Reply Brief — Engine Mfrs. Assn. v. South Coast Air Quality Management Dist.

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No. 02-1343 Chupe

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

ENGINE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION AND

WESTERN STATES PETROLEUM ASSOCIATION,

Petitioners,

Vv.

SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, ef al.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

JOHN J. SULLIVAN PHIL C. NEAL

GREGORY R. MCCLINTOCK Counsel of Record

MAYER, BROWN, ROWE & MAW JED R. MANDEL

1909 K Street, N.W. TIMOTHY A. FRENCH ,

Washington, D.C. 20006 NEAL, GERBER & EISENBERG

(202) 263-3000 Two North LaSalle Street

Suite 2200

Counsel for Petitioner Western Chicago, Illinois 60602

States Petroleum Association (312) 269-8000

Counsel for Petitioner Engine

Manufacturers Association

WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. — (202) 789-0096 -— WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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I. THE CONFLICT WITH THE FIRST AND

SECOND CIRCUIT DECISIONS IS REAL..

Il. THE DECISION BELOW FAILS TO FOLLOW

THE COURT’S ADMONITIONS THAT

PREEMPTION ANALYSIS MUST FOCUS ON

“THE PLAIN WORDING” OF AN EXPRESS

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III. THE CONFLICTING DECISIONS AT ISSUE

DO PRESENT AN ISSUE OF NATIONAL

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases:

American Auto. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Cahill, 152 F.3d 196

v le 8 ee 2,3,4

Association of Int'l Auto. Mfrs. v. Commissioner,

Massachusetts Dep't of Envtl. Protection, .

208 F.2d 1 (Ast Cir. 2000) ............ ce ceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeees 2,3,4

California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v.

Dillingham, 519 U.S. 316 (1997).....cccccccceeeereenees 5

CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood,

Ag | 4

Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine,

__ US. _, 123 S. Ct. $18 (2002)...........0..0000+ 4

Statutory Provisions:

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Petitioners’ Rule 29.6 Statement appears at Pet. 11.

(11)

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

No. 02-1343

ENGINE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION AND

WESTERN STATES PETROLEUM ASSOCIATION,

Petitioners,

Vv.

SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, ef al.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

INTRODUCTION

Petitioners Engine Manufacturers Association and the

Western States Petroleum Association hereby respectfully

submit this Reply Brief in support of the pending petition for

a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in this case.

I. THE CONFLICT WITH THE FIRST AND

SECOND CIRCUIT DECISIONS IS REAL.

Respondent’s brief in opposition attempts to obscure the

conflict between the Ninth Circuit’s decision in this case and

the decisions in the First and Second Circuits by disregarding

the major premise of both of the latter decisions. Respondent

2

describes the cases as though the sole question in each was

whether the challenged state regulations qualified for the

“opt-in” waiver of preemption granted by Section 177 of the

Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. § 7507). See Opp. Br. 9, 10. That

is an incorrect account of the decisions. Before reaching the

Section 177 question, the court in each case determined that

the regulations were covered by the preemption language of

Section 209(a) (42 U.S.C. § 7543(a)). That determination

was essential to the decision reached in each case, because if

the regulations were not covered by Section 209(a) in the

first place, they would have been permissible despite their

failure to comply with Section 177.

The Second Circuit’s opinion said, “We first address the

question left open in MVMA III, 17 F.3d at 536, namely,

whether the ZEV requirement is a ‘standard relating to the

control of emissions’ and therefore within Section 209’s

preemptive scope.” American Auto. Mfrs. Ass'n vy. Cahill,

152 F.3d 196, 199 (2d Cir. 1998). The court’s holding on

this point was: “We agree with the Manufacturers that the

ZEV sales requirement is a ‘standard relating to the control

of emissions’ and is therefore preempted by Section 209 of

the Clean Air Act.” /d. at 197.

Similarly, the First Circuit’s opinion first considered, as a

distinct point, whether the Massachusetts regulations were

standards within the meaning of Section 209 (and the identi-

cal language of Section 177) and said, “We share the opinion

of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that ‘the ZEV

sales requirement must be considered a standard ‘relating to

the control of emissions.’” Association of Int'l Auto. Mfrs.

v. Commissioner, Massachusetts Dep't of Envtl. Protection,

208 F.3d 1, 6 (Ist Cir. 2000).

The Second Circuit’s interpretation of the preemption

language of Section 209 was clear and simple: “We view

‘standards relating to the control of emissions’ as describing

regulatory measures intended to lower the level of auto

3

emissions.” 152 F.3d at 200. It held the ZEV regulations

preempted because “a requirement that a particular percent-

age of vehicle sales be ZEVs has no purpose other than to

effect a general reduction in emissions.” Jbid. The First

Circuit echoed the test: “[T]he very purpose and effect of the

ZEV mandates is to effect a quantitative reduction in emis-

sions. * * * As such, they fall squarely within the language

of §§ 209 and 177.” 208 F.3d at 7.

The language from the Second Circuit opinion quoted by

Respondent at pp. 9-10 of its brief was used by the Second

Circuit, not in defining the scope of Section 209, but in

explaining why compliance with the opt-in provisions of

Section 177 necessitates strict identity with the “California

standards.” 152 F.3d at 201. Those observations did not

limit or qualify the court’s broad view of the preemption

provision.

Nor did the First Circuit suggest that only a “production”

requirement is preempted by Section 209, as Respondent

attempts to suggest. See Opp. Br. 11. To the contrary, the

EPA letter quoted by the court as supporting its conclusion

correctly noted that a production requirement must be

considered part of the “standard-setting process,” not that a

“production requirement” is the only kind of regulation that

falls within the preemptive reach of Section 209.

The Ninth Circuit’s decision in this case cannot be recon-

ciled with the interpretation of Section 209 adopted by the

First and Second Circuits. The cases are “distinguishable”

only in the sense that any two cases with any different facts

are said by lawyers to be “distinguishable.” There is no

sensible reasoning that will harmonize the rationale and

result of the Ninth Circuit decision with the rationale and

result of the other two decisions.

There can be no doubt that the “very purpose and effect” of

the Fleet Rules is to “effect a quantitative reduction in

emissions” within the District. The District Court opinion

4

adopted by the Ninth Circuit did not deny (and could not

have denied) that the Fleet Rules have such a purpose and

effect. Instead, the court adopted a mechanistic test for

deciding whether regulations are “standards relating to the

control of emissions”—namely, if the regulations take the

form of restrictions on “purchases” rather than on “sales” or

“manufacture” there is no preemption. This means that if

New York or Massachusetts, instead of requiring the sale of a

certain percentage of ZEV vehicles, had forbidden the

purchase of any vehicles other than LEV vehicles, their

regulations would not be preempted. It cannot reasonably be

doubted, however, that any such regulations would be held to

be preempted under the Cahill and Commissioner decisions.

The scope of Section 209’s preemption may or may not be

adequately delimited by the First and Second Circuit opin-

ions, but there is certainly a genuine conflict between those

cases and the decision of the Ninth Circuit. The divergence

is so striking that it calls strongly for resolution by this Court.

As long as the Ninth Circuit decision stands, it is an invita-

tion to other States, and to local government entities every-

where, to adopt whatever emission-control standards they

choose, provided they take the form of restrictions on the

types of vehicles and vehicle engines that may be purchased.

II. THE DECISION BELOW FAILS TO FOLLOW

THIS COURT’S ADMONITIONS THAT

PREEMPTION ANALYSIS MUST FOCUS

FIRST ON “THE PLAIN WORDING” OF AN

EXPRESS PREEMPTION CLAUSE.

This Court has repeatedly emphasized that when a federal

statute contains an express preemption clause, interpretation

“must in the first instance focus on the plain wording of the

clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of

Congress’ pre-emptive intent.” CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easter-

wood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993); Sprietsma v. Mercury

Marine, _—*US. __, 123 S. Ct. 518, 526 (2002). The

ae--

5

opinion below disregards that principle by failing to give any

effect to the phrase “relating to the control of emissions” in

the express preemption clause that governs this case. In

effect the court has said that the Fleet Rules are not pre-

empted because they do not constitute an “emission stan-

dard.” But if Congress had meant to limit the preemption

solely to “emission standards,” it would no doubt have said

simply that no state shall adopt “emission standards.”

Instead it said that no state shall adopt any standard “relating

to the control of emissions,” by which it could only have

meant to preempt some types of emission-control regulations

that are not themselves “emission standards.” The opinion

below fails to acknowledge this “plain wording” of the

preemption clause or to offer any explanation why that

language does not encompass the Fleet Rules.

Respondent seems to suggest that the phrase “relating to”

should be ignored. But this Court’s decisions do not permit

reading the phrase out of the statute. They acknowledge that

the phrase, if taken literally, could extend without limit, but

they do not say it means nothing. In the Dillingham case, on

which Respondent relies, the Court reiterated its long line of

cases recognizing that the preemption clause of ERISA is

“clearly expansive,” has “a broad scope” and “an expansive

sweep,” and is “conspicuous for its breadth.” California Div.

of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham, 519 U.S.

316, 324 (1997). The Court then restated the narrowing

construction that previous decisions had placed on the

“expansive sweep” of the clause’s language, and applied it to

the specific case beiore the Court. Nor did Justice Scalia’s

concurring opinion suggest that the preemption clause was to

be read as though the language “relating to” had been left out

of the clause; rather, the language preceded by “relating to”

was to be taken as identifying the field in which ordinary

preemption operates. See 519 U.S. at 336. The opinion of

the Ninth Circuit in this case comports with neither the

6

majority nor the concurring opinion’s approach in the Dil-

lingham case.

Respondent also repeats the District Court’s erroneous

reliance on Section 246 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 7586, as limiting the scope of the preemption clause of

Section 209(a). See Opp. Br. 16. The significance of Section

246 is just the opposite. By imposing a federal requirement

of fleet-purchase regulations, conforming to all the specifica-

tions of Section 246 and subject to approval by federal

authority, Congress clearly showed that it regarded such

regulations as within the scope of the kinds of emission

control reserved for determination on a national basis.

Indeed, the requirements prescribed by Congress in Section

246 included the requirement that such a fleet-purchase plan

must leave the choice of clean-fuel vehicles to the fleet

operator, a requirement that is squarely violated by the Fleet

Rules at issue in this case. See 42 U.S.C. § 7586(d). Thus, it

is undisputed that the Fleet Rules of the SCAQMD cannot be

supported under Section 246. Aside from the fact that they

do not conform to the requirements of Section 246, the State

of California affirmatively opted out of Section 246, as it was

permitted to do with the permission of the federal EPA,

which was given. See 64 Fed. Reg. 46849 (Aug. 27, 1999).

The District Court’s fallacious use of Section 246 only

illustrates further the extent of its departure from a faithful

construction of the preemption clause at issue in this case.

iil. THE CONFLICTING DECISIONS DO

PRESENT AN ISSUE OF NATIONAL

IMPORTANCE.

Conflicts on questions of preemption are intrinsically im-

portant because they deal with difficult questions of alloca-

tion of authority between the national and state governments

and thus of respect for the Supremacy Clause. The impor-

tance of such questions is indicated by the frequency with

which this Court has addressed them in recent years. In this

7

case, however, the intrinsic importance of a preemption issue

is heightened by the fact that it affects the division of author-

ity over a major national industry whose operations in

interstate commerce constitute a vital part of the economy.

Restrictions on the purchase of particular types of vehicles

alter the demand conditions manufacturers face. Changes in

demand necessitate changes in production and alter the

volume of output for the different types of vehicles and

engines a manufacturer produces. Changes in volume affect

costs, and therefore prices. It is gross oversimplification to

suggest, as the courts below have done, that restrictions on

purchasers impose no requirements on manufacturers.

The question raised by this case is whether the broad reser-

vation by Congress of national authority to determine the

constraints under which manufacturers must operate for the

purpose of controlling emissions may be whittled away by

restrictions on “purchases” when similar restrictions on

“sales” would undoubtedly be forbidden. That is an impor-

tant question.

8

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, and for those in the petition, the

petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN J. SULLIVAN PHIL C. NEAL

GREGORY R. MCCLINTOCK Counsel of Record

MAYER, BROWN, ROWE & MAW ss JED R. MANDEL

1909 K Street, N.W. TIMOTHY A. FRENCH

Washington, D.C. 20006 NEAL, GERBER & EISENBERG

(202) 263-3000 Two North LaSalle Street

Suite 2200

Counsel for Petitioner Western Chicago, Illinois 60602

States Petroleum Association (312) 269-8000

Counsel for Petitioner Engine

Manufacturers Association

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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