Amicus Curiae Brief — McConnell v. Federal Election Commission

No. 02-1674

CLERK |

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

+

MITCH MCCONNELL,

UNITED STATES SENATOR, et al.,

Appellants,

v.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.,

Appellees.

+

On Appeal From

The United States District Court,

District Of Columbia

¢

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE BIPARTISAN

FORMER MEMBERS OF THE UNITED STATES

CONGRESS IN SUPPORT OF APPELLEES

+

RANDY L. DRYER

Counsel of Record

J. MICHAEL BAILEY

H. DOUGLAS OWENS

PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER

201 South Main Street

Suite 1800

Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898

(801) 532-1234

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO. (800) 225-6964

OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I ET in rnnctanntiasemnedaniionsnenaianeenenerede 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT...................:csseseceeeeeees 2

IIIT ns sinesdneihsiseninaauiniiiiednianinemmiaeniineminenneiiedenes 6

I. BCRA WILL HELP RESTORE INTEGRITY

TO NATIONAL POLITICS BY ENDING

LARGE SOFT MONEY DONATIONG............... 7

A. The National Parties Expect Members of

Congress to Raise Soft Money, and Mem-

B. Soft Money Donations Unavoidably Cor-

rupt the Legislative Process..................:000 10

1. Large Donors Enjoy Disproportionate

Access to Members of Congress.............. 11

2. Large Donors Exercise Disproportion-

ate Influence on the Legislative Proc-

i sccsnciceneisnnnitinlnnssiiidieieninieitintaniniinsiieemnnimaneies 13

C. Soft Money Donations Unavoidably Cor-

rupt the Electoral Process.................:::00+ 20

Il. BCRA WILL HELP RESTORE OUR CITI-

ZENS’ FAITH IN DEMOCRACY ...............c cesses 25

A. BCRA Mitigates the Appearance of Cor-

ITI icicihictasiiasindisneniininipinnnennediaciveiiimmpnrene 25

B. BCRA Enhances Political Participation

EST aa 27

TS a Oe a ee 29

ij

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

FEDERAL CASES

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)...........::::00e 9, 24, 25, 29

FEC v. Beaumont, 123 S. Ct. 2200 (2003)................. 7,9, 10

FEC v. National Right to Work Committee, 459 U.S.

BOT (OGD ccccecnscsnsessscemnenmmee — 7, 25

FEC v. The Christian Coalition, 52 F. Supp. 2d 45

CD.D.C. 2BGB) ccoccecesecceesssesmnemenetta 21

Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Government Political Action

Committee, 528 U.S. 377 (2000).........ccccccccccocccccseeseess 7, 25

: FEDERAL STATUTES

Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), Pub. L. No.

93-443, 88 Stat. 1263, 2 U.S.C. § 431 et seg. .................. 6

MISCELLANEOUS

148 Comg. Rec. FED66 CRBBE)...cccsccccerescenssessnsssnssesenanmennnn 19

148 Cong. Rac. EEBTS CRBGR) .nceccuscccsstncssssecsinvecnmmsconannnie 18

Craig B. Holman & Luke P. McLoughlin, Buying

Tine BOGS (BBG1) .accccccccxssscccssemntenntun 23

Jonathan S. Krasno & Frank Sorauf, Jssue Advo-

cacy and the Integrity of the Political Process, in

INSIDE THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE BATTLE: COURT

TESTIMONY ON THE NEW REFORMS (2003) ............0ce0ee+ee+ 23

Jonathan S. Krasno & Frank Sorauf, Why Soft

Money Has Not Strengthened Parties, in INSIDE

THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE BATTLE: COURT TESTI-

MONY ON THE NEW REFORMS (20038)...........-.0seeeeeeeeeeeeeees 23

es _—— =

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES -— Continued

Page

Mark Mellman & Richard Wirthlin, Public Views

on Party Soft Money, in INSIDE THE CAMPAIGN

FINANCE BATTLE: COURT TESTIMONY ON THE NEW

REFORMS 267 (Corrado, Mann & Potter eds.,

Ee I dca acanie 26

1

INTEREST OF AMICI

Amici are former members of the U.S. Senate and

U.S. House of Representatives (the “Former Members”).’

They are deeply interested in the Bipartisan Campaign

Reform Act (“BCRA”) and in this litigation because its

outcome will shape the environment for federal elections

for decades to come and have a profound impact on citi-

zens’ confidence in the integrity of federal elections and of

the officials who are elected. This Court’s decision will

either bolster a nascent hope for meaningful campaign

reform or cause a return to the pre-BCRA days of cynicism

and disillusionment. The Former Members have devoted

many years, for some most of their lives, to making repre-

sentative government work in practice, including the real

and gritty business of running for office. They hold a

unique position among interested parties in that they

(a) have studied and crafted federal campaign finance law,

(b) have lived with its consequences as federal candidates,

fund-raisers and officeholders, and (c) are free to criticize

the fund-raising system they no longer rely on to remain

in office. In those roles the Former Members have seen,

firsthand, the growing influence and appearance of influ-

ence of big money and special interests on elections and

the legislative process. They are also acutely aware of the

resulting sense of disenfranchisement felt by so many

citizens. Based on their experience and their exceptional

knowledge of the system, the Former Members attest to

the need to “clean up” the financing of federal campaigns

' This brief is filed with the written consent of all parties. No

counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, nor did any

person or entity, other than Amici or their counsel, make a monetary

contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief.

2

and by so doing to restore the voters’ confidence in the

process. They believe the principles enacted by BCRA

advance these worthy objectives.

The Former Members who have joined in this brief are

an impressive and diverse bipartisan group whose service

in Congress and experience in federal elections spans the

modern campaign era. The Former Members are identified

in the Appendix. Collectively, they represent more than

500 years of elected public service at the federal level.

They come from both sides of the political aisle with

constituencies from all walks of life: young and old, poor

and wealthy, urban and rural, educated and uneducated.

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Amici submit this brief to convince this Court of the

profound necessity to sustain the reforms enacted by the

Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (“BCRA”). The Former

Members are on intimate terms with the practical realities

of campaign finance law. They know the effects of soft

money on elections, and they know its effects on the

~ legislative process. While serving in Congress, they wit-

nessed the conflict between the ideal of representative

government, where a representative’s duty and exercise of

judgment is owed to constituents and to the broader public

interest, and the reality of raising the enormous sums of

money needed for the next election. They hope that their

experience will demonstrate to the Court the compelling

need for reform. They believe that the benefits of BCRA in

serving the values of a democratic republic do not come at

the expense of free speech or vigorous electioneering.

Indeed, BCRA will expand the number of voices participat-

ing in electivns. BCRA will move elections closer to the

ideal of a contest of ideas among all interests and away

i.

3

from recent trends of elections as contests only among

moneyed interests. BCRA will help check a growing

cynicism in the electorate and foster greater participation

in campaigns at the grass roots level and in veting itself.

The Former Members wish to underscore that the

campaign finance system that existed before BCRA cor-

rupted and undermined the legislative process in that it

often altered legislative outcomes by elevating moneyed

interests at the expense of the broader public interest.

Members of Congress are induced to offer their time and

attention to donors, and in particular to large donors.

Regrettably, but undeniably, it is a fact of political life that

members of Congress are often more attentive to those

who donate money to them or to their political party than

to those who do not. Large donations are the lifeblood of

any campaign. Money leads to preferential access, and

access means influence. Through such “access,” large

donors are able to influence legislation to their advantage,

often to the detriment of the overall public interest.

Members of Congress quickly learn that if they do not

provide time and attention to large donors, and if they do

not act to influence or acquiesce in legislative decisions

favoring such large donors, then they and their party are

likely to be at a serious disadvantage. As former Senator

Paul Simon bluntly stated, “When people have donated

$50,000 or $100,000, they are going to want their pound of

flesh after the election.” Declaration of Senator Paul

Simon (“Simon Decl.”)’ 4 15. The expectation is unwritten,

but is often honored nonetheless.

* This and the other declarations cited herein from former and

current members of Congress are in the record and were cited in the

opinions below. See, e.g., Memorandum Opinion of Judge Kollar-Kotelly

(D.D.C. May 19, 2003), reprinted in Appellants’ June 2003 Supplemental

(Continued on following page)

4

Foes of BCRA claim that all is well so long as there is

no quid pro quo between the donor and the officeholder.

The reality is that serious, if incremental, corruption

occurs without any explicit guid pro quo agreement. The

quid is given with the expectation that the quo is, or soon

will be, on its way. Those expectations are rewarded often

and amply enough to keep everyone playing the game.

Even where the expectation is not fulfilled, the perception

remains among others in Congress and in the public at

large that money “opened the door” or “greased the

wheels” of government.

The Former Members want to emphasize that most of

their colleagues serving then and now are upright and

honest men and women who are doing their best to serve

the public. Cases of personal venality and individual

corruption are quite rare. Nonetheless, the corrosive effect

of the money chase on the institution of Congress overall

and the public's perception of it are not in dispute.

BCRA does not end all campaign donations, of course,

so it does not remove all temptation to favor donors. But

BCRA will effectively end the single worst temptation —

the unlimited soft money donations that function with

essentially the same effect and influence as direct cam-

paign donations.

If unchecked by BCRA, donors will continue to use

soft money loopholes to avoid the key provisions of pre-

BCRA law, including the requirements to disclose the

identity of donors, limit the amount of donations, and

prohibit donations from corporations and unions. In

reality, BCRA does little more than reimpose the limits on

Appendix to Jurisdictional Statements, Vol. II. The declarations can

also be found at www.campaignlegalcenter.org.

tS ee ee ———

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campaign finance practices that this Court has previously

found to be constitutional.

These soft money loopholes are primarily exploited by

means of the so-called “issue” advertisement. issue adver-

tisements purport not to advocate the election of a particu-

lar candidate; that is a fiction believed nowhere, but relied

on everywhere to skirt the prior law. Virtually every

member of Congress has either benefited from or been

pilloried by an issue advertisement. Because candidates

for federal office ultimately learn the source or sources of

funding for most of these advertisements, large soft money

donations funding them present a serious potential for

undue influence.

The Former Members are very familiar with negative

attitudes held by the public toward government in general

and toward big-money politics in particular. This public

cynicism is based on a perception that a citizen without

great wealth cannot effectively participate in government.

Such cynicism is supported by an observation of pre-BCRA

campaign and legislative practices. The belief that “money

talks,” and that only “big money” talks effectively, corrodes

the foundation of American democracy by conveying to

average non-wealthy citizens a sense that their participa-

tion does not matter. The Former Members believe that

upholding BCRA will do much to expand the depth,

breadth and authenticity of political speech occurring in

an election, and rather than curtail speech will encourage

every citizen, regardless of wealth, te take part in his or

her government.

6

ARGUMENT

The growing use of the soft money loophole in the

Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), Pub. L. No. 93-

443, 88 Stat. 1263, 2 U.S.C. § 431 et seg. (1974), can be

chronicled with numbers and statistics. For the 1992

elections, the two major parties raised $86 million in soft

money. This amount roughly tripled for the 1996 elections

and then nearly doubled again to $495 million in the 2000

election cycle. Memorandum Opinion of Judge Koliar-

Kotelly (D.D.C. May 19, 2003), reprinted in Appellants’

June 2003 Supplemental Appendix to Jurisdictional

Statements Vol. II (hereinafter “Kollar-Kotelly Op.”) at

489sa. Soft money accounted for 42 percent of the spend-

ing by the national political parties in the 2000 presiden-

tial election. Kollar-Kotelly Op. at 491lsa citing Expert

Report of Thomas Mann at 24-25. Yet this exponential

growth only begins to tell the story. Amici here witnessed

firsthand the harm caused by exploitation of the loopholes

closed by BCRA, including distortions in policy-making

favoring large donors and the demoralization of the

electorate.

Our republican form of government depends upon the

essential trust of the pvople — trust in their elected represen-

tatives to serve the public interest and the common weal.

The Former Members believe that BCRA is necessary to

combat the dry rot eating at that element of trust and at

republican government itself. They believe that BCRA will

help restore integrity to the federal electoral process,

mend the damaged trust with the electorate, and improve

and expand political discourse in this country. The Court

should take notice of and credit their firsthand observa-

tions concerning the practices BCRA is designed to correct

and the overwhelming need for the reforms BCRA makes.

Similarly, the Court should give deference to the Congress

— <— -ee e ee

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that enacted BCRA in that campaign finance reform is

squarely within its area of special expertise.*

I. BCRA WILL HELP RESTORE INTEGRITY TO

NATIONAL POLITICS BY ENDING LARGE

SOFT MONEY DONATIONS.

A. The National Parties Expect Members of

Congress to Raise Soft Money, and Members

are Rewarded or Penalized Accordingly.

BCRA was passed in part to reform the manner in

which members of Congress (“Members”) raise money for

their respective political parties. Under the prevailing pre-

BCRA regime, Members were expected to raise significant

amounts of soft money for their party committees, were

given incentives to do so, and could face sanctions if they

did not. The party committees usually asked Members to

solicit additional contributions from persons who had

already donated the maximum possible amount to the

Member’s election campaign. The party committees kept

track of how much each Member raised, and this governed

in large part how much money the party was willing to

* See FEC v. Beaumont, 123 S. Ct. 2200, 2207 (2003) (“[Deference

to legislative choice is warranted particularly when Congress regulates

campaign contributions, carrying as they do a plain threat to political

integrity and a plain warrant to counter the appearance and reality of

corruption and the misuse of corporate advantages.”); Nixon v. Shrink

Mo. Gov't Political Action Comm., 528 U.S. 377, 402 (2000) (Breyer, J.,

concurring) (“Where a legislature has significantly greater institutional

expertise, as, for example, in the field of election regulation, the Court

in practice defers to empirical legislative judgments. . . . ”); FEC v. Nat'l

Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 209 (1982) (“(CJareful legislative

adjustment of the federal electoral laws . . . to account for the particular

legal and economic attributes of corporations and labor organizations

warrants considerable deference. . . . ”).

8

spend on that Member’s election campaign. Members were

asked to make the calls to raise the money because donors

preferred to give with the knowledge of a Member, thus

gaining favor in the Member’s sight. Donors often gave to

a party committee with the understanding that the funds

would go on the “tally” or be credited to the “account” of a

particular candidate and be used to help with his or her

campaign. Party committee officials regularly informed

Members of large donations and who made them.

Most donors were well aware that Members could

take direct credit for their donations to the parties, and

would specifically inform the Member when they made a

party donation. An experience typical for the Former

Members is that of Senator David Boren: “Like other

Senators, I was expected to ‘sell a table’ and attend these

[fund-raising dinners], and, from time to time, I did.

Sometimes, lobbyists called me or other Senators, offered

to buy a ‘table’ for the corporation they represent and then

offered to ‘make sure the donation goes on your tally.’”

Declaration of Senator David Boren (“Boren Decl.”) { 5.

Senator Dale Bumpers recounts: “The last time I ran, I

remember that the DSCC [Democratic Senatorial Cam-

paign Committee] promised to give every candidate a

minimal amount of money regardless of whether he or she -

did any fundraising for the DSCC. To get more than the

minimum, however, you had to raise money for the DSCC.

For example, if I had helped the DSCC raise the maximum

amount it could legally expend on my behalf, I certainly

would have expected the maximum to come back to me.”

Declaration of Senator Dale Bumpers (“Bumpers Decl.”)

q{ 11. The Former Members have had similar experiences.

Conversely, Members who did not raise soft money

often were penalized. The party committees withheld

donations to candidates who did not raise money for the

party. “I... tried to minimize the time I spent raising ‘soft

9

money’ for the Democratic Party, and as a result, I re-

ceived almost no money from the Democratic Party for my

campaigns. At the time, the DSCC and other national

party organizations kept records or ‘tallies’ of how much

soft money a Senator had raised for the party. The DSCC

then gave little money to the campaigns of those Senators

who had not raised adequate party funds.” Boren Decl.

q 4. This experience is similar to that of the Former

Members in both parties, who also saw particular soft

money expectations levied by leadership on colleagues who

held seats on the most powerful committees. There is an

inseverable link between the national political parties,

their congressional fund-raising committees and federal

candidates. Large contributions to national parties and

their committees pose the same risk of corruption or

appearance of corruption as large contributions by indi-

viduals directly to candidates themselves. The latter have

been banned by Congress and upheld by this Court for

decades.‘ BCRA merely prevents individuals and others

from doing indirectly what they cannot do directly.

Soft money is used less and less for traditional,

grassroots, party-building activities, and more and more

for electioneering. This should be expected because it is

axiomatic that the primary function of political parties is

to get their candidates elected. Moreover, this Court has

recognized that expenditures of candidates and of political

committees “are, by definition, campaign related.” See

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79 (1976). As Senator Bump-

ers stated: “Political parties’ primary interest is in sup-

porting and electing their candidates. The parties are

* See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); FEC v. Beaumont,

123 S. Ct. 2200 (2003).

10

money raisers, and they spend the money they raise to

assist their candidates in campaigns.” Bumpers Decl. { 4.

As set forth below, this campaign spending typically takes

the form of so-called “issue” advertising.

B. Soft Money Donations Unavoidably Cor-

rupt the Legislative Process.

In establishing a democratic republic, the Founders

intended elected officeholders to cast their votes and make

other decisions based on some combination of their own

judgment, the preferences and expectations of their

constituents, and a regard for the larger public interest.

This ideal is undermined by current practices relating to

soft money.

Because soft money donations are so large compared

to hard money donations, the soft money donations heavily

influence Members in the legislative process. And because

legislative leaders are especially interested in and in-

formed about these donations, the effect on key leadership

decisions, such as taking party positions and scheduling

bills for consideration, are particularly susceptible to

undue influence.

Of course, it would be against the law for an explicit

quid pro quo to exist between Member and donor. But the

relationship need not be an explicit one to effectively

corrupt the legislative process. As this Court observed in

its recent decision in FEC v. Beaumont, 123 S. Ct. 2200,

2207 (2003), “corruption” is to be “understood not only as

quid pro quo agreements, but also as undue influence on

an officeholder’s judgment, and the appearance of such

influence.”

———

_——_

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1. Large Donors Enjoy Disproportionate

Access to Members of Congress. ;

In the pre-BCRA system, many Members granted

greater “access” to large soft money donors and raised

money from donors for whom they made favorable legisla-

tive decisions. In turn, donors gave financial support to

Members perceived to be sympathetic and willing to

further the donors’ legislative agenda. Whatever the cause

and effect relationship in a given instance, the cumulative

effect and appearance are suspect.

It is only natural that a busy member of Congress

with ten minutes to spare will spend those minutes re-

turning the call of a large soft money donor before or

instead of the call of other constituents. Money equals

access which equals influence. Former Senator Paul

Simon’s testimony filed with the court below is illustrative

of the views of the Former Members:

Because few people can afford to give over

$20,000 or $25,000 to a party committee, those

people who can will receive substantially better

access to elected federal leaders than people who

can only afford smaller contributions or can not

afford to make any contributions. When you in-»

crease the amount that people are allowed to

give, or let people give without limit to the par-

ties, you increase the danger of unfair access.

Simon Decl. 7 16.

Party committee officials often promised large donors

access to Members in return for contributions. Perceiving

that their political survival depended on it, Members and

their staffs easily recalled who their party’s large donors

were and usually were eager to grant requests for attention.

No matter how busy a politician may be during

the day, he or she will always make time to see

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donors who gave large amounts of money.

Staffers who work for Members know who the

big donors are, and those people always get their

phone calls returned first and are allowed to see

the Member when others are not.

Declaration of Senator Alan K. Simpson (“Simpson Decl.”)

q 9.

The congressional community is not large. Members

know which lobbyists represent large donors. Large donors

and Members attend conferences, briefings, retreats, golf

outings and dinners together on a frequent basis. Each

group needs what the other has. It is natural that Mem-

bers should feel beholden to the donors. Donors and their

representatives communicate openly with Members about

financial matters, notifying them when large donations to

the party have been made, sometimes even preferring to

hand the checks directly to the Members. Members and

donors often do not discuss matters pending in Congress

at the same time that donations are discussed. This

formality helps to insulate the transaction from becoming

a quid pro quo. But even at fund-raising events it is not

uncommon for the donor to mention a desire to see the

Member at some subsequent time about a matter of

interest. Though most donations are made without specific

intention of asking for something in return, donors are

aware that their donation will afford them access when

they need it.

The Former Members stress that it was exceedingly

rare for a Member to make a particular legislative decision

because of a particular past or expected donation. The

system was much more subtle and incremental than that.

Even as the vast majority of individual Members have

never “sold” a vote, it is just as true that the influence of

campaign donations is so pervasive that it acts as an

13

invisible hand to guide and nudge outcomes in ways that

causation is always “plausibly deniable.”

The larger the donation, the greater the access.

“Sometimes, the party asked us to solicit soft money for

attendance at events that included access to the president;

other times major donors were given access to certain

lawmakers. The more money one donates, the higher-level

players he or she has access to.” Simpson Decl. ¥ 4.

The Former Members are convinced that the reason

most large donors give to political parties is because the

donors believe they will receive special access to and

influence over government officials, even as most also feel

their cause is legitimate or even altruistic. Donors also

believe, with ample justification, that if they do not make

large donations when requested by Members, those offi-

cials will pay less attention to their views and positions or

even favor those with opposing views. Because Members

need donations to survive politically, and because donors

need the access their donations obtain for them, and

because an opposing party or competing donor is usually

ready to fill any vacuum in the system, neither the Mem-

bers nor the donors can afford to “unilaterally disarm” by

opting out of the fund-raising “arms race.” In order to

reform the system, it takes legislation like BCRA to level

the playing field for all involved.

2. Large Donors Exercise Disproportionate

Influence on the Legislative Process.

The Former Members believe that the pre-BCRA

system distorted and corrupted the legislative process in

ways ranging from the subtle to the blatant. As noted,

Members make time to meet with large donors or their

representatives. Such meetings “are not idle chit-chats

14 ‘ 15

about the philosophy of democracy,” as Senator Warren

Rudman describes them.

Express, which according to published reports

had contributed $1.4 million in the last two-year

In these meetings, these special interests, often cycle to incumbent Members of Congress and al-

accompanied by lobbyists, press elected officials — most $1 million in soft money to the political par-

Senators who either raised money from the spe- ties.

cial interest in question or who benefit directly or I opposed this in the Democratic Caucus, arguing

indirectly from their contributions to the Sena- that even if it was good legislation, it dheude ont

tor’s party — to adopt their position on a matter be approved without holding a hearing, we

of interest to them. Senators are pressed by their should not cave in to special interests. One of my

benefactors to introduce legislation, to amend senior colleagues got up and said, “I’m tired of

legislation, to block legislation, and to vote on Paul always talking about special interests;

legislation in a certain way. No one says: “We we've got to pay attention to who is buttering our

gave money so you should do this to help us.” No bread.” I will never forget that. This was a clear

one needs to say it — it is perfectly understood by example of donors getting their way, not on the

all participants in every such meeting. merits of the legislation, but just because they

Declaration of Senator Warren Rudman (“Rudman Decl.”) had been big contributors. I do not think there is

4 7. The Former Members can attest to the accuracy of ) any question that this is the reason it passed.

Senator Rudman’s description. The access afforded to Simon Decl. J 13-14.°

large donors to, at a minimum, make their case, gives

them a substantial advantage. A large donor is much more i

likely than others to be successful in inducing legislative

decisions that benefit the donor. }

The Former Members have witnessed specific exam-

ples of legislation affected by the influence of large money

donors. Senator Simon recounts one such incident:

* Senator John McCain, one of BCRA’s sponsors, describes another:

In June 1998, it was widely reported that during the Sen-

ate’s consideration of a bill entitled the National Tobacco

Policy and Youth Smoking Reduction Act (S. 1415), U.S.

Senator Mitch McConnell, then head of the National Repub-

lican Senatorial Committee, talked at a Republican Sena-

tors’ policy lunch about political advertising by major

tobacco manufacturers. In a complaint it filed on June 29,

It is not unusual for large contributors to seek

legislative favors in exchange for their contribu-

tions. A good example of that which stands out in

my mind because it was so stark and recent oc-

curred on the next-to-last day of the 1995-96 leg-

islative session. Federal Express wanted to

amend a bill being considered by a Conference

Committee, to shift coverage of their truck driv-

ers from the National Labor Relations Act to the

Railway Act, which includes airlines, pilots and

railroads. This was clearly of benefit to Federal

1998 with the Federal Election Commission, the Campaign

for Tobacco-Free Kids characterized Senator McConnell’s

communications as follows: “Based upon reports that have

been widely published in the news media, only hours before

Republican Senators were due to vote for or against cloture

on S. 1415, Senator Mitch McConnell informed his col-

leagues in a closed door meeting that if they voted to kill the

tobacco bill, the major tobacco manufacturers were promis-

ing to mount a television ad campaign to support those who

voted against the bill.” [citation omitted] I was present at

the meeting and this is an accurate report of what Senator

(Continued on following page)

16

The examples from both parties are abundant. Cur-

rent Senator John McCain recounts how, while a bill was

pending to get generic drugs to market faster, the Republi-

can senatorial and congressional campaign committees

held a gala dinner that raised nearly $30 million in mostly

soft money, a substantial portion of which came from

pharmaceutical companies. McCain Decl. 411. He also

witnessed the “hijack[ing]” of telecommunications deregu-

lation legislation that ended up “filled with internal

inconsistencies designed to appease ... competing donors

rather than to serve the public interest,” and he saw the

demise of an important amendment to the Sarbanes-Oxley

corporate governance bill based on the opposition of large

donors to the parties. McCain Decl. 4 9-10.

Warren Rudman describes how “[s]ome large donors

will ask for help with personal causes, such as immigra-

tion matters, tax reform, or political appointments. Others

attend meetings with elected officials in order to voice

their company or industrys concerns with particular

legislation and to affect the outcome of the legislation.”

Rudman Decl. ¥ 8. He concludes that “[eJlected officials

may not intend to be affected by such access, but the fact

is that they receive a disproportionate amount of input

and advice from larger, more wealthy contributors. This

can skew their judgment.” Jd.

The Former Members can recount witnessing in-

stances when favors for soft money donors were dispensed

in a number of ways, including tactical parliamentary

McConnell said. This episode graphically indicates that cor-

porate soft money is widely used to influence legislative

votes.

Declaration of Senator John McCain (“McCain Decl.”) { 8.

17

maneuvers such as the offering of amendments, mobiliza-

tion of support or opposition, and speeding or delaying

_action. The Former Members join with Senator David

Boren when he says “I know from my first-hand experi-

ence and from my interactions with other Senators that

they did feel beholden to large donors.” Boren Decl. { 8.

Such feelings are openly acknowledged in moments of

candor:

I remember specific instances when Senators’

votes were affected by the fear of losing future

donations. One time, Senator Bob Dole and I

were seeking votes on an important national is-

sue. More than once, we heard a Senator tell us,

‘T realize it’s an issue of great importance, but if I

vote for that I won’t get any more money. I want

to be here for another term. You do want me back

here next year, don’t you?’ These senators know

- that it’s a bad idea to poison the well that nour-

ishes the system.

Simpson Decl. { 11.

Of course, special interests are not limited to making

soft money donations, and critics of reform might protest

that soft money is no more corrupting than hard money.

The Former Members simply state to the contrary that

soft money carries more risk for the simple reason that the

donations are so much larger. Hard money donations are

limited in size. Soft money donations are in effect unlim-

ited. These large, soft money donations, both past and

anticipated, are more prominent in the minds of the

Members. The Members know, in deciding on a vote or

parliamentary tactic, that a lot of money can ride on what

they are about to do. They do not necessarily change their

minds for that reason, but there is an insidious effect on

the psychology of the institution. Quite humanly, Members

may hope for an easier time fund-raising in the next

18

election cycle, or they may fear a more difficult effort.

They know that “[wJhen people have donated $50,000 or

$100,000, they are going to want their pound of flesh after

the election.” Simon Decl. 4 15. The recipients of such

donations know that the piper must be paid, or at least

respected: “ ... many Members of this body pause at least

once to ask themselves how a vote will affect their contri-

butions when they should be asking solely how it will

affect this great Nation.” 148 Cong. Rec. H373 (2002)

(Statement of Rep. Baird). Again, these effects are magni-

fied in the case of critical decisions by leadership.

Members often seek out positions on powerful commit-

tees, such as the Senate’s Finance Committee or the

House’s Ways and Means, in part because it is easier to

raise money from those positions. Most of this money is

raised from donors who have matters of interest pending

before these committees. The party committees and

leaders in turn expect the Members on these powerful

legislative committees to raise more soft money for the

party committees.

The overwhelming principle motivating donors is the

need to obtain access and influence. This is particularly

clear in light of the frequent practice of making large

donations to both parties. Forty of the 50 top soft money

donors in 1996 donated to both parties, as did 35 of the top

donors in 2000. Kollar-Kotelly Op. at 619sa-620sa citing

Expert Report of Thomas Mann tbls. 5-6). This seemingly

contradictory behavior is in fact easily explained by the

need donors feel for access on both sides of the aisle and by

a fear, based on experience, that they will be ignored or

even punished by one party if they give only to the other.

Many donors are left feeling “shaken down” for their .

money.

}

|

}

19

Remaining in office is a form of personal benefit to a

Member of Congress. Members enjoy financial and other

emoluments and privileges and a status not available to

most citizens. These benefits are hard earned and de-

served. Indeed, many Members make tremendous per-

sonal financial and other sacrifices in order to serve the

public. Nonetheless, most Members desire to continue in

elected office. Their desire requires reelection, and their

reelection campaigns depend on raising huge sums of

money. The money necessary to deter or defeat opponents

and win reelecticoa increasingly comes from large donors

and political parties, often in the form of soft money.

Pre-BCRA practices involving soft money exploited

loopholes in the previous election law, and turned that law

on its head. Indeed, BCRA’s sponsor said that BCRA’s

purpose is “to enforce the 1907 law banning corporate

treasury money, the 1947 [law] banning union dues money,

and enforce the 1974 law banning unlimited sums of

money.” 148 Cong. Rec. H346 (2002) (Statement of Rep.

Shays). BCRA is designed to restore force and effect to

these earlier statutes, which have already been upheld by

this Court.

The Former Members urge the Cour to consider their

experience. The current system of political fund-raising is

badly in need of repair. The process of donation to Mem-

bers, followed by access and favor granted by Members,

followed by further donation to Members, is inherently

corrupting at the institutional level even though the

participants are well intentioned and do nothing legally

wrong. This cycle reinforces itself when donors tend to

ignore Members who do not provide access and favors, and

Members tend not to provide access and favors to those

who do not donate. The circle is complete without the

necessity of a quid pro quo. Quid regularly followed by quo

20

is amply sufficient. BCRA removes the most powerful force

in this cycle — soft money.

C. Soft Money Donations Unavoidably Corrupt

the Electoral Process.

Beyond the distortions to the legislative process, soft

money is also deleterious to the electoral process under the

pre-BCRA system. It is soft money that fuels the abuses

associated with “issue advertisements” and “coordinated

expenditures.” An issue advertisement simply masks the

otherwise illicit infusion of soft money into congressional

elections through a charade-like and formalistic compli-

ance with the law. Issue advertisements studiously avoid a

“direct” pitch to the public to vote one way or another,

instead making that pitch indirectly (but still effectively)

by urging support or opposition to a particular issue and

then tying that support or opposition to a particular

candidate with statements such as “tell him [the oppo-

nent] to quit doing that.” Most issue advertisements run in

the periods immediately prior to elections, so it is appar-

ent they are not intended to provoke debate on the issues

of the day, as their name might suggest. Voters get the

very obvious message that they should vote for or against

Congressman X. It is the Former Members’ experience and

belief that the so-called “express advocacy” test to deter-

mine whether a campaign advertisement comes within the

scope of FECA is so easily avoided as to render meaning-

less the ban on companies and unions using treasury

funds to pay for advertisements designed to influence

federal elections.

By law, advertisements paid for with soft money must

be sponsored and funded by outside organizations or the

parties themselves. Additionally, the sponsors of the

advertisements must avoid explicit coordination of their

21

advertisements with the campaign in question. Otherwise,

the cost of the advertisements is considered to be an in-

kind contribution to the campaign, which may be illegal if

funded by soft money. Explicit coordination with the

campaign is unnecessary because election consultants who

have no formal ties to campaigns are perfectly capable of

analyzing what message will be useful to elect or defeat a

particular candidate. Candidates rarely take action to stop

issue advertisements they perceive as helpful.

The coordination between the candidate and the

sponsor can take other indirect forms, such as when the

consultants producing the advertisements work for other

candidates for federal office in the same areas where the

advertisements run. Consultants or staffers sometimes

move freely from a job working for a candidate to one

working for the sponsoring advocacy group and vice versa.

Political parties can also be the conduit for information

between campaigns and advocacy groups. Sometimes

political parties loan persons to assist campaigns with

their media. These persons may also serve unwittingly as

a conduit between a political party and the campaign.

With such overlaps, polling data and other research and

advice often are shared. While these relationships and

behaviors effectively coordinate soft money expenditures

with the campaign, the “independent” expenditures are

not counted as campaign contributions under FEC deci-

sions that narrowly and unrealistically define coordination

as “substantial discussion” about the coordinated commu-

nication. See, e.g., FEC v. The Christian Coalition, 52

F. Supp. 2d 45, 91-92 (D.D.C. 1999).

There is ample evidence that political parties, party

committees and candidates for office manipulate this soft

money loophole to their advantage. Candidates or others

associated with them sometimes circumvent limits appli-

cable to donations to campaigns by suggesting that donors

22

contribute to the interest groups that run the issue adver-

tisements. Members are frequently favorably disposed

towards such donors just as they would be to other soft

money donors.

Specific examples of the circumvention of pre-BCRA

election law abound. “The national Democratic party

managed to finance two-thirds of its pro-Clinton ‘issue ad’

television blitz by taking advantage of the more favorable

allocation methods available to state parties. They simply

transferred the requisite mix of hard and soft dollars to

party committees in the states they targeted and had the

state committees place the ads.” Mann Expert Report at

22, quoted in Kollar-Kotelly Op. at 494sa. Republicans

_ engage in the same types of conduct:

[The group “Republicans for Clean Air”] spon-

sored ads praising then-Governor George W.

Bush and criticizing Senator John McCain before

the 2000 Republican presidential primaries in

three states. Eventually, after the first of these

primaries (South Carolina’s) reporters uncovered

that Republicans for Clean Air consisted of two

brothers, Charles and Sam Wyly, long-time

friends and supporters of Governor Bush.

Charles Wyly, in fact, was an authorized fund-

raiser for the Bush campaign... . [I]t is impossi-

ble to imagine officials of the Bush campaign

were in the dark about Republicans for Clean

Air. According to press estimates, the Wylys

spent $25 million on their ads for Governor

Bush. [internal footnote omitted] We find it in-

conceivable that an expenditure of that magni-

tude could remain unknown to the small circle of

financial leaders close to both the Bush cam-

paign and the Wylys (including Charles Wyly

himself) or the even smaller circle of Republican

media consultants.

23

Jonathan S. Krasno & Frank Sorauf, Issue Advocacy and

the Integrity of the Political Process, in INSIDE THE CAM.-

PAIGN FINANCE BATTLE: COURT TESTIMONY ON THE NEW

REFORMS 189, 194-95 (Anthony Corrado et al. eds., 2003).°

It is apparent to the Former Members that soft money

is not being used by the parties for state and local elec-

tions or for other party-building activities, as FECA

contemplates. The national parties raise soft money and

work through state parties to influence federal elections.

Party-sponsored soft money advertisements increasingly

have become explicit electioneering. Parties and their

committees are almost never mentioned in the advertise-

ments for which they pay. In 2000, for example, 92% of the

advertisements paid for by the parties did not even iden-

tify the name of the party. None encouraged voters to

register with the party or to volunteer in support of the

party. Craig B. Holman & Luke P. McLoughlin, Buying

Time 2000 at 64 (2001), quoted in Kollar-Kotelly Op. at

507sa. But 99 percent of such ads in 2000 mention candi-

dates, 51 percent name the opposing candidate, 17 percent

name the party’ candidate, and 32 percent name both

candidates. Jonathan S. Krasno & Frank Sorauf, Why Soft

Money Has Not Strengthened Parties, in INSIDE THE

CAMPAIGN FINANCE BATTLE: COURT TESTIMONY ON THE

NEW REFORMS 49, 51 (Anthony Corrado et al. eds., 2003).

The soft money exception has swallowed the rule.

Such blatant disregard of campaign contribution limits by

the combination of soft money and issue advertisements

* Jonathan Krasno is a Visiting Fellow at Yale University’s

Institute for Social and Policy Studies. Frank Sorauf is a Regents’

Emeritus Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota.

Both filed expert testimony for the Appellees in the Court proceedings

below.

24

should not be permitted. It can best be corrected by up-

holding BCRA.

Generally, the public needs to know the true source of

an advertisement in order to fairly assess it and assign a

degree of credibility. Another problem with issue adver-

tisements not paid for by party committees is that they

frequently are paid for with money filtered through

nominal “committees” that do not disclose in any meaning-

ful way how or by whom they are funded. While pre-BCRA

law requires the sponsor to identify itself at the end of the

advertisement, such identification can be the name of an

entity created to conceal the identity of the true sponsor.

The lack of full disclosure of receipts and expenditures for

issue advertisements undermines the candor and financial

transparency that should be present in elections. The

secrecy creates opportunity for corruption, since the public

does not know who is paying for advertisements that

benefit a candidate.

Disclosure was one of the primary objectives of FECA,

and was seen by this Court as a substantial guard against

corruption. As this Court has held, “[DJisclosure require-

ments deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance of

corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures

to the light of publicity. This exposure may discourage those

who would use money for improper purposes either before

or after the election. A public armed with information

about a candidate’s most generous supporters is better —

able to detect any post-election special favors that may be

given in return.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67. Without BCRA,

the disclosure requirements of FECA can be evaded. BCRA

will restore it to efficacy.

pi eet te

25

II. BCRA WILL HELP RESTORE OUR CITIZENS’

FAITH IN DEMOCRACY.

A. BCRA Mitigates the Appearance of Corrup-

tion.

This Court has repeatedly held that the public percep-

tion of the probity of elected representatives is an impor-

tant and sufficient governmental interest.’ BCRA was

passed, in part, not only to address actual corruption, but

to address the appearance of corruption, an issue this

Court has previously noted as being of grave concern to

our democracy. In Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’ Poiitical

Action Comm., 528 U.S. 377, 390 (2000), the Court warned

that the “... cynical assumption that large donors call the

tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part

in dernocratic governance.” BCRA was Congress’s response

both to the wholesale evasion over time of the principles

underlying the FECA and to the growing appearance of

corruption and its corrosive effect.

As the district court noted, in the 2000 election cycle

almost a half billion dollars in soft money was contributed

to the national parties by corporations, unions and

wealthy individuals. Memorandum Opinion of Judge

" This Court has stated that legislation may be justified by a

government’s interest in preventing the appearance of corruption in

addition to actual corruption. FEC v. National Right to Work Comm..,

459 U.S. 197, 208 (1982) (affirming the “importance of preventing both

the actual corruption threatened by large financial contributions and

the eroding of public confidence in the electoral process through the

appearance of corruption”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976) (“Of

almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo arrange-

ments is the impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from

public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of

large individual financial contributions.”).

26

Richard J. Leon (D.D.C. May 1, 2003), reprinted in Appel-

lants’ June 2003 Supplemental Appendix to Jurisdictional

Statements Vol. IV at 1189sa; Kollar-Kotelly Op. at 491sa.

Although these funds were ostensibly not made for the

purpose of influencing the outcome of federal elections, the

Former Members’ experience demonstrates that the public

believes the opposite — and for good reason. The Federal

campaign law prior to the enactment of BCRA had become

so riddled with loopholes, and large contributors had

become so adept at exploiting these loopholes, that the

safeguards against corruption and the appearance of

corruption were rendered meaningless.

The pervasive public cynicism about the electoral

process is directly linked to the perception that a citizen

without great wealth cannot effectively participate in

government. Too many citizens believe that “money talks”

and that only “big money” talks with any effectiveness.

This belief leaves non-wealthy citizens with a sense that

their participation does not matter and so corrodes the

foundation of participatory democracy. The health of

republican government will be strengthened when a major

corrupting influence, one that is obvious to the average

voter, is curtailed. Nearly three-quarters of voters believe

that their congressional representatives sometimes decide

how to vote on an issue based on what their party's big

donors want. Mark Mellman & Richard Wirthlin, Public

Views on Party Soft Money, in INSIDE THE CAMPAIGN

FINANCE BATTLE: COURT TESTIMONY ON THE NEW REFORMS

267 (Corrado, Mann & Potter eds., 2003). Campaign laws

and practices which, without BCRA, seem to the public to

be designed to discourage voter participation and diminish

public confidence in government and in the electoral

process are a shame. BCRA will help end that shame. The

Former Members believe that this Court’s affirmation of

BCRA and BCRA’s underlying principles will do much to

27

restore the faith of the citizenry in our democratic proc-

esses by mitigating the appearance of corruption.

B. BCRA Enhances Political Participation and

Discourse.

BCRA will strengthen the electoral process by foster-

ing a greater role in that process for the individual voter

and small contributor, a role that prior legislation sought

to protect, but which soft money practices have trampled.

BCRA’s opponents assert that it will impinge free speech.

To the contrary, the Act will expand the speech opportuni-

ties for the vast majority of “ordinary” citizens in the

electoral process.

The Constitution establishes a system where the

Members of Congress represent the people of a particular

state or district. Soft money practices effectively under-

mine and distort that system, affording soft money donors

influence that eclipses that of the average voter and

average donor. Their voices are lost when Members grant

disproportionat® access and other attention to soft money

donors. Senator Simon has expressed the Former Mem-

bers’ views in this regard:

In a very real sense, we are going through the old

fight between Thomas Jefferson and Alexander

Hamilton: should propertied interests have pref-

erence in what goes on in government? And our

answer, with our present system of financing

campaigns, is yes, people with money are going

to be given greater influence, because their

names are going to be recognized. They are going

to have greater access than those who did not

contribute. The soft money system is the most

egregious part of the abuse of political contribu-

tions resulting in preferred access.

Simon Decl. { 17.

28

The voices of the avereze voter and the average small

donor are drowned out whe a flood of soft money, from

undisclosed sources, pours into a race. Those citizens see

and understand what is going on, and they are discour-

aged from participating and even from voting. As money

tends to compromise the elected, it also serves to disen-

franchise the electors. Any true competition of ideas has

little chance when faced with the financial conglomerate of

special interests. Such distortions have been curbed in the

past with this Court’s approval, and the Former Members

respectfully urge the Court to uphold BCRA, which was

Congress’ long-fought effort to eliminate the worst abuses

in the campaign finance system.

BCRA will go far to counter the dismay with which

people react to the big money politics of the recent past.

The Former Members have remained active in public

affairs in many different ways and continue to have

extensive opportunity to listen to the public on matters of

concern. They continue to encounter the palpable cynicism

about government in general and soft money politics in

particular they experienced while in office. One of the

issues most frequently mentioned is campaign finance and

soft money. The public is angry and frustrated with gov-

ernment officials who often appear to be for rent. The

public is convinced that Members and other federal

officials are beholden to special interests who bankroll

campaigns through unlimited soft money donations. They

believe that these interests have far too much sway over

their representatives, and they believe their own votes.

their own participation in grassroots activities, and their

own small donations do not count for much. These beliefs

generate the apathy, indifference and low voter turnout

that cut at the very root of American democracy. Represen-

tative democracy is seriously damaged when so many

citizens believe they have no meaningful opportunity to

eS oe

29

participate in government because they lack the financial

resources to compete with rich and powerful donors.

BCRA stands for the proposition that the national

government is not for sale to the highest bidder, and it

welcomes and encourages the participation of the average

citizen. Without that participation, the American political

system is in peril. Senator John Glenn, once a candidate

for this country’s highest office, framed the issue clearly:

I hope that when the courts review this law, they

~ consider what the future of this country is going

to be. In this case, the courts will be dealing with

an issue that is going to be a key part of whether

this country continues to look at itself as a coun-

try that represents every citizen’s interests

equally, or whether we go back toward that oli-

garchy from which we escaped in 1776. Yet the

great thing about this country is that there is no

such thing as an average citizen. Under the Con-

stitution, every citizen should be considered

equal and supreme. If we get away from that, we

get away from what makes this country great.

Declaration of Senator John Glenn 7.

+

CONCLUSION

BCRA’s reforms were designed principally to restore

the integrity of the Federal Election Campaign Act, to

address the fundamental concerns expressed in Buckley v.

Valeo regarding corruption and the appearance of corrup-

tion, and to stop the massive use of soft money to circum-

vent the constitutionally approved limitations on

campaign contributions. This Court should give effect to

30

BCRA’s objectives and affirm and reverse the decision of

the Court below accordingly.

Respectfully submitted,

RANDY L. DRYER

Counsel of Record

J. MICHAEL BAILEY

H. DOUGLAS OWENS

PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER.

201 South Main Street

Suite 1800

Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898

(801) 532-1234

August 5, 2003

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A-1

APPENDIX

The Former Members who have joined in this brief are

an impressive and diverse bipartisan group whose service

in Congress and ex»verience in federal elections spans the

modern campaign era. Collectively, they represent more

than 500 years of elected public service at the federal

level. They come from both sides of the political aisle with

constituencies from all walks of life: young and old, poor

and wealthy, urban and rural, educated and uneducated.

They are listed below:

Representative John B. Anderson served as a Republican

U.S. Representative from Illinois from 1961 to 1981. He

was a candidate for President of the United States in

1980.

Representative Michael D. Barnes served as a Democratic

U.S. Representative from Maryland from 1979 to 1987.

Representative Thomas M. Barrett served as a Democratic

U.S. Representative from Wisconsin from 1993 to 2003.

Representative Anthony Beilenson served as a Democratic

U.S. Representative from California from 1977 to 1997.

Representative James H. Bilbry served as a Democratic

U.S. Representative from Nevada from 1987 to 1995.

Representative Robert A. Borski served as a Democratic

U.S. Representative from Pennsylvania from 1983 to 2003.

Senator Leslie L. Byrne is currently a Virginia State

Senator. She served as a Democratic U.S. Representative

from Virginia from 1993 to 1995.

Representative Bob Carr served as a Democratic U.S.

Representative from Michigan from 1975 to 1981 and 1983

to 1995.

A-2

Representative William F. Clinger served as a Republican

U.S. Representative from Pennsylvania from 1979 to 1997.

Representative Barber B. Conable, Jr. served as a Repub-

lican U.S. Representative from New York from 1965 to

1985.

Representative Sam Coppersmith served as a Democratic

U.S. Representative from Arizona from 1993 to 1995.

Representative William J. Coyne served as a Democratic

U.S. Representative from Pennsylvania from 1981 to 2003.

Representative Thomas J. Downey served as a Democratic

U.S. Representative from New York from 1975 to 1993.

Senator Thomas F. Eagleton served as a Democratic U.S.

Senator from Missouri from 1968 to 1987.

Representative Don Edwards served as a Democratic U.S.

Representative from California from 1963 to 1995.

Representative Ben Erdreich served as a Democratic U.S.

Representative from Alabama from 1983 to 1993.

Representative Peter Hoagland served as a Democratic

U.S. Representative from Nebraska from 1989 to 1995.

Representative Elizabeth Holtzman served as a Demo-

cratic U.S. Representative from New York from 1973 to

1981.

Representative James P. Johnson served as a Republican

U.S. Representative from Colorado from 1973 to 1981.

Representative Robert Kastenmeier served as a Demto-

cratic U.S. Representative from Wisconsin from 1959 to

1991.

Representative John J. LaFalce served as a Democratic

U.S. Representative from New York from 1975 to 2003.

ee

A-3

Representative Elliott H. Levitas served as a Democratic

U.S. Representative from Georgia from 1975 to 1985.

Representative Bill Luther served as a Democratic U.S.

Representative from Minnesota from 1995 to 2003.

Representative James Maloney served as a Democratic

U.S. Representative from Connecticut from 1997 to 2003.

Representative Marc Lincoln. Marks served as a Republi-

can U.S. Representative from Pennsylvania from 1977 to

1983.

Representative Abner J. Mikva served as a Democratic

U.S. Representative from Illinois from 1969 to 1973,

September 1975 to 1979.

Vice President Walter F. Mondale served as Vice President

of the United States from 1977 to 1981. He served as a

Democratic U.S. Senator from Minnesota from 1964 to

1976. He was a candidate for President of the United

States in 1984. :

Representative Jim Moody served as a Democratic U:S.

Representative from Wisconsin from 1983 to 1993.

Representative Constance A. Morella served as a Republi-

can U.S. Representative from Maryland from 1987 to

2003.

Senator Charles H. Percy served as a Republican US.

Senator from Illinois from 1967 to 1985.

Representative John Edward Porter served as a Republi-

can U.S. Representative from Illinois from 1980 to 2001.

Representative Glenn Poshard served as a Democratic

U.S. Representative from Illinois from 1989 to 1999.

A-4

Senator David Pryor served as a Democratic U.S. Senator

from Arkansas from 1979 to 1997. He served as a Demo-

cratic U.S. Representative from Arkansas from 1966 to

1973.

Representative Patricia Schroeder served as a Democratic

U.S. Representative from Colorado from 1973 to 1997.

Representative Karen Shepherd served as a Democratic

U.S. Representative from Utah from 1993 to 1995.

Representative David E. Skaggs served as a Democratic

U.S. Representative from Colorado from 1987 to 1999.

Representative Peter Smith served as a Republican U.S.

Representative from Vermont from 1989 to 1991.

Senator Adlai E. Stevenson, III served as a Democratic

U.S. Senator from Illinois from 1970 to 1981.

Representative Richard Swett served as a Democratic U.S.

Representative from New Hampshire from 1991 to 1995.

Representative Jill Long Thompson served as a Demo-

cratic U.S. Representative from Indiana from 1989 to

1995.

Governor Lowell Weicker served as an Independent

Governor for the State of Connecticut from 1991 to 1995.

He served as a Republican U.S. Senator from Connecticut

from 1971 to 1989. He served as a Republican U.S. Repre-

sentative from Connecticut from 1969 to 1971.

Representative Howard E. Wolpe served as a Democratic

U.S. Representative from Michigan from 1979 to 1993.