Amicus Curiae Brief — Rasul v. Bush

3a) {3

Nos. 03-334, 03-343

: In The

Supreme Court of the Ani

Sd

SHAFIQ RASUL, et al.,

Petitioners,

Vv.

GEORGE W. BUSH,

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, et al.,

Respondents.

S

FAWZI KHALID ABDULLAH

FAHAD AL ODAH, et al.,

Petitioners,

V.

UNITED STATES, et al.,

Respondents.

°

On Writ Of Certiorari To The

United States Court Of Appeals

For The District of Columbia Cir cuit

Sf

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE OMAR AHMED KHADR

BY HIS NEXT FRIEND FATIMA EL-SAMNAH

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

+

DENNIS EDNEY JOHN A. E. Potrow

EDNEY, HATTERSLEY & DOLPHIN Counsel of Record

#1970, 10123 — 99th Street UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Edmonton, AB, T5J 3H1 LAW SCHOOL

Telephone: (780) 423-4081 625 South State Street

Facsimile: (780) 425-5247 Ann Arbor, MI, 48109

Telephone: (734) 647-3736

NATHAN WHITLING Facsimile: (734) 764-8309

PARLEE McLaws LLP

#1500, 10180 — 101 Street

Edmonton, AB, T5J 4K1

Telephone: (780) 423-8658

Facsimile: (780) 423-2870

Attorneys for the Amicus Curiae Omar Ahmed Khadr

January 12, 2004

—==——————==—|—amnBDn@>o°_ _SSSa=SBaSBBBEa=ODW@SSSO

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO (800) 225-6964

OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

—

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................sssccssesssesseeeeees ii

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ............::00ccceee0000 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS .............:.ccceceeeeeeeeeeees 2

DETTE eretnecsccssssssecsamnntssenenemninisimeiinni 4

I. The Rights of Children Under International

AEP. cuceccsnnscsdeseenenssecsesmnenesumetainimnianiaennan 4

Il. The Extra-Territorial Application of Consti-

SRNR EIT cccccceccccsscsccossccsseccossnsccssnssnencnessces 8

A. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, and R.

De FRI OP nceccccccscesccvscconsccccsascnosesonessssssonsnnesen 8

i Tt: ee 10

C. Adoption and Application to the Circum-

phases OF GES GOGO conecccecccnccsscscscssccsssscses 12

FTE, $C a cccccccececcccconesccccsoscesscnccsscnsenccssesosente 13

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

UNITED STATES JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp.2d 584 (E.D.N.Y.

2002), revd on other grounds, Beharry uv.

ABRCTOFE, SSO F.BE G1 (BOOB)......000000000000ceroseerseerersecceessenee 6

Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).........c.cc000ee00e 8

Sadeghi v. I.N.S., 40 F.3d 1139 (CA10 1994)......ccccccccccsceees 6

The Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon, 11 US. (7

ETE: 10

United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259

es cussunssonanncnd 9,13

FOREIGN JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Baker v. Canada (Minister of Employment and

Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 ..........ccccecceeeeceeeseeeeeees 5

R. v. Cook, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 597 .........00000000-. 3, 10, 11, 12, 13

R. v. Sharpe, (2001) 1 S.C.R. 45.0... cccccccceceeseesceseseeeeeees 4,5

R. v. Terry, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 207........cccccccccccceceeeeceeees 9, 10,11

INTERNATIONAL TREATIES, PROTOCOLS

AND RESOLUTIONS

Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N.G.A.

Res. 44/25, Annex, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49)

at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), entered into

force 2 September 1990.....................ccccecsesessssssseesesseceeees 5

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,

U.N.TS., vol. 1155, p. 331, entered into force 27

FemMMAEG DGD .....<000ccecesscesveecccesesvvsccccscssesccococccsscssosceceoes

Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights

of the Child on the Involvement of Children in

Armed Conflict, U.N.G.A. Res. 54/263, Annex I,

54 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49), U.N. Doc. A/54/49

(2000), entered into force 12 February 2002...................

Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights

of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prosti-

tution and Child Pornography, U.N.G.A. Res.

54/263, Annex II, 54 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49),

U.N. Doc. A/54/49 (2000), entered into force 18

Femme BOGB 2222000ccesecsecesececesesecccsssscccsccccesccccssssscsssssccosees

International Covenant of Civil and Political

Rights, U.N.G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N.

GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316

(1966), 993 U.N.TS. 3, entered into force 3 Janu-

Parliamentary Assembly Resolution No. 1340

(2003) (Adopted June 26, 2003) .............ccccceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeees

TREATISES

Oscar Schachter, INTERNATIONA. LAW IN THEORY

TE

Bernard H. Oxman, Jurisdiction of States, vol. 10,

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

CB scccenscccecccccccccecececescccccsscncesescccsssnsesoscssssscosescssccccoooese

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

OTHER AUTHORITY

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,

Enacted as Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982

Sn I Sa a al g

1

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE'

The amicus curiae Omar Ahmed Khadr (“Omar”) is

one of several children and the only Canadian citizen

currently detained in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Like the

Petitioners, Omar is virtually in communicado and his

grandmother Fatima El-Samnah acts as his Next Friend.

Reports indicate that Omar was first captured in

Afghanistan in July of 2002 when he was fifteen years old.

Since that time, Omar has been forcibly separated from

his mother, his siblings, and his grandparents. There is no

present indication of an intention to reunite Omar with his

family.

It is known that Omar sustained serious injuries at

the time of his capture and that he experiences ongoing

health concerns. He has lost approximately ninety percent

of the vision in his left eye and is also believed to be

recovering from bullet wounds.

In approximately the late fall of 2002, Omar was

taken from Bagram, Afghanistan, and flown across the

globe to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. As a consequence of

Omar’s plane having landed some ninety miles short of the

coast of Florida, he has not been brought before any

independent judicial authority for a determination of his

legal status, nor has he been advised of any formal charges

or allegations raised against him. Although Canadian .

intelligence officials have been permitted to question

* This brief is filed with the written consent of all parties. No

counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, nor did any

person or entity, other than amicus or his counsel, make a monetary

contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief.

2

Omar on at least one occasion, he has been accorded visits

from neither his family nor independent counsel.

Omar wishes to exercise his fundamental right to

challenge the legality of the deprivation of his liberty

before a court of competent, independent and impartial

authority, and to a prompt decision thereon. He submits

this brief, through his Next Friend, in support of Petition-

ers’ position seeking reversal of the decision of the Court of

Appeals.

¢

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The amicus curiae Omar Ahmed Khadr is mindful of

Rule 37 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United

States, as well as the fact that many other parties and

amici have filed briefs before this Court in these appeals.

As such, these submissions are limited to two topics

arising from the amicus curiae’s status as a child and as a

Canadian national.

The amicus curiae refers this Court to the principles

of international law that require states to protect the

rights of children deprived of their liberty. While children

also enjoy protection under such generally applicable

instruments as the Geneva Conventions, instruments such

as the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the

Child emphasize the need to accord special protection to

children. The amicus curiae contends that in deciding the

issues raised in these appeals, the Court should interpret

the Constitution in a manner consistent with the funda-

mental principles of international law contained in these

instruments.

3

As a Canadian, and to assist this Court in confronting

new and difficult issues recently addressed by sister

common law jurisdictions, the amicus curiae refers this

Court to recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada.

These decisions, while of course not binding upon this

Court, may prove instructive. They address the extent to

which the Constitution of Canada may be applied to the

conduct of Canadian government officials committed

outside Canada’s geographic boundaries. It is submitted

that a similar balancing test to that enunciated by the

Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Cook, [1998] 2 S.C.R.

597, ought to be adopted by this Court in these appeals.

The test in Cook - which may be invoked by Canadian

nationals and foreigners alike — provides that the domestic

courts of Canada may apply the Constitution beyond

Canada’s sovereign territory where: (1) the conduct in

question is that of Canadian government officials, and (2)

the application of the Constitution will not interfere with

the sovereign authority of the foreign state and thereby

generate an objectionable extra-territorial effect.

In sum, the amicus curiae submits that this Court

ought to interpret the Constitution in a manner consistent

with the principles of international law and consistent

with the decisions of other nations whose government

actors travel the world. This Court should recognize

jurisdiction on the part of the domestic courts of the

United States to review the conduct of United States

government actors in Guantanamo Bay, and reverse and

remand these matters for further proceedings on the

merits.

4

ARGUMENT

I. The Rights of Children Under International Law

The amicus curiae supports and adopts the submis-

sions of the Petitioners and amici regarding the applicabil-

ity of customary international law as domestic law and the

use of international law as an aid in constitutional inter-

pretation.

The Supreme Court of Canada has recently empha-

sized the importance of standards and principles of inter-

national law in ensuring the protection of children. In the

concurring reasons of L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier and Basta-

rache JJ. in R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45, it was stated:

The protection of children from harm is a univer-

sally accepted goal. While this Court has recog-

nized that, generally, international norms are not

binding without legislative implementation, they

are relevant sources for interpreting rights do-

mestically. ...

[A] balancing of competing interests [in constitu-

tional interpretation] must be informed by Can-

ada’s international obligations. The fact that a

value has the status of an international human

right is indicative of the high degree of impor-

tance with which it must be considered... .

Both legislators abroad and the international

community have acknowledged the vulnerability

of children and the resulting need to protect

them. It is therefore not surprising that the Con-

vention on the Rights of the Child has been rati-

fied or acceded to by 191 states as of January 19,

2001, making it the most universally accepted

human rights instrument in history.

Id. at 140-41.

5

As noted in Sharpe, supra, the most significant

instrument regarding the rights of children under interna-

tional law is the Convention on the Rights of the Child,

U.N.G.A. Res. 44/25, Annex, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49)

at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), entered into force 2

September 1990 (the “CRC”). Although never adopted as

domestic legislation by the Parliament of Canada, the

provisions of the CRC were nevertheless applied by the

Supreme Court of Canada as an interpretive aid to federal

legislation in the case of Baker v. Canada (Minister of

Employment and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817. In

that case, the Court interpreted provisions of immigration

statutes relating to families in removal proceedings in a

manner consistent with the CRC.

The United States and Somalia are the only two

nations not to have ratified the CRC. However, on Febru-

ary 16, 1995, the United States signed the CRC, thereby

affirming its obligation “to refrain from acts which would

defeat the object and purpose of [the] treaty,” Vienna

Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N.T.S., vol. 1155, p.

331, entered into force 27, Art. 18. Additionally, on January

23, 2003, the United States ratified two Optional Protocols

to the CRC, namely the Optional Protocol to the Conven-

tion on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of

Children in Armed Conflict, U.N.G.A. Res. 54/263, Annex

I, 54 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49), U.N. Doc. A/54/49 (2000),

entered into force 12 February 2002, and the Optional

Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on

the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornog-

raphy, U.N.G.A. Res. 54/263, Annex II, 54 U.N. GAOR

Supp. (No. 49), U.N. Doc. A/54/49 (2000), entered into force

18 January 2002.

6

More importantly, in light of its near-universal accep-

tance, the CRC has been recognized and applied by the

courts of the United States as customary international

law. For example, in Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp.2d 584,

600 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), rev'd on other grounds, Beharry v.

Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51 (2003), the District Court for the

Eastern District of New York noted the widespread accep-

tance of the CRC: “This overwhelming acceptance is strong

reason to hold that some CRC provisions have attained the

status of customary international law.” And in Sadeghi v.

I.N.S., 40 F.3d 1139, 1147 (CA10 1994), it was noted that

“The Convention on the Rights of the Child has been

ratified by 166 nations, including Iran! Moreover, it has

_ attained the status of customary international law.”

Article 37 of the CRC provides:

States Parties shall ensure that:

(b) No child shall be deprived of his or her lib-

erty unlawfully or arbitrarily. The arrest, deten-

tion or imprisonment of a child shall be in

conformity with the law and shall be used only as

a measure of last resort and for the shortest ap-

propriate period of time;

(d) Every child deprived of his or her liberty

shall have the right to prompt access to legal and

other appropriate assistance, as well as the right

to challenge the legality of the deprivation of his

or her liberty before a court or other competent,

independent and impartial authority, and to a

prompt decision on any such action.

eee

7

Article 37 of the CRC codifies longstanding and

widely-accepted principles of law. Moreover, the rights

enshrined in the CRC apply to “every child” regardless of

citizenship or reasons for detention. These same principles

are embodied in the International Covenant of Civil and

Political Rights, U.N.G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N.

GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993

U.N.TS. 3, entered into force 3 January 1976 (the

“ICCPR”), which both the United States and Canada have

signed and ratified. Article 9.4 of the ICCPR provides:

Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or

detention shall be entitled to take proceedings

before a court, in order that court may decide with-

out delay on the lawfulness of his detention and

order his release if the detention is not lawful.

It has been widely recognized throughout the world

that the indefinite detention without charge of the amicus

curiae and other children by the Respondents constitutes a

“flagrant breach” of international law. In the Parliamen-

tary Assembly of Europe’s Resolution No. 1340 (2003)

(Adopted June 26, 2003), it was resolved:

1. The Parliamentary Assembly:

ii. notes that a number of children are be-

ing held in Guantanamo Bay, including a

“handful” of children between 13 and 15

years of age transferred from the Bagram Air

Base in 2003, and a 16-year old Canadian na-

tional transferred at the end of 2002;

iii. believes that children should only be

detained as a last resort and that they re-

quire special protection; that the continuing

8

detention of these young people is a most

flagrant breach of the United Nations Con-

vention on the Rights of the Child.

The protection of children from harm is a universally

accepted goal and a fundamental tenet of both interna-

tional law and domestic law. The Constitution should be

interpreted in a manner requiring executive authority to

be exercised in a manner consistent with these most

fundamental of principles. An interpretation contrary to

that advanced by the Petitioners in this case would entail

a conclusion that the United States has acted in violation

of international law — a result which must be avoided

where an alternative conclusion is available.

II. The Extra-Territorial Application of Constitu-

tional Law

Between the United States and Canada lies the

longest undefended border in the world. Each nation

shares an interest in ensuring the fair treatment of its

citizens by its neighbor’s government, and each has a

proud constitutional tradition of recognizing basic human

rights. In assessing the issues in this case, this Court

ought to consider and adopt the jurisprudence recently

developed by the Supreme Court of Canada in relation to

the treatment of U.S. citizens by Canadian government

officials outside Canada’s sovereign territory.

A. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez and R.

v. Terry

In addition to Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763

(1950), the decision of the Court of Appeals below was

based in large measure upon this Court’s decision in

9

United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990). In

Verdugo-Urquidez, federal agents of the United States had

arranged to conduct searches of defendant Verdugo-

Urquidez’s residences in Mexico. The searches were

authorized by the Director General of the Mexican Federal

Judicial Police, and carried out in concert with Mexican

officials. Under those circumstances, this Court held that

Verdugo-Urquidez had no right to challenge the constitu-

tionality of the searches because the Fourth Amendment

did not apply extra-territorially to the conduct that oc-

curred in Mexico.

A decision similar to Verdugo-Urquidez was rendered

by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Terry, [1996] 2

S.C.R. 207. In that case, defendant Terry had been appre-

hended by American police officers in Santa Rosa, Califor-

nia, pursuant to an extradition warrant issued by a

federal district court. At the request of Canadian police

officers, the Santa Rosa police interviewed Terry and

obtained incriminating statements from him. Following

his extradition to Canada, Terry sought to have his state-

ments excluded by operation he Canadian Charter of

Rights and Freedoms (the “Charter”). Writing for the

unanimous Supreme Court of Canada, Justice McLachlin

(as she then was) held that Terry could not challenge the

constitutionality of the interview since the Charter did not

apply extra-territorially to the conduct of the Santa Rosa

police. This was so despite the fact that the interview had

been conducted at the behest of Canadian police officers.

Noting the historical pedigree of territorial jurisdiction

(and implicitly acknowledging the value of considering the

case law from sister jurisdictions), Justice McLachlin held

that applying the Charter to the conduct of the Santa Rosa

police would offend traditional notions of sovereignty:

10

Such a finding would run counter to the settled

rule that a state is only competent to enforce its

laws within its own territorial boundaries. As

Marshall C.J. put it in The Schooner Exchange v.

M’Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812), at p.

136, “(t]he jurisdiction of the nation within its

own territory is necessarily exclusive and abso-

lute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed

by itself.”

Id. at 215.

B. R. v. Cook

In the subsequent case of R. v. Cook, [1998] 2 S.C.R.

597, Cook, a U.S. citizen, had been arrested in New

Orleans by U.S. officials pursuant to a warrant issued in

response to a Canadian extradition request for a murder

committed in Canada. Canadian detectives attended in

New Orleans and interviewed Cook about the murder.

Following his extradition, Cook applied to have his state-

ment excluded by operation of the Charter. The Crown

argued that Terry was controlling precedent and had

previously established that the Charter did not apply to

conduct committed outside the geographic boundaries of

Canada.

In a 5-2 decision, the Supreme Court of Canada noted

that Terry had addressed an exercise of legal authority by

the government officials of a foreign nation; the interview

in Terry had been conducted by American police officers,

and the fact that they were acting at the behest of (and

conceivably as agents for) Canadian police officers did not

change that fact. By contrast, in Cook, the interview was

conducted by Canadian police officers themselves (albeit in

11

United States territory). This consideration was found to

be decisive requiring Terry to be distinguished.

Having declined to follow Terry, the Court in Cook

enunciated a new approach to the extra-territorial applica-

tion of the Canadian Charter. The domestic courts of Canada

may now apply the Charter beyond Canada’s sovereign

territory where a two part test is satisfied: (1) the conduct in

question was that of Canadian government officials, and (2)

the application of the Charter will not interfere with the

sovereign authority of the foreign state and thereby generate

an objectionable extra-territorial effect. Id. at 616, 625, 626,

627.

The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Cook was

informed by well established principles of internationa’

law and comity. The court noted that it was consistent

with established principles of international law for the

domestic courts of Canada to assert jurisdiction on the

basis of the nationality of the police officers who had

conducted the interview. The following passage by Oscar

Schachter in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

(1991), at p. 254 was adopted:

It had long been accepted that a State was enti-

tled to apply its legislative (or prescriptive) au-

thority to events and persons within its territory ~

and to its nationals outside of the country. “Terri-

toriality” and “nationality” were referred to as

“bases” of jurisdiction and functioned as criteria

of permissible authority. Territoriality is gener-

ally considered the normal basis of jurisdiction;

nationality more exceptional, but always ac-

cepted in international relations.

Id. at 618.

12

The court in Cook also noted that jurisdictional

competence on the basis of the nationality of the police

officers was an incident of Canada’s sovereign equality and

independence:

The fundamental bases for the exercise of

jurisdiction by a State are rooted in two aspects

of the modern concept of the State itself: defined

territory and permanent population. In principle,

a State has jurisdiction over all persons, property

and activities in its territory; a State also has ju-

—_— over its nationals wherever they may

Id. at 618. (Quoting Bernard H. Oxman, Juris-

diction of States, vol. 10, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB-

LIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (1987), at p. 279, with

emphasis added by the court.)

The Attorney General of Canada had been granted

intervener status in Cook and had argued that the appli-

cation of the Charter to the New Orleans interview would

ultimately confer Charter rights upon every person in the

world. The Supreme Court of Canada was not persuaded

by these arguments. At paragraph 53 the Court noted that

the Charter will only apply extra-territorially under those

exceptional circumstances where the two-part test is met.

Id. at 628-29.

C. Adoption and Application to the Circum-

stances of this Case

The amicus curiae respectfully submits that this

Court ought to adopt an approach to the extra-territorial

application of the Constitution similar to that established

by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Cook. This

approach has been developed in the context of today’s

— SO

13

global economy where people and goods travel across

borders at rates previously unimagined. It is carefully

crafted to strike an appropriate balance between the basic

human rights of the individual and the need to avoid

interference with the sovereign legal authority of foreign

governments.

As was the case in Terry, supra, this Court’s previous

decision in Verdugo-Urquidez addressed conduct that was

specifically authorized and carried out by Mexican gov-

ernment authorities in accordance with Mexican law.

Under these circumstances, the application of the Fourth

Amendment to the searches at issue would have consti-

tuted an interference with the sovereign authority of

Mexico and thereby generated an objectionable extra-

territorial effect, i.e., it would have failed the Cook test.

By contrast, in the present case, there can be no serious

suggestion that the application of the laws of the United

States to the government officials who are currently detain-

ing the Petitioners and amicus curiae would generate an

objectionable extra-territorial effect. The government of

Cuba, while technically retaining “ultimate sovereignty”

under the terms of the lease of Guantanamo Bay, does not

purport to exercise legal authority over the persons detained

therein. In the absence of such an objectionable extra-

territorial effect, it is appropriate for this Court to distin-

guish its previous decision in Verdugo-Urquidez. ,

Ill. Conclusion

It is submitted by the amicus curiae Omar Ahmed

Khadr that the Constitution must be interpreted in a

manner consistent with the universally recognized goal to

protect children from abuse and arbitrary detention.

14

With respect to the extra-territorial application of the

Constitution, the nationality of the government officials

who are arbitrarily detaining the Petitioners and amicus

curiae is a valid basis for an exercise of jurisdiction under

international law, and should be so as a matter of domestic

constitutional law provided that no impermissible in-

fringement on sovereignty is generated. Other constitu-

tional democracies, sharing traditional common law

notions of sovereignty, have so held.

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse

and remand these appeals for further proceedings consis-

tent with such an approach.

Respectfully submitted,

DENNIS EDNEY

EDNEY, HATTERSLEY & DOLPHIN

#1970, 10123 — 99th Street

Edmonton, Alberta, T5J 3H1

Telephone: (780) 423-4081

Facsimile: (780) 425-5247

JOHN A. E. Pottow

Counsel of Record

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL

625 South State Street

Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109

Telephone: (734) 647-3736

Facsimile: (734) 764-8309

NATHAN WHITLING

PaRLEE McLaws LLP

#1500, 10180 — 101 Street

Edmonton, Alberta, T5J 4K1

Telephone: (780) 423-8658

Facsimile: (780) 423-2870

Attorneys for the Amicus Curiae