Petitioners Brief — Engine Mfrs. Assn. v. South Coast Air Quality Management Dist.

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FILED

‘ AUG 29 2003

No. 02-1343 OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Jn the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

ENGINE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION AND

WESTERN STATES PETROLEUM ASSOCIATION,

Petitioners,

V.

SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT

DISTRICT, ET AL.,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS

KENNETH S. GELLER JED R. MANDEL

ANDREW J. PINCUS Counsel of Record

JOHN J. SULLIVAN TIMOTHY A. FRENCH

CRAIG W. CANETTI Neal, Gerber &

Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Eisenberg LLP

Maw LLP Two North LaSalle Street

1909 K Street, N.W. Suite 2200

Washington, DC 20006 Chicago, Illinois 60602

(202) 263-3000 (312) 269-8000

Counsel for Western States Counsel for Engine

Petroleum Association Manufacturers Association

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether local government regulations prohibiting the

purchase of new motor vehicles with specified emission

characteristics — which are otherwise approved for sale by

state and federal regulators — are preempted by Section 209(a)

of the Clean Air Act, which expressly preempts any state or

local “standard relating to the control of emissions from new

motor vehicles.” 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a).

(L)

ll

LIST OF PARTIES AND RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

Petitioner Engine Manufacturers Association (“EMA”), a

not-for-profit trade association, was plaintiff and appellant

below. It has no corporate parents, subsidiaries or affiliates, and

no publicly traded company has a 10% or greater ownership

interest in EMA.

Petitioner Western States Pettoleum Association (“WSPA”)

intervened as a plaintiff and was an appellant in the court of

appeals. It is a trade association organized as a non-profit

corporation. WSPA has no corporate parents, subsidiaries or

affiliates, and no publicly traded company has a 10% or greater

ownership interest in WSPA.

Respondents South Coast Air Quality Management District,

its individual Board Members (William A. Burke, Norma J.

Glover, Michael D. Antonovich, Hal Bernson, Jane W. Carney,

Cynthia P. Coad, Beatrice J.S. Lapisto-Kirtley, Ronald O.

Loveridge, Jon D. Mikels, Leonard Paulitz, Cynthia Vedugo-

Peralta, and S. Roy Wilson), and its Executive Officer (Barry

S. Wallerstein) were defendants and appellees below. |

The Natural Resources Defense Council, Coalition for

Clean Air, Communities for a Better Environment, Inc.,

Planning & Conservation League, and Sierra Club intervened

as defendants and were appellees in the court of appeals.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Ee e J

LIST OF PARTIES AND RULE 29.6 STATEMENT .... ii

EE ee rare l

Nee ee see cceceuncaccene l

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

o fyy 6 De 3) l

i cee e cea bancocedteseaccccess 2

cect ec cenkemneGocece cn 3

B. The California Motor Vehicle Emission Regula-

EE eee 10

C. The Challenged Fleet Rules .................. 14

D. The Proceedings Below .................0065 18

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ................ 19

eerie eek eeeceetesesesccescecces 20

I. SECTION 209(A) ENCOMPASSES RESTRICTIONS

ON PURCHASES OF NEW MOTOR VEHICLES

SUCH AS THE DISTRICT’S FLEET RULES ...... 21

A. The Plain Language Of Section 209(a) Estab-

lishes That A Rule Barring The Purchase Of

New Motor Vehicles Based On Their Emission

Characteristics Is A Preempted “Standard

Relating To The Control Of Emissions.” ........ 22

B. Other Provisions Of Section 209 Support A

Broad Reading Of “Any Standard Relating To

The Control Of Emissions” In Section 209(a) .... 28

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS — Continued

Page

C. The 1990 Amendments To The Clean Air Act

Confirm That Section 209(a) Preempts Purchas-

DEED od vccccustacancnscoesascens 29

D. The Fleet Rules Are Preempted By Section

PES o4dd0c0dsndcctressnudsenesneeusens 33

Il. THE FLEET RULES ARE NOT SAVED FROM

PREEMPTION BY ANY OTHER SECTIONS OF

ee ISS a cc ccnesecescecensercecs 36

OED Kacccccucsdctdescuevensaseni 36

ee Pe id66 6 snenskusaeetenseeend beets 39

ibd oy os ce edaneduseeeunentens 42

i <cicnbis cused dbenseseseesesawens 44

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases:

American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219

Di.) <tsuncnvéhsatheheanieteiiaankatee’ 24

American Auto. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Cahill, 152 F.3d 196

DP CD . cicentudccnksdethenesenkatas passim

Ass'n of Int'l] Auto. Mfrs. v. Commissioner,

ee Tee passim

Barnett Bank of Marion County, NA v. Nelson,

a a tes ee ewks 24

California Div. of Labor Standards

Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr. N.A.,

ST TTT ee passim

Central Green Co. v. United States,

CR 23

City of Chicago v. General Motors Corp.,

— 4 fo ly sk 6

CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood,

I i 6s a ci ON oe an ee eeun ae 21

District of Columbia v. Greater Washington

Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S: 125 (1992) ............... 27

Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141 (2001) ......... 21, 24

Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075

Te ee 4,8

FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,

I. voc n us ee eenweheunneeees 30

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page(s)

Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n,

rere a diehialins 33

General Motors Corp. v. United States,

La bannckbacesced¢trececcesse's 9

Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578 (1980) ..... 23

Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,

A ee od hence ce abbedetoenwin sens 24

Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA,

mee eB ere 6, 37, 38

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. New York State

Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 17 F.3d 521

DED tccécoeessncceesepeseesende passim

New York State Conference of Blue Cross &

Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,

De Lvs lores sadaswbbaknee en 25

Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp.,

as ccerccktsshe dcensuundeune 22

Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251 (1974) ............. 23

Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51 (2002) ..... 21

Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60 (1975) ..........-..4.. 6,9

United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597 (1986) .......... 23

United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000) ........... 22

Vermont Agency of Natural Res. v.

United States, 529 U.S. 765 (2000) .............. 30

Vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page(s)

Wasitimgnon State Dep't of Soc. &

Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of

Danmy Keffeler. 123 §.Ct. 1017 (2003) ........... 33

Washington v. Genenal Motors Corp..

i 5 passim

Constitutional ana Statutory Provisions:

I, av wvrwieincicdwscccccccccccecs l

DY nance natcamsoendevenesbes snes |

ee 27

Cleam Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q ......... passim

TEE” wvecccccccbvcccvcsscccosens 2

Nd oes cvdwwetdecseuceenenveussence +

SED aie odedcccccdscccvdsedadeseens 39

hk dn escnncesereseeedeecnseesues 7

OTS CTT TTT Te TT TT Teer 39

re eo os ope cbetasdeoosetneeese 39

ee 39

EE, os ciewddccbsccccccocesesedcuns 40

ic ccdegaseandecevsvess’ passim

dc tecseevececeesonbes 32

eee 10, 43

a a a 38

Viil

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page(s)

42 U.S.C. §§ 7521-7590 2.0... cece cere ween passim

GBUBL. OTEES cc cccvccccscccsccsvcccsceseseces 28

42 U.S.C. § TS4HO) onc cece cccccccccvesvcvces passim

42 U.S.C. § TS4BQD) onc cccccccccccsccscoees passim

42 U.S.C. § TS43(OM1) oo. ccccc ete renee neennes 37

42 U.S.C. § T543(DM IMC)... cec ee cece eee eee eee 38

42 U.S.C. § TS4HG) 0. cc cccccvccccccsceseces passim

42 U.S.C. § 7581(2) ..........+.- Speesccesrerentas 10

42 UBL. § TSBITT) onc ccccccccccccccccccssess 10, 43

GBUDGIC. 6 TERB occwncvcccccccccccccccsccesess 9, 32

EPUB. 6 THOT occccccccccccccccesereccovens 32

42 U.S.C. § TSBG(a){O) 6... ec eee cece eeees 32

42 U.S.C. § TSBG(D)-(C) 6. ccc cece cece eee nees 10

42 UBC. § TSOGG) ... ccc nccccccccccccccecces 10, 32

42 U.S.C. § T6Q1(d) ... 6. cece eee ee eee eees 39

Pub. L. No. 89-272, § 101(8), 79 Stat. 992 (1965) ....... 4

Pub. L. No. 90-148, §2, 81 Stat. 501 (1967).......... 5,6

Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 207, 91 Stat. 755 (1977) ........... 8

Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 229(a), 104 Stat. 2513 (1990) ... 10

Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 229(a), 104 Stat. 2520 (1990) .... 9

Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 232, 104 Stat. 2529 (1990) ...... 9

IX

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page(s)

Cal. Health & Safety Code § 39003......... Lene ee WOT

Cal. Health & Safety Code § 39052.5 ................ 15

Cal. Health & Safety Code § 39602 .............. “se Tn

Cal. Health & Safety Code § 40402 ................. 15

Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 40410-40412 .......... 15

Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 40440-40459 .......... 15

Cal. Health & Safety Code § 40447.5 ................ 15

Cal. Health & Safety Code § 43009 ................. 1]

Cal. Health & Safety Code § 43013 .............. 10-11

Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 43016-43017 .......... 1]

Cal. Health & Safety Code § 43018 .............. 10-11

Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 43100-43108 ........ 10-11

Cal. Health & Safety Code § 43102 ................. 1]

Cal. Health & Safety Code § 43105 ................. 1]

Regulatory Provisions:

Chk rincacccthhes cenaceneseseeds 14

Pe PO BE GP PEMEED cc cccccccccccccvecccccecce 4

GO FOE GE GEN COND ccc ccc ccvcccccccsccccses 37

FO POE. TA, GTO CRONE ccc ccc ccc cccccccssens 12, 40

ne 12

CS BIE CRUE occ ccccannsvcceveccecs 35

xX

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page(s)

63 Fed. Reg. 18,403 (1998) ...... 6... cece cree eee eees 12

64 Fed. Reg. 46,849 (1999) ...... 6. cece eee eens 12, 43

64 Fed. Reg. 46,850 (1999) ... 0.0... cece cece eens 12

66 Fed. Reg. 5,005 (2001) ..... 6... cece cere eee eees 14

67 Fed. Reg. 60,680 (2002) .......- 0c cece e ee eeeees 12

68 Fed. Reg. 19,811 (2003) ...... 6... cece eens 12, 40

68 Fed. Reg. 35,809 (2001) ...... 6... cece cece eee: 37

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 1956.1(a)(6)-(12) ........ 13,17

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 1956.2-1956.3 ..........5.. 13

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 1956.2(a) ......... eee eee 13

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 1956.2(b)(1) ...... 6... - eee 13

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 1956.2(f)(2)-(3) ..........5. 13

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 1956.3(C) .... 6... eee cece 13

Cal. Code Regs tit. 13, § 1956.8, ef seq ........-.005 14

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 1960(a) ...... 6.5. .0e ee eens 11

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 1960.1 .. 6.2.6... e cece eens 1]

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 1960.1(e)(3) ...........05- 11

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 1960.1(g)... 6... 6... eens 11

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 1960.1(g)(1)-(2) .........--. 40

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 1960.1(g)(2) ......... 11, 12, 16

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 1960.1(h)(2) ..........0008. 11

—_ ~ ———eE—eeE—eEeE—EEe

Xi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page(s)

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 1960.1(p) ............0ee8- 11

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 1961(a)-(b) ................ 40

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 1961(a) ..........cceeeeee 11

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 1961(b) ..............5.. 11, 16

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 1961(cM1) .......... eee 12

ee Se, Gs Ele PEED boc wccercccvcusecss 12

Other Authorities:

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999) ............ 24

CARB, Low-Emission Vehicle Program,

at http://www.arb.ca.gov/msprog/levprog/

evprog.htm (last updated Oct. 2, 2002) ............ 11

CARB, On-Road Heavy-Duty Vehicle Program,

at http://www.arb.ca.gov/msprog/onroadhd/

onroadhd.htm (last updated May 12, 2003) ......... 14

CARB News Release, ARB Cuts Emissions From

Transit Buses (Feb. 24, 2000), available at

http://www.arb.ca.gov/newsrel/nr022400.htm

CEE AEE, GE, BED eo cccccccessecevsecvenes 13

CARB Board Resolution 00-02 (Feb. 24, 2000),

available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/bus/

res00-2.pdf (viewed Aug. 18, 2003) .............. 13

Clean Air Conference Report (Oct. 27, 1990),

A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR

ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990 (1993) ............4.. 9

Xli

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page(s)

Exhibit 1 (Oct. 27, 1990), A LEGISLATIVE

HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS

OF 1990 (1993)... 2... cece eee eee eee tenes 9

H.R. Conf. Rep. 101-952, 101st Cong.,

2d Sess. (1990) ..... cece eee e cence ee reeeeecers 9

H.R. Rep. No. 728, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967) ..... 4,21

S. Rep. No. 403, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967) .......-- 4,5

WERSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY

(NOOB) cc cccccccccccnccccccccccscoccccces 23, 24

BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. la-2a) is

reported at 309 F.3d 550. The opinion of the district court

granting summary judgment for respondents (Pet. App. 3a-27a)

is reported at 158 F. Supp. 2d 1107.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on

October 24, 2002, and a petition for rehearing was denied on

December 11, 2002. Pet. App. 2a, 28a-29a. The petition for a

writ of certiorari was filed on March 11, 2003, and was granted

on June 9, 2003. This Court’s jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C.

§ 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2, provides

in pertinent part:

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which

shall be made in Pursuance thereof * * * shall be the

supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State

shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or

Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

Section 209(a) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a),

provides:

No State or any political subdivision thereof shall adopt or

attempt to enforce any standard relating to the control of

emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle

engines subject to this part. No State shall require certifica-

tion, inspection, or any other approval relating to the

control of emissions from any new motor vehicle or new

motor vehicle engine as condition precedent to the initial

retail sale, titling (if any), or registration of such motor

vehicle, motor vehicle engine, or equipment.

2

The Fleet Rules promulgated by respondent South Coast

Air Quality Management District appear at pages 16-74 of the

Joint Appendix.

STATEMENT

This case concerns the scope of Section 209(a) of the Clean

Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a), which expressly preempts state

and local “‘standard{s] relating to the control of emissions from

new motor vehicles.” This Court has observed that by this

language “Congress has largely preempted the field with regard

to ‘emissions from new motor vehicles.”” Washington v.

General Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109, 114 (1972).

Respondent South Coast Air Quality Management District

(“SCAQMD” or “the District”), a local governmental body in

California, has adopted “Fleet Rules” that prohibit an operator

of a fleet of 15 or more vehicles from purchasing certain types

of new motor vehicles because of those vehicles’ emission

characteristics. The Fleet Rules are preempted “standard(s]

relating to the control of emissions” under Section 209(a). They

were adopted with the undisputed purpose and effect of

reducing motor vehicle emissions by prohibiting the purchase

of certain new motor vehicles otherwise approved for sale in

California by the federal and state governments.

Unlike stationary sources of air pollution such as factories

and power plants — over which the States retain substantial

regulatory authority, subject to general oversight by the United

States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) (see 42

U.S.C. §§ 7401-7515; Washington, 406 U.S. at 114) — mobile

sources of air pollution (particularly new motor vehicles) are

regulated exclusively by federal law, subject to narrow excep-

tions allowing the State of California to adopt and enforce

standards relating to new motor vehicle emissions, but only

with the approval of EPA, 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b).

“

») -

States other than California, under certain limited condi-

tions set forth in Section 177 of the Clean Air Act, may also

adopt California’s motor vehicle emission standards as to which

EPA has waived preemption, 42 U.S.C. § 7507. Under no

circumstances, however, may any State (including California)

impose any standard relating to the control of new motor

vehicle emissions without the express approval of EPA. Nor

may any local governmental body impose standards relating to

the control of emission from new motor vehicles.

The Fleet Rules at issue in this case are not covered by any

of the limited exceptions in the Clean Air Act for state motor

vehicle emission standards. First, the District is not a State.

Second, the Fleet Rules vary from the EPA-approved standards

adopted by the State of California by prohibiting the purchase

of certain vehicles that already have been approved for sale in

the State. Third, the Fleet Rules have never been approved by

EPA.

If the District can adopt local standards banning the

purchase of certain new motor vehicles based on their emission

characteristics, then other local governments can do the same.

Such action would directly contravene the express, and plainly

stated, provisions of the Clean Air Act that prohibit the

adoption of such standards except in strict accordance with

EPA’s preemption waiver procedures. Allowing the District’s

Fleet Rules to stand would undermine Congress’s determina-

tion that — to prevent chaos in the motor vehicle industry —

only the federal government and the State of California, with

EPA’s approval, should be permitted to establish standards

relating to emissions from new motor vehicles.

A. The Clean Air Act.

The Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q) divides the

sources of air pollution into two categories — stationary and

mobile — and provides fundamentally different regulatory

regimes for each. Title I of the Act, which regulates stationary

4

sources of air pollution, directs EPA to establish “national

ambient air quality standards” and requires each State to submit

for EPA review and approval a “state implementation plan” for

meeting those standards. 42 U.S.C. §7408. The plan must

identify and describe the state emission control regulations

adopted for sources of air pollution in the State.

Title II of the Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 7521-7590), which is at

issue here, regulates mobile sources of air pollution, primarily

motor vehicles. “In contrast to federally encouraged state

control over stationary sources, regulation of motor vehicle

emissions ha[s] been a principally federal project.” Engine

Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

1. The first time Congress mandated the exercise of federal

regulatory authority to reduce air pollution was in 1965, when

Congress directed the federal government to regulate emissions

from new motor vehicles and new motor vehicle engines. Pub.

L. No. 89-272, § 101(8), 79 Stat. 992 (1965) (42 U.S.C.

§ 1857f-1 (Supp. IV, 1966-1968)). Despite the enactment of

this statute and the adoption of a regulation establishing

emission levels in 1966 (see 31 Fed. Reg. 5,170 (1966)), “[a]

number of states * * * continued to develop separate emission

programs. Congress thereupon promptly amended the Clean Air

Act in 1967 to impose federal preemption.” Motor Vehicle

Mfrs. Ass'nv. New York State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 17

F.3d 521, 525 (2d Cir. 1994) (“MVMA”); see also H.R. Rep.

No. 728, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 21 (1967) (preemption is

“necessary in order to prevent a chaotic situation from develop-

ing in interstate commerce in new motor vehicles”); S. Rep.

No. 403, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 33 (1967) (under federal

preemption, “industry * * * will be able to minimize economic

disruption and therefore provide emission control systems at

lower costs to the people of the Nation”).

The express preemption provision adopted by Congress,

now Section 209(a) of the Act (codified at 42 U.S.C.

— —<<—- a -—o

— ——~a

5

§ 7543(a)), contains two separate restrictions on state authority.

First, “[n]o State or any political subdivision thereof shall adopt

or attempt to enforce any standard relating to the control of

emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle

engines subject to this part.” Second, “[nJo State shall require

certification, inspection, or any other approval relating to the

control of emissions from any new motor vehicle or new motor

vehicle engine as condition precedent to the initial retail sale,

titling (if any), or registration of such motor vehicle, motor

vehicle engine, or equipment.”

The provision also contains a savings clause, now codified

in Section 209(d), in which Congress delineated the outer

boundaries of its preemption of state and local law. It provides

that “[nJothing in this title shall preclude or deny to any State

or political subdivision the right otherwise to control, regulate,

or restrict the use, operation, or movement of registered or

licensed motor vehicles.” Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 2, 81 Stat. 501

(1967) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7543(d)). Thus, the

States retained authority to regulate the use, operation, or

movement of motor vehicles only through means other than

standards or approvals relating to the control of emissions from

new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines.

Congress permitted only one exception to Section 209(a)’s

expansive preemption. During the debate on the 1967 statute,

“representatives of the State of California were clearly opposed

to displacing that State’s right to set more stringent standards

to meet peculiar local conditions.” S. Rep. No. 403, at 33.

Congress concluded that “California’s unique problems and

pioneering efforts justified a waiver of the preemption section

to the State.” Jbid.

Accordingly, the statute requires the federal government to

waive application of the preemption section to a standard

adopted by the State of California unless EPA finds that the

State “[did] not require standards more stringent than applica-

6

ble Federal standards to meet compelling and extraordinary

conditions” or that the California standard was inconsistent

with the rule-making criteria established by federal law. Pub. L.

No. 90-148, § 2, 81 Stat. 501 (now codified, as subsequently

amended, at Section 209(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)). The statute,

by its terms, made the waiver process available to any State that

had adopted motor vehicle emission control standards prior to

March 30, 1966, but California was the only State that satisfied

that test. MVMA, 17 F.3d at 525.

Given the broad language in Section 209(a), and the lumited

exception for California in Section 209(b), it is not surprising

that when this Court surveyed federal law with respect to air

pollution in 1972 it observed that “Congress has largely

preempted the field with regard to ‘emissions from new motor

vehicles.”” Washington, 406 U.S. at 114 (citing Section 209(a));

see also Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 1095,

1109 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (*“MEMA”) (“Congress in 1967 ex-

pressed its intent to occupy the regulatory role over emissions

control to the exclusion of all the states, all, that is, except

California”); City of Chicago v. General Motors Corp., 467

F.2d 1262, 1264 (7th Cir. 1972) (footnote omitted) (Section

209(a) preempts “the entire field of standards for emissions

from new motor vehicles”).

Congress’s approach with respect to emissions from new

motor vehicles stands in sharp contrast to the path that it took

with respect to stationary sources of air pollution. Although

under Title I of the Act, the federal government sets the

national ambient air quality standards that establish permissible

concentrations of various types of air pollutants, “it is relegated

by the Act to a secondary role in the process of determining and

enforcing the specific, source-by-source emission limitations

which are necessary if the national standards it has set are to be

met.” Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60, 79 (1975) (footnote

omitted); see also id at 79 n.16 (characterizing the federal

government’s authority over emissions from new motor

>

vehicles as an “[e}xception”™ to this approach); Washington, 406

U.S. at 115 (“{sJo far as factories, incinerators, and other

Stationary devices are implicated, the States have broad control

** ™.

To confirm the leading role for the States in controlling

non-mobile sources of air pollution, Congress enacted a general

savings clause in Title 1, 42 U.S.C. § 7416, preserving “the

right of any State or political subdivision thereof to adopt or

enforce (1) any standard or limitation respecting emissions of

air pollutants or (2) any requirement respecting control or

abatement of air pollution.” Nevertheless, to confirm federal

authority over mobile sources of air pollution, Congress

expressly excepted the “standard{s] relating to the control of

emissions from new motor vehicles” set forth in Section 209(a)

from that savings clause.

Congress has amended the Clean Air Act several times

since 1967, but it has not altered the basic scheme that estab-

lishes the federal government as preeminent with respect to the

regulation of pollution from new motor vehicles and motor

vehicle engines. To this day, only two sets of standards relating

to new motor vehicle emissions are permissible — those

adopted by the federal government and those adopted by the

State of California for which EPA has granted a waiver.

2. Congress in 1977 amended the motor vehicle provisions

of the Clean Air Act in two relevant respects. First, it allowed

certain States other than California — under conditions

“carefuily circumscribed to avoid placing an undue burden on

the automobile manufacturing industry” (MVMA, 17 F.3d at

527) — to adopt, in whole, California standards as to which the

federal government has waived preemption. Section 177 of the

Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7507, excludes from the preemptive scope of

Section 209(a) “standards relating to control of emissions” and

“such other actions as are referred to in [Section 209(a)] if * * *

such standards are identical to the California standards for

which a waiver has been granted for such model year” and if

both California and the other State adopt the standards at least

two years before the commencement of the model year. Thus,

“(rjather than being faced with 51 different standards, as they

had feared, or with only one, as they had sought, manufacturers

must cope with two regulatory standards * * *.” Engine Mfrs.

Ass'n, 88 F.3d at 1080.

The 1977 amendments also revised the statutory test for

granting a request by California for a waiver of preemptioti.

The principal change was to require the federal government “to

consider California’s standards as a package, so that California

could seek a waiver from preemption if its standards ‘in the

aggregate’ protected public health at least as well as federal

standards.” MVMA, 17 F.3d at 525. In addition, Congress

directed the federal government in considering a waiver request

under Section 209(b) of the Act to accord deference to the

State’s judgment regarding the effect of its standards on the

public health and welfare. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (Pub. L. No. 95-

95, § 207, 91 Stat. 755 (1977)).

3. Congress again revisited the Clean Air Act in 1990. It

added a second paragraph to Section 177 — the provision

authorizing other States to adopt California standards that

received a Section 209(b) preemption waiver — to emphasize

the strict limitations on the authority of such a State:

Nothing in this section or [in the title of the Act concerning

mobile source pollution] shall be construed as authorizing

any * * * State [that adopts California standards] to prohibit

or limit, directly or indirectly, the manufacture or sale of a

new motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine that is certified

in California as meeting California standards, or to take any

action of any kind to create, or have the effect of creating,

a motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine different than a

motor vehicle or engine certified in California under

9

California standards (a “third vehicle”) or otherwise create

such a “third vehicle.”

Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 232, 104 Stat. 2529 (1990). This

language was added to “codifly], in effect, Congress's under-

standing of the authority originally [given] to states by Section

177 as expressed in the legislative history of Section 177 when

it was adopted in 1977.” Clean Air Conference Report (Oct. 27,

1990), A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT

AMENDMENTS OF 1990 1001, 1021-1022 (1993); see also

Exhibit 1 (Oct. 27, 1990), id. at 790 (entered by Sen. Mitchell)

(describing the amendment to section 177 as “a mere clarifica-

tion of current law”).

Congress in 1990 also required some States that had failed

to reduce air pollution levels in accordance with national

ambient air quality standards to force operators of fleets of cars

and trucks to purchase specified percentages of vehicles that

“would be substantially cleaner than conventional vehicles.”

H.R. Conf. Rep. 101-952, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 337 (1990).

Each State must submit to EPA for approval an implementation

plan setting forth the emission limitations and other rules

adopted by the State — relating principally to the regulation of

stationary sources such as power plants and factories — that are

designed to produce compliance with the federal air quality

standards and other requirements of the Act. See generally

General Motors Corp. v. United States, 496 U.S. 530, 533

(1990); Train, 421 U.S. at 79-80. :

The 1990 amendments provide that a State that has failed

to attain specified air quality levels must submit for EPA

approval a revised implementation plan that requires operators

of centrally fueled fleets of ten or more specified types of

vehicles to purchase a designated percentage of “clean-fuel

vehicles.” Section 246, 42 U.S.C. § 7586 (Pub. L. No. 101-549,

§ 229(a), 104 Stat. 2520). A “clean-fuel vehicle” is one that

meets the clean-fuel vehicle emission standards established

10

under the Act (Section 241(7), 42 U.S.C. § 7581(7) (Pub. L.

No. 101-549, § 229(a), 104 Stat. 2513)).

Significantly, the Clean Air Act's “clean-fuel fleet”

provisions state that “[t]he plan revision * * * shall provide that

the choice of clean-fuel vehicles and clean alternative fuels

shall be made by the covered fleet operators subject to the

requirements” of Section 246. Section 246(d), 42 U.S.C.

§ 7586(d). The provisions also broadly define “clean alternative

fuel” as “any fuel (including methanol, ethanol, or other

alcohols * * *, reformulated gasoline, diesel, natural gas,

liquefied petroleum gas, and hydrogen) or power source

(including electricity) used in a clean-fuel vehicle that com-

plies” with the standards established under the Act (Section

241(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7581(2)); and apply only to limited

percentages of a fleet operator’s covered fleet vehicles (Section

246(b)-(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7586(b)-(c)). Thus, the “clean-fuel

fleet” provisions do not authorize States (much less local

governments) to limit a fleet operators’ ability to choose among

the various types of clean-fuel vehicles that otherwise comply

with the applicable emission regulations.

Finally, Congress authorized the federal government to

excuse a State from its obligation to impose a “clean-fuel fleet”

purchasing requirement if the State proposed an alternative

approach that would achieve emission reductions equal to those

that would be achieved under a fleet purchasing rule. 42 U.S.C.

§ 751 la(c)(4)(B).

B. The California Motor Vehicle Emission Regulations.

California law designates the California Air Resources

Board (“CARB”) as “the air pollution control agency for all

set forth in federal law” (Cal. Health & Safety Code

§ 39602) and vests CARB with authority to promulgate

regulations addressing air pollution resulting from motor

vehicles, including limitations on emissions from new motor

vehicles and new motor vehicle engines. See id §§ 39003,

ee

li

43013, 43018, 43100-43108. Three sets of CARB’s regulations

are relevant here.

1. CARB’s low-emission vehicle (“LEV”) program,

governing low-emission passenger cars and medium-duty

vehicles, was adopted in 1990 and 1991 and applies to 1994 to

2003 model-year vehicles. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 1960.1;

Pet. App. 13a; CARB, Low-Emission Vehicle Program, at

http://www.arb.ca.gov/msprog/levprog/evprog.htm (last up-

dated Oct. 2, 2002). In 1999, CARB adopted “LEV II” rules,

which are applicable to the 2004 and later model years. See

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 1960(a); CARB, Low-Emission

Vehicle Program, at http://www.arb.ca.gov/msprog/levprog/

levprog.htm (last updated Oct. 2, 2002). Although the numeri-

cal requirements differ, the basic structure of the two programs

is substantially similar. The rules establish different tiers of

emission regulation, which are, in order of increasing strin-

gency: Transitional Low-Emission Vehicles (“TLEVs”), which

include diesel-fueled vehicles; Low-Emission Vehicles

(“LEVs”); Ultra-Low-Emission Vehicles (“ULEVs”); Super-

Ultra-Low-Emission Vehicles (““SULEVs”); and Zero-Emission

Vehicles (“ZEVs”). Each tier has a set of emission limitations

for carbon monoxide, formaldehyde, non-methane organic

gases, oxides of nitrogen, and particulate matter. Cal. Code

Regs. tit. 13, §§1960.1(e)(3), (g), (h)(2), (p) (LEV 1); id

§ 1961(a) (LEV II). A vehicle may be sold in California only if

it qualifies under one of these categories. See Cal. Health &

Safety Code §§ 43009, 43016-43017, 43102, 43105.

The LEV program further requires that vehicles that a

single manufacturer delivers for sale in California must meet

overall fleet average emission requirements. These require-

ments are reduced over time, “requiring manufacturers to sell

progressively cleaner mixes of vehicles.” Pet. App. 14a; see

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 1960.1(g)(2) (LEV I); id. § 1961(b)

(LEV II). “Automobile manufacturers, under CARB’s regula-

tions, have the flexibility to decide how many vehicles of each

12

type they manufacture and sell in order to meet the fleet

average.” Pet. App. 14a. Additional flexibility is provided

through establishment of a marketable credit system: manufac-

turers may earn credits against the non-methane organic gas

emission standards by exceeding the fleet average require-

ments, and against the ZEV requirements by creating Partial

Zero-Emission Vehicles (“PZEVs”), reducing carbon dioxide

emissions, or increasing fuel efficiency. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13,

§ 1960.1(g)(2) (note 7 to appended table of fleet average

emission requirements) (non-methane organic gas credits); id.

§ 1961(c)(1) (same); id. § 1962(g) (ZEV credits).

In 1993, EPA granted California a waiver of federal

preemption under Section 209(b) for the LEV program applica-

ble to light-duty vehicles. 58 Fed. Reg. 4,166 (1993). Califor-

nia’s LEV program for medium-duty vehicles received preemp-

tion waivers from EPA in 1994 (59 Fed. Reg. 48,625 (1995 and

later model years)) and in 1998 (63 Fed. Reg. 18,403 (1998 and

later model years)). In April 2003, EPA granted a preemption

waiver for California’s LEV II amendments as they apply to

light-duty and medium-duty vehicles — except with respect to

California’s ZEV program. 68 Fed. Reg. 19,811. CARB

initially sought but later withdrew its requests for EPA consid-

eration of California’s ZEV program. 67 Fed. Reg. 60,680

(2002).

In addition to granting California’s LEV program a waiver

from federal preemption, EPA also approved that program as

a substitute for the federal “clean-fuel fleet” program required

by Section 246 for “nonattainment” areas in the State. 64 Fed.

Reg. 46,849 (1999). But for EPA’s approval of California’s

LEV program as a substitute, six “nonattainment” areas in

California, including the South Coast Air Basin, would have

been required by Section 246 to adopt federal “clean-fuel fleet”

programs. 64 Fed. Reg. 46,850.

13

2. CARB promulgated an emission control program for -

heavy-duty urban transit buses (the “Urban Bus Program’’) in

February 2000. See CARB News Release, ARB Cuts Emissions

From Transit Buses (Feb. 24, 2000), at http://www.arb.ca.gov/

newsrel/n1022400.htm (viewed Aug. 18, 2003). One element of

the program establishes increasingly stringent emission

standards for new urban buses and bus engines. Cal. Code

Regs. tit. 13, § 1956.1(a)(6)-(12).

The Urban Bus Program also imposes a ceiling on the

average emission level of a bus fleet operated by a public

transit agency. CARB nonetheless respected fleet operators’

need “to determine their optimal fleet mix in consideration of

such factors as air quality benefits, service availability, cost,

efficiency, safety, and convenience.” Accordingly, CARB

established “two paths to compliance with this fleet rule * * *:

the alternative-fuel path and the diesel path.” Cal. Code Regs.

tit. 13, § 1956.2(a).

Operators choosing the diesel path are obligated to retrofit

a larger number of existing buses to reduce nitrogen oxide

emissions than those choosing the alternative-fuel path (see

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 1956.2(f)(2)-(3)) and must purchase

a specified minimum number of zero emission buses (see id.

§ 1956.3(c)). The alternative-fuel path requires that at least

85% of new buses be capable of operating on alternative fuel,

which is defined as “natural gas, propane, ethanol, methanol,

electricity, fuel cells, or advanced technologies that do not rely

on diesel fuel” (id. § 1956.2(b)(1)); a lesser retrofit obligation

(see id. § 1956.2(f)(2)-(3)); and a deferred obligation to

purchase zero-emission buses (see id. § 1956.3(c)). All opera-

tors, regardless of the path selected, must retrofit existing buses

to reduce particulate emissions. /d. § 1956.2-1956.3; Pet. App.

15a.

' CARB Board Resolution 00-02 at 6 (Feb. 24, 2000), available at

http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/bus/res00-2.pdf (viewed Aug. 18, 2003),

(continued...)

14

3. CARB also has developed an emission control program

for heavy-duty vehicles (those over 14,000 pounds in gross

vehicle weight rating), including diesel-fueled trucks. Under

CARB’s Heavy-Duty Vehicle Program, emission limits are

established for oxides of nitrogen, non-methane hydrocarbons,

particulate matter, and carbon monoxide. Heavy-duty vehicles

that CARB certifies as meeting those emission limits may be

sold throughout the State. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, §§ 1956.8, er

seq. (2003); CARB, On-Road Heavy-Duty Vehicle Program, at

http://www.arb.ca.gov/msprog/onroadhd/onroadhd.htm (last

updated May 12, 2003).

Significantly, and in recognition of the need for regulatory

uniformity in the capital-intensive heavy-duty vehicle market,

CARB’s Heavy-Duty Vehicle Program standards are largely

identical to, and incorporate by reference, the standards EPA

has adopted for heavy-duty vehicles. Compare Cal. Code Regs.

tit. 13, §§ 1956.8, et seg. with 40 C.F.R. Part 86; see also J.A.

163, 165. As a result of these standards, “[heavy-duty] diesel

vehicles will [during 2007 to 2010] achieve gasoline-like

exhaust emission levels, in addition to their inherent advantages

over gasoline vehicles with respect to fuel economy, green-

house gas emissions, and lower evaporative hydrocarbon

emissions.” 66 Fed. Reg. 5,005 (2001).

C. The Challenged Fleet Rules.

The District is a political subdivision of the State of

California. It is a regional entity responsible for “imple-

ment[ing] a strategy for achieving and maintaining ambient air

quality standards within the South Coast Air Basin,” which

consists of parts of Los Angeles, San Bernardino, Riverside and

'(..continued)

directed CARB’s Executive Officer to forward the details of the Urban Bus

Program to EPA and request “a waiver or confirmation that the regulations

are within the scope of an existing waiver” under Section 209(b). According

to EPA’s on-line docket, however, CARB’s waiver request for the Urban

Bus Program has not yet been submitted to EPA.

15

Orange Counties. Pet App. 4a-5a; see Cal. Health & Safety

Code § 39052.5, 40402, 40410-40412, 40440-40459. The

district court in this case stated that the South Coast Air Basin

“experiences the most serious air quality problems in the

nation, primarily due to motor vehicle pollution.” Pet. App. Sa.

The California legislature in 1987 authorized the District to

adopt regulations governing vehicle purchases by operators of

“public and commercial vehicle fleets” of 15 or more vehicles.

Cal. Health & Safety Code § 40447.5. With some exceptions,

the District was permitted to require such operators “to pur-

chase vehicles which are capable of operating on methanol or

other equivalently clean burning alternative fuel and to require

that these vehicles be operated, to the maximum extent feasible,

on the alternative fuel when operating” in the District. Jbid.

In June, August and October 2000, the District promulgated

a series of six “Fleet Rules” regulating purchases or leases of

new vehicles by various private and public operators (including

federal, state, regional, county, and city departments and

agencies) of commercial fleets to “reduce air toxic and criteria

pollutant emissions.” J.A. 16. Each of the Rules addresses a

separate type of vehicle fleet, but all follow a common ap-

proach, prohibiting fleet operators from purchasing many types

of new vehicles — including some low-emission vehicles and

all diesel-fueled vehicles — that are certified by CARB for sale

within California.

For example, Rule 1194 (J.A. 58-65) applies “to all public

and private fleet operators of fifteen (15) or more vehicles

operated by the airport authority or any other public or private

fleet operators that transport passengers from commercial

airports located in the District.” Rule 1194(b) (J.A. 58). It

imposes separate restrictions on different types of transporta-

tion providers, as follows:

¢ For operators “providing limousine or transit shuttle

services out of commercial airport terminals to the public

16

through the collection of fares or fees, or [that] provide

courtesy pickup services out of commercial airport termi-

nals,” any new passenger car or medium-duty vehicle

purchase or lease “shall be a vehicle that has been certified

by CARB that meets the ULEV, SULEV, or ZEV emission

standards.” Rule 1194(d)(1) (J.A. 61-62). These operators

are barred from purchasing or leasing other vehicles that

also are certified by CARB and therefore permitted to be

sold in California — such as those meeting the TLEV and

LEV emissions standards. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13,

§ 1960.1(g)(2) (LEV I fleet average requirements permit-

ting sale of TLEVs and LEVs as part of manufacturers total

fleet of vehicles); id. § 1961(b) (same for LEV II).

* Operators of “shuttle van services that provide multi-

ple-party passenger transportation services to commercial

airport terminals and do not operate on fixed or scheduled

routes” were subjected to a phased-in requirement: from

July 1, 2001, through June 30, 2002, half of their purchases

or leases of new passenger cars or medium-duty vehicles

were required to be CARB-certified as meeting ULEV,

SULEV, or ZEV emission standards; beginning July 1,

2002, all purchases and leases had to meet this standard.

Rule 1194(d)(2) (J.A. 62). As noted above (at pages 11-12),

CARB’s rules permit the purchase and lease within Califor-

nia of new passenger cars and medium-duty vehicles that

do not meet these particular standards.

¢ For providers of “shuttle services to the public in and out

of airport terminals to airport parking lots, car rental lots, or

hotels/motels, all new heavy-duty transit vehicle purchases

or leases shall be alternative-fueled vehicles,” (Rule

1194(d)(3) (J.A. 62)), which the Rule defines as a “vehicle

or engine that is not powered by gasoline or diesel fuel,”

(Rule 1194(c)(2) (J.A. 59)). Under CARB’s rules,

heavy-duty transit vehicles powered by gasoline or diesel

17

fuel are CARB-certified and may be sold within California.

See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 1956.1(a)(6)-(12).

¢ Finally, for fleet operators “providing taxicab pickup

services out of commercial airport terminals,” any new

purchase or lease of a passenger car or medium-duty

vehicle to perform such services “shall [only] be a vehicle

that has been certified by CARB that meets the ULEV,

SULEV, or ZEV emission standards” (Rule 1194(d)(4)

(J.A. 62-63)), despite the availability of other

CARB-certified vehicles, including diesel-powered vehicles

(see page 11, supra). The Rule provides for an exemption

for such operators if the District has failed to make avail-

able a subsidy to cover any amount in excess of $10,000

that the operator is required to pay for such a vehicle. Rule

1194(e)(3) (J.A. 63-64).

Rule 1194 contains exemptions for situations in which the

operator demonstrates to the District that the vehicle required

under the Rule is not available commercially or could not be

used; for vehicles converted to be wheelchair accessible; and

for buses “used for the express purpose of providing

long-distance service.” Rule 1194(e)(1)-(2), (4) (J.A. 63-64).

Each of the other Fleet Rules follows the same approach for

different types of fleets: public and private street-sweeper fleet

operators (Rule 1186.1 (J.A. 16-23)); public fleet operators of

passenger cars, light-duty trucks, or medium-duty vehicles

(Rule 1191 (J.A. 24-45)); public transit fleet operators (Rule

1192 (J.A. 46-51)); public and private solid waste collection

fleet operators (Rule 1193 (J.A. 52-57)); and public fleet

operators of heavy-duty vehicles (Rule 1196 (J.A. 66-74)). In

each instance, the purchase of certain low-emission vehicles

and all covered diesel-fuel vehicles is generally prohibited. See

Pet. App. 16a-19a.

- 18

D. The Proceedings Below.

Petitioner Engine Manufacturers Association commenced

this action against respondent SCAQMD in the United States.

District Court for the Central District of California asserting

that the Fleet Rules are preempted by Section 209(a) of the

Clean Air Act and seeking an injunction barring the District

from enforcing those Rules. Petitioner Western States Petro-

leum Association intervened as a plaintiff; and respondents

Natural Resources Defense Council, Coalition for Clean Air,

Communities for a Better Environment, Inc., Planning &

Conservation League, and Sierra Club intervened as defen-

dants. Pet. App. 19a-20a.

The district court granted respondents’ motion for summary

judgment (Pet. App. 3a-27a). The court recognized that the

First and Second Circuits had held that state-imposed require-

ments regarding the sales of motor vehicles constitute a

“standard relating to the control of emissions” preempted by

Section 209(a). Pet. App. 23a. Nonetheless, the district court

stated that “[i]t does not follow, however, that a rule regulating

the purchase of vehicles is such a standard.” /bid. (emphasis in

original). “Where a state regulation does not compel manufac-

turers to meet a new emissions limit, but rather affects the

purchase of vehicles, as the Fleet Rules do, that regulation is

not a standard. No restriction on the sale of vehicles is present

here. Plaintiffs may continue to sell any vehicle which is

otherwise certified in California.” /bid.

The district court also relied on Section 246’s requirement

that some States require fleet operators to purchase certain

low-emission vehicles. “It is not rational to conclude that the

[Clean Air Act] would authorize purchasing restrictions on the

one hand, and prohibit them, as a prohibited adoption of a

‘standard,’ on the other.” Pet. App. 23a.

Finally, the district court concluded that Section 177’s

requirement that a State adopt standards “identical” to Califor-

19

nia’s to be exempt from preemption was not applicable because

it referred only to “the non-California ‘opt-in’ states.” Pet. App.

26a. The court also determined that the District's Fleet Rules

did not impose a “third car” requirement in violation of Section

177 because “they require purchasers to choose from among a

subset of previously certified vehicles. Automobile manufactur-

ers will not be forced to do something more than they already

must.” Pet. App. 27a. “The Fleet Rules may lead to decreased

demand for some cars and trucks certified in California, but the

Rules do not require the manufacturers to build or sell any

particular model for this area.” /bid.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment “for the reasons

stated in” the district court’s “well-reasoned opinion.” Pet. App.

la-2a. The court of appeals subsequently denied rehearing. Pet.

App. 28a-29a.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Section 209(a) of the Clean Air Act prohibits any “State or

any political subdivision thereof’ from “adopt{ing] or

attempt[ing] to enforce any standard relating to the control of

emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle

engines.” This provision sweeps broadly and encompasses the

emissions-based purchasing restrictions imposed on fleet

operators by the Fleet Rules at issue in this case.

The District’s Fleet Rules prohibit the purchase of certain

new motor vehicles — including all diesel-fueled vehicles —

based on the emission characteristics of those vehicles. As a

result, the Rules are “standard{s] relating to the control of

emissions from new motor vehicles” preempted by Section

209(a). The distinction drawn by respondents and the courts

below between purchase prohibitions (which they contend are

not preempted) and sales restrictions (which they acknowledge

are preempted) finds no support in the text of Section 209(a) or

the Clean Air Act’s regulatory scheme. Indeed, the distinction

20

is illusory; every sale includes a purchase and every purchase

includes a sale.

The Fleet Rules also expressly refer to and incorporate a

subset of the emission standards adopted by CARB. That subset

includes only the most stringent and restrictive of the broader

range of CARB emission standards and phase-in provisions.

The Fleet Rules amount to a new and different set of standards

adopted for the undisputed purpose of controlling emissions. If

the District can adopt these standards, then other state and local

governments can as well. The congressional scheme for

regulating mobile sources of emissions would be gutted.

No provision of the Clean Air Act — not the preemption

waiver provision for California (Section 209(b)), the “opt-in”

provision allowing other States to adopt California emission

standards that have been approved by EPA (Section 177), nor

the clean-fue! fleet provisions (Section 246) — saves the Fleet

Rules from federal preemption. The District is not a State. The

Fleet Rules vary from the EPA-approved standards adopted by

the State of California. And the Fleet Rules have never been

approved by EPA.

ARGUMENT

The District’s Fleet Rules are “standard[s] relating to the

control of emissions from new motor vehicles” and are,

therefore, preempted by Section 209(a) of the Clean Air Act.

The contrary holding of the courts below — based on the

conclusion that the Fleet Rules are beyond the reach of Section

209(a) because they proscribe purchases, not sales (see Pet.

App. 2a, 23a) — is untenable. It ignores the broad language of

Section 209(a), the entire regulatory scheme for controlling

motor vehicle emissions under the Clean Air Act, and the

purpose and effect of the Fleet Rules themselves.

If the Fleet Rules were not preempted emission standards,

then any state or local government could adopt rules permitting

21

or prohibiting any motor vehicle purchases (whether by fleet

operators or individuals) based on the emissions characteristics

of those vehicles. The balkanized regulatory scheme that

would result is the very sort of “chaotic situation” Congress

sought to avoid by preempting state and local regulation of

~ motor vehicle emission standards. See pages 4-7, supra. Such

localized variation will disrupt “interstate commerce in new

motor vehicles” and undermine the regulatory regime created

by Congress for mobile sources in Title II of the Act. H.R. Rep.

728, at 21.

I. SECTION 209(A) ENCOMPASSES RESTRICTIONS

ON PURCHASES OF NEW MOTOR VEHICLES

SUCH AS THE DISTRICT’S FLEET RULES -

Whether the Clean Air Act preempts the Fleet Rules is

determined by the text of Section 209(a). Where, as here, a

federal statute “contains an express pre-emption clause, [the]

task of statutory construction must in the first instance focus on

the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the

best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive intent.” Sprietsma v.

Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 62-63 (2002) (quoting CSX

Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993))

(internal quotation marks omitted).

The courts below, and respondents, mistakenly relied on a

“presumption” against federal preemption of traditional state

“police powers” in seeking to narrow the scope of Section

209(a). Pet. App 2a, 9a. But such a presumption has no bearing

on this case, where “Congress has made clear its desire for

preemption.” Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 146 (2001).

Moreover, the presumption applies only when Congress

legislates “in a field which the States have traditionally occu-

> The statute preempts state and local standards applicable to both “new

motor vehicles” and “new motor vehicle engines.” For ease of reference, we

include both “new motor vehicles” and “new motor vehicle engines” in

referring to “motor vehicles.”

22

pied” (United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000) (quoting

Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947))),

and not in a field “where there has been a history of significant

federal presence” (529 U.S. at 108). In this case, there is no

“tradition” of state regulation of motor vehicle emissions —

only a single State had adopted emission standards at the time

Congress enacted the relevant provisions of the Clean Air Act.

See pages 5-6, supra. To the contrary, there have been decades

of a “significant federal presence” in the field. Locke, 529 U.S.

at 108.

The preemption inquiry in this case begins and ends with

the text of Section 209(a), which “provides a reliable indicium

of congressional intent with respect to state authority.”

Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Section 209(a) plainly demonstrates Congress’s intent to

preempt regulations like the Fleet Rules.

A. The Plain Language Of Section 209(a) Establishes

That A Rule Barring The Purchase Of New Motor

Vehicles Based On Their Emission Characteristics Is

A Preempted “Standard Relating To The Control Of

Emissions.”

The first sentence of Section 209(a) is written in expansive

terms: “No State or any political subdivision thereof shall adopt

or attempt to enforce amy standard relating to the control of

emissions for new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines

subject to this part.” 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (emphasis added).

This language “largely preempt([s] the field with regard to

‘emissions from new motor vehicles.’” Washington, 406 U.S.

at 114; see also American Auto. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Cahill, 152 F.3d

196, 198 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Under Section 209 of the Clean Air

Act, exclusive control over ‘standards relating to the control of

emissions from new motor vehicles’ is vested in the federal

government, and the states are preempted from regulating in the

area.”); MVMA, 17 F.3d at 526 (the “cornerstone of Title II [of

23

the Clean Air Act] is Congress’ continued preemption of state

regulation of automobile emissions”).

Despite the provision’s broad language, the courts below

concluded that, although Section 209(a) has been properly

construed to preempt state laws regulating sales of new motor

vehicles based on the vehicles’ emission characteristics,’ “[i]t

does not follow * * * that a rule regulating the purchase of

vehicles is such a standard.” Pet. App. 23a (emphasis in

original). That construction of the statute cannot withstand even

casual scrutiny in light of the breadth of Section 209(a)’s

prohibition against “adopt[ing] or attempt[ing] to enforce any

standard relating to the control of emissions,” which is evident

from each element of the language Congress used in crafting

the provision.

First, the statute proscribes “any standard.” The term “any”

generally means a thing “selected without restriction or

limitation of choice,” and when used as a modifier — as in

Section 209(a) — “any” indicates “the maximum or whole of

a number or quantity.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNA-

TIONAL DICTIONARY 97 (1986). Congress’s use of the word

“any” in a statute “undercuts a narrow construction” of the

provision. United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 605 (1986),

abrogated on other grounds by Central Green Co. v. United

States, 531 U.S. 425 (2001); see also Harrison v. PPG Indus.,

Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 588-589 (1980) (Congress’s use of the

“expansive” term “any” “offer[ed] no indication whatever that

Congress intended the limiting construction” of the statute

urged by the respondents); Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251,

260 (1974) (interpreting Congress’s use of the word “any” to

* See Ass'n of Int'l Auto. Mfrs. v. Commissioner, 208 F.3d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir.

2000) (“a requirement that a particular percentage of vehicle sales be ZEVs

has no purpose other than to effect a general reduction in emissions” and

“must be considered ‘standards relating to the control of emissions” for

purposes of Section 209(a) (quoting Cahill, 152 F.3d at 200)).

24

indicate that there was “no limitation, apart from that of

reasonableness,” upon statute’s applicability).

Second, Congress described the object of the preemption

provision in broad terms: “any standard.” A “standard” is a

“criterion for measuring acceptability” (BLACK’s LAw DICTIO-

NARY 1412-1413 (7th ed. 1999)) and “something that is

established by authority, custom, or general consent as a model

or example to be followed,” ie., a “criterion” or “test”

(WEBSTER’S THIRD MEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2223 ).

The word “standard” includes not only the more limited terms

“law” and “regulation,” but also encompasses restrictions that

are the functional equivalents of standards as well. That is

confirmed by the inclusion by Congress of standards that a

State or local government either “adopt[s]” or “attempt(s] to

enforce;” an attempt to enforce a standard never formally

adopted is sufficient to trigger preemption.

Third, Section 209(a) preempts any standard “relating to

the control of emissions from motor vehicles,” and Congress’s

use of the term “relate to” in an express preemption clause

signals a “clearly expansive” preemptive intent. Egelhoff, 532

U.S. at 146; see also Barnett Bank of Marion County, NA v.

Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 38 (1996) (“The word ‘relates’ is highly

general, and this Court has interpreted it broadly in other

pre-emption contexts.”); Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,

504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992) (the phrase “relating to” in a preemp-

tion clause “express[es] a broad preemptive purpose”).

This Court has interpreted “related to” preemption clauses

to invalidate state laws that have a “reference to” or a “connec-

tion with” the preempted subject matter. See, e.g, Egelhoff, 532

U.S. at 147; California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement

v. Dillingham Constr. N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 324 (1997);

American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 223 (1995).

The “reference to” or “connection with” inquiry is based on

whether the state or local law at issue is expressly linked in

25

some fashion to the subject matter that has been reserved for

federal regulation. As the Court explained in Dillingham, a

“reference” sufficient to establish preemption will be found

“[wJhere a State’s law acts immediately or exclusively upon”

the preempted subject matter, or where the preempted subject

matter “is essential to the law’s operation.” 519 U.S. at 325.

To determine whether a state or local law has “the forbid-

den connection,” resort must be had to “the objectives of the

[federal statute] as a guide to the scope of the state law that

Congress understood would survive,” and “the nature of the

effect of the state law on [the preempted legislative area].”

Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 325 (internal quotation marks omitted);

see also New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue

Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 656 (1995)

(the Court looked to “the objectives of the [federal] statute as

a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress understood

would survive’’).

In light of these principles, the proscription against “any

standard relating to the control of emissions from new motor

vehicles” must encompass purchase prohibitions. Whatever the

outer limits of Section 209(a)’s preemptive scope, it is plain

that a state or local rule that bars the purchase of some new

motor vehicles and permits the purchase of others on the basis

of the vehicles’ respective emission characteristics is well

within Section 209(a)’s prohibition. There are only a few ways

to regulate motor vehicle emissions. Manufacturers may be

barred from producing vehicles that do not meet specified

emissions criteria; or sales, purchases, or use of new motor

vehicles may be limited on the same basis. Given its expansive

language, Section 209(a) necessarily encompasses such direct

emission controls.

Certainly, any distinction between sale restrictions and

purchase restrictions is nonsensical. Every new vehicle transac-

tion involves the purchase of the vehicle by the purchaser and

(e)

63

has been certified by CARB that meets the ULEV,

SULEV, or ZEV emission standards when adding or

replacing a passenger car or medium-duty vehicle to

their fleet.

(5) Vehicles acquired pursuant to paragraph (d)(4)

must be operated within the South Coast Air Quality

Management District for a minimum of three years if

funding to offset the purchase cost, less $10,000 in ac-

cordance with paragraph (e)(3), was made available.

(6) Prior to January 1, 2002, airport fleet operators

voluntarily purchasing an alternative-fueled vehicle

meeting requirements of paragraph (d)(4) after adop-

tion of this rule, may apply for funding to offset the

purchase cost, less $10,000 in accordance with para-

graph (e)(3).

Exemptions

The provisions of this rule shall not apply to the following:

(1) Buses used for the express purpose of providing

long-distance service (out-of-District), that are gener-

ally equipped with luggage compartments, restrooms,

and overhead storage.

(2) Upon demonstration to the Executive Officer,

any vehicles as required pursuant to paragraph (d)

for which no alternative-fuel engine and chassis con-

figuration is available commercially or could be used.

(3) An airport fleet operator who provides taxicab

pickup services at commercial airport terminals may

purchase a light- or medium-duty vehicle that is not

certified by CARB as ULEV or cleaner if the SCAQMD

or its designated agent has not provided sufficient fund-

ing to fully offset the purchase cost of an alternative-

fueled vehicle that complies with paragraph (d)(4)

64

less $10,000 (paid by or on the behalf of the airport

fleet operator):

(A) within 10 working days after notification by

the airport fleet operator of the intent to pur-

chase such vehicle and the airport fleet operator

has provided documentation that the $10,000 is

immediately available for purchase of the rule

compliant vehicle, or

(B) within two working days after the airport

fleet operator has notified the SCAQMD or its

designated agent in the event that the taxicab

vehicle to be replaced is rendered inoperable due

to a roadside accident and would require imme-

diate replacement of the taxicab vehicle. In addi-

tion, the airport fleet operator must demonstrate

that the $10,000 to be provided by the airport

fleet operator is immediately available for pur-

chase of the rule compliant vehicle.

(C) Notwithstanding the provisions in para-

graphs (e)(3)(A) or (e)(3)(B), the airport fleet op-

erator shall be responsible to pay for the cost of

converting the new rule compliant vehicle to

meet applicable taxicab vehicle specifications

and all other incidental costs including but not

limited to, sales tax on the $10,000 provided by

the airport fleet operator, license, and registra-

tion fees.

(D) An airport fleet operator qualifying for a

non-rule compliant vehicle as provided in para-

graphs (e\3\A) or (e)(3)(B) shall purchase the

non-rule compliant vehicle within 10 working

days after being notified that such vehicle could

be purchased or reapply for co-funding pursuant

to paragraphs (e)(3)(A) or (eX 3)(B).

65

(4) Vehicles not certified by CARB as ULEV or

cleaner that are converted to be wheelchair accessible

(to meet regulations set by the Commercial Airport

Authority and all Americans with Disability Act of

1990 requirements, including door height overhead

clearance as well as ramp or lift design specifications)

for the purpose of providing taxicab pickup services at

commercial airport terminals.

(f) Compliance Auditing and Enforcement

(1) The fleet operator shall provide at the request of

the District any files and/or records created to comply

with subdivision (d) including fleet-specific purchase

information, such as a list of official DMV registra-

tions, and manufacturer, model-year, model, engine

family number, and fuel type of each fleet vehicle. The

fleet operator shall keep all required records for a

minimum of two years.

(2) Any fleet operator seeking an exemption under

subdivision (f) shall supply proof that their fleet is ex-

empted from this rule when requested by the District.

(g) Severability

If any provision of this rule is held by judicial order to be

invalid, or invalid or inapplicable to any person or circum-

stance, such order shall not affect the validity of the

remainder of this rule, or the validity or applicability of

such provision to other persons or circumstances. In the

- event any of the exceptions to this rule is held by judicial

order to be invalid, the persons or circumstances covered

by the exception shall instead be required to comply with

the remainder of this rule.

66

South Coast Air Quality Management District

(Adopted October 20, 2000)

RULE 1196. CLEAN ON-ROAD HEAVY-DUTY

PUBLIC FLEET VEHICLES

(a) Purpose

For public fleets of heavy-duty vehicles operating in the

South Coast Air Quality Management (District), this rule

requires public fleet operators to acquire alternative-fuel

heavy-duty vehicles when procuring or leasing these

vehicles to reduce air toxic and criteria pollutant emis-

sions.

(b) Applicability

This rule applies to all government agencies located in the

District, including federal, state, regional, county and city

government departments and agencies, and any special

districts such as water, air, sanitation, transit and school

districts, with 15 or more heavy-duty vehicles. This rule

shall not apply to vehicles or services pursuant to para-

graph (f) or vehicles subject to Rules 1192, 1193, [adopted

June 16, 2000], 1194 [adopted August 18, 2000], 1195

[proposal for school buses} or 1186.1 [adopted August 18,

2000).

(c) Definitions

For purposes of this rule, the following definitions shall

apply:

(1) ALTERNATIVE-FUEL HEAVY-DUTY EN-

GINE OR VEHICLE means a heavy-duty vehicle

or engine that uses compressed or liquefied natu-

ral gas, propane, methanol, electricity, fuel cells,

or other advanced technologies that do not rely

67

on diesel fuel, and has been certified by the Cali-

fornia Air Resources Board (CARB).

(2) APPROVED CONTROL DEVICE(S) is a

CARB-certified exhaust control device(s) that re-

duces particulate matter and possibly other pre-

cursor emissions. To be considered fitted with an

approved control device(s), all diesel exhaust

from the vehicle must be vented through such a

device(s) that has been fitted at the time of vehi-

cle purchase. The vehicle equipped with such a

control device must use diesel fuel with a sulfur

content no greater than 15 ppm.

(3) DUAL-FUEL HEAVY-DUTY VEHICLE

means a heavy-duty vehicle equipped with a die-

se] engine that uses an alternative fuel (such as

compressed or liquefied natural gas, liquefied pe-

troleum gas, methanol, or other advanced tech-

nologies) in combination with diesel fuel to

enable compression ignition. A dual-fuel engine

typically uses the alternative fuel to supply 85

percent of the total engine fuel requirement on a

BTU basis. A dual-fuel engine must be certified

by CARB to meet an applicable optional nitrogen

oxide exhaust emission standard and be fitted

68

(5) FLEET VEHICLE means any heavy-duty

on-road vehicle, owned or leased by a public fleet

operator that totals 15 or more heavy-duty vehi-

cles excluding vehicles exempt under paragraphs

(f)(1) and (f)(2).

(6) HEAVY-DUTY VEHICLE means any vehicle

having a gross vehicle weight of at least 14,000

pounds.

(7) PUBLIC FLEET OPERATOR is a person

who owns, leases, or operates heavy-duty fleet

vehicles in the District. A person is a federal,

state, county or city government department or

agency, or special! district.

(8) SPECIAL DISTRICT means any public

agency that provides public services such as, but

not limited to, sanitation, school, transit, air, and

water districts.

(9) VEHICLE means any self-propelled, motor-

ized device that is permitted to operate on public

roads through Department of Motor Vehicle reg-

istration or the federal government.

(d) Fleet Requirements

Beginning July 1, 2002, for public fleet operators with 15

or more heavy-duty vehicles, all new additions to an

existing fleet, or formation of a new fleet, of heavy-duty

vehicles shall be by purchase or lease of:

with a particulate matter aftertreatment control

device that achieves a particulate matter emis-

sions level no greater than the particulate matter

emissions level of the latest certified M-100

methanol engine certified by CARB prior to the

date of adoption of this rule.

(1) alternative-fuel heavy-duty engine or vehi-

(4) EMERGENCY OR RESCUE VEHICLE cles;

means any vehicle defined in Section 165 of the :

California Vehicle Code and is equipped with red (2) dual-fuel heavy-duty vehicles;

lights and sirens as defined in Sections 30, . . wv

25269, and 27002 of the California Vehicle Code. (3) dedicated gasstine heavy-duty vehicles; or

69

(4) Ifthe fleet operator has an approved Techni-

cal Infeasibility Certification for this purchase or

lease, as described in subdivision (), a diesel-

powered heavy-duty engine or vehicle with an

approved contro] device and maintain that ap-

proved control device per manufacturer’s specifi-

cations. The provisions of this section shall not

apply to subparagraph (e)(1)D) after June 30,

2004.

(e) Technical Infeasibility Certification Criteria

and Procedures ~—

(1) No less than 60 days prior to the date of

purchase or lease of a replacement or additional

heavy-duty engine or vehicle, any fleet operator

seeking to comply with paragraph (d)(4) shall

demonstrate the technical infeasibility of comply-

ing with paragraph (d)(1), d(2), or (d)(3) require-

ments by submitting a signed and dated

Technical Infeasibility Certification Request to

the Executive Officer and attest to the accuracy

of all statements therein, that shall include:

(A) The name and address of the pub-

lic fleet operator; and

(B) Current heavy-duty vehicle fleet

composition, including make, model;

and

(C) Demonstration that no engine and

chassis/body configuration that meets

the requirements of paragraphs (d)(1),

(dX2), or (d)(3) is commercially avail-

able from any manufacturer (only tech-

nical reasons for choosing a given

chassis/body configuration are accept-

able) or could be used in a specific ap-

plication.

70

(D) Demonstration that an alterna-

tive-fuel refueling station for alternative-

fueled or dual-fuel heavy-duty vehicles

that are commercially available from any

manufacturer is not available within five

miles of the vehicle storage or mainte-

nance yards, or at locations where vehi-

cles will be home-based for extended

periods of time and the refueling supply

is provided through mobile means.

(E) Demonstration that vehicles com-

plying with paragraphs (d)(1), (d2), or

(dX3) exceed the incremental cost-

effectiveness criteria established in ac-

cordance with the most recent require-

ments of the Carl Moyer Program or

the Mobile Source Emission Reduction

Review Committee Program, whichever

is greater.

(2) Within 45 calendar days of receipt of a com-

pleted Technical Infeasibility Certification Re-

quest submitted pursuant to paragraph (e)1),

the Executive Officer will either approve or dis-

approve the Request, in writing. The Executive

Officer shall disapprove the request if it does not

meet the requirements of paragraph (e)(1). If a

Technical Infe sibility Certification Request is

disapproved by the Executive Officer:

(A) The reasons for disapproval shall

be given to the applicant in writing.

(B) Upon receipt of a notice of a dis-

approved Technica! Infeasibility Certifi-

cation Request, the fleet operator shall

comply with paragraph (d\1), (d)(2), or

(dX3).

.

71

(C) The fleet operator may resubmit a

Technical Infeasibility Certification Re-

quest at any time after receiving a dis-

approval notification »- nay apply for a

variance with the “~*QMD Hearing

Board. (See SCAQMD Regulation V and

California Health and Safety Code Sec-

tions 42350 through 42372 for informa-

tion regarding variances.), but must

still comply with paragraph (d)1),

(dX2), or (dX3) until such time as the

Executive Officer approves a Technical

Infeasibility Certification Request un-

der paragraph (e)(1) or a variance is

given by the SCAQMD Hearing Board.

(3) A Technical Infeasibility Certification Re-

quest is subject to a plan filing and evaluation

fees as described in Rule 306.

(f) Exemptions

The provisions of this rule shall not apply to the following:

(1) Emergency or rescue vehicles operated by

local, state, and federal law enforcement agen-

cies, police and sheriffs department, fire depart-

ment, hospital, medical or paramedic facility, and

used for responding to situations where potential

threats to life or property exist, including but not

limited to fire, ambulance calls, or life-saving

calls.

(2) Privately owned or operated heavy-duty ve-

hicle fleets that provide contract services to a

public agency. Nevertheless, privately owned

or operated heavy-duty vehicle fleets may be

required to meet other SCAQMD rules such as

Rules 1192, 1193, 1194, or 1186.1.

72

(3) No more than ten evaluation/test vehicles

per fleet, provided by or operated by vehicle

manufacturer for testing or evaluation, exclu-

sively.

(4) Any vehicle added to or replacing a vehicle

in an existing fleet after the applicable imple-

mentation date of this rule, as specified in subdi-

vision (d), as long as the purchase contract for

acquisition of such vehicle is signed before the

date of adoption of this rule. This exemption does

not apply to the execution of options to acquire

vehicles where the option is executed after the

date of adoption of this rule and where vehicle

delivery does not occur until after the applicable

implementation date as specified in subdivision

(d).

(5) Military vehicles used for tactical opera-

tions.

(6) Heavy-duty vehicles used routinely to

transport materials in and out of the District.

(7) Heavy-duty vehicles operated and housed by

state agencies or special districts in the Riverside

County portion of the Mojave Desert Air Basin

and located within the District if the vehicles are

equipped with approved control devices.

(8) When the remainder of the fleet consists of

heavy-duty vehicles that meet the requirements

of paragraphs (d)(1) or (d2),

(a) For public fleets with greater than

15 but less than 100 heavy-duty vehi-

cles, no more than three (3) heavy-duty

vehicles that do not meet the require-

ments of Subdivision (d) of this rule

may be part of the fleet at any given

(g)

73

time. Such vehicles shal] be equipped

with approved control devices.

(b) For public fleets with 100 or more

heavy-duty vehicles, no more than

three (3) heavy-duty vehicles that do

not meet the requirements of Subdivi-

sion (d) of this rule may be part of the

fleet and are garaged, housed, parked,

stored at any single vehicle storage or

maintenance yard at any given time.

Such vehicles shall be equipped with

approved control devices. A public fleet

operator may deploy these vehicles and

place them at any one vehicle storage or

maintenance yard if the public fleet op-

erator submits a plan to the SCAQMD

demonstrating that a proportionate

number of such heavy-duty vehicles is

reduced at other facilities operated by

the public fleet operator.

(9) Heavy-duty vehicles leased for no more than

120 days in any 12-month period by the U.S.

Postal Service during the peak winter holiday

period.

(10) Heavy-duty vehicles owned or operated by

federal agencies, state agencies, county agencies,

or special districts whose jurisdiction include ar-

eas outside of the District and the heavy-duty

vehicles are garaged, housed, parked, stored or

operated within the District for no more than 180

days in any 12-month period.

Compliance Auditing and Enforcement

(1) The fleet operator shall provide at the re-

quest of the District any files and/or records cre-

ated to comply with subdivision (d) including

74

fleet-specific information, such as a list of official

DMV registrations, principal vehicle location,

and manufacturer, model-year, model, and fuel

type and usage, of each fleet vehicle. This provi-

sion shall not apply for records that have been in

existence for more than one year.

(2) Any fleet operator seeking an exemption

under subdivision (f) shall supply proof that their

vehicle or fleet is exempted from this rule when

requested by the District.

(h) Severability

If any provision of this rule is held by judicial order to be

invalid, or invalid or inapplicable to any person or circum-

stance, such order shall not affect the validity of the

remainder of this rule, or the validity or applicability of

such provision to other persons or circumstances. In the

event any of the exceptions to this rule is held by judicial

order to be invalid, the persons or circumstances covered

by the exception shall instead be required to comply with

the remainder of this rule.

75

SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY

MANAGEMENT DISTRICT

Proposed Rule 1191 - Clean On-Road Light- and

Medium-Duty Public Fleet Vehicles

June 2000

Deputy Executive Officer

Planning, Rule Development and Area Sources

Jack P. Broadbent

Assistant Deputy Executive Officer

Planning, Rule Development and Area Sources

Elaine Chang, Dr. PH -

Planning and Rules Manager

Planning, Rule Development and Area Sources

Henry Hogo

AUTHORS:

Planning, Rule Development and Area Sources

David Coel — Program Supervisor

Larry Irwin —A.Q. Specialist

Vasken Yardemian — Transportation Specialist

REVIEWED BY:

District Counsel

Barbara Baird — District Counsel

Jeri Voge — Senior Deputy District Counsel

SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY

MANAGEMENT DISTRICT

GOVERNING BOARD

Chair: WILLIAM A. BURKE, Ed.D.

Speaker of the Assembly Appointee

76

Vice Chair: NORMAJ. GLOVER

Councilmember, City of Newport Beach

Cities Representative, Orange County

MEMBERS:

MICHAEL D. ANTONOVICH

Supervisor, Fifth District

Los Angeles County Representative

HAL BERNSON

Councilmember, City of Los Angeles

Cities Representative, Los Angeles County,

Western Region

CYNTHIA COAD

Supervisor, Fourth District

Orange County Representative

JANE CARNEY

Senate Rules Committee Appointee

BEATRICE LAPISTO-KIRTLEY

Councilmember, City of Bradbury

Cities Representative, Los Angeles County,

Eastern Region

RONALD O. LOVERIDGE

Mayor, City of Riverside

Cities Representative, Riverside County

JON D. MIKELS

Supervisor, Second District

San Bernardino County Representative

LEONARD PAULITZ

Councilmember, City of Montclair

Cities Representative, San Bernardino County

CYNTHIA VERDUGO-PERALTA

Governor’s Appointee

40

some for both manufacturers (who would have to keep track of

what could be sold where) as well as purchasers (who would be

confused about offerings that could differ from town to town).

The District is not a State, and therefore cannot rely upon

Section 177.

Second, Section 177 applies only if a State adopts and

enforces standards that are “identical to the California standards

for which a waiver has been granted for such model year.” 42

U.S.C. § 7505(1). The District’s standards fail this test as well.

As noted above, the Fleet Rules were adopted by the District

precisely to achieve an impact different from the CARB rules,

which already applied within the geographic area under the

District’s jurisdiction. See pages 33-34, supra; J.A. 141, 152.

Far from seeking to mirror the CARB standards, the District’s

entire purpose was to adopt a different, more restrictive

regulatory regime, and it accomplished that goal. That is fatal

under Section 177.

For example, CARB’s LEV Program consists of two

interrelated elements — standards establishing permissible

emission levels for each of the four categories of low-emission

vehicles, and standards setting the progressively lower average

emission level that a manufacturers’ fleet (of vehicles sold in

the State each year) must meet over time. See Cal. Code Regs.

tit. 13, §§ 1960.1(g)(1)-(2), § 1961(a)-(b). When CARB sought

EPA approval of its LEV Program, it submitted the emission

levels and the implementation mechanism together as a single

interrelated program. See 58 Fed. Reg. at 4,166 (referring to

amendments to California’s “exhaust emission standards and

test procedures” as the “California LEV program,” and evaluat-

ing the disparate standards as one program for purposes of a

single waiver request); see also 68 Fed. Reg. at 19,812 (using

the same framework of analysis for LEV II amendments). EPA

based its approval on the effect of the entire program; it did not

review the emission levels alone. See generally 68 Fed. Reg. at

19,812; 58 Fed. Reg. at 4,166.

4]

The District’s Fleet Rules allow the purchase of only some

of the vehicles that are permitted to be sold under CARB’s

LEV program, in most cases adopting an immediate prohibition

of certain vehicles (typically diesel-fueled vehicles) instead of

allowing manufacturers to phase in a mix of vehicles based

upon yearly state-wide emission averages. The Fleet Rules also

prohibit the purchase of all of the diesel-fueled trucks certified

for sale under CARB’s Heavy-Duty Vehicle Program. Thus,

what the District has done is to take some, but not all, of the

CARB emission regulations and combine them with a com-

pletely different implementation mechanism.

It is plain that the Fleet Rules are not “identical to the

California standards for which a waiver has been granted for

such model year,”as Section 177 requires. EPA has granted a

waiver to both the emission standards for the year and the fleet

average emission standards that apply to the particular model

year. The District’s attempt to implement only a selected subset

of the California standards precludes it from relying upon

Section 177.

The district court emphasized that “[t]he Fleet Rules require

purchasers to choose from among a subset of previously

certified California vehicles.” Pet. App. 23a. Several simple

examples illustrate why this approach is not permissible under

Section 177.

A State could decide on a different selective adoption of

California’s standards, choosing the CARB emission regula-

tions but not the requirement of progressively lower fleet

averages, and defend its decision on the same basis as the

District — that it had adopted California standards.

Of course, the effect of such a rule would be quite different

from the rules promulgated by CARB. Without the pressure of

having to meet increasingly stringent emission levels, manufac-

turers would have no reason to produce and sell the cleaner

vehicles. They could focus all of their efforts on vehicles

42

satisfying the least restrictive emission standards. That would

have substantially different — and adverse — consequences for

pollution levels.

On the other hand, a State could choose to adopt only the

most restrictive of the CARB emission standards. Eliminating

the gradual phase-in period provided by the CARB standards

could create a situation in which manufacturers might not have

sufficient production to meet demand for vehicles in that State.

Not surprisingly, the lower courts that have considered this

question — other than the courts below — have concluded that

any deviation from the exact rules adopted by California makes

Section 177 inapplicable. See Ass'n of Int'l Auto. Mfrs., 208

F.3d at 7-8 (ZEV sales mandates not identical to California

standards are preempted); American Auto. Mfrs. Ass'n, 152

F.3d at 199-201 (same).

Under Section 177, a State may adopt standards that differ

- from the federal standards only if they “are identical to the

California standards.” 42 U.S.C. § 7507 (emphasis added).

Here, of course, the Fleet Rules are not identical to the Califor-

nia standards. As noted above, their very purpose is to be more

restrictive. Moreover, Section 177 expressly prohibits a State

that adopts the California standards from limiting — whether

directly or indirectly — the “sale of a new motor vehicle * * *

that is certified in California as meeting California standards.”

Ibid. But that is precisely the function of the Fleet Rules, which

limit the sale of various vehicles (including diesel-fueled

vehicles) that do meet the California standards.

C. Section 246.

As discussed above (at pages 31-33), Section 246 does not

generally authorize States to adopt purchasing restrictions;

rather, it preserves against Section 209(a) preemption any fleet

purchasing requirements that satisfy the procedural and

43

substantive standards set forth in Section 246. Because the Fleet

Rules do not comply with these standards, they are preempted.

The Fleet Rules were not submitted to EPA for approval as

part of California’s state implementation plan revision, as

required by Section 246. Indeed, California did not submit any

fleet purchasing program in its implementation plan revision.

California instead exercised its option under Section

182(c)(4)(B) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 751 1a(c)(4)(B), to submit

its LEV Program as a substitute in place of a Section 246 fleet

purchasing program, and EPA approved the substitution finding

that the LEV Program would achieve substantially greater

emission reductions. See 64 Fed. Reg. 46,849, 46,851 (1999)

(Table 1) (forecasting LEV program emission benefits in excess

of those that would be achieved by the federal clean-fuel fleet

program). Because the Fleet Rules were not even submitted to

(let alone approved by) EPA, respondents cannot rely on

Section 246.

Moreover, the Fleet Rules could not otherwise be autho-

rized by Section 246 because the terms of the Fleet Rules are

squarely inconsistent with the plain language of Section 246(d),

which states that a plan revision establishing a fleet purchase

program “shall provide that the choice of clean-fuel vehicles

and clean alternative fuels shall be made by the covered fleet

operator * * *.” The Act defines “clean-fuel vehicle” as a

vehicle that “has been certified to meet * * * the clean-fuel

vehicle standards” applicable under the statute. 42 U.S.C.

§ 7581(7). Thus, federal law requires Section 246 fleet purchas-

ing programs to preserve the fleet operator’s freedom to choose

from among all of the low-emission and diesel-fueled vehicles

permitted to be sold. The Fleet Rules, however, do not allow a

fleet operator to choose to purchase vehicles from among all of

the low-emission vehicles permitted to be sold under California

law. Rather the Fleet Rules prohibit operators from purchasing

certain low-emission (and all diesel-fueled) vehicles that

comply with the applicable emission regulations and that are

offered for sale in California.

In sum, the Fleet Rules fail to comply with numerous

requirements of Section 246 and accordingly are not protected

against preemption under Section 209(a).

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the court of appeals should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted.

KENNETH S. GELLER

ANDREW J. PINCUS

JOHN J. SULLIVAN

CRAIG W. CANETTI

Mayer, Brown, Rowe &

Maw LLP

1909 K Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 263-3000

Counsel for Western States

Petroleum Association

AUGUST 2003

JED R. MANDEL

Counsel of Record

TIMOTHY A. FRENCH

Neal, Gerber &

Eisenberg LLP

Two North LaSalle Street

Suite 2200

Chicego, Illinois 60602

(312) 269-8000

Counsel for Engine

Manufacturers Association

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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