Supplemental Appendix — McConnell v. Federal Election Commission

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No. 02-1674 et al.

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

MITCH MCCONNELL et al.,

Appellants,

V.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION et al.,

Appellees.

On Appeal From The United States

District Court For The District of Columbia

SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX

TO JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENTS

VOLUME II

FLOYD ABRAMS KENNETH W. STARR

SUSAN BUCKLEY Counsel of Record

RIAN MARKLEY EDWARD W. WARREN

CAHILL GORDON & KANNON K. SHANMUGAM

REINDEL LLP KIRKLAND & ELLIS

80 Pine Street 655 Fifteenth Street, N.W.

New York, NY 10005 Washington, DC 20005

(212) 701-3000 (202) 879-5000

(additional counsel on inside cover)

June 2003

a cn NN RSS SECS RN

WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. — (202) 789-0096 -— WASHINGTON, D. C. 20001

KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN

559 Nathan Abbott Way

Stanford, CA 94305

(650) 725-9875

JAN WITOLD BARAN

THOMAS W. KIRBY

LEE E. GOODMAN

WILEY, REIN & FIELDING LLP

1776 K Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 719-7000

VALLE SIMMS DUTCHER

L. LYNN HOGUE

SOUTHEASTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, INC.

3340 Peachtree Road, N.E.

Suite 3515

Atlanta, GA 30326

(404) 365-8500

G. HUNTER BATES

1215 Cliffwood Drive

Goshen, KY 40026

(502) 473-7557

Counsel in No. 02-1674

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Volume I

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Opinion of Judge Hendersom................ccccesecsesseeeeeees 160sa

Volume II

Opinion of Judge Kollar-Kotelly.................:cccccseeeeseeees 479sa

Volume III

Opinion of Judge Kollar-Kotelly (continued) .............. 776sa

Volume IV

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ITT cincinitieacatendenasanntdetnnicsnmetenmnsmnepeeenets 1381sa

479sa

MEMORANDUM OPINION

KOLLAR-KOTELLY, District J.

I, INTRODUCTION

The recent issues confronting Congress related to cam- ~

paign finance are neither novel nor unfamiliar:

The idea is to prevent .. . the great aggregations of

wealth from using their corporate funds, directly or

indirectly, to send members of the legislature to these

halls in order to vote for their protection and the

advancement of their interests as against those of the

public. It strikes at a constantly growing evil which has

done more to shake the confidence of the plain people of

small means of this country in our political institutions

than any other practice which has ever obtained since the

foundation of our Government. And I believe that the

time has come when something ought to be done to put a

check to the giving of $50,000 or $100,000 by a great

corporation toward political purposes upon the under-

standing that a debt is created from a political party to it.

Elihu Root, Addresses on Government and Citizenship 143

(Bacon and Scott ed. 1916) (original statement made be-

fore the Constitutional Convention of the State of New York

in 1894),

Many believe that when an individual or association of

individuals makes large contributions for the purpose of

aiding candidates of political parties in winning the

elections, they expect, and sometimes demand, and occa-

sionally, at least, receive, consideration by the ‘bene-

ficiaries of their contributions which not infrequently is

harmful to the general public interest.

65 Cong. Rec. 9507-9508 (1924) (Statement of Sen. Joseph

Robinson).

480sa

We all know that money is the chief source of

corruption. We all know that large contributions to

political campaigns not only put the political party under

obligation to the large contributors, who demand pay in

the way of legislation, but we also know that large sums

of money are used for the purpose of conducting ex-

pensive campaigns through the newspapers and over the

radio; in the publication of all sorts of literature, true and

untrue; and for the purpose of paying the expenses of

campaigners sent out into the country to spread

propaganda, both true and untrue.

86 Cong. Rec. 2720 (1940) (Statement of Sen. John

Bankhead).

The unchecked rise in campaign expenditures coupled

with the absence of limitations on contributions and

expenditures, has increased the dependence of candi-

dates on special interest groups and large contributors.

H.R. Rep. No. 93-1239, at 3 (1974).

We have gone from basically a small donor system in

this country where the average person believed they had

a stake, believed they had a voice, to one of extremely

large amounts of money, where you are not a player

unless you are in the $100,000 or $200,000 range, many

contributions in the $500,000 range, occasionally you

get a $1 million contribution. . . . Many Members are

tired of picking up the paper every day and reading

about an important issue we are going to be considering,

one in which many interests have large sums at stake and

then the second part of the story reading about the large

amounts of money that are being poured into Wash-

ington on one side or the other of the issue—the

implication, of course being clear, that money talks and

large amounts of money talk the loudest.

481sa

147 Cong. Rec. $2958 (daily ed. March 27, 2001) (state-

ment of Senator Fred Thompson). Although these statements

each reflect discrete points in the history of campaign finance

regulation in this country, they reflect the same sentiment:

over the course of the last century, the political branches have

endeavored to protect the integrity of federal elections with

carefully tailored legislation addressing corruption or the

appearance of corruption inherent in a system of donor-

financed campaigns.

In the area of campaign finance regulation, congressional

action has been largely incremental and responsive to the

most prevalent abuses or evasions of existing law at particular

points in time. For example, consistent with the Constitution,

Congress has been permitted to prohibit the use of corporate

treasury funds for contributions and expenditures to federal

candidates and their parties, forbid the use of union dues in

connection with federal elections, cap contributions by indi-

viduals to candidates and parties, offer presidential candidates

the option of financing their general election campaigns with

money from the public fisc, and subject coordinated expen-

ditures to contribution limitations. This process has been

evolutionary, and the deliberative nature of the legislative

effort is not unexpected given the fact that campaign finance

is an extraordinarily challenging area to legislate, particularly

given the strong First Amendment interests at stake. On the

one hand, congressional action in this area plainly implicates

an individual’s right to be free from government regulation, a

right that is unquestionably at its apogee in the context of

political speech. On the other hand, legislation in this area is

designed to embolden public confidence in the political

system, which thereby ultimately encourages individuals to

participate and engage in the electoral process. See Colorado

Republican Federal Campaign Comm. vy. Federal Election

Comm'n (‘Colorado I’), 518 U.S. 604, 609 (1996) (per

curiam) (observing that in assessing the constitutionality of

FECA’s various provisions the Supreme Court ‘essentially

482sa

weigh{s] the First Amendment interest in permitting candi-

dates (and their supporters) to spend money to advance their

political views against a ‘compelling’ governmental interest

in assuring the electoral system’s legitimacy, protecting it

from the appearance and reality of corruption’); see also

Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992) (‘Perhaps fore-

most among these serious issues are cases that force us to

reconcile our commitment to free speech with our commit-

ment to other constitutional rights embodied in government

proceedings. ’).

Mindful of these competing constitutional interests, Con-

gress has moved deliberately and often slowly to address

evasion or abuse of the law. Building a consensus in an area

so penetratingly close to the heart of the First Amendment

requires serious consideration. In fact, in the case of the

legislation presently before the Court, the legislative process

took over six years of study and reflection by Congress. '

' Although campaign finance reform was considered during the 104th

Congress, see, e.g., Campaign Reform Act of 1996, H.R. 3820, 104th

Cong. (1996) (considered on the House floor, but failed by a vote of 162-

259, 142 Cong. Rec. H8,516 (daily ed. July 25, 1996)), deliberations on

BCRA’s precursors did not begin until the One Hundred and Fifth

Congress. The bills introduced in the One Hundred and Fifth Congress,

One Hundred and Sixth Congress, and One Hundred and Seventh

Congress, relating to campaign finance, include, but are not limited to:

‘Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 1997,’ H.R. 493 (105th Cong.);

‘Campaign Reform and Election Integrity Act of 1998,’ H.R. 3485 (105th

Cong.); ‘Campaign Finance Improvement Act of 1998,’ H.R. 3476 (105th

Cong.); ‘Bipartisan Campaign Integrity Act of 1997,’ H.R. 2183 (105th

Cong.); ‘Campaign Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1998,’ H.R. 3582

(105th Cong.); ‘Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 1997,’ S. 25 (105th

Cong.); ‘Senate Campaign Financing and Spending Reform Act,’ S. 57

(105th Cong.); ‘Campaign Finance Reform and Disclosure Act of 1997,’

S. 179 (105th Cong.); ‘Clean Money, Clean Elections Act,’ S. 918 (105th

Cong.); ‘Grassroots Campaign and Common Sense Federal Election

Reform Act of 1998,’ S. 1689 (105th Cong.); ‘Voter Empowerment Act

of 1999,’ H.R. 32 (106th Cong.); ‘Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of

1999,’ H.R. 417 (106th Cong); ‘Clean Money, Clean Elections Act,’ H.R.

483sa

This thoughtful and careful effort by our political branches,

over such a lengthy course of time, deserves respect. See, e.g.,

Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 223-224 (1991) (O’Connor, J.,

dissenting) (“This Court acts at the limits of its power when it

invalidates a law on constitutional grounds. In recognition of

our place in the constitutional scheme, we must act with great

gravity and delicacy when telling a coordinate branch that its

actions are absolutely prohibited absent constitutional amend-

ment.’) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see

also FEC v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197,209

(1982) (‘This careful legislative adjustment of the federal

electoral laws, in a cautious advance, step by step, to account

for the particular legal and economic attributes of corpo-

rations and labor organizations warrants considerable defer-

ence.’) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless,

1739 (106th Cong.); ‘FEC Reform and Authorization Act of 1999,’ H.R.

1818 (106th Cong.); ‘Campaign Integrity Act of 1999,’ H.R. 1867 (106th

Cong.); ‘Citizen Legislature and Political Freedom Act,’ H.R. 19 22

(106th Cong.); ‘Campaign Reform and Election Integrity Act of 1999,’

H.R. 2668 (106th Cong.); ‘PAC Limitation Act of 1999,’ H.R. 2866

(106th Cong.); ‘Open and Accountable Campaign Financing Act of 2000,’

H.R. 3243 (106th Cong.); ‘FEC Reform and Authorization Act of 2000,’

H.R. 4037 (106th Cong.); ‘Campaign Finance Improvement Act of 2000,”

H.R. 4685 (106th Cong.); ‘Campaign Finance Disclosure on Sales of

Personal Assets Act of 2000,’ H.R. 4989 (106th Cong.); ‘Informed Voter

Act of 2000,” H.R. 5507 (106th Cong.); ‘Campaign Finance Improvement

Act of 2000,’ H.R. 5596 (106th Cong.); ‘Bipartisan Campaign Reform

Act of 1999,’ S. 26 (106th Cong.); ‘Federal Election Enforcement and

Disclosure Reform Act,’ S. 504 (106th Cong.); ‘Clean Money, Clean

Elections Act,’ S. 982 (106th Cong.); ‘Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act

of 1999,’ S. 1593 (106th Cong.); ‘Campaign Finance Integrity Act of

1999,’ S. 1671 (106th Cong.); ‘Open and Accountable Campaign

Financing Act of 2000,’ S. 1816 (106th Cong.); “Campaign Finance

Reform and Disclosure Act of 2000,’ S. 2565 (106th Cong.); ‘Bipartisan

Campaign Reform Act of 2001,’ H.R. 2356 (107th Cong.); ‘Campaign

Reform and Citizen Participation Act of 2001,’ H.R. 2360 (107th Cong.);

and ‘Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2001,’ S. 27 (107th

Cong.).

484sa

it is the province of the judiciary to intervene when Congress

has struck the wrong balance and disproportionately trans-

gressed First Amendment rights in the name of reform. While

navigating this balance is undoubtedly complex, such a task is

demanded by the dictates of the Constitution and the well

worn path of interpretation of congressional action relating to

campaign finance legislation by the Supreme Court of the

United States.

It is within this historical framework that the incremental

changes Congress strives to accomplish in enacting the

Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-

155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) (‘BCRA’) are properly understood.

BCRA is yet another step in the careful evolution of the

campaign finance laws targeted at addressing exceptions to

the constitutionally permissible laws that are already in force.

Indeed, BCRA was enacted in large measure to amend the

Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. $§ 431

et seq. (‘FECA’), and any constitutional interpretation of

BCRA must, as its starting point, recognize the role BCRA

plays within the current state of federal law. In other words, it

must be remembered that the statutory provisions at issue

were designed by Congress as a comprehensive approach to

the abuses of FECA that legislators and candidates were

acutely aware of in their capacity as political actors.” BCRA

? As Senator Fritz Hollings wryly observed during the Senate debate on

BCRA:

It amused me the other day when they said we finally had some

debate going on in the Senate. The reason we have a debate is

because this is the first subject we know anything about. All the rest

of it is canned speeches that the staff gives you, and you come out

and you talk about Kosovo, you talk about the defense budget, or

you talk about the environment, and you read scientific statements

and everything - but we know about money. Oh boy, do we know.

147 Cong Rec. $2852-53 (daily ed. March 26, 2001) (statement of

Senator Fritz Hollings).

485sa

was designed to ameliorate FECA’s most glaring abuses,

while staying true to the constitutional boundaries set forth by

the judiciary.

Presently before this three-judge District Court are eleven

consolidated actions challenging much of BCRA as uncon-

Stitutional and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to

prohibit its enforcement. Plaintiffs and Defendants have filed

cross motions for judgment pursuant to Rule 54 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. Suffice it to say, the legal chal-

lenges raised by this litigation are complex and raise issues of

fundamental importance to the conduct and financing of

federal election campaigns.

In resolving these challenges, I have endeavored to adopt a

cohesive constitutional framework in adjudicating Plaintiffs’

claims, premised on the extensive record in this case and

Supreme Court precedent. It is an approach that I believe is

consistent with our common law traditions: a decision is

rooted in the record of this case and guided by the

constitutional boundaries established by the Supreme Court’s

campaign finance jurisprudence. Under this approach, I have

only found three of the challenged sections. unconstitutional:

Sections 213, 318, and 504. The provisions I have found

unconstitutional are all provisions of BCRA that are not

central to its core mission and are entirely severable without

doing injustice to the remainder of the law. The rest of the

challenged provisions I find either constitutional or nonjus-

ticiable, with the small exception, as observed in the per

curiam opinion, of one disclosure provision contained in

Section 201. In the case of Section 201, Judge Leon and I

have severed subsection (5) of Section 201; a relatively minor

change that does not impair the remaining disclosure

provisions of the Act.?

* T cannot agree with Judge Henderson, who appears to characterize my

opinion, along with the per curiam opinion, and Judge Leon’s opinion, as

486sa

Il. FINDINGS OF FACT

Reviewing a record in a case involving protected First

Amendment rights requires serious examination and analysis

of the underlying testimony and documentary evidence.

Therefore, with few exceptions, I have not relied on or cited

to the Findings of Fact proposed by the litigants. To ensure

accuracy and to eliminate any gloss or characterizations

added by the parties, I have reviewed and cited the underlying

documents, depositions, or declarations and have, in man

instances, chosen to quote directly from the original sources.

‘upholding a portion [of BCRA] here and striking down a fragment [of

BCRA] there until they (Judge Leon and Judge Kotelly] have drafted

legislation the Congress would never have enacted—all in the name of

deference to that vody.’ Henderson Op. at 5 (first emphasis added, second

emphasis in original). I would observe that my opinion does not sift

through various sections of BCRA that have been challenged, adopting

some and rejecting others. Rather, my decision is predicated on lengthy

discussions of both the record and the governing caselaw. In undertaking

this analysis, I have only found three sections unconstitutional in their

entirety; the same three sections that Judge Henderson and Judge Leon

have each found unconstitutional. I have also, with Judge Leon, severed

one section from a disclosure provision in Section 201; but this is no

different from Judge Henderson severing a phrase from Section 323(e).

Henderson Op. at Part IV.D.4. Itis also important to note that I have not

‘drafted legislation.’ /d. Nothing in my opinion rewrites BCRA in any

manner whatsoever. I have accepted the statute on its face, finding its core

provisions constitutional, with exceptions noted above as to some

ancillary provisions.

* Almost exclusive reliance on the litigants’ proposed findings of fact,

which I have already indicated is a method of fact finding that I do not

employ, should lead to a careful examination by the reviewing Court of

the adopted findings. See Berger v. Iron Workers Reinforced Rodmen

Local 201, 843 F.2d 1395, 1404 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (“While

‘the fact that the trial judge has adopted proposed findings does not, by

itself, warrant reversal,’ ‘it does raise the possibility that there was

insufficient independent evaluation of the evidence and may cause the

losing party to believe that his position has not been given the con-

487sa

I have endeavored to develop a factual record that is

commensurate with my legal approach. Accordingly, even

though in regard to my Conclusions of Law I am in dissent on

most of Title I, as well as in dissent with regard to the

primary definition of electioneering communication in Title

II, I have found it appropriate to adequately set forth the bases

of my Factual Findings to assist the appellate review of the

three-judge District Court’s decisions, and because the nature

of my legal positions demand it.

Having set forth the following preliminaries, I now turn to

my Findings of Fact. While the record is exhaustive-replete

with multiple sources for each point-I have focused on

selecting from the complete record, facts that are probative in

supporting my legal conclusions, distinguishing, where ap-

propriate, between disputed and uncontroverted evidence. In

short, I have exercised my discretion to be selective without

sacrificing, to the best of my ability, my due diligence.”

sideration it deserves."’) (quoting Photo Elecs. Corp. v. England, 581 F.2d

772, 777 (9th Cir.1978)); id at 1408.

> 1am compelled to respond to Judge Henderson, who, without any

elaboration, has criticized three of my Findings in particular as leaving

her “with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been

committed.’ Henderson Op. at 67 n.55 (quoting Easley v. Cromartie, 532

U.S. 234, 242 (2001) (citing my Findings 44 2.13; 1.82-1.83). In the

examples Judge Henderson cites, she points to two summaries and an

introduction; ignoring the surrounding Findings in support of the

evidentiary record. I have in my Findings discussed in great detail the

foundation and basis for the particular Findings she cites. See infra

Findings {4 2.8, 2.8.1- 2.8.3.5; 1.73-1.81; 1.83.1-1.83.7. Judge Henderson

does not assail that analysis nor does she in any way indicate a reasoned

basis for her disagreement. As such, I must respectfully disagree with her

view that a ‘mistake has been committed’ in regard to these three Findings

of Fact.

In addition, although Judge Henderson determines that the record is

largely superfluous to her legal conclusions, see Henderson Op. at 7 n.1

(‘[a}lthough the actions before us have produced a large (but probably

488sa

TITLE I: BCRA NONFEDERAL MONEY (‘SOFT

MONEY’) PROVISIONS

National Party Nonfederal Money Fundraising and Spending

1.1 As discussed both in the per curiam opinion and my own

conclusions of law, FECA was silent on how to draw lines

around money raised outside of FECA’s source and amount

limitations for political parties to spend on activities that were

expected not to be used for the purpose of influencing a

federal election. The FEC’s opinions and rulemakings drew

that line by permitting state and national party committees to

pay for the nonfederal portion of their administrative costs

and voter registration and turnout programs with monies

raised under relevant state laws (not FECA), even if they

permitted contributions from sources such as corpora-

tions and labor unions that were prohibited under FECA. As a

result, national and state parties began to raise so-called ‘soft

money,’ which described these nonfederal funds-not subject

to FECA limits and restrictions-to pay for a share of election-

related activities.

1.2 It is undisputed that over the past two decades the parties

have raised and spent an increasing amount of nonfederal

funds.

1.3 In 1980 the national Republican party spent roughly $15

million in soft money, the Democrats $4 million. This

unnecessary) record”) (emphasis added), she seemingly urges the Su-

preme Court to adopt her ‘Alternative Findings of Fact’ ‘as an alternative

to those of the majority,’ id. at 67, and in conclusory fashion alleges

mistakes in the Findings of Fact of the ‘majority,’ without any specificity.

Id. Given that Judge Henderson's findings are ‘an alternative to those in

the majority,’ I have not found it prudent to catalogue each instance where

I disagree with her factual conclusions. I would simply observe that |

respectfully disagree that Judge Henderson's ‘Alternative Findings of

Fact’ are a more appropriate and accurate ‘alternative to those [Findings

of Fact] of the majority.’ /d.

489sa

constituted 9% of total spending by the two national parties.

In 1984 the amount of soft money spent by the national

parties increased marginally to $21.6 million but it

constituted a smaller share (5%) of total national party

activity. In 1988... . [p]arty soft money spending more than

doubled to $45 million, which was 11% of national party

totals . . . . By 1988, both parties had developed effective

means of courting large soft money donors. After the

election, Republicans revealed that they had received gifts of

$100,000 each from 267 donors; Democrats counted 130

donors contributing $100,000 or more. . . . Mann®° Report at

12-13 [DEV 1-Tab 1] (citations omitted).

1.4 The FEC began tracking nonfederal donations in the 1992

election cycle. During that cycle the Democratic and

Republican parties together raised $86.1 million in nonfederal

funds. During the 1994 election cycle the two major parties

raised $101.6 million in nonfederal funds; during the 1996

election cycle they raised $263.5 million in nonfederal funds;

during the 1998 election cycle they raised $222.5 million in

nonfederal funds; during the 2000 election cycle they raised

$487.5 million in nonfederal funds; and during the 2002

election cycle they raised $495.8 million in nonfederal funds.

See FEC, News Release: Party Fundraising Reaches $1.1

Billion in 2002 Election Cycle (Dec. 18, 2002), available

at http:// www.fec.gov/press/2002 121 8party/20021218party.

html.

1.4.1 There was

a threefold increase in national party soft money activity

between 1992 and 1996—from $80 million to $272

million. Soft money as a share of total national party

spending jumped from 16% to 30%. Both parties and

“ Thomas Mann is one of Defendants’ experts. I note that neither

Plaintiffs nor Defendants have challenged the qualifications of any of the

designated experts in this case.

490sa

their elected officials worked hard to solicit soft money

donations from corporations, wealthy individuals, and

labor unions. During the 1996 election the national party

committees received . . . approximately 27,000 contri-

butions from federally prohibited sources . . . Less than

$10 million of the $272 million was contributed directly

to state and local candidates in the 1996 cycle. . . . The

two parties transferred a total of $115 million in soft

money to state party committees, which financed two-

thirds of state party soft money expenditures. . . . State

party soft money expenditures for political commu-

nication/advertising jumped from less tian $2 million in

1992 to $65 million in 1996.

Mann Report at 21-22 [DEV 1-Tab 1] (citation omitted).

During the 1996 election cycle, the top 50 nonfederal money

donors made contributions ranging from $530,000 to

$3,287,175. /d. at 22. Three of the top 50 nonfederal money

donors to the national political parties in 1996 were state

political parties. Mann Expert Report Tbl. 5 [DEV 1-Tab 1].

1.4.2

The total amount of soft money spent [in the 1998

midterm election cycle]—$221 million—was less than

in 1996 but more than double the previous midterm

election. And soft money as a share of total spending by

the national parties jumped to 34%. The congressional

party campaign committees put a premium on raising

and spending soft money to advance the election

prospects of their candidates. . . . Both national party

committees had discovered they could finance campaign

activity on behalf of their senatorial candidates with soft

money in the form of ‘issue advocacy.” The same

pattern, more pronounced with the Democrats than the

Republicans, was evident in the House campaign

committees.

Mann Report at 23 [DEV 1-Tab 1] (citation omitted).

49 1sa

1.4.3

[S]oft money financing of party campaigning ex-

ploded in the 2000 election cycle. Soft money spending

by the national parties reached $498 million, now 42%

of their total spending. Raising a half billion dollars in

soft money [in 2000] took a major effort by the national

parties and elected officials, but they had the advantage

of focusing their efforts on large donors. . . .The top 50

soft money donors . . . each contributed between

$955,695 and $5,949,000. Among the many soft money

donors who gave generously to both parties were Global

Crossing, Enron and WorldCom.

Mann Report at 24-25 [DEV 1-Tab 1] (citation omitted). ‘A

total of $280 million in soft money—well over half the

amount raised by the six national party committees—was

transferred to state parties [in 2000], along with $135 million

in hard money.’ /d. at 26. ‘By contrast, the national parties

contributed . . . only $19 million directly to state and local

candidates, less than 4% of their soft money spending and

1.6% of their total financial activity in 2000.’ Mann Report at

26 [DEV 1-Tab 1] (citation omitted). The table below ‘shows

the trend in hard and soft money donations to the political

parties since the 1991-1992 election cycle, when the FEC first

began tracking these figures. Soft money donations rose from

$86.1 million to $495.1 million between 1991-2 and 1999-

2000, but hard money contributions rose markedly as well,

from $445 million to $741 million.’ Green’ Expert Report at

30 [DEV 1-Tab 3}.

” Donald Green is one of Defendants’ experts.

492sa

1991-92 | 1993-94 1995-96 1997-98 | 1999-2000

Hard $445.0 $384.7 $638.1 $445.0 $741.0

Money ;

Soft $86.1 $101.6 $262.1 $224.4 $495.1

Money

Total $531.1 $486.3 $900.2 $669.4 $1,236.1

Id. (Tbl. 1: National Party Receipts 1992-2000) (figures in

millions) (based on ‘FEC Reports Increase in Party

Fundraising for 2000’ release of May 15, 2001). Defendants’

expert Donald Green points out that while the amount of

money flowing into the campaign finance system has

continued to grow, ‘the lawmakers subject to its influence

remain constant in number.’ Green Rebuttal Report at 22

[DEV 5-Tab 1}.

1.4.4 During the first 18 months of the 2001-2002 election

cycle the parties reported nonfederal receipts of $308.2

million, which is a 21 percent increase over the same period

during the 1999-2000 cycle. The FEC notes that this increase

is ‘all the more significant given that typically parties raise

more in Presidential campaign cycles than in non-presidential

campaigns.’ Press Release, Federal Election Commission,

Party Fundraising Growth Continues (Sept. 19, 2002)

FEC 141-0001 [DEV 28]. By October 16, 2002, the parties

had raised over $421 million in nonfederal funds. News

Release, Federal Election Commission, National Party

Fundraising Strong in Pre-Election Filings, available at

http://www.fec.gov/press/2002 1 030partypre.htm1/2002 1030p

arty pre.html.

The Rise of Nonfederal Money Spending

1.5 The figures above demonstrate that although nonfederal

receipts and spending began to grow in the 1980s, this trend

accelerated beginning in 1996.

493sa

1.6 Experts from both parties attribute the accelerated rise in

nonfederal money spending to President Bill Clinton and his

political consultant Dick Morris’ use of such funds during the

1996 campaign to fund

television ads designed to promote Clinton’s reelection.

While the ads prominently featured the President, none

of these costs were charged as coordinated expenditures

on behalf of Clinton’s campaign. Instead the party paid

the entire cost, based on a legal argument never before

made: that party communications which did not use

explicit words advocating the election or defeat of a

federal candidate could be treated like generic party

advertising and financed, according to the FEC

allocation rules, with a mix of soft and hard money.

Mann Report at 18 [DEV 1-Tab 1]. In the words of Plaintiffs’

expert Raymond La Raja, this ‘maneuver . . . catapulted soft

money.’ La Raja Cross Exam. Ex. 3 at 45 [JDT 15]

(Raymond Joseph La Raja, American Political Parties in the

Era of Soft Money (2001) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,

University of California at Berkeley).

The strategy to deploy soft money for [political

advertising] is described in a series of memos from Dick

Morris .... Morris says, ‘I met with... attorney [s] ...

and explained the kinds of ads I had in mind.

Fortunately, they said the law permitted unlimited

expenditures by a political party for such ‘issue-

advocacy’ ads. By the end of the race, we had spent

almost thirty-five million dollars on issue-advocacy ads

(in addition to about fifty million dollars on conventional

candidate-oriented media), burying the Republican

proposals and building a national consensus in support

of the president on key issues.’

494sa

Magleby * Expert Report at 11 (quoting Dick Morris, Behind

the Oval Office: Getting Reelected Against All Odds 141,

624 (1999)) [DEV 4-Tab 8]. ‘The national Democratic party

managed to finance two-thirds of its pro-Clinton ‘issue ad’

television blitz by taking advantage of the more favorable

allocation methods available to state parties. They simply

transferred the requisite mix of hard and soft dollars to party

committees in the states they targeted and had the state

committees place the ads.” Mann Expert Report at 22 [DEV

1-Tab 1]; see also La Raja Cross Exam. Ex. 3 at 14, 37-48

{[JDT 15] (discussing the emergence of ‘party soft money’);

Finding § 1.26.1 (discussing allocation regime).

1.7 Experts for both sides agree that ‘[i]t did not take the

Republican party long to respond in kind by promoting Bob

Dole and Jack Kemp.’ Magleby Expert Report at 11 [DEV 4-

Tab 8]; see also La Raja Cross Exam. Ex. 3 at 46 [JDT Vol.

15] (‘The Dole-Kemp campaign responded to the Morris plan

with its own party- based media strategy.’).

In May of 1996, the Republican National Committee

announced a $20 million ‘issue advocacy’ advertising

campaign. Its purpose, in the words of the chairman,

would be ‘to show the differences between Dole and

Clinton and between Republicans and Democrats on the

issues facing our country, so we can engage full-time in

one of the most consequential elections in our history.’

These presidential candidate-specific ads, like the

Democratic ones, were targeted on key battleground

states and financed with a mix of hard and (mostly) soft

money. Both parties were now financing a significant

part of the campaigns of their presidential candidates

outside of the strictures of the FECA and well beyond

the bounds of the 1979 FEC ruling that national parties

may raise corporate and union funds and _ solicit

* David Magleby is an expert for Defendants.

495sa

unlimited donations from individuals ‘for the exclusive

and limited purpose of influencing the nomination or

election of candidates for nonfederal office.’

Mann Expert Report at 20 (citation omitted) [DEV 1-Tab 1];

see also infra Findings 4 1.20.1 (Republican consultants’

discussion about whether such advertisements met the ‘issue

advocacy test’).

1.8 This approach for the use of nonfederal funds spilled over

into congressional races. Mann Expert Report at 20 [DEV I-

Tab 1]; see also Lamson” Decl. ¥ 9 (describing both parties’

national committees’ use of nonfederal money to run

advertisements in a race for Congress in Montana). 1.9 By the

end of the 2000 election cycle, it was clear that although ‘[s]

cholars might differ about how best to change the campaign

finance system, . . . they could not avoid the conclusion that

party soft money and electioneering in the guise of issue

advocacy had rendered the FECA regime largely ineffectual?

Mann Expert Report at 26.

* Since January 2001, Joe Lamson has served as the Communications

Director for the Office of Public Instruction of the State of Montana, a

post he also held from early 1997 until January 2000. During 2000,

Lamson managed Nancy Keenan’s campaign to represent Montana’s

Congressional district. During 1996, Lamson managed Bill Yellowtail’s

campaign to represent Montana’s Congressional district. From 1983

through 1996, Lamson served as the state director for United States

Representative Pat Williams’ Congressional office in Montana. During

this same period, Lamson also managed Congressman Williams’ election

campaigns in Montana. From 1981 to 1983, Lamson was Executive

Director of the Montana Democratic Party. Lamson provided a sworn

declaration in Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 41 F.

Supp. 2d 1197 (D. Colo. 1999), aff'd, 213 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2000),

rev'd, 533 U.S. 431 (2001). Lamson Decl. 44 2-3 [DEV 7-Tab 26].

496sa

The Rise of Nonfederal Money Is Not Related to ‘Party

Building’

1.10 “The parties’ expanding use of soft money for the

promotion or attack of particular candidates . . . . [runs]

counter to the stated purposes of soft money which were to

permit parties to raise unlimited amounts of money for ‘party

building’ purposes, unlike hard money which is subject to the

contribution limits given to the parties to help elect or defeat

candidates.” Magleby Expert Report at 11 [DEV 4-Tab 8].

Magleby notes that ‘[t]he content of such ads does nothing to

_ foster party infrastructure. Those who make the ads and

manage the campaigns are consultants, who often do not even

reside in the state where the election is taking place.’

Magleby Expert Report at 49 [DEV 4-Tab 8]. Plaintiffs’

expert La Raja concurs, finding that the political parties

‘exploit federal campaign finance laws by using soft money

for candidate support even though federal laws require them

to use it for generic party building.’ La Raja Cross Exam. Ex.

3 at 74-75; see also La Raja Cross Exam. at 67 [JDT Vol. 15]

(finding that ‘more non-federal funds in the allocation

accounts are used for media rather than what I call party

building’).

1.11 As former Senator Brock"® attests, nonfederal money

by and large is not used for ‘party building.’ To the

contrary, the parties by and large use the money to help

elect federal candidates—in the Presidential campaigns

and in close Senate and House elections. Far from

reinvigorating the parties, soft money has simply

strengthened certain candidates and a few large donors,

'° Senator William Brock he served as United States Representative

from Tennessee from 1963 until 1971. From 1971 until 1977, he served as

a United States Senator from the State of Tennessee. From 1977 until

1981, he served as Chairman of the Republican National Committee.

Brock Decl. ¢ 2 [DEV 6- Tab13}.

497sa

while distracting parties from traditional and important

grassroots work.

Brock Decl. § 6 [DEV 6-Tab 9]; see also Boren '' Decl. § 4

[DEV 6-Tab 8] (‘[S]oft money is not used purely for ‘party

building’ activities’); Buttenwieser '2 Decl. § 15 [DEV 6-Tab

11] (explaining that there is little difference between federal

and nonfederal money beyond the source and amount

limitations on federal money, because national and state

political parties use nonfederal money to influence federal

elections).

National Party ‘Issue Advocacy’ Campaigns Funded With

Nonfederal Money

1.12 As the experts for both parties note, the rise in non-

federal money fundraising was spurred by the new-found

ability to run ‘issue advertisements’ designed to affect federal

elections.

1.13 Witnesses involved in the political process all agree that

political party ‘issue advocacy’ includes communications,

paid for in whole or part with nonfederal money, that attack

or support a candidate by name while claiming to be an issue

discussion outside the reach of federal election laws and do

'' Senator David Boren served as a United States Senator from Okla-

homa from 1979-1994. Boren Decl. § 2 [DEV 6-Tab 8]

'? Peter Buttenwieser is a large contributor to the Democratic Party. He

estimates that from the 1996 election cycle through the 2002 cycle, he has

donated over $2.8 million in non-federal funds to national committees of

the Democratic Party, including over $1.2 million in the 2000 election

cycle. Also from the 1996 election cycle through the current cycle, he

estimates that he and his wife have contributed approximately $100,000

per cycle in federal funds to federal candidate committees and other

federal political committees not affiliated with political parties. During

this same period, he has also hosted many hard money fundraising events

for federal candidates in Philadelphia. Buttenwieser Decl. § 6 [DEV 6-

Tab 11).

498sa

not use the Buckley express advocacy language referred to as

‘magic words.’!?

Members of Congress and candidates for federal office

agree that political party advertisements paid for with

nonfederal funds often influence elections. See 146 Cong.

Rec. H428 (Feb. 15, 2000) (Rep. Ganske) (noting that parties

in the 1996 election cycle ‘took . . . [nonfederal] money and

they did not use it to just go out and get a voter registration

guide, they used that money for issue ads on TV that were

nothing less than full campaign attack ads. Independent

surveys have shown that 80 percent of those, quote, issue ads

were actually attack ads.’); Shays Decl. in RNC 9§ 7, 8 [DEV

68-Tab 40] (‘The political parties ... use these [nonfederal]

funds not for general party-building activities, but instead on

television advertisements that are designed to influence the

outcome of federal elections (and are often indistinguishable

from candidate-sponsored campaign ads.’); Meehan Decl. in

RNC 4 13 [DEV 68-Tab 30] (‘I believe that ‘issue ads’ by

party committees are designed to and do affect the outcomes

of elections, that they defeat candidates, and that they drive

up the costs of elections.’); Rudman" Decl. q 12 [DEV 8-

Tab 34] (‘The parties use soft money to help federal

candidates get elected by running so-called ‘issue ads’ funded

with soft money in closely contested federal races.’); McCain

Decl. 94 15, 17 (describing political party advertising

demonstrating that political ‘parties circumvent federal

contribution and spending limits by running candidate ads

under the guise of ‘issue advocacy.”); Chapin’? Decl. 4 11

'* See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 n.52 (1976).

'* Senator Warren Rudman was elected to the United States Senate

from New Hampshire in 1980 where he served two terms. Rudman Decl.

q¢ 1, 3 [DEV 8-Tab 34].

'S Since early 2001, Linda Chapin has been the Director of the

Metropolitan Center for Regional Studies at the University of Central

Florida. Chapin Decl. ¢ 2 [DEV 6-Tab 12] received about 49% of the

499sa

[DEV 6-Tab 12] (stating that the National Republican

Campaign Committee (‘NRCC’) ran television advertise-

ments during her 2000 Congressional campaign designed

to influence the result of the election); Bloom Decl. 4 10

[DEV 6-Tab 7].

Political consultants agree as well. See Beckett '° Decl.

q 11 (‘The NRCC itself ran television ads in the 2000

Congressional campaign . . . . which as I recall were run in

the two months prior to the general election . . . . [which]

votes cast. /d. 4 4. From 1998 to 2000, Chapin directed the Orange County

(Florida) Clerk’s Office. Jd. ¥ 2. Prior to that, Chapin was elected to two

successive four-year terms, in 1990 and 1994, as County Chairman of

Orange County. /d. The County Chairman is a strong executive position

roughly equivalent to a mayoral office. /d. In recognition of Chapin’s

work as County Chairman, she received a Public Service Excellence

Award from then- President Bill Clinton in 1997, and an Alumni

Achievement Award from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard

University in 1999. /d. Prior to her tenure as County Chairman, she was

elected to a four-year term on the Orange County Commission in 1986.

'° Terry S. Beckett is a Democratic political consultant who has spent

about 25 years working on politica! campaigns. Beckett Decl. § 2 [DEV 6-

Tab 3]. Beckett worked on the 1976 and 1980 Presidential campaigns of

Jimmy Carter, the 1978 Bill Nelson Congressional campaign, and she ran

Dick Batchelor’s 1982 Congressional campaign. /d. Beckett also en-

deavored to establish a House Democratic Caucus within the Alabama

legislature in the mid 1980's. /d. Beckett ran Gary Hart’s 1988 Presi-

dential campaign in Florida and Louisiana, and Dick Gephardt’s 1988

Presidential campaign in Florida. /d. In 1986, Beckett did the polling on

Linda Chapin’s campaign for Orange County (Florida) Commissioner,

and ran Chapin’s 1990 and 1994 campaigns for Orange County Chairman.

Id. Beckett also served as general consultant on Ms. Chapin’s 2000

campaign to represent Florida’s Eighth Congressional district, overseeing

the work of the campaign manager and the media and polling consultants.

Id. Beckett has also been involved in government having worked on the

Executive Staff for Bob Graham from 1981-82 when he was the Governor

of Florida and also serving as Ms. Chapin’s Chief of Staff from 1991 to

1994 when she was County Chairman. /d. In addition, Beckett worked for

a polling firm during the 1980s. /d.

500sa

were Clearly intended to influence the election result.’) & Ex.

3 (storyboards of two of these advertisements) [DEV 6-Tab

3}; id. ¢ 9 (describing Democratic Congressional Campaign

Committee (‘DCCC’) efforts during the same election);

Lamson Decl. ¥§ 9, 17, Ex. 2-4 [DEV 7-Tab 26] (noting that

political parties ran ‘issue ads’ designed to influence the

outcome of the Montana Congressional election in both 1996

and 2000); Pennington'’ Decl. ¢ 10-11, 13-15 [DEV 8-Tab

31] (discussing how parties can and have used issue advocacy

to affect federal elections). The DNC’s political director also

concurs. Stoltz'* Decl. § 16 [DEV 9-Tab 39] (‘In my

experience, issue ads affect elections. The ads can either

demoralize or confuse voters so that they do not vote, or

they can energize a voter base for or against a party or its

'’ Rocky Pennington is a Republican political consultant. Pennington

Decl. ¢ 2 [DEV 8-Tab 31]. He is the owner and President of three Florida

companies engaged in political activities: Southern Campaign Resources,

Direct Mail Systems, Inc., and Summit Communications. /d. Southern

Campaign Resources, which Pennington founded in 1982, does general

consulting primarily for Florida state campaigns, but has also done

Congressional races in Florida, including Congressman Cliff Steams’ first

race in 1988 in Ocala, Bill Sublette’s 2000 campaign in the Eighth Con-

gressional district, and Congressman Jeff Miller's 2001 special election in

the Panhandle. /d. Direct Mail Systems, founded in 1981, is a direct mail

company with roughly 100 employees that has done fundraising and has

sent voter contact mail for candidates, parties and interest groups in

Florida and elsewhere. /d. Direct Mail Systems has also sent voter contact

mail for some of Florida’s Republican Congressional delegation, as well

as for state Republican parties in many other states. Finally, Summit

Communications, which Pennington founded in 2000, creates political

advertising for television and radio and buys airtime for various cam-

paigns, such as Congressman Miller’s 2001 general election campaign. /d.

'* Gail Stoltz has been employed as the Political Director of the DNC

since May 2001. From 1998 through 2001, she worked for the Service

Employees International Union as Government Affairs Director. Prior to

this she worked as Political Director for the Democratic Senatorial

Campaign Committee (‘DSCC’) and in various capacities for the

Democratic National Committee (‘DNC’). Stoltz Decl. ¢ 1.

SOlsa

candidates. During a presidential election year, the ads

definitely make a difference when a presidential candidate

is featured.’).

In addition, experts for both sides agree that these ‘issue

ads’ are intended to and do support the campaigns of federal

candidates. See La Raja Cross Exam. Ex. 3 at 15 [JDT Vol.

15], 101-04; Magleby Expert Report at 40-42 [DEV 4-Tab 8].

Characteristics of National Party Nonfederal Campaign

Advertisements

1.14 Many national political party committee ‘issue ads’

have focused on the positions, past actions, or general

character traits of federal candidates, as part of efforts to

influence federal elections.

Scripts of these advertisements confirm this. See, e.g.,

ODP0021-01393 [DEV 70-Tab 48] (Republican National

Committee’s (‘RNC’) advertisement titled ‘Pledge,’

discussed infra Findings 4 1.20.2; ODPO0023-02288 to 95

[DEV 70-Tab 48] (sample scripts of ‘Keep More’ with

different sponsors identified (i.e. RNC, CRP, ‘[state party

name]’). Some versions of the advertisement end with

‘[Member Name] kept his promise and voted for the middle-

class tax cut. Clinton vetoed it,’ while others end with

‘Congressman [____] voted for the largest tax increase in

American history... . and against Republican efforts to roll it

back.”); ODP0023-02308 [DEV 70-Tab 48] (national political

party advertisement titled ‘Fool Me Once,’ beginning with

the line ‘Compare the Clinton rhetoric with the Clinton

record,’ discussing statements President Clinton made and

actions on the same issues, and concluding with the line ‘Tell

President Clinton you won't be fooled again.’); ODP0023-

02313 [DEV 70-Tab 48] (RNC advertisement titled ‘Stripes,’

which states in part: “Bill Clinton . . . He’s really something.

He’s now trying to avoid a sexual harassment lawsuit

claiming he is on active military duty .. . . Active Duty? Bill

502sa

Clinton . . . He’s really something.’); ODP0023-02314 [DEV

70-Tab 48] (script of the RNC’s ‘The Story,’ discussed supra

Finding § 1.20.1); ODPOO23-02326 (national political party

advertisement titled ‘More,’ stating that ‘Under President

Clinton, spending on illegal[] [immigrants] has gone up.

While wages for the typical worker have gone down... . Tell

President Clinton to stop giving benefits to illegals, and end

wasteful Washington spending.’); ODP0023-02389-92 [DEV

70-Tab 48] (three versions of a national political party

advertisement titled ‘Control’ stating that ‘Washington labor

bosses and liberal special interest groups want to buy control

of Congress,’ and explaining why these groups think a named

candidate ‘will vote their way . . . to return to higher taxes

and more wasteful spending’); ODP0029-00010-25 [DEV 70-

Tab 48] (national political party advertisement titled ‘High

Taxes’ and related documents. ‘High Taxes’ states that a

Congressional candidate while ‘in the state legislature .. .

voted to raise corporate and personal income tax rates almost

18 percent. He even supports raising social security

tax limits.’); ODP0029-00031 [DEV 70-Tab 48] (national

political party advertisement titled ‘Family Budget,’ stating

that a Congressional candidate raised taxes while in state and

local government, and concluding: ‘If you think your family

pays enough in taxes .. . Call [ |. Tell her to stop raising

your taxes.’) (emphasis in original); ODP0029-00041 [DEV

70-Tab 48] (national congressional committee advertisement

supporting a candidate who ‘knows you have better things to

do with your money than pay higher taxes’); see also

ODP0029-00114 [DEV 70-Tab 48]; ODP0029-00169 [DEV

71-Tab 48]; ODPO0O29-00177 to 79 [DEV 71-Tab 48];

ODP0029-00235 to 37 [DEV 71-Tab 48]; ODP0029-00329

[DEV 71-Tab 48]; ODP0029-00339 [DEV 71-Tab 48];

ODP0041-00177 to 78 [DEV 71-Tab 48]; ODP0041-00202 to

06 [DEV 71-Tab 48]; ODP0041-00220 to 23 [DEV 71-Tab

48]; ODP0041-00280 to 82 [DEV 71-Tab 48]; ODP0041-

00352 to 54 [DEV 71-Tab 48]; ODP0041-01261 [DEV 71-

503sa

Tab 48]; ODPOO41- 01275 [DEV 71-Tab 48]; ODPO0029-

00138 to 47 [DEV 71-Tab 48!; ODP0036-01403 to 06 [DEV

71-Tab 48]; ODP0036-02931-32 [DEV 71-Tab 48];

ODP004 | -00269-71 [DEV 71- Tab 48]; ODP0041-01024 to

27 [DEV 71-Tab 48]; ODP0041-01219 [DEV 71-Tab 48]

(other political party advertisements that focus on the

positions, past actions, or general character traits of federal

candidates, and related documents).

1.15 Many political party committee ‘issue ads’ have

compared the positions or past actions of competing federal

candidates, portraying one position negatively and the other

positively, as part of efforts to influence federal elections.

Scripts provided to the Court confirm this fact. See, e.g.,

ODP0023- 02387 [DEV 70-Tab 48] (national political party

advertisement comparing candidate positions on_ issues,

stating that ‘Congressman [ | voted for our plan to give

families a $500 per child tax credit. . . . [Opponent] voted for

Jim Florio’s $2.8 billion tax increase which increased your

income, sales and gas taxes.’); ODP0029-00149 [DEV 71-

Tab 48] (national political party advertisement stating that

one candidate ‘support[s] the $500 per child tax credit and

ending the tax penalty on married couples,’ while the other

‘voted against’ those ideas); ODP0029-00159 [DEV 71-Tab

48] (national political party advertisement stating that one

candidate ‘wants Washington bureaucrats to decide what’s

right for our kids,’ while the other ‘supports local school

control’) (emphasis in original); ODP0041-00585-86 [DEV

71-Tab 48] (national congressional campaign committee

advertisement stating that one candidate ‘supports a program’

that “spends millions to hire more bureaucrats,’ while the

other ‘supports proposals that spen i less on bureaucrats and

more on local schools’); ODP0041-00729-32 [DEV 71-Tab

48] (national political party advertisement stating that one

candidate supports a welfare program that ‘is restoring

responsibility, pride and self-worth,’ while the other ‘voted

against moving able-bodied welfare recipients from welfare

504sa

to work’) (emphasis in original); ODP0041-01152 [DEV 71-

Tab 48] (national political party advertisement stating that

one candidate ‘doesn’t support tax cuts for Idaho working

families,’ while the other ‘has a different view’); ODP0041-

01177 [DEV 71-Tab 48] (national political party advertise-

ment stating that one candidate was ‘the only member of

Congress who did not want to tell parents when a child

molester moved into their neighborhood,’ while the other

‘supports laws that protect our children and keep violent

criminals in jail for their full terms’); ODP0041-01189 [DEV

71-Tab 48] (national political party advertisement stating that

one candidate voted against a measure to ‘abolish the tax

code to force meaningful reform,’ while the other ‘wants to

abolish the tax code, so we can create a tax code that is fairer

and simpler for working families’); ODP0041-01198 [DEV

71-Tab 48] (national political party advertisement noting that

one candidate ‘supports tax cuts for working families,’ while

the other ‘voted against billions worth of tax cuts for working

families’); ODPO041-01266 [DEV 71-Tab 48] (national

political party advertisement noting that one candidate

‘pushed for tax increases’ while the other ‘knows lower taxes

and responsible government spending are better policies’);

ODP0041-01337 [DEV 71-Tab 48] (national political party

advertisement noting that one candidate ‘supports Senator

Kennedy’s ultra liberal plan to mandate spending increases of

25 billion dollars over the next five years,’ while the other

‘supports lower taxes’).

1.16 Political parties aim their nonfederal money largely

at competitive races. The political party committees spend

millions of nonfederal dollars in competitive U.S. Senate

races and hundreds of thousands of dollars or more in

competitive U.S. House races. Magleby Report at 39 [DEV 4-

Tab 8]. See also McConnell Dep. at 237 [JDT Vol. 19]

(‘I think every Senator realizes that the resources of the

National Republican Senatorial Committee [‘NRSC’] are

going to be deployed to the . . . maximum extent in places

505sa

where there are competitive races’); Bumpers'’ Decl. 4

[DEV 6-Tab 10] (‘Party committees focus their resources on

competitive races.’); McCain Decl. § 22 [DEV 8-Tab 29]

(‘[P]arties generally focus their soft money spending first on

taking care of the parties’ current officeholdersand on the

candidates running for open seats and after that on the

challengers running against incumbents’).

1.16.1 For example, television and radio electioneering

advertising by political parties played an important role in the

2000 Congressional elections in Florida’s Eighth District, ‘a

very close open-seat race.’ Beckett Decl. 44 4, 9 [DEV 6-Tab

3] (noting that the winning candidate garnered 51% of the

vote). Political parties on both sides of these campaigns ran

so-called ‘issue ads’ that were financed partly with nonfederal

money but clearly directed at influencing the outcome of the

election. The DCCC ran television advertising praising Linda

Chapin, the Democratic candidate, or criticizing the

Republican candidates, through the Democratic State Party in

order to take advantage of the more favorable hard money-

soft money allocation ratios enjoyed by state parties.””

'? Senator Dale Bumpers served two terms as Governor of Arkansas,

from 1971 to 1975. Bumpers Decl. § 2 [DEV 6-Tab 10]. After his time as

Governor, Bumpers served as a Member of the United States Senate,

representing the State of Arkansas, from 1975 to 1999. /d. After he retired

from the Senate, Senator Bumpers spent one year directing the Center for

Defense Information, a nonprofit think-tank based in Washington, D.C.

Id. He currently practices law in Washington D.C. at the law firm Arent

Fox Kintner Plotkin & Kahn, PLLC. /d. ¢ 3.

° One advertisement run during the final 60 days of the election

campaign, paid for by the DCCC through the Florida Democratic Pai-y,

attacked Chapin’s challenger, stating the following:

Announcer: ‘I’m pro-gun.’ That’s how he described himself to the

Orlando Sentinel. Pro-gun. He wants to get rid of the Brady Bill, the

common-sense law that says we should just wait 5 days before

purchasing a handgun. Pro-gun. He even opposes mandatory trigger

locks to keep children safe from harm. ‘I’m pro-gun.’ He’s Ric

506sa

Beckett Decl. § 9, Ex. | [DEV 6-Tab 3}; Chapin Decl. § 9

[DEV 6-Tab 12]; see also Bloom Decl. 4 10, Ex. 1-1, 1-4,

(describing a similar situation for the 2000 election campaign

in Florida’s 22nd Congressional District) [DEV 6-Tab 7]. The

NRCC and the Florida Republican Party also ran television

advertisements in the two months prior to the general

election, most of which criticized Chapin’s record or

positions, and which witnesses testify were clearly intended

to influence the election results.” Chapin Decl. § 10, Ex. 2

[DEV 6-Tab 12]; Beckett Decl. | 10, Ex. 2 [DEV 6-Tab 3];

Pennington Decl. ¢ 14, Ex. 3 [DEV 8-Tab 31]; see also

Bloom *’ Decl. 11, Ex. 2 (Republican party ads in 2000

Florida 22nd District Congressional race) [DEV 6-Tab 7].

Keller, and you should tell him to support sensible gun safety for

change.

Chapin Decl. § 9 & Ex. 1-2 [DEV 6-Tab 12]; Beckett Decl. ¢ 9-DEV 6-

Tab 3}.

*' One advertisement paid for by the NRCC ran within 60 days of the

election and stated the following: Announcer: It was Tyson vs. McNeeley,

the fight shown on Pay-Per-View, bought and paid for by the county jail

system. Linda Chapin’s county commission ran the jail system that paid

for Cable TV for convicts at [its] work-release center. Under Chapin,

Convicts also got new TVs and VCRs. The Sentinel wrote cells are

carpeted. The day room has padded furniture, such is life for hundreds of

Orange County Jail prisoners. Ask Chapin why convicts got Cable TV.

Chapin Decl. § 11 & Ex. 3-2 [DEV 6-Tab 12]; Beckett Decl. 4 11;

Pennington Decl. ¢ 14.

* Elaine Bloom is currently engaged in consulting, public speaking,

and community activities. Bloom Decl. ¢ 2 [DEV 6-Tab 7]. In 2001,

Bloom was a candidate for Mayor of Miami Beach, Florida. /d. In 2000,

Bloom was the Democratic candidate in the general election to represent

Florida’s 22nd Congressional district, running against the incumbent

Republican Clay Shaw, who had served in Congress for nearly 20 years.

Id. (Shaw won the race by approximately 500 votes out of over 200,000

cast). Prior to the 2000 race, Bloom served as a member of the Florida

House of Representatives for over 18 years, from 1974 to 1978 (repre-

senting Northeast Dade County) and from 1986-2000 (representing Miami

507sa

1.16.2

Most interest groups, in contrast [to political parties],

seek to build relationships with officeholders as a way of

improving access to the legislative process and lobbying

their position. In political science, there is strong

empirical support for the theory that interest groups

allocate resources primarily to pursue the ‘access’

Strategy, meaning they give to candidates who are most

likely to win office, which is usually the incumbents

(see, for example, Herrnson 2000). Political parties,

however, allocate resources for electoral _ stra-

tegies, meaning they contribute money to a party can-

didate who is in a potentially close election.

La Raja Expert Report ¥ 14 [RNC Vol. VII].

1.17 ‘Almost 92% of party ads in the 2000 election never

even identified the name of a political party. let alone

encouraged voters to register with the party, to voiunteer with

the local party organization, or to support the party.’ Buying

Time 2000 at 64 [DEV 46]. Defense Expert Magleby concurs,

finding ‘only 15 percent of the ads in 1998 and 7 percent of

the ads in 2000 mentioned the party by name in the ad, except

in the tag line indicating which party committee paid for the

ad.” Magleby Expert Report at 49 [DEV 4-Tab 8].

1.18 Out of the estimated $25.6 million spent by political

parties on advertisements in the 1998 election cycle, $24.6

million went to fund advertisements that referred to a federal

candidate. See Krasno & Sorauf ** Expert Report at Table 1.

Out of 44,485 commercials, 42,599 referred to a federal

Beach and Miami). /d. Bloom was Speaker Pro- Tempore of the Florida

House from 1992 to 1994, and also served as chair of several legislative

committees, including the Health Care Committee, the Joint Legisiative

Management Committee, the Joint Legislative Auditing Committee, and

the Tourism and Cultural Affairs Committee. /d.

** Jonathan Krasno and Frank Sorauf are experts for Defendants.

SO8sa

candidate. /d. Viewers perceived 94 percent of these adver-

tisements as electioneering in nature. /d. at Table 7.

1.19 Plaintiffs’ own experts and witnesses testify that ‘[i]ssue

advertising outside the context of electioneering by political

parties is rare." RNC expert Nelson Polsby Dep. in RNC v.

FEC, 98-CV-1207 (D.D.C) (hereinafter *“RNC’) Ex. 3, at 5

[DEV 66-Tab 5]. In this case, the Plaintiffs’ expert, Professor

Raymond La Raja, acknowledges that ‘issue advertisements’

are intended to and do support the campaigns of federal

candidates. La Raja Cross Exam. Ex. 3 at 14-15 [JDT Vol.

15] (‘[[ssue ads, however, have been designed with the intent

of boosting the campaigns of targeted candidates. . . . Rather

than use soft money to shore up weak state and local

organizations, or enforce party discipline in government,

parties invest primarily in issue ads that help candidates.’)

(JDT Vol. 15}; La Raja Decl. § 16(b) [RNC Vol. VII}

(‘Political parties use nonfederal money to develop and

disseminate political messages.’). RNC political operations

director Terry Nelson’ testifies that the RNC engages in

‘issue advocacy in order to achieve one of our primary

objectives, which is to get more Republicans elected.’ Nelson

Dep. at 191 [JDT Vol. 24]. This conclusion is echoed by

Defense Expert Magleby. Magleby Expert Report at 45 [DEV

4-Tab 8] (‘The content, tactics and strategy [of political party

advertisements] are generally indistinguishable from the

candidate campaigns, except that party campaign communi-

cations are generally more negative in tone.’)

1.19.1 An RNC official provides examples of advertisement

campaigns he claims the RNC ran for ‘the exclusive purpose

of influencing the legislative and policy debate.’ Josefiak *°

** Terry Nelson is the RNC’s Deputy Chief of Staff and Executive

Director of Political Operations. Nelson Dep. at 8-9 [JDT Vol. 24]

*> Thomas Josefiak is Chief Counsel of the RNC. Josefiak Decl. 4 1

[RNC Vol. I}.

509sa

Decl. § 91 [RNC Vol. I]. These campaigns dealt with the

issues of the balanced -budget amendment, welfare reform,

and education. /d. One of these advertisements’ purpose

was to communicate the Republican Party’s position that

the federal government must control its reckless appetite

for deficit spending. This particular advertisement

featured President Clinton, and included numerous clips

of him stating a different number of years in which he

would balance the budget. The advertisement explained,

‘Talk is cheap. Double talk is expensive. Tell Mr.

Clinton to support the Balanced Budget Amendment.

Id 4 91(c). Josefiak calls this advertisement ‘one of the most

memorable and effective broadcast advertisements in [RNC]

history.” Jd. This commercial was run in May 1996, id., the

same time the RNC was running very similar so-called ‘issue

advertisements’ attacking President Clinton as part of an

effort to assist the Dole presidential campaign which was low

on funds, see infra Findings 4 1.20. RNC advertisements

addressing welfare reform were also run in the summer of

1996, ‘comparing Clinton’s rhetoric on welfare reform with

his record on welfare reform.’ Josefiak Decl. § 91(d)[RNC

Vol. I]. Comparing President Clinton’s statements with his

record was a major theme of RNC advertisements run during

this period in aid of the Dole campaign. See infra Findings

94 1.20, 1.20.2. Another RNC advertisement ran in October

2002, the month before a federal election, ‘nationwide in

support of the Republican Party’s education agenda,’ and had

the following script:

Male: Every child can learn...

Female: . . . and deserves a quality education in a safe

school.

Male: But some people say some children can’t learn

510sa

Female: . . . so just shuffle them through.

Male: That’s not fair.

Female: That’s not right.

Male: Things are changing. A new federal law says

every child deserves to learn.

Female: It says test every child to make sure they’re

learning and give them extra help if they’re not.

Male: Hold schools accountable. Because no child

should be in a school that will not teach and will not

change.

Female: The law says every child must be taught to

read by the 3rd grade. Because reading is a new civil

right.

Male: President Bush’s No Child Left Behind Law.

Female: The biggest education reform and biggest

increase in education funding in 25 years. Male:

Republicans are working for better, safer schools ...

Female: . . . so no child is left behind.

Male: That’s right . . . Republicans.

Announcer: Learn how Republican education reforms

can help your children. Call 1-800-843-7620. Help

President Bush and leave No Child Behind.

Paid for by the Republican National Committee.

Josefiak Decl. | 91(e) & RNC Ex. 2428 [RNC Vol. I]. The

decision by the RNC to run this advertisement, about

legislation that had already passed, within one month of a

federal election raises questions about whether promoting

education policy was the only goal of this advertisement.

These presumably are the best examples the RNC had of

its ‘genuine issue advocacy.’ I find that two of these

Slisa

commercials, when viewed in context, clearly had an

electioneering purpose in addition to any policy goal. The

third, concerning education, may also have sought to promote

Republican candidates. These examples reinforce the deter-

mination of the RNC’s own experts: genuine issue advocacy

on the part of political parties is a rare occurrence. See supra

Findings § 1.19.

1.20 Political parties also engage in ‘issue advocacy’ to help

their candidates whose campaigns are low on funds. For

example, the RNC spent $20 million on issue advertisements

from March 18, 1996, through the Republican National

Convention in August, designed to boost Senator Dole’s

image at a time when he had virtually run out of federal

matching primary funds. The RNC paid for a portion of these

issue advertisements with nonfederal funds, including the

costs of creating and/or disseminating advertisements that

attacked President Clinton’s record on welfare reform, taxes,

and budgetary policy. Thompson Comm. Report at 4014-16,

7520, 8294; Annenberg Report 1997 at 66; Huyck”® Decl. in

Mariani v. United States, 3: CV-1701 (M.D. Pa) (hereinafter

Mariani) 4§ 3, 5 [DEV 79-Tab 60]; see also Huyck Decl. in

Mariani Attach. A [DEV Supp.-Tab 9] (text of adver-

tisements paid for by the RNC and other Republican party

committees in part with nonfederal money).

The RNC conducted a detailed analysis of several adver-

tisements it was planning to run in various markets. The

advertisements consisted of two themes: build up then-

Senator and Republican presidential candidate Bob Dole, and

attack President Bill Clinton. These advertisements were

tested in focus groups to see the effect they had on undecided

voters. The advertisement used to build up Senator Dole told

© Pat Huyck was the RNC’s Director of Accounting as of 1999. Huyck

Decl. in Mariani v. United States, 3: CV-1701 (M.D. Pa) 94 3, 5 [DEV

79-Tab 60].

512sa

his life story and never mentioned the words ‘vote for,’

‘elect,’ or any of the ‘magic words’ of express advocacy. The

second set of advertisements showed President Clinton

speaking on a certain issue, then publicly stating the opposite.

All of the commercials were tested to see which would give

help Senator Dole and hurt President Clinton in the polls.

Memorandum to Haley Barbour from Charlie Nave and Joel

Mincey, dated May 28, 1996, FEC MUR 4553, Fabrizio Dep.

Ex. 5 [DEV 55-Tab 113] (INTO11830); FEC MUR 4553,

Fabrizio Dep. at 83-94 [DEV 55-Tab 113] (despite working

as a consultant for Senator Dole, Fabrizio McLaughlin and

Associates were sharing their data with the RNC, NRSC,

and NRCC).

1.20.1 One example from this effort is “The Story’:

Audio of Bob Dole: We have a moral obligation to give

our children an America with the opportunity and values

of the nation we grew up in.

Voice Over: Bob Dole grew up in Russell, Kansas.

From his parents he learned the value of hard work,

honesty and responsibility. So when his country called ...

he answered. He was seriously wounded in combat.

Paralyzed, he underwent nine operations.

Audio of Bob Dole: I went around looking for a

miracle that would make me whole again.

Voice Over: The doctors said he’d never walk again.

But after 39 months, he proved them wrong.

Audio of Elizabeth Dole: He persevered, he never

gave up. He fought his way back from total paralysis.

Voice Over: Like many Americans, his life experience

and values serve as a strong moral corapass. The

principle of work to replace welfare. The principle of

accountability to strengthen our criminal justice system.

513sa

The principle of discipline to end wasteful Washington

spending.

Voice of Bob Dole: It all comes down to values. What

you believe in. What you sacrifice for. And what you

stand for.

Fabrizio Dep. Ex. 2; McCain Decl. § 15. The RNC paid for

‘The Story,’ in part with nonfederal money, and it was

intended to help Senator Dole in the Presidential election.

Huyck Decl. in Mariani | 3 [DEV 79-Tab 60]; FEC MUR

4553, Fabrizio Dep. at 50 [DEV 55-113]; McCain Decl. | 15

[DEV 8-Tab 29].

The RNC’s Curt Anderson and Wes Anderson wrote to the

RNC Chairman regarding the Dole ‘Story’ advertisement,

stating: ‘We could run into a real snag with the Dole Story

spot. Certainly, all the quantitative and qualitative research

strongly suggests that this spot needs to be run. Making this

spot pass the issue advocacy test may take some doing.’

ODP0025-02018-20 [DEV 70-Tab 48]. Senator Levin

commented: ‘[aJny reasonable person iooking at that ad ai

that particular time in the Presidential season would say: It’s

not an ad about welfare or wasteful spending; it is an ad about

why should we elect that particular nominee.’ 145 Cong. Rec.

§ 12747 (1999) (Sen. Levin). Senator Dole himself stated that

‘The Story’ ‘never says I’m running for President. I hope that

it’s fairly obvious since I’m the only one in the picture.’

Center for Responsive Politics, A Bag of Tricks: Loopholes

in the Campaign Finance System (1996) at 13, ODPOO18-

00172 [DEV 69-Tab 48].

1.20.2 Another example from the RNC’s 1996 issue advocacy

campaign is ‘Pledge’

Clinton: I will not raise taxes on the middle class.

Announcer: We heard this a lot.

514sa

Clinton: We gotta give middle class tax relief, no

matter what else we do.

Announcer: Six months later, he gave us the largest

tax increase in history. Higher income taxes, income

taxes on social security benefits, more payroll taxes.

Under Clinton, the typical American family now pays

over $1,500 more in federal taxes. A big price to pay for

his broken promises. Tell President Clinton: You can’t

afford higher taxes for more wasteful spending.

Annenberg Report 1997 at 66; see also Huyck Decl. in

Mariani ¥§ 3 & Attach. A [DEV 79-Tab 60].

1.21 The political parties understand that their issue advocacy

campaigns affect federal elections, and they sponsor them

with that purpose. This fact is evident from the 1998

‘Operation Breakout’ issue advocacy campaign mounted by

the NRCC in cooperation with the RNC. ‘Operation Break-

out’ was touted as an effort to ‘ensure that the [Republican]

party not only maintains, but expands our majorities in

Congress.’ ODP0031-00299 [DEV 71-Tab 48] (September

25, 1998, letter from RNC Chair Nicholson to donor thanking

him for his donation to ‘Operation Breakout’); see also

ODP0033-00534 [DEV 71-Tab 48] (RNC Solicitation letter

for ‘Operation Breakout,’ describing it as an effort to ‘hold

onto our majority inthe House’).

1.22 The nature of the political parties’ issue advertisements,

detailed supra, demonstrates what any observer of politics

has come to know: political party ‘issue advocacy’ campaigns

are targeted at federal elections, particularly competitive

races, and are intended to, and do affect the outcome of those

contests.

National Parties Expend A Large Proportion of their

Nonfederal Funds for ‘Issue Advocacy’

1.23 The national political parties spend a large proportion of

their budgets on ‘issue advertisements’ that are designed to

515sa

help elect federal officeholders and candidates. In 2000, for

example, the RNC spent an estimated $70-75 million dollars

on the production and broadcasting of television and radio

advertisements, including both issue advocacy and coor-

dinated expenditures. Oliver*’ Dep. at 148-49 [DEV Supp.-

Tab 1]. /d. ‘During the 2000 presidential election year, the

largest single portion of the DNC budget was used for issue

advertising.” Marshall Decl. | 3 [DEV 8-Tab 28].

1.24 Defense expert David Magleby’s study estimates that

‘over half, and sometimes as much as three-quarters, of soft

money expenditures go to broadcast advertising.” Magleby

Expert Report at 49 [DEV 4-Tab 8].

1.25 As Defendants’ expert Donald Green, relying on an

article by Plaintiffs’ expert La Raja, observes:

[T]he original exemptions for soft-money were justified

partly on the grounds that get-out-the-vote activity

would help strengthen parties. As it happened, only a

small fraction of the soft money (or hard money, for that

matter) that flowed to state and national parties was

spent on voter mobilization activity, even broadly

conceived to include direct mail and commercial phone

banking. According to the classification system pre-

sented by La Raja and Jarvis-Shean (2001, p.3), 8.5% of

national party soft money expenditures went to

‘mobilization’ and ‘grassroots.’ The figures for state and

local parties are each 15%.

D. Green Report at #4 n.17 [DEV 1-Tab 3] (citing Raymond

La Raja and Elizabeth Jarvis-Shean, Assessing the Impact of

a Ban on Soft Money: Party Soft Money Spending in the

2000 Elections. (Unpublished manuscript: Institute of Gov-

ernmental Studies and Citizens’ Research Foundation 2001).

” John Oliver is Deputy Chairman of the RNC.

516sa

National Parties Funnel Nonfederal Funds Through State

Parties for the Purchase of Advertisements Designed to

Affect Federal Elections

1.26 The evidence clearly demonstrates that a large pro-

portion of nonfederal funds transferred from the national to

the state parties is targeted for the purchase of specific issue

advertisements designed by the national parties. These

advertisements are overwhelmingly intended to affect federal

elections. This is done in large part because the state parties

have better federal/nonfederal allocation ratios which allows

such state-bought advertisements to be purchased with a

greater proportion of nonfederal funds.

1.26.1 Defense expert Magleby explains how the FEC’s

allocation regime makes nonfederal fund transfers to the state

parties attractive to the national parties.

—

Parties can stretch their soft money even further by

transferring soft and hard money to state parties where

they can achieve a better ratio of soft to hard dollars than

if they spent the money themselves. This is because the

ratio of soft to hard dollars for party spending if done by

the national patty committees is 35 percent soft and 65

percent hard for presidential years, and 40 percent soft

and 60 percent hard for off years, but if done by state

parties the ratio of soft to hard dollars is greater. The

reason for this difference is state parties are allowed to

calculate their soft/hard ratio based on the ratio of

federal offices to all offices on the ballot in any given

year. Both political parties have found spending soft

money with its accompanying hard money match

through their state parties to work smoothly, for the most

part, and state officials readily acknowledge they are

simply ‘pass throughs’ to the vendors providing the

broadcast ads or direct mail.

Magleby Expert Report at 37 [DEV 4-Tab 8]. Other witnesses

and evidence support this contention, which no one disputes.

517sa

See, e.g., Marshall Decl. | 3 [DEV 8-Tab 28] (testifying that

in 2000 the DNC transferred funds to the state parties to take

advantage of their allocation rates); see also 11 C.F.R. §

106.5(b)(2)(i) (2001) (during presidential election years

national party committees required to pay for their mixed

activities with at least 65 percent in federal funds); id. at §

106.5(b)(2)(ii) (during nonpresidential election years national

party committees required to pay for their mixed activities

with at least 60 percent in federal funds).

1.26.2 The national political parties take advantage of this

allocation regime when planning and executing their adver-

tising budgets. One RNC memorandum contains a chart

which

clearly demonstrates what we already clearly know, that

any media we place in the target presidential states

should be placed through state parties. The average

ballot allocation in the top 17 target states is 37%

federal—63% non- federal, this obviously contrasts very

well with our 65% federal—35% non- federal allocation.

RNC Memorandum dated March 18, 1996, titled ‘Ballot

Allocation of Target States’ ODP0025-02720 to 21 [DEV 70-

Tab 48]. The memorandum concludes that by using the state

political parties, rather than directly making the purchase, the

RNC would save $2.8 million in federal funds on a $10

million media buy. /d. see also ODP0021-1365 to 1367 [DEV

70-Tab 48] (memorandum from Haley Barbour to the

California House Republicans, discussing the need to make a

media buy in California and stating that ‘[t}o accomplish this

buy, the [RNC] would transfer funds to the California

Republican Party, which would actually buy the advertising.

Under FEC regulations, the California Republican Party must

pay for the advertising with one-third FEC contributions and

two thirds nonfederal dollars’); McConnell Dep. at 267-77

[JDT Vol. 19] (stating that the NRSC prefers to transfer funds

to state parties who then purchase NRSC advertisements with

518sa

a more favorable federal/nonfederal fund allocation ratio);

Nelson Dep at 76-77 [JDT Vol. 24] (stating that purchasing

political advertisements through state parties has two

advantages: (1) better federal/nonfederal fund allocation

ratios and (2) ‘having [a] state disclaimer [on the adver-

tisement] is generally better than having a national disclaimer

on it’); Marshall Decl. ¢ 3 [DEV 8-Tab 28] (noting that in

2000, the largest single portion of the DNC budget was used

for issue advertising, but that ‘[t]he DNC typically did not

expend money for these issue ads itself, but instead

transferred both federal and non-federal money to the state

parties to make these expenditures’); ODP0023-02358 to 65

[DEV 70-Tab 48] (RNC tally of ‘1996 Media Buys,’ listing

advertisements purchased, price, and the amount of federal

and RNSEC funds used); ODP0023-03560 to 660 [DEV 70-

Tab 48] (RNC report of 1996 fund transfers to state parties

used for ‘party building/media buy’); ODP0025- 01560 [DEV

70-Tab 48] (memorandum from the Republican National

Finance Committee dated May 24, 1996, titled ‘California

T.V. Money,’ discussing the. need to raise $4 million in

nonfederal funds in two weeks which would then be

transferred to the CRP in order to ‘get on the air and stay on

the air for the next three months in CA’) (emphasis in

original); supra Findings 9§ 1.6 (in 1996 the DNC financed

two-thirds of its Clinton presidential campaign issue advo-

cacy through state party transfers), 1.4.3 (Mann) (over half of

the nonfederal money raised by the national party commit-

tees was transferred to the state parties during the 2000

election cycle).

1.26.3 The national political party committees transferred

$9,710,166 in federal funds to state political party committees

during the 1992 election cycle, $9,577,985 during the 1994

election cycle, $49,967,893 during the 1996 election

cycle, $30,475,897 during the 1998 election cycle, and

$131,016,957 during the 2000 election cycle. The national

political party committees transferred $18,646,162 in non-

519sa

federal funds to state political party committees during the

1992 election cycle, $18,442,749 during the 1994 election

cycle, $113,738,373 during the 1996 election cycle,

$69,031,644 during the 1998 election cycle, and

$265,927,677 during the 2000 election cycle. Biersack”

Decl. Tbls. 4, 8 [DEV 6-Tab 6].

1.26.4 State political parties use a large portion of the

transferred nonfederal money to finance public commu-

nications that support or oppose a federal candidate. See

Bowler” Decl. § 15 (explaining that ‘[t}he majority of

[national transfers to the CDP] were for issue advocacy’).

According to Plaintiffs’ expert La Raja, ‘[i]t appears that both

parties . . . use soft money transfers primarily to execute

national campaign strategy through state parties.” La Raja

Cross Exam. Ex. 3 at 103 [JDT Vol. 15]. La Raja finds that

‘more non-federal funds in the allocation accounts are used

for media rather than what I call party building,’ La Raja

Cross Exam. at 67 [JDT Vol. 15] (La Raja’s definition of

‘party building’ does not include administrative spending); La

Raja Expert Report § 22 [RNC Vol. VII] (finding that in

2000, 44 percent of transferred nonfederal funds were used

for media expenditures and 30 percent for administrative

overhead). La Raja concludes that ‘state parties invest most

soft money from the national parties in federal races,’ but

notes that ‘these investments have considerable effects on

races further down the ticket.’ La Raja Cross Exam. Ex. 3 at

139 [JDT Vol. 15] (La Raja dissertation) [JDT Vol. 15]; see

* Robert W Biersack served as the Supervisory Statistician for the

FEC from 1983 to February 2002. As the Supervisory Statistician, he was

responsible for evaluating the quality, reliability, and validity of infor-

mation contained in the FEC disclosure databases. Currently, he is Deputy

Press Officer for the FEC, a position he has held since February 2002.

Biersack Decl. § 1 [DEV 6-Tab 6].

2’ Kathleen Bowler is the Executive Director of the CDP. Bowler

Decl. ¥ 1.

520sa

also La Raja Cross Exam. 17-18 (stating that he stands by the

conclusions reached in his dissertation).

1.26.4.1 A good example of this system comes from the

Republican Party of New Mexico (‘RPNM’). A_ 1998

financial statement from the state party shows that it received

revenues of $1,524,634 in nonfederal transfers from other

Republican organizations, $1,110,987 in individual contribu-

tions, and just $389,552 in federal transfers from Republican

organizations. The RPNM spent over one-third of its 1998

revenues, $1,062,095, on ‘issue advocacy—television, radio

and mail.’ INT810-1605 to 12 (RNC NM0406326—33)

[DEV 114]. :

1.26.5 These issue advertisements funded by nonfederal

transferred funds are mainly intended to support federal

candidates. Plaintiffs’ expert La Raja notes that ‘one of the

goals’ of national party allocation of nonfederal funds to state

parties is to help federal candidates in close elections, and

that his ‘impression’ is that it is their primary goal. La Raja

Cross Exam. at 73-74 [JDT Vol. 15]; see also Magleby

Expert Report at 39 (‘[National party sJoft money is largely

aimed at competitive [federal] races.’). La Raja finds that the

parties ‘are highly functional rather than responsible. Rather

than use soft money to shore up weaker organizations, or

reward state party members for moving closer to national

party ideology, the national organizations use soft money like

hard money—to pursue the short-term goal of winning

elections.’ La Raja Cross Exam. Ex. 3 at 75 [JDT Vol. 15];

see also id. at 15 (stating that parties invest soft money

primarily ‘in issue ads that help candidates’). According to La

Raja, the national parties’ spending of nonfederal funds is

proof that ‘they are functional parties dedicated to winning

elections.’ /d. at 25; see also La Raja Cross Exam. Ex. 1 (La

Raja Decl.) § 11(a) (‘American political parties have focused

primarily on winning elections . .. .”) [JDT Vol. 15].

52Isa 7

1.26.6 Representatives of the Congressional committees

acknowledge that fund transfers from their committees to

state parties are used primarily for federal election adver-

tising. See Jordan” Decl. § 68 [DEV 7-Tab 21] (‘In my

experience, the large majority of the DSCC’s nonfederal

transfers to state and local party committees have been to

support the nonfederal share of issue advocacy communi-

cations. Frequently, these communications refer to Demo-

cratic Senate candidates or their Republican opponents, while

not expressly advocating any candidate’s election or defeat.’);

Vogel *! Decl. ¢ 63 [DEV 9-Tab 41] (‘In my experience, the

large majority of the NRSC’s nonfederal transfers to state and

local party committees have been to support the nonfederal

share of issue advocacy communications. Frequently, these

communications refer to Republican Senate candidates or

their Democratic opponeiits, while not expressly advocating

any candidate’s election or defeat.’); McGahn™ Decl. 4 55

[DEV 8-Tab 30] (‘In my experience, the large majority of the

NRCC’s nonfederal transfers to state and local party

committees have been to support the nonfederal share of issue

advocacy communications. . . . Frequently, these communi-

cations refer to Republican House candidates or their

Democratic opponents, while not expressly advocating any

candidate’s election or defeat.’); Wolfson*’ Decl. § 63 [DEV

9-Tab 44] (‘In my experience, the large majority of the

DCCC’s nonfederal transfers to state and local party

committees have been to support the nonfederal share of issue

*® James Jordan is the Executive Director of the DSCC. Jordan Decl.

q 1 [DEV 7-Tab 21].

*! Alexander Vogel is General Counsel for the NRSC. Vogel Decl. { |

[DEV 9-Tab 41].

2 Donald McGahn is General Counsel for the NRCC. McGahn Decl.

q 1 [DEV 8-Tab 30].

3 Howard Wolfson is Executive Director of the DCCC. Wolfson Decl.

4 1 [DEV 9-Tab 44].

522sa

advocacy communications. Frequently, these communications

refer to Democratic House candida.es or their Republican

opponents, while not expressly advocating any candidate’s

election or defeat.’) see also La Raja Cross Exam. Ex. 3 at 69

(La Raja dissertation) [JDT Vol. 15] (‘It would be particularly

surprising for congressional campaign committees to venture

outside their traditional scope of helping candidates and

invest in state party organizations.’).

1.26.7 Representatives of the congressional campaign

committees also admit that they retain control over the

advertisements their nonfederal money transfers are used to

purchase. Jordan Decl. 4 72-73 [DEV 7-Tab 21] (“When the

DSCC transfers funds to state party committees, including

nonfederal funds, for the purpose of disseminating issue

advocacy communications, it first develops the communi-

cations in consultation with media consultants, who are gen-

erally retained by the state party at the request or suggestion

of the DSCC, and then provides the communications to the

State party, together with the necessary funds to distribute

them locally. State parties may, but generally do not, reject

the communications. . . . The DSCC does_not permit issue

advocacy communications it supports to be recorded or

produced until they have been approved by DSCC counsel

and DSCC senior employees.’); Vogel Decl. ¢ 67-68 [DEV 9-

Tab 41] (‘When the NRSC transfers funds to state party

committees, including nonfederal funds, for the purpose

of disseminating issue advocacy communications, it first

develops the communications in consultation with the state

party and media consultants, who are generally retained by

the state party at the request or suggestion of the NRSC, and

then provides the communications to the state party, together

with the necessary funds to distribute them locally. State

parties may, but generally do not, reject the communications.

. . . The NRSC does not permit issue advocacy commu-

nications it supports to be recorded or produced until they

have been approved by NRSC counsel and NRSC senior

523sa

employees.’); McGahn Decl. 9§ 58-59 (‘When the NRCC

transfers funds to state party committees, including non-

federal funds, for the purpose of disseminating issue

advocacy communications, it first develops the commu-

nications in consultation with the state party and media

consultants, and then provides the communications to the

state party, together with the necessary funds to distribute

them locally. State parties may, but generally do not, reject

the communications. . . . The NRCC does not permit issue

advocacy communications it supports to be recorded or

produced until they have been approved by me, as NRCC

counsel, and NRCC senior employees.’); Wolfson Decl.

¥4§ 66-67 (‘When the DCCC transfers funds to state party

committees, including nonfederal funds, for the purpose

of disseminating issue advocacy communications, it first

develops the communications in consultation with media

consultants, who are generally retained by the state party at

the request or suggestion of the DCCC, and then provides the

communications to the state party together with the necessary

funds to distribute them locally. State parties may, but

generally do not, reject the communications. . . . The DCCC

does not permit issue advocacy communications it supports to

be recorded or produced until they have been approved by

DCCC counsel and DCCC senior employees.’).

1.26.7.1 On September 28, 1998, NRSC Executive

Director Steven Law wrote then-NRSC Chairman Senator

Mitch McConnell recommending that the NRSC fund an

issue ad playing off an article that appeared in Nevada's

largest newspaper. Democratic Senatorial candidate Harry

Reid ‘got bad reviews for an over-the- top, hostile per-

formance, suggesting a line of attack that builds on our six-

month-long message that Harry Reid says one thing in

Nevada and does the opposite in Washington. . . . If we went

in this direction, I would suggest running this spot for one

week at 1000 [gross ratings point], to be followed with our

last ad in the Nevada issue advocacy campaign, on lawyers’

5§24sa

fees." ODP0036-0293 1-32 [DEV 71-Tab 48]. Law’s idea was

later implemented in an advertisement paid for by the

Republican State Central Committee of Nevada. ODP0036-

01403 to 06 [DEV 71-Tab 48].

1.26.7.2 Documents in the record also demonstrate that the

State political parties are -merely conduits between the

national political parties and their media consultants. See,

e.g., CRP 00367 [IER Tab 28] (fax from the NRCC to the

CRP’s Victory 2000 project proving CRP ‘wiring info’ and

informing the state party that the ‘[mJoney will be in your

account today . . . . Please wire back to Strategic Media’);

CDP 02095-101, 2103-04, 2106 [IER Tab 12] (wire transfer

instructions from the DNC to the CDP for media buys); CDP

02984-89 [IER Tab 12] (detailing transfer of funds from

DCCC to CDP for media buy).

1.26.7.3 The RNC and DNC also transfer nonfederal funds

to state parties to pay for advertisements over which the

national party committees retain control. See Castellanos

Dep. (Sept. 27, 2002) at 111-12 (stating that when working

on advertisements for state parties, National Media dealt with

an RNC representative, not a state party member); Marshall

Decl. { 4 (noting that the DNC normally approved the content

of the advertisement and the amount of money to be spent

before calling the state party in question ‘to let it know that an

ad was coming’); Josefiak Dep. at 97-98 [JDT Vol. 11]

(acknowledging that the RNC transfers funds to state parties

to pay for RNC advertisements); Huyck Decl. in Mariani 4 4

(stating that in 1995-1996 the RNC transferred funds to state

party committees to pay for issue advertisements related to

the 1996 Presidential election campaign) [DEV 79-Tab 60];

Hazelwood™ Dep. at 118- 19 (RNC transfers funds to state

parties to pay for issue advertisements). In 2000, the RNC

™“ Elizabeth Blaise Hazelwood is the RNC’s political director. Hazel-

wood Dep. at 10.

525sa

raised over $254 million, a majority of which was transferred

to the state parties for various activities. Josefiak Dep. at 76

[JDT Vol. 11]; see also FEC, National Party Transfers to

State/Local Committees: January 1, 1999 to December 31,

2000, available at http://www.fec.gov/press/ 051501 party

fund/tables/nat2state.html (during the 2000 election cycle the

RNC made transfers of approximately $129 million—$93.2

million in nonfederal funds and $35.8 million in federal

funds—to state and local parties). The greatest expenditures

from these transfers were for political advertising and

administrative expenses. Josefiak Dep. at 76-77 [JDT

Vol. 11}.

1.27 The evidence above clearly demonstrates that the

national political parties transfer nonfederal money through

their state party affiliates for the purpose of buying so-called

‘issue advertisements’ at a better allocation ratio. These ad-

vertisements are created and controlled by the national polit-

ical parties, with the state political parties merely accepting

the nonfederal money transfers and passing the funds on to

media consultants as directed by the national political parties.

These advertisements are intended to affect federal elections

without using express advocacy terminology.

Get-Out-The-Vote (GOTV)

1.28 It is undisputed that GOTV efforts, paid for with

nonfederal funds by national party committees and targeted at

federal elections, directly assist federal candidates, as well as

state and local candidates of the same party whose elections

are held on the same day. Declarations from representatives

of the four major congressional campaign committees attest

to the fact that these committees ‘transfer[] federal and

nonfederal funds to state and/or local party committees for

.. . get-out-the-vote efforts. These efforts have a significant

effect on the election of federal candidates.’ Jordan Decl. | 69

[DEV 7-Tab 21]; Wolfson Decl. 64 [DEV 9-Tab 44]; Vogel

Decl. ¢ 64 [DEV 9-Tab 41]; McGahn Decl. § 56 [DEV 8-Tab

526sa

30] (emphasis added); see also Josefiak Decl. | 26 [RNC

Vol. I] (Republican Party ‘Victory Programs’ which include

GOTV components are designed to benefit candidates at the

federal, state and local levels) (emphasis added); Philp** Dep.

at 47, 49 (when asked ‘[are there aJny other services that the

party provides to federal candidates,’ answering that the

Colcrado Republican Party’s GOTV ‘programm is designed to

beneiit all candidates.’).

1.28.1 Documentary evidence corroborates the testimony

that GOTV efforts assist federal candidates. See, e.g., CDP

00859 [IER Tab 1.1] (letter thanking a CDP donor and noting

that CDP’s ‘get-out-the-vote efforts’ would help ‘increase the

number of Californian Democrats in the United States

Congress, continue Democratic leadership in the State Senate,

take back the State Assembly—and deliver California’s 54

electoral votes for President Bill Clinton’s and Vice President

Al Gore’s re-election.’) (emphasis added); CRP 07164 [IER

Tab 1.F] (letter from the Executive Director of the Dole-

Kemp campaign, stating in part: ‘Unfortunately, federal law

prohibits the Dole/Kemp campaign from accepting any

contributions after the last day of the national convention.

However, you can still support the Dole/Kemp ticket by

sending your contribution to the Victory ‘96 fund, which will

support the party’s ‘get out the vote’ operation and help us

ensure a successful campaign in California . . .”) (emphasis

added); infra Findings § 1.60 (McConnell letter noting that

the Kentucky Victory 2000 campaign, which included a

GOTV component, ‘was an important part of President

George W. Bush’s impressive victory in Kentucky last year,

and it will be critical to my race and others next year’).

* Alan Philp testified on behalf of the Colorado Republican Party.

Philp Dep. at 9 [JDT Vol. 26].

527sa

1.28.2 Defendants’ expert Donald Green concludes that

[t]he evidence from California, as well as from numer-

ous opinion surveys and exit polls that demonstrate the

powerful correlation between voting at the state and

federal levels, shows quite clearly that a campaign that

mobilizes residents of a highly Republican precinct will

produce a harvest of votes for Republican candidates for

both state and federal offices. A campaign need not

mention federal candidates to have a direct effect on

voting for such a candidate. That parties recognize this

fact is apparent, for example, from the emphasis that the

Democrats place on mobilizing and preventing ballot

roll-off among African-Americans, whose solidly Demo-

cratic voting proclivities make them reliable supporters

for office-holders at all levels. As a practical matter,

generic campaign activity has a direct effect on federal

elections.

Green Expert Report at 14 [DEV 1-Tab 3].

1.28.3 The RNC transfers nonfederal funds to state

political parties to subsidize voter mobilization activities of

the state parties. Banning” Decl. § 31 [RNC Vol. III]; see

also Duncan*’ Decl. #4 11-12 [RNC Vol. VI]. According to

Josefiak, the RNC also helps state and local parties fundraise

for these voter mobilization efforts. See Josefiak Decl. { 63,

65-72 [RNC Vol. I]; see also Benson™ Decl. ¢ 10 [RNC Vol.

** Jay Banning has served as the RNC’s Director of Administration and

Chief Financial Officer since 1983, and has been employed by the RNC in

these and other capacities for twenty-six years. Banning Decl. ¢ 1 [RNC

Vol. Il}.

7 Robert Duncan is a Member of the RNC from the State of Kentucky.

At the time the RNC’s Complaint in this case was filed, he served as

Treasurer of the RNC, but as of July 2002 he became its General Counsel.

Duncan Decl. ¢ 1 [RNC Vol. VI}.

* Bruce Benson is Chairman of the Colorado Republican Party. Ben-

son Decl. ¢ 1 [RNC Vol. VIII}.

528sa

VIII} ([T]}he Republican national party committees also

assist [the Colorado Republican Party] in raising money for

these party building programs.’).

1.29 The CDP and the CRP conduct GOTV door-to-door

canvassing campaigns, phone banks and mailings. Since

federal, state and isical candidates are on the same ballot in

California, these efforts affect all the candidates on the ballot.

This fact explains why these efforts usually required the state

parties to use a mix of federal and nonfederal money to pay

for such activities. See, e.g., Bowler Decl. | 20.b. (noting that

CDP slate cards and door hangers often mention both federal

and nonfederal candidates and thus were funded with the mix

of funds); id. (SO to 60 percent of CDP’s paid phone banks

make reference to a federal candidate and must therefore be

paid for with a mix of funds); see also Erwin Aff. 4 10. It is

important to note, however, that under BCRA’s Levin

Amendment state political parties may still use a mix of

nonfederal and federal funds to pay for GOTV efforts for

elections that include federal candidates, as long as they use

nonfederal funds raised in accordance with the provision. Of

course, for elections without a federal candidate on the ballot,

BCRA does not impose any restrictions.

1.30 It is clear that nonfederal funds used to finance GOTV

efforts for elections with federal candidates on the ballot

affect federal elections. It is clear that GOTV activities target

a certain political party’s likely voters and attempts to get

them to the polls. Even if the intent behind such efforts were

to only affect state and local contests, increasing the number

of Democrats, for example, who vote in a state and local

election will undoubtedly increase the number of votes for the

federal Democratic candidates who share the same ballot.

This fact is well-known and appreciated by the national

political p rties and federal candidates.

529sa

Voter Registration

1.31 It is undisputed that voter registration efforts, paid for

with nonfederal funds by the national party committees in the

period before federal elections, directly assist federal

candidates, as well as state and local candidates from the

same party whose elections are held on the same day. As Dr.

Mann notes:

In a series of advisory opinions, the Commission sought

to ensure that a portion of state party activities benefiting

[sic] both federal and nonfederal candidates be paid for

with hard money. In Advisory Opinion 1975-21, the

Commission ruled that a local party committee had to

use hard dollars to pay for a part of its administrative

expenses and voter registration drives, on the grounds

that these functions have an indirect effect on federal

elections. It used this opinion in regulations it issued in

1977 governing allocation of administrative expenses

between federal and nonfederal accounts. The allocation

was to be made ‘in proportion to the amount of funds

expended on federal and non-federal elections, or on

another reasonable basis.’ (11 C.F.R. 106.1(e) 1978).

Mann Expert Report at 9 [DEV 1-Tab 1] (emphasis added).

1.32 Represematives of the four major congressional cam-

paign committees, confirm that the four committees ‘trans-

fer[{] federal and nonfederal funds to state and/or local party

committees for . . . voter registration . . . efforts. These

efforts have a significant effect on the election of federal

candidates.’ Jordan Decl. § 69 [DEV 7-Tab 21]]; Wolfson

Decl. § 64 [DEV 9-Tab 44]; Vogel Decl. | 64 [DEV 9-Tab

41]; McGahn Decl. 4 56 [DEV 8-Tab 30] (emphasis added);

see also CDP 00859 [IER Tab 1.I] (letter thanking a CDP

donor and noting that CDP’s ‘voter registration ... efforts’

would help ‘increase the number of Californian Democrats in

the United States Congress, continue Democratic leadership

530sa

in the State Senate, take back the State Assembly—and

deliver California’s 54 electoral votes for President Bill

Clinton’s and Vice President Al Gore’s re-election.’) (em-

phasis added); see also Findings § 1.60 (McConnell letter

noting that the Victory 2000 campaign, which included a

voter registration component ‘was an important part of

President George W. Bush’s impressive victory in Kentucky

last year, and it will be critical to my race and others next

year’); Philp Dep. at 49 (when asked ‘[are there a]ny other

services that the party provides to federal candidates,’

answering that the Colorado Republican Party’s GOTV

‘program is designed to benefit all candidates. That could

include voter registration and so on and so forth.’).

1.33 CRP official Erwin’ testifies that ‘[t]he overwhelm-

ing amount of [voter registration] activity is ‘generic’ voter

registration activity urging potential registrants to ‘Register

Republican.’’ Erwin Aff. ¥ 9. Erwin testifies that the CRP has

paid for voter registration—with a mix of federal and non-

federal funds—through its Operation Bounty program, in

which Republican county central committees, Republican

volunteer organizations and Republican candidates for federal

and state office participate. Through its Operation Bounty

drives, the CRP has typically registered over 350,000

Republican voters in each election cycle since the 1984

election cycle (except 1997-98). See Erwin Aff. 4 9; see also

CDP App. at 1185 [PCS 4] (charting CRP’s voter registration

activity by election cycle since 1984 cycle).

Ms. Bowler states that the CDP’s expenditures on voter

registration— consisting of a mix of federal and nonfederal

funds—were approximately $145,000 in the 1996 election

cycle; $300,000 in the 1998 cycle; $100,000 in the 2000

election cycle; and $185,000 during the period from January

*’ Ryan Erwin is the Chief Operating Officer of the CRP. Erwin

Aff. q 1.

53lsa

1, 2001 to June 30, 2002. See Bowler Decl. 4 20.a. Ms.

Bowler notes that the CDP’s expenditures for voter regis-

tration were higher in 1998 (a year with eight statewide

elections) than in 2000 (a presidential election year). Jd. CRP

and CDP officials testify that ‘it is often the case that these

voter registration activities are primarily driven by the desire

to affect State and local races.’ Erwin Aff. § 14a; Bowler

Decl. § 20.a.

Whatever their intention, the evidence supra, makes clear

that these efforts affect federal elections; particularly as

demonstrated by the CDP’s fundraising materials. See

Findings 4 1.32). Moreover, under the Levin Amendment

state political parties may still use a mix of nonfederal and

federal funds to conduct voter registration efforts for elections

that include federal candidates, as long as they use nonfederal

funds raised in accordance with the provision. Of course, for

those elections without a federal candidate on the ballot,

BCRA does not impose any restrictions.

Redistricting

1.34 The national parties use nonfederal funds, as well as

federal funds, toward their redistricting efforts, and these

efforts are of value to Members of Congress because the

changes in the composition of a Member’s district can mean

the difference between reelection and defeat.

1.34.1 As Defendants’ expert Donald Green notes:

The most important legislative activity in the electoral

lives of U.S. House members takes place- during re-

districting, a process that is placed in the hands of state

legislatures. The chances that a House incumbent will be

ousted by unfavorable district boundaries are often

greater than the chances of defeat at the hands of the

typical challenger. Thus, federal legislators who belong

to the state majority party have a tremendous incentive

to be attuned to the state legislature and the state party

leadership.

532sa

For example, in early 1999 the Republican National

Committee, recognizing that state legislatures in

Tennessee and Georgia would soon control redistricting,

transferred substantial sums of money to those states’

Republican parties in an effort to win the few seats

necessary to gain the majority. As Edwin Bender, in a

report for the National Institute on Money in State

Politics explains: ‘In a number of states with legislatures

that are controlled by narrow margins, a win or two in

the state House or Senate in 2000 could mean the

difference between a redistricting committee controlled

by Democrats or Republicans, and districts that favor

one party over the other .. . . As a result, national party

organizations have been flooding the states with

campaign donations, both soft money and hard, to

influence the redistricting process.

Green Expert Report at 11-12 [DEV 1-Tab 3].

1.34.2 The RNC uses a mix of federal and nonfederal

funds to support redistricting efforts, including redistricting

litigation. Josefiak Decl. § 74 [RNC Vol. I]. In 2002, for

example, the RNC budgeted approximately $4.1 million on

redistricting. Seventy percent of the redistricting budget was

to be funded with nonfederal money. Banning Decl. § 28.i

[RNC Vol. IIIf]. The RNC spends more overall on state

legislative redistricting than on congressional redistricting.

Josefiak Decl. § 74 [RNC Vol. I]; see also infra Findings

4 1.78.1 (Fortune 100 Company nonfederal money budget

request noting that ‘because both [national] parties will be

working to influence redistricting efforts during the next two

years, we anticipate that we will be asked to make soft money

contributions to these efforts. Redistricting is a key once-

a-decade effort that both parties have very high on their

priority list.’).

1.34.3 Mr. Alan Philp, of the Colorado Republican Party,

testifies that his party and the Colorado Democratic Party

533sa

played a significant role in the state’s legislative redistricting

process. Philp Dep. at 65 [JDT Vol. 26]. Philp states that the

results of the redistricting process ‘[c]an have a significant

impact’ on candidates for federal office. Jd. at 66. He notes

that the Colorado Congressional delegation discussed redis-

tricting with the Colorado Republican Party. /d.

Other Activities Paid for with Nonfederal Funds

1.35 Administrative Expenses: The FEC allowed the RNC to

pay for its administrative overhead—including salaries,

benefits, equipment, and supplies for party operations at RNC

headquarters in Washington, D.C.—with a mix of federal and

nonfederal funds. See Banning Decl. § 27 [RNC Vol. III];

Bowler Decl. ¥ 15. ‘During the 2000 election cycle, the RNC

spent $35.6 million of nonfederal funds and $52.9 million of

federal funds on administrative overhead.’ Banning Decl.

q 27 [RNC Vol. III]. ‘Administrative overhead includes the

operating costs of RNC facilities, such as utility bills and

maintenance, fundraising costs, and routine expenses for

travel and supplies. Administrative overhead also includes the

salaries of RNC-employees.’ /d. According to Plaintiffs’

expert La Raja, the RNC spent about one-quarter of their

nonfederal disbursements on administration and overhead

during the 2000 election cycle and transferred 67 percent to

the state parties. La Raja Expert Report | 14(c) [RNC Vol.

VII]. State parties spent about 30 percent of their nonfederal

money disbursements during the 2000 election cycle on

administrative expenses and overhead. La Raja Expert Report

q 22 [RNC Vol. VII]; see also Bowler Decl. 15 (stating that

allocation is required for administrative expenses like rent,

utilities, and salaries). The fact these expenditures required a

mix of federal and nonfederal funds demonstrates that these

activities affect federal elections. See also supra Findings

{ 1.26.4 (Plaintiffs expert La Raja stating administrative

expenses are not ‘party building’ activity).

534sa

1.36 Training Seminars: Banning testifies that the RNC used

a mix of federal and nonfederal funds to conduct training

seminars for Republican candidates, party officials, activists

and campaign staff, many of whom are involved in state and

local campaigns and elections. Topics included grassroots

organizing, fundraising and compliance with campaign

finance regulations. During the 2000 election cycle at least

10,000 people attended RNC-sponsored training sessions,

including 117 ‘nuts and bolts’ seminars on grassroots

organizing and get-out- the-vote activities. During the same

cycle the RNC spent $391,000 in nonfederal funds and >

$671,000 in federal funds on such training and support. See

Banning Decl. 4 28(c) [RNC Vol. Ill]; see also La Raja

Expert Report at 11 [RNC Vol. VII] (parties ‘help candidates

by training them and their campaign staff,’ support which

‘can make an important difference in whether a candidate

chooses to run for office, particularly in an era of cash-

intensive campaigning that requires skillful application of

advanced campaign technologies’). According to La Raja, the

RNC spent $8.5 million in nonfederal funds directly on all of

its grassroots and voter mobilization activities for the 2000

election cycle. La Raja Expert Report 4 14(c) [RNC Vol.

VII]. This constitutes about one-half of one percent of all

RNC nonfederal spending during the 2000 election cycle. See

Biersack Decl. Table 2 [DEV 6-Tab 6] (showing the RNC

spent $163,521,510 in nonfederal funds during the 2000

election cycle). Furthermore, by virtue of the fact these

activities were paid for with a mix of federal and nonfederal

funds demonstrates that they affect federal elections.

1.37 State and Local Governmental Affairs: The RNC

provided $100,000 of seed money for the formation of a

Republican state attorneys general association that focuses on

state issues. RNC Ex. 978; see also Josefiak Decl. 44 82-84

[RNC Vol. Ij. According to Banning, during the 2000

election cycle the RNC spent $199,000 in nonfederal funds

and $333,500 in federal funds on state and _ local

535sa

governmental affairs. See Banning Decl. 4 28.b [RNC Vol.

III]. The nonfederal funds the RNC spent on state and local

governmental affairs constituted a minuscule percentage of

the RNC’s $163,521,510 nonfederal budget for the 2000

election cycle. See Biersack Decl. Table 2 [DEV 6-Tab 6].

Furthermore, by virtue of the fact these activities were paid

with a mix of federal and nonfederal funds demonstrates that

they affect federal elections.

1.38 Minority Outreach: Banning states that the RNC used a

mix of federal and nonfederal funds to support efforts to

increase minority involvement and membership in_ the

Republican Party. During the 2000 election cycle the RNC

spent $1,211,000 in nonfederal funds and $2,163,000 in

federal funds on support of allied groups and minority

outreach. See id. J 28.e. This nonfederal expenditure also

constituted a minuscule percentage of the RNC’s total non-

federal spending for the 2000 election cycle. See Biersack

Decl. Table 2 [DEV 6-Tab 6]. Furthermore, by virtue of the

fact these activities were paid for with a mix of federal and

nonfederal funds demonstrates that they affect federal

elections.

1.39 State and Local Elections: The RNC’s Josefiak testifies

that ‘the RNC actually focuses many of its resources on

purely state and local election activity,’ Josefiak Decl. § 19

[RNC Vol. I]; however, the figures provided to the Court do

not support this contention. For example, in 1999 and 2000

the RNC donated approximately $7.3 million in nonfederal

funds to state and local candidates. Josefiak Decl. 4 61 [RNC

Vol. I]; Banning Decl. | 28(a) [RNC Vol. III]. However, this

amount is a small fraction of the $163,521,510 in nonfederal

funds it spent during the 2000 election cycle. Biersack Decl.

Table 2 [DEV 6-Tab 6]. Plaintiffs’ expert La Raja finds that

the Republican Party allocated just seven percent ($9.5

million) of their nonfederal funds during the 2000 election

cycle for contributions to state and local candidates. La Raja

536sa

Expert Report ¥ 14(b) [RNC Vol. VII]. Furthermore, accord-

ing to Defense expert Mann, the two national parties donated

‘only $19 million directly to state and local candidates, less

than 4% of their soft money spending and 1.6% of their total

financial activity in 2000.” Mann Report at 26 [DEV 1-Tab 1]

(citation omitted).

1.39.1.1 The RNC also provides testimony that it ‘some-

times devotes significant resources toward states with

competitive gubernatorial races even though the races- for

federal offices are less competitive.’ Josefiak Decl. § 62

[RNC Vol. I]. According to Josefiak, in 2000, most observers

believed that Indiana was a ‘safe’ state for George W. Bush

and that it did not have a competitive Senate race. ‘Never-

theless, the RNC committed significant resources to the state

in hopes of influencing the gubernatorial race.’ Josefiak Decl.

§ 62 [RNC Vol. I]. Josefiak’s declaration provides no figures

to allow the Court to determine what constitutes ‘significant

resources.’ Furthermore, although Indiana may have been a

‘safe’ state for the Republican presidential candidate and the

Republican candidate for U.S. Senate, the Indiana ballot

provided voters with three federal races in which to vote,

meaning that many expenditures, even if intended to only

influence a single state race, affected federal election races.

Most importantly, nothing in BCRA prevents the RNC

from using unlimited amounts of federal funds to affect any

state election.

1.39.1.2 Five States—Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi,

New Jersey and Virginia—hold elections for state and local

office in odd-numbered years when there are typically no

federal candidates on the ballot. See Josefiak Decl. 4 41 [RNC

Vol. I]. Likewise, numerous cities—including Houston,

Indianapolis, Los Angeles, Minneapolis and New York

City—hold mayoral elections in odd- numbered years. See id.

RNC officials state that for elections in which there is no

federal candidate on the ballot, the RNC frequently trains

537sa

state and local candidates, contributes to state and local

candidate campaign committees, funds communications

calling for election or defeat of state and local candidates, and

supports get-out-the-vote activities. See Banning Decl.

4 28(a) [RNC Vol. Ill]; Josefiak Decl. 44 19, 41-59 [RNC

Vol. Ij. The RNC’s CFO Jay Banning testifies that in

1999 and 2001, including transfers to state parties, direct

contributions to local and state campaigns, and direct RNC

expenditures, the RNC spent approximately $21 million in

nonfederal funds in 1999 and 2001 (approximately $5.7

million in 1999, $15.7 million in 2001). Banning Decl.

{ 28(a) [RNC Vol. III]; see also Duncan Decl. ff 14-15 [RNC

Vol. VI] (discussing RNC contributions to Kentucky state

and local races). Defendants’ expert Mann states that

donations to gubernatorial candidates in an odd numbered

year is not something intended to affect a Federal election.

Mann Cross Exam. at 71. Again, BCRA does not preclude the

national political parties from spending unlimited federal

funds on such activities. Furthermore, state political parties

can spend nonfederal funds on such campaigns without limit

as long as no federal election is held at the same time. See,

e.g., Torres” Decl. § 8 [3 PCS] (stating that the CDP has

spent millions of -dollars in nonfederal funds supporting

candidates in Los Angeles).

1.40 With the exception of administrative expenses, the

activities paid for with nonfederal funds listed supra

constituted a very small portion of the political parties’

nonfederal expenditures during the 2000 election cycle.

Furthermore, administrative expenses, training seminars,

expenditures on state and local governmental affairs, and

minority outreach, were all paid for with a mixture of federal

and nonfederal funds meaning that these activities have some

impact on federal elections.

” Art Torres is the elected chair of the CDP. Torres Decl. 4 1 [3 PCS].

538sa

The State Parties Have Become ‘Branches’ of

the National Parties

1.41 The evidence supra clearly demonstrates that nonfederal

money has not been used primarily for ‘party building’

activities as the authorizing rationale envisioned; rather, the

funds are being used by the national parties for electioneering

activities and the state parties have been coopted as part of

this effort.

1.42 The emergence of nonfederal money as a potent force in

national politics has made the state political parties, according

to Plaintiffs’ expert La Raja, ‘more reliant on the national

parties. They have worked more with the national parties.

They have become what I term branch organizations, which

to me is not a pejorative. It means they work more closely

with the national organization,’ ‘they still retain autonomy.

However, they’re integrated more with the national party

structure.” La Raja Cross Exam. at 43-44, 60 [JDT Vol. 15].

This has lead to a ‘nationalized party system, [where] state

parties use national party resources to advance national party

goals.’ /d. at Ex. 3 at 88, 101. “The national parties employ

the state parties as instruments to pursue federal electoral

goals, particularly through issue ads sponsored by state

organizations [paid for with nonfederal money transferred

from the national political parties].’ /d. at 104.

1.43 The close affiliation between the state, local and national

parties is clear from their cooperation during election

campaigns that include state and federal elections.

1.43.1 Ms. Bowler testifies that the CDP works closely

with the DNC in planning and implementing ‘Coordinated

Campaigns,’ the purpose of which is to allocate resources and

coordinate plans for the benefit of Democratic candidates up

and down the entire ticket. Party officials, candidates at all

levels of the ticket and their agents participate in Coordinated

Campaigns and collectively make decisions regarding the

539sa

solicitation, receipt, directing, and spending of the CDP’s

funds, both federal and nonfederal. Bowler Decl. 94 5, 29

{3 PCS]. According to Bowler, the CDP is ‘integrally related

to the [DNC].’ /d. 4 5.

1.43.2 The RNC’s ‘Victory Plans’ are voter contact

programs designed to support the entire Republican ticket at

the federal, state, and local levels. The RNC works with every

state party to design, fund and implement the Plans. See

Benson Decl. § 8 [RNC Vol. VIII]; Josefiak Decl. 4 26 [RNC

Vol. I]; Peschong Decl. 44 4-5 [RNC Vol. Vij.

1.43.2.1 According to RNC Chief Counsel Josefiak,

Victory Plans are formulated and implemented after extensive

and continuous collaboration between the RNC and the state

parties; each Plan is tailored to the unique needs of each State

and designed to stimulate grassroots activism and increase

voter turnout in the hopes of benefitting candidates at all

levels of the ticket. Josefiak Decl. 44 25-40 [RNC Vol. I].

According to Mr. Erwin, the CRP works closely with the

RNC in planning and implementing a Victory Plan. The

Victory Plan is implemented in the general election cycle

with the full involvement of RNC staff, CRP staff, state

legislative leadership and representatives from the top of the

ticket campaigns. See Erwin Aff. § 4 [3 PCS]. “By their

nature, the Victory Plans and the programs specified in them

span the calendar yéar, not just the 60 or 120 days prior to the

election.” Peschong Decl. ¢ 4 [RNC Vol. VI]. The Victory

Plans generally incorporate rallies, direct mail, telephone

banks, brochures, state cards, yard signs, bumper stickers,

door hangers, and door-to-door volunteer activities. /d.

1.43.2.2 According to Josefiak, in 2000 the RNC trans-

ferred approximately $42 million to state parties to use in

Victory Plan programs, 60 percent (about $25 million) of

which was nonfederal money, not including money spent on

broadcast ‘issue advertising.’ Josefiak Decl. 4 31 [RNC Vol.

540sa

I]; see also Peschong*' Decl. 44 4, 8-9 [RNC Vol. VI] (stating

that “(t]he RNC typically provides a very substantial share of

the funding of state victory programs.’).

1.43.2.3 State Republican party officials observe that

because there are often numerically more state and local races

than federal races during a given election, Victory Plans

‘often place greater emphasis’ on the non-federal races. See

Benson Decl. § 8 [RNC Vol. VIII]; Bennett Decl. § 17.k

{RNC Vol. VIII] (stating that the average ratio of state and

local candidates to federal candidates in Ohio in 2002 is 18

to 1). This observation does not change the fact that Victory

Plans are designed to ‘support the entire ticket.” Benson Decl.

4 8 [KNC Vol. VIII] (emphasis added).

Efforts to Address the Role of Nonfederal Funds in Campaign

Finance Must Limit State Party Use of Nonfederal Funds that

Affect Federal Elections

1.44 It is clear that state political party electoral activities

affect federal elections, especially when state and federal

elections are held of date. The record establishes

that federal officeholders value these services and that they

solicit nonfederal donations for the state political parties in

order to assist their own campaigns. National political parties

also solicit nonfederal donations for their state counterparts

and transfer nonfederal funds as part of their efforts to affect

federal elections. See infra Findings 4 1.59. The workings of

this campaign finance system demand that if one wants to

address the impact of nonfederal money, one cannot ignore

the state role in the system.-Former Members of Congress

concur. Former Senator Rudman states clearly:

To curtail soft-money fundraising and giving, it is nec-

essary to have a comprehensive approach that addresses

*' John Peschong is the RNC’s Regional Political Director for the

Western Region. Peschong Decl. { 1.

541sa

the use of soft money at the state and local party levels

as well as at the national party level. The fact is that

much of what state and local parties do helps to elect

federal candidates. The national parties know it; the

candidates know it; the state and local parties know it. If

state and local parties can use soft money for activities

that affect federal elections, then the problem will not be

solved at all. The same enormous incentives to raise the

money will exist; the same large contributions by

corporations, unions, and wealthy individuals will be

made; the federal candidates who benefit from state

party use of these funds will know exactly whom their

benefactors are; the same degree of beholdenness and

obligation will arise; the same distortions on the

legislative process will occur; and the same public

cynicism will erode the foundations of our democracy—

except it will all be worse in the public’s mind because a

perceived reform was undercut once again by a loophole

that allows big money into the system.

Rudman Decl. § 19 [DEV 8-Tab 34]. Former Senator Brock

comments:

It does no good to close the soft money loophole at the

national level, but then allow state and local parties to

use money from corporations, unions, and wealthy

individuals in ways that affect federal elections. State

and local parties use soft money to help elect federal

candidates both by organizing voter registration and get-

out-the-vote drives that help candidates at all levels of

the ticket, and by using soft and hard money to run

‘issue ads’ that affect federal el. tions. Therefore, for

soft money reforms to be truly effective, it is vitally

important to require the use of hard money at the state

level to pay for activities that affect federal elections.

Brock Decl. § 8 [DEV 6-Tab 9].

542sa

Summary

1.45 The evidence supra clearly demonstrates that nonfederal

money has become an increasingly important part of the

national political parties’ campaign efforts. The increase in

nonfederal fundraising and spending, especially since 1994,

has been dramatic, and is due to the advent of the so-called

‘issue advertisement.” Political party issue advertisements do

not include words of express advocacy, but are engineered to

still have an impact on federal elections. Despite their effect,

the fact that these advertisements do not constitute express

advocacy has allowed the political parties to use nonfederal

money, raised in part from the treasuries of corporations and

labor unions, to fund these commercials and thereby skirt

campaign finance laws. Furthermore, these advertisements

make a mockery of the original justification for allowing the

political parties to raise these funds, as they have nothing to

do with ‘party building.’ Plaintiffs’ own expert finds that

these funds have been spent primarily on electioneering and

not on strengthening the political parties.

The fact that the national political parties found a huge

loophole through which to circumvent the federal campaign

finance regime was only the first step. In order to maximize

the power of this new-found political tool, the national

political parties coopted their state party affiliates, or

branches as Plaintiffs’ expert calls them, and funneled

nonfederal funds through them in order to take advantage of

the state political parties’ more attractive allocation ratios. By

doing so, the national parties minimized the amount of federal

funds needed to purchase advertisements designed to affect

federal elections-advertisements that in the spirit of FECA

should have been paid for completely with federal funds. As a

result, the state political parties became an integral part of the

national political parties’ nonfederal money strategy, and

543sa

therefore any effort to deal with the use of nonfederal funds

in the campaign finance regime requires addressing the state

political parties.

Not all nonfederal funds are spent on political adver-

tisements, but these advertisements constitute the largest

category of nonfederal spending of the national and state

political parties. Furthermore, other activities, such as voter

registration and GOTYV, that are paid for in part with

nonfederal funds clearly affect federal elections when state

and local elections are held on the same day as the federal

election. Redistricting efforts affect federal elections no

matter when they are held. In sum, the political parties used

nonfederal funds to circumvent FECA and affect federal

elections.

The Role of Federal Lawmakers in Political Party

Nonfederal Fundraising

1.46 Unlike other entities, political parties have uniquely

close relationships with candidates they nominate and

support, and who, in turn, lead the party. See D. Green Expert

Report at 7-9 [DEV 1-Tab 3]; McCain Decl. 94 22- 23 [DEV

8-Tab 29]. The Colorado Republican Party has stated in past

litigation: ‘A party and its candidate are uniquely and

strongly bound to one another because: [a] party recruits and

nominates its candidate and is his or her first and natural

source of support and guidance[;] [a] candidate is identified

by party affiliation throughout the election, on the ballot,

while in office, and in the history books[;] [a] successful

candidate becomes a party leader, and the party continues to

rely on the- candidate during subsequent campaigns[;] [a]

party’s public image largely is defined by what its candidates

say and dof[;] [a] party’s candidate is held accountable by

voters for what his or her party says and does[;] [a] party

succeeds or fails depending on whether its candidates succeed

or fail. No other political actor shares comparable ties with a

candidate.’ Brief of Colorado Republican Party in FEC vy.

544sa

Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (‘Colorado II’),

533 U.S. 431, 457 (2001), at 19-20; see also id. at 7-8, 26-31;

Philp Dep. at 47-54 [JDT Vol. 26].

Federal Lawmakers Run the Party Committees

1.47 The national committees of the two major political

parties are: the Republican National Committee (‘RNC’); the

National Republican Senatorial Committee (‘NRSC’); the

National Republican Congressional Committee (‘NRCC’);

the Democratic National Committee (‘DNC’); the Democratic

Senatorial Campaign Committee (‘DSCC’); and the Demo-

cratic Congressional Campaign Committee (‘DCCC’). Vogel

Decl. | 6 [DEV 9-Tab 41]; McGahn Decl. | 6 [DEV 8-Tab

30]; Jordan Decl. § 6 [DEV 7-Tab 21]; Wolfson Decl. | 6

[DEV 9-Tab 44]. The primary purpose of the congressional

committees is to ensure the election of candidates from their

respective parties to their respective legislative body and

otherwise support the goals of their party. /d.

The national party committees are dominated by

elected public officials—the president or presidential

candidate in the case of the Republican and Democratic

National Committees, the top House and Senate

party leaders for the congressional campaign com-

mittees. . . . There is no meaningful separation between

the national party committees and the public officials

who control them.

Mann Expert Report at 29 (citations omitted) [DEV 1-

Tab 1]; see also Krasno & Sorauf Expert Report at 9-10

(‘Simply put, no wall between the national parties and the

national government exists.’), 12-13 (‘Party committees are

headed by or enjoy close relationships with their leading

officials, individuals who by virtue of their positions,

reputations, and control of the legislative machinery have

special influence on their colleagues.’) [DEV 1-Tab 2]; Green

Expert Report at 9-10 [DEV 1-Tab 3] (‘Political parties, it

should be noted, are structured along very different principles

545sa

from the American government. One such principle is the

separation and dispersal of power, of which one finds many

examples in the Constitution. . . . Leaders of legislative party

caucuses may also serve as members or leaders of party

campaign committees. Furthermore, party leaders are drawn

disproportionately from the ranks of those who hold

important legislative leadership posts. . . . [T]he internal

structure of parties permits, for example, former U.S. Senator

D’Amato, who chaired the [RSCC] from 1995-97, to at the

same time serve as chair of the Senate Banking, Housing, and

Urban Affairs Committee. Parties, in contrast to the law-

making institutions they inhabit, are organized in ways that

concentrate authority, entrusting multiple roles to particular

individuals.’); Rudman Decl. § 6 [DEV 8-Tab 34]; Vogel

Decl. § 4 [DEV 9-Tab 41] (NRSC is comprised of sitting

‘Republican Members of the United States Senate .. . . The

chair of the NRSC is elected by the Republican Caucus of the

United States Senate.’); Jordan Decl. § 4 [DEV 7- Tab 21]

(the DSCC ‘is comprised of sitting Democratic Members of

the United States Senate . . . . The chair of the DSCC is

appointed by the Democratic Leader of the United States

Senate.’); McGahn Decl. | 4 [DEV 8-Tab 30] (the NRCC

includes the ‘entire elected Republican leadership’ and its

executive Committee includes ‘the Speaker of the House, the

Majority Leader, the Republican Whip, Conference Chair-

man, the Conference Vice-Chairman, the Conference

Secretary, the Policy Chairman and the NRCC Chairman’);

Wolfson Decl. § 4 [DEV 9-Tab 44] (the DCCC is comprised

of sitting Democratic Members of (or Delegates to) the

United States House of Representatives, and the Chair of the

DCCC. is elected by the Democratic Caucus of the United

States House of Representatives).

1.48 ‘For at least a century [the national party committees]

have been melded into their party’s presidential campaign

every four years, often assuming a subsidiary role to the

presidential candidate’s personal campaign committee. The

546sa

presidential candidate has traditionally been conceded the

power to shape and use the committee, at least for the

campaign.’ Sorauf/Krasno Report in Colorado Republican at

27 [DEV 73-Tab C].

Political parties are primarily concerned with electing their

candidates and the money they raise is spent assisting their

candidates’ campaigns. As Congressman Meehan explained:

The ultimate goal of a political party such as the

Democratic Party is to get as many Party members as

possible into elective office, and in doing so to increase

voting and Party activity by average Party members. The

Party does this by developing principles on public policy

matters the Party stands for, and then by finding

candidates to run for the various political offices who

represent those principles for the Party. When the Party

finds its candidates, it tries to raise money to help get

like-minded people to participate in the elections, and to

try to get the Party’s candidates the resources they need

to get their message out to voters. In my experience,

political parties do not have economic interests apart

from their ultimate goal of electing their candidates

to office.

Meehan Decl. in RNC 9§ 3-4 [DEV 68-Tab 30]. Senator

Bumpers testifies that he is ‘not aware that the [Democratic]

party has any interest in the outcome of public policy debates

that is separate from its interest in supporting and electing its

candidates.’ Bumpers Decl. 4 6 [DEV 6-Tab 10]. Senator

McCain testifies that ‘[t]he entire function and history of

political parties in our system is to get their candidates

elected, and that is particularly true after the primary

campaign has ended and the party’s candidate has been

selected.’ McCain Decl. | 23 [DEV 8-Tab 29].

1.49 In general, the RNC espouses three core principles as

guiding the mission of the national Republican Party, which

547sa

includes electing candidates to national, state and local

offices who represent the RNC’s political views. In practice,

electing these candidates is the RNC’s primary focus.

1.49.1 The RNC’s Chief Counsel, Thomas Josefiak, attests

that

[t}he Republican Party has a long and rich history

advocating some core principles: a smaller federal

government, lower taxes, individual freedom, and a

strong national» defense. The RNC achieves these

principles through three primary means: (1) promoting

an issue agenda advocating Republican positions on

issues of local, state, regional, national and international

importance; (2) electing candidates who espouse these

views to local, state and national offices; and (3)

governing in accord with these views. Although these

efforts sometimes overlap, they also frequently occur

independently of one another.

Josefiak Decl. § 22 [RNC Vol. I]. Other documents in the

record, however, show that the RNC and Republican state

parties’ primary purpose is to elect Republican candidates to

office. See, e.g., RNC’s Resp. to FEC RFA’s in RNC, No. 40

[DEV 68-Tab 35]; ODP0021-02003 [DEV 70-Tab 48] (RNC

Memorandum in which Chairman Haley Barbour states: ‘The

purpose of a political party is to elect its candidates to public

office, and our first goal is to elect Bob Dole president. . . .

Electing Dole is our highest priority, but it is not our only

priority. Our goal is to increase our majorities in both houses

of Congress and among governors and state legislatures.’);

Knopp’ Cross Exam. at 10 [JDT Vol. 13] (stating that the

primary purpose of the RNC is ‘to elect Republicans to state,

local, and national office’); Brister*’ Decl. § 4 [RNC Vol.

* Janice Knopp is the RNC’s Deputy Director of Finance/Marketing

Director. Knopp Decl. ¥ 1 [RNC Vol. V].

** Pat Brister is the Chairman of the Republican Party of Louisiana.

Brister Decl. ¢ 1 [RNC Vol. VIII).

548sa

VIII] (‘The Republican Party of Louisiana’s primary purpose

is to help elect Republicans to office ‘from the courthouse to

the White House’’). Whether the Republican Party’s ‘core

principles’ drive its pursuit of electoral majorities, or vice

versa, is a chicken-or-the-egg type quandary that I need not

resolve at this juncture. What is clear from the evidence,

however, is that regardless of whether or not it is done to

advocate the party’s principles, the Republican Party’s

primary goal is the election of its candidates who will be

advocates for their core principles. As Dr. Green observes:

‘In order to obtain power a party must win elections; and in

order to win elections, elected officials scramble to claim

credit for good legislative deeds while publicizing the

misdeeds of the opposition party.” Green Expert Report at

[DEV 1-Tab 3].

1.50 The evidence makes clear that the national party

committees are creatures of their elected federal politician

members, who run them and set their priorities. It is clear that

the national party committees are focused on electing their

candidates to federal office, and in the case of the DNC and

RNC are actually subsumed by their respective Presidential

candidates’ campaigns. Given these facts, it is not surprising

that the national party committees use their elected officials

to solicit donations.

Federal Lawmakers Solicit Nonfederal Funds for the

National Party Committees

1.51 It is a common practice for Members of Congress to be

involved in raising both federal and nonfederal dollars for the

national party committees, sometimes at the parties’ request.

The personal involvement of high-ranking Members of

Congress is a major component of raising federal and

nonfederal funds.

Current and former Members of Congress acknowledge

this fact. See, e.g., Rudman Decl. § 12 [DEV 8-Tab 34];

549sa

Bumpers Decl. §§ 7-9 [DEV 6-Tab 10]; Simon* Decl. § 7

[DEV 9-Tab 37] (‘While I was in Congress, the DCCC and

the DSCC would ask Members to make phone calls seeking

contributions to the party. They would assign me a list of

names, people I had not known previously, and I would just

go down the list. I am certain they did this because they found

it more effective to have Members make calls.’); Simpson*

Decl. ¢ 4 [DEV 9- Tab 38]; McCain Decl. 44 2, 21 [DEV 8-

Tab 29] (‘Soft money is often raised directly by federal

candidates and officeholders, and the largest amounts are

often raised by the President, Vice President and Con-

gressional party leaders.’); Feingold Dep. at 91-93 [JDT Vol.

6}; Shays Decl. ¢ 18 [DEV 8-Tab 35] (‘Soft money is raised

directly by federal candidates, officeholders, and national

political party leaders. National party officials often raise

these funds by promising donors access to elected officials.

The national parties and national congressional campaign

committees also request that Members of Congress make the

calls to soft money donors to solicit more funds.’); Meehan

Decl. in RNC 4 6 [DEV 68-Tab 30] (‘Members of Congress

raise money for the national party committees, and I have

been involved in such fund-raising for the Democratic Party.

At the request of the Party Members of Congress go to the

[DCCC] and call prospective donors from lists provided by

the Party to ask them to participate in Party events, such as

DCCC dinners or [DNC] dinners. These lists typically consist

of persons who have contributed to the Democratic Party

in the past.’).

“ Senator Paul Simon served as a United States Senator for Illinois

from 1985 to 1997, and was a Member of the House of Representatives

from 1975 to 1985. Prior to being elected to Congress, Senator Simon

served as Lieutenant Governor of Illinois from 1968 to 1972, and served

in the Illinois House of Representatives from 1954 to 1962 and in the

Illinois State Senate from 1962 to 1966. Simon Decl. 4 1 [DEV 9-Tab 37].

* Senator Alan Simpson served as United States Senator from

Wyoming from 1979 to 1997. Simpson Decl. ¢ 2 [DEV 9-Tab 38].

550sa

Representatives of the House and Senate congressional

campaign committees testify that their committees and their

leadership ask Members of Congress to raise funds in

specified amounts or to devote specified periods of time to

fundraising. Jordan Decl. ¢ 33 [DEV 7-Tab 21]; Vogel Decl.

q§ 32-33 [DEV 9-Tab 41]; McGahn Decl. ¥§ 34-35 [DEV 8-

Tab 30]; Wolfson Decl. § 35 [DEV 9-44] (stating that the

DSCC, NRSC, NRCC, and DCCC ask members of Congress

to raise money for the committees).

Political donors also tes’ify that Members of Congress

solicit nonfederal money. See, e.g., Randlett* Decl. 44 6-9

[DEV 8-Tab 32] (‘I’ve been involved in political fundraising

long enough to remember when soft money had little value to

federal candidates. Ten years ago, a Senator might call a

potential donor and the donor would say something like, ‘I

would love to write you a check; I’m a big fan of yours; but

I’m federally maxed, so I can’t do it. If you like, I could write

a soft money check to your state party.’ And the Senator

might say, ‘Don’t bother. The soft money just doesn’t do me

any good.’ However, in recent election cycles, Members and

national committees have asked soft money donors to write

soft money checks to state and national parties solely in order

to assist federal campaigns. Most soft money donors don’t

ask and don’t care why the money is going to a particular

* Wade Randlett is Chief Executive Officer of Dashboard Technology,

_a World WideWeb technology consulting firm based in San Francisco,

California. Prior to founding Dashboard Technology, Mr. Randlett served

on the management teams of two other software companies. He was the

Democratic political director at the Technology Network, also known as

TechNet, a Palo Alto-based non-profit corporation and political service

organization which he co-founded in 1996. Prior to starting TechNet, he

spent many years as a political fundraiser and general political consultant,

working primarily in the Silicon Valley area of Northern California, but

also throughout California and to some extent in major metropolitan areas

in other parts of the nation. Randlett Decl. ¢ 2 [DEV 8- Tab 32].

55lsa

state party, a party with which they may have no connection.

What matters is that the donor has done what the Mem-

ber asked.’). |

Lobbyists also find that Members of Congress are involved

in fundraising for their political parties. See Rozen*’ Decl.

{ 15 [DEV 8-Tab 33] (‘Even though soft money contributions

often go to political parties, the money is given so that the

contributors can be close to, and recognized by, Members,

Presidents, and Administration officials who have power.

Members, not party staffers or party chairs, raise much of the

large soft money contributions. Party chairs do not have that

much power because the DNC and the RNC by themselves

don’t have power to do anything. So people are not giving to

be close to the party chairs. The Members of Congress and

the President are the heart of the national parties. The elected

officials are the ones who are really raising the money, either

directly or through their agents.’); see also Murray** Dep. in

*” Robert Rozen worked as a lobbyist for various interests at the law

firm Wunder, Diefenderfer, Cannon & Thelen from 1995 until 1997. For

the last six years, he has been a partner in a lobbying firm called

Washington Counsel; now Washington Council Ernst & Young. Mr.

Rozen represents a variety of corporate, trade association, non-profit, and

individual clients before both Congress and the Executive Branch. His

work includes preparing strategic plans, writing lobbying papers,

explaining difficult and’ complex issues to legislative staff, and drafting

proposed legislation. He also organizes fundraisers for federal candidates

and from time-to-time advises clients on their political contributions.

Rozen Decl. ¢ 4 [DEV 8-Tab 33]

* Daniel Murray served as a government relations specialist for Sprint,

GTE and BellSouth Corporations from 1982 until 1995. As Executive

Director of those companies, he assisted them and their PACs in selecting

candidates and political groups for financial support in both federal and

nonfederal funds. During this period he also served on the Democratic

Business Council of the DNC, the Advisory Council of the Democratic

Leadership Council, the 1998 and 1992 DNC Convention Site Selection

Committees, the DSCC Leadership Circle, the DCCC Annual Dinner

Committee, the RSCC Annual Dinner Committee, and steering com-

552sa

Mariani at 41-42 [DEV 79-Tab 58]; Rozen Decl., Ex. A ¥ 7

[DEV 8-Tab 33].

Finally, documentary evidence corroborates this testimony.

ODP0037-00062 [DEV 71-Tab 48] (Letter to NRSC Chair-

man’s Foundation member seeking a renewal contribution

signed by Senator McConnell); ODP0037-00884 [DEV_71-

Tab 48] (letter from Senator McConnell thanking donor for

$5,000 federal and $25,000 nonfederal donation to NRSC’s

issue advocacy campaign); ODP0031-00821 (letter from

contributor to RNC with contribution, stating ‘Congressman

Scott McInnis deserve [sic] most of the recruitment credit’);

ODP0037-00882 (a solicitation letter from Senator McCon-

nell to potential donor at the Microsoft Corporation, ex-

pressing the hope that this person would ‘take a leadership

role with [McConnell] at the NRSC in support of the

Committee’s issue advocacy campaign. The resources we

raise now will allow us to communicate our strategy through

Labor Day. . . . Your immediate commitment to this project

would mean a great deal to the entire Republican Senate and

to me personally.”); ODP0037-01171 to 72 [DEV 71-Tab 48]

(correspondence referencing solicitations by federal office-

holders and candidates); infra Finding § 1.74.3 (Fortune 100

company’s documents stating that Members of Congress had

requested nonfederal donations).

1.52 ‘The parties often ask Members to solicit soft money

from individuals who have maxed out to the Member's

campaign.” Simpson Decl. ¢ 6 [DEV 9-Tab 38]; see also

Meehan Decl. in RNC 4 6 (‘Party leaders also ask a Member

to call his or her own ‘maxed out’ donors—those who have

contributed to that Member the maximum amount of ‘hard

money’ allowed under the [FECA]—in order to request

mittees for many House and Senate campaigrs. Since 1995, he has acted

as a government relations consultant for business and other clients.

Murray Aff. in Mariani 44 3-5 [DEV 79-Tab 59}.

553sa

further donations to the Party including those which are not

restricted by the Act (‘soft money’).’) [DEV 68-Tab 30];

Billings Decl., Ex. A § 12 [DEV 6-Tab 5]; Jordan Decl. 4 20

[DEV 7-Tab 21] (‘When donors have reached their federal

contribution limit, the DSCC frequently encourages them to

make additional donations to the DSCC’s nonfederal

account.’); Wolfson Decl. § 21 (same for DCCC); Vogel

Decl. | 20 (same for NRSC); McGahn Decl. § 21 (same for

NRCC); Sorauf/Krasno Report in Colorado Republican, at

13-14 [DEV 68-Tab 44]; ODPO018- 00620 to 21 [DEV 69-

Tab 48] (federal candidate noting that he ‘recently sent a

letter to [his] maxed out donors suggesting contributions to

the NRCC’); Kirsch*” Decl. ¥ 8 (‘{OJnce a federal candidate

understands that a donor has maxed out, there will often be a

request that the donor make soft money donations to a

national party committee, as has been suggested when I have

been in that situation.’) [DEV 7-Tab 23]; La Raja Cross

Exam. Ex. 3 at 54 [JDT Vol. 15] (*[I]t is common practice for

a candidate to encourage donors to give to the party when

they have ‘maxed’ their federal contributions to his or her

committee’).

1.53 Mr. Vogel, General Counsel of the NRSC, testifies that

‘[s]ometimes, the NRSC urges Republican Senators to con-

tact particular donors because of shared public policy views,

such as outreach efforts to the high-tech community by

Senators with an interest in those issues.” Vogel Decl. § 28

[DEV 9-Tab 41]; see also id. Tab D at NRSC 066-000009

(draft letter from chairmen of the NRSC and NRCC

Technology Committees inviting High Technology CEOs to

the 1998 Republican House-Senate Dinner in response ‘to

your industry’s plea for a voice on the cutting edge issues so

® Steven T. Kirsch is founder and Chief Executive Officer of Propel

Software Corporation. He has donated millions of dollars to the Demo-

cratic Party and to ‘progressive candidates and groups.’ Kirsch Decl.

$¢ 2, 4 [DEV 7-Tab 23].

554sa

important to the future of high technology’ and noting that the

dinner is the ‘most prestigious annual event, and all

Republican members of the U.S. House and Senate will be in

attendance.’) [DEV 9-Tab 41]. The DCCC engages in similar

practices. Wolfson Decl. § 31 [DEV 9-Tab 44] (‘Sometimes,

the DCCC urges Democratic House Members to contact

particular donors because of shared public policy views. For

example, the DCCC has sought and received assistance from

particular Democratic House Members in fundraising from

the labor community, because those Members had a strong

public record of support for labor.”); see also Randlett Decl.

§ 6 [DEV 8-Tab 32] (‘National party committees often feel

they need to raise a certain amount of soft money for a given

election cycle. To reach that overall goal, they may divide up

potential donors by geography, affiliated organization, or

issue interests. The party committees decide which Members

of Congress should contact these potential donors, and these

Members then put in a certain amount of call time at the

national committee soliciting the money. A Member and a

potential donor may be matched because the Member is on a

legislative committee in which the donor has a particular

interest, whether economic or ideological.’).

1.54 Despite the foregoing evidence, the Finance Director of

the RNC states that it is ‘exceedingly rare’ for the RNC to

rely on federal officeholders for personal or telephonic

solicitations of major donors. See B. Shea”’ Decl. ¢ 17 [RNC

Vol. V]. She states that by RNC policy and practice, the RNC

Chairman, Co-Chairwoman, Deputy Chairman, fundraising

staff or members of major donor groups—not federal

officeholders—undertake initial contact and solicitation of

major donors of both federal and nonfederal funds. /d.

Whether or not initial solicitations by federal officials on

behalf of the RNC are rare, the record shows that they

© Beverly Shea is the RNC’s Finance Director. Shea Decl. ¢ 1 [RNC

Vol. V}.

555sa

are made. RNCO178497 (May 10, 1996, letter from RNC

Chairman Haley Barbour to Senators, asking to use their

name for a ‘membership recruitment package,’ which while

‘not directly solcit[ing] funds,’ ‘will serve as a set-up letter

for the membership invitation package that will be mailed

several days after this letter.’). Furthermore, Members of

Congress solicit funds for the RNC from those who have

donated in the past. See, e.g., RNCO266088-91 (handwritten

notes determining which Member of Congress would call

particular potential donors); RNC0O250514-15 (April 1997

solicitation letter from Speaker Gingrich asking donors ‘to

continue [their] support [for] the President’s Club’);

Moreover, it is clear that Ms. Shea does not speak for the

NRSC or the NRCC which clearly use Members to solicit

funds. See, e.g., Findings 1.51.

1.55 Raising nonfederal funds for the political parties can be

in a Member’s interest. For example, the amount of money a

Member of Congress raises for the national political party

committees often affects the amount the committees give to

assist the Member’s campaign. See, e.g., Boren’ Decl. § 4

[DEV 6- Tab 8] (‘[T]he DSCC and other national party

organizations kept records, or ‘tallies’ of how much soft

money a Senator had raised for the party. The DSCC then

gave little [nonfederal] money to the campaigns of those

Senators who had not raised adequate [nonfederal] party

funds. In my view, this practice demonstrates very clearly

that soft money is not used purely for ‘party building’

activities, but that there is at least a working understanding

among the party officials and Senate candidates that the

money will benefit the individual Senators’ campaigns.’); id.

(explaining that because he ‘minimized’ the amount of time

he spent raising soft money for the DNC, he ‘received almost

no money from the Democratic Party for my campaigns.’);

*' Senator David Boren served as a United States Senator from Okla-

homa from 1979-1994. Boren Decl. ¢ 2 [DEV 6-Tab 8]

556sa

Bumpers Decl. § 11 [DEV 6-Tab 10] (‘Members who raise

money for the DSCC expect some of that money to come

directly back to them. Part of this unwritten but not unspoken

rule is that if you do not raise a certain amount of money for

the DSCC, you are not going to get any back. The DSCC

does not give a candidate the maximum allowed unless he or

she has raised at least a certain amount for the DSCC.’); infra

Findings § 1.56.1 (statement of Senator Simpson).

Members also have an interest in a strong party that can

assist its federal officeholders. See, e.g., Bumpers Decl. | 10

[DEV 6-Tab10] (‘When a Member raises money for the

party, there is a sense on the part of the Member that he or

she is helping his or her own campaign by virtue of raising

that money. When Members raise funds for the DNC, it

helps the DNC perform its function of keeping tabs on

statements, policies, and votes of opposition party members

and groups.’). .

Former DNC and DSCC official and current lobbyist

Robert Hickmott™ testifies that even incumbents with safe

In 1980, during President Carter’s re-election campaign, Robert

Hickmott worked at the Democratic National Committee (‘DNC’) as an

Associate Finance Director. Hickmott Decl. ¢ 2 [DEV 6-Tab 19].

Following the general election, Hickmott became the Executive Director

of a new DNC entity, the Democratic Business Council (‘DBC’), where

he served until 1983. /d. During 1985-86, Hickmott served as National

Finance Director for then-Congressman Timothy Wirth’s Senate cam-

paign, and from 1987 until early 1989, on Senator Wirth’s Senate staff. /d.

After that, Hickmott was in private practice as an attorney until January

1991, when he joined the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee

(‘DSCC’) as Deputy Executive Director. /d. In 1993, Hickmott worked

for four years as the Associate Administrator for Congressional Affairs at

the Unites States Environmental Protection Agency, then for two years as

a counselor to then-Secretary Andrew Cuomo at the United States

Department of Housing and Urban Development (‘HUD’). /d. In 1999,

Hickmott left HUD and joined The Smith- Free Group (‘Smith-Free’), a

small governmental affairs firm located in Washington, D.C. /d. { 3.

Hickmott is currently a Senior Vice President at Smith-Free and one of

557sa

seats have incentives to raise money for the parties.

He explains:

Incumbents who were not raising money for

themselves because they were not up for reelection

would sometimes raise money for other Senators, or for

challengers. They would send $20,000 to the DSCC and

ask that this be entered on another candidate’s tally.

They might do this, for example, if they were planning

to run for a leadership position and wanted to obtain

support from the Senators they assisted. This would

personally benefit them, in addition to doing their part to

retain Democratic control of the Senate, which would

preserve the legislative power of all Democratic

Senators.

Hickmott Decl., Ex. A § 18 [DEV 6-Tab 19]; see also id.

{ 13 (attesting that Senators were very concerned about

whether or not donors’ checks were tallied to them); infra

Findings § 1.56.3 (describing the DSCC tallying/credit sys-

tem). Senator McCain attests that

[t]he parties encourage Members of Congress to raise

large amounts of soft money to benefit their own and

others” re-election. At one recent caucus meeting, a

Member of Congress was praised for raising $1.3

million dollars for the party. James Greenwood, a

Republican Congressman from Pennsylvania, recently

told the New York Times that House leaders con-

the six principals in the firm. /d. Hickmott is a regular contributor to

candidates for Congress, for President, and the national party committees,

primarily to Democratic candidates, but also to several Republicans, as

well. /d. In the 1999-2000 cycle, he contributed just over $7,000 and in

the 2001-2002 cycle, he has contributed a little more than $10,000. /d.

Hickmott provided a declaration in Federal Election Commission vy.

Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1197

(D. Colo. 1999), aff'd, 213 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2000), rev'd, 533 U.S.

431 (2001) (‘Colorado II’); See Colorado I, 533 U.S. at 458.

558sa

sider soft money fundraising prowess in assigning

chairmanships and other sought-after jobs. . . . | share

Mr. Greenwood’s concerns.

McCain Decl. § 7 [DEV 8-Tab 29]. Finally, the political

parties’ power over Members of Congress provides additional

incentive to fundraise for the national party committees. As

Dr. Green notes: “The ubiquitous role that parties play in the

lives of federal offic

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Supplemental Appendix — McConnell v. Federal Election Commission · 539 U.S. 938 | Frix