Respondents Brief — Stogner v. California
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No. 01-1757
In The
Supreme Court of the Anited States
SJ
MARION REYNOLDS STOGNER,
Petitioner,
Vv.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
Respondent.
¢
On Writ Of Certiorari To The Court Of Appeal
Of California, First Appellate District
¢
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT
o
BILL LOCKYER, Attorney General
MANUEL M. MEDEIROS, Solicitor General
ROBERT R. ANDERSON, Chief Assistant Attorney General
W. Scott THORPE, Special Assistant Attorney General
KELLY E. LEBEL, Deputy Attorney General
JANET GAARD, Special Assistant Attorney General,
Counsel of Record
P.O. Box 944255
Sacramento, CA 94244-2550
Telephone: (916) 324-5284
Fax: (916) 322-2630
COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Does a California statute that retroactively
changes the statute of limitations, so as to revive a previ-
ously-expired cause of action in a criminal case, on its face,
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause?
2. Does a California statute that retroactively
changes the statute of limitations, so as to revive a previ-
ously-expired cause of action in a criminal case, on its face,
violate the Due Process Clause? P
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED.....................csseccssseeeeeeees i
TABLE. OF CORR TEI SUD cccesccsceccececersscesstesssnnuin ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIEG. .................ccccsseccsseeeeeeees v
STATEMENT OF THE CASE..................cccseecceeeeeeees 1
A. Gtatubery DOGRTOURG cccescccsicsscsssinennennne 1
B. Factual and Procedural Background.............. 3
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT.................cceeeeeeee 5
PX CY)! 6. | nT ee 9
I. A RETROACTIVE CHANGE IN THE STAT-
UTE OF LIMITATIONS THAT REVIVES A
PREVIOUSLY-EXPIRED CAUSE OF AC-
TION IN A CRIMINAL CASE DOES NOT,
ON ITS FACE, VIOLATE THE EX POST
FACTO CEG wcccccccscccecesccnsssennssessennnnnnns 9
A. A Retroactive Change in the Statute of
Limitations Does Not Violate the First
Cetder CaRaGEe ..cecccesscecssesssensnenneanee 11
1. The First Calder Category Covers
Only Laws That Make Illegal An Act
That Was Legal When Committed...... 12
2. Retroactive Changes in Statutes of
Limitations Do Not Make Illegal
EE 14
a. Under California Law, A Statute
of Limitations is Not An Element
6 14
Il.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued
Page
b. A Statute of Limitations Is Not
the Type of Affirmative Defense
That Implicates the First Calder
ii ncieciscanssensesecccesovess
B. A Retroactive Change in the Statute of
Limitations Does Not Violate the Second
or Third Calder Category ....................00+
C. A Retroactive Change in the Statute of
Limitations Does Not Violate the Fourth
ae
D. The Purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause
Are Not Implicated by a Retroactive
Change in a Statute of Limitations .........
A RETROACTIVE CHANGE IN THE STAT-
UTE OF LIMITATIONS THAT REVIVES A
PREVIOUSLY-EXPIRED CAUSE OF ACTION
IN A CRIMINAL CASE DOES NOT, ON ITS
FACE, VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS
A. The Ex Post Facto Clause, Not the More
Generalized Notion of Substantive Due
Process, Governs the Constitutional In-.
B. A Change in the Statute of Limitations
Does Not Deny a Defendant Substantive
nr ccereerresnanesunccooces
1. The Expiration of a Statute of Limi-
tations Confers No Fundamental
Right or Liberty Interest....................
17
24
25
28
32
32
33
- iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued
Page
2. California Penal Code Section 803(g)
Serves a Legitimate State Interest That
Is Furthered By Rational Means............ 38
C. Petitioner’s Right to A Fair Trial is Pro-
tected by Procedural Due Process............ 45
SUED dicnbeiadinicheaiicabhininabb lenin tt kere tenes 47
—
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES:
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994).................0.. 8, 32, 34
Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167 (1925)................ 14, 21, 28, 33
Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964) .......... 13, 14
Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386 (1798) .............cccccceeeseeeeees passim
Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513 (2000)................00.004. passim
Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304
iit scilincstssinnntaceniennainieapniniiideinminiainaniadaiiia 7, 30, 34, 35, 36
Clements v. United States, 266 F.2d 397 (9th Cir.
IST hicsineensibseihtetiaeaihapieniaaatiitaaitantaenitinainiatiipaadibiatatneneedia 21
Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115 (1992)................. 34
Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 27 (1990)..............0+. passim
Cowan v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 4th 367, 926 P.2d
IEE tdnniishinnensininniesidiiisiniinimaaediéenbbiniiaiogsinmetiinenietndem 16
_ Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) .............cceseeeeeees 32
Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 377 (1894) ...............ccccceeeeees 18
Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998)................00+. 36
Electrical Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429
Se UIT din sicnrhaeiiihnen dines inlatt eanmaiananinanempnidumneenil 35
General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181
(STITT icedaiceieinaiattialiapasininatidiiiaei tacit iaeneiniiamensiantmitiiccnel 36
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)................cccccceeeeee 33
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel.
Schumer, 520 U.S. 939 (1997)................sccsscceereseeeees 30, 31
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) ..............ccccccceeseseeeeeeeees 15
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES -— Continued
Page
Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221 (1882).................. 19, 20, 23
Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U.S. 180 (1915)........0........ 18
Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423 (1987) ..........cccccccccececeeeeeeee 10
Moore v. State, 43 N.J.L. 203 (1881)..........cccccccccceeeeeeeeeeeees 37
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) ...........cccccccecceseeee 44
Pendergast v. United States, 317 U.S. 412 (1943)............. 16
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation v. R.A. Gray
i Ge ee Ge i iincienitinceninniitatnnnnensaninsinaiti 35, 36
People v. Bunn, 27 Cal. 4th 1, 37 P.3d 380 (2002).............. 3
People v. Crosby, 58 Cal. 2d 713, 375 P2d 839
Eira cihdttianieaentnrticdiliiintatacedasitieneniieeinansiasstiinhinnaidanedmitainicits 15, 45
People v. Frazer, 21 Cal. 4th 737, 982 P2d 180
(1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1108 (2000)............. passim
People v. Hall, 28 Cal. 3d 143, 616 P.2d 826 (1980).......... 22
People v. King, 27 Cal. 4th 29, 37 P.3d 390 (2002)............. 3
People v. Williams, 21 Cal. 4th 335, 981 P2d 42
Suara eienethccereeiiieitaiinatiateniaita inane 16
People v. Zamora, 18 Cal. 3d 538, 557 P.2d 75
Se arealevacipcttesecaidetariensdepenaneiaticideaenditeinacniceiaiaiaattesiaiainninailiasaiien 15, 45
Proctor v. Cockrell, 283 F.3d 726 (5th Cir. 2002)............... 21
Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959) ............ccccccscceeeeeees 46, 47
Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1998) ..........ccc0::ccceeeeeceseeeeeees 33
Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. ___ (2003)......... 32, 33
Stogner v. California, 99-8895................:csccsssssesessesssesceees 4
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934) .......ccccceeeeee 31
Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898)............0...0..... 19, 24
Vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES -— Continued
Page
Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112 (1970) ................... 16
United States v. Bischel, 61 F.3d 1429 (9th Cir.
TTTITTTI sic tineepetiiiiigaipciga anpaaaetateadiaiemmeneemnnt 21
United States v. Brechtel, 997 F.2d 1108 (5th Cir.
EE Se ee | eee 21
United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26 (1994)..................08 36
United States v. Cook, 84 U.S. 168 (1872)............cccccceeeeees 16
United States v. Danzey, 594 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1979) ....... 22
United States v. Garcia-Rosa, 876 F.2d 209 (1st Cir.
TTI as cpiaenestaetieinaaiaatitehl chee iainiiemnaiaeaamiemnaninmnmmentetenennieeets 22
United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 84 (D. Pa. 1809)............. 20
United States v. Knipp, 963 F.2d 839 (6th Cir. 1992)........ 21
United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977) ..........:...0++ 46
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971)............. 37, 46
United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978)............cccceceeeeees 15
Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Company, 428 U.S.
Ei iciincnsccncictagnattinncasomumenemaniineonamestinmasmnnnne 35, 36
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)....33, 34, 38
Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981)...........ccccccceeseeeeeeees 10
William Danzer & Co. v. Gulf & Ship Island R.R.
oe jf | 35
CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES:
U.S. Const.:
Article I, section 10 (Ex Post Facto Clause)........... passim
Fourteenth Amendment (Due Process Clause) ..... passim
Vili
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued
Page
Cal. Penal Code:
yaaa ieteteisenecemenionalitanitiginmmeatntaahliiiaiati acetate 16
| ETN ee eM E ae RD, et GO 3
ee eT 1
SE siietaiepinliaaeateieeniinmatitniit taint e 1
EE en ee: passim
IN iiitiheaitiieiainii iat ili cael el 44
resisteth 1, 44
Ene Ne 3
ITT vethieiceetarcictaiinttasntaientsinitindns liar siaaaatiata 1, 44
MISCELLANEOUS:
Analysis of A.B. 2014 (Boland) for Cal. Asm.
Comm. on Public Safety hearing, April 9, 1996......... 39
A.B. 2014 (Boland), 1995-96 Sess.; Ch. 130, Stats.
Sivas ereceesnsinyciencnpanennatnaniiaitandindbanaseipupinttainnedinanatiintnasina 39
21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 291 (1998)..........0..000... 37
1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 46...............ccccccceee. 12, 16
Briere & Runtz, Post Sexual Abuse Trauma: Data
and Implications for Clinical Practice, 2 Jour-
nal of Interpersonal Violence (1987)..............ccc00000+0. 40
Browne & Finkelhor, Initial and Long-Term
Effects: A Review of the Research, A Sourcebook
on Child Sexual Abuse (Sage Publications,
SU ecertscicnlcreciesannpseianiaitniveitieninianaiatibasatatsiaatesiiis abit 41
Chafee, Three Human Rights in the Constitution
er ee cincatincinasiintiniitatinitiinininaieampisithiieiniiinin aes 12, 13
ix
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued
Page
Hanson, et al., Long-Term Recicivism of Child
Molesters, Journal of Consulting and Clinical
Psychology, Vol. 61, No. 4 (1993)..........:cccceeseeeeeeeeeneees 41
Lyon, Scientific Support for Expert Testimony on
Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation, in Conte,
Critical Issues in Child Sexual Abuse (Sage
Petia Bi cccccsececcocccccsscsccececccessccncnessesvseessenesed 40
1 Myers, Evidence in Child Abuse and Neglect
Cases, § 4.2 (2d ed. 1992) ...........ccccccseeeeeeeseeeeeeeeeeees 41
Perkins and Boyce, Criminal Law (3d ed. 1982)........... 25
Prentky, et al., Recidivism Rates Among Child
Molesters and Rapists: A Methodological
Analysis, Law and Human Behavior, Vol. 31,
8 sqeoevensncusensenesencnenesed 42
2 Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses, Nonexculpa-
tory Defenses, § 202(b)..........cssesseseeerseesessesterseretens 15
Summit, Abuse of the Child Sexual Abuse Ac-
commodation Syndrome, Child Abuse and Ne-
mined BFE CRBBED ...cesocecerceccosccevecccccscssvevsesssescsnssccesosseces 40
Urquize & Capra, The Impact of Sexual Abuse:
Initial and Long-Term Effects, What If the Vic-
tim is Male? The Assessment and Treatment of
the Sexually Maltreated Male (Lexington
a 41
U.S. Department of Justice, When the Victim is a
I Ci ccecscccvscccsccsvcesssccssnsestsonnsvczccvesssescesssoscevesed 31
1 Wharton’s Criminal Law § 92 (15th ed. 1993)............ 37
2 R. Wooddeson, A Systematical View of the Laws
of England 621 (1742) (Lecture 41) ................. 8, 13, 28
—,
1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Statutory Background
The California Penal Code generally provides that the
prosecution of an alleged child molester must be com-
menced within a fixed number of years after the crime was
committed. Cal. Pen. Code §$§ 800, 801. In 1994, the
California Legislature enacted California Penal Code
section 803(g), thereby adding an exception to the statu-
tory scheme.
Section 803(g) provides that, notwithstanding the
normally-applicable statute of limitations, a complaint
alleging the commission of a specified sex offense against a
child may be filed within one year of the date the victim
reports the crime to a California law enforcement agency if
certain conditions are met. First, the crime must have
involved substantial sexual conduct, which is defined to
mean vaginal penetration or rectal penetration by a penis
or a foreign object, oral copulation, or mutual masturba-
tion. Cal. Pen. Code §§ 803(g)(2)(B), 1203.066(b). Second,
charges may be filed only if there is “independent evidence
that clearly and convincingly corroborates the victim’s
allegation.” Cal. Pen. Code § 803(g)(2)B). “No evidence
may be used to corroborate the victim’s allegation that
otherwise would be inadmissible during trial,” and
“[iIndependent evidence does not include the opinions of
mental health professionals.” Id.
Following the enactment of section 803(g), several
state court of appeal decisions held that it could not be
applied to cases in which the normally-applicable statute
of limitations had expired prior to January 1, 1994, the
effective date of the provision. Some of these courts held
the Legislature had not intended section 803(g) to be
2
applied retroactively; others opined it would violate ex post
facto principles. Still other courts found no statutory or
constitutional bar to applying the statute retroactively. See
People v. Frazer, 21 Cal. 4th 737, 745-46 & nn.5-8, 982
P.2d 180 (1999) (discussing history of the provision), cert.
denied, 529 U.S. 1108 (2000).
In 1996, the California Legislature responded to those
courts that were reluctant to apply the statute retroac-
tively. By nearly unanimous vote, the Legislature
amended section 803(g) to expressly state its intention
that the law be applied retroactively. The amendment also
made explicit the Legislature’s intent to revive previously-
expired causes of action if the requirements of section
803(g) were met. See People v. Frazer, 21 Cal. 4th at 746-
47; see also infra notes 6 and 7 and accompanying text.
Three years later, in People v. Frazer, 21 Cal. 4th 737,
the California Supreme Court addressed the questions of
whether retroactive application of section 803(g), on its
face, violated the Ex Post Facto Clause or the Due Process
Clause of the United States Constitution or the California
Constitution. That Court held that retroactive application
of the statute was not barred as a matter of either federal
or state constitutional law. A retroactive change in the
statute of limitations, the court found, does not fall within
one of the four proscribed categories of laws that violates
ex post facto principles. The expiration of a statute of
limitations also confers no fundamental right, and, be-
cause California Penal Code section 803(g) is well-suited to
addressing the serious concerns that prompted the statute,
it does not violate substantive due process. The defen-
dant’s protection from the prejudicial loss of evidence, if
any, the court held, would come from procedural due
3
process guarantees.’ This Court declined to review that
decision. 529 U.S. 1108. ps
B. Factual and Procedural Background
In 1998, during the course of an investigation of
petitioner’s son, who was suspected of sexually abusing his
stepdaughter, the police interviewed petitioner’s daughter.
She said she was not surprised by the allegation, because
that brother had molested her as a child. She also re-
ported, for the first time, that her father, the petitioner,
had molested her as a child. The investigation led the
police to petitioner’s other daughter, who also reported, for
the first time, that petitioner had molested her as a child.
The victims reported that petitioner had subjected them to
acts of oral copulation, sodomy, intercourse, and digital
penetration. (Contra Costa County Indictment No.
010398-6, Reporter’s Transcript (hereafter RT) 36-116.)
Within three months of the victims’ reports, the State
of California charged petitioner with two counts of lewd or
lascivious conduct with a child under the age of 14 years,
in violation of California Penal Code section 288(a). (RT
37.) The first count alleged petitioner molested his older
daughter between January 1, 1955 and September 30,
1964; the second count alleged he molested his younger
' Subsequently, the California Supreme Court held that a second
amendment to the statute, enacted in 1997, to permit the refiling of
previously-dismissed cases under narrowly-defined circumstances, Cal.
Pen. Code, § 803(g(3(B), in some instances violates the separation of
powers clause of the California Constitution. People v. Bunn, 27
Cal. 4th 1, 37 P.3d 380 (2002); People v. King, 27 Cal. 4th 29, 37 P.3d
398 (2002). That provision is not in issue in this case.
4
daughter between January 1, 1967 and September 27,
1973. Because the normally-applicable statute of limita-
tions had expired, the prosecution was commenced pursu-
ant to California Penal Code section 803(g). (J.App. A at 1-
4.)
Petitioner demurred, arguing that retroactive applica-
tion of section 803(g) violates the ex post facto provisions of
the state and federal constitutions. The trial court sus-
tained the demurrer, and the People appealed. (J.App. B at
5-6.) The California Court of Appeal reversed, holding it
was bound by the California Supreme Court’s decision in
People v. Frazer, 21 Cal. 4th 737. (J.App. B. at 6-8.) After
the California Supreme Court denied discretionary review,
petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari in this
Court, alleging that Frazer was wrongly decided. This -
Court denied the petition. Stogner v. California, 99-8895.
The complaint was reinstated, but it subsequently
was dismissed on the People’s motion because the prosecu-
tor had obtained a grand jury indictment. (J.App. G at 21.)
The indictment, filed in March 2001, charged petitioner
with the same crimes as charged in the complaint, and it
alleged the prosecution was commenced pursuant to
California Penal Code section 803(g). (J.App. D.)
Petitioner demurred to the indi: ment. The triai court
overruled the demurrer (J.App. E), and petitioner sought
review in the California Court of Appeal. In an unpub-
lished portion of its opinion, that court, again, held that it
was bound by Frazer, and it denied petitioner’s claim.
(J.App. F.) The court denied petitioner’s motion for rehear-
ing, and the California Supreme Court denied review.
(J.App. H, I.)
eee A gE TT TL EN eT
RR
5
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
California Penal Code section 803(g) retroactively
changes — and effectively extends — the statute of limita-
tions applicable to specified acts of child molestation. This
sensible piece of legislation, designed to address a serious
societal problem, violates neither the Ex Post Facto Clause
nor the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause of the
United States Constitution.
1. The Ex Post Facto Clause was adopted in response
to egregious acts of political retribution in common law
England. As explained by Justice Chase in Calder v. Bull,
3 Dall. 386 (1798), its purpose was to protect against four
specified categories of laws. Over the ensuing two centu-
ries, this Court has repeatedly affirmed the four Calder
categories as the exclusive definition of the Ex Post Facto
Clause’s protections. The retroactive extension of a statute
of limitations does not fall within any of those categories.
A law comes under the first Calder category when it
declares to be a crime conduct that was not prohibited at
the time it was commitied. Such a law, which can operate
by changing the legal definition or elements of existing
offenses, punishes a citizen for conduct he had no reason
to believe was prohibited. A statute of limitations does not
fit within this category because it has no bearing on the
definition of the offense as established by the elements of
the crime. By pleading the statute of limitations, a defen-
dant simply asserts that, by virtue of an extrinsic condi-
tion unrelated to the commission of the offense, he cannot
be prosecuted for the crime. It bears absolutely no relation
to guilt or innocence, which is the concern of the first
Calder category. Petitioner seeks to overcome this reason-
- ing by arguing that, as a matter of California law, the —
6
statute of limitations is an element of criminal offenses. To
the contrary, the California Supreme Court recently and
definitively held it is not.
Petitioner also relies on Collins v. Youngblood, 497
U.S. 27 (1990), where this Court explained that a law may
violate the first Calder category if it deprives a person
charged with a crime of a defense available at the time the
act was committed. The Court made clear in Collins,
however, that the Ex Post Facto Clause is not violated any
time a State withdraws a defense or alters the situation of
the defendant to his or her disadvantage. Rather, the
Court reaffirmed that the types of defenses covered by the
first Calder category are those that would change the
definition or elements of the charged crime or involve an
excuse or justification for the underlying conduct. A
statute of limitations, though a defensive measure, is
unrelated to the definition of a crime or its elements. It is
unlike true defenses, such as self-defense or heat of
passion, which transform what would have been a crimi-
nal act into something that is not criminal or is of a lesser
criminal nature.
Nor does _section 803(g) fall within the remaining
Calder categories. The second and third categories pro-
hibit laws that affect punishment, either by creating: a
punishment or by making an existing punishment more
severe. A change in the statute of limitations, standing
alone, simply has no bearing on how a crime will be
punished.
The fourth Calder category prohibits laws that alter
the legal rules of evidence and receive less, or different,
testimony than the law required at the time the crime was
committed, in order to convict the offender. A change in the
statute of limitations does none of those things. It merely
7
regulates the time at which a crime, defined and punished
elsewhere, may be charged. Even if applied retroactively,
such a change does nothing to alter the State’s evidentiary
burden to prove the defendant’s guilt by establishing
beyond a reasonable doubt all the elements of the charged
crimes as they existed when the crime was committed. The
quantum and kind of proof required to establish the
defendant’s guilt, and all questions that may be considered
by the trier of fact in determining guilt or innocence
remain the same. In Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513 (2000),
this Court explained that the fourth category is a mirror
image of the first category. And just as section 803(g) does
not fall within the first category, it also does not fall within
the fourth category.
A holding that section 803(g) violates the Ex Post
Facto Clause would not serve any of the clause’s purposes.
First, individuals quite obviously do not rely on statutes of
limitations when they commit crimes. Second, no showing
has been made that the California Legislature vindictively
targeted petitioner or a class of defendants when it en-
acted section 803(g). Third, and finally, the provision does
not implicate constitutional fairness concerns. Statutes of
limitations are a form of legislative grace based on “neces-
sity and convenience,” whose “operation does not discrimi-
nate between the just and the unjust claim.” Chase
Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945). By
retroactively extending the limitations period, California
has provided a heightened degree of justice to both the
accused and accuser.
2. Aretroactive change in the statute of limitations,
then, does not violate any of the four Calder categories,
and so is not proscribed by the Ex Post Facto Clause. That
clause provides the explicit textual source of constitutional
8
protection against retroactive changes in the law. Accord-
ingly, the Ex Post Facto Clause, and not the more general-
ized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide
for assessing petitioner’s claim. See Albright v. Oliver, 510
U.S. 266 (1994). Independent scrutiny of that claim under
the Due Process Clause is foreclosed.
—s
Even if petitioner’s claim were separately analyzed
under this Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence,
it would fail. The expiration of a statute of limitations
confers no fundamental right or liberty interest; it is
simply a public policy about the privilege to litigate. An
inviolate right to repose after the statute of limitations has
expired, such that a previously-existing cause of action
cannot be revived, is not deeply imbedded in our Nation’s
history and tradition. And although a change in the
statute of limitations may affect settled expectations, it is
not so implicit in the concept of ordered liberty that
neither liberty nor justice would exist if it were permitted.
Hence, it does not deny a defendant due process of law
unless there is not a rational basis for the law.
California Penal Code section 803(g) was enacted in
response to two significant concerns identified by the
California Legislature: the need to convict and punish
those who sexually abuse children; and the need to pre-
vent the victimization of more children. Section 803(g),
which extends the statute of limitations in specified
circumstances, is narrowly drawn to effectuate the signifi-
cant purposes it was designed to serve. The statute, on its
face, does not violate the Due Process Clause.
Instead, a defendant may find protection in the
procedural component of the Due Process Clause. If he
believes he has been prejudiced by a change in the statute
Se
9
of limitations, he may challenge the prosecution by mak-
ing a factual showing that the change affects the accuracy
or fairness of a determination of his guilt. Any procedural
due process claim pétitioner may have, however, is not
ripe for adjudication.
¢
ARGUMENT
I. ARETROACTIVE CHANGE IN THE STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS THAT REVIVES A PREVI-
OUSLY-EXPIRED CAUSE OF ACTION IN A
CRIMINAL CASE DOES NOT, ON ITS FACE,
VIOLATE THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSE
Article I, section 10, of the United States Constitution
expressly prohibits the states from enacting ex post facto
laws. This prohibition derives from English common law,
well known to the Framers, which drew heavily upon the
authoritative exposition of Richard Wooddeson, one of the
great scholars of the common law. Carmell v. Texas, 529
U.S. 513, 521-22 (2000); Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 391
(1798). Wooddeson classified ex post facto laws by dividing
them into three general categories: those respecting the
crimes themselves; those respecting the legal rules of
evidence; and those affecting punishment, either by
creating a punishment or by making an existing punish-
ment more severe. 2 R. Wooddeson, A Systematical View of
the Laws of England 621, 624-40 (1742) (Lecture 41)
(hereinafter Wooddeson); Carmell, 529 U.S. at 523 & n.11.
The proscription stems from the excesses of colonial
rulers in using retrospective legislation as a means of
political warfare and retribution. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. at
388-89. It serves “to assure that legislative Acts give fair
10
warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on
their meaning until explicitly changed.” Weaver v. Gra-
ham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1981). It also “restricts govern-
mental power by restraining arbitrary and potentially
vindictive legislation.” Jd. at 29; see also Miller v. Florida,
482 U.S. 423, 429-30 (1987) (citing Calder, 3 Dall. at 389).
“The latter purpose has much to do with the separation of
powers; like its textual and conceptual neighbor the Bill of
Attainder Clause, the Ex Post Facto Clause aims to ensure
that legislatures do not meddle with the judiciary’s task of
adjudicating guilt and innocence in individual cases.”
Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. at 566 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(citing Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29 n.10). And, by protecting
against legislative abuses, the Clause serves “fundamental
justice.” Carmell, 529 U.S. at 531 n.21.
Shortly after the Constitution was ratified, in Calder
v. Bull, Justice Chase catalogued the types of criminal
laws that implicate the core concern of the Zx Post Facto
Clause:
lst. Every law that makes an action done before
the passing of the law, and which was innocent
when done, criminal; and punishes such action.
2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes
it greater than it was, when committed. 3d.
Every law that changes the punishment, and in-
flicts a greater punishment, than the law an-
nexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every
law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and re-
ceives less, or different, testimony, than the law
required at the time of the commission of the of-
fence, in order to convict the offender.
3 Dall. at 390. This formulation “correlated precisely” to
Wooddeson’s categories, Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. at 523,
eteethilieat antennae
11
and it has repeatedly been endorsed by this Court as the
“exclusive definition of ex post facto laws,” Collins v.
Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42 (1990) (quoting Fletcher v.
Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 138 (1810)); see Carmell, 529 U.S. at
537-39.
Petitioner asserts that a retroactive change in the
statute of limitations violates all four Calder categories.
(Pet. Br. 6-31.) Amici curiae in support of petitioner claim
it transgresses the first and fourth categories. (NACDL Br.
5-15.) To the contrary, a change in the statute of limita-
tions, even if applied retroactively so as to revive a previ-
ously-expired cause of action, does not fit within any of the
four Calder categories of proscribed ex post facto laws. Nor
would barring a retroactive change in the statute of
limitations serve any of the purposes of the Ex Post Facto
Clause.
A. A Retroactive Change in the Statute of
Limitations Does Not Violate the First
Calder Category
The first Calder category addresses the universally
condemned action by the government of criminalizing
conduct that was innocent when done. A retroactive
change in the statute of limitations, even if applied so as
to revive a previously-expired cause of action, does not do
that. Instead, the statute of limitations simply acts as a
bar to prosecution, without regard to guilt or innocence.
12
1. The First Calder Category Covers Only
Laws That Make Illegal An Act That
Was Legal When Committed
According to Blackstone, a law is ex post facto when
“after an action (indifferent in itself) is committed, the
legislator then for the first time declares it to have been a
crime.” 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 46, quoted in
Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. at 44; Calder, 3 Dall. at
396 (Paterson, J.). “Here it is impossible, that the party
could foresee that an action, innocent when it was done,
should be afterwards converted to guilt by a subsequent
law; he had, therefore, no cause to abstain from it; and all
punishment for not abstaining, must, of consequence be
cruel and unjust.” 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 46,
quoted in Calder, 3 Dall. at 396 (Paterson, J.); Chafee,
Three Human Rights in the Constitution of 1787, at 96
(1956). This historical reference was discussed by the
Framers during debates on the Ex Post Facto Clause, and
it was deemed an authoritative source of the technical
meaning of the term in Calder. Collins v. Youngblood, 497
U.S. at 44 (citing Calder, 3 Dall. at 391 (Chase, J.) and id.
at 396 (Paterson, J.)).
Justice Chase explained that the “very nature of our
free Republican governments” is “that no man should be
compelled to do what the laws do not require; nor to
refrain from acts which the laws permit.” Calder, 3 Dall. at ©
388. Accordingly, it would be an abuse of power for a
legislature to enact a “law that punished a citizen for an
innocent action, or, in other words, for an act, which, when
done, was in violation of no existing law.” Id. A legislature
may declare new crimes and establish rules of conduct for
its citizens in future cases, and they may command what
13
is right, and prohibit what is wrong, “but they cannot
change innocence into guilt.” Id.
Justice Chase noted that the Parliament of Great
Britain had exercised the power to pass ex post facto laws,
under the denomination of bills of attainder or bills of
pains and penalties. Calder, 3 Dall. at 389. As an example
of the first category of these laws, which made innocent
acts criminal, Justice Chase, like Wooddeson before him,
cited the case of the Ear! of Strafford in 1641. Jd. at 389 &
n.l1; Wooddeson, at 629. Being forced to find a way to
dispose of the Earl, Charles I, by bill of attainder, assem-
bled blunders and misdemeanors into a package called
“accumulative treason,” and then sent the Earl to his
death. Wooddeson, at 629-33; see Chafee, Three Human
Rights in the Constitution of 1787 at 109-13. This law, said
Justice Chase, declared acts to be treason “which were not
treason, when committed,” Calder, 3 Dall. at 388, and such
a law was an ex post facto law, in that it “created... the
crime for the purpose of conviction,” id. at 391 (emphasis
added).
A modern example is provided in Bouie v. City of
Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964), which involved a due
process challenge to the judicial creation of a retroactive
crime. In Bouie, two African-American students were
convicted of criminal trespass for participating in a sit-in
demonstration in the restaurant area of a store, which was
reserved exclusively for whites. Although they were given
no notice that the restaurant was reserved for whites
when they entered, they were later informed by the police
and asked to leave. They refused. In affirming their
convictions, the State’s high court expanded its construc-
tion of the State’s criminal trespass statute to cover not
only the entry onto another’s property after receiving
14
notice not to do so, but also the act of remaining after
receiving notice to leave. Id. at 348-49. The students
claimed that by applying such a construction to affirm
their convictions, the State had punished them for conduct
that was not criminal at the time they committed it. Jd. at
349-50. This Court agreed. “If South Carolina had applied
to this case its new statute prohibiting the act of remain-
ing on the premises of another after being asked to leave,
the constitutional proscription of ex post facto laws would
clearly invalidate the convictions.” Jd. at 362.
The first Calder category is concerned with “the
criminal quality attributable to an act” as related to “the
legal definition of the offense” at the time it occurs. Beazell
v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 170 (1925). What a legislature may
not do is create a new substantive offense by altering the
elements that describe the criminal act itself so as to
create a crime where there was none before. California did
not do so when it enacted Penal Code section 803(g).
2. Retroactive Changes in Statutes of
Limitations Do Not Make Illegal Con-
duct That Was Legal When Committed
a. Under California Law, A Statute of
Limitations is Not An Element of
the Offense
Petitioner attempts to bring his case within this
definition by casting the statute of limitations as an
element of a criminal offense under California law. (Pet.
Br. i, 13-15, 23-24.) The California Supreme Court, the
final arbiter of state law, has said it is not. In that court’s
words, “the statute of limitations is not an ‘element’ of the
offense insofar as the ‘definition’ of criminal conduct is
15
concerned.” People v. Frazer, 21 Cal. 4th at 760 n.22; see
also People v. Crosby, 58 Cal. 2d 713, 723-24, 375 P.2d 839
(1962) (quoting People v. McGill, 10 Cal. App. 2d 155, 159, -
51 P.2d 433 (1935)).
Indeed, if the filing of criminal charges within the
statute of limitations were an element of the crime, a
defendant could be found guilty only if the prosecution
established that fact by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-62 (1970). Under
California law, however, while the prosecution has the
burden of proving that a prosecution was initiated within
the statutory period, it need ¢o so only by a preponderance
of the evidence. People v. Zamora, 18 Cal. 3d 538, 565
n.27, 557 P.2d 75 (1976).
That statutes of limitations are not elements of
offenses under California law is hardly surprising. A
statute of limitations “operates to preclude the imposition
of criminal liability on defendants, notwithstanding a
showing that they committed criminal acts.” United States
v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 111 (1978) (Brer an, J. dissenting).
It is a “nonexculpatory defense,” which “bars conviction of
an offender even though he may be entirely culpable.” 2
Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses, Nonexculpatory De-
fenses, § 202(b), at 465 (1984), quoted in People v. Frazer,
21 Cal. 4th at 758 n.20. By pleading the statute of limita-
tions, a defendant simply asserts that by virtue of an
extrinsic condition, which is unrelated to the commission
of the offense, he is not subject to prosecution for the
crime. And as this Court has explained, “a defendant who
has been released by a court for reasons required by the
Constitution or laws, but which are unrelated to factual
guilt or innocence, has not been determined to be innocent
in any sense of that word.” Scott, 437 U.S. at 98 n.11.
16
Accordingly, this Court has long observed that statutes of
limitations are not an element of criminal offenses. United
States v. Cook, 84 U.S. 168, 181 (1872); see also Toussie v..
United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970); Pendergast uv.
United States, 317 U.S. 412, 418 (1943).
The crimes with which petitioner is charged are set
forth in California Penal Code section 288. As the Califor-
nia Supreme Court has explained, “[S]ection 288 was
enacted in 1901, and the elements defining criminal
conduct under what is now subdivision (a) have remained
the same for decades. The crime has long involved any
touching of an underage child accomplished with the
intent of arousing the sexual desires of either the perpe-
trator or the child.” People v. Frazer, 21 Cal. 4th at 758-59
(quotation marks and citations omitted). At no time during
the charged period was the touching of an underage child
with the intent of arousing the sexual desires of the actor
or the child an innocent act, and nothing in California
Penal Code section 803(g) changes that. This simply is not
a case in which an action “indifferent in itself,” 1 W.
Blackstone, Commentaries 46, was only later declared to
be a crime. _
It is true that in California statutes of limitations are,
in many respects, jurisdictional in nature and may there-
fore be raised by defendants for the first time on appeal.
See People v. Williams, 21 Cal. 4th 335, 337-38, 981 P.2d
42 (1999) (reaffirming general rule that defendant does
not waive the statute of limitations by failing to raise it
before trial court); Cowan v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 4th
367, 370, 926 P.2d 438 (1996) (permitting defendant to
“expressly waive the statute of limitations when ... the
waiver is for his benefit”). But that is utterly beside the
point. Statutes of limitations are no more elements of
17
crimes than are facts bearing on venue, personal jurisdic-
tion, and subject matter jurisdiction - which are not
elements of crimes in California or, to our knowledge, in
any jurisdiction in the United States. For this reason, the
California Supreme Court observed in People v. Frazer
that “the manner in which California courts have charac-
terized criminal statutes of limitations outside the ex post
facto context” is not relevant to whether “the statute of
limitations is an ‘element’ of the offense insofar as the
‘definition’ of criminal conduct is concerned.” 21 Cal. 4th at
760 n.22.
b. A Statute of Limitations Is Not the
Type of Affirmative Defense That
Implicates the First Calder Category
In Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, this Court
explained that the Ex Post Facto Clause may be violated if
the state “deprives one charged with crime of any defense
available according to law at the time when the act was
committed.” Id. at 42 (quoting Beazell v. Ohio., 269 U.S. at
170). The Court made clear, however, that the withdrawal
of affirmative defenses does not constitute a discrete,
additional category of prohibited ex post facto laws.
Rather, the rule regarding defenses is “linked to the
prohibition on alterations in ‘the legal definition of the
offense’ or ‘the nature or amount of the punishment
imposed for its commission.” Collins, at 50 (quoting
Beazell, at 169-70). As to the former, the Court specified
the breadth of the prohibition: a defense may not retroac-
tively be withdrawn if that would change the definition or
elements of the charged crime or if the defense involves an
excuse or justification for the underlying conduct. Collins,
18
at 50. A statute of limitations is not the type of defense
within the scope of that prohibition.
1. In Collins v. Youngblood, Youngblood was con-
victed in a Texas court of aggravated sexual abuse and
sentenced by the jury to life in prison and a $10,000 fine.
On collateral review, a state district court held that the
sentence was void because Texas law did not permit the
imposition of a fine in addition to imprisonment, and the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had previously held that
appellate courts lacked the authority to reform such a
verdict. While the State’s appeal of the state district
court’s decision was pending, the Texas legislature enacted
a law giving appellate courts that power. Under that
authority, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reformed
Youngblood’s verdict by deleting the fine, and it denied his
request for a new trial. On federal habeas corpus review,
the court of appeals held that retroactive application of the
new Texas law violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. 497 U.S.
at 39-40. This Court reversed.
In reaching its holding, the Court overruled two of its
prior decisions, and it clarified ex post facto doctrine. The
Court previously had ruled that whereas the Ex Post Facto
Clause was not violated by mere “procedural” changes in
the law, it was violated when the state deprived a defen-
dant of “substantial protections with which the existing
law surrounds the person accused of crime,” Duncan v.
Missouri, 152 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1894), or if it arbitrarily
infringed upon “substantial personal rights,” Malloy v. South
Carolina, 237 U.S. 180, 183 (1915). In Collins, the Court
concluded that the phrases “procedural,” “substantial
protections,” and “personal rights” confused the inquiry.
497 U.S. at 45. The proper inquiry is simply whether the
OI cm
19
retroactive state law falls within one of the Calder catego-
ries. Id. at 41-52. The Court therefore overruled Thompson
v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898), which had relied on the
concept of “substantial protections,” and Kring v. Missouri,
107 U.S. 221, 228-29 (1882), which had held that any
change that “alters the situation of a party to his disad-
vantage” violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. Collins, 497
U.S. at 37-52.
The Court’s discussion of Kring is particularly perti-
nent to the present case. In Kring, the defendant had
pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, pursuant to a plea
agreement. After his conviction was reversed on appeal
because of an unlawful sentence, the state tried and
plea of guilty to second-degree murder constituted an
acquittal of first-degree murder. 107 U.S. at 221-24. This
Court held that Missouri’s abrogation of the implied-
acquittal rule after the crime was committed, but before
Kring entered his plea, violated the Ex Post Facto Clause
because, in denying Kring the benefit of an implied acquit-
tal to which he would previously have been entitled, the
change in the law “alter[ed] the situation to his disadvan-
tage.” Id. at 235. . ‘
In Collins, the Court stated that Kring might be
reconcilable with later cases if the change in Missouri law
were viewed as depriving Kring of a “defense” to which he
_previously had been entitled. 497 U.S. at 50. The Court
stated, however, that “defenses” protected by the Ex Post
Facto Clause are defenses linked to the “legal definition of
the offense.” Id. The “defense” available to Kring under
earlier Missouri law was not one related to the definition of
the crime. Missouri had not changed any of the elements of
20
the crime of murder or the matters that might be pleaded
as an excuse or justification for the conduct underlying the
charge. The holding in Kring, then, could not stand. Jd. at
50.
As an example of a case in which a defense could not
be withdrawn without violating ex post facto principles,
this Court cited United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 84 (D. Pa.
1809). Collins, 497 U.S. at 49. There, a vessel owner was
sued by the United States for forfeiture of an embargo
bond obliging him to deliver certain cargo. As a legal
excuse, the defendant asserted that a severe storm had
disabled ‘his vessel and forced him to land in Puerto Rico,
where he was forced by the Puerto Rican government to
sell the cargo. The Court explained that according to the
law in effect at the time Hall forfeited the cargo, an
“unavoidable accident” was an affirmative defense to a
charge of failing to deliver cargo. A later-enacted law,
which imposed an additional requirement for the affirma-
tive defense — that the vessel or cargo actually be lost at
sea as a result of the unavoidable accident — would have
deprived Hall of a defense of his actions available at the
time he sold the cargo. It was, therefore, an invalid ex post
facto law. Id. As this Court explained, a law that abolishes
an affirmative defense of justification or excuse contra-
venes the Ex Post Facto Clause because it expands the
scope of a criminal prohibition after the act is done. Id.
The Court in Collins concluded that the Texas statute
allowing reformation of improper verdicts did not with-
draw a defense bearing on the “definition” or “elements” of
the charged crime, or a defense involving “an excuse or
justification for the conduct underlying such a charge.”
497 U.S. at 50. Hence, the statute did not violate the Ex
Post Facto Clause. Likewise, the withdrawal of a statute of
—_—_—_—_—_———
— —
21
limitations “defense” does none of these things, and so it is
not prohibited.
2. Asserting thai a limitations period has expired is
certainly a defense in the general sense that it is a defen-
sive measure. More particularly, however, it is a matter in
bar of prosecution, which is unrelated to the definition of a
crime, see supra Part 1.A.2.a, and is not pleaded as a
nullification of one or more of its elements or as an excuse
or justification for its commission. It is, thus, distinguish-
able from a “pure” defense, which defeats an element of
‘the crime. Because it has nothing to do with the structure
of the crime or its elements, a statute of limitations is not
the typé of “defense” that implicates the first Calder
category.
In addition, an ex post facto violation exists only when
the accused is deprived of a defense “available according to
law at the time when the act was committed.” Collins, 497
US. at 42, 52; Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. at 169-70; see also
Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. at 537. A defense in this sense
only encompasses circumstances that existed at the time
the crime was committed, which exonerate or mitigate the
accused’s actions. The statute of limitations is not a
defense available at the time the act is committed, nor can
it ever be, because it does not relate to the circumstances
surrounding the crime, but only relates to the passage of
—_= —=
—_————
? See United States v. Brechtel, 997 F.2d 1108, 1113 (5th Cir. 1993);
United States v. Knipp, 963 F.2d 839, 843-44 (6th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Bischel, 61 F.3d 1429, 1435-36 (9th Cir. 1995); Clements v.
United States, 266 F.2d 397, 399 (9th Cir. 1959); see also Proctor v. Cockrell,
283 F.3d 726, 736 (5th Cir. 2002) (upholding statute retroactively shifting
(Continued on following page)
22
Although a statute of limitations provides a potential
bar to prosecution at a later date, it is “available” only to
the extent that, if the State fails to prosecute within a
specified period of time, the defendant may invoke it to
prevent his prosecution. The incipient nature of a statute
of limitations defense at the time the crime is committed
makes evident the fundamental difference in purpose and
effect between it and a defense of the type described in
Collins. A statute of limitations has no effect on the crimi-
nal nature of an act; a person who is successful in assert-
ing a statute of limitations bar is just as much a criminal ~
as he or she was the day the act was committed. In con-
trast, “pure” defenses, such as self-defense and heat of
passion, are available at the time the crime is committed.
Because they relate to an element of the defense, if suc-
cessful they transform what otherwise would have been a
criminal act into something that is not criminal or is of a
lesser criminal nature when applied to the defendant.’
It is well-settled by both state and federal courts that
the statute of limitations may be extended during its term
without running afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause. See
People v. Frazer, 21 Cal. 4th at 760-65 & n.25 (collecting
the burden of proof to the defendant to establish the statute of limita-
tions as a defense).
* Likewise, the State could not retroactively abolish the defense of
mistaken identification. Identity, meaning the doing of the criminal act
by the defendant, is an essential element of any crime. United States v.
Garcia-Rosa, 876 F.2d 209, 224 n.12 (1st Cir. 1989); see United States v.
Danzey, 594 F.2d 905, 911-14 (2d Cir. 1979); eg. People v. Hall, 28
Cal. 3d 143, 158-59, 616 P.2d 826 (1980). Petitioner is therefore wrong
in asserting that the State’s position would permit legislation that
retroactively abolishes that defense. (Pet. Br. 23-24)
23
cases). But if a statute of limitations is a defense available
at the time of the crime within the meaning of the Ex Post
Facto Clause, then an extension of the statute of limita-
tions prior to its expiration is just as much a violation of ex
post facto principles as is the revival of an action by a
change in the statute of limitations. Neither an extension
nor a revival violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, however,
because in neither case does the new expanded statute of
limitations retroactively affect the criminal nature of the
act. California Penal Code section 803(g) regulates the
time during which child sexual abuse, defined and pun-
ished elsewhere in the Penal Code, may be charged; it does
not impermissibly withdraw a “defense” within the mean-
ing of the Ex Post Facto Clause.
3. Recently, in Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, the
Court examined Collins and said nothing to undermine or
narrow the holding in Collins with respect to the types of
defenses protected by the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Court
in Carmell rejected the State’s claim that Collins had
“effectively cast out the fourth Calder category.” Id. at 537-
39. Te the contrary, held the Court, Collins is properly
understood as having “eliminated a doctrinal hitch” that
had developed in the cases, namely, the dichotomy dis-
cussed above between “procedural” changes and changes
with respect to “substantial protections.” Jd. at 539. And in
eliminating that hitch, stated the Court in Carmell,
Collins reestablished that Calder’s four categories are the
bounds of the Ex Post Facto Clause’s protections, beyond
which it is a mistake to stray. Id.
Carmell did not express any disapproval of the result
or reasoning of Collins (apart from describing as “cryptic”
Collins’ discussion of the fourth Calder category). 529 U.S.
at 538. The Court approved of Collins’ overruling of Kring
24
and Thompson, id., and it approved of Collins’ refusal to
create new categories of ex post facto laws, id. at 539.
Collins’ treatment of defenses remains good law, and it
defeats petitioner’s contention that section 803(g) contra-
venes the first Calder category.
B. A Retroactive Change in the Statute of
Limitations Does Not Violate the Second
or Third Calder Category
Petitioner’s claim that a retroactive expansion of the
statute of limitations violates the second and third Calder
categories (Pet. Br. 25-30) merits little discussion. Those
categories prohibit laws that affect punishment, either by
creating a punishment or by making an existing punish-
ment more severe. Carmell, 529 U.S. at 523 & n.11 (dis-
cussing Wooddeson, at 638-39). A change in the statute
* Wooddeson placed in the former category those laws “making
therein some innovation, or creating some forfeiture or disability, not
incurred in the ordinary course of laws.” Wooddeson, at 638; Carmell,
529 U.S. at 523 n.11. As examples of this category, he cited the bills
passed by Parliament that banished Lord Clarendon in 1669 and
Bishop Atterbury in 1723. Wooddeson, at 638-39. These were considered
“innovation{s} . . . not incurred in the ordinary course of laws” because
banishment, at those times, was not a form of penalty that could be
imposed by the courts. Carmell, 529 U.S. at 523 n.11 (quoting Wood-
deson at 639, and citing 11 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law
569 (1938), and Craies, The Compulsion of Subjects to Leave the Realm,
6 L. Q. Rev. 388, 396 (1890)). Justice Chase cited the same two exam-
ples. Calder, 3 Dall. 389 n.3. ,
For an example of a law that fell into the latter category, Wood-
deson cited an act passed in Charles the Second’s reign against the
persons who assaulted and wounded Sir John Coventry, declaring
assaults accompanied by personal mutilation a capital felony without
benefit of clergy. Wooddeson, at 639. The so-called “Coventry Act” did
not displace the common law of mayhem, which had been punishment
(Continued on following page)
25
of limitations, standing alone, simply has no bearing on
how a crime will be punished, and this is true whether or
not the change is applied retroactively.
C. A Retroactive Change in the Statute of
Limitations Does Not Violate the Fourth
Calder Category
There also is no basis for petitioner’s contention that
California has run afoul of the fourth Calder category,
which prohibits “Every law that alters the legal rules of
evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than
the law required at the time of the commission of the
offence, in order to convict the offender.” Calder, 3 Dall. at
390. Carmell confirmed that category’s continuing exis-
tence, but it said nothing that would make the category
applicable here.
The paradigmatic example of an act falling within the
fourth category is the case of Sir John Ferwick. Carmell,
529 U.S. at 526-31. After James II was deposed by King
William III in the Revolution of 1688, Fenwick and others
who remained loyal to James plotted against William.
Before their plan could be carried out, one of the conspira-
tors disclosed the plot to William. With the exception of
Fenwick, who went into hiding, the conspirators were
apprehended, tried, and convicted of treason. During their
by mutilation, but it provided an increased penalty for intentional
maiming and, for the first time, extended the crime to include disfig-
urement if intentional. Perkins and Boyce, Criminal Law, at 238-43 (3d
ed. 1982). Justice Chase used this same example. Calder, 3 Dall. at 389
n.4.
26
trials, it became apparent that there were only two wit-
nesses who could prove Fenwick’s guilt. By an act of
Parliament, two witnesses were necessary to convict a
person of treason. Fenwick’s wife succeeded in bribing one
of the two witnesses against Fenwick to leave the country;
without him, Fenwick could not be convicted under the
statute in effect. After the witness’s absence was discov-
ered, Parliament passed, and the King signed, a bill
making the two-witness bill inapplicable. Fenwick was
convicted oh.the testimony of only one witness, and he was
beheaded. Carmell, 529 U.S. at 526-31; Calder, 3 Dall. at
389 n.2. Parliament’s act, according to Justice Chase,
violated ex post facto principles because it “change[d] the
rules of evidence, for the purpose of conviction.” Calder, 3
Dall. at 391. This Court reaffirmed that conclusion in
Carmell, in which it stated, “the pertinent rule altered in
Fenwick’s case went directly to the general issue of guilt,
lowering the minimum quantum of evidence required to
obtain a conviction.” 529 U.S. at 534.
In Carmell, the Court reviewed the retrospective
application of a Texas law pertaining to sex offenses.
Under the law in effect at the time of the defendant’s
alleged acts, a defendant could not be convicted of speci-
fied offenses based upon the testimony of a victim unless
the victim’s testimony was corroborated by other evidence
or the victim informed another person of the offense
within six months of its commission. An exception to this
requirement applied if the victim was under the age of 14
years. The law further established a sufficiency of the
evidence rule respecting the minimum quantum of evi-
dence necessary for conviction. If the statute’s require-
ments were not met (for example, by introducing only the
uncorroborated testimony of a 15-year-old victim who did
27
not make a timely outcry), a defendant could not be
convicted and the court was required to enter a judgment
of acquittal. After the defendant's alleged crimes were
committed, Texas amended the law to extend the child
victim exception to victims under 18 years of age. As to
four of the charged counts, the amendment was critical;
those counts rested solely on the testimony of the victim,
who was 14 or 15 years old when they were alleged to have
occurred. 529 U.S. at 517-20.
This Court concluded that the circumstances of
Carmell’s case paralleled those of Fenwick’s case. Carmell,
529 U.S. at 530. Like that act of Parliament, the Texas
amendment violated the ex post facto prohibition because
it “changed the quantum of evidence necessary to sustain
a conviction.” Id. at 530; see also id. at 531, 532-33, 546.
The Court explained, -
A law reducing the quantum of evidence required
to convict an offender is as grossly unfair as, say,
retrospectively eliminating an element of the of-
fense, increasing the punishment for an existing
offense, or lowering the burden of proof. In each
of these instances, the government subverts the
presumption of innocence by reducing the num-
ber of elements it must prove to overcome that
presumption; by threatening such severe pun-
ishment so as to induce a plea to a lesser offense
or a lower sentence; or by making it easier to
meet the threshold for overcoming the presump-
tion. Reducing the quantum of evidence neces-
sary to meet the burden of proof is simply
another way of achieving the same end. All of
these legislative changes, in a sense, are mirror
images of one another....
28
Id. at 532-33 (citation and footnote omitted). The Court
concluded that “[t]he relevant question is whether the law
affects the quantum of evidence required to convict.” Id. at
551. The answer was yes with respect to the Texas statute
at issue in Carmell. -
When asked in relation to a law that changes the
statute of limitations, the answer is no. A change in the
statute of limitations does nothing to alter the State’s
evidentiary burden to prove the commission of the charged
offense; it simply regulates the time at which a crime
defined and punished elsewhere may be charged. The
State still must prove the defendant’s guilt by establishing
all the elements of the charged crimes that it would have
had to prove at the time they were alleged to have been
committed, and it still must do so by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. See People v. Frazer, 21 Cal. 4th at 760.
“The quantum and kind of proof required to establish
guilt, and all questions which may be considered by the
court and jury in determining guilt or innocence, remain
the same.” Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. at 170. Hence, this is
not the type of law that impermissibly attempts to rectify
a “deficiency of legal proof” in violation of the fourth
Calder category. Wooddeson, at 633-34, quoted in Carmell,
529 U.S. at 523-24 n.12. Indeed, it is for these same .
reasons that this also is not the type of law that violates
the first Calder category, of which it is a “mirror image.”
Carmell, 529 U.S. at 533.
D. The Purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause
Are Not Implicated by a Retroactive
Change in a Statute of Limitations
As noted at the outset, the Ex Post Facto Clause
serves to assure that legislative acts give fair warning of
— -
29
their effect so that individuals may rely on their meaning
until explicitly changed, to restrain arbitrary and poten-
tially vindictive legislation through which the legislature
would meddle with the judiciary’s task of adjudicating
guilt and innocence in individual cases, and to ensure
“fundamental justice.” To hold that a retroactive applica-
tion of a change in the statute of limitations, as set forth in
California Penal Code section 803(g), violates the Ex Post
Facto Clause would serve none of these purposes.
First, any person in California who committed a lewd
act with a child under the age of 14 years during the time
period covered by the charged offenses had ample notice
that the conduct in which he engaged wes illegal and
punishable under California law. Moreover, it defies
common sense to believe that a person might have com-
mitted that crime with the idea in mind that he could
escape liability by avoiding apprehension until the expira-
tion of the then-applicable statute of limitations. Even
could such an offender sensibly be imagined, there is
nothing unjust in disappointing that expectation by
changing the period during which he can be prosecuted.
Second, there is no indication that the California
Legislature intended to single out either petitioner or any
class of defendants for vindictive or arbitrary treatment.
Instead, Penal Code section 803(g) was a thoughtful and
narrowly tailored response to evidence that young victims
of sexual abuse often delay reporting the crimes, leaving
their perpetrators free to prey on other innocent children.
See People v. Frazer, 21 Cal. 4th at 744, 773; see also infra
Part II.B.2.
Finally, petitioner’s generalized claim of unfairness
(Pet. Br. 7) is wide of the mark. Any defendant would
30
presumably find it unfair for the legislature to enact a
statute that operates retrospectively to disadvantage him.
Yet, as discussed above, this Court has expressly held that
the Ex Post Facto Clause is not violated merely because a
retroactive law “alters the situation of a party to his disad-
vantage.” Collins, 497 U.S. at 50 (quoting Kring v. Missouri,
107 U.S. at 228-29). To the extent one may consider such
laws “unfair” or “unjust,” “they do not implicate the same
kind of unfairness” implicated by the four Calder categories.
Carmell, 529 U.S. at 533 n.23. Such “a reading of the Clause
departs from the meaning of the Clause as it was understood
at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, and is not
supported by later cases.” Collins, 427 U.S. at 50. “Moreover,
while the principle of unfairness helps explain and shape the
[Ex Post Facto] Clause’s scope, it is not a doctrine unto itself,
invalidating laws under the Ex Post Facto Clause by its own
force.” Carmell, 529 U.S. at 533 n.23.
Further weakening petitioner’s unfairness argument
is the nature of statutes of limitations themselves. Stat-
utes of limitations are an optional form of “legislative
grace,” which reflect a pragmatic determination that the
interests of the State are best served by forgoing prosecu-
tion in some cases. Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325
U.S. 304, 314 (1945). In this Court’s words, “Statutes of
limitations find their justification in necessity and conven-
ience rather than in logic.” Jd. “They are by definition
arbitrary, and their operation does not discriminate
between the just and the unjust claim.” Jd.°
* Petitioner’s amici curiae contend that Hughes Aircraft Co. v.
United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939 (1997), supports his
contention that a retroactive extension of a statute of limitations is the
(Continued on following page)
31
Petitioner also fails to recognize that fairness is a
relative concept, Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 116
(1934), and “justice, though due to the accused, is due to
the accuser also,” id. at 122. “There are few in our society
who would argue that child sexual abuse does not cause
serious problems for its victims. In addition to physical
injury, the psychological effects of victimization on chil-
dren are far-reaching, negative, and complex.” U.S. De-
partment of Justice, When the Victim is a Child, at 15
(1985); see also infra Part IL.B.2. Victims individually, and
society as a whole, are entitled to see the perpetrators of
child sexual abuse found accountable and punished. And
the children who will become victims of child sexual abuse
if perpetrators are allowed to remain free deserve the
State’s protection. See infra Part II.B.2. Fairness to
petitioner provides no basis upon which to expand the
scope of the Ex Post Facto Clause beyond the four Calder
categories in order that he may avoid prosecution.
a
=
sort of unfair legislation barred by the Ex Post Facto Clause. (NACDL
Br. 20-22.) That decision, however, addressed only the narrow question
whether, in light of the statutory presumption against retroactivity, a
statute that “essentially create[d) a new cause of action” under the
False Claims Act should be construed as applying retroactively. Id. at
950. The Court held it should not. Id. at 952. The Court in Hughes
Aircraft Co. did not apply the doctrine of constitutional doubt or
otherwise premise its decision in any way on constitutional concerns.
32
Il. A RETROACTIVE CHANGE IN THE STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS THAT REVIVES A PREVI-
OUSLY-EXPIRED CAUSE OF ACTION IN A
CRIMINAL CASE DOES NOT, ON ITS FACE,
VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
A. The Ex Post Facto Clause, Not the More Gen-
eralized Notion of Substantive Due Process,
Governs the Constitutional Inquiry -
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment contains a substantive component, sometimes
referred to as “substantive due process,” which bars
certain arbitrary government actions regardless of the
procedures used to implement them. Daniels v. Williams,
474 U.S. 327, 337 (1986). Petitioner, referencing a “funda-
mental right of liberty” (Pet. Br. 33) and “the substantive
nature of the right” (Pet. Br. 40), asks this Court to find
that a retroactive change in the statute of limitations in a
criminal case violates substantive due process. This
contention fails at the threshold because the Due Process
Clause cannot be read to provide greater protections
against ex post facto laws than the Ex Post Facto Clause
itself.
When a particular constitutional amendment “pro-
vides an explicit textual source of constitutional protec-
tion” against a particular sort of government behavior,
“that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of
‘substantive due process,’ must be the guide for analyzing
these claims.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994)
(quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)). The
Court recently reiterated this principle in Sattazahn v.
Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. ___ (2003), in which it stated that
“[a]t bottom, petitioner’s due-process claim is nothing
more than his double-jeopardy claim in different clothing,”
ee a ee
SS
33
and it declined his “invitation to hold that the Due Process
Clause provides greater double-jeopardy protection than
does the Double Jeopardy Clause,” id. at __ (slip op. at
14-15).
This principle is applicable in the instant case. The
Framers of the Constitution considered the matter of
retroactive changes in the law, and they drafted the Ex
Post Facto Clause of Article I, section 10, to address it.
That clause speaks to the circumstances under which
penal laws, “whatever their form,” may be “altered by
legislative enactment, after the fact, to the disadvantage of
the accused.” Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U-S. at 170. It-provides
an “explicit textual source of constitutional protection”
against retroactive legislative changes in criminal law, and
so it is not to be supplemented through the device of
“substantive due process.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. at
395. There is no reason for this Court to turn away from
this prior jurisprudence, and to create a new due process
right that duplicates a right that is readily identifiable in
the Constitution’s text and overlaid with case law govern-
ing its scope.
B. A Change in the Statute of Limitations
Does Not Deny a Defendant Substantive
Due Process
Petitioner’s due process claim fares no better when
analyzed in light of this Court’s substantive due process
precedents. The substantive content of the Due Process
Clause “forbids the government to infringe . . . ‘fundamen-
tal’ liberty interests at all, no matter what process is
provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling state interest.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S.
292, 302 (1993); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
34
719-20 (1997). Protected are those fundamental rights that
are “objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,
such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they
were sacrificed.” Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21 (citations
and quotation marks omitted).
The Court has “always been reluctant to expand the
concept of substantive due process.” Collins v. Harker
Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992); Albright v. Oliver, 510
U.S. at 271-72 (observing that defendant’s claim of a
substantive due process right to be free of prosecution
without probable cause was “markedly different” from
those matters — relating to marriage, family, procreation,
and the right to bodily integrity — that, for the most part,
have been accorded this protection). By extending consti-
tutional protection to an asserted right or liberty interest,
the Court, to a great extent, places the matter outside the
arena of public debate and legislative action. Washington
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720. It appears, however, that
petitioner would have this Court do just that, and find
that a criminal defendant has a new fundamental right,
protected by the Due Process Clause, in retaining the
benefit of an expired statute of limitations against subse-
quent attempts to amend the time during which criminal
charges may be filed. The Court should decline that
suggestion.
1. The Expiration of a Statute of Limita-
tions Confers No Fundamental Right
or Liberty Interest
In Chase Securities Corporation v. Donaldson, this
Court held that the shelter of a statute of limitations,
“which represent[s] a public policy about the privilege to
35
litigate,” has “never been regarded as what now is called a
‘fundamental’ right,” 325 U.S. at 314, and retroactive
- application of a change in the statute of limitations does
not, per se, violate the Due Process Clause, id. at 314-16
(discussing Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620 (1885)). The
Court affirmed this holding in Electrical Workers v. Rob-
bins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 243-44 (1976). Petitioner
attempts to distinguish these cases by asserting that in
California a criminal statute of limitations creates a
substantive right, in contrast to a remedy or a procedural
right, which was at issue in Chase. (Pet. Br. 49-50 & n.47.)
This contention is meritless.
a. For a time, this Court did distinguish between
civil statutes of limitations, involving only procedural
rights, and statutes of repose, involving substantive
rights. Compare Chase, 325 U.S. 305, with William Danzer
& Co. v. Gulf & Ship Island R.R. Co., 268 U.S. 633 (1925).
But this Court’s more recent line of cases directs a differ-
ent approach.
In Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Company, 428 US.
1 (1976), the Court rejected a due process challenge to
legislation that created a new liability upon coal mine
operators for illnesses to miners for work done long before
the legislation. Even though the effect of the legislation
was to impose a new duty or liability based on past acts,
the Court held, the burden was on the one complaining of
a due process violation to establish that the legislature
had acted in an arbitrary and irrational manner. /d. at 15-
16. And in Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation v. R.A.
Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717 (1984), the Court upheld a -
statute imposing liability on employers for withdrawal
from pension plans, even though the statute applied to
employers who withdrew before the statute was enacted.
36
Relying on Turner Elkhorn, the Court held that legislation
imposing liability retroactively need only be supported by
a rational legislative purpose. Jd. at 728-30. These cases
and their progeny direct that retroactive application of a
statute will not be found to violate due process if it serves
a legitimate legislative purpose that is furthered by
rational means. See also Eastern Enters. v. Apfe!, 524 U.S.
498, 524-28 (1998); United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26,
30-31 (1994); General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S.
181, 191 (1992). In other words, whether a change in a
statute of limitations is a matter of procedure or sub-
stance, whether it affects a right or a remedy, neither
liberty nor justice is sacrificed by a change that permits
the filing of cases after the expiration of the previously-
existing statute of limitations.
As this Court has made clear, “(Legislation readjust-
ing rights and burdens is not unlawful solely because it
upsets otherwise settled expectations. This is true even
though the effect of the legislation is to impose a new duty
or liability based on past acts.” Usery v. Turner Elkhorn
Mining Co., 428 U.S. at 16 (citations omitted). “Moreover,
the detrimental reliance principle is not limited to retroac-
tive legislation. An entirely prospective change in the law
may disturb the relied-upon expectations of individuals,
but such a change would not be deemed therefore to be
violative of due process.” United States v. Carlton, 512
U.S. 33-34.
b. In Chase, the Court explained that a defendant
“may, of course, have the protection of the policy while it
exists, but the histary of pleas of limitation shows them to
be good only by legislative grace and to be subject to a
relatively large degree of legislative control.” Jd. Nothing
37
in the history of statutes of limitations in criminal cases
justifies a different conclusion here.
At common law, there was no limitation of time for
prosecuting a crime. 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 291,
at 346 (1998); 1 Wharton’s Criminal Law § 92, at 628 (15th
ed. 1993); see United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 317
(1971). Then, as now, in the absence of a statutory limita-
tion, a prosecution could be brought at any time following
the commission of an offense. See 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal
Law § 291, at 346. Although federal and state statutes
regulating the time for bringing criminal charges have
existed since the adoption of the United States Constitu-
tion, “their popularity in this country has been viewed as
somewhat of a mystery.” People v. Frazer, 21 Cal. 4th at
770 n.30.
Sometime prior to 1881 “Mr. Bishop in his treatise on
Statutory Crimes, section 266,” stated that “a criminal
statute of limitations simply withholds from the courts
jurisdiction over the offence after the specified period, and
it is competent for the legislature to revive the old jurisdic-
tion or create a new one, when the prosecution may
proceed.” See Moore v. State, 43 N.J.L. 203, 213 (1881). To
our knowledge, it was not until 1881 that a court in this
country disagreed with Mr. Bishop and held that a legisla-
ture could not retroactively extend a statute of limitations
without violating the federal Ex Post Facto Clause. Id. at
214-25. In the ensuing 120 years, with the exception of
recent cases construing California Penal Code section
803(g), it appears there have been only two cases in which
the courts reached the same conclusion, and both of those
were decided in the past 20 years. See People v. Frazer, 21
Cal. 4th at 765 & nn.27, 28 (collecting cases).
38
There is no settled, long-standing tradition with
respect to the retroactive extension of a statute of limita-
tions in criminal cases. Hence, “historical practice” does
not provide a basis for finding that the shelter provided by
a statute of limitations is a fundamental right or liberty
interest, so that a legislature is prohibited by the Due
Process Clause from amending it to restore a state’s right
to prosecute a criminal defendant. Compare, e.g., Washing-
ton v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 723 (“To hold for respon-
dents, we would have to reverse centuries of legal doctrine
and practice, and strike down the considered policy choice
of almost every State.”).
In the context of civil law, this Court has found retro-
active extensions of statutes of limitations to be consistent
with the Due Process Clause, and the reasons underlying
those decisions compel the same result in criminal cases.
It cannot be said that California Penal Code section
803(g), on its face, deprives a defendant of a fundamental
right that is both “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history
and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if
[it] were sacrificed.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U:S. at
720-21 (citations and quotation marks omitted). Hence, it
does not deny a defendant due process unless there is not
a rational basis for the law. See id. at 722.
2. California Penal Code Section 803(g)
Serves a Legitimate State Interest
That Is Furthered By Rational Means
Petitioner has not claimed, nor could he successfully,
that California Penal Code section 803(g) fails to serve a
legitimate legislative purpose that is furthered by rational
means. ;
39
a. Beginning in the late 1980's, lawmakers across
the country became increasingly aware that young victims
often delay reporting sexual abuse. People v. Frazer, 21
Cal. 4th at 744. The California Legislature responded by
enacting California Penal Code section 803(g) in 1994. Id.
at 744-47. The statute “was based on the assumption that
past and future sex crimes against children, even though
subject to corroboration by independent evidence, would
otherwise go unpunished given the difficulty young victims
experience remembering and reporting such events, and
their emotional vulnerability at the hands of adult perpetra-
tors, including those in positions of trust.” Id. at 773.
Two years later, after several courts held the law was
not intended to be applied retroactively, the Legislature
reexamined the issue, when a bill was introduced to
expressly make the law apply retroactively. People v.
Frazer, 21 Cal. 4th at 745-47 & n.7. The legislative analy-
sis noted the justification for the bill: “Because many
victims do not bring the crime to the attention of law
enforcement until many years later, when the statute of
limitations has already expired, their molesters go unpun-
ished. This bill appropriately allows law enforcement to
seek justice and ensure other children do not become
victims in the future.” Analysis of A.B. 2014 (Boland) for
Cal. Asm. Comm. on Public Safety hearing, April 9, 1996,
at 3.° The bill became law by a vote of 100 to one. A.B.
2014 (Boland), 1995-96 Sess.; Ch. 130, Stats. 1996."
* Available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/95-96/bill/asm/ab_2001-
2050/ab_2014_cfa_960408_114032_asm_comm.html.
’ California Assembly vote available at http//www.leginfo.ca gov/
pub/95-96/bill/asm/ab_2001-2050/ab_2014_vote_960624_0110PM_asm_floor.
(Continued on following page)
40
The California Legislature’s assumptions in making
Penal Code section 803(g) apply retroactively are sup-
ported by significant scientific literature. The majority of
victims of childhood sexual abuse in retrospective surveys
had never told anyone of the abuse during their childhood.
Summit, Abuse of the Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation
Syndrome, Child Abuse and Neglect 173, at 181 (1992).
Rates of non-disclosure run between 33 percent and 92
percent for women, and between 42 percent and 85 percent
for men, and these numbers may be conservative. |,on,
Scientific Support for Expert Testimony on Child Sexual
Abuse Accommodation, in Conte, Critical Issues in Child
Sexual Abuse, at 114 (Sage Publications 2002). Delays in
reporting were most likely when the offender was related
to the child, when the abuse was more serious than fon-
~~dling, and when compliance was obtained through threat
or manipulation. Jd. at 116. The most commonly reported
reason for non-disclosure by child molestation victims was
fear: fear of being harmed or punished, fear of harm to a
loved one, or fear of harm to the perpetrator. In addition,
many child abuse victims wanted to forget the abuse,
thought no one would believe them, feared negative
reactions from family members, and had feelings of guilt,
self-blame, stigmatization, and isolation. Jd. at 117-20.
Most published studies indicate that a history of
sexual abuse is associated with subsequent psychological
dysfunction in adulthood. Briere & Runtz, Post Sexual
Abuse Trauma: Data and Implications for Clinical Prac-
tice, 2 Journal of Interpersonal Violence, at 367-79 (1987).
html; California Senate vote available at http//www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/
95-96/bill/asm/ab_2001-2050/ab_2014_vote_960620_1044AM_sen_floor. html.
41
Adult survivors are more anxious, have more disassocia-
tive and somatic symptoms, and suffer lower self-esteem.
They also are at significantly higher risk of developing
depression, various anxiety disorders, substance abuse
disorders, and sexual dysfunction. High rates of sexual
abuse are found in the histories of patients diagnosed with
conversion reactions, suicidal tendencies, self-mutilation,
multiple personality disorder, borderline personality,
chronic pelvic pain, and women with eating disorders.
Childhood sexual abuse also is found in the history of a
large percentage of adolescent prostitute and runaways. A
sizable minority of ‘sexual abuse victims develop post-
traumatic stress disorder. 1 Myers, Evidence in Child
Abuse and Neglect Cases, § 4.2 at 221-23 (2d ed, 1992);
Urquize & Capra, The Impact of Sexual Abuse: Initial and
Long-Term Effects, What If the Victim is Male? The As-
sessment and Treatment of the Sexually Maltreated Male
(Lexington Books, 1990); Browne & Finkelhor, Initial and
Long-Term Effects: A Review of the Research, A Sourcebook
on Child Sexual Abuse (Sage Publications, 1986).
Significantly, child molesters pose a substantial risk of
reoffending throwghout their lives. See Hanson, et al.,
Long-Term Recidivism of Child Molesters, Journal of
Consulting and Clinical Psychology, Vol. 61, No. 4, at 646-
52 (1993). In one long-term study, 42 percent of the offend-
ers were reconvicted for sexual crimes, violent crimes
thought to be associated with sexual offenses, or both.
Although the greatest risk appeared to be during the first
five to 10 years, 23 percent of the recidivists were recon-
victed more than 10 years after they were released from
prison. The authors noted it was likely the reconviction
rates underestimated the rate of reoffending, since it is
widely recognized that only a fraction of sexual offenses
42
against children results in the offender’s conviction. Jd.
Another long-term study showed the recidivism rate for
new sexual offenses was 52 percent, with the approximate
underestimation of recidivism being around 20 percent for
sexual offenses. Prentky, et al., Recidivism Rates Among
Child Molesters and Rapisis: A Methodological Analysis,
Law and Human Behavior, Vol. 31, No. 6, at 651 (1997).
The vulnerability of child sexual abuse victims, the
difficulties they experience in reporting the crimes, and
the recidivistic nature of their perpetrators are evidenced
in prosecutions that have been commenced pursuant to
California Penal Code section 803(g). Unfortunately, the
testimony of petitioner’s daughters, given at the grand
jury hearing in this case, is not atypical.
Petitioner’s older daughter testified that he began
molesting her as far back as she could remember, when
she was no older than five. (RT 107-08.) He orally copu-
lated her, digitally penetrated her, had intercourse with
her, and had her orally copulate him. (RT 109-10.) For a
time, the acts occurred on an almost-daily basis, but they
became less frequent as she grew into her late teens. (RT
111-13.) At about that time, she became aware that peti-
tioner was sexually abusing her sister, who was nine years
younger than she. (RT 96, 114-15.) She did not tell anyone
about the abuse because she was afraid of her father, she
did not believe anyone would help her, and she felt dirty.
(RT 115-16.) Later, after she got away from the abuse, she
did not want it to infect her new life. (RT 116.)
Petitioner’s younger-daughter testified that he began
molesting her when she was four or five years old. When
she saw him masturbating, he told her to orally copulate
him, which she did. (RT 44-45.) She did not tell anyone
——
43
because she was scared. (RT 45.) Thereafter, he sexually
abused her two or three times a week. Initially, he sodom-
ized her, which made her feel like she was “being ripped
open,” and he played with her vagina, and his fingernails
made her feel “like a razor blade was cutting [her] vagina.”
(RT 45-46.) As she got older, he had intercourse with her.
(RT 47.) At 16, when she became pregnant by petitioner or
her brother, who also had begun molesting her, she moved
out and had an abortion. (RT 47-48.)
She had not reported the crimes because petitioner
told her it was a secret, she was terrified of him, and she
thought it was “a normal way of life.” (RT 56-57, 68.) Even
after she moved out, she was afraid to tell anyone, and she
did not think she would be believed. (RT 57, 61.) She also
wanted to pretend everything was normal in her life and
that she had wonderful parents. (RT 60.) She did not
report the molestations until she was an adult, when she
was told that her brother had been molesting his step-
daughter, whom petitioner also had tried to molest. (RT
51-55.) She finally disclosed the abuse because she be-
lieved it necessary to protect other children. (RT 70.) After
her disclosure, the police contacted her sister, who admit-
ted petitioner had abused her also. Had the police not
contacted her, the older sister would not have reported the
crimes. (RT 116-17.)°
Thus, California Penal Code section 803(g) focuses on
two concerns: the need for society in general, and the
victims of substantial sexual abuse in particular, to see
* Petitioner has not been convicted of these crimes, of course, but
they are the factual basis for the grand jury’s indictment.
44
child sexual abusers convicted and punished for their
crimes; and, perhaps more important, the need to stop
perpetrators of substantial sexual abuse of a child from
victimizing more children. Neither of these problems could
have been adequately addressed by a prospective change
in the statute of limitations.
b. “It is evident beyond the need for elaboration that
a State’s interest in ‘safeguarding the physical and psycho-
logical well-being of a minor’ is ‘compelling.’” New York v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982) (quoting Globe News-
paper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982)).
“The prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of chil-
dren constitutes a government objective of surpassing
importance.” Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757. The California
Legislature reasonably determined that the policies
underlying statutes of limitations needed to yield to these
more compelling considerations.
The statute is narrowly drawn to effectuate the
significant purposes it was designed to serve, while pro-
tecting against oppressive use. It is strictly limited to
permit prosecution of only the most serious types of sexual
abuse of a child: vaginal penetration or rectal penetration
by a penis or a foreign object; oral copulation; and mutual
masturbation. Cal. Pen. Code §§ 803(g\(2)B), 1203.066(b).
Following receipt of a report from the victim, the State
must investigate and file charges promptly, because any
prosecution must be initiated within one year of the
victim's report. Cal. Pen. Code § 803(g)\(1). Charges may be
filed only if there is “independent evidence that clearly
and convincingly corroborates the victim’s allegation.” Cal.
Pen. Code § 803(g)2)B). “No evidence may be used to
corroborate the victim’s allegation that otherwise would be
inadmissible during trial,” and -“[iJndependent evidence
— eae ee
45
does not include the opinions of mental health profession-
als.” Id.
In addition, a defendant has the protection afforded by
procedures in California law to protect the defendant in
any prosecution brought under an exception to the nor-
mally-applicable statute of limitations. See People uv.
Zamora, 18 Cal. 3d at 561-65 & nn.25-26; People v. Crosby,
58 Cal. 2d 713. Among those are the right of the defendant
to contest the evidence at a pretrial hearing before a
neutral judge, who cannot sustain the prosecution unless
he or she finds the State has carried its burden of estab-
lishing the requirements of California Penal Code section
803(g) have been met. See Zamora, 18 Cal. 3d at 563 n.25;
Crosby, 58 Cal. 2d at 725.
Penal Code section 803(g) serves not just a legitimate,
but a compelling, state interest, which is furthered by
rational means. In fact, the means chosen by the Califor-
nia Legislature were so carefully tailored to respond to
that compelling interest that the statute survives even
strict scrutiny. The statute, on its face, does not deny a
defendant due process of law.
C. Petitioner’s Right to A Fair Trial is Pro-
tected by Procedural Due Process
For the reasons discussed above, the lifting of a
statute of limitations so as to restore a right of prosecution
that was lost by the mere passage of time does not, per se,
deny a defendant due process of law. That does not mean
the Due Process Clause does not provide a criminal defen-
dant some measure of protection. That protection, how-
ever, comes by way of the procedural, rather than the
substantive, component of the clause.
46
Petitioner implies, for example, that a defendant
charged pursuant to California Penal Code section 803(g)
will be unable to get a fair trial because his ability to
obtain reliable evidence will be impaired, as will be his
ability to demonstrate the significance of that evidence, in
the abstract. (Pet. Br. 43.) He has no cause for worry. A
defendant who believes he or she has been prejudiced by a
change in the statute of limitations, whether or not it is
applied retroactively, may challenge the prosecution by
making a factual showing that the change in the statute of
limitations affects the accuracy or fairness of a determina-
tion of his guilt or that it obviates or avoids procedures
that are necessary for preventing miscarriages of justice,
thereby entitling him or her to dismissal of the charges.
See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 796 (1977);
People v. Frazer, 21 Cal. 4th at 773-75. Speculative loss of
evidence is insufficient, however; as this Court has noted,
“proof of actual prejudice” to the defense is necessary to
prevail on a due process claim. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 789;
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. at 324.
This aspect of the Due Process Clause also addresses
the concerns expressed by petitioner and his amici curiae
that a crimina! defendant may have relied, to his detri-
ment, on the expiration of the statute of limitations by, for
example, giving self-incriminating testimony in the belief
that he could not be prosecuted. (Pet. Br. 39; NACDL Br.
26-27.) Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959), is on point.
There, the defendants refused to answer questions put to
them by the Ohio Un-American Activities Commission,
which actively misled them into believing they could
assert the privilege against self-incrimination. This Court
held that to convict a citizen for exercising a privilege that
the State clearly told him was available to him would be to
——s =
47
sanction the most indefensible form of entrapment, in
violation of the Due Process Clause. Jd. at 425-26, 438.
Because of the procedural posture of the case, which is
before this Court on the basis of his demurrer, petitioner
has not demonstrated prejudice. Hence, any procedural
due process claim he may have is not ripe for adjudication.
But the availability of the protections afforded by the
procedural component of the Due Process Clause are more
than adequate to protect his right to a fair trial.
+
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal of California
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
BILL LOCKYER, Attorney General
MANUEL M. MEDEIROS, Solicitor General
ROBERT R. ANDERSON, Chief Assistant Attorney General
W. Scott THORPE, Special Assistant Attorney General
KELLY E. LEBEL, Deputy Attorney General
JANET GAARD, Special Assistant Attorney General,
Counsel of Record
P.O. Box 944255
Sacramento, CA 94244-2550
Telephone: (916) 324-5284
Fax: (916) 322-2630
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