Amicus Curiae Brief — Nike, Inc. v. Kasky
Supreme Court brief2003
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
No. 02-575
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
Nike, Inc. et al.,
Petitioners,
Vv.
Marc Kasky,
Respondent.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
BRIEF AMICI CURIAE OF SIERRA CLUB,
CALIFORNIA CERTIFIED ORGANIC FARMERS,
AND CENTER ON RACE, POVERTY AND THE
ENVIRONMENT
Patrick Gallagher Tamara R. Piety Thomas McGarity
(Counsel of Univ. of Tulsa Univ. of Texas
Record) College of Law School of Law
Sierra Club 3120 E. 4t Place 727 E. Dean
85 Second Street John Rogers Hall Keeton St.
San Francisco,CA Tulsa, OK 74104 Austin, TX 78705
94105
415-977-5709
BEST AVAILABLE COPY
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether a state government can regulate a corporation's
false statements about its labor practices, that were made in
order to improve its public image and induce consumers to
purchase its products, because commercial speech
restrictions are permissible under the First Amendment to
ensure the public receives truthful information about
corporate products and services?
RULE 29.4(C) CERTIFICATION
Amici curiae certify that 28 U.S.C. § 2403(b) may apply and
that this brief has been served upon the Attorney General of
California.
in
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTION PRESENTED ooo ccecseessueesseeesneenneeenvees i
RULE 29.4(C) CERTIFICATION ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS occ ccccececcceccecseseeeeeeeseeeeeee 11
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iv
BRIEF AMICI CURIAE FOR SIERRA CLUB, CALIFORNIA
CERTIFIED ORGANIC FARMERS AND CENTER ON
RACE, POVERTY AND THE ENVIRONMENT. 1
INTERESTOF AMICI 1
INTRODUCTION... tsi‘ i‘: 3
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT. 3
rr 6
1. False Or Deceptive Environmental Claims In Green
Marketing Campaigns Can Injure Consumers And
Honest Competitors And May Ultimately Endanger
The Environment. t——s—s—s—i—‘i 6
Il. Truthful Information On Corporate Behavior Is
Essential To Ensuring Corporate Accountability And
Environmental Justice ..—s—as—s— see 13
Ill. The California Supreme Court's Decision Is
Consistent With The Commercial Speech Doctrine
And Its Emphasis On Preserving The Free Flow Of
Accurate Information To Consumers 15
IV. Petitioner's Claims That This Decision Unfairly
Balances A Debate About A Matter Of Public
Concern And That It Will Have A “Chilling Effect”
On Accurate Information, Should Be Rejected As
EEE EEE EEE EEE EEE OOOH
A. This Case Is Not About The Merits Of
EIR: Se Lee 19
B. Requirig Nike To Ascertain The Accuracy Of Its
Statements Before Disseminating Them Does Not
Impose An Onerous Burden 21
C. Claims Of Chilling Effects In This Context Should
Be Viewed With Skepticism. 21
CONCLUSION 22
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Anderson v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 333 U.S. 821 (1948) 4
Association of Nat'l Advertisers v. Lungren, 44 F.3d 726 (9th Cir.
1994) (citing THE GREEN REPORT) ss 10, 12
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809(1975) 16
Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469(1989) 20
Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service Commission
of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) 16, 17, 20
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993) 23
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 423 U.S. 765
IY ere RN ee ee en Ree 17, 21
In re R.M.]., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) 23
Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n,
| EE a ae. 23
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) 15
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia's Citizens
Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) 16, 17, 18, 21
STATUTES
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 etseq. 3
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 178505 11,12
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Carlson, et al., A Content Analysis of Environmental Advertising
Claims: A Matrix Method Approach, J. OF ADVERTISING (Sept.
el
Cavanagh, It’s a Lorax Kind Of Market! But is it a Sneetches
Kind of Solution?: A Critical Review of Current Laissez-Faire
Environmental Marketing Regulation, 9 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. (1998)
el
Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7,629 (Feb. 11, 1994) 14
Federal Trade Comm'n, Guides for the Use of
Environmental Marketing Claims, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,363 (Aug.
13, 1992) (codified at 16 C.F.R. 260 (1994)) (revised by 61 Fed.
ee 11
Gardener, How Green Were My Values: Regulation of
Environmental Marketing Claims, 23 UNIV. TOLEDO L. REV. 31
EEE EEE EEE EEE EEE EE EEE E EEE ELLE BEEBE EEE ELEEEEE LLL LL ELLE ELE
Holch & Franz, Legal Developments: Eco-Porn Versus the
Constitution: Commercial Speech and the Regulation of
Environmental Advertising, 58 ALB. L. REV. 441 (1994) 7
Israel, Taming the Green Marketing Monster: National Standards
for Environmental Marketing Claims, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
SEE EEE EEE EEE EEE EEE EEE EEE ELLE REEDED DDD
Luehr, Guiding The Green Revolution: The Role of the Federal
Trade Commission in Regulating Environmental Advertising, 10
UCLA J. ENVTL L. & POL’y 311 (1992) __ 11
Piety, “Merchants of Discontent”: An Exploration of the
Psychology of Advertising, Addiction, and the Implications for
Commercial Speech, 25 SEATTLE L. REV. 377 (2001) 19
Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA
Rechtschaffen, Deference v. Cooperation and the Evolving Theory
of Environmental Enforcement, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1181 (1998)
-
alte eet ELT ET TTT
Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of the First
Amendment, 56 U. OF CIN. L. REV. 1181(1988) 17
SETTLE & ALRECK, WHY THEY BUY: AMERICAN CONSUMERS
INSIDE AND OUT 70 (1986) 19
Sierra Club, Human Rights and the Environment, Reports and
Factsheets, at www.sierraclub.org/ human-rights /
Welsh, Environmental Marketing and Federal Preemption of
State Law: Eliminating the “Gray” Behind the “Green,” 81 CAL.
i. EV. 9 (ISS). 8,11, 12
Weintraub, Required Corporate Disclosure Under Security and
Exchange Commission Regulations, in THE LAW OF
ADDRESS DISPROPORTIONATE RISK 251 (Michael B. Gerrard
EL eT 13
INTEREST OF AMICI
The Sierra Club, California Certified Organic
Farmers, and Center on Race, Poverty and the Environment
submit this brief as amici curiae in support of Respondent
Marc Kasky.!
The Sierra Club is a nonprofit corporation organized
under California law, with approximately 740,000 members
nationwide, approximately 199,000 of whom reside in
California. The Sierra Club is dedicated to exploring,
enjoying and protecting the wild places of the Earth; to
practicing and promoting the responsible use of the Earth’s
resources and ecosystems; to educating and enlisting
humanity to protect and restore the quality of the natural
and human environment; and to using all lawful means to
carry out these objectives.
The Sierra Club’s concerns include holding
corporations accountable for making false environmental
claims in order to exploit environmentally friendly
consumers. One of the Sierra Club’s campaigns is corporate
accountability. This campaign encompasses encouraging
corporations to demonstrate their commitment to the
environment by signing voluntary codes of environmental
conduct. The Sierra Club’s particular interest in this case
stems from the past, present and future harm to the
environment that results from restricting the ability of
consumers to directly influence manufacturers’
environmental practices by using their purchasing power.
1 Letters of consent to the filing of this brief have been filed with Clerk of
Court pursuant to Rule 37.3. Pursuant to Rule 37.6 of this Court, amici
state that no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part,
and that no person, other than amici, its members, and its counsel, made a
monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief.
This ability is restricted when there is no check on
manufacturers’ ability to disseminate misinformation.2
California Certified Organic Farmers, Inc. (CCOF) is
a 30-year old, non-profit corporation organized under
California law. CCOF has over 1200 certified organic
farmers and processors in its organic certification program.
CCOF’s client base represents over 70 percent of organic
agricultural production in the State of California, as well as
hundreds of food processors throughout the United States,
Canada and Mexico. CCOF’s goal is to return agriculture to
a biological base and away from a food production system
based on toxic chemistry. CCOF is accredited by the United
States Government to issue a federal organic license on
behalf of the United States Department of Agriculture to its
clients. Organic certification has been key to building the
organic industry and CCOF has been one of the main
organizations helping to develop organic standards.
CCOF is concerned when any organization makes
certification claims that are without merit. Consumer
confidence in the integrity of organic certification has led to
annual growth rates of twenty percent within the organic
industry for more than a decade. Consumers are willing to
pay more for food because they believe that the methods
used to produce and process organic food are better for
themselves, the environment and wildlife. Allowing a
business to make claims that are false or not supported by
fact undermines the certification process. It is similar to
allowing counterfeit money into circulation; it undermines
confidence in the system. CCOF asks the court to protect the
2 The Sierra Club has been before the Court as an amicus curiae
environmental interests in a number of cases. These include
Borden Ranch Partnership v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 122 S.Ct. 2355
(2002); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998); Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Hallstrom v. Tillamook
County, 493 U.S. 20 (1989); United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985).
integrity of certification claims made in the marketplace and
hold claimants to fact based statements.
The Center on Race, Poverty and the Environment
provides legal and technical assistance to the grassroots
movement for environmental justice. The Center serves
individuals and community groups throughout the United
States, who struggle against a disproportionate burden of
pollution and the disproportionate enforcement of the law.
The Center has offices in San Francisco and Delano,
California. CRPE often files lawsuits under California's
Unfair Competition Law (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et
seq.) - the statute at the heart of this lawsuit - therefore, the
organization’s ability to represent its clients will be directly
affected by the outcome of this lawsuit.
INTRODUCTION
The California Supreme Court properly held that the
Constitution does not protect false or misleading public
statements about the Petitioner's labor practices made in
order to improve its public image and regain lost sales and
credibility in financial markets - whether these statements
were made in press releases, letters to newspaper editors,
letters to the heads of universities and athletic departments,
or advertising. Constitutional protection of free speech does
not extend to a _ corporation's dishonest factual
representations about its own product or its own operations
directed to consumers, or intended to reach consumers or
other members of the public, such as lending institutions
and purchasers of stock.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This case is about whether or not Nike will be
granted a constitutional right to lie to the public about the
facts of its operations in order to promote itself and the sale
of its products. Petitioner Nike filed a demurrer in the trial
court to Respondent's claim that it made misrepresentations
in its public statements offered to rebut the criticism of its
overseas labor practices. In reviewing the granting of a
demurrer, this Court must accept all of Kasky’s allegations as
true. Anderson v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 333 U.S. 821, 822
n.1 (1948). Nike claims that it is immaterial whether it has
intentionally made false and misleading statements because
such lies and misstatements of fact are protected by the First
Amendment. This claim conflicts with the very purpose for
which limited First Amendment protection was extended to
some commercial speech in the first place - the public’s right
to receive truthful information about products and services.
Nike’s claim is antithetical to the commercial speech
doctrine.
It is precisely this free flow of information that is
essential for consumers to make rational and informed
choices. Consumers cannot make informed choices when it
is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain truth from fiction
because manufacturers may lie with impunity.
Moreover, the confusion created when companies
misrepresent, distort, or lie disrupts proper functioning of
the market. Truthful and responsible manufacturers are
placed at a competitive disadvantage because dishonest
market participants can free-ride on the efforts of others. In
particular, dishonest manufacturers exploit consumers’
desires to purchase’ eco-friendly products from
environmentally friendly corporations by falsely boasting
these environmental claims. California has enacted a statute
that limits such “green washing” techniques - legislation
that will be put in jeopardy if this Court overturns the
California Supreme Court's decision in this case.
In response to these weighty concerns, the Petitioner
offers only straw men. Contrary to Petitioner's assertion,
Nike’s comments in this case were not about the merits of
globalization. Rather the statements were concrete
assertions of facts of Nike’s labor practices and the conditions
under which its products are manufactured. It is impossible
to state with any certainty, except as a matter of opinion,
whether or not globalization is a “good” thing. By contrast,
the working conditions in Nike's factories are not a matter of
opinion, but rather facts that consumers are interested in
obtaining to make their purchasing decisions. Consumers,
large institutional purchasers, lenders, stock analysts and
brokers may adjust their purchases or decisions based on
this information. Fully aware of this, Nike would like to
disseminate information about its labor practices that it feels
would find the most favor with these audiences. However,
Nike would like to disseminate favorable “information”
without regard to its veracity and unfettered by any need to
verify these facts - facts that Nike is in the best position to
accurately report.
Despite Petitioner's assertions to the contrary, it is no
more onerous to require a manufacturer to report facts about
its work practices accurately than it is to expect it to provide
accurate reports of its earnings for tax purposes or its
financial condition to meet . securities reporting
requirements. The fact that this information may be difficult
to compile or may sometimes be inadvertently inaccurate
does not absolve the company from the responsibility to
report as accurately as it can. Nike is a business entity, not a
political organization, and it has a financial incentive
connected to its “commentary” that other commentators
lack.
Similarly, contrary to Petitioner’s assertion that the
California Supreme Courts’ decision unfairly
“disadvantages” one side of a “debate,” it is Nike’s position
that would create the disadvantage. Insulating companies
from liability for inaccurate advertising of the sort alleged
here would disadvantage the public - consumers, investors,
analysts, and lenders alike - who have an interest in Nike's
operations, how Nike’s operations are viewed by the public,
and the effect of the public’s view on sales. In addition,
companies can gain unfair competitive advantage by falsely
boasting about environmentally friendly products when the
company has not undergone the expense of developing such
products. Any attempts to verify such claims would require
investigative journalism, as occurred in this case, but which
is unreasonable to expect in most instances.
In a modern consumer society, the relative impotence
of the individual consumer, compared to multi-billion dollar
corporations, must be augmented by the power of the
government to ensure that the information provided to the
public is truthful. Protecting the integrity of the marketplace
is a traditional function of government, and such regulation
is an important governmental vehicle for ensuring that public
goods, such a clean environment and sustainable
environmental practices, are arded.
ARGUMENT
I. False Or Deceptive Environmental Claims In Green
Marketing Campaigns Can Injure Consumers And
Honest Competitors And May Ultimately Endanger
The Environment.
Since the early 1990's, there has been a virtual
explosion throughout the United States in “green
marketing” - the manufacture and promotion of consumer
goods having real (or imaginary) environmental benefits.
Common household products boast that they are recyclable,
biodegradable, compostable, ozone-friendly, or some other
shade of green. Manufacturers claim that wood products are
produced only from sustainable harvesting practices, free
from clear-cutting or other environmental abuses. Organic
food is advertised as being produced without reliance upon
agricultural chemicals or biotechnology. Energy is marketed
as “clean,” generated from wind, water, or solar power, not
from the burning of coal or use of nuclear power. Even tuna
fish is claimed to be dolphin free. See generally Holch &
Franz, Legal Developments: Eco-Porn Versus the Constitution:
Commercial Speech and the Regulation of Environmental
Advertising, 58 ALB. L. REV. 441 (1994).
Such green marketing efforts, which rest upon sound
public policy goals, are designed to alter consumer
purchasing decisions in a pro-environment way and thereby
to reduce air and water pollution, promote energy efficiency,
reduce global warming, prevent toxic contamination, protect
wildlife, and encourage the sustainable use of natural
resources from our farmlands, forests and oceans. The use
of such market forces and economic incentives to protect the
environment has increased in importance since the
limitations of “command and control” government
regulation to address the nation’s serious and complex
environmental problems have become more apparent.
Rechtschaffen, Deference v. Cooperation and the Evolving Theory
of Environmental Enforcement, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1181, 1195
(1998).
In contrast to regulatory regimes that seek to limit the
amount of pollution “at the end of the pipe” through
discharge permits or emission controls, consumer-oriented
solutions rely upon the law of supply and demand, together
with increasing public concern for the environment, to
reduce pollution at the source. Id. Informational approaches
provide an incentive for manufacturers to employ
environmentally friendly practices in order to make their
products more appealing to the public. Market forces -
consumer purchasing decisions driven in part by
environmental concerns - have changed the dynamics of
environmental compliance, making it is a matter of self-
interest for corporations to voluntarily comply with
environmental requirements and even go beyond legally
enforceable requirements. Harnessing the power of self-
interest in the service of environmental concerns is an
effective way to mobilize and accelerate positive change to a
degree difficult to achieve through governmental regulation
alone.
Today, an increasing number of Americans consider
themselves “environmentalists” and have expressed their
concern for the environment by purchasing eco-friendly
products. Almost two-thirds of consumers describe
themselves as “more likely” to purchase a product because
of environmental considerations. Welsh, Environmental
Marketing and Federal Preemption of State Law: Eliminating the
“Gray” Behind the “Green,” 81 CAL. L. REV. 991, 992 (1993).
One Gallup poll found that a substantial majority of
respondents was willing to change its buying behavior to
improve the environment, even if it meant paying a higher
price for the product. Carlson, et al., A Content Analysis of
Environmental Advertising Claims: A Matrix Method Approach,
J. OF ADVERTISING at p. 27 (Sept. 1993). Another study
estimated that eighty-two percent of consumers would pay
at least five percent extra to “buy green.” Welsh,
Environmental Marketing and Federal Preemption of State Law:
Eliminating the “Gray” Behind the “Green,” 81 CAL. L. REV.
991, 992 (1993).
Some “green” consumers base purchasing decisions
on the “specific characteristics” of a product, while others,
indeed perhaps most, are influenced in their purchasing
decision by how a manufacturer claims a product was
manufactured. People buy “dolphin-free” tuna not because
of the tuna itself, which tastes the same no matter how it is
captured, but because they have concern for the health and
safety of dolphins. Similarly, with the deregulation of the
California energy supply, fierce competition is now taking
place in that market, with some competitors urging
consumers to purchase from “green” sources of energy. The
end product - electricity - is identical. Not buying wood
products made from trees harvested in the rain forests is
motivated by consumer concerns for endangered species, not
by the look of the furniture itself. Other examples abound,
including the example at the heart of this case - whether
Nike manufactures its products under sweatshop conditions
that prospective consumers find sufficiently offensive so as
to affect their purchasing decisions.
While green marketing serves the laudable goal of
leveraging market forces to accomplish improved
environmental protection, the use of “green washing”
techniques by dishcnest companies seeking to exploit
consumer environmental concerns by misstating the
environmental benefits of their products is, unfortunately,
on the rise. “Green washing” is harmful to consumers and
legitimate competitors alike, not to mention its impact on the
environment _ itself. The inherent conflict is clear.
Consumers will buy environmentally beneficial products to
induce greater corporate environmental responsibility.
Manufacturers striving for greater profits have an incentive
to inflate or even lie about the environmental attributes of
their products.
Thus, contrary to Petitioner's assertion that its
statements in this case are distinct from advertising, which
this Court called “the sine qua non of commercial profits,”
Petitioner's Brief at 27, Nike’s statements defending its labor
practices are directly related to commercial profits. If Nike is
allowed to claim a constitutional right to lie in these
statements to potential consumers, consumers will make
purchasing decisions based on inaccurate information. This
will lessen, if not eliminate altogether, consumers’ ability to
influence manufacturers’ choices and, by extension, the
benefits those choices provide to the environment.
In 1994, a 10-state attorney general task force found
that “green marketing” claims were being made for nearly
10% of all new products introduced into the United States -
a 20-fold increase since 1985:
10
“Green marketing” has become the marketing
craze of the 1990s. The American public is
increasingly concerned about environmental
issues and people are looking for ways to do
their part to protect and restore our nation’s
resources. As customers have become more
aware of the environmental impacts of the
products they purchase, environmental
awareness has begun to influence purchasing
decisions.
The increasing interest in the environmental
consequences of purchasing decisions has not
been lost on the environmental community. . .
. [MJjany companies have begun claiming that
their products provide some benefit to the
environment. . . . [T]his marketing strategy,
which has become known as “green
marketing,” .can be _ informative to
conscientious consumers when it used
honestly. Unfortunately, attempts to take
advantage of consumer interest in the
environment have led to a growing number of
environmental claims that are __ trivial,
confusing or even misleading.
Association of Nat'l Advertisers v. Lungren, 44 F.3d 726, 727
(9th Cir. 1994) (citing THE GREEN REPORT).
As a result of dishonest “green washing,” honest
manufacturers have less incentive to invest in research and
development of green products because they are unable to
capture the true profits which should come from developing
“green” products. If a manufacturer incurs the cost of
developing a legitimate environmentally friendly product
and honestly claims the product is eco-friendly, it cannot
pass the costs of production on to the consumer, because the
consumer - unable to distinguish genuine from dishonest
claims - may simply purchase the cheapest product making
a green claim. Welsh, Environmental Marketing and Federal
Preemption of State Law: Eliminating the “Gray” Behind the
“Green,” 81 CAL. L. REV. 991, 998 (1993).
The potential for false green advertising has led to an
increased frequency of enforcement actions by states and by
regulatory bodies such as the Better Business Bureau of the
Federal Trade Commission. Israel, Taming the Green
Marketing Monster: National Standards for Environmental
Marketing Claims, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 303 (1993). The
Federal Trade Commission began filing enforcement actions
against misleading environmental marketing as early as
1973, and it has maintained an active environmental
marketing enforcement program over the years. See Luehr,
Guiding The Green Revolution: The Role of the Federal Trade
Commission in Regulating Environmental Advertising, 10 UCLA
J. ENVTL L. & POL’Y 311 (1992); see also Federal Trade
Comm'n, Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing
Claims, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,363 (Aug. 13, 1992) (codified at 16
C.F.R. 260 (1994)) (revised by 61 Fed. Reg. 53,311, 53,316
(Oct. 11, 1996)).
Fear of deceptive advertising and consumer
confusion has generated a demand for “green marketing”
regulation at the state level as well. Cavanagh, It’s a Lorax
Kind Of Market! But is it a Sneetches Kind of Solution?: A
Critical Review of Current Laissez-Faire Environmental
Marketing Regulation, 9 VILL. ENVTL. LJ. 133 (1998). In a
world of caveat emptor, honest information is the consumer's
only defense. California has enacted remedial legislation to
protect the environmental marketplace. CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE § 17850.5. This “Green Marketing Act,” which has
already withstood a constitutional challenge (yet which
would again be thrust into constitutional doubt if the
California Supreme Court is overturned in this case),
provides:
— TT
12
It is unlawful for any person to make any
untruthful, deceptive or misleading
environmental marketing claim _ whether
explicit or implied. For the purpose of this
section, “environmental marketing claim”
shall include any claim contained in the
“Guides For the Use of Environmental
Marketing Claims” published by the Federal
Trade Commission.
Id. § 17850.5(2).
In enacting this statute, the California Legislature
recognized the important public interest in ensuring that
environmental claims are truthful, declaring “that it is the
public policy of the State that environmental marketing
claims, whether explicit or implied, must be substantiated by
competent and reliable evidence to prevent deceiving or
misleading consumers about the environmental impact of
products or packages. Id.; see also Welsh, Environmental
Marketing and Federal Pre-Emption of State Law: Eliminating the
“Gray” Behind the “Green,” 81 CAL. L. REV. 991 (1993);
Association of Nat'l Advertisers v. Lungren, 44 F.3d 726, 727
(9th Cir. 1994). This effort would be undermined, if not
completely undone, if this Court overrules the California
Supreme Court's holding. Moreover, the negative impact
could go much farther and cast doubt upon the
government's ability to enact any consumer protection
regulation that mandated what manufacturers could or
should say both about their products and in order to sell their
products.
///
///
///
13
Il. Truthful Information On Corporate Behavior Is
Essential To Ensuring Corporate Accountability
and Envirormental Justice.
In a speech before a crowd of Wall Street business
leaders, President George W. Bush announced, “[w]e must
usher in a new era of integrity in corporate America . . . Self
regulation is important, but it is not enough.” President
George W. Bush, Speech at the Wall Street Journal (July 9,
2002). Disillusioned Americans have been speaking out in
droves on the need for a robust ethic of corporate
responsibility, given recent financial scandals involving
corporate giants such as Enron, WorldCom and Tyco, which
caused public confidence in corporate America to fall to an
all-time low. Similarly irresponsible corporate behavior has
created the kinds of unfair labor practices, environmental
destruction, health and safety violations, injury to children
and overall deprivation of liberties that are at issue in this
case.
In the environmental arena, accurate corporate
disclosure of problems has become a mandatory obligation.
The Securities and Exchange Commission requires publicly
traded corporations to disclose environmental liabilities and
other environmental conditions that may affect profitability.
Particularly relevant to this case is the fact that even though
companies are not required to report on their general
environmental management policies, if they do those
disclosures are required to be accurate and not misleading.
Weintraub, Required Corporate Disclosure Under Security and
Exchange Commission Regulations, in THE LAW OF
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THEORY AND PROCEDURES TO
ADDRESS DISPROPORTIONATE RISK 251 (Michael B. Gerrard
ed., 1999).
The regulation of corporate behavior is also is critical
to the advancement of environmental justice. The principle
of environmental justice is rooted in the belief that all people
14
have the fundamental right to a healthy environment,
including the workplace. Dozens of laws, regulations, and
policies require the incorporation of environmental justice
principles and objectives. One of the most notable,
Executive Order 12,898 mandates “each Federal agency shall
make achieving environmental justice part of its mission by
identifying and addressing, as appropriate,
disproportionately high and adverse human health or
environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities
on minority populations and low-income populations.”
Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7,629 (Feb. 11, 1994).
Nike has been called to task for human rights,
environmental and labor violations in its factories in
Vietnam, China, Indonesia, Cambodia and Mexico. These
human rights and environmental injustices bear heavily on
Nike’s reputation in the public eye, and Nike should be held
accountable for truth in its image-making.
The global implications of Nike’s behavior do not
lessen the need for domestic regulation of its commercial
behavior. Corporate actors sell their image in the domestic
market and overseas, and in fact tend to violate the law
worse in the absence of regulation. This does nothing to
further democracy here or abroad.
The Sierra Club’s Human Rights and the
Environment Campaign echoes the U.S. Information Agency
statement on promoting environmental justice and
democracy: “Only through unfettered public debate and
free elections can human rights be protected; only through a
similar process of open debate and citizen involvement can
the environment be protected. In the end, the work of
environmental protection is the work of democracy.” Sierra
Club, Human Rights and the Environment, Reports and
Factsheets, at www:sierraclub.org /human-
rights/ factsheet.asp.
15
The American consumer increasingly demands
adherence to these same basic rights. Corporations know
they ignore these morals at their risk. Several studies and
business experts describe “failure to protect reputation . . . as
a management failure.” JUST PENSIONS: SOCIALLY
RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT AND INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT-A GUIDE FOR TRUSTEES AND FUND MANAGERS
5 (May 2001). Pricewaterhouse Coopers avows: “[S]ociety
increasingly demands that large multinational corporations
improve their performance in areas of human rights, the
environment, worker health and safety and other
governance issues. Failure to address these demands has
proved damaging to a company’s most important asset - its
reputation.” Id. at 5 (citing Peters, Human Rights: Is it any of
your Business? (Amnesty International, April 2000)).
Nike cannot be allowed to lie to the public about
factually verifiable information such as wages and
conditions in its factories, when the company’s plain motives
include commercial advantage. Environmental and all other
forms of justice are best served by holding the company
accountable for truth in its public actions.
Ill. The California Supreme Court's Decision Is
Consistent With The Commercial Speech Doctrine
And Its Emphasis On Preserving The Free Flow Of
Accurate Information To Consumers.
For 200 hundred years it was thought self-evident
that the government was free to regulate commercial
enterprises, including their speech, to protect the commerce
and the public interest. Indeed, this Court in 1942 felt the
question of whether the government may regulate
commercial advertising merited barely more than a sentence.
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (distribution of
handbill with advertising on one side and protest on the
other was advertising subject to government regulation).
The years between 1942 and 1975, however, witnessed a
eee eee
16
significant expansion in the role that advertising played in
society and an increasing uncertainty as to the Constitutional
status of some corporate speech, specifically advertising. In
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), this Court held that
commercial advertising enjoys limited first Amendment
protection.
The contours of that protection were outlined more
fully in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia’s Citizens
Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), and the Court articulated the
controlling test for assessing commercial speech regulation
in Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service Commission
of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). The resulting commercial
speech doctrine represents an enclave of limited protection
for certain types of commercial speech against a background
in which most commercial speech is not considered
protected by the First Amendment.> Thus, securities laws
regulate what the issuers of securities may say about their
company and its shares; legislation, regulation and the
common law regulate the negotiation and enforcement of
contracts; trademark and copyright law regulate what
expressions may represent a form of “property,” whose
owners can enjoin others from using; communications
between managers of different corporations can be regulated
by the Sherman Act; and the criminal law may prohibit
communications relating to fraud, extortion, bribery and
misrepresentation. See Schauer, Commercial Speech and the
Architecture of the First Amendment, 56 U. OF CIN. L. REV.
3 The backdrop against which Nike’s speech takes place is one in which
most speech is not protected. As Petitioner itself acknowledges, most
commercial speech “had received essentially no protection at all”
Petitioner's Brief at 25. The limited protection commercial speech has
received is grounded entirely on the benefits to the public of receiving
truthful information that is of interest to individual purchasing decisions.
Thus, the default position is not, as Petitioner would have it, that if the
commercial speech doctrine does not apply, full First Amendment
protection does. Rather, the presumption is that the government is fully
empowered to regulate commercial activity, including related speech,
unless that speech is covered by the commercial speech doctrine.
17
1181, 1184 (1988); see also Post, The Constitutional Status of
Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 20-21 (2000)
(hereinafter Post, Constitutional Status) (quoting same).
Thus, it is clear that all manner of “commercial”
communications are not protected by the First Amendment.
Within the commercial speech doctrine, many
governmental restrictions are permissible that would not be
permissible under traditional First Amendment doctrine.
Thus, in the area of commercial speech there is no
prohibition on compelled or forced speech such as
mandatory warning labels, listing of nutritional elements,
chemical composition, ingredients, etc. The overbreadth
doctrine and the prohibition on prior restraints are similarly
suspended. See Post, Constitutional Status at 25-26. The First
Amendment protection that was extended to commercial
speech in the Virginia Pharmacy case, and which has been
subsequently reaffirmed many times, encompassed only
commercial speech that was “truthful and not misleading.”
“The First Amendment's concern for commercia| speech is
based on the informational function of advertising.
Consequently, there can be no constitutional objection to the
suppression of commercial messages that do not accurately inform
the public about lawful activity.” Central Hudson, 447 US. at
563 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted); see also
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 423 U.S. 765, 783
(1978). Thus, speech that is not “truthful” does not qualify
for even the limited protection available under the
commercial speech doctrine.
It was because of the public interest in truthful
commercial speech that this Court extended limited
protection to commercial speech in the first place.
So long as we preserve a predominately free
enterprise economy, the allocation of our
resources in large .neasure will be made
through numerous. private economic
ee
a ee
18
decisions. It is a matter of public interest that
those decisions, in the aggregate, be
intelligent and well informed. To this end,
the free flow of commercial information is
indispensable.
Virginia Pharmacy at 765. Nevertheless, the Court did not
conclude that because the free flow of information was
“indispensable,” the government was powerless to see that it
was also a “clean” flow. The Court stated, “[t]he First
Amendment . . . does not prohibit the State from insuring
that the stream of commercial information flows cleanly as
well as freely.” Virginia Pharmacy at 771-72.
To the contrary, the Court concluded that the
government could, in this area, regulate precisely what it
could not regulate in other areas - truth. This power to
regulate was held unproblematic because “the truth of
commercial speech . . . may be more easily verifiable by its
disseminator . . . . [because it] presumably knows more
about [its product] than anyone else.” Virginia Pharmacy at
772 n.24. This applies equally here, where Nike makes
representations about its products and the conditions under
which they are manufactured. Although it is in the best
position to know the truth regarding its manufacturing
processes and products, Nike would very much like to be
free of the responsibility to tell the truth.
Contrary to Nike’s claim that its failure to provide
truthful information in this regard is not a “commercial
harm,” see Petitioner's Brief at 35-37, Nike’s own actions
demonstrate that it regards its image as a part of what it sells
to the public. Therefore, all information affecting how the
company is perceived may ultimately affect sales. That Nike
would like the public to perceive its products as “‘cooler’
than the competition's,” see Petitioner's Brief at 27, is beyond
peradventure. The public exposure of Nike’s labor practices
made the company’s product seem “un-cool,” particularly
19
with young college students who make up an important part
of Nike’s market. Nike’s statements were intended to
restore the “cool” to Nike. That “cool” is undoubtedly
connected to Nike’s labor practices and is not solely related
to price, product quality and the like, as Petitioner would
like this Court to believe. See Petitioner's Brief at 35( nv
suggestion that products were defective or dangerous or of
lesser quality). “The physical properties of . . . goods are
important only to the degree that they affect consumers’
perceptions!” SETTLE & ALRECK, WHY THEY BUY: AMERICAN
CONSUMERS INSIDE AND OUT 70 (1986) (emphasis omitted).
See also Piety, “Merchants of Discontent”: An Exploration of the
Psychology of Advertising, Addiction, and the Implications for
Commercial Speech, 25 SEATTLE L. REV. 377, 409-10 (2001). In
the clothing business, as in many other enterprises,
perception is all-important. And perceptions of the sort that
Nike was attempting to create are an integral part of any
manufacturer's advertising and promotional efforts. This is
demonstrated by the surge of companies marketing
themselves as “green.”
IV. Petitioner's Claims That This Decision Unfairly
Balances A Debate About A Matter Of Public
Concern And That It Will Have A “Chilling Effect”
On Accurate Information, Should Be Rejected As
Unfounded And Inaccurate.
A. This Case Is Not About The Merits Of
Globalization.
Nike would like for this Court to believe that this is a
case about globalization, Petitioner's Brief at 2, or “broader
social and moral issues,” rather than merely selling sneakers.
Id. at 41. However, the statements at issue here were not
about the merits or demerits of globalization, a subject about
which reasonable people may differ. Rather, its comments
were about the facts of labor conditions in its factories. Nike
wanted consumers, and those in a position to influence
20
consumer choices through purchasing decisions or
reporting, to believe that the charges made against it in the
press were untrue. Kasky claims that Nike attempted to
create this belief without regard to the truth of its claims.
Yet Nike urges this Court recognize a Constitutional right
for Nike to respond to its critics with misinformation
packaged as a “valuable contribution to public
understanding and discussion ....” See Petitioner's Brief at
41. It is difficult to understand how misinformation
contributes anything to “public understanding.” Indeed,
with respect to commerce, this Court has said that
misinformation most unequivocally does not contribute to
public understanding, and is in fact antithetical to the well-
being of the market. See, e.g., Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563
(“The government may ban forms of communication more
likely to deceive the public than to inform it”). Nike cannot
insulate itself from this responsibility by claiming that these
facts are also relevant to the debate on globalization.4
///
///
///
4 In Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 US. 469 (1989), the Supreme Court
considered whether a state university regulation that prohibited
“Tupperware parties” violated the First Amendment because the
company’s advocacy of home economics - such as advice on how to be
financially responsible and how to run an efficient home - was Claimed to
be “inextricably intertwined” with the sale of Tupperware. Writing for
the majority, Justice Scalia first rejected the effort to categorize such speech
as non-commercial, stating that “[njo law of man or nature makes it
impossible to sell housewares without teaching home economics, or to
teach home economics without selling housewares . . .. Nothing in the
nature of things requires [these non-commercial messages] to be combined
with commercial messages.” Id. at 474.
21
B. Requiring Nike To Ascertain The Accuracy
Of Its Statements Before Disseminating
Them Does Not Impose An Onerous
Burden.
As this Court observed in Virginia Pharmacy, “|t]he
truth of commercial speech . .. may be more easily verifiable
by its disseminator than, let us say, news reporting or
political commentary, in that ordinarily the advertiser seeks
to disseminate information about a specific product or
service that he himself provides and presumably knows more
about than anyone else.” Id. at 772 n.24 (emphasis added). This
is in contrast to situations like that in First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, 423 U.S. 765 (1978), where corporations
sought to contribute money and speak on issues that did not
relate “to issues that materially affect its business, property,
or assets,” id. at 767, or involve matters on which it was the
source of information rather than merely a commentator
opinion. Not only is Nike in the best position to verify the
truth of its own statement, it may be the only entity in a
position to do so - at least without laborious, and perhaps
even intrusive, investigation into those operations. If it is
difficult for Petitioner to ascertain the truth of any particular
representation, how much more difficult will it be for
anycne outside of the company to discern the truth without
its cooperation, when the information is unflattering and
thus likely to hurt sales?
Cc. Claims Of Chilling Effects In This Context
Should Be Viewed With Skepticism.
Nike claims that the “chilling effect of the legal
regime approved [by California] is fact, not hypothesis or
prediction.” Petitioner's Brief at 38. Among other things
Nike notes that it has declined to participate in the Dow Jones
Sustainability Index and has declined to issue a Corporate
Responsibility Report. Id. at 39. However, the argument that
a modest state-imposed requirement that companies tell the
22
truth when they characterize their products as “sweatshop-
free” or “environmental friendly” will reduce the
willingness of companies to make honest statements about
their products should be taken with a grain of salt. It is even
more doubtful that a reasonable requirement that companies
tell the truth in touting their products will have a chilling
effect on the willingness of members of the general public to
express their views.
CONCLUSION
The citizens of California have a substantial interest
in truthful information about the market, whether or not one
goal of that advertising is to improve a corporation's image.
All advertising attempts to improve that intangible thing -
the company’s “image.” It is fair to say that the bulk of all
advertising is directed at creating a positive “feeling” or
image to be associated with the product or service. Honest
competitors in the marketplace, such as those producing
food organically, providing “clean” sources of energy, or
using sustainable techniques to harvest natural resources,
should likewise be free from the threat of unfair competitors
making false claims about their environmental practices or
products. See generally, Gardener, How Green Were My
Values: Regulation of Environmental Marketing Claims, 23 UNIV.
TOLEDO L. REV. 31 (1991).
For environmental claims - no less than for the
“sweatshop-free” claims present it this case - the
manufacturer has a near monopoly on relevant information,
putting unknowing consumers and competitors at a serious
disadvantage in their ability to investigate or refute the
manufacturer's false or misleading factual statements.
Representations, for example, that manufacturers use
“clean” sources of energy generation or make use of only
organic production practices, are based on information that
is virtually impossible to “test” in the “marketplace of ideas”
because it is largely in the hands of the company making
23
those representations. To allow fraudulent or deceptive
claims in such circumstances, so long as they are also
intended to promote favorable “corporate image,” would
allow unscrupulous companies to undermine the ability of
the marketplace to steer manufacturers toward worker - and
environment - friendly production processes.
A settled body of constitutional authority makes
clear that states retain the ability to regulate misleading
advertising, whether or not it deals with the characteristics
of a product or how it was manufactured, and whether or
not it was intended to promote a more favorable corporate
image. See, eg., In re R.M.J., 455 US. 191, 203 (1982)
(“[m]isleading advertising may be prohibited entirely”); Peel
v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n, 496 U.S. 91,
100 (1990); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 768 (1993) (“our
cases make clear that the State may ban commercial
expression that is fraudulent or deceptive without further
justification”). The Respondent in this case seeks only to
enforce California’s Unfair Business Practices statute
guaranteeing such rights. Nothing in the United States
Constitution precludes the Respondent from doing so. This
Court should uphold the California Supreme Court's
decision.
Respectfully submitted,
Patrick Gallagher
(Counsel of Record)
Kristin Henry
Denise Hoffner-Brodsky
Sierra Club
Environmental Law Program
85 Second Street, Second Floor
San Francisco, CA 94105
(415) 977-5709
(415) 977-5793 fax
24
Thomas O. McGarity
University of Texas
School of Law
727 E. Dean Keeton Street
Austin, TX 78705
Tamara R. Piety
University of Tulsa
College of Law
3120 E. 4* Place
John Rogers Hall
Tulsa, OK 74104
DATED: This 3rd day of April, 2003.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.