Supplemental Appendix — McConnell v. Federal Election Commission
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No. 02-1674 et al.
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
MITCH MCCONNELL et al.,
Appellants,
V.
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION et al.,
Appellees.
On Appeal From The United States
District Court For The District of Columbia
SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX
TO JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENTS
VOLUME II
FLOYD ABRAMS KENNETH W. STARR
SUSAN BUCKLEY Counsel of Record
RIAN MARKLEY EDWARD W. WARREN
CAHILL GORDON & KANNON K. SHANMUGAM
REINDEL LLP KIRKLAND & ELLIS
80 Pine Street 655 Fifteenth Street, N.W.
New York, NY 10005 Washington, DC 20005
(212) 701-3000 (202) 879-5000
(additional counsel on inside cover)
June 2003
a cn NN RSS SECS RN
WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. — (202) 789-0096 -— WASHINGTON, D. C. 20001
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN
559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305
(650) 725-9875
JAN WITOLD BARAN
THOMAS W. KIRBY
LEE E. GOODMAN
WILEY, REIN & FIELDING LLP
1776 K Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 719-7000
VALLE SIMMS DUTCHER
L. LYNN HOGUE
SOUTHEASTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, INC.
3340 Peachtree Road, N.E.
Suite 3515
Atlanta, GA 30326
(404) 365-8500
G. HUNTER BATES
1215 Cliffwood Drive
Goshen, KY 40026
(502) 473-7557
Counsel in No. 02-1674
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Volume I
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Opinion of Judge Hendersom................ccccesecsesseeeeeees 160sa
Volume II
Opinion of Judge Kollar-Kotelly.................:cccccseeeeseeees 479sa
Volume III
Opinion of Judge Kollar-Kotelly (continued) .............. 776sa
Volume IV
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ITT cincinitieacatendenasanntdetnnicsnmetenmnsmnepeeenets 1381sa
479sa
MEMORANDUM OPINION
KOLLAR-KOTELLY, District J.
I, INTRODUCTION
The recent issues confronting Congress related to cam- ~
paign finance are neither novel nor unfamiliar:
The idea is to prevent .. . the great aggregations of
wealth from using their corporate funds, directly or
indirectly, to send members of the legislature to these
halls in order to vote for their protection and the
advancement of their interests as against those of the
public. It strikes at a constantly growing evil which has
done more to shake the confidence of the plain people of
small means of this country in our political institutions
than any other practice which has ever obtained since the
foundation of our Government. And I believe that the
time has come when something ought to be done to put a
check to the giving of $50,000 or $100,000 by a great
corporation toward political purposes upon the under-
standing that a debt is created from a political party to it.
Elihu Root, Addresses on Government and Citizenship 143
(Bacon and Scott ed. 1916) (original statement made be-
fore the Constitutional Convention of the State of New York
in 1894),
Many believe that when an individual or association of
individuals makes large contributions for the purpose of
aiding candidates of political parties in winning the
elections, they expect, and sometimes demand, and occa-
sionally, at least, receive, consideration by the ‘bene-
ficiaries of their contributions which not infrequently is
harmful to the general public interest.
65 Cong. Rec. 9507-9508 (1924) (Statement of Sen. Joseph
Robinson).
480sa
We all know that money is the chief source of
corruption. We all know that large contributions to
political campaigns not only put the political party under
obligation to the large contributors, who demand pay in
the way of legislation, but we also know that large sums
of money are used for the purpose of conducting ex-
pensive campaigns through the newspapers and over the
radio; in the publication of all sorts of literature, true and
untrue; and for the purpose of paying the expenses of
campaigners sent out into the country to spread
propaganda, both true and untrue.
86 Cong. Rec. 2720 (1940) (Statement of Sen. John
Bankhead).
The unchecked rise in campaign expenditures coupled
with the absence of limitations on contributions and
expenditures, has increased the dependence of candi-
dates on special interest groups and large contributors.
H.R. Rep. No. 93-1239, at 3 (1974).
We have gone from basically a small donor system in
this country where the average person believed they had
a stake, believed they had a voice, to one of extremely
large amounts of money, where you are not a player
unless you are in the $100,000 or $200,000 range, many
contributions in the $500,000 range, occasionally you
get a $1 million contribution. . . . Many Members are
tired of picking up the paper every day and reading
about an important issue we are going to be considering,
one in which many interests have large sums at stake and
then the second part of the story reading about the large
amounts of money that are being poured into Wash-
ington on one side or the other of the issue—the
implication, of course being clear, that money talks and
large amounts of money talk the loudest.
481sa
147 Cong. Rec. $2958 (daily ed. March 27, 2001) (state-
ment of Senator Fred Thompson). Although these statements
each reflect discrete points in the history of campaign finance
regulation in this country, they reflect the same sentiment:
over the course of the last century, the political branches have
endeavored to protect the integrity of federal elections with
carefully tailored legislation addressing corruption or the
appearance of corruption inherent in a system of donor-
financed campaigns.
In the area of campaign finance regulation, congressional
action has been largely incremental and responsive to the
most prevalent abuses or evasions of existing law at particular
points in time. For example, consistent with the Constitution,
Congress has been permitted to prohibit the use of corporate
treasury funds for contributions and expenditures to federal
candidates and their parties, forbid the use of union dues in
connection with federal elections, cap contributions by indi-
viduals to candidates and parties, offer presidential candidates
the option of financing their general election campaigns with
money from the public fisc, and subject coordinated expen-
ditures to contribution limitations. This process has been
evolutionary, and the deliberative nature of the legislative
effort is not unexpected given the fact that campaign finance
is an extraordinarily challenging area to legislate, particularly
given the strong First Amendment interests at stake. On the
one hand, congressional action in this area plainly implicates
an individual’s right to be free from government regulation, a
right that is unquestionably at its apogee in the context of
political speech. On the other hand, legislation in this area is
designed to embolden public confidence in the political
system, which thereby ultimately encourages individuals to
participate and engage in the electoral process. See Colorado
Republican Federal Campaign Comm. vy. Federal Election
Comm'n (‘Colorado I’), 518 U.S. 604, 609 (1996) (per
curiam) (observing that in assessing the constitutionality of
FECA’s various provisions the Supreme Court ‘essentially
482sa
weigh{s] the First Amendment interest in permitting candi-
dates (and their supporters) to spend money to advance their
political views against a ‘compelling’ governmental interest
in assuring the electoral system’s legitimacy, protecting it
from the appearance and reality of corruption’); see also
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992) (‘Perhaps fore-
most among these serious issues are cases that force us to
reconcile our commitment to free speech with our commit-
ment to other constitutional rights embodied in government
proceedings. ’).
Mindful of these competing constitutional interests, Con-
gress has moved deliberately and often slowly to address
evasion or abuse of the law. Building a consensus in an area
so penetratingly close to the heart of the First Amendment
requires serious consideration. In fact, in the case of the
legislation presently before the Court, the legislative process
took over six years of study and reflection by Congress. '
' Although campaign finance reform was considered during the 104th
Congress, see, e.g., Campaign Reform Act of 1996, H.R. 3820, 104th
Cong. (1996) (considered on the House floor, but failed by a vote of 162-
259, 142 Cong. Rec. H8,516 (daily ed. July 25, 1996)), deliberations on
BCRA’s precursors did not begin until the One Hundred and Fifth
Congress. The bills introduced in the One Hundred and Fifth Congress,
One Hundred and Sixth Congress, and One Hundred and Seventh
Congress, relating to campaign finance, include, but are not limited to:
‘Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 1997,’ H.R. 493 (105th Cong.);
‘Campaign Reform and Election Integrity Act of 1998,’ H.R. 3485 (105th
Cong.); ‘Campaign Finance Improvement Act of 1998,’ H.R. 3476 (105th
Cong.); ‘Bipartisan Campaign Integrity Act of 1997,’ H.R. 2183 (105th
Cong.); ‘Campaign Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1998,’ H.R. 3582
(105th Cong.); ‘Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 1997,’ S. 25 (105th
Cong.); ‘Senate Campaign Financing and Spending Reform Act,’ S. 57
(105th Cong.); ‘Campaign Finance Reform and Disclosure Act of 1997,’
S. 179 (105th Cong.); ‘Clean Money, Clean Elections Act,’ S. 918 (105th
Cong.); ‘Grassroots Campaign and Common Sense Federal Election
Reform Act of 1998,’ S. 1689 (105th Cong.); ‘Voter Empowerment Act
of 1999,’ H.R. 32 (106th Cong.); ‘Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
1999,’ H.R. 417 (106th Cong); ‘Clean Money, Clean Elections Act,’ H.R.
483sa
This thoughtful and careful effort by our political branches,
over such a lengthy course of time, deserves respect. See, e.g.,
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 223-224 (1991) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (“This Court acts at the limits of its power when it
invalidates a law on constitutional grounds. In recognition of
our place in the constitutional scheme, we must act with great
gravity and delicacy when telling a coordinate branch that its
actions are absolutely prohibited absent constitutional amend-
ment.’) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see
also FEC v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197,209
(1982) (‘This careful legislative adjustment of the federal
electoral laws, in a cautious advance, step by step, to account
for the particular legal and economic attributes of corpo-
rations and labor organizations warrants considerable defer-
ence.’) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless,
1739 (106th Cong.); ‘FEC Reform and Authorization Act of 1999,’ H.R.
1818 (106th Cong.); ‘Campaign Integrity Act of 1999,’ H.R. 1867 (106th
Cong.); ‘Citizen Legislature and Political Freedom Act,’ H.R. 19 22
(106th Cong.); ‘Campaign Reform and Election Integrity Act of 1999,’
H.R. 2668 (106th Cong.); ‘PAC Limitation Act of 1999,’ H.R. 2866
(106th Cong.); ‘Open and Accountable Campaign Financing Act of 2000,’
H.R. 3243 (106th Cong.); ‘FEC Reform and Authorization Act of 2000,’
H.R. 4037 (106th Cong.); ‘Campaign Finance Improvement Act of 2000,”
H.R. 4685 (106th Cong.); ‘Campaign Finance Disclosure on Sales of
Personal Assets Act of 2000,’ H.R. 4989 (106th Cong.); ‘Informed Voter
Act of 2000,” H.R. 5507 (106th Cong.); ‘Campaign Finance Improvement
Act of 2000,’ H.R. 5596 (106th Cong.); ‘Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 1999,’ S. 26 (106th Cong.); ‘Federal Election Enforcement and
Disclosure Reform Act,’ S. 504 (106th Cong.); ‘Clean Money, Clean
Elections Act,’ S. 982 (106th Cong.); ‘Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
of 1999,’ S. 1593 (106th Cong.); ‘Campaign Finance Integrity Act of
1999,’ S. 1671 (106th Cong.); ‘Open and Accountable Campaign
Financing Act of 2000,’ S. 1816 (106th Cong.); “Campaign Finance
Reform and Disclosure Act of 2000,’ S. 2565 (106th Cong.); ‘Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2001,’ H.R. 2356 (107th Cong.); ‘Campaign
Reform and Citizen Participation Act of 2001,’ H.R. 2360 (107th Cong.);
and ‘Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2001,’ S. 27 (107th
Cong.).
484sa
it is the province of the judiciary to intervene when Congress
has struck the wrong balance and disproportionately trans-
gressed First Amendment rights in the name of reform. While
navigating this balance is undoubtedly complex, such a task is
demanded by the dictates of the Constitution and the well
worn path of interpretation of congressional action relating to
campaign finance legislation by the Supreme Court of the
United States.
It is within this historical framework that the incremental
changes Congress strives to accomplish in enacting the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) (‘BCRA’) are properly understood.
BCRA is yet another step in the careful evolution of the
campaign finance laws targeted at addressing exceptions to
the constitutionally permissible laws that are already in force.
Indeed, BCRA was enacted in large measure to amend the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. $§ 431
et seq. (‘FECA’), and any constitutional interpretation of
BCRA must, as its starting point, recognize the role BCRA
plays within the current state of federal law. In other words, it
must be remembered that the statutory provisions at issue
were designed by Congress as a comprehensive approach to
the abuses of FECA that legislators and candidates were
acutely aware of in their capacity as political actors.” BCRA
? As Senator Fritz Hollings wryly observed during the Senate debate on
BCRA:
It amused me the other day when they said we finally had some
debate going on in the Senate. The reason we have a debate is
because this is the first subject we know anything about. All the rest
of it is canned speeches that the staff gives you, and you come out
and you talk about Kosovo, you talk about the defense budget, or
you talk about the environment, and you read scientific statements
and everything - but we know about money. Oh boy, do we know.
147 Cong Rec. $2852-53 (daily ed. March 26, 2001) (statement of
Senator Fritz Hollings).
485sa
was designed to ameliorate FECA’s most glaring abuses,
while staying true to the constitutional boundaries set forth by
the judiciary.
Presently before this three-judge District Court are eleven
consolidated actions challenging much of BCRA as uncon-
Stitutional and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to
prohibit its enforcement. Plaintiffs and Defendants have filed
cross motions for judgment pursuant to Rule 54 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Suffice it to say, the legal chal-
lenges raised by this litigation are complex and raise issues of
fundamental importance to the conduct and financing of
federal election campaigns.
In resolving these challenges, I have endeavored to adopt a
cohesive constitutional framework in adjudicating Plaintiffs’
claims, premised on the extensive record in this case and
Supreme Court precedent. It is an approach that I believe is
consistent with our common law traditions: a decision is
rooted in the record of this case and guided by the
constitutional boundaries established by the Supreme Court’s
campaign finance jurisprudence. Under this approach, I have
only found three of the challenged sections. unconstitutional:
Sections 213, 318, and 504. The provisions I have found
unconstitutional are all provisions of BCRA that are not
central to its core mission and are entirely severable without
doing injustice to the remainder of the law. The rest of the
challenged provisions I find either constitutional or nonjus-
ticiable, with the small exception, as observed in the per
curiam opinion, of one disclosure provision contained in
Section 201. In the case of Section 201, Judge Leon and I
have severed subsection (5) of Section 201; a relatively minor
change that does not impair the remaining disclosure
provisions of the Act.?
* T cannot agree with Judge Henderson, who appears to characterize my
opinion, along with the per curiam opinion, and Judge Leon’s opinion, as
486sa
Il. FINDINGS OF FACT
Reviewing a record in a case involving protected First
Amendment rights requires serious examination and analysis
of the underlying testimony and documentary evidence.
Therefore, with few exceptions, I have not relied on or cited
to the Findings of Fact proposed by the litigants. To ensure
accuracy and to eliminate any gloss or characterizations
added by the parties, I have reviewed and cited the underlying
documents, depositions, or declarations and have, in man
instances, chosen to quote directly from the original sources.
‘upholding a portion [of BCRA] here and striking down a fragment [of
BCRA] there until they (Judge Leon and Judge Kotelly] have drafted
legislation the Congress would never have enacted—all in the name of
deference to that vody.’ Henderson Op. at 5 (first emphasis added, second
emphasis in original). I would observe that my opinion does not sift
through various sections of BCRA that have been challenged, adopting
some and rejecting others. Rather, my decision is predicated on lengthy
discussions of both the record and the governing caselaw. In undertaking
this analysis, I have only found three sections unconstitutional in their
entirety; the same three sections that Judge Henderson and Judge Leon
have each found unconstitutional. I have also, with Judge Leon, severed
one section from a disclosure provision in Section 201; but this is no
different from Judge Henderson severing a phrase from Section 323(e).
Henderson Op. at Part IV.D.4. Itis also important to note that I have not
‘drafted legislation.’ /d. Nothing in my opinion rewrites BCRA in any
manner whatsoever. I have accepted the statute on its face, finding its core
provisions constitutional, with exceptions noted above as to some
ancillary provisions.
* Almost exclusive reliance on the litigants’ proposed findings of fact,
which I have already indicated is a method of fact finding that I do not
employ, should lead to a careful examination by the reviewing Court of
the adopted findings. See Berger v. Iron Workers Reinforced Rodmen
Local 201, 843 F.2d 1395, 1404 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (“While
‘the fact that the trial judge has adopted proposed findings does not, by
itself, warrant reversal,’ ‘it does raise the possibility that there was
insufficient independent evaluation of the evidence and may cause the
losing party to believe that his position has not been given the con-
487sa
I have endeavored to develop a factual record that is
commensurate with my legal approach. Accordingly, even
though in regard to my Conclusions of Law I am in dissent on
most of Title I, as well as in dissent with regard to the
primary definition of electioneering communication in Title
II, I have found it appropriate to adequately set forth the bases
of my Factual Findings to assist the appellate review of the
three-judge District Court’s decisions, and because the nature
of my legal positions demand it.
Having set forth the following preliminaries, I now turn to
my Findings of Fact. While the record is exhaustive-replete
with multiple sources for each point-I have focused on
selecting from the complete record, facts that are probative in
supporting my legal conclusions, distinguishing, where ap-
propriate, between disputed and uncontroverted evidence. In
short, I have exercised my discretion to be selective without
sacrificing, to the best of my ability, my due diligence.”
sideration it deserves."’) (quoting Photo Elecs. Corp. v. England, 581 F.2d
772, 777 (9th Cir.1978)); id at 1408.
> 1am compelled to respond to Judge Henderson, who, without any
elaboration, has criticized three of my Findings in particular as leaving
her “with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.’ Henderson Op. at 67 n.55 (quoting Easley v. Cromartie, 532
U.S. 234, 242 (2001) (citing my Findings 44 2.13; 1.82-1.83). In the
examples Judge Henderson cites, she points to two summaries and an
introduction; ignoring the surrounding Findings in support of the
evidentiary record. I have in my Findings discussed in great detail the
foundation and basis for the particular Findings she cites. See infra
Findings {4 2.8, 2.8.1- 2.8.3.5; 1.73-1.81; 1.83.1-1.83.7. Judge Henderson
does not assail that analysis nor does she in any way indicate a reasoned
basis for her disagreement. As such, I must respectfully disagree with her
view that a ‘mistake has been committed’ in regard to these three Findings
of Fact.
In addition, although Judge Henderson determines that the record is
largely superfluous to her legal conclusions, see Henderson Op. at 7 n.1
(‘[a}lthough the actions before us have produced a large (but probably
488sa
TITLE I: BCRA NONFEDERAL MONEY (‘SOFT
MONEY’) PROVISIONS
National Party Nonfederal Money Fundraising and Spending
1.1 As discussed both in the per curiam opinion and my own
conclusions of law, FECA was silent on how to draw lines
around money raised outside of FECA’s source and amount
limitations for political parties to spend on activities that were
expected not to be used for the purpose of influencing a
federal election. The FEC’s opinions and rulemakings drew
that line by permitting state and national party committees to
pay for the nonfederal portion of their administrative costs
and voter registration and turnout programs with monies
raised under relevant state laws (not FECA), even if they
permitted contributions from sources such as corpora-
tions and labor unions that were prohibited under FECA. As a
result, national and state parties began to raise so-called ‘soft
money,’ which described these nonfederal funds-not subject
to FECA limits and restrictions-to pay for a share of election-
related activities.
1.2 It is undisputed that over the past two decades the parties
have raised and spent an increasing amount of nonfederal
funds.
1.3 In 1980 the national Republican party spent roughly $15
million in soft money, the Democrats $4 million. This
unnecessary) record”) (emphasis added), she seemingly urges the Su-
preme Court to adopt her ‘Alternative Findings of Fact’ ‘as an alternative
to those of the majority,’ id. at 67, and in conclusory fashion alleges
mistakes in the Findings of Fact of the ‘majority,’ without any specificity.
Id. Given that Judge Henderson's findings are ‘an alternative to those in
the majority,’ I have not found it prudent to catalogue each instance where
I disagree with her factual conclusions. I would simply observe that |
respectfully disagree that Judge Henderson's ‘Alternative Findings of
Fact’ are a more appropriate and accurate ‘alternative to those [Findings
of Fact] of the majority.’ /d.
489sa
constituted 9% of total spending by the two national parties.
In 1984 the amount of soft money spent by the national
parties increased marginally to $21.6 million but it
constituted a smaller share (5%) of total national party
activity. In 1988... . [p]arty soft money spending more than
doubled to $45 million, which was 11% of national party
totals . . . . By 1988, both parties had developed effective
means of courting large soft money donors. After the
election, Republicans revealed that they had received gifts of
$100,000 each from 267 donors; Democrats counted 130
donors contributing $100,000 or more. . . . Mann®° Report at
12-13 [DEV 1-Tab 1] (citations omitted).
1.4 The FEC began tracking nonfederal donations in the 1992
election cycle. During that cycle the Democratic and
Republican parties together raised $86.1 million in nonfederal
funds. During the 1994 election cycle the two major parties
raised $101.6 million in nonfederal funds; during the 1996
election cycle they raised $263.5 million in nonfederal funds;
during the 1998 election cycle they raised $222.5 million in
nonfederal funds; during the 2000 election cycle they raised
$487.5 million in nonfederal funds; and during the 2002
election cycle they raised $495.8 million in nonfederal funds.
See FEC, News Release: Party Fundraising Reaches $1.1
Billion in 2002 Election Cycle (Dec. 18, 2002), available
at http:// www.fec.gov/press/2002 121 8party/20021218party.
html.
1.4.1 There was
a threefold increase in national party soft money activity
between 1992 and 1996—from $80 million to $272
million. Soft money as a share of total national party
spending jumped from 16% to 30%. Both parties and
“ Thomas Mann is one of Defendants’ experts. I note that neither
Plaintiffs nor Defendants have challenged the qualifications of any of the
designated experts in this case.
490sa
their elected officials worked hard to solicit soft money
donations from corporations, wealthy individuals, and
labor unions. During the 1996 election the national party
committees received . . . approximately 27,000 contri-
butions from federally prohibited sources . . . Less than
$10 million of the $272 million was contributed directly
to state and local candidates in the 1996 cycle. . . . The
two parties transferred a total of $115 million in soft
money to state party committees, which financed two-
thirds of state party soft money expenditures. . . . State
party soft money expenditures for political commu-
nication/advertising jumped from less tian $2 million in
1992 to $65 million in 1996.
Mann Report at 21-22 [DEV 1-Tab 1] (citation omitted).
During the 1996 election cycle, the top 50 nonfederal money
donors made contributions ranging from $530,000 to
$3,287,175. /d. at 22. Three of the top 50 nonfederal money
donors to the national political parties in 1996 were state
political parties. Mann Expert Report Tbl. 5 [DEV 1-Tab 1].
1.4.2
The total amount of soft money spent [in the 1998
midterm election cycle]—$221 million—was less than
in 1996 but more than double the previous midterm
election. And soft money as a share of total spending by
the national parties jumped to 34%. The congressional
party campaign committees put a premium on raising
and spending soft money to advance the election
prospects of their candidates. . . . Both national party
committees had discovered they could finance campaign
activity on behalf of their senatorial candidates with soft
money in the form of ‘issue advocacy.” The same
pattern, more pronounced with the Democrats than the
Republicans, was evident in the House campaign
committees.
Mann Report at 23 [DEV 1-Tab 1] (citation omitted).
49 1sa
1.4.3
[S]oft money financing of party campaigning ex-
ploded in the 2000 election cycle. Soft money spending
by the national parties reached $498 million, now 42%
of their total spending. Raising a half billion dollars in
soft money [in 2000] took a major effort by the national
parties and elected officials, but they had the advantage
of focusing their efforts on large donors. . . .The top 50
soft money donors . . . each contributed between
$955,695 and $5,949,000. Among the many soft money
donors who gave generously to both parties were Global
Crossing, Enron and WorldCom.
Mann Report at 24-25 [DEV 1-Tab 1] (citation omitted). ‘A
total of $280 million in soft money—well over half the
amount raised by the six national party committees—was
transferred to state parties [in 2000], along with $135 million
in hard money.’ /d. at 26. ‘By contrast, the national parties
contributed . . . only $19 million directly to state and local
candidates, less than 4% of their soft money spending and
1.6% of their total financial activity in 2000.’ Mann Report at
26 [DEV 1-Tab 1] (citation omitted). The table below ‘shows
the trend in hard and soft money donations to the political
parties since the 1991-1992 election cycle, when the FEC first
began tracking these figures. Soft money donations rose from
$86.1 million to $495.1 million between 1991-2 and 1999-
2000, but hard money contributions rose markedly as well,
from $445 million to $741 million.’ Green’ Expert Report at
30 [DEV 1-Tab 3}.
” Donald Green is one of Defendants’ experts.
492sa
1991-92 | 1993-94 1995-96 1997-98 | 1999-2000
Hard $445.0 $384.7 $638.1 $445.0 $741.0
Money ;
Soft $86.1 $101.6 $262.1 $224.4 $495.1
Money
Total $531.1 $486.3 $900.2 $669.4 $1,236.1
Id. (Tbl. 1: National Party Receipts 1992-2000) (figures in
millions) (based on ‘FEC Reports Increase in Party
Fundraising for 2000’ release of May 15, 2001). Defendants’
expert Donald Green points out that while the amount of
money flowing into the campaign finance system has
continued to grow, ‘the lawmakers subject to its influence
remain constant in number.’ Green Rebuttal Report at 22
[DEV 5-Tab 1}.
1.4.4 During the first 18 months of the 2001-2002 election
cycle the parties reported nonfederal receipts of $308.2
million, which is a 21 percent increase over the same period
during the 1999-2000 cycle. The FEC notes that this increase
is ‘all the more significant given that typically parties raise
more in Presidential campaign cycles than in non-presidential
campaigns.’ Press Release, Federal Election Commission,
Party Fundraising Growth Continues (Sept. 19, 2002)
FEC 141-0001 [DEV 28]. By October 16, 2002, the parties
had raised over $421 million in nonfederal funds. News
Release, Federal Election Commission, National Party
Fundraising Strong in Pre-Election Filings, available at
http://www.fec.gov/press/2002 1 030partypre.htm1/2002 1030p
arty pre.html.
The Rise of Nonfederal Money Spending
1.5 The figures above demonstrate that although nonfederal
receipts and spending began to grow in the 1980s, this trend
accelerated beginning in 1996.
493sa
1.6 Experts from both parties attribute the accelerated rise in
nonfederal money spending to President Bill Clinton and his
political consultant Dick Morris’ use of such funds during the
1996 campaign to fund
television ads designed to promote Clinton’s reelection.
While the ads prominently featured the President, none
of these costs were charged as coordinated expenditures
on behalf of Clinton’s campaign. Instead the party paid
the entire cost, based on a legal argument never before
made: that party communications which did not use
explicit words advocating the election or defeat of a
federal candidate could be treated like generic party
advertising and financed, according to the FEC
allocation rules, with a mix of soft and hard money.
Mann Report at 18 [DEV 1-Tab 1]. In the words of Plaintiffs’
expert Raymond La Raja, this ‘maneuver . . . catapulted soft
money.’ La Raja Cross Exam. Ex. 3 at 45 [JDT 15]
(Raymond Joseph La Raja, American Political Parties in the
Era of Soft Money (2001) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of California at Berkeley).
The strategy to deploy soft money for [political
advertising] is described in a series of memos from Dick
Morris .... Morris says, ‘I met with... attorney [s] ...
and explained the kinds of ads I had in mind.
Fortunately, they said the law permitted unlimited
expenditures by a political party for such ‘issue-
advocacy’ ads. By the end of the race, we had spent
almost thirty-five million dollars on issue-advocacy ads
(in addition to about fifty million dollars on conventional
candidate-oriented media), burying the Republican
proposals and building a national consensus in support
of the president on key issues.’
494sa
Magleby * Expert Report at 11 (quoting Dick Morris, Behind
the Oval Office: Getting Reelected Against All Odds 141,
624 (1999)) [DEV 4-Tab 8]. ‘The national Democratic party
managed to finance two-thirds of its pro-Clinton ‘issue ad’
television blitz by taking advantage of the more favorable
allocation methods available to state parties. They simply
transferred the requisite mix of hard and soft dollars to party
committees in the states they targeted and had the state
committees place the ads.” Mann Expert Report at 22 [DEV
1-Tab 1]; see also La Raja Cross Exam. Ex. 3 at 14, 37-48
{[JDT 15] (discussing the emergence of ‘party soft money’);
Finding § 1.26.1 (discussing allocation regime).
1.7 Experts for both sides agree that ‘[i]t did not take the
Republican party long to respond in kind by promoting Bob
Dole and Jack Kemp.’ Magleby Expert Report at 11 [DEV 4-
Tab 8]; see also La Raja Cross Exam. Ex. 3 at 46 [JDT Vol.
15] (‘The Dole-Kemp campaign responded to the Morris plan
with its own party- based media strategy.’).
In May of 1996, the Republican National Committee
announced a $20 million ‘issue advocacy’ advertising
campaign. Its purpose, in the words of the chairman,
would be ‘to show the differences between Dole and
Clinton and between Republicans and Democrats on the
issues facing our country, so we can engage full-time in
one of the most consequential elections in our history.’
These presidential candidate-specific ads, like the
Democratic ones, were targeted on key battleground
states and financed with a mix of hard and (mostly) soft
money. Both parties were now financing a significant
part of the campaigns of their presidential candidates
outside of the strictures of the FECA and well beyond
the bounds of the 1979 FEC ruling that national parties
may raise corporate and union funds and _ solicit
* David Magleby is an expert for Defendants.
495sa
unlimited donations from individuals ‘for the exclusive
and limited purpose of influencing the nomination or
election of candidates for nonfederal office.’
Mann Expert Report at 20 (citation omitted) [DEV 1-Tab 1];
see also infra Findings 4 1.20.1 (Republican consultants’
discussion about whether such advertisements met the ‘issue
advocacy test’).
1.8 This approach for the use of nonfederal funds spilled over
into congressional races. Mann Expert Report at 20 [DEV I-
Tab 1]; see also Lamson” Decl. ¥ 9 (describing both parties’
national committees’ use of nonfederal money to run
advertisements in a race for Congress in Montana). 1.9 By the
end of the 2000 election cycle, it was clear that although ‘[s]
cholars might differ about how best to change the campaign
finance system, . . . they could not avoid the conclusion that
party soft money and electioneering in the guise of issue
advocacy had rendered the FECA regime largely ineffectual?
Mann Expert Report at 26.
* Since January 2001, Joe Lamson has served as the Communications
Director for the Office of Public Instruction of the State of Montana, a
post he also held from early 1997 until January 2000. During 2000,
Lamson managed Nancy Keenan’s campaign to represent Montana’s
Congressional district. During 1996, Lamson managed Bill Yellowtail’s
campaign to represent Montana’s Congressional district. From 1983
through 1996, Lamson served as the state director for United States
Representative Pat Williams’ Congressional office in Montana. During
this same period, Lamson also managed Congressman Williams’ election
campaigns in Montana. From 1981 to 1983, Lamson was Executive
Director of the Montana Democratic Party. Lamson provided a sworn
declaration in Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 41 F.
Supp. 2d 1197 (D. Colo. 1999), aff'd, 213 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2000),
rev'd, 533 U.S. 431 (2001). Lamson Decl. 44 2-3 [DEV 7-Tab 26].
496sa
The Rise of Nonfederal Money Is Not Related to ‘Party
Building’
1.10 “The parties’ expanding use of soft money for the
promotion or attack of particular candidates . . . . [runs]
counter to the stated purposes of soft money which were to
permit parties to raise unlimited amounts of money for ‘party
building’ purposes, unlike hard money which is subject to the
contribution limits given to the parties to help elect or defeat
candidates.” Magleby Expert Report at 11 [DEV 4-Tab 8].
Magleby notes that ‘[t]he content of such ads does nothing to
_ foster party infrastructure. Those who make the ads and
manage the campaigns are consultants, who often do not even
reside in the state where the election is taking place.’
Magleby Expert Report at 49 [DEV 4-Tab 8]. Plaintiffs’
expert La Raja concurs, finding that the political parties
‘exploit federal campaign finance laws by using soft money
for candidate support even though federal laws require them
to use it for generic party building.’ La Raja Cross Exam. Ex.
3 at 74-75; see also La Raja Cross Exam. at 67 [JDT Vol. 15]
(finding that ‘more non-federal funds in the allocation
accounts are used for media rather than what I call party
building’).
1.11 As former Senator Brock"® attests, nonfederal money
by and large is not used for ‘party building.’ To the
contrary, the parties by and large use the money to help
elect federal candidates—in the Presidential campaigns
and in close Senate and House elections. Far from
reinvigorating the parties, soft money has simply
strengthened certain candidates and a few large donors,
'° Senator William Brock he served as United States Representative
from Tennessee from 1963 until 1971. From 1971 until 1977, he served as
a United States Senator from the State of Tennessee. From 1977 until
1981, he served as Chairman of the Republican National Committee.
Brock Decl. ¢ 2 [DEV 6- Tab13}.
497sa
while distracting parties from traditional and important
grassroots work.
Brock Decl. § 6 [DEV 6-Tab 9]; see also Boren '' Decl. § 4
[DEV 6-Tab 8] (‘[S]oft money is not used purely for ‘party
building’ activities’); Buttenwieser '2 Decl. § 15 [DEV 6-Tab
11] (explaining that there is little difference between federal
and nonfederal money beyond the source and amount
limitations on federal money, because national and state
political parties use nonfederal money to influence federal
elections).
National Party ‘Issue Advocacy’ Campaigns Funded With
Nonfederal Money
1.12 As the experts for both parties note, the rise in non-
federal money fundraising was spurred by the new-found
ability to run ‘issue advertisements’ designed to affect federal
elections.
1.13 Witnesses involved in the political process all agree that
political party ‘issue advocacy’ includes communications,
paid for in whole or part with nonfederal money, that attack
or support a candidate by name while claiming to be an issue
discussion outside the reach of federal election laws and do
'' Senator David Boren served as a United States Senator from Okla-
homa from 1979-1994. Boren Decl. § 2 [DEV 6-Tab 8]
'? Peter Buttenwieser is a large contributor to the Democratic Party. He
estimates that from the 1996 election cycle through the 2002 cycle, he has
donated over $2.8 million in non-federal funds to national committees of
the Democratic Party, including over $1.2 million in the 2000 election
cycle. Also from the 1996 election cycle through the current cycle, he
estimates that he and his wife have contributed approximately $100,000
per cycle in federal funds to federal candidate committees and other
federal political committees not affiliated with political parties. During
this same period, he has also hosted many hard money fundraising events
for federal candidates in Philadelphia. Buttenwieser Decl. § 6 [DEV 6-
Tab 11).
498sa
not use the Buckley express advocacy language referred to as
‘magic words.’!?
Members of Congress and candidates for federal office
agree that political party advertisements paid for with
nonfederal funds often influence elections. See 146 Cong.
Rec. H428 (Feb. 15, 2000) (Rep. Ganske) (noting that parties
in the 1996 election cycle ‘took . . . [nonfederal] money and
they did not use it to just go out and get a voter registration
guide, they used that money for issue ads on TV that were
nothing less than full campaign attack ads. Independent
surveys have shown that 80 percent of those, quote, issue ads
were actually attack ads.’); Shays Decl. in RNC 9§ 7, 8 [DEV
68-Tab 40] (‘The political parties ... use these [nonfederal]
funds not for general party-building activities, but instead on
television advertisements that are designed to influence the
outcome of federal elections (and are often indistinguishable
from candidate-sponsored campaign ads.’); Meehan Decl. in
RNC 4 13 [DEV 68-Tab 30] (‘I believe that ‘issue ads’ by
party committees are designed to and do affect the outcomes
of elections, that they defeat candidates, and that they drive
up the costs of elections.’); Rudman" Decl. q 12 [DEV 8-
Tab 34] (‘The parties use soft money to help federal
candidates get elected by running so-called ‘issue ads’ funded
with soft money in closely contested federal races.’); McCain
Decl. 94 15, 17 (describing political party advertising
demonstrating that political ‘parties circumvent federal
contribution and spending limits by running candidate ads
under the guise of ‘issue advocacy.”); Chapin’? Decl. 4 11
'* See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 n.52 (1976).
'* Senator Warren Rudman was elected to the United States Senate
from New Hampshire in 1980 where he served two terms. Rudman Decl.
q¢ 1, 3 [DEV 8-Tab 34].
'S Since early 2001, Linda Chapin has been the Director of the
Metropolitan Center for Regional Studies at the University of Central
Florida. Chapin Decl. ¢ 2 [DEV 6-Tab 12] received about 49% of the
499sa
[DEV 6-Tab 12] (stating that the National Republican
Campaign Committee (‘NRCC’) ran television advertise-
ments during her 2000 Congressional campaign designed
to influence the result of the election); Bloom Decl. 4 10
[DEV 6-Tab 7].
Political consultants agree as well. See Beckett '° Decl.
q 11 (‘The NRCC itself ran television ads in the 2000
Congressional campaign . . . . which as I recall were run in
the two months prior to the general election . . . . [which]
votes cast. /d. 4 4. From 1998 to 2000, Chapin directed the Orange County
(Florida) Clerk’s Office. Jd. ¥ 2. Prior to that, Chapin was elected to two
successive four-year terms, in 1990 and 1994, as County Chairman of
Orange County. /d. The County Chairman is a strong executive position
roughly equivalent to a mayoral office. /d. In recognition of Chapin’s
work as County Chairman, she received a Public Service Excellence
Award from then- President Bill Clinton in 1997, and an Alumni
Achievement Award from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard
University in 1999. /d. Prior to her tenure as County Chairman, she was
elected to a four-year term on the Orange County Commission in 1986.
'° Terry S. Beckett is a Democratic political consultant who has spent
about 25 years working on politica! campaigns. Beckett Decl. § 2 [DEV 6-
Tab 3]. Beckett worked on the 1976 and 1980 Presidential campaigns of
Jimmy Carter, the 1978 Bill Nelson Congressional campaign, and she ran
Dick Batchelor’s 1982 Congressional campaign. /d. Beckett also en-
deavored to establish a House Democratic Caucus within the Alabama
legislature in the mid 1980's. /d. Beckett ran Gary Hart’s 1988 Presi-
dential campaign in Florida and Louisiana, and Dick Gephardt’s 1988
Presidential campaign in Florida. /d. In 1986, Beckett did the polling on
Linda Chapin’s campaign for Orange County (Florida) Commissioner,
and ran Chapin’s 1990 and 1994 campaigns for Orange County Chairman.
Id. Beckett also served as general consultant on Ms. Chapin’s 2000
campaign to represent Florida’s Eighth Congressional district, overseeing
the work of the campaign manager and the media and polling consultants.
Id. Beckett has also been involved in government having worked on the
Executive Staff for Bob Graham from 1981-82 when he was the Governor
of Florida and also serving as Ms. Chapin’s Chief of Staff from 1991 to
1994 when she was County Chairman. /d. In addition, Beckett worked for
a polling firm during the 1980s. /d.
500sa
were Clearly intended to influence the election result.’) & Ex.
3 (storyboards of two of these advertisements) [DEV 6-Tab
3}; id. ¢ 9 (describing Democratic Congressional Campaign
Committee (‘DCCC’) efforts during the same election);
Lamson Decl. ¥§ 9, 17, Ex. 2-4 [DEV 7-Tab 26] (noting that
political parties ran ‘issue ads’ designed to influence the
outcome of the Montana Congressional election in both 1996
and 2000); Pennington'’ Decl. ¢ 10-11, 13-15 [DEV 8-Tab
31] (discussing how parties can and have used issue advocacy
to affect federal elections). The DNC’s political director also
concurs. Stoltz'* Decl. § 16 [DEV 9-Tab 39] (‘In my
experience, issue ads affect elections. The ads can either
demoralize or confuse voters so that they do not vote, or
they can energize a voter base for or against a party or its
'’ Rocky Pennington is a Republican political consultant. Pennington
Decl. ¢ 2 [DEV 8-Tab 31]. He is the owner and President of three Florida
companies engaged in political activities: Southern Campaign Resources,
Direct Mail Systems, Inc., and Summit Communications. /d. Southern
Campaign Resources, which Pennington founded in 1982, does general
consulting primarily for Florida state campaigns, but has also done
Congressional races in Florida, including Congressman Cliff Steams’ first
race in 1988 in Ocala, Bill Sublette’s 2000 campaign in the Eighth Con-
gressional district, and Congressman Jeff Miller's 2001 special election in
the Panhandle. /d. Direct Mail Systems, founded in 1981, is a direct mail
company with roughly 100 employees that has done fundraising and has
sent voter contact mail for candidates, parties and interest groups in
Florida and elsewhere. /d. Direct Mail Systems has also sent voter contact
mail for some of Florida’s Republican Congressional delegation, as well
as for state Republican parties in many other states. Finally, Summit
Communications, which Pennington founded in 2000, creates political
advertising for television and radio and buys airtime for various cam-
paigns, such as Congressman Miller’s 2001 general election campaign. /d.
'* Gail Stoltz has been employed as the Political Director of the DNC
since May 2001. From 1998 through 2001, she worked for the Service
Employees International Union as Government Affairs Director. Prior to
this she worked as Political Director for the Democratic Senatorial
Campaign Committee (‘DSCC’) and in various capacities for the
Democratic National Committee (‘DNC’). Stoltz Decl. ¢ 1.
SOlsa
candidates. During a presidential election year, the ads
definitely make a difference when a presidential candidate
is featured.’).
In addition, experts for both sides agree that these ‘issue
ads’ are intended to and do support the campaigns of federal
candidates. See La Raja Cross Exam. Ex. 3 at 15 [JDT Vol.
15], 101-04; Magleby Expert Report at 40-42 [DEV 4-Tab 8].
Characteristics of National Party Nonfederal Campaign
Advertisements
1.14 Many national political party committee ‘issue ads’
have focused on the positions, past actions, or general
character traits of federal candidates, as part of efforts to
influence federal elections.
Scripts of these advertisements confirm this. See, e.g.,
ODP0021-01393 [DEV 70-Tab 48] (Republican National
Committee’s (‘RNC’) advertisement titled ‘Pledge,’
discussed infra Findings 4 1.20.2; ODPO0023-02288 to 95
[DEV 70-Tab 48] (sample scripts of ‘Keep More’ with
different sponsors identified (i.e. RNC, CRP, ‘[state party
name]’). Some versions of the advertisement end with
‘[Member Name] kept his promise and voted for the middle-
class tax cut. Clinton vetoed it,’ while others end with
‘Congressman [____] voted for the largest tax increase in
American history... . and against Republican efforts to roll it
back.”); ODP0023-02308 [DEV 70-Tab 48] (national political
party advertisement titled ‘Fool Me Once,’ beginning with
the line ‘Compare the Clinton rhetoric with the Clinton
record,’ discussing statements President Clinton made and
actions on the same issues, and concluding with the line ‘Tell
President Clinton you won't be fooled again.’); ODP0023-
02313 [DEV 70-Tab 48] (RNC advertisement titled ‘Stripes,’
which states in part: “Bill Clinton . . . He’s really something.
He’s now trying to avoid a sexual harassment lawsuit
claiming he is on active military duty .. . . Active Duty? Bill
502sa
Clinton . . . He’s really something.’); ODP0023-02314 [DEV
70-Tab 48] (script of the RNC’s ‘The Story,’ discussed supra
Finding § 1.20.1); ODPOO23-02326 (national political party
advertisement titled ‘More,’ stating that ‘Under President
Clinton, spending on illegal[] [immigrants] has gone up.
While wages for the typical worker have gone down... . Tell
President Clinton to stop giving benefits to illegals, and end
wasteful Washington spending.’); ODP0023-02389-92 [DEV
70-Tab 48] (three versions of a national political party
advertisement titled ‘Control’ stating that ‘Washington labor
bosses and liberal special interest groups want to buy control
of Congress,’ and explaining why these groups think a named
candidate ‘will vote their way . . . to return to higher taxes
and more wasteful spending’); ODP0029-00010-25 [DEV 70-
Tab 48] (national political party advertisement titled ‘High
Taxes’ and related documents. ‘High Taxes’ states that a
Congressional candidate while ‘in the state legislature .. .
voted to raise corporate and personal income tax rates almost
18 percent. He even supports raising social security
tax limits.’); ODP0029-00031 [DEV 70-Tab 48] (national
political party advertisement titled ‘Family Budget,’ stating
that a Congressional candidate raised taxes while in state and
local government, and concluding: ‘If you think your family
pays enough in taxes .. . Call [ |. Tell her to stop raising
your taxes.’) (emphasis in original); ODP0029-00041 [DEV
70-Tab 48] (national congressional committee advertisement
supporting a candidate who ‘knows you have better things to
do with your money than pay higher taxes’); see also
ODP0029-00114 [DEV 70-Tab 48]; ODP0029-00169 [DEV
71-Tab 48]; ODPO0O29-00177 to 79 [DEV 71-Tab 48];
ODP0029-00235 to 37 [DEV 71-Tab 48]; ODP0029-00329
[DEV 71-Tab 48]; ODP0029-00339 [DEV 71-Tab 48];
ODP0041-00177 to 78 [DEV 71-Tab 48]; ODP0041-00202 to
06 [DEV 71-Tab 48]; ODP0041-00220 to 23 [DEV 71-Tab
48]; ODP0041-00280 to 82 [DEV 71-Tab 48]; ODP0041-
00352 to 54 [DEV 71-Tab 48]; ODP0041-01261 [DEV 71-
503sa
Tab 48]; ODPOO41- 01275 [DEV 71-Tab 48]; ODPO0029-
00138 to 47 [DEV 71-Tab 48!; ODP0036-01403 to 06 [DEV
71-Tab 48]; ODP0036-02931-32 [DEV 71-Tab 48];
ODP004 | -00269-71 [DEV 71- Tab 48]; ODP0041-01024 to
27 [DEV 71-Tab 48]; ODP0041-01219 [DEV 71-Tab 48]
(other political party advertisements that focus on the
positions, past actions, or general character traits of federal
candidates, and related documents).
1.15 Many political party committee ‘issue ads’ have
compared the positions or past actions of competing federal
candidates, portraying one position negatively and the other
positively, as part of efforts to influence federal elections.
Scripts provided to the Court confirm this fact. See, e.g.,
ODP0023- 02387 [DEV 70-Tab 48] (national political party
advertisement comparing candidate positions on_ issues,
stating that ‘Congressman [ | voted for our plan to give
families a $500 per child tax credit. . . . [Opponent] voted for
Jim Florio’s $2.8 billion tax increase which increased your
income, sales and gas taxes.’); ODP0029-00149 [DEV 71-
Tab 48] (national political party advertisement stating that
one candidate ‘support[s] the $500 per child tax credit and
ending the tax penalty on married couples,’ while the other
‘voted against’ those ideas); ODP0029-00159 [DEV 71-Tab
48] (national political party advertisement stating that one
candidate ‘wants Washington bureaucrats to decide what’s
right for our kids,’ while the other ‘supports local school
control’) (emphasis in original); ODP0041-00585-86 [DEV
71-Tab 48] (national congressional campaign committee
advertisement stating that one candidate ‘supports a program’
that “spends millions to hire more bureaucrats,’ while the
other ‘supports proposals that spen i less on bureaucrats and
more on local schools’); ODP0041-00729-32 [DEV 71-Tab
48] (national political party advertisement stating that one
candidate supports a welfare program that ‘is restoring
responsibility, pride and self-worth,’ while the other ‘voted
against moving able-bodied welfare recipients from welfare
504sa
to work’) (emphasis in original); ODP0041-01152 [DEV 71-
Tab 48] (national political party advertisement stating that
one candidate ‘doesn’t support tax cuts for Idaho working
families,’ while the other ‘has a different view’); ODP0041-
01177 [DEV 71-Tab 48] (national political party advertise-
ment stating that one candidate was ‘the only member of
Congress who did not want to tell parents when a child
molester moved into their neighborhood,’ while the other
‘supports laws that protect our children and keep violent
criminals in jail for their full terms’); ODP0041-01189 [DEV
71-Tab 48] (national political party advertisement stating that
one candidate voted against a measure to ‘abolish the tax
code to force meaningful reform,’ while the other ‘wants to
abolish the tax code, so we can create a tax code that is fairer
and simpler for working families’); ODP0041-01198 [DEV
71-Tab 48] (national political party advertisement noting that
one candidate ‘supports tax cuts for working families,’ while
the other ‘voted against billions worth of tax cuts for working
families’); ODPO041-01266 [DEV 71-Tab 48] (national
political party advertisement noting that one candidate
‘pushed for tax increases’ while the other ‘knows lower taxes
and responsible government spending are better policies’);
ODP0041-01337 [DEV 71-Tab 48] (national political party
advertisement noting that one candidate ‘supports Senator
Kennedy’s ultra liberal plan to mandate spending increases of
25 billion dollars over the next five years,’ while the other
‘supports lower taxes’).
1.16 Political parties aim their nonfederal money largely
at competitive races. The political party committees spend
millions of nonfederal dollars in competitive U.S. Senate
races and hundreds of thousands of dollars or more in
competitive U.S. House races. Magleby Report at 39 [DEV 4-
Tab 8]. See also McConnell Dep. at 237 [JDT Vol. 19]
(‘I think every Senator realizes that the resources of the
National Republican Senatorial Committee [‘NRSC’] are
going to be deployed to the . . . maximum extent in places
505sa
where there are competitive races’); Bumpers'’ Decl. 4
[DEV 6-Tab 10] (‘Party committees focus their resources on
competitive races.’); McCain Decl. § 22 [DEV 8-Tab 29]
(‘[P]arties generally focus their soft money spending first on
taking care of the parties’ current officeholdersand on the
candidates running for open seats and after that on the
challengers running against incumbents’).
1.16.1 For example, television and radio electioneering
advertising by political parties played an important role in the
2000 Congressional elections in Florida’s Eighth District, ‘a
very close open-seat race.’ Beckett Decl. 44 4, 9 [DEV 6-Tab
3] (noting that the winning candidate garnered 51% of the
vote). Political parties on both sides of these campaigns ran
so-called ‘issue ads’ that were financed partly with nonfederal
money but clearly directed at influencing the outcome of the
election. The DCCC ran television advertising praising Linda
Chapin, the Democratic candidate, or criticizing the
Republican candidates, through the Democratic State Party in
order to take advantage of the more favorable hard money-
soft money allocation ratios enjoyed by state parties.””
'? Senator Dale Bumpers served two terms as Governor of Arkansas,
from 1971 to 1975. Bumpers Decl. § 2 [DEV 6-Tab 10]. After his time as
Governor, Bumpers served as a Member of the United States Senate,
representing the State of Arkansas, from 1975 to 1999. /d. After he retired
from the Senate, Senator Bumpers spent one year directing the Center for
Defense Information, a nonprofit think-tank based in Washington, D.C.
Id. He currently practices law in Washington D.C. at the law firm Arent
Fox Kintner Plotkin & Kahn, PLLC. /d. ¢ 3.
° One advertisement run during the final 60 days of the election
campaign, paid for by the DCCC through the Florida Democratic Pai-y,
attacked Chapin’s challenger, stating the following:
Announcer: ‘I’m pro-gun.’ That’s how he described himself to the
Orlando Sentinel. Pro-gun. He wants to get rid of the Brady Bill, the
common-sense law that says we should just wait 5 days before
purchasing a handgun. Pro-gun. He even opposes mandatory trigger
locks to keep children safe from harm. ‘I’m pro-gun.’ He’s Ric
506sa
Beckett Decl. § 9, Ex. | [DEV 6-Tab 3}; Chapin Decl. § 9
[DEV 6-Tab 12]; see also Bloom Decl. 4 10, Ex. 1-1, 1-4,
(describing a similar situation for the 2000 election campaign
in Florida’s 22nd Congressional District) [DEV 6-Tab 7]. The
NRCC and the Florida Republican Party also ran television
advertisements in the two months prior to the general
election, most of which criticized Chapin’s record or
positions, and which witnesses testify were clearly intended
to influence the election results.” Chapin Decl. § 10, Ex. 2
[DEV 6-Tab 12]; Beckett Decl. | 10, Ex. 2 [DEV 6-Tab 3];
Pennington Decl. ¢ 14, Ex. 3 [DEV 8-Tab 31]; see also
Bloom *’ Decl. 11, Ex. 2 (Republican party ads in 2000
Florida 22nd District Congressional race) [DEV 6-Tab 7].
Keller, and you should tell him to support sensible gun safety for
change.
Chapin Decl. § 9 & Ex. 1-2 [DEV 6-Tab 12]; Beckett Decl. ¢ 9-DEV 6-
Tab 3}.
*' One advertisement paid for by the NRCC ran within 60 days of the
election and stated the following: Announcer: It was Tyson vs. McNeeley,
the fight shown on Pay-Per-View, bought and paid for by the county jail
system. Linda Chapin’s county commission ran the jail system that paid
for Cable TV for convicts at [its] work-release center. Under Chapin,
Convicts also got new TVs and VCRs. The Sentinel wrote cells are
carpeted. The day room has padded furniture, such is life for hundreds of
Orange County Jail prisoners. Ask Chapin why convicts got Cable TV.
Chapin Decl. § 11 & Ex. 3-2 [DEV 6-Tab 12]; Beckett Decl. 4 11;
Pennington Decl. ¢ 14.
* Elaine Bloom is currently engaged in consulting, public speaking,
and community activities. Bloom Decl. ¢ 2 [DEV 6-Tab 7]. In 2001,
Bloom was a candidate for Mayor of Miami Beach, Florida. /d. In 2000,
Bloom was the Democratic candidate in the general election to represent
Florida’s 22nd Congressional district, running against the incumbent
Republican Clay Shaw, who had served in Congress for nearly 20 years.
Id. (Shaw won the race by approximately 500 votes out of over 200,000
cast). Prior to the 2000 race, Bloom served as a member of the Florida
House of Representatives for over 18 years, from 1974 to 1978 (repre-
senting Northeast Dade County) and from 1986-2000 (representing Miami
507sa
1.16.2
Most interest groups, in contrast [to political parties],
seek to build relationships with officeholders as a way of
improving access to the legislative process and lobbying
their position. In political science, there is strong
empirical support for the theory that interest groups
allocate resources primarily to pursue the ‘access’
Strategy, meaning they give to candidates who are most
likely to win office, which is usually the incumbents
(see, for example, Herrnson 2000). Political parties,
however, allocate resources for electoral _ stra-
tegies, meaning they contribute money to a party can-
didate who is in a potentially close election.
La Raja Expert Report ¥ 14 [RNC Vol. VII].
1.17 ‘Almost 92% of party ads in the 2000 election never
even identified the name of a political party. let alone
encouraged voters to register with the party, to voiunteer with
the local party organization, or to support the party.’ Buying
Time 2000 at 64 [DEV 46]. Defense Expert Magleby concurs,
finding ‘only 15 percent of the ads in 1998 and 7 percent of
the ads in 2000 mentioned the party by name in the ad, except
in the tag line indicating which party committee paid for the
ad.” Magleby Expert Report at 49 [DEV 4-Tab 8].
1.18 Out of the estimated $25.6 million spent by political
parties on advertisements in the 1998 election cycle, $24.6
million went to fund advertisements that referred to a federal
candidate. See Krasno & Sorauf ** Expert Report at Table 1.
Out of 44,485 commercials, 42,599 referred to a federal
Beach and Miami). /d. Bloom was Speaker Pro- Tempore of the Florida
House from 1992 to 1994, and also served as chair of several legislative
committees, including the Health Care Committee, the Joint Legisiative
Management Committee, the Joint Legislative Auditing Committee, and
the Tourism and Cultural Affairs Committee. /d.
** Jonathan Krasno and Frank Sorauf are experts for Defendants.
SO8sa
candidate. /d. Viewers perceived 94 percent of these adver-
tisements as electioneering in nature. /d. at Table 7.
1.19 Plaintiffs’ own experts and witnesses testify that ‘[i]ssue
advertising outside the context of electioneering by political
parties is rare." RNC expert Nelson Polsby Dep. in RNC v.
FEC, 98-CV-1207 (D.D.C) (hereinafter *“RNC’) Ex. 3, at 5
[DEV 66-Tab 5]. In this case, the Plaintiffs’ expert, Professor
Raymond La Raja, acknowledges that ‘issue advertisements’
are intended to and do support the campaigns of federal
candidates. La Raja Cross Exam. Ex. 3 at 14-15 [JDT Vol.
15] (‘[[ssue ads, however, have been designed with the intent
of boosting the campaigns of targeted candidates. . . . Rather
than use soft money to shore up weak state and local
organizations, or enforce party discipline in government,
parties invest primarily in issue ads that help candidates.’)
(JDT Vol. 15}; La Raja Decl. § 16(b) [RNC Vol. VII}
(‘Political parties use nonfederal money to develop and
disseminate political messages.’). RNC political operations
director Terry Nelson’ testifies that the RNC engages in
‘issue advocacy in order to achieve one of our primary
objectives, which is to get more Republicans elected.’ Nelson
Dep. at 191 [JDT Vol. 24]. This conclusion is echoed by
Defense Expert Magleby. Magleby Expert Report at 45 [DEV
4-Tab 8] (‘The content, tactics and strategy [of political party
advertisements] are generally indistinguishable from the
candidate campaigns, except that party campaign communi-
cations are generally more negative in tone.’)
1.19.1 An RNC official provides examples of advertisement
campaigns he claims the RNC ran for ‘the exclusive purpose
of influencing the legislative and policy debate.’ Josefiak *°
** Terry Nelson is the RNC’s Deputy Chief of Staff and Executive
Director of Political Operations. Nelson Dep. at 8-9 [JDT Vol. 24]
*> Thomas Josefiak is Chief Counsel of the RNC. Josefiak Decl. 4 1
[RNC Vol. I}.
509sa
Decl. § 91 [RNC Vol. I]. These campaigns dealt with the
issues of the balanced -budget amendment, welfare reform,
and education. /d. One of these advertisements’ purpose
was to communicate the Republican Party’s position that
the federal government must control its reckless appetite
for deficit spending. This particular advertisement
featured President Clinton, and included numerous clips
of him stating a different number of years in which he
would balance the budget. The advertisement explained,
‘Talk is cheap. Double talk is expensive. Tell Mr.
Clinton to support the Balanced Budget Amendment.
Id 4 91(c). Josefiak calls this advertisement ‘one of the most
memorable and effective broadcast advertisements in [RNC]
history.” Jd. This commercial was run in May 1996, id., the
same time the RNC was running very similar so-called ‘issue
advertisements’ attacking President Clinton as part of an
effort to assist the Dole presidential campaign which was low
on funds, see infra Findings 4 1.20. RNC advertisements
addressing welfare reform were also run in the summer of
1996, ‘comparing Clinton’s rhetoric on welfare reform with
his record on welfare reform.’ Josefiak Decl. § 91(d)[RNC
Vol. I]. Comparing President Clinton’s statements with his
record was a major theme of RNC advertisements run during
this period in aid of the Dole campaign. See infra Findings
94 1.20, 1.20.2. Another RNC advertisement ran in October
2002, the month before a federal election, ‘nationwide in
support of the Republican Party’s education agenda,’ and had
the following script:
Male: Every child can learn...
Female: . . . and deserves a quality education in a safe
school.
Male: But some people say some children can’t learn
510sa
Female: . . . so just shuffle them through.
Male: That’s not fair.
Female: That’s not right.
Male: Things are changing. A new federal law says
every child deserves to learn.
Female: It says test every child to make sure they’re
learning and give them extra help if they’re not.
Male: Hold schools accountable. Because no child
should be in a school that will not teach and will not
change.
Female: The law says every child must be taught to
read by the 3rd grade. Because reading is a new civil
right.
Male: President Bush’s No Child Left Behind Law.
Female: The biggest education reform and biggest
increase in education funding in 25 years. Male:
Republicans are working for better, safer schools ...
Female: . . . so no child is left behind.
Male: That’s right . . . Republicans.
Announcer: Learn how Republican education reforms
can help your children. Call 1-800-843-7620. Help
President Bush and leave No Child Behind.
Paid for by the Republican National Committee.
Josefiak Decl. | 91(e) & RNC Ex. 2428 [RNC Vol. I]. The
decision by the RNC to run this advertisement, about
legislation that had already passed, within one month of a
federal election raises questions about whether promoting
education policy was the only goal of this advertisement.
These presumably are the best examples the RNC had of
its ‘genuine issue advocacy.’ I find that two of these
Slisa
commercials, when viewed in context, clearly had an
electioneering purpose in addition to any policy goal. The
third, concerning education, may also have sought to promote
Republican candidates. These examples reinforce the deter-
mination of the RNC’s own experts: genuine issue advocacy
on the part of political parties is a rare occurrence. See supra
Findings § 1.19.
1.20 Political parties also engage in ‘issue advocacy’ to help
their candidates whose campaigns are low on funds. For
example, the RNC spent $20 million on issue advertisements
from March 18, 1996, through the Republican National
Convention in August, designed to boost Senator Dole’s
image at a time when he had virtually run out of federal
matching primary funds. The RNC paid for a portion of these
issue advertisements with nonfederal funds, including the
costs of creating and/or disseminating advertisements that
attacked President Clinton’s record on welfare reform, taxes,
and budgetary policy. Thompson Comm. Report at 4014-16,
7520, 8294; Annenberg Report 1997 at 66; Huyck”® Decl. in
Mariani v. United States, 3: CV-1701 (M.D. Pa) (hereinafter
Mariani) 4§ 3, 5 [DEV 79-Tab 60]; see also Huyck Decl. in
Mariani Attach. A [DEV Supp.-Tab 9] (text of adver-
tisements paid for by the RNC and other Republican party
committees in part with nonfederal money).
The RNC conducted a detailed analysis of several adver-
tisements it was planning to run in various markets. The
advertisements consisted of two themes: build up then-
Senator and Republican presidential candidate Bob Dole, and
attack President Bill Clinton. These advertisements were
tested in focus groups to see the effect they had on undecided
voters. The advertisement used to build up Senator Dole told
© Pat Huyck was the RNC’s Director of Accounting as of 1999. Huyck
Decl. in Mariani v. United States, 3: CV-1701 (M.D. Pa) 94 3, 5 [DEV
79-Tab 60].
512sa
his life story and never mentioned the words ‘vote for,’
‘elect,’ or any of the ‘magic words’ of express advocacy. The
second set of advertisements showed President Clinton
speaking on a certain issue, then publicly stating the opposite.
All of the commercials were tested to see which would give
help Senator Dole and hurt President Clinton in the polls.
Memorandum to Haley Barbour from Charlie Nave and Joel
Mincey, dated May 28, 1996, FEC MUR 4553, Fabrizio Dep.
Ex. 5 [DEV 55-Tab 113] (INTO11830); FEC MUR 4553,
Fabrizio Dep. at 83-94 [DEV 55-Tab 113] (despite working
as a consultant for Senator Dole, Fabrizio McLaughlin and
Associates were sharing their data with the RNC, NRSC,
and NRCC).
1.20.1 One example from this effort is “The Story’:
Audio of Bob Dole: We have a moral obligation to give
our children an America with the opportunity and values
of the nation we grew up in.
Voice Over: Bob Dole grew up in Russell, Kansas.
From his parents he learned the value of hard work,
honesty and responsibility. So when his country called ...
he answered. He was seriously wounded in combat.
Paralyzed, he underwent nine operations.
Audio of Bob Dole: I went around looking for a
miracle that would make me whole again.
Voice Over: The doctors said he’d never walk again.
But after 39 months, he proved them wrong.
Audio of Elizabeth Dole: He persevered, he never
gave up. He fought his way back from total paralysis.
Voice Over: Like many Americans, his life experience
and values serve as a strong moral corapass. The
principle of work to replace welfare. The principle of
accountability to strengthen our criminal justice system.
513sa
The principle of discipline to end wasteful Washington
spending.
Voice of Bob Dole: It all comes down to values. What
you believe in. What you sacrifice for. And what you
stand for.
Fabrizio Dep. Ex. 2; McCain Decl. § 15. The RNC paid for
‘The Story,’ in part with nonfederal money, and it was
intended to help Senator Dole in the Presidential election.
Huyck Decl. in Mariani | 3 [DEV 79-Tab 60]; FEC MUR
4553, Fabrizio Dep. at 50 [DEV 55-113]; McCain Decl. | 15
[DEV 8-Tab 29].
The RNC’s Curt Anderson and Wes Anderson wrote to the
RNC Chairman regarding the Dole ‘Story’ advertisement,
stating: ‘We could run into a real snag with the Dole Story
spot. Certainly, all the quantitative and qualitative research
strongly suggests that this spot needs to be run. Making this
spot pass the issue advocacy test may take some doing.’
ODP0025-02018-20 [DEV 70-Tab 48]. Senator Levin
commented: ‘[aJny reasonable person iooking at that ad ai
that particular time in the Presidential season would say: It’s
not an ad about welfare or wasteful spending; it is an ad about
why should we elect that particular nominee.’ 145 Cong. Rec.
§ 12747 (1999) (Sen. Levin). Senator Dole himself stated that
‘The Story’ ‘never says I’m running for President. I hope that
it’s fairly obvious since I’m the only one in the picture.’
Center for Responsive Politics, A Bag of Tricks: Loopholes
in the Campaign Finance System (1996) at 13, ODPOO18-
00172 [DEV 69-Tab 48].
1.20.2 Another example from the RNC’s 1996 issue advocacy
campaign is ‘Pledge’
Clinton: I will not raise taxes on the middle class.
Announcer: We heard this a lot.
514sa
Clinton: We gotta give middle class tax relief, no
matter what else we do.
Announcer: Six months later, he gave us the largest
tax increase in history. Higher income taxes, income
taxes on social security benefits, more payroll taxes.
Under Clinton, the typical American family now pays
over $1,500 more in federal taxes. A big price to pay for
his broken promises. Tell President Clinton: You can’t
afford higher taxes for more wasteful spending.
Annenberg Report 1997 at 66; see also Huyck Decl. in
Mariani ¥§ 3 & Attach. A [DEV 79-Tab 60].
1.21 The political parties understand that their issue advocacy
campaigns affect federal elections, and they sponsor them
with that purpose. This fact is evident from the 1998
‘Operation Breakout’ issue advocacy campaign mounted by
the NRCC in cooperation with the RNC. ‘Operation Break-
out’ was touted as an effort to ‘ensure that the [Republican]
party not only maintains, but expands our majorities in
Congress.’ ODP0031-00299 [DEV 71-Tab 48] (September
25, 1998, letter from RNC Chair Nicholson to donor thanking
him for his donation to ‘Operation Breakout’); see also
ODP0033-00534 [DEV 71-Tab 48] (RNC Solicitation letter
for ‘Operation Breakout,’ describing it as an effort to ‘hold
onto our majority inthe House’).
1.22 The nature of the political parties’ issue advertisements,
detailed supra, demonstrates what any observer of politics
has come to know: political party ‘issue advocacy’ campaigns
are targeted at federal elections, particularly competitive
races, and are intended to, and do affect the outcome of those
contests.
National Parties Expend A Large Proportion of their
Nonfederal Funds for ‘Issue Advocacy’
1.23 The national political parties spend a large proportion of
their budgets on ‘issue advertisements’ that are designed to
515sa
help elect federal officeholders and candidates. In 2000, for
example, the RNC spent an estimated $70-75 million dollars
on the production and broadcasting of television and radio
advertisements, including both issue advocacy and coor-
dinated expenditures. Oliver*’ Dep. at 148-49 [DEV Supp.-
Tab 1]. /d. ‘During the 2000 presidential election year, the
largest single portion of the DNC budget was used for issue
advertising.” Marshall Decl. | 3 [DEV 8-Tab 28].
1.24 Defense expert David Magleby’s study estimates that
‘over half, and sometimes as much as three-quarters, of soft
money expenditures go to broadcast advertising.” Magleby
Expert Report at 49 [DEV 4-Tab 8].
1.25 As Defendants’ expert Donald Green, relying on an
article by Plaintiffs’ expert La Raja, observes:
[T]he original exemptions for soft-money were justified
partly on the grounds that get-out-the-vote activity
would help strengthen parties. As it happened, only a
small fraction of the soft money (or hard money, for that
matter) that flowed to state and national parties was
spent on voter mobilization activity, even broadly
conceived to include direct mail and commercial phone
banking. According to the classification system pre-
sented by La Raja and Jarvis-Shean (2001, p.3), 8.5% of
national party soft money expenditures went to
‘mobilization’ and ‘grassroots.’ The figures for state and
local parties are each 15%.
D. Green Report at #4 n.17 [DEV 1-Tab 3] (citing Raymond
La Raja and Elizabeth Jarvis-Shean, Assessing the Impact of
a Ban on Soft Money: Party Soft Money Spending in the
2000 Elections. (Unpublished manuscript: Institute of Gov-
ernmental Studies and Citizens’ Research Foundation 2001).
” John Oliver is Deputy Chairman of the RNC.
516sa
National Parties Funnel Nonfederal Funds Through State
Parties for the Purchase of Advertisements Designed to
Affect Federal Elections
1.26 The evidence clearly demonstrates that a large pro-
portion of nonfederal funds transferred from the national to
the state parties is targeted for the purchase of specific issue
advertisements designed by the national parties. These
advertisements are overwhelmingly intended to affect federal
elections. This is done in large part because the state parties
have better federal/nonfederal allocation ratios which allows
such state-bought advertisements to be purchased with a
greater proportion of nonfederal funds.
1.26.1 Defense expert Magleby explains how the FEC’s
allocation regime makes nonfederal fund transfers to the state
parties attractive to the national parties.
—
Parties can stretch their soft money even further by
transferring soft and hard money to state parties where
they can achieve a better ratio of soft to hard dollars than
if they spent the money themselves. This is because the
ratio of soft to hard dollars for party spending if done by
the national patty committees is 35 percent soft and 65
percent hard for presidential years, and 40 percent soft
and 60 percent hard for off years, but if done by state
parties the ratio of soft to hard dollars is greater. The
reason for this difference is state parties are allowed to
calculate their soft/hard ratio based on the ratio of
federal offices to all offices on the ballot in any given
year. Both political parties have found spending soft
money with its accompanying hard money match
through their state parties to work smoothly, for the most
part, and state officials readily acknowledge they are
simply ‘pass throughs’ to the vendors providing the
broadcast ads or direct mail.
Magleby Expert Report at 37 [DEV 4-Tab 8]. Other witnesses
and evidence support this contention, which no one disputes.
517sa
See, e.g., Marshall Decl. | 3 [DEV 8-Tab 28] (testifying that
in 2000 the DNC transferred funds to the state parties to take
advantage of their allocation rates); see also 11 C.F.R. §
106.5(b)(2)(i) (2001) (during presidential election years
national party committees required to pay for their mixed
activities with at least 65 percent in federal funds); id. at §
106.5(b)(2)(ii) (during nonpresidential election years national
party committees required to pay for their mixed activities
with at least 60 percent in federal funds).
1.26.2 The national political parties take advantage of this
allocation regime when planning and executing their adver-
tising budgets. One RNC memorandum contains a chart
which
clearly demonstrates what we already clearly know, that
any media we place in the target presidential states
should be placed through state parties. The average
ballot allocation in the top 17 target states is 37%
federal—63% non- federal, this obviously contrasts very
well with our 65% federal—35% non- federal allocation.
RNC Memorandum dated March 18, 1996, titled ‘Ballot
Allocation of Target States’ ODP0025-02720 to 21 [DEV 70-
Tab 48]. The memorandum concludes that by using the state
political parties, rather than directly making the purchase, the
RNC would save $2.8 million in federal funds on a $10
million media buy. /d. see also ODP0021-1365 to 1367 [DEV
70-Tab 48] (memorandum from Haley Barbour to the
California House Republicans, discussing the need to make a
media buy in California and stating that ‘[t}o accomplish this
buy, the [RNC] would transfer funds to the California
Republican Party, which would actually buy the advertising.
Under FEC regulations, the California Republican Party must
pay for the advertising with one-third FEC contributions and
two thirds nonfederal dollars’); McConnell Dep. at 267-77
[JDT Vol. 19] (stating that the NRSC prefers to transfer funds
to state parties who then purchase NRSC advertisements with
518sa
a more favorable federal/nonfederal fund allocation ratio);
Nelson Dep at 76-77 [JDT Vol. 24] (stating that purchasing
political advertisements through state parties has two
advantages: (1) better federal/nonfederal fund allocation
ratios and (2) ‘having [a] state disclaimer [on the adver-
tisement] is generally better than having a national disclaimer
on it’); Marshall Decl. ¢ 3 [DEV 8-Tab 28] (noting that in
2000, the largest single portion of the DNC budget was used
for issue advertising, but that ‘[t]he DNC typically did not
expend money for these issue ads itself, but instead
transferred both federal and non-federal money to the state
parties to make these expenditures’); ODP0023-02358 to 65
[DEV 70-Tab 48] (RNC tally of ‘1996 Media Buys,’ listing
advertisements purchased, price, and the amount of federal
and RNSEC funds used); ODP0023-03560 to 660 [DEV 70-
Tab 48] (RNC report of 1996 fund transfers to state parties
used for ‘party building/media buy’); ODP0025- 01560 [DEV
70-Tab 48] (memorandum from the Republican National
Finance Committee dated May 24, 1996, titled ‘California
T.V. Money,’ discussing the. need to raise $4 million in
nonfederal funds in two weeks which would then be
transferred to the CRP in order to ‘get on the air and stay on
the air for the next three months in CA’) (emphasis in
original); supra Findings 9§ 1.6 (in 1996 the DNC financed
two-thirds of its Clinton presidential campaign issue advo-
cacy through state party transfers), 1.4.3 (Mann) (over half of
the nonfederal money raised by the national party commit-
tees was transferred to the state parties during the 2000
election cycle).
1.26.3 The national political party committees transferred
$9,710,166 in federal funds to state political party committees
during the 1992 election cycle, $9,577,985 during the 1994
election cycle, $49,967,893 during the 1996 election
cycle, $30,475,897 during the 1998 election cycle, and
$131,016,957 during the 2000 election cycle. The national
political party committees transferred $18,646,162 in non-
519sa
federal funds to state political party committees during the
1992 election cycle, $18,442,749 during the 1994 election
cycle, $113,738,373 during the 1996 election cycle,
$69,031,644 during the 1998 election cycle, and
$265,927,677 during the 2000 election cycle. Biersack”
Decl. Tbls. 4, 8 [DEV 6-Tab 6].
1.26.4 State political parties use a large portion of the
transferred nonfederal money to finance public commu-
nications that support or oppose a federal candidate. See
Bowler” Decl. § 15 (explaining that ‘[t}he majority of
[national transfers to the CDP] were for issue advocacy’).
According to Plaintiffs’ expert La Raja, ‘[i]t appears that both
parties . . . use soft money transfers primarily to execute
national campaign strategy through state parties.” La Raja
Cross Exam. Ex. 3 at 103 [JDT Vol. 15]. La Raja finds that
‘more non-federal funds in the allocation accounts are used
for media rather than what I call party building,’ La Raja
Cross Exam. at 67 [JDT Vol. 15] (La Raja’s definition of
‘party building’ does not include administrative spending); La
Raja Expert Report § 22 [RNC Vol. VII] (finding that in
2000, 44 percent of transferred nonfederal funds were used
for media expenditures and 30 percent for administrative
overhead). La Raja concludes that ‘state parties invest most
soft money from the national parties in federal races,’ but
notes that ‘these investments have considerable effects on
races further down the ticket.’ La Raja Cross Exam. Ex. 3 at
139 [JDT Vol. 15] (La Raja dissertation) [JDT Vol. 15]; see
* Robert W Biersack served as the Supervisory Statistician for the
FEC from 1983 to February 2002. As the Supervisory Statistician, he was
responsible for evaluating the quality, reliability, and validity of infor-
mation contained in the FEC disclosure databases. Currently, he is Deputy
Press Officer for the FEC, a position he has held since February 2002.
Biersack Decl. § 1 [DEV 6-Tab 6].
2’ Kathleen Bowler is the Executive Director of the CDP. Bowler
Decl. ¥ 1.
520sa
also La Raja Cross Exam. 17-18 (stating that he stands by the
conclusions reached in his dissertation).
1.26.4.1 A good example of this system comes from the
Republican Party of New Mexico (‘RPNM’). A_ 1998
financial statement from the state party shows that it received
revenues of $1,524,634 in nonfederal transfers from other
Republican organizations, $1,110,987 in individual contribu-
tions, and just $389,552 in federal transfers from Republican
organizations. The RPNM spent over one-third of its 1998
revenues, $1,062,095, on ‘issue advocacy—television, radio
and mail.’ INT810-1605 to 12 (RNC NM0406326—33)
[DEV 114]. :
1.26.5 These issue advertisements funded by nonfederal
transferred funds are mainly intended to support federal
candidates. Plaintiffs’ expert La Raja notes that ‘one of the
goals’ of national party allocation of nonfederal funds to state
parties is to help federal candidates in close elections, and
that his ‘impression’ is that it is their primary goal. La Raja
Cross Exam. at 73-74 [JDT Vol. 15]; see also Magleby
Expert Report at 39 (‘[National party sJoft money is largely
aimed at competitive [federal] races.’). La Raja finds that the
parties ‘are highly functional rather than responsible. Rather
than use soft money to shore up weaker organizations, or
reward state party members for moving closer to national
party ideology, the national organizations use soft money like
hard money—to pursue the short-term goal of winning
elections.’ La Raja Cross Exam. Ex. 3 at 75 [JDT Vol. 15];
see also id. at 15 (stating that parties invest soft money
primarily ‘in issue ads that help candidates’). According to La
Raja, the national parties’ spending of nonfederal funds is
proof that ‘they are functional parties dedicated to winning
elections.’ /d. at 25; see also La Raja Cross Exam. Ex. 1 (La
Raja Decl.) § 11(a) (‘American political parties have focused
primarily on winning elections . .. .”) [JDT Vol. 15].
52Isa 7
1.26.6 Representatives of the Congressional committees
acknowledge that fund transfers from their committees to
state parties are used primarily for federal election adver-
tising. See Jordan” Decl. § 68 [DEV 7-Tab 21] (‘In my
experience, the large majority of the DSCC’s nonfederal
transfers to state and local party committees have been to
support the nonfederal share of issue advocacy communi-
cations. Frequently, these communications refer to Demo-
cratic Senate candidates or their Republican opponents, while
not expressly advocating any candidate’s election or defeat.’);
Vogel *! Decl. ¢ 63 [DEV 9-Tab 41] (‘In my experience, the
large majority of the NRSC’s nonfederal transfers to state and
local party committees have been to support the nonfederal
share of issue advocacy communications. Frequently, these
communications refer to Republican Senate candidates or
their Democratic opponeiits, while not expressly advocating
any candidate’s election or defeat.’); McGahn™ Decl. 4 55
[DEV 8-Tab 30] (‘In my experience, the large majority of the
NRCC’s nonfederal transfers to state and local party
committees have been to support the nonfederal share of issue
advocacy communications. . . . Frequently, these communi-
cations refer to Republican House candidates or their
Democratic opponents, while not expressly advocating any
candidate’s election or defeat.’); Wolfson*’ Decl. § 63 [DEV
9-Tab 44] (‘In my experience, the large majority of the
DCCC’s nonfederal transfers to state and local party
committees have been to support the nonfederal share of issue
*® James Jordan is the Executive Director of the DSCC. Jordan Decl.
q 1 [DEV 7-Tab 21].
*! Alexander Vogel is General Counsel for the NRSC. Vogel Decl. { |
[DEV 9-Tab 41].
2 Donald McGahn is General Counsel for the NRCC. McGahn Decl.
q 1 [DEV 8-Tab 30].
3 Howard Wolfson is Executive Director of the DCCC. Wolfson Decl.
4 1 [DEV 9-Tab 44].
522sa
advocacy communications. Frequently, these communications
refer to Democratic House candida.es or their Republican
opponents, while not expressly advocating any candidate’s
election or defeat.’) see also La Raja Cross Exam. Ex. 3 at 69
(La Raja dissertation) [JDT Vol. 15] (‘It would be particularly
surprising for congressional campaign committees to venture
outside their traditional scope of helping candidates and
invest in state party organizations.’).
1.26.7 Representatives of the congressional campaign
committees also admit that they retain control over the
advertisements their nonfederal money transfers are used to
purchase. Jordan Decl. 4 72-73 [DEV 7-Tab 21] (“When the
DSCC transfers funds to state party committees, including
nonfederal funds, for the purpose of disseminating issue
advocacy communications, it first develops the communi-
cations in consultation with media consultants, who are gen-
erally retained by the state party at the request or suggestion
of the DSCC, and then provides the communications to the
State party, together with the necessary funds to distribute
them locally. State parties may, but generally do not, reject
the communications. . . . The DSCC does_not permit issue
advocacy communications it supports to be recorded or
produced until they have been approved by DSCC counsel
and DSCC senior employees.’); Vogel Decl. ¢ 67-68 [DEV 9-
Tab 41] (‘When the NRSC transfers funds to state party
committees, including nonfederal funds, for the purpose
of disseminating issue advocacy communications, it first
develops the communications in consultation with the state
party and media consultants, who are generally retained by
the state party at the request or suggestion of the NRSC, and
then provides the communications to the state party, together
with the necessary funds to distribute them locally. State
parties may, but generally do not, reject the communications.
. . . The NRSC does not permit issue advocacy commu-
nications it supports to be recorded or produced until they
have been approved by NRSC counsel and NRSC senior
523sa
employees.’); McGahn Decl. 9§ 58-59 (‘When the NRCC
transfers funds to state party committees, including non-
federal funds, for the purpose of disseminating issue
advocacy communications, it first develops the commu-
nications in consultation with the state party and media
consultants, and then provides the communications to the
state party, together with the necessary funds to distribute
them locally. State parties may, but generally do not, reject
the communications. . . . The NRCC does not permit issue
advocacy communications it supports to be recorded or
produced until they have been approved by me, as NRCC
counsel, and NRCC senior employees.’); Wolfson Decl.
¥4§ 66-67 (‘When the DCCC transfers funds to state party
committees, including nonfederal funds, for the purpose
of disseminating issue advocacy communications, it first
develops the communications in consultation with media
consultants, who are generally retained by the state party at
the request or suggestion of the DCCC, and then provides the
communications to the state party together with the necessary
funds to distribute them locally. State parties may, but
generally do not, reject the communications. . . . The DCCC
does not permit issue advocacy communications it supports to
be recorded or produced until they have been approved by
DCCC counsel and DCCC senior employees.’).
1.26.7.1 On September 28, 1998, NRSC Executive
Director Steven Law wrote then-NRSC Chairman Senator
Mitch McConnell recommending that the NRSC fund an
issue ad playing off an article that appeared in Nevada's
largest newspaper. Democratic Senatorial candidate Harry
Reid ‘got bad reviews for an over-the- top, hostile per-
formance, suggesting a line of attack that builds on our six-
month-long message that Harry Reid says one thing in
Nevada and does the opposite in Washington. . . . If we went
in this direction, I would suggest running this spot for one
week at 1000 [gross ratings point], to be followed with our
last ad in the Nevada issue advocacy campaign, on lawyers’
5§24sa
fees." ODP0036-0293 1-32 [DEV 71-Tab 48]. Law’s idea was
later implemented in an advertisement paid for by the
Republican State Central Committee of Nevada. ODP0036-
01403 to 06 [DEV 71-Tab 48].
1.26.7.2 Documents in the record also demonstrate that the
State political parties are -merely conduits between the
national political parties and their media consultants. See,
e.g., CRP 00367 [IER Tab 28] (fax from the NRCC to the
CRP’s Victory 2000 project proving CRP ‘wiring info’ and
informing the state party that the ‘[mJoney will be in your
account today . . . . Please wire back to Strategic Media’);
CDP 02095-101, 2103-04, 2106 [IER Tab 12] (wire transfer
instructions from the DNC to the CDP for media buys); CDP
02984-89 [IER Tab 12] (detailing transfer of funds from
DCCC to CDP for media buy).
1.26.7.3 The RNC and DNC also transfer nonfederal funds
to state parties to pay for advertisements over which the
national party committees retain control. See Castellanos
Dep. (Sept. 27, 2002) at 111-12 (stating that when working
on advertisements for state parties, National Media dealt with
an RNC representative, not a state party member); Marshall
Decl. { 4 (noting that the DNC normally approved the content
of the advertisement and the amount of money to be spent
before calling the state party in question ‘to let it know that an
ad was coming’); Josefiak Dep. at 97-98 [JDT Vol. 11]
(acknowledging that the RNC transfers funds to state parties
to pay for RNC advertisements); Huyck Decl. in Mariani 4 4
(stating that in 1995-1996 the RNC transferred funds to state
party committees to pay for issue advertisements related to
the 1996 Presidential election campaign) [DEV 79-Tab 60];
Hazelwood™ Dep. at 118- 19 (RNC transfers funds to state
parties to pay for issue advertisements). In 2000, the RNC
™“ Elizabeth Blaise Hazelwood is the RNC’s political director. Hazel-
wood Dep. at 10.
525sa
raised over $254 million, a majority of which was transferred
to the state parties for various activities. Josefiak Dep. at 76
[JDT Vol. 11]; see also FEC, National Party Transfers to
State/Local Committees: January 1, 1999 to December 31,
2000, available at http://www.fec.gov/press/ 051501 party
fund/tables/nat2state.html (during the 2000 election cycle the
RNC made transfers of approximately $129 million—$93.2
million in nonfederal funds and $35.8 million in federal
funds—to state and local parties). The greatest expenditures
from these transfers were for political advertising and
administrative expenses. Josefiak Dep. at 76-77 [JDT
Vol. 11}.
1.27 The evidence above clearly demonstrates that the
national political parties transfer nonfederal money through
their state party affiliates for the purpose of buying so-called
‘issue advertisements’ at a better allocation ratio. These ad-
vertisements are created and controlled by the national polit-
ical parties, with the state political parties merely accepting
the nonfederal money transfers and passing the funds on to
media consultants as directed by the national political parties.
These advertisements are intended to affect federal elections
without using express advocacy terminology.
Get-Out-The-Vote (GOTV)
1.28 It is undisputed that GOTV efforts, paid for with
nonfederal funds by national party committees and targeted at
federal elections, directly assist federal candidates, as well as
state and local candidates of the same party whose elections
are held on the same day. Declarations from representatives
of the four major congressional campaign committees attest
to the fact that these committees ‘transfer[] federal and
nonfederal funds to state and/or local party committees for
.. . get-out-the-vote efforts. These efforts have a significant
effect on the election of federal candidates.’ Jordan Decl. | 69
[DEV 7-Tab 21]; Wolfson Decl. 64 [DEV 9-Tab 44]; Vogel
Decl. ¢ 64 [DEV 9-Tab 41]; McGahn Decl. § 56 [DEV 8-Tab
526sa
30] (emphasis added); see also Josefiak Decl. | 26 [RNC
Vol. I] (Republican Party ‘Victory Programs’ which include
GOTV components are designed to benefit candidates at the
federal, state and local levels) (emphasis added); Philp** Dep.
at 47, 49 (when asked ‘[are there aJny other services that the
party provides to federal candidates,’ answering that the
Colcrado Republican Party’s GOTV ‘programm is designed to
beneiit all candidates.’).
1.28.1 Documentary evidence corroborates the testimony
that GOTV efforts assist federal candidates. See, e.g., CDP
00859 [IER Tab 1.1] (letter thanking a CDP donor and noting
that CDP’s ‘get-out-the-vote efforts’ would help ‘increase the
number of Californian Democrats in the United States
Congress, continue Democratic leadership in the State Senate,
take back the State Assembly—and deliver California’s 54
electoral votes for President Bill Clinton’s and Vice President
Al Gore’s re-election.’) (emphasis added); CRP 07164 [IER
Tab 1.F] (letter from the Executive Director of the Dole-
Kemp campaign, stating in part: ‘Unfortunately, federal law
prohibits the Dole/Kemp campaign from accepting any
contributions after the last day of the national convention.
However, you can still support the Dole/Kemp ticket by
sending your contribution to the Victory ‘96 fund, which will
support the party’s ‘get out the vote’ operation and help us
ensure a successful campaign in California . . .”) (emphasis
added); infra Findings § 1.60 (McConnell letter noting that
the Kentucky Victory 2000 campaign, which included a
GOTV component, ‘was an important part of President
George W. Bush’s impressive victory in Kentucky last year,
and it will be critical to my race and others next year’).
* Alan Philp testified on behalf of the Colorado Republican Party.
Philp Dep. at 9 [JDT Vol. 26].
527sa
1.28.2 Defendants’ expert Donald Green concludes that
[t]he evidence from California, as well as from numer-
ous opinion surveys and exit polls that demonstrate the
powerful correlation between voting at the state and
federal levels, shows quite clearly that a campaign that
mobilizes residents of a highly Republican precinct will
produce a harvest of votes for Republican candidates for
both state and federal offices. A campaign need not
mention federal candidates to have a direct effect on
voting for such a candidate. That parties recognize this
fact is apparent, for example, from the emphasis that the
Democrats place on mobilizing and preventing ballot
roll-off among African-Americans, whose solidly Demo-
cratic voting proclivities make them reliable supporters
for office-holders at all levels. As a practical matter,
generic campaign activity has a direct effect on federal
elections.
Green Expert Report at 14 [DEV 1-Tab 3].
1.28.3 The RNC transfers nonfederal funds to state
political parties to subsidize voter mobilization activities of
the state parties. Banning” Decl. § 31 [RNC Vol. III]; see
also Duncan*’ Decl. #4 11-12 [RNC Vol. VI]. According to
Josefiak, the RNC also helps state and local parties fundraise
for these voter mobilization efforts. See Josefiak Decl. { 63,
65-72 [RNC Vol. I]; see also Benson™ Decl. ¢ 10 [RNC Vol.
** Jay Banning has served as the RNC’s Director of Administration and
Chief Financial Officer since 1983, and has been employed by the RNC in
these and other capacities for twenty-six years. Banning Decl. ¢ 1 [RNC
Vol. Il}.
7 Robert Duncan is a Member of the RNC from the State of Kentucky.
At the time the RNC’s Complaint in this case was filed, he served as
Treasurer of the RNC, but as of July 2002 he became its General Counsel.
Duncan Decl. ¢ 1 [RNC Vol. VI}.
* Bruce Benson is Chairman of the Colorado Republican Party. Ben-
son Decl. ¢ 1 [RNC Vol. VIII}.
528sa
VIII} ([T]}he Republican national party committees also
assist [the Colorado Republican Party] in raising money for
these party building programs.’).
1.29 The CDP and the CRP conduct GOTV door-to-door
canvassing campaigns, phone banks and mailings. Since
federal, state and isical candidates are on the same ballot in
California, these efforts affect all the candidates on the ballot.
This fact explains why these efforts usually required the state
parties to use a mix of federal and nonfederal money to pay
for such activities. See, e.g., Bowler Decl. | 20.b. (noting that
CDP slate cards and door hangers often mention both federal
and nonfederal candidates and thus were funded with the mix
of funds); id. (SO to 60 percent of CDP’s paid phone banks
make reference to a federal candidate and must therefore be
paid for with a mix of funds); see also Erwin Aff. 4 10. It is
important to note, however, that under BCRA’s Levin
Amendment state political parties may still use a mix of
nonfederal and federal funds to pay for GOTV efforts for
elections that include federal candidates, as long as they use
nonfederal funds raised in accordance with the provision. Of
course, for elections without a federal candidate on the ballot,
BCRA does not impose any restrictions.
1.30 It is clear that nonfederal funds used to finance GOTV
efforts for elections with federal candidates on the ballot
affect federal elections. It is clear that GOTV activities target
a certain political party’s likely voters and attempts to get
them to the polls. Even if the intent behind such efforts were
to only affect state and local contests, increasing the number
of Democrats, for example, who vote in a state and local
election will undoubtedly increase the number of votes for the
federal Democratic candidates who share the same ballot.
This fact is well-known and appreciated by the national
political p rties and federal candidates.
529sa
Voter Registration
1.31 It is undisputed that voter registration efforts, paid for
with nonfederal funds by the national party committees in the
period before federal elections, directly assist federal
candidates, as well as state and local candidates from the
same party whose elections are held on the same day. As Dr.
Mann notes:
In a series of advisory opinions, the Commission sought
to ensure that a portion of state party activities benefiting
[sic] both federal and nonfederal candidates be paid for
with hard money. In Advisory Opinion 1975-21, the
Commission ruled that a local party committee had to
use hard dollars to pay for a part of its administrative
expenses and voter registration drives, on the grounds
that these functions have an indirect effect on federal
elections. It used this opinion in regulations it issued in
1977 governing allocation of administrative expenses
between federal and nonfederal accounts. The allocation
was to be made ‘in proportion to the amount of funds
expended on federal and non-federal elections, or on
another reasonable basis.’ (11 C.F.R. 106.1(e) 1978).
Mann Expert Report at 9 [DEV 1-Tab 1] (emphasis added).
1.32 Represematives of the four major congressional cam-
paign committees, confirm that the four committees ‘trans-
fer[{] federal and nonfederal funds to state and/or local party
committees for . . . voter registration . . . efforts. These
efforts have a significant effect on the election of federal
candidates.’ Jordan Decl. § 69 [DEV 7-Tab 21]]; Wolfson
Decl. § 64 [DEV 9-Tab 44]; Vogel Decl. | 64 [DEV 9-Tab
41]; McGahn Decl. 4 56 [DEV 8-Tab 30] (emphasis added);
see also CDP 00859 [IER Tab 1.I] (letter thanking a CDP
donor and noting that CDP’s ‘voter registration ... efforts’
would help ‘increase the number of Californian Democrats in
the United States Congress, continue Democratic leadership
530sa
in the State Senate, take back the State Assembly—and
deliver California’s 54 electoral votes for President Bill
Clinton’s and Vice President Al Gore’s re-election.’) (em-
phasis added); see also Findings § 1.60 (McConnell letter
noting that the Victory 2000 campaign, which included a
voter registration component ‘was an important part of
President George W. Bush’s impressive victory in Kentucky
last year, and it will be critical to my race and others next
year’); Philp Dep. at 49 (when asked ‘[are there a]ny other
services that the party provides to federal candidates,’
answering that the Colorado Republican Party’s GOTV
‘program is designed to benefit all candidates. That could
include voter registration and so on and so forth.’).
1.33 CRP official Erwin’ testifies that ‘[t]he overwhelm-
ing amount of [voter registration] activity is ‘generic’ voter
registration activity urging potential registrants to ‘Register
Republican.’’ Erwin Aff. ¥ 9. Erwin testifies that the CRP has
paid for voter registration—with a mix of federal and non-
federal funds—through its Operation Bounty program, in
which Republican county central committees, Republican
volunteer organizations and Republican candidates for federal
and state office participate. Through its Operation Bounty
drives, the CRP has typically registered over 350,000
Republican voters in each election cycle since the 1984
election cycle (except 1997-98). See Erwin Aff. 4 9; see also
CDP App. at 1185 [PCS 4] (charting CRP’s voter registration
activity by election cycle since 1984 cycle).
Ms. Bowler states that the CDP’s expenditures on voter
registration— consisting of a mix of federal and nonfederal
funds—were approximately $145,000 in the 1996 election
cycle; $300,000 in the 1998 cycle; $100,000 in the 2000
election cycle; and $185,000 during the period from January
*’ Ryan Erwin is the Chief Operating Officer of the CRP. Erwin
Aff. q 1.
53lsa
1, 2001 to June 30, 2002. See Bowler Decl. 4 20.a. Ms.
Bowler notes that the CDP’s expenditures for voter regis-
tration were higher in 1998 (a year with eight statewide
elections) than in 2000 (a presidential election year). Jd. CRP
and CDP officials testify that ‘it is often the case that these
voter registration activities are primarily driven by the desire
to affect State and local races.’ Erwin Aff. § 14a; Bowler
Decl. § 20.a.
Whatever their intention, the evidence supra, makes clear
that these efforts affect federal elections; particularly as
demonstrated by the CDP’s fundraising materials. See
Findings 4 1.32). Moreover, under the Levin Amendment
state political parties may still use a mix of nonfederal and
federal funds to conduct voter registration efforts for elections
that include federal candidates, as long as they use nonfederal
funds raised in accordance with the provision. Of course, for
those elections without a federal candidate on the ballot,
BCRA does not impose any restrictions.
Redistricting
1.34 The national parties use nonfederal funds, as well as
federal funds, toward their redistricting efforts, and these
efforts are of value to Members of Congress because the
changes in the composition of a Member’s district can mean
the difference between reelection and defeat.
1.34.1 As Defendants’ expert Donald Green notes:
The most important legislative activity in the electoral
lives of U.S. House members takes place- during re-
districting, a process that is placed in the hands of state
legislatures. The chances that a House incumbent will be
ousted by unfavorable district boundaries are often
greater than the chances of defeat at the hands of the
typical challenger. Thus, federal legislators who belong
to the state majority party have a tremendous incentive
to be attuned to the state legislature and the state party
leadership.
532sa
For example, in early 1999 the Republican National
Committee, recognizing that state legislatures in
Tennessee and Georgia would soon control redistricting,
transferred substantial sums of money to those states’
Republican parties in an effort to win the few seats
necessary to gain the majority. As Edwin Bender, in a
report for the National Institute on Money in State
Politics explains: ‘In a number of states with legislatures
that are controlled by narrow margins, a win or two in
the state House or Senate in 2000 could mean the
difference between a redistricting committee controlled
by Democrats or Republicans, and districts that favor
one party over the other .. . . As a result, national party
organizations have been flooding the states with
campaign donations, both soft money and hard, to
influence the redistricting process.
Green Expert Report at 11-12 [DEV 1-Tab 3].
1.34.2 The RNC uses a mix of federal and nonfederal
funds to support redistricting efforts, including redistricting
litigation. Josefiak Decl. § 74 [RNC Vol. I]. In 2002, for
example, the RNC budgeted approximately $4.1 million on
redistricting. Seventy percent of the redistricting budget was
to be funded with nonfederal money. Banning Decl. § 28.i
[RNC Vol. IIIf]. The RNC spends more overall on state
legislative redistricting than on congressional redistricting.
Josefiak Decl. § 74 [RNC Vol. I]; see also infra Findings
4 1.78.1 (Fortune 100 Company nonfederal money budget
request noting that ‘because both [national] parties will be
working to influence redistricting efforts during the next two
years, we anticipate that we will be asked to make soft money
contributions to these efforts. Redistricting is a key once-
a-decade effort that both parties have very high on their
priority list.’).
1.34.3 Mr. Alan Philp, of the Colorado Republican Party,
testifies that his party and the Colorado Democratic Party
533sa
played a significant role in the state’s legislative redistricting
process. Philp Dep. at 65 [JDT Vol. 26]. Philp states that the
results of the redistricting process ‘[c]an have a significant
impact’ on candidates for federal office. Jd. at 66. He notes
that the Colorado Congressional delegation discussed redis-
tricting with the Colorado Republican Party. /d.
Other Activities Paid for with Nonfederal Funds
1.35 Administrative Expenses: The FEC allowed the RNC to
pay for its administrative overhead—including salaries,
benefits, equipment, and supplies for party operations at RNC
headquarters in Washington, D.C.—with a mix of federal and
nonfederal funds. See Banning Decl. § 27 [RNC Vol. III];
Bowler Decl. ¥ 15. ‘During the 2000 election cycle, the RNC
spent $35.6 million of nonfederal funds and $52.9 million of
federal funds on administrative overhead.’ Banning Decl.
q 27 [RNC Vol. III]. ‘Administrative overhead includes the
operating costs of RNC facilities, such as utility bills and
maintenance, fundraising costs, and routine expenses for
travel and supplies. Administrative overhead also includes the
salaries of RNC-employees.’ /d. According to Plaintiffs’
expert La Raja, the RNC spent about one-quarter of their
nonfederal disbursements on administration and overhead
during the 2000 election cycle and transferred 67 percent to
the state parties. La Raja Expert Report | 14(c) [RNC Vol.
VII]. State parties spent about 30 percent of their nonfederal
money disbursements during the 2000 election cycle on
administrative expenses and overhead. La Raja Expert Report
q 22 [RNC Vol. VII]; see also Bowler Decl. 15 (stating that
allocation is required for administrative expenses like rent,
utilities, and salaries). The fact these expenditures required a
mix of federal and nonfederal funds demonstrates that these
activities affect federal elections. See also supra Findings
{ 1.26.4 (Plaintiffs expert La Raja stating administrative
expenses are not ‘party building’ activity).
534sa
1.36 Training Seminars: Banning testifies that the RNC used
a mix of federal and nonfederal funds to conduct training
seminars for Republican candidates, party officials, activists
and campaign staff, many of whom are involved in state and
local campaigns and elections. Topics included grassroots
organizing, fundraising and compliance with campaign
finance regulations. During the 2000 election cycle at least
10,000 people attended RNC-sponsored training sessions,
including 117 ‘nuts and bolts’ seminars on grassroots
organizing and get-out- the-vote activities. During the same
cycle the RNC spent $391,000 in nonfederal funds and >
$671,000 in federal funds on such training and support. See
Banning Decl. 4 28(c) [RNC Vol. Ill]; see also La Raja
Expert Report at 11 [RNC Vol. VII] (parties ‘help candidates
by training them and their campaign staff,’ support which
‘can make an important difference in whether a candidate
chooses to run for office, particularly in an era of cash-
intensive campaigning that requires skillful application of
advanced campaign technologies’). According to La Raja, the
RNC spent $8.5 million in nonfederal funds directly on all of
its grassroots and voter mobilization activities for the 2000
election cycle. La Raja Expert Report 4 14(c) [RNC Vol.
VII]. This constitutes about one-half of one percent of all
RNC nonfederal spending during the 2000 election cycle. See
Biersack Decl. Table 2 [DEV 6-Tab 6] (showing the RNC
spent $163,521,510 in nonfederal funds during the 2000
election cycle). Furthermore, by virtue of the fact these
activities were paid for with a mix of federal and nonfederal
funds demonstrates that they affect federal elections.
1.37 State and Local Governmental Affairs: The RNC
provided $100,000 of seed money for the formation of a
Republican state attorneys general association that focuses on
state issues. RNC Ex. 978; see also Josefiak Decl. 44 82-84
[RNC Vol. Ij. According to Banning, during the 2000
election cycle the RNC spent $199,000 in nonfederal funds
and $333,500 in federal funds on state and _ local
535sa
governmental affairs. See Banning Decl. 4 28.b [RNC Vol.
III]. The nonfederal funds the RNC spent on state and local
governmental affairs constituted a minuscule percentage of
the RNC’s $163,521,510 nonfederal budget for the 2000
election cycle. See Biersack Decl. Table 2 [DEV 6-Tab 6].
Furthermore, by virtue of the fact these activities were paid
with a mix of federal and nonfederal funds demonstrates that
they affect federal elections.
1.38 Minority Outreach: Banning states that the RNC used a
mix of federal and nonfederal funds to support efforts to
increase minority involvement and membership in_ the
Republican Party. During the 2000 election cycle the RNC
spent $1,211,000 in nonfederal funds and $2,163,000 in
federal funds on support of allied groups and minority
outreach. See id. J 28.e. This nonfederal expenditure also
constituted a minuscule percentage of the RNC’s total non-
federal spending for the 2000 election cycle. See Biersack
Decl. Table 2 [DEV 6-Tab 6]. Furthermore, by virtue of the
fact these activities were paid for with a mix of federal and
nonfederal funds demonstrates that they affect federal
elections.
1.39 State and Local Elections: The RNC’s Josefiak testifies
that ‘the RNC actually focuses many of its resources on
purely state and local election activity,’ Josefiak Decl. § 19
[RNC Vol. I]; however, the figures provided to the Court do
not support this contention. For example, in 1999 and 2000
the RNC donated approximately $7.3 million in nonfederal
funds to state and local candidates. Josefiak Decl. 4 61 [RNC
Vol. I]; Banning Decl. | 28(a) [RNC Vol. III]. However, this
amount is a small fraction of the $163,521,510 in nonfederal
funds it spent during the 2000 election cycle. Biersack Decl.
Table 2 [DEV 6-Tab 6]. Plaintiffs’ expert La Raja finds that
the Republican Party allocated just seven percent ($9.5
million) of their nonfederal funds during the 2000 election
cycle for contributions to state and local candidates. La Raja
536sa
Expert Report ¥ 14(b) [RNC Vol. VII]. Furthermore, accord-
ing to Defense expert Mann, the two national parties donated
‘only $19 million directly to state and local candidates, less
than 4% of their soft money spending and 1.6% of their total
financial activity in 2000.” Mann Report at 26 [DEV 1-Tab 1]
(citation omitted).
1.39.1.1 The RNC also provides testimony that it ‘some-
times devotes significant resources toward states with
competitive gubernatorial races even though the races- for
federal offices are less competitive.’ Josefiak Decl. § 62
[RNC Vol. I]. According to Josefiak, in 2000, most observers
believed that Indiana was a ‘safe’ state for George W. Bush
and that it did not have a competitive Senate race. ‘Never-
theless, the RNC committed significant resources to the state
in hopes of influencing the gubernatorial race.’ Josefiak Decl.
§ 62 [RNC Vol. I]. Josefiak’s declaration provides no figures
to allow the Court to determine what constitutes ‘significant
resources.’ Furthermore, although Indiana may have been a
‘safe’ state for the Republican presidential candidate and the
Republican candidate for U.S. Senate, the Indiana ballot
provided voters with three federal races in which to vote,
meaning that many expenditures, even if intended to only
influence a single state race, affected federal election races.
Most importantly, nothing in BCRA prevents the RNC
from using unlimited amounts of federal funds to affect any
state election.
1.39.1.2 Five States—Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi,
New Jersey and Virginia—hold elections for state and local
office in odd-numbered years when there are typically no
federal candidates on the ballot. See Josefiak Decl. 4 41 [RNC
Vol. I]. Likewise, numerous cities—including Houston,
Indianapolis, Los Angeles, Minneapolis and New York
City—hold mayoral elections in odd- numbered years. See id.
RNC officials state that for elections in which there is no
federal candidate on the ballot, the RNC frequently trains
537sa
state and local candidates, contributes to state and local
candidate campaign committees, funds communications
calling for election or defeat of state and local candidates, and
supports get-out-the-vote activities. See Banning Decl.
4 28(a) [RNC Vol. Ill]; Josefiak Decl. 44 19, 41-59 [RNC
Vol. Ij. The RNC’s CFO Jay Banning testifies that in
1999 and 2001, including transfers to state parties, direct
contributions to local and state campaigns, and direct RNC
expenditures, the RNC spent approximately $21 million in
nonfederal funds in 1999 and 2001 (approximately $5.7
million in 1999, $15.7 million in 2001). Banning Decl.
{ 28(a) [RNC Vol. III]; see also Duncan Decl. ff 14-15 [RNC
Vol. VI] (discussing RNC contributions to Kentucky state
and local races). Defendants’ expert Mann states that
donations to gubernatorial candidates in an odd numbered
year is not something intended to affect a Federal election.
Mann Cross Exam. at 71. Again, BCRA does not preclude the
national political parties from spending unlimited federal
funds on such activities. Furthermore, state political parties
can spend nonfederal funds on such campaigns without limit
as long as no federal election is held at the same time. See,
e.g., Torres” Decl. § 8 [3 PCS] (stating that the CDP has
spent millions of -dollars in nonfederal funds supporting
candidates in Los Angeles).
1.40 With the exception of administrative expenses, the
activities paid for with nonfederal funds listed supra
constituted a very small portion of the political parties’
nonfederal expenditures during the 2000 election cycle.
Furthermore, administrative expenses, training seminars,
expenditures on state and local governmental affairs, and
minority outreach, were all paid for with a mixture of federal
and nonfederal funds meaning that these activities have some
impact on federal elections.
” Art Torres is the elected chair of the CDP. Torres Decl. 4 1 [3 PCS].
538sa
The State Parties Have Become ‘Branches’ of
the National Parties
1.41 The evidence supra clearly demonstrates that nonfederal
money has not been used primarily for ‘party building’
activities as the authorizing rationale envisioned; rather, the
funds are being used by the national parties for electioneering
activities and the state parties have been coopted as part of
this effort.
1.42 The emergence of nonfederal money as a potent force in
national politics has made the state political parties, according
to Plaintiffs’ expert La Raja, ‘more reliant on the national
parties. They have worked more with the national parties.
They have become what I term branch organizations, which
to me is not a pejorative. It means they work more closely
with the national organization,’ ‘they still retain autonomy.
However, they’re integrated more with the national party
structure.” La Raja Cross Exam. at 43-44, 60 [JDT Vol. 15].
This has lead to a ‘nationalized party system, [where] state
parties use national party resources to advance national party
goals.’ /d. at Ex. 3 at 88, 101. “The national parties employ
the state parties as instruments to pursue federal electoral
goals, particularly through issue ads sponsored by state
organizations [paid for with nonfederal money transferred
from the national political parties].’ /d. at 104.
1.43 The close affiliation between the state, local and national
parties is clear from their cooperation during election
campaigns that include state and federal elections.
1.43.1 Ms. Bowler testifies that the CDP works closely
with the DNC in planning and implementing ‘Coordinated
Campaigns,’ the purpose of which is to allocate resources and
coordinate plans for the benefit of Democratic candidates up
and down the entire ticket. Party officials, candidates at all
levels of the ticket and their agents participate in Coordinated
Campaigns and collectively make decisions regarding the
539sa
solicitation, receipt, directing, and spending of the CDP’s
funds, both federal and nonfederal. Bowler Decl. 94 5, 29
{3 PCS]. According to Bowler, the CDP is ‘integrally related
to the [DNC].’ /d. 4 5.
1.43.2 The RNC’s ‘Victory Plans’ are voter contact
programs designed to support the entire Republican ticket at
the federal, state, and local levels. The RNC works with every
state party to design, fund and implement the Plans. See
Benson Decl. § 8 [RNC Vol. VIII]; Josefiak Decl. 4 26 [RNC
Vol. I]; Peschong Decl. 44 4-5 [RNC Vol. Vij.
1.43.2.1 According to RNC Chief Counsel Josefiak,
Victory Plans are formulated and implemented after extensive
and continuous collaboration between the RNC and the state
parties; each Plan is tailored to the unique needs of each State
and designed to stimulate grassroots activism and increase
voter turnout in the hopes of benefitting candidates at all
levels of the ticket. Josefiak Decl. 44 25-40 [RNC Vol. I].
According to Mr. Erwin, the CRP works closely with the
RNC in planning and implementing a Victory Plan. The
Victory Plan is implemented in the general election cycle
with the full involvement of RNC staff, CRP staff, state
legislative leadership and representatives from the top of the
ticket campaigns. See Erwin Aff. § 4 [3 PCS]. “By their
nature, the Victory Plans and the programs specified in them
span the calendar yéar, not just the 60 or 120 days prior to the
election.” Peschong Decl. ¢ 4 [RNC Vol. VI]. The Victory
Plans generally incorporate rallies, direct mail, telephone
banks, brochures, state cards, yard signs, bumper stickers,
door hangers, and door-to-door volunteer activities. /d.
1.43.2.2 According to Josefiak, in 2000 the RNC trans-
ferred approximately $42 million to state parties to use in
Victory Plan programs, 60 percent (about $25 million) of
which was nonfederal money, not including money spent on
broadcast ‘issue advertising.’ Josefiak Decl. 4 31 [RNC Vol.
540sa
I]; see also Peschong*' Decl. 44 4, 8-9 [RNC Vol. VI] (stating
that “(t]he RNC typically provides a very substantial share of
the funding of state victory programs.’).
1.43.2.3 State Republican party officials observe that
because there are often numerically more state and local races
than federal races during a given election, Victory Plans
‘often place greater emphasis’ on the non-federal races. See
Benson Decl. § 8 [RNC Vol. VIII]; Bennett Decl. § 17.k
{RNC Vol. VIII] (stating that the average ratio of state and
local candidates to federal candidates in Ohio in 2002 is 18
to 1). This observation does not change the fact that Victory
Plans are designed to ‘support the entire ticket.” Benson Decl.
4 8 [KNC Vol. VIII] (emphasis added).
Efforts to Address the Role of Nonfederal Funds in Campaign
Finance Must Limit State Party Use of Nonfederal Funds that
Affect Federal Elections
1.44 It is clear that state political party electoral activities
affect federal elections, especially when state and federal
elections are held of date. The record establishes
that federal officeholders value these services and that they
solicit nonfederal donations for the state political parties in
order to assist their own campaigns. National political parties
also solicit nonfederal donations for their state counterparts
and transfer nonfederal funds as part of their efforts to affect
federal elections. See infra Findings 4 1.59. The workings of
this campaign finance system demand that if one wants to
address the impact of nonfederal money, one cannot ignore
the state role in the system.-Former Members of Congress
concur. Former Senator Rudman states clearly:
To curtail soft-money fundraising and giving, it is nec-
essary to have a comprehensive approach that addresses
*' John Peschong is the RNC’s Regional Political Director for the
Western Region. Peschong Decl. { 1.
541sa
the use of soft money at the state and local party levels
as well as at the national party level. The fact is that
much of what state and local parties do helps to elect
federal candidates. The national parties know it; the
candidates know it; the state and local parties know it. If
state and local parties can use soft money for activities
that affect federal elections, then the problem will not be
solved at all. The same enormous incentives to raise the
money will exist; the same large contributions by
corporations, unions, and wealthy individuals will be
made; the federal candidates who benefit from state
party use of these funds will know exactly whom their
benefactors are; the same degree of beholdenness and
obligation will arise; the same distortions on the
legislative process will occur; and the same public
cynicism will erode the foundations of our democracy—
except it will all be worse in the public’s mind because a
perceived reform was undercut once again by a loophole
that allows big money into the system.
Rudman Decl. § 19 [DEV 8-Tab 34]. Former Senator Brock
comments:
It does no good to close the soft money loophole at the
national level, but then allow state and local parties to
use money from corporations, unions, and wealthy
individuals in ways that affect federal elections. State
and local parties use soft money to help elect federal
candidates both by organizing voter registration and get-
out-the-vote drives that help candidates at all levels of
the ticket, and by using soft and hard money to run
‘issue ads’ that affect federal el. tions. Therefore, for
soft money reforms to be truly effective, it is vitally
important to require the use of hard money at the state
level to pay for activities that affect federal elections.
Brock Decl. § 8 [DEV 6-Tab 9].
542sa
Summary
1.45 The evidence supra clearly demonstrates that nonfederal
money has become an increasingly important part of the
national political parties’ campaign efforts. The increase in
nonfederal fundraising and spending, especially since 1994,
has been dramatic, and is due to the advent of the so-called
‘issue advertisement.” Political party issue advertisements do
not include words of express advocacy, but are engineered to
still have an impact on federal elections. Despite their effect,
the fact that these advertisements do not constitute express
advocacy has allowed the political parties to use nonfederal
money, raised in part from the treasuries of corporations and
labor unions, to fund these commercials and thereby skirt
campaign finance laws. Furthermore, these advertisements
make a mockery of the original justification for allowing the
political parties to raise these funds, as they have nothing to
do with ‘party building.’ Plaintiffs’ own expert finds that
these funds have been spent primarily on electioneering and
not on strengthening the political parties.
The fact that the national political parties found a huge
loophole through which to circumvent the federal campaign
finance regime was only the first step. In order to maximize
the power of this new-found political tool, the national
political parties coopted their state party affiliates, or
branches as Plaintiffs’ expert calls them, and funneled
nonfederal funds through them in order to take advantage of
the state political parties’ more attractive allocation ratios. By
doing so, the national parties minimized the amount of federal
funds needed to purchase advertisements designed to affect
federal elections-advertisements that in the spirit of FECA
should have been paid for completely with federal funds. As a
result, the state political parties became an integral part of the
national political parties’ nonfederal money strategy, and
543sa
therefore any effort to deal with the use of nonfederal funds
in the campaign finance regime requires addressing the state
political parties.
Not all nonfederal funds are spent on political adver-
tisements, but these advertisements constitute the largest
category of nonfederal spending of the national and state
political parties. Furthermore, other activities, such as voter
registration and GOTYV, that are paid for in part with
nonfederal funds clearly affect federal elections when state
and local elections are held on the same day as the federal
election. Redistricting efforts affect federal elections no
matter when they are held. In sum, the political parties used
nonfederal funds to circumvent FECA and affect federal
elections.
The Role of Federal Lawmakers in Political Party
Nonfederal Fundraising
1.46 Unlike other entities, political parties have uniquely
close relationships with candidates they nominate and
support, and who, in turn, lead the party. See D. Green Expert
Report at 7-9 [DEV 1-Tab 3]; McCain Decl. 94 22- 23 [DEV
8-Tab 29]. The Colorado Republican Party has stated in past
litigation: ‘A party and its candidate are uniquely and
strongly bound to one another because: [a] party recruits and
nominates its candidate and is his or her first and natural
source of support and guidance[;] [a] candidate is identified
by party affiliation throughout the election, on the ballot,
while in office, and in the history books[;] [a] successful
candidate becomes a party leader, and the party continues to
rely on the- candidate during subsequent campaigns[;] [a]
party’s public image largely is defined by what its candidates
say and dof[;] [a] party’s candidate is held accountable by
voters for what his or her party says and does[;] [a] party
succeeds or fails depending on whether its candidates succeed
or fail. No other political actor shares comparable ties with a
candidate.’ Brief of Colorado Republican Party in FEC vy.
544sa
Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (‘Colorado II’),
533 U.S. 431, 457 (2001), at 19-20; see also id. at 7-8, 26-31;
Philp Dep. at 47-54 [JDT Vol. 26].
Federal Lawmakers Run the Party Committees
1.47 The national committees of the two major political
parties are: the Republican National Committee (‘RNC’); the
National Republican Senatorial Committee (‘NRSC’); the
National Republican Congressional Committee (‘NRCC’);
the Democratic National Committee (‘DNC’); the Democratic
Senatorial Campaign Committee (‘DSCC’); and the Demo-
cratic Congressional Campaign Committee (‘DCCC’). Vogel
Decl. | 6 [DEV 9-Tab 41]; McGahn Decl. | 6 [DEV 8-Tab
30]; Jordan Decl. § 6 [DEV 7-Tab 21]; Wolfson Decl. | 6
[DEV 9-Tab 44]. The primary purpose of the congressional
committees is to ensure the election of candidates from their
respective parties to their respective legislative body and
otherwise support the goals of their party. /d.
The national party committees are dominated by
elected public officials—the president or presidential
candidate in the case of the Republican and Democratic
National Committees, the top House and Senate
party leaders for the congressional campaign com-
mittees. . . . There is no meaningful separation between
the national party committees and the public officials
who control them.
Mann Expert Report at 29 (citations omitted) [DEV 1-
Tab 1]; see also Krasno & Sorauf Expert Report at 9-10
(‘Simply put, no wall between the national parties and the
national government exists.’), 12-13 (‘Party committees are
headed by or enjoy close relationships with their leading
officials, individuals who by virtue of their positions,
reputations, and control of the legislative machinery have
special influence on their colleagues.’) [DEV 1-Tab 2]; Green
Expert Report at 9-10 [DEV 1-Tab 3] (‘Political parties, it
should be noted, are structured along very different principles
545sa
from the American government. One such principle is the
separation and dispersal of power, of which one finds many
examples in the Constitution. . . . Leaders of legislative party
caucuses may also serve as members or leaders of party
campaign committees. Furthermore, party leaders are drawn
disproportionately from the ranks of those who hold
important legislative leadership posts. . . . [T]he internal
structure of parties permits, for example, former U.S. Senator
D’Amato, who chaired the [RSCC] from 1995-97, to at the
same time serve as chair of the Senate Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs Committee. Parties, in contrast to the law-
making institutions they inhabit, are organized in ways that
concentrate authority, entrusting multiple roles to particular
individuals.’); Rudman Decl. § 6 [DEV 8-Tab 34]; Vogel
Decl. § 4 [DEV 9-Tab 41] (NRSC is comprised of sitting
‘Republican Members of the United States Senate .. . . The
chair of the NRSC is elected by the Republican Caucus of the
United States Senate.’); Jordan Decl. § 4 [DEV 7- Tab 21]
(the DSCC ‘is comprised of sitting Democratic Members of
the United States Senate . . . . The chair of the DSCC is
appointed by the Democratic Leader of the United States
Senate.’); McGahn Decl. | 4 [DEV 8-Tab 30] (the NRCC
includes the ‘entire elected Republican leadership’ and its
executive Committee includes ‘the Speaker of the House, the
Majority Leader, the Republican Whip, Conference Chair-
man, the Conference Vice-Chairman, the Conference
Secretary, the Policy Chairman and the NRCC Chairman’);
Wolfson Decl. § 4 [DEV 9-Tab 44] (the DCCC is comprised
of sitting Democratic Members of (or Delegates to) the
United States House of Representatives, and the Chair of the
DCCC. is elected by the Democratic Caucus of the United
States House of Representatives).
1.48 ‘For at least a century [the national party committees]
have been melded into their party’s presidential campaign
every four years, often assuming a subsidiary role to the
presidential candidate’s personal campaign committee. The
546sa
presidential candidate has traditionally been conceded the
power to shape and use the committee, at least for the
campaign.’ Sorauf/Krasno Report in Colorado Republican at
27 [DEV 73-Tab C].
Political parties are primarily concerned with electing their
candidates and the money they raise is spent assisting their
candidates’ campaigns. As Congressman Meehan explained:
The ultimate goal of a political party such as the
Democratic Party is to get as many Party members as
possible into elective office, and in doing so to increase
voting and Party activity by average Party members. The
Party does this by developing principles on public policy
matters the Party stands for, and then by finding
candidates to run for the various political offices who
represent those principles for the Party. When the Party
finds its candidates, it tries to raise money to help get
like-minded people to participate in the elections, and to
try to get the Party’s candidates the resources they need
to get their message out to voters. In my experience,
political parties do not have economic interests apart
from their ultimate goal of electing their candidates
to office.
Meehan Decl. in RNC 9§ 3-4 [DEV 68-Tab 30]. Senator
Bumpers testifies that he is ‘not aware that the [Democratic]
party has any interest in the outcome of public policy debates
that is separate from its interest in supporting and electing its
candidates.’ Bumpers Decl. 4 6 [DEV 6-Tab 10]. Senator
McCain testifies that ‘[t]he entire function and history of
political parties in our system is to get their candidates
elected, and that is particularly true after the primary
campaign has ended and the party’s candidate has been
selected.’ McCain Decl. | 23 [DEV 8-Tab 29].
1.49 In general, the RNC espouses three core principles as
guiding the mission of the national Republican Party, which
547sa
includes electing candidates to national, state and local
offices who represent the RNC’s political views. In practice,
electing these candidates is the RNC’s primary focus.
1.49.1 The RNC’s Chief Counsel, Thomas Josefiak, attests
that
[t}he Republican Party has a long and rich history
advocating some core principles: a smaller federal
government, lower taxes, individual freedom, and a
strong national» defense. The RNC achieves these
principles through three primary means: (1) promoting
an issue agenda advocating Republican positions on
issues of local, state, regional, national and international
importance; (2) electing candidates who espouse these
views to local, state and national offices; and (3)
governing in accord with these views. Although these
efforts sometimes overlap, they also frequently occur
independently of one another.
Josefiak Decl. § 22 [RNC Vol. I]. Other documents in the
record, however, show that the RNC and Republican state
parties’ primary purpose is to elect Republican candidates to
office. See, e.g., RNC’s Resp. to FEC RFA’s in RNC, No. 40
[DEV 68-Tab 35]; ODP0021-02003 [DEV 70-Tab 48] (RNC
Memorandum in which Chairman Haley Barbour states: ‘The
purpose of a political party is to elect its candidates to public
office, and our first goal is to elect Bob Dole president. . . .
Electing Dole is our highest priority, but it is not our only
priority. Our goal is to increase our majorities in both houses
of Congress and among governors and state legislatures.’);
Knopp’ Cross Exam. at 10 [JDT Vol. 13] (stating that the
primary purpose of the RNC is ‘to elect Republicans to state,
local, and national office’); Brister*’ Decl. § 4 [RNC Vol.
* Janice Knopp is the RNC’s Deputy Director of Finance/Marketing
Director. Knopp Decl. ¥ 1 [RNC Vol. V].
** Pat Brister is the Chairman of the Republican Party of Louisiana.
Brister Decl. ¢ 1 [RNC Vol. VIII).
548sa
VIII] (‘The Republican Party of Louisiana’s primary purpose
is to help elect Republicans to office ‘from the courthouse to
the White House’’). Whether the Republican Party’s ‘core
principles’ drive its pursuit of electoral majorities, or vice
versa, is a chicken-or-the-egg type quandary that I need not
resolve at this juncture. What is clear from the evidence,
however, is that regardless of whether or not it is done to
advocate the party’s principles, the Republican Party’s
primary goal is the election of its candidates who will be
advocates for their core principles. As Dr. Green observes:
‘In order to obtain power a party must win elections; and in
order to win elections, elected officials scramble to claim
credit for good legislative deeds while publicizing the
misdeeds of the opposition party.” Green Expert Report at
[DEV 1-Tab 3].
1.50 The evidence makes clear that the national party
committees are creatures of their elected federal politician
members, who run them and set their priorities. It is clear that
the national party committees are focused on electing their
candidates to federal office, and in the case of the DNC and
RNC are actually subsumed by their respective Presidential
candidates’ campaigns. Given these facts, it is not surprising
that the national party committees use their elected officials
to solicit donations.
Federal Lawmakers Solicit Nonfederal Funds for the
National Party Committees
1.51 It is a common practice for Members of Congress to be
involved in raising both federal and nonfederal dollars for the
national party committees, sometimes at the parties’ request.
The personal involvement of high-ranking Members of
Congress is a major component of raising federal and
nonfederal funds.
Current and former Members of Congress acknowledge
this fact. See, e.g., Rudman Decl. § 12 [DEV 8-Tab 34];
549sa
Bumpers Decl. §§ 7-9 [DEV 6-Tab 10]; Simon* Decl. § 7
[DEV 9-Tab 37] (‘While I was in Congress, the DCCC and
the DSCC would ask Members to make phone calls seeking
contributions to the party. They would assign me a list of
names, people I had not known previously, and I would just
go down the list. I am certain they did this because they found
it more effective to have Members make calls.’); Simpson*
Decl. ¢ 4 [DEV 9- Tab 38]; McCain Decl. 44 2, 21 [DEV 8-
Tab 29] (‘Soft money is often raised directly by federal
candidates and officeholders, and the largest amounts are
often raised by the President, Vice President and Con-
gressional party leaders.’); Feingold Dep. at 91-93 [JDT Vol.
6}; Shays Decl. ¢ 18 [DEV 8-Tab 35] (‘Soft money is raised
directly by federal candidates, officeholders, and national
political party leaders. National party officials often raise
these funds by promising donors access to elected officials.
The national parties and national congressional campaign
committees also request that Members of Congress make the
calls to soft money donors to solicit more funds.’); Meehan
Decl. in RNC 4 6 [DEV 68-Tab 30] (‘Members of Congress
raise money for the national party committees, and I have
been involved in such fund-raising for the Democratic Party.
At the request of the Party Members of Congress go to the
[DCCC] and call prospective donors from lists provided by
the Party to ask them to participate in Party events, such as
DCCC dinners or [DNC] dinners. These lists typically consist
of persons who have contributed to the Democratic Party
in the past.’).
“ Senator Paul Simon served as a United States Senator for Illinois
from 1985 to 1997, and was a Member of the House of Representatives
from 1975 to 1985. Prior to being elected to Congress, Senator Simon
served as Lieutenant Governor of Illinois from 1968 to 1972, and served
in the Illinois House of Representatives from 1954 to 1962 and in the
Illinois State Senate from 1962 to 1966. Simon Decl. 4 1 [DEV 9-Tab 37].
* Senator Alan Simpson served as United States Senator from
Wyoming from 1979 to 1997. Simpson Decl. ¢ 2 [DEV 9-Tab 38].
550sa
Representatives of the House and Senate congressional
campaign committees testify that their committees and their
leadership ask Members of Congress to raise funds in
specified amounts or to devote specified periods of time to
fundraising. Jordan Decl. ¢ 33 [DEV 7-Tab 21]; Vogel Decl.
q§ 32-33 [DEV 9-Tab 41]; McGahn Decl. ¥§ 34-35 [DEV 8-
Tab 30]; Wolfson Decl. § 35 [DEV 9-44] (stating that the
DSCC, NRSC, NRCC, and DCCC ask members of Congress
to raise money for the committees).
Political donors also tes’ify that Members of Congress
solicit nonfederal money. See, e.g., Randlett* Decl. 44 6-9
[DEV 8-Tab 32] (‘I’ve been involved in political fundraising
long enough to remember when soft money had little value to
federal candidates. Ten years ago, a Senator might call a
potential donor and the donor would say something like, ‘I
would love to write you a check; I’m a big fan of yours; but
I’m federally maxed, so I can’t do it. If you like, I could write
a soft money check to your state party.’ And the Senator
might say, ‘Don’t bother. The soft money just doesn’t do me
any good.’ However, in recent election cycles, Members and
national committees have asked soft money donors to write
soft money checks to state and national parties solely in order
to assist federal campaigns. Most soft money donors don’t
ask and don’t care why the money is going to a particular
* Wade Randlett is Chief Executive Officer of Dashboard Technology,
_a World WideWeb technology consulting firm based in San Francisco,
California. Prior to founding Dashboard Technology, Mr. Randlett served
on the management teams of two other software companies. He was the
Democratic political director at the Technology Network, also known as
TechNet, a Palo Alto-based non-profit corporation and political service
organization which he co-founded in 1996. Prior to starting TechNet, he
spent many years as a political fundraiser and general political consultant,
working primarily in the Silicon Valley area of Northern California, but
also throughout California and to some extent in major metropolitan areas
in other parts of the nation. Randlett Decl. ¢ 2 [DEV 8- Tab 32].
55lsa
state party, a party with which they may have no connection.
What matters is that the donor has done what the Mem-
ber asked.’). |
Lobbyists also find that Members of Congress are involved
in fundraising for their political parties. See Rozen*’ Decl.
{ 15 [DEV 8-Tab 33] (‘Even though soft money contributions
often go to political parties, the money is given so that the
contributors can be close to, and recognized by, Members,
Presidents, and Administration officials who have power.
Members, not party staffers or party chairs, raise much of the
large soft money contributions. Party chairs do not have that
much power because the DNC and the RNC by themselves
don’t have power to do anything. So people are not giving to
be close to the party chairs. The Members of Congress and
the President are the heart of the national parties. The elected
officials are the ones who are really raising the money, either
directly or through their agents.’); see also Murray** Dep. in
*” Robert Rozen worked as a lobbyist for various interests at the law
firm Wunder, Diefenderfer, Cannon & Thelen from 1995 until 1997. For
the last six years, he has been a partner in a lobbying firm called
Washington Counsel; now Washington Council Ernst & Young. Mr.
Rozen represents a variety of corporate, trade association, non-profit, and
individual clients before both Congress and the Executive Branch. His
work includes preparing strategic plans, writing lobbying papers,
explaining difficult and’ complex issues to legislative staff, and drafting
proposed legislation. He also organizes fundraisers for federal candidates
and from time-to-time advises clients on their political contributions.
Rozen Decl. ¢ 4 [DEV 8-Tab 33]
* Daniel Murray served as a government relations specialist for Sprint,
GTE and BellSouth Corporations from 1982 until 1995. As Executive
Director of those companies, he assisted them and their PACs in selecting
candidates and political groups for financial support in both federal and
nonfederal funds. During this period he also served on the Democratic
Business Council of the DNC, the Advisory Council of the Democratic
Leadership Council, the 1998 and 1992 DNC Convention Site Selection
Committees, the DSCC Leadership Circle, the DCCC Annual Dinner
Committee, the RSCC Annual Dinner Committee, and steering com-
552sa
Mariani at 41-42 [DEV 79-Tab 58]; Rozen Decl., Ex. A ¥ 7
[DEV 8-Tab 33].
Finally, documentary evidence corroborates this testimony.
ODP0037-00062 [DEV 71-Tab 48] (Letter to NRSC Chair-
man’s Foundation member seeking a renewal contribution
signed by Senator McConnell); ODP0037-00884 [DEV_71-
Tab 48] (letter from Senator McConnell thanking donor for
$5,000 federal and $25,000 nonfederal donation to NRSC’s
issue advocacy campaign); ODP0031-00821 (letter from
contributor to RNC with contribution, stating ‘Congressman
Scott McInnis deserve [sic] most of the recruitment credit’);
ODP0037-00882 (a solicitation letter from Senator McCon-
nell to potential donor at the Microsoft Corporation, ex-
pressing the hope that this person would ‘take a leadership
role with [McConnell] at the NRSC in support of the
Committee’s issue advocacy campaign. The resources we
raise now will allow us to communicate our strategy through
Labor Day. . . . Your immediate commitment to this project
would mean a great deal to the entire Republican Senate and
to me personally.”); ODP0037-01171 to 72 [DEV 71-Tab 48]
(correspondence referencing solicitations by federal office-
holders and candidates); infra Finding § 1.74.3 (Fortune 100
company’s documents stating that Members of Congress had
requested nonfederal donations).
1.52 ‘The parties often ask Members to solicit soft money
from individuals who have maxed out to the Member's
campaign.” Simpson Decl. ¢ 6 [DEV 9-Tab 38]; see also
Meehan Decl. in RNC 4 6 (‘Party leaders also ask a Member
to call his or her own ‘maxed out’ donors—those who have
contributed to that Member the maximum amount of ‘hard
money’ allowed under the [FECA]—in order to request
mittees for many House and Senate campaigrs. Since 1995, he has acted
as a government relations consultant for business and other clients.
Murray Aff. in Mariani 44 3-5 [DEV 79-Tab 59}.
553sa
further donations to the Party including those which are not
restricted by the Act (‘soft money’).’) [DEV 68-Tab 30];
Billings Decl., Ex. A § 12 [DEV 6-Tab 5]; Jordan Decl. 4 20
[DEV 7-Tab 21] (‘When donors have reached their federal
contribution limit, the DSCC frequently encourages them to
make additional donations to the DSCC’s nonfederal
account.’); Wolfson Decl. § 21 (same for DCCC); Vogel
Decl. | 20 (same for NRSC); McGahn Decl. § 21 (same for
NRCC); Sorauf/Krasno Report in Colorado Republican, at
13-14 [DEV 68-Tab 44]; ODPO018- 00620 to 21 [DEV 69-
Tab 48] (federal candidate noting that he ‘recently sent a
letter to [his] maxed out donors suggesting contributions to
the NRCC’); Kirsch*” Decl. ¥ 8 (‘{OJnce a federal candidate
understands that a donor has maxed out, there will often be a
request that the donor make soft money donations to a
national party committee, as has been suggested when I have
been in that situation.’) [DEV 7-Tab 23]; La Raja Cross
Exam. Ex. 3 at 54 [JDT Vol. 15] (*[I]t is common practice for
a candidate to encourage donors to give to the party when
they have ‘maxed’ their federal contributions to his or her
committee’).
1.53 Mr. Vogel, General Counsel of the NRSC, testifies that
‘[s]ometimes, the NRSC urges Republican Senators to con-
tact particular donors because of shared public policy views,
such as outreach efforts to the high-tech community by
Senators with an interest in those issues.” Vogel Decl. § 28
[DEV 9-Tab 41]; see also id. Tab D at NRSC 066-000009
(draft letter from chairmen of the NRSC and NRCC
Technology Committees inviting High Technology CEOs to
the 1998 Republican House-Senate Dinner in response ‘to
your industry’s plea for a voice on the cutting edge issues so
® Steven T. Kirsch is founder and Chief Executive Officer of Propel
Software Corporation. He has donated millions of dollars to the Demo-
cratic Party and to ‘progressive candidates and groups.’ Kirsch Decl.
$¢ 2, 4 [DEV 7-Tab 23].
554sa
important to the future of high technology’ and noting that the
dinner is the ‘most prestigious annual event, and all
Republican members of the U.S. House and Senate will be in
attendance.’) [DEV 9-Tab 41]. The DCCC engages in similar
practices. Wolfson Decl. § 31 [DEV 9-Tab 44] (‘Sometimes,
the DCCC urges Democratic House Members to contact
particular donors because of shared public policy views. For
example, the DCCC has sought and received assistance from
particular Democratic House Members in fundraising from
the labor community, because those Members had a strong
public record of support for labor.”); see also Randlett Decl.
§ 6 [DEV 8-Tab 32] (‘National party committees often feel
they need to raise a certain amount of soft money for a given
election cycle. To reach that overall goal, they may divide up
potential donors by geography, affiliated organization, or
issue interests. The party committees decide which Members
of Congress should contact these potential donors, and these
Members then put in a certain amount of call time at the
national committee soliciting the money. A Member and a
potential donor may be matched because the Member is on a
legislative committee in which the donor has a particular
interest, whether economic or ideological.’).
1.54 Despite the foregoing evidence, the Finance Director of
the RNC states that it is ‘exceedingly rare’ for the RNC to
rely on federal officeholders for personal or telephonic
solicitations of major donors. See B. Shea”’ Decl. ¢ 17 [RNC
Vol. V]. She states that by RNC policy and practice, the RNC
Chairman, Co-Chairwoman, Deputy Chairman, fundraising
staff or members of major donor groups—not federal
officeholders—undertake initial contact and solicitation of
major donors of both federal and nonfederal funds. /d.
Whether or not initial solicitations by federal officials on
behalf of the RNC are rare, the record shows that they
© Beverly Shea is the RNC’s Finance Director. Shea Decl. ¢ 1 [RNC
Vol. V}.
555sa
are made. RNCO178497 (May 10, 1996, letter from RNC
Chairman Haley Barbour to Senators, asking to use their
name for a ‘membership recruitment package,’ which while
‘not directly solcit[ing] funds,’ ‘will serve as a set-up letter
for the membership invitation package that will be mailed
several days after this letter.’). Furthermore, Members of
Congress solicit funds for the RNC from those who have
donated in the past. See, e.g., RNCO266088-91 (handwritten
notes determining which Member of Congress would call
particular potential donors); RNC0O250514-15 (April 1997
solicitation letter from Speaker Gingrich asking donors ‘to
continue [their] support [for] the President’s Club’);
Moreover, it is clear that Ms. Shea does not speak for the
NRSC or the NRCC which clearly use Members to solicit
funds. See, e.g., Findings 1.51.
1.55 Raising nonfederal funds for the political parties can be
in a Member’s interest. For example, the amount of money a
Member of Congress raises for the national political party
committees often affects the amount the committees give to
assist the Member’s campaign. See, e.g., Boren’ Decl. § 4
[DEV 6- Tab 8] (‘[T]he DSCC and other national party
organizations kept records, or ‘tallies’ of how much soft
money a Senator had raised for the party. The DSCC then
gave little [nonfederal] money to the campaigns of those
Senators who had not raised adequate [nonfederal] party
funds. In my view, this practice demonstrates very clearly
that soft money is not used purely for ‘party building’
activities, but that there is at least a working understanding
among the party officials and Senate candidates that the
money will benefit the individual Senators’ campaigns.’); id.
(explaining that because he ‘minimized’ the amount of time
he spent raising soft money for the DNC, he ‘received almost
no money from the Democratic Party for my campaigns.’);
*' Senator David Boren served as a United States Senator from Okla-
homa from 1979-1994. Boren Decl. ¢ 2 [DEV 6-Tab 8]
556sa
Bumpers Decl. § 11 [DEV 6-Tab 10] (‘Members who raise
money for the DSCC expect some of that money to come
directly back to them. Part of this unwritten but not unspoken
rule is that if you do not raise a certain amount of money for
the DSCC, you are not going to get any back. The DSCC
does not give a candidate the maximum allowed unless he or
she has raised at least a certain amount for the DSCC.’); infra
Findings § 1.56.1 (statement of Senator Simpson).
Members also have an interest in a strong party that can
assist its federal officeholders. See, e.g., Bumpers Decl. | 10
[DEV 6-Tab10] (‘When a Member raises money for the
party, there is a sense on the part of the Member that he or
she is helping his or her own campaign by virtue of raising
that money. When Members raise funds for the DNC, it
helps the DNC perform its function of keeping tabs on
statements, policies, and votes of opposition party members
and groups.’). .
Former DNC and DSCC official and current lobbyist
Robert Hickmott™ testifies that even incumbents with safe
In 1980, during President Carter’s re-election campaign, Robert
Hickmott worked at the Democratic National Committee (‘DNC’) as an
Associate Finance Director. Hickmott Decl. ¢ 2 [DEV 6-Tab 19].
Following the general election, Hickmott became the Executive Director
of a new DNC entity, the Democratic Business Council (‘DBC’), where
he served until 1983. /d. During 1985-86, Hickmott served as National
Finance Director for then-Congressman Timothy Wirth’s Senate cam-
paign, and from 1987 until early 1989, on Senator Wirth’s Senate staff. /d.
After that, Hickmott was in private practice as an attorney until January
1991, when he joined the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee
(‘DSCC’) as Deputy Executive Director. /d. In 1993, Hickmott worked
for four years as the Associate Administrator for Congressional Affairs at
the Unites States Environmental Protection Agency, then for two years as
a counselor to then-Secretary Andrew Cuomo at the United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development (‘HUD’). /d. In 1999,
Hickmott left HUD and joined The Smith- Free Group (‘Smith-Free’), a
small governmental affairs firm located in Washington, D.C. /d. { 3.
Hickmott is currently a Senior Vice President at Smith-Free and one of
557sa
seats have incentives to raise money for the parties.
He explains:
Incumbents who were not raising money for
themselves because they were not up for reelection
would sometimes raise money for other Senators, or for
challengers. They would send $20,000 to the DSCC and
ask that this be entered on another candidate’s tally.
They might do this, for example, if they were planning
to run for a leadership position and wanted to obtain
support from the Senators they assisted. This would
personally benefit them, in addition to doing their part to
retain Democratic control of the Senate, which would
preserve the legislative power of all Democratic
Senators.
Hickmott Decl., Ex. A § 18 [DEV 6-Tab 19]; see also id.
{ 13 (attesting that Senators were very concerned about
whether or not donors’ checks were tallied to them); infra
Findings § 1.56.3 (describing the DSCC tallying/credit sys-
tem). Senator McCain attests that
[t]he parties encourage Members of Congress to raise
large amounts of soft money to benefit their own and
others” re-election. At one recent caucus meeting, a
Member of Congress was praised for raising $1.3
million dollars for the party. James Greenwood, a
Republican Congressman from Pennsylvania, recently
told the New York Times that House leaders con-
the six principals in the firm. /d. Hickmott is a regular contributor to
candidates for Congress, for President, and the national party committees,
primarily to Democratic candidates, but also to several Republicans, as
well. /d. In the 1999-2000 cycle, he contributed just over $7,000 and in
the 2001-2002 cycle, he has contributed a little more than $10,000. /d.
Hickmott provided a declaration in Federal Election Commission vy.
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1197
(D. Colo. 1999), aff'd, 213 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2000), rev'd, 533 U.S.
431 (2001) (‘Colorado II’); See Colorado I, 533 U.S. at 458.
558sa
sider soft money fundraising prowess in assigning
chairmanships and other sought-after jobs. . . . | share
Mr. Greenwood’s concerns.
McCain Decl. § 7 [DEV 8-Tab 29]. Finally, the political
parties’ power over Members of Congress provides additional
incentive to fundraise for the national party committees. As
Dr. Green notes: “The ubiquitous role that parties play in the
lives of federal offic
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