Opinion — Barnhart v. Thomas

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(Shp Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2003 1

Svllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible. a svl'abus (headnote) will be released. as is

being done in connection with this case. at the time the opinion is issued

The ssilabus constitutes no part of the opimon of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convemence of the reader

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co. 200 U.S. 321, 487

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

BARNHART, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

v. THOMAS

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 02-763. Argued October 14. 2003—Decided November 12, 2003

A person is disabled. and thereby eligible for Social Security disability

insurance benefits and Supplemental Security Income (SSI), “only if

his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such sever-

itv that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, con-

sidering his age. education, and work experience. engage in any other

kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national econ-

omy.” 42 U.S.C. §§423(d)2 A), 1382c(a3B) (emphasis added)

(hereinafter §423(d)(2)(A)). After her job as an elevator operator was

ehminated. respondent Thomas applied for disamlitv insurance bene-

fits and SSI. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that her im-

pairments did not prevent her from performing her past relevant

work as an elevator operator, rejecting her argument that she is un-

able to do that work because it no longer exists in significant num-

bers in the national economy. The District Court affirmed the ALJ.

concluding that whether Thomas's old job exists 1s irrelevant under

the Social Security Administration's (SSA) regulations. In reversing

and remanding,. the en bane Third Circuit held that §$423(d)(2)(A) un-

ambiguously provides that the ability to perform prior work disquali-

fies from benefits only if it is substantial gainful work which exists in

the national economy.

Held: The SSA's determination that it can find a claimant not disabled

where she remains physically and mentally able to do her previous

work. without investigating whether that work exists in significant

numbers in the national economy, is a reasonable interpretation of

§423(d)(2(A) that is entitled to deference under Chevron U.S. A. Inc.

v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837. Section

425(d)(2)A) establishes two requirements: An impairment must ren-

BARNHART +. THOMAS

Svilabus

der an individual “unable te do his previous work” and must also pre-

clude him from “engag{ing| in anv other kind of substantial gainful

work” The clause “which exists in the national economy” clearly

qualifies the latter requirement. The issue in this case is whether

_ that clause also qualifies the former requirement. The SSA’s regula-

tions, which create a five-step sequential evaluation process to de-

termine disability, answer that question in the negative At step

four, the SSA will find not disabled a clammant who can do his previ-

ous work, without inquiring whether that work exists in the national

economy. Rather. it reserves inquiry into the national economy for

the fifth step. when it considers vocational factors and determines

whether the claimant can pertorm other jobs in the national economy

See 20 CFR §§404.15200f), 404.1560c), 116.92001. 116.960(c). That

interpretation is a reasonable construction of §425«dKM24A) The

Third Cireuit’s contrary reading ignores the grammatical “rule of the

last antecedent.” under which a limiting clause or phrase should be

read to modify only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows.

Construing $423(d)(2A) in accord with this rule is quite sensible

Congress coula have determined that an analysis of a claimant's capae-

ity to do his previous work would in most cases be an effective and effi-

cent acministrative proxy for the claimant's ability to do some work

that exists in the national economy. There is good reason to use such a

proxy to avoid the more expansive and individualized step-five analvsis

The proper Checron inquiry is not whether an agency construction can

give rise to undesirable results in some instances (which both the SSA's

and the Third Circuit's constructions can). but whether. in hight of the

alternatives, the agenev construction is reasonable. Here, the SSA's

authoritative inte pretation satisfies that test. Pp. -19

294 F. 36 568, reversed.

SCALIA, 4. delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Cite as: 440 US _ (2003) l

Opinion of the Court

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 02-763

JO ANNE B. BARNHART. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

SECURITY. PETITIONER v. PAULINE THOMAS

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

{November 12. 2903]

JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.

Under the Social Security Act. the Social Security Ad-

ministration (SSA) is authorized to pay disability insur-

ance benefits and Supplemental Security Income to per-

sons who have a “disability” A person qualifies as

disabled. and thereby eligible for such benefits. “only if his

physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such

severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work

but cannot. considering his age. education. and work

experience. engage in any other kind of substantial gainful

work which exists in the national economy” 42 U.S.C.

§$$4251dn 2A), 1382c(aX3nB). The issue we must decide

is Whether the SSA may determine that a claimant is not

disabled because she remains physically and mentally

able to do her previous work. without investigating

whether that previous work exists in significant numbers

in the national economy.

Pauline Thomas worked as an elevator operator for six

vears until her job was eliminated in August 1995. In

June 14%6. at age 53. Thomas applied for disability insur-

te

BARNHART: THOMAS

Opimion of the Court

ance benefits under Title Il and Supplemental Security

Income under Tithe XVI of the Social Security Act. See 49

Stat. 622. as amended. 42 U.S.C. $401 ef seg. (Tithe Th: as

added, s6 Stat. 1465. and as amended. $1581 ef seg. (Title

XVI). She claimed that she suffered trom. and was

disabled by. heart disease and cervical and lumbar

radiculopathy

After the SSA denied Thomas's application initially and

on reconsideration, she requested a hearing before an

Administrative Law Judge (Al-}). The AlL-) tound that

Thomas had “hypertension. cardiac arrythmia. [and]

cervical and lumbar strain sprain” Decision of AL 5,

Record 15. He concluded. however. that Thomas was not

under a “disability” because her “impairments do not

prevent (her) trom pertorming her past relevant work as

an elevator cperator. /d., at 6. Record 16. He rejected

Thomas's argument that she is unable to do her previous

work because that work no lonver exists in significant

numbers in the national economy. The SSA’s Appeals

Council dened Thomas s request tor review.

Thomas then challenged the ALJ's ruling in the United

States Instmet Court for the District of New Jersey. re-

newing her argument that she is unable to do her previous

work due to its searcitv. The Distmet Court atfirmed the

ALJ. concluding that whether Thomas's old job exists is

irrelevant under the SSA’s regulations. Thomas v. Apfel.

Civ, No. 99-2234 (Aug. 17, 2000). The Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit. sitting en banc. reversed and re-

manded. Over the dissent of three of its members. it held

that the statute unambiguously provides that the abilits

to pertorm prior work disqualifies trom benetits only if itis

“substantial gainful work which exists in the national

economy. 294 F.3d 568, 572 (2002). That holding con-

flicts with the decisions of four other Courts of Appeals

See Queng Vin Han vy. Bowen. ss2 F.2d 1453, 1457 (CAS

198%): Garcia v. Secretary of Health and Human Services.

Cite as: S40 U8. (2003) 3

Opinion of the Court

46 F.3d 552, 558 (CA6 1995); Pass v. Chater, 65 F. 3d

1200, 1206-1207 (CA4 1995): Rater v. Chater, 73 F.3d

796, 799 (CA8 1996). We granted the SSA’s petition for

certiorari. 537 U.S. 1187 (2003).

As relevant to the present case. Title I] of the Act de-

fines “disability” as the “inability to engage in any sub-

stantial gainful activity by reason of any medically deter-

minable physical or mental impairment which can be

expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12

months.” 42 U.S.C. §423(d)1)(A). That definition is

qualified, however, as follows:

“An individual shall be determined to be under a

disability only if his physical or mental impairment or

impairments are of such severity that he is not only

unable to do his previous work but cannot. considering

his age. education, and work experience. engage in

any other kind of substantial gainful work which ex-

ists in the national economy...“ §425(d)(2)A) (em-

phasis added).

“|Wljork which exists in the national economy” is defined to

mean “work which exists in significant numbers either in

the region where such individual lives or in several re-

gions of the country.” /bid. Tithe XVI of the Act, which

governs Supplemental Security Income benefits for dis-

abled indigent persons, employs the same definition of

“disability” used in Title Il. including a qua'ification that

is verbatim the same as §423(d)(2)A). See 42 U.S.C.

§1382c¢(a)(3)(B). For simplicity’s sake. we will refer only to

the Title I] provisions. but our analysis applies equally to

Title XVI.

Section 423(d)(2)(A) establishes two requirements for

disability. First, an individual's physical or mental im-

4 BARNHART» THOMAS

Opinion of the Court

pairment must render him “unable to do his previous

work.” Second, the impairment must also preclude him

from “ergagling} in any other kind of substantial gainful

work.” The parties agree that the latter requirement ts

qualified by the clause that immediately follows it—

“which exists in the national economy.” The issue in this

case is whether that clause alse qualifies “previous work”

The SSA has answered this question in the negative.

Acting pursuant to its statutory rulemaking authority, 42

U.S.C §$8405a) (Tithe Th. 138scd)1) (Tithe XVD. the

agency has promulgated regulations establishing a five-

step sequential evaluation process to determine disability.

See 20 CFR §404.1520 (2003) (governing claims for dis-

ability insurance benefits): §416.920 (parallel regulation

governing claims fer Supplemental Security Income). If at

any step a finding of disability or non-disability ean be

made, the SSA will not review the claim further. At the

first step, the ageney will find non-disability unless the

claimant shows that he is not working at a “substantial

gainful activity.” §§404.15200b), 116.9200b). At step two.

the SSA will find non-disability unless the claimant shows

that he has a “severe impairment.” defined as “any im-

pairment or co.nbination of impairments which sigmfi-

cantly limits [the claimant's} physical or mental ability to

do basic work activities” §§404.1520le), 416.920te) At

step three, the ageney determines whether the impair-

ment which enabled the claimant to survive step two ts on

the list of impairments presumed severe enough to render

one disabled: iv so. the claimant qualifies. 98404. 1520td),

416.920). If the claimant's impairment is net on the list,

the inquiry proceeds to step four, at which the SSA as-

sesses whether the claimant can do his previous work;

unless he shows that he cannot. he is determined not to be

Creas MOU S — eee 5

Opinwn of the Court

disabled If the claimant survives the fourth stage. the

fifth. and final. step requires the SSA to consider so-called

“yecational factors” (the claimant's age. education. and

past work experience). and to determine whether the

claimant is capable of performing other jobs existing in

significant numbers = = in the national economy.

§§404.15200f), 404.1 5600). 416.920), 416. 960K0).-

As the above description shows, step four can result ina

determination of no disability without inquiry inte

whether the claimant's previous work exists In the na-

tional economy: the regulations explicitly reserve inquiry

into the national economy for step five. Thus. the SSA has

made it perfectly clear that it does not interpret the clause

“which exists in the national economy” in $420 d2MA) as

applying to “previous work.”’ The issue presented is

whether this agency interpretation must be accorded

deterence.

As we held in Chevron U.S. A Ine. v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, Ine., 467 U.S. 837, 845 (1984). when a

The <tep-four instructions te tae clarmant read as fulows: “kt we

cannet make a decision based on your current work activity or ot

medical ‘ats alone. and vou have a severe Impairmentis). We then

review Veour residual functional capacity and the physical and mental

demareds ot the work vou have done i the past It vou oan still de this

kund of work, we will find that vou are Ret Gisumed ~ 20 CFR

8404 1 2iter, £16 M20bes C2

-bn regulatiens that became effective om September 25. 2008. the SSA

amended certain aspects of the five-step prowess In Wars Net material te

this opin nm The provisions referred to a= subsections ©) and fim this

opinion ar: Now subsections if) and ig)

This interpretation was emboqiea in the regulations that first es-

tablished the five-step process im 147s. see 44 Fed Rey 95.549 teodr ied.

as amended, at 20 CFR §8404.1520 and 416.920 (i9s24 Ever before

enactment of $403edH2"A) in 1987. the SSA disallowed disability

benefits wher the inability te work was caused bv technological

changes or the ondastrv in which ithe chamant! has worked” 20 CFR

goon Larebe (1461)

" BARNHART: THeMAS

Operon of the Court

statute speaks clearly .o the Issue at hand we “must give

effect to the unambiguously expressed intent et Congress.

but when the statute “ts silent or ambigueus” we must

defer to a reasonable constraction by the agenes charged

with it< implementation. The Third Cireuit held that. by

referring first to “previous werk” and then te “any other

kind of substantial gainful work which exists mn the na-

tional economy.” 42 U.S.C. §423edn20 A) tempha='>

added). the statute unambiguously indicates that the

former is a species of the latter “When.” t said. “a sen-

tence <eTs< out one or More specific tems followed bw ‘any

other ond a description, the =pecrtic tems must tall within

the description.” 294 F.3d. at 972. We disagree For the

reasors discussed below the interpretation adopted by

SSA jis ot least a reasonable construction of the text and

must theretore be given ettedt

The Third Crreuit’s reading disregards— indeed. Is pre-

cisely contrary to—the grammatical “rule of the last ante-

cedent.” according to which a limiting claus or phrase

there. the relative clause “which exists 1 the national

economy”) should ordinarily be read as moditving only the

noun or phrase that it immed:ateis follows there. “any

other kind of substantial gainful work”). See 2A N. Singer.

Sotherland on Statutory Construction $47.54. p. 369 (8th

rev. ed. 2000) CReferential and qualitying words and

phrases. where no contrary Intention appears, refer solely to

the last antecedent”). While this rule is net an absolute

and can assuredly be overcome by other medicia of Mean-

ing. we have said that construing a statute IP accord with

the rule 2s “quite sensible as a matter ot grammar.” No-

helman v. Americen Savings Rank, 50s ts 224. 0

crete, In FTC vo Mande! Brothers, Inc. om LS. 385

(195%), this Court emploved the rule to interpret a statute

stnkingly similar in structure te §423¢de2 4 Ar—a provision

of the Fur Products Labeling Act. 15 0.5.0. 869. which

detined “inwerce as “a WINtlen acount, memorandum, ist.

Creas WOU S — (2th

Opimen of the Court

or catalog ... transported or delivered to a purchaser, con-

signee. factor. bailee. correspondent. or agent. or any other

person tho is engaged in dealing commercially in fur prod-

ucts or furs”” 359 U.S.. at 386 (quoting 15 U.S.C. 969m)

jemphas!= added). Like the Third Cireuit here. the Court of

Appeals in Mande! Brothers had interpreted the phrase

“any other” as rendering the relative clause (who is en-

gaged in dealing commercially”) applicable to al! the spe-

cifically listed categories. 359 U.S.. at 38%. This Court

unamimously reversed. concluding that the “limiting clause

is to be applied only to the last antecedent.” /d., at 589. and

n. 4 «citing 2 J. Sutherland. Statutory Construction §4921

(ded 1444).

An example will illustrate the error of the Third Cireuit’s

perception that the specifically enumerated “previous

work” “must” be treated the same as the more general

reference to “any other kind of substantial zaintul work.”

244 F 3d. at 572. Consider. for example. the case of par-

ents who. before leaving their teenage son alone in the

house for the weekend. warn him. “You will be punished if

you throw a party or engage im any other setivity that

damages the house” If the son nevertheless throws a

party and is caught. he should hardly be able to avoid

punishment by arguing that the house was not damaged.

The parents proscribed (1) a party. and (2) any other

activity that damages the house. As far as appears from

what they said. their reasons for prohibiting the home-

alone party may have had nothing to do with damage to

the house—ior instance, the ris«x that underage drmking

or sexual activity would occur, And even if their only

concern was to prevent damage. 11 does not follow from the

fact tha: the same interest underlay both the ~pecific and

the general prohibition that proof of impairment of that

interest is required for both. The parents. foreseemg that

assessment of whether an activity had ir fact “damaged”

the house could be disputed by their son might have

s BARNHART: THOMAS

Opimen ot the Court

wished to preclude all argument by specifying and cate-

gorically prohibiting the one activity—hosting a party—

that was most likely to cause damage and most likely to

occur.

The Third Circuit suggested that interpreting the stat-

ute as does the SSA would lead to “absurd results.” /bid.

See also Kolman v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 212. 213 «CA7

1991) (the fact that a claimant could perform a past job

that no longer exists would not be “a rational ground for

denying benefits”). The court could conceive of “no plausi-

ble reason why Congress might have wanted to deny

benefits to an otherwise qualifie. person simply because

that person. although unable to perform any job that

actually exists in the national economy. could perform a

previous job that no longer exists.” 294 F. 3d, at 572-573.

But on the very next page the Third Circuit conceived of

just such a plausible reason. namely. that “in the vast

majority of cases. a claimant who is found to -have the

capacity to perform her past work also will have the ca-

pacity to pertorm other types of work.” /d., at 574, n. 5.

The conclusion which follows is that Congress could have

determined that an analysis of a claimant's physical and

mental capacity to do his previous work would “in the vast

majority of cases” serve as an effective and efficient ad-

ministrative proxy for the claimant's ability to do some

work that does exist in the national economy. Such a

proxy is useful because the step-five inquiry into whether

the clain ants cumulative impairments preclude him from

finding “othe” work is very difficult. requiring considera-

tien of “each of thie] [vocational] factors and ... an indi-

vidual assessment of each clanmants abilities and limita-

tions. Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458. 460-461. no 1

(1983) tciting 20 CPR §§404.1545-404.1565 (1982)). There

is good reason to use a workable proxy that avoids the

more expansive and individualized step-tive analysis. As

we have observed, “[t}he Social Security hearing system ts

Cite as: 540 U8. (2008) 4

Opinion of the Court

‘probably the largest adjudicative agency in the western

world.’... The need for efficiency is self-evident.” 461

U.S., at 461, n. 2 (citation omitted).

The Third Circuit rejected this proxy rationale because

it would produce results that “may not always be true, and

... May not be true in this case.” 294 F. 3d. at 576. That

logic would invalidate a vast number of the procedures

employed by the administrative state. To generalize is to

be imprecise. Virtually every legal (or other) rule has

imperfect applications in particular circumstances. Cf.

Bowen ©. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137. 157 (1987) (O'CONNOR, J...

concurring) (“To be sure the Secretary faces an administra-

tive task of staggering proportions in applying the disability

benefits provisions ~* the Social Security Act. Perfection in

processing millions of such claims annually is impossible”).

It is true that. under the SSA's interpretation, a worker

with severely limited capacity who has managed to find

easy work in a declining industry could be penalized for

his troubles if the job later disappears. It is also true.

however, that under the Third Circuit's interpretation.

impaired workers in declining or marginal industries who

cannot do “other” work could simply refuse to return to

their jobs—even though the jobs remain open and avail-

able—and nonetheless draw disability benefits. The

proper Chevron inquiry is not whether the agency con-

struction can give rise to undesirable results in some

instances (as here both constructions can), but rather

whether. in light of the alternatives. the agency construc-

tion is reasonable. In the present case, the SSA’s authori-

tative interpretation certainly satisfies that test.

We have considered respondent's other arguments and

find them to be without merit.

. . *

We need not decide today whether §423(d)(2)(A) compels

the interpretation given it by the SSA. It suffices to con-

— A le et

Ww BARNHART) THOMAS

Opinion of the Court

clude, as we do, that §423(d2)A) does not unambiguously

require a different interpretation. and that the SSA‘s

regulation is an entirely reasonable interpretation of the

text. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed

It is so ordered.

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