Supplemental Appendix — McConnell v. Federal Election Commission

Supreme Court brief2003

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7 E

No. 02-1674 et al.

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

MITCH MCCONNELL et ai.,

Appellants,

V.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION et ai.,

Appellees.

On Appeal From The United States

District Court For The District of Columbia

SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX

TO JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENTS

VOLUME IV

FLOYD ABRAMS KENNETH W. STARR

SUSAN BUCKLEY _ Counsel of Record

BRIAN MARKLEY EDWARD W. WARREN

CAHILL GORDON & KANNON K. SHANMUGAM

REINDEL LLP KIRKLAND & ELLIS

80 Pine Street 655 Fifteenth Street, N.W.

New York, NY 10005 Washington, DC 20005

(212) 701-3000 (202) 879-5000

(additional counsel on inside cover) RECEIVED

June 2003 ~ 2004

WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. — (202) 789-0096 - WASHINGTONC# ie @QGR1y, 1. CLERK

SUPREME COURT, U.S.

KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN

559 Nathan Abbott Way

Stanford, CA 94305

(650) 725-9875

JAN WITOLD BARAN

THOMAS W. KIRBY

LEE E. GOODMAN

WILEY, REIN & FIELDING LLP

1776 K Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 719-7000

VALLE SIMMS DUTCHER

L. LYNN HOGUE

SOUTHEASTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, INC.

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Suite 3515

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G. HUNTER BATES

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Counsel in No. 02-1674

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Volume I

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Opinion of Judge Henderson...............ccccccsesesssesseseseeees 160sa

Volume II

Opinion of Judge Kollar-Kotelly..............ccccccceccsssesenees 479sa

Volume III

Opinion of Judge Kollar-Kotelly (continued) .............. 776sa

Volume IV

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1082sa

MEMORANDUM OPINION

LEON, District J.

The passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of

2002 (“BCRA”),’ as the record amply indicates, was a

considerable legislative achievement that many thought

would never come to pass. Indeed, the law constitutes the

most comprehensive reform of our national campaign finance

system in the past twenty-eight years. As such, it is the latest

chapter in the history of a longstanding and recurring problem

that our government has been wrestling with since the

administration of Theodore Roosevelt.

Titles I and Il of BCRA focus principally on a major

campaign finance development that has dramatically unfolded

over the past decade: the use of corporaie and union treasury

funds, either directly or through soft money donations to

political parties, to finance electioneering communications

masquerading, predominantly, as “issue ads.” In an attempt to

prevent actual and apparent corruption arising from the

funding of such sham issue advertisements, Congress enacted

a sweeping set of reforms that effectively: alters the

methodology of our national, state, and local parties and

transforms their relationship with each other; limits the ability

of corporations, unions, individuais, and interest groups to

engage in communications on public policy; and diminishes

the role of federal officeholders in fundraising for political

parties and nonprofit interest groups.

For the reasons set forth in the following opinion, I find

that the defendants have more than adequately demonstrated

the constitutionally necessary basis for Congress: (1) to

restrict the use of soft money donations by national, state, and

local parties to fund certain types of campaign

communications (particularly candidate-advocacy “issue”

' Pub.L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002).

— = | | —

| 1083sa

advertisements) which are designed to, and which do, directly

affect federal elections; and (2) to restrict the airing of

corporate and union electioneering communications which

promote, oppose, attack, or support specific candidates for the —

office which they seek.

Notwithstanding this coficlusion, however, I do not find

that the defendants have demonstrated a_ sufficient

constitutional basis to support Congress’s decision: (1) to ban

the solicitation, receipt, and use of soft money by national

parties for purposes that do not directly affect federal

elections; (2) to ban state and local parties from using soft

money to fund a variety of election activities that do not

directly affect federal elections; (3) to ban the use of

corporate and union treasury monies to fund genuine issue

advertisements that are aired during a particular time period

preceding election even though they do not directly advocate

the election or defeat of a federal candidate; (4) to ban

national parties from donating to and soliciting soft money

for certain Section 501(c) and Section 527 organizations

under the Internal Revenue Code; (5) to prohibit federal

officeholders from raising soft money for their national

parties; and (6) to require broadcast licensees to collect and

disclose certain records in connection with requests to

purchase broadcast time. To the contrary, I find that in trying

to do so Congress has unconstitutionally infringed upon the

First Amendment rights of the various political actors and

their supporters.

In short, the defendants, in my judgment, have been able to

establish in some respects, but not in others, a sufficient basis

for Congress’s intervention in dealing with these problems.

As to those where they succeeded, I believe it would make a

mockery of existing Supreme Court precedent and the

regulatory scheme that it has heretofore blessed, to hold

otherwise. As to those where they have not, the protections

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accorded the plaintiffs under the First Amendment more than

adequately warrant their undoing.

The following is a brief outline of my opinion, which has

been organized on a title by title basis. With respect to the

opinion itself, to the extent I have agreed with both the

judgment and reasoning of either of my colleagues (or both),

I have so noted and refrained from writing. As to those

sections where I have agreed only in the judgment of one or

more of my colleagues, I have limited the discussion of my

reasoning to that necessary to explain how I reached my

holding. To the greatest extent possible I have tried to

acknowledge and address any disagreements we have had

factually. However, in-light of the importance and enormity

of the record, I have included in my opinion a complete set of

my Findings of Fact which I relied upon in reaching my

judgments.

I. Title I: Restrictions on Nonfederal Funds New FECA

Sections 323(a), 323(b), 301(20)(a), 323(d), 323(e),

and 323(f)

A. New FECA Section 323(a): Nonfederal Fund

Restrictions on National Parties

I agree with Judge Henderson’s conclusion, although for

different reasons, that Congress, in essence, is constitutionally

prohibited from regulating a national party’s ability to solicit,

receive, or use nonfederal funds (i.e., soft money) for

nonfederal and mixed purposes. To the extent that Section

323(a) seeks to regulate donations to national parties that are

used for purposes that at the most indirectly affect federal

elections (i.e., nonfederal or mixed purposes), the defendants

have failed to demonstrate that Section 323(a) serves an

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important government interest, or even if they had, that it is

sufficiently tailored to serve that interest.

However, I find that Congress can restrict a national

party’s use of nonfederal money to directly affect federal

elections through communications that support or oppose

specifically identified federal candidates. Therefore, like

Judge Kollar-Kotelly, I find constitutional Congress's ban on

the use of nonfederal funds by national parties for Section

301(20)(A)(iii) communications. As a result, I concur in part

in, and dissent in part from, Judge Henderson’s judgment and

reasoning regarding Section 323(a).

1. Standard of Review for _Restrictions on

Donations to Political Parties

The right to freedom of political association under the First

Amendment is a fundamental right of donors to political

parties, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1976),” and

arguably of the political parties themselves, see FEC v.

Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. ( “Colorado

Il”), 533 U.S. 431, 448 n.10 (2001). Our national political

structure is firmly anchored by our two major parties. The

? In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, the Supreme Court declared that

“{ajn individual’s freedom to speak, to worship, and to petition the

government for the redress of grievances could not be vigorously

protected from interference by the State unless a correlative freedom to

engage in group effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed. 468

U.S. 609, 622, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984) (citing Citizens

Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley, 454

U.S. 290, 294, 102 S.Ct. 434, 70 L.Ed.2d 492 (1981)).

* See FEC v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (“Colorado

I”), 518 U.S. 604, 618, 116 S.Ct. 2309, 135 L.Ed.2d 795 = (noting

litical ies play an “important and legitimate ro‘e . . . in

ath decions" ‘aot v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 144-45, 106

S.Ct. 2797, 92 L.Ed.2d 85 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment)

(“There can be little doubt that the emergence of a strong and stable two-

party system in this country has contributed enormously to sound and

effective government .”); see also Findings of Fact (“Findings”) 20-26.

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role those national parties play in defining wide- -ranging

political agendas and bringing together individuals (and their

financial resources) on behalf of those political agendas is

critical to the stability our political system has enjoyed over

the past 200 years.*

Upon giving money to a political party, or to any political

organization for that matter, a donor hopes that the

organization will amplify his political perspective or

candidate preference.” Any number of activities by a political

party can amplify the donor’s political voice. Some activities,

like direct contributions to state candidates, are for a

nonfederal purpose because they have no effect on a federal

election. Others, like public communications that advocate

the election or defeat of a particular federal candidate, are for

a federal purpose because they directly affect federal

elections. And still others, like Seneric voter registration and

genuine issue advertisements,° are for “mixed purposes”

because they indirectly affect both state and federal elections.

Regardless of the purpose served, all of these party activities,

paid for with aggregated donations, express loudly, and often

effectively, the donor’s political position.’ For this reason, an

* See Caiifornia Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574, 120

S.Ct. 2402, 147 L.Ed.2d 502 (2000) (“Representative democracy in any

populous unit of governance is unimaginable without the ability of

citizens to band together in promoting among the electorate candidates

who espouse their political views. The formation of national political

parties was almost concurrent with the formation of the Republic itself.”

(citing Noble E. Cunningham, Jr., The Jeffersonian Republican Party, in |

History of U.S. Political Parties 239, 241 (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. ed.,

1973))).

* See, e.g., Findings 14-19.

* For a discussion of the distinction between genuine issue adver-

tisements and “sham” issue ads designed to directly affect a federal

candidate’s election, see Findings 288-89 and infra Parts I.A.3 & 1.B.2.

” See Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 453 (“{A] party combines its members’

power to speak by aggregating contributions and broadcasting messages

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individual’s donation to a political party is an act of political

association protected by the First Amendment. But as

important as this right is, it is not absolute.

The Supreme Court, in Buckley v. Valeo and ensuing

campaign finance cases, has recognized Congress’s power

through FECA * to regulate, in effect, the source and amount

of contributions to political parties and candidates that donors

could make for the purpose of influencing federal elections.

more widely than individual contributors generally could afford to do.”);

FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life (“MCFL” ), 479 U.S. 238, 261,

107 S.Ct. 616, 93 L.Ed.2d 539 (1986) (“[I}ndividuals contribute to a

political organization in part because they regard such a contribution as a

more effective means of advocacy than spending the money under their

own personal direction.”); Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 294

(“{Bly collective effort individuals can make their views known, when,

individually, their voices -would be faint or lost.”); id. at 296 (citing

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 65-66); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15, 22. Alexis de

Toqueville observed:

As soon as several of the inhabitants of the United States have

conceived a sentiment or an idea that they want to produce in the

world, they seek each other out; and when they have found each

other, they unite. From then on, they are no longer isolated men, but

a power one sees from afar, whose actions serve as an example; a

power that speaks, and to which one listens.

2 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 492 (Harvey C.

Mansfield & Delba Winthrop eds., 2000).

* Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (“FECA”), Pub.L. No. 92-

225, 86 Stat. 3 (1971 provisions) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C.

§§ 431 ef seq.)

* See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-35 (upholding contribution limitations to

candidates and their political committees); Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov't

PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 390-98, 120 S.Ct. 897, 145 L.Ed.2d 886 (2000)

(same); see also California Medical Ass'n v. FEC (“California

Medical” ), 453 U.S. 182, 197-99, 101 S.Ct. 2712, 69 L.Ed.2d 567 (1981)

(upholding contribution limitations to PACs). The Supreme Court has

never explicitly addressed limitations on contributions to political parties.

The $20,000, now $25,000, limit on contributions to national parties was

not even added to FECA until the post-Buckley 1976 amendments. See

ero ee ee .

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In enacting such contribution limitations Congress had to

demonstrate that it was doing so in furtherance of the

important government interest of preventing actual or

apparent corruption of either the officeholder or the federal

electoral system. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25; see, e.g., Citizens

Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of

Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 298-99 (1981); Nixon vy. Shrink

Missouri Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387-88 (2000).'° Indeed,

in addressing contribution limitations, preventing actual or

apparent corruption is the only government interest the

Supreme Court has found sufficient to interfere with

associational rights. FEC v. National Conservative Political

Action Comm. (“NCPAC” ), 470 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1985). In

Buckley, the Supreme Court explained:

To the extent that large contributions are given to secure

a political quid pro quo from current and potential office

holders, the integrity of our sysicm of representative

democracy is undermined . . . . Of almost equal concern

as the danger of actual quid pro quo arrangements is the

impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from

Pub.L. No. 94-283 § 320, 90 Stat. 475 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C.

§ 441a(a)(1)(B)); see also California Medical, 453 U .S. at 194 n. 15:

BCRA § 307(a)(2) (raising amount individuals can contribute to national

parties from $20,000 to $25,000); BCRA § 102 (raising amount

individuals can donate to state parties from $5,000 to $10,000); FECA

§ 315(a)(1); 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(D). Contribution limitations to parties,

however, have-been upheld indirectly, see Buckley, 424 U.S. at 38

(upholding FECA’s $25,000 limitation on total contributions, which

included “huge contributions to the candidate’s political party”), and in

dictum, see Colorado I, 518 U.S. at 617 (recognizing $20,000

contribution limit to political parties and citing 2 U.S.C. § 44 1a(a)).

’ If a contribution limitation survives a claim that it infringes

associational rights, then it also survives a speech challenge. See Shrink

Missouri, 528 U.S. at 388. Note also that the challenge based on the

donor’s associational right is “correlative” to an overbreadth challenge.

See id. at 388 n. 3.

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public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent

in a regime of large individual financial contributions.

424 U.S. at 26-27. In each case where the Supreme

Court upheld contribution limitations, see supra note 9,

the Court reviewed those limits under Buckley's “closely

drawn” scrutiny, a standard of review somewhat less

rigorous than strict scrutiny, by which “[elven a

significant interference with protected rights of political

association may be sustained if the State demonstrates a

sufficiently important interest and employs means

closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of

associational freedoms.” Buckley, 420 U.S. at 25

(internal quotations omitted); see also California

Medical Ass'n v. FEC (“California Medical” ), 453 U.S.

182, 196, 196 n.16 (1981).

Nevertheless, the plaintiffs argue, and Judge Henderson

agrees, that any limitation on a national party’s ability to raise

and use nonfederal money must pass muster under the strict-

scrutiny standard of review that the Supreme Court has

traditionally applied to analyze expenditures. See, @.g.,

Republican National Committee (“RNC”) Opening Br. at 51-

53. I disagree.

While I agree that Section 323(a)’s prohibitions on

soliciting, receiving, and using nonfederal funds restricts a

party’s ability to spend nonfederal money, their principal

effect is to limit the ability of future donors through their

contributions to use the national parties to amplify their

voices.'' Therefore, in determining to what extent Congress

' That is, Section 323(a) limits an individual, wishing to express his

political agenda, to donations of hard money up to $25,000, the limitation

on contributions to parties under FECA. 2 U.S.C. § 44 1a(a)(1)(B); see

also BCRA § 307(a)(2) (raising how much individuals can contribute to

national parties from $20,000 to $25,000).

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can limit donations to national and state parties,'? this Court

Should review the limitations using the closely-drawn

standard of review applied to contribution limitations in

Buckley, 420 U.S. at 25, and ensuing campaign finance

cases,'* in which the Court specifically acknowledged “that

restrictions on contributions require less compelling

justification than restrictions on independent spending.” FEC

v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (“MCFL” ), 479 U.S.

238, 259-60 (1986); see also Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at

387. The Supreme Court lowered the hurdle for contributions,

see Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 387-88, because restrictions

on contributions, in its judgment, impact associationalrights

less by leaving “the contributor free to become a member of

any political association and to assist personally in the

association’s efforts on behalf of candidates,” id. at 387

(quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22) (internal quotations

omitted), and by not preventing “political committees from

amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy,”

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21. Surely, these reasons for applying a

lower standard of scrutiny for donations to candidates and

their political committees are no less persuasive for analyzing

contributions to political parties.

The plaintiffs, nevertheless, maintain that in Citizens

Against Rent Control, which involved limitations on

contributions to political committees with the purpose of

Supporting or opposing ballot measures, 454 U.S. at 291, the

" This standard of review applies to all donation restrictions under

Title l of BCRA.

'* Since the practical effect is that any restriction on solicitation is

subsumed within the restriction on receipt of donations, which I maintain

should be reviewed under closely-drawn scrutiny, there is no reason to

apply a different standard of review for the solicitation restriction. In the

end, if the political parties are restricted from receiving nonfederal

donations for federal purposes, then they are restricted from soliciting

funds for those purposes as well.

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Supreme Court settled on_ strict-scrutiny review for

contribution limitations to political organizations.'* This

conclusion is not based on a close enough reading of the case.

While the plurality does suggest the undefined standard of

“exacting judicial scrutiny,” Citizens Against Rent Control,

454 U.S. at 294, 298, the three concurring justices either

specifically applied closely-drawn scrutiny, id. at 301

(Marshall, J., concurring), > or equated the plurality’s

“exacting scrutiny” with Buckley's closely-drawn scrutiny, id.

at 302 (Blackmun, J., & O’Connor, J., concurring). '° Thus, if

'4 See McConnell Opp’n Br. at 17; see also J. Henderson Op. at Part

IV.D.1.a.

'S Justice Marshall observed:

[T}his Court has always drawn a distinction between restrictions on

contributions, and direct limitations on the amount an individual can

expend for his own speech. . . . Because the Court’s opinion is silent

on the standard of review it is applying to this contributions

limitations, I must assume that the Court is following our consistent

position that this type of government action is subjected to less

rigorous scrutiny than a direct restriction on expenditures.

Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 301 (Marshall, J., concurring).

'© Although “exacting judicial scrutiny” is oft-cited, its parameters are

loosely defined in other cases as well. The Supreme Court, for example,

employed the phrase “exacting scrutiny” when reviewing FECA’s

disclosure requirements in Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64, explaining that the

government interest must be “sufficiently important,” id. at 66, and

“substantial,” id. at 80. To give another example: in First National Bank

of Boston v. Bellotti, the Supreme Court applied “exacting scrutiny” to

contribution and expenditures limitations on corporations; it stated that the

government must show a “compelling” interest, 435 U.S. 765, 786, 98

S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978) (quoting Bates v. City of Little Rock,

361 U.S. 516, 524, 80 S.Ct. 412, 4 L.Ed.2d 480 (1960)), and that the

interest must be “closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment,”

Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 786 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25). In any event,

since it is uncontroverted that preventing actual and apparent corruption is

a “compelling” government interest, see, e.g., NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 496-

97, the only remaining dispute is whether any donation restriction need be

“narrowly tailored” or “closcly drawn” to serve the compelling

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anything, Citizens Against Rent Control suggests that closely-

drawn scrutiny should apply, even if the political organization

is established exclusively for a purpose unrelated to federal

campaigns. Restrictions on national political parties, which

engage in both candidate-specific and _ issue-oriented

activities, do not deserve to be treated with greater vigilance.

Indeed, considering the standard of review adopted by the

Supreme Court in Citizens Against Rent Control and the fact

that contribution regulations are less jarring of associational

rights than are expenditure restrictions, restrictions on

donations to political parties should be similarly regulable if

they are closely drawn to serve the compelling government

interest of preventing corruption and its appearance.

2. Donations Used to Directly Affect Federal

Elections are Regulable by Congress

Section 323(a) of BCRA seeks to expand Congress’s

authority to regulate donations that by definition did not

appear to be regulable under FECA because, ostensibly, they

were not | given for the purpose of influencing federal

elections." It does so in sweeping fashion: national parties

“may not solicit, receive, .. . direct . . . transfer, or spend any

funds that are not subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and

reporting requirements of this Act.” BCRA § 101; FECA

§ 323(a); 2 US.C. § 441i(b)(1). Congress seeks this

expansion, principally, because the national parties have

increasingly, over the past decade, exploited a so-called

government interest in combating corruption. And Buckley, coupled with

the various opinions in Citizens Against Rent Control, seemingly

foreclose that question in favor of Buckley’ s closely-drawn scrutiny.

“— they had been intended by the donor to influence federal elections,

they should have been treated, at the time they were received, as federal

money. As stated earlier, the Supreme Court has, in effect, upheld

limitations on contributions to political parties, see supra note 9, and a

“contribution,” as defined by FECA, is a donation “for the purpose of

influencing any election for Federal office.” 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A)(i).

1093sa

“loophole” '* in FECA that fails to regulate the use of these

nonfederal. funds for various types of electioneering

communications that advocate the election or defeat of a

specifically identified candidate.”

The defendants contend that Congress, in its attempt to

close this “loophole,” can limit any donation to a national

party, regardless of the purpose for which it is used thereafter.

See Intervenors Opp’n Br. at 26. I disagree. The plaintiffs, on

the other hand, contend that Congress can only limit

donations that are funneled thereafter through the party as

coordinated expenditures, direct contributions to candidates,

or uncoordinated expenditures for express advocacy as

defined by the “magic words.” See, e.g., McConnell Opening

Br. at 36; McConnell Opp’n Br. at 25-26; see also Buckley,

424 U.S. at 44 n.52 (providing examples of “express words of

advocacy”). With that I disagree, as well. Both contentions

are calculatingly indifferent to what reason, and precedent,

have shown to be the only constitutionally viable antidote to

corruption or its appearance: restrictions on donations to

political parties based upon their use to directly affect federal

elections.” In this sense, from my perspective, the issue

'* This so-called “loophole” was created through Federal Election

Commission (“FEC”) advisory opinions. See McCain Dep. at 63 (stating

that BCRA will “close certain loopholes that have been opened by the

FEC, not through acts of Congress”); FEC Advisory Op.1995-25; FEC

Advisory Op.1979- 17; FEC Advisory Op.1978-10.

fs See, e.g., McCain Dep. at 192-93 (explaining that grassroots

activities are “the fundamentals of a democratic process” and that “it’s the

broadcast television and radio ads that we believe are what is the

problem”); Meehan Dep. at 218-19 (explaining that voter mobilization

efforts are “good for the system” and distinguishing those efforts from

candidate advocacy).

” Even the plaintiffs acknowledged that “[i]f BCRA limited only party

activities directly related to federal candidates, Defendants might have the

better argument.” California Democratic Party (“CDP)/California

Republican Party (“CRP”) Reply Br. at 9.

1094sa

before the Court is not whether Congress can limit donations

to political parties,” but to what extent it can do so.

In Shrink Missouri, the Supreme Court made it clear that

the amount of evidence needed to satisfy judicial scrutiny of

restrictions on associational rights depends on the “novelty

and plausibility of the justification raised.” 528 U.S. at 391.

Here, Congress relies upon the government interest of

preventing actual and apparent corruption to justify the

restrictions on nonfederal funds. When nonfederal funds are

being used by national parties for nonfederal or mixed

purposes, the government’s interest in preventing corruption

or its appearance to justify this restraint is so novel, and

implausible, that it requires a substantial amount of evidence

to withstand constitutional scrutiny. However, when

nonfederal funds are being used by national parties for the

federal purpose of directly benefitting the election of

candidates * through either express advocacy or “issue”

advocacy of the type defined in Section 301(20)(A)(iii),”’ the

government's use of that interest to justify congressional

intervention is neither novel, nor implausible, because the risk

of corruption, see infra Part 1.B.2, naturally flows from

”! See supra note 9.

” There is no disagreement that political parties use donations for

federal purposes. See Findings 30-52; see also Colorado II, 533 U.S. at

449 (“Parties are . . . necessarily the instruments of some contributors

whose object is . . . to support a specific candidate for the sake of a

position on one, narrow issue, or even to support any candidate who will

be obliged to the contributors.”). Political parties, inter alia, provide direct

contributions to candidates, see 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2)(A) (setting contri-

bution limit by political committees to candidates at $5,000); Buckley, 424

U.S. at 35-36, make expenditures in coordination with a federal candidate,

see § 441a(d) (setting party expenditure limits); Colorado II, 533 U.S. at

464 (upholding § 441a(d) only as applied to coordinated expenditures),

and spend money on uncoordinated candidate advocacy, both express and

nonexpress.

*’ See infra Part 1.B.2.

1095sa

circumstances where a donor’s contribution to a party is used

thereafter to directly benefit a candidate’s campaign. Indeed,

as I discuss at length in the later in relation to Section

301(20)(A)(iii), id., the record overwhelmingly demonstrates

that candidates are aware of who makes the large soft money

donations, and in many instafices, participate in raising

money from them. Furthermore, the record clearly establishes

that the public perceives that those large soft money donors

receive special access to the legislators and have special

influence on the legislative process. /d.

The notion that using donations for a federal purpose can

implicate corruption is consistent with Congress’s definition

of “contribution” in FECA: “any gift, subscription, loan,

advance, or deposit of money or anything of value made by

any person for the purpose of influencing any election for

Federal office.” 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A)(i) (emphasis added).

This definition of contribution was part of FECA when the

Supreme Court upheld contribution limitations in Buckley,

stating that a donation is regulable (that is, a “contribution )

because “it is connected with a candidate or his campaign,”

thus having “a sufficiently close relationship” to the

government interest in preventing actual or apparent

corruption. 424 U.S. at 78. Additionally, the contention that a

party’s use of a donation to influence a federal election is

conducive to-corruption, or its appearance, is also supported

by the widely accepted premise that Congress can restrict

donations used for party express advocacy as defined by the

so-called “magic words” requirement of Buckley. Indeed, the

plaintiffs concede as much,” and this is perfectly consistent

4 See, e.g., RNC Opp’n Br. at 37 (conceding that Buckley and its

progeny indicate that contributions to a party may be regulated and

subjected to a federal contribution limit “only to the extent the entity uses

the contributions for regulable activity,” which includes “independent

expenditures expressly advocating the election or defeat of federal

~ candidates”); id. (stating that money political parties receive for express

advocacy “may constitutionally be subjected to a federal contribution

1096sa

with the regulatory scheme that was propagated by the FEC.”

Surely, if donations used for express advocacy can be limited

to prevent corruption, then donations used for candidate

advocacy that is tantamount to express advocacy—assuming

some minimal “quantum of empirical evidence” of corruption

or its appearance, see Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 391—

should be regulable for the same reason.

The notion that Congress may limit donations based on

their use for certain purposes is also consistent with Supreme

Court precedent which intimates that donations closely

connected to a candidate’s campaign—even if they are not

direct contributions or coordinated expenditures—raise, at a

minimum, the specter of corruption. In First Bank of Boston

v. Bellotti, the Court rejected a Massachusetts statute

prohibiting corporations from making contributions or

expenditures to influence the vote on referendum proposals.

435 U.S. 765, 787- 95 (1978). In rejecting the statute, the

Court explained that the interests in preventing corruption and

thus preserving the integrity of the electoral process were not

served by limiting contributions and expenditures that

affected referendum discussion. /d. at 789-92. The Court

stated: “Referenda are held on issues, not candidates for

public office. The risk of corruption perceived in cases

involving candidate elections simply is not present in a

limit”); McConnell Opening Br. at 36, 37-38 (admitting that a

contribution to be used for activities that exclusively serve to get a

candidate elected, like express advocacy, can be corrupting).

*> See FEC Advisory Op. 1995-25 (not allowing use of nonfederal funds

to pay for any portion of party express advocacy). One of the reasons that

parties should not be able to fund uncoordinated express advocacy with

nonfederal funds is that if such a restriction did not exist, corporations and

labor unions could simply evade the limitations on their use of their

geneyal-treasury funds for express advocacy by funneling those funds

through the parties. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b; MCFL, 479 U.S. at 241-64

(upholding prohibition against using corporate treasuries to fund

uncoordinated expenditures for express advocacy).

1097sa

popular vote on a public issue.” /d. at 790. Alternatively, one

can infer that perceived corruption is likely to be present in

cases involving candidate elections.

The extent to which certain uses of donations create the

risk of corruption was also at issue in both California

Medical, 453 U.S. at 193-201, and Citizens Against Rent

Control, 454 U.S. at 292-300, where the Court considered

donations to organizations, not candidates. It is difficult to

reconcile these two cases without drawing the conclusion that

the Court was primarily concerned with the purpose for

which the organizations were using the donations.” In

California Medical, the Court held that Congress can restrict

the amount of donations to multicandidate political

committees “which advocate[] the views and candidacies of a

number of candidates.” 453 U.S. at 197. Multicandidate

political committees assuredly spend some of their funds on

“independent expenditures,” as the Court in California

Medical concedes, id. at 195-96, but the Court seemingly

concluded that those uncoordinated expenditures, by a

“multicandidate” political committee, are made on behalf of

candidates, whether direct contributions or uncoordinated

expenditures. See 2 U.S.C. § 44la(a)(4) (defining multi-

candidate political committee as a political committee “which

has received contributions from more than 50 persons, and. .

. has made contributions to 5 or more candidates for Federal

office.”). The Court said as much when it dismissed the

ACLU’s concerns that donation restrictions would hinder the

© Not surprisingly, the defendants rely on California Medical for the

proposition that Congress can regulate ali donations to political

organizations, see, e.g., RNC Opp’n Br. at 36; the plaintiffs equally rely

on Citizens Against Rent Control for their contention that Congress

cannot regulate any donations to such organizations, see, e.g., Gov't

Opening Br. at 65-66. Again, both positions sweep too far and cannot be

reconciled without parsing the Supreme Court’s rationales in the two

cases.

1098sa

PAC’s efforts to collectively express political views.

California Medical, 455 U.S. at 197 n.17. Restricting

contributions to committees like the one at issue in California

Medical, the Court maintained, is different than efforts to

regulate groups expressing common political views. /d. In

this sense, the nature of the organization—that it is

established solely to benefit federal candidates—was enough

to conclude that most, if not all, of its contributions and

expenditures were for the purpose, and had the effect, of

benefitting a federal candidate. Conversely, in Citizens

Against Rent Control, where the Court found that the City of

Berkeley could not restsict donations to political committees

that support or oppose ballot propositions, 454 U.S. at 295-

300, the organization was established exclusively to advocate

on behalf of a public issue, id. at 291 (explaining that the

issue before the Court was whether donations to associations

“formed to support or oppose ballot measures” could be

regulated). That the association was formed only to oppose a

public issue and that its speech was unrelated to candidates in

any way, id. at 296-98, led the Court to find that the

restriction “does not advance a legitimate governmental

interest significant enough to justify its infringement of First

Amendment rights,” id. at 299.

Of course, political parties are unique; they are neither

super multicandidate political committces formed entirely to

support candidates for federal office nor political associations

completely uninvolved_in candidate advocacy. Justice

Kennedy described political parties this way:

Political parties have a unique role in serving [the

principle of open, robust debate on public issues]; they

exist to advance their members’ shared political beliefs.

. A political party has its own traditions and

principles that transcend the interests of individual

candidates and campaigns; but in the context of

1099sa

particular elections, candidates are necessary to make the

party’s message known and effective, and vice versa.

Colorado I, 518 U.S. at 628 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the

judgment and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).”’ With

such varying purposes, national political parties merit a

hybrid treatment in regulating the funds donated to them.

Further, Colorado I and Colorado Il do not preclude

Congress from regulating donations that directly affect

federal elections, even if the parties use those funds

independently of the candidates ** and even if there is no

coordination between the donor and the candidate. In

Colorado I, the Supreme Court merely found that Congress

could not limit uncoordinated party expenditures. 518 U.S.

617. Indecc, the Court even reiterated that Congress has

every power to limit the amount of donations to parties that

are “used for independent party expenditures for the benefit

of a particular candidate.” 518 U.S. at 617. Thus, if anything,

Colorado I serves to bolster the proposition that Congress can

regulate donations used “for the benefit of a particular

candidate” because that is where “the greatest danger of

*” One Republican National Committee (“RNC”) official explained his

party this way:

The RNC achieves [its core principles} through three primary

means: (1) promoting an issue agenda advocating Republican

_ positions on issues of local, state, regional, national, and

international importance; (2) electing candidates who espouse these

views to local, state and national offices; and (3) governing in

accord with these views. . . . [T]he RNC often seeks to promote

Republican positions on important issues, even in contexts outside

elections.

Josefiak Decl. ¥ 22.

78 See J. Henderson Op. at Part IV.D.1.c (arguing that “Congress

cannot constitutionally regulate non-federal donations to political parties

if the funds are then spent independently of a candidate”).

1100sa

corruption” arises. /d.7” Reading Colorado | together with

Buckley, Bellotti, Citizens Against Rent Control, and

California Medical \eaves one with a clear impression:

donations used directly for the purpose of uncoordinated

federal activity, like express advocacy, can engender

corruption, or the appearance thereof,' and are therefore

regulable.” Finally, Colorado II, in which the Supreme

Court determined that Congress could limit the amount of

coordinated party expenditures, 533 U.S. at 440-65, is

relevant because it stands for the proposition that a

contribution by the party to the candidate, even absent

coordination between the donor and candidate, can be

regulated. Thus, donations to political parties used thereafter

for purposes that directly affect federal elections, such as

candidate “issue ads,” even if there is no coordination

between the donor and the candidates in advance of the

? The Supreme Court also noted that the opportunity for corruption

posed by nonfederal contributions to a party for certain activities, such as

supporting state candidates or voter mobilizations efforts, is “at best,

attenuated” because “[u]nregulated ‘soft money’ contributions may not be

used to influence a federal campaign.” Colorado I, 518 U.S. at 616. That

observation implies that if soft money were being used “to influence a

federal campaign,” the opportunities for corruption would be less

attenuated, perhaps even palpable. Also, note that the Supreme Court’s

observation that “[ujnregulated ‘soft money’ contributions may not be

used to influence a federal campaign,” id., preceded the 1996 explosion of

party candidate advocacy financed with nonfederal funds. See Mann

Expert Report at 17-21. From 1996 unti! the enactment of BCRA, the

parties used nonfederal funds for the exact purpose that the Supreme

Court stated those funds cannot be used for: “to influence a federal

campaign.” Colorado I, 518 U.S. at 616.

” See Jacobus v. Alaska, 182 F.Supp.2d 881, 889 (D.Alaska 2001)

(explaining that there is no appearance of corruption from political party

“donations of time, money and services ... not being made for nominating

and electing candidates” and holding that “donations to political parties

for purposes other than nominating or electing purposes (e.g., issue

advocacy, voter registration) may not constitutionally be considered

contributions subject to regulation . . . .”)

1101sa

donations to the party, should likewise be regulable. Common

sense and the evidence introduced by the defendants support

that conclusion. See infra Part 1.B.2. And, until such time as

Buckley and its progeny are overruled, allowing such

donations to occur without regulation is an affront to a

regulatory system that has been blessed by the Supreme Court

and in place since the adoption of the 1974 amendments

to FECA.

3. New FECA § Section 323(a) Uncon-

stitutionally Regulates the Use of Nonfederal

Funds for Nonfederal and Mixed Purposes

As sure as the evidence, legal precedent, and common

sense support Congress’s power to regulate the use of

nonfederal funds for federal purposes, they do not support

Congress’s effort to regulate nonfederal funds used for

nonfederal and mixed purposes. National parties need to raise

and use nonfederal funds for a variety of purposes.

Sometimes they raise and use nonfederal funds for the

nonfederal purpose of contributing to state and local

candidates in “off-year” elections when there are no federal

candidates on the ballot.*' Other times they need to raise and

* As one RNC official testified: “The RNC’s national focus should not

be misunderstood as a federal focus. Rather, given the RNC’s state- based

structure, it is not surprising that the RNC actually focuses many of its

resources on purely state and local election activity.” Josefiak Decl. ¢ 19. I

agree. In 1999 and 2001, the RNC contributed over $9.5 million dollars,

using nonfederal funds, directly to state and local candidates. Banning

Decl. 28(a); see also Findings 57-59 (explaining, inter alia, that five

states hold elections in odd-numbered years). For example, the RNC

contributed approximately $500,000 to the 1999 Republican gubernatorial

candidate in Virginia. La Raja Decl. ¢ 14. In the last two off-year

elections, the RNC also transferred over $10 million to state parties and

made over $1 million dollars in direct expenditures, bringing the total to

$21 million dollars, not including administrative overhead, spent on the

two elections where no federal candidates appeared on the ballot. Banning

Decl. § 28(a). In 2001 alone, the RNC spent $15.6 million on nonfederal

1102sa

use funds for mixed purposes that only indirectly affect the

election of federal candidates, such as generic voter

mobilization efforts and genuine issue advertisements.” The

activities (contributions to state and local candidates, transfers to state

parties, and direct spending). That $15.6 million dollars represented 30

percent of all nonfederal money raised that year by the RNC. See Hearing

Tr. (Dec. 4, 2002) at 43 (statement of Burchfield). Thus for elections in

which there is no federal candidate on the ballot, the RNC contributes

directly to state and local candidates, trains state and local candidates, and

funds communications calling for election or defeat of state and local

candidates. See id.; Josefiak Decl. 4 4 19, 41-59; La Raja Decl. 4 14; see

also Bok-.Cross Exam. at 34-35. Even defendants’ expert Thomas E.

Mann agreed that donations to a gubernatorial candidate in an odd-

numbered year is not something that is intended to affect a federal

election. Cross Exam. of Def. Expert Mann et 71.

Of course, the RNC made direct contributions to state and local

candidates during even-numbered years as well, see Josefiak Decl. 4 61,

and “sometimes devote[d] significant resources toward states with

competitive gubernatorial races even though the races for federal offices

[were] less competitive,” Josefiak Decl. ¥ 62.

* Portions of RNC transfers to state and local parties were used for

voter mobilization efforts. One RNC official testified that “RNC transfers

of non-federal funds to the state parties play a critical role in subsidizing

the activities of the state parties. The state parties depend on these funds to

pay for everything from their own administrative overhead to voter

mobilization, grass roots organizing, and media.” Banning Decl. 31; see

also Duncan Decl. {4 11-12. In 2000, for example, the RNC transferred

approximately $25 million in nonfederal funds to the Republican's

Victory Plans, which were plans tailored to each state’s needs and

designed to mobilize voters on behalf of all the candidates on the ticket.

Josefiak Decl. #4 2. 40. Money for the Victory Plans was not spent on

federal candidate “issue ads,” Josefiak Decl. ¢ 31, and was used primarily

to benefit state and local candidates, see Peschong Decl. 4{ 4, 8-9 (stating

that “the RNC typically provides a very substantial share of the funding of

State victory programs,” which are “programs designed to support the

entire Republican ticket, and frequently place more emphasis on high

profile state-wide races than on federal races, especially when no federal

candidate is running state-wide”). Other examples of mixed activities

include party newsletters, administrative overhead, training seminars on

1103sa

defendants do not deny that the national parties use

nonfederal funds for both nonfederal and mixed purposes that

at the most indirectly affect federal elections. They contend,

nonetheless, that nonfederal donations to national parties—

regardless of their use—create actual or apparent corruption.

See Intervenors Opp’n Br. at 26. To support that expansion of

Congress’s power in contravention of the First Amendment

rights of the donors and national parties, the defendants

would have to demonstiate that using nonfederal funds for

either nonfederal or mixed purposes gives rise to either

corruption or an appearance of corruption, such that the

blanket restriction on nonfederal funds is not overbroad. For

the following reasons, they have not done so.

First, the suggestion that the appearance of corruption, let

alone actual corruption, exists regardless of any perceived, or

actual, benefit to a federal candidate does not comport with

the conventional legal understanding of corruption and

apparent corruption. The Supreme Court has defined

corruption as something more than a quid pro quo

arrangement in which a legislator sells his vote for one or

more contributions to his campaign, see, e.g., Colorado Il,

533 U.S. at 440-41, as well as “improper influence” or

conduct by a donor that results in a legislator who is “too

compliant” with the donor, Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 389.

Of course, the Supreme Court has also recognized that

get-out-the-vote activities, and fundraising assistance to state and local

parties. See Findings 71-99.

Considering the national parties’ extensive involvement in so many

nonfederal and mixed activities, it is not surprising that the Supreme

Court has recognized that political parties do not use all of their donations

to affect federal elections, explaining in Colorado | that FECA permits

unregulated ‘soft money’ contributions for certain nonfederal and mixed

purposes. 518 U.S. at 616 (“We also recognize that FECA permits

unregulated “soft money” contributions to a party for certain activities,

such as electing candidates for state office, or for voter registration and

“get out the vote” drives.”) (internal citations omitted).

1104sa

Congress has an equally compelling government interest in

preventing the appearance of corruption in the public’s mind.

Id. at 390; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27. The reason for this is

simple: like corruption itself, the appearance of corruption

undermines the public’s confidence in our system of

government and frustrates participation in the political

process by causing the public to believe elected

representatives are not acting independently of the

individuals, corporations, and unions who contribute to

representatives’ campaigns and parties. Shrink Missouri, 528

U.S. at 390. Indeed, contribution limits to federal candidates

and parties were enacted, and have been upheld by the

Supreme Court, to prevent this very perception in the mind of

the public. /d.; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23- 35. And it has been

Congress’s province to set the dollar limit above which this

perception starts to ferment. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30;

Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 397. Thus, whether the

corruption is actual or perceived, every traditional and

accepted definition to date depends on the donor conferring,

or being perceived as having conferred, a benefit on the

candidate in return for something.”? In NCPAC, for example,

* See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25; NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 497; see also

Black's Law Dictionary 1261 (7th ed.1999) (translating quid pro quo as

“something for something”). Defense expert Donald P. Green explained

that corruption, whether quid pro quo or otherwise, “redound[s] to the

personal benefit of the candidate seeking to win election.” Green Expert

Report at 20. ;

Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s belief that, notwithstanding my statements to

the contrary, I am narrowly construing the definition of corruption as

“something akin to bribery” is, in my judgment, an inaccurate reading of

my opinion. See J. Kollar-Kotelly Op. at Part ITIL11.B.2.a.i. That said,

regardless of how you describe the acts by an officeholder that are

“contrary to their obligations of office,” NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 497; see,

e.g., Intervenors Opening Br. at 43 (“legislative effort”) (quoting Green

Expert Report at 23-24); Gov't Reply Br. at 15-16 (“access”); Shrink

Missouri, 528 U.S. at 389 (“politicians too compliant with the wishes of

large contributors”), the more telling portion of the corruption equation

1105sa

the Supreme Court defined corruption in the following way:

“Corruption is a subversion of the political process. Elected

officials are influenced to act contrary to their obligations of

office by the prospect of financial gain to themselves or

infusions of money into their campaigns.” 470 U.S. at 497.

Without financial gain to themselves or money into their

campaigns, why would candidates elect to act contrary to

their obligations? In short, since donations cannot logically

foster corruption, or its appearance, unless the candidate

benefits or appears to benefit in some way, donations to a

party with no prospect that they will be used to directly affect

the candidate’s election, cannot, absent substantial evidence

to the contrary, give rise to either actual or apparent

corruption.

Second, the defendants’ contention, in essence, that

Congress can regulate the use of soft money donations by

national parties for either nonfederal, or mixed, purposes is

equally unsupportable by the record and common sense. If a

national party uses nonfederal funds to support generic voter

registration, or to conduct training seminars for state parties

on get-out-the vote activities, the benefit to the federal

candidate, assuming his election is even being contested, is

attenuated at best, Colorado 1, 518 U.S. at 616, because it is

generic in nature and diluted among a far greater number of

state and local candidates. See infra Part I.B.1. No credible

evidence has been submitted by the defendants that

demonstrates that federal candidates either are, or are

perceived to be, indebted to donors as a result of such mixed-

for the purpose of understanding my opinion is the Supreme Court’s

description of the prospective benefit to the officeholder that supposedly

influences him to act: “the prospect of financial gain to themselves or

infusions of money into their campaign.” NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 497. Only

an actual or potential benefit of the kind described by the Supreme Court

can lure an officeholder into conduct sufficiently corrupting to warrant

Congress's regulation.

1106sa

purpose party activities.* Moreover, donations used for

generic issue advertisements that may be helpful to both state

and federal candidates, another example of a mixed-purpose

activity by a party that indirectly affects federal elections in a

way unlinked to any particular candidate’s election or re-

election, also do not foster actual or apparent corruption.

Political parties, like many other political organizations,

engage in noncandidate-related speech (i.e., genuine or pure

issue ads) to influence public opinion on issues of the day.”

“ Judge Kollar-Kotelly references in her opinion an identical statement

by officials of the four national party congressional committees describing

as “significant” the effect “that voter identification, voter registration and

get out the vote efforts” have on the election of federal candidates. See J.

Kollar-Kotelly Op. at Part III.11.B.2.b.ii. That “combined” statement is not

in my judgment proof per se that such efforts (either individually or

collectively) directly affect federal elections. Indeed, there is no

quantitative evidence in the record demonstrating the extent to which

voter registration, voter identification, and get-out-the-vote efforts assist

federal candidates, as opposed to the far greater number of state and local

candidates that appear on the ballot. Determining that, of course, is

exacerbated by the practical reality that congressional races in many states

are either noncompetitive, or uncontested. Simply stated, there is no way

of knowing the election impact value of what is considered “significant”

in the eyes of these party officials. Moreover, because these officials do

not specify which, if any, of these were “generic” efforts, there is no way

of knowing whether the activities to which they are referring were crafted

in a way to specifically turn out voters for particular federal candidates.

Of course, if they had been, they would not be permissible under this

Court’s ruling today. See supra Part 1.A.2 & infra Part I.B.2. As a result, I

accord limited probative value to these identical statements on this point.

5 See Josefiak Decl. 4 91(e) (“The RNC seeks to educate the public

about the positions for which the Republican Party stands .”); La Raja

Decl. 4 16 (“Political parties use nonfederal funds to develop and

disseminate political messages.”); Colorado I, 518 U.S. at 616

(recognizing that “a political party's independent expression . . . reflects

its members’ views about the philosophical and governmental matters that

bind them together”); id. at 629 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part) (explaining that political parties “exist to advance their

members’ shared political beliefs”)

1107sa

Just recently, for example, the RNC funded a generic issue

advertisement on the radio that touted the Republican’s

education proposal. It broadcasted the following:

Male: Every child can learn .. .

Female: . . . and deserves a quality education in a safe

school.

Male: But some people say some children can’t learn. . .

Female: . . . so just shuffle them through.

Male: That’s not fair.

Female: That’s not right.

Male: Things are changing. A new federal law says

every child deserves to learn.

Female: It says test every child to make sure they’re

learning and give them extra help if they’re not.

Male: Hold schools accountable. Because no child

should be in a school that will not teach and will not

change.

Female: The law says every child must be taught to read

by the 3rd grade. Because reading is a new civil right.

Male: President Bush’s No Child Left Behind Law.

Female: The biggest education reform and biggest

increase in education funding in 25 years.

Male: Republicans are working for better, safer schools

Female: . . . so no child is left behind.

Male: That’s right . . . Republicans.

Anncr: Learn how Republican education reforms can

help your children. Call .... Help President Bush and

leave No Child Behind.

Josefiak Decl. | 91(e) & Exhibit X. While pure issue

advocacy, like the above advertisement, can indirectly affect

a federal election,”® it is unlikely, and there is no evidence to

* See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 42-43, 43 n.50 (“Public discussion of public

issues . . . tend naturally and inexorably to exert some influence on voting

1108sa

the contrary, that candidates will feel indebted to those who

helped fund such advertisements. Moreover, the fact that state

and local parties would still be able to use nonfederal money

to engage in genuine issue advocacy *” serves to undermine

Section 323(a)’s complete ban on national parties being able

to do the same.” Lastly, if the above analysis is true with

regard to the inability to demonstrate even an appearance of

corruption when nonfederal funds are being used for mixed

purposes that indirectly affect a federal election, it is even

more true when the purpose is nonfederal and has no effect

on any federal candidate’s election or re-election. In short, the

at elections.” (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 875 (D.C. Cir.

1975))).

*” BCRA § 101; FECA § 323(b); 2 U.S.C. § 441i(b)(1); BCRA § 101;

FECA § 301(20)(A); 2 U.S.C. § 431(20)(A). The state and local parties

could also presumably use nonfederal funds for all other mixed activities

not included within Section 301(20)(A)’s definition of “federal election

activity.”

** In United States v. National Treasury Employees Union (“NTEU” ),

513 U.S. 454, 473-75, 115 S.Ct. 1003, 130 L.Ed.2d 964 (1995), the

Supreme Court rejected a complete ban on honoraria for government

employees because, in part, Congress exempted certain speeches that had

no nexus to the government employment, explaining that the exemption

“cast serious doubt on the Government’s submission” that the honoraria

was so “threatening ... as to render the ban a reasonable response to the

threat.” /d. at 473. The Court thus found that Congress’s exemption

undermined application of the ban to speeches without a connection to

government employment: “[a]bsent such a nexus, no corrupt bargain or

even appearance of impropriety appears likely.” /d. at 474; see also City

of Ladue v. Giileo, 512 U.S. 43, 52, 114 S.Ct. 2038, 129 L.Ed.2d 36

(1994) (observing that exemptions “may diminish the credibility of the

government's rationale for restricting speech in the first place”).

Further, Congress's decision to only restrict state and local parties from

using nonfederal funds for candidate advocacy, see BCRA § 101; FECA

§ 301(20) A) iii); 2 U.S.C. § 431(20)A)(iii), reinforces the premise that

actual or apparent corruption manifests only when there is a nexus to a

federal candidate.

1109sa

defendants have provided no legal basis to restrict a national

party's use of nonfederal funds for nonfederal purposes.

Third and finally, the defendants’ contention that

candidates, who raise soft money donations for their national

parties, regardless of their subsequent use, are indebted to the

donors due to “internal party benefits” they subsequently

receive for raising the nonfederal donations,” is equally

tenuous from both a theoretical and an evidentiary standpoint,

and, in any event, Section 323(a) remains insufficiently

tailored based on that justification to pass constitutional

muster. The defendants’ contention is theoretically flawed

because it proceeds from the premise that the corruption, or

appearance of corruption, necessary to warrant congressional

intervention can be satisfied by a federal candidate receiving

a benefit other than personal financial gain or direct

assistance, monetary or otherwise, to his election effort. The

Supreme Court has never defined corruption, or its

appearance, in those terms. As stated previously, the only

benefit the Supreme Court has based a finding on is “the

prospect of financial gain to themselves or infusiGns of

money into their campaigns.” NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 497.”

Even if the Court did, however, bless the notion that a

nonmonetary benefit from someone other than the donor

could, under the right circumstances, give rise to an

® See Intervenors Opp’n Br. at 26-27 (explaining that “without regard

to how soft money is ultimately spent, . . . the parties reward [federal

candidates and officeholders] for raising it” and that “success in the party

reinforces stature in the government because federal officeholders attain

leadership positions in Congress partly as a result of their success as

fundraisers” (citing Bumpers Decl. ¢§ 7-9)).

” Cf. Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-

Raising: Why Campaign Spending Limits May Not Violate the First

Amendment After All, 94 Colum. L.Rev. 1281, 1313 (1994) (“If

candidates did not stand to gain much for their own campaigns from the

money so raised, one doubts that party loyalties (or pressure) would lead

to excessive diversion of candidate time to [soft money] fund-raising.”’).

1110sa

indebtedness that the public could perceive as “corrupting”’ its

legislator’s independence, there is no evidence on this record

that such corruption has either occurred or is perceived by the

public to exist. The evidence relating to the appearance of

corruption, such as it is, only establishes that the public

believes there is a connection between large donations to

national parties and the influence and access the pubic

believes the donors receive. See infra Part I.B. It does not,

however, establish that this connection exists independent of

how the parties use the funds. If anything, the public’s regular

exposure to so-called “issue ads” sponsored by the parties and

crafted to help their candidates,*' combined with its lack of

knowledge of the difference between soft and hard money

and its lack of knowledge of the campaign finance regulations

(both of which have been demonstrated,’ should lead this

Court to reasonably infer that the public believes that these

donations are used in whole, on in part, by the parties to

directly help their candidates. It is that perceived benefit, in

my judgment, that gives rise to the public’s view that

officeholders, either out of gratitude, or in hope of similar

future contributions, provide increased access and influence

to those donors. And in light of the utter absence of evidence

on the record establishing -any other reason that the public

believes accounts for federal officeholders granting increased

influence and access to those who give large donations to

their party, this Court should infer the same. In any event, the

defendants’ argument is flawed because their supposed

internal-party-benefit rationale was not even relied upon by

Congress to limit the national parties use of nonfederal funds.

If it had been, Congress would have only restricted

*' These advertisements clearly show who funds the advertisements,

Stating in no uncertain terms at the end of each advertisement: “Paid for

by the Republican National Committee” or “Paid for by Republican Party

of Florida.” See, e.g., Findings 45 & 46.

* See Findings 264-67.

lllisa

nonfederal funds that federal candidates themselves solicited.

Thus, Section 323(a)’s sweeping restriction, even if

acceptable theoretically and factually based on the internal-

party-benefit rationale, is not sufficiently tailored to “alleviate

[the] harm in a direct and material way.” Turner

Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC (“Turner I”), 512 U.S. 622,

664 (1994).4

In sum, conduct which only indirectly affects a federal

election requires a greater degree of evidence of corruption,

Or appez.atice thereof, to warrant congressional regulation.

Thus, in vic absence of sufficient proof to warrant expanding

FECA in this direction, Congress may only prohibit the

national parties from using nonfederal money for federal

purposes such as those defined in Section 301(20)(A)(iii),

which are clearly designed to directly affect federal elections.

The use of nonfederal funds for nonfederal or mixed

purposes, which at the most indirectly affect federal elections,

is simply not regulable by Congress because it does not give

rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption. Thus

Section 323(a)’s complete ban on the use of nonfederal funds

is not closely drawn to serve the designated government

interest.

4. Severability of New FECA Section 323(a)

Because Section 323(a) prohibits all uses of nonfederal

funds by national parties, and because I only uphold

Congress’s power to prohibit the use of nonfederal funds for

federal purposes (as defined in Section 301(20)(A)(iii)), see

** It has also been suggested by one of the defendants’ witnesses that

Members of Congress raising soft money donations receive the additional

benefit of helping their parties retain control of Congress. See Hickmott

Decl. Exhibit A 4 18. Even assuming, arguendo, that this benefit is not too

attenuated to establish a sense of indebtedness to the large party donors, it

is severely undercut if the parties cannot, as we have held, use large

nonfederal donations to directly assist the election and re-election of their

members. See supra Part 1.A.2 & infra Part 1.B.2.

1112sa

infra Part 1.B.2, a considerable issue is presented as to

whether we can isolate and uphold that prohibition from the

remaining undefined, unconstitutional prohibitions in Section

323(a) in a manner consistent with both the severance clause

and Supreme Court precedent. For the following reasons, |

believe we can and should.

It is a “cardinal principle” of statutory construction to save

as much of a statute as possible. See NLRB v. Jones &

Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937) (Hughes, C.J. ye

Indeed, Congress itself in Section 401 of BCRA provided us

with a severability clause which directed us to do as much.”

In attempting to save a statute, however, the Supreme Court

has made it clear that a court must take great pains to avoid

“ See also Edward J. Debartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. &

Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575, 108 S.Ct. 1392, 99 L.Ed.2d

645 (1988) (“([E]very reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order

to save a statute from unconstitutionality.” (quoting Harper v. California,

155 U.S. 648, 657, 15 S.Ct. 207, 39 L.Ed. 297 (1895))); Regan v. Time,

Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652, 104 S.Ct. 3262, 82 L.Ed.2d 487 (1984) (“[A]

court should refrain from invalidating more of the statute than is

necessary.”); Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 186, 242, 116

S.Ct. 1186, 134 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining

that a court is required to find a “limiting construction or partial

invalidation” that will “remove the seeming threat or deterrence to

constitutionally protected expression” (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma,

413 U.S. 601, 613, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973))); see also

Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 504, 105 S.Ct. 2794, 86

L.Ed.2d 394 (1985) (observing that a statute should be “declared invalid

to the extent it reaches too far, but otherwise left intact’).

*S The severability clause states: “If any provision of this Act or

amendment made by this Act, or the application of a provision or

amendment to any person or circumstance, is held to be unconstitutional,

the remainder of this Act and the amendments made by this Act, and the

application of the provisions and amendment to any person or

circumstance, shall not be affected by the holding.” BCRA § 401.

1113sa

“rewriting” the statute.“ Thus, a severability clause, due in

part to separation of powers concerns, is merely an “aid,” not

a “command,” to the judiciary. Nonetheless, the Supreme

Court has frequently found statutory provisions uncon-

Stitutional (or constitutional) as to particular applications

without invalidating (or validating) the entire provision.*’ In

the campaign finance arena, the Supreme Court in Colorado |

and Colorado II did not object to severing applications of

Section 441a(d), a FECA provision that caps how much

“ See Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 464, 111 S.Ct. 1919,

114 L.Ed.2d 524 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (“The canon of construction

that a court should strive to interpret a statute in a way that will avoid an

unconstitutional construction is useful in close cases, but it is ‘not a

license for the judiciary to rewrite language enacted by the legislature.’”

(quoting U.S. v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 611, 109 S.Ct. 2657, 105-

L.Ed.2d 512 (1989))); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’ n v. Schor, 478

U.S. 833, 841, 106 S.Ct. 3245, 92 L.Ed.2d 675 (1986) (“Although this

Court will often strain to construe legislation so as to save it against

constitutional attack, it must not and will not carry this to the point of

perverting the purpose of statute . . . or judicially rewriting it.” (quoting

Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 515, 84 S.Ct. 1659, 12

L.Ed.2d 992 (1964) (internal quotations omitted))); United States vy.

Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 680, 105 S.Ct. 2897, 86 L.Ed.2d 536 (1985)

(explaining any attempt “to rewrite language enacted by the legislature . . .

while purporting to be an exercise of judicial restraint, would trench upon

the legislative powers vested in Congress by Article I, § 1, of the

Constitution” (citing Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 741-42, 104 S.Ct.

1387, 79 L.Ed.2d 646 (1984))); In re Espy, 800 F.3d 501, 505

(D.C.Cir. 1996).

” See, e.g., Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 763, 113 S.Ct. 1792, 123

L.Ed.2d 543 (1993) (rejecting a broad ban on solicitation only as applied

to the business context); Brockett, 472 U.S. at 502-07, 504 (partially

invalidating moral nuisance law “only insofar as the word ‘lust’ is to be

understood as reaching protected materials”); United States v. Grace, 461

U.S. 171, 175, 183, 103 S.Ct. 1702, 75 L.Ed.2d 736 (1983) (invalidating

prohibition of speech activities on Supreme Court grounds “as applied to

the public sidewalks”); see also NTEU, 513 U.S. at 487 (O’Connor, J.,

concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (citing

examples).

1114sa

political parties can spend.” In Colorado I, the Supreme

Court invalidated Section 44la(d) as applied to

uncoordinated, or independent, expenditures. 518 U.S. at 613-

20. It then remanded the question of whether Section

441a(d)’s application to coordinated expenditures was

constitutional, directing the lower. courts to determine

“whether or not Congress would have wanted [Section

441a(d)’s] limitations to stand were they to apply only to

coordinated, and not to independent, expenditures.” /d. at

625-26. On remand the district court found that Section

441a(d)’s application to coordinated expenditures was

severable from its application to uncoordinated expenditures.

41 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1206- 07 (D. Co. 1999). The district

court found the two applications severable because of the

“strong” severability provision, which is almost identical to

the provision at issue here, and because there was “no

evidence” that Congress would not have rejected Section

441a(d) as applied to coordinated party expenditures. Id. at

1207. Both the Tenth Circuit and the Supreme Court, noting

that the severability argument was not renewed upon appeal,

let the district court’s decision stand. Colorado II, 533 U.S. at

440 n.5; FEC v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign

Comm., 213 F.3d 1221, 1225 n.3 (10th Cir. 2000). In the end,

though the language in Section 441a(d) makes no reference to.

coordinated or uncoordinated expenditures, the Supreme

Court upheld certain applications of the provision

(coordinated party expenditures) but invalidated other

applications (uncoordinated party expenditures).

“ Specifically, Section 441a(d) states that political parties “may not

make any expenditure in connection with the general election campaign of

a candidate in Federal office in a State who is affiliated with such party

which exceeds” $10,000 in a House campaign and, in a senatorial

campaign, the greater of $20,000 or “2 cents multiplied by the voting age

population of the State.” 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(3).

1115sa

Typically the Supreme Court invalidates specific

applications, while letting others stand, when it can

confidently discern congressional intent. In one recent case

where the Supreme Court refused to limit the application of a

statute which banned all honoraria to government employees,

United States v. National Treasury Employees Union

(“NTEU” ), 513 U.S. 454, 479 (1995), it did so because it was

faced with considerable uncertainty as to how Congress

would have defined the honoraria restriction if it had known

the complete ban on honoraria would have been rejected as

unconstitutional. /d.*” For a number of reasons, we do not

have that problem here.

* The Court in NTEU shied away from a limiting construction, in part,

because it could not be sure that it “would correctly identify the nexus

Congress would have adopted in a more limited honoraria ban.” 513 U.S.

at 479. “[Djrawing one or more lines between categories of speech

covered by an overly broad statute, when Congress has sent inconsistent

signals as to where the new line or lines should be drawn, involves a far

more serious invasion of the legislative domain.” /d. at 479 n. 26. The

Court echoed this concern in Reno v. ACLU, where it refused to apply a

tailoring construction to provisions seeking to protect minors from

“indecent” and “patently offensive” internet communications. 521 U.S.

844, 883-88, 117 S.Ct. 2329, 138 L.Ed.2d 874 (1997). It found that, in a

facial chailenge, a court “may impose a limiting construction on a statute

only if it is ‘readily susceptible’ to such a construction.” Jd. at 884

(quoting Virginia v. American Bookseller's Ass'n., Inc., 484 U.S. 383,

397, 108 S.Ct. 636, 98 L.Ed.2d 782 (1988)). The Supreme Court

Suggested that a statute is “readily susceptible” for a limiting construction

when the statute provides “guidance ... for limiting its coverage” and “the

text or other source of congressional intent identified a clear line that this

Court could draw.” Reno, 521 U.S. at 884.

Justice O’Connor, in her dissent in NTEU, lamented that “a court

should not [ | throw up its hands and despair of delineating the area of

unconstitutionality” and that it is “inconsistent with congressional intent

to strike a greater portion of the statute than is necessary to remedy the

problem at hand.” 513 U.S. at 486-89 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the

judgment in part and dissenting in part); see also id. at 501-03 (Rehnquist,

C.J., dissenting) (describing the majority’s remedy as an “O. Henry

ending”).

1116sa

First, with regard to Title I, Congress’s intent, based on

both the severability clause and the text of the statute, is

unambiguous. The clause itself, of course, directs that the

Court save “the application of the provisions ... to any person

or circumstance.” BCRA § 401. However, as_ stated

previously, such a clause only creates a presumption of

severability.~ It does not relieve this Court of its obligation to

determine if the limiting construction of Section 323(a) can

stand alone, and if Congress would have enacted such a

construction knowing that its broader position would be held

unconstitutional.°' With regard to both the former and the

latter, Congress, by defining “federal election activity” in

Section 301(20)(A)(iii) to include certain communications

which directly affect federal elections and by constitutionally

prohibiting state parties from engaging in such activity in

Section 323(b), has unequivocally indicated its intent that

such activity—as defined—would be among the undefined

uses of nonfederal funds that national parties were similarly

being prohibited from engaging in under Section 323(a). To

conclude otherwise would be to turn a blind eye to an obvious

” See Reno, 521 U.S. at 884 n. 49 (explaining that “[iJn part because of

separation-of-powers concerns, we have held that a severability clause is

‘an aid merely; not an inexorable command’” (quoting Dorchy v. Kansas,

264 U.S. 286, 290, 44 S.Ct. 323, 68 L.Ed. 686 (1924))); Alaska Airlines,

Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 686, 107 S.Ct. 1476, 94 L.Ed.2d 661 (1987);

Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Turner, 893 F.2d 1387, 1394

(D.C.Cir.1990) (agreeing that “‘the ultimate determination of severability

will rarely turn on the presence or absence” of a severability clause

(quoting United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 585 n. 27, 88 S.Ct. 1209,

20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968))).

*! See Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S.

172, 191, 119 S.Ct. 1187, 143 L.Ed.2d 270 (1999) (“Unless it is evident

that the legislature would not have enacted those provisions which are

within its power, independently of that which is not, the invalid part may

be dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law.” (quoting Champlin

Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n of Okla., 286 U.S. 210, 234, 52 _

S.Ct. 559, 76 L.Ed. 1062 (1932))); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 108-09 (same).

1117sa

reason why Sections 323(b) and 301(20)(A) were written in

the first place: to prohibit donors (especially corporations and

unions) and the national parties from circumventing Section

323(a) by funneling soft money through state and local

parties for Section 301(20)(A) purposes. By limiting the

prohibited uses of nonfederal funds by national parties in

Section 323(a) to communications of the kind defined by

Congress in its own words in 301(20)(A)(iii), I am neither

employing a saving construction that “rewrites” Section

323(a), nor ignoring Congress’s clear intention to save an

implicit feature of that section consistent with BCRA’s

severance clause admonition.

Finally, by applying Section 301(20)(A)(iii), which I hold

to be constitutionally acceptable for Section 323(b), see infra

Pari 1.B.2, to define the prohibited conduct in Section 323(a),

I avoid the Supreme Court’s additional concern of creating a

* See, e.g., 145 Cong. Rec. $2138 (Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen.

McCain) (“Closing the [state and local party] loophole is crucial to

prevent evasion of the new federal rules.”); 147 Cong. Rec. $2928 (Mar.

27, 2001) (Sen.Schumer) (“[R Jegulating soft money without dealing with

the soft money that goes to State parties is like the person who drinks a

Diet Coke with his double cheeseburger and fries: It does not quite get the

job done.”); 145 Cong Rec. H8275 (Sept. 14, 1999) (statement of Rep.

Kaptur) (stating that banning nonfederal funds for national parties but

allowing it for state parties is “like bolting the front door to protect

yourself from burglars while hanging a neon sign on the back door that

says, ‘Come on in” *); 144 Cong. Rec. H7323 (Aug. 6, 1998) (statement

of Rep. Roukema) (stating that allowing state parties to use federal funds

creates a “loophole large enough to drive an armored car stuffed with

campaign cash through.”); Brock Decl. ¢ 8; Rudman Decl. ¢ 19; see also

Gov't Opening Br. at 53 (“Section 323 contains several interrelated

provisions designed to eliminate solicitation, contribution, and use of

unregulated soft money by federal candidates, federal officeholders, and

national political parties.”); Gov't Opening Br. at 103 (“Any successful

attempt to limit national party soft money activity must perforce prevent

easy evasion through surrogates such as state and local parties.”) (citing

Mann Expert Report at 31).

¢ 1118sa

definition the constitutionality of which has not been

decided.** Accordingly, for all of the above reasons, I find

that Section 323(a)’s implicit prohibition on national parties

to use nonfederal money to fund communications of the kind

defined in Section 301(20)(A)(iii) is constitutionally

severable from its remaining unconstitutional applications.

B. New FECA Sections 323(b) and 301(20)(A):

Restrictions on Nonfederal Funds for “Federal

Election Activities”

Unlike Section 323(a)’s total ban on the use of nonfederal

funds by national parties, Section 323(b) only prohibits state

parties from using nonfederal funds for certain “federal

election activities,” BCRA § 101; FECA § 323(b); 2 U.S.C.

§ 441i(b)(1), which it defines in Section 301(20)(A). BCRA

§ 101; FECA § 301(20)(A); 2 U.S.C. § 431(20)(A). Thus, in

order to assess the constitutionality of the restraint on the

state parties in Section 323(b), we have to simultaneously

assess the constitutionality of Section 301(20)(A)’s definition

of federal election activity.

Section 301(20)(A) defines federal election activity to

include: (1) voter registration activity during the period 120

days before a regularly scheduled federal election; (2) “voter

identification, get-out-the-vote activity, or generic campaign

activity conducted in connection with an election in which a

candidate for Federal office appears on the baliot”; (3) “a

public communication that refers to a clearly identified

candidate for Federal office . . . and that promotes or supports

* See NTEU, 513 U.S. at 479 (refusing to adopt a limiting con-

struction, in part, because its judicial obligation was to avoid

“independent constitutional concerns”); see also Ashwander v. TVA, 297

U.S. 288, 346-47, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (“The Court will not

‘anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of

deciding it.” (quoting Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. Steamship Co. v.

Emigration Comm’ rs, 113 U.S. 33, 39, 5 S.Ct. 352, 28 L.Ed. 899 (1885))).

1119sa

a candidate for that office, or attacks or opposes a candidate

for that office (regardless of whether the communication

expressly advocates a vote for or against a candidate)”; and

(4) services provided by a state or local party committee

employee who spends more than twenty-five percent of that

individual’s compensated time “on activities in connection

with a Federal election.” BCRA § 101; FECA § 301(20)(A);:

2 U.S.C. § 431(20)(A).

Only Section 301(20)(A)(iii), however, describes conduct

which is targeted exclusively at federal elections and which

directly affects federal elections. Accordingly, for the reasons

set forth below, I find that Section 323(b) and Sections

301(20)(A)(i), (ii), and (iv) are substantially overbroad in that

they seek to restrain state parties from using nonfederal funds

for election activities, which only indirectly affect federal

elections, and thus do not give rise to the appearance of

corruption necessary to warrant congressional intervention.

As to Section 301(20)(A)(iii), however, I find that it is

constitutionally permissible because, by contrast, it focuses

on election activities that directly affect federal elections and

as such, give rise to the appearance of corruption necessary to

warrant Congress’s restraint on the First Amendment rights of

the donors.

1. New FECA Sections 323(b) and

301(20)(A)(i), (ii), and (iv)

Section 323(b) is premised, in part, on the congressional

belief that certain mixed-purpose activities by state parties,

when funded with nonfederal funds, sufficiently affect federal

elections that they give rise to an appearance of corruption

between the donors and the candidates whose campaign

receives the benefit of these activities. 1 disagree. Setting

aside the considerable issue of whether the Elections Clause,

1120sa

U.S. Const. art. I, § 4; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 13 & n.16,*

be fairly read to allow Congress to regulate state party

activities such as those defined in Sections 301(20)(A)(i), (ii),

and (iv), see CDP/CRP Opening Br. at 20-27, the justification

and evidence submitted here fail to establish that those

provisions serve a sufficient government interest to justify an

infringement on First Amendment rights.

The Supreme Court pointed out in Colorado | that “the

opportunity for corruption posed by” nonfederal funds for

mixed-purpose activities like voter registration and get-out-

the-vote “is, at best, attenuated.” 518 U.S. at 616. Though

dictum it may be, it is particularly telling. See Central Green

Co. v. United States, 531 U.S. 425, 431 (2001) (“dicta ‘may

be followed if sufficiently persuasive’ but are not binding”

(quoting Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S.

602, 627 (1935))). One can infer from the Supreme Court’s

plain statement that the opportunity for corruption is less

because there is no clear link between donations used for

these predominantly generic activities and whatever benefit

accrues to the candidate.

When nonfederal funds go to political parties, not

candidates, and are spent for purposes that do not directly

affect federal elections, there is less concern about donors

having quid pro quo arrangements with candidates. Indeed,

given that Section 301(20)(A)(iii) prevents communications

that promote federal candidates, the activities defined in

Sections 301(20)(A)(i) and (ii) are necessarily “generic” or

specific only to a nonfederal candidate: that is, these activities

are not directed at a specific federal candidate.*° Conversely,

“4 Because 1 find these sections and Section 323(a) (aside from

nonfederal funds used for federal activities) unconstitutional based on the

First Amendment, I need not reach either the federalism or equal-

protection claims.

‘5 Under the pre-BCRA regime, political parties could not use any

nonfederal funds if the voter mobilization effort supported or opposed “a

1121sa

such activities potentially assist a considerably larger number

of state and local candidates that greatly outnumber the one,

or possibly two, federal candidates on the ballot,” many of

whom invariably run unopposed or in clearly noncompetitive

races. There is also evidence that state and local parties

undertake voter mobilization efforts principally for state and

local candidates,”’ mostly from nonfederal money they raised

specific candidate.” See 11 C.F.R. § 106.5(a)(2)iv). And in BCRA,

generic campaign activity is defined as “a public communication that

promotes or opposes a political party and does not promote or oppose a

clearly identified Federal candidate or a non-Federal candidate,” BCRA

§ 101(b); 2 U.S.C. 431(21); 11 C.F.R. § 100.25 (67 Fed.Reg. 49,111 VJuly

29, 2002)), and “get-out-the-vote” is defined as “contacting registered

voters . . . to assist them in engaging in the act of voting,” regardless of a

reference to a federal candidate. See 11 C.F.R. § 100.24(a)(3). In any

event, get-out-the-vote or voter registration activities employing a “public

communication,” which is defined broadly to include everything from

telephone banks to mass mailings, see BCRA § 101(b); 2 U.S.C. 431(22);

11 C.F.R. § 100.26, that promotes or attacks a clearly identified federal

candidate, see BCRA § 101; FECA § 301(20,A iii); 2 U.S.C.

§ 431(20)A)iii), would not be allowed if Section 301(20)A)(iii) is

upheld. See also Bowler Decl. { 20(b) (noting that California Democratic

Party’s (“CDP’s”) direct mail programs typically do not mention federal

candidates); Erwin Aff. ¢ 9 (explaining that “(t]he overwhelming amount

of [voter registration] activity is ‘generic’ voter registration activity urging

9

potential registrants to ‘Register Republican’”).

* See Bowler Decl. 44 13, 15 (explaining that in the 2002 cycle, where

the only federal office on the California ballots was a congressional race,

administrative expenses were required to be allocated 12.5 percent federal

and 87.5 percent nonfederal based on the ballot composition formula).

California holds elections for 120 legislative officers, eight statewide-

elected officers, and four members of the State Board of Equalization. It

also holds elections for judicial offices, local offices, and ballot measures

at both the state and local levels. See id. ¢ 13; Erwin Aff. ¢ 5.

*’ See Findings 113-37, 150-54. The CDP spent more money for voter

registration in 1998, a year with eight statewide elections, than in 2000, a

presidential election year. Bowler Decl. ¢ 20.2: see also Erwin Aff. { 14.

(stating that “voter registration activities are primarily driven by the desire

to affect State and local races”).

1122sa

on their own,>* and in elections where the federal candidates

are practically uncontested.”

In light of this focus on state and local candidates, there is

every reason for this Court to doubt whether the federal

candidates themselves would view such generic activities by

state and local parties as sufficiently helpful to their

campaigns as to warrant even a token sense of indebtedness

to the soft money donors to the political parties. The

evidence, such as it is, regarding Sections 301(20)(A)(i) and

(ii) activities fails to demonstrate either the degree of effect

such activities have on the federal candidate’s re-election, or

the existence of a public perception that donations used to

fund such efforts create a sense of indebtedness between the

federal candidate and those who make large donations to the

party. That there is no evidence that the public perceives

corruption in these circumstances is not surprising. Since the

public would expect state parties to engage in such voter

mobilization efforts for the benefit of all of its candidates, we

can, and should, reasonably infer that the public would

™ See also Bowler Rebuttal Decl. {¥ 3-4 (explaining that the CDP pays

for much of its voter registration and get-out-the-vote activities with

money raised by the state party); Bowler Decl. § 12 (explaining that in the

1999-2000 election cycle, the CDP raised $15,617,002 in nonfederal

funds, which it used to fund state and local activities). The amount of

nonfederal money the California Republican Party (“CRP”) and CDP

_ raised themselves is much more than the nonfederal funds they received

from national-party transfers. CDP/CRP 1171 (in the 1999-2000 election

cycle, which was a presidential election cycle, only 19.1 percent of all

CRP nonfederal money was from national-party transfers); CDP/CRP 35,

37, 39 (in 2000, only 36 percent of all CDP nonfederal money was from

national-party transfers). While the state and local parties may spend most

of their nonfederal national-party transfers on candidate advocacy, they

spend very little of their overall nonfederal funds on such activities.

® For example, the CDP actively registered over 300,000 Democratic

voters throughout California during 2002 even though there was only one

competitive congressional race out of 52 races. See Bowler Decl. § 20.a:

Torres Decl. ¢ 8.

1123sa

correspondingly view a federal candidate’s sense of

indebtedness, if any, to be diluted among the numerous state

and local candidates who equally benefit from these

activities. See Feingold Dep. at 126- 27 ¢acknowledging that

soft money being used for generic campaign activity is less

likely to create an appearance of corruption). Such

uncertainties are hardly a sufficient basis from which to

allege that precluding state and local parties from using

nonfederal funds for mixed-purpose activities serves the

government interest in preventing corruption, or its

appearance. Thus, in the absence of a substantial evidentiary

showing to the contrary, it is “mere conjecture,” Shrink

Missouri, 528 U.S. at 392, by the defendants that an

appearance of corruption arises from donations to state

parties, or transfers from national parties, that are used for

these generic or noncandidate-specific activities set forth in

Sections 301(20)(A)(i) and (ii).

Finally, even if the defendants had demonstrated that some

mixed-purpose activities do somehow create an appearance of

corruption, Sections 301(20)(A)(i), (ii), and (iv) are not

sufficiently tailored to be constitutionally acceptable. By

limiting donations for so many unmistakably noncorrupting

activities, like donations for voter registration on behalf of

state candidates, these sections extend too far. It is simply not

enough to claim that just because the use of a donation has

some effect on a federal election, it must be completely

funded with federal funds.” To reach such a conclusion

would inevitably sweep in too many activities that deserve

First Amendment protection. Section 301(20)(A)(iv)’s

“ Cf. Robert Post, Regulating Election Speech Under the First

Amendment, 77 Tex. L.Rev. 1837, 1842 (1999) (“It is surely the case that

election speech affects elections, but so does all public discourse. If all

that were necessary to bring speech within the authority of a managerial

domain were that the speech produce effects on the domain, nothing much

would be left of public discourse.”).

1124sa

percentage based definition of the amount of time a party

official must spend in connection with a federal election,

BCRA § 101; FECA § 301(20)(A)(iv); 2 U.S.C.

§ 431(20)(A)(iv), provides the starkest example of this

insufficient tailoring. If a state party employee spends 26

percent of his compensated time “in connection with a

Federal election,” then his entire salary must be paid using

federal funds. Clearly, 74 percent of the employee's

compensated time, which has no relation whatsoever to a

federal election, is being regulated. There is no adequate basis

in the record before us to determine whether the nature of his

conduct sufficiently impacts the election to give rise to an

appearance of corruption between the donors who may be

funding his efforts through the state party and the candidate

receiving the benefit of his services. Thus, even if Sections

301(20)(A)(i), (ii), and (iv) served to prevent some

appearance of corruption, they are not drawn closely enough

to survive scrutiny.

2. New FECA Section 301(20)(A)(iii)

As I indicated previously, Congress has the power to

require both national and state parties to use only federal

money for election activities that directly affect federal

elections.°' Section 301(20)(A)(iii) focuses on one such type

of activity: “a public communication that refers to a clearly

identified candidate for Federal office . . . and that promotes

or supports a candidate for that office, or attacks or opposes

a candidate for that office.’ BCRA § 101; FECA

"This analysis of Section 301(20)A)(iii) is equally applicable to

national, state, and local parties. Considering the coordination and

financial transfers between the various party levels and that parties at all

levels work on behalf of national, state, and local candidates, it is

unrealistic to view the parties differently simply based on the fact that one

is labeled “national” and another “state.” It is the nature of the activities

they undertake rather than they label they assume that defires the type of

allowable regulations.

1125sa

§ 301(20)A)iii); 2 U.S.C. § 431(20)(A)(iii) (emphasis

added). Judge Henderson concludes in her opinion that the

Supreme Court in Buckley required certain “magic words”

that specifically advocate the election or defeat of a candidate

in order for a communication to be the type of advocacy

regulable by Congress. All other communications, even if

they directly affect a federal election, from her perspective,

are not regulable.”” I disagree. For the same reasons, in part,

set forth by Judge Kollar-Kotelly in her opinion on Title II, I -

believe that Buckley did not set forth a “bright-line test.” See

J. Kollar-Kotelly Op. at Part IIL.LC.1. But, even if the

Supreme Court did set forth a bright-line test for Congress's

regulation of expenditures by nonparties in Buckley, 424 U.S.

at 39-51, that rationale is not necessarily applicable to, and

binding on, Congress’s power to regulate donations to

political parties under BCRA.

Therefore, the question before this Court is not so much

whether Congress can regulate the use of nonfederal funds for

uncoordinated, nonexpress advocacy that directly affects

federal elections, but whether Congress has defined such

nonexpress advocacy in Section 301(20)(A)(iii) in a way that

will withstand constitutional scrutiny. For the following

reasons, I have concluded that Congress.not only can regulate

uncoordinated, nonexpress advocacy which directly affects

federal elections, but has defined that nonexpress advocacy in

Section 301(20)(A)(iii) in a way that is sufficiently tailored to

serve the government interest of preventing actual or apparent

® See, e.g., J. Henderson Op. at Part IV.D.l.a & Part IV.D.1.b

(referring repeatedly to “protected issue advocacy”). I do not believe we

should assume that just because the party advertisements are currently

funded with nonfederal money that they, by definition, have a nonfederal

purpose. See J. Henderson Op. at Part IV.D.1.c.

1126sa

corruption, and in a way that is not unconstitutionally

vague.”

In defining “candidate advocacy” as it did, Congress chose

to couple two concepts together in order for communications

to qualify as regulable: (1) the identification of a candidate

for a federal office; and (2) words that promote, oppose,

attack, or support that candidate for that office. BCRA § 101;

FECA § 301(20)(A)(iii); 2 U.S.C. § 431(20)A)(iii).

Therefore, unlike genuine issue advocacy, which both

national and state parties have every right to participate in

with nonfederal funds, and which help all party candidates in

a generic sense, Congress in this definition was seeking to

focus on parties using nonfederal funds for communications

intended to directly help a specific federal candidate. Because

such assistance is focused ona specific candidate,” it is

** Any attempt to regulate communications that directly affect federal

elections, like those regulated in Section 301(20)(A)(iii), does not exceed

Congress's authority to regulate federal elections under the Elections

Clause, see U.S. Const. art I., § 4. For this reason, I do not need to address

further the plaintiffs’ federalism claims in relation to Section

301(20)(A)(iii). I also reiect the plaintiffs’ equal-protection challenge

because political partie’ « e unique actors in the political system, see

supra note 27 and accompaying text, such that Congress is warranted in

treating contributions to them differently. See California Medical, 453

U.S. at 200-01 (rejecting equal-protection challenge to contribution limits

for multicandidate political committees, stating that “(t]he differing

restrictions placed on [different entities] reflect a judgment by Congress

that these entities have differing structures and purposes, and that they

therefore may require different forms of regulation in order to protect the

integrity of the electoral process”). Finally, I concur with Judge

Henderson’s discussion of the Thompson Plaintiffs’ equal- protection

claim. See J. Henderson Op. at Part IV.D.4.

“ See, e.g., Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 458 (“I understood that when I

raised funds for the [Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee

(“DSCC”) }, the donors expected that I would receive the amount of their

donations multiplied by a certain number that the DSCC had determined

in advance, assuming the DSCC has raised other funds.” (quoting Senator

Timothy Wirth)); Simpson Decl. ¢ 7 (“Members know that if they assist

1127sa

natural for that candidate to feel indebted towards those

whose donations funded the communication, even if he does

not know exactly which soft money donors’ funds actually

made it possible. Concomitantly, it is natural for the public to

perceive that those whose large soft money donations funded

the national and state parties’ communications are not only

known by the parties’ staffs, but by the federal candidates

who directly benefitted from the donations.

The evidence submitted by the defendants overwhelmingly

corroborates these common sense conclusions. The record is

clear that many, if not most, of the party so-called “issue ads”

refer to a specific federal candidate.” And the evidence also

demonstrates that the advertisements are designed to, and do,

support or oppose those candidates for that office. To

illustrate one extreme of this genre: in 1996, the Republican

National Committee (“RNC”) ran a supposed “issue ad”

called “The Story” which requires only a quick reading to

discern its true purpose and effect.

Audio of Bob Dole: We have a moral obligation to

give our children an America with the opportunity and

values of the nation we grew up in. Voice Over: Bob

Dole grew up in Russell, Kansas. From his parents he

the party with fundraising, be it hard or soft money, the party will later

assist their campaign. . . . Although soft money cannot be given directly to

federal candidates, everyone knows that it is fairly easy to push the money

through our tortured system to benefit specific candidates Ys McCain

Decl. § 7 (“{Plarties encourage Members of Congress to raise large

amounts of soft money to benefit their own and others’ re-election.”); see

also Findings 31-35.

5 In the 1998 election, $24.6 out of $25.6 million spent by political

parties on advertisements were spent on advertisements that referred to a

federal candidate. Out of 44,485 advertisements, 42,599 advertisements

referred to a specific candidate. See Krasno & Sorauf Expert Report at

tbl. 1.

” See Findings 36-52.

1128sa

learned the value of hard work, honesty and responsi-

bility. So when his country called . . . he answered. He

was seriously wounded in combat. Paralyzed, he

underwent nine operations.

Audio of Bob Dole: I went around looking for a

miracle that would make me whole again.

Voice Over: The doctors said he’d never walk again.

But after 39 months, he proved them wrong.

Audio of Elizabeth Dole: He persevered, he never

gave up. He fought his way back from total paralysis.

Voice Over: Like many Americans, his life experience

and values serve as a strong moral compass. The

principle of work to replace welfare. The principle of

accountability to strengthen our criminal justice system.

The principle of discipline to end wasteful Washington

spending.

Voice of Bob Dole: It all comes down to values. What

you believe in. What you sacrifice for. And what you

stand for.

Fabrizio Dep. Exhibit 2; McCain Decl. § 15; Huyck Decl. 4

3; Fabrizio Dep. at 49-55. Though this advertisement

transparently was intended to assist Senator Dole’s campaign,

it was funded in part with nonfederal funds. It is hard to

disagree with Senator Levin, who described the advertisement

this way: “It’s not an ad about welfare or wasteful spending;

it is an ad about why should we elect that particular

nominee.” °’

Another and more typical form of sham_ issue

advertisement run by parties is a candidate-centered ad that

focuses on the positions, past actions, or general character

*" 145 Cong. Rec. $12747 (Oct. 18, 1999) (Sen.Levin); see also

Memorandum from Charlie Nave to Haley Barbour (May 28, 1996)

(explaining that the Dole advertisement was tested to see its effect on

Senator Dole’s election).

1129sa

traits of a given federal candidate; contrasts them to the

party’s view of the proper outlook on those issues; and

encourages the viewers to contact the candidate to ostensibly

inquire why he/she is taking those positions or actions. See

Findings 45 & 46. In the 2000 election, for example, the

National Republican Congressional Committee and the

Florida Republican Party ran television advertisements

criticizing Linda Chapin, the Democratic candidate for

Congress:

Announcer: Linda Chapin. Hard on taxpayers. Soft on

convicts. Chapin raised taxes on your utilities, pushed to

raise the county sales tax and even tried raising your

property tax. Meanwhile, hard time in the county jail

turned into “Chapin time.” Where convicts received

cable tv and lounged on padded furniture in carpeted

cells. Chapin’s County Commission ran this soft jail ... a

jail she called a “national model.” Ask Chapin why she’s

hard on taxpayers and soft on convicts.

Chapin Decl. Exhibit 2; Chapin Decl. 4 10; Beckett Decl.

4 10; Pennington Decl. ¥ 14.% This type of electioneering

advertisement, and many others like it, were run by the state

party, which used mostly nonfederal funds to pay for it. It

takes little convincing to find that these advertisements can,

and do, directly influence the outcome of a federal election”

“ Another example of negative candidate advocacy funded by parties:

“We expect our public officials to be responsible, do their jobs and obey

the law. But Corrine Brown missed an astonishing 187 votes in Congress.

... Apparently, Corrine Brown thinks she’s above the law. A government

audit found extensive violations of federal law during her 1992 campaign.

Call Corrine Brown . . . . Tell her public officials should act responsibly,

do their job and obey the law.” ODP0041-1024. For more examples, see

Findings 41, 45, 46.

” See Findings 36-52, 138-47. The parties were clearly not using such

advertisements for party building purposes since 92 percent of the

advertisements did not even mention the name of the party in the body of

the advertisement. Buying Time 2000 at 64 (stating that in the 2000

1130sa

and that parties engaging in them are “electioneering in the

guise of issue advocacy.”- Mann Expert Report at 26.

Moreover, because the amount of money used for candidate

advocacy is substantial,” the candidates are likely to feel

even more indebted to the donors whose contributions to the

political parties made possible this form of campaign

assistance.’' Not surprisingly, the use of nonfederal funds for

this type of candidate advocacy was, to all appearances,

Congress’s primary concern in deciding to enact BCRA

Sections 323(a) and 323(b).”

The record further demonstrates that congressional

candidates know who the major soft money donors are.”* In

election, almost 92 percent of party advertisements never even identified

the name of a political party in the body of the advertisement, let alone

encouraged voters to register with or support the party or to volunteer

with the local party organization).

” See Oliver Dep. at 148-49 (estimating that the RNC spent around

$56-61 million dollars on “issue ads” during the 2000 campaign);

Marshall Decl. { 3 (stating that the largest portion of Democratic National

Committee (“DNC”) budget during the 2000 election cycle was used for

“issue ads”). In 2000, the RNC raised $254 million, a majority of which

was transferred down to the state parties mostly for “issue

advertisements.” Josefiak Dep. at 76; Vogel Decl. § 63; McGahn Decl.

q 5S.

” The donors themselves are not blind to the fact that donations to the

parties are used to benefit the federal candidates. See, e.g., Rozen Decl.

{ 12 (“Donors to the national parties understand that if a federal

officeholder is raising soft money—supposedly ‘non-federal’ money—

they are raising it for federal uses, namely to help that Member or other

federal candidates in their elections.”).

” See supra note 19.

” One donor, and former political fundraiser, observed the following:

Information about what soft money donors have given travels

among the Members in different ways. Obviously the Member who

solicited the money knows. Members also know who is involved

with the various major donor events which they attend, such as

retreats, meetings and conference calls. And there is communication

1131sa

some cases, they actively assist in helping the party to raise

such contributions.’* And as to those candidates who do not,

the parties and the donors keep many of them apprised of

who made the large donations. For example, Robert

Hickmott, lobbyist and former DNC official, advised donors

in the following manner:

[W]hen one of my clients is going to make a donation to

a federal candidate or party, hard or soft money, I advise

them on the manner in which they should do that. I tell

them not to just send the check to the party committee,

for example, to the young staff member who is

collecting the checks. Instead I tell my clients that they

should personally give the money to a Member of

Congress who then can give the money to the Chair of

the party committee, who will in turn make sure that the

among Members about who has made soft money donations and at

what level they have given, and this is widely known and

understood by the Members and their staff. .

Randlett Decl. ¢ 10; see also Bumpers Dect. ¢§ 18, 20 (testifying that

“some Members even keep lists of big donors in their offices” and that

“you cannot be a good Democratic or a good Republican Member and not

be aware of who gave money to the party. If someane in Arkansas gave

$50,000 to the DNC, for example, I would certainly know that.”); Wirth

Decl. Exhibit A § 17 (“[CJandidates were generally aware of the sources

of the funds that enabled the party committee to support their

campaigns.”).

™ See Findings 169, 170, 172-79; Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 458 (“[Y Jou

are at the limit of what you can directly contribute to my campaign,” but

“you can further help my campaign by assisting the Colorado Republican

Party.” (quoting then-Congressman Wayne Allard)); see also Letter from

Senator Mitch McConnell to Potential Donor at the Microsoft Corporation

(August 17, 1998) (asking potential donor for an “immediate

commitment” in support of the National Republican Senatorial

Committee’s (“NRSC’s”) issue advocacy campaign); see also Letter

Senators Mitch McConnell and Bill Frist to Donor at Steel Service Center

Institute (February 25, 1998) (thanking donor for a “nonfederal

contribution of $25,000” to the NRSC).

1132sa

check reaches the young staff member. That way the

donor, with one check, gets “chits” with multiple

Members of Congress.

Hickmott Decl. § 9.”°

Finally, while there is no evidence in the record of actual

quid pro quo corruption,” the record does establish that the

public not only appreciates that there are many donors giving

large sums of money (mostly corporations and unions) to the

political parties,’’ but believes and expects that the donors—

in return—receive privileged access to ‘he legislators and

special influence in the legislative process.” It is of little

” See Findings 176, 208; see, e.g., McCain Decl. 4 6 (“Legislators of

both parties often know who the large soft money contributors to their

party are, particularly those legislators who have solicited soft money,”

and “[dJjonors or their lobbyists often inform a particular Senator that they

have made a large donation.”); Simpson Decl. §¢ 5 (“Even if some

Members did not attend these events, they all still knew which donors

gave the large donations, as the party publicizes who gives what.”); Boren

Decl. ¢ 6 (“Each Senator knows who the biggest donors to his party are”

because “[djonors often prefer to hand their [soft money contribution]

checks to the Senator personally, or their lobbyist informs the Senator that

a large donation was just made.”).

”® See Findings 201-06, 209-10. Although it is possible—though not

established—that the appearance of increased access alone is synonymous

in the public’s mind with increased influence, there is no evidence in the

record that increased access necessarily results in actual influence. Since

the Supreme Court has never found that access in and of itself constitutes

corruption, I believe there is no evidence of actual corruption.

” See Buying Time 2000 at 62. In 2000, thirty-five of the top 50

nonfederal donors were corporations, and they gave a total of $29,447,350

to the Republican national committees in the 2000 election cycle which

was 11.4 percent of all nonfederal money received by that national party.

See Mann Expert Report at tbl. 6. Most of the other donors in the top 50

were unions and plaintiff attorneys. /d.

”’ Thus the Court reviews the evidence of actual or apparent corruption

against the background of a plausible justification, and, as explained

1133sa

surprise that Congress was particularly concerned with the

consequences of the public’s perception of a correlation

between large donations to parties and the special access and

influence that the public believes are accorded to these

donors.” There is ample evidence, including polls’ and press

earlier, the more plausible the argument, the less evidence the defendants

must marshal. See Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 391-95.

”’ Whether because of the endless examples of donors receiving access

in return for donations to parties, see Findings 211-43, the many press

reports that made public such exchanges, see infra note 81, or constituent

complaints about them, see Finding 269, members of Congress were

understandably troubled with the appearance of corruption created by

large nonfederal donations to parties. See, e.g., 147 Cong. Rec. $2446

(Mar. 19, 2001) (Sen.Feingold) (“The appearance of corruption is rampant

in our system, and it touches virtually every issue that comes before

use.”); 147 Cong. Rec. $3248-49 (April 2, 2001) (Sen.Levin) (“[Pler-

mitting the appearance of corruption undermines the very foundation of

our democracy—the trust of the people in the system.”).

” See Findings 251-68; see, e.g., Mark Mellman & Richard Wirthlin,

Research Findings of a Telephone Study Among 1300 Adult Americans 7

(Sept. 23, 2002) (poll result finding that 71 percent of Americans think

that members of Congress sometimes decide how to vote on an issue

based on what big contributors to their political party want, even if it is

not what most people in the district want, or even if it is not what they

think is best for the country); Robert Y. Shapiro, Public Opinion &

Campaign Finance 13-14 (Sept. 18, 2002) (poll results showing that the

public has been troubled by large donations to political parties).

Evidence, like these two reports, need not have been before Congress

when it made its predictive judgment. See Turner I, 512 U.S. at 667

(explaining that to ensure that Congress drew “reasonable inferences,” the

Supreme Court needed “substantial elaboration in the District Court of the

predictive or historical evidence upon which Congress relied, or the

introduction of some additional evidence.” (emphasis added)); Turner

Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC (“Turner Il”), 520 U.S. 180, 185, 187,

117 S.Ct. 1174, 137 L.Ed.2d 369 (1997); cf. City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M.,

529 U.S. 277, 310-17, 120 S.Ct. 1382, 146 L.Ed.2d 265 (2000) (Souter, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part) (advocating a remand for

development of the judicial record).

1134sa

reports,’ to support Congress’s judgment that the special

access and perceived special influence accorded to those large

donors have undermined the public’s confidence in the

independence of its elected representatives from those donors,

and thereby giving rise to an appearance of corruption. The

record clearly establishes that those large donations are used

in large part by the parties to bombard the public with

candidate advocacy of the type defined by Section

301(20)(A)(iii). See Findings 36-52, 138-47. Because the

advertisements are recognizably sponsored by the parties, see

supra note 41, it takes little for the public to conclude that

candidates are directly benefitting from large donations to the

parties. Moreover, the fact that the public neither

distinguishes between “soft money” and “hard money,” nor is

knowledgeable of the restrictions on contributions,"’ does

nothing to deter the inference that the special access and

influence it perceives are accorded to the donors is in return

for the plainly visible assistance the parties provide to

candidates’ campaigns. Given the high plausibility that

federal candidates feel indebted to donors who fund, through

the parties, Section 301(20)(A)(iii) communications of which

they are the beneficiary, and the equally high plausibility that

*! Senator Rudman observed:

Almost every day, the press reports on important public issues that

are being considered in Congress. Inevitably, the press draws a

connection between an outcome and the amount that interested

companies have given in soft money. . . . Even if a senator is

supporting a position that helps an industry for reasons other than_

that the industry gave millions to his party, it does not appear that

way in the public eye.

Rudman Decl. ¢ 11 (emphasis added); see Finding 270; see, e.g., Dan

Morgan and Juliet Eilperin, Campaign Gifts, Lobbying Built Enron's

Power in Washington, Wash. Post, December 25, 2001, at AO1; R.G.

Ratcliffe and Alan Bernstein, Political Donors Have the Money, and Get

the Time, Houston Chron., May 23, 1999, at 1.

* See Findings 264-67.

1135sa

the public perceives that the special access and influence it

believes are accorded to these donors is in gratitude for that

assistance, the evidentiary documentation more than

adequately convinces me that an appearance of corruption has

arisen from such arrangements. Simply stated, Congress has

drawn a reasonable inference of the same based on substantial

evidence.”

Moreover, any fear that Section 301(20)(A)iii) is

overbroad is cured by the accumulated effects of three

circumstances. First, Section 301(20)(A)(iii) only regulates

communications that are candidate specific, not issue

specific, such that most genuine issue communications should

not be subject to regulation. See Hearing Tr. (Dec. 4, 2002)

at 17. Second, though there are some genuine issue

advertisements that do specifically mention candidates, the

fact that the Section 301(20)(A)(iii) definition requires the

communication to have language that “promotes or supports a

candidate for that office, or attacks or opposes a candidate for

that office” eviscerates any remaining overbreadth by

** Turner I, 512 U.S. at 666 (explaining that a court’s role is to “assure

that, in formulating its judgments, Congress has drawn reasonable

inferences based on substantial evidence”). Though courts must “accord

substantial deference to the predictive judgments of Congress,” Turner /,

512 U.S. at 665, it does not “ ‘foreclose our independent judgment of the

facts bearing on an issue of constitutional law,” * id. at 666 (quoting Sable

Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 129, 109 S.Ct. 2829,

106 L.Ed.2d 93 (1989)).

“For example, genuine issue advertisements include: (1) adver-

tisements that support oppose officeholder-named legislation, like the

MecCain-Feingold bill, which is the common label for the legislation at

issue here; (2) advertisements supporting or opposing legislation that

simply ends with a call-to-action line asking the viewers to contact their

congressional members to vote against or for a particular bill; or (3) even

advertisements that criticize a certain political personality in order to

energize the party’s base on a particular issue, so long as those

advertisements are not broadcast within the identified candidate’s district

or state.

1136sa

focusing on advertisements that directly influence “a

candidate for that office.” Finally, the fact that the “speaker”

running this type of advertisement is a national or state party

also supports the defendants’ contention that most of the

advertisements, referring to a candidate in this manner, will

be intended to promote or attack that particular candidate.” A

political party, as opposed to corporations and other

nonparties, exists to a large extent for the purpose of electing

candidates of its party to office.” In Buckley, the Supreme

Court observed that expenditures by political parties, and

other political committees with “the major purpose of which

is the nomination and election of a candidate . . . can be

assumed to fall within the core area sought to be addressed by

Congress. They are, by definition, campaign related.” 424

U.S. at 79. In interpreting this language by the Supreme

Court, the D.C. Circuit observed that “when an organization

controlled by a candidate or the major purpose of which is

election-related makes disbursements, those disbursements

will presumptiveiy be expenditures within the statutory

definition.” Akins v. FEC, 101 F.3d 731, 742 (en banc) (D.C.

Cir. 1996)."’ With this understanding of parties and other

“

*° See generally Richard Briffault, The Political Parties and Campaign

Finance Reform, 100 Colum. L.Rev. 620, 655-57 (2000).

*° See Finding 27; see, e.g., Brister Decl. ¢ 4 (“The Republican Party of

Louisiana's primary purpose is to help elect Republicans to office ‘from

the courthouse to the White House.’”); RNC Chairman Haley Barbour’s

Update to the Members of the Republican National Committee, August 7,

1996, at 3 (stating that “(t]he purpose of a political party is to elect its

candidates to public office, and our first goal is to elect Bob Dole

president . . . Electing Dole is our highest priority, but it is not our only

priority. Our goal is to increase our majorities in both houses of Congress

and among governors and state legislatures”); see also Hastert Amicus Br.

at 20 (“The very purpose of the National Republican Congressional

Committee is to maintain Republican control of the House.”).

*” See also Nelson Dep. at 191 (stating that the RNC engages in “issue

advocacy in order to achieve one of our primary objectives, which is to

get more Republicans elected”).

1137sa

political committees, it is not surprising that the Supreme

Court limited disclosure of expenditures by all other groups

to express advocacy, but sanctioned disclosure of all

expenditures by “political committees.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at

49. While not all party advertisements are intended to directly

influence a _ federal election (i.e., genuine issue

advertisements), the presumptively electoralfocus of parties

Suggests that party communications that do mention

candidates are, more likely than not, designed to have some

impact on a federal election.” For these reasons, Section

301(20)(A (iii) is closely drawn to serve the government’s

interest.

* It bears repeating: Even though donations to political parties may be

used presumptively for the purpose of influencing a federal election, it is

clearly not an irrebuttable presumption, such that all donations should be

regulated. While the Court insinuated that Congress could require

disclosures for all expenditures by political parties, Buckley, 424 U.S. at

79, there is a simple explanation for this outcome--the Constitution

affords less protection to less offensive speech infringements, like

disclosure’ requirements, than for more offensive infringements, like

expenditure limitations. Compare id. at 39-51 (rejecting expenditure

limitations, even those on express advocacy), with id. at 79-81 (upholding

disclosure requirements for express advocacy); see also Post, supra note

60, at 1843 (“[T]}he placement of a line between election speech and

public discourse must be sensitive to the nature of the proposed regulation

of election speech. Relatively more benign forms of regulation . . . may

constitutionally reach more deeply into the recesses of public discourse

than more draconian requirements, like expenditure limitations.”). Surely,

the speech handicap imposed by contribution limitations, which simply

requires that parties use hard money for certain activities, rests somewhere

between that of expenditures limitations and disclosure requirements. See,

e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20-23, 64-68; see also Colorado I, 518 U.S. at

611-26 (rejecting expenditure limitation on political parties, even though

parties are considered political committees” that are subject to disclosure

of all disbursements).

1138sa

Even so, plaintiffs contend that Section 301(20)(A)(ili) is

still defective because its definition of communications that

must be funded with federal money is too vague to withstand

constitutional scrutiny. They claim that words such as

“promote,” “oppose,” “attack,” and “support” are too vague

to enable party officials to determine where the line between

noncandidate advocacy (i.e., pure issue advertisements) and

candidate advocacy lies. Like Section 201’s fallback

definition, see BCRA § 201(a); FECA § 304(f)(3)(A)(i); 2

U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i), however, the definition of candidate

advocacy in Section 301(20)(A)(iii) is not unconstitutionally

vague because: (1) potential party speakers can simply avoid

regulation by not identifying a candidate; (2) the formulation

Congress chose to use—even for those not expert in the

subtleties of campaign advocacy—is anchored in every day

words that have to be linked to a specific candidate’s election,

or re-election, to a particular office; (3) to paraphrase

defendant’s counsel during oral argument, as long as the

communication is not neutral—as to the candidate’s election

or defeat—it is covered by the definition, see Intervenors

Opp’n Br. at 66; and (4) the opportunity to seek advisory

opinions to clarify any ambiguity “mitigates whatever chill

may be induced by the- statute and argues against

constitutional adjudication on a barren record,” see Martin

Tractor Co. v. FEC, 627 F.2d 375, 384-85 (D.C. Cir. 1980);

see also United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of

Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 580 (1973). Indeed, Section

301(20)(A)(iii), as crafted, “give[s] the person of ordinary

intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is

prohibited,” “provide[s] explicit standards for those who

*? When the Buckley Court found unconstitutionally vague FECA

expenditure provisions, which involved different language, “the vast

majority of individuals and groups subject to” the Act did “not have a

right to obtain an advisory opinion,” 424 U.S. at 41 n .47. Subsequently,

Congress amended the advisory provision to make it available to “any

person.” 2 U.S.C. § 437f(a)(1).

1139sa

apply them,” and where First Amendment rights are

implicated, does not induce “citizens to ‘steer far wider of the

unlawful zone’ . . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden

areas were clearly marked.” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408

U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S.

360, 372 (1964)).

Even if the above factors were not enough to save Section

201 from a vagueness attack, those factors, combined with

the identity of the speaker being restricted and the fact that it

is a restriction on a contribution (as opposed to an

expenditure), would still rescue Section 301(20)(A)(iii).

Because political parties are sophisticated participants in the

election arena, they are much more likely to recognize the

line between candidate advocacy and genuine issue advocacy.

See Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 453 (“[T]he party marshals [the

power to speak] with greater sophistication than individuals

generally could.”).” Political parties, more than others, are

also more likely to assume the risk that they have crossed the

line.”' In short, the argument that Section 301(20)(A)(iii) is

unconstitutionally vague rings hollow as it applies to parties

who are experts in the business of discerning what

combination of words and images help, or harm, candidates.”

” See also Richard Briffault, /ssue Advocacy: Redrawing the Elec-

tions/Politics Line, 77 Tex. L.Rev. 1751, 1792 (1999) (“{A]s skilled

campaign professionals, the major political parties are in the best position

to conform their activities to legal requirements.”).

*! As Justice Holmes observed: “Wherever the law draws a line there

will be cases very near each other on opposite sides. The precise course of

the line may be uncertain, but no one can come near it without knowing

that he does so, if he thinks, and if he does so, it is familiar to the criminal

law to make him take the risk.” United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396,

399, 50 S.Ct. 167, 74 L.Ed. 508 (1930).

” That political parties are the speakers is also relevant because since

most of their communications are election-based speech, especially those

that identify candidates, there is less potential for chilling pure issue

advocacy. :

1140sa

Vagueness conceins are also less pronounced with regard

to contributions than expenditures. When restrictions on

expenditures are at issue, one must be concerned that if the

potential speaker cannot discriminate between issue advocacy

and candidate advocacy, then the speaker will shy away from

speaking at all. The restrictions at issue here, however, only

require that Section 301(20)(A)(iii) communications be

funded with federal money, so if the political parties are

afraid that a communication may promote or attack a

candidate, they can simply resort to federal funds. In any

event, if despite all of the mitigations, some slight potential

for vagueness remains, “uncertainty at the periphery” does

not render a provision unconstitutionally vague. See FEC v.

National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 211 (1982).

In sum, Section 301(20)(A)(iii), in its application to

Sections 323(a) and 323(b), is neither unconstitutionally

vague, nor insufficiently tailored to serve the compelling

government interest of combating the appearance of

corruption. By seeking only to restrict donations that can give

rise to actual or apparent corruption, it sweeps neither too far

nor too near. To the extent that “issue ads” are about issues in

fact, as well as in name, political parties are free to raise as

much soft money as they like for such advertisements. In

contrast, soft money donations topolitical parties used for

communications that support or oppose a clearly identified

candidate for federal office—that is, candidate advocacy—

directly affect a federal election and give rise to an

appearance of corruption that Congress has a substantial

interest in combating. Such candidate advocacy must be

funded with federal money.

A final note on Section 301(20)(A)(iii). Requiring parties

to fund Section 301(20)(A)(iii) communications with federal

money not only serves the government interest of preventing

actual and apparent corruption, but also prevents

circumvention of campaign laws and principles. See NCPAC,

1141sa

470 U.S. at 500 (noting the Court’s “deference to a

congressional determination of the need for a prophylactic

rule”).”? Under Section 441b of FECA, corporations and

unions are prohibited from using general treasury funds for

independent expenditures expressly advocating the election or

defeat of a particular federal candidate. 2 U.S.C. § 441b; see

also MCFL, 479 U.S. at 241-64. If the backup definition of

“electioneering communications” under Section 203 of

BCRA is upheld, BCRA § 203(a); FECA §§ 316(a), (b)(2); 2

U.S.C. §§ 441b(a), (b)(2), corporations and unions would be

additionally prohibited from using their general treasuries to

fund candidate advocacy pieces which promote, oppose,

attack, or support federal candidates. BCRA § 201(a); FECA

§ 304(f)(3)(A)(ii); 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(ii). Most of the

largest nonfederal money contributions to parties are by

corporations and unions. See supra note 77. Thus, if national

and state parties were allowed to spend unlimited amounts of

nonfederal money on candidate advocacy, corporations and

unions could largely circumvent the new BCRA Section 203

by funneling unlimited funds through political parties to pay

for advertisements that they are now prohibited from

broadcasting under Section 441b of FECA. To allow such a

circumvention in that manner would be ludicrous. Finally, to

permit national (or state or local) parties to convert

nonfederal donations, whether from the general treasuries of

** Title I does not, however, prevent circumvention of existing

limitations on contributions to candidates in the manner set forth by the

Supreme Court in Buckley, 424 U.S. at 38, and Colorado II, 533 U.S. at

456 & n. 18. Even before BCRA was enacted, because of existing party

limitations on direct contributions to and coordinated expenditures on

behalf of candidates, see 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d); Colorado II, 533 U.S. at

440-65, donors could not use the parties to funnel large sums of money

directly to candidates in the form of contributions. Thus, any reliance on

the Supreme Court’s anticircumvention rationale in Buckley and Colorado

Il, see J. Kollar-Kotelly Op. at Part III.11.B.2.a.iii, necessarily dictates a

novel application of that precedent.

1142sa

corporations and unions, or from wealthy individuals and

MCEL groups, to the federal purpose of directly influencing a

federal election through candidate advocacy of the type

defined in Section 301(20)(A)(iii) is, in and of itself, a direct

circumvention of a fundamental premise of the FECA

regulatory scheme relating to donations, blessed by the

Supreme Court in Buckley and its progeny: only federal

money may be used to directly influence a federal election.

As long as the Buckley line of cases remains the law, it would

make a mockery of those Supreme Court cases and the

current regulatory scheme to allow political parties to use soft

money to engage in what Justice Kennedy has aptly described

as “covert advocacy.” Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 406, 407

(Kennedy, J., dissenting).

C. New FECA Section 323(d): Nonfederal Fund

Restrictions on Tax-Exempt Organizations

Section 323(d) prohibits national, state, and local parties

from donating either soft or hard money to, or soliciting for,

either: (1) a Section 527 organization; or (2) a Section 501(c)

organization if that organization makes expenditures in

connection with a federal election, including expenditures for

“federal election activity” as defined in Section 301(20)(A).

BCRA § Ol(a); FECA § 323(d); 2 U.S.C. § 41i(d). Judge

Henderson strikes down the entire section as unconstitutional.

I concur in her judgment, but for different reasons.

First, I would note that the defendants argue that the

donation and solicitation restrictions should be reviewed

under closely-drawn scrutiny. See Intervenors Opp’n Br. at

21-23. While I agree with the defendants that Buckley's

closely-drawn scrutiny should apply to donation limitations to

organizations as well as candidates, it is less clear which

scrutiny should apply to the solicitation restriction. See J.

Henderson Op. at Part IV.D.4. However, if the restriction on

solicitation cannot even withstand closely-drawn scrutiny,

1143sa

there is no need to choose between the standards of review.

Cf. Blount v. S.E.C., 61 F.3d 938, 942-43 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

As to the statute itself, Section 323(d) prevents national

parties from donating any funds to certain Section 501(c)

organizations. This complete ban on donations infringes the

various parties’ abilities to effectuate their members voices,

and because it is not even closely drawn to serve a sufficient

government interest, it cannot withstand scrutiny. Section

323(d) is not closely drawn as to Section 501(c) organizations

because it prohibits solicitation for and donations to those

organizations merely because they have made, in effect,

expenditures for federal purposes in the past, and regardless

of whether those donations will be used again for that very

purpose. By not specifying the purpose for which the money

will be put, Congress, in effect, is prohibiting solicitation for

and donations to these Section S5OI(c) organizations that

might in turn be used for nonfederal or mixed purposes.

Congress, of course, can only do this if it could show that a

sufficient government interest was being served by doing so.

It has not. As discussed at length earlier, the only restrictions

on uses of nonfederal funds that can .be constitutionally

regulated are uses that directly affect a federal election. See

supra Parts 1.A.2 & 1.B.2. Any other use of the donation is

too tangential to give rise to the risk of corruption, or

appearance of corruption, that is necessary to warrant this

congressional infringement on First Amendment rights. To

say the least, the defendants have not produced sufficient

evidence to demonstrate that an appearance of corruption, let

alone corruption itself, arises when organizations of this type

use donations from national, state, and local parties for

nonfederal or mixed purposes.

Section 323(d) is also constitutionally problematic as a

result of its treatment of Section 527 organizations. Section

527 organizations, according to the applicable IRS definition,

exist, in part, to influence the selection, nomination, election,

1144sa

or appointment of individuals to state and local public offices,

as well as to various political organizations. 26 U.S.C.

§§ 527(e)(1) and (2). Accordingly, since Section 527

organizations could expend the solicited or donated funds for

one of these nonfederal or mixed purposes,” the blanket

prohibition in Section 323(d) on national, state, and local

parties from assisting them in this manner is similarly not

closely drawn. Perhaps if Congress had structured Section

323(d) like Section 323(b) and prohibited these organizations

from using nonfederal funds—which they had received from

national, state, and local parties—to directly affect federal

elections, it might have been able to demonstrate that the

restriction was closely drawn to serve the sufficient

government interest required under any standard of review to

justify these infringements. But it did not. Therefore, for all

of the above reasons, I conclude that Section 323(d) is

unconstitutionally overbroad.

D. New FECA Section 323(e): Nonfederal Fund

Restrictions on Federal Candidates

Judge Henderson and Judge Kollar-Kotelly uphold Section

323(e) in its entirety. While I concur to the extent that this

section prohibits federal officeholders and candidates from

receiving, directing, transferring, or spending any nonfederal

funds in connection with any election, including the kind of

election activity defined in Section 301(20)(A),” I dissent .

* For example, the California Republican Party funds Section 527

organizations to engage in voter registration activities in its Operation

Bounty program. See Erwin Aff. ¢ 9.

°° Soft money donations to federal candidates, regardless of whether

they are used for nonfederal purposes by the candidates thereafter, can

give rise to actual or apparent corruption, especially if the donation is of

any magnitude. In those circumstances, it is natural for the public to

presume that the donation will either be used to help the federal candidate

get elected or in some other way that directly enures for his/her benefit.

1145sa

with regard to the prohibition on a federal candidate, or

officeholder, from soliciting funds for the benefit of his

national party, especially since Congress can and has legally

prohibited the parties (national, state, and local) from using

nonfederal funds to directly influence federal elections.

Accordingly, | am writing separately to dissent in part from,

and concur in part in, their opinions.

With regard to the First Amendment rights of federal

candidates and officeholders to solicit soft money funds for

the use of their parties, I would dissent principally on the

basis that the defendants have failed to demonstrate that

soliciting nonfederal funds to be used by parties for purposes

that, at most, indirectly affect federal elections is regulable by

Congress. For example, donations used for such activities as

party building, newsletters, genuine issue advocacy, and

generic voter mobilization so indirectly affect federal

elections, if at all, that they do not give rise to the minimally

necessary appearance of corruption to warrant congressional

intervention.

Indeed, soliciting donations to be used for the national

party on such mixed (and/or nonfederal) purposes is the kind

of conduct by officeholders which the public not only would

expect them to participate in, but which is fundamental to the

successful operation of the major national parties. To the

extent that helping their parties in this way provides

officeholders with some added status among other party

officials, in my judgment, is too attenuated a benefit to give

rise to the appearance of corruption necessary to warrant

congressional intervention. See supra Part’ LA.3.

Accordingly, I concur in part in, and dissent in part from, the

holding of my colleagues.

Either way, the perception of a personal gain, and the sense of

indebtedness that follows therefrom, justly warrants Congress's

regulation.

1146sa

E. New FECA Section 323(f): Nonfederal Fund

Restrictions on State Candidates

Section 323(f) prohibits state candidates from spending

funds for a communication of the type discussed in Section

301(20)(A)(iii) unless the funds are subject to the limitation,

prohibitions, and reporting requirements of FECA (i.e., hard

money). Restricting the use of soft money by state candidates

for communications that directly affect federal elections is, of

course, consistent with my preceding discussion of the

constitutionality of Section 301(20)A)(iii). By placing this

restriction on state candidates Congress is simply guarding

against similar conversions of soft money donations to fund

communications that are designed to accomplish the federal

purpose of directly influencing a federal election. Since this

section is closely drawn to uses of soft money by state

candidates exclusively for that purpose, I similarly uphold its

constitutionality.

II. Title Il: Noncandidate Campaign Expenditures Sections

201, 204, 213

I join with Judge Henderson, but for different reasons, in

holding that the primary definition of electioneering

communications set forth in Section 201 is unconstitutional. I

do not, however, join in her holding that the backup definition

also provided in. Section 201 is unconstitutional.

To the contrary, I uphold the backup definition’s

constitutionality, as does Judge Kollar-Kotelly who joins in

my opinion as a necessary alternative to Judge Henderson's

and my finding the primary definition unconstitutional. The

following are my reasons for rejecting the primary definition

and upholding the backup definition.

A. Section 201: The Primary Definition

Title Il of BCRA is Congress’s attempt to close certain

loopholes in FECA and to regulate certain conduct arising

1147sa

from the use, both directly and indirectly, of corporate and

union treasury funds to finance electioneering com-

munications that directly affect federal elections, even though

masquerading otherwise as “pure issue advocacy.” Because,

in part, Judge Henderson believes that Buckley and its

progeny set forth a bright line test requiring the presence of

certain “magic words” advocating the election or defeat of a

federal candidate in order for this advocacy to be regulable by

Congress, she strikes down both the primary and backup

definitions.”° Judge Kollar-Kotelly and I disagree with this

reasoning, and I join in the portion of her opinion analyzing

why the Supreme Court never intended the so-called express

advocacy test to be a constitutional rule of law limiting the

power of Congress to regulate expenditures for certain

uncoordinated advocacy that directly affects federal elections,

notwithstanding the absence of these words.”

While Judge Kollar-Kotelly and I agree regarding

Congress’s power to regulate the source of the funds used for

these communications and the disclosures that donors must

file, 1 do not agree that the primary definition, as crafted by

Congress, is sufficiently tailored to regulate the electioneering

advocacy it seeks to cover. To the contrary, the primary

definition, which regulates communications referring to

Clearly identified federal candidates based upon when and

where they are broadcast, rather than their effect on federal

elections, sweeps so broadly that it captures too much First

Amendment protected speech that Congress, in the absence of

a demonstrated compelling government interest, has no power

to regulate. What type of speech is that?

The plaintiffs have clearly demonstrated that corporations,

interest groups, labor unions and other entities air genuine

issue advertisements in the periods immediately preceding

*° See J. Henderson Op. at Part IV.A.

” See J. Kollar-Kotelly Op. at Part IIL.1.C.1 & Part IILI.C .2.

1148sa

general and primary elections, the sole purpose of which is

educating the viewers about an upcoming vote on pending

legislation, and encouraging them to inform their elected

representative to vote for or against the bill (i.e., legislation-

centered advertisements). Edward Monroe, Director of

Political Affairs for Associated Builders and Contractors

(“ABC”), explained that “serious legislative initiatives or

regulatory proposals often are qonsidered near the time of

elections.” Monroe Decl. §§ 18-19. Laura Murphy, legislative

director for the ACLU, seconds this: “[The] 60 days before a

general election and 30 days before a primary . . . are often

periods of intense legislative activity. During election years,

the candidates stake out positions on virtually all of the

controversial issues of the day. Much of the debate occurs

against the backdrop of pending legislative action or

executive branch initiatives.” Murphy Decl. § 12. See also

Mann Cross Exam. at 176 (explaining that a flurry of

legislative activity occurs near the end of a congressional

session, therefore, often within the 60 day period preceding a

general election); Finding 359."

* For example, last fall alone, in the period immediately preceding

the 2002 congressional election, Congress considered the following

important, and controversial, pieces of legislation: a resolution authorizing

the use of armed force against Iraq, (H.J.Res.114, 107th Cong.); an

election reform bill to update ballot machines and provide greater access

to individuals with disabilities to polling places (H.R.3295, 107th Cong.);

legislation to establish the Department of Homeland Security (H.R.5710,

107th Cong.); and various appropriations bills for federal departments,

including the Departments of Defense, Justice, and State. While last fall's

legislative calendar may not be typical, it nevertheless illustrates BCRA’s

potential impact on genuine issue advocacy. Murphy Decl. § 12 (“Some of

the President's or Attorney General's boldest initiatives are advanced

during election years—often within 60 days of a general election. This

year, for instance, legislation creating a new federal department of Home-

land Security is under consideration during this pre-election period.”).

1149sa

Notwithstanding defendants’ expert testimony to the

contrary,” interest groups believe, and plaintiffs expert

agrees,” that the periods immediately preceding élections

are the most effective times to run issue adverti nts

discussing pending legislation because the public’s interest in

policy is at its peak.'°’ Edward Monroe of ABC explains that

“it is... clear that members of the public are generally more

receptive to and engaged in considering government policy

ideas and issues as elections near. If that is the time when

people will listen, that is the time to speak. And once an

election occurs, there seems to be a period of fatigue during

which political matters are of less interest, making issue ads

then less effective.” Monroe Decl. 44 18-19; see also Finding

359. Likewise, Paul Huard, Senior Vice President for Finance

and Administration for the National Association of

Manufacturers (“NAM”), finds that “Americans tend to have

greater interest in political matters as an election approaches.

At the same time, elected officials are most attuned to the

views of their constituents in the pre- election period. Thus,

for many purposes, the pre-election season is a critical time

for issue ads.” Huard Decl. 4 10; see also Finding 359.

The mere fact that these issue advertisements mention the

name of a candidate (i.e., the elected representative in whose

district the advertisement ran) does not necessarily indicate,

let alone prove, that the advertisement is designed for

electioneering purposes. To the contrary, the testimony of

various plaintiffs’ witnesses indicates that, in their

experience, there are many reasons why it is helpful, if not

necessary, tO mention a candidate’s name in_ these

” See Finding 359 n.224.

' See Finding 358 (statement of Dr. Gibson, rejecting the defendants’

argument that it is unproductive to run legislation-centered issue

advertisements focusing on policy matters in the periods before elections).

'! See Findings 358-60.

1150sa

advertisements in order to focus the public’s attention on a

particular pending piece of legislation. For example, Paul

Huard of NAM states “[t]here are many reasons that an issue

ad may need to refer to the name of an elected official or

candidate. Many bills are identified with particular sponsors

and may be known by the sponsors’ names. Also, both

incumbents and candidates may be prominent people whose

support or opposition to a bill or policy may have important

persuasive effect. . . . Also, if an issue ad is used to explain

why a legislative position of a particular Member of Congress

is good for his or her district or state, the member generally

must be mentioned. The same is true if the purpose of the ad

may be to induce viewers to contact the Member and

communicate a policy position.’’ Huard Decl. § 12 (emphasis

added); see also Finding 293. Similarly, Denise Mitchell,

Special Assistant for Public Affairs to the AFL-CIO,

concurred, explaining that it is often necessary to refer to a

federal candidate by name because “[t]he express or implied

urging of viewers or listeners to contact the policymaker

regarding [an] issue is . . . especially effective by showing

them how they can personally impact the issue debate in

question.” Mitchell Decl. ¥ 11; see also Finding 293. A quick

review of a classic example of a legislation-centered genuine

issue advertisement demonstrates these points.

In 1998, the AFL-CIO aired an advertisement entitled

“Barker.” The advertisement referred to a federal candidate

by name only in the call-to-action line at the end of the

advertisement where it urged viewers to call their Member of

Congress and express their position regarding the pending

Fast Track trade legislation. The legislation was scheduled for

a vote in the House of Representatives on September 25,

11Sisa

1998—within 60 days of the peneral election. The text of the

advertisement is as follows:'°

Paid for by the Working Men and Women of the AFL-

CIO. [Barker speaking]: Okay ladies and gents, step

right up and see if you can follow the ball. Is it here? Is

it there? Where could it be? [Voice over]: They’re

playing games again in Washington. Without discussion

or debate, they’re planning another vote on _ the

controversial Fast Track law—special powers to ram

through trade deals like NAFTA. Fast Track failed /ast

year because working families don’t want more trade

deals that put big corporations first; deals that ignore our

concerns about lost jobs; environmental problems on our

borders, and dangerous, imported foods. But Newt

Gingrich and the sponsors of Fast Track hope they can

sneak it by this fall, while public attention is focused on

other issues. [Barker speaking]: Keep your eyes on the

ball now . . . [Voice over]: Call Representative

at XXX-XXX-XXXx and tell him to vote no on Fast Track.

Tell him we're still paying attention. And Fast Track is

still a bad idea.

Mitchell Decl. Exhibit 116, Exhibit 1 at 86. Defendants’ own

expert, David Magleby, who stated in his report that he would

“presume” an advertisement is electioneering merely because

it mentions a federal candidate by name,'”’ candidly admitted

after reviewing “Barker” that such an advertisement is a

“genuine” issue advertisement. He concluded as such—even

though it mentions a federal candidate’s name—because

' The advertisement aired in the districts of Congressman Chris John

(LA-07); Congressman Scott Klug (WI-02); Congresswoman Jo Ann

Emerson (MO-08); Congresswoman Anne Northup (KY-03); Congress-

man Jack Kingston (GA- 01); and Congressman Rick White (WA-01),

and referred to those federal candidates by name. See Finding 368.

' See Finding 290 (discussing the indicia of electioneering adver-

tisements).

1152sa

“[t]he body of the ad has no referent to [a candidate]

whatsoever. The only referent to [the candidate] is the call

line.” Magleby Cross Exam. at 104.

[A] generic call your Congressman, call your Senator,

when then linked to a legislation and call your

Congressman or Senator about this legislation without a

referent to their position on the issue, seems to me

substantively different than when they are mentioned in

view of what their position is on that issue. Q. When you

say substantively different, are you referring to a

difference with respect to whether the advertisement

communicates an electioneering message? A. Yes.

Magleby Cross Exam. at 106.

Because genuine issue advertisements, like “Barker,” have

been, and will need to be, aired during periods of legislative

activity leading up to elections, plaintiffs contend the primary

definition, if upheld, will capture them as “electioneering

communications.”'™ As such, they will be subjected to a host

of limitations and regulations which, according to the

plaintiffs, will limit and chill their ability to engage in First

Amendment protected speech. I agree.

The crux of the problem with the primary definition is that,

unlike the backup definition, it does not depend on the effect

of the communication’s message on a candidate’s election.

As such, many genuine issue ads, like “Barker,” will be

treated the same as the sham “issue” ads Congress supposedly

was intending to regulate. It is the absence of a link between

the advocacy of an issue and a candidate’s fitness, or lack

thereof, for election that renders congressional intervention

with respect to genuine issue ads of this type unconstitutional.

Notwithstanding the absence of this link, defendants contend,

' McConnell Opening Br. at 65 (arguing generally that genuine issue

advocacy will be regulated by BCRA); NRA Opening Br. at 26.

1153sa

and Judge Kollar-Kotelly agrees, that the evidence

sufficiently demonstrates that even though some genuine

issue advertisements that run in the months leading up to an

election will be swept in under this definition, it is too

insufficient a number to render the primary definition

constitutionally defective. I disagree.

The plaintiffs have met their burden in this facial challenge

because they have shown that BCRA’s primary definition

“reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected

conduct.” City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458 (1987)

(quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman

Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982)) (emphasis added).

Plaintiffs, in short, have demonstrated from the statute’s “text

. and from actual fact that a substantial number of

instances exist in which the [lJaw cannot be applied

constitutionally.” New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New

York, 487 U.S. 1, 14 (1988) (emphasis added). These

instances are not merely “‘some’ overbreadth,” Ashcroft v.

ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 584 (2002) (quoting Reno v. ACLU,

521 U.S. 844, 896 (1997)), or a “single” or “bare possibility”

of an impermissible application. Members of City Council of

the City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.

789, 800 & n.19 (1984) (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413

U.S. 601, 630 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). Instead, the

plaintiffs have shown, as the Supreme Court aptly put it in

Vincent, that BCRA presents “a realistic danger that the

statue will significantly compromise recognized First

Amendment protections of parties not before the Court.” /d.

at 800-801.

The evidentiary basis of both the plaintiffs’ and defen-

dants”’ arguments concerning the primary definition’s

overbreadth is the Buying Time 1998 and Buying Time 2000

studies. While the defendants correctly contend that plaintiffs

carry the burden to show that BCRA is substantially

1154sa

overbroad,’ the studies defendants rely upon to show that it

is narrowly tailored'” are, in essence, a highly controversial

“survey” of the ads run in the months leading up to the 1998

and 2000 elections. Judge Henderson correctly notes in her

opinion, see J. Henderson Op. Part IV.A, that the parties

“quarrel at length” regarding the significance of the Buying

Time studies and, in particular, its conclusions regarding the

percentage of genuine issue advocacy that would be

improperly regulated by Section 201 of BCRA. Unlike Judge

Henderson, I believe that the Buying Time studies are entitled

to some evidentiary weight.”

However, I do not believe that the studies’ statistical

conclusions are the last word in this Court’s analysis of

whether or not the primary definition is overbroad. With the

respect to the percentage of protected, political speech that is,

or will be, regulated by BCRA, it is, of course, impossible to

quantify the exact percentage with absolute certainty. See

New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 773 (1982) (explaining

that “[h]ow often, if ever” the statute at issue in Ferber would

regulate protected speech “cannot be known with certainty.

'5 Gov't Opening Br. at 159; Gov’t Opp’n Br. at 68.

' The definition itself—a content-indifferent definition based on time

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Supplemental Appendix — McConnell v. Federal Election Commission · 539 U.S. 938 | Frix