Jurisdictional Statement — National Right to Life Committee, Inc. v. Federal Election Commission

Supreme Court brief2003

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AN.

02173838 MY 262008

OFFICE OF THE CLERE

No. 02-

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE, INC., ET AL.,

Appellants,

Vv.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, =T AL., Appellees.

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

Jurisdictional Statement

James Bopp, Jr.

Counsel of Record

Richard E. Coleson

Thomas J. Marzen

JAMES MADISON CENTER FOR

FREE SPEECH

Bopp, COLESON & BOSTROM

1 South 6th Street

Terre Haute, IN 47807-3510

812/232-2434

May 28, 2003 Counsel for JMC Appellants

Questions Presented

1. Whether the prohibition of § 101 of the Bipartisan

Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) on the solicitation,

receipt, redirection, or use of “soft money” by any national

political party for any communication that “promotes or

supports . . . or attacks or opposes” a federal candidate, violates

the First and Fifth Amendment and principles of federalism.

2. Whether the prohibition on federal officeholders and

candidates from soliciting, receiving, directing, transferring, or

spending “soft money” contained in BCRA § 101 violates the

First Amendment.

3. Whether the prohibition on state officeholders and

candidates from soliciting, receiving, directing, transferring, or

spending “soft money” in connection with an election for

federal office in BCRA §101 violates the First Amendment.

4. Whether the backup “electioneering communication”

definition at BCRA§ 201, or its construction by the district

court, violates the First Amendment.

5. Whether the requirements that “disbursements” and

“expenditures” be reported as occurring when contracted for,

rather than when made, BCRA §§ 201 and 212, are justiciable

and violate the First Amendment.

6. Whether District Court injunction should extend to

activities outside the District of Columbia.

7. Whether BCRA § 403(b), permitting members of

Congress to intervene, and the permitted intervention by

Intervenor-Defendants without regard to whether they have

Article III standing, violates the Constitution.

Parties to the Proceedings

This jurisdictional statement is filed on behalf of the

following Plaintiffs-Appellants represented by the James

Madison Center for Free Speech (JMC Appellants): U.S.

Representative Mike Pence, Alabama Attorney General Bill

Pryor, Libertarian National Committee, Inc. (LNC), Club for

Growth, Inc. (CFG), Indiana Family Institute, Inc. (IFI),

National Right to Life Committee, Inc. (NRLC), National Right

to Life Educational Trust Fund (NRL Ed Fund), and National

Right to Life Political Action Committee (NRL PAC).'

As to the appeal of the denial of the Madison Center

Plaintiffs’ Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment herein,

Trevor M. Southerland, and Barret Austin O’ Brock were also

plaintiffs below and are appellants along with the previously

listed JMC Appellants.’

Plaintiffs below not represented by the Madison Center

were U.S. Senator Mitch McConnell, former U.S. Representa-

tive Bob Bar, American Civil Liberties Union, Associated

Builders and Contractors, Inc., Associated Builders and

Contractors Political Action Committee, Center for Individual

Freedom, National Right to Work Committee, 6-Plus Associa-

tion, Inc., Southeastern Legal Foundation, Inc., U.S. English

d/b/a/ ProENGLISH, Thomas McInerney.

‘Withdrawn Plaintiffs below are Alabama Republican Execu-

tive Committee, Libertarian Party of Illinois, Inc., DuPage Political

Action Council, Jefferson County Republican Executive Committee,

Christian Coalition of America, Inc., and Martin Connors.

?The Madison Center represented these two minors, who would

be appellees as to their successful challenge to the ban on contribu-

tions by minors to candidates or political party committees. Mr.

Southerland will become 18 years of age on May 28, 2003. .

Defendants and Intervenor-Defendants, Appellees,

herein, are the Federal Election Commission (FEC), Federal

Communication Commission (FCC), John D. Ashcroft, in his

capacity as Attorney General of the United States, the United

States Department of Justice; and the United States of America,

U.3. Senator John McCain, U.S. Senator Russell Feingold, U.S.

Representative Christopher Shays, U.S. Representative Martin

Meehan, U.S. Senator Olympia Snowe, and U.S. Senator James

Jeffords.

Defendants in consolidated cases: (in addition to those

named above) David W. Mason, Ellen L. Weintraub, Danny L.

McDonald, Bradley A. Smith, Scott E. Thomas, and Michael E.

Toner, in their official capacities as FEC Commissioners.

Plaintiffs in consolidated cases:

* National Rifle Ass'n v. FEC, No. 02-581 — National Rifle

Association of America (NRA) and NRA Political Victory

Fund

¢ Echols v. FEC, No. 02-633 — Emily Echols, Daniel Solid,

Hannah McDow, Isaac McDow, Jessica Mitchell, and

Zachary White.

* Chamber of Commerce v. FEC, No. 02-751 — Chamber of

Commerce of the United States, U.S. Chamber Political

Action Committee, and National Association of Manufac-

turers (Plaintiff National Association of Wholesaler-

Distributors withdrew. )

¢ National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. FEC, No. 02-753 —

National Association of Broadcasters

¢ AFL-CIO v. FEC, No. 02-754 — AFL-CIO and AFL-CIO

Committee on Political Education and Political Contribu-

tions

Paul v. FEC, No. 02-781 — U.S. Representative Ron Paul,

Gun Owners of America, Inc., Gun Owners of America

Political Victory Fund, Realcampaignreform.org, Citizens

United, Citizens United Political Victory Fund, Michael

Cloud, and Clara Howell

Republican National Committee v. FEC, No. 02-874 —

Republican National Committee, (RNC), Robert Michael

Duncan, former Treasurer, current General Counsel, and

Member of the RNC, the Republican Party of Colorado, the

Republican Party of New Mexico, the Republican Party of

Ohio, and the Dallas County (lowa) Republican County

Central Committee

California Democratic Party v. FEC, No. 02-875 —

California Democratic Party, Art Torres, Yolo County

Democratic Central Committee, California Republican

Party, Shawn Steel, Timothy Morgan, Barbara Alby, Santa

Cruz County Republican Central Committee, and Douglas

Boyd, Jr.

Adams v. FEC, No. 02-877 — Victoria Jackson Gray

Adams, Carrie Bolton, Cynthia Brown, Derek Cressman,

Victoria Fitzgerald, Anurada Joshi, Peter Kostmayer, Nancy

Russell, Kate Seely-Kirk, Rose Taylor, Stephanie Wilson,

California Public Interest Research Group (PIRG), The

Fannie Lou Hamer Project, and Association of Community

Organizers for Reform Now

Thompson v. FEC, No. 02881 — U.S. Representatives

Corporate Disclosure Statement

None of the appellants has a parent corporation and no

publicly held company owns ten percent or more of the stock of

any of the appellants. Rule 29.6.

Rs. 6 bcc dedecensededabeeses i

FIED dcccocsescccsecessussoosens ii

Corporate Disclosure Statement ..................... v

WD nccoccnueuscdsdnceseosessosesnes vi

SEED covcecocccdcnccedéssbcccecens viii

SE cnccdccocccccecseséeseeseusteteseses 1

Se caccccecccedeccecesscceunncccocssestes 1

Constitutional & Statutory Provisions ................. 1

BEE Pccceccocesddcccsccecedceeséoss 2

Wc ccccéstsccedscsnsocscccecesseces 2

The Uniqueness of JMC Appellants ............... 5

Questions Presented Are Substantial ................. 16

Oppose Federal Candidates ..................... 16

Federal Officeholders and Candidates. ......... 18

State Officeholders and Candidates ............ 18

The Truncated Backup Electioneering Communication”

PD cccccccéeseséesesseesecesesaseseese 18

Disclosure Requirements on “Electioneering Communi-

cations” and Independent Expenditures. ........... 22

Extent of the District Court's Injunction .......... 223

Article III Standing of Congressional Intervenors 24

SD bneccoccusetucdédbcdsecconssceescceees 28

Main Appeal

Appendix A, Notice of Appeal ............-----055: la

Appendix B, Opinion of District Court ............... 3a

Appendix C, U.S. Const. art. 1,§4 ........-...00005: 4a

Appendix D, U.S. Const. amend-I ............-554+: Sa

Appendix E, U.S. Const. amend V ...........--.--+: 6a

Appendix F, Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 :

pedoceeseeedonseesseedssuddeesetesedeoosess a

Denial of Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment

Appendix G, Notice of Appeal .............-----+: 69a

Appendix H, Opinion of District Court .............. Tla

Appendix I, Order of District Court ................. 83a

vii

Table of Authorities

Cases

Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43

Ee ee 25

Associated Builders & Contractors v. Perry, 16 F.3d 688

PED pb cdcdbrdcscdcctndsedéossduaness 27

Becker v. FEC, 230 F.3d 381 (ist Cir. 2000) ........... 26

Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) .... 15

Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) .......... 24

Brownsburg Area Patrons Affecting Change v. Baldwin,

SG Cer SEGUE BOOED cccccccccccccccecces 21

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) ........ 2, 3, 16, 18-22

Building and Constr. Trades Dept., AFL-CIO v. Reich, 40

CE EEE cooccsecsececesoceescs 27

California Pro-Life Council v. Getman, 2003 WL

21027288 (9th Cir. 2003)... 2.2.2... eee ee eee 22

Chamber of Commerce v. Moore, 288 F.3d 187 (Sth Cir.

SEED Ceddcncedocceccesedenssscesenoessaness 20

Chiglo v. City of Preston, 104 F3d. 185 (1997) ......... 26

Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing

v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981) .... 2... 6. ee ee 16

Citizens for Responsible Gov't State PAC v. Davidson,

236 F.3d 1174 (10th Cir. 2000) ... 2.0.0... cee ee 20

Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC,

Pe PE cc ceccsvesecccescecssesesss 17

Common Cause v. FEC, 108 F.3d 412 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 26-27

Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986) .............. 25

Faucher v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 928 F.2d 468 (ist

PEED Seccdddduhecdadscoisscdacceenéeseees 21

FEC v. Christian Action Network, 110 F.3d 1049 (4th

PRED hn sadedddbdccesddedsesccdseeeneneeees 21

FEC v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1987) ......... 21

FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238

RR RS acai A ee: 13, 15, 21

FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Comm.,

Se EE occ cnncedunécdsceesoosenvess 16

FEC v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm. , 647

F. Supp. 987 (S.D. N.Y. 1986) .. 0... 6.6 eee eee 23

FEC v. Pub. Citizen, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 2d 1327 (N.D. Ga.

TOUED cccccccsevcccccccceeecccocoooeqesesoese 23

- s PPTTTTITITITTTTTTTT TTT 21

Hoffman v. Jeffords, 175 F. Supp.2d 49 (D.D.C. 2001) ... 26

lowa Right to Life Comm. v. Williams, 187 F.3d 963 (8th

See SESE weccosescncavecccccesocesecucessece 21

Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 64 (1973) .......... 25

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) .. 25-26

Mausolf v. Babbit, 85 F.3d 1295 (8th Cir. 1996) ........ 27

National Credit Union Admin. v. First National Bank &

Trust Co., 522 U.S. 1146 (1998) ..... 0.6.6.6 c eens 25

Planned Parenthood of Mid-Missouri and Eastern

Kansas, Inc. v. Ehlmann, 137 F.3d 573 (8th Cir.

I eal pe hee en eee eS 27

Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997) ........-.020000. 25

Right to Life of Dutchess County, Inc. v. FEC, 6 F. Supp.

2d 248 (S.D. N.Y. 1998) 0.0... cece cece cece cece 23

Roe v. Casey, 464 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. Pa. 1978) ........ 26

Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 101

F.3d 503 (7th Cir. 1996)... 0... eee eee 27

United States Postal Serv. v. Brennan, 579 F.2d 188 (2d

EEEEEEED cocovcesdeceseceessoncesessoecesos? 27

DEED Socscdoccocenccsoesoceseonneesse< we a

Vermont Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 221 F.3d

POD EPEEE EEE ccccceesesssonccesececcesess 20

Virginia Soc'y for Human Life v. FEC, 263 F.3d 379 (4th

GR EE 6 oS ed cdcedcdescdecdeseddiueseedes 20, 23

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 49 (1975) . 20... cc cee 25

Yniguez v. State of Arizona, 939 F.2d 727 (9th Cir.1991) . 27

Constitution, Statutes, Regulations & Rules

DO BI i ivndniiddncdcnevieinsiascsdes 24

I IIE oii iiicticccvedecenceteineees 23

RO cut sasdsadigtasasandiauel i, 16-18

Ren ee i, 3, 4, 14, 19, 22

CPLR AS ER ICIS PDS OED 4,19

ESTEE PP eae A aL E 3, 4, 18, 19

0 RR len f ARPS RE PR eke 3, 19

ETE PPLE IDEA A PONS i, 4, 22

I So osncdacduanascvennneadenscuccans 4

onc cciccsnniidaddentacanabeakaaes 4

ERE A ERS Pig Senki MEM soi 4,19

RIP Se) eRe BRE AB corte 4

EEE Ee Eber hea rye 4

LORS I AEE,» MMA 4

PERSE cecnccceccensddchecccecneséane 24, 25

NO 0 00:06 c0cecbccvesnsedncdecscbecenceess 4

PRED icbucticndduuébencadsansceves 24

Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), Pub. L. No. 92-

Seay G0 BUR, SQTSTED 0 cc cccccvecccce 2, 3, 6, 7, 14, 19

Re SUD Secscaccccccuaccnaceessccs 8, 10, 12, 13

PEED ccdeddcessececancnrencesesececeese 8,14

Other Authorities

U.S. Const. amend.I ............. i, 2, 16, 18, 19, 21, 24

ee es GUE, Fhe c ceccnewcccsctcccsteces 2, 17, 18

Se A GE TINS ccc ciccccseccnccscccesecss 2

a SGI EBS cccccccccseccccccnscescccccess l

U.S. Const. art. Hl, §2,cl. 1 ............ i, vii, 1, 5, 24-27

xii

Opinions Below

The district court’s opinions have not yet been reported. See

Appendix (App.) 3a. JMC Appellants’ Notice of Appeal is

reprinted at App. la-2a. Their Second Notice of Appeal is

reprinted at App. 69a.

Jurisdiction

The district court issued judgment on May 1, 2003. Appeal

is direct. BCRA § 403(a)(1). JMC Appellants noticed appeal on

May 7, 2003. On May 19, 2003, the district court deniéd

Madison Center Plaintiffs’ Motion to Alter or Amend the

Judgment on May 19, 2003, and their Second Notice of Appeal

as to this issue was filed on May 28, 2003. This Court has

jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1253.

Constitutional & Statutory Provisions

BCRA is reprinted at App. 7a-68a.

Article I, § 4, of the U.S. Constitution is at App. 4a.

Article Ill, §2, clause 1, of the U.S. Constitution provides:

The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and

Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the

United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be

made, under their Authority; — to all Cases affecting

Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; — to

all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; — to

Controversies to which the United States shall be a

Party; — to Controversies between two or more States;

— between a State and Citizens of another State; —

between Citizens of different States, — between Citizens

of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of

different States, and between a State, or the Citizens

thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.

The First Amendment to the Constitution is at App. Sa.

The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is at App.

6a.

The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution provides:

The powers not delegated to the United States by the

Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are

reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

Statement of the Case

The Litigation

This case involves multiple challenges to BCRA, which

itself amends the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), Pub.

L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended by Pub.

L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974) at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455).

FECA set limits on the amount of money that individuals,

political parties, and political committees may contribute to

candidates, i.e., limits on “hard money.” BCRA raises the

contribution limits on individuals to candidates and political

parties and the amount individuals may contribute, in aggregate,

to all candidates, political committees, and political party

committees. JMC Appellants do not challenge these FECA or

BCRA “hard money” limits.

Many of the restrictions contained in the 1974 amendments

to the FECA were challenged in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1

(1976). In Buckley, this Court recognized that contributions and

expenditures involved the First Amendment rights of free

speech and association. /d at 19-23. At the same time, the

Court recognized a compelling governmental interest in

“prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption”

that would justify limits on contributions to candidates. /d. at

25.

As a result, the Buckley Court upheld FECA’s contribution

limits to candidates, but stuck down its limits on campaign

expenditures. Jd. at 24-59. In the course of so deciding, this

Court carefully distinguished between funds used for “express

advocacy” (communications which expressly advocate the

election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate by use of

explicit words of advocacy) and “issue advocacy”

(communications on issues of public concern that do not

contain express advocacy). /d. at 44.

BCRA contains four titles that significantly expand the

reach of FECA and that contain elements subject to challenge

in this litigation.

Title I prohibits national political party committees for

using money raised in compliance with state law, but not in

compliance with federal law (“soft money”), for any purpose

and from transferring it to any other entity, including state and

local party committees. It forbids state and local party

committees from spending non-federal money for any “federal

election activity,” which includes voter registration, voter

identification, get-out-the-vote activity, and generic campaign

activity when there is a federal candidate on the ballot,

including advertising with certain references to federal

candidates. It generally forbids federal officeholders and_

candidates from participating in raising or spending any non-

federal funds, for themselves or others for “federal election

activity.” It bars state candidates from using non-federal funds

for communications regarding candidates for federal office,

even if those communications do not contain express advocacy.

Title II of BCRA, §§ 201 and 204, forbids corporations,

unions, and entities using monies donated by unions and

corporations from disbursing funds for “electioneering

communications” — which § 203 defines as any broadcast

advertisement within 30 days of a primary and 60 days of a

general election that “refers to a clearly identified candidate for

Federal office.” Section 203 includes a fallback definition of

“electioneering communications” that includes any broadcast

advertising at any time that “promotes,” “supports,” “attacks,”

or opposes a federal candidate and is “suggestive of no

plausible meaning other than an exhortation to vote for or

against a specific candidate.” Disclosures to the FEC are also

required of all persons who spend $10,000 on “electioneering

communications.” Sections 201 and 212 of Title II also impose

disclosure requirements on those who enter into contracts to

disburse funds for electioneering communication, regardless of

whether communication occurs. Section 202 treats coordinated

disbursements for electioneering communications as

contributions to candidates. Section 213 requires political

parties to choose whether to make independent or coordinated

expenditures on behalf of a candidate.

Title Ill of BCRA, § 318, forbids minors from contributing

“hard money” to any federal candidate and either “hard” or

“soft” money to a political party committee. Section 305

conditions securing the lowest rates for broadcast advertising

for federal candidates on certification that other candidates will

not be referred to in the advertisement or that the advertisement

will include a specified statement or identification. Section 311

requires detailed identification of sponsors of express advocacy

or “electioneering communications.” Sections 304, 316, and

319 increase the limitations on contributions and coordinated

expenditures for candidates who have opponents with certain

levels of personal funds in their campaigns.

Title V of BCRA, § 504, requires broadcasters to collect

and disclose records of requests to buy broadcast time for

communications “relating to any political matter of national

importance,” regardless whether the communications are made.

After BCRA was signed into law, eleven complaints were

filed in the United States District Court for the District of

Columbia challenging the constitutionality of multiple

provisions of BCRA. The cases were consolidated under BCRA

§ 403 before a three-judge panel. Expedited discovery was

ordered; witnesses filed written statements and were cross-

examined without immediate judicial oversight. Expedited

briefing ensued, oral argument was held on December 4 and 5,

2002; the district court issued its Final Judgment on May 1,

2003, upholding and striking down various provisions of

BCRA. JMC Plaintiffs filed their Motion to Alter or Amend the

Judgment on May 19, 2003. JMC Appellants filed their Notice

of Appeal as to the judgment on May 7, 2003, and their Notice

of Appeal as to the denial of Madison Center Plaintiffs’ Motion

to Alter or Amend the Judgment on May 28, 2003.

The Uniqueness of JMC Appellants

This Jurisdictional Statement is filed on behalf of JMC

Appellants with special characteristics that render their standing

unquestionable. They include a unique minority national

political party, a federal officeholder and candidate, a state

officeholder and candidate, a broad spectrum of nonprofit issue

advocacy groups, and a political action committee. Their wide

range assures that, on nearly all issues, a JMC Appellant has

Article III standing to challenge the particular BCRA provisions

in question. Particular details about four of these Appellants

highlights their uniqueness and clear standing, describing the

conduct in which they engage that would violate BCRA.

Libertarian National Committee (LNC) is the governing

body of the Libertarian Party at the national level.’ The LNC is

a nonprofit corporation that seeks to advance the principle that

all individuals have the right to exercise sole dominion over

their lives and have the right to live in whatever manner they

*The Libertarian National Committee is the only national

political party committee in McConnell v. FEC, thus the only party

with standing to challenge BCRA’s many restrictions on the conduct

of national political parties.

choose, so long as they do not forcibly interfere with the equal

right of others to live in whatever manner they choose.

The impact of BCRA on the Libertarian National

Committee is significantly greater than on the Democratic

National Committee (DNC) or Republican National Committee

(RNC). The Libertarian Party is much smaller than either of the

major parties. In size and administrative sophistication, the

LNC is similar to a typical state affiliate of the RNC or DNC.

The LNC does not seek, accept, or use any federal funds to

conduct its campaigns.

The general administrative burdens imposed by FECA are

the same on all political parties, regardless of size, so that the

LNC must expend a relatively higher percentage of its resources

on compliance with FECA than the RNC or DNC — a situation

exacerbated by BCRA. Moreover, the LNC has less relative

expertise and sophistication, a greater likelihood that it will

commit errors in administering the requirements of FCA, and

as the result of BCRA — all to the further relative detriment of

the LNC. Considerable administrative expenses will be incurred

and changes in the infrastructure of the Libertarian national and

state parties will also be required in order to comply with

BCRA.

Only 10-15% of LNC funds are placed in its “soft money”

account, a far lower percentage than for the RNC or DNC,

which place more than half their funds in “soft money”

accounts. At preset, the LNC has three principle sources of

non-federal money: | ) list rental fees, 2) dues paid through state

affiliates and forwarded from the state affiliates to the LNC, and

3) advertising in the LNC’s newspaper, the Libertarian Party®

News, and elsewhere. Only 7 of the 51 state affiliates of the

national Libertarian Party have registered as political

committees with the FEC, subject to FECA requirements. Very

littke money received by LNC is from any corporate source (if

funds from renting lists or advertising in the Libertarian Party®

News are discounted) or from large individual contributions. In

2002, for example, only one individual contribution exceeded

$20,000. During the past six years, no more than 4 donors to the

LNC have exceeded this limit in any one year.

No federal officeholder has been a candidate of the

Libertarian Party, and no candidate of the Libertarian Party has

ever won a race for federal office. Libertarian Party federal

candidates know that they have only a remote chance to win

federal office, and they use their candidacies for running

educational/issue advocacy campaigns that concentrate on

advancing libertarian principles. Libertarian Party federal

candidate campaigns are also focused on fostering party growth

and gaining and maintaining ballot access in order to assure that

there will be an electoral forum in which federal candidates

might advocate libertarian principles. The Libertarian Party also

sometimes raises issues without any express reference to any

Libertarian Party federal candidate when major party candidates

are not addressing them.

The LNC has in the past and intends in the future to engage

in conduct that would violate BCRA. It solicits, receives, and

uses non-federal funds to advocate issues, and, as a means to

this end, supports Libertarian Party candidates in campaigns for

federal and state elective office — although no Libertarian Party

candidate has ever been elected to federal or statewide office.

It solicits, receives, and uses non-federal funds to finance

issue advocacy communications. It transfers non-federal funds

to state-affiliated parties that have in the past and intend in the

future to receive such funds. It communicates with candidates

for federal office and with federal officeholders and spends

issues supported by federal candidates and federal

officeholders. The LNC makes both independent and

coordinated expenditures on behalf of it’s candidates for state

and federal office, after the party’s candidates are nominated,

and transfers funds between national, state, and local party

to LR.C. § 527 and LR.C. § 501(c) organizations that make

expenditures and disbursements in connection with federal

elections.

The Lil ‘an National C , —_ hershi

Organization that requires the regular payment of dues from

members to the LNC. Dues are frequently paid to state-

affiliated Libertarian Parties, with a portion to be distributed to

the Libertarian National Committee, so that those who pay dues

may be members of both the state and national parties. Dues are

often paid by one person on behalf of another, as a wife might

pay for a husband, and are often paid with delays in forwarding

them to the LNC. In these circumstances, the funds are

appropriately deposited in state affiliates’ “soft money”

accounts. Under BCRA, these funds may not be transferred to

the LNC, so that members who pay dues in such a manner must

be denied membership in the Libertarian National Committee.

Further, the LNC is substantially sustained by non- federal funds

dues transfers from state-affiliated parties to the LNC and by

purchases of literature and other educational materials from the

LNC by state-affiliated parties. By forbidding such non-federal

current structure of the Libertarian Nationa! Committee as a

hershi tae

The LNC has in the past and intends in the future to use

non-federal funds to finance its ballot access drives and to

finance all of its national conventions, which are held every

other year. Libertarian Party conventions, held in years when

there are no federal presidential elections, are solely devoted to

discussion and advocacy of issues; no candidates for public

office are nominated for or selected to run as Libertarian Party

candidates at these conventions.

Bill Pryor is presently the Attorney General of the State of

Alabama and, unti! he is confirmed as a federal judge — a

position for which he has been nominated, but for which he has

not been confirmed — he will be a candidate in the next election

for the office of Alabama Attorney General or for some other

State office in Alabama.

As he has in the past, General Pryor intends in the future to

make public communications that refer to clearly defined

candidates for federal office and that promote or support

candidates or attack or oppose a candidate for that office,

including communications that do not expressly advocate the

election or defeat of any federal candidate.

General Pryor has received and intends in the future to

receive non-federal funds contributions from the Republican

National State Elections Committee, a division of the

Republican National Committee. As a candidate (and as a

candidate in association with or in a group of candidates for

state or local office or of individuals holding state or local

office), he has in the past and intends in the future to spend

funds lawfully raised under the laws of the State of Alabama,

by BCRA, for the purpose of: (a) making public

communications that refer to a clearly identified candidate for

federal office and that promote or support a candidate or attack

or oppose a candidate for that office, including communications

that do not expressly advocate the election or defeat of a federal

candidate; (b) engaging in voter registration activities

conducted within 120 days of a federal election, and (c)

engaging in voter identification, get-out-the-vote, and generic

campaign activities conducted in connection with an election in

which a candidate for federal office is on the ballot.‘

The Club for Growth, Inc. (CFG) is a nationwide

ideological membership organization with approximately 5,000

members dedicated to advancing public policies that promote

economic growth which is tax-exempt under § 527 of the

Internal Revenue Code. The mission of CFG is to identify for

its members the candidates for elective office who believe in

these ideals, to monitor their performance in elected office, and

to help finance their elections through CFG’s connected PAC.

CFG also helps finance strategic issue campaigns to advance its

policy goals. In pursuit of these goals, CFG would violate

BCRA in several ways.

CFG regularly makes disbursements for the direct costs of

producing and airing “electioneering communications” in

excess of $10,000 in a calendar year that: (a) refer to clearly

identified candidates for federal office, (b) are made within 60

days before general, special, and runoff elections for the offices

sought by the candidates and within 30 days before primary

elections, and (c) are targeted to relevant electorates. CFG

regularly talks with candidates about their positions on the

issues in interviews and forums. On a regular and recurring

basis, CFG (1) consults with both incumbent and challenger

candidates on their positions on issues, (2) does “electioneering

‘General Pryor is the only plaintiff in McConnell v. FEC who

complained against provis ‘ons of BCRA that forbid state candidates

forbid raising or using non-federal money to refer (without express

advocacy) to federal candidates or for registration, get-out-the-vote,

and other generic election activities. Furthermore, General Pryor is

the only state public official subject to provisions of BCRA that

to a clearly identified candidaie for federal office.

communications,” and (3) publishes communications with

information about candidates’ positions on issues. Some of

these communications are done without any communication

with any candidate and some are done after a communication

with a candidate.

CFG is presently affected by BCRA. On May 13, 2003, the

Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee filed a complaint

against CFG alleging that CFG had violated BCRA by

broadcasting an “electioneering communication,” under the

lower court’s truncated backup definition that prohibits any

broadcast communication that “promotes or supports . . . or

attacks or opposes” a candidate during the time that the backup

definition was in effect. Letter from Robert F. Bauer & Marc E.

Elias, Counsel for the Democratic Senatorial Campaign

Committee (DSCC), to Lawrence Norton, FEC General

Counsel (May 13, 2003).

The advertisement at issue was broadcast in South Dakota

and told listeners to urge U.S. Senator Tom Daschle to support

President Bush’s pending tax cut plan. The complaint on behalf

of the DSCC alleges that the advertisement “attacks [Daschle]

for opposing the President's ‘tax cut plan,”” in violation of the

truncated backup definition. This advertisement is part of a

broader effort by CFG to gain public and Congressional support

for the President’s tax cut plan.”

‘CFG has been running broadcast advertisements in support of

President Bush’s proposed tax cut, one of which has become the

subject of the complaint by the DSCC to the FEC described. An

advertisement was also run in Ohio depicting Ohio Senator George

Voinovich, during the 18 days that the truncated backup definition

was in effect, and has the following text:

President Kennedy cut income taxes and the economy

soared.

President Reagan cut taxes more, and created fifteen million

National Right to Life Committee, Inc. (NRLC) is a

501(c)(4) corporation whose purpose is to promote respect for

the worth and dignity of all human life from conception to

natural death. NRLC’s and its affiliated organizations’ conduct

would violate BCRA in several ways.

NRLC regularly makes disbursements for the direct costs of

producing and airing “electioneering communications” in

excess of $10,000 in a calendar year that: (a) refer to clearly

identified candidates for federal office, (b) are made within 60

days before general, special, and runoff elections for the offices

sought by the candidates and within 30 days before primary

of political parties with authority to nominate candidates for the

offices sought by the candidates, and (c) are targeted to relevant

electorates.

On a regular and recurring basis, NRLC: (a) lobbies

candidate legislators on legislation, (b) consults with both

incumbent and challenger candidates on their positions on

issues, (c) engages in “electioneering communications,” and (d)

new jobs.

President Bush knows tax cuts create jobs, and that helps

balance the budget.

But Senator George Voinovich opposes the president.

Ohio has lost thousands of jobs, and president Bush has a

plan to help.

Tell George Voinovich to support the Kennedy, Reagan,

Bush tax policy that will bring jobs back to Ohio.

Senator Voinovich is a candidate for federal office. While CFG

believes that its advertisement is “neutral” and lawful, it depicts a

federal candidate and could be considered by someone (as happened

with the DSCC complaint to the FEC regarding the South. Dakota

ad), as not “neutral” under the truncated backup definition of BCRA.

These communications are done both with and without

communications with candidates.

At present, NRLC is in the midst of Congressional

legislative battles to ban human cloning, pass the Unborn

Victims of Violence Act, and pursue other legislative interests.

As part of these campaigns, NRLC plans to run broadcast

advertisements in the Congressional districts of key members

of Congress, naming the members of Congress, many or all of

whom are candidates (i.c., have transacted $5,000 in

“contributions” or “expenditures”), and could be viewed as

attacking/opposing their positions on these legislative issues.

The ads will be paid for with general corporate funds and will

be similar to the AFL-CIO advertisement, “No Two Way,” that

Judge Leorr found “not neutral”and thus contrary to BCRA

because “it attacks [the candidate’s] position on the federal

budget.” Leon Memorandum Opinion at 92.

National Right to Life Educational Trust Fund (NRL Ed

Fund) is an internal § 501(c)(3) fund of NRLC. It qualifies as an

“MCFL-type” organization under FEC v. Massachusetts

Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1986). NRL Ed Fund has spent,

and intends to do so again, more than $10,000 in a calendar year

on broadcast communications that mention no candidate but

advocate for or against issues that are hotly contested in

contemporaneous political campaigns on which candidates

running in the same geographic area have taken a position.

Under the vague alternative definition of “electioneering

communication,” which examines whether a “communication

... promotes or supports” or “attacks or opposes a candidate,”

§ 201(a), it is unclear whether such conduct would be

considered an “electioneering communication.”

National Right to Life Political Action Committee (NRL

PAC) is aconnected § 527 fund of NRLC that is registered with

the FEC as a political action committee subject to the FECA.

NRL PAC regularly makes contracts for independent

expenditure communications in federal elections days, weeks,

and months in advance of the time the actual independent

expenditures are made. NRL PAC has suffered harassment and

interference with contractual relationships as a result of federal

candidates learning about arrangements with broadcasters to air

independent expenditure in opposition to these candidates. NRL

PAC intends to continue making independent expenditures, but

its freedom of expression is burdened by the necessity of

reporting them when contracts are made instead of when the

independent expenditure is made.°

Mike Pence is the U. S. Representative from the Second

Congressional District of the State of Indiana, first elected in

2000.He is an Assistant Majority Whip, Chairman of the Small

Business Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform and Oversight,

and serves on the Judiciary and Agriculture Committees.

Representative Pence has raised, assisted to raise, and wishes to

continue to raise and to assist in raising funds for Appellant

Indiana Family Institute, Inc. (IFI), and he has communicated

and wishes to continue to communicate with IFI with regard to

raising and assisting in raising funds for IFI — conduct that

would violate BCRA.’

Indiana Family Instituie, Inc. (IFI), is an Indiana non-

profit corporation that qualifies as an “MCFL-type”

organization under FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479

U.S. 238 (1986), and it qualifies as an “expressive association”

°NRL PAC is the only Plaintiff in McConnell v. FEC that makes

independent expenditures subject to BCRA.

"U.S. Representative Mike Pence is the only plaintiff in

McConnell v. FEC to challenge provisions of FEC that torbid federal

candidates from raising funds for entities involved in federal election

activities, as defined by BCRA.

“15

as described in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640

(2000). IFI is dedicated to encouraging and invigorating Indiana

families by offering them time-proven solutions to problems

which harm the family, the church, and society. Over 10,000

Indiana residents receive IFI publications and many hear IF1

radio programs and commentaries throughout the State of

Indiana.

IFI has made and intends to make disbursements for the

direct costs of producing and airing “electioneering

communications” in excess of $10,000 that: (a) refer to clearly

identified candidates for federal office, (b) are made within 60

days before general, special, and runoff elections for the offices

sought by the candidates and within 30 days before primary

elections, preference elections, and conventions and caucuses

of political parties with authority to nominate candidates for the

offices sought by the candidates, and (c) are targeted to relevant

electorates. IFI also: (a) lobbies candidate legislators on

legislation, (b) consults with both incumbent and challenger

candidates on their positions on issues, (c) engages in

“electioneering communications,” and (d) publishes printed

materials, including voter guides. Some of these

communications are done: (a) without any communication with

any candidate, (b) after communication with a candidate, and

candidate.

Appellant U.S. Representative Mike Pence has raised end

intends to continue to raise and to assist in raising funds for IF1;

IFI has communicated and will continue to communicate with

Representative Pence with regard to raising and assisting in

raising funds for IFI.*

*IFI is the only Plaintiff in McConnell v. FEC to complain

against provisions of BCRA that forbid federal candidates from

raising non-federal money for entities engaged in federal election

Questions Presented Are Substantial

Raising or Using “Soft Money” By National Political Party

Committees to Promote, Support, Attack, or Oppose

Federal Candidates

While the district court held unconstitutional most of the

soft money provisions of BCRA (§ 101), it upheld its

prohibitions on “soft money” solicited, received, redirected, or

used by national, state, or local political committees that

“promotes or supports . . . or attacks or opposes” a federal

candidate.

Section 101 violates the First Amendment. It restricts the

freedom of speech and association in a manner that exceeds the

contribution and expenditure limitations at issue in Buckley. It

directly restricts speech, and it restricts the right of national

political party committees to associate with officeholders,

such, it should properly be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.

Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v.

Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 299 (1981).

Under this standard of review, § 101 cannot survive

scrutiny. The only interest that this Court has recognized to

justify restrictions in the context of campaign finance is in

reducing apparent or actual corruption. FEC v. National

Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496-97

(1985). Special restrictions on political party committees cannot

be justified since there are no “special dangers” of corruption

associated with political parties.” Colorado Republican Fed.

Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 616 (1996).

Moreover, use of campaign funds bear only an “attenuated”

relationship to corruption unless there the funds are used

“exclusively” to elect a candidate. /d. In any event, § 101 is not

activities.

narrowly drawn. Even if there is a constitutionally cognizable

compelling interest served by § 101, Congress might simply

have restricted the amount of non-federal money raised rather

than entirely banning its use.

Insofar as BCRA purports to regulate state election

activities, the also violates the Tenth Amendment by subsuming

powers reserved to the States. BCRA unconstitutionally

interferes with state election activities if they even indirectly

and remotely can be said to impact on federal elections in a

manner that cannot be reconciled with our federal system.

Further, by unjustifiably discriminating against political

parties, § 101 violates the equal protection component of the

Fifth Amendment. Political party committees are entirely

forbidden from using or raising non-federal money for any

number of purposes - including specifically for

communications to promote, attack, support, or oppose federal

candidates. But all other citizens’ groups are permitted to

continue to raise and use nonfederal money for these purposes.

This makes no constitutional sense when political parties have

already been deemed to pose no “special dangers.” Colorado

Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC, 518 U.S.

604, 616 (1996).

Finally, the terms used by § 101 to restrict freedom of

speech — forbidding a communication that “promotes or

supports . . . or attacks or opposes” a federal candidate — are

unconstitutionally vague.

Federal Officeholders and Candidates. The district court

also upheld BCRA § 101 insofar as it forbids federal

officeholders and candidates from soliciting, receiving,

directing, transferring, or spending “soft money.” Like the

direct restrictions on free speech of § 101, this prohibition

violates the First Amendment. It restricts the freedom speech

and association in a manner that exceeds the contribution and

expenditure limitations at issue in Buckley v. Valeo. It directly

restricts speech by banning solicitation of funds. As an absolute

ban, it is not narrowly drawn, as a restriction on amount might

be.

State Officeholders and Candidates. Similarly, the district

court upheld BCRA. § 101 insofar as it forbids state

officeholders and candidates from soliciting, receiving,

directing, transferring, or spending “soft money” in connection

with an election for federal office. This prohibition violates the

First Amendment in the same manner as restrictions on federal

candidates/officeholders. Moreover, it proceeds beyond the

legitimates scope of the federal constitution reflected by the

Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution by purporting to

regulate the conduct of state political candidates and

officeholders.

The Truncated Backup Electioneering Communication”

Definition

The district court also upheld the “backup” definition of

“electioneering communications” of BCRA § 203, which, as

construed by the lower court, reaches any broadcast reference

to any candidate for federal office at any time “that is not

neutral as to [the] candidate.” Leon, J., Mem. Op. 92. The court

also largely upheld the “electioneering communications”

provisions of BCRA involving disclosure of electioneering

communications (§§ 201 and 311), coordinated electioneering

communications as contriSutions (§ 202), and the ban on

electioneering communications by corporations and unions

(§§ 203 and 204).

The definition of “electioneering communications” violates

the First Amendment under this Court’s decisions in Buckley

and FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238

(1986) (MCFL). In light of serious constitutional overbreadth

considerations, this Court in Buckley narrowly construed

provisions in the FECA restricting expenditures “relative to a

clearly identified candidate” and requiring disclosures for the

purpose of “influencing” federal elections to embrace only

“communications that in express terms advocate the election or

defeat of a clearly identified candidate for federal office.” 424

U.S. at 44 and n. 52. “Express terms” were defined to include

“communications containing express words of advocacy of

election of defeat, such as ‘vote for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ ‘cast

your ballot for,’ ‘Smith for Congress,’ ‘vote against,’ ‘defeat,’

‘reject.’” Id. at 80. See also MCFL, 479 U.S. at 248-49.

The plain language of neither of § 203’s definitions of

“electioneering communications” can be reconciled with

Buckley. Both embrace communications that go beyond

“express advocacy” to include “issue advocacy.” Judge Leon’s

attempted saving construction of the backup definition of §203

to any communication “that is not neutral as to [the] candidate”

generates the same conflict with Buckley: A communication

that is “not neutral” about a candidate still does not necessarily

in “express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly

identified candidate.”

Moreover, the truncated backup “electioneering

communication” definition is unconstitutionally vague. The

terms it employs — “promotes,” “supports,” “attacks,” and

“opposes” — are all open to interpretation with regard to any

specific advertisement.

The Circuit Courts of Appeal that have considered cases

involving the express advocacy test’s protection for issue

advocacy do not agree with the district court below as to the

constitutionality of tests abandoning this Court’s own

formulation of the express advocacy test. These courts have

uniformly recognized that this Court’s holdings in Buckley and

MCFL are binding and require the bright-line test of explicit

words expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly

identified candidate for federal office. Thus, there is a conflict

between these circuits and the three-judge panel below.

“These courts rely primarily on Buckley’s emphasis on (1)

the need for a bright-line rule demarcating the government’s

authority to regulate speech and (2) the need to ensure that

regulation does not impinge on protected issue advocacy.”

Chamber of Commerce v. Moore, 288 F.3d 187, 193 (Sth Cir.

2002). See, e.g. Virginia Soc'y for Human Life v. FEC, 263

F.3d 379, 391-92 (4th Cir. 2001) (VSHL) (a regulation that

“shifts the focus of the express advocacy determination away

from the words themselves to the overall impressions of the

hypothetical, reasonable listener or viewer . . . is precisely what

Buckley warned against and prohibited”); Citizens for

Responsible Gov't State PAC v. Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174,

1187, 1193-95 (10th Cir. 2000) (Statutes unconstitutional where

they could not be narrowly construed to apply “only to

expenditures for communications that contain explicit words

advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified

candidate.”); Vermont Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 221

F.3d 376, 386 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding all the parties “in

reporting provisions . . . are necessarily unconstitutional unless

they apply only to [communications] ‘that expressly advocate

the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.’”

(emphasis added) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80)); Florida

Right to Life v. Lamar, 238 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2001); Jowa

Right to Life Comm. v. Williams, 187 F.3d 963, 969-70 (8th Cir.

1999) ( To be regulable, “the communication must contain

express language of advocacy with an exhortation to elect or

defeat a candidate,” and “[t}he Supreme Court has made clear

that a ‘finding of “express advocacy”depend|s] upon the use of

language such as ‘vote for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ etc.” (quoting

MCFL, 479 U.S. at 249 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44, n.

52)); Brownsburg Area Patrons Affecting Change v. Baldwin,

137 F.3d 503, 506 (7th Cir. 1998) (The Court [in Buckley]

recognized the important First Amendment interest in

protecting political speech, including discussions surrounding

elections and candidates. . .. Because of the vital importance of

protecting such speech, the Buckley Court articulated what has

come to be known as the ‘express advocacy’ test .. . .”);

Faucher v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 928 F.2d 468, 470 (ist

Cir.1991) (“The Supreme Court, recognizing that such broad

language . . . creates the potential for first amendment

violations, sought to avoid future conflict by explicitly limiting

the statute’s prohibition to “express advocacy.”).

Even the Ninth Circuit in FEC v. Furgaich, 807 F.2d 857

(9th Cir. 1987), recognized the binding nature of the express

advocacy test, although in dicta it discussed the test in ways that

seemed broader than the Supreme Court’s articulation of the

test.” However, the 9th Circuit has now affirmed that it fully

embraces the Buckley formulation, by declaring that “a close

reading of Furgaich indicates that we presumed express

advocacy must contain some explicit words of advocacy.”

California Pro-Life Council v. Getman, 2003 WL 21027288 at

*7 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis in original). This ruling eliminates

any arguable federal circuit court support for a contextual

approach, which is contained in BCRA’s alternate definitions

of “electioneering communication.”

Disclosure Requirements on “Electioneering _

Communications” and Independent Expenditudes

°Cf, FEC v. Christian Action Network, 110 F.3d 1049, 1054 (4th

Cir. 1997) (CAN 11) (Furgatch contains broad dicta, but the Fourth

Circuit summarized the narrower holding of Furgatch as: “where

political communications . . . include an explicit directive to voters

to take some [unclear] course of action, . . . ‘context’ . . . may be

considered in determining whether the action urged is the election or

defeat of a... candidate ... .”).

The district court held BCRA § 212 (disclosure of

independent expenditures) nonjusticiable and largely upheld §

201 (disclosure of “electioneering communications”). Both

provisions require reporting to the FEC of “disbursements” and

“expenditures” when contracted for rather than when they are

made — and regardless whether the service contracted for is ever

provided and, in fact, the independent expenditure or

are thus significantly different than the reporting requirements

this Court upheld in Buckley, 424 U.S. at 76-82, which required

only disclosure of communications actually made.

Further, the disclosure provisions are not narrowly drawn to

serve any compelling governmental interest. Though the

government may have an interest in assuring that the electorate

is informed of the source of expenditures made on behalf of

candidates, there no such interest at stake unless these

expenditures are, in fact, made. In the absence of an actual

communication, there is no expenditure made on behalf of a

candidate. Moreover, prior disclosure requirements would often

result in prior notice to political opponents of political and

media strategies, thereby chilling and effectively penalizing free

speech. The prospect of chilled free speech or harassment of

those with whom entities contract, for example, for media

services, renders these provisions justiciable even in the

absence of immediate harm.

Extent of the District Court’s Injunction

JMC Appellants filed Madison Center Plaintiffs’ Motion to

Alter or Amend the Judgment in the district court, which was

denied on May 19, 2003. See App. 87a. JMC Appellants appeal

denial of that Order insofar as it denied JMC Appellants’

request to explicitly extend the district court’s injunction

against the Defendants by ordering that the Defendants be

enjoined from enforcing any unconstitutional BCRA provision

against the Plaintiffs anywhere in the United States.

It is the policy of the FEC and the position that they have

adopted in other similar cases that FEC rules and regulations

that have been struck down in one jurisdiction will nevertheless

be enforced by the FEC in other jurisdictions."° See VSHL, 263

F.3d 379, 382 (4th Cir. 2001); Right to Life of Dutchess County,

Inc. v. FEC, 6 F. Supp. 2d 248, 252-53 ( S.D. N.Y. 1998).

Under this policy, the district court’s judgment would bind the

FEC only in the District of Columbia, leaving the FEC free to

enforce enjoined BCRA provisions in other jurisdictions.

The FEC policy and the VSHL holding are in error. Under

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), agency action can be entirely set aside if

it is “not in accord with the law,” including agency action found

“contrary to constitutional right.” 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(B). This

justifies injunctive relief beyond the scope of any particular

jurisdiction, especially when First Amendment rights are at

issue and the “very existence [of a statute] may cause others not

before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected

speech or expression.” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,

612 (1973).

In view of FEC policy, the state of the law, and the silence

of the district court on the geographical scope of its injunction,

JMC Appellants have every reason to believe that the FEC

"Similarly, the “FEC has in the past prosecuted groups in the

judicial districts where they distributed advertising materials, as

opposed to the states where they are chartered or headquartered.”

VSHL, 263 F 3d at 389 (citing FEC v. Pub. Citizen, Inc., 64 F. Supp.

2d 1327(N.D. Ga. 1999); FEC v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action

Comm., 647 F. Supp. 987 (S.D. N.Y. 1986)).

would, consistent with its policy, enforce provisions of BCRA

outside the District of Columbia absent a nationwide injunction.

As an Act of Congress, BCRA applies nationwide, so any

of its provisions held unconstitutional should be also enjoined

nationwide. In addition, BCRA § 403(1) provides that suit for

declaratory and injunctive relief may only be brought in the

United States District Court for theDistrict of Columbia. Thus,

there can be no protection from other courts from the FEC’s

enforcement actions in jurisdictions beyond the District of

Columbia. JMC Appellants therefore request this Court to

reverse the decision of the district court denying their Motion

to Alter or Amend and to direct the district court on remand to

enjoin the FEC from enforcing any BCRA provision held

unconstitutional anywhere in the United States.

Article II Standing of Congressional Intervenors

Senator John McCain, Sen. Russell Feingold, Rep.

and Sen. James Jeffords (Intervenors) intervened under Fed. R.

Civ. P. 24(a)(1), invoking BCRA § 403(b) (“any member of the

House of Representatives . . . or Senate shall have the right to

intervene either in support or opposition to the position of a

party to the case regarding the constitutionality of the provision

or amendment’).

Applying BCRA § 403 does not, however, answer the

separate question of whether all intervenors must have Article

Ill standing, a matter this Court has not addressed. See

Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 66

(1977) (expressing “grave doubts whether the [initiative

sponsors] have standing under Article III to pursue appellate

review”); Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68-69 and n.21

(1986) (an intervenor may not appeal, or continue a suit,

without the party on whose side intervention was permitted,

unless intervenor has Article III standing).

Intervenors must satisfy both constitutional and prudential

requirements for standing. See, e.g., National Credit Union

Admin. v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 1146

(1998); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61

(1992). Section 403(b), by permitting members of Congress to

intervene, removes any prudential standing concerns. Raines v.

Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 n. 3 (1997) (“Congress’s decision to

grant a particular plaintiff the right to challenge an act’s

constitutionality . . . eliminates any prudential standing

limitations and significantly lessens the risk of unwanted

conflict with the Legislative Branch when the plaintiff brings

suit.”). However, “Congress cannot erase Article III's standing

requirements by statutorily granting the right to sue a plaintiff

who would not otherwise have standing.” /d. at 820.n. 3. This

Court has long held that Congressional power to create standing

is, at least in theory, subject to the limitations of Article III. See,

e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 49 (1975); Linda R.S. v. Richard

D., 410 U.S. 64 (1973). Thus, Article III's injury in fact

requirement functions as a limit on Congress’ power to confer

standing. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580-81 (Kennedy, J.,

concurring); Common Cause v. FEC, 108 F.3d 413, 418 (D.C.

Cir. 1997).

Intervenors do not satisfy Article II] standing requirements.

First, they do not satisfy the requirement that suffer an “injury

in fact” consisting of an “invasion of a legally protected interest

which is (a) concrete and particularized . . .and (b) actual or

imminent.” Lujan, 504 U.S. 560 (internal quotations and

citations omitted). A generalized, abstract interest as members

of a regulated class of legislators or as citizens participating in

the political process is insufficiently concrete and particularized

to grant them Article III standing.

Voters’ “concern for the corruption of the political process

is not only widely shared, but is also an abstract and indefinite

nature, comparable to the common concern for obedience of the

law.” Becker v. FEC, 230 F.3d 381, 390 (ist Cir. 2000). See

also Chiglo v. City of Preston, 104 F3d. 185, 187 (1997);

Hoffman v. Jeffords, 175 F. Supp.2d 49, 55 (D.D.C. 2001).

Likewise, this Court has held that individual members of

Congress lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of

legislation, although the federal Line Item Veto Act provided

that any member might bring suit, because the members had

alleged no cognizable injuries to themselves, and their claimed

institutional injury was widely dispersed and abstract. Raines,

521 U.S. at 829. See also, e.g., Roe v. Casev, 464 F. Supp. 486,

48 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 623 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1980) (in

constitutional challenge to statute, a legislator as member of

Assembly and co-sponsor had no legally protectable interest).

Second, the Intervenors lack Article III standing because

there is no causal connection between their “injury”and the

conduct complained of. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61. Any injury

suffered by a holding that BCRA is unconstitutional would

simply mean that the Intervener would have to continue to

campaign in the absence of BCRA and within the established,

relatively unregulated, system of election finance control.

However, “[i]n those cases where a plaintiff's asserted injury

arises from the government’s allegedly unlawful regulation (or

lack of regulation) of someone else, it is substantially more

- difficult to establish injury in fact, for in such cases one or more

of the essential elements of standing depends on the unfettered

choices made by independent actors not before the courts and

whose exercise of broad and legitimate discretion the courts

cannot presume either to control or to predict.” Common Cause

v. FEC, 108 F.3d 412, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quotations and

citations omitted) (emphasis added).

Thus, whether the Intervenors lack Article III standing is in

itself a plainly substantial question that warrants review by this

Court.

Moreover, there is a conflict of circuits with regard to this

matter that this Court ought properly to resolve. Several circuit

courts require that interveners must have Article III standing.

Planned Parenthood of Mid- Missouri and Eastern Kansas, Inc.

v. Ehlmann, 137 F.3d 573, 576-77 (8th Cir. 1998); Solid Waste

Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 101 F.3d 503, 507 (7th

Cir. 1996); Mausolf v. Babbit, 85 F.3d 1295, 1300 (8th Cir.

1996); Building and Constr. Trades Dept., AFL-CIO v. Reich,

40 F.3d 1275, 1282 (D.C. Cir.1994). One circuit has stated that

intervention under Rule 24 requires more of an interest than that

required by Article III analysis. United States v. 36.96 Acres of

Land, 754 F.2d 855, 859 (7th Cir.1985). But at least three other

circuits do not require Article III standing for intervention.

United States Postal Serv. v. Brennan, 579 F.2d 188, 190 (2d

Cir.1978); Associated Builders & Contractors v. Perry, 16 F.3d

688, 690 (6th Cir.1994); Yniguez v. State of Arizona, 939 F.2d

727, 731 (9th Cir.1991).

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should note probable

jurisdiction.

Respectfully submitted,

Bopp, Jr., C Record

Richard E. Coleson

Thomas J. Marzen

JAMES MADISON CENTER FOR FREE SPEECH

Bopp, COLESON & BOSTROM

1 South 6th Street

Terre Haute, IN 47807-3510

812/232-2434 (fax: 812/235-3685)

Counsel for JMC Appellants

Appendix Table of Contents

Main Appeal

Appendix A, Notice of Appeal ................-++5- la

Appendix B, Opinion of District Court ............... 3a

Appendix C, U.S. Const. art. 1,§ 4 ............02545. 4a

Appendix D, U.S. Const. amend. I ...............+.-- Sa

Appendix E, U.S. Const. amend V ...........-..-+-: 6a

Appendix F, Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002

$96 04600000080d000068646000850666000bR60 06008 Ta

Denial of Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment

Appendix G, Notice of Appeal ..........-...-.-+-- 69a

Appendix H, Opinion of District Court .............. Tila

Appendix I, Order of District Court ...............-. 83a

APPENDIX A

NOTICE OF APPEAL

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

COMMISSION, et al.,

)

SENATOR MITCH )

McCONNELL, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) Case No. 02-0582

) (CKK, KLH, RJL)

FEDERAL ELECTION )

)

Madison Center Plaintiffs' Notice of Appea'

Madison Center Plaintiffs U.S. Representative Mike

Pence, Alabama Attorney General Bill Pryor, Libertarian

National Committee, Inc., Club for Growth, Inc., Indiana

Family Institute, Inc., National Right to Life Committee,

Inc., National Right to Life Educational Trust Fund, and

National Right to Life Political Action Committee hereby

give notice that they appeal to the United States Su-

preme Court from the final judgment entered in this and

consolidated actions on May 2, 2003.

Respectfully submitted,

Alan P. Dye (Bar No. 215319) James Bopp, Jr.

Heidi K. Abegg (Bar No. Richard E. Coleson

463935) Thomas J. Marzen

WEBSTER, CHAMBERLAIN & JAMES MADISON CENTER

BEAN FOR FREE SPEECH

1747 Pennsylvania Ave..N.W. BOPP, COLESON &

Suite 1000 BOSTROM

Washington, D.C. 20006 1 South Sixth Street

(202) 785-9500 Terre Haute, IN 47807

(202) 835-0243 facsimile (812) 232-2434

APPENDIX B

OPINION OF THE DISTRICT COURT

The opinions of the district court are reported at

2003 WL 2010983, 21003118, 21003103, and 21003124

(D.D.C. May 1, 2003). Pursuant to the Court’s May 15,

2003, Order, the James Madison Center for Free

Speech Appellants anticipate jointly filing an appendix

containing the opinions of the district court.

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

ARTICLE I, SECTION 4

The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for

Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State

by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by

Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of

chusing Senators.

The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and

such meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless

they shall by Law appoint a different day.

APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

AMENDMENT I

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of

religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging

the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people

peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a

redress of grievances.

APPENDIX E

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

AMENDMENT V

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise

infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a

Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces,

or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public

danger, nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to

be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled

in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be

deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of

law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without

just compensation.

APPENDIX F

BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT OF 2002

PUB. L. NO. 107-155, 166 STAT. 81

[March 27, 2002]

An Act To amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of

1971 to provide bipartisan campaign reform.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of

the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) SHORT TITLE. — This Act may be cited as the

“Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002”. 7

(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS. — The table of contents of

this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

TITLE | — REDUCTION OF SPECIAL INTEREST

INFLUENCE

Sec. 101. Soft money of political parties.

Sec. 102. Increased contribution limit for State committees of

Sec. 103. Reporting requirements.

TITLE t& — NONCANDIDATE CAMPAIGN

EXPENDITURES

Subtitle A — Electioneering Communications

Sec. 201. Disclosure of electioneering communications.

Sec. 203. Prohibition of corporate and labor disbursements

Sor ehaatt oe

Sec. 204. Rules relating to certain targeted electioneering

communications.

Subtitle B — Independent and Coordinated Expenditures

Sec. 211. Definition of independent expenditure.

Sec. 212. Reporting requirements for certain independent

expenditures.

Sec. 213. Independent versus coordinated expenditures by

party.

Sec. 214. Coordination with candidates or political parties.

TITLE If! — MISCELLANEOUS

Sec. 301. Use of contributed amounts for certain purposes.

Sec. 302. Prohibition of fundraising on Federal property.

Sec. 303. Strengthening foreign money ban.

Sec. 304. Modification of individual contribution limits in

response to expenditures from personal funds.

Sec. 305. Limitation on availability of lowest unit charge for

Federal candidates attacking opposition.

Sec. 306. Software for filing reports and prompt disclosure of

Sec. 307. Modification of contribution limits.

Sec. 308. Donations to Presidential inaugural committee.

Sec. 309. Prohibition on fraudulent solicitation of funds.

Sec. 310. Study and report on clean money clean elections

laws.

Sec. 311. Clarity standards for identification of sponsors of

Lecti seat efvanial

Sec. 312. Increase in penalties.

Sec. 313. Statute of limitations.

Sec. 314. Sentencing guidelines.

Sec. 315. Increase in penalties imposed for violations of

conduit contnbution ban.

Sec. 316. Restriction on increased contribution limits by

taking into account candidate’s available funds.

Sec. 317. Clarification of right of nationals of the United

States to make political contributions.

Sec. 318. Prohibition of contributions by minors.

Sec. 319. Modification of individual contribution limits for

House candidates in response to expenditures from personal

funds.

TITLE IV — SEVERABILITY; EFFECTIVE DATE

Sec. 401. Severability.

Sec. 402. Effective dates and regulations.

Sec. 403. Judicial review.

TITLE V — ADDITIONAL DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS

Sec. 501. Internet access to records.

Sec. 502. Maintenance of website of election reports.

Sec. 503. Additional disclosure reports.

Sec. 504. Public access to broadcasting records.

TITLE I — REDUCTION OF SPECIAL INTEREST

INFLUENCE

SEC. 101. SOFT MONEY OF POLITICAL PARTIES.

(a) IN GENERAL. — Title Ill of the Federal Election

Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 431 et seq.) is amended by

adding at the end the following:

“SEC. 323. SOFT MONEY OF POLITICAL PARTIES.

“(a) NATIONAL COMMITTEES. —

“(1) IN GENERAL. — A national committee of a political

party (including a national congressional campaign committee

10a

of a political party) may not solicit, receive, or direct to another

person a contribution, donation, or transfer of funds or any

other thing of value, or spend any funds, that are not subject to

the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this

Act.

“(2) APPLICABILITY. — The prohibition established by

paragraph (1) applies to any such national committee, any

officer or agent acting on behalf of such a national committee,

and any entity that is directly or indirectly established, financed,

maintained, or controlled by such a national committee.

“(b) STATE, DISTRICT, AND LOCAL COMMITTEES. —

“(1) INGENERAL. — Except as provided in paragraph (2),

an amount that is expended or disbursed for Federal election

activity by a State, district, or local committee of a political

party (including an entity that is directly or indirectly

established, financed, maintained, or controlled by a State,

district, or local committee of a political party and an officer or

agent acting on behalf of such committee or entity), or by an

association or similar group of candidates for State or local

office or of individuals holding State or local office, shall be

made from funds subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and

reporting requirements of this Act.

“(2) APPLICABILITY. —

“(A) IN GENERAL. — Notwithstanding clause (i) or (ii)

of section 301(20)A), and subject to subparagraph (B),

paragraph (1) shall not apply to any amount expended or

disbursed by a State, district, or local committee of a political

party for an activity described in either such clause to the extent

the amounts expended or disbursed for such activity are

allocated (under regulations prescribed by the Commission)

among amounts —

“(i) which consist solely of contributions subject to the

limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act

(other than amounts described in subparagraph (B)(iii)); and

“(ii) other amounts which are not subject to the

limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act

(other than any requirements of this subsection).

“(B) CONDITIONS. — Subparagraph (A) shall only apply

if —

“(i) the activity does not refer to a clearly identified

candidate for Federal office;

“(ii) the amounts expended or disbursed are not for the

costs of any broadcasting, cable, or satellite communication,

other than a communication which refers solely to a clearly

identified candidate for State or local office;

“(iii) the amounts expended or disbursed which are

described in subparagraph (A)(ii) are paid from amounts which

are donated in accordance with State law and which meet the

requirements of subparagraph (C), except that no person

(including any person established, financed, maintained, or

controlled by such person) may donate more than $10,000 to a

State, district, or local committee of a political party in a

calendar year for such expenditures or disbursements; and

“(iv) the amounts expended or disbursed are made solely

from funds raised by the State, local, or district committee

which makes such expenditure or disbursement, and do not

include any funds provided to such committee from —

“(I) any other State, local, or district committee of any

State party,

“(II) the national committee of a political party

(including a national congressional campaign committee of a

political party),

“(IIl) any officer or agent acting on behalf of any

committee described in subclause (I) or (II), or

“([V) any entity directly or indirectly established,

financed, maintained, or controlled by any committee described

in subclause (I) or (I).

12a

“(C) PROHIBITING INVOLVEMENT OF NATIONAL

PARTIES, FEDERAL CANDIDATES AND

OFFICEHOLDERS, AND STATE PARTIES ACTING

JOINTLY. — Notwithstanding subsection (e) (other than

subsection (e)(3)), amounts specifically authorized to be spent

under subparagraph (B){iii) meet the requirements of this

subparagraph only if the amounts —

“(j) are not solicited, received, directed, transferred, or

spent by or in the name of any person described in subsection

(a) or (e); and

“(ii) are not solicited, received, or directed through

fundraising activities conducted jointly by 2 or more State,

local, or district committees of any political party or their

agents, or by a State, local, or district committee of a political

party on behalf of the State, local, or district committee of a

political party or its agent in one or more other States.

“(c) FUNDRAISING COSTS. — An amount spent by a

person described in subsection (a) or (b) to raise funds that are

used, in whole or in part, for expenditures and disbursements

for a Federal election activity shall be made from funds subject

to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of

this Act.

“(d) TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS. — A national,

State, district, or local committee of a political party (including

a national congressional campaign committee of a political

party), an entity that is directly or indirectly established,

financed, maintained, or controlled by any such national, State,

district, or local committee or its agent, and an officer or agent

acting on behalf of any such party committee or entity, shall not

solicit any funds for, or make or direct any donations to —

“(1) an organization that is described in section 501(c) of

the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and exempt from taxation

under section 501(a) of such Code (or has submitted an

application for determination of tax exempt status under such

13a

section) and that makes expenditures or disbursements in

connection with an election for Federal office (including

expenditures or disbursements for Federal election activity); or

“(2) an organization described in section 527 of such Code

(other than a political committee, a State, district, or local

committee of a political party, or the authorized campaign

committee of a candidate for State or local office).

“(e) FEDERAL CANDIDATES. —

“(1) IN GENERAL. — 4A candidate, individual holding

Federal office, agent of a candidate or an individual holding

Federal office, or an entity directly or indirectly established,

financed, maintained or controlled by or acting on behalf of 1 or

more candidates or individuals holding Federal office, shall not

“(A) solicit, receive, direct, transfer, or spend funds in

connection with an election for Federal office, including funds

for any Federal election activity, unless the funds are subject to

the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this

Act; or

“(B) solicit, receive, direct, transfer, or spend funds in

connection with any election other than an election for Federal

office or disburse funds in connection with such an election

unless the funds —

“(i) are not in excess of the amounts permitted with respect

to contributions to candidates and political committees under

paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of section 315(a); and

- “(ii) are not from sources prohibited by this Act from

making contributions in connection with an election for Federal

office.

“(2) STATE LAW. — Paragraph (1) does not apply to the

solicitation, receipt, or spending of funds by an individual

described in such paragraph who is or was also a candidate for a

State or local office solely in connection with such election for

l4a

State or local office if the solicitation, receipt, or spending of

funds is permitted under State law and refers only to such State

or local candidate, or to any other candidate for the Staie or

local office sought by such candidate, or both.

“(3) FUNDRAISING EVENTS. — Notwithstanding

paragraph (1) or subsection (b)(2)(C), a candidate or an

individual holding Federal office may attend, speak, or be a

featured guest at a fundraising event for a State, district, or local

committee of a political party.

“(4) PERMITTING CERTAIN SOLICITATIONS. —

“(A) GENERAL SOLICITATIONS. — Notwithstanding

any other provision of this subsection, an individual described

in paragraph (1) may make a general solicitation of funds on

behalf of any organization that is described in section 501(c) of

the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and exempt from taxation

under section 501(a) of such Code (or has submitted an

application for determination of tax exempt status under such

section) (other than an entity whose principal purpose is to

conduct activities described in clauses (i) and (ii) of section

301(20)(A)) where such solicitation does not specify how the

funds will or should be spent.

“(B) CERTAIN SPECIFIC SOLICITATIONS. — In

addition to the general solicitations permitted under

subparagraph (A), an individual described in paragraph (1) may

make a solicitation explicitly to obtain funds for carrying out

the activities described in clauses (i) and (ii) of section

301(20)(A), or for an entity whose principal purpose is to

conduct such activities, if —

“(j) the solicitation is made only to individuals; and

“(ii) the amount solicited from any individual during any

calendar year does not exceed $20,000.

“(f) STATE CANDIDATES. —

15a

“(1) IN GENERAL. — A candidate for State or local office,

individual holding State or local office, or an agent of such a

candidate or individual may not spend any funds for a

communication described in section 301(20)(A)(iii) unless the

funds are subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting

requirements of this Act.

“(2) EXCEPTION FOR CERTAIN COMMUNICATIONS.

— Paragraph (1) shall not apply to an individual described in

such paragraph if the communication involved is in connection

with an election for such State or local office and refers only to

such individual or to any other candidate for the State or local

office held or sought by such individual, or both.”

(b) DEFINITIONS. — Section 301 of the Federal Election

Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 431) is amended by adding at

the end thereof the following:

“(20) FEDERAL ELECTION ACTIVITY. —

“(A) IN GENERAL. — The term ‘Federal election activity’

means —

“(i) voter registration activity during the period that begins

on the date that is 120 days before the date a regularly

scheduled Federal election is held and ends on the date of the

election;

“(ii) voter identification, get-out-the-vote activity, or

generic campaign activity conducted in connection with an

election in which a candidate for Federal office appears on the

ballot (regardless of whether a candidate for State or local office

also appears on the ballot);

“(iii) a public communication that refers to a clearly

identified candidate for Federal office (regardless of whether

candidate for State or local office is also mentioned or

identified) and that promotes or supports a candidate for that

office, or attacks or opposes a candidate for that office

16a

(regardless of whether the communication expressly advocates

a vote for or against a candidate); or

“(iv) services provided during any month by an employee

of a State, district, or local committee of a political party who

spends more than 25 percent of that individual's compensated

time during that month on activities in connection with a

Federal election.

“(B) EXCLUDED ACTIVITY. —- The term ‘Federal

election activity’ does not include an amount expended or

disbursed by a State, district, or local committee of a political

party for —

“(i) a public communication that refers solely to a clearly

identified candidate for State or local office, if the

communication is not a Federal election activity described in

subparagraph (A)(i) or (ii);

“(ii) a contribution to a candidate for State or local office,

provided the contribution is not designated to pay for a Federal

election activity described in subparagraph (A);

“(iii) the costs of a State, district, or local political

convention; and

“(iv) the costs of grassroots campaign matenials, including

buttons, bumper stickers, and yard signs, that name or depict

only a candidate for State or local office.

“(21) GENERIC CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY. — The term

‘generic campaign activity’ means a campaign activity that

promotes a politica] party and does not promote a candidate or

non-Federal candidate.

“(22) PUBLIC COMMUNICATION. — The term ‘public

communication’ means a communication by means of any

broadcast, cable, or satellite communication, newspaper,

magazine, outdoor advertising facility, mass mailing, or

telephone bank to the general public, or any other form of

general public political advertising.

17a

“(23) MASS MAILING. — The term ‘mass mailing’ means

a mailing by United States mail or facsimile of more than 500

pieces of mail matter of an identical or substantially similar

nature within any 30-day period.

“(24) TELEPHONE BANK. — The term ‘telephone bank’

means more than 500 telephone calls of an identical or

substantially similar nature within any 30-day period.”

SEC. 102. INCREASED CONTRIBUTION LIMIT FOR

STATE COMMITTEES OF POLITICAL PARTIES.

Section 315(a)(1) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of

1971 (2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(1)) is amended —

~ (1) in subparagraph (B), by striking “or” at the end;

(2) in subparagraph (C) —

(A) by inserting “(other than a committee described in

subparagraph (D))” after “committee”; and

(B) by striking the period at the end and inserting “; or”;

and

(3) by adding at the end the following:

“(D) to a political committee established and maintained by

a State committee of a political party in any calendar year

which, in the aggregate, exceed $10,000.”

SEC. 103. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

(a) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS. — Section 304 of the

Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 434) is

amended by adding at the end the following:

“(e) POLITICAL COMMITTEES. —

“(1) NATIONAL AND CONGRESSIONAL POLITICAL

COMMITTEES. — The national committee of a political party,

any national congressional campaign committee of a political

party, and any subordinate committee of either, shall report all

receipts and disbursements during the reporting period.

18a

“(2) OTHER POLITICAL COMMITTEES TO WHICH

SECTION 323 APPLIES. —

“(A) IN GENERAL. — In addition to any other reporting

requirements applicable under this Act, a political committee

(not described in paragraph (1)) to which section 323(b)(1)

applies shall report all receipts and disbursements made for

activities described in section 301(20)(A), unless the aggregate

amount of such receipts and disbursements during the calendar

year is less than $5,000.

“(B) SPECIFIC DISCLOSURE BY STATE AND LOCAL

PARTIES OF CERTAIN NON-FEDERAL AMOUNTS

PERMITTED TO BE SPENT ON FEDERAL ELECTION

ACTIVITY. — Each report by a political committee under

subparagraph (A) of receipts and disbursements made for

activities described in section 301(20)A) shall include a

disclosure of all receipts and disbursements described in section

323(b)(2)(A) and (B).

“(3) ITEMIZATION. — If a political committee has

receipts or disbursements to which this subsection applies from

or to any person aggregating in excess of $200 for any calendar

year, the political committee shall separately itemize its

reporting for such person in the same manner as required in

paragraphs (3)(A), (5), and (6) of subsection (b).

“(4) REPORTING PERIODS. — Reports required to be

filed under this subsection shall be filed for the same time

periods required for political committees under subsection

(aX4)(B).”

(b) BUILDING FUND EXCEPTION TO THE

DEFINITION OF CONTRIBUTION. —

(1) IN GENERAL. — Section 301(8)(B) of the Federal

Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 431(8)(B)) is

amended —

(A) by striking clause (viii); and

19a

(B) by redesignating clauses (ix) through (xv) as clauses

(viii) through (xiv), respectively.

(2) NONPREEMPTION OF STATE LAW. — Section 403

of such Act (2 U.S.C. 453) is amended —

(A) by striking “The provisions of this Act” and inserting:

“(a) IN GENERAL. — Subject to subsection (b), the

provisions of this Act”; and

(B) by adding at the end the following:

“(b) STATE AND LOCAL COMMITTEES OF

POLITICAL PARTIES. — Notwithstanding any other

provision of this Act, a State or local committee of a political

party may, subject to State law, use exclusively funds that are

not subject to the prohibitions, limitations, and reporting

requirements of the Act for the purchase or construction of an

office building for such State or local committee.”

TITLE If — NONCANDIDATE CAMPAIGN

EXPENDITURES

Subtitle A — Electioneering Communications

SEC. 201. DISCLOSURE OF ELECTIONEERING

COMMUNICATIONS.

(a) IN GENERAL. — Section 304 of the Federal Election

Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 434), as amended by section

103, is amended by adding at the end the following new

subsection:

“(f) DISCLOSURE OF ELECTIONEERING

COMMUNICATIONS. —

“(1) STATEMENT REQUIRED. — Every person who

makes a disbursement for the direct costs of producing and

airing electioneering communications in an aggregate amount in

excess of $10,000 during any calendar year shall, within 24

hours of each disclosure date, file with the Commission a

20a

statement containing the information descnbed in paragraph

(2).

“(2) CONTENTS OF STATEMENT. — Each statement

required to be filed under this subsection shall be made under

penalty of perjury and shall contain the following information:

“(A) The identification of the person making the

disbursement, of any person sharing or exercising direction or

control over the activities of such person, and of the custodian

of the books and accounts of the person making the

disbursement.

“(B) The principal place of business of the person making —

the disbursement, if not an individual.

“(C) The amount of each disbursement of more than $200

during the period covered by the statement and the

identification of the person to whom the disbursement was

made.

‘“(D) The elections to which the electioneering

communications pertain and the names (if known) of the

candidates identified or to be identified.

“(E) If the disbursements were paid out of a segregated

bank account which consists of funds contributed solely by

individuals who are United States citizens or nationals or

lawfully admitted for permanent residence (as defined in section

101(aX(20) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.

1101(aX(20))) directly to this account for electioneering

communications, the names and addresses of all contnbutors

who contnbuted an aggregate amount of $1,000 or more to that

account during the period beginning on the first day of the

preceding calendar year and ending on the disclosure date.

Nothing in this subparagraph is to be construed as a prohibition

on the use of funds in such a segregated account for a purpose

other than electioneering communications.

2la

“(F) If the disbursements were paid out of funds not

described in subparagraph (E), the names and addresses of all

contributors who contributed an aggregate amount of $1,000 or

more to the person making the disbursement during the period

beginning on the first day of the preceding calendar year and

ending on the disclosure date.

“(3) ELECTIONEERING COMMUNICATION. — For

purposes of this subsection —

“(A) IN GENERAL. — (i) The term ‘electioneering

communication’ means any broadcast, cable, or satellite

communication which —

“(I) refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal

office;

“(ID is made within —

“(aa) 60 days before a general, special, or runoff election

for the office sought by the candidate; or

“(bb) 30 days before a primary or preference election, or

a convention or caucus of a political party that has authority to

nominate a candidate, for the office sought by the candidate;

and

“(III) in the case of a communication which refers to a

candidate for an office other than President or Vice President, is

targeted to the relevant electorate.

“(ii) If clause (i) is held to be constitutionally insufficient

by final judicial decision to support the regulation provided

herein, then the term ‘electioneering communication’ means

any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication which

promotes or supports a candidate for that office, or attacks or

opposes a candidate for that office (regardless of whether the

communication expressly advocates a vote for or against a

candidate) and which also is suggestive of no plausible meaning

other than an exhortation to vote for or against a specific

candidate. Nothing in this subparagraph shall be construed to

22a

affect the interpretation or application of section 100.22(b) of

title 11, Code of Federal Regulations.

“(B) EXCEPTIONS. — The term ‘electioneering

communication’ does not include —

“(i) a communication appearing in a news story,

commentary, or editorial distnbuted through the facilities of any

broadcasting station, unless such facilities are owned or

controlled by any political party, political committee, or

candidate;

“(ii) a communication which constitutes an expenditure or

an independent expenditure under this Act;

“(iii) a communication which constitutes a candidate

debate or forum conducted pursuant to regulations adopted by

the Commission, or which solely promotes such a debate or

foram and ts made by or on behall of the persen epensesing the

debate or forum; or

“(iv) any other communication exempted under such

regulations as the Commission may promulgate (consistent with

the requirements of this paragraph) to ensure the appropriate

implementation of this paragraph, except that under any such

regulation a communication may not be exempted if it meets

the requirements of this paragraph and is described in section

301(20, Ai).

“(C) TARGETING TO RELEVANT ELECTORATE. —

For purposes of this paragraph, a communication which refers

to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office is ‘targeted to

the relevant electorate’ if the communication can be received by

50,000 or more persons —

“(i) in the district the candidate seeks to represent, in the

case of a candidate for Representative in, or Delegate or

Resident Commissioner to, the Congress; or

“(ii) in the State the candidate seeks to represent, in the

case of a candidate for Senator.

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“(4) DISCLOSURE DATE. — For purposes of this

subsection, the term ‘disclosure date’ means —

“(A) the first date during any calendar year by which a

person has made disbursements for the direct costs of producing

or airing electioneering communications aggregating in excess

of $10,000; and

“(B) any other date during such calendar year by which a

person has made disbursements for the direct costs of producing

or airing electioneering communications aggregating in excess

of $10,000 since the most recent disclosure date for such

calendar year.

“(S5) CONTRACTS TO DISBURSE. — For purposes of

this subsection, a person shall be treated as having made a

disbursement if the person has executed a contract to make the

disbursement.

“(6) COORDINATION WITH OTHER REQUIREMENTS.

— Any requirement to report under this subsection shall be in

addition to any other reporting requirement under this Act.

“(7) COORDINATION WITH INTERNAL REVENUE

CODE. — Nothing in this subsection may be construed to

establish, modify, or otherwise affect the definition of political

activities or electioneering activities (including the definition of

participating in, intervening in, or influencing or attempting to

influence a political campaign on behalf of or in opposition to

any candidate for public office) for purposes of the Internal

Revenue Code of 1986.”

(b) RESPONSIBILITIES OF FEDERAL

COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION. — The Federal

C eations C ission shall ile and maintain ony

information the Federal Election Commission may require to

carry out section 304(f) of the Federal Election Campaign Act

of 1971 (as added by subsection (a)), and shall make such

information available to the public on the Federal

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SEC. 202. COORDINATED COMMUNICATIONS AS

CONTRIBUTIONS.

Section 315(a)(7) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of

1971 (2 U.S.C. 441a(aX(7)) is amended —

(1) by redesignating subparagraph (C) as subparagraph (D);

and

(2) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the following:

“(C) if —

“(i) any person makes, or contracts to make, any

disbursement for any electioneering communication (within the

meaning of section 304(f)(3)); and

“(ii) such disbursement is coordinated with a candidate or

an authorized committee of such candidate, a Federal, State, or

local political party or committee thereof, or an agent or official

of any such candidate, party, or committee;

such disbursement or contracting shall be treated as a

contribution to the candidate supported by the electioneering

communication or that candidate’s party and as an expenditure

by that candidate or that candidate’s party, and”.

SEC. 203. PROHIBITION OF CORPORATE AND

LABOR DISBURSEMENTS FOR ELECTIONEERING

COMMUNICATIONS.

(a) IN GENERAL. — Section 316(b)(2) of the Federal

Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 441b(b)(2)) is

amended by inserting “or for any applicable electioneering

communication” before “, but shall not include”.

(b) APPLICABLE ELECTIONEERING

COMMUNICATION. — Section 316 of such Act is amended

by adding at the end the following:

“(c) RULES RELATING TO ELECTIONEERING

COMMUNICATIONS. —

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“(1) APPLICABLE ELECTIONEERING

COMMUNICATION. — For purposes of this section, the term

‘applicable electioneering communication’ means an

electioneering communication (within the meaning of section

304(f)(3)) which is made by any entity described in subsection

(a) of this section or by any other person using funds donated by

an entity described in subsection (a) of this section.

“(2) EXCEPTION. — Notwithstanding paragraph (1), the

term ‘applicable electioneering communication’ does not

include 2 communication by a section 501(c)(4) organization or

a political organization (as defined in section 527(e)(1) of the

Internal Revenue Code of 1986) made under section

304(f)(2)(E) or (F) of this Act if the communication is paid for

exclusively by funds provided directly by individuals who are

United States citizens or nationals or lawfully admitted for

permanent residence (as defined in section 101(a\(20) of the

Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(20))). For

purposes of the preceding sentence, the term ‘provided directly

by individuals’ does not include funds the source of which is an

entity described in subsection (a) of this section.

“(3) SPECIAL OPERATING RULES. —

“(A) DEFINITION UNDER PARAGRAPH (1). — An

electioneering communication shall be treated as made by an

entity described in subsection (a) if an entity described in

subsection (a) directly or indirectly disburses any amount for

any of the costs of the communication.

“(B) EXCEPTION UNDER PARAGRAPH (2). — A

section 501(c)4) organization that derives amounts from

business activities or receives funds from any entity described

in subsection (a) shall be considered to have paid for any

communication out of such amounts unless such organization

paid for the communication out of a segregated account to

which only individuals can contribut., as described in section

304(f(2)(E).

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“(4) DEFINITIONS AND RULES. — For purposes of this

subsection —

“(A) the term ‘section 501(c)(4) organization’ means —

“(i) an organization described in section 501(c)(4) of the

Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and exempt from taxation under

section 501(a) of such Code; or

“(i1) an organization which has submitted an application to

the Internal Revenue Service for determination of its status as

an organization described in clause (i); and

“(B) a person shall be treated as having made a

disbursement if the person has executed a contract to make the

disbursement.

“(S) COORDINATION WITH INTERNAL REVENUE

CODE. — Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to

authonze an organization exempt from taxation under section

501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to carry out any

activity which is prohibited under such Code.”

SEC. 204. RULES RELATING TO CERTAIN

TARGETED ELECTIONEERING COMMUNICATIONS.

Section 316(c) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of

1971 (2 U.S.C. 441b), as added by section 203, is amended by

adding at the end the following:

“(6) SPECIAL RULES FOR TARGETED

COMMUNICATIONS. —

“(A) EXCEPTION DOES NOT APPLY. — Paragraph (2)

shall not apply in the case of a targeted communication that is

made by an organization described in such paragraph.

“(B) TARGETED COMMUNICATION. — For purposes

of subparagraph (A), the term ‘targeted communication’ means

an electioneering communication (as defined in section

304(f)(3)) that is distributed from a television or radio broadcast

station or provider of cable or satellite television service and, in

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the case of a communication which refers to a candidate for an

office other than President or Vice President, is targeted to the

relevant electorate.

“(C) DEFINITION. — For purposes of this paragraph, a

communication is ‘targeted to the relevant electorate’ if it meets

the requirements described in section 304(f)(3)(C).”

Subtitle B — Independent and Coordinated Expenditures

SEC. 211. DEFINITION OF INDEPENDENT

EXPENDITURE.

Section 301 of the Federal Election Campaign Act (2 U.S.C.

431) is amended by striking paragraph (17) and inserting the

following:

“(17) INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURE. — The term

‘independent expenditure’ means an expenditure by a person —

“(A) expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly

identified candidate; and

“(B) that is not made in concert or cooperation with or at

the request or suggestion of such candidate, the candidate’s

authorized political committee, or their agents, or a political

party committee or its agents.”

SEC. 212. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR

CERTAIN INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES.

(a) IN GENERAL. — Section 304 of the Federal Election

Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 434) (as amended by section

201) is amended —

(1) in subsection (c)(2), by striking the undesignated matter

after subparagraph (C); and

(2) by adding at the end the following:

“(g) TIME FOR REPORTING’ CERTAIN

EXPENDITURES. —

“(1) EXPENDITURES AGGREGATING $1,000. —

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“(A) INITIAL REPORT. — A person (including a political

committee) that makes or contracts to make independent

expenditures aggregating $1,000 or more after the 20th day, but

more than 24 hours, before tie date of an election shall file a

report describing the expenditures within 24 hours.

“(B) ADDITIONAL REPORTS. — After a person files a

report under subparagraph (A), the person shall file an

additional report within 24 hours after each time the person

makes or contracts to make independent expenditures

aggregating an additional $1,000 with respect to the same

election as that to which the initial report relates.

“(2) EXPENDITURES AGGREGATING $10,000. —

“(A) INITIAL REPORT. — A person (including a political

committee) that makes or contracts to make independent

expenditures aggregating $10,000 or more at any time up to and

including the 20th day before the date of an election shall file a

report describing the expenditures within 48 hours.

“(B) ADDITIONAL REPORTS. — After a person files a

report under subparagraph (A), the person shall file an

additional report within 48 hours after each time the person

makes or contracts to make independent expenditures

aggregating an additional $10,000 with respect to the same

election as that to which the initial report relates.

“(3) PLACE OF FILING; CONTENTS. — A report under

this subsection —

“(A) shall be filed with the Commission; and

“(B) shall contain the information required by subsection

(b\(6\B)iii), including the name of each candidate whom an

expenditure is intended to support or oppose.”

(b) TIME OF FILING OF CERTAIN STATEMENTS. —

(1) IN GENERAL. — Section 304(g) of such Act, as added

by subsection (a), is amended by adding at the end the

following:

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“(4) TIME OF FILING FOR EXPENDITURES

AGGREGATING $1,000. — Notwithstanding subsection

(a)(S), the time at which the statement under paragraph (1) is

received by the Commission or any other recipient to whom the

notification is required to be sent shall be considered the time of

filing of the statement with the recipient.”

(2) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS. — (A) Section

304(a)(5) of such Act (2 U.S.C. 434(a)(S)) is amended by

striking “the second sentence of subsection (c)(2)” and inserting

“subsection (g)(1)”.

(B) Section 304(d)(1) of such Act (2 U.S.C. 434(d)(1)) is

amended by inserting “or (g)” after “subsection (c)”.

SEC. 213. INDEPENDENT VERSUS COORDINATED

EXPENDITURES BY PARTY.

Section 315(d) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of

1971 (2 U.S.C. 441 a(d)) is amended —

(1) in paragraph (1), by striking “and (3)” and inserting “,

(3), and (4)”; and

(2) by adding at the end the following:

“(4) INDEPENDENT VERSUS COORDINATED

EXPENDITURES BY PARTY. —

“(A) IN GENERAL. — On or after the date on which a

political party nominates a candidate, no committee of the

political party may make —

“(i) any cocvdinated expenditure under this subsection

with respect to the candidate during the election cycle at any

time after it makes any independent expenditure (as defined in

section 301(17)) with respect to the candidate during the

election cycle; or

“(ii) any independent expenditure (as defined in section

301(17)) with respect to the candidate during the election cycle

at any time after it makes any coordinated expenditure under

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this subsection with respect to .. > candidate during the election

cycle.

“(B) APPLICATION. — For purposes of this paragraph,

all political committees established and maintained by a

national political party (including all congressional campaign

committees) and all political committees established and

maintained by a State political party (including any subordinate

committee of a State committee) shall be considered to be a

single political committee.

“(C) TRANSFERS. — A committee of a political party

that makes coordinated expenditures under this subsection with

respect to a candidate shall not, during an election cycle,

transfer any funds to, assign authority to make coordinated

expenditures under this subsection to, or receive a transfer of

funds from, a committee of the political party that has made or

intends to make an independent expenditure with respect to the

candidate.”

SEC. 214. COORDINATION WITH CANDIDATES OR

POLITICAL PARTIES.

(a) IN GENERAL. — Section 315(a)(7)(B) of the Federal

Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 44Ja(a)(7)(B)) is

amended —

(1) by redesignating clause (ii) as clause (iii); and

(2) by inserting after clause (i) the following new clause:

“(ii) expenditures made by any person (other than a

candidate or candidate’ s authorized committee) in cooperation,

consultation, or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of,

a national, State, or local committee of a political party, shall be

considered to be contributions made to such party committee;

and”.

(b) REPEAL OF CURRENT REGULATIONS. — The

regulations on coordinated communications paid for by persons

other than candidates, authorized committees of candidates, and

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party committees adopted by the Federal Election Commission

and published in the Federal Register at page 76138 of volume

65, Federal Register, on December 6, 2000, are repealed as of

the date by which the Commission is required to promulgate

new regulations under subsection (c) (as described in section

402(c)(1)).

COMMISSION. — The Federal Election Commission shall

promulgate new regulations on coordinated communications

paid for by persons other than candidates, authorized

committees of candidates, and party committees. The

regulations shall not require agreement or formal collaboration

to establish coordination. In addition to any subject determined

by the Commission, the regulations shall address —

(1) payments for the republication of campaign materials;

(2) payments for the use of a common vendor;

(3) payments for communications directed or made by

persons who previously served as an employee of a candidate or

a political party; and

(4) payments for communications made by a person after

substantial discussion about the communication with a

candidate or a political party.

(d) MEANING OF CONTRIBUTION OR EXPENDITURE

FOR THE PURPOSES OF SECTION 316. — _ Section

316(b)(2) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2

U.S.C. 441b(b)(2)) is amended by striking “shall include” and

inserting “includes a contribution or expenditure, as those terms

are defined in section 301, and also includes”.

32a

TITLE Ill — MISCELLANEOUS

SEC. 301. USE OF CONTRIBUTED AMOUNTS FOR

CERTAIN PURPOSES.

Title III of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2

U.S.C. 431 et seq.) is amended by striking section 313 and

inserting the following:

“SEC. 313. USE OF CONTRIBUTED AMOUNTS FOR

CERTAIN PURPOSES.

“(a) PERMITTED USES. — A contribution accepted by a

candidate, and any other donation received by an individual as

support for activities of the individual as a holder of Federal

office, may be used by the candidate or individual —

“(1) for otherwise authorized expenditures in connection

with the campaign for Federal office of the candidate or

individuai;

“(2) for ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in

connection with duties of the individual as a holder of Federal

office;

“(3) for contributions to an organization described in

section 170(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; or

“(4) for transfers, without limitation, to a national, State, or

local committee of a political party.

“(b) PROHIBITED USE. —

“(1) IN GENERAL. — A contribution or donation

described in subsection (a) shall not be converted by any person

to personal use.

“(2) CONVERSION. — For the purposes of paragraph (1),

a contribution or donation shall be considered to be converted

to personal use if the contribution or amount is used to fulfill

any commitment, obligation, or expense of a person that would

exist irrespective of the candidate’s election campaign or

individual’s duties as a holder of Federal office, including —

33a

“(A) a home mortgage, rent, or utility payment;

“(B) a clothing purchase;

“(C) a noncampaign-related automobile expense,

“(D) a country club membership;

“(E) a vacation or other noncampaign-related tnp,

“(F) a household food item;

“(G) a tuition payment;

“(H) admission to a sporting event, concert, theater, or

other form of entertainment not associated with an election

campaign, and

“(I) dues, fees, and other payments to a health club or

recreational facility.”

SEC. 302. PROHIBITION OF FUNDRAISING ON

FEDERAL PROPERTY.

Section 607 of title 18, United States Code, is amended —

(1) by striking subsection (a) and inserting the following:

“(a) PROHIBITION. —

“(1) IN GENERAL. — It shall be unlawful for any person

to solicit or receive a donation of money or other thing of value

in connection with a Federal, State, or local election from a

person who is located in a room or building occupied in the

discharge of official duties by an officer or employee of the

United States. It shall be unlawful for an individual who is an

officer or employee of the Federal Government, including the

President, Vice President, and Members of Congress, to solicit

or receive a donation of money or other thing of value in

connection with a Federal, State, or local election, while in any

room or building occupied in the discharge of official duties by

an officer or employee of the United States, from any person.

34a

“(2) PENALTY. — A person who violates this section shall

be fined not more than $5,000, imprisoned not more than 3

years, or both.’; and

(2) in subsection (b), by inserting “or Executive Office of

the President” after “Congress”.

SEC. 303. STRENGTHENING FOREIGN MONEY BAN.

Section 319 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971

(2 U.S.C. 44le) is amended —

(1) by striking the heading and inserting the following:

“CONTRIBUTIONS AND DONATIONS BY FOREIGN

NATIONALS”; and

(2) by stnking subsection (a) and inserting the following:

“(a) PROHIBITION. — It shall be unlawful for —

“(1) a foreign national, directly or indirectly, to make —

(A) a contnbution or donation of money or other thing of

value, or to make an express or implied promise to make a

contnbution or donation, in connection with a Federal, State,

or local election;

“(B) a contribution or donation to a committee of a

political party, or

“(C) an expenditure, independent expenditure, or

disbursement for an electioneering communication (within the

meaning of section 304(f(3)); or

“(2) a person to solicit, accept, or receive a contribution or

donation described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (1)

from a foreign national.”

weer

35a

SEC. 304. MODIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL

CONTRIBUTION LIMITS IN RESPONSE TO

EXPENDITURES FROM PERSONAL FUNDS.

(a) INCREASED LIMITS FOR INDIVIDUALS. — Section

315 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C.

441a) is amended —

(1) in subsection (a)(1), by striking “No person” and

inserting “Except as provided in subsection (i), no person”; and

(2) by adding at the end the following:

“(i) INCREASED LIMIT TO ALLOW RESPONSE TO

EXPENDITURES FROM PERSONAL FUNDS. —-

“(1) INCREASE. —

“(A) IN GENERAL. — Subject to paragraph (2), if the

opposition personal funds amount with respect to a candidate

for election to the office of Senator exceeds the threshold

amount, the limit under subsection (a) 1) A) (in this subsection

referred to as the ‘applicable limit’) with respect to that

candidate shall be the increased limit.

“(B) THRESHOLD AMOUNT. —

“(i) STATE-BY-STATE COMPETITIVE AND FAIR

CAMPAIGN FORMULA. — In this subsection, the threshold

amount with respect to an election cycle of a candidate

described in subparagraph (A) is an amount equal to the sum of

“(1) $150,000; and

“(IT) $0.04 multiplied by the voting age population.

“(ii) VOTING AGE POPULATION. — In this

subparagraph, the term ‘voting age population’ means in the

case of a candidate for the office of Senator, the voting age

population of the State of the candidate (as certified under

section 31 5(e)).

36a

“(C) INCREASED LIMIT. — Except as provided in clause

(ii), for purposes of subparagraph (A), if the opposition personal

funds amount is over —

“(i) 2 times the threshold amount, but not over 4 times that

amount —

“(I) the increased limit shall be 3 times the applicable

limit; and

“(II) the limit under subsection (a)(3) shall not apply

with respect to any contribution made with respect to a

candidate if such contribution is made under the increased limit

of subparagraph (A) during a period in which the candidate may

accept such a contribution;

“(ii) 4 times the threshold amount, but not over 10 times

that amount —

“(1) the increased limit shall be 6 times the applicable

limit; and

“(I1) the limit under subsection (a)(3) shall not apply

with respect to any contribution made with respect to a

candidate if such contribution is made under the increased limit

of subparagraph (A) during a period in which the candidate may

accept such a contribution; and

“(iii) 10 times the threshold amount —

“(1) the increased limit shall be 6 times the applicable

limit;

“(I1) the limit under subsection (a)(3) shall not apply

with respect to any contribution made with respect to a

candidate if such contribution is made under the increased limit

of subparagraph (A) during a period in which the candidate may

accept such a contribution; and

“(II1) the limits under subsection (d) with respect to any

expenditure by a State or national committee of a political party

shall not apply.

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“(D) OPPOSITION PERSONAL FUNDS AMOUNT. —

The opposition personal funds amount is an amount equal to the

excess (if any) of —

“(i) the greatest aggregate amount of expenditures from

personal funds (as defined in section 304(a)(6)(B)) that an

opposing candidate in the same election makes; over

“(ii) the aggregate amount of expenditures from personal

funds made by the candidate with respect to the election.

“(2) TIME TO ACCEPT CONTRIBUTIONS UNDER

INCREASED LIMIT. —

“(A) IN GENERAL. — Subject to subparagraph (B), a

candidate and the candidate’s authorized committee shall not

accept any contribution, and a party committee shall not make

any expenditure, under the increased limit under paragraph (1)

“(i) until the candidate has received notification of the

opposition personal funds amount under section 304(a(6)B);

and

“(ii) to the extent that such contribution, when added to the

aggregate amount of contributions previously accepted and

under this subsection for the election cycle, exceeds 1 10 percent

of the opposition personal funds amount.

“(B) EFFECT OF WITHDRAWAL OF AN OPPOSING

CANDIDATE. — A candidate and a candidate's authorized

committee shall not accept any contribution and a party shall

date on which an opposing candidate ceases to be a candidate to

the extent that the amount of such increased limit is attributable

to such an opposing candidate.

“(3) DISPOSAL OF EXCESS CONTRIBUTIONS. —

“(A) IN GENERAL. — The aggregate amount of

contributions accepted by a candidate or a candidate’s

38a

authorized committee under the increased limit under paragraph

(1) and not otherwise expended in connection with the election

with respect to which such contributions relate shall, not later

than 50 days after the date of such election, be used in the

manner described in subparagraph (B).

“(B) RETURN TO CONTRIBUTORS. — A candidate or a

candidate’s authorized committee shall return the excess

contribution to the person who made the contribution.

“(j) LIMITATION ON REPAYMENT OF PERSONAL

LOANS. — Any candidate who incurs personal loans made

after the effective date of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act

of 2002 in connection with the candidate’s campaign for

election shall not repay (directly or indirectly), to the extent

such loans exceed $250,000, such loans from any contributions

made to such candidate or any authorized committee of such

candidate after the date of such election.”

(b) NOTIFICATION OF EXPENDITURES FROM

PERSONAL FUNDS. — Section 304(a)(6) of the Federal

Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 434(a)(6)) is

amended —

(1) by redesignating subparagraph (B) as subparagraph (E),

and

(2) by inserting after subparagraph (A) the following:

“(B) NOTIFICATION OF EXPENDITURE FROM

PERSONAL FUNDS. —

“(i) DEFINITION OF EXPENDITURE FROM

PERSONAL FUNDS. — In this subparagraph, the term

‘expenditure from personal funds’ means —

“(I) an expenditure made by a candidate using personal

funds; and

“(II) a contribution or loan made by a candidate using

personal funds or a loan secured using such funds to the

candidate’s authorized committee.

39a

“(ii) DECLARATION OF INTENT. — Not later than the

date that is 15 days after the date on which an individual

becomes a candidate for the office of Senator, the candidate

shall file a declaration stating the total amount of expenditures

from personal funds that the candidate intends to make, or to

obligate to make, with respect to the election that will exceed

the State-by-State competitive and fair campaign formula with

“(1) the Commission; and

“(I1) each candidate in the same election.

“(iii) INITIAL NOTIFICATION. — Not later than 24 hours

after a candidate described in clause (ii) makes or obligates to

make an aggregate amount of expenditures from personal funds

in excess of 2 times the threshold amount in connection with

any election, the candidate shall file a notification with —

“(1) the Commission; and

“(IT) each candidate in the same-election.

“(iv) ADDITIONAL NOTIFICATION. — After a candidate

files an initial notification under clause (iii), the candidate shall

file an additional notification each time expenditures from

personal funds are made or obligated to be made in an

aggregate amount that exceed $10,000 with —

“(1) the Commission; and

“(I1) each candidate in the same election.

Such notification shall be filed not later than 24 hours after

the expenditure is made.

“(v) CONTENTS. — A notification under clause (iii) or

(iv) shall include —

“(I) the name of the candidate and the office sought by the

candidate;

“(I1) the date and amount of each expenditure; and

40a

“(IIL the total amount of expenditures from personal funds

that the candidate has made, or obligated to make, with respect

to an election as of the date of the expenditure that is the subject

of the notification.

“(C) NOTIFICATION OF DISPOSAL OF EXCESS

CONTRIBUTIONS. — In the next regularly scheduled report

after the date of the election for which a candidate seeks

nomination for election to, or election to, Federal office, the

candidate or the candidate’s authorized committee shall submit

to the Commission a report indicating the source and amount of

any excess contributions (as determined under paragraph (1) of

section 315(i)) and the manner in which the candidate or the

candidate’s authorized committee used such funds.

“(D) ENFORCEMENT. — For provisions providing for the

enforcement of the reporting requirements under this paragraph,

see section 309.”

Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 431), as amended by section

101(b), is further amended by adding at the end the following:

“(25) ELECTION CYCLE. — For purposes of sections

315(i) and 315A and paragraph (26), the term ‘election cycle’

means the period beginning on the day after the date of the most

recent election for the specific office or seat that a candidate is

seeking and ending on the date of the next election for that

office or seat. For purposes of the preceding sentence, a

primary election and a general election shall be considered to be

separate elections.

“(26) PERSONAL FUNDS. — The term ‘personal funds’

means an amount that is derived from —

(A) any asset that, under applicable State law, at the time

the individual became a candidate, the candidate had legal nght

of access to or control over, and with respect to which the

candidate had —

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“(i) legal and rightful title; or

“(ii) an equitable interest;

“(B) income received during the current election cycle of

the candidate, including —

“(i) a salary and other earned income from bona fide

employment;

“(ii) dividends and proceeds from the sale of the

candidate’s stocks or other investments;

“(iii) bequests to the candidate;

“(iv) income from trusts established before the beginning

of the election cycle;

“(v) income from trusts established by bequest after the

beginning of the election cycle of which the candidate is the

beneficiary;

“(vi) gifts of a personal nature that had been customarily

received by the candidate prior to the beginning of the election

cycle; and

“(vii) proceeds from lotteries and similar legal games of

chance; and

“(C) a portion of assets that are jointly owned by the

candidate and the candidate’s spouse equal to the candidate’s

share of the asset under the instrument of conveyance or

ownership, but if no specific share is indicated by an instrument

of conveyance or ownership, the value of 1/2 of the property.”

SEC. 305. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF

LOWEST UNIT CHARGE FOR’ FEDERAL

CANDIDATES ATTACKING OPPOSITION.

(a) IN GENERAL. — Section 315(b) of the

Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S. C. 315(b)) is amended

42a

(1) by striking “(b) The charges” and inserting the

following:

“(b) CHARGES. —

“(1) IN GENERAL. — The charges”;

(2) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and (2) as

subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively; and

(3) by adding at the end the following:

“(2) CONTENT OF BROADCASTS. —

“(A) IN GENERAL. — In the case of a candidate for

Federal office, such candidate shall not be entitled to receive the

rate under paragraph (1)(A) for the use of any broadcasting

station unless the candidate provides wnitten certification to the

broadcast station that the candidate (and any authorized

committee of the candidate) shall not make any direct :eference

to another candidate for the same office, in any broadcast using

the rights and conditions of access under this Act, unless such

reference meets the requirements of subparagraph (C) or (D).

“(B) LIMITATION ON CHARGES. — If a candidate for

Federal office (or any authorized committee of such candidate)

makes a reference described in subparagraph (A) in any

broadcast that does not meet the requirements of subparagraph

rate under paragraph (1)(A) for such broadcast or any other

broadcast during any portion of the 45-day and 60-day periods

described in paragraph (1)(A), that occur on or after the date of

such broadcast, for election to such office.

“(C) TELEVISION BROADCASTS. — A candidate meets

the requirements of this subparagraph if, in the case of a

television broadcast, at the end of such broadcast there appears

simultaneously, for a period no less than 4 seconds —

“(i) aclearly identifiable photographic or similar image of

the candidate; and

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“(ii) a clearly readable printed statement, identifying the

candidate and stating that the candidate has approved the

broadcast and that the candidate’s authorized committee paid

for the broadcast.

“(D) RADIO BROADCASTS. — A candidate meets the

requirements of this subparagraph if, in the case of a radio

broadcast, the broadcast includes a_ personal audio statement

by the candidate that identifies the candidate, the office the

candidate is seeking, and indicates that the candidate has

approved the broadcast.

“(E) CERTIFICATION. — Certifications under this

section shall be provided and certified as accurate by the

candidate (or any authorized committee of the candidate) at the

time of purchase.

“(F) DEFINITIONS. — For purposes of this paragraph, the

terms ‘authorized committee’ and ‘Federal office’ have the

meanings given such terms by section 301 of the Federal

Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 431).”

(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT. — Section

315(b)(1 (A) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C.

315(b)(1)(A)), as amended by this Act, is amended by inserting

“subject to paragraph (2),” before “during the forty-five days”.

section shall apply to broadcasts made after the effective date of

this Act.

SEC. 306. SOFTWARE FOR FILING REPORTS AND

PROMPT DISCLOSURE OF CONTRIBUTIONS.

Section 304(a) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of

1971 (2 U.S.C. 434(a)) is amended by adding at the end the

following:

“(12) SOFTWARE FOR FILING OF REPORTS. —

“(A) IN GENERAL. — The Commission shall —

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“(i) promulgate standards to be used by vendors to develop

software that —

“(1) permits candidates to easily record information

conceming receipts and disbursements required to be reported

under this Act at the time of the receipt or disbursement;

“(I1) allows the information recorded under subclause i)

to be transmitted immediately to the Commission; and

“(IIL allows the Commission to post the information on

the Internet immediately upon receipt; and

“(ii) make a copy of software that meets the standards

promulgated under clause (i) available to each person required

to file a designation, statement, or report in electronic form

under this Act.

“(B) ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. — To the extent

feasible, the Commission shall require vendors to include in the

software developed under the standards under subparagraph (A)

the ability for any person to file any designation, statement, or

report required under this Act in electronic form.

“(C) REQUIRED USE. — Notwithstanding any provision

of this Act relating to times for filing reports, each candidate for

Federal office (or that candidate’s authorized committee) shall

use software that meets the standards promulgated under this

paragraph once such software is made available to such

candidate.

“(D) REQUIRED POSTING. — The Commission shall, as

soon as practicable, post on the Internet any information

received under this paragraph.”

SEC. 307. MODIFICATION OF CONTRIBUTION

LIMITS.

(a) INCREASE IN INDIVIDUAL LIMITS FOR CERTAIN

CONTRIBUTIONS. — Section 315(aX(1) of the Federal

Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 US.C. 44la(aX1)) is

amended —

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(1) in subparagraph (A), by striking “$1,000” and inserting

“$2,000”; and |

(2) in subparagraph (B), by striking “$20,000” and inserting

“$25,000”.

(b) INCREASE IN ANNUAL AGGREGATE LIMIT ON

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTIONS. — Section 315(a)(3) of the

Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(3)) is

amended to read as follows:

“(3) During the period which begins on January | of an odd-

numbered year and ends on December 31 of the next even-

numbered year, no individual may make contributions

aggregating more than —

“(A) $37,500, in the case of contributions to candidates and

the authorized committees of candidates;

“(B) $57,500, in the case of any other contributions, of

which not more than $37,500 may be attributable to

contributions to political committees which are not political

committees of national political parties.”

COMMITTEE LIMIT. — Section 315(h) of the Federal

Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 441a(h)) is amended

by striking “$17,500” and inserting “$35,000”.

(d) INDEXING OF CONTRIBUTION LIMITS. — Section

315(c) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C.

441a(c)) is amended —

(1) in paragraph (1) —

(A) by striking the second and third sentences;

(B) by inserting “(A)” before “At the beginning”; and

“(B) Except as provided in subparagraph (C), in any

calendar year after 2002 —

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“(i) a limitation established by subsections (a)(1)(A),

(a)(1)(B), (a3), (b), (d), or (h) shall be increased by the percent

difference determined under subparagraph (A);

“(ii) each amount so increased shall remain in effect for the

calendar year; and

“(iii) if any amount after adjustment under clause (i) is not a

multiple ot $100, such amount shall be rounded to the nearest

multiple of $100. -

“(C) In the case of limitations under subsections (a1 )(A),

(a!)(B), (a3), and (h), increases shall only be made in odd-

numbered years and such increases shall remain in effect for the

2-year period beginning on the first day following the date of

the last general election in the year preceding the year in which

the amount is increased and ending on the date of the next

general election.”; and

(2) in paragraph (2B), by striking “means the calendar

year 1974” and inserting “means —

“(i) for purposes of subsections (b) and (d), calendar year

1974; and

“(ii) for purposes of subsections (a)( 1A), (a1 )(B), (a3),

and (h), calendar year 2001”.

(e) EFFECTIVE DATE. — The amendments made by this

section shall apply with respect to contributions made on or

after January 1, 2003.

SEC. 308 DONATIONS TO PRESIDENTIAL

INAUGURAL COMMITTEE.

(a) IN GENERAL. — Chapter 5 of title 36, United States

Code, is amended by —

(1) redesignating section 510 as section 511; and

(2) inserting after section 509 the following:

“§ 510. Disclosure of and prohibition on certain donations

47a

“(a) INGENERAL. — A committee shall not be considered

to be the Inaugural Committee for purposes of this chapter

unless the committee agrees to, and meets, the requirements of

subsections (b) and (c).

“(b) DISCLOSURE. —

“(1) IN GENERAL. — Not later than the date that is 90

days after the date of the Presidential inaugural ceremony, the

committee shall file a report with the Federal Election

Commission disclosing any donation of money or anything of

value made to the committee in an aggregate amount equal to or

greater than $20.

“(2) CONTENTS OF REPORT. — A report filed under

paragraph (1) shall contain —

“(A) the amount of the donation;

“(B) the date the donation is received; and

“(C) the name and address of the person making the

donation

“(c) LIMITATION. — The committee shall not accept any

donation from a foreign national (as defined in section 319(b)

of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C.

441e(b))).”

(b) REPORTS MADE AVAILABLE BY FEC. — Section

304 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C.

434), as amended by sections 103, 201, and 212 is amended by

adding at the end the following:

“(h) REPORTS FROM INAUGURAL COMMITTEES. —

The Federal Election Commission shall make any report filed

by an Inaugural Committee under section 510 of title 36, United

States Code, accessible to the public at the offices of the

Commission and on the Internet not later than 48 hours after the

report is received by the Commission.”

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SEC. 309. PROHIBITION ON FRAUDULENT

SOLICITATION OF FUNDS.

Section 322 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971

(2 U.S.C. 441th) is amended —

(1) by inserting “(a) IN GENERAL. —” before “No

person”; and

(2) by adding at the end the following:

“(b) FRAUDULENT SOLICITATION OF FUNDS. — No

person shall —

“(1) fraudulently misrepresent the person as speaking,

writing, or otherwise acting for or on behalf of any candidate or

political party or employee or agent thereof for the purpose of

soliciting contributions or donations; or

(2) willfully and knowingly participate in or conspire to

participate in any plan, scheme, or design to violate paragraph

(1).”

SEC. 310. STUDY AND REPORT ON CLEAN MONEY

CLEAN ELECTIONS LAWS.

(a) CLEAN MONEY CLEAN ELECTIONS DEFINED. —

In this section, the term “clean money clean elections” means

funds received under State laws that provide in whole or in part

for the public financing of election campaigns.

(b) STUDY. —

(1) IN GENERAL. — The Comptroller General shall

conduct a study of the clean money clean elections of Arizona

and Maine.

(2) MATTERS STUDIED. —

(A) STATISTICS ON CLEAN MONEY CLEAN

ELECTIONS CANDIDATES. — The Comptroller General

shal! determine —

—_——

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(i) the number of candidates who have chosen to run for

public office with clean money clean elections including —

(I) the office for which they were candidates;

(I) whether the candidate was an incumbent or a

challenger, and

(11) whether the candidate was successful in the

candidate’s bid for public office; and

(ii) the number of races in which at least one candidate ran

an election with clean money clean elections.

(B) EFFECTS OF CLEAN MONEY CLEAN

ELECTIONS. — The Comptroller General of the United States

shall describe the effects of public financing under the clean

money clean elections laws on the 2000 elections in Anzona

and Maine.

enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the United

States shall submit a report to the Congress detailing the results

of the study conducted under subsection (b).

SEC. 311. CLARITY STANDARDS FOR

IDENTIFICATION OF SPONSORS OF ELECTION-

RELATED ADVERTISING.

Section 318 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971

(2 U.S.C. 441d) is amended —

(1) in subsection (a) —

(A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1) —

(i) by striking “Whenever” and inserting “Whenever a

political committee makes a disbursement for the purpose of -

financing any communication through any broadcasting station,

newspaper, magazine, outdoor advertising facility, mailing, or

any other type of general public political advertising, or

50a

(ii) by striking “an expenditure” and inserting “a

disbursement”;

(iii) by striking “direct”; and

(iv) by inserting “or makes a disbursement for an

electioneering communication (as defined in section 304(f)(3))”

after “public political advertising”; and

(B) in paragraph (3), by inserting “and permanent street

address, telephone number, or World Wide Web address” after

“name”; and

(2) by adding at the end the following:

“(c) SPECIFICATION. — Any printed communication

descnbed in subsection (a) shall —

“(1) be of sufficient type size to be clearly readable by the

recipient of the communication,

“(2) be contained in a printed box set apart from the other

contents of the communication; and

(3) be printed with a reasonable degree of color contrast

between the background and the printed statement.

“(d) ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS. —

“(1) COMMUNICATIONS BY CANDIDATES OR

AUTHORIZED PERSONS. —

“(A) BY RADIO. — Any communication described in

paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (a) which is transmitted

through radio shall include, in addition to the requirements of

that paragraph, an audio statement by the candidate that

“(B) BY TELEVISION. — Any communication described

in paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (a) which is transmitted

through television shal! include, in addition to the requirements

of that paragraph, a statement that identifies the candidate and

Sla

states that the candidate has approved the communication.

Such statement —

“(i) shall be conveyed by —

“(I) an unobscured, full-screen view of the candidate

making the statement, or

“(II) the candidate in voice-over, accompanied by a

clearly identifiable photographic or similar image of the

candidate; and

“(ii) shall also appear in writing at the end of the

communication in a clearly readable manner with a reasonable

degree of color contrast between the background and the printed

statement, for a period of at least 4 seconds.

“(2) COMMUNICATIONS BY OTHERS. — Any

communication described in paragraph (3) of subsection (a)

which is transmitted through radio or television shall include, in

capi <7 nent g com — haaaa

spoken manner, the following audio statement: ‘

responsible for the content of this advertising.’ (with the blank

to be filled in with the name of the political committee or other

person paying for the communication and the name of any

connected organization of the payor). If transmitted through

television, the statement shall be conveyed by an unobscured,

full-screen view of a representative of the political committee or

other person making the statement, or by a representative of

such political committee or other person in voice-over, and

shall also appear in a clearly readable manner with a reasonable

degree of color contrast between the background and the printed

statement, for a period of at least 4 seconds.”

SEC. 312. INCREASE IN PENALTIES.

(a) IN GENERAL. — Subparagraph (A) of section

309(d)(1) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2

U.S.C. 437g(d)\(1)(A)) is amended to read as follows:

52a

“(A) Any person who knowingly and willfully commits a

violation of any provision of this Act which involves the

making, receiving, or reporting of any contribution, donation, or

expenditure —

“(i) aggregating $25,000 or more during a calendar year

shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, or imprisoned

for not more than 5 years, or both; or

“(ii) aggregating $2,000 or more (but less than $25,000)

during a calendar year shall be fined under such title, or

imprisoned for not more than | year, or both.”

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE. — The amendment made by this

section shall apply to violations occurring on or after the

effective date of this Act.

SEC. 313. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

(a) IN GENERAL. — Section 406(a) of the Federal Election

Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 455(a)) is amended by

striking “3” and inserting “S”.

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE. — The amendment made by this

section shall apply to violations occurring on or after the

effective date of this Act.

SEC. 314. SENTENCING GUIDELINES.

(a) IN GENERAL. — The United States Sentencing

Commission shall —

(1) promulgate a guideline, or amend an existing guideline

under section 994 of title 28, United States Code, in accordance

with paragraph (2), for penalties for violations of the Federal

Election Campaign Act of 1971 and related election laws; and

(2) submit to Congress an explanation of any guidelines

promulgated under paragraph (1) and any legislative or

administrative recommendations regarding enforcement of the

Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and related election

laws.

53a

(b) CONSIDERATIONS. — The Commission shall provide

guiselines under subsection (a) taking into account the

following considerations:

(1) Ensure that the sentencing guidelines and policy

statements reflect the serious nature of such violations and the

need for aggressive and appropriate law enforcement action to

prevent such violations.

(2) Provide a sentencing enhancement for any person

convicted of such violation if such violation involves —

(A) acontnbution, donation, or expenditure from a foreign

source;

(B) a large number of illegal transactions;

donations, or expenditures;

(D) the receipt or disbursement of governmental funds; and

(E) an intent to achieve a benefit from the Federal

Government.

(3) Assure reasonable consistency with other relevant

directives and guidelines of the Commission.

(4) Account for aggravating or mitigating circumstances

that might justify exceptions, including circumstances for which

the sentencing guidelines currently provide sentencing

enhancements.

(5) Assure the guidelines adequately meet the purposes of

sentencing under section 3553(a)(2) of title 18, United States

Code.

PROMULGATE GUIDELINES. —

(:) EFFECTIVE DATE. — Notwithstanding section 402,

the United States Sentencing Commission shall

guidelines under this section not later than the later of —

54a

(A) 90 days after the effective date of this Act; or

(B) 90 days after the date on which at least a majority of

the members of the Commission are appointed and holding

office.

(2) EMERGENCY AUTHORITY TO PROMULGATE

GUIDELINES. — The Commission shall promulgate

guidelines under this section in accordance with the procedures

set forth in section 21(a) of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1987,

as though the authority under such Act has not expired.

SEC. 315. INCREASE IN PENALTIES IMPOSED FOR

VIOLATIONS OF CONDUIT CONTRIBUTION BAN.

(a) INCREASE IN CIVIL MONEY PENALTY FOR

KNOWING AND WILLFUL VIOLATIONS. — Section

309(a) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C.

437g(a)) is amended —

(1) in paragraph (5)(B), by inserting before the period at the

end the following: “(or, in the case of a violation of section

320, which is not less than 300 percent of the amount involved

in the violation and is not more than the greater of $50,000 or

1,000 percent of the amount involved in the violation)”; and

(2) in paragraph (6)(C), by inserting before the perioa at the

end the following: “(or, in the case of a violation of section 320,

which is not less than 300 percent of the amount involved in the

violation and is not more than the greater of $50,000 or 1,000

percent of the amount involved in the violation)”.

(b) INCREASE IN CRIMINAL PENALTY. — Section

309(d)\(1) of such Act (2 U.S.C. 437g(d)(1)) is amended by

adding at the end the following new subparagraph:

“(D) Any person who knowingly and willfully commits a

violation of section 320 involving an amount aggregating more

than $10,000 during a calendar year shall be —

55a

“(i) imprisoned for not more than 2 years if the amount is

less than $25,000 (and subject to imprisonment under

subparagraph (A) if the amount is $25,000 or more);

“(ii) fined not less than 300 percent of the amount involved

in the violation and not more than the greater of —

“(1) $50,000; or

“(II) 1,000 percent of the amount involved in the violation;

“(iii) both imprisoned under clause (i) and fined under

clause (ii).”

section shall apply with respect to violations occurring on or

after the effective date of this Act.

SEC. 316. RESTRICTION ON INCREASED

CONTRIBUTION LIMITS BY TAKING INTO

ACCOUNT CANDIDATE’S AVAILABLE FUNDS.

Section 315(i)(1) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of

1971 (2 U.S.C. 441a(i)(1)), as added by this Act, is amended by

adding at the end the following:

“(E) SPECIAL RULE FOR CANDIDATE’S CAMPAIGN

FUNDS. —

“(i) IN GENERAL. — For purposes of determining the

aggregate amount of expenditures from personal funds under

subparagraph (D)(ii), such amount shall include the gross

receipts advantage of the candidate's authorized committee.

“(ii) GROSS RECEIPTS ADVANTAGE. — For purposes

of clause (i), the term ‘gross receipts advantage’ means the

excess, if any, of —

“(I) the aggregate amount of 50 percent of gross receipts

of a candidate’s authorized committee during any election cycle

(not including contributions from personal funds of the

candidate) that may be expended in connection with the

56a

election, as determined on June 30 and December 31 of the year

preceding the year in which a general election is held, over

“(Il) the aggregate amount of 50 percent of gross

receipts of the opposing candidate’s authorized committee

during any election cycle (not including contnbutions from

personal funds of the candidate) that may be expended in

connection with the election, as determined on June 30 and

December 31 of the year preceding the year in which a general

election is held.”

SEC. 317. CLARIFICATION OF RIGHT OF

NATIONALS OF THE UNITED STATES TO MAKE

POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS.

Section 319(b)(2) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of

1971 (2 U.S.C. 44le(b)(2)) is amended by inserting after

“United States” the following: “or a national of the United

States (as defined in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and

Nationality Act)”.

SEC. 318. PROHIBITION OF CONTRIBUTIONS BY

MINORS.

Title Il] of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2

U.S.C. 431 et seq.), as amended by section 101, is further

amended by adding at the end the following new section:

“PROHIBITION OF CONTRIBUTIONS BY MINORS

“SEC. 324. An individual who is 17 years old or younger

shall not make a contribution to a candidate or a contribution or

donation to a committee of a political party.”

SEC. 319. MODIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL

CONTRIBUTION LIMITS FOR HOUSE CANDIDATES

IN RESPONSE TO EXPENDITURES FROM PERSONAL

FUNDS.

(a) INCREASED LIMITS. — Title III of the Federal

Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 431 et seq.) is

57a

amended by inserting after section 315 the following new

section:

“MODIFICATION OF CERTAIN LIMITS FOR HOUSE

CANDIDATES IN RESPONSE TO

PERSONAL FUND EXPENDITURES OF OPPONENTS

“SEC. 315A. (a) AVAILABILITY OF INCREASED

LIMIT. —

“(1) IN GENERAL. — Subject to paragraph (3), if the

opposition personal funds amount with respect to a candidate

for election to the office of Representative in, or Delegate or

Resident Commissioner to, the Congress exceeds $350,000 —

“(A) the limit under subsection (a)(1)(A) with respect to

the candidate shall be tripled;

“(B) the limit under subsection (a)(3) shall not apply with

respect to any contribution made with respect to the candidate if

the contribution is made under the increased limit allowed

under subparagraph (A) during a period in which the candidate

may accept such a contribution; and

“(C) the limits under subsection (d) with respect to any

expenditure by a State o: national committee of a political party

on behalf of the candidate shall not apply.

“(2) DETERMINATION OF OPPOSITION PERSONAL

FUNDS AMOUNT. —

“(A) IN GENERAL. — The opposition personal funds

amount is an amount equal to the excess (if any) of —

“(i) the greatest aggregate amount of expenditures from

personal funds (as defined in subsection (b)(1)) that an

opposing candidate in the same election makes; over

“(ii) the aggregate amount of expenditures from personal

funds made by the candidate with respect to the election.

“(B) SPECIAL RULE FOR CANDIDATE’S CAMPAIGN

FUNDS. —

58a

“(i) IN GENERAL. — For purposes of determining the

aggregate amount of expenditures from personal funds under

subparagraph (A), such amount shall include the gross receipts

advantage of the candidate’s authorized committee.

“(ii) GROSS RECEIPTS ADVANTAGE. — For purposes

of clause (i), the term ‘gross receipts advantage’ means the

excess, if any, of —

“(1) the aggregate amount of 50 percent of gross receipts

of a candidate’s authorized committee during any election cycle

(not including contributions from personal funds of the

candidate) that may be expended in connection with the

election, as determined on June 30 and December 31 of the year

preceding the year in which a general election is held, over

“(I1) the aggregate amount of 50 percent of gross

receipts of the opposing candidate’s authorized committee

during any election cycle (not including contributions from

personal funds of the candidate) that may be expended in

connection with the election, as determined on June 30 and

December 31 of the year preceding the year in which a general

election is held.

“(3) TIME TO ACCEPT CONTRIBUTIONS UNDER

INCREASED LIMIT. —

“(A) IN GENERAL. — Subject to subparagraph (B), a

candidate and the candidate’s authorized committee shall not

accept any contribution, and a party committee shall not make

any expenditure, under the increased limit under paragraph (1)

“(i) until the candidate has received notification of the

opposition personal funds amount under subsection (b)(1); and

“(ii) to the extent that such contribution, when added to the

aggregate amount of contributions previously accepted and

party expenditures previously made under the increased limits

59a

under this subsection for the election cycle, exceeds 100 percent

of the opposition personal funds amount.

“(B) EFFECT OF WITHDRAWAL OF AN OPPOSING

_ CANDIDATE. — A candidate and a candidate’s authorized

committee shall not accept any contribution and a party shall

not make any expenditure under the increased limit after the

date on which an opposing candidate ceases to be a candidate to

the extent that the amount of such increased limit is attributable

to such an opposing candidate.

“(4) DISPOSAL OF EXCESS CONTRIBUTIONS. —

“(A) IN GENERAL. — The aggregate amount of

contributions accepted by a candidate or a candidate’s

authorized committee under the increased limit under paragraph

(1) and not otherwise expended in connection with the election

with respect to which such contributions relate shall, not later

than 50 days after the date of such election, be used in the

manner described in subparagraph (B).

“(B) RETURN TO CONTRIBUTORS. — A candidate or a

candidate’s authorized committee shall return the excess

contribution to the person who made the contribution.

“(b) NOTIFICATION OF EXPENDITURES FROM

PERSONAL FUNDS. —

“(1) IN GENERAL. —

“(A) DEFINITION OF EXPENDITURE FROM

PERSONAL FUNDS. — In this paragraph, the term

‘expenditure from personal funds’ means — |

“(i) an expenditure made by a candidate using personal

funds; and

“(ii) a contribution or loan made by a candidate using

personal funds or a loan secured using such funds to the

candidate’s authorized committee.

60a

“(B) DECLARATION OF INTENT. — Not later than the

date that is 15 days after the date on which an individual

becomes a candidate for the office of Representative in, or

Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, the Congress, the

candidate shall file a declaration stating the total amount of

expenditures from personal funds that the candidate intends to

make, or to obligate to make, with respect to the election that

will exceed $350,000.

“(C) INITIAL NOTIFICATION. — Not later than 24 hours

after a candidate described in subparagraph (B) makes or

obligates to make an aggregate amount of expenditures from

personal funds in excess of $350,000 in connection with any

election, the candidate shall file a notification.

“(D) ADDITIONAL NOTIFICATION. — After a

candidate files an initial notification under subparagraph (C),

the candidate shall file an additional notification each time

expenditures from personal funds are made or obligated to be

made in an aggregate amount that exceeds $10,000. Such

notification shall be filed not later than 24 hours after the

expenditure is made.

“(E) CONTENTS. — A notification under subparagraph

“(i) the name of the candidate and the office sought by the

candidate;

“(ii) the date and amount of each expenditure; and

“(iii) the total amount of expenditures from personal funds

that the candidate has made, or obligated to make, with respect

to an election as of the date of the expenditure that is the subject

of the notification.

“(F) PLACE OF FILING. — Each declaration or

notification required to be filed by a candidate under

subparagraph (C), (D), or (E) shall be filed with —

“(i) the Commission; and

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“(ii) each candidate in the same election and the national

party of each such candidate.

“(2) NOTIFICATION OF DISPOSAL OF EXCESS

CONTRIBUTIONS. — In the next regularly scheduled report

after the date of the election for which a candidate seeks

nomination for election to, or election to, Federal office, the

candidate or the candidate's authorized committee shall submit

to the Commission a report indicating the source and amount of

any excess contributions (as determined under subsection (a))

and the manner in which the candidate or the candidate's

authorized committee used such funds.

“(3) ENFORCEMENT. — For provisions providing for the

enforcement of the reporting requirements under this

subsection, see section 309.”

(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT. — Section 315(a)(1)

of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 441a),

ee re ee oe ae

“subsection (i),” and inserting “subsection (i) and section

315A,”.

TITLE IV — SEVERABILITY; EFFECTIVE DATE

SEC. 401. SEVERABILITY.

If any provision of this Act or amendment made by this Act,

or the application of a provision or amendment to any person or

circumstance, is held to be unconstitutional, the remainder of

this Act and amendments made by this Act, and the application

of the provisions and amendment to any person or

circumstance, shall not be affected by the holding.

SEC. 402. EFFECTIVE DATES AND REGULATIONS.

(a) GENERAL EFFECTIVE DATE. —

(1) INGENERAL. — Except as provided in the succeeding

provisions of this section, the effective date of this Act, and the

amendments made by this .'\ct, is November 6, 2002.

ss, ee

62a

(2) MODIFICATION OF CONTRIBUTION LIMITS. —

The amendments made by —

(A) section 102 shall apply with respect to contributions

made on or after January |, 2003; and

(B) section 307 shall take effect as provided in subsection

(e) of such section.

(3) SEVERABILITY; EFFECTIVE DATES AND

REGULATIONS; JUDICIAL REVIEW. — Title IV shall take

effect on the date of enactment of this Act.

(4) PROVISIONS NOT TO APPLY TO RUNOFF

ELECTIONS. — Section 323(b) of the Federal Election

Campaign Act of 1971 (as added by section 101(a)), section

103(a), title I], sections 304 (including section 31 5(j) of Federal

Election Campaign Act of 1971, as added by section 304(a)(2)),

305 (notwithstanding subsection (c) of such section), 311, 316,

318, and 319, and title V (and the amendments made by such

sections and titles) shall take effect on November 6, 2002, but

shall not apply with respect to runoff elections, recounts, or

election contests resulting from elections held pnor to such

date.

(b) SOFT MONEY OF NATIONAL POLITICAL

PARTIES. —

(1) IN GENERAL. — Except for subsection (b) of such

section, section 323 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of

1971 (as added by section 101(a)) shall take effect on

November 6, 2002.

(2) TRANSITIONAL RULES FOR THE SPENDING OF

SOFT MONEY OF NATIONAL POLITICAL PARTIES. —

(A) IN GENERAL. — Notwithstanding section 323(a) of

the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (as added by

section 101(a)), if a national committee of a political party

descnbed in such section (including any person who is subject

to such section under paragraph (2) of such section), has

all

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received funds described in such section prior to November 6,

2002, the rules described in subparagraph (B) shall apply with

respect to the spending of the amount of such funds in the

possession of such committee as of such date.

(B) USE OF EXCESS SOFT MONEY FUNDS. —

(i) IN GENERAL. — Subject to clauses (ii) and (iii), the

national committee of a political party may use the amount

described in subparagraph (A) prior to January |, 2003, solely

for the purpose of —

(I) retiring outstanding debts or obligations that were

incurred solely in connection with an election held prior to

November 6, 2002; or

(I) paying expenses or retiring outstanding debts or

paying for obligations that were incurred solely in connection

with any runoff election, recount, or election contest resulting

from an election held prior to November 6, 2002.

(ti) PROHIBITION ON USING SOFT MONEY FOR

HARD MONEY EXPENSES, DEBTS, AND OBLIGATIONS.

— A national committee of a political party may not use the

amount described in subparagraph (A) for any expenditure (as

defined in section 301(9) of the Federal Election Campaign Act

of 1971 (2 U.S.C. pe etapa gma

obligations that were incurred for such an expenditure.

(iti) PROHIBITION OF BUILDING FUND USES. — A

national committee of a political party may not use the amount

described in subparagraph (A) for activities to defray the costs

of the construction or purchase of any office building or facility.

(1) INGENERAL. — Except as provided in paragraph (2),

the Federal Election Commission shall promulgate regulations

to carry out this Act and the amendments made by this Act that

are under the Commission's jurisdiction not later than 270 days

after the date of enactment of this Act.

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(2) SOFT MONEY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. — Not

later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the

Federal Election Commission shall promulgate regulations to

carry out title | of this Act and the amendments made by such

title.

SEC. 403. JUDICIAL REVIEW.

(a) SPECIAL RULES FOR ACTIONS BROUGHT ON

CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS. — If any action is brought

for declaratory or injunctive relief to challenge the

constitutionality of any provision of this Act or any amendment

made by this Act, the following rules shall apply:

(1) The action shall be filed in the United States District

Court for the District of Columbia and shall be heard by a 3-

judge court convened pursuant to section 2284 of title 28,

United States Code.

(2) A copy of the complaint shall be delivered promptly to

the Clerk of the House of Representatives and the Secretary of

the Senate.

(3) A final decision in the action shall be reviewable only

by appeal directly to the Supreme Court of the United States.

Such appeal shall be taken by the filing of a notice of appeal

within 10 days, and the filing of a jurisdictional statement

within 30 days, of the entry of the final decision.

¢*) It shall be the duty of the United States District Court

for we District of Columbia and the Supreme Court of the

United States to advance on the docket and to expedite to the

greatest possible extent the disposition of the action and appeal.

(b) INTERVENTION BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS. —

In any action in which the constitutionality of any provision of

this Act or any amendment made by this Act is raised

(including but not limited to an action described in subsection

(a)), any member of the House of Representatives (including a

Delegate or Resident Commissioner to the Congress) or Senate

65a

shall have the right to intervene either in support of or

opposition to the position of a party to the case regarding the

constitutionality of the provision or amendment. To avoid

duplication of efforts and reduce the burdens placed on the

parties to the action, the court in any such action may make

such orders as it considers necessary, including orders to require

intervenors taking similar positions to file joint papers or to be

represented by a single attorney at oral argument.

Any Member of Congress may bring an action, subject to the

special rules described in subsection (a), for declaratory or

injunctive relief to challenge the constitutionality of any

provision of this Act or any amendment made by this Act.

(a) APPLICABILITY. —

(1) INITIAL CLAIMS. — With respect to any action

initially filed on or before December 31 , 2006, the provisions of

subsection (a) shall apply with respect to each action described

in such section.

(2) SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS. — With respect to any

action initially filed after December 31, 2006, the provisions of

subsection (a) shall not apply to any a

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