Joint Appendix Vol V — McConnell v. Federal Election Commission

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Text

Appeal Docketed May 15, 2003

Probable Jurisdiction Noted June 5, 2003 6

r No. 02-1674 et al.

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

MITCH MCCONNELL et ai/.,

Appellants,

V.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION et a/.,

Appellees.

On Appeal From The United States

District Court For The District of Columbia

JOINT APPENDIX

VOLUME V (Pages 1820 to 2145)

FLOYD ABRAMS KENNETH W. STARR

SUSAN BUCKLEY Counsel of Record

BRIAN MARKLEY EDWARD W. WARREN

CAHILL GORDON & KANNON K. SHANMUGAM

REINDEL LLP KIRKLAND & ELLIS

80 Pine Street 655 Fifteenth Street, N.W.

New York, NY 10005 Washington, DC 20005

(212) 701-3000 (202) 879-5000

(additional counsel on inside cover)

August 2003

a oe

WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. — (202) 789-0096 -— WASHINGTON, D. C. 20001

KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN

559 Nathan Abbott Way

Stanford, CA 94305

(650) 725-9875

JAN WITOLD BARAN

THOMAS W. KIRBY

LEE E. GOODMAN

WILEY, REIN & FIELDING LLP

1776 K Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 719-7000

VALLE SIMMS DUTCHER

L. LYNN HOGUE

SOUTHEASTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, INC.

3340 Peachtree Road, N.E.

Suite 3515

Atlanta, GA 30326

(404) 365-8500

G. HUNTER BATES

Frost Brown Todd LLC

400 West Market Street, Suite 3200

Louisville, KY 40202-3363

- ($02) 568-0222

Counsel in No. 02-1674

:

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

VOLUME I

Declarations & Affidavits

i se ntsnsctndens l

ET 9

Ayres, Q. Whitfield - Rebuttal ..0.00000000000 ooo occcccccccccccceeeceeee 17

Te csunecenenousanane 24

EEE 30

Tee ccesmnmracucnmanand 47

LL 56

Tee scessemuunonessovans 68

SSS 73

EL 93

cessation 97

a _.. scenesnsenssnenecnnen 102

Er 114

Bowler, Kathleen — Rebuttal ..00000000..00.00oo ccc ccccccccceceeeeeees 160

Neen etueuscne 169

rat cceesccreinnncansenecsenncecencsccees 172

a snenseutuonnanaces 181

SS SLE 203

“*

RII, TPE <ssesinsscannesctiensnsnansanstnsastnbmnenenpionneenatennisantenten 217

I, Bei vcccicseesestascssosesanionnnsapatabiensinsacenbseninubeesinnsasntd 223

SPU IIIE: IIIT cxsersiinicsininiscsciiisiaitiibaidgseinnsulisiadiieioniditanindiiesidehinimadiaa 261

I, FE FD cccccccscereinecsssncinnsnssiniaeiaunanainianennnians 265

I Co icccnsccsnssncsnicreresnsensiansiieiitiaiaaniidisigaamiaamaaaiid 281

IE, SUE, DIR eciscvticsseseensiinisenaiesisiieiinasiintaddaadatiatuiatan 285

| ye a em Narre mrr eevee TES 289

I TI scnttsctcsermciencninsnscreimiivenmninianis 322

Josten, R. Bruce (pp. 1-3) TS a CTE ENTE NE eT 327

I, TING 0 Piss icciccsensictsesicesccteninnscscinssninnneneniansimminnionta 333

BN, TI Fipreccassenstnssrcomunmsncnomnsennninintinninnciannnitios 334

BEE, CRRIEUS TED. GEIR, GD ncccccccescenssnsnnsenesensnsnsasnecnneeein 348

LaPierre, Wayne (NRA App. 1-26).............:ccccseesseeeeeeeees 364

RT Sarre wee Mare Fe 389

TEA, DID ccccsresensessssctecssemiscnnaseonmennniasnentnenncnnael 401

NE, oe EN ENS NTO Ry 406

EEE Se nEe ETE ees 408

I, BI sccenencerieninsnnrnicennsssnititiiaicissenasinininiinaanmceniaia 412

McQueen, Angus (NRA App. 35-40) ...........ccccceeeeeseeeeeee 416

IETS, CIID scnsevinccensccssintninnintinitenmnianpadoniiaeintianmeail 423

ill

VOLUME II

I 464

TEI Le eee ee ee 582

STE ee ee ES aA 588

Monroe, Edward (pp. 1-3).............cccccccscsssssessesescesceceeceeceee 591

I ae 595

SET, TEI ‘isccesicnliintssitetemcesiniahitaitttndabinimnisioitiaeniiiiaeded 608

8 ee 615

___ ETRE Oe OTIS NST 618

8 SE RN Se nC 620

RTI tatilesinetiahiseessitieetieaitintiai a ee 628

ETT Se eee 662

| TTT eae NTE ET 668

SERRE aoe a ea RNa 678

NN aL NE ee NO 685

IL III cccechcreetiininndiciaepnabdictiiihadinactialeciseanicemeateil 693

SEES tn ce 702

SII ana Wee Oe OE Re 705

ER tr oe REA ne RO 712

NI ichitienidesiidaicibccnethitieeaeiaibnaentnatsic 718

a 723

ST eS on 737

SO MUN iasitesiieaistcaciesahienatihciblig lal 738

iV

7 Vv

I TO ssid ccladiiaemneniadnanaiaad 740

___ SS ee, 857

ey FR ce ccscsscenecmesssersentmmannmermsinencrncemenavian 747 RRA fie 858

Shays, Christopher (NRA App. 101)..........:::sssssssssssssseeee 749 CS a 860

Shea, Beverly poenbonembenesneunassuneansesensaneereiennenoemeenanenesesoneenseds 750 Green Cross-x as 24 iietnielhanletiehilasesiieitebillateit ate al 861

NN 0 hn are oe Ye 173 a ~eeeeennnanonnnnoenseoennntrenansoenaneeessi nop

-< “naan ammemnmne Rete: pe gOS ee Oe RE 864

BRD. FB .nnccerceccveorcseccees ___ SSE Ree 867

ee a ees ee 802 cee. _, SIS N 868

Simon, Paul ........-..--eeseecseceseseseenneen ETT 870

nT a 808 EM 12 serrerrnrnerenennrnecntnntnsen ae

RN scccsvessorninquieteniatnacencanubseemnenmaceiviciantel 813 ST nner snsensens 877

IE siiinreicsnsiescancrsiieniaitiinsishiitiiadensianiagi 817 Hiatt - NOR essessseeseernceensetnsereseetneeeeneeensetn 878

OO ne Sens, 878

; a a ia ea ee 819

Solid, Daniel............. Hickmott - Pe iinistiaimiiesiseiel bei toes 880

Se NEE Re ee 823

Stoltz, Gal ...........eecsseesseeesseee Hilliard - _ TEER nee 890

i dr aaiiieal 829 TG ocssseescvvnnnnnsnnnssssssossssseoeesssessessssseesssssecs 891

_ EEE eae 891

Fe SID wvndccniacastanterneinsscanscesenennemeumnemnimepeniatines 831 il isiiteticnenatcenmtmeterieemantestencaeinstaans 892

__ EE ITERSTn Sonne 893

___ SEES eae nea 894

Depositions

Holman - lg, en 895

_____ EIST ee eee I So 896

Andrews - ae 836 PU Niniiiemsiaiiiaiaiise aii sexea Dad 896

RESET eee 846

a I 846 Huard- ~ SERIE Sala es eee 899

__ onl CES Enea a 901

Feingold - Oi scsenesecemesssnmareseannentamseamenmmanennenit 852

Ear ere ear 853

ES ete ie eee 854 Jeffords - ___ SEE 902

Josten -

LaPierre

Lupia -

Mann Cross-x -

McCain -

McConnell -

McLoughlin -

McQueen -

Meehan -

Oliver -

vi

i ccececincacssccsssenianeescsisnnnnmnnimenniniiia 916

I vcenccccncsccsesssnsnsncstniensanmascesensneasi 918

FFP ccccasnsnntnnnenssesnsntinieiniintanstetndsiiecei 920

Exh. 3 (4G 1-11, 17, 27-33, 47-52,

Sigmature) ..............ccsccsereresssscsorsrsssseese 922

IF sccicttesccnsssassiiubtinessntensibtinennemmmmseiila 926

148-49... ccessesesecscscnsesenenensscnsesnsnsesnenens 927

i cccnccncntnctecccscrecaneintnneiceianinessiitl 928

DE cccctonscnmninccniantacmncnmimasincssoncdiniiin 930

i cinincctitarnnnntiensinnsintiitianesibaitiiameiniedmeniiaiaii 931

DIG cecacttsccenccinncacccncsssnsnesncanencnvemmeatan 933

I cinecncccnsscsnnsscncinnnniisiinsisaneedcenisienaanens 936

Tt viinsnieisaseinctinneniinianhsiidinemnmemnecaieeii 941

I... sisinssiateienenmnnesebenniimniinacnnsnamnsental 942

DI ccnsccnacenicssconcnentnniennessninscesssmaniiitit 943

Bi cccccssnsocsnsniessonssenmnacmnannmsenniniti 944

a ncccscnscicseniasintinadinmaiecnmmenasieaitia 952

VOLUME Ill

BP cceninsncsensnssntescsstiviniiinessnmnmnviinsti 953

» aE 959

LS 960

| ee 971

ae 973

- 974

eee 974

Be BD vneccncccescamncensetesccnssnsemnememensiiiien 975

IF cicsistsiscctursentemnsiiiiiiiinbinnnsmmmmniiuntina 977

Vil

Seltz - TE ne Pe 986

Shapiro Cross-x - 114-17 .o...ccccccccccscscscscscececececeseseeeeeeeees. 987

Shays - ee sa nS EEE, 991

SRR eee a ne AN. 994

NS Te a a 995

RN REA 996

RSENS RRS ae OE ASE aT, 1005

Shields - RT SES eo a Ry 1007

Simpson - Seen iiiiininnincislaiceibciiidieatibbbtbigde iil ae 1010

DO ipidhittiniteide etic 1013

| ee ee ee 1019

PEt are ne Mee one 1022

Snowe - EE es oe Te 1025

SEEPS Reo ear 1026

TET ee ne a 1028

Strother - Ee a ee 1031

A Rech aa aan ene e 1032

RTE ee 1032

RE EES Cree 1037

Strother Cross-x - 38-39 .o..o.o.ccccccccecccsceesecccesee.coceeeeeee., 1038

Thompson - _ Enna eno aE eID 1039

SE ae ee) ae 1040

Williams Cross-x - 21-22 ooo..ccccccccccccescecesccoceceeseeeeeeeeeeee. 1041

ra le a er ee 1042

Expert Reports

Gibson (1 PCS/ ER 1-66) .o.....c.ccccccccccccccescescecseeseeeeeeeceeee 1046

Vill

Gibson Rebuttal (2 PCS/ ER 794-821).........ccesseseeeeees 1115

Gibson Supplemental (2 PCS/ ER 831-37) .....-..:++e++++ 1144

Goldstein ..............cscccccscscesssssccssseceseecseseresssnscenesessnneees 1150

GIOETI ......cccccecscceccscoscsccessccsensscscrncsenscsenessssccossnsnsossnnsooses 1188

Green Rebuttal ...............:cccssccssseeseeeeseeeeneenensenseeeeeennenenes 1235

IBGE .....ceccececeeseccccesscoscsecesersosssscossssoosegeovesoeonssssosossonsnsess 1241

Krasno & Sorauf...........:ccccccssccesssseeessreeesenneennserenenenennaees 1272

VOLUME IV

La Raja ........c.cesssesesssssesseseessnensnenssncesenenenensnnnsneannsnzensesens 1406

La Raja Rebuttal .............s:cccsesesesesesnsnsesnensenensnensnsnensnenens 1459

BIE oonecncoccccesveccvnvecessousssscesssssensnasensovesesosnovsvesesoucsnsenenesesss 1473

Magleby - 1, 5-6, 10, 18-23, 26-33, 35-45... 1476

ee

Mann Declaration ...............sssscssseeseeseesseeeneeensenssenesensennes 1561

Mellman/ Wirthlin - 1, 5-12 .............ccceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeenenes 1563

Milkis..... ss reaesieaianniccinaiannnnmmmmnamrian 1572

Milkis Rebuttal ..................:cccssscscseseeessrneseeeeneneseeneneneneens 1610

GMYAEL.........ssessesscsessessesnessensenennssnsnesnensnnensensnnsnsensansnsnness 1623

Pleadings and Orders

4/24/2002 - Order (Docket #24).........:cccssseeseeereneeeeeeees 1655

ix

4/24/2002 - Order (Docket #25) .........cccccccsccscssecssccsecsees 1659

5/13/2002 - Order (Docket #49) .........cccccccecccscescecseeceee, 1661

6/17/2002 — Responses and Objections of Defendant FEC to

First Interrogatories by the Echols Plaintiffs.................. 1665

6/17/2002 — Response and Objections of the Attorney

General to the Echols’ Plaintiffs’ First Set

RSPR ES REA LEP 1 TE 1675

7/26/2002 - Order (Docket #113)

9/5/2002 — Intervenors’ Responses to Plaintiffs California

Democratic Party and California Republican Party’s First Set

of Requests for Admissions, Interrogatory, and Request for

Production of Documents...............cccccccccessseeceseseeseececeees 1694

9/16/2002 - FEC Response to Requests for Admissions Nos.

i PEE scudicieaudinichinsirenbiaaiaiaiaicdiedsinstac es 1732

9/16/2002 - Intervenors’ Responses to Contention

Interrogatories (Adams Exh. 15)...........cccccccccccsceeceseeeeeee 1736

_ 9/16/2002 — Objections and Responses of Defendant FEC to

the First Requests for Admission by Plaintiff Emily Echols,

SUITE -viscstetessstiadatendecseneniveninbiciasainntetiiniapescatinateatiiniinaaasintain 1752

9/16/2002 — Responses of Defendant United States to

Plaintiffs’ Requests to Admit, Supplemental Interrogatory

and Request to Produce to All Defendants..................... 1775

9/19/2002 - US Response to RNC’s 2 Set of Interrogatories

AE ER REY See re RE RG seccnevenes 1800

10/15/2002 - Order (Docket #175)............cccccccccsseeseeesees 1802

11/15/2002 - Order (Docket #218) .ecccsccsscssscscssssssscsssssse 1807

x

11/26/2002 - Order (Docket #239).......c:cceccererereseesees 1809

§/9/2003 ACLU Motion for Stay ...........:::seeeeseeeresereres 1812

5/9/2003 Declaration of Anthony Romero in Support x! 7

ACLU Motion for Stay.........:cccccccssseeerseereeereeeteesneestenees

VOLUME V

Other Documents

FEC, Twenty Year Report, Ch. 3, p. 4 (April 1995)......1820

Statement of Commissioner B. Smith in FEC MUR 4624

(Nov. 6, 2001) .....cesccesesesesesesesssseseenenenenananenesnenenens 1822

Echols Exhibits 30-39

(FEC Annual Reports 1992 - i ccncssaccscnnenusenss 1868

RNC Exhibit 1 .........0.....ceeccceseessseetseesrseseneennreneneneenennens | oo

RNC Exhibit 232 ............:ccccecsssesseseeseeeeesteeseeneeseersesenennees wt

RNC Exhibit 292 ..........:cccscccssesesseseeeeseeesnseeseseneeneenennens

T. Edsall & D. VonDrehle, Republicans Have Huge Edge in

Campaign Cash, Wash. Post, Feb. 14, FIED cxeresencccessvess 1931

T. Edsall, Liberals Meeting to Set ‘04 Strategy; Labor,

Rights Groups Focus on Getting Out the Vote to Help

Democrats, Wash. Post, May 25, 2003 .........::s+s+ssseseee 1938

H. Meyerson, Union Dos and Don'ts For the —

Wash. Post, May 28, 2003..........sssssesseenennenenresesneenes

BNA, Money & Politics Report (June 24, 2003)........... 1946

NRA Bylaws (NRA App 106)......-.-::0-sssssesesesessesesnenenene 1948

NRA Fundraising Materials (NRA App. 133-36)........-. 1950

x!

Annenberg Center Study - 7 (NRA App. 197), 27-28....1957

Summary of NRA’s Gross Revenues ..........cccccccccccec0.---. 1963

Summary of Returns on NRA Infomercials

PUI WU nticiiahi ie 1964

Summary of Airings of NRA Infomercials from Jan. - Dec.

EARL OI OMS 1965

Summary of “Airings” of California News Magazine (NRA

GU ep icoiiniltatassnhssiivitieistiinpinentpeniatisimsatmiseiianiaaigaiisis 1966

Intervenors’ Comments to FEC re “Electioneering

Communications” - 3, 10-11 (NRA App. 209-10)......... 1967

Storyboards of Political Ads Attacking NRA (NRA App.

PUNT escitaslsdidnidiiihetiiiiieineiibeaiitiadai le atta! 1969

L. de Moraes, Political “Reality”: Viewers to Pick 2004

Candidate, Wash. Post, 9/21/02 (NRA App. 343-45)....1982

Internet Doubles Claim New Survey Fraud Warnings Made,

Internet Bus. News, 7/1/98 (NRA Ee 1987

The Pew Research Center, Jnternet Sapping a Broadcast

News Audience, 6/11/02 (NRA App. 444-45) .......ccccse. 1989

T. Putnam, The G.E. Boycott: A Story NBC Wouldn't Buy,

Extra!, Jan/Feb. 1991 (NRA App. 687-89) .......cccccccsses 1993

C. Lewis, Media Money: How Corporate Spending Blocked

Ad Reform and Other Stores of Influence, Columbia

Journalism Review (NRA App. 697-97) ......cccccccecsssssees 1997

The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, Se/f

Censorship: How Often and Why, Apr. 30, 2000 (NRA App.

So TUTTI Ais inheetesiecsaelcarsiienistseesiieipatinaantase coast 2000

Xi

Transcript of “Brady Bill” (NRA App. 885)..............+ 2005

Transcript of “Crime Bill” (NRA App. 886-88) ............ 2006

Transcript of “California” (NRA App. 892-904) parvanenata 2010

Transcript of President Clinton Appearance on Today Show

CA Fe GB GI acceccccncccconesnntsncecccesncesescnsesenensscengeons 2034

Transcript of “It Can’t Happen Here” ..............:csceeeeee 2046

Transcript of “MMM Prosecution” ............:c:sccessseeeeeees 2070

Transcript of “Tribute” (NRA Age. a; an 2086

Summary of NRA News Magazines ..............ccc00eceeeeeeees 2096

Transcript of “The Truth About Prosecution” (NRA App.

PTD ccsiecicncsnintesctininaiaitncnsinyptacinieseiiacimaneiannemnatnnian 2102

NRA News Magazine Budget Recap. ............::ccssseeeseee 2115

Adams Exh. 6 :Memoranda from Bush Pioneer Thomas R.

Adams, Exh 34: Jim Abrams, Senate Takes Up Rival to

McCain-Feingold Spending Limits,

er EE ee 2121

I Ge ecesesecincnitnsasesinanteenernmnemunannitninimntoentineonnenes 2125

Huard Deposition Exhibit 4..............c:ccccsscessseeseseeeeeeeees 2127

Huard Deposition Exhibit oe aoe

xiii

VOLUME VI

UMENTS UNDER SEAL

Strother Declaration

seaensnssendubnessdesthbebeienseeeeiedescsentennesene 2146

Huard Deposition Exhibits

2

peacseasseseseencesesssessesesetbocoseoncesesenceseseeeseesees 2153

= poliaheaddiibianietiaticidendidieietbtiaeiiiateseemmeesaises 2159

io dtnaietanenentteradesctibdenatincesentntesiemmmiensesees,ans 2166

Mitchell Deposition Exhibits

7 asenentateneanietieeintnietaneistdediniseunsnesmess. 2169

NieAeneiiatiiniiiaddatintinenttiieciitnigatiatateeeeti 2172

9 (pp. AFL 1582-86) oo... eeccccccccece. 2174

Fil svecoriitnhanticetiencnsiensbididsdeiisesienssemasese 2178

/

1820

FEC TWENTY YEAR REPORT

Shortly after the MCFL decision, the National Right to Work

Committee (NRWC) filed a petition asking the FEC to rewrite

its rules to adopt the Court's conclusion that "express

advocacy" is the proper standard for determining when

communications by corporations and labor organizations are

prohibited under §441b. The Commission responded by

publishing an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

seeking comments on how the agency should respond to the

MCFL decision.

The Commission received more than 17,000 comments in

response to the Advance Notice, most of which supported the

NRWC's position on express advocacy. Nevertheless, the

comments, the testimony at public hearings on the subject and

discussions among the Commissioners themselves all revealed

a wide range of views on how broadly or narrowly the

Commission should define express advocacy. Some

encouraged the Commission to limit express advocacy to the

words and phrases spelled out in Buckley, while others--citing

MCFL and Furgatch--favored a broader interpretation.

In the wake of the Austin decision, the Commission published

a second notice inviting comments on express advocacy and

the MCFL exemption. Again, most of the those commenting

supported adoption of a narrow express advocacy standard.

Several also offered suggestions for implementing the MCFL

exemption.

In its attempt to craft regulations, the Commission has

struggled to find an express advocacy definition that is narrow

enough to avoid impinging upon First Amendment rights, but

broad enough to ensure the effectiveness of the federal

election laws. The definition must distinguish express

advocacy from issue advocacy without creating a loophole

that would, in effect, allow corporations, labor unions and

individuals to sidestep the requirements of the election law.

FEC, Twenty Year Report, Ch. 3, p. 4 (April 1995)

1821

1822

In August 1994, the Commission tentatively approved an

express advocacy definition, but has not taken final action on FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

the rulemaking. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20463

The Commission is also considering proposals to implement

the MCFL exemption allowing certain nonprofit advocacy

groups to make independent expenditures using treasury In the Matter of

funds. In addition, the rulemaking proposals under

consideration would revamp the applicable standards for

corporate and union activities such as the publication of voter

guides and candidate endorsements, in line with the MCFL

decision.

MUR 4624

The Coalition

National Republican

)

)

)

)

)

Soft Money Congressional Committee, et al.

soft money- n. [slang]: funds raised and/or spent

outside the limitations and prohibitions of the FECA.

Sometimes called nonfederal funds, soft money often STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD

includes corporate and/or labor treasury funds, and Co

individual contributions in excess of the federal MMISSIONER BRADLEY A. SMITP

limits, which cannot legally be used in connection

with federal elections, but can be used for other I.

pacoateies . I voted in favor of the General Counsel’s Report of

April 20, 2001 recommending that the file be closed.

However, while some commissioners seem to feel this case

indicates that the Commission’s rules regarding coordination

and political committees do not sufficiently restrain political

speech and participation, ' I believe that this case is

illustrative of the need for still further protections for

Americans wishing to participate in the political life of our

Soft money is one of the most difficult issues the Commission

has addressed during the last 20 years. The origins of "soft

money" lie in the United States' federal system of government.

The Constitution grants each state the right to regulate certain

activities within that state. In the area of campaign finance,

each state may establish its own rules for financing the

nonfederal elections held within its borders. As a result,

committees that support both federal and nonfederal nation. In particular, limiting the Commission’s reach in

candidates frequently must adhere to two different sets of cases involving allegations of coordinated public

campaign finance rules--federal and state. (Sometimes, cities communications to communications involving express

and counties create yet a third set of rules governing the

financing of local elections.)

1

See Statement of Reasons of Commissioner Sc

ott E. Thomas and

e | Chairman Danny L. McDonald, (hereinafter “Thomas/McDonald

FEC, Twenty Year Report, Ch. 3, p. 4 (April 1995) Statement”); Statement for the Record of Commissioner Karl J

Sandstrom (hereinafter “Sandstrom Statement”). )

1823

advocacy,” is, in my view, sound interpretation of both the

statute and judicial precedent, and is required by the

Constitution.

[1]

The broad facts and procedure of this case are

substantially as put forth in the Statement of Reasons filed by

Commissioner Thomas and Chairman McDonald.’ In March

of 1997, the Democratic National Committee (“DNC”) filed

a complaint alleging that various Republican Party affiliated

committees, and a large number of business and trade

associations supportive of the general agenda of Republicans

in Congress, had in 1996 committed massive violations of

the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended

(“FECA” or “the Act”). This triggered a four-year

investigation of more than 60 committees and organizations

plus several individual respondents. The Commission’s

attorneys took nine depositions, collected thousands of pages

of documents, and interviewed numerous other witnesses,

before this case came to its merciful end.*

? The term “express advocacy” stems from the Supreme Court’s decision

in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). In that case, the court limited the

reach of sections 608(e)( 1) and 434(e) of the FECA to those

communications that “in express terms advocate the election or defeat of

a clearly identified candidate,” id. at 44, then held that a cap on section

608(e)( 1) expenditures, even as narrowed, was unconstitutional. As

examples of express advocacy, the Court offered such terms as “‘vote

for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ ‘cast your ballot for,’ ‘Smith for Congress,’ “vote

against,” ‘defeat,’ ‘reject.”” Buckley at 44, n.52. This limitation on the

reach of regulation has been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court, see

Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479

U.S. 238 (1986) (hereinafter “MCFL”), and countless lower courts, see

infra note 27. The question in this case is whether or not this limitation

applies to communications that are coordinated with the campaign.

3 See Thomas/McDonald Statement at 2-4.

* | joined the Commission on June 26, 2000, at which time the case had

been going on for over three years. Two weeks later, on July 11, 2000, I

joined in a 5-0 Commission vote in favor of an additional round of

1824

Despite the fact that the Commission has now found

no violations in this case, I strongly suspect that the original

complainant, the Democratic National Committee, considers

its complaint to have been a success. The complaint

undoubtedly forced their political opponents to spend

hundreds of thousands, if not millions of dollars in legal fees

and ~ devote countless hours of staff, candidate, and

executive time to responding to discovery and handli

matters. Despite our finding that their ahaa

coordinated and so did not violate the Act, I strongly suspect

a the huge costs imposed by the investigation will

reer rns similar participation by these and other groups in

| . We cannot fault the complainant DNC for pursui

its political goals through the legal tools made alidieer it,

but nor can we on the Commission blind ourselves to the fact

that the substantial majority of the complaints filed with the

Commission are filed by political opponents of those they

name as respondents. These complaints are usually filed as

much to harass, annoy, chill, and dissuade their opponents

from speaking as to vindicate any public interest in

‘discovery. I now recognize tlie error of that vote, for

a below, hae no longer lend my vote to any = oo the

7 ~ cag and groups whose communications do not contain

Pore of the Respondents in this MUR have also expressed their belief

t General Counsel 8 Report of April 20, 2001, while ultimately

Pom that no action be taken against them, unfairly maligns

and insinuates illegal conduct. See Letter of Jan Witold

rye to Commission, June 13, 2001; Letter of Benjamin L. Ginsberg, et

's pecker: ome Counsel Lois G. Lerner, July 5, 2001. I share the

—— of respondents that reports to the Commission ought not

to impugn the activities and motives of respondents when the

evidence does not support continuing with the case or when no violation

is found, and I believe that this type of tone will further discourage

— and groups from participating in political activity in the

1825

preventing “corruption or the appearance of corruption.”

This knowledge makes it particularly important that we be

sensitive to the possibility that

[2]

our interpretations of the Act can, and sometimes do, chill

what is and ought to be constitutionally protected political

speech.

In this case, the Office of General Counsel concluded

that it could not prove that the activities and disbursements of

the respondents were coordinated with candidates and

committees pursuant to the regulations promulgated by the

Commission only last December. See 11 C.F.R. § 100.23.

These coordination rules were themselves a salutary effort to

address problems of vagueness and overbreadth in the

Commission’s prior practices, which lacked any clear

definition of “cooperation, consultation, or concert,” see 2

USS.C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i), and provided inadequate guidance

to groups and individuals as to what activities would be

deemed “coordinated” under the Act. See Federal Election

Commission v. Christian Coalition, 52 F. Supp.2d 45

(D.D.C. 1999); see also Clifton v. Federal Election

Commission, 114 F.3d 1309 (ist Cir. 1997). Groups and

individuals who petition the government, contact their

elected representatives, or perhaps are friends or

acquaintances of representatives or Congressional staffers,

former staffers, or friends and acquaintances of the same,

need guidance on what conduct falls short of coordination

without concluding that the only clear way to avoid liability

° The phrase “corruption or appearance of corruption” comes from

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976), and serves as the constitutionally

valid rationale for regulating political speech in the form of campaign

contributions and expenditures. Although this case involves the DNC

complaining about Republican candidates and organizations and their

allies, it goes without saying that Republicans file charges against

Democrats.

1826

is to refrain from making independent expenditures

. The

conduct standard implemented by the new coordination rule

z a vast improvement over the past practices of the

Commission, providing much-needed guidance t

independent expenditures.’ aa asain

Untortunately, in promulgating 11 C.F.R. § 100.23

the Commission provided scant guidance to groups engaged

in issue advocacy,’ by not addressing the question of whether

a content standard, as well as a conduct standard, would be

” Commissioners Thomas and McDonald, who voted agai j

the regulations, complain that the regulations are sivas er

Thomas/McDonald Statement at 4-14. For reasons I state below I

believe they comply with the Act and that our old practices exceeded the

scope of both the Act and the Constitution. Commissioners Thomas and

McDonald also argue that the Commission has thwarted the will of the

Senate, Thomas/McDonald Statement at 17, by implementing these

regulations in the wake of the Senate’s passage of S.27, the McCain-

Feingold bill. Section 214 of S. 27 would effectively repeal the

coordination rule of 11 C.F.R. 100.23. We are not, of course, entrusted

with implementing the will of the Senate, at least not until such time as

. the House of Representatives manifests the same “will” and the President

has one signed the bill, allowed it to become law without his signature

a pee over-ridden by the necessary two-thirds majority of each

—_ generally, INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). I note that

gh the Senate received the proposed final rule on December 7

2000, it did not “disapprove” the rule by resolution within thirty

a days of its receipt, as it was free to do pursuant to 2 U.S.C.

* As terms of art, “independent expenditures ” express

election or defeat of a candidate. Though not limited 4 aac o are

subject to other provisions of the Act. “Issue advocacy,” on the =

hand, is political discussion that does not contain explicit words of

roar of election or defeat, and so has been protected by the Supreme

— —— regulation. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44, n.52; MCFL, 479

' - at 9. The issue here is whether an issue ad, if coordinated with a

candidate, becomes subject to the Act.

1827

required before coordinated public communications would be

subject to the rule.” This failure is

(3]

ecause as this case demonstrates, the conduct

ert ne does not provide an adequately bright line to

prevent the specter of investigation and litigation from

chilling constitutionally protected speech. When a ~—

decides to make independent political expenditures, he _

himself up to two potential burdens under the Act. The

burden is to report those independent expenditures in or

of $250.00. See 2 U.S.C. § pr tes The — - ” defen

tions that the advocacy was so vw

aude or coordinated with a candidate which, if -

would lead to still greater limits on the person’s politica ,

activity. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(17). Respondents can spen

substantial sums defending themselves against such

allegations, and this possibility will cause many speakers a

~ avoid engaging in what ought to be constitutionally protec

" anation and Justification of the final rule, the Commission

ann pn is “addressing the constitutional concerns — rie

by creating a safeharbor for issue discussion. See ase emi -~

Final Rule on General Public Political Communications Coo a,

Candidates and Party Committees; Independent —— =

Reg. 76138, 76141 (Dec. 7, 2000). This statement is true bu ~” -.

only with respect to 11 CFR section 100.23(d), which makes c ender

candidate’s response to on inquiry sageeting fer pens issu ue

not suffice to establish coordination. /d. Otherwise, the > — any

not provided an adequate safeharbor for issue discussion, ~ i

of yet, determined the content standard necessary for regu = —_

coordinated communications. See id. at 76141 (“The Commissi

adopting any content standard as part of these rules at a een

time.” (emphasis added). The Commission's conscious decis a

address a content standard should not be read as a presumption

Commission has made a final decision against requiring a a

standard, however, for as the Explanation & Justification also “— ,

“the Commission may revisit the issue of a content standard for

coordinated communications when it considers candidate-party

coordination.” 65 Fed Reg. at 76141.

1828

speech. Thus, a bright line test is needed. A content test—

express advocacy—provides such a bright line. If a financier

of general public communications is not willing to defend

against charges that his speech was authorized bya

candidate, or prefers not to disclose the sources of his

funding, see e.g. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958),

McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334

(1995), he can simply delete from his message words of

express advocacy and speak on any other topic of his

choosing. If he is investigated nonetheless, he can be assured

that the investigation will be short, non-intrusive, and

inexpensive, merely by demonstrating the absence of express

advocacy in his communications. Absent a content standard,

however, no such immediate defense is available if the

Commission launches an investigation into the alleged

coordination with candidates. Further, such an investigation

is likely to be highly intrusive, as is demonstrated by this

case and another recent high-profile matter eventually

resulting in no finding of a violation, MUR 4291 (American

Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial

Organizations). The investigation can include extensive

rifling through the respondents’ files, public revelations of

internal plans and strategies, depositions of group leaders,

and the like. Such allegations and investigations may be

avoided only by completely avoiding all contact with

candidates, because even minimal contact could trigger a

credible allegation. Oddly, the less immediately obvious

evidence there is that the conduct would meet the standard of

11 C.F.R. § 100.23, the more intrusive the investigation is

likely to be, as the Commission searches for evidence of the

veracity of the complaint. The effect of the rule becomes

essentially the same as that of the rule struck down in Clifton;

“it treads heavily upon the right of citizens, individual or

corporate, to confer and discuss public matters with their

legislative representatives or candidates for such office,” and

is therefore, “patently offensive to the First Amendment.”

1829

114 F.3d 1309, 1314 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, §22 US.

1108 (1998).

[4]

With that in mind, I believe that the Act, che .

Constitution, judicial precedent, and sound public —

require us to limit our enforcement to cases in whic

communications, whether or not coordinated with a .

candidate, expressly advocate the election or defeat o

candidates for federal office. Failure to include such a

content standard has and will have a chilling effect on

political participation and speech.

Il.

Institutional competence and prudence requires that

executive agencies charged with enforcing the law, even

more than the courts, ought to adhere to the general eS

of not unnecessarily deciding Constitutional issues. ae a

first analyze our authority under the statute. I believe tha

statute, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, does not ‘

authorize us to regulate issue advocacy, even when suc

advocacy is coordinated with a candidate.

ibutions are

Corporate expenditures and contn

prohibited under section 441b of the Act. The phrase

“contribution or expenditure” in section 441b is defined .

separately in 2 U.S.C. section 441b(b)(2)." Nevertheless, in

1 9 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) provides as follows:

eae cogupemsattincenian...0oter .

‘contribution or expenditure’ shall include any direct or

indirect payment, distribution, loan, advance, mee

or gift of money or any other services, or anything o

value (except a loan of money by a national or State

bank made in accordance with the applicable banking

laws and regulations in the ordinary course of business)

to any candidate, campaign committee, or political

1830

Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for

Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1986)("MCFL”), the United States

Supreme Court looked to the general definitions section of

the Act, 2 U.S.C. section 431, to define the scope of the term

“expenditure” as used in section 44 Ib. See 479 U.S. at 245-

46. The MCFL Court also held that “an expenditure must

constitute ‘express advocacy’ in order to be subject to the

prohibition of44Ib.” Jd. at 249. There is no reason to believe

that section 431, the general definitions section, is not as

applicable in construing the term “contribution” in section

441b as it is in construing the term “expenditure” in 44 1b.

Section 431(8)(B)(vi) states that the term “cont:ibution” does

not include “any payment made or obligation incurred by a

corporation or labor union which, under section 441b(b) of

this title, would not [first] constitute an expenditure by such

corporation or labor organization.” 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(B)(vi).

Because the Court has determined that the term

“expenditure,” as used in section 441b, is limited to

communications containing express advocacy, and because

the Coalition did not engage in express advocacy, the

corporate respondents in this MUR did not make prohibited

“expenditures” under section 441b. They therefore cannot

have made prohibited in-kind “contributions” under section

441b, by way of section 441a(a)(7)(B)(i). Likewise, the

committees involved in this MUR could not have accepted

in-kind corporate contributions from the Coalition in

violation of 2 U.S.C. section 44lb.

[5]

Nor do I believe that non-corporate respondents

violate the Act through coordinated issue advocacy. In

Buckley, the Supreme Court held that the phrase “for the

purpose of influencing’ an election or nomination,”

appearing in the definition of “expenditure” at 2 U.S.C.

party or organization, in connection with any election

to any of the offices referred to in this section. ...

1831

section 431 (9)(A)(i), limited the meaning of “expenditure”

to communications containing express advocacy, at least

when, as in this case, the speaker was not a political

committee. 424 U.S. 1 at 79-80. After the Buckley decision

was handed down, Congress, fully aware of the Court’s

restrictive interpretation of the term “expenditure” in section

431 (9)(A)(i), used the term “expenditure” in amending ~

section 441a(a)(7)(B)(i). Section 441a(a)(7)(B)(i) provides

that “expenditures made by any person in cooperation,

consultation, or concert with ... a candidate ... shall be

considered to be a contribution to such candidate.”

(emphasis added). Congress’s post-Buckley use of the term

“expenditure”—where the statutory definition of the term as

interpreted by the Supreme Court is limited to

communications containing words of express advocacy—

indicates that even coordinated public communications must

contain express advocacy before they can be transformed into

regulable in-kind contributions."

Indeed, Congress has responded to the courts on this

topic before. After Buckley, Congress limited the disclaimer

provisions to apply specifically to express advocacy

communications, 2 U.S.C. § 441d(a), even where those

communications are coordinated with a candidate.'* If

'! Additionally, section 431(8)(A){i) of the Act limits the definition of

“contribution” to any gift, etc. “made ... for the purpose of influencing” a

federal election. 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A){i). This is the same statutory

phrase as is used in the definition of “expenditure,” 2 U.S.C. § 431

(9)(A)(i), and which was construed by the Buckley Court to require a

showing of express advocacy. The Buckley Court referred to 2 U.S.C. §

431(8)(A)(i) arid 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(A)(i) as “parallel provisions.”

Buckley at 77.

2 Soe Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 497, May 11, 1976 (amending 2

U.S.C. § 441d). 2 U.S.C. § 441d(a){(2) provides in pertinent part:

Whenever any person makes an expenditure for the

of financing communications expressly

advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified

candidate ... such communication ... (2) if paid for by

other persons but authorized by a candidate, an

1832

Congress had intended for coordinated issue advocacy

communications to be within the jurisdiction of the FECA, it

surely would have required a disclaimer for such

communications.

Finally, that the Act as current

, y written requires

express advocacy before coordinated public communications

are subject to its terms is evidenced by the fact that, in

pending legislation, the Senate has approved an amendment

to do away with any requirement of e

awa: xpress ad

coordination provisions of the Act.!* ’ er

[6]

. Given that the respondents in this c

in express advocacy, this should have caine the

spring of 1997, without the extensive investigation that

followed. The Commission may only pursue violations of

the FECA. See 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(2). For me this is

adequate to dismiss the case." However, recognizing that

the statute is not a model of clarity in this regard, and in light

of the apparent certainty of other commissioners that the Act

authorized political committee of a candidate. or i

, Or its

an ee — state that the cenumntasion t

or by such other persons and authorized

“ authorized political committee. =

. we ver ne, the Second Circuit had also held that issue advocacy

ae ow oo “A a disclosure provisions of the FECA, United

1972) mittee for Impeachment, 469 U.S. 1135 (2d Cir.

See S. 27, Sec. 214, 107th Congress, Ist i

- 7 SEC. » 107 , Ist Session (commonly kno

lo ey a bill) (amending the Act’s definition m sag

Prenat to include “any coordinated expenditure or other

made by any person in connection with a candidate’s

campaign, regardless of whether the expenditure or disbursement is a

ae se that contains express advocacy.”)

“aa ee also made “reason to believe” findings under section

nce ~ make disclaimers . As section 441d, by its express

a » 0 no applies to “communications expressly advocating election or

eat, this charge could have been easily dismissed as well.

1833

at least allows for regulation of coordinated —_ — I

believe it worthwhile to set forth more fully why it!

wise policy, and constitutionally required, to ro arin

enforcement efforts to communications including exp

advocacy.

Ill. A.

< of the

The starting point for any analysis Oo ;

constitutional and policy issues involved in enforcing the

FECA is the recognition that “{t}he Act’s pene mete and

expenditure limitations operate in an area of mae m ar

fundamental First Amendment activities.” Buckley,

at 14. With that in mind, a key concern of the —. -

Court’s Buckley decision was to prevent the Act ae _

a “chilling” effect on speech pertaining to public —

affairs. See 424 U.S. at 41, n. 47. The Court not .

vague laws may not only ‘trap the innocent by

not providing fair warning’ or foster arbitrary

and discriminatory application but also

operate to inhibit protected expression by

inducing ‘citizens to steer far wider of the

unlawful zone... than if the boundaries of the

forbidden areas were clearly marked.

‘Because First Amendment freedoms need

breathing space to survive, government may

regulate in the area only with narrow

specificity.’

424 US. at 41, n. 48 (citations omitted).

In Buckley, the Supreme Court accepted oe

limits as constitutionally permissible, but oe —

on expenditures as violations of the First Am = *. ao

were three major reasons for providing greater pro atl

expenditures than to contributions. First, the Court =

limits on contributions were a lesser burden on speec

1834

because a contribution, unlike an expenditure for public

communications, did not “communicate the underlying basis

for the support. 424 U.S. at 21. Second, limits on

expenditures “reduce [] the quantity of expression by

restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their

exploration, and the size of the audience reached.” Id. at 19.

Limits on contributions to candidates, on the other hand, do

not necessarily have the effect of materially reducing

political discussion because they “leave the contributor free

to become a member of any political association” and permit

such associations “to aggregate large sums of money to

promote effective advocacy.” Jd. at 22. F inally, limits on

contributions “focus [3] precisely on the problem of...

[7]

corruption....” By contrast, limitations on expenditures raise

the concerns of vagueness that cause “citizens to steer far and

wide of the unlawful zone.” /d. at 41, n. 48.

Thus, in analyzing section 608(e)(1) of the Act, which

provided that “[nJo person may make any expenditure ...

relative to a clearly identified candidate during a calendar

year which ... exceeds $1,000,” the Court held that “the use

of so indefinite a phrase as ‘relative to’ a candidate fails to

clearly mark the boundary between permissible and

impermissible speech.” /d. at 41. It continued:

The constitutional deficiencies [of vagueness]

can be avoided only by reading §608(e)(1) as

limited to communications that include

explicit words of advocacy of election or

defeat of a candidate. ... [F]unds spent to

propagate one’s views on issues without

expressly calling for a candidate’s election or

defeat are thus not covered... [I]n order to

preserve the provision against invalidation on

vagueness grounds, §608(e)(1) must be

1835

construed to apply only to expenditures for

communications that in express terms

advocate the election or defeat of a clearly

identified candidate for federal office.

Buckley at 43-44.

These same concerns arose when the Court .

considered the Act’s disclosure provisions. Once again, the

Court could have regulated issue advocacy, but did not.

Rather, the Court chose again to give the term ‘expenditure

a limiting construction. The Court stated:

[T]he [disclosure] provision raises serious

problems of vagueness, ... [that] may deter

those who seek to exercise protected F irst

Amendment rights. Section 434(e) applies to

‘fe]very person ... who makes contributions or

expenditures.’ ‘Contributions’ and

‘expenditures’ are defined ... in terms of

money or other valuable assets ‘for the

purpose of influencing’ the nomination or —

election of candidates for federal office. It is

the ambiguity of this phrase that poses

constitutional problems.

***

There is no legislative history to guide us in

determining the scope of the critical phrase

‘for the purpose of ... influencing’... Where

the constitutional requirement of definiteness

is at stake, we have the further obligation to

construe the statute, if that can be done

consistent with the legislative purpose, to

avoid the shoals of vagueness.

***

1836

[8]

When we attempt to define ‘expenditure’ ...

we encounter line-drawing problems of the

sort we faced in §608(e)(1). Although the

phrase ‘for the purpose of ... influencing’ an

election or nomination, differs from the

language used in §608(e)(1), it shares the same

potential for‘encompassing both issue

discussion and advocacy of a political result.

Id. at 76-79. (Citations omitted). The Court worried that the

“general requirement that ‘political committees’ and

candidates disclose their expenditures could raise similar

vagueness problems, for ‘political committee’ is defined only

in terms of the amount of annual ‘contributions’ and

‘expenditures,’ and could be interpreted to reach groups

engaged purely in issue discussion.” Jd at 79. However,

because the vagueness problems associated with the term

“politic al committee” had already been largely resolved due

to narr. + readings of the statute by lower courts, it was not

the effe. . upon groups defined as “political committees”

under the Act that particularly concerned the Court.

The Court was more concerned about the effects that

a vague and overbroad law could have upon the otherwise

lawful First Amendment activities of other groups and

individuals.'> The Court, therefore, narrowed the term “for

the purpose of influencing” to save the definition of the terms

“expenditure” and “contribution” from being

unconstitutionally overbroad: “To insure that the reach of

§434(e) is not impermissibly broad, we construe

“expenditure” ... in the same way we construed the terms of

§608(e)— to reach only funds used for communications that

'S See Buckley at 79. Our new coordination regulations deal specifically

with groups and individuals, exempting party committees and authorized

committees. 65 Fed Reg. 76141-76142.

1837

defeat of a clearly

expressly advocate the election or |

saensified candidate.” Jd. at 80. Thus, the Court concluded:

[Section] 434(e) as construed imposes

independent reporting requirements on

individuals and groups only in the following

circumstances: (1) when they make

contributions earmarked for political purposes

or authorized or requested by a candidate --» 10

some person other than a candidate or political

committee, and (2) when they make

expenditures for communications that

expressly advocate the election or defeat of a

clearly identified candidate.

+***

As [constitutionally] narrowed, §434(c), like

§608(e)(1), does not reach all partisan

discussion for it only requires disclosure of

those expenditures that expressly advocatea -

particular election result.

Buckley at 80.

In reviewing the Buckley decision then, we see that

each time the Buckley Court considered the definition of

“expenditure,” it narrowly interpreted the term to avoid

[9]

” f vagueness and

vagueness or overbreadth. ’ Concerns 0 ness and ~

oma were foremost in the Buckley Court’s thinking in

— ; ;, nd. 65

as also Federal Election Commission v. Survival Education F und,

23608. 294-95 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that the phrase nse

earmarked for political purposes” must, for reasons of oe =

limited to contributions earmarked for communications t expressly

advocate the election or defeat of candidates for office).

1838

interpreting all aspects of the FECA. Most importantly, it

found that the qualifying phrase “for the purpose of

influencing,” which is also part of the Act’s definition of

“contribution,” 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A)(i), could be saved from

vagueness problems only by construing it as applying to

“words that in express terms advocate ... election or defeat.”

The Buckley Court referenced coordinated

communications only in passing. In arguing Buckley, the

parties defending the Act contended that its limitation on

independent expenditures was necessary to prevent would-be

contributors from avoiding the contribution limitations of the

Act by paying directly for media advertisements or other

portions of the candidate’s campaign activities. The Court

addressed this concern with a brief statement that “controlled

or coordinated expenditures are treated as contributions

rather than expenditures under the Act” under Section

608(c)(2)(B), id. at 46 (emphasis added), noting that

““§$608(e)(1) does not apply to expenditures ‘on behalf of a

candidate’ within the meaning of §608(c)(2)(B). The latter

subsection provides that expenditures ‘authorized or

requested by the candidate’ ... are to be treated as

expenditures of the candidate and contributions by the person

making the expenditure.” /d. at 46, n.53.

What the Court did not specifically address is whether

it intended the same limiting construction of the term

“expenditure” it had applied to sections 608(e)(1) and 434(e)

to apply to section 608(c)(2)(B). Clearly the Court did not

intend for independent issue advocacy to be regulated, but

one might argue that in holding that authorized or requested

“expenditures” are “contributions” under the Act, the Court

meant to include coordinated issue advocacy. However, the

Buckley Court’s example of a coordinated “expenditure” that

would be treated as 2 contribution, itself taken from the

legislative history of the Act, is an express advocacy ad.

1839

[A] person might purchase billboard :

advertisements endorsing a candidate... (1)

the advertisement was placed in cooperation

with the candidate’s campaign organization,

then the amount would constitute a gift by the

supporter and an expenditure by the

candidate—just as if there had been a direct

contribution enabling the candidate to place

the advertisement himself.

Buckley at 46, n. 53 (emphasis added). Nothing — that

the Court did not intend to extend to section 608(c) the ”

narrow definition of “expenditure” it had given the term a

section 608(e). Of course, it is possible that the Court ne

considered that a candidate would request or authorize a

“media advertisements” that did not expressly ——e “dl

election or defeat of one candidate or another. After all,

legal distinction between

[10]

express ads and issue ads did not exist before Buckley, 8) ;

there would have been no reason for a campaign to ag

an ad that did not expressly advocate election or defeat. bem ,

the most probable interpretations of Buckley are that ~ y

limited the term “expenditure” in section er / Oo

disbursements for express advocacy, or simply did no

address the issue. That the Court intended to find ‘a

coordinated issue ads to be covered by the Act seems the

least probable interpretation.

uestion we face is whether, in light of

ouaain : orem the holdings in Buckley and its —.

the Constitutional concerns raised by the Supreme Co :

lower courts, and our position as officials of the = oe :

branch who have independently taken an oath to upho

1840

Constitution,'’ we can or should interpret the Act as reaching

coordinated spending for issue advocacy communications.

In considering the question, I note first that each of

the Constitutional concerns raised by the Buckley Court as

reasons for providing greater protection to expenditures than

to contributions is present in the context of coordinated issue

advocacy disbursements. First, the coordinated issue

advocacy disbursements do more than merely “serve as a

general expression of support;” they do in fact “communicate

the underlying basis for the support.” See Buckley, 424 U.S.

at 21. Second, restrictions on coordinated issue advocacy

spending are, as a practical matter, likely to lead to a

“reduc[tion] in the quantity of expression by restricting the

number of issues discussed.” See id. at 19. Arguably, of

course, these groups might simply run their ads

independently, so that no such speech reduction would result.

As we know, however, groups regularly work with members

of Congress to promote shared agendas. As the Buckley

Court recognized, “[d]iscussions of those issues, and as well

more positive efforts to influence public opinion on them,

tend naturally and inexorably to exert some influence on

voting at elections.” Jd. at 43,n. 50. If the Act applies to

coordinated issue advocacy, many groups will be unable both

to work with elected representatives and to run ads

attempting to influence public opinion on issues of mutual

interest. In short, the groups will be asked to surrender either

their rights of free speech and association or their rights of

speech and to petition for redress. As already noted, the

threat of investigation is itself often sufficient to chill speech.

It is exactly our job, as the administrative agency with

” Unlike some of my colleagues, I do not interpret that oath to mean that

we can fulfill our constitutional obligations simply by ignoring

constitutional considerations until and unless we are bound by judicial

tuling. Rather, as representatives of a co-equal branch of government,

our obligation requires us to consider the constitutional implications of

our actions even when we have not been b6und by judicial decisions.

1841

ise | ize the practical

expertise in enforcing the Act, to recognize

- of differing interpretations of the Act and to set policy

accordingly.

Most importantly, efforts to regulate coordinated

issue advocacy raise exactly the vagueness concems at the

heart of Buckley. For example, if Common Cause, having

coordinated its legislative efforts with Senator McCain, were

to also run advertisements in support of its agenda that — aa

mentioned the Senator, whether or not their ads would violate

the Act would depend upon whether or not the Commission

believed that they

(11)

i : lection.” This is the

were “for the purpose of influenc"ag an ¢€

exact standard that the Supreme Court found, without more,

to be unacceptably vague even in terms of the less

burdensome disclosure provisions of the Act.

Because of the resulting vagueness, see Buckley, 424

US. at 41, n. 48, we can anticipate that groups will, in the

future, “steer far wider of the unlawful zone’... than if 3

boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked. e

present case illustrates that only too well. ‘The oo

costs, imposition, and length of the investigation that has

occurred in this case suggests that at least some of the more

than 60 respondents involved, and who knows how wes

other groups and individuals that have witnessed the d acle,

will “steer far wide” rather than risk a lengthy agg “ao

even if that investigation does ultimately lead to a finding o

“no probable cause.”"

At one time, a majority of the Commission seems to

have recognized this vagueness problem. On June 24, 1999,

rey a

os ne at this Commission is well aware of a favorite saying of th

Pho campaign finance law bar: “The process is the punishment.

1842

Commissioners Wold, Mason, and Sandstrom, joined by then

Commissioner Elliott,'” issued a statement of reasons

rejecting the enforcement of coordination cases under a

vague, “electioneering message” content standard.”” The

Commission majority at that time correctly concluded that

the vague “electioneering message” standard offered no

guideposts for free discussion, even in cases where such

discussion was coordinated or presumably coordinated with a

candidate, writing:

The vagueness and overbreadth problems of

the “electioneering message” and “relative to”

standards are thus two sides of the same

counterfeit coin. They are vague because it is

not clear when they encompass issue

discussion and not candidate advocacy. They

are overbroad because, given the nature of

campaigning, they will inevitably encompass

both. For the same substantive reasons that

the Supreme Court held the “relative to”

standard in the FECA to be unconstitutional,

the Commission may not employ the

“electioneering message” standard. Even in

the context of coordinated, or presumably

coordinated, communications in which the

“electioneering message” test has generally

been proposed (see 11 C.F.R.

§114.49c)(5)(ii)c)(5)(11)(B)(E) (regulation of

voter guides)), the Commission may not

ignore these constitutional requirements.

'? | did not join the Commission until June of 2000.

° This appears to have been the standard used by the Commission in

deciding whether or not coordinated issue advocacy was subject to the

Act prior to adoption of 11 CFR § 100.23. See Advisory Opinion 1985-

14 [1976—1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Elec. Camp. Fin. Guide (CCH), §

5819 at 11185.

1843

Statement of Reasons of Vice Chairman Darryl R. ee

Commissioners Lee Ann Elliott, David M. Mason, an

J. Sandstrom on the Audits of “Dole for President |

Committee, Inc.” (Primary), “Clinton/Gore 96 Primary

Committee, Inc.,” “Dole/Kemp 96, inc. (General), .

Dole/Kemp ‘96 Compliance Committee, Inc. (General),

[12]

“Clinton/Gore ‘96 General Election Legal and Compliance

Fund” at 6, (June 24, 1999) (emphasis added).

rtly thereafter, the Federal District Court for the

OB too decided Federal Election ———"

v. Christian Coalition, 52 F. Supp.2d 45 (D. 7

That decision held that corporate expenditures | or

coordinated issue ads were subject to the contribution ™

prohibitions of 2 U.S.C. section 441b.~° Id. nea oun . .

single district court decision seems to have agence Oo

re-evaluation of the Commission’s previously expr

appreciation for and insistence upon definite conten

standards, I will address this decision and related precedent at

some length.”

In MCFL the Supreme Court had held that issue

advocacy by corporations and unions does not constitute an

2! In doing so the district court failed to address the ne mg t ; jog

431(8)(B)(vi) in light of the Supreme Court's holding in ,

21 wnt ri the Christian Coalition case was a factor in this change

as all three Commissioners still on the Commission ge a on

the need for clear content standards after that opinion. ol

possibility is that these commissioners believe that ——e oa

overbreadth can be cured by a content standard see a ne

“electioneering message” standard they specifically = oe

express advocacy test they have so far not adopted, gh

such standard has been proposed.

1844

“expenditure” pursuant to the Act. 479 U.S. at 249. Thus,

corporate and union communications lacking express

advocacy are not only not “independent expenditures””?

under Section 44lb—they are not “expenditures” at all.

Nevertheless, the Christian Coalition court concluded that

whether or not corporate or union activity is prohibited or

protected turns upon whether the activity is “in connection

with an election,” and not whether the activity is an

“expenditure,” under the Act because, “(t]he real issue ... is

whether an expenditure is ‘authorized’ by a campaign or

‘coordinated’ with the campaign.” 52 F. Supp.2d at 87-88.

The Christian Coalition court went on to argue that “Buckley,

in its treatment of coordinated expenditures as in-kind

contributions, left undiscussed the First Amendment

concerns that arise with respect to ‘expressive coordinated

expenditures.’ ... It can only be surmised that the Buckley

majority purposely left this issue for another case.”24 52 F.

Supp.2d at 85.

[13]

” The district court stated that “corporations and unions can make

independent expenditures that are related to a federal election campaign

so long as those expenditures are not for communications that advocate

the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.” Christian

Coalition at 48 (emphasis in the original). Because the term

“independent expenditure” is defined within the FECA as requiring

express advocacy, see 2 U.S.C. § 431(17), and section 44 1b prevents

corporations and unions from making any FECA “expenditures” we

know that the district court meant “issue advocacy” by its use of the term

“independent expenditures” in the above sentence.

** The Buckley Court allowed contributions to be carved from First

Amendment protection largely because contribution limits “involve []

little direct restraint on [one’s] political communication [and] does not in

any way infringe on the contributor’s freedom to discuss candidates and

issues.” Buckley at 21. Investigating issue advocates on the theory that

their communications may be coordinated with a candidate is a direct

restraint on a speaker's freedom to discuss candidates and issues.

1845

In addressing the issue, the Christian Coalition court

next recognized a need to differentiate between

“expenditures on non-communicative materials, such as

hamburgers or travel expenses for campaign staff,” which,

like direct contributions to the candidate, do not

communicate the underlying basis of support, and

expenditures “in which the spender is responsible for a

substantial portion of the speech.” Jd. at 85, n. 45. The

latter, which the court termed “expressive coordinated

expenditures,” are speech-laden or communicative, and

therefore different from other non-communicative in-kind

contributions. /d. Ultimately, however, the court concluded

that coordinated issue advocacy could be regulated, believing

that it is the “fact of coordination” that is significant, not the

character of the underlying item that is coordinated. The

court seemed to conclude that the lesson of Buckley is that it

is the independence of the speech, rather than its

communicative value, that determines its level of

constitutional protection. In other words, the court focused

only on the corruption side of the coin, but not on the First

Amendment side. Thus, the court found that independent

speech is deserving of clear content standards, but where

independence fades—or at least a complainant alleges it has

faded—speech may be extensively investigated regardless of

‘ts content and without regard for whether that speech

constitutes speech of the spender. See id at 87, n. 50.

The district judge in Christian Coalition reasoned that

Buckley specifically read an express advocacy standard only

into the statutory provisions regarding independent

expenditures ‘relative to’ a clearly identified candidate and

‘for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal

office.’ 52 F. Supp.2d at 87, n.50. Therefore, the court

concluded, for all other parts of the FECA, the Buckley Court

must have “used the term ‘expenditure’ advisedly, leaving

intact the normal, broad meaning Congress had given it.” Jd.

But what “normal, broad meaning” had Congress given the

1846

td expenditure”? Webster’s Dictionary defines

be as ‘the act of expending; a spending or usin

” oO money, time, etc.; disbursement.” Webster’s New ;

eee Century Dictionary of the English Language, p

: - rn > 1977. Clearly the Act did not intend, nor would

nstitutional to prohibit all expenditures or

re by a person in excess of $1000, at least not in

aa aco ed meaning of the terms. Thus Congress

Siaeieneien ae of both the terms “expenditure” and

aauae oO, [a]nything of value ... for the purpose of

my poy 4 oe np Federal office.” 2 U.S.C. §§ 431

1) (emphasis added). Th

crane ae phrase “for a re 7

ill insufficient

meng of vagueness and overbreadth? par aaa

pr only express advocacy. 424 U.S. at 79. If, as the ;

rs rer Coalition court maintained, the Buckley Court

po nh oO phrase only with regard to independent

a ped — phrase must still be imbued with

por ney an meaning before deciding which

ye am isoursements are regulable “expenditures,” and

erefore “contributions” subject to the Act.

[14]

= When a group engages in public discussion

— issues and coordinates its activity with a his

committee, the critical phrase that turns the speech int

prohibited or limited activity is that it is speech “for rn :

— of influencing an election.” The court in Christian

Sichquilalp@duteganatietase

saphena ee

express advocacy in the context of ioadialiicnentinen

25

There is no legislative history to gui

ef guide [the courts] in determining

sc ‘

ope of the critical phrase ‘for the purpose of influencing,” cane

77, yet “[i}t is the ambigui i

olen te iguity of this phrase that poses constitutional

1847

it must have decided that groups that are alleged to have

engaged in coordinated speaking are not faced with the same

concerns of vagueness and overbreadth. In fact, the Supreme

Court has simply never specifically answered the question.”°

There is no normal, accepted meaning of the phrase,

“for the purpose of influencing,” and Congress has not

provided one. An “unconstitutionally overbroad statute may

not be enforced at all until an acceptable construction has

been obtained.” McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 259

(1971), reh'g denied, 406 U.S. 978 (1972). Either the

Commission or the courts must give the phrase “for the

purpose of influencing” some prospective, content-based

meaning.”

2° See ante at 13.

27 tn the context of FECA, the courts have consistently used an “express

advocacy” test to give meaning to the Act’s vague or overly broad

provisions. See e.g. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Massachusetts

Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1986); Maine Right to Life v. FEC, 98

F.3d 1 (1" Cir. 1996), cert. denied 118 S. Ct. 52 (1997); FEC v. Christian

Action Network, Inc., 92 F.3d 1178 (4" Cir. 1996) (summarily affirming

894 F. Supp. 947 (W.D. Va. 1995)); Faucher v. FEC, 928 F.2d 468 (1*

Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 820 (1991); FEC v. Central Long Island Tax

Reform Immediately Comm., 616 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc);

- Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 839 F. Supp. 1448 (D.

Co.), rev ‘d on other grounds, 59F.3d 1015 (1061 Cir. 1995), vacated on

other grounds, 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996); Right to Life of Michigan v.

Miller, 23 F. Supp.2d 766 (W.D. Mich. 1998); FEC v. National Org. for

Women, 713 F. Supp. 428 (D. D.C. 1989); FEC v. American Fed'n of

State, County & Mun. Employees, 471 F. Supp. 315(D. D.C. 1979). See

also FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 US.

480, 497 (1985) (holding that the First Amendment prohibits limits on

independent expenditures that expressly advocate the election or defeat of

a candidate, and noting in dicta “[tJhe fact that candidates and elected

officials may alter or reaffirm their own positions on issues in response to

political messages ... can hardly be called corruption, for one of the

essential features of democracy is the presentation to the electorate of

varying points of view.”); Clifton v. FEC, 114 F.3d 1309 (1* Cir. 1997)

(holding that the Commission’s efforts to regulate “issue advocacy” as

“contributions” exceeded its powers under the FECA, and stating, “we do

1848

IV.

The approach to coordinated expenditures ad

+ sarge Thomas and McDonald would cari “4

C ommission from any need to clearly define which speech is

for the purpose of influencing” elections until after an

extensive investigation. They would have this determination

made by the Commission on a case-by-case basis after an

investigation which would be, in effect, a search for evidence

of the respondent’s true intent based upon a totality of the

circumstances. These Commissioners believe a complete

oe in this case, for example, could have shown that

e “the Coalition’s communications were undertaken for the

purpose of influencing federal elections” because the

Coalition “aired ads in the weeks before the election;”

“d

[15]

direct mail ten days before the election:” and ‘ it”

for the reelection of many members Bosca =

Thomas/McDonald Statement, at 12, n. 6, (internal citations

omitted). Additionally, they would find that “(there is no

indication that the Coalition was formed for any purpose

other than building ne public support for certain candidates

[and] nothing suggesting that the Coalition engaged in

issue discussion outside the context of elections.” -

Thomas/McDonald Statement at 15. The capstone for the

Commissioners is a quote from the Coalition itself: “Our

ultimate objective is to return a pro-business, fiscally

Tesponsible majority for the 105" Congress.”

not take Congress ’

interests.”) to have authorized rules that sacrifice First Amendment

1849

Thomas/McDonald Statement at 16 (emphasis omitted),

quoting The Washington Post, August 8, 1996.”

These criteria offer no prospective guidance and

contribute little if anything to overcoming the vagueness

problem. Because, as the Supreme Court noted in Buckley,

“campaigns themselves generate issues of public interest,”

424 US. at 42, and because public interest in issues is often

highest close to an election, the logical time to engage in

28 Commissioners Thomas and McDonald also cite these facts for the

proposition that the Coalition was a “political committee” that must

register under 2 U.S.C. § 433 and report its activity under 2 U.S.C. § 434.

Thomas/McDonald Statement at 15-17. The Act defines “political

committee” as “any ... association ... of persons which receives

contributions ... or makes expenditures aggregating in excess of $1 ,000

during a calendar year.” 2 U.S.C. § 431(4)(A) (emphasis added). The

Buckley Court cautioned that the broad statutory definition of ‘political

committee,’ which turns on the terms contribution and expenditure and

on the phrase “for the purpose of influencing any election” had the

potential for encompassing “both issue discussion and advocacy or a

political result” and thus might encroach upon First Amendment

freedoms. Buckley at 79. Therefore, to fulfill the purposes of the Act, the

term political committee. “need only encompass organizations that are

under the control of a candidate or the major purpose of which is the

nomination or election of a candidate.” /d. While an organization’s

purpose may be evidenced by its public statements of its purpose, see

MCEL at 262, such an inquiry is secondary to the requisite of finding

“expenditures” or “contributions” in excess of $1,000. So “[e]ven if the

organization’s major purpose is the election of a federal candidate or

candidates [, as Commissioners Thomas and McDonald insist the

evidence would conclude,] the organization does not become a “political

committee” unless or until it makes expenditures in cash or in kind.” See

Machinists at 392. The argument that “major purpose” alone is enough to

make a group a “political committee” or make disbursements into

“expenditures” as defined by the Act was specifically rejected in F ederal

Election Commission v. GOPAC, 917 F. Supp. 851, 861-62 (1996)(“As a

matter of law, the Commission ... failed to demonstrate that GOPAC

became a political committee within the meaning of the Act by spending

or receiving $1,000 or more and engaging in ‘partisan politics’ and

‘electioneering.”” (ermphasis added).

1850

issue advocacy is close to an election.?’ Simi

will ultimately hope that if politicians do me mn a

positions on issues, the voters will turn against them. Surel

eo re regulate issue ads simply because they will 4

je: See ee think are important. That does

€ purpose of i ing”

me election as the meaning of oe wrest

~ aie to oo vagueness problems in the context of

a fon oy itures. See Federal Election Commission

cs 17 F. Supp. 851 (D. D.C.) (1996). Thus the

type of criteria on which Commissioners Thomas and

McDonald would rely fails, even after the a

[16]

fact, to provide any meani 1 distincti

* sbi ingful distinctions th

chill constitutionally protected amb. ee

PE important, “[nJo matter what facts [the

—— ssion] finds through [an} investigation, the requisite

ete i a ~ investigation itself must stand or fall on

re claim....” Federal Electio Sst

ey Non-Partisan Political rhe prepepnpo ‘

3 Oc Cir. 1981) (hereinafter “Machinists”). In

: Sn Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of

i rr i to determine whether to enforce a Commission

oe ray a’ draft committee where it was unclear

eae vag vg taro authority to regulate

. Id. The Co

compelling interests the ameiuetnmnsancte ro na

information, can be compelling and granted effect if the sg

urthermore, ngress is often still in session within, for exa

= pri eee and engaged in more than the usual cedueeliee

porn —— to wrap up the session. See Bradley A. Smith,

_ Pa ealities. The Constitutional Prohibition on a Soft

ey Ban, 24 J. Legis. 179, 192 n. 85 (1998); See also Mills v

Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966)strikin ani

advocacy close to an cae 8 down a limited ban on express

1851

Commission first has authority to regulate a particular type of

speech or activity. Jd. But the Court held that “the highly

sensitive character of the information sought simply makes it

all the more important that the court be convinced that

jurisdiction exists.” Jd at 389.

In the current MUR, the purely legal claim is that

coordinated issue advocacy is “for the purpose of influencing

elections” and so subject to regulation under the FECA. In

deciding the question of Commission jurisdiction, the

Machinists Court warns us that “[{iJn this delicate first

amendment area, there is no imperative to stretch the

statutory language, or read into it oblique references of

Congressional intent....” Rather, “falchieving a reasonable,

constitutionally sound conclusion in this case requires just

the opposite. ‘It is our duty in the interpretation of federal

statutes to reach a conclusion which will avoid serious doubt

of their constitutionality.”” Jd at 394, quoting Richmond v.

United States, 275 U.S. 331 (1928).

Certainly we, as Commissioners, should equally

avoid interpretations of the statute that raise constitutional

questions, at least absent a clear expression of intent from

Congress. We are obliged to be certain we are acting within

the confines of the FECA and the Constitution. We cannot

use ambiguities to expand our regulatory authority. Even if

Commissioners do not believe that the Buckley Court limited

the phrase “for the purpose of influencing” to express

advocacy when applied to coordinated communications, they

must concede that our guidance in this area is at a minimum.

To avoid serious constitutional concerns, we should adopt an

objective, bright line express advocacy standard as a

predicate to investigating allegedly coordinated issue

discussion.

Indeed, the D.C. Circuit has also admonished this

agency to use clear, bright line standards, not only to address

constitutional concerns, but for more mundane, practical

1852

reasons as well. In Orloski v. F.E.C., 795 F.2d 156. 165

(D.C. Cir. 1986), the Court of Appeals wrote that,

[a]dministrative exigencies mandate that the F EC adopt

objective, bright-line test for distinguishing between ten

permissible and impermissible corporate donations.”

Certainly this would apply to permissible and impermissibl

non-conperate donations as well. The Orloski court went =

or that, an objective test is required to coordinate the

iabilities of donors and donees. The bright-line test also is

necessary to enable donees and donors t

O easil

their conduct to the law and to a

[17]

= pm ao to take the rapid, decisive enforcement action

re or in the highly-charged political arena.” Jd.

oe ese concerns apply in the context of coordinated

nt ocacy—as the naming of over 60 respondents and

e ength of the investigation in this MUR show, without

objective content standard neither donees nor donors can 4

easily conform their conduct to the law,” and the FEC

cannot take “rapid, decisive enforcement action.” And. of

course, Orloski also warned of the need for a bright line to

avoid a chilling effect on protected speech: “A subjective test

based upon the totality of the circumstances [such as that

favored by Commissioners Thomas and McDonald in this

MUR] would inevitably curtail permissible conduct.” /d.

“[A subjective test] would also unduly burden

the FEC with requests for advisory opinions ..

and with complaints by disgruntled opponents

who could take advantage of a totality of the

circumstances test to harass the sponsoring

candidate and his supporters. It would further

1853

burden the agency by forcing it to direct its

limited resources toward conducting a full-

scale, detailed inquiry into almost every

complaint, even those involving the most

mundane allegations. It would also

considerably delay enforcement action.

Rarely could the FEC dismiss a — ™

without soliciting a response because the

would need to know all the facts bearing on

motive before making its “reason to believe

determination.

i d in particular the

at 165. These considerations, and in

nities effect on speech of this uncertainty, argue oo

ress advocacy test over the vague, post hoc,

objective, exp ve

dinates test favored by Commissioners Thomas and

McDonald.

issioner Sandstrom, in his turn, voices a

enor and overbreadth, but — eo oa _

“express advocacy test is a subjective, content- “4

about which reasonable minds can on occasion oa a

different results,” and for that reason, ought to a ne

“only where more objective criteria are ae ae

Sandstrom Statement at 6. et ern ime

the objective criteria s

oro for their effect on voters’ nes —

Based on this, he voted against the General a.

recommendation to take no further action in ts ’

First, Commissioner Sandstrom errs nenes -

the express advocacy test is subjective. A subjective -

depends on the mental impression of _—" — ccnemeeed an

icati ade. objec

time his communications were m

i h as whether or not a

‘independently verifiable facts, suc

porns rw contains express words of advocacy a :

election or defeat. While it is true that the inexactness

1854

language means that reasonable minds can sometimes reach

differing results on whether or not certain words are express

[18]

words of advocacy of election or defeat,*° in the

overwhelming majority of cases the express advocacy

standard is very easy to apply. The occasional disagreement

does not mean that the express advocacy test is “subjective,”

that it fails to provide notice to the regulated community, or

that it fails to provide courts a standard of reviewing the

actions of legislatures, regulatory commissions, prosecutors,

and inferior courts. By an “objective” test, it is not meant

that every adjudicator will reach the same result in every

case, but rather that the test will not rely on the subjective

motives of the speaker. Commissioner Sandstrom’s

proposed objective criteria — whether or not the ad was

tested for effect on voter candidate preferences — is, like the

express advocacy test, objective in that it does not rely on

intent, but is, like the express advocacy test, subject to

disagreement as to whether it has been met.”

More important, Commissioner Sandstrom’s

proposed standard provides no guidance to a group that had

not so tested its ads. That is, the presence of such testing

might quickly allow the Commission to find a purpose to

influence a federal election, but its absence would not allow

* See e.g. Federal Election Commission v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857 (9*

Cir. 1987), cert den. 484 U.S. 850 (1987); MUR 4922 (Suburban O’Hare

Commission).

*' For example, my standard for determining what constitutes “test[ing]

an ad’s influence on voters’ choice of federal candidate” may differ from

Commissioner Sandstrom’s. Does it include, for example, asking

generically whether a voter would be more or less inclined to favor a

candidate who takes particular positions? Or asking not if the ad would

affect one’s vote or even preference, but merely the respondent’s opinion

of the individual in question? Or suppose that the ads are tested for

voters using candidates in a Senate race, but then run in a House race? I

am sure-many more variations are available.

1855

ndent to quickly demonstrate no such purpose. (I do

a think that Sonnateclanee Sandstrom means to propose

that o: ’y issue ads that are tested for effect on voters a

candidate preferences would be subject to —,

would the Commission be expected to routinely accept a

respondent’s denial of such testing without an investigation.

Respondents would therefore continue to be subject a :

extensive investigations on the basis of allegations filed by

their political adversaries. Thus, the chilling effects on

speech, not to mention the other problems outlined in a

Orloski, would still be present. Furthermore, groups engag

in issue advocacy in the ultimate hope of changing mins

government policy. One way to assure that issue 4

effective is to test them on voters to see if they are i ely to

encourage voters to put the desired pressure on ene

and candidates to adopt the favored positions. The - ; -

engage in political issues discussion would lose much of 1

meaning if groups and individuals were limited to -

communications that were not effective in mobilizing voters.

The express advocacy test is an instrument of law :

designed to further constitutional aims by limiting amen a

legislatures and regulatory bodies that would chill protec

political speech through their overbreadth and vagueness. a

The existence of express advocacy isa threshold requirem

for regulating the communicative expenditures of a -

corporations, groups or individuals. No matter the -

dissatisfaction with the results the test yields, we are no

permitted, nor would it be wise, to jettison the express 7

advocacy test simply because we might believe in any gi

case that “more objective criteria” are available.

i i i is in the statute or judicial

22 It goes without saying that there is no basis in

Ms. moses of the statute for Commissioner oe s proposal to

sa ee or pe os ads sce their effect on

“expenditure” and “contribution” to inc effe

“a candidate preferences. Commissioner Sandstrom is ees a

concerned that the rules be made clear. Sandstrom Statemen ;

1856

[19]

It is true that tive express advocacy test often yields

results with which some individuals are unhappy. Many

observers fear that coordinated issue advocacy has the

potential to corrupt candidates and officeholders. The

Christian Coalition court, for example, warned that were the

express advocacy standard “imported” into section 441b’s

contribution prohibition, “it would open the door to

unrestricted corporate or union underwriting of numerous

campaign-related communications that do not expressly

advocate a candidate’s election or defeat.” 52 F. Supp.2d at

88. This would, feared the court, “present real dangers to the

integrity of the electoral process.” Jd at 92. Of course, all of

this is nothing more than the district court saying that its

concern about quid pro que corruption overrides the

vagueness and overbreadth problems inherent in regulating

issue advocacy. The Supreme Court faced the same issues in

Buckley and reached the opposite conclusion, recognizing

that issue advocacy would be used to influence campaigns:

“Tt would naively underestimate the ingenuity and

resourcefulness of persons and groups desiring to buy

influence to believe that they would have much difficulty

devising expenditures that skirted the restriction on express

advocacy of election or defeat but nevertheless benefited the

candidate’s campaign.” 424 U.S. at 45. Regulating

coordinated issue advocacy, no matter how much it may or

not benefit a campaign, plunges the discussion of issues back

into a morass of regulation and resuscitates the concerns of

vagueness and overbreadth the Court addressed in Buckley.

A content standard is needed to alleviate this problem, but at

this time our coordination regulations possess no content

standard beyond the vague statutory language that

expenditures be made for the purpose of influencing a federal

addition to being well grounded in judicial precedent, the express

advocacy test has the advantage of being clear, simple to understand for

the inexperienced, easy to apply in the overwhelming majority of cases,

and familiar to regular participants in campaigns.

1857

election.*° This is effectively no content standard at all, as —s

Buckley Court held in discussing the disclosure provisions 0

the Act, and as another Supreme Court case, cited

extensively in Buckley, makes clear.

In Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 ( 1945), Thomas, a

national union leader, was accused of violating a Texas

statute requiring “all labor union organizers operating in ai

Texas ... to file [for an organizer’s card] with the Secretary =

State before soliciting any members for his organization. -

at 519, n. 1. The statute required organizers to carry the car

whenever “soliciting” members, and to exhibit the same

when requested to do so by prospective members. a ‘

statute was invalidated because speakers would not know 1

what ways they could speak about the labor movement, or

about labor issues, without

[20]

carrying a card. In short, the statute was invalidated because

it lacked a definite content standard.

The Court suggested that had the statute included a

precise content standard, equivalent to the express we

test later adopted in Buckley, the regulation could have been

valid under the State’s police power because, [a] speaker in

such circumstances could avoid the words ‘solicit,

‘invite,’[or] ‘join.”” Jd. at 534. However,

33 Some have suggested that “the purpose of influencing " be aot in

‘any ad featuring a candidate's name or likeness. But this is

improvement, for reasons of overbreadth, over the relative ? a

candidate’ standard the Court rejected as vague in deciding mo *

Limiting the content standard to any ad containing a clearly-i “

candidate is unconstitutionally overbroad for as the Court wee 7

Buckley, “[c]andidates, especially incumbents, are intimate - ll

public issues involving legislative proposals and governmen

Not only do candidates campaign on the basis of their positions ° io

various public issues, but campaigns themselves generate issues of p

interest.” 424 U.S. at 42.

1858

[w]ithout such a limitation, the statute forbids

any language which conveys, or reasonably

could be found to convey, the meaning of

invitation. How one might ‘laud unionism’ as

the State and State Court concede Thomas

was free to do, yet in these circumstances not

imply an invitation, is hard to conceive.... In

short, the supposedly clear-cut distinction

between discussion, laudation, general

advocacy, and solicitation, puts the speaker in

these circumstances wholly at the mercy of his

hearers. ... Such a distinction offers no

security for free discussion.

Id. at’535.

The Court made the point most relevant to the

problem posed by our current coordination regulations:

The vice [in a statute prohibiting the issuing

of invitations without an organizer’s card] is

not merely that invitation ... is speech. It is

also that its prohibition forbids or restrains

discussion which is not or may not be

invitation. The sharp line cannot be drawn

surely or securely.

Id. at 535-36 (emphasis added). Similarly, the “vice” in the

coordination regulations is not that they regulate ads that a

candidate may authorize or request. The vice of the

regulations is that unless they are limited to phrases of a

particular kind, speakers who want to discuss more generic

matters will not know whether they will be investigated

under the regulations. A speaker seeking to discuss issues

without risking investigation can avoid words such as ‘vote

for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘vote against,’ or ‘defeat.’ But absent a content

standard, our regulations provide no guidance as to which

types of phrases will be deemed to “influence the outcomes

1859

of elections,” and our regulations will limit or chill much

speech that is not or may not be “for the purpose of

influencing” a federal election.

Nor can the lack of a content standard can be

effectively offset through a restrictive test for coordination.

While other considerations lead me to support a conduct test

for coordination similar to that enunciated in Christian

Coalition and since incorporated into our regulations at 11

C.F.R. § 100.23, the truth is that such a restrictive test for

proving coordination can, absent a content standard, actually

make investigations more intrusive and chilling of speech.

The reason is because the more difficult evidentiary burden

the Commission faces to prove coordination requires, a more

intrusive investigation to gather facts that are usually in

control of the respondent. Thus, while the

(21]

coordination rule of Christian Coalition solves the notice

problem of the Commission’s old “insider trading” standard,

it does not address the fundamental vagueness problem.

“The objectionable quality of vagueness and overbreadth

does not depend [just] upon [the] absence of fair notice to

a(n] accused ... but [more importantly] upon the danger of

tolerating, in the area of First Amendment freedoms, the

existence of a... statute susceptible of sweeping and

improper application.” NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-

433 (1963). A content standard provides advance notice to

actors of what kind of speech the FEC may investigate, and

reduces the risk of arbitrary, discriminatory, or capricious

enforcement far more effectively than a purely conduct based

standard.

Absent a content standard, it does not appreciably

warm the environment for speech to say that the standard for

actually proving and punishing coordination “must be

restrictive,” as the court did in Christian Coalition. 52 F.

1860

— 88. This is because a restrictive conduct standard

oe . to alleviate the ease with which allegations may

— e an intrusive, expensive investigations launched

je Supreme Court in Thomas v. Collins, assessing the

chilling effect of the Texas statute upun speech did :

discuss the defendant’s likelihood of success at trial a th

difficulty that the State would have in proving stuther the

defendant violated the organizer-card ordinance, or the

elements involved in that proof The mere threat of

prosecution was sufficient to chill speech and make the

statute unconstitutional. (“The threat of ... arrest ... hun

over every word.” Jd. at 534.) Because the threat of ,

prosecution (or investigation) can itself chill speech, see

Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass n., 484 U.S 383 392

93 (1998), a tough conduct standard does not eliminate the ;

ee for a clear content standard. A precise content standard

ms with the new conduct standards outlined in 11 CFR §

.23 would work as bookends in enforcing the Act while

removing an unconstitutional chill fro speec

. . =

associational activities. ene sia

V.

Investigations into allegati inati

| egations of coordinat

pee involve demands for access to an eenrweorar _ -

on - legislative and political plans, including intrusion

into the most sensitive internal political discussions. See

no AFL-CIO, et al. v. FEC, Civ. Action No. 01-1522

patel District of Columbia. The express-advocacy

- - dard ensures that investigations into allegations

coordination are only visited upon those groups,

corporations or unions who first cross a bright, content line.

The dangers to the First Amendm

e Fir ent posed by such

sa government investigations of political activity have

: MI-9 angry time and again by the federal courts. See

-&., FE.C. v. Larouche Campaign, 817 F.2d 233, 234 (2d

1861

Cir. 1987)(recognizing that the Commission’s investigative

authority should be constrained or clearly delineated due to

the sensitive nature of the activities the agency regulates, and

holding that where a case implicates First Amendment .

concerns, “the usual deference to the administrative agency Is

not appropriate and protection of the constitutional liberties

of the target of the subpoena calls for a more exacting

scrutiny of the justification offered by the agency. ) In

Buckley, the Supreme Court recognized that compelled

disclosure

[22]

litical activities], in itself, can seriously infringe on

are of associations and belief guaranteed by the First

Amendment.” 424 U.S. at 64. Justice Frankfurter made the

same point over forty years ago: “It is particularly important

that the exercise of the power of compulsory process be

carefully circumscribed when the investigatory process -

to impinge upon such highly sensitive areas as a

speech or press, freedom of association, and freedom Oo

communication of ideas.” Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354

U.S. 234, 235 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). A

Investigations into such areas of constitutional ae

ought to be triggered only where respondents can know

they have crossed a bright line.

issi inquiries at all until

4 1 do not suggest that the Commission may make no inquin

it is sure that express advocacy exists. The Commission could conduct a

Reader's Digest inquiry, even to the point of enforcing subpoenas, to be

certain no express ads were run. See Reader's Digest Ass'n. Vv. FEC, 509

F. Supp. 1210 (S.D.N.Y) (where factual questions existed —

whether the Commission had statutory authority to st >

investi tion, the court adopted a two-step process go

cme the first stage of the investigation would be solely for the

purpose of determining whether statutory authority existed). As a factual

matter, complaints are normally filed because someone—usually the

speaker’s political opponent— has seen the ads in question. The ads are

described in or attached to the complaint, so even a Reader's Digest

1862

The suggestion that a bright line can be found by the

fact of communicating with a candidate—in other words, that

a speaker can find a safeharbor by not communicating at all

with a candidate in the two, four or six-year period between

elections, is not realistic.** Indeed, one reason for our

passing the new coordination regulation was the recognition

that our old enforcement standard, presumptively finding

coordination based on any contact between the speaker and

the candidate, was unrealistic. For example, in seeking to

prove coordination between the Christian Coalition and

various Republican candidates, the Commission’s evidence

included the fact that public officials addressed meetings of

the organization. See Christian Coalition, 52 F. Supp.2d at

68, 71, 76. Public officials have a legitimate need to

communicate with their constituents, these constituents have

a right to listen to their elected officials, and “nowhere in the

Act did Congress expressly limit an incumbent’s right to

communicate with his constituency.” Orloski v. Federai

Election Commission, 795 F.2d 156, 163 (D.C. Cir. 1986).

inquiry will be rare. When the ads are not shown by the complaint to be

issue ads, the respondent can typically attach the ads to the response, and

if they do not include express advocacy, the enforcement ends there at

very low cost to both respondent and Commission.

** Chairman McDonald and Commissioner Thomas state that the Act and

the Buckley Court required only a “general understanding” to find

coordination and presumably would state that persons speaking with

legislative officials or candidates in the 2, 4 or 6 years between elections

do so at their own risk. See Thomas/McDonald Statement at 7. I

disagree with this conclusion, for the reasons stated in Clifton. See 114

F.3d 1309 at 1314. The district court in Christian Coalition also seemed

not to appreciate the First Amendment dilemma in this area,

mischaracterizing the choice as one between “lobbying the campaign on

issues but spending no money on the election ... or remaining walled off

from the campaign so that all campaign-related expenditures are clearly

independent.” Christian Coalition, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 89, n. 53 (emphasis

added). Approximately fifty percent of all “campaigns” involve

officeholders who make up “the government,” and with whom the

speaker may wish to confer on legislative issues pursuant to the First

Amendment right to “petition for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST.

amend. I.

1863

Groups and candidates talk all the time, and to force groups

to choose between talking to candidates or losing their

safeharbor is likely to be as chilling on the First Amendment

rights to speak and to petition the government as the conduct

standard the Commission just rejected.

[23]

Issue discussion ought not, and constitutionally

cannot, be regulated merely because an issue ad may be of

benefit to the candidate or his campaign. Issue discussion

will almost always, at some point, benefit some campaign, as

the Buckley Court understood. The purpose of the express

advocacy test is not to neatly separate those communications

that are intended to influence a campaign from those that are

not, but to protect the rights of all citizens to engage in

protected speech. In this respect, the test is similar to many

other prophylactic tests found in the law. For example, in

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Supreme Court

recognized that “to permit a full opportunity to exercise the

privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be

adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and the

exercise of those rights must be fully honored.” Miranda, at

467° The warnings that law enforcement officials have

been required to give to suspects ever since are not a sifting

screen to divine the subjective intent of the suspect, not one

tool among many for determining whether his confession

was voluntary. Likewise, the express advocacy test is not a

sifting screen to divine the subjective intent of a respondent,

to determine whether in his mind the speech he engaged in

was for the purpose of influencing an election. Rather, both

the Miranda warnings and the express advocacy test are

objectively ascertainable threshold requirements promulgated

6 The Miranda warnings were re-affirmed last year as a constitutionally

based approach for determining the admissibility of statements made

during a custodial interrogation that could not be overruled by statutory

enactment. Dickerson v. United States 530 U.S. 428 (2000).

-

1864

by Courts to protect the constitutional rights of citizens

Neither test 1s disposable, even though there may be other

evidence that a confession was voluntary, or that a

= S speech was “for the purpose of influencing” an

election. As stated by the Court in Miranda, the “privilege is

so fundamental to our system of constitutional rule and the

expedient of giving adequate warning as to the availability of

the Privilege so simple, we will not pause to inquire in

individual cases whether the defendant was aware of his

rights without a warning being given.” Miranda at 468. The

First Amendment is no less fundamental,’ and the expedient

of applying the express advocacy test so simple, that we ma

not and ought not pause to inquire in individual cases .

whether speech can be “for the purpose of influencing” an

election without first finding express advocacy.*® :

. Campaign finance laws and regulations have, ov

time, become weapons in the arsenals of candidates and i

committees, and we should not quickly minimize the far- ”

reaching aspects of these regulations. In 2000 the

Congressional Committee Chairman of one major political

party went so far as to sue his

cy counterpart under the RICO -

37

See e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 14 (“Di

» Buck ’ S. (“Discussion of public i

= a [is] integral to the operation of the system of ese ”

es te a Constitution.”)

w is of blanket rules, in addition to Miranda. tha

’ , that

in oe to protect rights or to provide for increased accuracy os eit

: mnie if in a particular case the application of the rule does not

at leve its purpose. For example, statutes of limitations may

= ate ce when evidence is not stale; the exclusionary rule

pre ee i evi from being used in trials though it is known to be

ns a ee too may make a contract unenforceable

es t such a deal was made, to name just a

39

In 2000, DCCC Chairman, Patrick Kenned

D-R.L.

and Tom DeLay (R-Tx.) under the acct

1865

[24]

our coordination regulations proceed without an

adequate content standard, it will take the political elite about

three minutes to deduce that nearly all allegations of

coordination will be followed by an FEC investigation, to

which the respondent can offer no affirmative defense that

will quickly terminate the investigation. Given that groups

frequently have contacts with officeholder/candidates,

credible allegations of coordination will be easy to make. If

the complaint is reasonably well-crafted,” the Commission

will have no choice but to find “reason to believe” that a

violation has occurred. This is low-hanging fruit for any

party, candidate, person or group seeking to silence and

harass opposing voices in an election cycle.

Whether express advocacy is present in any written or

broadcast message, however, is a legal question susceptible

of a quick preliminary determination by the Commission. It

therefore acts as an affirmative defense the Commission can

accept or reject in the initial stages of the MUR. Absent such

a test, a respondent’s preliminary denial of coordination,

even when backed by signed affidavits, will never amount to

anything more than a self-serving factual (not legal)

representation. If in the future the Commission adopts an

incorrect content standard, or effectively no content standard,

there will be no affirmative defense that could save an

advocate from a protracted investigation. The express

RICO statute. See Juliet Eilperin, House Democrats Sue DeLay, Action

Accuses Whip of Extortion, Money Laundering in Fundraising, THE

WASHINGTON POST, May 4, 2000, at A06.

“ Commission policy has been to treat complaints liberally. If the

complainant swears an affidavit (as he is essentially required to do in

swearing out a complaint, see 2 U.S.C. §437g(a)), the Commission will

nearly always be required to launch into a full investigation to fairly

decide whether the complainant or respondent has the better factual

representation. “Rarely could the FEC dismiss a complaint ... because the

FEC would need to know all the facts bearing on motive before making

its ... determination.” Orloski at 165.

1866

advocacy bright line serves as that affi

Commission abandons that bright “aignapea ia _—

individual which seeks to both engage in issue discussion and

has even a passing contact with elected officials may be

subject to allegations that will trigger the type of massive

investigation, and corresponding costs, seen in this MUR

Thus it will be among the most aggressive moves the |

a has taken towards chilling debate in the United

s.

The expensive, intrusive, len investigati

MUR 4624, like the similar “ies ade ra

4291, would have been readily avoided by the simple

application of an express advocacy content standard.

Adopting this standard is, in my view, required by both the

statute and the Constitution. But even if not required, it is

certainly a permissible standard under the statute, and offers

many benefits. It provides clear notice to the community; it

should result in fewer Advisory Opinion requests than the

mere conduct standard; it will result in fewer expansive

investigations which eat up Commission resources: it will

reduce the role of litigation in campaigns; and most

importantly, it avoids any concerns about constitutionality

and will not have the chilling effect on speech of an ap roach

without a clear content standard. .

Thus I would have ended this MUR on

much simple

grounds, at a much earlier date, by finding that the _

Coalition’s spending for issue advocacy, whether or not

(25)

otherwise coordinated, was as a matter of law not for the

purpose of influencing an election and not subj

regulation under the FECA. —

1867

/s/ Bradley A. Smith

11/6/01

Bradley A. Smith, Commissioner

[26]

Date

1868

Federal Election Commission

Annual Report 1992

[FEC logo omitted]

[pages 1- 63 omitted]

Contributions from Minors

Section: 2 U.S.C. Sec.441a(a)(1)

Recommendation: Congress should establish a minimum age

for contributors.

Explanation: The Commission has found that contributions

are sometimes given by parents in their children's names.

Congress should address this potential abuse by establishing

a minimum age for contributors, or otherwise provide

guidelines ensuring that parents are not making contributions

in the name of another.

[pages 65 - end]

1869

Federal Election Commission

Annual Report 1993

[FEC logo omitted]

[pages 1- 49 omitted]

Contributions from Minors

Section: 2 U.S.C. Sec.441a(a)(1)

Recommendation: The Commission recommends _ that

Congress establish a presumption that contributors below age

16 are not making contributions on their own behalf.

Explanation: The Commission has found that contributions

are sometimes given by parents in their children's names.

Congress should address this potential abuse by establishing

a minimum age for contributors, or otherwise provide

guidelines ensuring that parents are not making contributions

in the name of another.

[pages 51 - end]

1870

Federal Election Commission

Annual Report 1994

[FEC logo omitted]

[pages 1- 55 omitted]

Contributions from Minors

Section: 2 U.S.C. Sec.44 1 a(a)(1)

Recommendation: The Commission recommends _ that

Congress establish a presumption that contributors below age

16 are not making contributions on their own behalf :

Explanation: The Commission has found that contributions

are sometimes given by parents in their children's names

Congress should address this potential abuse by establishin |

a minimum age for contributors, or otherwise se

guidelines ensuring that parents ar —

e not making“cont i

in the name of another. g ributions

[pages 57 - end omitted]

1871

Federal Election Commission

Annual Report 1995

[FEC logo omitted]

[pages 1- 55 omitted]

Contributions from Minors

Section: 2 U.S.C. Sec.441la(a)(1)

Recommendation: The Commission recommends _ that

Congress establish a presumption that contributors below age

16 are not making contributions on their own behalf.

Explanation: The Commission has found that contributions

are sometimes given by parents in their children's names.

Congress should address this potential abuse by establishing

a minimum age for contributors, or otherwise provide

guidelines ensuring that parents are not making contributions

in the name of another.

[pages 57 - end omitted]

1872

Federal Election Commission

Annual Report 1996

[FEC logo omitted]

[pages 1- 54 omitted]

Contributions from Minors

Section: 2 U.S.C. Sec.44 la(a)(1)

Recommendation: The Commission recommends that

Congress establish a presumption that contributors below a

16 are not making contributions on their own behalf .

Explanation: The Commission has found that contributions

are sometimes given by parents in their children's names

Congress should address this potential abuse by establishin

a minimum age for contributors, or otherwise aaa

guidelines ensuring that parent |

! S are not making contributi

in the name of another. . —

[pages 56 - end]

1873

Federal Election Commission

Annual Report 1997

[FEC logo omitted]

[pages 1- 53 omitted]

Contributions from Minors

Section: 2 U.S.C. Sec.441a(a)(1)

Recommendation: The Commission recommends _ that

Congress establish a presumption that contributors below age

16 are not making contributions on their own behalf.

Explanation: The Commission has found that contributions

are sometimes given by parents in their children's names.

Congress should address this potential abuse by establishing

a minimum age for contributors, or otherwise provide

guidelines ensuring that parents are not making contributions

in the name of another.

[pages 54 - 96 omitted]

1874

Federal Election Commission

Annual Report 1998

[FEC logo omitted]

[pages 1- 43 omitted]

Contributions from Minors

Section: 2 U.S.C. §441a(a)(1)

Recommendation: The Commission recommends _ that

Congress establish a presumption that contributors below age

16 are not making contributions on their own behalf °

Explanation: The Commission has found that contributions

are sometimes given by parents in their children’s names.

Congress should address this potential abuse by establishin

a minimum age for contributors, or otherwise provide

guidelines ensuring that parents

! are not making contributi

in the name of another. . =

[pages 45-92 omitted]

1875

Federal Election Commission

Annual Report 1999

[FEC logo omitted]

[pages 1- 49 omitted]

Contributions from Minors (revised 2000)

Section: 2 U.S.C. §44la(a\(1)

Recommendation: The Commission recommends that

Congress establish a minimum age of 16 for making

contributions.

Explanation: The Commission has found that contributions

are sometimes given by parents in their children’s names.

Congress should address this potential abuse by establishing

a minimum age of 16 for contributors, or otherwise provide

guidelines ensuring that parents are not making contributions

in the name of another.

[pages 51-86 omitted]

1876

Federal Election Commission

Annual Report 2000

[FEC logo omitted]

[pages 1- 42 omitted]

Contributions from Minors

Section: 2 U.S.C. Sec.441a(a)(1)

inset The Commission recommends _ that

ngress establish a minimum a :

ee ge of 16 for making

Explanation: The Commission has found that contributions

a sometimes given by parents in their children’s names.

ongress should address this potential abuse by establishing

a minimum age of 16 for contributors, or otherwise provide

guidelines ensuring that parents are not making contributions

in the name of another.

[pages 43 - 93 omitted]

1877

Federal Election Commission

Annual Report 2001

[FEC logo omitted]

[pages l- end omitted]

1878

THE RULES OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY

As adopted by the

2000 Republican National Convention

July 31, 2000

PREAMBLE

BE IT RESOLVED, That the Republican Party is the

party of the open door. Ours is the party of liberty, the party

of equality of opportunity for all and favoritism for none.

It is the intent and purpose of these rules to encourage

and allow the broadest possible participation of all voters in

Republican Party activities at all levels and to assure that the

Republican Party is open and accessible to all Americans.

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That the following be

and hereby are adopted as the Rules of the Republican Party,

comprised of the rules for the election and government of the

Republican National Committee until the next national

convention, the rules under which delegates and alternate

delegates shall be allotted to the respective states in the next

national convention and the rules under which such delegates

and alternate delegates shall be elected and under which

contests shall be considered, and the rules of business of this

national convention.

RNC Ex. | |

1879

THE REPUBLICAN

NATIONAL COMMITTEE

RULE NO. 1

Organization of the .

Republican National Committee

The Republican National Committee shall have =

general management of the Republican Party, a -

direction from the national convention. The gy Oo -

Republican National Committee shall consist 0 one

national committeeman and one (1) national a om :

from, and the chairman of the state Republican Party o ~

state. For the purposes of this rule and all other rae “

definition of “state” or “states” shall be that as defined in Ru

No. 26.

RULE NO. 2

Method of Election

(a) Where the rules adopted by a state ——

Party provide a method of election of the Raye

committeeman and the national commutteewoman, they sha

be elected pursuant to such method.

(b) Where the rules adopted by a State —

Party do not provide a method of election of the pers

committeeman and the national committeewoman, and om

state laws do provide such a method of election, they =

elected pursuant to such method provided by state laws.

(c) Where neither the rules adopted 7 : _

Republican Party nor state laws provide a method of elec ee

of the national committeeman and | the hea

committeewoman, the national convention delegation from

such state shall elect them.

RNC Ex. | 2

1880

(d) At each national convention, the roll shall be

called and the delegation from each state shall report, through

the chairman of the delegation, the names of the elected

national committee members whose election shall be ratified

by the national convention if otherwise in accordance with

these rules.

RULE NO. 3

Term of Office

(a) National committeemen and national

committeewomen shall serve from the adjournment of the

national convention until the adjournment of the following

[*3] national convention, and until their successors shal] have

been elected and ratified. For seniority purposes, newly

elected committee persons shall be ratified in order of the date

of their individual election.

(b) The duly elected and acting chairman of each

State Republican Party shall be a member of the Republican

National Committee during his or her term in office.

RULE NO. 4

Vacancies

(a) Election of members to fill vacancies in the

Republican National Committee shall be ratified by the

Republican National Committee upon their election by the

State Republican Party in and for the state in which the

vacancy occurs.

(b) The Republican National Committee shall have

the power to declare vacant the seat of any member who

refuses to support the Republican nominee for President of the

United States or Vice President of the United States.

(c) In the event of the death, resignation,

disqualification, or disability of any officer of the Republican

RNC Ex. | 2-3

1881

National Committee or member of a ——. .

Republican National Committee, as enumerated in t : or

such vacancy shall be filled by the same body and int sa

manner as provided therein for the election of such officer o

officers or committee members in the first instance.

(d) In the event of the death, i a

disqualification, or disability of any yee a. Raw

Republican National Committee, the vacancy sha bo sa

according to adopted Republican state party rules. “0 neon

exists, vacancies shall be filled by majority vote of the sta

committee.

RULE NO. 5

Officers of the

Republican National Committee

(a) The Officers of the Republican National

Committee shall consist of:

(1) A chairman and a Leipeioue .

site sex who shall be elected by the membd

cenblieen National Committee. Except as otherwise —

by a majority of the members of the Republican ati =

Committee present and voting on the matter, the ee sa

|*4] the co-chairman shall be full-time, paid — - =

Republican National Committee. The chairman sha 2

chief executive officer of the Republican National vege ee.

The chairman or co-chairman may be removed from = ice

only by a- two-thirds (2/3) vote of the entire Republican

National Committee.

(2) Eight (8) vice chairmen, comprising

one (1) man and one (1) woman from each of the following

four (4) regions:

(i) The Western States Association: ”

Alaska, American Samoa, Arizona, California, Colorado,

RNC Ex. | 3-4

1882

Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico,

Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming;

(11) The Midwestern States

Association: Illinois, Indiana, lowa, Kansas. Michigan,

Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South

Dakota, and Wisconsin;

(1) The Northeastern States

Association: Connecticut, Delaware, the District of

Columbia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,

New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico. Rhode

Island, Vermont, and the Virgin Islands; and

(iv) The Souther States

Association: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida. Georgia, Kentucky,

Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma. South

Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia.

(3) A secretary, a treasurer, and such other

officers as the Republican National Committee shall deem

necessary, all to be elected by the Republican National

Committee.

(b) The chairman, co-chairman, and all other’

officers shall be elected in January of each odd-numbered

year. All officers, except the vice chairmen, shall be

nominated from the floor, and candidates must have at least

the majority vote of the Republican National Committee

members in each of three (3) states in order to have their

names placed in nomination. There shall be no nominating

committee.

(c) The eight (8) vice chairmen shall be elected at

regional caucuses by the Republican National Committee

members of the four (4) regions and shall be residents of and

Republican National Committee members from _ their

respective regions. The election shall take place in January of

RNC Ex. 14

1883

each odd-numbered year. The election of ye chairmen shall

not require confirmation by the Republican National

Committee.

(d) The chairman shall appoint a general counsel

for the Republican National Committee and a chairman of the

Republican Finance Committee, both of whom shall be

confirmed by the Republican National Committee.

RULE NO. 6

Executive Committee

(a) There shall be an Executive Committee of the

Republican National Committee to consist of eleven (11)

members of the Republican National Committee: three (3) to

be appointed by the chairman, to serve at the will of the

chairman and whose terms shall be coterminous with that of

the chairman, and eight (8) additional members to consist of

one (1) man and one (1) woman elected by and from each of

the four (4) regional caucuses. In addition, the following shall

serve as ex-officio members of the Executive Committee: the

chairman, the co-chairman, the vice chairmen, the secretary,

the treasurer, the general counsel, the chairman of the

Republican Finance Committee, the chairman of the

Republican State Chairmen’s Advisory Committee, the

chairman of the Budget Committee, and the president of the

National Federation of Republican Women.

(b) The Executive Committee may exercise all the

executive and administrative functions required of the

Republican National Committee between meetings of the

Republican National Committee, with the exception of the

following:

(1) election of officers of the Republican

National Committee;

RNC Ex. 1 5

1884

(2) ratification of the electi

. ection of mem

of the Republican National Committee; =

(3) issuance of the call and desi

. esignation of

the time and place for holding the national convention; and

(4) filling a vacancy ji

| y in the office of

Republican candidate for President of the United States

Republican candidate for Vice President of the United States.

- (c) The Executive Committee shal

call of the chairman and such meetings shall poe hei

twice in each year. In addition, upon written petition of at

least [*6] twenty-five percent (25%) of the members of the

Executive Committee, the chairman, within ten (10) days of

his receipt of said petition, shall call a meeting of the

Executive Committee to be held in a city to be designated by

the chairman. The date of such meeting shall fall between ten

( 10) and twenty (20) days from the date of the call. The

minutes of all Executive Committee meetings shall be

distributed as promptly as practicable to all members of th

Republican National Committee. ;

i (d) In addition to the foregoing, the Executive

ommittee shall encourage and solicit the advice and counsel

of Republican groups and organizations.

RULE NO. 7

Rules of Order

(a) The current authorized edition o

Rules of Order: Newly Revised (“Robert's Rules - ‘ours

shall govern in all meetings of the Republican National

Committee and its committees insofar as they are applicable

and not inconsistent with these rules.

RNC Ex. | 5-6

1885

(b) All meetings of the Republican National

Committee and all of its committees shall be open meetings,

except as provided for by Robert's Rules of Order.

(c) A member of the Republican National

Committee may give a written and witnessed proxy to an

eligible and declared Republican voter of the same state,

which shall be effective for one (1) meeting and may include

all committees of the Republican National Committee and

other meetings held in conjunction with the Republican

National Committee meeting that the proxy grantor is eligible

to attend. A member of a committee of the Republican

National Committee may give a written and witnessed proxy

to an eligible and declared Republican voter of the same state

or to a member of that member’s state delegation to the

Republican National Committee. Proxies to attend

Republican National Committee meetings shall be filed with

the secretary of the Republican National Committee. Proxies

to attend a committee of the Republican National Committee

shall be filed with the chairman of the respective committee.

(d) No votes (except elections to office when

properly ordered pursuant to the provisions of Robert's Rules

of Order) shall be taken by secret ballot in any open meeting

of the Republican National Committee or of any committee

thereof.

\*7]} (e) A prayer and the pledge of allegiance shall be

conducted at the beginning of all meetings of the committees

listed in these rules, including meetings of all subcommittees,

immediately following the call to order by the chairman.

RULE NO. 8

Meetings of the

Republican National Committee

(a) The Republican National Committee shall meet

at least twice in each year. A tentative agenda for each

RNC Ex. | 6-7

1886

Fa eg be mailed to the membership at least ten (10)

ph lor to such meeting. The minutes, including all

lons and motions, shall be mailed to all members of the

Republican National Commit ithi ,

t

the close of the meeting, ee within thirty (30) days after

(b) The first meetin

| & of the Republican Nat;

sso shall take place within five (5) days eae ec

Journment of the national convention. Such meeting and all

mr place upon call of the chairman or, in case of a vacanc

€ chairmanship, upon call of the co-chairman or, in nnd

RNC Ex. 1 7

1887

RULE NO. 9

Filling Vacancies in Nominations

(a) The Republican National Committee is hereby

authorized and empowered to fill any and or anagpange as

{*8] may occur by reason of death, declination, eee

of the Republican candidate for President of the om oe

or the Republican candidate for Vice President of the ag

States, as nominated by the national ae ene

Republican National Committee may reconvene the na

convention for the purpose of filing any such vacancies.

(b) In voting under this rule, the Republican

National Committee members representing any state shall “

entitled to cast the same number of votes as said state wa

entitled to cast at the national convention.

(c) In the event that the members of the

Republican National Committee form any state shall — -

agreement in the casting of votes hereunder, the votes , =

state shall be divided equally, including fractiona —

among the members of the Republican National Commi

present or voting by proxy.

(d) No candidate shall be chosen to fill any wr

vacancy except upon receiving a majority of the votes entitle

to be cast in the election.

RULE NO. 10

Committees of the

Republican National Committee

(a) There shall be the following committees:

(1) There shall be a Standing Committee on

Rules of the Republican Nationai Committee, composed of

one (1) member of the Republican National Committee —

each state, to review and propose recommendations wit

RNC Ex. | 7-8

1888

respect to the Rules of the Republican Party. The members of

the Republican National Committee from each state shall

caucus, and by majority vote, choose from their number

within eight (8) months following the national convention

appointees to serve on this committee. If the members of the

Republican National Committee from any state do not within

this period submit to the chairman of the Republican National

Committee their choice to serve on the Standing Committee

on Rules, the chairman of the Republican National Committee

shall select, from among the members of the Republican

National Committee from each such State, one (1) member to

serve on the Standing Committee on Rules. The chairman of

the Standing Committee on Rules shall be elected by the

committee from among its members.

(2) There shall be a Committee on

Arrangements to plan for and manage the next national

convention. The [*9] chairman and co-chairman of the

Republican National Committee shall be members of the

Committee on Arrangements and the chairman of the

Republican National Committee shall appoint to the

Committee on Arrangements at least one (1) member of the

Republican National Committee from each State. The

chairmen of the Committee on Arrangements and of its

_ Subcommittees shall be appointed by and serve at the pleasure

of the chairman of the Republican National Committee from

among the members of the Committee on Arrangements and,

together with such other officers as shall be elected by the

Committee on Arrangements, shall be members of the

Executive Committee of the Committee on Arrangements.

The chairman of the Standing Committee on Rules and the

chairman of the Committee on Contests shall also be members

of the Committee on Arrangements.

(3) There shall be a Committee on the Call,

composed of a chairman and at least seven (7) members of the

Republican National Committee who shall be appointed by

the chairman of the Republican National Committee. This

RNC Ex. | 8-9

1889

committee shall assist the Republican National Commune 7

connection with the issuance of the call for the next paren

convention pursuant to Rule No. 12. This meno . . poe

appointed after the selection of the Committees on Rule

Arrangements.

(4) There shall be a Committee on

Contests, which shall be composed of two (2) — of a

Republican National Committee from each of the no a

regions described in Rule No. 5, elected by members po “

Republican National Committee from each such region, . si

chairman appointed by the chairman of the Republic ;

National Committee from among the members or a =

the Republican National Committee. This gy a

perform the duties relating to the resolution ry) = a

prescribed in Rule No. 22. This committee shall be . ec .

after the selection of the Committees on Rules an

Arrangements.

(5) There shall be a Committee on the Site

of the Republican Natioifal Convention, which are be

composed of two (2) members of the rnp ons la ~ .

Committee from each of the four (4) regions describe in Ru

No. 5, elected by the members of the Republican nes

Committee from each such region, and a chairman —

by the chairman of the Republican National Committee ne

among the members or officers of the Republican “ng

Committee. This committee shall be responsib e for

investigating potential sites for the next national map or

and for recommending a [* 10] site to the Republican wer su

Committee for selection. This committee shall be selecte no

later than two (2) years following the presidential election.

(6) There shall be a Committee pe

Resolutions, which shall be composed of two (2) members -

the Republican National Committee from each of the do ( /

regions described in Rule No. 5. elected by the a rs -

the Republican National Committee from each such region,

RNC Ex. | 9-10

1890

and a chairman appointed by the chairman of the Republican

National Committee from among the members of the

Republican National Committee. This committee shall

consider all resolutions submitted by any member for adoption

by the Republican National Committee and shall report to the

Republican National Committee all resolutions timely

submitted to it together with its recommendations for

adoption, amendment, or other disposition. The Committee

on Resolutions shall report out, without amendment and for

consideration by the Republican National Committee, any

resolution submitted in writing and supported by at least one

(1) member of the Republican National Committee from each

of ten (10) states which is dated and submitted to the

Chairman of the Resolutions Committee at least thirty (30)

days before any regularly called meeting of the Republican

National Committee or at least ten (10) days before a specially

called meeting.

(7) Each member of the Republican

National Committee shall be a member of at least one (1) of

the above mentioned committees. The general counsel of the .

Republican National Committee shall be counsel to each of

such committees. The minutes of these committees shall be

distributed as promptly as practicable to all members of the

‘Republican National Committee. Any of these committees

may meet and act by telephone conference upon twenty-four

(24) hours notice.

(b) The Republican National Committee shall

create a Republican Finance Committee and any

subcommittees thereof which it deems desirable to which it

may delegate the responsibility of developing and

implementing a broad-based fundraising plan. The chairman

of the Republican Finance Committee shall be appointed

pursuant to the provisions of Rule No. 5(d).

(c) The Republican National Committee shall

create a Budget Committee and any subcommittees thereof

RNC Ex. | 10

1891

which it deems desirable to which it may delegate the

responsibility of developing a budget and reviewing income

and expenditures of the Republican National Committee. The

Budget [*11] Committee shall be composed of seven (7)

members of the Republican National Committee, three (3) of

whom shall be appointed by the chairman of the Republican

National Committee and one (1) of whom shall be elected by

each of the four (4) regional caucuses in January of each odd

numbered year (as provided in Rule No. 5(c)). In addition, the

general counsel of the Republican National Committee shall

be counsel to such committee and the following shall serve as

ex officio members of the Budget Committee: the chairman,

co-chairman, and treasurer of the Republican National

Committee, and the chairman of the Republican Finance

Committee. The chairman of the Republican National

Committee shall make every effort in such appointments to

ensure that an equal number of men and women serve on the

Budget Committee. The chairman of the Republican National

Committee shall appoint the chairman of the budget

Committee from among the members thereof.

(d) The annual budget shall be approved at the first

meeting of the Republican National Committee held in each

year. The proposed budget, in reasonable detail, shall be

mailed to all members of the Republican National Committee

at least ten (10) days prior to such meeting.

(e) The chairman of the Republican National

Committee, with the approval of the Republican National

Committee, may appoint such other committees and assistants

as he or she may deem necessary. Whenever such committees

are appointed, they shall consist of a chairman and an equal

number of men and women.

RNC Ex. | 10-11

1892

RULE NO. 11

Candidate Support

(a) The Republican National C

without the prior written and filed net time of

the Republican National Committee from the state outed

contribute money or in-kind aid to any candidate for an

= or party office except the nominee of the cater Prom

arty or a candidate who is unopposed in the Republic

primary after the filling deadline for that Office. In ios

States where state law establishes a non-partisan prima in

a Republican candidates could participate, but in which

rs a en rw include a Republican candidate,

, ed by a conventi

authority of the state Republican Party shall apr ol ri

the Republican Nation

al C .

nominee. ommittee as the Republican

(b) No state party rule or state |

observed that allows persons who have siiliietel as bo

participating in [*12] the selection of any nominee of a sie

a — the Republican Party, including, but not limited to

ugh the use of a multi-party primary or similar type ballot,

to participate in the selection of a nominee of the Republic

Party for that general election. No person na in

violation of this rule shall be recogn;

, nized as th

Republican Party from that state. g € nominee of the

CONVENING OF THE

NEXT NATIONAL CONVENTION

RULE NO. 12

Call of Next Convention

The Republican National Commi i

mittee shall is

re the next national convention to nominate Pos hv

on resident of the United States and Vice President of the

nited States prior to January | of the year in which the

RNC Ex. 1 11-12

1893

national convention is to be held. The Republican National

Committee shall issue and promulgate the call in a poe

consistent with these rules. The call shall include the pe :

the rules relating to the convening and the proceedings of the

national convention.

RULE NO. 13

Membership in Convention

Subject to the provisions of Rule No. 16, oe

membership of the next national convention shall consist of:

(a) Delegates.

(1) Ten (10) delegates at large from each of

the fifty (SO) states.

(2) The national committeeman, the

national committeewoman and the chairman of the —

Republican Party of, each state and American rey ie

District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin

Islands.

(3) Three (3) district delegates for each

Representative in the United States House of Representatives

from each state.

(4) Six (6) delegates at large from

American Samoa, sixteen (16) delegates at large from the

District of Columbia, six (6) delegates at large from roger

twenty (20) delegates at large from Puerto Rico, and six (6)

delegates at large from the Virgin Islands; provided, oe

that if Puerto Rico shall become a state prior to the a

national |*13] convention, the number of delegates rom

Puerto Rico shall be calculated in accordance with the same

formula used for the other states.

(5) From each state having cast its electoral

votes, or a majority thereof, for the Republican nominee for

RNC Ex. | 12-13

1894

President of the United States in the last preceding election:

four and one-half (4 1/2) delegates at large plus a number of

the delegates at large equal to sixty percent (60%) of the

number of electoral votes of that state; provided, however, that

if Puerto Rico shall become a state prior to the next national

convention, it shall be presumed that it would have cast its

electoral votes, or a majority thereof, for the Republican

nominee in the last preceding election. (In the computation of

the number of delegates at large, any sum of the four and one-

half (4 1/2) plus the sixty percent (60%) representing a

fraction shall be increased to the next whole number.) In

addition, one (1) delegate at large shall be awarded to a state

for any and each of the following public officials elected by

such state in the year of the last preceding presidential election

or at any subsequent election held prior to January | of the

year in which the next national convention is held:

(i) A Republican governor,

provided that no such additional delegate at large award to any

state shall exceed one (1);

(ii) | Membership in the Republican

Party of at least one-half (1/2) of the Representatives

representing a state in the United States House of

Representatives; provided that no such additional delegate at

large award to any state shall exceed one (1);

(iii) | Membership in the Republican

Party of a majority of the members of any chamber of a state

legislature, if such chamber has been organized, and is

presided over (if the presiding officer is elected by the

chamber), by Republicans; provided that no such additional

delegate at large award to any state shall exceed one (1).

(iv) | Membership in the Republican

Party of a majority of all chambers of a state legislature, if all

such chambers are presided over (if the presiding officer is

elected by the chamber), by a Republican; provided that no

RNC Ex. | 13

1895

such additional delegate at large award to any state shall

exceed one (1).

(6) In addition, one (1) delegate at large

shall be awarded to a state for any and each Republican

United States [*14] Senator elected by such state in the six (6)

year period prior to January | of the year in which the next

national convention is held; provided that no such additional

delegate at large award to any state shall exceed two (2).

(7) In addition, if the District of Columbia

shall have cast its electoral votes, or a majority thereof, for the

Republican nomin e for President of the United States in the

last preceding presidential election: four and one-half (4 1/2)

delegates at large plus the number of delegates at large equal

to thirty percent (30%) of the sixteen (16) delegates at large

allotted to the District of Columbia. In the computation of the

number of delegates at large, any sum of the four and one-half

(4 1/2) plus the thirty percent (30%) representing a fraction

shall be increased to the next whole number.

(b) Alternate Delegates.

One (1) alternate delegate for each delegate to the

national convention, except that no alternates shall be selected

for Republican National Committee members.

(c) Any state party may set the date for any

primary, caucus, convention, or meeting for the purpose of

voting for a presidential candidate and/or selecting delegates

to the national convention. To the extent a state party's rules

are in conflict with its state's laws with respect to this rule, the

provisions of this rule and the state party's rules shall control.

To the extent the provisions of the rule -re inconsistent with

the provisions of Rule No. 15, the provisions of this rule shall

be controlling for all purposes.

RNC Ex. | 13-14

1896

RULE NO. 14

Participation

. (a) The Republican National Committee shall

assist the States in their efforts to inform all citizens as to how

they may participate in delegate selection procedures. The

states, in cooperation with the Republican National

Committee, shall prepare instructive material on delegate

selection methods and make it available for distribution. ’

(b) Participation in a Republican primary, caucus

or any meeting or convention held for the purpose of selecting

delegates and alternate delegates to a county, district, state, or

national convention shall in no way be abridged for reasons of

Sex, race, religion, color, age, or national Origin. The

Republican National Committee and the Republican state

SommaNiies or governing committee of each state shall take

| 1S} positive action to achieve the broadest possible

participation by men and women, young people, minority and

heritage groups, senior citizens, and all other citizens in th

delegate selection process. ;

(c) Unless otherwise provided b

. y the laws of the

state in which the election occurs, in those states where

delegates and alternate delegates are elected through the

convention system or a combination of convention and

primary systems, the precinct, ward, township, or county

meetings shall be open meetings and all citizens who are

qualified shall be urged to participate.

(d) Each state shall endeavor to have equal

representation of men and women in its de ‘gation to the

Republican National Convention.

(e) The provisions of these rules are i

) ' not intend

to be the basis of any kind of quota system. pelea

RNC Ex. | 14-15

1897

RULE NO. 15

Election of Delegates and Alternate Delegates

(a) Order of Precedence.

Delegates at large and their alternate delegates and

delegates from congressional districts and their oe

delegates to the national convention shall be elected in the

following manner:

(1) In accordance with any applicable

Republican Party rules of a state, insofar as the same are not

inconsistent with these rules; or,

(2) To the extent not provided for in the

applicable Republican Party rules of a state, in accordance

with any applicable laws of a state, insofar as the same are not

inconsistent with these rules; or,

(3) By a combination of the methods set

forth in paragraphs (a)(1) or (a)(2) of this rule; or,

(4) To the extent not provided by state law

or party rules, as set forth in paragraph (c) of this rule.

(b) General.

In all elections of delegates or alternate delegates to

the national convention, the following rules shall apply:

|*16] (1) In any jurisdiction in which i. gg

representation upon the board of judges or inspectors :

elections for primary elections is denied by law, delegates =

alternate delegates shall be elected as provided in paragrap

(a)(1) or (a)(4) of this rule.

(2) In selecting delegates and alternate

delegates to the national convention, no state law shall ¥

observed which hinders, abridges, or denies to any citizen 0

RNC Ex. | 15-16

1898

the United States, eligible under the Constitution of the United

States to hold the office of President of the United States or

Vice President of the United States, the right or privilege of

being a candidate under such state law for the nomination for

President of the United States or Vice President of the United

States or which authorizes the election of a number of

delegates or alternate delegates from any state to the national

convention different from that fixed in these rules.

(3) Alternate delegates shall be elected to

the national convention for each unit of representation equal in

number to the number of delegates elected therein and shall be

chosen in the same manner and at the same time as the

delegates and under the same rules; provided, however, that if

the law of any state shall prescribe another method of

choosing alternate delegates, they may be chosen in

accordance with the provisions of the law of the state in which

the election occurs, except that no alternates shall be selected

for Republican National Committee members.

(4) Delegates and alternate delegates at

large to the national convention when serving as delegates and

alternate delegates shall be residents of and duly qualified

voters in their respective states. All delegates and alternate

delegates allocated as delegates and alternate delegates at

large shall be elected at large in the several states; provided,

however, that such allocation and method of election may be

varied in any state to the extent, and only to the extent,

necessary to avoid conflict with state law applicable to the

selection of national convention delegates if such varying

allocation and method of election were those pursuant to

which delegates at large and alternate delegates at large were

elected to the 1988 Republican National Convention from that

State.

(5) Delegates and alternate delegates to the

national convention representing congressional districts shall

be residents of and qualified voters in said districts

RNC Ex. | 15-16

1899

respectively when elected and when serving as delegates ee

alternate delegates. There shall be three (3) pte eng

three (3) alternate delegates allocated to represent pre ,

congressional district of the several states, who sha 3 :

elected by each such congressional district, provided,

however, that such number of delegates and ogee

delegates allocated to represent, and elected by, rod

congressional district of a state may be reduced or increased to

the extent, and only to the extent, necessary to avoid conflict

with state law applicable to the selection of national

convention delegates if such varying allocation was that

pursuant to which district delegates and alternate st

delegates were elected to the 1988 Republican Nationa

Convention from the state.

(6) No delegate or alternate delegate to the

national convention shall be required to pay an assessment or

fee in excess of that provided by the law of the state in which

his or her election occurs as a condition of serving as a

delegate or alternate delegate to the national convention.

(7) There shall be no automatic delegates to

i } f party position

the national convention who serve by virtue 0

or elective office, except as provided for in Rule No. 13 (a)(2).

(8) Delegates and alternate delegates to the

national convention may be elected only in one of the

following manners:

(i) by primary election;

(ii) by the Republican _ state

committee, where specifically provided by state law,

(iii) by state and congressional

district conventions;

RNC Ex. | 16-17

1900

(iv) by any method consistent with

these rules by which delegates and alternate delegates were

selected to the most recent Republican National Convention

from that state;

(v) by Rule No. 13 (a)(2) of these

rules.

(9) No state law shall be observed which

permits any person to participate in a primary delegate and

alternate delegate selection process that also permits that

person at the same primary to participate in the choosing of

nominees of any other party for other elective office.

Delegates and alternate delegates to the national convention

shall in that event be selected pursuant to state party rules that

are not inconsistent with the Rules of the Republican Party;

provided, however, that the selection process established by

the state [*18] party rules shall provide that only persons

eligible to vote who are deemed to be Republicans pursuant to

State law or state party rules shall participate in such delegate

selection process.

(10) No delegates or alternate delegates shall

be selected pursuant to any Republican Party rule of a state or

State law which materially changes the manner of selecting

delegates or alternate delegates or the date upon which such

state party holds a presidential primary, caucus, convention, or

meeting for the purpose of voting for a presidential candidate

and/or selecting delegates to the national convention if such

changes were adopted or made effective after the first Tuesday

in October of the year before the year in which the national

convention is to be held. Where it is not possible for a state

party to certify the manner and the date upon which it holds a

presidential primary, caucus, convention, or meeting for the

purpose of voting for a presidential candidate and/or selecting

delegates to the national convention in effect in that state on

the date and in the manner provided in paragraph (d) of this

rule, the process for holding the presidential primary, caucus,

RNC Ex. 1 17-18

1901

convention, or meeting for the purpose of voting for a

presidential candidate and/or selecting delegates to the

national convention shall be conducted in the same manner

and held upon the same date as was used for the immediately

preceding national convention. If it is not possible to hold a

presidential primary, caucus, convention, or meeting for the

purpose of voting for a presidential candidate and/or selecting

delegates to the national convention upon the same date as

was used for the immediately preceding national convention,

then delegates or alternate delegates shall be selected by

congressional district or state conventions pursuant to

paragraph (c) of this rule.

(11) Except with respect to delegates and

alternate delegates elected under paragraph (b)(8)(1i) of this

rule-and if consistent with paragraph (c)(5) of this rule:

(i) No presidential primary, caucus,

convention, or other meeting may be held for the purpose of

voting for a presidential candidate and/or selecting delegates

or alternate delegates to the national convention, prior to the

first Tuesday of February or after the third Tuesday of June in

the year in which the national convention is held; and,

(ii) The selection process of

choosing those who will select delegates or alternate delegates

shall not begin before September | of the year before the year

in which the national convention is to be held.

|*19} (12) The Republican National Committee

may grant a-waiver to a state party from certain provisions of

this rule in the following instance:

Where it is not possible for a state party to comply

with the first Tuesday in October deadline delineated in

paragraph (d) of this rule and not possible for a state party to

hold its presidential primary, caucus, convention, or meeting

for the purpose of voting for a

RNC Ex. | 18-19

1902

presidential candidate and/or selecting delegates to th

national convention as was used for the immedi t “

se national convention or to select denies es

rem delegates by congressional district or state

wons pursuant to paragraph (c) of this rule, and th

Republican National Committee determines that grantin h

waiver 1s in the best interests of the Republican Party are

(c) Conventions.

a Pgs state law permits or the Republican Party

revved 4 ‘ae require the election of delegates and alternate

y convention or there is no appli

( pplicable state law or

sie price age pug and alternate delegates to the

ention sha elected by con istri

! gressional distr

or state conventions pursuant to the following rules:

(1) Congressional distri

; . istrict or State

coriventions shall be called by the Republican state committee.

conventions = Py tO congressional district

; elected in precinct c

: aucuses, mass

m ,

eetings, mass conventions, or county conventions in which

only eligible voters in su

ch precinct, county, or distri

case may be, shall vote. ee

(3) Notices of the call fi

| | or any such cauc

meeting, or convention shall be published in a camaiee os

— of general circulation in the county, district, or

-* , as the case may be, not less than fifteen (15) days prior to

€ date of such caucus, meeting, or convention.

(4) Only persons eligi

gible to vote wh

peter Z : | _— of public record to be Republicans

State law or, if voters are not enrolled b

arty, b

ne ome party rules of a state, shall enor on

J sa e ree held for the purpose of electing delegates or

ate delegates to the national convention or in any

RNC Ex. | 19

1903

Republican caucus, mass meeting, or mass convention held

for the purpose of selecting delegates to the county, district, or

state conventions, and only such legal and qualified voters

shall be elected as delegates to county, district, and state

conventions; [*20] provided, however, that in addition to the

qualifications provided herein, the applicable Republican

party rules of a state may prescribe additional qualifications

not inconsistent with law, which additional qualifications shall

be adopted before the first Tuesday in October in the year

before the year in which the national convention is to be held

and published in at least one (1) newspaper having a general

circulation throughout the state, such publication to be at least

ninety (90) days before such qualifications become effective.

(5) No delegates shall be deemed eligible

to participate in any congressional district or state convention

the purpose of which is to elect delegates to the national

convention who are elected prior to the date of the issuance of

the call of such national convention.

(6) Congressional district conventions shall

be composed of delegates who are persons eligible to vote and

who are deemed to be Republicans pursuant to state law or

party rules. State conventions shall be composed of delegates

who are persons eligible to vote and who are deemed to be

Republicans pursuant to state law or party rules in the

respective districts which they represent in said state

conventions. Such delegates shall be apportioned by the state

Republican Party among counties, parishes, and cities of the

state or district having regard to the Republican vote or the

population therein.

(7) There shall be no proxies at any district

or state convention (which shall not include meetings of a

Republican state committee) held for the purpose of selecting

delegates to the national convention. If alternate delegates to

such selection convention are selected, the alternate delegate

_and no other shall vote in the absence of the delegate.

RNC Ex. | 19-20

1904

(d) Certification and filing by state committees.

On or before the first Tuesday in October 0

before the year in which the national Aad is n re orr|

each Republican State committee shall adopt rules, procedures,

policies, and instructive materials (prepared pursuant to Rule

No. 14(a)) governing the selection of delegates and alternate

delegates to the national convention to convene during the

following year and shall certify and file with the secretary of

the Republican National Committee true copies of the same

and of all statutes governin

g the selection of such de

and alternate delegates. —

{*21] RULE NO. 16

Enforcement of Rules

(a) If any state or state party violates th

the Republican Party relating to the iaiee of a ieee

process resulting in the election of delegates or alternate

delegates to the next national convention, such state shall

suffer a loss of its delegates and alternate delegates to that

national convention as follows:

(1) If a state or state party vi

Rules of the Republican Party relating gc arvangge o.

selection process resulting in the election of delegates or

alternate delegates to the national convention before the call to

the national conven) ion is issued, then the number of delegates

to the national convention from that state shall be reduced by

fifty percent (50%), and the c

shall also be reduced. enn iomsto dulegutes

(2) If a state or state party violate

Rules of the Republican Party relating ite Quien of ~

selection process resulting in the election of delegates or

alternate delegates to the national convention after the call to

the national convention is issued, then the number of delegates

RNC Ex. | 20-21

1905

to the national convention from that state shall be reduced by

ninety percent ¢90%), and the corresponding alternate

delegates shall also be reduced.

(3) Any sum representing a fraction shall

be increased to the nearest whole number, so long as such

rounding does not prevent a state from having at least one (1)

delegate or alternate delegate to the nat.o al convention.

(b) If a violation has occurred before the issuance

of the call to the national convention, the chairman of the

Republican National Conimittee shall notify the offending

state of the violation and shall inform the state of the number

of delegates and alternate delegates it will lose. This reduced

number of delegates and alternate delegates will be reflected

in the call to the national convention, and will be reported to

the secretary of state or responsible election official of the

offending state and to the chairman of every state party. Said

reduced number will be the only number recognized as the

official delegation of the state to the national convention.

(c) If a violation has occurred after the issuance of

the call to the national convention, the chairman of the

Republican National Committee shall notify the state of the

violation and shall inform the state of the number of delegates

and alternate delegates it will lose. This reduced number of

[*22] delegates and alternate delegates will be reported to the

secretary of state or responsible election official of the

offending state and to the chairman of every state party, and

such reduced number will be the only number recognized as

the official delegation of the state to the national convention.

(d) If the chairman of the Republican National

Committee does not act upon a violation of the Rules of the

Republican Party relating to the selection and/or allocation of

delegates or alternate delegates to the national convention,

then a statement may be filed against a state or state party by

any three (3) members of the Republican National Committee

RNC Ex. | 21-22

1906

£

S a

(1) A statement filed against a st

party by any three (3) members of the Standing Seuaieeas

Rules shall be written and shall specify the reasons why the

members believe the state or state party is in violation. The

statement shall be signed and dated by each Rules member

filing the statement, and shall be filed with the secretary of the

Republican National Committee. The secretary of the

Republican National Committee shall, within twenty (20) days

of receipt, distribute such statement to all members of th

Republican National Committee. ;

(2) The Standing Commit

meet upon the call of the aiden of the eathce

and shall vote upon whether a state or state party is in

violation. If by majority vote the Standing Committee on

Rules finds a violation, then such state or state party shall

suffer the penalties described in paragraph (a) of this rule.

(e) ‘Ifa state or state party i ,

heteiae party is determined to be in

(1) No member of the Republican National

‘Committee from the offending state shall be permitted to serve

as a delegate or alternate delegate to the national convention.

. (2) After the Republica i

Committee members are excluded Pin laine Pye ye

offending state’s delegation to the national convention, the

State party shall determine which of the state’s remainin

delegates (and corresponding alternate delegates) are cities.

to serve as part of the state’ ;

, s reduced delegati

national convention. gation to the

{*23] (3) In addition to the i

penalties provided fo

in paragraphs (e)(1) and (2) of this rule, the ence do

RNC Ex. | 22-23

1907

National Committee Standing Committee on Rules may

impose additional sanctions relating to the offending state’s

hotel location at the national convention, guest privileges and

VIP passes at the national convention, and seating location in

the national convention hall.

(f) A state or state party shall have no appeal from

either a finding of a violation against it or a penalty imposed

upon it under this rule.

RULE NO. 17

Excess Delegates and Alternate Delegates

(a) No state shall elect a greater number of persons

to act as delegates and alternate delegates than the actual

number of delegates and alternate delegates respectively to

which it is entitled under the call for the national convention.

Provided, however, that if a state is found in violation of the

delegate selection rules under Rule No. 16, then that state

shall not elect a greater number of persons to act as delegates

and alternate delegates than the actual number of delegates

and alternate delegates respectively to which it is entitled

under Rule No. 16. No unit of representation may elect any

delegate or alternate delegate with permission to cast a

fractional vote.

(b) Where more than the authorized number of

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Joint Appendix Vol V — McConnell v. Federal Election Commission · 539 U.S. 938 | Frix