Amicus Curiae Brief — Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen

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MAR 1 1 2004

IN THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Supreme Court of the united States

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, ef ai.

Petitioners,

Vv.

PUBLIC CITIZEN, et ai.,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE

EAGLE FORUM EDUCATION & LEGAL DEFENSE

FUND IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS

ANDREW SCHLAFLY KAREN B. TRIPP *

521 Fifth Ave. - 17th Floor 2245 Shakespeare Road

New York, NY 10175 Houston, TX 77030

(212) 292-4510 (713) 658-9323

* Counsel of Record Counsel for Amicus

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Pages

TABLE OF AUTHORITIEBG...............ccccccocsscosssscsoseosees il

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ......ccccccccccccsesseseeseeee I

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.............cccccccccsceceeseseesees 2

IN aCe a 3

I. NAFTA, AS ENACTED BY CONGRESS,

DOES NOT AUTHORIZE PRESIDEN-

TIAL BYPASS OF DOMESTIC LAW TO

ADHERE TO A_ DECISION OF AN

INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL............00000000. 4

Il. NAFTA UNCONSTITUTIONALLY CRE-

ATES A FOREIGN COURT WITHOUT

AUTHORIZATION BY TREATY ................... 10

Ill. THE REQUISITE ENVIRONMENTAL IM-

PACT STATEMENT MUST INCLUDE

EFFECTS ON HUMAN SAFETY AND

Sa aalll eihieieseiniiecinirincenbnnsanenattenmcesemttintianiinainetansintteies 14

Soe NTEITT sensesinstsencctussasterntbiniisaiiiiininiemammsaninitans 21

(i)

il

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES Pages

Barker v. Harvey, 181 U.S. 481 (1901)... 5

Botiller v. Dominguez, 130 U.S. 238 (1889) ......... 5

Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581

(| EE eee 5

Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).. 11

Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530

U.S. SBS (QOD) nccccecccsssccsscesensnscnsnnsensnnnanann 8

Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992)... Y

Highland Cooperative v. City of Lansing, 492 F.

Supp. 1372 (W.D. Mich, 1980) ..........cccsceeeeeeeee 18

Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. 211 (1872) wecccceceeeeeeeeees 10

Made in the USA Foundation vy. United States,

242 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 534

U.S. 1GBD (BEDI ) eccoceccosessesesstsasesnteemnnenneinias 13,14

Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear

Energy, 460 U.S. 766 (1983) ......ccceseseeeseeeeeeees 20

Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) ............ 14

New York vy. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)... 14

Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe

Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982)..........ccccccrccessseseees 12

Oregon Environmental Council v Kunzman, 714

F.2d S01 (Sele Cig, 1SGS) .coccccscccsesscccsnsorssesnossiiens 18

Public Citizen v. Department of Transp., 316

F.3d 1002 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct.

AY |) ee 8, 10, 17

Tag v. Rogers, 267 F.2d 664 (D.C. 1959), cert.

denied, 362 U.S. 957 (1960)..........cssecsccssessrereees 8

Taylor v. Morton, 23 F, Cas. 784, 2 Curt. 454 (D.

Mass. 1855), aff'd, 67 U.S. 481 (1863)............. 6

United States vy. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 83MM.

Files, 413 US. 123 (UDTS) cccocccsocessecensenninastnians 13

United States v. 27.09 Acres of Land, 760 F.

Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ....cccccscsseseeereseseeeens 17

iil

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

CONSTITUTION, STATUTES AND Pages

LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS

SE IES GUIs Wily Ge Sb cccncsccccnsnesscrssccssesssoscesesees |

SIS TE TIT ortrcsenserecieneemensseemenenecseseosenevescssecsees

SEITE TIT cceseriestnesunsennencnsnssnsnssnensesncessees

STII TIPU cosneccecercsnscssussesesssnecsesesevenseaees

SIIIIIIE TET IIIT cntnsnnsesusssnstecsienssessmssssecesscconsscescees

EE tt IID cxencecenesscesnseussesssconsocesacsscetee

Se it ELIE cccrssnecsseesnserecsecssecsesseevececeses

Be is 0 SERIE esd coceececcscececcsccvesccccceseesesssseess

Satta tt EEE D ccrssnttcessenscnsssnesscesscceessssoceses

_ — cca

BP UBA. § USIGBICK 1 WA) nccccccccsccsccccccscsscesccscesees

Ss OF RUUIINDEAD ccnseccscecessesescesesesessocsssescsses

GP ics ©) SSO UIENDLID conccsecsscesccssscseecesevscesccceccecs

5 Annals of Cong. 760-62 (1796) .........:cccccceeeeeeees

5 Annals of Cong. 771-72 (1796) ........ccccccccceeeeeeee

139 Cong. Rec. $16,712-13 (daily ed. Nov. 20,

—eFe nnn t &BwWUWDAHh SOOO

S

»

-—s

OTHER

Jorge Chabat, “Mexico’s War on Drugs: No

Margin for Maneuver,” 582 The Annals of The

American Academy of Political and Social

SCHMCS 134 (Fely ZOUZ) .nccrcccccccosvesecevesesereeeseoees 19

“Company that Hired Illegal Driver to Pay

$10.7M,” USA Today, June 19, 2001 ............... 15

Paul Stephen Dempsey, “Free Trade But Not

Free Transport? The Mexican Stand-Off,” 30

Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol’y 91 (Winter 2001)....... 16

Federalist No. 75, The Federalist Papers (Ros-

siter & Kesler 0s. 1999) ......ceccrccrcscorssecveseceeeees 11

iV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Craig Jarvis, “N.C. Seen as Hub where Illicit

Drugs Repackaged,” The News & Observer

(Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 22, 2004 ..........ccccscesseeeeee

Alan Larson, “Outlining the Potential for

Expanded US-Mexico Trade,” Remarks to

54th Plenary of the Mexico-U.S. Business

Committee (Mar. 5, 2001), http://www.state.

gov/e/ris/rm/2001/1133pf.html (visited Apr.

J. Patrick LaRue, “The ‘ILL-ICIT’ Effects of

NAFTA: Increased Drug Trafficking into the

United States Through the Southwest Border,”

9 Currents Int’! Trade L.J. 38 (Summer 2000)..

Majer Drug Traffickers, U.S. DEP’T OF JUS-

TICE, DEA BRIEFING BOOK, (Oct. 1999),

http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/briefing-book/page

34-48.him (visited Nov. 20, 1999)... cece

Jason C. Messenger, “Opening the U.S.-Mexico

Border: Problems and Concerns for the Bush

Administration, the Countries, and the Legal

System to Consider,” 9 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int'l

ao G5 GRIND ZIIIED excnscccnsnanscsssacsenssemsssssnessnsens

Kirk Mitchell, “Police: Deadly I-76 Crash Fits

Immigrant-Smuggling Profile,” Denver Post,

Jim Muir, “Glenn Poshard: On the Record:

Speaking Frankly About the Corruption,

Wrongdoing and Cover-Ups,” The Southern

DG OU

James Pinkerton, “Semi-Conscious State; Inspec-

tion of Trucks on Border Threadbare,” Hous-

ton Chronicle, Aug. 12, 2001 ........cccccccceeeeeseees

Page

18

20

16

15

17

\

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Ciro Rodriguez, “Safety on the NAFTA Super-

highway, ” Congressional Press Releases, Feb.

Diy GDS cncsnmenanteenmmsnmstnanmarensnetianinsmaneasenees

Laurence H. Tribe, “Taking Text and Structure

Seriously; Reflections on Free-Form Method

in Constitutional Interpretation, ” 108 Harv. L.

STs Cee Qe cnencnnsmnnscnnnnecssmeansnscesenissnenes

World Almanac 79 (2004) .........cccccesseescesseeesceeees

John C. Yoo, “Laws as Treaties?: The Con-

stitutionality of | Congressional-Executive

Agreements,” 99 Mich. L. Rev. 757 (2001)......

Page

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

No, 03-358

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, ef al.,

Petitioners,

Vv .*

PUBLIC CITIZEN, et al.,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE

EAGLE FORUM EDUCATION & LEGAL DEFENSE

FUND IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE'

Eagle Forum Education and Legal Defense Fund

(“EFELDF”) is a nonprofit organization founded in 1981.

For more than twenty years it has defended American

sovereignty. EFELDF has consistently opposed the abdica-

tion of authority by American governmental entities to newly

created international institutions. EFELDF promotes adher-

ence to the U.S. Constitution and respect for the obligations

' This brief is filed with the written consent of all parties. No counsel

for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, nor did any person or

entity, other than amicus, its members, or its counsel make a monetary

contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief.

2

and power that it mandates for the federal government free

from control by global entities. EFELDF has repeatedly

taken a stand against delegation of power by any American

governmental entity to an international tribunal.

Amicus has a direct and vital interest in the issues presented

to this Court based on its longstanding defense of American

sovereignty.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is being

tested here for the first time. Implicitly at stake is whether

congressional bypass of the Treaty Clause, Article II, Sec-

tion 2, can trump federal law in favor of a decision by an

international tribunal. On February 6, 2001, a five-member

foreign panel mandated that the United States lift its restric-

tions on Mexican trucks and allow them full access. Though

NAFTA could not be ratified by the Senate as required by the

Treaty Clause, the tribunal repeatedly referred to NAFTA as a

“treaty” and purported to enforce it as such. The Adminis-

tration has arbitrarily and capriciously ignored applicable

federal law in adhering to that decision.

In creating an international tribunal and then ignoring

domestic obligations in submitting to that tribunal, NAFTA

implementation has gone overboard. In the first fifty years

after ratification of the Constitution, the vast majority of

international agreements complied with the Treaty Clause.

But since World War Il, over 90% of international agree-

ments have ignored that constitutional requirement. Un-

checked, the agreements have assumed increased power, as

exemplified by the contemplated invasion of Mexican trucks

in the case at bar. It is time to reaffirm limits on con-

gressional-executive agreements that were never properly

ratified as treaties.

The judiciary abdicates its responsibilities if it allows

international tribunals to usurp adjudicative power. Vigilant

a

3

in invalidating congressional expansion in jurisdiction of

Article I courts, this Court should likewise strike down

congressional submission to international tribunals that

dictate domestic issues such as use of our highways.

Congress cannot create or endorse a new adjudicative entity

to wield power over domestic issues. At a minimum this

violates the separation of powers inherent in our con-

stitutional system. If allowed, the erosion of the judiciary in

the face of global tribunals could dramatically worsen.

The Ninth Circuit correctly required the Department of

Transportation to comply fully with domestic laws before

allowing Mexican trucks to travel on our highways and

byways. An environmental impact statement must be

prepared. It should include not only the adverse effect of the

trucks on nature, but also on human safety. It should analyze

not only the pollution caused by truck emissions, but also the

loss of life through accidents. Mexican trucks are older and

more dangerous than domestic trucks, and their drivers are

less familiar with our roads and our language. The resulting

loss of life from a predictable increase in accidents must be

part of the requisite environmental impact statement.

ARGUMENT

The Ninth Circuit properly found that a federal agency had

failed to comply with federal law, and had acted arbitrarily

and capriciously in violating the National Environmental

Protection Act (NEPA) and the Clean Air Act (CAA). The

court was right in remanding the case to the Department of

Transportation with instructions to comply with those laws.

Simply put, the Department adhered to an_ international

tribunal opinion at the expense of domestic law. Such agency

action must be reversed.

Though the government maintains that admitting Mexican

trucks is within executive discretion, in fact it adhered to an

international tribunal never authorized by any treaty. The

4

arbitral panel established by NAFTA encroaches imper-

missibly on the sovereignty of our domestic laws and

institutions. By effect if not design, the executive branch has

become subservient to the judicial decisions of a tribunal

lacking in constitutional authority. The tribunal was neither

established under the Treaty Clause nor pursuant to a

recognized congressional power. Rote implementation of its

decision must be invalidated.

Finally, the requisite environmental impact statement must

address the impact on human lives, not merely the impact on

nature. Life-threatening and fatal accidents caused by older

trucks like those in Mexico should be analyzed and included

in the statement. Deaths caused by language incompatibility,

such as misunderstanding directions or road signs, are an

essential aspect of this required analysis. An analysis of the

indirect harm caused by increased pollution must accompany

a study of the threat of direct harm to men, women and

children. Increased drug trafficking should also be included

in the impact statement.

Allowing tens of thousands of hazardous Mexican trucks

on American roads is not a “foreign affairs action” exempt

from application of domestic laws. The decision below

should be affirmed.

I. NAFTA, AS ENACTED BY CONGRESS, DOES

NOT AUTHORIZE PRESIDENTIAL BYPASS

OF DOMESTIC LAW TO ADHERE TO A DE-

CISION OF AN INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL.

NAFTA, as enacted by a simple majority in Congress, did

not repeal the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.

$§ 701-706, the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969

(NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)C), or the Clean Air Act

(CAA), 42 U.S.C. § 7506(c)(1). 19 U.S.C. § 3311. To the

contrary, Congress expressly mandated that “[njo provision

of the Agreement . . . which is inconsistent with any law of

eo ne Re emer +

5

the United States shall have effect.” 19 U.S.C. § 3312(a)(1).

Moreover, Congress prohibited any construction of NAFTA

that would “amend or modify any law of the United States,

including any law regarding . . . the protection of human,

animal, or plant life or health [or] the protection of the

environment.” /d. § 3312(a)(2). See Barker v. Harvey, 181

U.S. 481, 488 (1901) (“*[S]o far as the act of Congress is in

conflict with the treaty with Mexico, that is a matter in which

the court is bound to follow the statutory enactments of

its own Government.’”) (quoting Botiller v. Dominguez, 130

U.S. 238, 247 (1889), emphasis added).

This Court has emphasized that our border security cannot

be surrendered, and surely not by a mere congressional-

executive agreement:

To preserve its independence, and give security against

foreign aggression and encroachment, is the highest duty

of every nation, and to attain these ends nearly all other

considerations are to be subordinated. It matters not in

what form such aggression and encroachment come,

whether from the foreign nation acting in its national

character or from vast hordes of its people crowding in

upon us. . . . [The powers of exclusion] cannot be

abandoned or surrendered. Nor can their exercise be

hampered, when needed for the public good, by any

considerations of private interest. The exercise of these

public trusts is not the subject of barter or contract.

Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606, 609

(1889). NAFTA cannot compel the opening of our borders to

hordes of Mexican trucks.

The President may not bypass domestic law in attempting

to comply with an international tribunal pursuant to NAFTA.

“Almost immediately after the arbitrators’ decision, President

Bush made clear his intention to lift the moratorium on cross-

border operations following the preparation of new regu-

lations governing grants of operating authority to Mexican

6

motor carriers, in order to comply with NAFTA and

promote trade between the United States and Mexico.” Govt.

Br. at 7 (citing Pet. App. 10a; J.A. 53; Pet. 5 & n.2, emphasis

added). The Bush Administration announced that “we have

assured the Mexican government that we intend to live up to

our NAFTA obligations to open the U.S.-Mexico border to

trucking [and] discussions are underway on how to im-

plement the recent NAFTA Panel decision in a safe and

orderly fashion.” Alan Larson, “Outlining the Potential for

Expanded US-Mexico Trade,” Remarks to 54th Plenary of

the Mexico-U.S. Business Committee (Mar. 5, 2001).

The Administration seeks to ignore the APA, NEPA and

CAA in the name of “foreign relations” and “foreign trade,”

phrases it invokes repeatedly in its brief before this Court.

Govt. Br. at I, 2, 3, 18, 22, 23, 35. That argument may invite

support in connection with a military conflict abroad or even

an economic dispute in a foreign land. When the presidential

action is directed outside of the borders of the United States,

then there is little reason for the foregoing restraints on

administrative action. But here the action is directed at

domestic highways entirely within the United States, and

even at intrastate roads. Invocation of a desire to improve

foreign relations is no excuse for bypassing domestic legal

requirements. See, e.g., Taylor v. Morton, 23 F. Cas. 784,

785, 2 Curt. 454 (D. Mass. 1855), aff'd, 67 U.S. 481 (1863)

(“The foreign sovereign between whom and the United States

a treaty has been made, has a right to expect and require its

stipulations to be kept with scrupulous good faith; but

through what internal arrangements this shall be done, ts

exclusively, for the consideration of the United States.”).

The government cannot justify its failure to comply with

NEPA and CAA in opening the borders to Mexican trucks by

* http://www.state.gov/e/rls/rm/2001/1133pf.html (visited Apr. 16,

2002).

a ee ee eee en —

7

relying on 49 U.S.C. § 13902. That statute permits the

President or his delegate to combat discriminatory practices

by foreign countries against United States transportation

companies by restricting access from those foreign countries.

Section 13902(c), for example, expressly targets “[p]reven-

tion of discriminatory practices” by foreign countries and

mandates “[e]qualization of treatment” for domestic com-

panies. “Any action taken under [Section 13902(c)(1)(A)] to

eliminate an act, policy, or practice shall be so devised so as

to equal to the extent possible the burdens or restrictions

imposed by such foreign country on United States trans-

portation companies.” 49 U.S.C. § 13902(c)(2). But that

provision is designed to protect domestic transportation

companies, not subject them to a foreign invasion using

workers paid less than the minimum wage. Nothing in

Section 13902 allows the Department of Transportation to

open the borders in violation of the NEPA and CAA.

The government brief distorts this statute by changing its

remedial purpose—to combat discrimination by foreign

countries against United States transportation companies—

into a blanket presidential authority to ignore domestic law.

In fact, the Section 13902(c)(3) grant to the President of

authority to modify the moratorium only applies to ac-

tions taken under “paragraph (1)(A)", which consist of

responses to discriminatory actions taken by foreign nations

against United States transportation companies. 49 U.S.C.

§ 13902(c)(3). No such discrimination is the cause of the

Administration’s action here, and thus it cannot be justified as

a remedy for domestic transportation companies faced with

discrimination by a foreign power.

The government insists that opening the borders “was the

result of the joint exercise by Congress and the President of

their constitutional responsibilities for foreign trade and

foreign relations, and was made in accordance with NAFTA

obligations and pursuant to statutory provisions vesting trade

8

authority directly in the President.” Govt. Br. at 3. But who

drives on U.S. highways is surely a domestic rather than

“foreign” issue. Moreover, the government cannot create a

new loophole for avoiding statutory restraints on admin-

istrative action by having the President issue an adminis-

trative rule directly. This is unavailing because numerous

administrative actions are essential to implement a presiden-

tial directive, and those actions may be properly challenged.

This lawsuit is not against the President, and the court

below did not order or enjoin the President. “The President

of the United States is not a party to this action, and the issues

before us do not touch on his clear, unreviewable discre-

tionary authority to modify the moratorium pursuant to 49

U.S.C. § 13902(c).” Public Citizen v. Department of Transp..,

316 F.3d 1002, 1020 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 957

(2003). The court observed that “neither the validity of nor

the United States’ compliance with NAFTA is before us.” /d.

The government misplaces reliance on Crosby v. National

Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 375 (2000). That

decision merely applied the Supremacy Clause to invalidate a

“state Act’s provisions [in] conflict with Congress’s specific

delegation to the President of flexible discretion.” /d. at 388.

There the presidential action concerned sanctions against a

foreign country, not activity on domestic roads. /d. at 368-69.

Congress has never delegated, implicitly or explicitly,

authority to the President to open internal roads to tens of

thousands of Mexican trucks in derogation of NEPA and

CAA. See Tag v. Rogers, 267 F.2d 664 (D.C. 1959), cert.

denied, 362 U.S. 957 (1960) (“Whatever force appellant's

argument might have in a situation where there is no

applicable treaty, statute, or constitutional provision, it has

long been settled in the United States that the federal courts

are bound to recognize any one of these three sources of law

as superior to canons of international law.”)

9

The government insists that the President himself is not

subject to the APA even though its definition of “agency”

includes “each authority of the Government of the United

States” and excludes specific entities like Congress without

excluding the President. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(1), 701(b)(1). See

Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992). There this

Court did hold that “textual silence” in the APA’s definition

of “agency” would not subject the President to the procedural

requirements of the APA. /d. at 800.

But Franklin does not support the presidential action here.

In Franklin, the President had a statutory duty to decide

whether or not to send a census report to Congress.

Massachusetts, facing a loss of a seat under the decennial

census, sued the Secretary of Commerce and the President

over the census. But the presidential action there was nothing

like the presidential action here. In Franklin, Congress had

delegated specific duties to the President, who then acted

within that delegation without the need for further admin-

istrative action. Here, the President acted beyond his stat-

utory authority and the implementation by the Department of

Transportation has violated multiple federal statutes.

In essence, the government blithely seeks to ignore federal

law under the pretext of allegedly “serious and ongoing harm

to United States’ businesses and consumers and to inter-

national relations with Mexico.” Pet. at 26. And what is that

supposed harm? In its Petition, the government argued that it

will be more efficient simply to open the borders to trucks

from Mexico, and that the court below protects inefficiency.

“The Ninth Circuit’s decision prevents the President’s action

from taking effect and thereby hampers commerce. On a

border where there are approximately 4.5 million northbound

truck crossings each year, cargo from Mexico must be

transferred at the border onto U.S. trucks before it can

be shipped to points in the United States beyond the border

zone. Passengers using scheduled bus services must follow

10

similarly inefficient procedures.” Pet. at 25-26 (citation

omitted). But this inefficiency has sound justifications, and

other applicable federal laws cannot be ignored in the name

of efficiency.

The action by the Department of Transportation to expose

our highways and byways to tens of thousands of trucks from

Mexico is the impermissible result of a foreign adjudication

rather than compliance with applicable federal law. The

decision below properiy held that the Department acted

arbitrarily and capriciously in violating federal law.

Il. NAFTA UNCONSTITUTIONALLY CREATES A

FOREIGN COURT WITHOUT AUTHORIZA-

TION BY TREATY.

The NAFTA tribunal, the court below, and most com-

mentators repeatedly describe and interpret NAFTA as

though it were an actual treaty. See, e.g., Public Citizen, 316

F.3d at 1009, 1011, 1913, 1017, 1018. This is error. “Ex-

press power is given to the President, by and with the advice

and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-

thirds of the senators present concur.” Holden v. Joy, 84

U.S. 211, 242-43 (1872) (emphasis added). This is, after all,

what the U.S. Constitution expressly requires. The President

“shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the

Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators

present concur.” U.S. Const. Art. Il, Sec. 2. There is no

other constitutional authority for binding the United States to

major international commitments. Nothing else can subject

Americans to the rulings of international tribunals. Approved

by a vote of only 61-38 in the Senate, NAFTA fell short of

the requisite two-thirds majority for passage as a treaty. 139

Cong. Rec. $16,712-13 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1993).

NAFTA, sweeping in scope, far surpasses most bona fide

treaties in breadth and impact. The House Ways and Means

Committee itself declared that NAFTA “is the most com-

prehensive trade agreement ever negotiated and creates the

world’s largest integrated market for goods and services.”

House Report No. 103-361(1), at 8 (1993). NAFTA is unique

in American history in how it integrates the domestic

economy with those of two other large nations. NAFTA has

everything that one would expect in a treaty; most treaties

duly ratified by the Senate pale in comparison. The House

has no authority to pass such a treaty. 5 Annals of Cong.

760-62 (1796) (reprinting President Washington's message in

which he denied any role by the House in determining

whether to implement treaties that were properly approved by

the President and then duly ratified by the Senate); id.

at 771-72 (resolution adopted by the House disclaiming “any

agency in making Treaties,” while reserving some authority

with respect to treaties that stipulate regulations on matters

within enumerated congressional powers).

“If there is to be a new procedure in which the President

will play a different role in determining the final text of what

may “become a law,’ such change must come not by

legislation but through the amendment procedures set forth in

Article V of the Constitution.” Clinton v. City of New York,

524 U.S. 417, 449 (1998). See also Federalist No. 75, The

Federalist Papers 419-20 (Rossiter & Kesler eds. 1999) (“The

[treaty] power in question seems therefore to form a distinct

department, and to belong, properly, neither to the legislative

nor to the executive. ... However proper or safe it may be in

governments where the executive magistrate is an hereditary

monarch, to commit to him the entire power of making

treaties, it would be utterly unsafe and improper to entrust

that power to an elective magistrate of four years duration.

..« [T]he joint possession of the power in question, by the

President and Senate, would afford a greater prospect of

security, than the separate possession of it by either of

them.”). Lacking approval as a treaty, the delegation by

NAFTA of adjudicatory authority is particularly objection-

able. It implicitly transfers power from the federal judges

12

confirmed by the Senate to foreign arbitrators appointed by

foreign countries.

The creation by Congress, without treaty authorization, of

an international tribunal to dictate who may travel on our

roads is no more acceptable than shifting jurisdiction from

Article III to Article I courts. See Northern Pipeline Constr.

Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (invali-

dating an attempt by Congress to shift jurisdiction from

Article Ill courts to Article | bankruptcy courts). Justice

Brennan noted in his plurality opinion that “of course,

virtually all matters that might be heard in Art. III courts

could also be left by Congress to state courts . . . [and] the

principle of separation of powers is not threatened by leaving

the adjudication of federal disputes to such judges.” 458

U.S. at 64 n.15. But transferring the same power to a new

tribunal other than an Article II] court would be consti-

tutionally infirm:

Art. Ill bars Congress from establishing legislative

courts to exercise jurisdiction over all matters related to

those arising under the bankruptcy laws. The estab-

lishment of such courts does not fall within any of the

historically recognized situations in which the general

principle of independent adjudication commanded by

Art. Ill does not apply. Nor can we discern any

persuasive reason, in logic, history, or the Constitution,

why the bankruptcy courts here established lie beyond

the reach of Art. III.

ld. at 76.

The same constitutional prohibition applies with greater

force to NAFTA’s tribunals. As the Marathon decision made

clear, Congress does not have the power to establish new

courts to decide a new category of commercial disputes, nor

can it endow such courts with the power to dictate entry by

tens of thousands of trucks from a foreign country. It matters

not, as the government argues, that “[t}his Court has recog-

ee ee ee

13

nized that ‘[t}he Constitution gives Congress broad, com-

prehensive’ and ‘plenary’ powers to regulate foreign

commerce.” Pet. at 3 (quoting United States v. 12 200-Ft.

Reels of Super 838MM. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 125-126 (1973)).

The Constitution does not allow Congress to subject federal

law to decisionmaking by international tribunals. This sort of

dispute could only be handled by an Article II] court rather

than a tribunal outside of the judiciary, and presidential

implementation of the foreign decision does not justify it.

Currently the executive branch enforces decisions by the

judiciary. Does the Constitution authorize the executive

branch to enforce decisions by extraterritorial tribunals? That

is what NAFTA, through a congressional-executive agree-

ment rather than Senate ratification, purports to accomplish.

Unsatisfied with the American judiciary, Congress and the

President could then apparently limit its jurisdiction and

establish adherence to courts outside of the United States. If

NAFTA’s method of resolving disputes is affirmed without

ratification by a treaty, nothing would prevent Congress and

the President from moving judicial authority offshore.

implicitly transferring authority to an international tribunal in

the Hague over disputes concerning a multinational cor-

poration would become possible without even complying

with the Treaty Clause.

“Few constitutional provisions seem so easily evaded” as

the Treaty Clause. John C. Yoo, “Laws as Treaties?: The

Constitutionality of Congressional-Executive Agreements,”

99 Mich. L. Rev. 757, 759 (2001). If NAFTA need not

comply, one wonders why any controversial treaty need be

submitted to the Senate for ratification again. “According to

this logic, President Bush could now resubmit the Test-Ban

Treaty to Congress for approval by majority vote, and

President Wilson could have brought the United States into

the League of Nations through a statute, even after the defeat

of both agreements in the Senate.” /d. See also Made in the

USA Foundation v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300, 1311-17

14

(lith Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1039 (2001) (reviewing,

without deciding, whether NAFTA is constitutional despite

bypassing the Treaty Clause); Laurence H. Tribe, “Taking

Text and Structure Seriously; Reflections on Free-Form

Method in Constitutional Interpretation,” 108 Harv. L. Rev.

1221 (1995) (arguing, in the context of NAFTA, that the

Constitution may require treaty ratification for major

congressional-executive agreements).

The growing use of congressional-executive agreements as

a bypass to the Treaty Clause threatens even federalism.

Agreements with foreign powers have traditionally enjoyed

greater latitude in infringing on state sovereignty, perhaps

implicitly justified by the requisite 2/3rd approval re-

quirement in the Senate. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416,

434 (1920) (“No doubt the great body of private relations

usually fall within the control of the State, but a treaty may

override its power.”). Congressional-executive agreements,

in contrast, lack the legitimacy of approval by a supermajority

of the Senate. A simple majority in Congress should not

enjoy treaty authority that would thereby enable it to erode

state sovereignty. Cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S.

144, 168 (1992) (invalidating a federal statute in part because

it caused “the accountability of both state and federal officials

[to be] diminished”’).

The U.S. Constitution does not allow treaties to be passed

by simple majorities of Congress. Nor does it allow Congress

to create a mechanism for the President to enforce a decision

of an international tribunal.

Ill. THE REQUISITE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT

STATEMENT MUST INCLUDE EFFECTS ON

HUMAN SAFETY AND LIVES.

The requisite environmental impact statement (EIS) should

thoroughly address the safety, pollution and even drug

hazards posed by an influx of tens of thousands of Mexican

«eel

Re Oe a oe —_

15

trucks on roads throughout the United States. The risks are

substantial and NEPA requires an objective and realistic

assessment of them. The Department of Transportation

and its Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration

(FMCSA) failed in their obligations to evaluate completely

these dangers.

The Department and FMCSA underestimated the threat to

the safety of American citizens posed by a vast increase in

trucks from Mexico on our roads. Tragic stories of needless

deaths caused by a foreign driver who failed to understand or

obey the rules of our roads are all too familiar. In 1994, Rev.

Duane Willis and his wife Janet lost all six of their children in

a fiery crash caused by a truck illegally driven by Ricardo

Guzman. “Company that Hired Illegal Driver to Pay

$10.7M,” USA Today, June 19, 2001. Former Democratic

Congressman Glenn Poshard later explained, “We found out

that there were at least three people that tried to tell Guzman

to get off the road only minutes before the crash, that the

huge taillight assembly on the truck was about to fall off and

cause a wreck. Several truck drivers even tried reaching

Guzman by radio, but they said he couldn't speak English so

he didn’t understand a word they said.” Jim Muir, “Glenn

Poshard: On the Record: Speaking Frankly About the Cor-

ruption, Wrongdoing and Cover-Ups,” The Southern

Illinoisan, Mar. 1, 2003.

Texas legislator Ciro Rodriguez observed the following at

the time of the NAFTA panel decision mandating access by

Mexican trucks:

Mexican trucks are held to less stringent safety standards

than U.S. trucks. Unlike American drivers, Mexican

drivers do not have to meet minimal medical quail-

fications, submit to drug testing, or maintain logbooks

which monitor the length of time they spend behind the

wheel. Additionally, Mexican trucks are older, heav-

ier, 4nd more likely to transport unmarked toxic or

16

hazardous materials. Overall, Mexican trucks are

reported to have three times as many safety deficiencies

than U.S. trucks and without a standard regulatory

apparatus in place, Mexico has been unable to improve

the safety of its trucks or enforce a border safety

inspection program of its own.

Ciro Rodriguez, “Safety on the NAFTA Superhighway,”

Congressional Press Releases, Feb. 17, 2001 (quoted in Paul

Stephen Dempsey, “Free Trade But Not Free Transport? The

Mexican Stand-Off,” 30 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 91, 96

(Winter 2001)). Mexican truck drivers are also not covered

by the minimum wage laws, creating an incentive for

employers to overutilize the Mexican drivers. Dempsey, 30

Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol’y at 95.

Particularly frequent are road accidents by vans or trucks

filled with illegal aliens, driven by “coyotes” who are paid

handsomely to transport them into the United States. As

reported by the Denver Post, “[s]mugglers stuff cars, vans

and trucks with Latin Americans willing to pay up to $10,000

to be transported illegally into the U.S. Several times a year,

the outcome is similar to Tuesday’s crash that killed five

people on Interstate 76." Kirk Mitchell, “Police: Deadly 1-76

Crash Fits Immigrant-Smuggling Profile,” Denver Post, Jan.

29, 2004. The van in that crash was carrying eleven people

from Guatemala; one of the fatalities was a pregnant woman

who was rushed to the hospital in order to save and deliver

her unborn child. “Tuesday’s early-morning crash of

her sport utility vehicle, packed dangerously full with

Guatemalan families on a long-distance trip, was all too

familiar for investigators.” /d.

Road accidents pose a greater safety hazard than any other

environmental issue. In 2002, 30.7 million drivers were

involved in motor vehicle accidents in the United States.

See World Almanac 79 (2004) (citing the National Safety

Council). Far more people die in car accidents than from

A et ce in a

17

terrorism, for example. /d. (noting that 44,000 people died in

2002 in car accidents). Truck accidents now kill more than

5,000 people annually in the United States. Sixty federal

officers inspected Mexican trucks along the border in fiscal

year 2000 and found that safety violations required taking

36% out of commission; fifty-three Texas officials did

inspections in calendar year 2000 and safety violations

required taking 37% out of service. James Pinkerton, “Semi-

Conscious State; Inspection of Trucks on Border Thread-

bare,” Houston Chronicle, Aug. 12, 2001, Al. Opening the

border would flood our highways with unsafe trucks, creating

a hazard for all American drivers. The ability to com-

municate in English and understand the flow of traffic is

crucial to avoiding accidents, ascertaining afterwards what

happened, and planning how they can be prevented in

the future.

Pollution from the Mexican trucks should also be ad-

dressed by an EIS. The court below observed “a wealth of

government and private studies showing that diesel exhaust

and its Components constitute a major threat to the health of

children, contribute to respiratory illnesses such as asthma

and bronchitis, and are likely carcinogenic.” Public Citizen,

316 F.3d at 1024. The court properly found that the

Department of Transportation was remiss in failing to prepare

an environmental impact statement “to consider whether any

negative health effects could be associated with increased

diesel exhaust emissions.” /d. (citing United States v. 27.09

Acres of Land, 760 F. Supp. 345, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)

(holding that “even [the] marginal degradation of drinking

water” has been considered enough to trigger the need for an

environmental impact statement)).

There is no “interference” with “presidential discretion,” as

the government now argues, in requiring the Department of

Transportation to obey the law, Pet. at 24. The Department

lacks treaty authorization to override domestic law. Its failure

18

to prepare an EIS was arbitrary and capricious. Like a

spraying program, the introduction of numerous pollution-

emitting vehicles from Mexico poses a direct threat to the

well-being of American citizens, and this threat must be

thoroughly analyzed and vetted. See, e.g., Oregon Envir-

onmental Council v Kunzman, 714 F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir.

1983) (EIS must address the effects of the pollutant on

children and others, and must analyze carcinogenic effects).

Allowing tens of thousands of Mexican trucks onto our

highways is surely as threatening to our environment as

highway construction itself, and both require preparation of

an EIS. “The health and safety of the residents of this

neighborhood will be significantly affected by the in-

troduction of a highway through their community,” and

therefore required preparation of an EIS. Highland Coop-

erative v. City of Lansing, 492 F. Supp. 1372, 1380 (W.D.

Mich. 1980). That court enjoined the city “from acquiring the

rights-of-way, awarding construction contracts, commencing

construction, or in any other way proceeding with the

Edgewood Project pending the preparation and issuance of an

Environmental Impact Statement.” /d. at 1383. Far more

compelling is the case for an EIS here, with the attempted

opening of all highways to numerous old trucks from a

foreign country.

The EIS should also address the inevitable increase in

illicit drugs coming into the United States in Mexican trucks.

U.S. Attorney Frank Whitney admitted that, even without the

influx of endless numbers of Mexican trucks, “It’s virtually

impossible for the border patrol or customs to truly check

every one of these vehicles.” Craig Jarvis, “N.C. Seen as

Hub where Illicit Drugs Repackaged,” The News & Observer

(Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 22, 2004, Al. The Department of

Transportation’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) “found

that the number of trucks crossing the U.S.-Mexico border

increased from 2.5 million in 1993 (the year NAFTA was

On a ae a ee eee ie eee a acl

19

passed) to 3.7 million in 1997. Out of the millions of trucks,

only about one percent of trucks are inspected.” J. Patrick

LaRue, “The ‘ILL-ICIT’ Effects of NAFTA: Increased Drug

Trafficking into the United States Through the Southwest

Border,” 9 Currents Int'l Trade L.J. 38, 40 (Summer 2000)

(citations omitted). Mexico is an “important supplier of

marijuana and heroin to the United States and emerged as a

point of transit for the cocaine coming from South America.”

Jorge Chabat, “Mexico’s War on Drugs: No Margin for

Maneuver,” 582 The Annals of The American Academy of

Political and Social Science 134, 136 (July 2002).

NAFTA has already increased illegal drug trafficking so

much in border states that the Texas Attorney General

described it as the “North American Free Trafficking

Agreement.” Major Drug Traffickers, U.S. DEP’T OF

JUSTICE, DEA BRIEFING BOOK (Oct. 1999) (emphasis

added).* “NAFTA has undoubtedly ‘opened’ the floodgates

for Mexican drug traffickers by not only increasing trucking

and railway traffic, but by crippling the Southwest border’s

economic development.” LaRue, 9 Currents Int’! Trade L.J.

at 45. The hazard to be caused by opening our borders

further would be catastrophic. One commentator observed:

Recent intelligence reports indicate that Mexican traf-

fickers . . . have focused on three major means of

transport into the U.S.: truck cargo, railway and illegal

or migrant workers known as ‘mules’. For example, one

truck that was stopped near San Diego carried eight tons

of cocaine in cans of jalapeno peppers. Law enforcement

officials believe that the cocaine belonged to a busi-

nessman who owns one of the biggest trucking

companies in Mexico. ... In May 1997 a tractor-trailer

http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/briefing -book/page34-48.htm (visited Nov.

20, 1999),

20

load of commercial size cans of Del Monte tomatoes

were opened by the DEA in New York City revealing

sealed bundles of cash in the tomato sauce.

Id. at 40-41. The more trucks that enter the country from

Mexico, the greater the potential for drug smuggling.

Another commentator echoed identical concerns:

Drug traffickers smuggle record levels of narcotics into

the U.S. via the U.S.-Mexico border, and are presenting

a growing risk to the security of the U.S. Mexico is a

major source of heroin, marijuana, and cocaine traf-

ficking to the U.S. Three of the four primary points of

cocaine importation are located along the Mexico border

in Texas, Arizona, and California. Marijuana trafficking

through Mexico accounts for the majority of marijuana

smuggled into the U.S. This high volume of narcotics

trafficking has established Mexican traffickers as “the

world’s preeminent drug traffickers.”

Jason C. Messenger, “Opening the U.S.-Mexico Border:

Problems and Concerns for the Bush Administration, the

Countries, and the Legal System to Consider,” 9 Tulsa J.

Comp. & Int’! L. 607, 617 (Spring 2002) (citations omitted).

He concluded that “[t}]he essential role of commercial traffic

and the U.S.-Mexico border is obvious since rather large

amounts of these illegal drugs are carried on tractor-trailers

and are reused to carry the funds from the sales in the U.S.”

Id. at 617-18 (citations omitted).

Increased importation of drugs has a devastating effect on

the human environment, and should be addressed in the

requisite EIS. This is not merely a psychological harm as

alleged and rejected in Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against

Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766 (1983). Increased levels and

usage of narcotics inflict serious and often fatal harm to

innocent human beings. Regardless of whether the increased

drug trafficking would itself trigger the need for an EIS, the

21

compilation of an EIS required for independent reasons

should not ignore the devastating effect of drugs in its

analysis.

CONCLUSION

The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

ANDREW SCHLAFLY KAREN B. TRIPP *

521 Fifth Ave. - 17th Floor 2245 Shakespeare Road

New York, NY 10175 Houston, TX 77030

(212) 292-4510 (713) 658-9323

* Counsel of Record Counsel for Amicus

March 11, 2004.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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