Joint Appendix Vol V — McConnell v. Federal Election Commission
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Appeal Docketed May 15, 2003
Probable Jurisdiction Noted June 5, 2003 6
r No. 02-1674 et al.
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
MITCH MCCONNELL et ai/.,
Appellants,
V.
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION et a/.,
Appellees.
On Appeal From The United States
District Court For The District of Columbia
JOINT APPENDIX
VOLUME V (Pages 1820 to 2145)
FLOYD ABRAMS KENNETH W. STARR
SUSAN BUCKLEY Counsel of Record
BRIAN MARKLEY EDWARD W. WARREN
CAHILL GORDON & KANNON K. SHANMUGAM
REINDEL LLP KIRKLAND & ELLIS
80 Pine Street 655 Fifteenth Street, N.W.
New York, NY 10005 Washington, DC 20005
(212) 701-3000 (202) 879-5000
(additional counsel on inside cover)
August 2003
a oe
WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. — (202) 789-0096 -— WASHINGTON, D. C. 20001
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN
559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305
(650) 725-9875
JAN WITOLD BARAN
THOMAS W. KIRBY
LEE E. GOODMAN
WILEY, REIN & FIELDING LLP
1776 K Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 719-7000
VALLE SIMMS DUTCHER
L. LYNN HOGUE
SOUTHEASTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, INC.
3340 Peachtree Road, N.E.
Suite 3515
Atlanta, GA 30326
(404) 365-8500
G. HUNTER BATES
Frost Brown Todd LLC
400 West Market Street, Suite 3200
Louisville, KY 40202-3363
- ($02) 568-0222
Counsel in No. 02-1674
:
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
VOLUME I
Declarations & Affidavits
i se ntsnsctndens l
ET 9
Ayres, Q. Whitfield - Rebuttal ..0.00000000000 ooo occcccccccccccceeeceeee 17
Te csunecenenousanane 24
EEE 30
Tee ccesmnmracucnmanand 47
LL 56
Tee scessemuunonessovans 68
SSS 73
EL 93
cessation 97
a _.. scenesnsenssnenecnnen 102
Er 114
Bowler, Kathleen — Rebuttal ..00000000..00.00oo ccc ccccccccceceeeeeees 160
Neen etueuscne 169
rat cceesccreinnncansenecsenncecencsccees 172
a snenseutuonnanaces 181
SS SLE 203
“*
RII, TPE <ssesinsscannesctiensnsnansanstnsastnbmnenenpionneenatennisantenten 217
I, Bei vcccicseesestascssosesanionnnsapatabiensinsacenbseninubeesinnsasntd 223
SPU IIIE: IIIT cxsersiinicsininiscsciiisiaitiibaidgseinnsulisiadiieioniditanindiiesidehinimadiaa 261
I, FE FD cccccccscereinecsssncinnsnssiniaeiaunanainianennnians 265
I Co icccnsccsnssncsnicreresnsensiansiieiitiaiaaniidisigaamiaamaaaiid 281
IE, SUE, DIR eciscvticsseseensiinisenaiesisiieiinasiintaddaadatiatuiatan 285
| ye a em Narre mrr eevee TES 289
I TI scnttsctcsermciencninsnscreimiivenmninianis 322
Josten, R. Bruce (pp. 1-3) TS a CTE ENTE NE eT 327
I, TING 0 Piss icciccsensictsesicesccteninnscscinssninnneneniansimminnionta 333
BN, TI Fipreccassenstnssrcomunmsncnomnsennninintinninnciannnitios 334
BEE, CRRIEUS TED. GEIR, GD ncccccccescenssnsnnsenesensnsnsasnecnneeein 348
LaPierre, Wayne (NRA App. 1-26).............:ccccseesseeeeeeeees 364
RT Sarre wee Mare Fe 389
TEA, DID ccccsresensessssctecssemiscnnaseonmennniasnentnenncnnael 401
NE, oe EN ENS NTO Ry 406
EEE Se nEe ETE ees 408
I, BI sccenencerieninsnnrnicennsssnititiiaicissenasinininiinaanmceniaia 412
McQueen, Angus (NRA App. 35-40) ...........ccccceeeeeseeeeeee 416
IETS, CIID scnsevinccensccssintninnintinitenmnianpadoniiaeintianmeail 423
ill
VOLUME II
I 464
TEI Le eee ee ee 582
STE ee ee ES aA 588
Monroe, Edward (pp. 1-3).............cccccccscsssssessesescesceceeceeceee 591
I ae 595
SET, TEI ‘isccesicnliintssitetemcesiniahitaitttndabinimnisioitiaeniiiiaeded 608
8 ee 615
___ ETRE Oe OTIS NST 618
8 SE RN Se nC 620
RTI tatilesinetiahiseessitieetieaitintiai a ee 628
ETT Se eee 662
| TTT eae NTE ET 668
SERRE aoe a ea RNa 678
NN aL NE ee NO 685
IL III cccechcreetiininndiciaepnabdictiiihadinactialeciseanicemeateil 693
SEES tn ce 702
SII ana Wee Oe OE Re 705
ER tr oe REA ne RO 712
NI ichitienidesiidaicibccnethitieeaeiaibnaentnatsic 718
a 723
ST eS on 737
SO MUN iasitesiieaistcaciesahienatihciblig lal 738
iV
7 Vv
I TO ssid ccladiiaemneniadnanaiaad 740
___ SS ee, 857
ey FR ce ccscsscenecmesssersentmmannmermsinencrncemenavian 747 RRA fie 858
Shays, Christopher (NRA App. 101)..........:::sssssssssssssseeee 749 CS a 860
Shea, Beverly poenbonembenesneunassuneansesensaneereiennenoemeenanenesesoneenseds 750 Green Cross-x as 24 iietnielhanletiehilasesiieitebillateit ate al 861
NN 0 hn are oe Ye 173 a ~eeeeennnanonnnnoenseoennntrenansoenaneeessi nop
-< “naan ammemnmne Rete: pe gOS ee Oe RE 864
BRD. FB .nnccerceccveorcseccees ___ SSE Ree 867
ee a ees ee 802 cee. _, SIS N 868
Simon, Paul ........-..--eeseecseceseseseenneen ETT 870
nT a 808 EM 12 serrerrnrnerenennrnecntnntnsen ae
RN scccsvessorninquieteniatnacencanubseemnenmaceiviciantel 813 ST nner snsensens 877
IE siiinreicsnsiescancrsiieniaitiinsishiitiiadensianiagi 817 Hiatt - NOR essessseeseernceensetnsereseetneeeeneeensetn 878
OO ne Sens, 878
; a a ia ea ee 819
Solid, Daniel............. Hickmott - Pe iinistiaimiiesiseiel bei toes 880
Se NEE Re ee 823
Stoltz, Gal ...........eecsseesseeesseee Hilliard - _ TEER nee 890
i dr aaiiieal 829 TG ocssseescvvnnnnnsnnnssssssossssseoeesssessessssseesssssecs 891
_ EEE eae 891
Fe SID wvndccniacastanterneinsscanscesenennemeumnemnimepeniatines 831 il isiiteticnenatcenmtmeterieemantestencaeinstaans 892
__ EE ITERSTn Sonne 893
___ SEES eae nea 894
Depositions
Holman - lg, en 895
_____ EIST ee eee I So 896
Andrews - ae 836 PU Niniiiemsiaiiiaiaiise aii sexea Dad 896
RESET eee 846
a I 846 Huard- ~ SERIE Sala es eee 899
__ onl CES Enea a 901
Feingold - Oi scsenesecemesssnmareseannentamseamenmmanennenit 852
Ear ere ear 853
ES ete ie eee 854 Jeffords - ___ SEE 902
Josten -
LaPierre
Lupia -
Mann Cross-x -
McCain -
McConnell -
McLoughlin -
McQueen -
Meehan -
Oliver -
vi
i ccececincacssccsssenianeescsisnnnnmnnimenniniiia 916
I vcenccccncsccsesssnsnsncstniensanmascesensneasi 918
FFP ccccasnsnntnnnenssesnsntinieiniintanstetndsiiecei 920
Exh. 3 (4G 1-11, 17, 27-33, 47-52,
Sigmature) ..............ccsccsereresssscsorsrsssseese 922
IF sccicttesccnsssassiiubtinessntensibtinennemmmmseiila 926
148-49... ccessesesecscscnsesenenensscnsesnsnsesnenens 927
i cccnccncntnctecccscrecaneintnneiceianinessiitl 928
DE cccctonscnmninccniantacmncnmimasincssoncdiniiin 930
i cinincctitarnnnntiensinnsintiitianesibaitiiameiniedmeniiaiaii 931
DIG cecacttsccenccinncacccncsssnsnesncanencnvemmeatan 933
I cinecncccnsscsnnsscncinnnniisiinsisaneedcenisienaanens 936
Tt viinsnieisaseinctinneniinianhsiidinemnmemnecaieeii 941
I... sisinssiateienenmnnesebenniimniinacnnsnamnsental 942
DI ccnsccnacenicssconcnentnniennessninscesssmaniiitit 943
Bi cccccssnsocsnsniessonssenmnacmnannmsenniniti 944
a ncccscnscicseniasintinadinmaiecnmmenasieaitia 952
VOLUME Ill
BP cceninsncsensnssntescsstiviniiinessnmnmnviinsti 953
» aE 959
LS 960
| ee 971
ae 973
- 974
eee 974
Be BD vneccncccescamncensetesccnssnsemnememensiiiien 975
IF cicsistsiscctursentemnsiiiiiiiinbinnnsmmmmniiuntina 977
Vil
Seltz - TE ne Pe 986
Shapiro Cross-x - 114-17 .o...ccccccccccscscscscscececececeseseeeeeeeees. 987
Shays - ee sa nS EEE, 991
SRR eee a ne AN. 994
NS Te a a 995
RN REA 996
RSENS RRS ae OE ASE aT, 1005
Shields - RT SES eo a Ry 1007
Simpson - Seen iiiiininnincislaiceibciiidieatibbbtbigde iil ae 1010
DO ipidhittiniteide etic 1013
| ee ee ee 1019
PEt are ne Mee one 1022
Snowe - EE es oe Te 1025
SEEPS Reo ear 1026
TET ee ne a 1028
Strother - Ee a ee 1031
A Rech aa aan ene e 1032
RTE ee 1032
RE EES Cree 1037
Strother Cross-x - 38-39 .o..o.o.ccccccccecccsceesecccesee.coceeeeeee., 1038
Thompson - _ Enna eno aE eID 1039
SE ae ee) ae 1040
Williams Cross-x - 21-22 ooo..ccccccccccccescecesccoceceeseeeeeeeeeeee. 1041
ra le a er ee 1042
Expert Reports
Gibson (1 PCS/ ER 1-66) .o.....c.ccccccccccccccescescecseeseeeeeeeceeee 1046
Vill
Gibson Rebuttal (2 PCS/ ER 794-821).........ccesseseeeeees 1115
Gibson Supplemental (2 PCS/ ER 831-37) .....-..:++e++++ 1144
Goldstein ..............cscccccscscesssssccssseceseecseseresssnscenesessnneees 1150
GIOETI ......cccccecscceccscoscsccessccsensscscrncsenscsenessssccossnsnsossnnsooses 1188
Green Rebuttal ...............:cccssccssseeseeeeseeeeneenensenseeeeeennenenes 1235
IBGE .....ceccececeeseccccesscoscsecesersosssscossssoosegeovesoeonssssosossonsnsess 1241
Krasno & Sorauf...........:ccccccssccesssseeessreeesenneennserenenenennaees 1272
VOLUME IV
La Raja ........c.cesssesesssssesseseessnensnenssncesenenenensnnnsneannsnzensesens 1406
La Raja Rebuttal .............s:cccsesesesesesnsnsesnensenensnensnsnensnenens 1459
BIE oonecncoccccesveccvnvecessousssscesssssensnasensovesesosnovsvesesoucsnsenenesesss 1473
Magleby - 1, 5-6, 10, 18-23, 26-33, 35-45... 1476
ee
Mann Declaration ...............sssscssseeseeseesseeeneeensenssenesensennes 1561
Mellman/ Wirthlin - 1, 5-12 .............ccceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeenenes 1563
Milkis..... ss reaesieaianniccinaiannnnmmmmnamrian 1572
Milkis Rebuttal ..................:cccssscscseseeessrneseeeeneneseeneneneneens 1610
GMYAEL.........ssessesscsessessesnessensenennssnsnesnensnnensensnnsnsensansnsnness 1623
Pleadings and Orders
4/24/2002 - Order (Docket #24).........:cccssseeseeereneeeeeeees 1655
ix
4/24/2002 - Order (Docket #25) .........cccccccsccscssecssccsecsees 1659
5/13/2002 - Order (Docket #49) .........cccccccecccscescecseeceee, 1661
6/17/2002 — Responses and Objections of Defendant FEC to
First Interrogatories by the Echols Plaintiffs.................. 1665
6/17/2002 — Response and Objections of the Attorney
General to the Echols’ Plaintiffs’ First Set
RSPR ES REA LEP 1 TE 1675
7/26/2002 - Order (Docket #113)
9/5/2002 — Intervenors’ Responses to Plaintiffs California
Democratic Party and California Republican Party’s First Set
of Requests for Admissions, Interrogatory, and Request for
Production of Documents...............cccccccccessseeceseseeseececeees 1694
9/16/2002 - FEC Response to Requests for Admissions Nos.
i PEE scudicieaudinichinsirenbiaaiaiaiaicdiedsinstac es 1732
9/16/2002 - Intervenors’ Responses to Contention
Interrogatories (Adams Exh. 15)...........cccccccccccsceeceseeeeeee 1736
_ 9/16/2002 — Objections and Responses of Defendant FEC to
the First Requests for Admission by Plaintiff Emily Echols,
SUITE -viscstetessstiadatendecseneniveninbiciasainntetiiniapescatinateatiiniinaaasintain 1752
9/16/2002 — Responses of Defendant United States to
Plaintiffs’ Requests to Admit, Supplemental Interrogatory
and Request to Produce to All Defendants..................... 1775
9/19/2002 - US Response to RNC’s 2 Set of Interrogatories
AE ER REY See re RE RG seccnevenes 1800
10/15/2002 - Order (Docket #175)............cccccccccsseeseeesees 1802
11/15/2002 - Order (Docket #218) .ecccsccsscssscscssssssscsssssse 1807
x
11/26/2002 - Order (Docket #239).......c:cceccererereseesees 1809
§/9/2003 ACLU Motion for Stay ...........:::seeeeseeeresereres 1812
5/9/2003 Declaration of Anthony Romero in Support x! 7
ACLU Motion for Stay.........:cccccccssseeerseereeereeeteesneestenees
VOLUME V
Other Documents
FEC, Twenty Year Report, Ch. 3, p. 4 (April 1995)......1820
Statement of Commissioner B. Smith in FEC MUR 4624
(Nov. 6, 2001) .....cesccesesesesesesesssseseenenenenananenesnenenens 1822
Echols Exhibits 30-39
(FEC Annual Reports 1992 - i ccncssaccscnnenusenss 1868
RNC Exhibit 1 .........0.....ceeccceseessseetseesrseseneennreneneneenennens | oo
RNC Exhibit 232 ............:ccccecsssesseseeseeeeesteeseeneeseersesenennees wt
RNC Exhibit 292 ..........:cccscccssesesseseeeeseeesnseeseseneeneenennens
T. Edsall & D. VonDrehle, Republicans Have Huge Edge in
Campaign Cash, Wash. Post, Feb. 14, FIED cxeresencccessvess 1931
T. Edsall, Liberals Meeting to Set ‘04 Strategy; Labor,
Rights Groups Focus on Getting Out the Vote to Help
Democrats, Wash. Post, May 25, 2003 .........::s+s+ssseseee 1938
H. Meyerson, Union Dos and Don'ts For the —
Wash. Post, May 28, 2003..........sssssesseenennenenresesneenes
BNA, Money & Politics Report (June 24, 2003)........... 1946
NRA Bylaws (NRA App 106)......-.-::0-sssssesesesessesesnenenene 1948
NRA Fundraising Materials (NRA App. 133-36)........-. 1950
x!
Annenberg Center Study - 7 (NRA App. 197), 27-28....1957
Summary of NRA’s Gross Revenues ..........cccccccccccec0.---. 1963
Summary of Returns on NRA Infomercials
PUI WU nticiiahi ie 1964
Summary of Airings of NRA Infomercials from Jan. - Dec.
EARL OI OMS 1965
Summary of “Airings” of California News Magazine (NRA
GU ep icoiiniltatassnhssiivitieistiinpinentpeniatisimsatmiseiianiaaigaiisis 1966
Intervenors’ Comments to FEC re “Electioneering
Communications” - 3, 10-11 (NRA App. 209-10)......... 1967
Storyboards of Political Ads Attacking NRA (NRA App.
PUNT escitaslsdidnidiiihetiiiiieineiibeaiitiadai le atta! 1969
L. de Moraes, Political “Reality”: Viewers to Pick 2004
Candidate, Wash. Post, 9/21/02 (NRA App. 343-45)....1982
Internet Doubles Claim New Survey Fraud Warnings Made,
Internet Bus. News, 7/1/98 (NRA Ee 1987
The Pew Research Center, Jnternet Sapping a Broadcast
News Audience, 6/11/02 (NRA App. 444-45) .......ccccse. 1989
T. Putnam, The G.E. Boycott: A Story NBC Wouldn't Buy,
Extra!, Jan/Feb. 1991 (NRA App. 687-89) .......cccccccsses 1993
C. Lewis, Media Money: How Corporate Spending Blocked
Ad Reform and Other Stores of Influence, Columbia
Journalism Review (NRA App. 697-97) ......cccccccecsssssees 1997
The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, Se/f
Censorship: How Often and Why, Apr. 30, 2000 (NRA App.
So TUTTI Ais inheetesiecsaelcarsiienistseesiieipatinaantase coast 2000
Xi
Transcript of “Brady Bill” (NRA App. 885)..............+ 2005
Transcript of “Crime Bill” (NRA App. 886-88) ............ 2006
Transcript of “California” (NRA App. 892-904) parvanenata 2010
Transcript of President Clinton Appearance on Today Show
CA Fe GB GI acceccccncccconesnntsncecccesncesescnsesenensscengeons 2034
Transcript of “It Can’t Happen Here” ..............:csceeeeee 2046
Transcript of “MMM Prosecution” ............:c:sccessseeeeeees 2070
Transcript of “Tribute” (NRA Age. a; an 2086
Summary of NRA News Magazines ..............ccc00eceeeeeeees 2096
Transcript of “The Truth About Prosecution” (NRA App.
PTD ccsiecicncsnintesctininaiaitncnsinyptacinieseiiacimaneiannemnatnnian 2102
NRA News Magazine Budget Recap. ............::ccssseeeseee 2115
Adams Exh. 6 :Memoranda from Bush Pioneer Thomas R.
Adams, Exh 34: Jim Abrams, Senate Takes Up Rival to
McCain-Feingold Spending Limits,
er EE ee 2121
I Ge ecesesecincnitnsasesinanteenernmnemunannitninimntoentineonnenes 2125
Huard Deposition Exhibit 4..............c:ccccsscessseeseseeeeeeeees 2127
Huard Deposition Exhibit oe aoe
xiii
VOLUME VI
UMENTS UNDER SEAL
Strother Declaration
seaensnssendubnessdesthbebeienseeeeiedescsentennesene 2146
Huard Deposition Exhibits
2
peacseasseseseencesesssessesesetbocoseoncesesenceseseeeseesees 2153
= poliaheaddiibianietiaticidendidieietbtiaeiiiateseemmeesaises 2159
io dtnaietanenentteradesctibdenatincesentntesiemmmiensesees,ans 2166
Mitchell Deposition Exhibits
7 asenentateneanietieeintnietaneistdediniseunsnesmess. 2169
NieAeneiiatiiniiiaddatintinenttiieciitnigatiatateeeeti 2172
9 (pp. AFL 1582-86) oo... eeccccccccece. 2174
Fil svecoriitnhanticetiencnsiensbididsdeiisesienssemasese 2178
/
1820
FEC TWENTY YEAR REPORT
Shortly after the MCFL decision, the National Right to Work
Committee (NRWC) filed a petition asking the FEC to rewrite
its rules to adopt the Court's conclusion that "express
advocacy" is the proper standard for determining when
communications by corporations and labor organizations are
prohibited under §441b. The Commission responded by
publishing an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
seeking comments on how the agency should respond to the
MCFL decision.
The Commission received more than 17,000 comments in
response to the Advance Notice, most of which supported the
NRWC's position on express advocacy. Nevertheless, the
comments, the testimony at public hearings on the subject and
discussions among the Commissioners themselves all revealed
a wide range of views on how broadly or narrowly the
Commission should define express advocacy. Some
encouraged the Commission to limit express advocacy to the
words and phrases spelled out in Buckley, while others--citing
MCFL and Furgatch--favored a broader interpretation.
In the wake of the Austin decision, the Commission published
a second notice inviting comments on express advocacy and
the MCFL exemption. Again, most of the those commenting
supported adoption of a narrow express advocacy standard.
Several also offered suggestions for implementing the MCFL
exemption.
In its attempt to craft regulations, the Commission has
struggled to find an express advocacy definition that is narrow
enough to avoid impinging upon First Amendment rights, but
broad enough to ensure the effectiveness of the federal
election laws. The definition must distinguish express
advocacy from issue advocacy without creating a loophole
that would, in effect, allow corporations, labor unions and
individuals to sidestep the requirements of the election law.
FEC, Twenty Year Report, Ch. 3, p. 4 (April 1995)
1821
1822
In August 1994, the Commission tentatively approved an
express advocacy definition, but has not taken final action on FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION
the rulemaking. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20463
The Commission is also considering proposals to implement
the MCFL exemption allowing certain nonprofit advocacy
groups to make independent expenditures using treasury In the Matter of
funds. In addition, the rulemaking proposals under
consideration would revamp the applicable standards for
corporate and union activities such as the publication of voter
guides and candidate endorsements, in line with the MCFL
decision.
MUR 4624
The Coalition
National Republican
)
)
)
)
)
Soft Money Congressional Committee, et al.
soft money- n. [slang]: funds raised and/or spent
outside the limitations and prohibitions of the FECA.
Sometimes called nonfederal funds, soft money often STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
includes corporate and/or labor treasury funds, and Co
individual contributions in excess of the federal MMISSIONER BRADLEY A. SMITP
limits, which cannot legally be used in connection
with federal elections, but can be used for other I.
pacoateies . I voted in favor of the General Counsel’s Report of
April 20, 2001 recommending that the file be closed.
However, while some commissioners seem to feel this case
indicates that the Commission’s rules regarding coordination
and political committees do not sufficiently restrain political
speech and participation, ' I believe that this case is
illustrative of the need for still further protections for
Americans wishing to participate in the political life of our
Soft money is one of the most difficult issues the Commission
has addressed during the last 20 years. The origins of "soft
money" lie in the United States' federal system of government.
The Constitution grants each state the right to regulate certain
activities within that state. In the area of campaign finance,
each state may establish its own rules for financing the
nonfederal elections held within its borders. As a result,
committees that support both federal and nonfederal nation. In particular, limiting the Commission’s reach in
candidates frequently must adhere to two different sets of cases involving allegations of coordinated public
campaign finance rules--federal and state. (Sometimes, cities communications to communications involving express
and counties create yet a third set of rules governing the
financing of local elections.)
1
See Statement of Reasons of Commissioner Sc
ott E. Thomas and
e | Chairman Danny L. McDonald, (hereinafter “Thomas/McDonald
FEC, Twenty Year Report, Ch. 3, p. 4 (April 1995) Statement”); Statement for the Record of Commissioner Karl J
Sandstrom (hereinafter “Sandstrom Statement”). )
1823
advocacy,” is, in my view, sound interpretation of both the
statute and judicial precedent, and is required by the
Constitution.
[1]
The broad facts and procedure of this case are
substantially as put forth in the Statement of Reasons filed by
Commissioner Thomas and Chairman McDonald.’ In March
of 1997, the Democratic National Committee (“DNC”) filed
a complaint alleging that various Republican Party affiliated
committees, and a large number of business and trade
associations supportive of the general agenda of Republicans
in Congress, had in 1996 committed massive violations of
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended
(“FECA” or “the Act”). This triggered a four-year
investigation of more than 60 committees and organizations
plus several individual respondents. The Commission’s
attorneys took nine depositions, collected thousands of pages
of documents, and interviewed numerous other witnesses,
before this case came to its merciful end.*
? The term “express advocacy” stems from the Supreme Court’s decision
in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). In that case, the court limited the
reach of sections 608(e)( 1) and 434(e) of the FECA to those
communications that “in express terms advocate the election or defeat of
a clearly identified candidate,” id. at 44, then held that a cap on section
608(e)( 1) expenditures, even as narrowed, was unconstitutional. As
examples of express advocacy, the Court offered such terms as “‘vote
for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ ‘cast your ballot for,’ ‘Smith for Congress,’ “vote
against,” ‘defeat,’ ‘reject.”” Buckley at 44, n.52. This limitation on the
reach of regulation has been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court, see
Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479
U.S. 238 (1986) (hereinafter “MCFL”), and countless lower courts, see
infra note 27. The question in this case is whether or not this limitation
applies to communications that are coordinated with the campaign.
3 See Thomas/McDonald Statement at 2-4.
* | joined the Commission on June 26, 2000, at which time the case had
been going on for over three years. Two weeks later, on July 11, 2000, I
joined in a 5-0 Commission vote in favor of an additional round of
1824
Despite the fact that the Commission has now found
no violations in this case, I strongly suspect that the original
complainant, the Democratic National Committee, considers
its complaint to have been a success. The complaint
undoubtedly forced their political opponents to spend
hundreds of thousands, if not millions of dollars in legal fees
and ~ devote countless hours of staff, candidate, and
executive time to responding to discovery and handli
matters. Despite our finding that their ahaa
coordinated and so did not violate the Act, I strongly suspect
a the huge costs imposed by the investigation will
reer rns similar participation by these and other groups in
| . We cannot fault the complainant DNC for pursui
its political goals through the legal tools made alidieer it,
but nor can we on the Commission blind ourselves to the fact
that the substantial majority of the complaints filed with the
Commission are filed by political opponents of those they
name as respondents. These complaints are usually filed as
much to harass, annoy, chill, and dissuade their opponents
from speaking as to vindicate any public interest in
‘discovery. I now recognize tlie error of that vote, for
a below, hae no longer lend my vote to any = oo the
7 ~ cag and groups whose communications do not contain
Pore of the Respondents in this MUR have also expressed their belief
t General Counsel 8 Report of April 20, 2001, while ultimately
Pom that no action be taken against them, unfairly maligns
and insinuates illegal conduct. See Letter of Jan Witold
rye to Commission, June 13, 2001; Letter of Benjamin L. Ginsberg, et
's pecker: ome Counsel Lois G. Lerner, July 5, 2001. I share the
—— of respondents that reports to the Commission ought not
to impugn the activities and motives of respondents when the
evidence does not support continuing with the case or when no violation
is found, and I believe that this type of tone will further discourage
— and groups from participating in political activity in the
1825
preventing “corruption or the appearance of corruption.”
This knowledge makes it particularly important that we be
sensitive to the possibility that
[2]
our interpretations of the Act can, and sometimes do, chill
what is and ought to be constitutionally protected political
speech.
In this case, the Office of General Counsel concluded
that it could not prove that the activities and disbursements of
the respondents were coordinated with candidates and
committees pursuant to the regulations promulgated by the
Commission only last December. See 11 C.F.R. § 100.23.
These coordination rules were themselves a salutary effort to
address problems of vagueness and overbreadth in the
Commission’s prior practices, which lacked any clear
definition of “cooperation, consultation, or concert,” see 2
USS.C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i), and provided inadequate guidance
to groups and individuals as to what activities would be
deemed “coordinated” under the Act. See Federal Election
Commission v. Christian Coalition, 52 F. Supp.2d 45
(D.D.C. 1999); see also Clifton v. Federal Election
Commission, 114 F.3d 1309 (ist Cir. 1997). Groups and
individuals who petition the government, contact their
elected representatives, or perhaps are friends or
acquaintances of representatives or Congressional staffers,
former staffers, or friends and acquaintances of the same,
need guidance on what conduct falls short of coordination
without concluding that the only clear way to avoid liability
° The phrase “corruption or appearance of corruption” comes from
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976), and serves as the constitutionally
valid rationale for regulating political speech in the form of campaign
contributions and expenditures. Although this case involves the DNC
complaining about Republican candidates and organizations and their
allies, it goes without saying that Republicans file charges against
Democrats.
1826
is to refrain from making independent expenditures
. The
conduct standard implemented by the new coordination rule
z a vast improvement over the past practices of the
Commission, providing much-needed guidance t
independent expenditures.’ aa asain
Untortunately, in promulgating 11 C.F.R. § 100.23
the Commission provided scant guidance to groups engaged
in issue advocacy,’ by not addressing the question of whether
a content standard, as well as a conduct standard, would be
” Commissioners Thomas and McDonald, who voted agai j
the regulations, complain that the regulations are sivas er
Thomas/McDonald Statement at 4-14. For reasons I state below I
believe they comply with the Act and that our old practices exceeded the
scope of both the Act and the Constitution. Commissioners Thomas and
McDonald also argue that the Commission has thwarted the will of the
Senate, Thomas/McDonald Statement at 17, by implementing these
regulations in the wake of the Senate’s passage of S.27, the McCain-
Feingold bill. Section 214 of S. 27 would effectively repeal the
coordination rule of 11 C.F.R. 100.23. We are not, of course, entrusted
with implementing the will of the Senate, at least not until such time as
. the House of Representatives manifests the same “will” and the President
has one signed the bill, allowed it to become law without his signature
a pee over-ridden by the necessary two-thirds majority of each
—_ generally, INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). I note that
gh the Senate received the proposed final rule on December 7
2000, it did not “disapprove” the rule by resolution within thirty
a days of its receipt, as it was free to do pursuant to 2 U.S.C.
* As terms of art, “independent expenditures ” express
election or defeat of a candidate. Though not limited 4 aac o are
subject to other provisions of the Act. “Issue advocacy,” on the =
hand, is political discussion that does not contain explicit words of
roar of election or defeat, and so has been protected by the Supreme
— —— regulation. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44, n.52; MCFL, 479
' - at 9. The issue here is whether an issue ad, if coordinated with a
candidate, becomes subject to the Act.
1827
required before coordinated public communications would be
subject to the rule.” This failure is
(3]
ecause as this case demonstrates, the conduct
ert ne does not provide an adequately bright line to
prevent the specter of investigation and litigation from
chilling constitutionally protected speech. When a ~—
decides to make independent political expenditures, he _
himself up to two potential burdens under the Act. The
burden is to report those independent expenditures in or
of $250.00. See 2 U.S.C. § pr tes The — - ” defen
tions that the advocacy was so vw
aude or coordinated with a candidate which, if -
would lead to still greater limits on the person’s politica ,
activity. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(17). Respondents can spen
substantial sums defending themselves against such
allegations, and this possibility will cause many speakers a
~ avoid engaging in what ought to be constitutionally protec
" anation and Justification of the final rule, the Commission
ann pn is “addressing the constitutional concerns — rie
by creating a safeharbor for issue discussion. See ase emi -~
Final Rule on General Public Political Communications Coo a,
Candidates and Party Committees; Independent —— =
Reg. 76138, 76141 (Dec. 7, 2000). This statement is true bu ~” -.
only with respect to 11 CFR section 100.23(d), which makes c ender
candidate’s response to on inquiry sageeting fer pens issu ue
not suffice to establish coordination. /d. Otherwise, the > — any
not provided an adequate safeharbor for issue discussion, ~ i
of yet, determined the content standard necessary for regu = —_
coordinated communications. See id. at 76141 (“The Commissi
adopting any content standard as part of these rules at a een
time.” (emphasis added). The Commission's conscious decis a
address a content standard should not be read as a presumption
Commission has made a final decision against requiring a a
standard, however, for as the Explanation & Justification also “— ,
“the Commission may revisit the issue of a content standard for
coordinated communications when it considers candidate-party
coordination.” 65 Fed Reg. at 76141.
1828
speech. Thus, a bright line test is needed. A content test—
express advocacy—provides such a bright line. If a financier
of general public communications is not willing to defend
against charges that his speech was authorized bya
candidate, or prefers not to disclose the sources of his
funding, see e.g. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958),
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334
(1995), he can simply delete from his message words of
express advocacy and speak on any other topic of his
choosing. If he is investigated nonetheless, he can be assured
that the investigation will be short, non-intrusive, and
inexpensive, merely by demonstrating the absence of express
advocacy in his communications. Absent a content standard,
however, no such immediate defense is available if the
Commission launches an investigation into the alleged
coordination with candidates. Further, such an investigation
is likely to be highly intrusive, as is demonstrated by this
case and another recent high-profile matter eventually
resulting in no finding of a violation, MUR 4291 (American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations). The investigation can include extensive
rifling through the respondents’ files, public revelations of
internal plans and strategies, depositions of group leaders,
and the like. Such allegations and investigations may be
avoided only by completely avoiding all contact with
candidates, because even minimal contact could trigger a
credible allegation. Oddly, the less immediately obvious
evidence there is that the conduct would meet the standard of
11 C.F.R. § 100.23, the more intrusive the investigation is
likely to be, as the Commission searches for evidence of the
veracity of the complaint. The effect of the rule becomes
essentially the same as that of the rule struck down in Clifton;
“it treads heavily upon the right of citizens, individual or
corporate, to confer and discuss public matters with their
legislative representatives or candidates for such office,” and
is therefore, “patently offensive to the First Amendment.”
1829
114 F.3d 1309, 1314 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, §22 US.
1108 (1998).
[4]
With that in mind, I believe that the Act, che .
Constitution, judicial precedent, and sound public —
require us to limit our enforcement to cases in whic
communications, whether or not coordinated with a .
candidate, expressly advocate the election or defeat o
candidates for federal office. Failure to include such a
content standard has and will have a chilling effect on
political participation and speech.
Il.
Institutional competence and prudence requires that
executive agencies charged with enforcing the law, even
more than the courts, ought to adhere to the general eS
of not unnecessarily deciding Constitutional issues. ae a
first analyze our authority under the statute. I believe tha
statute, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, does not ‘
authorize us to regulate issue advocacy, even when suc
advocacy is coordinated with a candidate.
ibutions are
Corporate expenditures and contn
prohibited under section 441b of the Act. The phrase
“contribution or expenditure” in section 441b is defined .
separately in 2 U.S.C. section 441b(b)(2)." Nevertheless, in
1 9 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) provides as follows:
eae cogupemsattincenian...0oter .
‘contribution or expenditure’ shall include any direct or
indirect payment, distribution, loan, advance, mee
or gift of money or any other services, or anything o
value (except a loan of money by a national or State
bank made in accordance with the applicable banking
laws and regulations in the ordinary course of business)
to any candidate, campaign committee, or political
1830
Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for
Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1986)("MCFL”), the United States
Supreme Court looked to the general definitions section of
the Act, 2 U.S.C. section 431, to define the scope of the term
“expenditure” as used in section 44 Ib. See 479 U.S. at 245-
46. The MCFL Court also held that “an expenditure must
constitute ‘express advocacy’ in order to be subject to the
prohibition of44Ib.” Jd. at 249. There is no reason to believe
that section 431, the general definitions section, is not as
applicable in construing the term “contribution” in section
441b as it is in construing the term “expenditure” in 44 1b.
Section 431(8)(B)(vi) states that the term “cont:ibution” does
not include “any payment made or obligation incurred by a
corporation or labor union which, under section 441b(b) of
this title, would not [first] constitute an expenditure by such
corporation or labor organization.” 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(B)(vi).
Because the Court has determined that the term
“expenditure,” as used in section 441b, is limited to
communications containing express advocacy, and because
the Coalition did not engage in express advocacy, the
corporate respondents in this MUR did not make prohibited
“expenditures” under section 441b. They therefore cannot
have made prohibited in-kind “contributions” under section
441b, by way of section 441a(a)(7)(B)(i). Likewise, the
committees involved in this MUR could not have accepted
in-kind corporate contributions from the Coalition in
violation of 2 U.S.C. section 44lb.
[5]
Nor do I believe that non-corporate respondents
violate the Act through coordinated issue advocacy. In
Buckley, the Supreme Court held that the phrase “for the
purpose of influencing’ an election or nomination,”
appearing in the definition of “expenditure” at 2 U.S.C.
party or organization, in connection with any election
to any of the offices referred to in this section. ...
1831
section 431 (9)(A)(i), limited the meaning of “expenditure”
to communications containing express advocacy, at least
when, as in this case, the speaker was not a political
committee. 424 U.S. 1 at 79-80. After the Buckley decision
was handed down, Congress, fully aware of the Court’s
restrictive interpretation of the term “expenditure” in section
431 (9)(A)(i), used the term “expenditure” in amending ~
section 441a(a)(7)(B)(i). Section 441a(a)(7)(B)(i) provides
that “expenditures made by any person in cooperation,
consultation, or concert with ... a candidate ... shall be
considered to be a contribution to such candidate.”
(emphasis added). Congress’s post-Buckley use of the term
“expenditure”—where the statutory definition of the term as
interpreted by the Supreme Court is limited to
communications containing words of express advocacy—
indicates that even coordinated public communications must
contain express advocacy before they can be transformed into
regulable in-kind contributions."
Indeed, Congress has responded to the courts on this
topic before. After Buckley, Congress limited the disclaimer
provisions to apply specifically to express advocacy
communications, 2 U.S.C. § 441d(a), even where those
communications are coordinated with a candidate.'* If
'! Additionally, section 431(8)(A){i) of the Act limits the definition of
“contribution” to any gift, etc. “made ... for the purpose of influencing” a
federal election. 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A){i). This is the same statutory
phrase as is used in the definition of “expenditure,” 2 U.S.C. § 431
(9)(A)(i), and which was construed by the Buckley Court to require a
showing of express advocacy. The Buckley Court referred to 2 U.S.C. §
431(8)(A)(i) arid 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(A)(i) as “parallel provisions.”
Buckley at 77.
2 Soe Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 497, May 11, 1976 (amending 2
U.S.C. § 441d). 2 U.S.C. § 441d(a){(2) provides in pertinent part:
Whenever any person makes an expenditure for the
of financing communications expressly
advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified
candidate ... such communication ... (2) if paid for by
other persons but authorized by a candidate, an
1832
Congress had intended for coordinated issue advocacy
communications to be within the jurisdiction of the FECA, it
surely would have required a disclaimer for such
communications.
Finally, that the Act as current
, y written requires
express advocacy before coordinated public communications
are subject to its terms is evidenced by the fact that, in
pending legislation, the Senate has approved an amendment
to do away with any requirement of e
awa: xpress ad
coordination provisions of the Act.!* ’ er
[6]
. Given that the respondents in this c
in express advocacy, this should have caine the
spring of 1997, without the extensive investigation that
followed. The Commission may only pursue violations of
the FECA. See 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(2). For me this is
adequate to dismiss the case." However, recognizing that
the statute is not a model of clarity in this regard, and in light
of the apparent certainty of other commissioners that the Act
authorized political committee of a candidate. or i
, Or its
an ee — state that the cenumntasion t
or by such other persons and authorized
“ authorized political committee. =
. we ver ne, the Second Circuit had also held that issue advocacy
ae ow oo “A a disclosure provisions of the FECA, United
1972) mittee for Impeachment, 469 U.S. 1135 (2d Cir.
See S. 27, Sec. 214, 107th Congress, Ist i
- 7 SEC. » 107 , Ist Session (commonly kno
lo ey a bill) (amending the Act’s definition m sag
Prenat to include “any coordinated expenditure or other
made by any person in connection with a candidate’s
campaign, regardless of whether the expenditure or disbursement is a
ae se that contains express advocacy.”)
“aa ee also made “reason to believe” findings under section
nce ~ make disclaimers . As section 441d, by its express
a » 0 no applies to “communications expressly advocating election or
eat, this charge could have been easily dismissed as well.
1833
at least allows for regulation of coordinated —_ — I
believe it worthwhile to set forth more fully why it!
wise policy, and constitutionally required, to ro arin
enforcement efforts to communications including exp
advocacy.
Ill. A.
< of the
The starting point for any analysis Oo ;
constitutional and policy issues involved in enforcing the
FECA is the recognition that “{t}he Act’s pene mete and
expenditure limitations operate in an area of mae m ar
fundamental First Amendment activities.” Buckley,
at 14. With that in mind, a key concern of the —. -
Court’s Buckley decision was to prevent the Act ae _
a “chilling” effect on speech pertaining to public —
affairs. See 424 U.S. at 41, n. 47. The Court not .
vague laws may not only ‘trap the innocent by
not providing fair warning’ or foster arbitrary
and discriminatory application but also
operate to inhibit protected expression by
inducing ‘citizens to steer far wider of the
unlawful zone... than if the boundaries of the
forbidden areas were clearly marked.
‘Because First Amendment freedoms need
breathing space to survive, government may
regulate in the area only with narrow
specificity.’
424 US. at 41, n. 48 (citations omitted).
In Buckley, the Supreme Court accepted oe
limits as constitutionally permissible, but oe —
on expenditures as violations of the First Am = *. ao
were three major reasons for providing greater pro atl
expenditures than to contributions. First, the Court =
limits on contributions were a lesser burden on speec
1834
because a contribution, unlike an expenditure for public
communications, did not “communicate the underlying basis
for the support. 424 U.S. at 21. Second, limits on
expenditures “reduce [] the quantity of expression by
restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their
exploration, and the size of the audience reached.” Id. at 19.
Limits on contributions to candidates, on the other hand, do
not necessarily have the effect of materially reducing
political discussion because they “leave the contributor free
to become a member of any political association” and permit
such associations “to aggregate large sums of money to
promote effective advocacy.” Jd. at 22. F inally, limits on
contributions “focus [3] precisely on the problem of...
[7]
corruption....” By contrast, limitations on expenditures raise
the concerns of vagueness that cause “citizens to steer far and
wide of the unlawful zone.” /d. at 41, n. 48.
Thus, in analyzing section 608(e)(1) of the Act, which
provided that “[nJo person may make any expenditure ...
relative to a clearly identified candidate during a calendar
year which ... exceeds $1,000,” the Court held that “the use
of so indefinite a phrase as ‘relative to’ a candidate fails to
clearly mark the boundary between permissible and
impermissible speech.” /d. at 41. It continued:
The constitutional deficiencies [of vagueness]
can be avoided only by reading §608(e)(1) as
limited to communications that include
explicit words of advocacy of election or
defeat of a candidate. ... [F]unds spent to
propagate one’s views on issues without
expressly calling for a candidate’s election or
defeat are thus not covered... [I]n order to
preserve the provision against invalidation on
vagueness grounds, §608(e)(1) must be
1835
construed to apply only to expenditures for
communications that in express terms
advocate the election or defeat of a clearly
identified candidate for federal office.
Buckley at 43-44.
These same concerns arose when the Court .
considered the Act’s disclosure provisions. Once again, the
Court could have regulated issue advocacy, but did not.
Rather, the Court chose again to give the term ‘expenditure
a limiting construction. The Court stated:
[T]he [disclosure] provision raises serious
problems of vagueness, ... [that] may deter
those who seek to exercise protected F irst
Amendment rights. Section 434(e) applies to
‘fe]very person ... who makes contributions or
expenditures.’ ‘Contributions’ and
‘expenditures’ are defined ... in terms of
money or other valuable assets ‘for the
purpose of influencing’ the nomination or —
election of candidates for federal office. It is
the ambiguity of this phrase that poses
constitutional problems.
***
There is no legislative history to guide us in
determining the scope of the critical phrase
‘for the purpose of ... influencing’... Where
the constitutional requirement of definiteness
is at stake, we have the further obligation to
construe the statute, if that can be done
consistent with the legislative purpose, to
avoid the shoals of vagueness.
***
1836
[8]
When we attempt to define ‘expenditure’ ...
we encounter line-drawing problems of the
sort we faced in §608(e)(1). Although the
phrase ‘for the purpose of ... influencing’ an
election or nomination, differs from the
language used in §608(e)(1), it shares the same
potential for‘encompassing both issue
discussion and advocacy of a political result.
Id. at 76-79. (Citations omitted). The Court worried that the
“general requirement that ‘political committees’ and
candidates disclose their expenditures could raise similar
vagueness problems, for ‘political committee’ is defined only
in terms of the amount of annual ‘contributions’ and
‘expenditures,’ and could be interpreted to reach groups
engaged purely in issue discussion.” Jd at 79. However,
because the vagueness problems associated with the term
“politic al committee” had already been largely resolved due
to narr. + readings of the statute by lower courts, it was not
the effe. . upon groups defined as “political committees”
under the Act that particularly concerned the Court.
The Court was more concerned about the effects that
a vague and overbroad law could have upon the otherwise
lawful First Amendment activities of other groups and
individuals.'> The Court, therefore, narrowed the term “for
the purpose of influencing” to save the definition of the terms
“expenditure” and “contribution” from being
unconstitutionally overbroad: “To insure that the reach of
§434(e) is not impermissibly broad, we construe
“expenditure” ... in the same way we construed the terms of
§608(e)— to reach only funds used for communications that
'S See Buckley at 79. Our new coordination regulations deal specifically
with groups and individuals, exempting party committees and authorized
committees. 65 Fed Reg. 76141-76142.
1837
defeat of a clearly
expressly advocate the election or |
saensified candidate.” Jd. at 80. Thus, the Court concluded:
[Section] 434(e) as construed imposes
independent reporting requirements on
individuals and groups only in the following
circumstances: (1) when they make
contributions earmarked for political purposes
or authorized or requested by a candidate --» 10
some person other than a candidate or political
committee, and (2) when they make
expenditures for communications that
expressly advocate the election or defeat of a
clearly identified candidate.
+***
As [constitutionally] narrowed, §434(c), like
§608(e)(1), does not reach all partisan
discussion for it only requires disclosure of
those expenditures that expressly advocatea -
particular election result.
Buckley at 80.
In reviewing the Buckley decision then, we see that
each time the Buckley Court considered the definition of
“expenditure,” it narrowly interpreted the term to avoid
[9]
” f vagueness and
vagueness or overbreadth. ’ Concerns 0 ness and ~
oma were foremost in the Buckley Court’s thinking in
— ; ;, nd. 65
as also Federal Election Commission v. Survival Education F und,
23608. 294-95 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that the phrase nse
earmarked for political purposes” must, for reasons of oe =
limited to contributions earmarked for communications t expressly
advocate the election or defeat of candidates for office).
1838
interpreting all aspects of the FECA. Most importantly, it
found that the qualifying phrase “for the purpose of
influencing,” which is also part of the Act’s definition of
“contribution,” 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A)(i), could be saved from
vagueness problems only by construing it as applying to
“words that in express terms advocate ... election or defeat.”
The Buckley Court referenced coordinated
communications only in passing. In arguing Buckley, the
parties defending the Act contended that its limitation on
independent expenditures was necessary to prevent would-be
contributors from avoiding the contribution limitations of the
Act by paying directly for media advertisements or other
portions of the candidate’s campaign activities. The Court
addressed this concern with a brief statement that “controlled
or coordinated expenditures are treated as contributions
rather than expenditures under the Act” under Section
608(c)(2)(B), id. at 46 (emphasis added), noting that
““§$608(e)(1) does not apply to expenditures ‘on behalf of a
candidate’ within the meaning of §608(c)(2)(B). The latter
subsection provides that expenditures ‘authorized or
requested by the candidate’ ... are to be treated as
expenditures of the candidate and contributions by the person
making the expenditure.” /d. at 46, n.53.
What the Court did not specifically address is whether
it intended the same limiting construction of the term
“expenditure” it had applied to sections 608(e)(1) and 434(e)
to apply to section 608(c)(2)(B). Clearly the Court did not
intend for independent issue advocacy to be regulated, but
one might argue that in holding that authorized or requested
“expenditures” are “contributions” under the Act, the Court
meant to include coordinated issue advocacy. However, the
Buckley Court’s example of a coordinated “expenditure” that
would be treated as 2 contribution, itself taken from the
legislative history of the Act, is an express advocacy ad.
1839
[A] person might purchase billboard :
advertisements endorsing a candidate... (1)
the advertisement was placed in cooperation
with the candidate’s campaign organization,
then the amount would constitute a gift by the
supporter and an expenditure by the
candidate—just as if there had been a direct
contribution enabling the candidate to place
the advertisement himself.
Buckley at 46, n. 53 (emphasis added). Nothing — that
the Court did not intend to extend to section 608(c) the ”
narrow definition of “expenditure” it had given the term a
section 608(e). Of course, it is possible that the Court ne
considered that a candidate would request or authorize a
“media advertisements” that did not expressly ——e “dl
election or defeat of one candidate or another. After all,
legal distinction between
[10]
express ads and issue ads did not exist before Buckley, 8) ;
there would have been no reason for a campaign to ag
an ad that did not expressly advocate election or defeat. bem ,
the most probable interpretations of Buckley are that ~ y
limited the term “expenditure” in section er / Oo
disbursements for express advocacy, or simply did no
address the issue. That the Court intended to find ‘a
coordinated issue ads to be covered by the Act seems the
least probable interpretation.
uestion we face is whether, in light of
ouaain : orem the holdings in Buckley and its —.
the Constitutional concerns raised by the Supreme Co :
lower courts, and our position as officials of the = oe :
branch who have independently taken an oath to upho
1840
Constitution,'’ we can or should interpret the Act as reaching
coordinated spending for issue advocacy communications.
In considering the question, I note first that each of
the Constitutional concerns raised by the Buckley Court as
reasons for providing greater protection to expenditures than
to contributions is present in the context of coordinated issue
advocacy disbursements. First, the coordinated issue
advocacy disbursements do more than merely “serve as a
general expression of support;” they do in fact “communicate
the underlying basis for the support.” See Buckley, 424 U.S.
at 21. Second, restrictions on coordinated issue advocacy
spending are, as a practical matter, likely to lead to a
“reduc[tion] in the quantity of expression by restricting the
number of issues discussed.” See id. at 19. Arguably, of
course, these groups might simply run their ads
independently, so that no such speech reduction would result.
As we know, however, groups regularly work with members
of Congress to promote shared agendas. As the Buckley
Court recognized, “[d]iscussions of those issues, and as well
more positive efforts to influence public opinion on them,
tend naturally and inexorably to exert some influence on
voting at elections.” Jd. at 43,n. 50. If the Act applies to
coordinated issue advocacy, many groups will be unable both
to work with elected representatives and to run ads
attempting to influence public opinion on issues of mutual
interest. In short, the groups will be asked to surrender either
their rights of free speech and association or their rights of
speech and to petition for redress. As already noted, the
threat of investigation is itself often sufficient to chill speech.
It is exactly our job, as the administrative agency with
” Unlike some of my colleagues, I do not interpret that oath to mean that
we can fulfill our constitutional obligations simply by ignoring
constitutional considerations until and unless we are bound by judicial
tuling. Rather, as representatives of a co-equal branch of government,
our obligation requires us to consider the constitutional implications of
our actions even when we have not been b6und by judicial decisions.
1841
ise | ize the practical
expertise in enforcing the Act, to recognize
- of differing interpretations of the Act and to set policy
accordingly.
Most importantly, efforts to regulate coordinated
issue advocacy raise exactly the vagueness concems at the
heart of Buckley. For example, if Common Cause, having
coordinated its legislative efforts with Senator McCain, were
to also run advertisements in support of its agenda that — aa
mentioned the Senator, whether or not their ads would violate
the Act would depend upon whether or not the Commission
believed that they
(11)
i : lection.” This is the
were “for the purpose of influenc"ag an ¢€
exact standard that the Supreme Court found, without more,
to be unacceptably vague even in terms of the less
burdensome disclosure provisions of the Act.
Because of the resulting vagueness, see Buckley, 424
US. at 41, n. 48, we can anticipate that groups will, in the
future, “steer far wider of the unlawful zone’... than if 3
boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked. e
present case illustrates that only too well. ‘The oo
costs, imposition, and length of the investigation that has
occurred in this case suggests that at least some of the more
than 60 respondents involved, and who knows how wes
other groups and individuals that have witnessed the d acle,
will “steer far wide” rather than risk a lengthy agg “ao
even if that investigation does ultimately lead to a finding o
“no probable cause.”"
At one time, a majority of the Commission seems to
have recognized this vagueness problem. On June 24, 1999,
rey a
os ne at this Commission is well aware of a favorite saying of th
Pho campaign finance law bar: “The process is the punishment.
1842
Commissioners Wold, Mason, and Sandstrom, joined by then
Commissioner Elliott,'” issued a statement of reasons
rejecting the enforcement of coordination cases under a
vague, “electioneering message” content standard.”” The
Commission majority at that time correctly concluded that
the vague “electioneering message” standard offered no
guideposts for free discussion, even in cases where such
discussion was coordinated or presumably coordinated with a
candidate, writing:
The vagueness and overbreadth problems of
the “electioneering message” and “relative to”
standards are thus two sides of the same
counterfeit coin. They are vague because it is
not clear when they encompass issue
discussion and not candidate advocacy. They
are overbroad because, given the nature of
campaigning, they will inevitably encompass
both. For the same substantive reasons that
the Supreme Court held the “relative to”
standard in the FECA to be unconstitutional,
the Commission may not employ the
“electioneering message” standard. Even in
the context of coordinated, or presumably
coordinated, communications in which the
“electioneering message” test has generally
been proposed (see 11 C.F.R.
§114.49c)(5)(ii)c)(5)(11)(B)(E) (regulation of
voter guides)), the Commission may not
ignore these constitutional requirements.
'? | did not join the Commission until June of 2000.
° This appears to have been the standard used by the Commission in
deciding whether or not coordinated issue advocacy was subject to the
Act prior to adoption of 11 CFR § 100.23. See Advisory Opinion 1985-
14 [1976—1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Elec. Camp. Fin. Guide (CCH), §
5819 at 11185.
1843
Statement of Reasons of Vice Chairman Darryl R. ee
Commissioners Lee Ann Elliott, David M. Mason, an
J. Sandstrom on the Audits of “Dole for President |
Committee, Inc.” (Primary), “Clinton/Gore 96 Primary
Committee, Inc.,” “Dole/Kemp 96, inc. (General), .
Dole/Kemp ‘96 Compliance Committee, Inc. (General),
[12]
“Clinton/Gore ‘96 General Election Legal and Compliance
Fund” at 6, (June 24, 1999) (emphasis added).
rtly thereafter, the Federal District Court for the
OB too decided Federal Election ———"
v. Christian Coalition, 52 F. Supp.2d 45 (D. 7
That decision held that corporate expenditures | or
coordinated issue ads were subject to the contribution ™
prohibitions of 2 U.S.C. section 441b.~° Id. nea oun . .
single district court decision seems to have agence Oo
re-evaluation of the Commission’s previously expr
appreciation for and insistence upon definite conten
standards, I will address this decision and related precedent at
some length.”
In MCFL the Supreme Court had held that issue
advocacy by corporations and unions does not constitute an
2! In doing so the district court failed to address the ne mg t ; jog
431(8)(B)(vi) in light of the Supreme Court's holding in ,
21 wnt ri the Christian Coalition case was a factor in this change
as all three Commissioners still on the Commission ge a on
the need for clear content standards after that opinion. ol
possibility is that these commissioners believe that ——e oa
overbreadth can be cured by a content standard see a ne
“electioneering message” standard they specifically = oe
express advocacy test they have so far not adopted, gh
such standard has been proposed.
1844
“expenditure” pursuant to the Act. 479 U.S. at 249. Thus,
corporate and union communications lacking express
advocacy are not only not “independent expenditures””?
under Section 44lb—they are not “expenditures” at all.
Nevertheless, the Christian Coalition court concluded that
whether or not corporate or union activity is prohibited or
protected turns upon whether the activity is “in connection
with an election,” and not whether the activity is an
“expenditure,” under the Act because, “(t]he real issue ... is
whether an expenditure is ‘authorized’ by a campaign or
‘coordinated’ with the campaign.” 52 F. Supp.2d at 87-88.
The Christian Coalition court went on to argue that “Buckley,
in its treatment of coordinated expenditures as in-kind
contributions, left undiscussed the First Amendment
concerns that arise with respect to ‘expressive coordinated
expenditures.’ ... It can only be surmised that the Buckley
majority purposely left this issue for another case.”24 52 F.
Supp.2d at 85.
[13]
” The district court stated that “corporations and unions can make
independent expenditures that are related to a federal election campaign
so long as those expenditures are not for communications that advocate
the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.” Christian
Coalition at 48 (emphasis in the original). Because the term
“independent expenditure” is defined within the FECA as requiring
express advocacy, see 2 U.S.C. § 431(17), and section 44 1b prevents
corporations and unions from making any FECA “expenditures” we
know that the district court meant “issue advocacy” by its use of the term
“independent expenditures” in the above sentence.
** The Buckley Court allowed contributions to be carved from First
Amendment protection largely because contribution limits “involve []
little direct restraint on [one’s] political communication [and] does not in
any way infringe on the contributor’s freedom to discuss candidates and
issues.” Buckley at 21. Investigating issue advocates on the theory that
their communications may be coordinated with a candidate is a direct
restraint on a speaker's freedom to discuss candidates and issues.
1845
In addressing the issue, the Christian Coalition court
next recognized a need to differentiate between
“expenditures on non-communicative materials, such as
hamburgers or travel expenses for campaign staff,” which,
like direct contributions to the candidate, do not
communicate the underlying basis of support, and
expenditures “in which the spender is responsible for a
substantial portion of the speech.” Jd. at 85, n. 45. The
latter, which the court termed “expressive coordinated
expenditures,” are speech-laden or communicative, and
therefore different from other non-communicative in-kind
contributions. /d. Ultimately, however, the court concluded
that coordinated issue advocacy could be regulated, believing
that it is the “fact of coordination” that is significant, not the
character of the underlying item that is coordinated. The
court seemed to conclude that the lesson of Buckley is that it
is the independence of the speech, rather than its
communicative value, that determines its level of
constitutional protection. In other words, the court focused
only on the corruption side of the coin, but not on the First
Amendment side. Thus, the court found that independent
speech is deserving of clear content standards, but where
independence fades—or at least a complainant alleges it has
faded—speech may be extensively investigated regardless of
‘ts content and without regard for whether that speech
constitutes speech of the spender. See id at 87, n. 50.
The district judge in Christian Coalition reasoned that
Buckley specifically read an express advocacy standard only
into the statutory provisions regarding independent
expenditures ‘relative to’ a clearly identified candidate and
‘for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal
office.’ 52 F. Supp.2d at 87, n.50. Therefore, the court
concluded, for all other parts of the FECA, the Buckley Court
must have “used the term ‘expenditure’ advisedly, leaving
intact the normal, broad meaning Congress had given it.” Jd.
But what “normal, broad meaning” had Congress given the
1846
td expenditure”? Webster’s Dictionary defines
be as ‘the act of expending; a spending or usin
” oO money, time, etc.; disbursement.” Webster’s New ;
eee Century Dictionary of the English Language, p
: - rn > 1977. Clearly the Act did not intend, nor would
nstitutional to prohibit all expenditures or
re by a person in excess of $1000, at least not in
aa aco ed meaning of the terms. Thus Congress
Siaeieneien ae of both the terms “expenditure” and
aauae oO, [a]nything of value ... for the purpose of
my poy 4 oe np Federal office.” 2 U.S.C. §§ 431
1) (emphasis added). Th
crane ae phrase “for a re 7
ill insufficient
meng of vagueness and overbreadth? par aaa
pr only express advocacy. 424 U.S. at 79. If, as the ;
rs rer Coalition court maintained, the Buckley Court
po nh oO phrase only with regard to independent
a ped — phrase must still be imbued with
por ney an meaning before deciding which
ye am isoursements are regulable “expenditures,” and
erefore “contributions” subject to the Act.
[14]
= When a group engages in public discussion
— issues and coordinates its activity with a his
committee, the critical phrase that turns the speech int
prohibited or limited activity is that it is speech “for rn :
— of influencing an election.” The court in Christian
Sichquilalp@duteganatietase
saphena ee
express advocacy in the context of ioadialiicnentinen
25
There is no legislative history to gui
ef guide [the courts] in determining
sc ‘
ope of the critical phrase ‘for the purpose of influencing,” cane
77, yet “[i}t is the ambigui i
olen te iguity of this phrase that poses constitutional
1847
it must have decided that groups that are alleged to have
engaged in coordinated speaking are not faced with the same
concerns of vagueness and overbreadth. In fact, the Supreme
Court has simply never specifically answered the question.”°
There is no normal, accepted meaning of the phrase,
“for the purpose of influencing,” and Congress has not
provided one. An “unconstitutionally overbroad statute may
not be enforced at all until an acceptable construction has
been obtained.” McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 259
(1971), reh'g denied, 406 U.S. 978 (1972). Either the
Commission or the courts must give the phrase “for the
purpose of influencing” some prospective, content-based
meaning.”
2° See ante at 13.
27 tn the context of FECA, the courts have consistently used an “express
advocacy” test to give meaning to the Act’s vague or overly broad
provisions. See e.g. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Massachusetts
Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1986); Maine Right to Life v. FEC, 98
F.3d 1 (1" Cir. 1996), cert. denied 118 S. Ct. 52 (1997); FEC v. Christian
Action Network, Inc., 92 F.3d 1178 (4" Cir. 1996) (summarily affirming
894 F. Supp. 947 (W.D. Va. 1995)); Faucher v. FEC, 928 F.2d 468 (1*
Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 820 (1991); FEC v. Central Long Island Tax
Reform Immediately Comm., 616 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc);
- Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 839 F. Supp. 1448 (D.
Co.), rev ‘d on other grounds, 59F.3d 1015 (1061 Cir. 1995), vacated on
other grounds, 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996); Right to Life of Michigan v.
Miller, 23 F. Supp.2d 766 (W.D. Mich. 1998); FEC v. National Org. for
Women, 713 F. Supp. 428 (D. D.C. 1989); FEC v. American Fed'n of
State, County & Mun. Employees, 471 F. Supp. 315(D. D.C. 1979). See
also FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 US.
480, 497 (1985) (holding that the First Amendment prohibits limits on
independent expenditures that expressly advocate the election or defeat of
a candidate, and noting in dicta “[tJhe fact that candidates and elected
officials may alter or reaffirm their own positions on issues in response to
political messages ... can hardly be called corruption, for one of the
essential features of democracy is the presentation to the electorate of
varying points of view.”); Clifton v. FEC, 114 F.3d 1309 (1* Cir. 1997)
(holding that the Commission’s efforts to regulate “issue advocacy” as
“contributions” exceeded its powers under the FECA, and stating, “we do
1848
IV.
The approach to coordinated expenditures ad
+ sarge Thomas and McDonald would cari “4
C ommission from any need to clearly define which speech is
for the purpose of influencing” elections until after an
extensive investigation. They would have this determination
made by the Commission on a case-by-case basis after an
investigation which would be, in effect, a search for evidence
of the respondent’s true intent based upon a totality of the
circumstances. These Commissioners believe a complete
oe in this case, for example, could have shown that
e “the Coalition’s communications were undertaken for the
purpose of influencing federal elections” because the
Coalition “aired ads in the weeks before the election;”
“d
[15]
direct mail ten days before the election:” and ‘ it”
for the reelection of many members Bosca =
Thomas/McDonald Statement, at 12, n. 6, (internal citations
omitted). Additionally, they would find that “(there is no
indication that the Coalition was formed for any purpose
other than building ne public support for certain candidates
[and] nothing suggesting that the Coalition engaged in
issue discussion outside the context of elections.” -
Thomas/McDonald Statement at 15. The capstone for the
Commissioners is a quote from the Coalition itself: “Our
ultimate objective is to return a pro-business, fiscally
Tesponsible majority for the 105" Congress.”
not take Congress ’
interests.”) to have authorized rules that sacrifice First Amendment
1849
Thomas/McDonald Statement at 16 (emphasis omitted),
quoting The Washington Post, August 8, 1996.”
These criteria offer no prospective guidance and
contribute little if anything to overcoming the vagueness
problem. Because, as the Supreme Court noted in Buckley,
“campaigns themselves generate issues of public interest,”
424 US. at 42, and because public interest in issues is often
highest close to an election, the logical time to engage in
28 Commissioners Thomas and McDonald also cite these facts for the
proposition that the Coalition was a “political committee” that must
register under 2 U.S.C. § 433 and report its activity under 2 U.S.C. § 434.
Thomas/McDonald Statement at 15-17. The Act defines “political
committee” as “any ... association ... of persons which receives
contributions ... or makes expenditures aggregating in excess of $1 ,000
during a calendar year.” 2 U.S.C. § 431(4)(A) (emphasis added). The
Buckley Court cautioned that the broad statutory definition of ‘political
committee,’ which turns on the terms contribution and expenditure and
on the phrase “for the purpose of influencing any election” had the
potential for encompassing “both issue discussion and advocacy or a
political result” and thus might encroach upon First Amendment
freedoms. Buckley at 79. Therefore, to fulfill the purposes of the Act, the
term political committee. “need only encompass organizations that are
under the control of a candidate or the major purpose of which is the
nomination or election of a candidate.” /d. While an organization’s
purpose may be evidenced by its public statements of its purpose, see
MCEL at 262, such an inquiry is secondary to the requisite of finding
“expenditures” or “contributions” in excess of $1,000. So “[e]ven if the
organization’s major purpose is the election of a federal candidate or
candidates [, as Commissioners Thomas and McDonald insist the
evidence would conclude,] the organization does not become a “political
committee” unless or until it makes expenditures in cash or in kind.” See
Machinists at 392. The argument that “major purpose” alone is enough to
make a group a “political committee” or make disbursements into
“expenditures” as defined by the Act was specifically rejected in F ederal
Election Commission v. GOPAC, 917 F. Supp. 851, 861-62 (1996)(“As a
matter of law, the Commission ... failed to demonstrate that GOPAC
became a political committee within the meaning of the Act by spending
or receiving $1,000 or more and engaging in ‘partisan politics’ and
‘electioneering.”” (ermphasis added).
1850
issue advocacy is close to an election.?’ Simi
will ultimately hope that if politicians do me mn a
positions on issues, the voters will turn against them. Surel
eo re regulate issue ads simply because they will 4
je: See ee think are important. That does
€ purpose of i ing”
me election as the meaning of oe wrest
~ aie to oo vagueness problems in the context of
a fon oy itures. See Federal Election Commission
cs 17 F. Supp. 851 (D. D.C.) (1996). Thus the
type of criteria on which Commissioners Thomas and
McDonald would rely fails, even after the a
[16]
fact, to provide any meani 1 distincti
* sbi ingful distinctions th
chill constitutionally protected amb. ee
PE important, “[nJo matter what facts [the
—— ssion] finds through [an} investigation, the requisite
ete i a ~ investigation itself must stand or fall on
re claim....” Federal Electio Sst
ey Non-Partisan Political rhe prepepnpo ‘
3 Oc Cir. 1981) (hereinafter “Machinists”). In
: Sn Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of
i rr i to determine whether to enforce a Commission
oe ray a’ draft committee where it was unclear
eae vag vg taro authority to regulate
. Id. The Co
compelling interests the ameiuetnmnsancte ro na
information, can be compelling and granted effect if the sg
urthermore, ngress is often still in session within, for exa
= pri eee and engaged in more than the usual cedueeliee
porn —— to wrap up the session. See Bradley A. Smith,
_ Pa ealities. The Constitutional Prohibition on a Soft
ey Ban, 24 J. Legis. 179, 192 n. 85 (1998); See also Mills v
Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966)strikin ani
advocacy close to an cae 8 down a limited ban on express
1851
Commission first has authority to regulate a particular type of
speech or activity. Jd. But the Court held that “the highly
sensitive character of the information sought simply makes it
all the more important that the court be convinced that
jurisdiction exists.” Jd at 389.
In the current MUR, the purely legal claim is that
coordinated issue advocacy is “for the purpose of influencing
elections” and so subject to regulation under the FECA. In
deciding the question of Commission jurisdiction, the
Machinists Court warns us that “[{iJn this delicate first
amendment area, there is no imperative to stretch the
statutory language, or read into it oblique references of
Congressional intent....” Rather, “falchieving a reasonable,
constitutionally sound conclusion in this case requires just
the opposite. ‘It is our duty in the interpretation of federal
statutes to reach a conclusion which will avoid serious doubt
of their constitutionality.”” Jd at 394, quoting Richmond v.
United States, 275 U.S. 331 (1928).
Certainly we, as Commissioners, should equally
avoid interpretations of the statute that raise constitutional
questions, at least absent a clear expression of intent from
Congress. We are obliged to be certain we are acting within
the confines of the FECA and the Constitution. We cannot
use ambiguities to expand our regulatory authority. Even if
Commissioners do not believe that the Buckley Court limited
the phrase “for the purpose of influencing” to express
advocacy when applied to coordinated communications, they
must concede that our guidance in this area is at a minimum.
To avoid serious constitutional concerns, we should adopt an
objective, bright line express advocacy standard as a
predicate to investigating allegedly coordinated issue
discussion.
Indeed, the D.C. Circuit has also admonished this
agency to use clear, bright line standards, not only to address
constitutional concerns, but for more mundane, practical
1852
reasons as well. In Orloski v. F.E.C., 795 F.2d 156. 165
(D.C. Cir. 1986), the Court of Appeals wrote that,
[a]dministrative exigencies mandate that the F EC adopt
objective, bright-line test for distinguishing between ten
permissible and impermissible corporate donations.”
Certainly this would apply to permissible and impermissibl
non-conperate donations as well. The Orloski court went =
or that, an objective test is required to coordinate the
iabilities of donors and donees. The bright-line test also is
necessary to enable donees and donors t
O easil
their conduct to the law and to a
[17]
= pm ao to take the rapid, decisive enforcement action
re or in the highly-charged political arena.” Jd.
oe ese concerns apply in the context of coordinated
nt ocacy—as the naming of over 60 respondents and
e ength of the investigation in this MUR show, without
objective content standard neither donees nor donors can 4
easily conform their conduct to the law,” and the FEC
cannot take “rapid, decisive enforcement action.” And. of
course, Orloski also warned of the need for a bright line to
avoid a chilling effect on protected speech: “A subjective test
based upon the totality of the circumstances [such as that
favored by Commissioners Thomas and McDonald in this
MUR] would inevitably curtail permissible conduct.” /d.
“[A subjective test] would also unduly burden
the FEC with requests for advisory opinions ..
and with complaints by disgruntled opponents
who could take advantage of a totality of the
circumstances test to harass the sponsoring
candidate and his supporters. It would further
1853
burden the agency by forcing it to direct its
limited resources toward conducting a full-
scale, detailed inquiry into almost every
complaint, even those involving the most
mundane allegations. It would also
considerably delay enforcement action.
Rarely could the FEC dismiss a — ™
without soliciting a response because the
would need to know all the facts bearing on
motive before making its “reason to believe
determination.
i d in particular the
at 165. These considerations, and in
nities effect on speech of this uncertainty, argue oo
ress advocacy test over the vague, post hoc,
objective, exp ve
dinates test favored by Commissioners Thomas and
McDonald.
issioner Sandstrom, in his turn, voices a
enor and overbreadth, but — eo oa _
“express advocacy test is a subjective, content- “4
about which reasonable minds can on occasion oa a
different results,” and for that reason, ought to a ne
“only where more objective criteria are ae ae
Sandstrom Statement at 6. et ern ime
the objective criteria s
oro for their effect on voters’ nes —
Based on this, he voted against the General a.
recommendation to take no further action in ts ’
First, Commissioner Sandstrom errs nenes -
the express advocacy test is subjective. A subjective -
depends on the mental impression of _—" — ccnemeeed an
icati ade. objec
time his communications were m
i h as whether or not a
‘independently verifiable facts, suc
porns rw contains express words of advocacy a :
election or defeat. While it is true that the inexactness
1854
language means that reasonable minds can sometimes reach
differing results on whether or not certain words are express
[18]
words of advocacy of election or defeat,*° in the
overwhelming majority of cases the express advocacy
standard is very easy to apply. The occasional disagreement
does not mean that the express advocacy test is “subjective,”
that it fails to provide notice to the regulated community, or
that it fails to provide courts a standard of reviewing the
actions of legislatures, regulatory commissions, prosecutors,
and inferior courts. By an “objective” test, it is not meant
that every adjudicator will reach the same result in every
case, but rather that the test will not rely on the subjective
motives of the speaker. Commissioner Sandstrom’s
proposed objective criteria — whether or not the ad was
tested for effect on voter candidate preferences — is, like the
express advocacy test, objective in that it does not rely on
intent, but is, like the express advocacy test, subject to
disagreement as to whether it has been met.”
More important, Commissioner Sandstrom’s
proposed standard provides no guidance to a group that had
not so tested its ads. That is, the presence of such testing
might quickly allow the Commission to find a purpose to
influence a federal election, but its absence would not allow
* See e.g. Federal Election Commission v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857 (9*
Cir. 1987), cert den. 484 U.S. 850 (1987); MUR 4922 (Suburban O’Hare
Commission).
*' For example, my standard for determining what constitutes “test[ing]
an ad’s influence on voters’ choice of federal candidate” may differ from
Commissioner Sandstrom’s. Does it include, for example, asking
generically whether a voter would be more or less inclined to favor a
candidate who takes particular positions? Or asking not if the ad would
affect one’s vote or even preference, but merely the respondent’s opinion
of the individual in question? Or suppose that the ads are tested for
voters using candidates in a Senate race, but then run in a House race? I
am sure-many more variations are available.
1855
ndent to quickly demonstrate no such purpose. (I do
a think that Sonnateclanee Sandstrom means to propose
that o: ’y issue ads that are tested for effect on voters a
candidate preferences would be subject to —,
would the Commission be expected to routinely accept a
respondent’s denial of such testing without an investigation.
Respondents would therefore continue to be subject a :
extensive investigations on the basis of allegations filed by
their political adversaries. Thus, the chilling effects on
speech, not to mention the other problems outlined in a
Orloski, would still be present. Furthermore, groups engag
in issue advocacy in the ultimate hope of changing mins
government policy. One way to assure that issue 4
effective is to test them on voters to see if they are i ely to
encourage voters to put the desired pressure on ene
and candidates to adopt the favored positions. The - ; -
engage in political issues discussion would lose much of 1
meaning if groups and individuals were limited to -
communications that were not effective in mobilizing voters.
The express advocacy test is an instrument of law :
designed to further constitutional aims by limiting amen a
legislatures and regulatory bodies that would chill protec
political speech through their overbreadth and vagueness. a
The existence of express advocacy isa threshold requirem
for regulating the communicative expenditures of a -
corporations, groups or individuals. No matter the -
dissatisfaction with the results the test yields, we are no
permitted, nor would it be wise, to jettison the express 7
advocacy test simply because we might believe in any gi
case that “more objective criteria” are available.
i i i is in the statute or judicial
22 It goes without saying that there is no basis in
Ms. moses of the statute for Commissioner oe s proposal to
sa ee or pe os ads sce their effect on
“expenditure” and “contribution” to inc effe
“a candidate preferences. Commissioner Sandstrom is ees a
concerned that the rules be made clear. Sandstrom Statemen ;
1856
[19]
It is true that tive express advocacy test often yields
results with which some individuals are unhappy. Many
observers fear that coordinated issue advocacy has the
potential to corrupt candidates and officeholders. The
Christian Coalition court, for example, warned that were the
express advocacy standard “imported” into section 441b’s
contribution prohibition, “it would open the door to
unrestricted corporate or union underwriting of numerous
campaign-related communications that do not expressly
advocate a candidate’s election or defeat.” 52 F. Supp.2d at
88. This would, feared the court, “present real dangers to the
integrity of the electoral process.” Jd at 92. Of course, all of
this is nothing more than the district court saying that its
concern about quid pro que corruption overrides the
vagueness and overbreadth problems inherent in regulating
issue advocacy. The Supreme Court faced the same issues in
Buckley and reached the opposite conclusion, recognizing
that issue advocacy would be used to influence campaigns:
“Tt would naively underestimate the ingenuity and
resourcefulness of persons and groups desiring to buy
influence to believe that they would have much difficulty
devising expenditures that skirted the restriction on express
advocacy of election or defeat but nevertheless benefited the
candidate’s campaign.” 424 U.S. at 45. Regulating
coordinated issue advocacy, no matter how much it may or
not benefit a campaign, plunges the discussion of issues back
into a morass of regulation and resuscitates the concerns of
vagueness and overbreadth the Court addressed in Buckley.
A content standard is needed to alleviate this problem, but at
this time our coordination regulations possess no content
standard beyond the vague statutory language that
expenditures be made for the purpose of influencing a federal
addition to being well grounded in judicial precedent, the express
advocacy test has the advantage of being clear, simple to understand for
the inexperienced, easy to apply in the overwhelming majority of cases,
and familiar to regular participants in campaigns.
1857
election.*° This is effectively no content standard at all, as —s
Buckley Court held in discussing the disclosure provisions 0
the Act, and as another Supreme Court case, cited
extensively in Buckley, makes clear.
In Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 ( 1945), Thomas, a
national union leader, was accused of violating a Texas
statute requiring “all labor union organizers operating in ai
Texas ... to file [for an organizer’s card] with the Secretary =
State before soliciting any members for his organization. -
at 519, n. 1. The statute required organizers to carry the car
whenever “soliciting” members, and to exhibit the same
when requested to do so by prospective members. a ‘
statute was invalidated because speakers would not know 1
what ways they could speak about the labor movement, or
about labor issues, without
[20]
carrying a card. In short, the statute was invalidated because
it lacked a definite content standard.
The Court suggested that had the statute included a
precise content standard, equivalent to the express we
test later adopted in Buckley, the regulation could have been
valid under the State’s police power because, [a] speaker in
such circumstances could avoid the words ‘solicit,
‘invite,’[or] ‘join.”” Jd. at 534. However,
33 Some have suggested that “the purpose of influencing " be aot in
‘any ad featuring a candidate's name or likeness. But this is
improvement, for reasons of overbreadth, over the relative ? a
candidate’ standard the Court rejected as vague in deciding mo *
Limiting the content standard to any ad containing a clearly-i “
candidate is unconstitutionally overbroad for as the Court wee 7
Buckley, “[c]andidates, especially incumbents, are intimate - ll
public issues involving legislative proposals and governmen
Not only do candidates campaign on the basis of their positions ° io
various public issues, but campaigns themselves generate issues of p
interest.” 424 U.S. at 42.
1858
[w]ithout such a limitation, the statute forbids
any language which conveys, or reasonably
could be found to convey, the meaning of
invitation. How one might ‘laud unionism’ as
the State and State Court concede Thomas
was free to do, yet in these circumstances not
imply an invitation, is hard to conceive.... In
short, the supposedly clear-cut distinction
between discussion, laudation, general
advocacy, and solicitation, puts the speaker in
these circumstances wholly at the mercy of his
hearers. ... Such a distinction offers no
security for free discussion.
Id. at’535.
The Court made the point most relevant to the
problem posed by our current coordination regulations:
The vice [in a statute prohibiting the issuing
of invitations without an organizer’s card] is
not merely that invitation ... is speech. It is
also that its prohibition forbids or restrains
discussion which is not or may not be
invitation. The sharp line cannot be drawn
surely or securely.
Id. at 535-36 (emphasis added). Similarly, the “vice” in the
coordination regulations is not that they regulate ads that a
candidate may authorize or request. The vice of the
regulations is that unless they are limited to phrases of a
particular kind, speakers who want to discuss more generic
matters will not know whether they will be investigated
under the regulations. A speaker seeking to discuss issues
without risking investigation can avoid words such as ‘vote
for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘vote against,’ or ‘defeat.’ But absent a content
standard, our regulations provide no guidance as to which
types of phrases will be deemed to “influence the outcomes
1859
of elections,” and our regulations will limit or chill much
speech that is not or may not be “for the purpose of
influencing” a federal election.
Nor can the lack of a content standard can be
effectively offset through a restrictive test for coordination.
While other considerations lead me to support a conduct test
for coordination similar to that enunciated in Christian
Coalition and since incorporated into our regulations at 11
C.F.R. § 100.23, the truth is that such a restrictive test for
proving coordination can, absent a content standard, actually
make investigations more intrusive and chilling of speech.
The reason is because the more difficult evidentiary burden
the Commission faces to prove coordination requires, a more
intrusive investigation to gather facts that are usually in
control of the respondent. Thus, while the
(21]
coordination rule of Christian Coalition solves the notice
problem of the Commission’s old “insider trading” standard,
it does not address the fundamental vagueness problem.
“The objectionable quality of vagueness and overbreadth
does not depend [just] upon [the] absence of fair notice to
a(n] accused ... but [more importantly] upon the danger of
tolerating, in the area of First Amendment freedoms, the
existence of a... statute susceptible of sweeping and
improper application.” NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-
433 (1963). A content standard provides advance notice to
actors of what kind of speech the FEC may investigate, and
reduces the risk of arbitrary, discriminatory, or capricious
enforcement far more effectively than a purely conduct based
standard.
Absent a content standard, it does not appreciably
warm the environment for speech to say that the standard for
actually proving and punishing coordination “must be
restrictive,” as the court did in Christian Coalition. 52 F.
1860
— 88. This is because a restrictive conduct standard
oe . to alleviate the ease with which allegations may
— e an intrusive, expensive investigations launched
je Supreme Court in Thomas v. Collins, assessing the
chilling effect of the Texas statute upun speech did :
discuss the defendant’s likelihood of success at trial a th
difficulty that the State would have in proving stuther the
defendant violated the organizer-card ordinance, or the
elements involved in that proof The mere threat of
prosecution was sufficient to chill speech and make the
statute unconstitutional. (“The threat of ... arrest ... hun
over every word.” Jd. at 534.) Because the threat of ,
prosecution (or investigation) can itself chill speech, see
Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass n., 484 U.S 383 392
93 (1998), a tough conduct standard does not eliminate the ;
ee for a clear content standard. A precise content standard
ms with the new conduct standards outlined in 11 CFR §
.23 would work as bookends in enforcing the Act while
removing an unconstitutional chill fro speec
. . =
associational activities. ene sia
V.
Investigations into allegati inati
| egations of coordinat
pee involve demands for access to an eenrweorar _ -
on - legislative and political plans, including intrusion
into the most sensitive internal political discussions. See
no AFL-CIO, et al. v. FEC, Civ. Action No. 01-1522
patel District of Columbia. The express-advocacy
- - dard ensures that investigations into allegations
coordination are only visited upon those groups,
corporations or unions who first cross a bright, content line.
The dangers to the First Amendm
e Fir ent posed by such
sa government investigations of political activity have
: MI-9 angry time and again by the federal courts. See
-&., FE.C. v. Larouche Campaign, 817 F.2d 233, 234 (2d
1861
Cir. 1987)(recognizing that the Commission’s investigative
authority should be constrained or clearly delineated due to
the sensitive nature of the activities the agency regulates, and
holding that where a case implicates First Amendment .
concerns, “the usual deference to the administrative agency Is
not appropriate and protection of the constitutional liberties
of the target of the subpoena calls for a more exacting
scrutiny of the justification offered by the agency. ) In
Buckley, the Supreme Court recognized that compelled
disclosure
[22]
litical activities], in itself, can seriously infringe on
are of associations and belief guaranteed by the First
Amendment.” 424 U.S. at 64. Justice Frankfurter made the
same point over forty years ago: “It is particularly important
that the exercise of the power of compulsory process be
carefully circumscribed when the investigatory process -
to impinge upon such highly sensitive areas as a
speech or press, freedom of association, and freedom Oo
communication of ideas.” Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354
U.S. 234, 235 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). A
Investigations into such areas of constitutional ae
ought to be triggered only where respondents can know
they have crossed a bright line.
issi inquiries at all until
4 1 do not suggest that the Commission may make no inquin
it is sure that express advocacy exists. The Commission could conduct a
Reader's Digest inquiry, even to the point of enforcing subpoenas, to be
certain no express ads were run. See Reader's Digest Ass'n. Vv. FEC, 509
F. Supp. 1210 (S.D.N.Y) (where factual questions existed —
whether the Commission had statutory authority to st >
investi tion, the court adopted a two-step process go
cme the first stage of the investigation would be solely for the
purpose of determining whether statutory authority existed). As a factual
matter, complaints are normally filed because someone—usually the
speaker’s political opponent— has seen the ads in question. The ads are
described in or attached to the complaint, so even a Reader's Digest
1862
The suggestion that a bright line can be found by the
fact of communicating with a candidate—in other words, that
a speaker can find a safeharbor by not communicating at all
with a candidate in the two, four or six-year period between
elections, is not realistic.** Indeed, one reason for our
passing the new coordination regulation was the recognition
that our old enforcement standard, presumptively finding
coordination based on any contact between the speaker and
the candidate, was unrealistic. For example, in seeking to
prove coordination between the Christian Coalition and
various Republican candidates, the Commission’s evidence
included the fact that public officials addressed meetings of
the organization. See Christian Coalition, 52 F. Supp.2d at
68, 71, 76. Public officials have a legitimate need to
communicate with their constituents, these constituents have
a right to listen to their elected officials, and “nowhere in the
Act did Congress expressly limit an incumbent’s right to
communicate with his constituency.” Orloski v. Federai
Election Commission, 795 F.2d 156, 163 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
inquiry will be rare. When the ads are not shown by the complaint to be
issue ads, the respondent can typically attach the ads to the response, and
if they do not include express advocacy, the enforcement ends there at
very low cost to both respondent and Commission.
** Chairman McDonald and Commissioner Thomas state that the Act and
the Buckley Court required only a “general understanding” to find
coordination and presumably would state that persons speaking with
legislative officials or candidates in the 2, 4 or 6 years between elections
do so at their own risk. See Thomas/McDonald Statement at 7. I
disagree with this conclusion, for the reasons stated in Clifton. See 114
F.3d 1309 at 1314. The district court in Christian Coalition also seemed
not to appreciate the First Amendment dilemma in this area,
mischaracterizing the choice as one between “lobbying the campaign on
issues but spending no money on the election ... or remaining walled off
from the campaign so that all campaign-related expenditures are clearly
independent.” Christian Coalition, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 89, n. 53 (emphasis
added). Approximately fifty percent of all “campaigns” involve
officeholders who make up “the government,” and with whom the
speaker may wish to confer on legislative issues pursuant to the First
Amendment right to “petition for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
1863
Groups and candidates talk all the time, and to force groups
to choose between talking to candidates or losing their
safeharbor is likely to be as chilling on the First Amendment
rights to speak and to petition the government as the conduct
standard the Commission just rejected.
[23]
Issue discussion ought not, and constitutionally
cannot, be regulated merely because an issue ad may be of
benefit to the candidate or his campaign. Issue discussion
will almost always, at some point, benefit some campaign, as
the Buckley Court understood. The purpose of the express
advocacy test is not to neatly separate those communications
that are intended to influence a campaign from those that are
not, but to protect the rights of all citizens to engage in
protected speech. In this respect, the test is similar to many
other prophylactic tests found in the law. For example, in
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Supreme Court
recognized that “to permit a full opportunity to exercise the
privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be
adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and the
exercise of those rights must be fully honored.” Miranda, at
467° The warnings that law enforcement officials have
been required to give to suspects ever since are not a sifting
screen to divine the subjective intent of the suspect, not one
tool among many for determining whether his confession
was voluntary. Likewise, the express advocacy test is not a
sifting screen to divine the subjective intent of a respondent,
to determine whether in his mind the speech he engaged in
was for the purpose of influencing an election. Rather, both
the Miranda warnings and the express advocacy test are
objectively ascertainable threshold requirements promulgated
6 The Miranda warnings were re-affirmed last year as a constitutionally
based approach for determining the admissibility of statements made
during a custodial interrogation that could not be overruled by statutory
enactment. Dickerson v. United States 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
-
1864
by Courts to protect the constitutional rights of citizens
Neither test 1s disposable, even though there may be other
evidence that a confession was voluntary, or that a
= S speech was “for the purpose of influencing” an
election. As stated by the Court in Miranda, the “privilege is
so fundamental to our system of constitutional rule and the
expedient of giving adequate warning as to the availability of
the Privilege so simple, we will not pause to inquire in
individual cases whether the defendant was aware of his
rights without a warning being given.” Miranda at 468. The
First Amendment is no less fundamental,’ and the expedient
of applying the express advocacy test so simple, that we ma
not and ought not pause to inquire in individual cases .
whether speech can be “for the purpose of influencing” an
election without first finding express advocacy.*® :
. Campaign finance laws and regulations have, ov
time, become weapons in the arsenals of candidates and i
committees, and we should not quickly minimize the far- ”
reaching aspects of these regulations. In 2000 the
Congressional Committee Chairman of one major political
party went so far as to sue his
cy counterpart under the RICO -
37
See e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 14 (“Di
» Buck ’ S. (“Discussion of public i
= a [is] integral to the operation of the system of ese ”
es te a Constitution.”)
w is of blanket rules, in addition to Miranda. tha
’ , that
in oe to protect rights or to provide for increased accuracy os eit
: mnie if in a particular case the application of the rule does not
at leve its purpose. For example, statutes of limitations may
= ate ce when evidence is not stale; the exclusionary rule
pre ee i evi from being used in trials though it is known to be
ns a ee too may make a contract unenforceable
es t such a deal was made, to name just a
39
In 2000, DCCC Chairman, Patrick Kenned
D-R.L.
and Tom DeLay (R-Tx.) under the acct
1865
[24]
our coordination regulations proceed without an
adequate content standard, it will take the political elite about
three minutes to deduce that nearly all allegations of
coordination will be followed by an FEC investigation, to
which the respondent can offer no affirmative defense that
will quickly terminate the investigation. Given that groups
frequently have contacts with officeholder/candidates,
credible allegations of coordination will be easy to make. If
the complaint is reasonably well-crafted,” the Commission
will have no choice but to find “reason to believe” that a
violation has occurred. This is low-hanging fruit for any
party, candidate, person or group seeking to silence and
harass opposing voices in an election cycle.
Whether express advocacy is present in any written or
broadcast message, however, is a legal question susceptible
of a quick preliminary determination by the Commission. It
therefore acts as an affirmative defense the Commission can
accept or reject in the initial stages of the MUR. Absent such
a test, a respondent’s preliminary denial of coordination,
even when backed by signed affidavits, will never amount to
anything more than a self-serving factual (not legal)
representation. If in the future the Commission adopts an
incorrect content standard, or effectively no content standard,
there will be no affirmative defense that could save an
advocate from a protracted investigation. The express
RICO statute. See Juliet Eilperin, House Democrats Sue DeLay, Action
Accuses Whip of Extortion, Money Laundering in Fundraising, THE
WASHINGTON POST, May 4, 2000, at A06.
“ Commission policy has been to treat complaints liberally. If the
complainant swears an affidavit (as he is essentially required to do in
swearing out a complaint, see 2 U.S.C. §437g(a)), the Commission will
nearly always be required to launch into a full investigation to fairly
decide whether the complainant or respondent has the better factual
representation. “Rarely could the FEC dismiss a complaint ... because the
FEC would need to know all the facts bearing on motive before making
its ... determination.” Orloski at 165.
1866
advocacy bright line serves as that affi
Commission abandons that bright “aignapea ia _—
individual which seeks to both engage in issue discussion and
has even a passing contact with elected officials may be
subject to allegations that will trigger the type of massive
investigation, and corresponding costs, seen in this MUR
Thus it will be among the most aggressive moves the |
a has taken towards chilling debate in the United
s.
The expensive, intrusive, len investigati
MUR 4624, like the similar “ies ade ra
4291, would have been readily avoided by the simple
application of an express advocacy content standard.
Adopting this standard is, in my view, required by both the
statute and the Constitution. But even if not required, it is
certainly a permissible standard under the statute, and offers
many benefits. It provides clear notice to the community; it
should result in fewer Advisory Opinion requests than the
mere conduct standard; it will result in fewer expansive
investigations which eat up Commission resources: it will
reduce the role of litigation in campaigns; and most
importantly, it avoids any concerns about constitutionality
and will not have the chilling effect on speech of an ap roach
without a clear content standard. .
Thus I would have ended this MUR on
much simple
grounds, at a much earlier date, by finding that the _
Coalition’s spending for issue advocacy, whether or not
(25)
otherwise coordinated, was as a matter of law not for the
purpose of influencing an election and not subj
regulation under the FECA. —
1867
/s/ Bradley A. Smith
11/6/01
Bradley A. Smith, Commissioner
[26]
Date
1868
Federal Election Commission
Annual Report 1992
[FEC logo omitted]
[pages 1- 63 omitted]
Contributions from Minors
Section: 2 U.S.C. Sec.441a(a)(1)
Recommendation: Congress should establish a minimum age
for contributors.
Explanation: The Commission has found that contributions
are sometimes given by parents in their children's names.
Congress should address this potential abuse by establishing
a minimum age for contributors, or otherwise provide
guidelines ensuring that parents are not making contributions
in the name of another.
[pages 65 - end]
1869
Federal Election Commission
Annual Report 1993
[FEC logo omitted]
[pages 1- 49 omitted]
Contributions from Minors
Section: 2 U.S.C. Sec.441a(a)(1)
Recommendation: The Commission recommends _ that
Congress establish a presumption that contributors below age
16 are not making contributions on their own behalf.
Explanation: The Commission has found that contributions
are sometimes given by parents in their children's names.
Congress should address this potential abuse by establishing
a minimum age for contributors, or otherwise provide
guidelines ensuring that parents are not making contributions
in the name of another.
[pages 51 - end]
1870
Federal Election Commission
Annual Report 1994
[FEC logo omitted]
[pages 1- 55 omitted]
Contributions from Minors
Section: 2 U.S.C. Sec.44 1 a(a)(1)
Recommendation: The Commission recommends _ that
Congress establish a presumption that contributors below age
16 are not making contributions on their own behalf :
Explanation: The Commission has found that contributions
are sometimes given by parents in their children's names
Congress should address this potential abuse by establishin |
a minimum age for contributors, or otherwise se
guidelines ensuring that parents ar —
e not making“cont i
in the name of another. g ributions
[pages 57 - end omitted]
1871
Federal Election Commission
Annual Report 1995
[FEC logo omitted]
[pages 1- 55 omitted]
Contributions from Minors
Section: 2 U.S.C. Sec.441la(a)(1)
Recommendation: The Commission recommends _ that
Congress establish a presumption that contributors below age
16 are not making contributions on their own behalf.
Explanation: The Commission has found that contributions
are sometimes given by parents in their children's names.
Congress should address this potential abuse by establishing
a minimum age for contributors, or otherwise provide
guidelines ensuring that parents are not making contributions
in the name of another.
[pages 57 - end omitted]
1872
Federal Election Commission
Annual Report 1996
[FEC logo omitted]
[pages 1- 54 omitted]
Contributions from Minors
Section: 2 U.S.C. Sec.44 la(a)(1)
Recommendation: The Commission recommends that
Congress establish a presumption that contributors below a
16 are not making contributions on their own behalf .
Explanation: The Commission has found that contributions
are sometimes given by parents in their children's names
Congress should address this potential abuse by establishin
a minimum age for contributors, or otherwise aaa
guidelines ensuring that parent |
! S are not making contributi
in the name of another. . —
[pages 56 - end]
1873
Federal Election Commission
Annual Report 1997
[FEC logo omitted]
[pages 1- 53 omitted]
Contributions from Minors
Section: 2 U.S.C. Sec.441a(a)(1)
Recommendation: The Commission recommends _ that
Congress establish a presumption that contributors below age
16 are not making contributions on their own behalf.
Explanation: The Commission has found that contributions
are sometimes given by parents in their children's names.
Congress should address this potential abuse by establishing
a minimum age for contributors, or otherwise provide
guidelines ensuring that parents are not making contributions
in the name of another.
[pages 54 - 96 omitted]
1874
Federal Election Commission
Annual Report 1998
[FEC logo omitted]
[pages 1- 43 omitted]
Contributions from Minors
Section: 2 U.S.C. §441a(a)(1)
Recommendation: The Commission recommends _ that
Congress establish a presumption that contributors below age
16 are not making contributions on their own behalf °
Explanation: The Commission has found that contributions
are sometimes given by parents in their children’s names.
Congress should address this potential abuse by establishin
a minimum age for contributors, or otherwise provide
guidelines ensuring that parents
! are not making contributi
in the name of another. . =
[pages 45-92 omitted]
1875
Federal Election Commission
Annual Report 1999
[FEC logo omitted]
[pages 1- 49 omitted]
Contributions from Minors (revised 2000)
Section: 2 U.S.C. §44la(a\(1)
Recommendation: The Commission recommends that
Congress establish a minimum age of 16 for making
contributions.
Explanation: The Commission has found that contributions
are sometimes given by parents in their children’s names.
Congress should address this potential abuse by establishing
a minimum age of 16 for contributors, or otherwise provide
guidelines ensuring that parents are not making contributions
in the name of another.
[pages 51-86 omitted]
1876
Federal Election Commission
Annual Report 2000
[FEC logo omitted]
[pages 1- 42 omitted]
Contributions from Minors
Section: 2 U.S.C. Sec.441a(a)(1)
inset The Commission recommends _ that
ngress establish a minimum a :
ee ge of 16 for making
Explanation: The Commission has found that contributions
a sometimes given by parents in their children’s names.
ongress should address this potential abuse by establishing
a minimum age of 16 for contributors, or otherwise provide
guidelines ensuring that parents are not making contributions
in the name of another.
[pages 43 - 93 omitted]
1877
Federal Election Commission
Annual Report 2001
[FEC logo omitted]
[pages l- end omitted]
1878
THE RULES OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY
As adopted by the
2000 Republican National Convention
July 31, 2000
PREAMBLE
BE IT RESOLVED, That the Republican Party is the
party of the open door. Ours is the party of liberty, the party
of equality of opportunity for all and favoritism for none.
It is the intent and purpose of these rules to encourage
and allow the broadest possible participation of all voters in
Republican Party activities at all levels and to assure that the
Republican Party is open and accessible to all Americans.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That the following be
and hereby are adopted as the Rules of the Republican Party,
comprised of the rules for the election and government of the
Republican National Committee until the next national
convention, the rules under which delegates and alternate
delegates shall be allotted to the respective states in the next
national convention and the rules under which such delegates
and alternate delegates shall be elected and under which
contests shall be considered, and the rules of business of this
national convention.
RNC Ex. | |
1879
THE REPUBLICAN
NATIONAL COMMITTEE
RULE NO. 1
Organization of the .
Republican National Committee
The Republican National Committee shall have =
general management of the Republican Party, a -
direction from the national convention. The gy Oo -
Republican National Committee shall consist 0 one
national committeeman and one (1) national a om :
from, and the chairman of the state Republican Party o ~
state. For the purposes of this rule and all other rae “
definition of “state” or “states” shall be that as defined in Ru
No. 26.
RULE NO. 2
Method of Election
(a) Where the rules adopted by a state ——
Party provide a method of election of the Raye
committeeman and the national commutteewoman, they sha
be elected pursuant to such method.
(b) Where the rules adopted by a State —
Party do not provide a method of election of the pers
committeeman and the national committeewoman, and om
state laws do provide such a method of election, they =
elected pursuant to such method provided by state laws.
(c) Where neither the rules adopted 7 : _
Republican Party nor state laws provide a method of elec ee
of the national committeeman and | the hea
committeewoman, the national convention delegation from
such state shall elect them.
RNC Ex. | 2
1880
(d) At each national convention, the roll shall be
called and the delegation from each state shall report, through
the chairman of the delegation, the names of the elected
national committee members whose election shall be ratified
by the national convention if otherwise in accordance with
these rules.
RULE NO. 3
Term of Office
(a) National committeemen and national
committeewomen shall serve from the adjournment of the
national convention until the adjournment of the following
[*3] national convention, and until their successors shal] have
been elected and ratified. For seniority purposes, newly
elected committee persons shall be ratified in order of the date
of their individual election.
(b) The duly elected and acting chairman of each
State Republican Party shall be a member of the Republican
National Committee during his or her term in office.
RULE NO. 4
Vacancies
(a) Election of members to fill vacancies in the
Republican National Committee shall be ratified by the
Republican National Committee upon their election by the
State Republican Party in and for the state in which the
vacancy occurs.
(b) The Republican National Committee shall have
the power to declare vacant the seat of any member who
refuses to support the Republican nominee for President of the
United States or Vice President of the United States.
(c) In the event of the death, resignation,
disqualification, or disability of any officer of the Republican
RNC Ex. | 2-3
1881
National Committee or member of a ——. .
Republican National Committee, as enumerated in t : or
such vacancy shall be filled by the same body and int sa
manner as provided therein for the election of such officer o
officers or committee members in the first instance.
(d) In the event of the death, i a
disqualification, or disability of any yee a. Raw
Republican National Committee, the vacancy sha bo sa
according to adopted Republican state party rules. “0 neon
exists, vacancies shall be filled by majority vote of the sta
committee.
RULE NO. 5
Officers of the
Republican National Committee
(a) The Officers of the Republican National
Committee shall consist of:
(1) A chairman and a Leipeioue .
site sex who shall be elected by the membd
cenblieen National Committee. Except as otherwise —
by a majority of the members of the Republican ati =
Committee present and voting on the matter, the ee sa
|*4] the co-chairman shall be full-time, paid — - =
Republican National Committee. The chairman sha 2
chief executive officer of the Republican National vege ee.
The chairman or co-chairman may be removed from = ice
only by a- two-thirds (2/3) vote of the entire Republican
National Committee.
(2) Eight (8) vice chairmen, comprising
one (1) man and one (1) woman from each of the following
four (4) regions:
(i) The Western States Association: ”
Alaska, American Samoa, Arizona, California, Colorado,
RNC Ex. | 3-4
1882
Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico,
Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming;
(11) The Midwestern States
Association: Illinois, Indiana, lowa, Kansas. Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South
Dakota, and Wisconsin;
(1) The Northeastern States
Association: Connecticut, Delaware, the District of
Columbia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico. Rhode
Island, Vermont, and the Virgin Islands; and
(iv) The Souther States
Association: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida. Georgia, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma. South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia.
(3) A secretary, a treasurer, and such other
officers as the Republican National Committee shall deem
necessary, all to be elected by the Republican National
Committee.
(b) The chairman, co-chairman, and all other’
officers shall be elected in January of each odd-numbered
year. All officers, except the vice chairmen, shall be
nominated from the floor, and candidates must have at least
the majority vote of the Republican National Committee
members in each of three (3) states in order to have their
names placed in nomination. There shall be no nominating
committee.
(c) The eight (8) vice chairmen shall be elected at
regional caucuses by the Republican National Committee
members of the four (4) regions and shall be residents of and
Republican National Committee members from _ their
respective regions. The election shall take place in January of
RNC Ex. 14
1883
each odd-numbered year. The election of ye chairmen shall
not require confirmation by the Republican National
Committee.
(d) The chairman shall appoint a general counsel
for the Republican National Committee and a chairman of the
Republican Finance Committee, both of whom shall be
confirmed by the Republican National Committee.
RULE NO. 6
Executive Committee
(a) There shall be an Executive Committee of the
Republican National Committee to consist of eleven (11)
members of the Republican National Committee: three (3) to
be appointed by the chairman, to serve at the will of the
chairman and whose terms shall be coterminous with that of
the chairman, and eight (8) additional members to consist of
one (1) man and one (1) woman elected by and from each of
the four (4) regional caucuses. In addition, the following shall
serve as ex-officio members of the Executive Committee: the
chairman, the co-chairman, the vice chairmen, the secretary,
the treasurer, the general counsel, the chairman of the
Republican Finance Committee, the chairman of the
Republican State Chairmen’s Advisory Committee, the
chairman of the Budget Committee, and the president of the
National Federation of Republican Women.
(b) The Executive Committee may exercise all the
executive and administrative functions required of the
Republican National Committee between meetings of the
Republican National Committee, with the exception of the
following:
(1) election of officers of the Republican
National Committee;
RNC Ex. 1 5
1884
(2) ratification of the electi
. ection of mem
of the Republican National Committee; =
(3) issuance of the call and desi
. esignation of
the time and place for holding the national convention; and
(4) filling a vacancy ji
| y in the office of
Republican candidate for President of the United States
Republican candidate for Vice President of the United States.
- (c) The Executive Committee shal
call of the chairman and such meetings shall poe hei
twice in each year. In addition, upon written petition of at
least [*6] twenty-five percent (25%) of the members of the
Executive Committee, the chairman, within ten (10) days of
his receipt of said petition, shall call a meeting of the
Executive Committee to be held in a city to be designated by
the chairman. The date of such meeting shall fall between ten
( 10) and twenty (20) days from the date of the call. The
minutes of all Executive Committee meetings shall be
distributed as promptly as practicable to all members of th
Republican National Committee. ;
i (d) In addition to the foregoing, the Executive
ommittee shall encourage and solicit the advice and counsel
of Republican groups and organizations.
RULE NO. 7
Rules of Order
(a) The current authorized edition o
Rules of Order: Newly Revised (“Robert's Rules - ‘ours
shall govern in all meetings of the Republican National
Committee and its committees insofar as they are applicable
and not inconsistent with these rules.
RNC Ex. | 5-6
1885
(b) All meetings of the Republican National
Committee and all of its committees shall be open meetings,
except as provided for by Robert's Rules of Order.
(c) A member of the Republican National
Committee may give a written and witnessed proxy to an
eligible and declared Republican voter of the same state,
which shall be effective for one (1) meeting and may include
all committees of the Republican National Committee and
other meetings held in conjunction with the Republican
National Committee meeting that the proxy grantor is eligible
to attend. A member of a committee of the Republican
National Committee may give a written and witnessed proxy
to an eligible and declared Republican voter of the same state
or to a member of that member’s state delegation to the
Republican National Committee. Proxies to attend
Republican National Committee meetings shall be filed with
the secretary of the Republican National Committee. Proxies
to attend a committee of the Republican National Committee
shall be filed with the chairman of the respective committee.
(d) No votes (except elections to office when
properly ordered pursuant to the provisions of Robert's Rules
of Order) shall be taken by secret ballot in any open meeting
of the Republican National Committee or of any committee
thereof.
\*7]} (e) A prayer and the pledge of allegiance shall be
conducted at the beginning of all meetings of the committees
listed in these rules, including meetings of all subcommittees,
immediately following the call to order by the chairman.
RULE NO. 8
Meetings of the
Republican National Committee
(a) The Republican National Committee shall meet
at least twice in each year. A tentative agenda for each
RNC Ex. | 6-7
1886
Fa eg be mailed to the membership at least ten (10)
ph lor to such meeting. The minutes, including all
lons and motions, shall be mailed to all members of the
Republican National Commit ithi ,
t
the close of the meeting, ee within thirty (30) days after
(b) The first meetin
| & of the Republican Nat;
sso shall take place within five (5) days eae ec
Journment of the national convention. Such meeting and all
mr place upon call of the chairman or, in case of a vacanc
€ chairmanship, upon call of the co-chairman or, in nnd
RNC Ex. 1 7
1887
RULE NO. 9
Filling Vacancies in Nominations
(a) The Republican National Committee is hereby
authorized and empowered to fill any and or anagpange as
{*8] may occur by reason of death, declination, eee
of the Republican candidate for President of the om oe
or the Republican candidate for Vice President of the ag
States, as nominated by the national ae ene
Republican National Committee may reconvene the na
convention for the purpose of filing any such vacancies.
(b) In voting under this rule, the Republican
National Committee members representing any state shall “
entitled to cast the same number of votes as said state wa
entitled to cast at the national convention.
(c) In the event that the members of the
Republican National Committee form any state shall — -
agreement in the casting of votes hereunder, the votes , =
state shall be divided equally, including fractiona —
among the members of the Republican National Commi
present or voting by proxy.
(d) No candidate shall be chosen to fill any wr
vacancy except upon receiving a majority of the votes entitle
to be cast in the election.
RULE NO. 10
Committees of the
Republican National Committee
(a) There shall be the following committees:
(1) There shall be a Standing Committee on
Rules of the Republican Nationai Committee, composed of
one (1) member of the Republican National Committee —
each state, to review and propose recommendations wit
RNC Ex. | 7-8
1888
respect to the Rules of the Republican Party. The members of
the Republican National Committee from each state shall
caucus, and by majority vote, choose from their number
within eight (8) months following the national convention
appointees to serve on this committee. If the members of the
Republican National Committee from any state do not within
this period submit to the chairman of the Republican National
Committee their choice to serve on the Standing Committee
on Rules, the chairman of the Republican National Committee
shall select, from among the members of the Republican
National Committee from each such State, one (1) member to
serve on the Standing Committee on Rules. The chairman of
the Standing Committee on Rules shall be elected by the
committee from among its members.
(2) There shall be a Committee on
Arrangements to plan for and manage the next national
convention. The [*9] chairman and co-chairman of the
Republican National Committee shall be members of the
Committee on Arrangements and the chairman of the
Republican National Committee shall appoint to the
Committee on Arrangements at least one (1) member of the
Republican National Committee from each State. The
chairmen of the Committee on Arrangements and of its
_ Subcommittees shall be appointed by and serve at the pleasure
of the chairman of the Republican National Committee from
among the members of the Committee on Arrangements and,
together with such other officers as shall be elected by the
Committee on Arrangements, shall be members of the
Executive Committee of the Committee on Arrangements.
The chairman of the Standing Committee on Rules and the
chairman of the Committee on Contests shall also be members
of the Committee on Arrangements.
(3) There shall be a Committee on the Call,
composed of a chairman and at least seven (7) members of the
Republican National Committee who shall be appointed by
the chairman of the Republican National Committee. This
RNC Ex. | 8-9
1889
committee shall assist the Republican National Commune 7
connection with the issuance of the call for the next paren
convention pursuant to Rule No. 12. This meno . . poe
appointed after the selection of the Committees on Rule
Arrangements.
(4) There shall be a Committee on
Contests, which shall be composed of two (2) — of a
Republican National Committee from each of the no a
regions described in Rule No. 5, elected by members po “
Republican National Committee from each such region, . si
chairman appointed by the chairman of the Republic ;
National Committee from among the members or a =
the Republican National Committee. This gy a
perform the duties relating to the resolution ry) = a
prescribed in Rule No. 22. This committee shall be . ec .
after the selection of the Committees on Rules an
Arrangements.
(5) There shall be a Committee on the Site
of the Republican Natioifal Convention, which are be
composed of two (2) members of the rnp ons la ~ .
Committee from each of the four (4) regions describe in Ru
No. 5, elected by the members of the Republican nes
Committee from each such region, and a chairman —
by the chairman of the Republican National Committee ne
among the members or officers of the Republican “ng
Committee. This committee shall be responsib e for
investigating potential sites for the next national map or
and for recommending a [* 10] site to the Republican wer su
Committee for selection. This committee shall be selecte no
later than two (2) years following the presidential election.
(6) There shall be a Committee pe
Resolutions, which shall be composed of two (2) members -
the Republican National Committee from each of the do ( /
regions described in Rule No. 5. elected by the a rs -
the Republican National Committee from each such region,
RNC Ex. | 9-10
1890
and a chairman appointed by the chairman of the Republican
National Committee from among the members of the
Republican National Committee. This committee shall
consider all resolutions submitted by any member for adoption
by the Republican National Committee and shall report to the
Republican National Committee all resolutions timely
submitted to it together with its recommendations for
adoption, amendment, or other disposition. The Committee
on Resolutions shall report out, without amendment and for
consideration by the Republican National Committee, any
resolution submitted in writing and supported by at least one
(1) member of the Republican National Committee from each
of ten (10) states which is dated and submitted to the
Chairman of the Resolutions Committee at least thirty (30)
days before any regularly called meeting of the Republican
National Committee or at least ten (10) days before a specially
called meeting.
(7) Each member of the Republican
National Committee shall be a member of at least one (1) of
the above mentioned committees. The general counsel of the .
Republican National Committee shall be counsel to each of
such committees. The minutes of these committees shall be
distributed as promptly as practicable to all members of the
‘Republican National Committee. Any of these committees
may meet and act by telephone conference upon twenty-four
(24) hours notice.
(b) The Republican National Committee shall
create a Republican Finance Committee and any
subcommittees thereof which it deems desirable to which it
may delegate the responsibility of developing and
implementing a broad-based fundraising plan. The chairman
of the Republican Finance Committee shall be appointed
pursuant to the provisions of Rule No. 5(d).
(c) The Republican National Committee shall
create a Budget Committee and any subcommittees thereof
RNC Ex. | 10
1891
which it deems desirable to which it may delegate the
responsibility of developing a budget and reviewing income
and expenditures of the Republican National Committee. The
Budget [*11] Committee shall be composed of seven (7)
members of the Republican National Committee, three (3) of
whom shall be appointed by the chairman of the Republican
National Committee and one (1) of whom shall be elected by
each of the four (4) regional caucuses in January of each odd
numbered year (as provided in Rule No. 5(c)). In addition, the
general counsel of the Republican National Committee shall
be counsel to such committee and the following shall serve as
ex officio members of the Budget Committee: the chairman,
co-chairman, and treasurer of the Republican National
Committee, and the chairman of the Republican Finance
Committee. The chairman of the Republican National
Committee shall make every effort in such appointments to
ensure that an equal number of men and women serve on the
Budget Committee. The chairman of the Republican National
Committee shall appoint the chairman of the budget
Committee from among the members thereof.
(d) The annual budget shall be approved at the first
meeting of the Republican National Committee held in each
year. The proposed budget, in reasonable detail, shall be
mailed to all members of the Republican National Committee
at least ten (10) days prior to such meeting.
(e) The chairman of the Republican National
Committee, with the approval of the Republican National
Committee, may appoint such other committees and assistants
as he or she may deem necessary. Whenever such committees
are appointed, they shall consist of a chairman and an equal
number of men and women.
RNC Ex. | 10-11
1892
RULE NO. 11
Candidate Support
(a) The Republican National C
without the prior written and filed net time of
the Republican National Committee from the state outed
contribute money or in-kind aid to any candidate for an
= or party office except the nominee of the cater Prom
arty or a candidate who is unopposed in the Republic
primary after the filling deadline for that Office. In ios
States where state law establishes a non-partisan prima in
a Republican candidates could participate, but in which
rs a en rw include a Republican candidate,
, ed by a conventi
authority of the state Republican Party shall apr ol ri
the Republican Nation
al C .
nominee. ommittee as the Republican
(b) No state party rule or state |
observed that allows persons who have siiliietel as bo
participating in [*12] the selection of any nominee of a sie
a — the Republican Party, including, but not limited to
ugh the use of a multi-party primary or similar type ballot,
to participate in the selection of a nominee of the Republic
Party for that general election. No person na in
violation of this rule shall be recogn;
, nized as th
Republican Party from that state. g € nominee of the
CONVENING OF THE
NEXT NATIONAL CONVENTION
RULE NO. 12
Call of Next Convention
The Republican National Commi i
mittee shall is
re the next national convention to nominate Pos hv
on resident of the United States and Vice President of the
nited States prior to January | of the year in which the
RNC Ex. 1 11-12
1893
national convention is to be held. The Republican National
Committee shall issue and promulgate the call in a poe
consistent with these rules. The call shall include the pe :
the rules relating to the convening and the proceedings of the
national convention.
RULE NO. 13
Membership in Convention
Subject to the provisions of Rule No. 16, oe
membership of the next national convention shall consist of:
(a) Delegates.
(1) Ten (10) delegates at large from each of
the fifty (SO) states.
(2) The national committeeman, the
national committeewoman and the chairman of the —
Republican Party of, each state and American rey ie
District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin
Islands.
(3) Three (3) district delegates for each
Representative in the United States House of Representatives
from each state.
(4) Six (6) delegates at large from
American Samoa, sixteen (16) delegates at large from the
District of Columbia, six (6) delegates at large from roger
twenty (20) delegates at large from Puerto Rico, and six (6)
delegates at large from the Virgin Islands; provided, oe
that if Puerto Rico shall become a state prior to the a
national |*13] convention, the number of delegates rom
Puerto Rico shall be calculated in accordance with the same
formula used for the other states.
(5) From each state having cast its electoral
votes, or a majority thereof, for the Republican nominee for
RNC Ex. | 12-13
1894
President of the United States in the last preceding election:
four and one-half (4 1/2) delegates at large plus a number of
the delegates at large equal to sixty percent (60%) of the
number of electoral votes of that state; provided, however, that
if Puerto Rico shall become a state prior to the next national
convention, it shall be presumed that it would have cast its
electoral votes, or a majority thereof, for the Republican
nominee in the last preceding election. (In the computation of
the number of delegates at large, any sum of the four and one-
half (4 1/2) plus the sixty percent (60%) representing a
fraction shall be increased to the next whole number.) In
addition, one (1) delegate at large shall be awarded to a state
for any and each of the following public officials elected by
such state in the year of the last preceding presidential election
or at any subsequent election held prior to January | of the
year in which the next national convention is held:
(i) A Republican governor,
provided that no such additional delegate at large award to any
state shall exceed one (1);
(ii) | Membership in the Republican
Party of at least one-half (1/2) of the Representatives
representing a state in the United States House of
Representatives; provided that no such additional delegate at
large award to any state shall exceed one (1);
(iii) | Membership in the Republican
Party of a majority of the members of any chamber of a state
legislature, if such chamber has been organized, and is
presided over (if the presiding officer is elected by the
chamber), by Republicans; provided that no such additional
delegate at large award to any state shall exceed one (1).
(iv) | Membership in the Republican
Party of a majority of all chambers of a state legislature, if all
such chambers are presided over (if the presiding officer is
elected by the chamber), by a Republican; provided that no
RNC Ex. | 13
1895
such additional delegate at large award to any state shall
exceed one (1).
(6) In addition, one (1) delegate at large
shall be awarded to a state for any and each Republican
United States [*14] Senator elected by such state in the six (6)
year period prior to January | of the year in which the next
national convention is held; provided that no such additional
delegate at large award to any state shall exceed two (2).
(7) In addition, if the District of Columbia
shall have cast its electoral votes, or a majority thereof, for the
Republican nomin e for President of the United States in the
last preceding presidential election: four and one-half (4 1/2)
delegates at large plus the number of delegates at large equal
to thirty percent (30%) of the sixteen (16) delegates at large
allotted to the District of Columbia. In the computation of the
number of delegates at large, any sum of the four and one-half
(4 1/2) plus the thirty percent (30%) representing a fraction
shall be increased to the next whole number.
(b) Alternate Delegates.
One (1) alternate delegate for each delegate to the
national convention, except that no alternates shall be selected
for Republican National Committee members.
(c) Any state party may set the date for any
primary, caucus, convention, or meeting for the purpose of
voting for a presidential candidate and/or selecting delegates
to the national convention. To the extent a state party's rules
are in conflict with its state's laws with respect to this rule, the
provisions of this rule and the state party's rules shall control.
To the extent the provisions of the rule -re inconsistent with
the provisions of Rule No. 15, the provisions of this rule shall
be controlling for all purposes.
RNC Ex. | 13-14
1896
RULE NO. 14
Participation
. (a) The Republican National Committee shall
assist the States in their efforts to inform all citizens as to how
they may participate in delegate selection procedures. The
states, in cooperation with the Republican National
Committee, shall prepare instructive material on delegate
selection methods and make it available for distribution. ’
(b) Participation in a Republican primary, caucus
or any meeting or convention held for the purpose of selecting
delegates and alternate delegates to a county, district, state, or
national convention shall in no way be abridged for reasons of
Sex, race, religion, color, age, or national Origin. The
Republican National Committee and the Republican state
SommaNiies or governing committee of each state shall take
| 1S} positive action to achieve the broadest possible
participation by men and women, young people, minority and
heritage groups, senior citizens, and all other citizens in th
delegate selection process. ;
(c) Unless otherwise provided b
. y the laws of the
state in which the election occurs, in those states where
delegates and alternate delegates are elected through the
convention system or a combination of convention and
primary systems, the precinct, ward, township, or county
meetings shall be open meetings and all citizens who are
qualified shall be urged to participate.
(d) Each state shall endeavor to have equal
representation of men and women in its de ‘gation to the
Republican National Convention.
(e) The provisions of these rules are i
) ' not intend
to be the basis of any kind of quota system. pelea
RNC Ex. | 14-15
1897
RULE NO. 15
Election of Delegates and Alternate Delegates
(a) Order of Precedence.
Delegates at large and their alternate delegates and
delegates from congressional districts and their oe
delegates to the national convention shall be elected in the
following manner:
(1) In accordance with any applicable
Republican Party rules of a state, insofar as the same are not
inconsistent with these rules; or,
(2) To the extent not provided for in the
applicable Republican Party rules of a state, in accordance
with any applicable laws of a state, insofar as the same are not
inconsistent with these rules; or,
(3) By a combination of the methods set
forth in paragraphs (a)(1) or (a)(2) of this rule; or,
(4) To the extent not provided by state law
or party rules, as set forth in paragraph (c) of this rule.
(b) General.
In all elections of delegates or alternate delegates to
the national convention, the following rules shall apply:
|*16] (1) In any jurisdiction in which i. gg
representation upon the board of judges or inspectors :
elections for primary elections is denied by law, delegates =
alternate delegates shall be elected as provided in paragrap
(a)(1) or (a)(4) of this rule.
(2) In selecting delegates and alternate
delegates to the national convention, no state law shall ¥
observed which hinders, abridges, or denies to any citizen 0
RNC Ex. | 15-16
1898
the United States, eligible under the Constitution of the United
States to hold the office of President of the United States or
Vice President of the United States, the right or privilege of
being a candidate under such state law for the nomination for
President of the United States or Vice President of the United
States or which authorizes the election of a number of
delegates or alternate delegates from any state to the national
convention different from that fixed in these rules.
(3) Alternate delegates shall be elected to
the national convention for each unit of representation equal in
number to the number of delegates elected therein and shall be
chosen in the same manner and at the same time as the
delegates and under the same rules; provided, however, that if
the law of any state shall prescribe another method of
choosing alternate delegates, they may be chosen in
accordance with the provisions of the law of the state in which
the election occurs, except that no alternates shall be selected
for Republican National Committee members.
(4) Delegates and alternate delegates at
large to the national convention when serving as delegates and
alternate delegates shall be residents of and duly qualified
voters in their respective states. All delegates and alternate
delegates allocated as delegates and alternate delegates at
large shall be elected at large in the several states; provided,
however, that such allocation and method of election may be
varied in any state to the extent, and only to the extent,
necessary to avoid conflict with state law applicable to the
selection of national convention delegates if such varying
allocation and method of election were those pursuant to
which delegates at large and alternate delegates at large were
elected to the 1988 Republican National Convention from that
State.
(5) Delegates and alternate delegates to the
national convention representing congressional districts shall
be residents of and qualified voters in said districts
RNC Ex. | 15-16
1899
respectively when elected and when serving as delegates ee
alternate delegates. There shall be three (3) pte eng
three (3) alternate delegates allocated to represent pre ,
congressional district of the several states, who sha 3 :
elected by each such congressional district, provided,
however, that such number of delegates and ogee
delegates allocated to represent, and elected by, rod
congressional district of a state may be reduced or increased to
the extent, and only to the extent, necessary to avoid conflict
with state law applicable to the selection of national
convention delegates if such varying allocation was that
pursuant to which district delegates and alternate st
delegates were elected to the 1988 Republican Nationa
Convention from the state.
(6) No delegate or alternate delegate to the
national convention shall be required to pay an assessment or
fee in excess of that provided by the law of the state in which
his or her election occurs as a condition of serving as a
delegate or alternate delegate to the national convention.
(7) There shall be no automatic delegates to
i } f party position
the national convention who serve by virtue 0
or elective office, except as provided for in Rule No. 13 (a)(2).
(8) Delegates and alternate delegates to the
national convention may be elected only in one of the
following manners:
(i) by primary election;
(ii) by the Republican _ state
committee, where specifically provided by state law,
(iii) by state and congressional
district conventions;
RNC Ex. | 16-17
1900
(iv) by any method consistent with
these rules by which delegates and alternate delegates were
selected to the most recent Republican National Convention
from that state;
(v) by Rule No. 13 (a)(2) of these
rules.
(9) No state law shall be observed which
permits any person to participate in a primary delegate and
alternate delegate selection process that also permits that
person at the same primary to participate in the choosing of
nominees of any other party for other elective office.
Delegates and alternate delegates to the national convention
shall in that event be selected pursuant to state party rules that
are not inconsistent with the Rules of the Republican Party;
provided, however, that the selection process established by
the state [*18] party rules shall provide that only persons
eligible to vote who are deemed to be Republicans pursuant to
State law or state party rules shall participate in such delegate
selection process.
(10) No delegates or alternate delegates shall
be selected pursuant to any Republican Party rule of a state or
State law which materially changes the manner of selecting
delegates or alternate delegates or the date upon which such
state party holds a presidential primary, caucus, convention, or
meeting for the purpose of voting for a presidential candidate
and/or selecting delegates to the national convention if such
changes were adopted or made effective after the first Tuesday
in October of the year before the year in which the national
convention is to be held. Where it is not possible for a state
party to certify the manner and the date upon which it holds a
presidential primary, caucus, convention, or meeting for the
purpose of voting for a presidential candidate and/or selecting
delegates to the national convention in effect in that state on
the date and in the manner provided in paragraph (d) of this
rule, the process for holding the presidential primary, caucus,
RNC Ex. 1 17-18
1901
convention, or meeting for the purpose of voting for a
presidential candidate and/or selecting delegates to the
national convention shall be conducted in the same manner
and held upon the same date as was used for the immediately
preceding national convention. If it is not possible to hold a
presidential primary, caucus, convention, or meeting for the
purpose of voting for a presidential candidate and/or selecting
delegates to the national convention upon the same date as
was used for the immediately preceding national convention,
then delegates or alternate delegates shall be selected by
congressional district or state conventions pursuant to
paragraph (c) of this rule.
(11) Except with respect to delegates and
alternate delegates elected under paragraph (b)(8)(1i) of this
rule-and if consistent with paragraph (c)(5) of this rule:
(i) No presidential primary, caucus,
convention, or other meeting may be held for the purpose of
voting for a presidential candidate and/or selecting delegates
or alternate delegates to the national convention, prior to the
first Tuesday of February or after the third Tuesday of June in
the year in which the national convention is held; and,
(ii) The selection process of
choosing those who will select delegates or alternate delegates
shall not begin before September | of the year before the year
in which the national convention is to be held.
|*19} (12) The Republican National Committee
may grant a-waiver to a state party from certain provisions of
this rule in the following instance:
Where it is not possible for a state party to comply
with the first Tuesday in October deadline delineated in
paragraph (d) of this rule and not possible for a state party to
hold its presidential primary, caucus, convention, or meeting
for the purpose of voting for a
RNC Ex. | 18-19
1902
presidential candidate and/or selecting delegates to th
national convention as was used for the immedi t “
se national convention or to select denies es
rem delegates by congressional district or state
wons pursuant to paragraph (c) of this rule, and th
Republican National Committee determines that grantin h
waiver 1s in the best interests of the Republican Party are
(c) Conventions.
a Pgs state law permits or the Republican Party
revved 4 ‘ae require the election of delegates and alternate
y convention or there is no appli
( pplicable state law or
sie price age pug and alternate delegates to the
ention sha elected by con istri
! gressional distr
or state conventions pursuant to the following rules:
(1) Congressional distri
; . istrict or State
coriventions shall be called by the Republican state committee.
conventions = Py tO congressional district
; elected in precinct c
: aucuses, mass
m ,
eetings, mass conventions, or county conventions in which
only eligible voters in su
ch precinct, county, or distri
case may be, shall vote. ee
(3) Notices of the call fi
| | or any such cauc
meeting, or convention shall be published in a camaiee os
— of general circulation in the county, district, or
-* , as the case may be, not less than fifteen (15) days prior to
€ date of such caucus, meeting, or convention.
(4) Only persons eligi
gible to vote wh
peter Z : | _— of public record to be Republicans
State law or, if voters are not enrolled b
arty, b
ne ome party rules of a state, shall enor on
J sa e ree held for the purpose of electing delegates or
ate delegates to the national convention or in any
RNC Ex. | 19
1903
Republican caucus, mass meeting, or mass convention held
for the purpose of selecting delegates to the county, district, or
state conventions, and only such legal and qualified voters
shall be elected as delegates to county, district, and state
conventions; [*20] provided, however, that in addition to the
qualifications provided herein, the applicable Republican
party rules of a state may prescribe additional qualifications
not inconsistent with law, which additional qualifications shall
be adopted before the first Tuesday in October in the year
before the year in which the national convention is to be held
and published in at least one (1) newspaper having a general
circulation throughout the state, such publication to be at least
ninety (90) days before such qualifications become effective.
(5) No delegates shall be deemed eligible
to participate in any congressional district or state convention
the purpose of which is to elect delegates to the national
convention who are elected prior to the date of the issuance of
the call of such national convention.
(6) Congressional district conventions shall
be composed of delegates who are persons eligible to vote and
who are deemed to be Republicans pursuant to state law or
party rules. State conventions shall be composed of delegates
who are persons eligible to vote and who are deemed to be
Republicans pursuant to state law or party rules in the
respective districts which they represent in said state
conventions. Such delegates shall be apportioned by the state
Republican Party among counties, parishes, and cities of the
state or district having regard to the Republican vote or the
population therein.
(7) There shall be no proxies at any district
or state convention (which shall not include meetings of a
Republican state committee) held for the purpose of selecting
delegates to the national convention. If alternate delegates to
such selection convention are selected, the alternate delegate
_and no other shall vote in the absence of the delegate.
RNC Ex. | 19-20
1904
(d) Certification and filing by state committees.
On or before the first Tuesday in October 0
before the year in which the national Aad is n re orr|
each Republican State committee shall adopt rules, procedures,
policies, and instructive materials (prepared pursuant to Rule
No. 14(a)) governing the selection of delegates and alternate
delegates to the national convention to convene during the
following year and shall certify and file with the secretary of
the Republican National Committee true copies of the same
and of all statutes governin
g the selection of such de
and alternate delegates. —
{*21] RULE NO. 16
Enforcement of Rules
(a) If any state or state party violates th
the Republican Party relating to the iaiee of a ieee
process resulting in the election of delegates or alternate
delegates to the next national convention, such state shall
suffer a loss of its delegates and alternate delegates to that
national convention as follows:
(1) If a state or state party vi
Rules of the Republican Party relating gc arvangge o.
selection process resulting in the election of delegates or
alternate delegates to the national convention before the call to
the national conven) ion is issued, then the number of delegates
to the national convention from that state shall be reduced by
fifty percent (50%), and the c
shall also be reduced. enn iomsto dulegutes
(2) If a state or state party violate
Rules of the Republican Party relating ite Quien of ~
selection process resulting in the election of delegates or
alternate delegates to the national convention after the call to
the national convention is issued, then the number of delegates
RNC Ex. | 20-21
1905
to the national convention from that state shall be reduced by
ninety percent ¢90%), and the corresponding alternate
delegates shall also be reduced.
(3) Any sum representing a fraction shall
be increased to the nearest whole number, so long as such
rounding does not prevent a state from having at least one (1)
delegate or alternate delegate to the nat.o al convention.
(b) If a violation has occurred before the issuance
of the call to the national convention, the chairman of the
Republican National Conimittee shall notify the offending
state of the violation and shall inform the state of the number
of delegates and alternate delegates it will lose. This reduced
number of delegates and alternate delegates will be reflected
in the call to the national convention, and will be reported to
the secretary of state or responsible election official of the
offending state and to the chairman of every state party. Said
reduced number will be the only number recognized as the
official delegation of the state to the national convention.
(c) If a violation has occurred after the issuance of
the call to the national convention, the chairman of the
Republican National Committee shall notify the state of the
violation and shall inform the state of the number of delegates
and alternate delegates it will lose. This reduced number of
[*22] delegates and alternate delegates will be reported to the
secretary of state or responsible election official of the
offending state and to the chairman of every state party, and
such reduced number will be the only number recognized as
the official delegation of the state to the national convention.
(d) If the chairman of the Republican National
Committee does not act upon a violation of the Rules of the
Republican Party relating to the selection and/or allocation of
delegates or alternate delegates to the national convention,
then a statement may be filed against a state or state party by
any three (3) members of the Republican National Committee
RNC Ex. | 21-22
1906
£
S a
(1) A statement filed against a st
party by any three (3) members of the Standing Seuaieeas
Rules shall be written and shall specify the reasons why the
members believe the state or state party is in violation. The
statement shall be signed and dated by each Rules member
filing the statement, and shall be filed with the secretary of the
Republican National Committee. The secretary of the
Republican National Committee shall, within twenty (20) days
of receipt, distribute such statement to all members of th
Republican National Committee. ;
(2) The Standing Commit
meet upon the call of the aiden of the eathce
and shall vote upon whether a state or state party is in
violation. If by majority vote the Standing Committee on
Rules finds a violation, then such state or state party shall
suffer the penalties described in paragraph (a) of this rule.
(e) ‘Ifa state or state party i ,
heteiae party is determined to be in
(1) No member of the Republican National
‘Committee from the offending state shall be permitted to serve
as a delegate or alternate delegate to the national convention.
. (2) After the Republica i
Committee members are excluded Pin laine Pye ye
offending state’s delegation to the national convention, the
State party shall determine which of the state’s remainin
delegates (and corresponding alternate delegates) are cities.
to serve as part of the state’ ;
, s reduced delegati
national convention. gation to the
{*23] (3) In addition to the i
penalties provided fo
in paragraphs (e)(1) and (2) of this rule, the ence do
RNC Ex. | 22-23
1907
National Committee Standing Committee on Rules may
impose additional sanctions relating to the offending state’s
hotel location at the national convention, guest privileges and
VIP passes at the national convention, and seating location in
the national convention hall.
(f) A state or state party shall have no appeal from
either a finding of a violation against it or a penalty imposed
upon it under this rule.
RULE NO. 17
Excess Delegates and Alternate Delegates
(a) No state shall elect a greater number of persons
to act as delegates and alternate delegates than the actual
number of delegates and alternate delegates respectively to
which it is entitled under the call for the national convention.
Provided, however, that if a state is found in violation of the
delegate selection rules under Rule No. 16, then that state
shall not elect a greater number of persons to act as delegates
and alternate delegates than the actual number of delegates
and alternate delegates respectively to which it is entitled
under Rule No. 16. No unit of representation may elect any
delegate or alternate delegate with permission to cast a
fractional vote.
(b) Where more than the authorized number of
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