Joint Appendix — Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc.

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No. 02-1192

Jn the Supreme Court of the Anited States

COOPER INDUSTRIES, INC., Petitioner

V.

AVIALL SERVICES, INC., Respondent

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

JOINT APPENDIX

WM. BRADFORD REYNOLDS

Counsel of Record

LISA K. HSIAO

HOWREY, SIMON, ARNOLD

& WHITE, L.L.P.

1299 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20004

(202) 783-0800

(202 383-6610 (fax)

DALE E. STEPHENSON

SQUIRE, SANDERS &

D=MPSEY L.L.P.

4900 Key Tower

127 Public Square

Cleveland, Ohio 44114-1304

(216) 479-8500

(216) 479-8776

Attorneys for Petitioner

Cooper Industries, Inc.

RICHARD O. FAULK

Counsel of Record

CYNTHIA J. BISHOP

JEFFREY M. GABA

STACY OBENHAUS

GARDERE WYNNE SEWELL LLP

3000 Thanksgiving Tower

1601 Elm Street

Dallas, Texas 75201-4761

(214) 999-3000

(214) 999-4667

Attorneys for Respondent

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED FEBRUARY 12, 2003

CERTIORARI GRANTED JANUARY 9, 2004

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents Included in Petition Appendix 2A

Chronological List of Relevant Docket Entries

US District Court wal

US Court of Appeals 6A

Complaint BA

First Amended Complaint 27A

Second Amended Complaint 48A

Transcript of Oral Argument (N.D. Tex.) 69A

-2A- SA «

CONTENTS INCLUDED IN PETITION APPENDIX CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF RELEVANT

DOCKET ENTRIES

The following opinions, decisions, judgments, and

orders have been omitted in printing this joint appendix U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas

because they appear on the following pages in the appendix Division

to the Petition for Certiorari:

8/7/1997 Complaint filed by Aviall Services, Inc.

Aviall Services, Inc. v. Cooper Industries, Inc., (“Aviall”) in U.S. District Court for

No. 00-10197 (Sth Cir. Nov. 14, 2002) (en banc Northern District of Texas (Dallas) (Dkt.

EE SEE SESE eee 9a 1)

Aviall Services, Inc. v. Cooper Industries, Inc.., 9/23/1997 | Answer to Complaint and Counterclaim

No. 00-10197 (Sth Cir. Dec. 19, 2001) filed by Cooper Industries, Inc.

(granting rehearing en DANC) ......c.c.cscsscssesesesseseseseeeseeee 46a (“Cooper”) (Dkt. )

Aviall Services, Inc. v. Cooper Industries, Inc., 1/26/1998 | Answer by Aviall to Cooper's

No. 00-10197 (Sth Cir. Aug. 14, 2001) counterclaim (Dkt. 9)

EP IIIT sctinstcsienisesenantednstnssensnenenmesesnecosssevecssnseenes 47a

| 1/12/1999 | First Amended Complaint filed by Aviall

Aviall Services, Inc. v. Cooper Industries, Inc., (Dkt. 35)

No. 3:97-CV-1926-D (N.D. Tex. Jan. 13, 2000) :

(istrict COUT OPINION)...............cscesseeeseeeeeersseeseseeeeesees 90a 2/1/1999 Answer to First Amended Complaint and

Counterclaim by Cooper (Dkt. 37)

4/16/1999 | Motion for Summary Judgment by

Cooper and Memorandum in support

thereof (Dkt. 51-52)

5/12/1999 | Response by Aviall to Cooper's Motion

for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 57)

5/28/1999 | Reply by Cooper to Aviall’s Response to

Cooper’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Dkt. 63)

11/29/1999 | Second Amended Complaint by Aviall

(Dkt. 78)

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-5A-

12/22/1999

Answer by Cooper to Second Amended

Complaint and Continued Counterclaim

(Dkt. 79)

Certiorari (Dkt. 94)

1/5/2000

Oral argument on Cooper's Motion for

Summary Judgment before Judge Sidney

Fitzwater (Dkt. 80)

1022/2003

Order directing Administrative Closure

(Dkt. 95)

1/13/2000

Memorandum Opinion and Order

granting Cooper’s Motion for Summary

Judgment, dismissing Aviall’s Section

113(f)(1) contribution claim and

remaining causes of action, and Cooper's

counterclaim, without prejudice, and

Judgment entered (Dkt. 82-83)

1/24/2000

Motion by Aviall for reconsideration of

judgment and Memorandum in support of

same (Dkt. 85-86)

1/25/2000

Order denying Aviall’s motion for

reconsideration (Dkt. 87)

2/16/2000

Notice of Appeal by Aviall (Dkt. 88)

12/10/2002

Opinion of Fifth Circuit reversing and

remanding District Court judgment (Dkt.

90-91)

12/13/2002

Order reopening case (Dkt. 92)

1/21/2003

Joint Motion by Cooper and Aviall to stay

proceedings pending resolution of

Cooper’s Petition for Certiorari in the

U.S. Supreme Court (Dkt. 93)

1/22/2003

Agreed Order granting joint motion to

Stay pending resolution of Petition for

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U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

-9A-

3/28/2002

Supplemental Brief filed by Cooper

1/24/2001

Supplemental Authorities filed by Aviall

5/20/2002

Oral Argument heard en banc

2/5/2001

Supplemental Authorities filed by Cooper

2/24/2000

Notice of Appeal filed by Aviall and case

docketed

6/19/2002

Amicus Curiae brief filed by Amicus Curiae

United States

5/22/2000

Appellant's Brief filed by Aviall

7/3/2002

Second Supplemental Brief filed by Cooper in

response to brief by Amicus Curiae United

States

5/22/2000

Record Excerpts filed by Aviall

7/25/2000

Appellee’s Brief filed by Cooper

7/3/2002

Second Supplemental Brief filed by Aviall in

response to brief by Amicus Curiae United

States

8/21/2000

Reply Brief filed by Aviall

2/7/2001

Oral Argument to Panel of Judges Wiener,

Barksdale, and Garza

8/14/2001

Opinion filed and Judgment entered Affirming

District Court Judgment (Judge Wiener,

dissenting)

11/14/2002

En Banc Opinion filed and Judgment entered,

reversing panel decision, reversing District

Court judgment, remanding case to District

Court (Judges Garza, Smith, and Barksdale,

dissenting)

2/24/2003

Notice from U.S. Supreme Court of filing of

Petition for Certiorari by Cooper

9/4/2001

Petition for Rehearing En Banc by Aviall

12/10/2001

Response/ Opposition filed by Cooper to

Aviall’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc

12/19/2001

Order granting Petition for Rehearing En Banc

and case reopened

2/18/2002

Supplemental Brief filed by Aviall

2/28/2002

Amicus Curiae Brief filed by by Amicus Curiae

American Petroleum Institute, Amicus Curiae

American Chemistry Counsel, and Amicus

Curiae Texas Oil and Gas Association

--

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

AVIALL SERVICES

INCORPORATED

Plaintiff, -

VS. CIVIL ACTION NO. ___

COOPER INDUSTRIES.

INC.

Sr Lr IR Ln Lr LH IH IH TH

COMPLAINT

NJ

«

Sr Le

Defendant

COMPLAINT

Aviall Services, Incorporated (“Aviall”), for its

Complaint against Defendant Cooper Industries, Inc.

(“Cooper”), alleges as follows:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

l. This is a civil action, under Section 107 of the

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,

and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601, et seq., as amended

(hereafter “CERCLA”) and under the Texas Solid Waste

Disposal Act, TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.

Chapter 361 (“SWDA”) seeking (1) reimbursement of certain

investigation and remediation costs incurred by Aviall in

response to the release or threat of release of hazardous

substances and petroleum hydrocarbons on, under and about

the properties known as the Forest Park Facility, Love Field

Facility, Lemmon Terminal Facility and Carter Field Facility

(collectively identified herein as the “Facilities”); and (2)

declaratory judgment under Section 113(g)(2) of CERCLA,

42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 2201, as to

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Defendant’s liability for further response costs incurred and

to be incurred by Aviall at the Facilities.

2. This action is also instituted under the

statutory and common laws of the State of Texas seeking

abatement, damages to property value, cost of repair and

such other relief as just and proper.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

3. This Court has exclusive jurisdiction over the

subject matter of this action under Section 113(b) of

CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. -§ 9613(b). This Court has federal

question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 for this civil

action arising under the laws of the United States. Venue is

proper in this District pursuant to Section 113(b), 42 U.S.C. §

9613(b) because the Facilities are located within this District

and the release of hazardous substances and petroleum

hydrocarbons occurred within this District.

4. The SWDA, negligence, negligence per se, gross

negligence, trespass, nuisance, public nuisance and breach

of contract claims are so related to the claims within the

original jurisdiction of this Court that they form part of the

same case or controversy under Article III of the United

States Constitution. This Court has supplemental

jurisdiction over the SWDA, negl*gence, negligence per se,

gross negligence, trespass, nuisance, public nuisance and

breach of contract claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 and

the doctrine of pendant jurisdiction.

PARTIES

5. Plaintiff Aviall is a Delaware corporation and has its

principal place of business in the State of Texas.

6. Defendant Cooper Industries, Inc., is a [sic] Ohio

corporation doing business in the State of Texas. Defendant

may be served with citation by delivering a copy of the

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citation and this Complaint to its registered agent, CT

Corporation System, 801 Dallas Avenue, Houston, Texas

77002.

BACKGROUND

7. The subject of this action concerns costs, fees and

damages arising out of releases and threatened releases of

hazardous materials and petroleum hydrocarbons at four

facilities known individually as the Forest Park Facility,

Love Field Facility, Lemmon Terminal Facility and Carter

Field Facility at which Cooper and its predecessors

conducted aircraft engine overhaul and maintenance

operations. All four facilities are located either in Dallas,

Texas near Love Field or in Fort Worth in the vicinity of the

Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport.

Forest Park Facility

8. The Forest Park Facility is located at 6114 Forest

Park Road, Dallas, Texas. Beginning in the late 1940's,

Texas Aircraft & Engine Company (“TA&EC”) and Texas

Metal & Manufacturing Company (“TM&MC”) conducted

engine rebuilding and metal fabricating operations at that

location.

9. In 1949, Cooper’s predecessor, Aviation Activities

Company (“AAC”), acquired TA&EC and TM&MC. On

information and belief, AAC merged AAC, TA&EC and

TM&MC and formed a new company known as Dallas

Airmotive.

10. Dallas Airmotive, also Cooper's predecessor,

continued the engine rebuilding and metal fabricating

operations at the Forest Park Facility. These operations

consisted, in part, of cleaning engines; painting, stripping

and plating engine parts; assembling engines; testing

engines; maintaining and operating underground storage

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tanks and tank farms; and using, receiving and storing

hazardous materials and petroleum hydrocarbons.

11. During the course of their operations, Cooper's

predecessors disposed of and released hazardous materials

and petroleum hydrocarbons at the Forest Park Facility.

Without limitation, Cooper’s predecessors buried drums of

waste containing hydrochloric acid; dumped spent

trichloroethylene (“TCE”) used in their plating operations

onto the bare ground; released into the environment TCE

used to wash engines located in test cells; allowed

petroleum storage tanks to overflow their contents onto the

ground; buried silver plating sludges in soils; and corroded

drains with acids while releasing into the drains metals,

plating solutions and solvents.

Carter Field Facility

12. In 1955, Cooper’s predecessor, Southwest Airmotive

Company (“Southwest Airmotive’’), began aircraft engine

maintenance operations at Carter Field located at 15225

F.A.A. Boulevard, Forth Worth, Texas.

13. At the Carter Field Facility, Cooper's predecessor

assembled, disassembled and tested aircraft engines and

used, received and stored hazardous materials and

petroleum hydrocarbons.

14. During the course of such operations, Cooper's

predecessor released and disposed of hazardous substances

and petroleum hydrocarbons into the environment. Such

releases and disposals include, but are not limited to,

overfilling of storage tanks with jet fuel, releasing of

hazardous substances into drains, and periodic overflowing

an oil/water separator with hazardous materials and

petroleum hydrocarbons.

-12A-

Love Field Facility

15. Beginning in 1931, Cooper's predecessor, Edwin F.

Booth, Inc. began piston engine maintenance operations at

the Love Field Facility located at 9311 Reeves Street, Dallas,

Texas.

16. Southwest Airmotive was subsequently formed from

the successor corporation to Edwin F. Booth, Inc., Booth-

Herring, Inc. Southwest Airmotive continued aircraft engine

overhaul operations at the Love Field Facility and eventually

added 3300 Lemmon Avenue, Dallas, Texas to the Love

Field Facility.

17. The aircraft engine operations conducted by Cooper’s

predecessors at Love Field include, but are not limited to,

overhauling aircraft engines, which involved cleaning aircraft

engines; painting, stripping and plating engine parts;

assembling engines; testing engines; refueling of aircraft;

maintaining and operating underground storage tanks and

tank farms; and using, receiving, and storing hazardous

materials and petroleum hydrocarbons.

18. During the course of such operations, Cooper’s

predecessors overfilled jet fuel storage tanks and disposed of

jet fuel onto bare ground, allowed tanks and related piping to

leak petroleum hydrocarbons into the surrounding

environment, and caused barrels containing chemicals to

accumulate and deteriorate on bare ground, leaking their

contents into soils and groundwater. Further, Cooper’s

predecessors overfilled sumps in the plating shop with

solvents and plating waste, draining such chemicals into the

ground.

Lemmon Terminal Facility

19. The Lemmon Terminal Facility is located at 7511 and

7515 Lemmon Avenue, Dallas, Texas. Beginning in the

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1950's, Cooper's predecessor, Southwest Airmotive,

conducted engine maintenance fueling and storage at that

location.

20. In connection with such operations, Cooper’s

predecessor overfilled fuel tanks, allowed dripping and

spilling of petroleum hydrocarbons onto soils, spilled

petroleum hydrocarbons onto the ground in its weed control

activities, and allowed tanks and piping to deteriorate,

thereby releasing petroleum hydrocarbons into soils and

potentially groundwater. In addition, Cooper's predecessors

released non-halogenated solvents into soils.

Cooper’s Acquisition of the Facilities

21. In 1970, Dallas Airmotive merged with Cooper, and

Cooper assumed all liabilities of Dallas Airmotive in the

merger, including the liabilities related to the Forest Park

Facility.

22. After the merger, Cooper continued the operations of

Dallas Airmotive at the Forest Park Facility and continued to

release and dispose of hazardous materials and petroleum

hydrocarbons into the environment.

23. Asa result of the acts and omissions of Cooper and

its predecessors, hazardous materials and petroleum

hydrocarbons released by Cooper and its predecessors at the

Forest Park Facility have been detected in groundwater and

soil at the facility including, but not limited to, phase

separated hydrocarbons, chlorobenzenes, cis-1,2-

dichloroethene (cis-1,2-DCE), perchloroethene, TCE, 1,1-

dichloroethene (1,1-DCE), vinyl chloride, and hexavalent

chromium. Certain hazardous materials released at the

Forest Park Facility by Cooper and its predecessors have

migrated through groundwater off of the Forest Park

Facility property.

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24. In 1973, Cooper acquired Southwest Airmotive

pursuant to a merger in which Cooper assumed the

obligations and liabilities of Southwest Airmotive at the

Carter Field, Love Field and Lemmon Terminal Facilities.

25. Further, Cooper continued the operations of its

predecessor, Southwest Airmotive, at the Carter Field, Love

Field and Lemmon Terminal Facilities and continued to

dispose of and release hazardous materials and petroleum

hydrocarbons into the soils and groundwater at the

Facilities.

26. As a result of the operations of Cooper and its

predecessors at the Carter Field Facility, elevated

concentrations of total petroleum hydrocarbons, benzene,

toluene, ethylbenzene, and xylenes were identified in soils

at the Carter Field Facility. Further, groundwater

monitoring wells have identified the on-site presence of

1,1,DCE, vinyl chloride, phase-separated hydrocarbons and

halogenated solvents at the Carter Field Facility.

27. As a result of the operations of Cooper and its

predecessors at the Love Field Facility, unsaturated

halocarbons including 1,1-DCE, cis-1,2-DCE,

perchloroethene, TCE, petroleum hydrocarbons and vinyl

chloride have been detected in soils. Certain unsaturated

halocarbons have also been detected in groundwater at the

Love Field Facility. Further, four hydrocarbon plumes exist

in the groundwater at the Love Field Facility.

28. Asa result of the acts and omissions of Cooper and

its predecessor at the Lemmon Terminal Facility, gasoline,

jet fuel, acetone, and non-halogenated solvent

methylethylketone have been detected in soils in and around

the on-site sewer catch basins and/or tank farm, among

other areas.

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29. The contamination caused by Cooper and its

predecessors at the Facilities constituted unauthorized

discharges prohibited by Texas Water Code Section 26.121

and Fort Worth City Code, Chapter 49 and/or Dallas City

Codes, Chapter 7A.

Aviall’s Acquisition of the Facilities

30. In 1981, Aviall purchased the assets of Cooper,

including the Forest Park, Love Field, Lemmon Terminal and

Carter Field Facilities.

31. Aviall and Cooper entered a written Asset Purchase

Agreement, dated December 10, 1981 (“Agreement’’) which

set forth the terms and conditions of the sale. Pursuant to the

Agreement, Cooper assumed all liabilities arising out of pre-

closing environmental contamination.

32. Cooper has refused to honor and follow the

Agreement and its obligations under Texas and federal laws

by failing to undertake any environmental responsibilities

associated with pre-closing disposals and releases of

hazardous materials and petroleum hydrocarbons.

33 In 1995 and 1996, Aviall entered two separate sales

through which it sold all of its interests in the Facilities.

Under the terms and conditions of such sales, Aviall has

retained environmental obligations with respect to the

Facilities.

34. Aviall has cooperated with the State of Texas to

investigate and clean up the aforementioned contamination.

Thus far, Aviall has incurred over $5,000,000 in costs to

respond to, investigate, and remediate contamination at the

Facilities. Aviall anticipates that such costs will eventually

total approximately $21,000,000. Further, Aviall has

suffered diminution in value of the Facilities and the risk of

liability to off-site landowners.

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35. — Aviall has incurred response costs consistent with the

National Contingency Plan (“NCP”) pursuant to CERCLA

and will incur further response costs consistent with the NCP

pursuant to CERCLA in the future.

36. The response, investigation and remediation costs

incurred by Aviall were also reasonable, necessary and

required by the Texas Natural Resource Conservation

Commission (“TNRCC”’), or its predecessors.

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST COOPER

(CERCLA Cost Recovery)

37. Aviall incorporates the averments of Paragraphs |-36

as if set out verbatim.

38. — Aviall is entitled to recover from Cooper, pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 9607, response costs incurred or to be incurred

by Aviall under CERCLA in connection with the Facilities.

ao. and “release” and/or threatened release

of “hazardous substances” has occurred at the Facilities as

defined by Sections 101(14), (22), and (29) of CERCLA, 42

U.S.C. §§ 9601(14), (22), and (29) of CERCLA.

40. Cooper is a responsible party under Section 107(a),

42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), of CERCLA as a past owner and

operator of the Facilities at the time of disposal of hazardous

substances and as an arranger for disposal of hazardous

substances at the Facilities.

41. Each of the Facilities constitutes a “facility” as

required by Section 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), of

CERCLA because hazardous substances have come to be

located at the Facilities.

42. _ Aviall has incurred recoverable response costs in

responding to the contamination at the Facilities that are

consistent with the NCP, 40 C.F.R. Part 300.

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43. Aviall is entitled, pursuant to CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §

9613(g)(2), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202, and Tex. Civ. PRAC.

& REM. CODE ANN. Section 37.004, to a declaratory

judgment as to Cooper's liability for response and remedial

action costs and other liabilities in connection with the

Facilities, along with related relief as is requested herein.

Also, Aviall seeks recovery of costs and reasonable and

necessary attorney's fees pursuant to TEX. Civ. PRAC. &

REM. CODE ANN. Section 37.009.

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST COOPER

(CERCLA Contribution)

44. —_ Aviall incorporates the averments of Paragraphs |-

43 as if set out verbatim.

45. Pursuant to CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1),

Aviall is entitled to seek contribution from Cooper, as a

person liable or potentially liable under CERCLA, 42

U.S.C. § 9607(a), for any response costs and other liability

Aviall. has incurred or may incur under CERCLA in

connection with the Facilities.

46. Aviall is entitled to contribution for all such

response costs and other liability on the basis of equitable

factors, including, but not limited to:

A. For over thirty years, Cooper and its predecessors

owned and operated the Facilities during which time

they managed and controlled waste handling and

disposal practices at the Facilities and generated

contamination at and from the Facilities.

B. In contrast to Cooper, Aviall has cooperated with

government efforts regarding investigation and

cleanup of the Facilities.

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.. If Aviall bore the response costs for which Cooper is

directly responsible, Cooper would obtain a windfall

at Aviall’s expense.

D. Cooper and Aviall agreed pursuant to the Agreement

that Cooper would bear all liabilities as between

them for response and remedial action costs arising

out of Cooper’s pre-closing operation and ownership

of the Facilities.

47. Aviall is entitled, pursuant to CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §

9613(g)(2), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202, and TEx. Civ. PRAC.

& REM. CODE ANN. Section 37.004, to a declaratory

judgment as to Cooper's liability for response and remedial

action costs and other liabilities in connection with the

Facilities, along with related relief as is requested herein.

Also, Aviall seeks recovery of costs and reasonable and

necessary attorney's fees pursuant to TEX. Civ. PRAc. &

REM. CODE ANN. Section 37.009.

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST COOPER

(SWDA Contribution)

48. _—_ Aviall incorporates the averments of Paragraphs |-

47 as if set out verbatim.

49. Pursuant to TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.

Section 361.344(a), as amended, Aviall is entitled to

recover from Cooper the costs of the removal or remedial

actions conducted by Aviall in connection with its former

Facilities.

50. Such removal and remedial actions were approved

by the TNRCC and were reasonable and necessary to

address a release or threatened release of a solid waste as

defined by the SWDA.

51. Aviall is entitled, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-

2202 and Tex. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. Section

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37.004, to a declaratory judgment as to Cooper's liability

for response and remedial action costs and other liabilities

in connection with the Facilities, along with related relief as

is requested herein. Also, Aviall seeks recovery of costs

and reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees pursuant to

TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. Section 361.344(a) and

Tex. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. Section 37.009.

FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST COOPER

(Negligence and Negligence Per Se)

52. Aviall incorporates the averments of Paragraphs |-

51 as if set out verbatim.

53. The actions and omissions of Cooper and its

essors in connection with their operations at the

former Aviall Facilities were negligent.

54. Cooper owes Aviall a duty to exercise ordinary care

in the conduct of its and its predecessors’ operations at the

Facilities and has a duty to conduct such operations in a

reasonable and prudent manner so that soils and

groundwater are not polluted by petroleum hydrocarbons,

solvents and other substances.

55. Cooper's conduct and that of its predecessors’

constitutes a breach and continuing breach of these duties,

giving rise to negligence and negligence per se.

56. Such negligence is a proximate cause of Aviall’s

injuries. Cooper’s wrongful acts include, without

limitation, the following:

A. Failure to properly dispose of hazardous materials

and drums containing hazardous materials,

B. Failure to adequately inspect underground storage

tank systems, waste lines, and storage facilities;

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od Failure to timely repair leaks and other equipment

failures;

D. Failure to timely report and/or notify the TNRCC or

its predecessors of known and suspected leaks;

disposals or spills;

E.. Failure to comply with applicable environmental laws

including, but not limited to, TEXAS WATER CODE

Section 26.121, which prohibits pollution of the

waters of Texas except as authorized by the TNRCC;

,. Failure to notify and/or warn Aviall of conditions

causing and potentially causing contamination;

G. Failure to operate in accordance with prudent

operating standards in the industry;

H. Failure to adequately protect the natural resources of

the State of Texas, including its groundwater;

I, Failure to adequately train and supervise personnel

with respect to proper waste disposal practices;

J. Failure to adequately train and supervise personnel to

conduct operations in accordance with the laws,

orders and rules of the State of Texas and the codes of

the Cities of Dallas and Fort Worth; and

K. Failure to investigate, remediate, and take affirmative

actions to investigate, respond to, abate and eliminate

the contamination and hazardous conditions existing

at the Facilities.

57. | Cooper knew or should have known that such failures

as described in Paragraph 56 above would cause pollution of

the soil and groundwater at the Facilities.

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58. The negligent or grossly negligent actions and

omissions of Caoper have caused damage to Aviall. As a

proximate result of Cooper’s negligent acts and omissions,

as set forth herein, Aviall has suffered and in the future will

suffer injuries related to the contamination.

59. | Cooper’s actions and inactions allowing pollutants

and hazardous materials to enter surface and subsurface

soils and groundwater are direct violations of Texas rules

and regulations and Dallas and Fort Worth codes designed

to prevent pollution and injury to entities like” Aviall,

amounting to negligence per se.

FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST COOPER

(Gross Negligence)

60. Aviall incorporates the averments of Paragraphs |-

59 as if set out verbatim.

61. Cooper’s operations at the Facilities have been

managed and performed with such lack of care and such

reckless disregard for the protection of the surface and

subsurface of the Facilities that such conduct amounts to

gross negligence or willful misconduct as a matter of law.

Coopers’ wrongful conduct, acts and omissions constituting

gross negligence consist of, but are not limited to, the

following:

a. Cooper's conscious business decision to engage in

illegal waste disposal methods and the resulting

contamination problems caused thereby; and

b. The knowledge of and conscious indifference to the

risks involved and consequences of ignoring the

threat to groundwater, the environment and public

health and safety posed by Cooper's failure to

comply with Dallas and Fort Worth codes and Texas

laws, rules, orders and regulations and failure to take

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any steps to prevent injury to Aviall and the public as

a result of Cooper’s acts and omissions.

62. Cooper's conduct constitutes a breach and continuing

breach of the duties giving rise to this gross negligence

count.

SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST COOPER _

(Trespass)

EE

63. Aviall incorporates the averments of Paragraphs 1-62

as if set out verbatim.

64. —__In the course of engaging in the acts and omissions

described herein, Cooper has caused and allowed the release,

escape and migration of hazardous materials and petroleum

products into the soils and groundwater underlying Aviall’s

former property.

65. Cooper caused or allowed the entry of petroleum

hydrocarbons, solvents and other substances upon and under

Aviall’s former property without Aviall’s permission or

invitation. Aviall was, at the time of its previous occupation

of the Facilities, lawfully entitled to possession of the real

estate at issue.

66. Cooper intentionally conducted operations in such a

manner as to either not guard against, or to purposefully

allow or cause, pollutants and other hazardous materials to

migrate into and contaminate the surface and subsurface soil

and groundwater in violation of Aviall’s former vested

— property rights. This constituted an intentional invasion of

Aviall’s former property, thus constituting an intentional

trespass and continuing trespass as those terms are defined

and understood under the laws and statutes of the State of

Texas. Such intentional trespass was also a legal or

contributing cause to Aviall’s damages as herein alleged.

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67. Cooper’s intentional trespass constitutes the

proximate cause of injury, damage and loss to Aviall.

SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST COOPER

(Private Nuisance)

68. — Aviall incorporates the averments of Paragraphs |-67

as if set out verbatim.

69. Cooper knew to a reasonable certainty, or in the

exercise of ordinary care should have known, that its acts and

omissions would cause material harm to Avial! as well as

substantial costs to clean up contamination. Cooper has

voluntarily, intentionally, or negligently interfered with the

use and enjoyment of Aviall’s former property. Cooper's acts

and omissions have caused and continue to cause pollutants

and other hazardous substances to enter the Facilities

amounting to a present and continuing nuisance.

70. Further, the acts and omissions of Cooper were an

intentional invasion of Aviall’s former interest in the

Facilities, including the surface, subsurface and groundwater

beneath the land, or in the alternative, a negligent invasion of

Aviall’s former property interests in the surface, subsurface

and groundwater beneath the Facilities. This invasion of

Aviall’s former property interests has interfered and is

continuing to interfere with the use and enjoyment of the

Facilities and the normal and expected use and enjoyment of

the Facilities and groundwater. These acts committed by

Cooper constitute a nuisance. Such nuisance is also a legal

and contributing cause of injury to the Facilities.

71. The pollution caused by Cooper is continuing, exists

today and will, in all likelihood, continue into the future, thus

constituting a continuing tort. Cooper has violated its

common-law obligations to abate and correct the continuing

nuisance it created. As alleged above, Cooper’s actions are

- 24A -

and were intentional or reckless, such that the harm to

Aviall’s interests were substantially certain to follow.

72. The presence of petroleum hydrocarbons, solvents

and other hazardous materials in groundwater and soil is

offensive, inconvenient and annoying to persons with

normal sensibilities in the surrounding community.

73. The nuisances created by Cooper subvert the welfare’

of the environment and public and constitute an obstruction

of public rights with respect to Aviall and landowners

surrounding the Facilities.

74. Asaresult of the nuisance created by Cooper and its

offensive and injurious effects, Aviall has been forced to

incur response and remediation costs and other costs

associated with damage to the Facilities.

EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST COOPER

(Public Nuisance)

75. Aviall incorporates the averments of Paragraphs 1-

74 as if set out verbatim.

76. Cooper’s acts and omissions remain a source of

continuing pollution for which Cooper has refused to accept

responsibility. Cooper’s acts and omissions have caused

and continue to cause pollutants and other hazardous

materials to emanate from certain Facilities amounting to a

present and continuing public nuisance.

77. In committing these acts and omissions, Cooper has

created, maintained and refused to abate a public nuisance,

contrary to the laws of the State of Texas. Further, Cooper

willfully and intentionally, and in utter disregard of these

laws, damaged and continues to damage the Facilities.

Cooper’s actions resulting in the contamination of soils and

groundwater have subverted and are subverting the public

order and have constituted and are constituting an

- 25A -

obstruction of the public’s rights. Aviall has suffered

damages in the form of response costs, remediation costs,

diminution to real property value and repair costs.

NINTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST COOPER

(Breach of Contract by Cooper)

78. Aviall incorporates the averments of Paragraphs |-

77 as if set out verbatim.

79. — As between Aviall and Cooper, under the December

10, 1981 Agreement, Cooper retained all risk of costs,

damages and liabilities arising out of pre-closing disposals

of hazardous materials and contamination.

80. Cooper agreed to retain all liabilities or obligations

not expressly assumed by Aviall under the Agreement,

those liabilities and obligations covered by Cooper's

insurance, and/or all liabilities or obligations constituting a

violation of federal, state or local law or requirement of any

governmental authority.

81. Aviall has incurred costs and liabilities related to

Cooper's violation of applicable law and governmental

authority governing Cooper’s acts at the Facilities. Such

costs and liabilities arise out of Cooper’s acts and omissions

resulting in the contamination of soils and groundwater at

the Facilities. Moreover, Aviall itself never agreed to

assume such costs and liabilities under the Agreement.

82. Aviall has requested that Cooper undertake its

obligations and liabilities under the Agreement, and Cooper

breached its duties under the Agreement by refusing to

assume and satisfy such obligations and liabilities.

83. Aviall has incurred and continues to incur

substantial damages as a result of Cooper’s breaches of the

Agreement.

- 26A -

WHEREFORE, Aviall prays for the relief requested above,

for costs, attorneys fees, interest as allowed by law and for

general relief.

DATED: August 7, 1997

Respectfully submitted,

GARDERE & WYNNE, L.L.P

ls/_

Douglas S. Lang, Esq.

Bar No.1 1895500

1601 Elm Street

3000 Thanksgiving Tower

Dallas, Texas 75210-4761

(214) 999-3000 Telephone

(214) 999-4274 Facsimile

By permission

/s/ Joan Krajewski

ee eee

~~ ame

-27A-

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

AVIALL SERVICES §

INCORPORATED §

§

PLAINTIFF, §

§

VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 3-

§ 97CV1926-D

§

COOPER INDUSTRIES. §

INC. § FIRST AMENDED

§ COMPLAINT

DEFENDANT. §

S

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Aviall Services, Incorporated (“Aviall’’), for its First

Amended Complaint against Defendant Cooper Industries,

Inc. (“Cooper”), alleges as follows:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

5. This is a civil action, under Sections 107 and

113 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601, et seq.,

as amended (hereafter “CERCLA”), under the Texas Solid

Waste Disposal Act, Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann.

Chapter 361 (“SWDA”), and the Texas Water Code §

26.3513 seeking (1) reimbursement of certain investigation

and remediation costs incurred by Aviall in response to the

release or threat of release of hazardous substances and

petroleum hydrocarbons on, under and about the properties

known as the Forest Park Facility, Love Field Facility,

Lemmon Terminal Facility and Carter Field Facility

(collectively identified herein as the “Facilities”); and (2)

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declaratory judgment under Section 113(g)(2) of CERCLA.

42 US.C. § 9613(g2) and 28 U.S.C. § 2201. as to

Defendant's liability for further response costs incurred and

to be incurred by Aviall at the Facilities.

2. This action is also instituted under the

common laws of the State of Texas for breach of contract,

breach of warranty and contractual indemnity arising from a

written Asset Purchase Agreement, dated December 10, 1981

(“Agreement”), seeking abatement, damages to property

value, cost of repair and such other relief as just and proper.

An alternative claim in quantum meruit to preclude Cooper

from being unjustly enriched by~Aviall’s remediation

activities is also asserted herein.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

3. This Court has exclusive jurisdiction over the

subject matter of this action under Section 113(b) of

CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b). This Court has federal

question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 for this civil

action arising under the laws of the United States. Venue is

proper in this District pursuant to Section 1 13(b), 42 U.S.C. §

9613(b) because the Facilities are located within this District

and the release of hazardous substances and petroleum

hydrocarbons occurred within this District. The amount in

controversy exceeds the amount required for adjudication by

this Court.

4. The SWDA, Texas Water Code, breach of

contract, breach of warranty, and contractual indemnity and

quantum meruit claims are so related to the claims within the

original jurisdiction of this Court that they form part of the

same case or controversy under Article II] of the United

States Constitution. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction

over the SWDA, negligence, negligence per se, gross

negligence, trespass, nuisance, public nuisance and breach of

- 29A -

contract claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 and the doctrine

of pendent jurisdiction.

PARTIES

5. Plaintiff Aviall is a Delaware corporation and

has its principal place of business in the State of Texas.

6. Defendant Cooper Industries, Inc., is a [sic]

Ohio corporation doing business in the State of Texas.

Defendant may be served with citation by delivering a copy

of the citation and this Complaint to its registered agent, CT

Corporation System, 801 Dallas Avenue, Houston, Texas

77002.

FACTS COMMON TO ALL CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

7. The subject of this action concerns costs, fees

and damages arising out of releases and threatened releases

of hazardous materials and petroleum hydrocarbons at four

facilities known individually as the Forest Park Facility,

Love Field Facility, Lemmon Terminal Facility and Carter

Field Facility. At those facilities, Cooper and its

predecessors conducted aircraft engine overhaul and/or

maintenance operations. All four facilities are located either

in Dallas, Texas near Love Field Airport or in Fort Worth in

the vicinity of the Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport.

The factual background for each facility and the conduct of

the parties is alleged below.

Forest Park Facility

8. The Forest Park Facility is located at 6114

Forest Park Road, Dallas, Texas. Beginning in the late

1940’s, Texas Aircraft & Engine Company (“TA&EC”) and

Texas Metal & Manufacturing Company (“TM&MC”)

conducted engine rebuilding and metal fabricating operations

at that location.

- 30A -

9. In 1949, Cooper's predecessor, Aviation

Activities Company (“AAC”), acquired TA&EC and

TM&MC. On information and belief. AAC merged AAC,

TA&EC and TM&MC and formed a new company known as

Dallas Airmotive.

10. Dallas Airmotive, also Cooper's predecessor,

continued the engine rebuilding and metal fabricating

operations at the Forest Park Facility. These operations

consisted, in part, of cleaning engines; painting, stripping and

plating engine parts; assembling engines; testing engines;

maintaining and operating underground storage tanks and

tank farms; and using, receiving and storing hazardous

materials and petroleum hydrocarbons.

11. During the course of their operations,

Cooper's predecessors disposed of and released hazardous

materials and petroleum hydrocarbons at the Forest Park

Facility. Without limitation, Cooper's predecessors buried

drums of waste containing hydrochloric acid; dumped spent

trichloroethylene (“TCE”) used in their plating operations

onto the bare ground; released into the environment TCE

used to wash engines located in test cells; allowed petroleum

storage tanks to overflow their contents onto the ground;

buried silver plating sludges in soils; and corroded drains

with acids while releasing into the drains metals, plating

solutions and solvents.

Carter Field Facility

12. In 1955, Cooper's predecessor, Southwest

Airmotive Company (“Southwest Airmotive™), began aircraft

engine maintenance operations at Carter Field located at

15225 F.A.A. Boulevard, Forth Worth, Texas.

13. At the Carter Field Facility, Cooper's

predecessor assembled, disassembled and tested aircraft

-31A-

engines and used, received and stored hazardous materials

and petroleum hydrocarbons.

14. During the course of such operations,

Cooper's predecessor released and disposed of hazardous

substances and petroleum hydrocarbons into _ the

environment. Such releases and disposals include, but are

not limited to, overfilling of storage tanks with jet fuel,

releasing of hazardous substances into drains, and periodic

overflowing of an oil/water separator with hazardous

materials and petroleum hydrocarbons.

Love Field Facility

1S. Beginning in 1931, Cooper's predecessor,

Edwin F. Booth, Inc. began piston engine maintenance

operations at the Love Field Facility located at 9311 Reeves

Street, Dallas, Texas.

16. Southwest Airmotive was subsequently

formed from the successor corporation to Edwin F. Booth,

Inc., Booth-Herring, Inc. Southwest Airmotive continued

aircraft engine overhaul operations at the Love Field Facility

and eventually added 3300 Lemmon Avenue, Dallas, Texas

to the Love Field Facility.

17. The aircraft engine operations conducted by

Cooper's predecessors at Love Field include, but are not

limited to, overhauling aircraft engines, which involved

cleaning aircraft engines; painting, stripping and plating

engine parts; assembling engines; testing engines; refueling

of aircraft; maintaining and operating underground storage

tanks and tank farms; and using, receiving, and storing

hazardous materials and petroleum hydrocarbons.

18. During the course of - such operations,

Cooper's predecessors overfilled jet fuel storage tanks and

disposed of jet fuel onto bare ground, allowed tanks and

related piping to leak petroleum hydrocarbons into the

-32A-

surrounding environment, and caused barrels containing

chemicals to accumulate and deteriorate on bare ground,

leaking their contents into soils and groundwater. Further,

Cooper's predecessors overfilled sumps in the plating shop

with solvents and plating waste, draining such chemicals into

the ground.

Lemmon Terminal Facility

19. The Lemmon Terminal Facility is located at

7511 and 7515 Lemmon Avenue, Dallas, Texas. Beginning

in the 1950°s, Cooper's predecessor, Southwest Airmotive,

conducted aircraft maintenance, fueling and storage at that

location.

20. _—_ In connection with such operations, Cooper's

predecessor overfilled fuel tanks, allowed dripping and

spilling of petroleum hydrocarbons onto soils, spilled

petroleum hydrocarbons onto the ground in its fueling and

weed control activities, and allowed tanks and piping to

deteriorate, thereby releasing petroleum hydrocarbons into

soils and potentially groundwater. In addition, Cooper's

predecessors released non-halogenated solvents into soils.

Cooper's Acquisition of the Forest Park Facility

21. In 1970, Cooper purchased Dallas Airmotive

and merged Dallas Airmotive into Cooper. As a result of this

merger, Cooper assumed all obligations of and belongings to

Dallas Airmotive, including the environmental liabilities

relating to the Forest Park Facility.

22. After the merger, Cooper continued

operations and purchased additional, adjacent property at the

Forest Park Facility and continued to release and dispose of

hazardous materials and petroleum hydrocarbons into the

environment.

-33A-

Pollution at the Forest Park Facility by Cooper and its [sic]

Predecessors

23. As a result of the acts and omissions of

Cooper and its predecessors, hazardous materials and

petroleum hydrocarbons released by Cooper and its

predecessors at the Forest Park Facility have been detected in

groundwater and soil at the facility including, but not limited

to, phase separated hydrocarbons, chlorobenzenes, cis-!,2-

dichloroethene (cis-!,2-DCE), perchloroethene, TCE, 1,1-

dichloroethene (1,1-DCE), vinyl chloride, and hexavalent

chromium. Certain hazardous materials released at the

Forest Park Facility by Cooper and its predecessors have

migrated through groundwater off of the Forest Park Facility

property.

Cooper's Acquisition of the Carter Field, Love Field and

Lemmon Terminal Facilities

24. In 1973, Cooper purchased the stock of

Southwest Airmotive, Inc. As a result of the stock purchase,

Cooper assumed the obligations and liabilities of Southwest

Airmotive at the Carter Field, Love Field and Lemmon

Terminal Facilities.

Cooper's Pollution of the Carter Field, Love Field and

Lemmon Terminal Facilities

25. Further, Cooper continued the operations at

the Carter Field, Love Field and Lemmon Terminal Facilities

and continued to dispose of and release hazardous materials

and petroleum hydrocarbons into the soils and groundwater

at the Facilities.

26. Asa result of the operations of Cooper and its

predecessors at the Carter Field Facility, elevated

concentrations of total petroleum hydrocarbons, benzene,

toluene, ethylbenzene, and xylenes were identified in soils at

- 34A -

the Carter Field Facility. Further, groundwater monitoring

wells have identified the on-site presence of 1,1-DCE, viny!

chloride, dissolved-phase hydrocarbons and halogenated

solvents at the Carter Field Facility.

27. Asa result of the operations of Cooper and its

predecessors at the Love Field Facility, unsaturated

halocarbons including 1,1-DCE, cis- 1 ,2-DCE,

perchloroethene, TCE, petroleum hydrocarbons and vinyl

chloride have been detected in soils. Certain unsaturated

halocarbons and dissolved-phase hydrocarbons have also

been detected in groundwater at the Love Field Facility.

Further, four hydrocarbon plumes exist in the soil and

groundwater at the Love Field Facility.

28 As a result of the acts and omissions of

Cooper and its predecessor at the Lemmon Terminal Facility,

gasoline, jet fuel, acetone, and non-halogenated solvent

methylethylketone have been detected in soils in and around

the on-site sewer catch basins and/or tank farm, among other

areas.

29. The contamination caused by Cooper and its

predecessors at the Facilities constituted unauthorized

discharges prohibited by applicable law, the Texas Water

Code Section 26.121 and Fort Worth City Code, Chapter 49

and/or Dallas City Codes, Chapter 7A.

Aviall’s Acquisition of the Facilities from Cooper - The Asset

Purchase Agreement

30. In 1981, Aviall (through Aviall’s predecessor,

Aviation Power Supply, Inc.) purchased certain assets of

Cooper, including the operations at the Forest Park, Love

Field, Lemmon Terminal and Carter Field Facilities.

31. Aviall and Cooper entered a written Asset

Purchase Agreement, dated December 10, 1981

- 35A -

(“Agreement”) which set forth the terms and conditions of

the sale. Pursuant to the Agreement, Cooper retained all

liabilities arising out of pre-closing environmental

contamination.

32. Additionally, Cooper represented, in

consideration for the Agreement, that Cooper was not in

violation of any law, regulation or requirement relating to the

Facilities, including without limitation applicable

environmental protection laws and regulations. This

representation was false. In fact, at the time of closing the

Agreement, Cooper was in violation of environmental

protection laws and regulations.

33. In consideration for the Agreement, Cooper

entered into an “affirmative covenant” that, prior to closing,

Cooper would comply with all legal requirements and

contractual obligations applicable to the purchased assets. In

fact, Cooper did not comply with all legal requirements and

contractual obligations prior to the closing date.

34. ‘In the Agreement, Cooper agreed to promptly

inform Aviall in writing of all material variances from the

representations and warranties contained in Article 4 of the

Agreement. In fact, Cooper failed to inform Aviall of

material variances in environmental compliance from the

representations made in Section 4.09(f) of the Agreement.

35. | Cooper has refused to honor and follow the

Agreement and its obligations under Texas and federal laws

by failing to recognize, accept and undertake any

environmental responsibilities associated with pre-closing

disposals and releases of hazardous materials and petroleum

hydrocarbons at the Facilities.

Aviall’s Sales of the Facilities and Standing to Sue

36. In 1995 and 1996, Aviall entered two separate

sales through which it sold all of its interests in the Facilities.

- 36A -

Under the terms and conditions of such sales, Aviall has

retained pre-closing environmental obligations with respect

to the Facilities. Accordingly Aviall has standing to

prosecute this action.

Aviall’s Costs

37. Aviall has cooperated with the State of Texas

to investigate and clean up the aforementioned

contamination. Thus far, Aviall has incurred over

$5,000,000 in costs to respond to, investigate, and remediate

contamination at the Facilities. Aviall anticipates that such

costs could exceed $21,000,000. Further, Aviall has suffered

diminution in value of the Facilities through the 1995 and

1996 sales and the risk of liability to off-site landowners.

38. Aviall has incurred response costs consistent

with the National Contingency Plan (“NCP”) pursuant to

CERCLA and will incur further response costs consistent

with the NCP pursuant to CERCLA in the future, as well as

costs reimbursable under the laws of the State of Texas.

39. The response, investigation and remediation

costs incurred by Aviall were also reasonable, necessary and

required by the Texas Natural Resource Conservation

Commission (“TNRCC’”) or its predecessors.

40. A “disposal” and “release” and/or threatened

release of “hazardous substances” and or “hazardous waste”

has occurred at the Facilities as defined by Sections 101(14),

(22), and (29) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(14), (22), and

(29) of CERCLA and by TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE

ANN. Sec. 361.003.

41. | Cooper is a person who is a responsible party

under Section 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), of CERCLA as a

past owner and operator of the Facilities at the time of

disposal of hazardous substances and as an arranger for

disposal of hazardous substances at the Facilities.

-37A -

42. Forest Park, Love Field and Carter Field each

constitute a “facility” as required by Section 107(a), 42

U.S.C. § 9607(a), of CERCLA. Hazardous substances have

come to be located at the Facilities.

43. Aviall has incurred recoverable response costs

in responding to the contamination at the Facilities that are

consistent with the NCP, 40 C.F.R. Part 300.

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST COOPER

(Breach of Contract by Cooper)

44. Aviall incorporates the averments of

Paragraphs 1-43 as if set out verbatim.

45. As between Aviall and Cooper, under the

December 10, 1981 Agreement, Cooper retained all risk of

costs, damages and liabilities arising out of pre-closing

disposals of hazardous materials and contamination.

46. Cooper agreed to retain all liabilities or

obligations (i) not expressly assumed by Aviall under the

Agreement, (ii) those liabilities and obligations covered by

Cooper’s insurance, and/or (iii) all liabilities or obligations

constituting a violation of federal, state or local law or

requirement of any governmental authority. Additionally, in

the Agreement, Cooper falsely represented that it was not in

violation of any law, regulation or requirement relating to the

Facilities, including, without limitation, applicable

environmental protection laws and regulations. Moreover,

Cooper agreed to promptly inform Aviall in writing of all

material variances from the representations and warranties

contained in Article 4 of the Agreement. Notwithstanding

this Agreement, Cooper entirely failed to inform Aviall of

the material variances from its representations and warranties

of environmental compliance.

47. Aviall has incurred costs and liabilities related

to Cooper’s violation of applicable law and governmental

- 38A -

authorities’ requirements governing Cooper's acts at the

Facilities. Such costs and liabilities arise out of Cooper's

acts and omissions resulting in the contamination of soils and

groundwater at the Facilities. Moreover, Aviall itself never

agreed to assume such costs and liabilities under the

Agreement.

48. — Aviall has requested that Cooper undertake its

obligations and liabilities under the Agreement. Cooper has

breached its duties under the Agreement by refusing to

assume and satisfy such obligations and _ liabilities.

Moreover, by refusing to honor its obligations, Cooper has

engaged in an anticipatory breach of the Agreement, thereby

entitling Aviall to recover damages for costs to be incurred in

the future as a proximate result of Cooper’s anticipatory

breach.

49. Aviall has incurred and continues to incur

substantial damages proximately caused as a result of

Cooper’s breaches of the Agreement. In _ reasonable

probability, Aviall will incur substantial damages in the

future as a result of Cooper’s anticipatory breach of the

Agreement.

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST COOPER

(Breach of Warranty)

50. Aviall incorporates the averments of

Paragraphs 1-49 as if set out verbatim.

51. As between Aviall and Cooper, under the

December 10, 1981 Agreement, Cooper expressly warranted

that it was not in violation of any applicable law, regulation

or requirement relating to the operation of the Facilities,

including applicable environmental laws and regulations.

52. By _ releasing petroleum and _ hazardous

substances into the ground and groundwater at the Facilities,

- 39A -

Cooper violated applicable environmental laws and

regulations.

53. Accordingly, Cooper breached the warranty

set forth in the Agreement regarding compliance with

applicable environmental laws and regulations. Moreover,

although Cooper agreed to notify Aviall about any material

variances from the warranties regarding environmental

compliance, Cooper has never notified Aviall of regarding its

non-compliance. As a result, Aviall has incurred and will

continue to incur substantial damages proximately caused as

a result of this breach of warranty. :

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST COOPER

(Contractual Indemnification) °

54. Aviall incorporates the averments of

Paragraphs 1-53 as if set out verbatim.

55. As between Aviall and Cooper, under the

December 10, 1981 Agreement, Cooper agreed to indemnify

Aviall against any loss, liability, damage or expense that

Aviall may incur as a result of a breach by Cooper of any

representation, warranty, covenant or agreement contained in

the Agreement.

56. By refusing to honor its retained

environmental liabilities resulting from Cooper’s pre-closing

activities, and by the other breaches, acts and omissions

alleged herein, Cooper breached representations, warranties,

covenants and agreements set forth in the Agreement.

57. Accordingly, Cooper is required under the

Agreement to indemnify Aviall for all past and future losses,

damages and expenses incurred as a proximate result of

Cooper’s breach of those representations, warranties,

covenants and agreements.

- 40A -

FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST COOPER

(Declaratory Judgment)

58. Aviall incorporates the averments of

Paragraphs 1-57 as if set out verbatim.

59. This claim is for declaratory judgment

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and 42 U.S.C. § 9613 for the

purpose of determining a question of actual controversy

between and among the parties.

60. An actual controversy has arisen and now

exists between Aviall and Cooper in that Aviall contends and

Cooper will deny or will likely deny:

(A)that, as between the parties,

responsibility for certain releases

or threatened releases of hazardous

substances at or from the Facilities

has been retained by Cooper; and

(B) that as a result, Cooper is obligated

to indemnify Aviall for any sums

that it has paid or may be

compelled to pay as a result of

such release or threatened release

of hazardous substances and/or

hazardous and solid wastes at or

from the Facilities;

(C)that Cooper is liable for certain

response costs incurred by Aviall,

or damages sustained by Aviall

under CERCLA, SWDA and the

Texas Water Code;

(D)that Cooper is liable for certain

response costs incurred by Aviall,

or damages sustained by Aviall in

-41A -

the future under CERCLA, SWDA

and the Texas Water Code;

(E)that Aviall is entitled to a

declaratory judgment of future

liability at the Facilities that will

be binding on any subsequent

actions to recover response costs

incurred at the Facilities in the

future.

64. _—Aviall therefore requests that this Court enter

a declaratory judgment declaring that Cooper is liable for all

or part of the costs, plus interest, of past, present and future

actions taken by Aviall, or any other person or entity, to

responses to releases or threatened releases of hazardous

substances and solid and hazardous wastes at or proximately

caused by conditions that existed before December 10, 1981

in connection with the Facilities for any past or future

response costs incurred or damages sustained that arise from

activities at the Facilities.

FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST COOPER

(Liability under CERCLA)

65. Aviall incorporates the averments of

paragraphs 1-64 above as if set forth verbatim.

66. Pursuant to CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1),

Aviall is entitled to seek contribution from Cooper, as a

person liable or potentially liable under CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.

§ 9607(a), for any response costs and other liability Aviall

has incurred or may incur under CERCLA in connection with

the Facilities.

67. — Aviall is entitled to contribution for all such

response costs and other liability on the basis of equitable

factors, including, but not limited to:

-42A -

(A)for over thirty years, Cooper and

its predecessors owned and

operated the Facilities during

which time they managed and

controlled waste handling and

_ disposal practices at the Facilities

and generated contamination at

and from the Facilities;

(B)in contrast to Cooper, Aviall has

cooperated with government

efforts regarding investigation and

cleanup of the Facilities;

(C)if Aviall bore the response costs

for which Cooper is directly

responsible, Cooper would be

unjustly enriched and obtain a

windfall at Aviall’s expense;

(D)Cooper and Aviall agreed pursuant

to the Agreement that Cooper

would bear all liabilities as

between them for response and

remedial action costs arising out of

Cooper’s pre-closing operation and

ownership of the Facilities.

SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST COOPER

(Contribution Under the Texas

Solid Waste Disposal Act)

68. Aviall incorporates the averments of

Paragraphs 1-67 as if set out verbatim.

69. Pursuant to Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann.

Section 361.344(a), as amended, Aviall is entitled to recover

- 43A -

from Cooper the costs of the removal or remedial actions

conducted by Aviall in connection with its former Facilities.

70. Such removal and remedial actions were

approved by the TNRCC and were reasonable and necessary

to address a release or threatened release of a solid waste as

defined by the SWDA. Aviall is entitled to apportionment of

costs as provided b [sic] the SWDA.

71. Aviall is entitled, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§

2201-2202 and Tex. Civ. Prac. & Relv1l. Code Ann. Section

37.004, to a declaratory judgment as to Cooper’s liability for

response and remedial action costs and other liabilities in

connection with the Facilities, along with related relief as is

requested herein. Also, Aviall seeks recovery of costs and

reasonable and necessary attorney's fees pursuant to Tex.

Health & Safety Code Ann. Section 361.344(a) and Tex. Civ.

Prac. & Relv1. Code Ann. Section 37.009. aa

SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST COOPER

(Contribution Under the Texas Water Code)

72. _ Aviall =incorporates the averments of

Paragraphs 1-71 as if set out verbatim.

73. | Cooper, while owner and operator of the

Facilities, placed, used and maintained storage tanks at the

Facilities. As a result of its actions, regulated hazardous, —

toxic or otherwise harmful substances, including without

limitation, jet fuel, diesel, gasoline, solid and hazardous

waste and hazardous substances, were released, causing or

threatening to cause serious groundwater and other

contamination. The release and threatened releases present

substantial danger to the public health, welfare, or the

environment.

74. Cooper failed to take corrective action at the

Facilities. Aviall has incurred reasonable and necessary

. 44A -

response costs by taking corrective action in response to

releases or threatened releases of hazardous substances

and/or hazardous and solid wastes. Aviall will continue to

incur such costs in eliminating releases and threatened

releases.

75. An actual and judicial controversy exists

between the parties concerning liability for costs incurred by

Aviall, including attorneys’ fees and interest, which Aviall

contend are due it from Cooper pursuant to the Texas Water

Code § 26.3513, and Aviall seeks contribution against

Cooper, as the former owner and operator of the Facilities for

the corrective action costs incurred. Pursuant to Texas law,

Aviall is entitled to judgment in its favor and against Cooper

for contribution, adjudging and deeming that Cooper is liable

for the amounts expended by Aviall in response to the

releases or threatened releases, plus attorneys’ fees, court

costs, and interest therein, plus any future costs incurred by

Plaintiffs.

EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST COOPER

(Quantum Meruit)

76. ~—Aviall = incorporates the averments of

Paragraphs 1-75 as if set out verbatim.

77. Aviall has furnished and is _ furnishing

valuable services and materials to Cooper by cleaning up the

Facilities, an obligation for which Cooper is partially liable.

78. Theses [sic] services and materials were

performed and are performed to the benefit of Cooper and

enjoyed by Cooper.

79.“ Aviall notified Cooper of the services and

materials and expected to be paid by Cooper for such

services.

- 45A -

80. Accordingly, as an alternative to the other

above-mentioned claims, Aviall is entitled to all costs and

expenses it has incurred under the theory of quantum meruit.

NINTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST COOPER

(Attorneys’ Fees)

81. Aviall incorporates the averments of

Paragraphs 1-80 as if set out verbatim.

82. Aviall has repeatedly demanded that Cooper

comply with the Agreement and pay Aviall for Cooper's

share of its response costs incurred to clean up the Facilities.

83. Because Cooper repeatedly refused to honor

its commitments, Aviall retained the undersigned counsel to

pursue this litigation on its behalf.

84. Aviall has paid or agreed to pay the

undersigned counsel reasonable and necessary fees and

expenses incurred in connection with this action.

85. Aviall is entitled, pursuant to CERCLA, 42

U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202, Tex. Civ.

Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. sections 37.009 and 38.002,

section 7.02(a) of the Agreement, and Tex. Health & Safety

Code Ann. Section 361.344, as well as under the SWDA and

the Texas Water Code, to a judgment against Cooper for all

attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in association with these

claims.

WHEREFORE, Aviall prays for the relief requested

above, for costs, attorneys’ fees, interest as allowed by law

and for general relief.

DATED: January 12, 1999.

Respectfully submitted,

- 46A -

OF COUNSEL:

José A. Berlanga

State Bar No. 02203400

John S. Gray

State Bar No. 00793850

GARDERE WYNNE

SEWELL & RIGGS, L.L.P.

Three Allen Center

333 Clay Avenue, Suite 800

Houston, Texas 77002-4086

Richard O. Faulk

State Bar No. 06854300

GARDERE WYNNE SEWELL

& RIGGS, L.L.P.

Three Allen Center

333 Clay Avenue, Suite 800

Houston, Texas 77002-4086

‘i clephone: (713) 308-5500

Facsimile: (713) 308-5555

Douglas S. Lang

State Bar No. 11895500

GARDERE & WYNNE, L.L.P.

3000 Thanksgiving Tower

1601 Elm Street

Dallas, Texas 75201

Phone (214) 999-3000

FAX (214) 999-4667

Cynthia J. Bishop

State Bar No. 00790309

GARDERE & WYNNE,

L.L.P.

3000 Thanksgiving Tower

1601 Elm Street

Dallas, Texas 75201

(Certificate of Service

omitted in printing)

-47A-

- 48A -

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

AVIALL SERVICES §

INCORPORATED §

§

PLAINTIFF. §

§

VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 3-

§ 97CV1926-D

§

COOPER INDUSTRIES. §

INC. §

N

DEFENDANT. s

§

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

Aviall Services, Incorporated (“Aviall”), for its

Second Amended Complaint against Defendant Cooper

Industries, Inc. (“Cooper”), alleges as follows:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

l. This is a civil action, under Sections 107 and

113. of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601, et seg..

as amended (hereafter “CERCLA”), under the Texas Solid

Waste Disposal Act, Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann.

Chapter 361 (“SWDA”), and the Texas Water Code §

26.3513, seeking (1) reimbursement of certain investigation

and remediation costs incurred by Aviall in response to the

release or threat of release of hazardous substances and

petroleum hydrocarbons on, under and about the properties

known as the Forest Park Facility, Love Field Facility,

-49A-

Lemmon Terminal Facility and Carter Field Facility

(collectively identified herein as the “Facilities”); and (2)

declaratory judgment under Section 113(g)2) of CERCLA,

42 US.C. § 9613(g2) and 28 U.S.C. § 2201, as to

Defendant's liability for further response costs incurred and

to be incurred by Aviall at the Facilities.

2. This action is also instituted under the

common laws of the State of Texas for breach of contract,

breach of warranty and contractual indemnity arising from a

written Asset Purchase Agreement, dated December 10, 1981

(“Agreement”), seeking abatement, damages to property

value, cost of repair and such other relief as just and proper.

An alternative claim in quantum meruit to preclude Cooper

from being unjustly enriched by Aviall’s remediation

activities is also asserted herein.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

3. This Court has exclusive jurisdiction over the

subject matter of this action under Section 113(b) of

CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b). This Court has federal

question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 for this civil

action arising under the laws of the United States. Venue is

proper in this District pursuant to Section 1 13(b), 42 U.S.C. §

9613(b) because the Facilities are located within this District

and the release of hazardous substances and petroleum

hydrocarbons occurred within this District. The amount in

controversy exceeds the amount required for adjudication by

this Court.

+ The SWDA, Texas Water Code, breach of

contract, breach of warranty, and contractual indemnity and

quantum meruit claims are so related to the claims within the

original jurisdiction of this Court that they form part of the

same case or controversy under Article III of the United

States Constitution. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction

- SOA -

over the SWDA, negligence, negligence per se, gross

negligence, trespass, nuisance, public nuisance and breach of

contract claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 and the doctrine

of pendent jurisdiction.

PARTIES

5. Plaintiff Aviall is a Delaware corporation and

has its principal place of business in the State of Texas.

6. Defendant Cooper Industries, Inc., is a [sic]

Ohio corporation doing business in the State of Texas.

Defendant may be served with citation by delivering a

copy of the citation and this Complaint to its registered

agent, CT Corporation System, 801 Dallas Avenue,

Houston, Texas 77002.

FACTS COMMON TO ALL CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

7. The subject of this action concerns costs, fees

and damages arising out of releases and threatened releases

of hazardous materials and petroleum hydrocarbons at four

facilities known individually as the Forest Park Facility,

Love Field Facility, Lemmon Terminal Facility and Carter

Field Facility. At those facilities, Cooper and its predecessors

conducted aircraft engine overhaul and/or maintenance

operations. All four facilities are located either in Dallas,

Texas near Love Field Airport or in Fort Worth in the

vicinity of the Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport. The

factual background for each facility and the conduct of the

parties is alleged below.

Forest Park Facility

8. The Forest Park Facility is located at 6114

Forest Park Road, Dallas, Texas. Beginning in the late

1940's, Texas Aircraft & Engine Company (“TA&EC”) and

Texas Metal & Manufacturing Company (“TM&MC”)

-SIA-

a~

conducted engine rebuilding and metal fabricating operations

at that location.

9. In 1949, Cooper's predecessor, Aviation _

Activities Company (“AAC”), acquired TA&EC and

TM&MC. On information and belief, AAC merged AAC,

TA&EC and TM&MC and formed a new company known

as Dallas Airmotive.

10. Dallas Airmotive, also Cooper's predecessor,

continued the engine rebuilding and metal fabricating

operations at the Forest Park Facility. These operations

consisted, in part, of cleaning engines; painting, stripping

and plating engine parts; assembling engines; testing

engines; maintaining and operating underground storage

tanks and tank farms; and using, receiving and storing

hazardous materials and petroleum hydrocarbons.

11. During the course of their operations,

Cooper's predecessors disposed of and released hazardous

materials and petroleum hydrocarbons at the Forest Park

Facility. Without limitation, Cooper’s predecessors buried

drums of waste containing hydrochloric acid; dumped spent

trichloroethylene (“TCE”) used in their plating operations

onto the bare ground; released into the environment TCE

used to wash engines located in test cells; allowed

petroleum storage tanks to overflow their contents onto the

ground; buried silver plating sludges in soils; and corroded

drains with acids while releasing into the drains metals,

plating solutions and solvents.

Carter Field Facility

12. In 1955, Cooper’s predecessor, Southwest

Airmotive Company (“Southwest Airmotive”), began aircraft

engine maintenance operations at Carter Field located at

15225 F.A.A. Boulevard, Forth Worth, Texas.

- 52A -

13. At the Carter Field Facility, Cooper's

predecessor assembled, disassembled and tested aircraft

engines and used, received and stored hazardous materials

and petroleum hydrocarbons.

14. During the course of such operations,

Cooper’s predecessor released and disposed of hazardous

substances and petroleum hydrocarbons into the

environment. Such releases and disposals include, but are

not limited to, overfilling of storage tanks with jet fuel,

releasing of hazardous substances into drains, and periodic

overflowing of an oil/water separator with hazardous

materials and petroleum hydrocarbons.

Love Field Facility

15. Beginning in 1931, Cooper’s predecessor,

Edwin F. Booth, Inc. began piston engine maintenance

operations at the Love Field Facility located at 9311 Reeves

Street, Dallas, Texas.

16. Southwest Airmotive was _ subsequently

formed from the successor corporation to Edwin F. Booth,

Inc., Booth-Herring, Inc. Southwest Airmotive continued

aircraft engine overhaul operations at the Love Field

Facility and eventually added 3300 Lemmon Avenue,

Dallas, Texas to the Love Field Facility.

17. The aircraft engine operations conducted by

Cooper’s predecessors at Love Field include, but are not

limited to, overhauling aircraft engines, which involved

cleaning aircraft engines; painting, stripping and plating

engine parts; assembling engines; testing engines; refueling

of aircraft; maintaining and operating underground storage

tanks and tank farms; and using, receiving, and storing

hazardous materials and petroleum hydrocarbons.

- 53A -

18. During the course of such operations,

Cooper’s predecessors overfilled jet fuel storage tanks and

disposed of jet fuel onto bare ground, allowed tanks and

related piping to leak petroleum hydrocarbons into the

surrounding environment, and caused barrels containing

chemicals to accumulate and deteriorate on bare ground,

leaking their contents into soils and groundwater. Further,

Cooper’s predecessors overfilled sumps in the plating shop

with solvents and plating waste, draining such chemicals

into the ground.

Lemmon Terminal Facility

19. The Lemmon Terminal Facility is located at

7511 and 7515 Lemmon Avenue, Dallas, Texas. Beginning

in the 1950's, Cooper’s predecessor, Southwest Airmotive,

conducted aircraft maintenance, fueling and storage at, that

location.

20. _—_In connection with such operations, Cooper’s

predecessor overfilled fuel tanks, allowed dripping and

spilling of petroleum hydrocarbons onto soils, spilled

petroleum hydrocarbons onto the ground in its fueling and

weed control activities, and allowed tanks and piping to

deteriorate, thereby releasing petroleum hydrocarbons into

soils and potentially groundwater. In addition, Cooper’s

predecessors released non-halogenated solvents into soils.

Cooper’s Acquisition of the Forest Park Facility

21. In 1970, Cooper purchased Dallas Airmotive

and merged Dallas Airmotive into Cooper. As a result of this

merger, Cooper assumed all obligations of and belongings to

Dallas Airmotive, including the environmental liabilities

relating to the Forest Park Facility.

22. After the merger, Cooper continued

operations and purchased additional, adjacent property at the

- 54A -

Forest Park Facility and continued to release and dispose of

hazardous materials and petroleum hydrocarbons into the

environment.

Pollution at the Forest Park Facility by Cooper and its [sic]

Predecessors

23. As a result of the acts and omissions of'

Cooper and its predecessors, hazardous materials and

petroleum hydrocarbons released by Cooper and _ its

predecessors at the Forest Park Facility have been detected in

groundwater and soil at the facility including, but not limited

to, phase separated hydrocarbons, chlorobenzenes, cis-1.2-

dichloroethene (cis-1,2-DCE), perchloroethene, TCE, 1,1-

dichloroethene (1,1-DCE), vinyl chloride, and hexavalent

chromium. Certain hazardous materials released at the

Forest Park Facility by Cooper and its predecessors have

migrated through groundwater off of the Forest Park

Facility property.

| Cooper’s Acquisition of the Carter Field, Love Field and

Lemmon Terminal Facilities

24. In 1973, Cooper purchased the stock of

Southwest Airmotive, Inc. As a result of the stock purchase,

Cooper assumed the obligations and liabilities of Southwest

Airmotive at the Carter Field, Love Field and Lemmon

Terminal Facilities.

Cooper's Pollution of the Carter Field, Love Field and

Lemmon Terminal Facilities

25. Further, Cooper continued the operations at

the Carter Field, Love Field and Lemmon Terminal Facilities

and continued to dispose of and release hazardous materials

and petroleum hydrocarbons into the soils and groundwater

at the Facilities.

- 55A -

26. Asaresult of the operations of Cooper and its

predecessors at the Carter Field Facility, elevated

concentrations of total petroleum hydrocarbons, benzene,

toluene, ethylbenzene, and xylenes were identified in soils at

the Carter Field Facility. Further, groundwater monitoring

wells have identified the on-site presence of 1,l-DCE, vinyl

chloride, dissolved-phase hydrocarbons and halogenated

solvents at the Carter Field Facility.

27. Asa result of the operations of Cooper and

its predecessors at the Love Field Facility, unsaturated

halocarbons including 1,1-DCE, cis-1,2-DCE,

perchloroethene, TCE, petroleum hydrocarbons and viny]|

chloride have been detected in soils. Certain unsaturated

halocarbons and dissolved-phase hydrocarbons have also

been detected in groundwater at the Love Field Facility.

Further, four hydrocarbon plumes exist in the soil and

groundwater at the Love Field Facility.

28. As a result of the acts and omissions of

Cooper and its predecessor at the Lemmon Terminal

Facility, gasoline, jet fuel, acetone, and non-halogenated

solvent methylethylketone have been detected in soils in

and around the on-site sewer catch basins and/or tank farm,

among other areas.

29. The contamination caused by Cooper and its

predecessors at the Facilities constituted unauthorized

discharges prohibited by applicable law, the Texas Water

Code Section 26.121 and Fort Worth City Code, Chapter 49

and/or Dallas City Codes, Chapter 7A.

Aviall’s Acquisition of the Facilities from Cooper - The Asset

Purchase Agreement

30. In 1981, Aviall (through Aviall’s predecessor,

Aviation Power Supply, Inc.) purchased certain assets of

- 56A -

Cooper, including the operations at the Forest Park, Love

Field, Lemmon Terminal and Carter Field Facilities.

31. | Aviall and Cooper entered a written Asset

Purchase Agreement, dated December 10, 1981

(“Agreement”) which set forth the terms and conditions of

the sale. Pursuant to the Agreement, Cooper retained all

liabilities arising out of pre-closing environmental

contamination.

32. Additionally, Cooper represented, in

consideration for the Agreement, that Cooper was not in

violation of any law, regulation or requirement relating to

_the Facilities, including without limitation applicable

environmental protection laws and regulations. This

representation was false. In fact, at the time of closing the

Agreement, Cooper was in violation of environmental

protection laws and regulations.

33. In consideration for the Agreement, Cooper

entered into an “affirmative covenant” that, prior to closing,

Cooper would comply with all legal requirements and

contractual obligations applicable to the purchased assets.

In fact, Cooper did not comply with all legal requirements

and contractual obligations prior to the closing date.

34. In the Agreement, Cooper agreed to promptly

inform Aviall in writing of all material variances from the

representations and warranties contained in Article 4 of the

Agreement. In fact, Cooper failed to inform Aviall of

material variances in environmental compliance from the

representations made in Section 4.09(f) of the Agreement.

35. | Cooper has refused to honor and follow the

Agreement and its obligations under Texas and federal laws

by failing to recognize, accept and undertake any

environmental responsibilities associated with pre-closing

- 57A -

disposals and releases of hazardous materials and petroleum

hydrocarbons at the Facilities.

Aviall’s Sales of the Facilities and Standing to Sue

36. In 1995 and 1996, Aviall entered two separate

sales through which it sold all of its interests in the Facilities.

Under the terms and conditions of such sales, Aviall has

retained pre-closing environmental obligations with respect

to the Facilities. Accordingly Aviall has standing to

prosecute this action.

Aviall’s Costs

37. — Aviall has cooperated with the State of Texas

to investigate and clean up the aforementioned

contamination. Thus far, Aviall has incurred over

$5,000,000 in costs to respond to, investigate, and remediate

contamination at the Facilities. Aviall anticipates that such

costs could exceed $21,000,000. Further, Aviall has suffered

diminution in value of the Facilities through the 1995 and

1996 sales and the risk of liability to off-site landowners.

38. Aviall has incurred response costs consistent

with the National Contingency Plan (“NCP”) pursuant to

CERCLA and will incur further response costs consistent

with the NCP pursuant to CERCLA in the future, as well as

costs reimbursable under the laws of the State of Texas.

39. The response, investigation and remediation

costs incurred by Aviall were also reasonable, necessary

and required by the Texas Natural Resource Conservation

Commission (“TNRCC’”) or its predecessors.

40. A “disposal” and “release” and/or threatened

release of “hazardous substances” and or “hazardous waste”

has occurred at the Facilities as defined by Sections

101(14), (22), and (29) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§

- 58A -

9601(14), (22), and (29) of CERCLA and by TEX.

HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. Sec. 361.003.

41. | Cooper is a person who is a responsible party

under Section 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), of CERCLA as

a past owner and operator of the Facilities at the time of

disposal of hazardous substances and as an arranger for

disposal of hazardous substances at the Facilities.

42. Forest Park, Love Field and Carter Field each

constitute a “facility” as required by Section 107(a), 42

U.S.C. § 9607(a), of CERCLA. Hazardous substances have

come to be located at the Facilities.

43. Aviall has incurred recoverable response

costs in responding to the contamination at the Facilities

that are consistent with the NCP, 40 C.F.R. Part 300.

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST COOPER

(Breach of Contract by Cooper)

44. Aviall incorporates the averments of

Paragraphs 1-43 as if set out verbatim.

45. As between Aviall and Cooper, under the

December 10, 1981 Agreement, Cooper retained all risk of

costs, damages and liabilities arising out of pre-closing

disposals of hazardous materials and contamination.

46. Cooper agreed to retain all liabilities or

obligations (i) not expressly assumed by Aviall under the

Agreement, (ii) those liabilities and obligations covered by

Cooper’s insurance, and/or (iii) all liabilities or obligations

constituting a violation of federal, state or local law or

requirement of any governmental authority. Additionally, in

the Agreement, Cooper falsely represented that it was not in

violation of any law, regulation or requirement relating to the

Facilities, including, without limitation, applicable

- 59A -

environmental protection laws and regulations. Moreover,

Cooper agreed to promptly inform Aviall in writing of all

material variances from the representations and warranties

contained in Article 4 of the Agreement. Notwithstanding

this Agreement, Cooper entirely failed to inform Aviall of

the material variances from its representations and warranties

of environmental compliance.

47. Aviall has incurred costs and liabilities related

to Cooper's violation of applicable law and governmental

authorities’ requirements governing Cooper's acts at the

Facilities. Such costs and liabilities arise out of Cooper's

acts and omissions resulting in the contamination of soils and

groundwater at the Facilities. Moreover, Aviall itself never

agreed to assume such costs and liabilities under the

. Agreement.

48. Aviall has requested that Cooper undertake its

obligations and liabilities under the Agreement. Cooper has

breached its duties under the Agreement by refusing to

assume and satisfy such obligations and liabilities.

Moreover, by refusing to honor its obligations, Cooper has

engaged in an anticipatory breach of the Agreement, thereby

entitling Aviall to recover damages for costs to be incurred in

the future as a proximate result of Cooper's anticipatory

breach.

49. _Aviall has incurred and continues to incur

substantial damages proximately caused as a result of

Cooper’s breaches of the Agreement. In _ reasonable

probability, Aviall will incur substantial damages in the

future as a result of Cooper's anticipatory breach of the

Agreement.

- 60A -

(Breach of Warranty)

50. Aviall incorporates the averments of

paragraphs 1-49 as if set out verbatim.

51. As between Aviall and Cooper, under the

December 10, 1981 Agreement, Cooper expressly warranted

that it was not in violation of any applicable law, regulation

or requirement relating to the operation of the Facilities,

including applicable environmental laws and regulations.

52. By releasing petroleum and hazardous

substances into the ground and groundwater at the Facilities,

Cooper violated applicable environmental laws and

regulations.

53. Accordingly, Cooper breached the warranty

set forth in the Agreement regarding compliance with

applicable environmental laws and regulations. Moreover,

although Cooper agreed to notify Aviall about any material

variances from the warranties regarding environmental

compliance, Cooper has never notified Aviall of regarding its

non-compliance. As a result, Aviall has incurred and will

continue to incur substantial damages proximately caused as

a result of this breach of warranty.

(Contractual Indemnification)

54. Aviall incorporates the averments of

Paragraphs 1-53 as if set out verbatim.

55. As between Aviall and Cooper, under the

December 10, 1981 Agreement, Cooper agreed to indemnify

Aviall against any loss, liability, damage or expense that

Aviall may incur as a result of a breach by Cooper of any

-61A-

representation, warranty, covenant or agreement contained in

the Agreement.

56. By refusing to honor its _ retained

environmental liabilities resulting from Cooper's pre-closing

activities, and by the other breaches, acts and omissions

alleged herein, Cooper breached representations, warranties,

covenants and agreements set forth in the Agreement.

57. Accordingly, Cooper is required under the

Agreement to indemnify Aviall for all past and future losses,

damages and expenses incurred as a proximate result of

Cooper's breach of those representations, warranties,

covenants and agreements.

FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST COOPER

(Declaratory Judgment)

58. Aviall incorporates the averments of

‘Paragraphs 1-57 as if set out verbatim.

59. This claim is for declaratory judgment

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and 42 U.S.C. § 9613 for the

purpose of determining a question of actual controversy

between and among the parties. |

60. An actual controversy has arisen and now

exists between Aviall and Cooper in that Aviall contends and

Cooper will deny or will likely deny:

(A) that, as between the parties, responsibility for

certain releases or threatened releases of

hazardous substances at or from the Facilities

has been retained by Cooper; and

(B) that as a result, Cooper is obligated to

indemnify Aviall for any sums that it has paid

or may be compelled to pay as a result of such

- 62A -

release or threatened release of hazardous

substances and/or hazardous and solid wastes

at or from the Facilities;

(C) that Cooper is liable for certain response costs

incurred by Aviall, or damages sustained by

Aviall under CERCLA, SWDA and the Texas

Water Code;

(D) that Cooper is liable for certain response costs

incurred by Aviall, or damages sustained by

Aviall in the future under CERCLA, SWDA

and the Texas Water Code;

(E) that Aviall is entitled to a declaratory

judgment of future liability at the Facilities

that will be binding on any subsequent actions

to recover response costs incurred at the

Facilities in the future.

61. Aviall therefore requests that this Court enter

a declaratory judgment declaring that Cooper is liable for all

or part of the costs, plus interest, of past, present and future

actions taken by Aviall, or any other person or entity, to

responses to releases or threatened releases of hazardous

substances and solid and hazardous wastes at or proximately

caused by conditions that existed before December 10, 1981

in connection with the Facilities for any past or future

response costs incurred or damages sustained that arise from

activities at the Facilities.

FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST COOPER

(Liability under CERCLA)

62. Aviall incorporates the averments of

paragraphs 1-61 above as if set forth verbatim.

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63. Pursuant to CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1),

Aviall is entitled to seek contribution from Cooper, as a

person liable or potentially liable under CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.

§ 9607(a), for any response costs and other liability Aviall

has incurred or may incur under CERCLA in connection with

the Facilities.

64. —_Aviall is entitled to contribution for all such

response costs and other liability on the basis of equitable

factors, including, but not limited to:

(A) for over thirty years, Cooper and its

owned and operated the

Facilities during which time they managed

and controlled waste handling and disposal

practices at the Facilities and generated

contamination at and from the Facilities;

(B) in contrast to Cooper, Aviall has cooperated

with government’ efforts regarding

investigation and cleanup of the Facilities;

(C) if Aviall bore the response costs for which

Cooper is directly responsible, Cooper would

be unjustly enriched and obtain a windfall at

Aviall’s expense;

(D) Cooper and Aviall agreed pursuant to the

Agreement that Cooper would bear all

liabilities as between them for response and

remedial action costs arising out of Cooper's

pre-closing operation and ownership of the

Facilities.

65. Both the Attorney General of the United

States and the Administrator of the environmental [sic]

Protection Agency have been notified of the action and

- 64A -

provided with a copy of the Original Complaint and First

Amended Complaint.

SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST COOPER

(Contribution Under the Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act)

66. Aviall incorporates the averments of

Paragraphs 1-66 as if set out verbatim.

67. Pursuant to TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE

ANN. Section 361.344(a), as amended, Aviall is entitled to

recover from Cooper the costs of the removal or remedial

. tions conducted by Aviall in connection with its former

Facilities.

68. Such removal and remedial actions were

approved by the TNRCC and were reasonable and

necessary to address a release or threatened release of a

solid waste as defined by the SWDA. Aviall is entitled to

apportionment of costs as provided b [sic] the SWDA.

69. Aviall is entitled, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§

2201-2202 and Tex. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.

Section 37.004, to a declaratory judgment as to Cooper’s

liability for response and remedial action costs and other

liabilities in connection with the Facilities, along with

related relief as is requested herein. Alsc. Aviall seeks

recovery of costs and reasonable and necessary attorney’s

fees pursuant to TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. Section

361.344(a) and Tex. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN.

Section 37.009.

SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST COOPER

(Contribution Under the Texas Water Code)

70. ~~ Aviall incorporates the averments of

Paragraphs 1-71 as if set out verbatim.

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71. ~ Cooper, while owner and operator of the

Facilities, placed, used and maintained storage tanks at the

Facilities. As a result of its actions, regulated hazardous,

toxic or otherwise harmful substances, including without

limitation, jet fuel, diesel, gasoline, solid and hazardous

waste and hazardous substances, were released, causing or

threatening to cause serious groundwater and other

contamination. The release and threatened releases present

substantial danger to the public health, welfare, or the

environment.

72. | Cooper failed to take corrective action at the

Facilities. Aviall has incurred reasonable and necessary

response costs by taking corrective action in response to

releases or threatened releases of hazardous substances

and/or hazardous and solid wastes. Aviall will continue to

incur such costs in eliminating releases and threatened

releases.

73. An actual and judicial controversy exists

between the parties concerning liability for costs incurred by

Aviall, including attorneys’ fees and interest, which Aviall

contend are due it from Cooper pursuant to the Texas Water

Code § 26.3513, and Aviall seeks contribution against

Cooper, as the former owner and operator of the Facilities for

the corrective action costs incurred. Pursuant to Texas law,

Aviall is entitled to judgment in its favor and against Cooper

for contribution, adjudging and deeming that Cooper is liable

for the amounts expended by Aviall in response to the

releases or threatened releases, plus attorneys’ fees, court

costs, and interest therein, plus any future costs incurred

by Plaintiffs.

- 66A -

(Quantum Meruit)

74. ~+Aviall incorporates the averments of

Paragraphs 1-73 as if set out verbatim.

75. + Aviall has furnished and is _ furnishing

valuable services and materials to Cooper by cleaning up

the Facilities, an obligation for which Cooper is partially

liable.

76. Theses [sic] services and materials were

performed and are performed to the benefit of Cooper and

enjoyed by Cooper.

77. Aviall notified Cooper of the services and

materials and expected to be paid by Cooper for such

services.

78. Accordingly, as an alternative to the other above-

mentioned claims, Aviall is entitled to ali costs and

expenses it has incurred under the theory of quantum

meruit.

NINTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF AGAINST COOPER

(Attorneys’ Fees)

79. Aviall incorporates _ the averments of

Paragraphs 1-78 as if set out verbatim.

80. Aviall has repeatedly demanded that Cooper

comply with the Agreement and pay Aviall for Cooper’s

share of its response costs incurred to clean up the

Facilities.

81. Because Cooper repeatedly refused to honor

its commitments, Aviall retained the undersigned counsel

to pursue this litigation on its behalf.

- 67A -

82. Aviall has paid or agreed to pay the

undersigned counsel reasonable and necessary fees and

expenses incurred in connection with this action.

83. ~~ Aviall is entitled, pursuant to CERCLA, 42°

U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202, TEX. Clv.

PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. sections 37.009 and 38.002,

section 7.02(a) of the Agreement, and TEX. HEALTH &

SAFETY CODE ANN. Section 361.344, as well as under the

SWDA and the Texas Water Code, to a judgment against

Cooper for all attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in

association with these claims.

WHEREFORE, Aviall prays for the relief requested

above, for costs, attorneys’ fees, interest as allowed by law

and for general relief.

DATED: June __, 1999.

Respectfully submitted,

ls/

Richard O. Faulk

State Bar No. 06854300

GARDERE WYNNE SEWELL &

RIGGS, L.L.P.

Wells Fargo Plaza

1000 Louisiana, Suite 3400

Houston, Texas 77002-5007

Telephone: (713) 276-5500

Facsimile: (713) 276-5555

Douglas S. Lang

State Bar No. 11895500

GARDERE & WYNNE, L.L.P.

3000 Thanksgiving Tower

1601 Elm Street

Dallas, Texas 75201

- 68A -

Phone (214) 999-3000

FAX (214) 999-4667

OF COUNSEL:

José A. Berlanga

State Bar No. 02203400

John S. Gray

State Bar No. 00793850

GARDERE WYNNE SEWELL &

RIGGS, L.L.P.

Wells Fargo Plaza

1000 Louisiana, Suite 3400

Houston, Texas 77002-5007

Cynthia J. Bishop

State Bar No. 00790309

3000 Thanksgiving Tower

Dallas, Texas 75201

- 69A -

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

AVIALL SERVICES, CIVIL ACTION NUMBER

INCORPORATED

3:97-CV-1926-D

VERSUS

January 5, 2000

COOPER INDUSTRIES,

INC.

Nee eee ee ee

TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL

ARGUMENT BEFORE THE

HONORABLE SIDNEY A. FITZWATER,

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiff; DALE E. STEPHENSON

SQUIRE, SANDERS & DEMPSEY,

L.L.P.

6250 Texas Commerce Tower

600 Travis Street

Houston, Texas 77002

713/546-5858

For the Defendant: RICHARD O. FAULK and

JOSE BERLANGE

GARDERE WYNNE SEWELL &

RIGGS, L.L.P.

1000 Louisiana, #3400

Houston, Texas 77002-5007

713/276-5651

Court Reporter: PAMELA J. WILSON, CSR

1100 Commerce Room 15A3

214/415-1884

- 70A -

THE LAW CLERK: All rise.

The United States District Court for the Northern

District of Texas is now in session, the Honorable Judge

Sidney A. Fitzwater presiding.

Let us pray. God save the United States and this

Honorable Court.

THE COURT: Be seated, please.

This is Aviall Services versus Cooper Industries.

We'll begin with Mr. Stephenson.

MR. STEPHENSON: May it please the court.

Plaintiff Aviall and defendant Cooper Industries, Inc. have

filed cross motions for summary judgment addressing many

of the same issues. Aviall seeks partial summary judgment

only with respect to five of the nine claims asserted in the

first amended complaint: Breach of contract based on alleged

retaining liabilities; contractual indemnification under the

written contract; contribution under Section 113 of the

Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and

Liability Act; and contribution under state law claims for the

Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act and the Texas Water Code.

The statutory environmental claims are all based on strict

liability provisions. Aviall does not seek summary judgment

with respect to the other four causes of action asserted in its

amended complaint: Breach of warrant, declaratory

[2]

-71A-

judgment, quantum meruit and attorneys fees.

In constrast, Cooper seeks summary judgment on its

favor in all the claims asserted in the amended complaint.

THE COURT: Mr. Stephenson, what’s the

basis for the subject matter jurisdiction of the court in this

case?

MR. STEPHENSON: Subject matter

jurisdiction arises under the Comprehensive Environmental

Response Compensation and Liability Act, Section 113.

THE COURT: All right. So it’s federal

question jurisdiction?

MR. STEPHENSON: That’s correct.

THE COURT: And if you are correct that

there is not a viable CERCLA claim, does the court have

discretion to dismiss the balance of the case without

prejudice?

MR. STEPHENSON: Absolutely, under

UMW V. Gibbs, I believe.

THE COURT: And what do you understand

the declaratory judgment claim of the plaintiff to be?

MR. STEPHENSON: The declaratory

judgment claim is for future costs to be expended at the

property. It’s based on a provision in Section 113(g) of

CERCLA which relates solely to private party direct causes

of action under Section 107. Since their remaining claim is

under Section 113 and there is no parallel provision for

declaratory judgment under CERCLA, that section is

inapposite.

-72A -

(3)

THE COURT: Now, when you say there is no

declaratory judgment provision under CERCLA, as | read

that provision there is a remedy of declaratory judgment

that’s available, but you contend that that is tied to a 107

claim; is that correct?

MR. STEPHENSON: It is a section that

relates solely to direct causes of action under Section 107(a).

Immediately following -- it is limited to this subsection.

Immediately following the subsection which refers to

statutory of limitations and other things for contribution

actions under Section 113(f) does not have an equivalent

provision.

THE COURT: What do you understand this

combined 107/113 claim to be that Aviall brings?

MR. STEPHENSON: The combined -- I don’t

think there -- there is a -- is a combined claim. I think the law

is well established that to pursue a direct cause of action

under Section 107 you have to be either an innocent party or

the United States Government, and we don’t have that -- or

an innocent -- or an innocent party, and we don’t have that in

this case. In fact, Aviall dropped its Section 107 complaint

in the original complaint. It was originally count | of the

complaint.

THE COURT: Aviall continues to refer to 107

in connection with the 113 claim. I used the word

“combined,”

(4)

-73A-

another way might be hybrid or something else.

MR. STEPHENSON: Sure. I think that under the

cases cited that you have to have a threshold activity that gets

a party to assert a contribution claim: That is, you have to

have either an enforcement action against a party for their

own direct liability for which they can then seek

contribution; you can have an administrative enforcement

action by the United States; you can have a lawsuit by

another party, an innocent, private party that -- pursuing an

act under 107, and then the defendant in that action can have

a right to contribution under Section 113. None of those

circumstances exist in the present case. This is solely a

private party taking action on its own property and seeking to

manufacture the CERCLA claim.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. STEPHENSON: Thank you.

Aviall doesn’t dispute at all that it polluted thése

properties, and that’s why it can’t have its own direct private

party claim as an innocent party.

18 years ago Aviall purchased the properties and

koew exactly what it was purchasing. It was an industrial

property of 50 underground storage tanks, industrial

operations for plating, handling solvents and other materials.

Indeed the president of Cooper went over to become the

president of Aviall on the purchase. They knew

[5]

- 74A -

exactly what they were purchasing and operating. As the

environmental laws emerged over time, particularly with

respect to underground storage tanks in the late 1980s, some

seven or eight years after the purchase, Aviall systematically,

methodically rer xoved underground storage tanks, cleaned up

contaminated soil from the leaks in the aging tanks during its

watch and incurred those costs in the ordinary course of

business.

The comprehensive written contracts negotiated

between the two parties in this case are really the heart of the

issue. Indeed, Aviall agrees that this is primarily a contract

case, and so we'll focus on those issues initially. The

contracts may be complex but they aren't ambiguous. Aviall

argues that Cooper is trying to avoid its legal obligations, but

the thrust of Aviall’s argument makes clear that it’s trying to

rewrite the terms of the agreements.

THE COURT: Let me tum if I might to

Section 103.(b), Roman Numeral X.

MR. STEPHENSON: Yes.

THE COURT: You've made an argument in

your brief where you attempt to draw a distinction between

retained versus not assumed. And I think you criticized

Cooper’s brief — Aviall’s brief, excuse me, for repeatedly

referring to retained liabilities when you contend the word

retained is not in the agreement.

- 175A -

Would you explain to me what you mean by that

distinction? Because the other side of that is if you don’t

assume it, the other party kept it.

MR. STEPHENSON: What Cooper kept was

obligations for a specific period of time under the indemnity

provision of the agreement. Anything that was not an

assumed liability falls over to be handled under Section 7.02

of the purchase agreement. And matters which were other

than assumed liabilities had a five year from the time -- date

of closing window in which to assert a claim. That would

have expired in 1986. It went away along before Cooper --

Aviall ever contacted Cooper a decade later.

So what I mean is that retained -- retained only has

the concept of the indemnity that is woven into the

agreement. It doesn’t have a standalone implied breach of

contract connotation that swallows the carefully crafted terms

for recovery.

THE COURT: And you would say that the

obligation to indemnify is the same; is that right?

Because they attempt to distinguish between an

obligation to indemnify and a retained liability as I

understand it.

MR. STEPHENSON: That’s correct. Well,

it’s one of two things. If the claim comes under section --

subsection (x) that you're referring to, that’s an other

- 176A -

than assumed liability. Those -- those had an express five

year window for bringing a claim for that. If it's something

other than -- other than those enumerated things in

subsection B, then the comprehensive release that the

parties negotiated in 1982, October of 1982, was a complete

release and forgiveness of all agreements or other terms in

the contract. So it’s one or the other.

THE COURT: And they say there is

language in the release that says you acknowledge and will

continue to honor liabilities that you retain.

MR. STEPHENSON: And the = second

sentence of the release says “subject to the applicable time

limits.” I mean, it’s express in the release that anything that

is left under the non-assumed liabilities is subject to the

applicable time limits, in this -- in this context five years.

This court recently took a look at the vendor property

obligations in a slightly different context. It involved leaking

underground storage tanks in the Owens versus the Estate of

Irwin matter. In recognizing the general rules, a grantor of

real property isn’t liable for dangerous or defective

conditions on land once the grantee has taken possession of

the property, unless the grantor knew of dangerous

conditions at the time of the transfer or acted to conceal or

failed to disclose it. We don’t have that

circumstance in this case. There is no allegation of

misrepresentation. There is no allegation of fraud. A similar

result was reached in Jones versus Texaco in the Southern

- TTA -

District of Texas in 1996, 945 F. Sup 1037 and Hicks versus

Humble Oil in the Texas appellate court, 970 S.W.2d 90.

The analogy here is Aviall bought property with

specific contract rights for recovery if something went wrong

for one year or for five years or was released. If Aviall in

doing construction on its property discovered a pot of gold

on the property, I don’t think they would be giving it back to

Cooper because it was a windfall to them. Likewise, if a

homeowner buys a house and later the roof leaks, it doesn’t

undo the deal.

The real question here: Does the contract unwind the

general rule that a person buys what they get?

We think it is clear that application of the contract on

its face requires -- means that there is no -- no contractual

recovery for Aviall.

THE COURT: Let me jump back to

something you just said, the general rule that somebody gets

what they buy.

MR. STEPHENSON: Correct.

THE COURT: Their argument though under

Texas corporate law is that a successor corporation doesn’t

assume certain liabilities; so is that analogy really correct?

[9]

MR. STEPHENSON: I think it is, because the

liability that they got was the property that they bought.

- 718A -

Their liability under CERCLA arises not only

because they contaminated the property themselves but

because they owned it. CERCLA is a strict liability statute

that creates liabilities for owners. And they got that as part

of the evolving time period.

There hasn’t been a CERCLA claim brought against

Cooper in this case. There hasn’t been a CERCLA claim

brought against Aviall in this case. They simply did

something with their own property. They got what they got.

They fixed it up over time. They complied with emerging

rules for underground storage tanks and other things. And

finally they sold their properties in 1995/°96. And the only

reason they're continuing to do anything with those

properties is because they contractually agreed with the

buyers to do that. They cut the deal, and now they're trying

to make somebody else pay for any cost differences that they

encountered. They did this work normally and

systematically for more than a decade before they ever

contacted Cooper. It was the ordinary course of business as

far as they were concerned.

We note in the briefs there is a single environmental

provision in the contract which relates to the representation

for compliance with environmental safety laws

and regulations, and that expired under the one year statute of

limitations in Section 7.02(a) of the contract.

THE COURT: And they say that

they're not suing you based on that provision.

-79A -

MR. STEPHENSON: Well, the complaint on

its face alleges that.

THE COURT: I’m trying to remember which

brief it was I read, but in one of the briefs they say --

MR. STEPHENSON: They say they no longer

believe we misrepresented that in the summary judgment

brief, that’s correct.

THE COURT: And I think the reason they do

that is to bolster the argument that the time limits don’t

apply.

MR. STEPHENSON: That’s certainly true.

But the key time limit, here again, is the other than

assumed liability five year time limit.

Coupling that with the release, “All representations,

warrants, covenants, agreements --- “

THE COURT: Slow down a little when you

read for the reporter.

MR. STEPHENSON: Yeah. “-- contained in

the asset agreement are deemed to be fully satisfied forever.

Aviall releases Cooper from any and all allegations or claims

to indemnify Aviall for any breach of any representation,

warranty, covenant or agreement of Cooper contained in or

[11]

related to the asset agreement.”

- 80A -

Even if the express term limits in the contract did not

apply, the general statute of limitations would be four years

in the State of Texas, triggering from the time the injury was

caused to the property, again, expiring in 1985. We raised in

the brief also the issue of the express strict liability doctrine

in the State of Texas applicable to these. We do need to

advise the court that yesterday the Fifth Circuit reversed the

decision in Fina versus Arco.

THE COURT: Yeah, I saw that. That was

Judge Wiener, | think.

MR. STEPHENSON: That’s correct. That's

correct. Aviall had argued that here the contract did not

specifically mention CERCLA liability nor under the

authorities must it do so, citing Fina versus Arco. The Fifth

Circuit reversed, holding that general contractual language in

two purchase agreements did not cover strict liability under

CERCLA pursuant to, one contract, Delaware’s clear and

unequivocal standard, and in the other contract, Texas’s more

stringent express strict liability standard. That follows the:

Houston Lighting and Power decision from the Texas

Supreme Court in 1994, refusing to enforce a strict liability

claim on indemnity provision expressly -that expressly

covered negligence claims.

THE COURT: Let me go back to

CERCLA for a minute.

[12]

You make the argument that the failure to

give notice deprived the court -- and deprives the court of

subject matter jurisdiction.

-81A-

MR. STEPHENSON: Right.

THE COURT: Would you explain the basis

for that argument and address whether those subject matter

jurisdiction cases are distinguishable because they deal with

different types of statutes?

MR. STEPHENSON: They are certainly -- the

holdings are different in that they are citizen suit provisions

under the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act, and other

Statutes that allow a private party to stand in as a private

Attorney General. But the exact provision that we’re talking

about here in Section 1 13(1) of CERCLA is incorporated into

the citizen suit provision of CERCLA in Section 310 and it is

held to be a concurrent requirement by USEPA.

Here, in the CERCLA context, the agency and the

Attorney General responsible for overseeing this statute

didn’t know about the claims being made here for 21 months,

until it was brought to their attention after we brought it to

Aviall’s attention. Similarly, the lack of public participation

on the site kept all of the public shielded from what was

going on here.

My guess is that the United States, administrator of

[13]

EPA, and the Attorney General don’t know that there is a

second amended complaint in this case alleging that notice

21 months late is okay. I haven’t seen any indication that

Aviall has served that complaint on the United States.

-82A -

The idea behind provisions like this is to give the

government a chance to do something. The only case that

Aviall cited with respect to this was a -- where individual

plaintiffs brought a claim in the Green matter in Kansas.

And in that case, the court allowed -- or directed the parties

to go back and depose EPA -- an EPA official to see if they

cared about the site or not. That was the relief granted in that

case.

Here you can look at analogous statutes that aren't

citizen suit provisions. We looked at one maritime --

THE CLERK: Three minutes.

MR. STEPHENSON: Thank you.

We looked at one maritime matter where less than

120 days was found to be too long.

And I would like to reserve the remaining 10 minutes,

r if you had a follow-up question

THE COURT: You may reserve up to ten

minutes under the court’s order.

MR. STEPHENSON: Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Mr.

Faulk.

[14]

MR. FAULK: Thank you, Your Honor.

- 83A-

If the court please, I -- it appears the court is familiar

with the contract provisions, but we’ve prepared a short

excerpt of contract highlighted sections that we would like to

tender to the court.

Your Honor, I -- I think as has during the course of

the questioning of this contract are things that are of the case.

And we believe that it redundant perhaps, to look at the

specific interpretation that Aviall places on these contract

provisions and then show how those contract provisions

support the positions we have taken.

Clearly in Section 1.03(b), Aviall did not assume

certain responsibilities under the contract. And there were

three different types of liabilities that weren’t assumed under

that particular type of -- part of the contract. And the catchall

one is, as the court properly noted, Section which states that

we're not responsible for any liability of the seller unless it is

expressly assumed by the buyer.

There is also a provision, Section 4, that deals with

liabilities of the seller arising as a result of preclosing

conduct and also with respect to insured liabilities under

Section 3 of the contract.

[15]

The interesting thing about those obligations, we

believe that there’s no other place in the contract where

environmental liabilities are discussed with any particularity

at all. And the only place that that in fact does come in,

arguably from Mr. Stephenson’s client, is in the phrase

“ordinary course of business” under the assumed liabilities

section, Section 1.03(a).

- 84A -

For several good reasons, Your Honor, the question

of ordinary course of business does not apply in this

situation. The most critical point is Section 4.05(c) of the

contract, in which the parties define what ordinary course of

business is. And in that provision, ordinary course of

business specifically excludes breach of contract claims,

torts, claims or lawsuits, or such extraordinary liabilities as

you would find under that particular definition. So the

contract itself says that this is not the sort of thing -- a

liability arising in the ordinary course of business.

The ordinary course of business distinction also

covers -- only deals with balance sheet liabilities, as the

contract specifically says. And no such nondisclosed and at

the time nonexisting environmental liability such as this

would ever be disclosed on a balance sheet as the parties

anticipated.

Now, the contracts definition excluding extraordinary

[16]

liabilities is very consistent with the Mudgett case and the

Tuscarosa cases from Texas which specifically hold that

torts, for example, are not things that are in the ordinary

course of business under these sorts of situations. Even

getting down to a dictionary definition, the transaction of

business seems to be the focus here, and this sort of waste

disposal activity doesn’t really apply as a transaction of

business with third parties or a profit-generating activity

which would be subject to it. So we submit for those reasons

that environmental liabilities are not specifically allocated in

this contract.

- 85A -

Therefore, we have to construe the contract according

to what Aviall and the parties intended. And they intended

that Aviall assume only those liabilities which were

expressly assumed, and that was clearly not.

The court asked a question about whether or not

retaining the liabilities means the same thing as not assuming

them. Let me point out that the release that they executed, as

the court noted, definitely says that Cooper continues to

acknowledge its obligations under those provisions for

liabilities not assumed by Aviall. And the course of dealing

between the parties, for five separate times after this contract

was executed, when Aviall tendered environmental claims to

Cooper, they accepted those using the words that these are

retained liabilities which were not

[17]

assumed by Cooper. So it’s not a word or a play on words,

Your Honor, that this is something we have conjured up here.

We’re using words that were first used by Cooper both in the

release and in the correspondence regarding these other

environmental claims that came up.

If I may, Your Honor, let me talk about the indemnity

provision specifically. There has been some discussion by

Mr. Stephenson that the claim made in the indemnity

language here is a claim that is regulated by either a one or a

five year plan.

In the handout that I have given you, on the 21st page

is the section involving indemnity. And our claim is not

based, Your Honor, on either of the provisions that are

regulated by those time periods.

- 86A -

Our claim is based ’-- under indemnity is based under

7.02(a), and there is a small subsection 2 in that section

which says we can sue them, “as a result of the breach by

seller of any representation, warranty, covenant or agreement

contained in this agreement.”

We're not suing them under little Section 1, which as

the court will see below in 17.02(b)(a)(1) provides a one year

limitations period contractually, and in Section (c), Section

(a)(3) provides a five year statute. But under Section 2 there

is no contractual time limitation stated in the contract.

[18}

Now, I’ve done some thinking about this to the point

of saying where do the parties’ minds meet here. Is there a

way to say why that particular provision doesn’t have a

specific limitation. And the answer is very lucid, and it’s

down in Section 7.02(e). And if the court will take a look at

that, the court will see that in that provision, with the

exception of Section 5 of the contract, which doesn’t apply in

this situation, that Aviall is obliged to indemnify Cooper for

the same conduct, the same language. I t is a mirror image of

the provision in Section 2 above, and there is no time

limitation set on that.

What does that mean?

To me, Your Honor, I think it’s reasonable to say that

under those circumstances that indicates that with respect to

claims that were unknown at the time of closing, with respect

to actions that might arise in the future as a result of pre-

closing conduct, that the parties did not intend to be bound

by contractual time limitations on that particular type of

-87A -

activity. And to me that is one of the clearest -- that mirror

image is one of the clearest examples of the parties having

equal rights to come back and assert actions notwithstanding

the passage of these one and five year limitations.

THE COURT: Let me jump over for a

moment to the four year statute of limitations under Texas

law and ask

[19]

that you address Cooper’s argument.

MR. FAULK: Well, Cooper’s argument is based

upon the fact that according to them Aviall incurred a legal

injury at the time the injury occurred or at the time the

contamination was occurring or in fact discovered. That is

the general rule, Your Honor, under tort law, and I'm not

going to argue with that. But for a breach of contract claim,

the Texas law, number one, says that a cause of action occurs

on breach of the contract.

And the cases from Texas, the Permian case, as well

as the Fifth Circuit case that we have cited say that when

you're dealing with a contract the cause of action does not

accrue upon the time that you sustain damage, it doesn’t

accrue when you first suffer a loss or when you first suffer

some sort of contamination; it occurs upon presentment of

the claim for enforcement of the contract and upon refusal of

the other side to perform.

And within those parameters, we made these

presentations to Cooper well within the four year period prior

- 88A -

to the time this lawsuit was filed, by letters in 1995, in 1996.

They clearly refused in 1996. This lawsuit was filed in 1997.

THE COURT: Well, they, as I understand it,

at least advance three arguments in that connection: One is

they distinguish these cases that you rely on; two, they

characterize your argument as somewhat circular; and three, |

think they call it bootstrapping. And when they say you

could let these claims go on for eternity, you say, well, no,

there’s no eternity because there’s a limit of four years under

the Texas statute.

Now, why isn’t there a potential for eternity in that

you just let the claims become stale, relevant witnesses die,

and then decide at some future point that you will make the

demand?

I mean, under your argument aren’t you allowed to

stretch this out for many years before you make a demand?

MR. FAULK: Your Honor, | certainly do

contend that we are allowed to do that.

Before I get directly to the court’s question though,

let me point out that this eternity argument is not a problem

that gave Cooper any pause with respect to environmental

liabilities five separate times other than this. There were

claims made against Cooper five times prior to the -- to us

standing here, once after the time period where the lawsuit

herehad been filed, and no limitations arguments, no

contractual defense arguments, none of those things were

- 89A -

raised by Cooper in that course of dealing and contract,

which seems to be the best evidence of how Cooper

construes it.

Let me answer the question directly. Your Honor, if

[21]

the-law legally permits the cause of action to accrue upon

~ the presentment of the claim and its declination, it’s no

different and no more unfair, for example, than making the

long-awaited claims that are made against insurance

companies for these sort of pollution issues for coverage in

other situations. It is not uncommon in environmental

liabilities for persons not to discover these sorts of events,

and to discover the proper party’s culpability until many

years thereafter. It is no more unfair to Cooper than it is to

hold an insurer responsible and to say that the cause of

action you're denied under coverage accrues at such time as

the insurer actually denies them.

THE COURT: Let me jump over if I might

to CERCLA for a minute, so I make certain | get some

questions out, and then I'll get you go back to these

arguments, if you would like. r

MR. FAULK: Excellent.

THE COURT: First of all, would you address

the issue of the court's subject matter jurisdiction. Is this a

federal question case where the state claims are

supplemental as opposed to diversity of the citizen --

- 90A -

MR. FAULK: It is. It is a federal question

issue.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. And what is

the nature of your declaratory judgment action as it relates

to

[22]

federal claims? I know a component of it is state liability.

Is it a 2201 general garden variety declaratory

judgment action?

MR. FAULK: It is, Your Honor, to the extent

that it mirrors the relief that we're entitled to under Section

107, which is essentially a finding -- and 113, which is

essentially a finding and declaration of Cooper's

responsibility as a responsibility part -- party under

CERCLA, and -- which is necessary for a finding of

contribution. So it is in a sense a mirrored claim of the claim

under 107/113.

THE COURT: And then that leads to the

question of what is the nature of your claim. I've been

calling it a hybrid or a combined claim. Explain what the

claim is.

MR. FAULK: The Supreme Court in the

King (phonetic) case referred to it as a blended remedy. The

claim that we are asserting is a claim under Section | 13(f) for

recovery of contribution for costs against parties that we can

recover from under Section 107.

-91A-

Section 107, according to the Centurior case

out of the Sixth Circuit and the Sun Company case out of the

Tenth Circuit, Section 107 is a part of a Section 113

contribution action for that purpose.

The only difference between a cause of action like

[23]

ours, which is brought by one party against another, one

PRP against another, and a direct: 107 action brought by the

government, is that the only relief that we can obtain is a

several judgment for that portion of Cooper’s responsibility

that we have been able to bring forward. That is the cause of

action. It is a cause of action that expressly under CERCLA

can be brought in the absence of any other civil action.

I refer to it in the brief, Your Honor,. as an initial

action for contribution. It is an action by a PRP who has

cleaned up, without the necessity of environmental

enforcement action prompting it through an order or through

judgment and who now has obtained -- obtained a cost and

now seeks contribution against another party who is

responsible. In that situation both parties are jointly and

severally liable and being jointly and severally liable, they

are responsibility for contribution according to Section 113.

The Centurior case, Your Honor, is the case of the

Sixth Circuit that makes this point I think most eloquently,

and the case also specifically holds that some sort of prior

action by the government is not required, some sort of prior

judgment in a civil action is not required as a prerequisite to

this. The case very specifically holds that the only difference

is that our recovery is several.

-92A -

[24]

THE COURT: Do you then concede that you

do not have at this time a standalone Section 107 claim?

MR. FAULK: I don’t think I would concede

it quite that way. I would say we have a 113 claim that is

based upon its incorporation of the remedies and rights under

107 according to what the statute provides. I’m hesitant to

say that, although I don’t think I could maintain a 107 claim

standing alone, nor have we ever tried to.

THE COURT: Well, what was the claim that

you dropped?

MR. FAULK: Mr. Stephenson has referred to

it as a moving target. I apologize it appears that way. We

have dropped no claims. The complaint itself very

specifically says in its opening paragraph that this is a

lawsuit under Section 107 and 113, which, in fact, it is, Your.

Honor, because you can’t discuss 113 in this context without

discussing 107, because, as the cases say, 107 is a part of 113

for purposes of causes of action like this.

THE COURT: But in your original complaint

there was a claim that does not -- is not phrased the way you

currently phrase your complaint. What type of claim did you

think it was when you brought it? A 107 claim?

MR. FAULK: I'll be honest with you, Your

Honor, I wasn’t involved in the case when the original

complaint was drafted.

[25]

- 93A -

THE COURT: I didn’t mean you personally,

I meant you --

MR. FAULK: I do believe that were trying to

seek the umbrella relief from -- for -- under both Sections of

the provision as they complemented each other. If that was

in artfully phrased, that was certainly the intent, was to make

sure that Cooper could be shown to be a responsible party

under 107 so that we could then obtain contribution under

Section 113.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me ask it another

way then. You're a very careful lawyer.

If I were to have allowed you to amend again, why

would you not, you meaning your client, bring a 107 claim?

Without 113.

MR. FAULK: I would not do it because I do

not think that -- I think the remedy that the law authorizes

here is a 107 claim -- a 113 claim in the -- in the format that

we have raised it in our current pleadings.

THE COURT: Is it because you're a PRP?

MR. FAULK: It would be, I believe. | would

believe that. It wouldn’t bar it, however, for purposes of

contribution.

THE COURT: I’m not to that point.

MR. FAULK: Okay.

THE COURT: I am really just trying to

understand

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d3p2|mouy dy) “194NQ JO jyeYsq UO JO JOY SPeU UONRUIWIRXS

Aue ‘pajonb Ajjesyiseds st pue ‘Surpurysyymiou ‘aatauns

JUDWIIIIZE IY) Ul YUOJ Jos sjUgUIZIIZe dy) ‘JapUN BuINs J1.3Mm

UOHSaS dy) OF 2IqQedIIdde jude yey) SII] SWI) dy) sUTeJUOS

YoIyM “Z7O'L OF Welqns ‘pres Aayy *Ajpeoyisedg

~ V86 -

*yoRIUOS

oy) Ul payueIS UOINSE JO SoSNeD JO |[RAIAINS dy) UO DIR

OU dARY 0} Sem S30XOjdWId ZuUINUIZUOD JO d3pojmouy dy) Jey)

pooise Ajjenioeuod somsed oy) uONdes yey) UI Jey) SI ‘WeYy)

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noge Surly) ZuNsoidju sy) pue ‘Nod anes | ey) INOpuReY

a]ut] ya JO (Dts) OQ] aed “joRNUOD ay) JO [Q'L UONDEg

ye YOO] [JIM INOS oyp JI “Bury yURWOdU ysoW dy) INg

‘a3 po} mouy dy1oads pey ay Jey) Yst|geIse JOU PIP

H PUR SBD SIY) Ul Ud¥e) sem UOIISOdap s,woque’] “IW puy

‘pousddey pey sity) mouy suOAIZA9 Jey) ‘poudaodsip Aj mou

}OU SBM Jey) SuIyJOWOS sem A]jeas SIN) Jey) Bp2]mouy jo

HOS SWOS YIM [[PIAY PENquUIT MOYSWOS Jey) JY) “UOTIBSURI)

ay) Jaye OS JO JedA B JOY UONISOd SAIINDOXS UR UI [JeIAY

usy) puke Jodood yiog jo s0A0jdwia snonuyuoo & sem oyM

“Woquue’] “JW Jey) pondse uosuasydaig “I “spew uosusydargs

‘JW yey) yuowNSse ue oO} J990dso1 YM ‘aOUTI },URD | pure

‘UONUSU 0} pauRM | SuIYy) DUO s,asoy) INg ‘WIe]D YTDYFIO

oy} Moge SWOS -- INI] B ye} OF powuEM |

yey) op

o} Addey wy “1y3u ye suey, “WINW4 ‘MW

‘pouamsue suonsonb Aw 303 |

UIRDD SYRW O} pajuRM Isnf | “syUsWINTIe INO 0} Udy WIN}2J

noA 3,uop Ay “WY8U ITY “LYNOO AHL

‘ISD INO JO Wed [BDI & S_JeY) *3SINOD Jo “ING

VION) WM Yeap YoIyM ased sy) JO UOIOd yey) aso] AjUO

‘QSINOD JO “‘PINOM 3A “OpeW dq AjaHUIyap pynom sjuswINTse

ayy ‘souoH JNOX “yury) | “WINVA “AW

- VL6~-

“Me] AJOINIBIS SEX] JO JUSUIDIIZE OY)

JOPUN JIYIOYM “SUITED BIS JO 1XIJUOS dy) UI apeW aq PjnoM

[67]

sjusuingse

oy} yey) “ISO] 9q JOU P/NMOM We sy] spunos Wt puR :)so}

2q P]/NOM yey) DUOP dsARY NOA PynoM YOM yeYM st Wt Bursesyd

jo Aem soyioue ssan3 | ‘2A, *=LYNOD AHL

‘MIYMOWOS BUOP dq A[LBSSd90U P|NOM YOM dy) ‘UONDIpsuNf

OU SEY H SSUILIDZI9P NOD sy) JI ING ‘9UOP 3q 0} YOM JO

JUNOWE [BNURISGNS B SBM dy) Jey) SI JOMsSUR dy) OS

‘QPOD J9d1BA\ SEXO] pur IDV jesodsig aIseAA PI]OS

ay) Japun puy “pinom Ay, = 3WINVA “YW

lou Asy) pynom “juswde13e sseysund ay) *19e1]U09 dy) JopuN

Sonsst oq pjnom ssoy) ING -LYNOD AHL

‘yey) uO uotuIdo yadx9 jeyUDWIa;ddns

& aptaoid 0} Aytunwioddo ue sn dat3 01 NOD dy) Yyse Pjnom 3M

‘QUOP 3q P[NOD Buljns B aIOj9qQ *AUOUIIISI) FEUOLNIPpR sasinbas

pasodoid sary 9M UWdYSS UOHRO]]e dy) Jey) SoUTWUDZIOp

MNOD dY}_j9ej Ul Jl “UONRSO]e 0} J99dso1 YUM sUOP 3q 0}

SP2dU JY AJDAODSIP SWOS SI Udy] “saseWep ay) INO puNoOs

0} SUOP 3q O} SPooU Jey) AJZAODSIP SWOS SI dy]

‘3q [JIM sadewep

JIQEIZAOIAI JO JUNOWR dy) JEYM O} SE UOIRULOJUI JO STG

jO spuesnoy) jo soquinu Aue jo Ajyaudoid ay) 40 Ayypiqeoydde

oy} Suindie pue Sunesysuowap Aypeosyisods pure y3nosy)

Bulos JO udpsng dy) Wo’ sN dyetAajje AjuRSsaz9uU JOU sop

- VY96-

eSneeeee ee

I -- S11 “UNOS ajyeIS DY) OF J9AO HI BuNIYys Aq yey) NOD dy) [91

0} UBM | Puy “UOHeULIOJUI SOD 9Yy) SUNePdnN oO} WodsaJ YIM

‘suotuido wodxs Zunuowajddns 0} 3edso1 ym AJAOOSIP

JO Sonsst sWOS ase OY) “19M -MTNVA UW

dyeunquy

aes B O} Woy) JUdSoId puke sjUsWINZIe oy) pu sARYy NOA

AIDAOISIP JY} DAR) UY) JOYIO “WINSME] DY) Ul OP O} 149] B9Y) SI

YA {SONSSI aIeIS YIM JeI[IUeY BOW SI 9Z1UTOdOI Ajjes9Ud3

QM JEYI LINOD JIeIS BO} 1 JUaSQId PUR sARY NOA Jey) SUIydLIq

2181S SY} ye) O} ING OP Oo} 12] BARY J9dO00>D puR NOA pjnom

YM ‘“SUUIR]D dyeIS J9AO UOHOIpsuNf jeyUsWIa|ddns asidJoxo

0} SUI[IOP OF BJ9M UNOS 34) JT -LUYNOO AHL

‘POAIIOOJ JOU SEM

Jd1N0U DY) JI UOIISOd $s JUZWIUIZAOS dy) BsIWIOIdWIOD AJaJ9A98

pinos Asy) “WYO JO Wy Je UID dy) ‘asked JOYyOUR

Ul ING ‘SUIPURIS NOY) UO JD9JJe OU DABY SUONIOR ING “PeAtsdou

SEM Dd1NOU SY) SWIT) YM -- JOYIOYM JO sANSodsou ‘J9eU

Sy} dds0JUd 0} ayeLUdOIdde SWIZ9P HH UOIISE JOANIVYM Jy¥eI O}

‘Q91J0U PoIe]Iq SY) YUM UdAD ‘sIYySU sy sey [[MS JUOWUIDAOS

suf ‘“WOWUIZAOS ay) UO ssop HH Jey) WRduUN sy) SuIARY

0} JSO]D BOYMOU SI UONENIIS SIy) Ul DdNOU sy) JO sIN{IRy

dy} -- JoNOU sy) PREY “WIJIP A][ROIOWeIP sue soINjeIs

asOy) UL 3d1NOU dy) BUIALOPUN s}soJZIUI SY) ‘SddURISWINDIID

asoy) Jopun puy ‘Sd¥d OM) UdeMI0q ‘A[UO soseWIEp

Aguow Buryses ‘uouse Jo asned ayeaud eb SI SIyL

‘219 JUSWIWIIAOS

oy) Bunuassidos you as.aqQ = ‘JRssUamH Aoswony dseaud

dy) SB BUIAIOS JOU 31,9M J1dY “IBADMOH{ “JOU JO ayedIONUed

-VS6-

[Lz]

0} JOYIOYM O} SB UOISIDSOP POUOJUl

ue SyRU OF IYSU sy) DAY PUR EME 9q O} JUDIUUIZAOS 9y)

JO} ‘UONEBIN] DY) JO WME 3Q 0} JUSUUIIAOS JY) JOJ JANUDOUI

eos eB SI asoy) ‘fesoUam AowonNy seALid dy) SB sa0ys

SU UL SUIPUBIS SI JUSUIUIZAODH sareIg pou oy) SuNUasaidas

st Aued & as0yA, “JUOWUIIAOS ay) 0} a]qQeAed Udy) ae JEU)

sanjeuod SuLndes ul s}sasajUl Ss JUDWIUIZAOS oy) SUNUaSaIdas

‘UsWUZAOS =oYy) BuNUasoidas § AjjeNUssSso = *JUSWIIA08

dy) JO JfeYoq UO JeJoUsZH Aowony oeALid ay) se BUIAJaS SI

uOoT}oe JO asned sy) BuIsULIQ Ayed sy) BOY IY J31B AA URd|D

ay) 10 WADY Jopun syns uszy19 Surajoaut sased jje sue uodn

SO1]21 Sy WY} Saseo sy “Jomsue sty jo Wed ul WYy3U oINb

sem uosusydarsg “1 pue ‘yey Sulpsesor uoNsonb s,yNn0S

oy) pivoy | “OUOH AMOK = =WINVA AW

,uonsipsunf Joye afqns JO UNOS sIy)

S2ALIdap dNNOU JO JOUISGR IY) IBY) UONUDIUOS dy) 0} -- SY)

0} asuodsai INO si 1eYM PUY :LYNOO AHL

‘Ae¥O “AAO > WINVA “UN

‘QUI S JY] “PsRnso;Yysresys

Ayjaud SBM wy “LYNOD Ss HHL

"WL DYBUL UBD | YUIY | SB IBd]9

se SI JeYL “WNsMmeEy JO odA} SI) UI E] | JOpUN UODe JO asNed

UOIINGLIUOD dy) JO JUSWA]a UR SB /O] ISN st Op OF BuIAN

Wy wy “JOUOH JNOX “SOK W1INVA UW

‘€] | Je YOO] 9M UdYM /O] SutsN NOA aue-MOY

[97]

- Vr6-

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Joint Appendix — Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc. · 543 U.S. 157 | Frix