Reply Brief — Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen

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No. 03-358 | Ontict OF THE CLERK |

Jn the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,

ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

PUBLIC CITIZEN, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

-TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS

THEODORE B. OLSON

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

(202) 514-2217

a4

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. The interference with Presidential discretion will

not “resolve itself” and has not been ratified by

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II. The court of appeals erroneously required the prep-

aration of an EIS concerning the President’s dis-

cretionary TEIIEIIIUID ‘constebnnnvestetinbedinhidesebatnttnigenentenneenicinenenemenesnces

III. The court of appeals’ clean air analysis was

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. v. SCRAP, 442 U.S. 289

ETIITTUIED cadence dientsiiepd psiieniiapatnatatiaiasatsdiaiabemneuenbiieimecetennneceneee

Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate

Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994) .... ee

Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530

SF, SP IO eceecesnessnenscesmmnscsccsemmsansemnessensmneaseneemnsesemsescssecees

Environment Def. Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 82 F.3d 451,

amended, 92 F.3d 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ........ccccecceseeeeees

Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council,

| ESTE eae oe OER

United States v. Franco-Lopez, 312 F.3d 984

| cae en TN

Statutes and regulations:

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. T50G(C)(1) ......ccccccccsccsscssscssesesseseeees

Department of Transportation and Related Agencies

Appropriations Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-87, § 350,

Is TIED cxccinniensincinnneiciesnmninesnndincenioninnineemmenmanieneees

National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.

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I, I i ctastrieerta csi ccinaeas aitenieitiintaaarintaiii

(1)

Page

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In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

Regulations—Continued: Page

40 C.FLR.:

ek ‘9,10 No. 03-358

ection BEBD.Me]) ......ncevessrssesscsssessstesssanesneannentaaniaaaanle 7 ,

| 6 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,

Section BEGB.IG ...ccccceccscsssssssovsscesseeveietsnestatianmiasaaaaa 6 ET AL., PETITIONERS

Miscellaneous: v

148 Cong. Rec. 87429-87430 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) ........ 3

Determining Conformity of General Federal Actions PUBLIC CITIZEN, ET AL.

to State or Federal Implementation Plans, 58 Fed.

Poem, GR, SBI (ROBB) ..ccccscencvosnssnnsesessscnssesanamnameniiammnne 10

S. Rep. No. 224, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. (2002) ....ccccccseesseeen 3,4 ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

. TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS

This is anything but the “routine” case (Br. in Opp. 9)

respondents make it out to be. The court of appeals in-

correctly construed and applied the National Environmental

Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., and the

conformity-review requirement of the Clean Air Act (CAA),

42 U.S.C. 7506(c)(1), to override Presidential discretion that

those statutes preserve. The Ninth Circuit’s unwarranted

extension of NEPA and the CAA to require environmental

review of a foreign affairs decision that is within the Pre-

sident’s sole discretion “compromise|[s] the very capacity of

the President to speak for the Nation with one voice in deal-

ing with other governments.” Crosby v. National Foreign

Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 381 (2000); see Pet. 24-25. Fur-

thermore, looking no further than this particular case, the

decision below is delaying substantially the United States’

compliance with the arbitration decision of February 2001,

(1)

»

thereby preventing the resolution of a trade dispute that

affects millions of border crossings each year and that,

Mexico asserts, is causing billions of dollars of economic

injury. See Pet. 24-26.

I. THE INTERFERENCE WITH PRESIDENTIAL DIS-

CRETION WILL NOT “RESOLVE ITSELF” AND HAS

NOT BEEN RATIFIED BY CONGRESS

A. Respondents’ first argument against review by this

Court is that, because the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Ad-

ministration (FMCSA) has begun the environmental review

required by the court of appeals despite the pendency of the

instant petition, the case “will soon resolve itself.” Br. in

Opp. 10. That is plainly wrong. As the petition explains (at

15 n.7), FMCSA has entered into a contract for preparation

of the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and CAA

analysis contemplated by the court of appeals, if that

analysis is required. There is no genuine possibility that

FMCSA would complete the necessary work before the end

of this Court’s current Term. See Br. in Opp. 10. Moreover,

the agency’s CAA review might thereafter require addi-

tional consideration of air emissions in certain areas. And

because the court of appeals’ decision provides respondents

future opportunities to attempt to prevent opening of the

border by again claiming that FMCSA undertook inade-

quate environmental review, another judicial challenge to

FMCSA’s safety rules would be virtually certain. Unless the

Court intervenes, resolution of this dispute is unlikely until

2005 or 2006 at the earliest—and that assumes the Ninth

Circuit would reject any subsequent challenge.

Trying to downplay the significance of that delay, respon-

dents assert (Br. in Opp. 17) that the Ninth Circuit's decision

does not “interfere with any commitments of this country.”

Undeniably, however, the decision below is preventing the

United States from implementing the February 2001 arbi-

3

tration decision that found a NAFTA violation. See Pet. 5,

26.

B. Respondents similarly are incorrect when they con-

tend (Br. in Opp. 11-14, 20-21) that, in February 2003, Con-

gress ratified the court of appeals’ decision by re-enacting

Section 350, the appropriations rider that governs FMCSA’s

expenditure of funds on registering new operations of

Mexican motor carriers. See Pet. 7 (discussing rider).

Section 350 addressed safety issues associated with the

registration of the Mexican trucks that would be permitted

to enter the United States under the President’s decision to

open the border. Section 350 did not amend the environ-

mental statutes on which the court of appeals relied and it

makes no mention of environmental issues. As respondents

concede, such legislative inaction “has generally been re-

jected as an interpretive aid.” Br. in Opp. 13 (citing Central

Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,

N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 186 (1994)).

Respondents’ ratification argument seems to be that, by

reenacting the appropriations rider a few weeks after the

Ninth Circuit panel issued its decision in this case, Congress

endorsed the practical result of delaying implementation of

the President's border-opening decision. See Br. in Opp. 12-

14. There was no such congressional endorsement. The

court of appeals entered its judgment on January 16, 2003.

Pet. App. 2a. The rider was in the Fiscal Year 2003

appropriations bill when it was reported by the Senate Com-

mittee on Appropriations in July 2002—six months before

the Ninth Circuit rendered its decision in this case. See 148

Cong. Rec. S7429-S7430 (daily ed. July 26, 2002); S. Rep. No.

224, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (2002).

Moreover, the Senate Committee’s reasons for including

the rider were unrelated to the instant litigation. The

Senate Report focused entirely on safety concerns. When

the Report was issued, FMCSA already had published its

4

final safety rules, and the Senate Report addressed one task

that remained to be performed under Sectjon 350: the

Secretary of Transportation’s consideration of findings by

the agency’s Inspector General that opening the border does

not pose an unacceptable safety risk. See S. Rep. No. 224,

supra, at 84-85. Notably, respondents do not suggest that

legislators considered the decision below in connection with

the appropriations process, see Br. in Opp. 12-13, and there

is no evidence that they did.

In any event, Congress’s unexplained reenactment of

Section 350, which makes no mention of environmental

concerns, says nothing about the question before this Court:

whether the court of appeals correctly applied the environ-

mental laws to a foreign affairs determination of the

President.

Il. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY RE-

QUIRED THE PREPARATION OF AN EIS CON-

CERNING THE PRESIDENT’S DISCRETIONARY

DECISION

A. The petition explains (at 14-19) that the President’s

border-opening decision is exempt from NEPA’s EIS re-

quirement, and that the exemption of Presidential action

cannot properly be overridden by treating the border

opening as an effect of FMCSA’s safety rules. Respondents

argue (at 14-15) that this issue was not preserved below.

Again, respondents are mistaken.

In the court of appeals, the government argued precisely

that respondents “misappllied] [Council on Environmental

Quality (CEQ)] guidelines as to the proper scope of NEPA

analysis” in urging the application of the EIS requirement to

“effects that may result from a Presidential decision to

modify the trade moratorium.” Gov't C.A. Br. 50-51; see id.

at 53 (“[T}he President’s discretionary action on the mora-

torium * * * cannot be said to be ‘caused by’ [FMCSA’s]

rulemaking.”), 54 (environmental impacts alleged by respon-

5

dents “are * * * impacts of the moratorium modification

alone”). The government made the same argument in the

stay proceedings below, see Gov’t Response in Opp. to Pet.’s

Mot. for an Emergency Stay Under Circuit Rule 27-3, at 8

(“(T]he President's actions relating to international trade

and the trade moratorium * * * are beyond this Court’s

review.”); id. at 17 (citing potential harm to “diplomatic rela-

tions and the President’s conduct of foreign affairs”), and in

its petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc (at 1) (“At

issue is the ability of the President to conduct foreign affairs

and trade policy free of interference from the courts.”).

Although the court of appeals disagreed with the govern-

ment’s position, it clearly understood that the government

had raised the issue whether the President’s decision to open

the border is exempt from NEPA review. See Pet. App. 26a,

30a-31a, 47a, 5la.

B. Respondents next suggest (Br. in Opp. 17) that the

President’s ability to exercise his lawful discretion is not

genuinely at issue in this case because Congress has the

power to regulate foreign commerce. As the petition ex-

plains (at 4, 25), Congress has vested the President with sole

authority to lift the moratorium on cross-border operations.

The President’s discretionary decision to take that step in

response to the February 2001 ruling of the international ar-

vitration panel is an exercise of the combined authority of

both Political Branches.

C. FMCSA had no authority, either before or after the

enactment of Section 350, to override the President’s deter-

mination to lift the moratorium or to impose its own bar to

the entry of Mexican trucks and buses. Because FMCSA

operates under a statutory mandate to grant registration to

all domestic and foreign carriers that are “willing and able to

comply with” applicable safety and financial responsibility

requirements, 49 U.S.C. 13902(a)(1), FMCSA’s task was con-

fined to issuing appropriate rules to govern the safe opera-

6

tions of trucks and buses that would be allowed to enter the

United States when the President lifted the moratorium.

Because FMCSA has no authority to prohibit the entry of

those vehicles into the United States, it had no obligation to

prepare an EIS to examine the environmental consequences

of either allowing entry or maintaining a general prohibition.

Respondents further contend (Br. in Opp. 18-23) that

F MCSA was required to prepare an EIS addressing the

President’s border-opening decision because, under the

appropriations rider, “Mexico-domiciled trucks cannot travel

throughout the United States unless the challenged rules are

implemented,” id. at 19. Respondents echo the court of

appeals’ view (Pet. App. 30a-31a) that, under the CEQ regu-

lations implementing NEPA, any environmental effects of

opening the border are “caused by” FMCSA’s safety rules,

see 40 C.F.R. 1508.8(b), because “Congress has prohibited

F MCSA from processing applications from Mexico-domiciled

trucks until the rules are in place,” Br. in Opp. 19.

The Ninth Circuit’s “but for” approach is inconsistent with

NEPA and the CEQ regulations, for the reasons stated in

the petition (at 14-18). First, that approach would in prac-

tical effect subject to NEPA analysis a decision of the Pre-

sident that is expressly exempt from NEPA under 40 C.F.R.

1508.12. Second, it would require FMCSA, which is vested

under its authorizing statute strictly with safety responsi-

bilities (see Pet. 6), to treat its 2002 safety rules as the

“cause” of a border-opening action that the President made

in 2001, and that FMCSA has no power to change. Third, in

compelling FMCSA to suspend its safety rules while it

prepares an EIS addressing a NEPA-exempt determination

that the President made several years ago in light of foreign-

affairs considerations—and thereby delaying this Nation’s

compliance with NAFTA and the 2001 arbitral decision—the

“but for” approach does nothing to advance NEPA's purpose

7

of “helpling| publie officials make decisions.” 40 C.F.R.

1500. 1(e).

The decisions respondents cite as being “no different”

from the use of a “but for” approach (Br. in Opp. 20) are

entirely unhelpful to them. In Robertson v. Methow Valley

Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989), the Forest Service

prepared an EIS to assist its own discretionary decision

whether to grant a permit for the construction of a ski resort

on federal land. See id. at 336-338. Similarly, in Aberdeen

& Rockfish Railroad y. SCRAP, 422 U.S. 289 (1975), the

subject of the EIS prepared by the Interstate Commerce

Commission was the environmental impact of the Com-

mission’s own decision concerning rates for rail transport.

See id. at 297-306. SCRAP in fact confirms that NEPA

review is not required if “no purpose |would be] served” by

such review. /d. at 325. That is precisely the situation here.

Respondents also assert (Br. in Opp. 21) that “i]t is not

the President's decision that is subject to review” under the

court of appeals’ decision, but rather FMCSA’s rules. See id.

at 2 (“This case does not involve the application of the

environmental laws to a presidential decision.”). The court

of appeals disagreed. It declared that any “distinction be-

tween the effects of the regulations themselves and the

effects of the presidential rescission of the moratorium on

Mexican truck entry” is “illusory,” Pet. App. 47a, and it

concluded that “the President’s rescission of the moratorium

was [a] ‘reasonably foreseeable’ |effect]” of FMCSA’s regu-

lations that should have been studied by the agency, id. at

3la. Under the decision below, the action that FMCSA must

examine in an EIS is the President's decision to lift the mora-

torium on new cross-border operations.

D. Finally, respondents argue (Br. in Opp. 25) that

FMCSA’'s NEPA review was deficient because FMCSA

might have been able to tailor its safety regulations to

“alleviate environmental effects” of the President's decision.

S

As pointed out in the certiorari petition (at 21-22 n.10),

however, none of the respondents argued in FMCSA’s

rulemaking proceedings that FMCSA should consider alter-

native rules, let alone adopt especially stringent safety

requirements so as to prevent Mexican trucks from meeting

those requirements and thereby lessen any environmental

consequences of the President’s border opening. There is,

moreover, a substantial question whether that would be a

proper use of FMCSA’s rulemaking authority under a statu-

tory scheme that requires the agency to grant registration to

all carriers that are willing and able to meet safety and

financial responsibility requirements.

Respondents likewise did not raise this issue in their

petition for judicial review, but rather adverted to it only in

passing in a reply brief. See Pet. 21 & n.10. Respondents

assert that the inclusion of the issue in a reply brief means

that it was timely presented under Ninth Circuit precedent

and, therefore, provides potential grounds for affirmance by

this Court. Br. in Opp. 25 n.5. Respondents are mistaken.

Ninth Circuit cases do not say that parties may raise new

issues in their reply brief by calling them “rebuttal” (cbid.),

but rather that the court may consider an appellant’s argu-

ments concerning issues the appellee injected into the case.

See United States v. Franco-Lopez, 312 F.3d 984, 993 n.6

(9th Cir. 2002). Respondents do not identify anything in the

government’s appellate brief that raised, on their behalf, the

alternative claim of agency error they seek to advance.

Because respondents’ agency-discretion argument was

not properly raised before FMCSA or in the court of appeals,

it cannot support affirmance. See Pet. 21. Furthermore,

even if this Court agreed with respondents’ alternative

ground and it became the basis for a remand order, the

government would receive substantial relief from this Court

because FMCSA’s task on remand then would not include

studying the environmental effects of the President’s

9

border-opening decision, but instead would be limited to

examining the environmental consequences of the relatively

narrow range of safety-related options open to FMCSA in

light of the President’s decision to open the border. See

ibid.

Ill. THE COURT OF APPEALS’ CLEAN AIR ANALYSIS

WAS INCORRECT

Respondents say little about the petition’s showing (at 22-

24) that the court of appeals also fundamentally misinter-

preted the CAA’s conformity-review requirement. Respon-

dents do not attempt to argue that the President is a “de-

partment, agency, or instrumentality of the Federal Govern-

ment,” 42 U.S.C. 7506(c)(1), whose activities are potentially

subject to the conformity-review obligation. See Br. in Opp.

26 n.8. Instead, tracking their NEPA argument, respon-

dents contend (id. at 27) that FMCSA had to conduct a

conformity review because “[FMCSA’s] rules will result in

Mexico-domiciled trucks traveling beyond the border com-

mercial zones and emitting pollution.”

The controlling regulations of the Environmental Protec-

tion Agency (EPA), as construed by the District of Columbia

Circuit in upholding those regulations, see Environmental

Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 82 F.3d 451, 463-465 (per

curiam), amended, 92 F.3d 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1996), compel the

opposite conclusion. See Pet. 23-24. First, FMCSA cannot

“practicably control” the additional emissions that sup-

posedly will result from opening the border, as would be

required for those emissions to be “indirect emissions” of the

FMCSA rules (and thus subject to the conformity-review

requirement). See Pet. 22-24; 40 C.F.R. 93.152 (definition of

indirect emissions). FMCSA has no control over the Pre-

sident’s decision to open the border to Mexican motor

10

carriers and no programmatic responsibility for emissions by

those carriers. See Pet. 24.”

Second, FMCSA will not “maintain control over” emis-

sions that result from opening the border, as EPA’s “indirect

emissions” definition also requires. 40 C.F.R. 93.152.

FMCSA’s role in this context is the essentially ministerial

one of granting registration to any Mexican motor carrier

that is “willing and able to comply with” applicable safety

and financial-responsibility requirements. 49 U.S.C.

13902(a)(1). FMCSA’s authorizing statute does not make it

responsible for limiting carrier registration to accomplish

environmental objectives, and FMCSA likewise is not re-

sponsible for opening or closing the border. For that

additional reason, the conformity-review requirement does

not apply to FMCSA’s safety rules.

« x * * *

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted.

THEODORE B. OLSON

Solicitor General

NOVEMBER 2003

* The “practicabl[e|] control” requirement is separate from, and in

addition to, the “continuing program responsibility” requirement that

respondents say (Br. in Opp. 27) is satisfied in this case. See Determining

Conformity of General Federal Actions to State or Federal Imple-

mentation Plans, 58 Fed. Reg. 63,221 (1993) (“indirect emissions” are less-

proximate emissions “that would be brought about by agency action, and

that the agency can practicably control, and that are subject to a con-

tinuing program responsibility of th{e] agency”) (emphasis added). Re-

spondents, moreover, are incorrect when they argue (Br. in Opp. 27) that

FMCSA has continuing program responsibility over the emissions of

Mexican trucks and buses because those emissions are the “result” of

FMCSA’s rules. As explained in Point II.C, above, under the correct

analysis the additional emissions that respondents contend will occur

would result, not from FMCSA’s safety rules, but from the President's

decision to open the border to new Mexican motor carriers-

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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