-CIO & CLC, 157

F.3d 758, 761 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal quotations omitted)

citing Locai 246 Utility Workers Union v. Southern Cal.

Edison Co., 83 F.3d 292 (9th Cir 1996) (holding where em-

ployees’ claim is based on substantive rights under the FLSA,

no resort to arbitration under the CBA is required). See also

Collins v. Lobdell, 188 F.3d 1124, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 1999)

(holding congressionally granted FLSA rights take prece-

dence over conflicting provisions in a collectively bargained

compensation arrangement). The Supreme Court also has

held that FLSA rights “cannot be abridged by contract or oth-

erwise waived because this would ‘nullify the purposes’ of

the statue and thwart the legislative policies it was designed

to effectuate.” Barrantine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450

U.S. 728, 740 (1981) (citations omitted.) Conflicting provi-

sions between FLSA and collective bargaining agreements

are resolved in favor of the FLSA. See id.”

6. Class certification

IBP requests reconsideration of class certification based on

the difficulty in calculating damages. Again, this is based on a

52

misunderstanding of the Court’s proposed findings, and an

attempt to distort the concept of individualized damages. The

Court is requiring individualized damages calculations in an

over-abundance of caution to the Defendant. The Court could

have determined that the evidence was sufficient to permit a

more generalized damages calculation, but because the evi-

dence and testimony per:nitted a more discrete determination

as to timing by job description, equipment list, and activities

testified to, the Court determined that this calculation would

lead to a recovery that relates to what work was actually

performed. Defendant’s objection will be denied based on the

findings of adequate representative evidence.

IT IS HEP -BY ORDERED:

1. Plaintiffs’ Objections and Clarifications to the Court’s

Proposed Findings (Ct. Rec. 716) is GRAN. ED in part and

DENIED in part, as outlined in the above order.

2. Defendant’s Objections and Clarifications to the Court’s

Proposed Findings (Ct. Rec. 793) is GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part as outlined in the above order.

IT IS SO ORDERED. The District Court Executive is

directed to enter this order and to provide copies to counsel.

DATED this 2nd day of August 2001.

/s/ Robert H. Whaley

ROBERT H. WHALEY

United States District Judge

53

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 03-1238

IBP, INC..,

Petitioner

Vv.

GABRIEL ALVAREZ, Individually and on

Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, et al.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, No. 02-

35042, 02-35110.

ON CONSIDERATION of the petition for a writ of certio-

rari herein to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit.

IT IS ORDERED by this Court that the said petition is

granted limited to Question | presented by the petition. This

case is consolidated with No. 04-66 and a total of one hour is

allotted for oral argument.

February 22, 2005

A true copy WILLIAM K. SUTER

Test:

Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States

By

Deputy

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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