Jurisdictional Statement — Adams v. Federal Election Commission

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(') , Sup.c.ria Cour

‘, u.S,

No. , FILED

FUMAY 9 9 2003

In The

Supreme Court of the Anited States

o

VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY ADAMS, et al.,

Appellants,

Vv.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.,

Appellees.

°

On Appeal To The United States District Court,

District Of Columbia

—?

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

¢

BOoNnITA P. TENNERIELLO

Counsel of Record

JOHN C. BONIFAZ

LISA J. DANETZ

BRENDA WRIGHT

NATIONAL VOTING RIGHTS

INSTITUTE

27 School Street

Suite 500

Boston, MA 02108

(617) 624-3900

DAvID A. WILSON

Avi SAMUEL GARBOW

HALE AND DorR LLP

1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW,

10th Floor

Washington, DC 20004

(202) 942-8400

Attorneys for Appellants

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO. (800) 225-6964

OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the District Court erred in ruling that a

challenge to the increased “hard money” contribution

limits found in sections 304, 307 and 319 of the Bipartisan

Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), Pub. L. No. 107-

155, 116 Stat. 81, 97-100, 102-03, and 109-112 (codified as

amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a and 441a-1) is nonjusticiable

due to lack of cognizable injury, even though the increases

will confer preponderant electoral power on wealthy

donors and will effectively exclude candidates and voters

without access to networks of large donors from electoral

participation, in violation of the equal protection guaran-

tee incorporated by the due process clause of the Fifth

Amendment to the United States Constitution.

ii

PARTIES

Actual parties to the proceedings in the United States

District Court were:

(1) Victoria Jackson Gray Adams, Carrie Bolton,

Cynthia Brown, Derek Cressman, Victoria Fitzgerald,

Anurada Joshi, Nancy Russell, Kate Seely-Kirk, Rose

Taylor, Stephanie L. Wilson, California Public Interest

Research Group, Massachusetts Public Interest Research

Group, New Jersey Public Interest Research Group,

United States Public Interest Research Group, Fannie Lou

Hamer Project, and Association Of Community Organizers

For Reform Now, plaintiffs, appellants herein,

(2) The United States of America, defendant,

(3) The Federal Communications Commission, defen-

dant,

(4) The Federal Election Commission, defendant,

(5) John Ashcroft, in his capacity as Attorney Gen-

eral of the United States, defendant,

(6) Sen. John McCain, Sen. Russell Feingold, Rep.

Christopher Shays, Rep. Martin Meehan, Sen. Olympia

Snowe, and Sen. James Jeffords, defendant-intervenors.

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

None of the appellants has a parent corporation, and

no publicly held company owns 10% or more of the stock of

any of the appellants.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Table of Authorities ...............ccccccccccscscsssccssssccessceeeees v

Opinions Below. ..............:ssseeeseeseeseeeseeseeeeeennensenssenees 1

BeaGA GANG cccccoccccccceccccsccscsccccccccesecccecssssessessssossssooses ]

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved.... 1

Statement of the Case ...............cccccccseeeeeeeeeeenneeeeennees 2

A. The electoral exclusion of candidates lacking

D.

E.

F.

personal wealth or access to large networks

of wealthy Gomors.................ccccccseeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeees

The exclusion of non-wealthy voters from the

Slocteral PFOCSES ...........cccccresessccccccsccssseseceesees

electoral Process .............csceceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeenneeeees

The entrenchment of incumbents ..................

The further exclusionary effects of the

“millionaire” ProviSiOns ...............+.--eseseeeeeeees

Reasons for Noting Probable Jurisdiction.................

A. The appellants have presented a cognizable

ietinie"~1. a ee

Se ee em a ee

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASEs:

Albanese v. FEC, 78 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 1996) ..0.0......ccccccccccee 20

Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) .0..........cccccc00- 13

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)..........cccccccccecseseeeeseseeees 14

Becker v. FEC, 230 F.3d 381 (1st Cir. 2000)................ 17, 18

Buchanan v. FEC, 112 F. Supp. 2d 58 (D.D.C. 2000)........ 17

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).........c.ccccccceeeee. 15, 16, 21

Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) .................. 12, 13, 14

Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986) ..........ccccccccceeeeeees 12

FEC v. Mass Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238

a 15

Fulani v. Brady, 948 F.2d 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1991)............... 17

Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 882

EE 13, 17

Ga. State Conference of NAACP Branches v. Cox,

183 F.3d. 1259 (11th Cir. 1999) 00.0.0... cccccceeeeeeeees 13, 20

Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) ............cccccccccccececeeeee 14

Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663

Sia hecncncnsrenmnnncnnensnmicimenteetampasnntenmmensistmsmaimtmatamaniaenes 12

Int'l Assn. of Machinists v. FEC, 678 F.2d 1092

UD CIEE Me ccrsiricnrnensccetrcistinintidineeidientintaermaamtaain 12, 17, 18

Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974) .......ccccccccccceeceeees 12, 13

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).......... 20

NAACP Los Angeles Branch v. Jones, 131 F.3d 1317

TEED MUU ictvieitiecenitnnibcennicebttinietarsiniasemematciatnthinarannieaanasiaed 20

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528

| oT. aa 15, 16

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)............ 12, 14, 15, 16

Vote Choice Inc. v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26 (1st Cir.

ee 12, 17, 20

Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) ............cccceeeeeeeseeees 23

Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971).............ccceeeeeeeees 14

White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) ..........ccecceeeeeeerenees 14

CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES

UB. Comst.. Ammemd. V ....cccccccccsererccccrssccccccccsccsssosesese 1, 2, 11

Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002,

Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002)..................:0++ 1

Title Ii

§ 94, 116 Btat. OF .....ccccccccccecccsccsscccccseccssecssoscssessess 2,11

§ 907, 116 Stat. 102...................cccccrsrosersrsrrerersssssrorsesees 2

§ BIO, 116 Beat. 10O.........0......ccsccccscssssseceeseerseesoseee 2,11

Title IV

§ 403(aX3), 116 Stat. 113-14 ...........ccccseeeeeeeneeeneenenees 1

OTHER AUTHORITIES:

of Democracy, in IF BUCKLEY FELL 63 (E. Joshua

Rosenkranz ed., 1999) ..............:cccccsseceeereeseenenreeeeseneenenees 22

Vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71

Towa L. Rev. 1405 (1986) ..........cccccccccccececccseeeeececeeeeeee

Burt Neuborne, Toward a Democracy-Centered

Reading of the First Amendment, 93 Nw. U. L.

Oe Ga ae ocrctccencnenssennenesenestenenentenssenennscssesseanouns

Richard A. Oppel Jr., “Bush’s Heaviest Hitters to

Be Called Rangers,” New York Times, May 24,

2003, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/

05/24/politics/campaigns/24DONA.html?ex= 1054

Sharon Theimer, “Bush Volunteer Fund-Raising

Group Formed,” Associated Press, May 23, 2003,

available at http://www. washingtonpost. com/ac2/

wp-dyn/A30660-2003May23.html................ccccccceeeeees

U.S. Census Bureau, “Income 2001,” available at

http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/income0 l/inc

i> Ci crerenccnnensnnccencnensnnsanentenmmeneueeseensencatenansennees

U.S. PIRG, “Presidential Candidates Getting More

Money from Big Donors,” available at http-/www.

pirg.org/democracy/democracy.asp?id2=9950.............

+ ee ee ee

1

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinions of the three-judge United States District

Court for the District of Columbia are not yet reported. In

accordance with this Court’s order of May 15, 2003 (Nos.

02-M-98 and 02-M-99), they are omitted from the appendix

that is bound with this jurisdictional statement and will

be reprinted in a single appendix to be filed on behalf of all

appellants.

¢

JURISDICTION

The final judgment of the court below was entered on

May 2, 2003. The Adams appellants, Victoria Jackson

Gray Adams, Carrie Bolton, Cynthia Brown, Derek

Cressman, Victoria Fitzgerald, Anurada Joshi, Nancy

Russell, Kate Seely-Kirk, Rose Taylor, Stephanie L.

Wilson, California Public Interest Research Group, Massa-

chusetts Public Interest Research Group, New Jersey

Public Interest Research Group, United States Public

Interest Research Group, Fannie Lou Hamer Project, and

Association Of Community Organizers For Reform Now,

filed their notice of appeal on May 4, 2003. See Appendix

(“App.”) la. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under

the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002,

Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 403(a)(3), 116 Stat. 81, 113-114

(2002).

¢

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

This constitutional challenge is brought pursuant to

the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the

2

United States Constitution, set forth a! App. 3a. The

challenged sections of the Bipartisan Caipaign Finance

Reform Act of 2002 are codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 44la and

441a-1 and set forth beginning at App. 4a.

¢

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The case arises out of radical increases in the limits

on individual campaign contributions contained in the

Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA),

§§ 304, 307 and 319, 116 Stat. 81, 97-100, 102-03, and 109-

112 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a and 441a-1).

These provisions raise the amount that an individual may

contribute to a federal campaign from $1,000 per election

to $2,000 per election. BCRA § 307. The individual contri-

bution limit is further raised in races where a candidate

faces an opponent who has spent over a threshold amount

in personal funds. Under such circumstances, a candidate

for Representative may receive individual contributions of

up to $3,000 per election, and a Senate candidate may

receive individual contributions of up to $12,000 per

election. BCRA §§ 304 and 319.

The appellants are candidates lacking personal wealth

and access to large networks of wealthy donors; non-

wealthy voters supporting such candidates; and organiza-

tions representing the interests of non-wealthy voters.

They assert that the increased contribution limits deprive

them of the equal opportunity to participate in all integral

aspects of the electoral process, in violation of the equal

protection guarantee incorporated by the due process

clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States

Constitution. Voluminous evidence submitted by the

in.

3

appellants demonstrates that by increasing exponentially

the amount of money that the highest donors can give to

their favored candidates, the challenged BCRA provisions

will magnify the influence of the wealthy in the electoral

process to such an extent that candidates lacking personal

wealth or access to large networks of high donors will

effectively be excluded from electoral competition. The

ruling of the three-judge district court, that the appellants

lack standing because there is no cognizable injury fairly

traceable to the BCRA, Per Curiam op. at 10-11; Hender-

son op. at 339-343, fails to take adequate account of this

evidence.

A. The electoral exclusion of candidates lacking

personal wealth or access to large networks

of wealthy donors.

Under the BCRA hard money limit increases, candi-

dates without access to netwsiks of wealthy donors will be

effectively excluded from seeking political office, as the

war chests of well-connected candidates grow and the

financial bar rises far beyond the reach of those lacking

such connections. Candidates with a financial advantage

nearly always win elections, and won congressional office

94 percent of the time in the 2000 general election. Adams

Exh. 1, Declaration and Expert Report of Derek Cressman

(“Cressman Decl.”), 42, App. 22a. A large proportion of

winning campaigns are funded through maximum contri-

butions; maximum donations made up 60 percent of the

individual funds raised by winning candidates in the 2000

election cycle. Id. 95. These pandemic realities are con-

firmed by numerous individuals who have previously run

for federal office and are considering doing so again, but

who testified that BCRA increases would deter them from

4

future caudidacies because they lack access to large

networks of maximum donors.’ Senator Russell Feingold, a

defendant-intervenor and a co-sponsor of BCRA, admitted

that the hard money limit increases will likely further

enable certain candidates to build up campaign war

chests, “potentially discouragling] some people from

running” for federal office. Deposition of Russell Feingold

(“Feingold Deposition”), September 9, 2002, 264, line 14 to

265, line 3.

B. The exclusion of non-wealthy voters from the

electoral process.

In opposing the hard money limit increases, Senator

Christopher Dodd eloquently described how increased

hard money limits would marginalize the great majority of

voters to the point of “de facto exclusion.”

[W]hat are we doing here by raising these

amounts? We are moving further and further and

further away from the overwhelming majority of

Americans. I would like to see the average

American participate in the electoral process of

the country . . . I do not see many campaigns that

are going to bother any longer with smaller do-

nors. It is the de facto exclusion of more than 99

percent of the American adult population who

could support, financially, the political process in

this country, that worries me the most.

' See Adams Exh. 19, Declaration of Dr. Thomas A. Caiazzo, App.

79a; Adams Exh. 20, Declaration of Gail Crook, App. 83a; Adams Exh.

21, Declaration of Victor Morales, App. 88a; Adams Exh. 22, Declara-

tion of Cynthia Brown (“Brown Decl.”), App. 93a; Adams Exh. 23,

Declaration of Ted Glick (“Glick Decl.”), App. 96a.

sa eae eey Atte ey he

5

Congressional Record — Senate, March 27, 2001, S2965

(emphasis added).

If elite donors are permitted to double the hard money

they now channel to their favorite candidates, the candi-

dates favored by non-wealthy voters and communities will

not stand a chance. Most Americans are unable to make

contributions anywhere near the BCRA limit. A $2,000

contribution would represent nearly five percent of the

median U.S. family income, which U.S. Census Bureau

data puts at $42,228. See U.S. Census Bureau, “Income

2001,” available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/

income0l/inctabl.html. The $12,000 limit applicable in

some races under the millionaire provisions would repre-

sent over 28 percent of median income.

The ability of the average person to have a meaningful

impact on elections will diminish as the electoral weight of

‘the largest donors increases. Voter-plaintiffs and other

non-wealthy voters have testified that the hard money

increases would make their vote less meaningful, and that

they would therefore be discouraged from forms of elec-

toral participation such as volunteering, making small

contributions, and even voting itself. As one voter-plaintiff

testified, “[tJhe increases in the hard money contribution

limits make it no longer conceivable that I can access the

political process. They undermine the meaning and value

of my vote.” Adams Exh. 25, Declaration of Carrie Bolton

(“Bolton Decl.”), 412, App. 106a.’ Representatives Hilliard

* See also Adams Exh. 24, Declaration of Victoria Jackson Gray

Adams (“Adams Decl.”) 45, App. 101a (“The largest donors get more

attention, and when the ceiling is raised the voices of small] contributors

and voters like myself will be lost.”); Adams Exh. 30, Declaration of

(Continued on following page)

6

and Thompson testified that the increases will harm the

ability of low- and moderate-income communities, and

communities of color, to elect the representatives of their

choice.’

C. The predominance of the high donors in the

electoral process.

The appellants presented substantial, uncontroverted

evidence that the challenged provisions would give grossly

disproportionate weight in the electoral process to a small

portion of the population able to contribute the maximum

amount permitted. Only a small minority of the voting-age

population, 0.11 percent, gave maximum hard money

contributions to federal candidates in the 2000 election

cycle, yet these contributions constituted nearly half of all

individual funds raised. Cressman Decl. 494-5, App. 22a-

23a. These highest donors come disproportionately from

the ranks of corporate management and wealthy commu-

nities, and are overwhelmingly white and male. See Adams

Exh. 2, Declaration and Expert Report of Prof. John Green,

43 (“Green Decl.”), App. 31a. The challenged increases in

Chris Saffert, 418, App. 125a-126a (“The effect of the contribution limit

increases will be to drown out the voices of people from low and

moderate-income communities ...”); Adams Exh. 26, Declaration of

Daryl Irland, App. 107a; Adams Exh. 27, Declaration of Anuradha

Joshi; Adams Exh. 28, App. 110a, Declaration of Howard Lipoff, App.

113a; Adams Exh. 29, Declaration of Nancy Russell, App. 116a; Adams

Exh. 31, Declaration of Kate Seely-Kirk, App. 127a; Adams Exh. 32,

Declaration of Stephanie L. Wilson, App. 130a.

* See Thompson Deposition, 87, lines 9-12 (“[Bly doubling the hard

money contribution, you price low and moderate communities out of the

market for electoral participation”); Hilliard Deposition, 103, lines 4-7.

7

BCRA will “result in increased giving by the elite pool of

individual donors to federal campaigns,” Jd., 94, and

would permit this elite group to double the disproportion-

ate weight they already enjoy in the electoral process.

Indeed, analysis of FEC data for the first quarter of 2003

shows that fully 80 percent of funds raised for primary

campaigns came from donors giving over $1,000. See U.S.

PIRG, “Presidential Candidates Getting More Money from

Big Donors,” available at http://www.pirg.org/democracy/

democracy.asp7id2=9950.

Candidates with networks of maximum donors are

able to further augment their fundraising advantage by

encouraging these donors to bundle (i.e. solicit or facili-

tate) maximum contributions from business associates,

friends and family members. Adams Exh. 3, Declaration

and Expert Report of Craig McDonald (“McDonald Decl.”)

95, App. 47a. The BCRA hard money limit increases will

multiply the amounts bundled by well-connected donors,

giving these donors even greater electoral power. Candi-

dates lacking networks of large donors will be even more

greatly disadvantaged when faced with sophisticated

bundling operations.

The Bush Pioneer program — the hard money bun-

dling operation employed in the 2000 election cycle by the

George W. Bush Presidential Exploratory Committee, Inc.,

and its successor organization, the George W. Bush For

President Committee — exemplifies the disproportionate

electoral influence that bundlers enjoy. Each Pioneer was

responsible for gathering at least $100,000 in hard money

contributions, and the 212 Pioneers channeled over $22

million to the 2000 Bush presidential campaign. Jd., 713,

App. 53a. Under the BCRA increases, this small group

could have potentially collected twice as much from the

8

same number of donors. In fact, press accounts indicate

that the Bush campaign for 2004 is asking a new group,

called “Texas Rangers,” to bundle at least $200,000 each.

See Sharon Theimer, “Bush Volunteer Fund-Raising Group

Formed,” Associated Press, May 23, 2003, available at; http://

www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A30660-2003May

23.html; Richard A. Oppel Jr., “Bush’s Heaviest Hitters

to Be Called Rangers,” New York Times, May 24, 2003,

available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/24/politics/

campaigns/24DONA_html?ex=1054353600&en=ff0eeb59d76f

3bb5&ei=5062&partner=GOOGLE.

The Pioneer program also demonstrates that those

who bundle contributions often do so with the aim of

gaining enhanced access and influence with elected

officials. The Pioneers — who were comprised largely of

corporate executives and lobbyists, McDonald Decl., 410,

App. 50a-51a — were each assigned a tracking number so

that the Bush Campaign could record the total amount of

money raised by each individual. See id., 415; Deposition

of John L. Oliver III, 30(b)(6) witness on behalf of Bush for

President, Inc., 46, line 10 to 57, line 11, 106, lines 10-16.

As wealthy individuals such as the Pioneers are increas-

ingly able to determine electoral outcomes under BCRA,

they will also expand their ability to influence legislative

outcomes. A wealth of evidence documents the dispropor-

tionate access and influence that maximum donors and

bundlers enjoy in Congress.‘

* See Adams Exh. 18, Declaration of Pat Williams, former Member

of Congress from Montana, 94 (“Williams Decl.”), App. 77a (“There is no

doubt in my mind that those giving the largest contributions expect

preferential access and disproportionate influence”); Adams Exh. 17,

(Continued on following page)

D. The entrenchment of incumbents.

By aiding candidates favored by the wealthy, incum-

bent members of Congress dealt themselves a powerful

advantage, for incumbents most often are the favorites of

the wealthy. Appellants’ expert witnesses Professor Tho-

mas Stratmann, Derek Cressman, and others testified

that BCRA’s hard money increases will benefit incum-

bents, who enjoy greater access to large donors than do

challenger candidates. See Cressman Decl., 419, App. 29a;

Stratmann Decl., 795-12, App. 57a-60a. A leading co-

sponsor of the BCRA, Defendant-Intervenor Senator

Feingold has admitted that the hard money limit increases

will benefit incumbent candidates facing challengers

without access to wealth. Feingold Deposition 260, lines 7-

8.

These predictions are buttressed by evidence docu-

menting incumbents’ strong advantages in raising maxi-

mum contributions. An analysis of Federal Election

Declaration of Paul Simon, former U.S. Senator from Illinois, 44,

(“Simon Decl."), App. 73a (“No member of Congress, not even the most

10

Commission data from the 2000 election cycle finds,

“Senate incumbents in 2000 raised, on average, nearly

three times as much as their challengers did from donors

of $1,000 or more: $1.8 million v. $650,000. House incum-

bents in 2000 raised more than twice as much from donors

of $1,000 or more ar tieir challengers, on average:

$178,000 v. $85,000.” Awams Exh. 35, “Why the Battle

over Hard Money Matters: Hard Facts on Hard Money,”

Public Campaign, App. i152a-153a. Raising the hard

money limit would exacerbate the advantage incumbents

already have over challengers.

E. The further exclusionary effects of the “mil-

lionaire” provisions.

The burdens on non-wealthy candidates described

above will increase exponentially in races where a self-

funded candidate triggers provisions allowing opponents

to raise funds in increments of $3,000 per election in

House races, and up to $12,000 per election in Senate

races. See BCRA §§ 304 and 319. The record demonstrates

that when one candidate takes advantage of these “mil-

lionaire” provisions to multiply maximum contributions, a

competing candidate whose supporters cannot make large

donations will be buried in her opponents’ cash. Candi-

dates who have in the past faced wealthy, self-funded

opponents have testified that the burden of simultane-

ously confronting a second campaign with vast infusions of

cash from wealthy donors would make it impossible for

them to compete. For example, North Carolina Senate

candidate Cynthia Brown testified, “The people that I

know can hardly afford to contribute twenty-five dollars,

let alone $12,000. There is no way that any candidate like

11

in the hard money contribution limits would effectively

eliminate any future campaign I might hope to wage for

the U.S. Senate.” Brown Decl., ¢98-9, App. 95a; See also

Glick Decl., 46, App. 98a (“It is impossible to participate

facing that tremendous disparity in resources. I just do not

run in the circles of people who can contribute $12,000.”).

F. Proceedings in district court.

The Adams plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in the U.S.

District Court for the District of Columbia on May 7, 2002.

Count I alleged that the increases in the individual hard

money contribution limits contained in BCRA Sec. 307

violate the equal protection guarantee incorporated by the

due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S.

Constitution. Count II alleged that the BCRA provisions

providing for further contribution limit increases in

response to expenditures from personal funds (the “mil-

lionaire” provisions), BCRA §§ 304 and 319, similarly

violate the Fifth Amendment.

The case was consolidated with ten other challenges

to various provisions of the BCRA and assigned to a three-

judge panel. A two-day trial based on recorded testimony

was held on December 4 and 5, 2002 The defendants and

defendant-intervenors presented no evidence counter to

that presented by the Adams plaintiffs. Rather, they

argued that the plaintiffs’ injuries were insufficient to

confer standing. Defendants’ Opening Brief (“Def. Br.”) at

208-209. The three-judge District Court issued a final

judgment on May 2, 2003 ruling the claims of the Adams

plaintiffs nonjusticiable.

12

REASONS FOR NOTING PROBABLE

JURISDICTION

A. The appellants have presented a cognizable

injury implicating core constitutional values

of equality.

The appellants’ evidence demonstrates that the

challenged BCRA provisions will multiply the electoral

power of donors able to give the maximum contributions,

and will thereby deny any realistic hope of gaining office to

candidates drawing their support from non-wealthy

voters. While this Court has not previously addressed an

equal protection challenge to a law creating inequalities in

campaign finance, it has long held that wealth discrimina-

tion in elections violates equal protection principles, see

Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)

(poll tax violates equal protection clause of Fourteenth

Amendment); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972)

(candidate filing fees violate equal protection clause);

Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974) (same), and that all

citizens are entitled to an equally meaningful vote. See,

e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (dilution of

voting strength based on geography violates equal protec-

tion clause of Fourteenth Amendment); Davis v. Bande-

mer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (dilution of voting strength of

political group is justiciable under equal protection

clause). The district court’s ruling of nonjusticiabilty, Per

Curiam op. at 10-11; Henderson op. at 339-342, stands in

of equality embodied in these cases. It also conflicts with

established case law recognizing that an injury to the

ability to compete in elections is justiciable. See, e.g., Int'l.

Assn. of Machinists v. FEC, 678 F.2d 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1982);

Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano, 4 £.3d 26 (1st Cir. 1993)

13

(“Vote Choice”); Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ.

Fund, 882 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1989) (“Fulani I”).

The only member of the three-judge district court to

discuss the court's nonjusticiability ruling was Judge

Henderson, who wrote that the appellants “have not

suffered an invasion of a legally protected interest,” be-

cause “no one has a ‘right to equal influence in the overall

electoral process.’” Henderson op. at 340 (citing Ga. State

Conference of NAACP Branches v. Cox, 183 F.3d 1259,

1263-64 (11th Cir. 1999)) (emphasis in original). As is clear

on the face of the appellants’ pleadings, they seek not

equal influence but an equal ability to participate in the

electoral process regardless of economic status. This is

precisely the right that this Court affirmed when it struck

mandatory candidate filing fees as unconstitutional wealth

discrimination. In Bullock and Lubin, the Court held that

candidates “lacking both personal wealth and affluent

backers are in every practical sense” excluded from the

electoral process by mandatory filing fees, and that “[tJhe

effect of this exclusionary mechanism on voters is neither

incidental nor remote.” Bullock, 405 U.S. at 143-144. See

also Lubin, 415 U.S. at 716 (rights of excluded candidates

are “intertwined with the rights of voters”); and see Ander-

son et al. v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 786-787 (1983)

(striking early candidate filing deadline which unconstitu-

tionally burdened rights of voters supporting independent

candidate). While Judge Henderson supports her ruling by

noting that “none of the Adams plaintiffs has been, or

conceivably will be, stripped of his right to vote or of access

to the ballot,” Henderson op. at 340, the same was true in

Bullock and Lubin. The challenged statutes in those cases

did not directly abridge the right to vote, but rather denied

non-wealthy voters a meaningful vote. The exclusion of

14

voters and their preferred candidates was de facto rather

than de jure; those lacking wealth were not literally but

“in every practical sense” excluded from elections. Bullock,

405 U.S. at 143-144.

Similarly, the apportionment cases recognize that “the

right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution

of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by

wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.”

Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555; see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.

186 (1962) (vote dilution claim is justiciable); Gray v.

Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) (violation of equal protection

and due process clauses of fourteenth amendment, and of

seventeenth amendment, to weight rural votes more

heavily than urban votes); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 US. 1

(1964) (vote dilution violates Art. I, § 2); Davis, 478 U.S.

109 (dilution of voting strength of political group is justici-

able under equal protection clause). The multimember

districts invalidated in White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755

(1973), did not explicitly restrict the vote of racial minori-

ties, yet this Court upheld the lower court’s conclusion

that such districts “effectively excluded” minority groups

from participation in the primary because such groups

“had less opportunity than did other residents in the

district to participate in the political process and to elect

legislators of their choice.” Jd. at 766-67 (emphasis added).

Cf. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971) (claim of

racial vote dilution from multi-member districts is justici-

able but not shown on the record).

The district court’s ruling takes a far more constricted

view of the righi to vote than the wealth discrimination

and apportionmeni cases permit. Indeed, the district

court’s standard would bar all voting rights claims except

where the right to vote were explicitly and directly

15

abridged by the state. No voter is stripped of the right to

vote by a mandatory candidate filing fee, and no voter is

stripped of the right to vote by unfair legislative appor-

tionment, yet such practices indeed deny these voters

equal protection of the law. This Court has recognized the

right of each citizen to “an equally effective voice” in

elections, declaring, “Modern and viable state government

needs, and the Constitution demands, no less.” Reynolds,

377 U.S. at 565. The appellants’ claim that the BCRA hard

money provisions deny them an “equally effective voice”

may not be dismissed as nonjusticiable merely because the

law does not, on its face, abridge the vote.

Judge Henderson summarily rejects the above-cited

wealth discrimination and apportionment case law as

“inapposite,” with no more than a citation to Buckley's

well-known admonishment that the voting rights cases do

not support “abridging the rights of some persons to

engage in political expression in order to enhance the

relative voice of other segments of our society.” Buckley v.

Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 n. 55 (1976). That statement was

written in regard to the FECA’s expenditure limitations

which, on the record in Buckley, the Court held to be an

unconstitutional restriction of speech. Jd. at 51. The

appellants in this case do not seek to “abridge” the speech of

anyone; rather they seek to maintain the very contribution

limits which Buckley held entail “only a marginal restric-

tion upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free commu-

nication,” 424 U.S. at 20, and do not substantially infringe

the speech or associational rights of donors. Id. at 22; see

also Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 US.

377, 386-88 (2000) (distinguishing between spending and

contribution limits and upholding Missouri’s contribution

limits ranging from $250 to $1,000); FEC v. Mass Citizens

16

for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 259-260 (1986) (“We have consis-

tently held that restrictions on contributions require less

compelling justification than restrictions on independent

spending”). The appellants here seek to “assure that

citizens are accorded an equal right to vote for their

representatives regardless of ... wealth,” a principle

affirmed in Buckley, 424 U.S. 49 n. 55, and not to validate

“governmentally imposed restrictions on the franchise” as

Buckley prohibits. Id. Far from stifling speech, contribu-

tion limits “aim to democratize the influence that money

itself may bring to bear upon the electoral process. In

doing so, they seek to build- public confidence in that

process and broaden the base of a candidate’s meaningful

financial support, encouraging the public participation and

open discussion that the First Amendment itself presup-

poses.” Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 401 (Breyer, J., joined

by Ginsburg, J., concurring), citing Reynolds, 377 U.S. at

565."

* Further, in his Shrink concurrence Justice Breyer cautioned

against reading Buckley's disapproval of spending limits as a prohibi-

tion of any effort to promote electoral equality, particularly through

contribution limits.

[Buckley] said ... that it rejected ‘the concept that govern-

ment may restrict the speech of some elements of our soci-

ety in order to enhance the relative voice of others.’ But

those words cannot be taken literally. The Constitution of-

ten permits restrictions on the speech of some in order to

prevent a few from drowning out the many... . Regardless,

as the result in Buckley made clear, the statement does not

automatically invalidate a statute that seeks a fairer elec-

toral debate through contribution limits, nor should it forbid

the Court to take account of the competing constitutional in-

terests just mentioned.”

528 U.S. at 402 (Breyer, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).

17

Additionally, the district court decision conflicts with

case law explicitly recognizing competitive electoral injury

as a justiciable claim. See Int'l. Assn. of Machinists, 678

F.2d 1092; Vote Choice, 4 F.3d 26; Fulani I, 882 F.2d 621;

Becker v. FEC, 230 F.3d 381 (1st Cir. 2000); Buchanan v.

FEC, 112 F.Supp.2d 58 (D.D.C. 2000); cf. Fulani v. Brady,

953 F.2d 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“Fulani IZ”). To deny

cognizable injury from a candidate’s loss of competitive

advantage “would tend to diminish the import of depriving

a serious candidate for public office of the opportunity to

compete equally for votes in an election.” Fulani I, 882

F.2d at 626.

The competitor standing doctrine has clear application

in a case such as this one, where the appellants suffer an

economic disadvantage from the challenged provisions.

For example, under this doctrine, a candidate has been

granted standing to challenge a statute which permitted

her competitors participating in public financing to accept

contributions of $2,000 per year, while she would be

limited to $1,000 per year as a non-participating candi-

date. Vote Choice, 4 F.3d at 37. Elsewhere, voters had

standing to challenge FECA provisions that they alleged

allowed corporations greater latitude in solicitation than

* The Court in Fulani II noted that “(ujnquestionably, there is

such a concept as ‘competitor standing,” 953 F.2d at 1327, but denied

standing because plaintiffs sued under the Internal Revenue Code and

plaintiffs’ injuries were not fairly traceable to the tax status of the

defendant. The Buchanan decision notes that in Fulani II, “the fact

that the plaintiffs did not sue under FECA, but rather under the

Internal Revenue Code, proved dispositive.... The FECA, unlike the

Internal Revenue Code, confers a broad grant of standing.” See Bu-

chanan, 112 F.Supp.2d at 63.

18

unions, giving corporate political committees an economic

advantage. Int’l Assn. of Machinists, 678 F.2d at 51. The

court was satisfied with allegations that the plaintiffs

“suffer a relative diminution in their political voices —

their influence in federal elections — as a direct result of

the discriminatory imbalance Congress is alleged to have

ordered in the 1976 FECA amendments.” Id. Here, the

appellants similarly claim that by advantaging wealthy

donors and their favored candidates, the BCRA will cause

the appellants to suffer a relative diminution in their

political voice. The appellant candidates’ and voters’

assessment of the disadvantage they will suffer is entitled

to deference. A court should not second-guess “a candi-

date’s reasonable assessment of his own campaign,” for

this “would require the clairvoyance of campaign consult-

ants or political pundits - guises that members of the

apolitical branch should be especially hesitant to assume.”

Becker, 230 F.3d at 387.

Finally, the district court finds a lack of injury from

the millionaire provisions because “none of the Adams

plaintiffs is a candidate in an election affected by the

millionaire provision.” Henderson op. at 343. This ignores

the claims of plaintiff Cynthia Brown, who testified that

she was a candidate for the United States Senate from

North Carolina in the 2002 Democratic Primary, Brown

Decl. 43, App. 94a; that one of her opponents was a mil-

lionaire who “contributed enormous sums of money to his

own campaign;” that another opponent “raised large sums

of money from wealthy contributors” id. 95; that her own

contributions averaged approximately $25, id. 94; and

that she would consider running again for the U.S. Senate,

but the BCRA millionaire provisions would “seriously

discourage” her from participating. Id. 47. “If I were to run

19

for the U.S. Senate again from North Carolina, I would

likely face again a millionaire opponent. Under the in-

creases in the hard money contribution limits, my other

opponents would be free to raise up to $12,000 per indi-

vidual per election. The people I know can hardly afford to

contribute twenty-five dollars, let alone $12,000. There is

no way that any candidate like me can compete under

these new conditions.” Jd. 98, App. 95a.’

Neither Ms. Brown nor any of the other candidates

challenging various provisions of the BCRA in the consoli-

dated litigation could have demonstrated complete cer-

tainty that they would compete in the 2004 elections,

given that the lawsuits were filed during the 2002 elec-

tions. However, there is a clear likelihood that if Ms.

Brown were to run for Senate in North Carolina in 2004

she would be in a race where the millionaire amendment

provisions apply. Incumbent Senator John Edwards spent

$6.15 million of his own money to win election in 1998, see

Center for Responsive Politics, “John R. Edwards: Politi-

cian Profile,” available at http://www.opensecrets.org/

19980s/index/N00002283.htm, and he will face re-election

in 2004.

B. The appellants’ injuries are fairly traceable

to the BCRA.

The district court concluded that the appellants’

injuries are not fairly traceable to BCRA because “any

" Carrie Bolton, a North Carolina voter supporting Ms. Brown, also

testified regarding her desire to support Ms. Brown in future elections.

Bolton Decl., App. 103a-106a.

20

inequality the Adams plaintiffs may suffer would be at the

hands of other individuals, not BCRA.” Henderson op. at

340-41, citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. In so concluding, the

court relied nearly entirely on cases in which plaintiffs

sought to challenge the entire system of privately funded

campaigns as a violation of equal protection, and sought

judicial imposition of public campaign financing as a

remedy. See id., citing Cox, 183 F.3d 1259; NAACP Los

Angeles Branch v. Jones, 131 F.3d 1317 (9th Cir. 1997);

Albanese v. FEC, 78 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 1996). However, in

contrast with these “wealth primary” cases, the appellants

here challenge an enactment of Congress that directly

impairs their ability to participate in elections.

The Adams plaintiffs are not asking the Court to craft

a judicial remedy for general inequalities in campaign

finance, but rather to enjoin a statute that actively creates

inequalities so severe as to disenfranchise the plaintiffs.

Here, Congress has empowered the wealthiest donors to

give double the amount previously permitted (and many

times more in the case of the millionaire provisions), and

there can be no doubt of the link between the challenged

statute and the inequalities of which the appellants

complain. The appellants here, as in Vote Choice, seek “a

permanent injunction against enforcement of the very

statutes which cause[] [their] injury. This produces the

causal connection between the injury alleged and the relief

requested.” Vote Choice, 4 F.3d at 37. The fact that the

challenged statute injures the plaintiffs by advantaging

private individuals does not destroy the causal link be-

tween the statute and the injury. If that were the case,

then there would have been no standing in Vote Choice,

where the candidate plaintiff claimed harm from increased

private contributions to her competitors. See id.

21

While Buckley did not find that the promotion of

equality justified the imposition of spending limits, 424

U.S. at 48-49, neither does that decision give constitu-

tional license to a law which creates gaping inequalities.

Since Buckley, the threats posed by money in politics have

become clear. Before the BCRA increases, a mere 0.11

percent of the voting-age population was providing nearly

half of all money raised in individual contributions,

Cressman Decl., App. 22a-23a, and the largest donors had

learned to multiply their electoral power through bun-

dling. See McDonald Decl., App. 45a. Now, with BCRA,

this miniscule elite has permission to double its ability to

determine electoral outcomes, locking disfavored candi-

dates out of contention and stretching democracy to the

breaking point.

Justice Breyer has observed that contribution limits

“protect the integrity of the electoral process — the means

through which a free society democratically translates

political speech into concrete action.” Shrink Missouri, 528

U.S. at 401 (Breyer, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring).

The evisceration of contribution limits accomplishes the

inverse, striking at the integrity of the electoral process.

Many observers have noted the dangers to democracy

posed by the increased influence of wealth in elections.

See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, Toward a Democracy-Centered

Reading of the First Amendment, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1055,

1072-73 (1999) (“[Wlealth disparity introduces massive

political inequality skewed to a predictable set of self-

interested positions” and permits “wholly unjustifiable

differences in political power to emerge ... The obvious

inequalities introduced by massive wealth disparities

cause many persons to lose faith in the system.”); Owen M.

Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 Iowa L. Rev.

22

1405, 1412 (1986) (in an election campaign, the resources

at the disposal of the rich “enable them to fill all available

space for public discourse with their message”); Ronald

Dworkin, Free Speech and the Dimensions of Democracy,

in IF BUCKLEY FELL 63, 78 (E. Joshua Rosenkranz ed.,

1999) (“People cannot plausibly regard themselves as

partners in an enterprise of self-government when they

are effectively shut out from the political debate because

they cannot afford a grotesquely high admission price”).

The BCRA’s hard money increases turn these dangers into

accomplished fact.

Equal protection principles require that the Court act

to preserve the franchise for all citizens, just as it did in

the wealth discrimination cases, Harper 383 U.S. 663;

Bullock, 405 U.S. 134; Lubin, 415 U.S. 709, and the one

person — one vote cases. See Baker, 369 U.S. 186; Gray,

372 U.S. 368; Wesberry. 376 U.S. 1; Reynolds, 377 U.S.

533; Davis, 478 U.S. 109. When this Court enforced the

one person — one vote standard in Wesbery, it recalled

Madison’s words:

Who are to be the electors of the Federal Repre-

sentatives? Not the rich more than the poor; not

the learned more than the ignorant; not the

haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than

the humble sons of obscure and unpropitious for-

tune. The electors are to be the great body of the

people of the United States.

376 U.S. at 18 (citing The Federalist, No. 57 (Cooke ed.

1961)). With the BCRA hard money increases, the rich will

in every practical sense become the electors of federal

officeholders, for nobody lacking their favor will have a

significant chance of success. In Wesbery, this court fa-

mously observed, “No right is more precious in a free

23

country than that of having a voice in the election of those

who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must

live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the

right to vote is undermined. Our Constitution leaves no

room for classifications of people in a way that unnecessar-

ily abridges this right.” 376 U.S. at 17-18. It is this vision

of the Constitution which the Court must now act to

protect.

¢

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should note

probable jurisdiction.

Respectfully submitted

BonITA P. TENNERIELLO

Counsel of Record

JOHN C. BONIFAZ

° LISA J. DANETZ

BRENDA WRIGHT

NATIONAL VOTING RIGHTS

INSTITUTE

27 School Street

Suite 500 ~

Boston, MA 02108

(617) 624-3900

DAVID A. WILSON

Avi SAMUEL GARBOW

HALE AND Dorr LLP

1455 Pennsylvania Avenue,

NW, 10th Floor

Washington, DC 20004

(202) 942-8400

Attorneys for Appellants

la

APPENDIX A

IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

VICTORIA JACKSON ) Civil Action NO.

GRAY ADAMS, et ai., ) 02-cv-877 KLH CKK RJL

Plaintiffs, ‘ consolidated with

po |) 02-ev-582-KLH-CKK-RJL

) (lead case)

THE FEDERAL ELECTION )

COMMISSION et al., \°

02-cev-581-KLH-CKK-RJL

Defendants. ) 02-cv-633-KLH-CKK-RJL

) 02-cv-751-KLH-CKK-RJL

) 02-cv-753-KLH-CKK-RJL

) 02-cv-754-KLH-CKK-RJL

) 02-cv-781-KLH-CKK-RJL

) 02-cv-874-KLH-CKK-RJL

) 02-cv-875-KLH-CKK-RJL

) 02-cv-881-KLH-CKK-RJL

NOTICE OF APPEAL

(Filed May 4, 2003)

Notice is hereby given that Victoria Jackson Gray

Adams, Carrie Bolton, Cynthia Brown, Derek Cressman,

Victoria Fitzgerald, Anurada Joshi, Nancy Russell, Kate

Seely-Kirk, Rose Taylor, Stephanie L. Wilson, California

Public Interest Research Group, Massachusetts Public

Interest Research Group, New Jersey Public Interest

Research Group, United States Public Interest Research

Group, Fannie Lou Harner Project, and Association of

Community Organizers For Reform Now, plaintiffs in

2a

the above named case, hereby appeal to the United

States Supreme Court from the final judgment entered

in this action on the 2nd day of May 2003. This appeal is

taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253 and the Bipartisan

Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-

155, § 403, 116 Stat. 81, 113-114 (2002). .

Dated: May 5, 2003 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ David A. Wilson

DAVID A. WILSON

(D.C. Bar # 430400)

HALE AND Dorr LLP

1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW,

10th Floor

Washington, DC 20004

(202) 942-8400

JOHN C. BONIFAZ

(admitted pro hac vice)

LISA J. DANETZ

(admitted pro hac vice)

BONNIE TENNERIELLO

(admitted pro hac vice)

BRENDA WRIGHT

(admitted pro hac vice)

NATIONAL VOTING RIGHTS INSTITUTE

27 School Street

Suite 500

Boston, MA 02108

(617) 624-3900

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

3a

APPENDIX B

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitu-

tion provides as follows:

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or

otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or

indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the

land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual

service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any

person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in

jeopardy of life or limb, nor shall be compelled in any

criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be

deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of

law; nor shall private property be taken for public use

without just compensation.

4a

APPENDIX C

The relevant sections of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform

Act of 2002 provide as follows:

PUBLIC LAW 107-155 — MAR. 27, 2002

SEC. 304. MODIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTION

LIMITS IN RESPONSE TO EXPENDITURES FROM

PERSONAL FUNDS.

(a) INCREASED LIMITS FOR INDIVIDUALS. — Section 315

of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C.

441a) is amended —

(1) in subsection (a)(1), by striking “No person”

and inserting “Except as provided in subsection (i), no

person”; and

(2) by adding at the end the following:

“(i) INCREASED LIMIT To ALLOW RESPONSE TO EXPENDI-

TURES FROM PERSONAL FUNDS. —

“(1) INCREASE. —

“(A) IN GENERAL. — Subject to paragraph

(2), if the opposition personal funds amount with

respect to a candidate for election to the office of

Senator exceeds the threshold amount, the limit

under subsection (a1)A) (in this subsection re-

ferred to as the ‘applicable limit’) with respect to

that candidate shall be the increased limit.

“(B) THRESHOLD AMOUNT.

“(i) STATE-BY-STATE COMPETITIVE AND

FAIR CAMPAIGN FORMULA. — In this subsec-

tion, the threshold amount with respect to

5a

an election cycle of a candidate described in

subparagraph (A) is an amount equal to the

sum of —

“(I) $150,000; and

“(II) $0.04 multiplied by the vot-

ing age population.

“(ii) VOTING AGE POPULATION. - In this

subparagraph, the term ‘voting age popula-

tion’ means in the case of a candidate for the

office of Senator, the voting age population

of the State of the candidate (as certified

under section 315(e)).

“(C) INCREASED LIMIT. — Except as provided

in clause (ii), for purposes of subparagraph (A), if

che opposition personal funds amount is over —

(i) 2 times the threshold amount, but

not over 4 times that amount —

“(I) the increased limit shall be 3

times the applicable limit; and

“(II) the limit under subsection

(aX3) shall not apply with respect to any

contribution made with respect to a can-

didate if such contribution is made under

the increased limit of subparagraph (A)

during a period in which the candidate

may accept such a contribution;

“(ii) 4 times the threshold amount, but

not over 10 times that amount —

“(I) the increased limit shall be 6

times the applicable limit; and

“II) the limit under subsection

(a)(3) shall not apply with respect to

6a

any contribution made with respect toa

candidate if such contribution is made

under the increased limit of subpara-

graph (A) during a period in which the

candidate may accept such a contribu-

tion; and

“(iii) 10 times the threshold amount —

“(I)_ the increased limit shall be 6

times the applicable limit;

“(II) the limit under subsection

(a3) shall not apply with respect to

any contribution made with respect to a

candidate if such contribution is made

under the increased limit of subpara-

graph (A) during a period in which the

candidate may accept such a contribu-

tion; and

“(III) the limits under subsection

(d) with respect to any expenditure by a

State or national committee of a politi-

cal party shall not apply.

“(D) OPPOSITION PERSONAL FUNDS AMOUNT.

— The opposition personal funds amount is an

amount equal to the excess (if any) of

“(i) the greatest aggregate amount of

expenditures from personal funds (as de-

fined in section 304(a)(6)(B)) that an oppos-

ing candidate in the same election makes;

over

“(ii) the aggregate amount of expendi-

tures from personal funds made by the can-

didate with respect to the election.

7a

“(2) TIME TO ACCEPT CONTRIBUTIONS UNDER

INCREASED LIMIT.

“(A) IN GENERAL. — Subject to subpara-

graph (B), a candidate and the candidate’s

authorized committee shall not accept any

contribution, and a party committee shall

not make any expenditure, under the in-

creased limit under paragraph (1) —

“(i) until the candidate has re-

ceived notification of the opposition

personal funds amount under section

304(a\(6)(B); and

“(ii) to the extent that such con-

tribution, when added to the aggregate

amount of contributions previously ac-

cepted and party expenditures previ-

ously made under the increased limits

under this subsection for the election

cycle, exceeds 110 percent of the opposi-

tion personal funds amount.

“(B) EFFECT OF WITHDRAWAL OF AN OPPOS-

ING CANDIDATE. — A candidate and a candidate’s

authorized committee shall not accept any con-

tribution and a party shall not make any expen-

diture under the increased limit after the date on

which an opposing candidate ceases to be a can-

didate to the extent that the amount of such in-

creased limit is attributable to such an opposing

candidate.

“(3) DISPOSAL OF EXCESS CONTRIBUTIONS. —

“(A) IN GENERAL. — The aggregate amount of

contributions accepted by a candidate or a candidate’s

authorized committee under the increased limit under

8a

paragraph (1) and not otherwise expended in connec-

tion with the election with respect to which such con-

tributions relate shall, not later than 50 days after

the date of such election, be used in the manner de-

scribed in subparagraph (B).

“(B) RETURN TO CONTRIBUTORS. — A candidate or

a candidate’s authorized committee shall return the

excess contribution to the person who made the con-

tribution.

“G) LIMITATION ON REPAYMENT OF PERSONAL LOANS. —

Any candidate who incurs personal loans made after the

effective date of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of

2002 in connection with the candidate’s campaign for

election shall not repay (directly or indirectly), to the

extent such loans exceed $250,000, such loans from any

contributions made to such candidate or any authorized

committee of such candidate after the date of such elec-

tion.”.

(b) NOTIFICATION OF EXPENDITURES FROM PERSONAL

FUNDS. — Section 304(a)(6) of the Federal Election Cam-

paign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 434(a)(6)) is amended

(1) by redesignating subparagraph (B) as sub-

paragraph (E); and

(2) by inserting after subparagraph (A) the fol-

lowing:

“(B) NOTIFICATION OF EXPENDITURE FROM PERSONAL

FUNDS. —

“(i) DEFINITION OF EXPENDITURE FROM PERSONAL

FUNDS. — In this subparagraph, the term ‘expenditure

from personal funds’ means

9a

“I) an expenditure made by a candidate

using personal funds; and

“(II) a contribution or loan made by a can-

didate using personal funds or a loan secured us-

ing such funds to the candidate’s authorized

committee.

“(ii) DECLARATION OF INTENT. — Not later than

the date that is 15 days after the date on which an

individual becomes a candidate for the office of Sena-

tor, the candidate shall file a declaration stating the

total amount of expenditures from personal funds

that the candidate intends to make, or to obligate to

make, with respect to the election that will exceed the

State-by-State competitive and fair campaign formula

with

“(I) the Commission; and

“(II) each candidate in the same election.

“(iii) INITIAL NOTIFICATION. — Not later than 24

hours after a candidate described in clause (ii) makes

or obligates to make an aggregate amount of expendi-

tures from personal funds in excess of 2 times the

threshold amount in connection with any election, the

candidate shall file a notification with

“(I) the Commission; and

“(II) each candidate ir the same election.

“(iv) ADDITIONAL NOTIFICATION. — After a candi-

date files an initial notification under clause (iii), the

candidate shall file an additional notification each

time expenditures from personal funds are made or

obligated to be made in an aggregate amount that ex-

ceed $10,000 with —

10a

“(I) the Commission; and

“(II) each candidate in the same election.

Such notification shall be filed not later than 24 hours

after the expenditure is made.

“(v) CONTENTS. - A notification under clause

(iii) or (iv) shall include —

“(I) the name of the candidate and the of-

fice sought by the candidate;

“(II) the date and amount of each expendi-

ture; and

“(III) the total amount of expenditures from

personal funds that the candidate has made, or

obligated to make, with respect to an election as

of the date of the expenditure that is the subject

of the notification.

“(C) NOTIFICATION OF DISPOSAL OF EXCESS CONTRIBU-

TIONS. — In the next regularly scheduled report after the

date of the election for which a candidate seeks nomina-

tion for election to, or election to, Federal office, the

candidate or the candidate’s authorized committee shall

submit to the Commission a report indicating the source

and amount of any excess contributions (as determined

under paragraph (1) of section 315(1)) and the manner in

which the candidate or the candidate’s authorized commit-

tee used such funds.

“(D) ENFORCEMENT. — For provisions providing for

the enforcement of the reporting requirements under this

paragraph, see section 309.”.

(c) DEFINITIONS. — Section 301 of the Federal Elec-

tion Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 431), as amended by

lla

section 101(b), is further amended by adding at the end

the following:

“(25) ELECTION CYCLE. — For purposes of sections

315(1) and 315A and paragraph (26), the term ‘elec-

tion cycle’ means the period beginning on the day af-

ter the date of the most recent election for the specific

office or seat that a candidate is seeking and ending

on the date of the next election for that office or seat.

For purposes of the preceding sentence, a primary

election and a general election shall be considered to

be separate elections.

“(26) PERSONAL FUNDS. — The term ‘personal

funds’ means an amount that is derived from —

. “(A) any asset that, under applicable State

law, at the time the individual became a candi-

date, the candidate had legal right of access to or

control over, and with respect to which the can-

didate had —

“(i) legal and rightful title; or

“(ii) an equitable interest;

“(B) income received during the current

election cycle of the candidate, including —

“(i) a salary and other earned income

from bona fide employment;

“(ii) dividends and proceeds from the

sale of the candidate’s stocks or other in-

vestments;

“(iii) bequests to the candidate;

“(iv) income from trusts established

before the beginning of the election cycle;

12a

“(v) income from trusts established by

bequest after the beginning of the election

cycle of which the candidate is the benefici-

ary;

“(vi) gifts of a personal nature that

had been customarily received by the candi-

date prior to the beginning of the election

cycle; and

“(vii) proceeds from lotteries and simi-

lar legal games of chance; and

“C) a portion of assets that are jointly

owned by the candidate and the candidate’s

spouse equal to the candidate’s share of the asset

under the instrument of conveyance or owner-

ship, but if no specific share is indicated by an

instrument of conveyance or ownership, the

value of 1/2 of the property.”.

SEC. 307. MODIFICATION OF CONTRIBUTION LIMITS.

(a) INCREASE IN INDIVIDUAL LIMITS FOR CERTAIN

CONTRIBUTIONS. — Section 315(a)(1) of the Federal Election

Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 441a(a\1)) is amended

(1) in subparagraph (A), by striking “$1,000”

and inserting “$2,000”; and

(2) in subparagraph (B), by striking “$20,000”

and inserting “$25,000”.

(b) INCREASE IN ANNUAL AGGREGATE LIMIT ON INDIVID-

UAL CONTRIBUTIONS. — Section 315(aX3) of the Federal

Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 441a(a\3)) is

amended to read as follows:

~~

13a

“(3) During the period which begins on January

1 of an odd-numbered year and ends on December 31

of the next even-numbered year, no individual may

make contributions aggregating more than —

“(A) $37,500, in the case of contributions to can-

didates and the authorized committees of candidates;

“(B) $57,500, in the case of any other contribu-

tions, of which not more than $37,500 may be attrib-

utable to contributions to political committees which

are not political committees of national political par-

ties.”.

(c) INCREASE IN SENATORIAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE

Limit. — Section 315(h) of the Federal Election Campaign

Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 44la(h)) is amended by striking

“$17,500” and inserting “$35,000”.

(d) INDEXING OF CONTRIBUTION Limits. — Section

315(c) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2

U.S.C. 441a(c)) is amended —

(1) in paragraph (1) —

(A) by striking the second and third sen-

tences;

(B) by inserting “(A)” before “At the begin-

ning”; and

(C) by adding at the end the following:

“(B) Except as provided in subparagraph (C), in any

calendar year after 2002 —

“(i) a limitation established by subsections

(aX1)(A), (aX 1B), (aX3), (b), (d), or (h) shall be in-

creased by the percent difference determined under

subparagraph (A);

l4a

“(ii) each amount so increased shall remain in

effect for the calendar year; and

“(iii) if any amount after adjustment under

clause (i) is not a multiple of $100, such amount shall

be rounded to the nearest multiple of $100.

“(C) In the case of limitations under subsections

(a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(B), (a3), and (h), increases shall only be

made in odd-numbered years and such increases shall

remain in effect for the 2-year period beginning on the

first day following the date of the last general election in

the year preceding the year in which the amount is in-

creased and ending on the date of the next general elec-

tion.”; and

(2) in paragraph (2\B), by striking “means the

calendar year 1974” and inserting “means —

“(i) for purposes of subsections (b) and (d),

calendar year 1974; and

“(ii) for purposes of subsections (a)(1)(A),

(aX(1)B), (a3), and (h), calendar year 2001”.

(e) EFFECTIVE DATE. — The amendments made by

this section shall apply with respect to contributions made

on or after January 1, 2003.

SEC. 319. MODIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTION

LIMITS FOR HOUSE CANDIDATES IN RE-

SPONSE TO EXPENDITURES FROM PERSONAL

FUNDS.

(a) INCREASED Limits. — Title III of the Federal

Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 431 et seq.) is

15a

amended by inserting after section 315 the following new

section:

“MODIFICATION OF CERTAIN LIMITS FOR

HOUSE CANDIDATES IN RESPONSE TO

PERSONAL FUND EXPENDITURES OF OP-

PONENTS

“Sec. 315A. (a) AVAILABILITY OF INCREASED LIMIT. —

“(1) IN GENERAL. — Subject to paragraph (3), if

the opposition personal funds amount with respect to

a candidate for election to the office of Representative

in, or Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, the

Congress exceeds $350,000 —

“(A) the limit under subsection (a)(1)A)

with respect to the candidate shall be tripled;

“(B) the limit under subsection (aX3) shall

not apply with respect to any contribution made

with respect to the candidate if the contribution

is made under the increased limit allowed under

subparagraph (A) during a period in which the

candidate may accept such a contribution; and

“(C) the limits under sub-section (d) with

respect to any expenditure by a State or national

committee of a political party on behalf of the

candidate shall not apply.

“(2) DETERMINATION OF OPPOSITION PERSONAL

FUNDS AMOUNT. —

“(A) IN GENERAL. — The opposition personal

funds amount is an amount equal to the excess

(if any) of —

“(i) the greatest aggregate amount of

expenditures from personal funds (as defined

l6a

in subsection (b)(1)) that an opposing candi-

date in the same election makes; over

“(ii) the aggregate amount of expendi-

tures from personal funds made by the can-

didate with respect to the election.

“(B) SPECIAL RULE FOR CANDIDATE'S CAM-

PAIGN FUNDS. —

“(ij) IN GENERAL. — For purposes of de-

termining the aggregate amount of expendi-

tures from personal funds under sub-

paragraph (A), such amount shall include

the gross receipts advantage of the candi-

date’s authorized committee.

“(ii) GROSS RECEIPTS ADVANTAGE. — For

purposes of clause (i), the term ‘gross receipts

advantage’ means the excess, if any, of —

“(I) the aggregate amount of 50

percent of gross receipts of a candidate's

authorized committee during any elec-

tion cycle (not including contributions

from personal funds of the candidate)

that may be expended in connection

with the election, as determined on

June 30 and December 31 of the year

preceding the year in which a general

election is held, over

“(II) the aggregate amount of 50

percent of gross receipts of the opposing

candidate’s authorized committee dur-

ing any election cycle (not including

contributions from personal funds of

the candidate) that may be expended in

connection with the election, as deter-

mined on June 30 and December 31 of

17a

the year preceding the year in which a

general election is held.

“(3) TIME TO ACCEPT CONTRIBUTIONS UNDER IN-

CREASED LIMIT. —

“(A) IN GENERAL. — Subject to subparagraph

(B), a candidate and the candidate’s authorized

committee shall not accept any contribution, and

a party committee shall not make any expendi-

ture, under the increased limit under paragraph

(1)-

“Gi) until the candidate has received

notification of the opposition personal funds

amount under subsection (b)\1); and

“(ii) to the extent that such contribu-

tion, when added to the aggregate amount of

contributions previously accepted and party

expenditures previously made under the in-

creased limits under this subsection for the

election cycle, exceeds 100 percent of the op-

position personal funds amount.

“(B) EFFECT OF WITHDRAWAL OF AN OPPOSING

CANDIDATE. — A candidate and a candidate’s au-

thorized committee shall not accept any contri-

bution and a party shall not make any

expenditure under the increased limit after the

date on which an opposing candidate ceases to be

a candidate to the extent that the amount of such

increased limit is attributable to such an oppos-

ing candidate.

“(4) DISPOSAL OF EXCESS CONTRIBUTIONS. —

“(A) IN GENERAL. — The aggregate amount

of contributions accepted by a candidate or a can-

didate’s authorized committee under the increased

limit under paragraph (1) and not otherwise

18a

expended in connection with the election with re-

spect to which such contributions relate shall,

not later than 50 days after the date of such elec-

tion, be used in the manner described in sub-

paragraph (B).

“(B) RETURN TO CONTRIBUTORS. — A candi-

date or a candidate’s authorized committee shall

return the excess contribution to the person who

made the contribution.

“(b) NOTIFICATION OF EXPENDITURES FROM PERSONAL

FUNDS. —

“(1) IN GENERAL. —

“(A) DEFINITION OF EXPENDITURE FROM PER-

SONAL FUNDS. — In this paragraph, the term ‘ex-

penditure from personal funds’ means —

“(i) an expenditure made by a candi-

date using personal funds; and

“(ii) a contribution or loan made by a

candidate using personal funds or a loan se-

cured using such funds to the candidate’s

authorized committee.

“(B) DECLARATION OF INTENT. — Not later

than the date that is 15 days after the date on

which an individual becomes a candidate for the

office of Representative in, or Delegate or Resi-

dent Commissioner to, the Congress, the candi-

date shall file a declaration stating the total

amount of expenditures from personal funds that

the candidate intends to make, or to obligate to

make, with respect to the election that will ex-

ceed $350,000.

19a

“(C) INITIAL NOTIFICATION. — Not later than

24 hours after a candidate described in subpara-

graph (B) makes or obligates to make an aggre-

gate amount of expenditures from personal funds

in excess of $350,000 in connection with any elec-

tion, the candidate shall file a notification.

“(D) ADDITIONAL NOTIFICATION. — After a

candidate files an initial notification under sub-

paragraph (C), the candidate shall file an addi-

tional notification each time expenditures from

personal funds are made or obligated to be made

in an aggregate amount that exceeds $10,000.

Such notification shall be filed not later than 24

hours after the expenditure is made.

“(E) CONTENTS. — A notification under sub-

paragraph (C) or (D) shall include —

“(i) the name of the candidate and the

office sought by the candidate;

“(ii) the date and amount of each ex-

penditure; and

“(iii) the total amount of expenditures

from personal funds that the candidate has

made, or obligated to make, with respect to

an election as of the date of the expenditure

that is the subject of the notification.

“(F) PLACE OF FILING. — Each declaration or

notification required to be filed by a candidate

under subparagraph (C), (D), or (E) shall be filed

with —

“(i) the Commission; and

“(ii) each candidate in the same elec-

tion and the national party of each such

candidate.

20a

“(2) NOTIFICATION OF DISPOSAL OF EXCESS CON-

TRIBUTIONS. — In the next regularly scheduled report

after the date of the election for which a candidate

seeks nomination for election to, or election to, Fed-

eral office, the candidate or the candidate’s authorized

committee shall submit to the Commission a report

indicating the source and amount of any excess con-

tributions (as determined under subsection (a)) and

the manner in which the candidate or the candidate’s

authorized committee used such funds.

“(3) ENFORCEMENT. — For provisions providing

for the enforcement of the reporting requirements

under this subsection, see section 309.”.

(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT. — Section 315(a)(1) of

the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C.

44la), as amended by section 304(a), is amended by

striking “subsection (i),” and inserting “subsection (i) and

section 315A.”.

2la

APPENDIX D

Exhibit 1

IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY ? Civil Action No.

ADAMS, et al., . 02-cv-877-KLH-CKK-RJL

Plaintiffs, ) consolidated with

_ ) 02-cv-582-KLH-CKK-RJL

THE FEDERAL ELECTION ) ‘lead case)

COMMISSION et al., Jand

02-cv-581-KLH-CKK-RJL

Defendants. ) 02-cv-633-KLH-CKK-RJL

) 02-cv-751-KLH-CKK-RJL

) 02-cv-753-KLH-CKK-RJL

) 02-cv-754-KLH-CKK-RJL

) 02-cv-781-KLH-CKK-RJL

) 02-cv-874-KLH-CKK-RJL

) 02-cv-875-KLH-CKK-RJL

02-cv-881-KLH-CKK-RJL

DECLARATION AND EXPERT REPORT

OF DEREK CRESSMAN

1. My name is Derek Cressman. I am the Democracy

Program Director of the State Public Interest Research

Groups. The PIRGs are a network of non-profit, non-

partisan research and advocacy organizations that have

analyzed campaign finance issues and other public inter-

est issues for the past 30 years. I have professionally

studied federal hard money contributions since 1995 with

U.S. PIRG, the national policy office of the State PIRGs. In

that time, I have authored or co-authored nine studies and

white papers regarding the financing of federal campaigns. I

22a

have provided testimony before the United State Senate

Rules Committee on the topic of increasing federal contri-

bution limits. I have not received any compensation for

providing this declaration and expert report.

2. It is my expert opinion that hard money contributions

and expenditures significantly influence the outcome of

elections. In 440 of 469 (or 94%) of 2000 general election

races for the House of Representatives and U.S. Senate,

the candidate who spent the most money won their race

[see exhibit A, Look Who’s Not Coming to Washington, U.S.

PIRG, January 2001, Appendix A]. Winning candidates

outraised opponents by a margin of 2.6 to 1 [see exhibit B,

The Best Elections Money Can Buy, U.S. PIRG, November

2000. page 4]. In 1998, the candidate who spent the most

won 94% of House races and 95% of Senate races. Further,

in every presidential primary since 1976, the candidate

who has raised the most money has won his party’s nomi-

nation [see exhibit C, Running for the Money, U.S. PIRG,

September 1999, page 5].

3. While money is not the sole factor in determining

elections, it is an overwhelming factor. This is the reason

that candidates and campaign directors, who are experts

in the business of winning elections, spend so much time

and energy raising campaign funds. If money did not

largely determine election outcomes, then candidates

would not bother raising it.

4. Federal campaign funds come from a small minority of

citizens. In the 2000 election cycle, fewer than 232,000

individuals gave contributions of $1,000 or more to federal

candidates. This represents just 0.11% of the voting age

population [see exhibit D, Reinforcing the Rich, Public

Citizen, February 2, 2001, page 2]. Clearly the current

23a

federal limits only affect a miniscule proportion of U.S.

citizens, the vast majority of whom are limited by their

disposable incomes in what they can give at amounts far

lower than $1000.

5. The small number of donors who give the maximum

amount comprise a significant source of candidate funds.

Contributors who gave $1000 or more to a federal candi-

date gave 46% of all individual contributions to federal

candidates from January 1, 1999 to November 28, 2000

[see exhibit E, The Consequences of Raising Federal

Contribution Limits, U.S. PIRG, March 2001, page 5]. Of

those candidates who were successful, 60% of their indi-

vidual funds came from donors who gave $1000 or more

[see exhibit A, page 6].

6. Common sense would indicate that citizens who can

afford to give $1000 will tend to be wealthier than those

who cannot. This has been documented by surveys show-

ing that of large donors to federal elections, 95% had

family incomes greater than $50,000 while almost two-

thirds of American households had incomes below that

level. Large donors are 95% white, 80% male, and 50%

were over 60 years of age. This compares to a U.S. popula-

tion that is 17% non-white, 51% female, and only 12.8%

over the age of 60. Large federal donors are much more

likely to be employed in business or law professions than

the public at large. They are more conservative than the

public at large on economic matters and environmental

matters. However, one-third of large donors identified

themselves as liberal compared to one-fifth of the general

public, so it is primarily the middle of the political spec-

trum that is underrepresented among large donors [see

exhibit F, Pushing the Limit, U.S. PIRG, July 1999, page

7 and exhibit G, Individual Campaign Contributors:

24a

WEALTHY, CONSERVATIVE — AND REFORM MINDED,

Green, Hernson, Powell, and Wilcox, June 1998].

7. In the first 15 months of the 1999-2000 election cycle,

2/3 of Fortune 500 CEOs gave at least one maximum

$1000 contribution to a candidate, compared to less than

one percent of the general population [see exhibit H,

Legalizing the Loophole, U.S. PIRG, June 2000 page 3).

Clearly, CEOs have greater influence over election results

than ordinary citizens.

8. Because campaign fundraising is such a large factor in

electoral success, many potential candidates choose not to

run for office or drop out of contention because they do not

have the backing of large donors. For example, Congress-

man John Kasich and Elizabeth Dole withdrew from the

Republican Primary for President in the last election

before a single vote was cast in large part due to fundrais-

ing. Had these candidates had similar large donor support

to frontrunner George W. Bush, or had Bush raised

amounts similar to Kasich and Dole, those candidates

would likely have remained in the race. At the time John

Kasich dropped out of the Republican presidential pri-

mary, George W. Bush had raised 74.4% of his funds from

maximum $1000 donors [see exhibit C, page 2].

9. Therefore, through giving hard money contributions of

$1000, a small and unrepresentative group of citizens has

vastly more influence than most Americans in determining

who runs for federal office, and who wins elections. All

citizens do not have equal opportunity to participate in the

electoral process in America, and the accompanying

results cannot be interpreted to represent the will of the

majority of citizens.

25a

10. Low and moderate-income citizens are aware that

their voices do not carry equal weight in federal politics. In

1999, only 29% of Americans trusted the government in

Washington to do the right thing, according to a poll by the

Council for Excellence in Government. The same survey

found that 63% of respondents feel that government serves

the special interests, while only 25% said it serves the

public interest. Just 39% said that they believed our

current government meets Abraham Lincoln’s goal of

government of, by, and for the people, while 54% said we

do not have a government of, by, and for the people [see

exhibit I, Testimony of Campaign Finance Reform, Derek

Cressman, March 29, 2001]. The feeling of disenfran-

chisement is a significant reason for declining rates of

voter participation and a barrier to citizens getting in-

volved in federal elections through volunteering or making

small contributions. This then exacerbates the undue

influence of large donors on the process.

11. Members of Congress are also aware of the dispropor-

tionate role that money plays in influencing election

outcomes. Even if a member of Congress grants no access

to a donor, and has no personal communication let alone

quid pro quo understanding with a donor, that member of

Congress knows that the donor can influence his or her re-

election and is therefore more accouatable to that donor

than to other constituents. For politi :ians who favor their

political career more than their personal wealth, the

unequal influence of large donors on election outcomes can

be more corrupting in the form of distortion to the political

process than traditional bribery. A recent study by political

scientists Lawrence Jacobs and Robert Shapiro found that

in 1980, federal lawmakers followed the wishes of the

majority of Americans about two-thirds of the time. In

26a

2000, that was down to 40% of the time. The professors

concluded that lawmakers answer “to the extreme ideo-

logical elements of their parties, to their contributors, and

to special interests” [see exhibit J, Politicians Don’t Pan-

der, Washington Post, March 19, 2000.]

12. If legislators do not follow the wishes of large donors,

they may find themselves defeated by candidates who do.

For example, with one exception, the candidates in the

2000 election who received the most money from Enron

and Arthur Anderson defeated their opponents. One

specific example involves the 1994 election for the 18th

Congressional District in Texas. Enron CEO Kenneth Lay

recruited Sheila Jackson Lee to challenge then-incumbent

Craig Washington because of Washington’s opposition to

NAFTA. Lay and other Enron employees helped raise

nearly $600,000 for Jackson Lee, three times as much as

Washington had raised in his previous re-election. The

result was an overwhelming win for Jackson Lee. This

demonstrates how large contributions can influence policy

decisions without any quid pro quo or even access grafted

by the candidate. Representative Jackson Lee’s position on

NAFTA was likely not influenced by her contributors.

However, Lay and his fellow large donors were able to

change the vote of the representative of the 18th District

of Texas by dint of large campaign contributions. This

avenue of political influence is unavailable to most voters

in the 18th District of Texas [see exhibit K, Phantom Fixes,

U.S. PIRG, January 2002, page 10).

13. The influence of large donors on election outcomes

has increased significantly since the Supreme Court

upheld the current $1000 limit in 1976. The techniques

of television advertising, polling, focus groups, direct mail

marketing, and other expensive modern campaign practices

27a

were in their infancy in the 1960s and early 1970s. As

professional campaign managers have become more

skilled at employing these marketing techniques to win

political campaigns, the competitive advantage of candi-

dates who have significant large donor backing over those

who do not has increased and the influence of large donors

has grown correspondingly. A Wall Street Journal Poll in

1997 found that 68% of respondents think that the Ameri-

can political system was more influenced by special

interest money than it was twenty years earlier [see

exhibit I, page 1).

14. Increasing contribution limits will further reduce the

role of small donors in influencing federal elections. I

estimate that the proportion of individual funds raised by

federal candidates from donors who give less than $200 to

candidates will shrink from 30% to 21-25%. Meanwhile,

the percentage of individual funds federal candidates raise

from donors who give the maximum amount allowed will

increase from 46% currently to 55-63% [see exhibit E, page

5).

15. Increasing federal contribution limits will reduce the

free speech opportunities of low and moderate-income

donors, and of candidates who are backed by these donors.

There is a limited amount of advertising time available for

purchase during a campaign season. As candidates com-

pete for this limited time, the cost of advertising increases.

The price of advertising triples in some markets as a

result of increased campaign season demand [see exhibit

L, The Case for Free Air Time, Alliance for Better Cam-

paigns, March 2002, page 9]. Candidates need to purchase

air-time to compete, but those candidates backed by lower

income voters are effectively priced out of speech opportu-

nities by candidates who have large donor backing. If the

28a

large donor candidates raise even more money under

higher contribution limits, it will further drive up the cost

of advertisements and literally reduce the number of

advertisements that a lesser-funded candidate could

purchase, potentially driving their campaigns below the

level of notice.

16. Even in races that do not depend upon TV or radio

advertising, which is limited by its very nature, voters

have a limited capacity to absorb political information.

This is limited not only by the time in the day, but by

competing demands for a voters attention in their every-

day lives. Candidates backed by large donors can effec-

tively capture nearly all of most voters’ attention spans

through saturation advertising techniques, and literally

drown out the voices of lesser-funded candidates.

17. The rationale used by Congress to increase federal

contribution limits is not compelling. Although inflation

has occurred since the limits were set, federal candidate

fundraising has risen even faster. House and Senate

candidate fundraising increased by 425% from 1977-78 to

1999-2000, with inflation accounting for less than half of

this increase [see exhibit E, page 4). Candidates are

raising and spending more money than ever in the history

of our republic under the current $1000 limits.

18. Increasing contribution limits will not reduce the

time candidates spend raising funds. Many states have no

contribution limits at all, yet there is no evidence from

those states that candidates spend any less time raising

funds. Candidates will spend time raising funds to the

extent that they believe their opponent is doing so and

could therefore defeat them. In fact, higher limits may

encourage candidates to spend more of their personal time

29a

raising funds. The higher the donation level, the greater

the incentive for a candidate to personally speak with a

donor as opposed to letting a direct mail piece, internet

site, or campaign staff make the solicitation. Further, the

larger the donation, the more the donor expects a personal

call from the candidate, or a seat at the same dinner table

at a fundraiser, or a photograph. Only limits on candidate

spending would effectively reduce the time candidates

spend raising funds.

19. Increasing contribution limits will not help challeng-

ers. Under the current limits, House incumbents outraised

House challengers by margins ranging from 2.3 to 1 up to

4 to 1 in elections from 1990-1998. Since there is no reason

to believe that higher contribution limits will allow either

challengers or incumbents to find additional donors, only

receive more from existing donors, it is certain that higher

contribution levels will only increase the fundraising

disparity between challengers and incumbents [see exhibit

F, page 11).

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of

the United States of America that the foregoing is true and

correct.

Executed on: Sept. 20, 2002

/s/ Derek Cressman

Derek Cressman

30a

Exhibit 2

IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY Civil Action Ne

ADARES, < ef. ) 02-ev-877-KLH-CKK-RJL

Plaintiffs, )

consolidated with

— 02-cv-582-KLH-CKK-RJL

THE FEDERAL ELECTION ) (lead case)

COMMISSION et al., ead

Defendants. ) 02-ev-581-KLH-CKK-RJL

‘ 02-ev-633-KLH-CKK-RJL

) 02-ev-751-KLH-CKK-RJL

) 02-cv-753-KLH-CKK-RJL

) 02-cv-754-KLH-CKK-RJL

) 02-cv-781-KLH-CKK-RJL

) 02-cv-874-KLH-CKK-RJL

) 02-cv-875-KLH-CKK-RJL

‘ 02-cv-881-KLH-CKK-RJL

DECLARATION AND EXPERT REPORT OF

PROF. JOHN C. GREEN

1. My name is John C. Green. I am the director of the

Ray C. Bliss Institute of Applied Politics at the University

of Akron, where I teach courses on campaign finance and

fundraising. I have published widely on American cam-

paign finance, especially on the behavior of individual

campaign contributors. I am the editor and a contributor

to Financing the 1996 Election, and I am a contributor to

Financing the 2000 Election. My curriculum vitae further

establishing my expertise on campaign finance matters is

attached to this declaration as Exhibit A. I have not

3la

received any compensation for providing this declaration

and expert report.

2. I am the co-author with Clyde Wilcox, Paul S.

Herrnson and Peter L. Francia of “Raising the Limits,”

published in the May/June 2002 issue of the Public

Perspective. A copy of the “Raising the Limits” article is

attached to this declaration as Exhibit B.

3. In “Raising the Limits,” we analyzed the impact of the

increased contribution limits in the Bipartisan Campaign

Reform Act. Our findings were based on a national ran-

dom sample survey of hard money contributors to congres-

sional campaigns, conducted at the University of Akron in

1997-98. In an earlier report based on this survey re-

search, we found that 81 percent of such donors had

annual family incomes higher than $100,000, ninety-five

percent were white, and eighty percent were men.

4. In “Raising the Limits,” we concluded that the cumu-

lative impact of doubling the individual contribution limits

would result in increased giving by the elite pool of indi-

vidual donors to federal campaigns.

5. We further concluded that this increased giving is

likely to exacerbate the upper status character of the

donor pool, providing greater voice to wealthy business-

men and individuals already heavily engaged in giving.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of

the United States of America that the foregoing is true

and correct.

32a

Executed on: September 18, 2002

/s/

John C. Green

Exhibit 2B

C . i f } l l : .

Raising

the Limits

By Clyde Wilcox, John C. Green, Paul S. Herrnson, Peter

L. Francia, Lynda W. Powell, and Benjamin A. Webster

The United States has embarked upon a major reform of

the federal campaign finance laws, something that hap-

pens only about once a generation. Congress has passed,

and the president has signed, the most extensive regula-

tion of campaign money since the Watergate-era Federal

Election campaign Act (FECA).

Unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court,

the new law will restrict “soft money” contributions to

political parties and “issue advocacy” spending by parties

and interest groups (neither regulated by FECA). The new

law will also increase “hard money” contributions (those

regulated by FECA).

Clyde Wilcox is professor of government and Benjamin A.

Webster is a doctoral student, Georgetown University. John C.

Green is professor political science, University of Akron. Paul

S. Herrnson is professor of government and politics, and Peter

L. Francia is a research fellow at the Center for American

Politics and Citizenship, University of Maryland. Lynda W.

Powell is professor of political science, University of Rochester.

33a

For example, it will double the limit on the amount individu-

als can give to congressional candidates in an election from

$1,000 to $2,000, so that in a typical race, an individual will

be able to give a candidate a total of $4,000 ($2,000 in the

primary and $2,000 in the general election). The law also

expands to $95,000 per year the total aggregate amount

individuals can give to candidates, parties, and PACs.

Some reformers, many of them Republicans, argue that

doubling the individual limits will largely restore the

value of contributions eroded by inflation, thus expanding

participation and helping wean candidates away from soft

money and issue advocacy. Other reformers, many of them

Democrats, say the new limits will mostly increase the

participation of Republican and conservative donors, and

thus mostly help GOP candidates. Still others think the

new limits will allow candidates to spend less time raising

money, and more time legislating, because their fundrais-

ing efforts will yield more money.

Further analysis is needed, however, because the effects of

reform are often unanticipated by reformers. Labor unions

pushed for language permitting the formation of political

action committees (PACs) in 1974, but did not foresee the

tidal wave of corporate PAC formation in the 1980s.

Likewise, the activists who supported the creation of party

soft money in 1979 did not fully anticipate the sheer

magnitude of those funds twenty years later. Thus, it is

worth asking: with increased individual limits, who will

give more money, and which candidates will benefit?

We can offer some tentative answers to these questions

with a combination of survey and campaign finance data.

34a

Supported by a grant from the Joyce Foundation, we

conducted a mail survey of a random sample of individuals

who gave $200 or more to congressional candidates in

1996 (hereafter referred to as “major donors”), drawn from

the records of the Federal Elections Commission.

Because these records list specific contributions and not

contributors, we weighted the major donor sample to

correct for oversampling those who made many contribu-

tions. To make sure we understood the donors who gave

the most, we also surveyed a special list of individuals who

had given to at least eight candidates and/or gave a total

of $8,000 (hereafter referred to as “most active donors”).

The surveys were conducted at the University of Akron,

and the survey responses were matched to the actual

donation records, thus linking donor attitudes directly to

contributing behavior. [See the July/August 2000 issue of

Public Perspective for an earlier article on this study. ]

As part of a battery of campaign finance reform questions,

we asked both samples of donors, “How might your own

contributions to congressional candidates be affected if the

following changes were enacted? If larger individual gifts

were allowed?” The response categories were “would give

more,” “would give the same,” and “would give less.”

Just 15% of the major donors reported that they would

give more if the limits were raised — we refer to these

respondents as “Expanded Givers” — and 5% said that they

would give less if contribution limits were raised (“Re-

duced Givers”. Among the most active donors, 30% were

Expanded Givers and only 3% Reduced Givers. However,

the great bulk of both samples said they would be unaf-

fected by the change: 80% of the major donors and 67% of

35a

the most active said their contributions would remain the

same. We call them “Stand-Pat Givers.”

Speculation on the impact of increased contribution limits

has naturally focused on those donors who “maxed out” at

the current limit of $1,000, since only they were restricted

by the old law. Yet our study yields a surprising result:

nearly one-half of major donors who would give more did

not make a maximum contribution in 1996, and this was

true of nearly one-quarter of the most active donors as

well.

Why would someone who does not make a maximum

contribution give more if the limit were doubled? Many

donations are made at events, such as dinners and cocktail

parties, which typically require a minimum contribution,

set below the legal limit. An increase in the limit is likely

to produce higher minimum contributions for these events:

a senators $500-a-plate dinner may become $750 or

$1,000, and all attendees will give more. Indeed, many

Stand-Pat Givers might have to contribute more to par-

ticipate in the same events.

Why would a donor give less if the legal limit for contribu-

tions were raised? The Reduced Givers are deeply disillu-

sioned with the campaign finance system, with one-half

saying that the current campaign finance system is

“broken and needs to be replaced.” As a consequence, they

are strong supporters of limits on campaign spending and

television advertising, and a ban on soft money. Many

already contribute only occasionally and in small amounts.

Thus, they may well reduce their giving — or stop it com-

pletely — if the role of “big money” grows.

Expanded Givers have a different perspective. For start-

ers, they have a more positive opinion of the campaign

36a

finance system, witha plurality claiming “it has some

problems but is basically sound.” Many are habitual

donors who regard campaign contributing as a legitimate

form of political activity. They also support campaign

finance reform, and one of their favorite reform proposals

is raising individual limits.

Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the demographic and political

characteristics of Expanded Givers compared to the entire

donor samples. These results must be viewed with caution

because the Expanded Givers make up only a small

portion of the donor pool, but the patterns are neverthe-

less quite interesting.

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39a

As can be seen in Figure 1, major congressional donors are

disproportionately wealthy, well-educated, middle-aged,

and male. Among the major donors, the Expanded Givers

fit this profile well. Twenty-two percent report incomes of

over $500,000, compared with 14% of the entire sample. In

terms of occupation, Expanded Givers are more likely

(43% vs. 35%) to be business managers. (Business manag-

ers are defined as corporate CEOs, vice presidents, and

other high-level business bureaucrats.)

Education and age show more a more complex pattern.

Expanded Givers tend to have some graduate training,

rather than just a college degree or a graduate degree.

Likewise, they tend to be middle-aged, with most between

46 and 60 years of age. There is also a gender gap: Ex-

panded Givers are even more masculine than the sample

as a whole.

The Reduced Givers tend to have the opposite characteris-

tics, being less affluent, less educated, and more female,

but comprising more older and younger donors. Most of

these demographic characteristics are less important for

the most active donors. Here the Expanded Givers are

wealthier and more likely to be less than 60 years old. But

there are few differences in occupation or education, and

the gender gap is smaller.

Thus, Expanded Givers tend to be wealthy, middle-aged

businessmen, with some variation among the most active

donors. And, thus, increased giving is likely to intensify

the existing upper-status bias of the donor pool and reduce

the representation of women. Raising the limits may well

increase individual participation in campaign finance, but

in a highly selective fashion.

40a

This conclusion is reinforced by the motives the donors

report as “very important” for their giving. Compared to

the samples as a whole, Expanded Givers were most likely

to report business motives, such as “so my business will be

treated fairly,” “candidate is friendly to my industry or

line of work,” or “[I was] asked by someone I cannot say no

to.” Reduced Givers were less likely to cite this kind of

motive as important.

Given the demography and motivation of Expanded

Givers, their political profile in Figure 2 should come as no

surprise. Among the major donors, Expanded Givers were

more likely to be strong Republicans and strong conserva-

tives compared to the sample as a whole.

These patterns extended to specific issues, especially

economic questions. Expanded Givers were more likely to

support tax cuts “even if it means reducing public ser-

vices.” Similarly conservative-leaning results obtained for

Expanded Givers on national health insurance, anti-

poverty programs, and environmental protection.

Much the same thing occurred on social issues. For exam-

ple, Expanded Givers were more likely than other donors

to agree that “abortion should be outlawed except to save

the mother’s life,” and were also more conservative on gay

rights and affirmative action.

In addition, there is an organizational component to these

figures. Fully 30% of the self-identified members of busi-

ness or conservative interest groups qualified as Expanded

Givers. In contrast, just 7% of members of both environ-

mental and liberal groups said they would give more if the

limits were raised.

4la

These partisan and ideological tendencies hold for the

most active donors — an important finding, because the

most active donors are more Democratic and liberal than

the major donors. Thus, increased giving may erode a

Democratic counterbalance to the Republican tilt of the

major donors. Overall, the Reduced Givers are more likely

to be liberals, independents of various sorts, and Democ-

rats.

What kind of congressional candidates did Expanded

Givers support in 1996? Not surprisingly, they directed

more than 70% of their money to Republicans. This figure

contrasts sharply with the Reduced Givers, who gave just

38% of their 1996 funds to Republicans, and the Stand-Pat

Givers, who gave 56%. Taken together, all of this evidence

suggests some factual basis for the opposition to increased

individual limits by Democratic reformers.

It is very difficult to estimate the amount and distribution

of new funds resulting from the doubling of the individual

limits. Much depends on the circumstances of the election

and how a wide range of political actors responds to the

entire reform package. We can, however, use our major

donor sample to estimate the extra funds that might have

been raised in 1996, had the increased limits been in

place.

For this purpose, we assume that all the Expanded Givers

doubled their 1996 contributions, the Reduced Givers cut

their contributions to zero, and the Stand-Pat Givers

remained unchanged. Table 1 reports the results of this

estimate overall and for various kinds of candidates.

42a

Table 1

What If Limits Had Applied in 19967?

1996 ESTIMATED ESTIMATED ESTIMATED

TOTAL IN % NEW FUNDS TOTAL IN

MILLIONS: CHANGE’ IN MILLIONS’ MILLIONS‘

TOTAL $203.5 16.7% $34.0 $237.5

REPUBLICAN

INCUMBENTS $62.8 25.6% $16.0 $78.8

NOon-

INCUMBENTS $50.1 19.6% $9.8 $59.9

DEMOCRATIC

INCUMBENTS $38.2 13.3% $5.0 $43.2

Non-

INCUMBENTS $52.4 6.2% $3.2 $55.6

Note: ‘total funds raised by congressional candidates from

individual contributions of $200 or more in 1996. *Esti-

mated increase in individual donations of $200 or more

assuming: a) all Expanded Givers doubled their 1996

contributions, and b) all Reduced Givers reduced their

1996 contributions to zero.’ Column one multiplied by

column two.‘ Column one added to column three.

Source. Estimated by the authors from the University of

Akron Fall 1997 survey and Federal Election Commission

data.

The first row in Table 1 reports the total funds raised in

1996 from individuals’ donations of $200 or more to

congressional candidates ($203.5 million). We estimate

that these funds would have been 16.7% higher if the

increased limits had been in place and the above assump-

tions were met, producing an additional $34 million.

43a

There is a sharp partisan bias in the distribution of the

estimated funds. For Republican incumbents, funds

increased by 25.6% and accounted for almost one-half of

the increased funds ($16 out of $34 million). Republican

non-incumbents (challengers and open-seat candidates)

showed a smaller increase of 19.6% and obtained a little

more than one-quarter of the estimated new money.

By comparison, Democrats fared less well: incumbents

increased by 13.3% and non-incumbents by 6.2%. The total

Democratic increase was $8.2 million, about one-third of

the total Republican gain.

These estimates must be viewed with caution, of course,

since different assumptions will produce different results,

and future campaigns may not resemble that of 1996. The

total figures could be much higher if the Stand-Pat Givers

are induced to contribute more, or the Reduced Givers

continue to participate rather than abstaining.

It is possible that Democratic candidates will more suc-

cessfully exploit the new limits than Republicans, or that

the larger maximum donations will help non-incumbents

by providing crucial “seed money” for their campaigns.

However, it is also possible that these patterns will also

apply to the increased contributions to parties and PACs,

to the further advantage of the GOP and conservative

candidates.

Finally, the level of estimated new money is high enough

to suggest that some candidates may be able to spend less

time on fundraising and more time on other duties —

especially if they are Republicans and incumbents.

What, then, is the likely impact of doubling individual

contribution limits? Although only one in six major donors

44a

claim they would give more, and one in twenty would give

less, the cumulative impact could be significant. Increased

giving is likely to exacerbate the upper status character of

the donor pool, providing greater voice to wealthy busi-

nessmen and individuals already heavily engaged in

giving.

More of the new funds are likely to go to Republican

congressional candidates, particularly incumbents, and

may allow these candidates to spend less time on fundrais-

ing and more time legislating. Thus, the new reforms may

produce some political consequences unforeseen — but not

unforeseeable — by the reformers.

45a

Exhibit 3

IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Civil Action No.

VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY

ADAMS , et. al., 02-cv-877-KLH-CKK-RJL

— consolidated with

Plaintiffe, 02-cv-582-KLH-CKK-RJL

-Vs- (lead case)

THE FEDERAL ELECTION ) and

COMMISSION et ai., 02-cv-581-KLH-CKK-RJL

Defendants. 02-cv-633-KLH-CKK-RJL

02-cv-751-KLH-CKK-RJL

02-cv-753-KLH-CKK-RJL

02-cv-754-KLH-CKK-RJL

02-cv-781-KLH-CKK-RJL

02-cv-874-KLH-CKK-RJL

02-cv-875-KLH-CKK-RJL

02-cv-881-KLH-CKK-RJL

Nee NN eee eee eee ees Ga

DECLARATION AND EXPERT REPORT

OF CRAIG MCDONALD

I, Craig McDonald, hereby declare as follows:

1. I am the Director of Texans for Public Justice, a

non-profit research organization based in Austin, Texas. I

have served as director of Texas for Public Justice since its

establishment in 1997. Prior to that I was employed by

Public Citizen, Inc. and the Center for New Democracy

and as an employee of those organizations, I have accumu-

lated over 20 years of experience in studying and analyz-

ing campaign financing practices and policy with a focus

on both federal and state campaigns. My curriculum vitae

46a

is attached to this declaration as Exhibit A. I have not

received any compensation for providing this declaration

and expert report.

2. Texans for Public Justice monitors, documents

and analyzes political campaign donation activity of

political candidates and political committees. In July 1999,

Texans for Public Justice began monitoring and gathering

information on the Governor George W. Bush Presidential

Exploratory Committee, Inc. and its successor organiza-

tion, the George W. Bush For President Committee. A

particular focus of our research was the establishment and

activity of the Pioneer fundraising network that was

established by the Bush Exploratory Committee and

functioned as an ongoing activity of the George W. Bush

for President Committee. Since July of 1999, Texans for

Public Justice has produced several reports documenting

the operation of the Pioneer network and detailing the

identities, occupations and economic interests of the Bush

Pioneers.

3. The existence of the Bush Pioneer program first

became public in May 1999, two months after the creation

of Bush’s presidential exploratory committee on March 7,

1999. The program was designed to circumvent the $1,000

limit on individual contributions to the Bush Presidential

Exploratory Committee and the Bush For President

Campaign Committee. The Pioneer program solicited

individual campaign supporters to commit to raising a

minimum of $100,000 for the campaign by reaching out to a

network of personal contacts and encouraging those contacts

to contribute directly to the campaign. To reach their goal of

$100,000 a Pioneer would have to build a network of at least

100 donors who could contribute the $1,000 maximum

amount allowed under law. Each volunteer participant in

47a

the Pioneer program was assigned an identification, or

tracking number, which was to appear on all checks the

individual Pioneer successfully solicited for the campaign.

The Bush campaign monitored the progress of each volun-

teer at it Austin headquarters. In May 1999, when the

existence of the Pioneer program became public, Mr.

Donald Evans, the Bush campaign fundraising chairman,

acknowledged that 150 individuals had signed up for the

Pioneer program, but noted he did not expect all to reach

the $100,000 goal.

4. To build the fundraising network and meet the

campaign’s goal of raising $50 million by the end of 1999,

Bush had courted hundreds of money men who had trav-

eled into Austin to lunch with the Governor either in a

downtown restaurant or at the Governor’s mansion. While

the campaign initially refused to publicly disclose the

identities of the 150 participants in the Pioneer program,

the campaign revealed that Bush had enlisted the help of

an undisclosed number of Republican governors and

Washington lobbyists. Texas-based lobbyist Tom Loeffler

was named as a Pioneer, as was Washington-based lobby-

ist Haley Barbour.

5. Essentially, the Pioneer program is what is

commonly referred to as a “bundling” operation. Bundling

is the term used when supporters of a particular candidate

or campaign assist the campaign in raising money from

their own networks of family, employees, friends, co-

workers, etc. A “bundler” is often a donor that has pledged

or contributed the maximum contribution allowed by law,

but is willing to engage in further fundraising outreach to

their own networks and encourage an unlimited number of

other individuals to contribute to the candidate or cam-

paign. Bundlers, therefore, facilitate the delivery of — and

ften take and receive credit for - amounts of money that

are many times the amount allowed by law for individual

‘ontributions. The practice of “bundling” campaign contnri-

butions and delivering them to candidates or campaigns 1s

not new and is practiced by many modern federal cam-

paigns. However, the Bush Pioneer program elevated this

practice to new levels of sophistication. The practice of

bundling campaign contributions, while contrary to the

spirit of the federal campaign laws limiting individual

contributions to candidates to $1,000 per election, is not

prohibited as long a those who engage in it do not coerce

others to give a campaign contribution.

6. In July of 1999, the campaign revealed further

information about the Pioneer program. Jim Francis,

Director of the Texas Public Safety Commission, served as

the head of the Pioneer program. According to Francis, 115

individuals had reached the goal of bundling $100,000

each. Francis acknowledged there were close to 400 Bush

supporters working toward the $100,000 goal, including

the 115 that already there.

7. The degree to which the Bush Pioneer program

was systemically tracking — and crediting — donors with

contributions exceeding the individual limits, was further

brought to light when a May 27, 1999 memo from Pioneer

and Edison Electric Institute president, Tom Kuhn to

electric utility industry executives became public. The

Kuhn memo, written on Bush campaign committee station-

ary [sic], revealed that the campaign was not only tracking

and crediting individuals for bundling over the limits, but

was tracking bundlers with respect to the industries they

represented. An excerpt from the Kuhn memo:

49a

“My personal thanks to all of you for taking a

leadership role in gathering support for the June

22 reception honoring Governor George W. Bush

... As you know, a very important part of the

campaigns outreach to the business community

is the use of tracking numbers for contributions.

Both Don Evans and Jack Oliver have stressed

the importance of having our industry incorpo-

rate the #1178 tracking number in your fundrais-

ing efforts. Listing your industry's code does not

prevent you, any of your individual solicitors or

your state from receiving credit for soliciting a

contribution. It does ensure that our industry is

credited, and that your progress is listed among

the other business/industry sectors. If you have

any questions about your industry's tracking in-

formation, please do not hesitate to let me know

8. Clearly, the conclusion that can be derived from

the Bush campaign’s own characterization of the program

and the explicit description by Tom Kuhn of the impor-

tance of making sure the proper “codes” were included on

donations so that the individual, state and industry would

receive “credit for soliciting a contribution” from the

campaign’s key staff, must be that some benefit(s) would

accrue to those who delivered the largest amounts or share

of money. If there were no expectation of special access,

rewards, or favors, there would have been no need to

“track” contributions and “credit” them according to the

industries, states and individuals generating them.

9. The Bush campaign made public a list of 115

Pioneers on July 19, 1999. According to the campaign,

these 115 individuals were those who had met the goal of

bundling a minimum of $100,000 in contributions to Bush.

According to campaign spokespersons, individuals who

50a

had not yet fulfilled the goal of reaching the $100,000

mark were not considered Pioneers and their names were

not disclosed. Neither did the campaign publicly disclose

(at the time or anytime subsequently) the total amounts

that Pioneers were credited with raising. This and subse-

quent limited disclosures by the campaign were criticized

by TPJ. We believed the public had the right to know the

total amounts Pioneers were being credited with raising,

and the right to know the names and amounts credited to

any individuals the campaign might be tracking regard-

less of whether they had reached the magic $100,000

number.

10. Periodic disclosures of those considered to be

Pioneers according the campaign’s definition resulted in

the release of 226 names. In July 2000, TPJ published an

analysis of the occupations and economic interests of 212

Pioneers whose names had been disclosed through June

2000. The report concluded that the ranks of the Pioneers

were dominated by corporate executives and lobbyists. The

report classified the known Pioneers by their business and

primary economic or ideological interests, tracked the total

money each spent on politics, and provided individual

profiles of each. The major findings of the report were:

¢ 133 Pioneers were business executives, 16 of

whom George W. Bush appointed to state gov-

ernment posts.

¢ The 212 identified Pioneers, who by definition

had raised a minimum of $21.2 million for

Bush’s presidential effort, had also personally

contributed an additional $7.1 million to fed-

eral candidates and PACs since the ‘96 elec-

tion cycle.

5la

* When the 212 were identified by their pri-

mary economic interest or profession 44 of

the Pioneers were classified as Lawyers &

Lobbyists, 38 represented the Financial sec-

tor, 28 were from the Energy & Natural Re-

sources sector (dominated by oil and gas), 24

were from the Real Estate sector, and 23 were

classified as representing Miscellaneous

Businesses.

11. Members and/or potential members of the Pio-

neer network enjoyed special access to Governor Bush and

the campaign, prior to the officiel announcement that he

would pursue the presidency, and during the campaign

itself. Governor Bush met with Pioneers and future or

potential Pioneers on a number of occasions as docu-

mented in the media:

* On December 18, 1998 a group gathered at

the Governors Mansion to discuss the cam-

paign. That group included California financier

Brad Freeman and California agribusiness ty-

coon Howard Leach, both later designated by

the campaign as Pioneers.

¢ In the Spring of 1999, Bush met in Austin

with Christine Toretti, head of Pennsylvania

drilling company who pledged to deliver $1

million to the primary campaign yet was

never designated a Pioneer.

* At least seven “Pioneers” stayed at least one

night in the Texas governor’s mansion be-

tween February 1, 1999 and March of 2000.

These Pioneers included Don Jordan of Re-

lient Energy, investment banker Brad Free-

man, Craig Stapleton of Marsh and McLellan,

and Roland Betts of Chelsea Piers Manage-

ment.

12. Many of the Pioneers were rewarded with

government appointments. A report released by Texan [sic]

for Public Justice on March 5, 2002 shows that 43 of the

publicly named Pioneers had received presidential ap-

pointments of some kind. Again, by definition, these 43

Pioneer appointees delivered more than $4.3 million to

Bush’s presidential race. Pioneers who received Bush

52a

According to the Center for Responsive Poli-

tics, in June 1999, Charles Cawley, president

of MBNA America Bank, hosted a dinner at

his summer home in Kennebunkport, Maine.

More than 200 guests gathered to help un-

derwrite the presidential campaign of George

W. Bush, the party’s guest of honor. Over the

next year, Cawley would personally raise at

least $100,000 for the Bush campaign, quali-

fying him as a Pioneer, helping to secure

MBNA’ slot as Bush’s single top contribution

with more than $240,000 in contributions

from its employees during 1999-2000.

On November 15, 1999, the Bush campaign

hosted a gathering of 300 top fundraisers in

Austin, TX, 150 of whom had been designated

“Pioneers.”

August 16, 2002, Bush held a gathering at his

Crawford, TX residence for the “Pioneer”

network.

appointments include:

19 U.S. ambassadors to countries from Aus-

tria to Uruguay;

Five members of the Energy Department

Transition Team that first envisioned Bush's

supply-side energy policy (including ex-Enron

CEO Ken Lay); and

53a

¢ Two seats on the President’s Foreign Intelli-

gence Advisory Board.

13. It is impossible to determine exactly how much

money the Pioneer network was responsible for raising for

the Bush campaign, given the fact that the campaign has

not publicly disclosed that information nor produced that

information for this litigation. At a bare minimum, relying

on the Bush campaign’s limited public disclosure, the

Pioneers were responsible for raising $22.6 million, or

approximately one-fifth of the private money raised by the

campaign. (Based on the campaign’s public release of the

names of 224 Pioneers who achieved their “goal” of raising

$100,000.)

14. It is likely that the Pioneer network raised many

millions more than the acknowledged $22.6 million.

According to documents produced by the Bush for Presi-

dent Committee for this litigation, the campaign was

tracking a total of 431 individuals as part of the Pioneer

program. This means there were at least 207 individuals

who pledged to raise $100,000 but apparently fell short of —

the goal, or achieved the goal but were not disclosed by the

campaign. It is also quite likely that several, if not many

of the Pioneers raised well more than $100,000 for the

campaign. Again, documents produced by the Bush for

President Committee for this litigation reveals that 34

Pioneers pledged to raise more than $100,000 with 29 of

them committing to raise $250,000 or more and three

pledging to raise more than $1,000,000. When considering

that the campaign did not disclose how much the “under-

achieving” and “overachieving” Pioneers delivered, it is

reasonable to speculate that the total amount of money

raised by the Pioneer bundling operation may have

reached $50,000,000 or more.

15. The increased limits on individual contributions

called for under the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of

2002 (BCRA) would undoubtedly increase the ability of

elite fundraisers, such as those who comprise the Bush

Pioneers, to deliver larger amounts of money to political

campaigns. With those larger amounts of funds, would

likely come more access and potential influence over public

policy and governmental actions. 1 believe it is reasonable

to speculate that under the more indulgent contribution

limits of BCRA, the same Bush Pioneer network might

have been able to provide the campaign with many mil-

lions of dollars more than it delivered for the 2000 election

effort. It is not unrealistic to speculate that, under BCRA,

the Pioneers would be able to double the amount of contri-

butions delivered in 2000, meaning that a relatively small

handful of citizens could be responsible for delivering

anywhere from $45 million up to $100 million to a federal

presidential effort - enough money to fund an entire

campaign.

16. The sources that I have relied on in forming my

opinions are attached as Exhibits B-Q.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of

the United States of America that the foregoing is true and

correct.

Executed on September 19, 2002

/s/ Craig McDonald

Craig McDonald

a

55a

Exhibit 4

IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

) Civil Action No.

VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY

AD AMS, et. al., ) 02-cv-877-KLH-CKK-RJL

)

) consolidated with

) 02-cv-582-KLH-CKK-RJL

Plaintiffs, . (lead case)

) and

02-cv-581-KLH-CKK-RJL

02-cv-633-KLH-CKK-RJL

02-cv-751-KLH-CKK-RJL

02-cv-753-KLH-CKK-RJL

02-cv-754-KLH-CKK-RJL

02-cv-781-KLH-CKK-RJL

02-cv-874-KLH-CKK-RJL

02-cv-875-KLH-CKK-RJL

02-cv-881-KLH-CKK-RJL

THE FEDERAL ELECTION

COMMISSION et al.,

i a a a a a oe

Defendants.

DECLARATION AND EXPERT REPORT OF

PROFESSOR THOMAS STRATMANN

I, Thomas Stratmann, hereby declare as follows:

1. I am a Professor of Economics at George Mason

University. I have received a Ph. D. in Economics from the

University of Maryland in 1990, and a M.A. in Economics

from the University of Maryland in 1988. I have given

expert testimony in a campaign finance case in Montana

(Montana Right to Life Assoc. v. Eddleman, No. CV 96-165-

BLG-JDS), and in Vermont (Landell v. Sorrell, 118 F. Supp.

2d 459 (D. Vt. 2000)). I receive a $175 fee per hour for

56a

working on this case. A current version of my CV is at-

tached to the affidavit.

2. My research on campaign finance issues falls into

three areas. In one research area I examine whether limits

on contributions to candidates make it more difficult or

less difficult for challengers to compete with incumbents.

This work examines whether contribution limits make

elections more or less competitive. In another research

area I examine whether contributions to legislators affect

the voting behavior of legislators and, specifically, whether

there is a causal link between contributions and legisla-

tors’ voting behavior. In a third research area I examine

whether contributors pursue solely an “electoral strategy”

in allocating their contributions across legislators (i.e., do

they give money solely to assist the election of legislators

who support the contributors’ policy views) or whether the

allocation of contributions reflects a “legislative strategy”

(i.e., giving money to influence legislators’ votes on legisla-

tion).

Contribution limits and competitiveness of elec-

tions.

3. The subject of the causal relationship between

campaign contribution limits and the outcome of elections

has been debated for many years. Some argue that limit-

ing campaign contributions amounts to “incumbent protec-

tion”. This school of thought holds that contribution limits

are damaging to challengers as a class because they

prevent them from getting their message out and compet-

ing against an incumbent with strong name recognition.

Moreover, reductions in contributions would hurt chal-

lengers overall if each dollar is marginally more important

57a

to challengers. Others contend that limits make challeng-

ers more competitive. They claim that contribution limits

are helpful to challengers as a class because they reduce the

amount by which incumbents can outspend challengers.

4. Studies conducted at the federal level offer little

insight regarding the effects of contribution limits because

these studies took place at the federal level, where federal

campaign finance laws had not changed since the mid-

1970s. But, there is another way to determine the effects

of contribution limits on election outcomes. By turning to

the states, the traditional laboratories of democracy, we

can compare states that have no contribution limits to

those that have them. State campaign finance laws exhibit

a lot of variation across states and over time. Since the

latel1970s, many states have enacted and changed their

own campaign finance laws and therefore states provide a

natural testing ground for theoretical campaign finance

models. If contribution limits amount to “incumbent

protection,” then challengers should do comparatively well

in states with no limits, and fare more poorly as contribu-

tion limits get lower in other states.

5. My work in “Competition Policy for Elections: Do

Campaign Contribution Limits Matter?” co-authored with

Francisco J. Aparicio-Castillo, looks at the states with

contribution limits and without limits and empirically

measures changes in competitiveness. The analysis is

based on more than 30,000 elections to state lower houses

in 45 states between 1980 and 2001. I measure competi-

tiveness by examining electoral margins in winner-take-all

elections, which are dominant in U.S. elections. I look at the

margin of victory of the winning candidate to measure

“closeness” of elections and at the percentage of races won by

challengers to measure how often incumbents get re-elected.

58a

I also look at the number of candidates in each general

election, which should be a good indicator of the ability

and willingness of challengers to mount a campaign either

for the purposes of winning or for the purposes of raising

important issues that may not yet have majority support.

6. The multi-state, multi-year analysis shows that

states with contribution limits have closer elections. I

document that campaign contribution limits favor chal-

lengers by reducing the incumbent margin of victory.

7. The existence of a contribution limit reduced the

margin of victory for open seat candidates an? incumbents

who were in office after the passage of the contribution

limits by 7.6% for individual contribution limits, 9.4% for

PAC limits, 4.1% for limits on corporations (although this

percentage is not statically [sic] significant at conventional

levels) 6.5% for limits on unions, and 6.9% for limits on

party giving.

8. If open seat races are removed, we can look only

at the effect of contribution limits on incumbents. Incum-

bents who are in office when campaign contribution limits

are passed may not experience the full effect of those

limits. Those incumbents have had years of campaigning

under the old limits to build up their brand name recogni-

tion. They also have had the chance to build up large

reserves of campaign funds under the old limits that they

may use for future campaigns even after new limits have

gone into effect. To isolate this effect, we can look only at

incumbents who take office after a change in campaign

finance law has gone into effect. Examining races that

involve incumbents only, I find that individual limits

reduce the margin of victory for post-limit incumbents by

6% while it reduces the margin of victory for pre-limit

59a

incumbents by 3.1%. We find similar effects for PACs,

corporations, unions and parties.

9. The findings show that all forms of contribution

limits have a negative impact on incumbents’ margin of

victory, although they have a lesser impact on incumbents

who are already in office when the law takes effect. Re-

gression results also indicate that the presence of contri-

bution limits results in a 0.1 (or 5%) increase in the

number of candidates (in races with post-limit incum-

bents), taking the average from 1.8 to 1.9 candidates in a

race.

10. The data further indicate that the lower the

contribution limit, the greater the increase in competitive-

ness overall. When examining races with incumbents the

results show that lowering a contribution limit by $1,000

when controlling for factors such as term limits and

election day registration, time invariant state characteris-

tics and factors that influence election outcomes nation-

wide, reduces the margin of victory for incumbents by 5.4

percent. When this is further controlled to account for the

number of candidates in the race, then a $1,000 decrease

in contribution limits yields a 3% decrease in incumbent

margin of victory. When all races are included, not just

incumbents, a $1,000 decrease in contribution limits results

in a 1.5% to 2.6% reduction in the margin of victory, so

lowering a limit appears to have a slightly larger impact on

incumbents than open seat candidates.

11. Given that incumbents on average win elections

with 78% of the vote, the decrease in vote margins from

contribution limits is not large enough to cause most

incumbents to lose. When the estimate on incumbent vote

60a

loss is applied to the actual margins of victory by incum-

bents, I find that approximately 4% of successful incum-

bents would have lost had the contribution limits in their

races been lowered by $2,000. The presence of individual

contribution limits result in a 1.1% reduction in likelihood

of incumbent victories, and when limits are placed on all

sources of contributions, (individuals, PACs, corporations,

unions, and parties) the likelihood of incumbent victory

reduces by 2.1%.

12. The data show that contribution limits make

races closer, reduce the incumbency advantage, and lead to

more candidates in elections. The data do not lend support

to the hypothesis that contribution limits protect incum-

bents. Quite to the contrary, lower contribution limits help

challengers, make them more competitive, and increase

the likelihood they emerge as winners in electoral races.

Therefore, the new higher limits on hard-money contribu-

tions in the federal Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act are

likely to benefit incumbents at the expense of challengers.

Campaign contributions and the voting behav-

ior of legislators.

13. Whether campaign contributions induce a

legislator to favor the interests of the contributor has been

a long-standing research questions. In particular, the

question is whether contributions to legislators affect the

voting behavior of legislators and whether there is a

causal link between contributions and legislators’ voting

behavior.

14. In my 1991 and 1995 articles (Southern Eco-

nomic Journal 1991, Review of Economics and Statistics,

6la

1995) I analyze roll call votes on subsidies to the agricul-

tural sector and to examine whether campaign contribu-

tions from agriculture caused legislators to vote in

agricultural interests. I examine roll call votes on amend-

ments to the 1981 and 1985 Farm Bill as well as votes on

agricultural appropriations and emergency funding. The

outcome of these votes was important to the agricultural

sector, as these votes provided funding, subsidies, and

favorable regulations for particular agricultural sectors.

The benefits associated with these votes were concen-

trated among the agricultural sector, while the costs were

distributed throughout the electorate.

15. Between two articles I anwlyze a total of fifteen

roll call votes in the U.S. House of Representatives in 1981

and 1985. All votes are on agricultural issues such changes

in the level of subsidies for dairy, peanuts, sugar, tobacco,

and wheat, while others were votes on emergency funding

for agriculture, appropriation bills for agriculture, and the

final vote on the agricultural bill. Some of these votes

proposed increasing government farm subsidies, others

proposed decreasing farm subsidies.

16. Any research examining the effects of campaign

contributions on voting behavior, and wanting to establish

a causal effect going from contributions to voting behavior,

has to recognize that contributors may give to their

friends, and thus that a vote favoring a contributor may

not indicate that the vote has been ‘bought’. I address this

issue by using a well accepted statistical technique, called

two-stage least squares, that allows the researcher to

tease out the causal effect going from campaign contribu-

tions received to voting behavior, if such an effect is in the

data.

62a

17. In my regression analysis I examine whether

contributions from the dairy industry influence votes on

dairy issues, and proceed with an equally detailed analysis

for votes on tobacco, wheat, sugar, and peanut issues. For

analyzing the Farm bill and emergency finding I examine

whether contributions from the entire agricultural sector

cause legislators to vote in agricultural interests.

18. My research shows that campaign contributions

are effective in altering politicians’ voting behavior. I find

that in most of these votes, campaign contributions in-

crease the probability that a legislator is voting in con-

tributors’ interests. My 1991 and 1995 articles document

that contributions from agricultural Political Action

Committees (PACs) increased the probability that legisla-

tors would vote in favor of PAC interests. Not only are

contributions in the current election cycle important for

influencing the voting behavior of politicians, but contri-

butions in the period prior to the roll call votes are also

important. For example, dairy contributions in 1983/84

electoral cycle and contributions received early in 1985

influence a dairy vote late in 1985.

19. An alternative measure to assess the impact of

campaign contributions is to examine whether the out-

come of the congressional roll call vote would have

changed if congressmen had received no campaign contri-

butions. I examine this in my 1991 article and find that in

two out of the ten votes examined, agricultural interests

would have lost the vote if campaign contributions were

prohibited. For example, an amendment to increase sugar

subsidies passed by a vote of 267-146. I estimate that

without campaign contributions this amendment would

have been defeated 203-210. These numbers indicate that

63a

campaign contributions are quite effective in changing

legislators’ voting behavior.

20. In my most recent work on this topic I have

conducted a detailed study examining changes in voting

behavior in financial services legislation. This paper is

forthcoming in the October 2002 issue of the Journal of

Law and Economics. I examine two votes in the U.S.

House of Representatives on the repeal of the Glass

Steagall Act. One vote took place in 1991 and the other

vote took place in 1998. No roll call vote on the repeal of

the Glass Steagall Act took place between these two dates.

Banking interests favored the repeal of the Glass Steagall

Act, while insurance and securities interests opposed it.

21. Some legislators sided with banking interests in

1991 and switched sides in 1998 by voting for insurance

and securities interests. Other legislators switched from

voting for insurance and securities interests in 1991 to

banking interests in 1998. In this study I analyze why

legislators changed their position between 1991 and 1998.

I find that changes in the flow of financial services cam-

paign contributions can explain much of the change in

voting behavior. Moreover, the article documents that

junior legislators’ voting behavior is particularly suscepti-

ble to being influenced by campaign contributions. In

particular, this study examines whether changes in

contribution flows can explain why legislators switched

sides. I find that legislators switched their voting behavior

from insurance/securities to banking interests when they

received larger banking contributions in the late 1990s

than in the early 1990s.

22. This is the first study of its kind that examines

whether changes in contributions over time lead to

64a

changes in legislators’ voting. I find that changes in

contributions lead to changes in voting and I believe that

this is a causal effect. One could argue that some legisla-

tors changed their position from favoring banking inter-

ests to favoring insurance interests and that this was the

reason that they received more contributions. However,

though this is possible, I believe that it is unlikely. Finan-

cial services legislation is not a salient issue in legislators

home district, giving them little opportunity to stake out a

public position. One of the few opportunities to stake out a

position is to vote on this issue, and there were no roll call

votes between 1991 and 1998, which would have allowed

them to take a position favoring one interest over another.

Moreover, there is not evidence of substantial changes in

the desire of the home constituency with respect to the

repeal of the Glass Steagall Act, which could have caused a

legislator to shift position. Thus I am confident that this

paper estimates a causal effect of money on votes.

What contributors do: assist the election of

legislators who support the contributors’ pol-

icy views or give money to influence legisla-

tors’ votes on legislation?

23. Another important question in campaign finance

is whether contributors pursue solely an “electoral strat-

egy” in allocating their contributions across legislators

(i.e., do they give money solely to assist the election of

legislators who support the contributors’ policy views) or

whether the allocation of contributions reflects a “legisla-

tive strategy” (i.e., giving money to influence legislators’

votes on legislation)?

65a

24. My research findings published in the Journal of

Political Economy 1992, the Journal of Law and Econom-

ics 1996, and the Journal of Law and Economics 1998

shows that PACs allocate contributions across legislators

in ways that are consistent with the objective of influenc-

ing legislators’ votes on legislation.

25. In the Journal of Political Economy article I

raise the question of how PACs would behave if their

objective were to influence legislators’ voting decisions. I

argue that the rational allocation of funds implies that

PACs do not contribute to those legislators who will vote in

their favor regardless of whether or not they receive

contributions, but rather contribute to legislators who are

likely to be opposed to their interests. The more a legisla-

tor is opposed to PAC interests, the more the PAC is going

to have to contribute to swing his or her voting decision.

Moreover, given that Congress uses simple majority rule to

decide on issues such as, for example, tariffs, subsidies,

and price supports, PACs have an incentive to give contri-

butions in order to secure a majority, not unanimity.

Therefore, if PACs could rank legislators in terms of how

likely they are to oppose PACs’ interest, most contributions

would have to be given to the median legislator, i.e., the

legislator with the median level of opposition to the PACs’

interests. Legislators with declining opposition would

receive fewer contributions, in line with their level of

opposition.

26. To test whether contributors give less to legisla-

tors who are compelled to vote in PAC interests because of

constituency interests, it is important to identify a sector

in the economy in which voters in some constituencies have

the same interest as the PAC. I identified the farm sector,

which has a voting constituency in most congressional

66a

districts, as well as PACs that work for farm interests.

Identifying the number of potential farm interest support-

ers in a legislative district allows the ranking of legislators

in terms of their likelihood of supporting PAC interests:

the smaller the farm constituency size the less likely the

legislator will support farm PAC interests, and thus the

larger the necessary contribution required to change his or

her voting behavior, keeping in mind that legislators with

more than the median amount of opposition do not need to

receive any contributions.

27. My empirical findings show that the pattern of

giving by agricultural PACs follows the line of reasoning |

outlined. Legislators with virtually no farm constituency,

such as Representatives from New York City and Los

Angeles, receive little or no farm contributions. Most

contributions are received by legislators with a median

farm constituency (for example, legislators from Mary-

land), and, the larger the farm constituency beyond the

median (legislators from Montana, and the Dakotas), the

lower the amount contributed by farm PACs.

28. In my 1996 Journal of Law and Economics

article I analyze the contribution pattern of labor PACs

and corporate PACs. I hypothesize that if PACs were

contributing primarily to assist the election of legislators

who support the contributors’ policy views, labor PACs

would contribute more money to liberal Democrats than to

conservative Democrats and corporations would contribute

more to conservative Republicans than to liberal Republi-

cans. If these PACs would try to influence legislators’ votes

(using similar logic as in my Journal of Political Economy

article) then labor PACs would concentrate their contribu-

tions on conservative Democrats. Similarly corporate PACs

would concentrate their contributions liberal Republicans.

67a

Using regression analysis, and controlling for a variety of

factors, including the closeness of the electoral race, I

documented that labor PACs contribute more to conserva-

tive Democrats than they do to liberal Democrats, and

that corporate PACs give more to liberal Republicans than

they do to conservative Republicans. The findings show

that PACs contribute less to legislators who will vote

clearly in their favor than to legislators who are undecided

or potentially opposed to their interests.

29. The 1998 Journal of Law and Economics article

argues that if the contribution-for-vote exchange occurs, in

part, at the time the legislation is voted on, then one can

expect that contributions flow around the time of the

House roll call votes. Focusing on farm legislation, this

article documents that there is a significant increase in

contributions at the time that congressional votes are

taken.

30. To a legislator, a one dollar campaign contribu-

tion from PACs is as valuable as a one dollar campaign

contribution from individuals. Both contributions wi!] be

equally valuable in his or her reelection campaign. There-

fore, on a dollar for dollar basis one expects contributions

from individuals to have a very similar effect on legisla-

tors’ votes as contributions from PACs. Although contribu-

tion limits are lower for individuals than for PACs,

individuals can bundle contributions, which will allow

them to exert a stronger influence on legislators’ decisions.

There is no reason to believe that PAC monies exert

different influence on legislative behavior than do monies

from individuals. Thus, the conclusions that I have

reached regarding PAC behavior can be extended to

contributions from individuals.

68a

I declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1746 that the foregoing is true and correct to the

best of my knowledge, information and belief.

This 19th day of September, 2002.

/s/ Thomas Stratmann

Thomas Stratmann

69a

Exhibit 16

IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

VICTORIA JACKSON ) Civil Action No.

GRAY ADAMS, et ai., 02-cv-877-KLH-CKK-RJL

Plaintiffs, ) consolidated with

) 02-cv-582-KLH-CKK-RJL

-Vs-

) (lead case)

THE FEDERAL ar

ELECTION COMMISSION ) 09-cv-581-KLH-CKK-RJL

” ) 02-cv-633-KLH-CKK-RJL

Defendants. 02-cv-751-KLH-CKK-RJL

) 02-ev-753-KLH-CKK-RJL

) 02-ev-754-KLH-CKK-RJL

) 02-cv-781-KLH-CKK-RJL

) 02-cv-874-KLH-CKK-RJL

) 02-cv-875-KLH-CKK-RJL

) 02-cv-881-KLH-CKK-RJL

Declaration of Sam Gejdenson

I, Sam Gejdenson, declare as follows:

1. I served as a member of the U.S. House of Repre-

sentatives from the Second District of Connecticut from

1981 to 2000 and now run an international trade company,

Gejdenson International.

2. During my tenure in Congress, I sponsored cam-

paign finance reform legislation, and held many hearings on

this topic across the United States. It became clear to me

during these hearings that as the size of campaign contribu-

tions has increased, the average voter has felt more irrele-

vant to electoral politics. The growing importance of the

70a

largest contributions has depressed voter turnout and

volunteerism. The new generation of voters believes that

politics is primarily about raising money to buy television

advertising.

3. The increased contribution limits of the Biparti-

san Campaign Finance Reform Act (BCRA) will convince

many voters that their participation in politics is meaning-

less. When the wealthy few are permitted to contribute

$2,000 per election (or $4,000 per cycle), and to gather

$2,000 from wealthy friends and relatives, those who

cannot contribute or solicit large donations will be mar-

ginalized from politics. This will be even truer in cases

where candidates with a wealthy, self-funded opponent are

able to take contributions twice as high (or, in Senate

races, up to $12,000).

4. The increased contribution limits will enable

those candidates who have access to large contributors to

raise far more money. Those who lack such access will

either be discouraged from seeking office, or will have to

spend far more time fundraising. Under the current cam-

paign finance system, I have observed that Members of

Congress spend about three hours a day seeking contribu-

tions from large donors during the campaign, and at least

three to six hours a week fundraising throughout the

term. This will only worsen when maximum donors are

able to multiply their clout, and fundraising will displace

contact with voters.

I declare under penalty of perjury, pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1746, that the foregoing is true and correct to the

best of my knowledge, information and belief.

7la

This 3 day of October, 2002.

/s/ Sam Gejdenson

Sam Gejdenson

72a

Exhibit 17

IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

VICTORIA JACKSON ) Civil Action No.

GRAY ADAMS, et al., ) 02-ev-877-KLH-CKK-RJL

Plaintiffs,

-VS-

THE FEDERAL

ELECTION COMMISSION

et al.,

consolidated with

02-cv-582-KLH-CKK-RJL

(lead case)

and

02-cv-581-KLH-CKK-RJL

02-cv-633-KLH-CKK-RJL

02-cv-751-KLH-CKK-RJL

02-cv-753-KLH-CKK-RJL

02-cv-754-KLH-CKK-RJL

02-cv-781-KLH-CKK-RJL

02-cv-874-KLH-CKK-RJL

02-cv-875-KLH-CKK-RJL

02-cv-881-KLH-CKK-RJL

~ Defendants.

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DECLARATION OF PAUL SIMON

I, Paul Simon, declare as follows:

1. I served as a member of the U.S. House of Repre-

sentatives from Illinois from 1975 through 1984, and then

as a U.S. Senator for Illinois from 1985 through 1996. I am

currently the Director of the Public Policy Institute at

Southern Illinois University at Carbondale.

2. Based on my experience as a Senator and as a

U.S. Representative, I believe that the increased individual

contribution limits enacted in the Bipartisan Campaign

73a

Finance Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) will increase the

influence of the largest campaign donors to such an extent

that those who lack wealth, or access to wealth, will not be

able to participate equally in the political process.

3. The vast majority of my former constituents, and

of U.S. voters, are unable to make large campaign contri-

butions. Doubling the contribution limits to $2,000 per

election — and up to $12,000 in Senate races with a self-

funded candidate — will place the highest contributions

even further out of reach for these people.

4. No member of Congress, not even the most scru-

pulous, is unaware of his or her largest contributors, and

not even the most scrupulous members will ignore them.

As a Senator, if I returned to my home or to a hotel room

late at night and found twenty phone messages, one from

a maximum donor and nineteen from people whose names

I did not recognize, I would not make twenty calls but I

might make one call: to the maximum donor.

5. Like other members of Congress (except the most

wealthy), I was forced to fundraise throughout my terms

in office. The potential donors whom I regularly called

personally were those who had given the maximum, or

were likely to do so. The donors to whom I regularly sent

personal thank-you notes were those who had given the

maximum. The donors who were regularly invited to small

receptions with me, or who had their photograph taken

with me, were also the highest donors.

6. Because money has become critical to winning re-

election, every member of Congress is subject to similar

fundraising pressures. Visitors to the U.S. Senate may be

discouraged to see only two or three Senators on the floor

debating the issue at hand at any given moment. They

74a

would be appalled it they knew the reality, that far more

Senators were on the phone trying to raise campaign

funds.

7. It was clear to me that the largest donors expected

favorable policy consideration in exchange for their contri-

butions. For example, after I voted in favor of the North

American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) my long-time

friends in the labor movement were displeased; one union

official observed to a small gathering that I had received

over $600,000 in labor contributions, with the clear impli-

cation that I therefore should have voted against NAFTA.

8. Sensitivity to large donors’ concerns was a fact of

life known to all Senators and Representatives. When I

once complained to a meeting of Democrats that the

Senate was caving in to special interests, a fellow Senator

rebuked me by saying, “Special interests. Special interests.

I’m tired of hearing about special interests. We’ve got to

face who’s buttering our bread.”

9. There were several occasions when I believed that

the outcomes of policy debates were influenced by cam-

paign contributions. Defense appropriations for unneces-

sary projects, such as the B-2 Bomber, could not be cut

without the loss of contributions from donors associated

with the defense industry, and so many unnecessary

programs continue. President Clinton’s health care bill

was defeated, in part, because donors associated with the

insurance industry and American Medical Association give

far more to members’ campaigns than the 41 million

Americans who lack health insurance.

10. The increased individual contribution limits will

exacerbate the disproportionate access and influence that the

largest donors enjoy. Those who are able to contribute the

75a

maximum amount, and gather maximum contributions from

friends, family and associates, will fund an ever-greater

share of campaign budgets. Lower-income citizens will be

discouraged from active participation in political cam-

paigns.

11. The increased contribution limits will only increase

the amount of time Senators and Representatives spend

fundraising. Members of Congress deter potential chal-

lengers, and assure electoral victory, by raising as much

_ money as possible. Therefore, Members of Congress will

continue to maximize their fundraising time. The in-

creased limits will make each potential maximum donor

doubly attractive, and will only ratchet up the arms race

in campaign spending.

12. I remember when I was in the fourth grade or

maybe fifth grade, learning about the philosophical differ-

ences between Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson.

Hamilton wanted to give people of wealth and property

greater voice in government and Jefferson want to treat

all citizens equally. How proud I was that Jefferson pre-

vailed! But with our present system of financing we have

ended up siding with Hamilton, and Jefferson is the loser.

I declare under penalty of perjury, pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1746, that the foregoing is true and correct to the

best of my knowledge, information and belief.

This 18 day of September, 2002.

/s/ Paul Simon

Paul Simon

76a

Exhibit 18

IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

VICTORIA JACKSON ) Civil Action No.

GRAY ADAMS, et al., ) 02-cv-877-KLH-CKK-RJL

Plaintiffs,

consolidated with

02-cv-582-KLH-CKK-RJL

(lead case)

THE FEDERAL inal

a - _ 02-cv-581-KLH-CKK-RJL

y 02-cv-633-KLH-CKK-RJL

Defendants.

02-cv-751-KLH-CKK-RJL

02-cv-753-KLH-CKK-RJL

02-cv-754-KLH-CKK-RJL

02-cv-781-KLH-CKK-RJL

02-cv-874-KLH-CKK-RJL

02-cv-875-KLH-CKK-RJL

02-cv-881-KLH-CKK-RJL

ee ee ee ee ee ee oe ee ee ee ee ee ee

Declaration of Pat Williams

I, Pat Williams, declare as follows:

1. I served as a member of the U.S. House of Repre-

sentatives representing Montana from 1979 through 1996.

I am currently the Executive Director of the Center for the

Rocky Mountains West.

2. Based on my experience running for office, and my

experience as a Member of Congress, I believe that the

increased contribution limits of the Bipartisan Campaign

Finance Reform Act (BCRA) will permit wealthy interests

to more heavily influence electoral outcomes and will

prevent the non-wealthy from equal political participation.

77a

3. In Montana and other Western states, voters over-

whelmingly express pro-environmental positions in polls,

and yet Westerners are sending to Congress representatives

who favor extractive industries, such as mining and log-

ging, and oppose environmental regulation. Candidates

who favor these industries have attracted far more money

in contributions, enabling them to dominate the media

with misleading 30-second television ads that skew the

ability of voters to choose candidates who really represent

their interests. Thus the extractive industries, by amass-

ing contributions from executives, their family members

and associates, have been able to disproportionately influ-

ence election results. By potentially doubling the amount of

contributions that these industries can gather, the BCRA will

radically increase their ability to determine electoral out-

comes.

4. There is no doubt in my mind that those giving

the largest contributions expect preferential access and

disproportionate influence. As one sign of this, members of

committees with jurisdiction over matters of concern to

wealthy interests attract large numbers of maximum contri-

butions.

5. Neither do I doubt that money does buy access for

large donors. In my own case, I tried not to pay much

attention to who was or was not contributing to my cam-

paigns. But if my secretary brought me a list of people

wanting to see me, and if a contributor who had helped

elect me was on that list, I would meet with that person as

a political friend. And often money made people political

friends; in many cases, when I left office I noted that the

friendship with a donor had dried on the vine, and I

realized that it was all about access to the office I held.

78a

6. Money has become the driving force behind elec-

tions. Trying to be in politics and not worry about money

would be like trying to swim across Lake Michigan with-

out getting wet. It is not possible. The increased contribu-

tion limits, by opening the spigot and adding more money

to elections, threatens a system that is already in serious

trouble. I speak regularly with elder voters about public

land policy in the West, and they are discouraged from

political participation by the influence of money. Recently,

one gentleman told me, “Pat, I’m very interested in this.

You have told me that public lands are my lands, but I

don’t see how I can influence policy over my own property.

I’ve given up trying because I’ve realized that the people

with all the money have all the say.”

7. The increased contribution limits will convince

many more voters that their votes, their small campaign

contributions, and their political participation are mean-

ingless. If many average people already feel powerless in

the face of $1000 contributions, doubling that limit (and

even further multiplying it for candidates faced with a

wealthy, self-funded opponent) will worsen the problem to

the point where equal political participation is denied to

those without wealth.

I declare under penalty of perjury, pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1746, that the foregoing is true and correct to the

best of my knowledge, information and belief.

This 3rd day of October, 2002.

/s/ Pat Williams

Pat Williams

79a

Exhibit 19

IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

VICTORIA JACKSON ) Civil Action No.

GRAY ADAMS, et ai., ) 02-cev-877-KLH-CKK-RJL

Plaintiffs, . consolidated with

) 02-cv-582-KLH-CKK-RJL

-Vs-

) (lead case)

THE FEDERAL Deal

— COMMISSION ) 02-cev-581-KLH-CKK-RJL

" ) 02-cv-633-KLH-CKK-RJL

Defendants. )

) 02-cv-751-KLH-CKK-RJL

) 02-cv-753-KLH-CKK-RJL

) 02-cv-754-KLH-CKK-RJL

) 02-cv-781-KLH-CKK-RJL

) 02-cv-874-KLH-CKK-RJL

) 02-cv-875-KLH-CKK-RJL

) 02-cv-881-KLH-CKK-RJL

Declaration of Dr. Thomas A. Caiazzo

I, Tom Caiazzo, declare as follows:

1. Iam a political sconce professor at Collin County

Community College in Plano, Texas, and hold a

terminal degree in political science. I have taught

political science at the community college and

university level for the past eleven years.

2. I ran in 2002 as a Republican seeking to repre-

sent Texas’ third congressional district in the U.S.

House of Representatives. I was defeated in the

Republican primary, receiving 15.7% of the vote

80a

against incumbent Sam Johnson. I raised approxi-

mately $12,000 for this race, while Mr. Johnson

has raised over $500,000.

Based upon my experience as a candidate for

Representative in the U.S Congress, I believe

that the increased individual contribution limits

enacted in the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Re-

form Act of 2002 (BCRA) will make it more diffi-

cult for those without wealth or access to wealth

to mount a viable campaign for federal office. Fur-

thermore, the higher contribution limits will in-

crease the influence of the largest campaign donors

to such an extent that those who lack wealth, or ac-

cess to wealth, will be unable to exercise their

constitutionally protected right to equal participa-

tion in the political process.

I believe that money was a deciding factor in my

primary loss. In spite of the qualifications listed

above and my experience helping other Republi-

can candidate’s seek and win elective office, as

well as being involved/member of the [sic]

[sic] local Republican Men’s’, Young, and College

organizations], I was not able to compete effectively

for

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