Respondents Brief — Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Ayers

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Supreme Court of the United States

.

NORFOLK & WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY,

Petitioner,

Vv.

FREEMAN AYERS, et al.,

Respondents.

*

On Writ Of Certiorari To

The Circuit Court Of Kanawha County,

West Virginia

¢

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

+

SEAN DONAHUE RICHARD J. LAZARUS*

WASHINGTON & LEE UNIV. GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

SCHOOL or LAW LAW CENTER

Lexington, VA 24450 600 New Jersey Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20001

Jamas H. RION, JR. (202) 662-9129

NESS MOTLEY

28 Bridgeside Blvd. JAMES A. MCKOWEN

Mt. Pleasant, SC 29465 JAMES F. HUMPHREYS &

ASSOCIATES, L.C.

LAWRENCE M. MANN 500 Virginia Street, East

ALPER & MANN, P.C.

Charleston, WV 25301

1667 K Street, N.W. (304) 347-5050

Eleventh Floor

Washington, D.C. 20006 *Counsel of Record

Counsel for Respondents

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51,

provides that a railroad is liable in damages for injuries to

railroad employees “resulting in whole or in part” from the

railroad’s negligence. Respondents prevailed in a jury trial

brought pursuant to FELA against petitioner based on injuries

resulting from petitioner's negligence in exposing respondents

to asbestos at the workplace. The questions presented are:

1. Whether the trial judge properly instructed the jury that a

plaintiff railroad employee who has a reasonable fear of cancer

because he is suffering from a physical disease caused by the

defendant railroad employer's negligently exposing the

plaintiff to asbestos is entitled to be compensated for that

mental injury under FELA.

2. Whether the trial judge properly declined to instruct the

jury in a FELA lawsuit to apportion damages between the

defendant railroad employer and absent third parties where the

plaintiff railroad employees were suffering from indivisible

injuries caused by the railroad’s negligence.

(i)

LIST OF ALL PARTIES

In addition to the parties listed in the caption, the following

were plaintiffs below and are respondents in this case:

Carl Butler

Doyle Johnson

John Shirley

James Spangler

Clifford Vance

(ii)

—

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Nee ce cececee i

eee reed eeeedeeneecesesccecesecsees ii

ST MERUEGUNGUAURGONGHeSececeescececccccesccecs 1

I. Background: Asbestos, Asbestosis, and Cancer ....... 1

le cctcdencocccsccassecccscscees 4

Introduction and Summary of Argument ................ 9

Argument:

I. The Trial Judge Properly Instructed The Jury That A

Plaintiff Who Has A Reasonable Fear Of Cancer

Because He Is Suffering From A Physical Disease

Caused By The Defendant's Negligence Is Entitled To

Recover For That Mental Injury As Part Of His Overall

PR RGRRGUESSS GEES Uncesocccecececccccecces 13

A. Under Settled Tort Law, A Defendant Who

Negligently Causes Physical Injury To The Person

Of Another Is Liable For The Resulting Physical

And Mental Harms, Including Reasonable

Apprehension Of Future Physical Consequences

B. A Plaintiff Who Reasonably Fears Cancer Because

He Has Asbestosis May Recover Damages for that

Fear From A Defendant Who Negligently Caused

PE SOU GNGRECHenecesecscccccesceccee 17

(iii)

Il.

Conclusion

None Of Petitioner's Various Arguments Is

Relevant To The Question Whether A Railroad

Employee Suffering From Asbestosis May Recover

Under FELA For Fear of Cancer Based On Such

pe PPPPPPPPTTTTTTETTITITTT TTT TTL

The Trial Court Properly Declined To Instruct The

Jury To Apportion Respondents’ Damages Between

Petitioner And Absent Third Parties ...........-.

FELA Provides That A Railroad Employee Can

Recover In Full From The Railroad For Injuries

Caused “In Whole Or In Part” By The Railroad's

Negligence .........sececeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeees

Traditional And Settled Common Law Liability

Rules Also Support The Trial Judge’s Refusal To

Instruct The Jury To Apportion Damages In This

Case Between The Railroad And Absent Third

. . cuccocceceneseeedeceseecenesegeesee

(iv)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Ala. Great S. R.R. v. Chi. & Northwestern Ry., 493 F.2d

EE 0 4cstccinddddutetebdbeenannesciae 36

American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443 (1994) ...... 49

Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557

SD Kcbeendsceccddedstwdeeesensdceedscccocces 14, 33

Ayers v. Macoughtry, 29 Okla. 399 (1911) ............244. 16

Beeman v. Manville Corp., 496 N.W.2d 247 (lowa,

BEND S6Sb6sddndbddedanceswancacedbscacesescoss 22, 24

Bernadsky v. Erie R. Co., 76 N.J.L. 580 (1908) ............. 17

Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076

gE oe RL OE nore 43

Buck v. Brady, 110 Md. 568 (1909) ...............0 eens 16

Burd v. Sinn, 486 Pa. 146 (1979)... 02... e ees 27

Capital Holding Corp. v. Bailey, 873 S.W.2d 187 (Ky. 1994) .. 24

Chem Nuclear System v. Bush, 292 F.3d 254 (D.C. Cir.

PE 456d Seeb ckdEndasadedetbneeadusdeceeesesees 47, 48

Coats v. Penrod Drilling Corp., 61 F.3d 1113

gg RR RE ree eere 38, 49

Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532

SD sb60bONGdens0cekdbaceuunl Risedenciovceeess passim

Coray v. Southern Pac. Co., 335 U.S. 520 (1949) ........... 34

Corey v. Havener, 65 N.E. 69 (Mass. 1902) ................ 41

Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433

Ps CUED SOS dwbevdadducantcddcuenbadbecceeseceees 27

Dale v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 552 A.2d 1037 (Pa.

Be hokehnsebdancssecaddcandaneceksssdvasonss 36-37

Denton v. Southern Railway Co., 854 S.W. 2d 885 (Tenn.

SG ED ebdddcheccanocncwncedaseedaceecesces 24

Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 202 N.J. Super. 556 (1985) .. 22

Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517 (Fla. Dist.

PME Ksacddteadenddesushbcsdddetsecens 22, 24

Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S.

PT NG6d:4 Kesdaddadeddnbbdedeneduaeennenses passim

Ellison v. Shell Oil Co., 882 F.2d 349 (9" Cir. 1989) ........ 36

The Employer's Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463 (1908) ........ 39

(v)

Cases -- Continued:

Engvall v. Soo Line R.R., 632 N.W.2d 560 (Minn. 2001) .... 36

Fort Worth & Denver Ry. v. Threadgill, 228 F.2d 307

(FS Cig. 1955)... cc cece ccccccccccccccccccccccccess 36

Freeman v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., Inc., 714 So. 2d 832

(La. App. 1998) ....... 0c cece cece cence eee ceeeeeenees 36

Gaines v. Illinois Central Ry. Co., 23 F.3d 1170 (7 Cir.

PPPPPPITTTITTTTTTTTTT TTT tt 36

Gallick v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 372 U.S. 108 (1963) ....... 25

Gamer v. Winchester, 110 S.W. 2d 1190 (Tex. Civ.

App. 1937) .......cc ccc eee cece neceeceeeeneceneeeees 17

Gaulden v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 654 P.2d 383

(D.Kam. 1963) .......cccccccccccccsccccccnssesecees 34

Godeau v. Blood, 52 Vt. 251 (1880) ........ 6c cece eee wees 16

Griffin v. Keene Corp., 1990 U.S. Dist. Lexis 7424, slip op. 4

(N.D. TH. 1990)... cccccccccccccccccccccsceces 22, 24

Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R. v. Arthur Dixon Transfer Co., 98

N.E.2d 783 (TEL. 1961) .......cccccncccccccccccccccces 36

Heintz v. Caldwell, 9 Ohio Cir. Dec. 412 (1898) ........... 16

Hoerner v. ANCO Insulations, Inc., 812 So. 2d 45 (La. Ct.

App. 2002) ..... cece cece cece eee ene eetneeeeeees 24

In re Bell Petroleum Servs., 3 F.3d 889 (5" Cir. 1993) ....... 48

In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 734 F. Supp. 1563

(D. Haw. 1990) ....ccccccccccccccccccccccccveces 29-30

Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394

get | PPPPPPOTTTITITT TT TTT 24

Joia v. Jo-Ja Service Corp., 817 F.2d 908 (1" Cir. 1983) ....... 49

Jones v. CSX Transportation, 287 F.3d 1341 (11" Cir.

BED ccncccceccccccccsccceseccocesvaccccsesocceces 27

Kennedy v. Penn. R. Co., 282 F. 2d 705 (3d Cir. 1960) ...... 36

Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426 (1958) ...... 49

Lavelle v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 30 Ohio

Misc. 2d 11 (Ct. Common Pleas, Cayahoga Cty. 1987) . . . 23

Lavender v. Kurn, 327 US. 645 (1946) ......0000eeeeeeees 31

Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398 (1974) ..........02000eee 27

Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U.S. 459 (1947) ....... 2.0000 ee ees 35

The Lord Derby, 17 F. 265 (E.D. La. 1883) ...........00005 17

McAdams v. Eli Lilly, 638 F Supp. 1173 (N.D. Ill. 1986) .... 28

(vi)

Cases -- Continued:

McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202 (1994) ....... 38, 49

Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424

PD ceesbdsdtanbseacdadsctensastetestoneeess passim

Middlesex Co. v. City of Lowell, 21 N.E. 872 (Mass. 1889) ... 41

Mills v. River Terminal Ry. Co., 276 F.3d 322 (6" Cir.

ME OG SNN RS Ven daddenhNScdedecncnenesnceeecessoons 36

Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 27 Cal. 3d 916

DE SbdCbNCERdSKESHAKEddoCREsbOREeeeEreeesoeecee 27

Moore v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 1061

| EE ESD ee eee 47

Murray v. Lovejoy, 3 Wall. 19 (1863) ...............2005 40

O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176 (1" Cir. 1989) .............. 47

Owens Corning Fiberglass v. Parrish, 58 S.W. 3d 467

DME ShcGcbeedckenneccssedondsddéinecenscees 43

Patterson v. Penn. R. Co., 197 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1952) ...... 36

Phoenix Ins. Co. v. The Atlas, 93 U.S. 302 (1876) ........... 40

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133

PEED SOdbeDeNbudeEeeKesececeseisbscedcsooeseccoones 4

Reynolds v. Southern R. Co., 320 F. Supp. 1141

eS DEEN Soe ONSdebdnddecducedecsocecocedcsses 36

Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 352 U.S. 500 (1957) ...... passim

Seabord Air Line Ry. v. American Dist. Elec. Prot., 143 So.

PE ED 6.656 004.5 ane KdeKnndedhascnsedecsesscs 36

Self v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Vo., 832 F.2d 1540

gg RES ar eee ere 49

Sentilles v. Inter-Caribbean Shipping Corp., 361 U.S. 107

SED SENUKSHRdObb6sddRREdK SH eKEKROSRDSCCceseceves 35

Serio v. American Brewing, 141 La. 290 (1917) ............ 16

Sinkler v. Missouri P.R. Co., 356 U.S. 326 (1958) .......... 40

Smith v. Hines, 2 Sumn. 348 (Me. 1863) ................. 40

Southern R. Co. v. Foote Mineral Co., 384 F.2d 224

DP s+iiddtheidethesetetiiieennaunsanhiens 36

Spielman v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R. Co.,

OGe &. WU. GEE GE EAIL.U. BOUED ccccccccccccccccccces 36

St. Louis I.M. & S.R. Co. v. Craft, 237 U.S. 648 (1915) ... 14,31

Stephens v. S. Pac. Transp. Col., 991 F. Supp. 618

eee SE SUED Seccceccccecesvevevesesesoccencncass 36

Cases -- Continued:

Still v. Norfolk & W. R. Co., 368 U.S. 35 (1961) .....-+++++- 33

Taylor v. Baptist Medical Center, 400 So. 2d 369

CVE U.) } 27

Tennant v. Peoria & P.U.R. Co., 321 U.S. 29 (1944) ......... 31

Tracy v. Cottrell, 206 W. Va. 363 (1999) .....--+seeee renee 44

Tucker v. Reading Co., 335 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Pa. 1971) ... 36

U.S. v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252 (3d Cir.

1992) nc cccvcvccvcccvccccccvssscesesesessscesesess 47

U.S. v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711 (2d Cir.

WOT) on cvcccvccccccccccccccvcvccccccevescesscesces 47

U.S. v. Brighton, 153 F. 3d 307 (6" Cir. 1998) .........0+5: 47

U.S. v. Chem-Dyne, 572 F.Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983) ..... 47

U.S. v. Hercules, 247 F.3d 706 (8" Cir. 2001) ........... 47, 48

U.S. v. Monsanto, 858 F.2d 160 (4" Cir. 1988) ...........+. 47

Urie v. Thompson, 37 U.S. 163 (1949) .......eeeeeees 35, 39

Versland v. Caron Transport, 206 Mont. 313 (1983) ........ 27

Walter v. Dow Chemical Co., 195 N.W. 2d 323

(Mich. App. 1972) ........ 66 ec cece eee eees peevcceces 36

Warner v. Chamberlain, 12 Del. 18 (1884) ...........+005 16

Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111

(D.C. Cir. 1982) 0... . cece cceeeeeeeeeeeceseereeeens 21

Winfree v. Northern P.R. Co., 227 U.S. 296 (1913) ......-++> 48

Statutes and regulation:

The Act of June 11, 1906, 34 Stat. 232 «2... 6. cece renee 39

The Act of April 22, 1908, 35 Stat.65 .........00005: vee 39

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,

and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §9601 et seq. ........-200+ 47

Federal Employer's Liability Act, |

| a PP POrrrrrrTrrTrir TT tt itis. passim

GU BL. GID nccccccccaccccccccvccccccccvccesccces 37

The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. App. § 688 .... 6... cece eee eeee 49

29 C.F.R. §1910.1001 2.0... ce ccccccccvccvevecccvevess 46

(viii)

Miscellaneous:

American Insurance Association Amicus Brief

in Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, -

Se ED dbudddeeseusddsaddedaseecenss 23, 24

American Thoracic Society Guidelines concerning

the Diagnosis of Nonmalignant Diseases Related to

NL bib esuinntedieendddbdededeedonewes 3,6

American Thoracic Society Guidelines concerning

the Evaluation of Impairment Disability Secondary

to Respiratory Disorder (1986) ...............00ceeeees 6

Annot., Right of Railroad Charged with Liability of Injury

to or Death of Employee Under Federal Employers Liability

Act to Claim Indemnity of Contribution from Other

Tortfeasors, 19 A.L.R. 3d 923 (1968) ...........0 cece eee 36

Francis H. Bohlen, Right to Recover for Injury Resulting

from Negligence Without impact, 50 Am. L. Rev. (1902) ... 15

Francis H. Bohlen, I Cases on the Law of Torts (1915) ...... 15

Kevin Browne, Is Asbestos ov Asbestosis the Cause of

the Increased Risk of Lung Cancer in Asbestos Workers?,

43 Brit. J. Ind. Med. 145 (1986) ................0008. 4, 30

Andrew Churg & Francis Green, Pathology of Occupational

ts cvneninnaseesnésevessensees 4, 30

42 Cong. Rec. (1908)

PP SNAAGHONASNEDKAvenesabdadeeseceeddeseeeecs 40

PGE Sho cbeckevkdncnccncneccdeccocecocsecacs 39

145 Cong. Rec. $3510 (March 25, 1999) .............. 32-33

T. Coolev, Treatise on the Law of Torts (3d ed. 1906) ....... 41

Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts (2000) .............. passim

Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of 1999, Hearing

Before the House Comm. on the Judiciarv, 106" Cong.,

bh ibiddd tides adeuccuauncenecesies 32-33

Herbert F. Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal

Damage, 20 Mich. L. Rev. 497 (1921) ..........6..00005 14

H. Corwin Hinshaw & John F. Murray, Diseases of the

ST MED ctciidcwonscnecenederssesecuéscoce 22

SEE cnccédccccdsectedessseeseues 19

59 Fed. Reg. (1994)

GPE v8 cceccovecccssccececscsvesecscccosecoseess 46

Miscellaneous - Continued:

59 Fed. Reg. (1994)

P. 40,970 occ ccccccccccccereeeeeseeceueeseseesens 46

P. 40,992 on. rcccccccccecccesececncceusesseeeeees 46

Fowler V. Harper, Readings in Torts (1941) ..........545. if

H.R. 1283, Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of

1999, 106 Cong., 1" Sess. (1999) ..... eee ee ee eens 32

James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Asbestos

Litigation Gone Made: Exposure-Based Recovery for Incrased

Risk, Mental Distress, and Medical Monitoring ........... 32

Johns-Manville, Inc., Johns-Manville Service to Railroads

(RGTD nn cccccccccccccccevececsecevescccencesesccces 1

Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in

the Law of Torts, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1033 (1936) ........... 15

David Minneman, Annot., Future Disease or Condition,

or Anxiety Relating Thereto, As Element of Recovery,

SR ALB SWE ccc csccsvevcccscessacevececes: 16

Oral Argument Transcript in Metro-North Commuter R.R.

Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424 (1997) 2.0... ccc cece eee eees 30

Petitioner's Brief in Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v.

Buckley, 521 U.S. 424 (1997)... 2... cece cee eee eee eee 24

Petitioner’s Reply Brief in Metro-North Commuter R.R.

Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424 (1997) 2.0... cc cece eee ees 23

Jerome H. Nates, Damages in Tort Actions (1993 &

WOOT Gea.) nnn cccccccccccicccccvccecececesesacece 38

Wil’ am L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts

GIDE cccccccccccescesesncseucecceveessecesesce 14, 26

Prosser & Keeton on Torts (5 ed. 1984) ...... 0... c cece ees 41

Restatement (First) of Torts (1939)

DEE oi ccccccccccvncescccesncsvsscenessencessacees 43

_ , PRPPPETUCTTTETETTTTTTLT TTT TTT TTT TTT ieee 42, 43

i... cece eenesneneweeeeeesnsceene 42,43

Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965 & 1979)

Chapter 2, Introductory note, D. 23) «2.6... cece eee ee 26

DED ccccncecccsccenccecenstnsccussceesscceuscscesas 22

BED secccccccscccscvesccccntevescevencnaccuece 22, 28

DEE ccccnccesceccoucccccseseseccousesssaecusess 22, 28

SAL COMMMMIMBE cc ccccccccccscgescccccccessececesess 28

(x)

Miscellaneous - Continued:

Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965 & 1979)

UT VEGND EA ddebenecaadeadedednddacedsuceednansesss 28

saa iNOAANeEANOKOR ER eeedAnsshnceececeencescess 28

PED Chddkuenshandvapandesesenacesacdanceceaes 28

EE SadGUNCinhSeenehenseedatakenseneecncs<eccas 43

I ids éutccadnnsteseseenceessusseas 43

EE i0ch<scdeneatesananensescesca 42, 43

ED 545544545 000-000dacnsevavecsnvecunesuceses 44

EE NEMAG ERAN RHSdeRdEdendecedusedeocessiens 11, 15, 20

SET GAUANSASRESNE OD RNSRERAENSKSRekeneexescuoness 42

PE SibOGRG Rb Odd ede deheeskunesdisineseseeeniassts 43

ELE e Tore E eT Tee 26

§ 924(a) comment (a) ........... ccc cece cece eeeecees 26

Restatement (Second) App. §§ 174-423 (1995) .......... ad

Restatement (Third) of Torts (2000)

EL, SGt ni ccuauadenedstadcéudseenesecs 49, 50

PEE Mined dak ankidaeiaueeindedsdeptnacessccs 49

SNEED bib cick Geadulaceekabenedsdukancan ds 44

S. 2546, Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of 1998,

SG I ID soi vv cnccccececenceucescs 32

Thomas J. Scoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law

RE EE SA sacciNcdenhaevébededentéccscnenses 40, 49

Thomas G. Shearman & Amasa A. Redfield, III A Treatise

on the Law of Negligence (6" ed. 1913) ............0005. 15

Thomas A. Street, I The Foundations of Legal Liability -

Theory and Principles of Tort (1906) ................. 15, 26

Supreme Court Rule 24.1(a) .............ccccccceeceees 21

Archibald Robinson Watson, A Treatise on the Law of

Damages for Personal Injuries (1901) ..............0.05. 15

(xi)

STATEMENT

Petitioner Norfolk & Western Railway Company seeks to

overturn a jury verdict reached after a two week trial in a

negligence action brought in a West Virginia state trial court by

respondents pursuant to the Federal Employer's Liability Act

(FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51. The jury found that petitioner

negligently exposed respondents, six former railway workers,

to asbestos while in petitioner’s employment and that they were

each suffering from a physical disease (asbestosis) that had

been caused by that exposure. The trial court denied

petitioner’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict

or for a new trial and the state supreme court denied review.

I. Background: Asbestos, Asbestosis, and Cancer

Asbestos refers to a family of crystalline hydrated silicates

that are strong, flexible, resistant to heat, and very durable.

Because of these physical characteristics, asbestos was used by

many industries during the 19" and 20" centuries, especially for

fireproofing and insulation. As trumpeted by one early industry

publication, asbestos “[s]o closely * * * fit the needs of this new

world of steam, electricity and blazing furnaces, that it seems to

have been almost purposely designed.” Johns-Manville, Inc.,

Johns-Manville Service to Railroads, 5 (1923). Railroads used

asbestos in their steam locomotives because asbestos kept the

heat in the boiler. Railroad workers wired layers of asbestos

blocks around the boilers and then used a cement mix of

asbestos powder and water to fill in the gaps. Railroads also

used asbestos in brake linings, pipes, and roofings. JA155-56;

App., infra A1-A2 (trial exhibit photos of asbestos on engines).

Railroads, such as petitioner, overhauled the steam

locomotive engines every few years. The areas of greatest

exposure to asbestos were in the rooms where the overhauling

took place. To overhaul an engine, the asbestos would be

stripped off, collected from the floor, ground up, reprocessed

back into an asbestos-mud, and finally reapplied to the engine.

The entire process led to clouds of asbestos dust. Other major

2

sources of asbestos exposure were working steam engines,

overhead pipes, and roofing. JA 155-56. |

Asbestos is hazardous to human health because the small size

and shape of its fibers allow their entry into the small airways

in the lower areas of the lungs. The lungs extract oxygen from

the air and move it into the bloodstream for transportation

throughout the body. The lung is very flexible because it

contains elastic, very thin connective tissue that allows the

oxygen in the air to be breathed in and out by the lungs for

diffusion into the blood stream. JA 85-88. . .

Breathing in asbestos fibers can cause asbestosis - diffuse

interstitial fibrosis of the lungs — because of the particular way

that lung tissue reacts to the presence of asbestos fibers that

reach the air spaces within the lung. As the number of fibers

increases, the lung is unable to rid itself of the fibers and the

lung responds to their presence by forming scar tissue in a

process called “fibrosis.” This scar tissue impairs the

respiration capacity of the lungs in two distinct respects. First,

as the otherwise thin walls become thickened with scar tissue,

the lung itself become stiff and inflexible. This stiffness restricts

an individual's ability to breathe. Second, the diffusion

capacity of the lung becomes compromised because oxygen and

carbon dioxide cannot move as efficiently through an area with

scar tissue. The air spaces that contain the tiny capillary blood

vessels responsible for spreading oxygen throughout the body —

become blocked by the scar tissue. JA 85-92; App, infra, A3-A11.

Only a small percentage of those who are exposed to asbestos

fibers get asbestosis. Whether asbestosis results depends on

many factors, such as the intensity of exposure, duration of

exposure, circumstances of exposure, fiber type, and individual

susceptibility. Approximately one-third of the lung needs to be

scarred before asbestosis is detectable by chest x-ray, with an

average latency period between exposure and the disease of

twenty years. Asbestosis is generally a progressive disease,

meaning it continues to worsen long after the initial period of

exposure is over. The fibers remain in the lung and the amount

of scarring can increase over time. JA 87-88, 91-92, 150, 211,

3

421, 457; Trial Trans. 147-48 (4/15/98).'

Medical diagnosis of asbestosis generally requires application

of a series of criteria set forth by the American Thoracic Society

(ATS). Because it is too harmful to the patient to obtain samples

of lung tissue for direct analysis, the ATS sets forth two

necessary elements and four specific medical inquiries of

“recognized value” to support a diagnosis of asbestosis. The

medical profession has further developed a series of

examinations that a doctor can pass in order to be certified as

possessing particular expertise for determining from a chest x-

ray whether a patient has a pulmonary lung disease such as

asbestosis and, if so, the disease’s current stage. JA146-47, 158-

67, 178, 198-99, 239; App., infra, A11-A21 (ATS guidelines).

The most common physical symptom of asbestosis is

progressively worsening shortness of breath, which can be

extremely debilitating. See note 10 infra. This sensation is

directly linked to marked decrease in lung flexibility and

reduction in diffusion capacity. Asbestosis can itself be fatal as

the degree of the scarring and lung impairment increas2s over

time. There is no effective treatment. JA 85, 87-92, 150, 464.

There are two major forms of cancer caused by asbestos

exposure. The first, mesothelioma, is a cancer of the lining of

the lung and is a very painful disease that is almost always

fatal. The second form is lung cancer. It is currently not

possible to predict with reasonable medical certainty that any

exposed person will develop either cancer. JA 93, 96, 154.

Persons suffering from asbestosis, however, are far more

likely to get both types of cancer than those without asbestosis,

because their asbestosis confirms the intensity of their exposure,

the extent of lung infiltration, and their body’s particular

adverse reaction to the fibers’ presence, which varies by

' The scarring that results from asbestosis is distinct from scarring on

the lining of the lung, which is called “pleural plaque.” Unlike asbestosis,

pleural plaque does not infiltrate the lung and does not, standing alone,

generally cause lung impairment. The physical damage caused by

asbestosis is physically distinct from that caused by smoking. Smoking

impairs the ability of an individual to exhale (expiration), while asbestosis

impairs the ability to inhale (inspiration). JA 90-91, 216, 421-23

4

individual. For lung cancer, many scientists believe (including

petitioner’s own expert) that the increased risk is present only

for those with asbestosis and not for those just exposed to

asbestos? Although that is not true for mesothelioma, ten

percent of those with asbestosis die of mesothelioma. Thirty-

nine percent of patients with asbestosis who smoke die of lung

cancer, compared to lung cancer rates of only ten to fifteen

percent for smokers who have not even been exposed to

asbestos. The lung cancer rate for nonsmokers exposed to

asbestos is between two and five percent. JA 92-97, 470-71.

Il. Proceedings Below

This action is a consolidation of the complaints filed by

respondents, six former railway employees, in the Circuit Court

of Kanawha County, West Virginia, against petitioner Norfolk

& Western under FELA for injuries allegedly caused by

petitioner's negligence in exposing respondents to asbestos.

Because the trial resulted in ajury verdict in respondents’ favor,

the trial evidence must now be considered in the light most

favorable to respondents, which means the Court “must draw

all reasonable inferences in favor of: [respondents]” and

“disregard all evidence favorable to the [petitioner] that the jury

[wa]s not required to believe.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 151 (2000).

1. At trial, respondents, all West Virginia residents who

worked for petitioner in West Virginia, established that because

of petitioner’s negligent conduct they were each substantially

exposed to asbestos while in petitioner's employment and are

2 See Andrew Churg & Francis Green, Pathology of Occupational Lung

Disease, (1987) (“It should be appreciated that asbestosis is the only

generally accepted indicator of an asbestos etiology for lung cancer.”).

Although petitioner’s own expert agreed (J.A. 470) that the increased risk

of lung cancer exists only for those exposed individuals who have

asbestosis, other reputable scientists believe that those exposed but

without asbestosis also face heightened cancer risks, simply much less so.

E.g., Kevin Browne, Is Asbestos or Asbestosis the Cause of the Increased Risk

of Lung Cancer in Asbestos Workers? 43 British J.indus. Med. 145 (1986).

5

now suffering from asbestosis as a result. All the respondents

worked for significant periods of time in those employment

areas where concentrations of asbestos fibers in the air were

especially high, including where asbestos was directly handled

and where asbestos was stripped off and reapplied to steam

engines.’ “[T]errible” and “extreme” clouds of asbestos dust

resulted from those practices. JA 340. Respondents were also

exposed to asbestos from pipes, freight houses, brakes, and

operating steam engines in working for petiti -

ey — cr g for petitioner. JA 112, 192

Each respondent is suffering from asbestosis according to

objective medical diagnoses performed by a Board-certified

medical expert in pulmonary and lung disease who is also

National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health-certified

to read chest x-rays for the diagnosis of asbestosis. The

* Respondents Vance, Ayers, Johnson, and Butler all worked where the

asbestos stripping and reapplication occurred (JA 102-07, 112, 167-68, 198

201, 266-73, 303-04, 328); respondent Shirley handled asbestos sheets and

cleaned up broken bags of asbestos (JA 192-93, 282-86); and respondent

Spangler was directly involved in the stripping and the application of

asbestos on the engines (JA 205, 338-39). See P. Tr. Exhibs. 2-3. Photos

App., infra Al-A2. Almost all of the respondents were emploved for

decades by petitioner, ranging over 4, 5, 14, 30, and 38 years (JA 106 192

198, 201, 205), except for respondent Butler. Although Butler was subject

to asbestos exposure for only three months in petitioner's employment,

and further exposed in his future employment as a pipefitter, Butler's

exposure at petitioner's workplace was especially intense. He worked

during that time in the repair shop in close proximity to where asbestos

was stripped and reapplied and where, as a result, the air he inhaled was

exceedingly dusty with asbestos fibers. JA 249-50.

. Although petitioner learned of the public health hazards of asbestos

exposure in the workplace beginning in the 1930s, petitioner took none

of the industry-recommended precautions on behalf of any respondent

Petitioner did not advise any of them of asbestos hazards. Petitioner did

not tell respondents how to reduce the amount of asbestos dust in the air

or otherwise make the workplace less hazardous. Respondents were not

told to wet down the dust or instructed to wear masks or respirators of

any oe ae petitioner did not take any dust measurements during

respondents’ o tor promote res , ini

jATM4,25253,23943344

6

diagnoses rely on the necessary threshold facts that each

respondent was subjected to substantial asbestos exposure and

a sufficient amount of time has elapsed since that exposure for

asbestosis to develop. Most tellingly, the diagnoses are based

on the ATS-established diagnostic tests of “recognized value.

Respondents are suffering from serious physical and mental

injuries because of asbestosis and the. impairment is

progressively worsening. One respondent stated that his

“shortness of breath” meant that he “just can’t breath. *** [just

feel like I’m gonna fall dead * * *.” JA 114. Others explained

that the physical effect was so debilitating that they could not

“walk a distance” or could walk only about a block. JA 262, 276,

330. One respondent requires six minutes to walk 110 feet to

> The chest x-rays of each respondent reveal asbestosis of the lung. JA

178-81, 184, 193, 198, 199, 202, 204, 205-06. For respondent Spangler, the

asbestosis has already progressed to an even more advanced stage, but the

disease is likely to worsen for all respondents over time. JA 206; see id. at

171, 186, 195, 198, 203. Five respondents also suffered from diffusion

impairment consistent with asbestosis. JA 169-70, 193-94, 200, 202, 206.

Physical examination of the lungs, using a stethoscope, revealed rale

sounds in the chests of several respondents, including the one whose

diffusion capacity appeared normal, which further corroborated

asbestosis. JA 168-69, 184, 193. At trial, a medical expert testified that

some respondents also exhibited lung damage from smoking, but that the

evidence of asbestosis — especially the chest x-rays and diffusion

impairment -- was physically distinct for diagnostic purposes from that

caused by either smoking or pleural plaques. JA 171, 185, 189, 202, 208-09.

Petitioner improperly now tries to relitigate the facts and in doing so

misstates the trial evidence. Respondents’ expert did not “concede[] the

absence of ATS-recommended criteria” for respondent Ayers. Pet. Br. 7 &

n.6. The expert found those criteria met. JA 201-03. Petitioner's reference

to “corrected” diffusing capacity is misleading because, as established at

trial, this so-called correction does not measure for asbestosis impairment,

which is why it is not used by the ATS guidelines for measuring

respiratory impairment Petitioner's own expert conceded just that. JA

165-66, 477-78, 483, 522-23. Petitioner is likewise mistaken in now

contending (Br. 4 n.3) that a lung profusion reading of 1/1 is required to

support a diagnosis of asbestosis. The evidence at trial established that a

1/0 reading is sufficient evidence of abnormality to support an asbestosis

diagnosis according to the author of the ATS guidelines and to both

petitioner's and respondents’ medical experts. JA 199, 240, 432, 460.

7

get the mail and back, after which he has to sit down and rest.

JA 206, 356. The impact on another respondent's lung is so

severe that “no matter what I do, I could just be talking and I'll

run plum out of breath.” JA 294-95.

At trial, respondents established the seriousness of the mental

injuries caused by their asbestosis. In addition to the obvious

trauma from their growing physical incapacity to engage in

normal life activities, there was testimony about the emotional

trauma directly linked to shortness of breath. Respondent

Spangler described how his worsening condition was causing

him emotional distress. JA 357. Respondent Shirley stated it

was making “a nervous wreck out of me” and he “gfojt

depressed sometimes.” JA 298.

Respondents also proved at trial both their fear of getting

either lung cancer or mesothelioma and the reasonableness of

that fear based on their asbestosis. There was trial testimony

regarding the significantly enhanced risk of those cancers for

those with asbestosis (see pp. 3-4, supra), as well as the mental

injury caused by the knowledge of those risks. There was also

testimony that respondents were the kind of individuals who

understated their fears. JA 116, 255, 277, 299, 331, 354.

2. During jury selection, the trial judge granted respondents’

motion that petitioner not be allowed either to refer in voir dire

or to introduce at trial evidence of other lawsuits or settlements

that respondents may have filed against or entered into with

other parties relating to their asbestos-related injuries. Trial Tr.

32-38, 148-49 (April 13, 1998); JA 66-73. In considering the

motion, the trial judge repeatedly questioned whether

petitioner was planning to introduce evidence of the negligence

of other tortfeasors in support of apportionment of fault and, if

not, what did petitioner suggest the jury was “going to

apportion with?.” JA 69. Petitioner denied intent to introduce

evidence with respect to manufacturers and mentioned only the

possibility of “apportionment” based on the fact that several

respondents were smokers. JA 68-71. The trial court’s order

pertained only to evidence of the filing of other lawsuits and

settlements, and it did not preclude petitioner from introducing

evidence of the culpability of manufacturers or nonrailroad

employers. See JA 126 (“evidence that [respondents] have sued

the manufacturers and might have received settlement’).° |

3. Petitioner also requested two jury instructions that the trial

judge denied. Petitioner requested an instruction that there

could be no award of “damages to plaintiff for fear of cancer”

unless the jury found both that (1) “he has an actual likelihood

of developing cancer” and (2) “he has experienced Physical

manifestations caused by fear of developing cancer.” JA 348.

Petitioner did not contend (as it does now) that physical

manifestations would suffice for recovery or that mental injury

must be “severe.” The trial judge instead instructed the jury

that “any plaintiff who has demonstrated that he has developed

a reasonable fear of cancer that is related to proven physical

injury from asbestos is entitled to be compensated for that fear

as a part of the damages you award for pain and suffering” for

that physical injury. JA 573. The judge further instructed that

because “none of the plaintiffs have offered evidence that he

actually has cancer or that he will, with reasonable certainty

develop cancer in the future. *** [YJou cannot award damages

to plaintiffs for cancer or for increased risk of cancer. Id.

The trial judge also denied petitioner's apportionment’

instruction. Petitioner requested that the jury be instructed that

if it finds that the “plaintiff in this case has a condition or

disease which was caused by his employment with employers

other than the railroad, plaintiff's recovery must be limited to

only such damages as result from his railroad employment and

he cannot recover damages which have been or will be caused

by his non-railroad employment.” JA 539. Petitioner further

* Other evidence related to manufacturers denied admission by the trial

judge was certain evidence concerning when manufacturers warned

petitioner of asbestos hazards. Petitioner, however, sought to argue that

the manufacturers were nonnegligent in lacking knowledge of asbestos

hazards and, based on that alleged factual premise, hoping to persuade

the jury that petitioner was likewise nonnegligent. See JA 127 (“The

purported evidence would be that [the manufacturers] didn’t warn

because the general state-of-the-art was such that nobody knew enough

to do anything.). In denying petitioner the freedom to suggest that the

manufacturers were nonnegligent, the judge did not limit petitioner's

ability to introduce evidence of manufacturer negligence, which both

respondents and the court agreed was in bountiful supply. See JA 126-37.

9

proposed a verdict form that would have allowed the jury to

allocate percentages of damages to petitioner, each respondent

(based on smoking), and “Other Employment.” JA 550-60

The trial judge instead instructed the jury that plaintiff's

recovery should be “reduced” and “not * * * barred” if the jury

found that “a plaintiff was negligent and that plaintiff's

negligence caused in whole or in part, the plaintiff's lung

impairment or injury.” The verdict forms provided by the

judge accordingly allowed the jury to determine the

“percentage of negligence” attributable to “each of the parties”

in the event that the jury first found any of them contributorily

negligent. JA 578-79, 582-83, 586-87. The court further

instructed the jury that it was no defense to petitioner's liability

that there “may be more than one cause to any injury.” JA 568.

4. The jury reached verdicts in favor of respondents, but

reduced damages for three respondents based on their

comparative negligence by smoking. The reductions were 37,

31, and 14 percent, amounting to a $776,954.44 overall decrease.

The judge further reduced the verdicts to account for

settlements that respondents had entered into with other non-

FELA entities. The damages ultimately awarded in the final

judgments totaled $4,891,603.20. See JA 590-613; Order

Modifying Judgment (9/22/99). The judge subsequently

denied petitioner’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the

verdict or in the alternative for a new trial. Pet. App. 3a-4a.

5. The West Virginia Supreme Court denied discretionary

review. Pet. App. 1la-2a.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Petitioner sets forth two claims. Petitioner's first claim is that

the trial court erred in allowing the jury to award any damages

based on fear of cancer. Petitioner’s second claim is that the

trial court erred in holding petitioner liable for all of

respondents’ injuries rather than instructing the jury to

apportion damages between petitioner and other non-party

tortfeasors who may also have contributed to those injuries.

Neither of these contentions has any merit. Both are premised

ona misreading of settled tort doctrine, which supports the jury

10

instructions in all respects. Both also run afoul of the Federal

Employer's Liability Act (FELA), which Congress enacted in

order to expand a plaintiff's ability to recover for injuries

caused by a railroad’s negligence. — Finally, petitioner

misapprehends this Court's role in reviewing trial ee

and jury verdicts by repeatedly questioning the sufficiency 0

the evidence at trial and by introducing new evidence and new

arguments not presented at trial. The judgment of the trial

court should, accordingly, be affirmed, or the Court may wish

to dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.

1. Petitioner's first contention contravenes settled tort

doctrine that permits recovery of damages for reasonably-

incurred mental injuries where, as in this case, the basis of those

injuries is a physical injury caused by the defendants

negligence. Contrary to petitioner's repeated insistence, this

case, unlike Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 US.

424 (1997), does not involve a stand-alone tort claim for

negligent infliction of emotional distress. Respondents are not

relying on mere “asbestos exposure” in support of their claim

for recovery of mental injuries. Nor are they asserting those

mental injuries as what establishes their tort cause of action in

irst instance.

"hanaken alleged and proved at trial that they each suffer

from a serious, debilitating — yor —eonora .

used itioner’s negligent conduct, an oner :

oan > i adainnat’| (Br. 2) the jury’s finding of asbestosis.

Respondents further established at trial the reasonableness of

their fear, arising from their asbestosis, that they may suffer in

the future from two painful and potentially fatal forms of

cancer: mesothelioma and lung cancer. The evidence was

uncontradicted at trial that those who, like respondents, suffer

from asbestosis are significantly more likely to develop these

cancers than those who do not, including those who have been

only exposed to asbestos. Pursuant to the trial judge’s

instruction, the jury concluded that respondents fear of cancer

was in fact reasonably related to their asbestosis and the

sufficiency of that evidence can no longer be fairly questioned.

Based on traditional and longstanding tort doctrine, recovery

for such mental injuries is permissible under FELA. Once a

ll

plaintiff establishes that the defendant's conduct has caused a

physical injury, such as a serious physical disease from asbestos

exposure, the plaintiff is entitled to recover for all reasonably

foreseeable physical and mental injuries proximately resulting

from the same “conduct which cause[d]” the initial injury. See

Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 456 (1965). The physical disease

in that circumstance satisfies the “injury” element necessary for

the tort cause of action, and the mental injuries are merely an

aspect of damages for an otherwise established tort.

Nor is there anything about the jury verdict to suggest that

respondents’ asbestosis was merely a pretext for a damage

award based mostly on respondents’ fear of cancer. Wholly

apart from fear of cancer, the evidence at trial established the

seriousness of respondents’ asbestosis and its debilitating and

progressively worsening impact on their daily lives. Indeed,

none of the respondents sought to prove that their fear of cancer

was their most substantial injury, and at least one even

expressly denied just that. Because, moreover, petitioner failed

to seek or obtain a jury verdict that reveals how much was

awarded for fear of cancer, petitioner cannot now presume that

the jury awarded too much on that one ground.

2. FELA’s plain terms and settled tort law also contradict

petitioner's second claim that the trial court erred by not

instructing the jury to apportion damages between petitioner

and absent third parties who may have contributed to the

injuries of two respondents. FELA and tort law permit a

plaintiff to recover his entire damages from a defendant whose

negligence jointly causes indivisible personal injuries, such as

a physical disease, while allowing the defendant to seek

contribution from other tortfeasors.

FELA expressly imposes liability on petitioner so long as its

negligence caused respondents’ injuries “in part.” 45 U.S.C. §

51. As repeatedly stressed by this Court, this statutory standard

is met when the “employer negligence played any part, even

the slightest, in producing the injury ** *. It does not matter

that, from the evidence, the jury may also with reason, on

grounds of probability, attribute the result to other causes ** *.”

Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506-07 (1957). In

contrast to FELA’s adoption of comparative negligence, FELA

12

does not provide that a plaintiff's recovery must be reduced

because other nonrailroad sources contributed to the plaintiff's

indivisible injuries. Neither the common law in existence at the

time of FELA’s enactment nor the weight of common law

authorities today dictate otherwise. Respondents’ personal

injuries resulting from asbestosis are classic “indivisible”

injuries for which apportionment is not compelled.

Even if, contrary to our submission, FELA’s plain language

and applicable common law doctrine do not preclude

apportionment for the type of indivisible physical and

reasonable mental injuries resulting from asbestosis, petitioner

cannot prevail by now claiming that a reasonable basis for

apportionment exists. The burden of establishing any such

“reasonable basis” necessarily falls on petitioner as the

defendant. Here, however, petitioner made no such showing

at trial, notwithstanding multiple opportunities to do so.

3. Although petitioner pays nominal lip-service to the

irrefutable notion that, before this Court, petitioner may neither

challenge the sufficiency of the evidence before the jury nor

present new evidence not introduced at trial, petitioner’s brief

is riddled with efforts to dojust that. Petitioner never accounts

for the fact that all reasonable evidentiary inferences must now

be made in respondents’ favor as the prevailing parties at trial.

With regard to the first question presented, petitioner (1)

questions whether respondents in fact suffer from asbestosis by

repeatedly stressing the possibility of its misdiagnosis; (2) offers

new evidence that asbestosis is not a serious debilitating

disease; and (3) presents new evidence that respondents’ fear of

cancer is not reasonable. Petitioner's arguments on the

apportionment issue are similarly infected by illegitimate

factual allegations. Petitioner relies on fact evidence that could

have been (but was not) introduced at trial to support a finding

that a reasonable basis for apportionment of liability exists.

Petitioner is not entitled to a new trial based on its

hypothetical notions of what it should have done at trial.

Undoubtedly, there is room for “Brandeis Brief” presentations

in cases raising legal issues where such historical facts may be

legally relevant. Here, however, the Court has decided to

review the propriety of a jury verdict and jury instructions that

13

were based on the evidence actually presented at trial. A party

cannot introduce new evidence to impeach that verdict or those

instructions or invite this Court to review the sufficiency of the

evidence. For this reason, the Court may wish to consider

dismissing the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.

ARGUMENT

I. THE TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE

JURY THAT A PLAINTIFF WHO HAS A

REASONABLE FEAR OF CANCER BECAUSE HE IS

SUFFERING FROM A PHYSICAL DISEASE CAUSED

BY THE DEFENDANT’S NEGLIGENCE IS ENTITLED

TO RECOVER FOR THAT MENTAL INJURY AS PART

OF HIS OVERALL DAMAGES

; The trial judge in this case properly instructed the jury that

any plaintiff who has demonstrated a reasonable fear of cancer

that is related to proven physical injury from asbestosis is

entitled to be compensated for that fear as a part of the darr.ages

you may award for pain and suffering.” JA 573. The trial

judge’s instructions were valid in all respects. It is

longstanding, settled tort law that where, as in this case, a

plaintiff has established that defendant's negligence has

resulted in a physical injury, the plaintiff can recover for all

physical and reasonable mental harms proximately related to

that initial physical injury. For this reason, petitioner’ s claim of

jury instruction error is little more than the very kind of

dressed-up sufficiency of the evidence challenge that this Court

has consistently declared inappropriate for plenary review.

A. Under Settled Tort Law, A Defendant Who

Negligently Causes Physical Injury To The Person Of

Another Is Liable For The Resulting Physical And

Mental Harms, Including Reasonable Apprehension

Future Physical Consequences

1. FELA “invests the injured employee with a right to such

damages as will compensate him for his personal loss and

os

suffering.” St. Louis I.M. & S.R. Co. v. Craft, 237 U.S. 648, 656

(1915). In construing the precise scope of damages recoverable

under FELA, this Court considers, first, “FELA itself, its

purposes and background,” and, second, “because ‘FELA

jurisprudence gleans guidance from common-law

developments,’ * * * the common law treatment of the right of

recovery asserted by respondents.” Consolidated Rail Corp. v.

Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 541-42 (1994), quoting Atchison, T. & S.

F. R. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 568 (1987). Although FELA

does not itself answer the question of the scope of physical and

mental injuries for which a negligent defendant is liable, settled

common law principles readily do.

Under settled tort law, where, as in this case, a defendant

negligently causes a physical injury to another person, the

defendant's liability is not confined to the physical injuries that

immediately result. The initial physical injury satisfies the

“injury” element necessary to establish a prima facie case of

negligence, consisting of “breach of duty, injury and causation”

(Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 550-551). But the defendant is liable for

all physical and mental harms that proximately result from the

threshold physical injury.

The scope of proximate mental injuries that may be recovered

includes “ pain and suffering” in the narrowest sense: pain that

arises in the immediate aftermath of a physical wounding. But,

contrary to petitioner's claim (Br. 15-16), it is not strictly

confined to such immediate, direct pain. “In connection with

proved physical injury, wrongfully caused [emotional

disturbance] has long been an element in recovery, not merely

where undistinguishable from ‘physical pain,’ but in further

removed situations.” | Herbert F. Goodrich, Emotional

Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 Mich. L. Rev. 497, 509 (1921).

As described by Dean Prosser in the very first edition of his

Handbook of Torts, “[w]ith a cause of action established by the

physical harm, ‘parasitic’ damages are awarded, and it is

considered that there is sufficient assurance that the mental

injury is not being feigned.” William L. Prosser, Handbook of the

Law of Torts, 213 (1941). Hence, mental injuries that would not,

standing alone, be sufficient to create liability, are recoverable

as “parasitic damages” when they are the result of a physical

15

impact that produces a physical injury because the latter

satisfies the “injury” element necessary to establish the tort

cause of action. The essential correctness of this proposition

both at the time of FELA’s enactment and since, cannot be

seriously questioned.’ As set forth in the Restatement (Second)

of Torts, § 456 (1965): “If the actor’s negligent conduct has so

caused any bodily harm to another as to make him liable for it

the actor is also subject to liability for * * * fright, shock, or other

emotional disturbance resulting from the bodily harm or the

conduct which causes it * * *” (emphasis supplied).

2. Nor can it be gainsaid that it is has long been settled tort

law that such recoverable mental injuries extend to the

reasonable apprehension of future physical consequences.

“[E]ven if the plaintiff cannot prove that a disease will result in

the future, courts have permitted recovery for reasonable fears

that the impact will inflict some future disease. * * * Such cases

fit the pattern of parasitic damages - emotional harm results

from an initial injury and is recovered as one element of

damages for that injury.” Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts, 844

(2000); Thomas G. Shearman & Amasa A. Redfield, III A Treatise

on the Law of Negligence § 761 (6" ed. 1913) (“The mental

suffering which may be allowed for includes such as arises

from the plaintiff's reflections upon what he personally has to

endure.”). There is simply no merit, therefore, to petitioner's

contention (Br. 15-16) that mental injury based on fear of future

consequences such as cancer are recoverable only as “stand-

alone negligently inflicted emotional distress.”

Cases involving fear of cancer based on asbestosis did not

exist at the time of FELA’s enactment, but there are plenty of

historical and contemporary analogues in the case law. See

’ See Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of

Torts, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1033, 1048-49 (1936); Archibald Robinson Watson

A Treatise on the Law of Damages for Personal Injuries, 500-01 (1901); Francis

H. Bohlen, Right to Recover for Injury Resulting from Negligence Without

Impact, 50 Am. L. Rev. 141, 142 (1902); Thomas A. Street, I The Foundations

. a oe - bere and Principles of Tort, 460 (1906); Francis H.

en, | Cases on t of To

in Gabaseien f Torts 215 (1915); Fowler V. Harper, Readings

16

David Minneman, Annot, Future Disease or Condition, or Anxiety

Relating Thereto, As Element of Recovery, 50 A.L.R. 4" 13 (1986).

Perhaps most directly analogous are the legion of dog bite and

blood poisoning cases during the late 19" and early 20

centuries in which plaintiffs recovered damages both for the

physical wounding of the immediate bite and for the fear of

future disease (rabies, lockjaw) caused by the possibility that

harmful germs were injected into the victim’s bloodstream. The

courts routinely allowed for recovery of mental injury based on

fear of future disease, wholly apart from the physical harm (and

immediate mental harm) caused by the initial wounding itself.

In Ayers v. Macoughtry, 29 Okla. 399 (1911), for instance, the

plaintiff stated simply at trial that he was “in fear of acquiring

[rabies]” and, because of that fear, “there was a good deal of

anxiety, and I experienced it.” Id. at 402. Based on that

testimony, the Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld the trial

court’s instruction to the jury that in determining the amount of

damages, “you may take into consideration the apprehension

of poisoning from the bite of said dog and the fear of evil

results therefrom.” Id. at 404.° In Buck v. Brady, 110 Md. 568

(1909), another dog bite case, the defendant objected to the

plaintiff's being allowed to testify in response to the question

“Have you any fear now” of rabies, “Yes, sir; I still worry about

it.” The Maryland Supreme Court held that there was no error

in allowing this testimony, relying on an earlier decision of the

Vermont Supreme Court: “’The apprehension of poison from

the bite of the dog, and the fear and solicitude as to evil results

therefrom -- all pain, anguish, solicitude, occasioned by the bite

-- were proper matters for the jury in estimating the damages.

Id. at 573, quoting Godeau v. Blood, 52 Vt. 251 (1880); Warner v.

Chamberlain, 12 Del. 18, 21 (1884) (“fear and apprehension of

hydrophobia”); Serio v. American Brewing Co., 141 La. 290, 299

(1917) (“compensate the mental suffering resulting from the

knowledge that he had been bitten by a mad dog”).

8 See Heintz v. Caldwell, 9 Ohio Cir. Dec. 412 (1898) (“we hold that the

court also erred in not permitting the plaintiff to testify to the mental

suffering consequent upon her apprehensions of hydrophobia and lockjaw

resulting from the dogs biting her”).

17

The courts in these cases carefully distinguished between a

plaintiff's right to recover for reasonable apprehensions of

future consequences and the right to recover for the future

consequences themselves. The courts specifically upheld the

legitimacy of recovery for the mental injury based on such

apprehensions even when the consequence were themselves too

uncertain to be recoverable. See Bernadsky v. Erie R. Co., 76

N.J.L. 580 (1908). The courts also endorsed the reasonableness

of fears based on microscopic bodily invasions notwithstanding

their potentially lengthy duration: “The ghost of hydrophobia

is raised, not to down during the life-time of the victim.” The

Lord Derby, 17 F. 265, 267 (E.D. La 1883); Gamer v. Winchester,

110 S.W. 2d 1190, 1193 (Tex. Civ. App. 1737) (“these mental

fears may be considered by the jury”).

3. Innone of the longstanding tort law precedent allowing for

recovery of mental injuries related to a physical impact or injury

was there a further requirement that the mental injuries be

“physically manifested.” The mental injuries needed only to be

related to a physical injury, reasonable, and, like injuries of any

kind, supported by evidence sufficient to sustain a jury verdict.

For that same reason, of course, we do not doubt that a jury is

entitled to consider the absence of physical manifestations as

evidence that a mental injury is less severe and therefore less

deserving of a significant award. In this case, moreover,

petitioner made just such a closing argument to the jury. See JA

576. But the jury’s fair cbnsideration of that argument is all that

tort law requires.

B. A Plaintiff Who Reasonably Fears Cancer Because He

Has Asbestosis May Recover Damages for that Fear From

A Defendant Who Negligently Caused the Asbestosis

1. In Metro-North , this Court ruled that a victim of asbestos

exposure could not recover for mental injuries based on fear of

cancer because exposure to asbestos, alone, did not amount to

the threshold “ physical impact” necessary for such recovery. In

the instant case, however, respondents are not the victims of

mere exposure to asbestos. The evidence at trial established

that petitioner’s negligence in exposing respondents to asbestos

18

has resulted in their suffering from asbestosis, which is a

serious, debilitating pulmonary lung disease that progressively

worsens over time. Accordingly, under longstanding tort law,

petitioner can prevail only either if (1) asbestosis does not

supply the requisite physical injury or (2) if respondents’ fear

of cancer is not sufficiently related to asbestosis to be a

legitimate additional aspect of damages.

Revealingly, almost none of the lengthy briefs filed by

petitioner and its supporting amici discuss at any length these

essential, threshold legal and factual issues. On the significance

of asbestosis, petitioner can at most muster only a footnote (Br.

21 n.13) that declares, without any elaboration, that this Court

in Metro-North “did not decide that asbestosis, or any specific

asbestos-related disease, would in fact qualify a plaintiff” for

recovery of related mental injury. At least one of petitioner's

amicus seeks to fill the analytical gap in petitioner's position,

albeit no more convincingly. According to amicus American

Insurance Association (Br. 17-18), the asbestosis diagnosis does

not change the result because “asbestosis is merely a proxy for

exposure to asbestos.” “[T]he presence of asbestosis - the only

asserted factual difference between this case and Buckley - adds

nothing to the legal analysis.” Id.

Such propositions are simply untenable. The legitimacy and

legal sig cance of respondents’ asbestosis diagnosis is

incontrovertible. Notwithstanding petitioner’s repeated (and

improper) efforts to cast doubt on the validity and seriousness

of that medical diagnosis,’ the evidence was more than ample

to sustain the jury’s verdict. There was substantial evidence of

respondents’ significant asbestos exposure at petitioner's

employment. See p. 5, supra. A Board-certified medical expert

applied the consensus American Thoracic Society guidelines in

support of that diagnosis, which even petitioner acknowledges

as “authoritative” (Br. 3) and which carefully distinguishes

> See, e.g., Pet. Br. 7 (“accounts of railroad exposure were riddled with

vagueness and imprecision”); id. at 2 (“minimal proof of disease”); id. at

3 (“misdiagnosis is thus common”); id. at 5 (“commonly diagnose those

who manifest even the slightest lung scarring as asbestotic”); id. at 6

(“scant evidence of asbestosis”); id. at 30 (“benign disease”).

19

between lung impairments caused by asbestos and smoking.

See note 1, supra. Contrary to petitioner's intimation (Br. 6, 8),

respondents’ asbestosis is not a mere, incidental inconvenience

based on the “slightest lung scarring.” As shown at trial, at

least one-third of the lung must be scarred before asbestosis is

even revealed by an x-ray, its restriction on lung inspiration

capacity causes shortness of breath that significantly restricts

the ability to engage in daily life activities, it worsens over time,

and it is potentially fatal. See pp. 2-3, supra.”

No more subject to dispute before this Court is the jury’s

assessment pursuant to the jury instruction of the relationship

of respondents’ fear of cancer to their asbestosis. The

sufficiency of that evidence is not a proper matter for this

Court's review. But, in all events, the United States is simply

wrong in asserting (Br. 5, 13) that “any increased risk of cancer

or associated fear is not related to the physical injury that

permits respondents to sue.” The relationship is substantial

and doubly-layered. Asbestosis is what makes respondents’

fear of cancer reasonable. Indeed, petitioner's amicus, the

American Insurance Association, correctly acknowledges (Br.

22) that asbestosis is “logically related” to the reasonableness of

the fear of cancer because “a present injury of asbestosis makes

'° Petitioner's description of asbestosis -- a “benign disease” lacking

“any severe impairment” and causing “only” shortness of breath (Br. 8,

30) -- sharply contrasts with the description of the disease set forth by the

federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration:

[I]ndividuals with asbestosis experience a relatively long and

debilitating period of morbidity. Dr. Holstein, a pulmonary physician,

described a typical case:

The main symptom of asbestosis is progressive shortness of breath.

When this has its onset in its typically insidious and gradual manner,

the individual thinks that he is just getting older or getting a little

overweight, can't run as fast as he used to, or gets out of breath more

easily than he used to; and attributes it to factors such as the ones |

mentioned. A little later on, the person begins to notice that in fact, he

or she can't do the things that many other people the same age can do."

** Eventually, in the very severe cases, a person's life consists of

sitting in an armchair on the ground floor with an oxygen tank, and

disconnecting it just long enough to get up and go to the bathroom.

51 Fed. Reg. 22612, 22622 (1986).

20

it more likely than it otherwise would be that a particular

plaintiff who has been exposed to asbestos will eventually

develop cancer.” .

Nor i that logical relationship insubstantial. As previously

described (pp. 3-4, supra), 10 percent of individuals with

asbestosis contract mesothelioma (cancer of the lining of the

lung); 39 percent of those with asbestosis who also smoke

contract fatal lung cancer, while the rate for nonsmokers with

asbestosis is 2-5 percent, which is still a substantial risk.

Significantly, as petitioner's own expert agreed at trial, it isa

widely held view that the increased risk of lung cancer applies

only to those who have asbestosis. JA 470; p.4 & note 2, supra.

The asbestosis confirms the degree of lung infiltration —- the

highest kinds of exposures” (JA 95) — as well as a person's

particular adverse biologic reaction to the fibers. .

The second layer of the relationship binding together

respondents’ asbestosis and their fear of cancer is likewise

significant. It derives from the essential fact that asbestosis and

the fear of cancer are both caused by petitioner's same negligent

conduct, commencing with the infiltration of the respondents

lungs with asbestos fibers and extending to asbestosis.

Respondents’ fear of cancer is, precisely as contemplated by the

Restatement (Second) of Torts, “an emotional disturbance

resulting from * * * the conduct which causes [asbestosis]. See

§ 456. Just as with the cases of dog bites and rabies more than

a century ago, both asbestosis and cancer are caused by the

same negligent conduct and respondents seek recovery only for

damages based on fear and not for the cancer itself.

"! Significantly, the relationship between asbestosis and fear of cancer

clearly satisfies even petitioner's own test of the necessary corroboration

of mental injury, as described in the petition for a writ of certiorari. As set

forth in the “Questions Presented” of its petition, petitioner did not

present the issue as whether emotional injury based on fear of cancer must

be proved by physical manifestations. The petition was instead carefully

written in the disjunctive, expressly allowing for the possibility of other

corroboration of injury related to their alleged fear of cancer. Pet. i (emphasis

supplied). Proof of asbestosis, however, supplies just that corroboration

which petitioner acknowledged would be sufficient. It is undeniably both

“injury” and it is “related” to the “fear of cancer.” The evidence of

21

~

2. Petitioner and its amici are also mistaken that reasonable

fear of cancer is not recoverable because “asbestosis and cancer

are separate diseases.” Pet. Br. 15-16; U.S. Amicus Br. 5, 11-13.

Respondents did not seek and the trial judge did not permit the

jury to award any damages based on cancer itself. See JA 573.

The “’separate disease’ rule cited by the United States (Br. 12)

is therefore neither implicated in this case nor inconsistent with

the recovery of damages based on fear of cancer.

The “separate disease” rule originated in cases in which tort

defendants, relying on “the well-established rule that a claim or

cause of action may not be split,” were arguing for “a

judge-made rule that upon manifestation of any harm, the

injured party must then, if ever, sue for all harms the same

exposure may (or may not) occasion some time in the future.”

Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 117, 119

(D.C. Cir. 1982) (Ginsburg, J.). As proposed by the tort

defendants in those earlier cases, a victim of asbestosis would

have to sue for both asbestosis and for unrealized cancer at the

same (earlier) time and would be able to obtain relief for the

latter only if he could prove that he was then “reasonably

certain” to get cancer. Id. at 120. The unfairness of requiring a

plaintiff to bring a suit, if ever, when the evidence would

invariably be insufficient is what prompted many courts to

adopt the “separate disease” rule, which allows for the statute

of limitations to run for each disease separately. Id. at 120-21.

In this case, however, respondents are not claiming damages

for cancer. JA 573. They are instead seeking damages not for

asbestosis, furthermore, is itself corroborated by the very type of

“objective medical evidence” upon which petitioner insists: a detailed

expert medical diagnosis. Perhaps that is why petitioner sought, upon

further reflection, to rewrite the question presented in its subsequent brief

on the merits. Compare Pet. i with Pet. Br. i. Such a rewrite would seem to

implicate the Court's rules, which allow for the “Question Presented” to

be reworded, but do not allow the petitioner to “change the substance of

the questions already presented.” S.Ct Rule 24.1(a). But, in all events,

petitioner's effort to revise the question presented is strikingly revealing

of the fundamental weakness of its legal position. The judge’s instruction

to the jury in this case is entirely consistent with petitioner's . riginal

question. Compare JA 573 with Pet. i.

22

a future physical injury, but for their present mental injury,

which exists whether or not that future physical injury occurs.

The United States is correct that FELA’s “text clearly focuses on

present injuries” (Br. 15), but equal wrong in characterizing

respondents’ mental injury as not “present.” Respondent's

“fear is happening now.” Beeman v. Manville Corp., 496

N.W.2d 247, 252 (lowa 1993). a .

Unlike either petitioner or the United States, the trial judge in

this case correctly distinguished between the reasonable

apprehension of future consequences and the consequences

themselves, allowing recovery only for the former. JA 573. Itis

the same distinction evidentin the rabies cases discussed above.

It is also, of course, the same distinction that defines the

essential difference between the independent torts of assault

(apprehension of a harmful contact) and battery (harmful

contact). Restatement (Second) Torts, §§ 13, 18, 21. . ;

No inconsistency is presented between the “separate disease

rule and distinguishing between present and future injury.

Many of the jurisdictions adopting that rule have also allowed

plaintiffs with asbestosis to recover damages for fear of cancer

in their asbestosis claims. See, e.g., Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Cox,

481 So. 2d 517, 521, 528 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Devlin v.

Johns-Manville Corp., 202 N.J. Super. 556, 563, 567 (1985);

Griffin v. Keene Corp., 1990 U.S. Dist. Lexis 7424, slip op. 4

(N.D. Ill. 1990). Those courts all recognize that the present

injury based on reasonable fear is distinct from the future

consequences of cancer and presents no more a problem of

double recovery than does recovery for both assault and

battery. These judicial rulings also avoid the unfairness that

would otherwise result because many current victims of

asbestosis would be unlikely ever to be made whole for their

present mental injuries, such as those victims who die of

asbestosis or other causes before cancer occurs or a lawsuit can

be brought. Most persons die of mesothelioma within 12

months of its diagnosis. See H. Corwin Hinshaw & John F.

Murray, Diseases of the Chest 731-32 (4" ed. 1980).

3. Although this Court did not rule in Metro-North on the

precise question, the Court's opinion left little doubt that a

23

plaintiff with asbestosis could recover damages for reasonable

fear of cancer under FELA. The Court held that FELA “permits

‘recovery of emotional injury’ by ‘those plaintiffs who sustain

a physical impact as a result of a defendant's negligent

conduct.” 521 U.S. at 430, quoting, Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 547-48.

The Court also made clear that under settled tort doctrine, a

disease such as asbestosis would satisfy the threshold physical

injury requirement. The Court both described how “[c]ommon

law courts do permit a plaintiff who suffers from a disease to

recover for negligently caused emotional distress” (521 U.S. at

432 (emphasis supplied)) and affirmatively ruled thata railroad

employee “cannot recover unless, and until, he manifests

symptoms of a disease” (id. at 436 (emphasis supplied)). The

Metro-North opinion even cites favorably to the lower court's

ruling in Lavelle v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 30 Ohio Misc.

2d 11 (Ct. Common Pleas, Cayahoga Cty. 1987), which this

Court described as allowing recovery for fear of cancer because

the “emotional distress damages [were] sought by an asbestosis-

afflicted plaintiff.” 521 U.S. at 437 (emphasis supplied).

Indeed, unlike in this case, the railroad petitioner in Metro-

North and the same amici who support petitioner in this case,

made quite clear in the legal briefs that they filed in Metro-North

that an asbestosis-afflicted plaintiff would be able to recover for

reasonable fear of cancer as part of his overall damages."* The

American Insurance Association (AIA), amicus both in Metro-

North and here, made explicit its promise to future asbestosis-

inflicted plaintiffs. The AIA declared in its Metro North amicus

brief (Metro North AIA Amicus Br. 14) that “[t]he question here

is not whether respondent can sue, but when. There is no doubt

that if respondent does, in fact, suffer a physical injury from

exposure to asbestos, he will be able to bring a cause of action

to recover not only for his physical injuries, but also for any

emotional injury” (emphasis in original and supplied).

"2 See, e.g., Metro-North Pet. Rep. Br. 18 (“Indeed, if plaintiff's medical

records contained any objectively verifiable functional impairment, he

would have an old-fashioned personal injury claim, and there would be

no need to talk about a zone of danger test, physical impact, or the like.”).

'° In strikingly similar language and identical emphasis, the United

24

Such acknowledgments were hardly surprising in Metro-

North because of the clarity of settled tort law. What is

surprising is how the petitioner railroad in this case and the

same amicus now claim otherwise. As correctly described by

the petitioner railroad in its Metro-North brief (Br. 20 & n.12),

the “better rule in asbestos cases” is the one “adopted by the

overwhelming majority of courts, namely to restrict recovery

for emotional distress to plaintiffs with actual physical injury

caused by asbestos exposure.” The lower courts have, in fact,

routinely upheld jury instructions that allow a jury to include

damages based on reasonable fear of cancer where, as in this

case, “the exposure to asbestos * * * has already actually

resulted in some physical harm” suchas asbestosis. Dobbs, The

Law Of Torts, supra, 844 & n. 5, citing Eagle-Picher Industries v.

Cox, 481 So.2d 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); see, e.g., Jackson v.

Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 413-415 (5™ Cir.1986)

(en banc); Griffin v. Keene Corp., 1990 U.S. Dist. Lexis 7424, slip

op. 4 (N.D. Ill. 1990); Beeman v. Manville Corp., 496 N.W.2d

247, 251-53 (lowa 1993); Capital Holding Corp. v. Bailey, 873

S.W.2d 187, 194 (Ky. 1994); Hoerner v. ANCO Insulations, Inc.,

812 So.2d 45, 77 (La. Ct. App. 2002); Denton v. Southern

Railway Co., 854 S.W. 2d 885, 888-89 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

4. Finally, there is nothing about the jury verdict in this case

to support the Chamber of Commerce's suggestion (Br. 3) that

respondents’ asbestosis was merely a pretext for a damage

award almost exclusively based on fear of cancer. There is

instead every reason to presume the opposite. The trial

evidence established the serious impairments caused by

respondents’ asbestosis, ranging from their major physical

impact on daily life activities - walking short distances, talking,

singing - to the sheer terror caused by being unable to breath

because of progressively worsening shortness of breath. See,

States asserts in this case that “the question is not whether damages for fear

of cancer may be recovered, but when.” U.S. Amicus Br. 5 (emphasis in

original). The answer to that question, however, is provided in the Metro-

North brief from which the question apparently originated: when “the

respondent does, in fact suffer a physical injury from exposure to

asbestos.” AIA Metro-North Br. 14.

———

25

e.g.,JA 114 (“shortness of breath” means “just can’t breath[e]”);

pp. 6-7, supra. No one testified, nor did their trial counsel argue

to the jury, that fear of cancer was the most significant of their

injuries. One respondent stated that his greatest source of

anxiety was not cancer but his worsening “shortness of breath”

by causing him to “clos[e] out more and more every day. ** *

The only thing I know is pray * * *.” JA 299.

Because, moreover, petitioner neither sought nor obtained a

special jury verdict that separated out the damages attributable

to fear of cancer from respondents’ other injuries, there is no

way of knowing whether any respondent received significant,

or even any, damages on that ground. Nor can petitioner now

fairly pierce the verdict and presume otherwise. A general jury

verdict on appellate review is entitled to a virtually irrebutable

presumption of regularity as to how the jury allocated damages

between a plaintiff's various injuries. A defendant cannot

prevail on appeal by arguing that the jury might have awarded

all of the damages for one of a plaintiff's injuries and none for

any of the others. Cf Gallick v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 572 U.S.

108, 119 (1963) (“it is the duty of the courts to attempt to

harmonize the [jury] answers, if it is possible under a fair

reading of them”). In sum, even if, as petitioner argues, the

evidence did not support awarding large sums for respondents’

fear of cancer, there is no reason to presume that the jury did so.

C. None Of Petitioner’s Various Arguments Is Relevant To

From Asbestosis May Recover Under FELA For Fear of

Cancer Based On Such Asbestosis

Petitioner and its amici dedicate volumes to legal issues not

presented by the facts and procedural posture of this case. They

contend that a plaintiff should not be able to maintain a claim

for negligent infliction of emotional distress unless the

emotional distress is sufficiently “severe” to be corroborated by

physical manifestations.” They argue, more particularly, that

such emotional distress claims based on fear of cancer should

be subject to especially rigorous scrutiny because of the

background risks of cancer everyone faces. And petitioners and

26

its amici contend that the nation faces an asbestos litigation

“crisis” that warrants the judiciary’s guarding against any

expansion of tort remedies to those ht gama of

future physical injuries. See, e.g., Pet. Br. '

The hort pc to all these contentions is that unlike the

railroad employees in Metro-North, respondents here are not

maintaining a stand-alone claim for negligent infliction of

emotional distress. They were not merely exposed to asbestos;

they were not mere bystanders to the physical injury of others;

and they are not complaining of some incidental, trivial

physical impact with only a tangential relationship to their

principal injury. Respondents are not physically unimpaired

plaintiffs. Consistent with the trial judge's instructions (JA

573), respor:dents are instead claiming the right to recover

damages for mental injuries as an element of damages for a tort

otherwise established that caused physical injury.

Petitioner’s basic error lies in its confusing two distinct legal

categories for the recovery of mental injuries: (1) Where mental

injuries are simply an additional aspect of damages for a tort

cause of action otherwise established (sometimes referred to as

“parasitic” damages); and (2) Where no physical injury

occurred and the mental injuries themselves purport to satisfy

the injury element necessary to establish the prima facie case

necessary for tort recovery. See generally William L. Prosser,

Handbook of the Law of Torts 213 (1941); Thomas A. Street, I The

Foundations of Legal Liability - Theory and Principles of Tort, 460

(1906); Restatement (Second) of Torts, Ch. 2, Intro. Note, p. 23;

id. at § 924(a) & comment (a). This case implicates the first legal

category. Because, moreover, all of the legal authorities and

policy arguments vigorously asserted by petitioner and its

amici presuppose application of the second category, they are

erected on a foundational mischaracterization of the case at

hand. And, like a house of cards, petitioner’s entire argument

utterly collapses upon removal of that single, fictional card.

1. Petitioner devotes most of its brief (Br. 16-31) to the

proposition that the common law requires physical

raanifestations of severe mental injury. The legal precedent and

authorities upon which petitioner principally relies, however,

are all cases in which the petitioner is maintaining a stand-alone

27

claim for recovery of emotional distress either intentionally or

negligently’ inflicted. Many are bystander cases. None is

relevant to this case."

We do not deny that for stand-alone emotional distress claims

there is precedent providing that the mental injury element

necessary for liability must be “severe” and sometimes even

established by physical manifestations. This precedent

includes claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress for

persons not physically impacted or injured but only a bystander

within the “zone of danger.” But no comparable substantial

precedent exists for instances where the plaintiff is not seeking

'* Jones v. CSX Transportation, 287 F.3d 1341 (11" Cir. 2002) is completely

out of step with both traditional tort law and the vast majority of judicial

rulings addressing whether victims of asbestosis can also recover for their

reasonable fear of cancer. The court erred by completely rejecting the

longstanding and established distinction between stand-alone claims for

negligent infliction of emotional distress and recovery of damages for

mental injury “simply as an element of damages in an ordinary negligence

action.” Id. at 1348.

'° The result in this case, however, would not change even if, contrary

to our submission, the relationship of respondents’ mental injury to their

physical injury (asbestosis) was not deemed sufficient to make this a

parasitic damages claim. Although some courts imposed additional limits

on the recovery of mental injury when they expanded recovery to

plaintiffs in the “zone of danger” but lacking physical impact and injury,

those precedents do not intimate an intention simultaneously to contract

recovery where, as here, such an impact and injury are both present. As

“this Court has itself noted, moreover, the precedent is not nearly as one-

sided as petitioner suggests, and not all jurisdictions are so insistent on

such proof of physical manifestations even for stand-alone claims of

negligent infliction of emotional distress. See Gottschall, 512 U.S. at 549

n.11; see, e.g., Taylor v. Baptist Medical Center, 400 So.2d 369 (Ala. 1981);

Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 27 Cal.3d 916 (1980); Leong v.

Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398 (1974); Culbert v. Sampson’s Supermarkets, Inc.,

444 A.2d 433 (Me. 1982); Versland v. Caron Transport, 206 Mont. 313

(1983); Burd v. Sinn, 486 Pa. 146 (1979). In all events, whether formally

recovered as “parasitic” damages or on the basis of a “stand-alone” tort,

the policy reasons for imposing the physical manifestation requirement

(the only issue raised by the question presented) on mental injury are not

present in this case where respondents are suffering from asbestosis.

28

recovery of mental injury on a stand-alone basis for negligent

infliction of emotional distress. Quite the opposite is true. The

reasons for requiring greater degrees of proof for stand-alone

claims for mental injury are simply not present, which is why

it would be “absurd[ to] apply[] the bystander rule to a case

where the direct victim is seeking recovery for emotional

distress which is reasonably related to a physical injury.”

McAdams v. Eli Lilly, 638 F Supp. 1173, 1178 (N.D. Ill. 1986).

As described by this Court in Metro-North, the common law

“ does not examine the genuineness of emotional harm case by

case.” 521 U.S. at 436. There is consequently no rule of tort law

generally applicable to mental injuries that makes such injuries

recoverable only if they are “severe” and are “physically

manifested.” Courts have instead decided that whether a form

of “emotional distress” is recoverable should turn on whether

“the distress falls within specific categories.” Id. at 429. The

limitations that apply to the recovery of mental injuries vary

widely between categories.'° What is entirely absent from tort

law’s categorical approach is any support for petitioner's claim

that there are universally applicable requirements that mental

injuries, including emotional distress, are recoverable only if

they are severe and physically manifested.

Even more significantly, the Metro-North Court expressly

identified respondents’ circumstances as one such “category”

of plaintiffs that is entitled to recovery for mental injury: “that

category of plaintiffs who suffer from a disease” caused by the

16 For some of those categories, there are courts that require that the

mental injury be severe, such as for intentional infliction of emotional

distress in general (see Restatement (Second) Torts, § 46), and some even

further require that the emotional distress result in “bodily harm” (id. § 46

(2)(b) (where tortious conduct directed at third party who is not amember

of the plaintiff's immediate family)). But such categorical rules are

context-specific and without general applicability. For example, false

imprisonment (id. § 35), assault (§ 21), or offensive battery (§ 18) are all

torts where, unlike this case, the mental injury provides the injury element

necessary to establish the tort in the first instance, but no such severity or

physical manifestations requirement applies to any of those torts. See, e.g.,

id. § 21 comment c (“It is not necessary that [the assault] should directly

or indirectly cause any tangible and material harm”).

29

defendant's negligent conduct. 521 U.S. at436. The reasons the

Court offered for that categorical rule are those which justify

frall recovery where, as in this case, the plaintiff has otherwise

established his tort based on physical injury and merely seeks

to recoves ior “related” mental injury (id.) as “parasitic

damages”: “a desire to make a physically injured victim whole

or because the parties are likely to be in court in any event” (id.

at 436-37). Because of their asbestosis, respondents are just

those “physically injured victim[s]” who will “be in court in

any event” and are therefore entitled to be made “whole” for all

their injuries caused by petitioner's negligence.

. Tort law's categorical approach to the recovery of mental

injuries is also why petitioner is mistaken in relying (Br. 28-30)

on any of the “general policy reasons” previously identified by

this Court for why courts have restricted recovery of mental

injury. See Metro-North, 521 U.S. at 433. The very reason for

the categorical approach is to address those policy concerns by

substantially limiting the number of potentially valid plaintiffs.

Hence, where, as in this case, the plaintiff fits in a traditional

tort category because he is suffering froma physical disease, the

category has itself already “separat[ed] valid, important claims

from those that are invalid or ‘trivial.’” Id. Likewise dissipated

by the categorical bounds is the “threat of ‘unlimited and

unpredictable liability,” or “the ‘potential for a flood’ or

comparatively unimportant, or ‘trivial,’ claims.” Id.

It is especially noteworthy in this respect that the categorical

requirement that a plaintiff suffers from a physical disease such

as “asbestosis” does in fact dramatically limit the number of

potential plaintiffs who can maintain a valid cause of action. At

trial, it was established that only a small percentage of those

exposed to asbestos suffer from the intensity of lung scarring

and pulmonary impairment necessary for a diagnosis of

asbestosis. JA 95-96, 211.” Petitioner in this case is

oe Petitioner acknowledges this essential fact, but fails to account for its

significance. See Br. 22 n.16 , quoting In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases

734 F. Supp. 1563, 1570 (D. Haw. 1990) ( “of those exposed to asbestos,

only a small percentage suffer from asbestos-related physical

impairment.’”). During the Metro-North oral argument, the railroad

30

uently hard pressed to claim that allowing asbestosis

plaints to Ase for all their injuries according to traditional

tort law will unduly open the litigation floodgates.

2. Equally lacking in merit is petitioner's assertion (Br. 21-25)

that fear of cancer is per se unreasonable. According to

petitioner, such “knowledge-based " ars” are too inherently

subjective” and, “[e]specially when measured against the —

background risks every individual faces, * * * not the kind )

information that reasonably causes severe emotional injury to

the normally constituted person.” Id. at 12, 21-22, 24. .

Petitioner's error is two-fold. First, petitioner s argument is

preted on the same false notion that infects its entire brief,

which is that the mental injury must be “severe” to warrant

recovery. As previously described, no such severity

requirement generally applies where, as here, the plaintiffs are

not asserting a stand-alone claim for mental injury.

Petitioner’s second error, however, iseven more fundamental.

Stripped of its exaggerated rhetoric, petitioner s attack on what

it dubs “knowledge-based fears” is little more than a thinly-

guised effort to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence.

Because any fear is necessarily based on personal knowled ge,

petitioner’s indictment must be that the information upon

which respondents’ fear was based in this case was insufficient

to sustain any jury award. Petitioner supports its argument by

citing to a series of miscellaneous articles (Br. 22-24 & nn.17-21)

that discuss asbestos exposure (not asbestosis) and

othelioma or lung cancer.

"We could easily Seed to this argument by lengthy

discussion of substantial competing scientific authority

concerned with asbestosis and not just asbestos exposure, ~ but

the proper course is instead to rely on the factual om

actually produced in the trial court. As previously described,

counsel was similarly clear, advising the Court that “it is undisputed that

the overwhelming majority of exposure-only plaintiffs will never develop

asbestos-related injuries.” Metro-North Oral Arg. Trans. 14-15.

8 E.g., Churg & Green, Pathology of Occupational Lung Disease, supra;

Browne, Is Asbestos or Asbestosis the Cause of the Increased Risk of Lung

Cancer in Asbestos Workers?, supra.

31

that trial evidence, which included the introduction of scientific

studies subject to cross examination, was more than sufficient

to establish the reasonableness of respondents’ fear of cancer

based on asbestosis. See pp. 3-4, 7, supra. A reasonable person

would not have to view a 10 percent risk of mesothelioma, or a

39 percent risk of fatal lung cancer for smokers as “trivial,”

“small,” or “incremental. “ Pet. Br. 25, 30.

What petitioner plainly cannot now do is either introduce

new evidence or invite this Court to reweigh the evidence.

Petitioner had ample opportunity at trial to introduce evidence

that an asbestosis victim cannot reasonably apprehend cancer.

Petitioner cannot now supplement the trial record without

improperly invading the jury’s factfinding responsibilities and

the supervisory authority of the trial judge. “Courts are not free

to reweigh the evidence and set aside the jury verdict merely

because the jury could have drawn different inferences or

conclusions * * *.” Tennant v. Peoria & P.U.R. Co., 321 U.S. 29,

35 (1944). Nor is it a fair objection “to say that the jury’s verdict

involved speculation and conjecture. Whenever facts are in

dispute * * * a measure of speculation and conjecture is required

on the part of those whose duty it is to settle the dispute.”

Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 653 (1946). This Court,

moreover, has long made especially clear the impropriety of

challenges to the amount of jury awards in FELA cases."

3. Finally, petitioner's assertion that respondents should be

" For instance, the Court in St. Louis I. M. & S.R. Co. v. Craft, 237 U.S.

648, 661 (1915) readily dismissed a claim “that the award of $5,000 as

damages for pain and suffering” was “excessive.” While acknowledging

that “[t]he award does seem large,” the Court ruled that “the power, and

with it the duty and responsibility, of dealing with this matter rested upon

the courts below. It involves only a question of fact and is not open to

reconsideration here.” Id. (citations omitted). Petitioner's implicit

challenge to the amount of the jury award in this case is even thinner. The

railroad defendant in Craft at least knew that the plaintiff had been

awarded a substantial sum: $5,000 in 1915. Notwithstanding its reference

(Br. 2, 6) to “staggering recoveries” and “massive verdicts,” petitioner can

make no such comparable claim with regard to the jury’s assessment of

damages for respondents’ fear of cancer. Here, the record does not reveal

how much, if any, damages the jury awarded based on such fear.

32

denied any recovery for their reasonable fear of cancer because

the nation faces an asbestos litigation “crisis” is no more

persuasive. As described in the very documents upon which

petitioner relies, those who claim that a crisis exists focus on the

litigation burden presented by thousands of lawsuits filed by

so-called “exposure only” plaintiffs - those who have been

exposed to asbestos, but do not suffer from any physical disease

or impairment as a result. They contend that this litigation

threatens to overwhelm the courts and thereby deny judicial

relief to those deserving victims who are actually suffering from

a physical disease. They single out victims of asbestosis as

examples of those “clearly entitled to compensation.” See

James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Asbestos Litigation

Gone Mad: Exposure-Based Recovery for Increased Risk, Mental

Distress, and Medical Monitoring, reproduced in Pet. Lodging, p.

27. Respondents, however, represent the very victims of

asbestosis - the “individuals who actually have asbestos-

related illnesses” - routinely acknowledged as legitimate

plaintiffs. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce Amicus Br. 2.

The policy arguments advanced by petitioner and its amici

are further misdirected because neither this Court nor FELA is

the proper avenue for securing the law reform they seek. If

current tort law is incapable of addressing the claims brought

by thousands negligently exposed to asbestos, then it is for

Congress and state legislatures, and not this Court, to change

the applicable law.” FELA would, in all events, be an

2° Congress has, in fact, been considering legislative action to reform tort

law and related civil procedural matters for the past several years in

response to the challenges presented by mounting asbestos litigation. See,

e.g., S. 2546, Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of 1998, 105" Cong.

2d Sess. (1998); H.R. 1283, Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of 1999,

106" Cong. 1* Sess. (1999). Notably, in those legislative proceedings, those

supporting petitioner in this case freely admitted that legislative, rather

than judicial, action was the only legitimate avenue for addressing the

complex issues. See, e.g., Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of 1999,

Hearing Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 106" Cong., 1"

Sess. 320 (1999) (testimony of Conrad Mallet, Jr., Chairman, Coalition for

Asbestos Reform) (“resolution of the [asbestos litigation] dilemma lies not

with the judiciary, but with Congress”); 145 Cong. Rec. $3510 (March 25,

33 -

especially inappropriate vehicle for the kind of tort reforms

sought by petitioner and its amici. Not only does FELA play

only a peripheral role in asbestos litigation, but as long

emphasized by this Court, FELA is a “broad remedial statute”

and its statutory language must be interpreted “‘liberally’ in

light of its humanitarian purposes.” Atchison T. &S.F.R. Co. v.

Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 562 (1987); Metro-North, 521 U.S. at 429,

quoting, Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 543. As described by the Court

decades ago in rejecting a similar effort to limit FELA’s

deliberate expansion of railroad employee recovery, “[i]n the

face of the legislative policy embodied in [FELA] * * *

considerations of public policy of the general kind relied upon

*** cannot be permitted to encroach further upon the special

policy expressed by Congress in the Act.” Still v. Norfolk & W.

R. Co., 368 U.S. 35, 44-45 (1961).

Il. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DECLINED TO

INSTRUCT THE JURY TO APPORTION

RESPONDENTS’ DAMAGES BETWEEN

PETITIONER AND ABSENT THIRD PARTIES

Petitioner argues that the trial judge should have instructed

the jury to apportion damages to various absent third parties

that petitioner alleges are partially responsible for respondents’

injuries. Petitioner’s initial argument (Br. 32-42) is that

apportionment was warranted because respondents’ injuries

were “divisible” based on causation. Petitioner's alternative

proffer (Br. 42-47) is that even if causation does not provide a

basis for apportionment, the Court should now devise for FELA

a new, unspecified scheme of comparative fault for

apportionment. Both arguments should be rejected.”"

1999) (statement of Senator John Ashcroft) (“Judges who make legal rules

out of whole cloth in the absence of constitutional or statutory text

damage the standing of the judiciary and our constitutional structure. * *

* [A] legislative solution to th{e asbestos] problem * * * provides the

proper incentives for courts to be restrained and reinforces the proper

roles of Congress and the Judiciary.”).

21 +4: , ,

Petitioner's apportionment arguments pertain at most only to ~

1. Contrary to petitioner's submission (Br. 32-35), FELA’s

“simple and direct” language establishes a “relaxed standard of

causation” that compels rejection of petitioner's proposed

“relaxed” apportionment standard. Coray v. Southern Pac. Co.,

335 U.S. 520, 524 (1949); Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 543. FELA

unambiguously answers the question whether a railroad

employer is liable for an employee's personal injuries for which

the railroad’s negligent conduct was only a partial cause.

According to the express terms of the statute, a railroad “shall

be liable in damages” to the injured employee “for such injury

or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence” of the

railroad. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (emphasis supplied). It is therefore well

settled that it is neither a complete nor a partial defense to an

employee's lawsuit for complete recovery that the employee's

injuries were “caused jointly by the fault of the carrier and third

persons.” See, e.g., Gaulden v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 654

P.2d 383, 391(D. Kan. 1983) (“bear all of the loss”).

This Court's own decisions are fully in accord. In Rogers v.

Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957), this Court

reversed a state court ruling that had construed FELA to impose

a test of causation under which the railroad defendant's

negligence had to be “the sole, efficient, producing cause of

injury.” Emphasizing the “in whole or in part” language, the

Court held that causation is established when “the proofs

justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence

respondents Ayer and Butler because only for those two did petitioner

argue below that there was evidence of asbestos exposure at nonrailroad

workplaces. See JA 647; note 3, supra. Petitioner did not assert asbestos

manufacturers liability in its proposed jury instruction or verdict form and

declined to put on evidence as to their culpability. JA 539, 550-60; pp. 7-8,

supra. Petitioner's oblique references (Br. 8, 49) to respondent Spangler’s

2 years of service on a Navy submarine fall far short of the minimum for

apportionment, no matter what the legal standard, given the lack of any

evidence concerning the extent or nature of his asbestos exposure there.

35

played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or

death for which damages are sought.” Id. (emphasis supplied).

See, e.g., Sentilles v. Inter-Carribean Shipping Corp., 361 U.S.

107, 109 (1959); Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 187 (1949).

To be sure, the Court in Rogers did not elaborate on the

precise scope of damages recoverable by an employee when the

railroad’s negligence “played any part” in causing the injury,

and there was also a contributing third party cause. 352 U.S. at

507. But there is no merit to petitioner's suggestion that the

Rogers’ ruling does not bear on that question. The Rogers Court

described as “drastic” the employer's duty to pay damages for

injury “due ‘in whole or in part’ to its negligence.” Id. The

Court characterized FELA as having “stripped [an employer] of

his common law defenses” to such a degree that “for practical

purposes the inquiry in these cases today rarely presents more

than the single question whether the negligence of the

employer played any part, however small, in the injury * * *.”

Id. at 507-08. Finally, the Court deemed as wholly “irrelevant”

“whether the immediate reason” for the injury was “some cause

not identified by the evidence.” Id. at 503.

Hence, in Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U.S. 459, 461-62 (1947), the

Court similarly described as “irrelevant” even “[t}hat the

foreseeable danger was from intentional or criminal

misconduct.” The railroad “nonetheless had a duty to make

reasonable provision against it” and “[b]reach of that duty

would be negligence.” Id. Rejecting the railroad’s defense, che

Court held that “we cannot say as a matter of law that

petitioner's injury did not result at least in part from such

negligence.” Id.

Under petitioner's view by contrast, apportionment would be

required whenever an injury is “caused by successive

independent causes” (Br. 32) and the existence of a contributing

cause would be highly “relevant” whether intentional, criminal,

negligent, or even nonnegligent in nature. FELA litigation

would regularly rather than “rarely” present more than the

“single question” whether the employer's negligence played

“any part.” FELA litigation would become encumbered by the

far more complex, nonbinary inquiry of the precise percentage ~

of the employer's causal contribution to the injury. In short,

36

injected into FELA would be the very kind of limitation on

liability that Congress intended to eliminate by rejecting the

assumption of risk and fellow servant rule defenses and by

making employers liable for injuries they caused “in part.”

Finally, petitioner’s radical reading of FELA is contradicted

by the virtual absence in almost a century of FELA litigation of

any indication in either the judicial precedent or the litigation

practices of railroads that a railroad’s liability to a plaintiff must

be reduced in inverse proportion to its causal contribution. Not

once in this Court’s many decisions reaffirming the specialized

and liberal nature of FELA’s “in whole or in part” causation

language has the Court even hinted at the existence of such a

major limitation on defendant liability. Instead, the federal and

state reporters are replete with contribution cases brought by

FELA defendants under state law. See Annot., Right of Railroad

Charged with Liability for Injury to or Death of Employee Under

Federal Employer's Liability Act, to Claim Indemnity or Contribution

from Other Tortfeasors, 19 A.L.R. 3d 928 (1968).* Those cases

arose because those railroad defendants were entirely liable

under FELA and sought to recover part of the damages by

suing a third party that jointly caused the injuries.”

* See, e.g. Mills v. River Terminal Ry. Co., 276 F.3d 222, 222 (6" Cir.

2002); Gaines v. Illinois Central Ry. Co., 23 F.3d 1170, 1171 (7 Cir. 1994);

Ellison v. Shell Oil Co., 882 F.2d 349, 353-54 (9" Cir. 1989); Ala. Great. S.

R.R. v. Chi. & Northwestern Ry., 493 F.2d 979, 983 (8" Cir. 1974);

Kennedy v. Penn. R. Co., 282 F.2d 705, 710 (3d Cir. 1960); Southern R. Co.

v. Foote Mineral Co., 384 F.2d 224, 226 (6" Cir. 1967); Fort Worth &

Denver Ry. v. Threadgill, 228 F.2d 307, 312 (5" Cir. 1955); Patterson v.

Penn. R. Co., 197 F.2d 252, 253 (2d Cir. 1952); Stephens v. S. Pac. Transp.

Co., 991 F. Supp. 618, 620 (S.D. Tex. 1998); Tucker v. Reading Co., 335 F.

Supp. 1269, 1271 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Reynolds v. Southern Ry. Co., 320 F.

Supp. 1141, 1142-43 (N.D. Ga. 1969); Spielman v. New York, New Haven

& Hartford R. Co., 147 F. Supp. 451, 453-54 (E.D.N.Y. 1956); Engvall v. Soo

Line R., 632 N.W.2d 560, 569 (Minn. 2001); Freeman v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co.,

Inc., 714 So.2d 832, 835 (La. App. 1998); Walter v. Dow Chem. Co., 195

N.W.2d 323, 324-25 (Mich. App. 1972); Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R. v. Arthur

Dixon Transfer Co., 98 N.E.2d 783, 785-86 (Ill. App. 1951); Seaboard Air

Line Ry. v. American Dist. Elec. Prot. Co. 143 So. 316, 317 (Fla. 1932).

* Petitioner properly relegates to a footnote (Br. 33 n.26) Dale v.

37

2. Petitioner and its amici seek to overcome FELA’s plain

meaning by relying on two other statutory clauses that they

contend mandate apportionment of damages between joint

causes. Petitioner’s reliance on both clauses is misguided.

a. According to petitioner (Br. 32-33 n.26) and amicus

Coalition for Asbestos Justice (Br. 24-27) FELA’s adoption of

comparative fault for plaintiff's negligence (45 U.S.C. § 53)

demonstrates congressional intent in favor of apportionment in

this case. Rather than support petitioner’s view, however, this

Court has previously made clear that the fact that Congress

took such an explicit step reinforces the opposing view that

Congress intended no similar reduction in plaintiff recovery on

account of the joint liability of nonrailroad third parties. While

45 U.S.C. § 53 provides that when the employee’s own

negligence causes his injury, “the damages shall be diminished

by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence

attributable to such employee,” no comparable provision exists

with regard to third party causes. As this Court pointedly

explained in Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443

U.S. 256, 268 n.23 (1979), “[i]t would be particularly curious for

Congress to refer expressly to the established principle of

comparative negligence, yet say nota word about adopting anew

rule limiting the liability of the [defendant] on the basis of the

nonparty employer's negligence” (emphasis supplied). Hence,

both the “in part” causation standard and comparative

negligence standard set forth in 45 U.S.C. §§ 51,53 affirmatively

reinforce the full scope of railroad liability.

Nor is there any merit to the suggestion of petitioner and its

amicus that FELA’s imposition of complete liability on a

railroad is inconsistent with FELA’s adoption of comparative

fault for plaintiff's negligence. FELA adopted a comparative

Baltimore & Ohio R.Co., 552 A.2d 1037, 1041 (Pa. 1989), which served as the

centerpiece of its petition (pp. 20-21) and reply (pp. 6-7). The Dale court

found “implicit” in FELA a reduction in damages for third party causes,

somehow based on FELA’s treatment of contributory negligence and the

Rogers decision. 552 A.2d at 1041. We think that the reasoning of the Dale

dissenters (id. at 1043-44 (Papadakos, J., joined by Larsen, JJ), which is

consistent with the overwhelming precedent, is more persuasive.

38

fault approach in order to expand an employee's ability to

recover by eliminating the contributory negligence defense that

otherwise would have barred recovery altogether. Petitioner's

proffered apportionment standard, by contrast, would limit

employee recovery by placing the burden on the employee,

rather than on the railroad employer, to establish the liability of

other third parties and to assume the risk that those other third

parties are judgment proof. Indeed, because petitioner

contends that its liability must be reduced if there are other

contributing nonnegligent causes (Br. 36), unlike even the rule

for comparative fault, petitioner's unprecedented theory of

limited defendant liability would virtually guarantee that

plaintiffs would be denied full recovery for their injuries.

Accordingly, because comparative fault and joint and several

liability were both intended to expand employee recovery, they

reinforce rather than oppose each other. It is therefore not at all

surprising that many federal and state liability schemes

combine the two approaches, thereby directly contradicting

petitioner’s claim of their fundamental incompatibility. See

McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 220 (1994);

Edmonds, 443 U.S. at 260-61 & n.7; Coats v. Penrod Drilling

Corp., 61 F.3d 1113, 1123, 1129 (5 Cir. 1995) (en banc); Dobbs,

supra, at 1086 & n.2; Jerome H. Nates, Damages in Tort Actions,

§ 48.03[6] (1993 & 1997 Supp.).

b. Equally without merit is petitioner's claim (Br. 32) that

FELA “makes clear that railroads are not liable for employee

injuries that result from outside causes” because 45 U.S.C. § 51

provides that railroads are liable only “to any person suffering

injury while he is employed by such carrier.” The single word

“while” has no bearing on the joint causation issue.

First, petitioner's unfortunate phrasing “result trom outside

causes,” obscures the vital distinction between (1) the scope of

railroad liability for injuries that result exclusively from

“outside” or nonrailroad causes; and (2) the scope of railroad

liability for injuries that result from a combination of railroad

and “outside” causes. Under the first scenario, the railroad is

plainly not liable. A railroad must be a legal cause of the injury

to be liable. But the apportionment question raised in this case

concerns only the second scenario, and it is equally plain that

39

the “while he is employed” language upon which petitioner

relies does not remotely address the distinct circumstance of

joint causation. The more natural, and historically accurate,

reading of the language is simply that it ensures that FELA’s

remedial scheme would be available to persons injured in the

course of theiremployment with an interstate common carrier.”*

Second, the statutory reference to “while” would have, in any

event, been an especially inapt means of addressing the joint

causation issue. Multiple-tortfeasor situations typically occur

when the employee’s injuries are caused by more or less

simultaneous and concurrent railroad and nonrailroad causes.

See, e.g., Rogers, supra. The statutory language “while he is

employed” offers no more guidance as to whether damages

should be apportioned in that circumstance than it does if the

multiple causes are not concurrent. If, moreover, petitioner is

suggesting that the word “while” means that an employee is

entirely barred from recovering for diseases traceable to

railroad conduct, but which remain latent until long after

employment has ended, this Court has already rejected such a

crabbed view of FELA’s remedial scope. See Urie, 337 U.S. at

187 (“We do not think the mere difference in the time required

for different acts of negligence to take effect and disclose their

harmful, disabling consequences would justify excluding the

one type of injury from the Act's coverage.”).

B. Traditional And Settled Common Law Liability Rules

Also support The Trial Judge’s Refusal To Instruct The

:

See jlroad And Absent Third Parti

The trial judge’s refusals to give petitioner's proposed

apportionment instruction and special verdict forms to the jury

** Congress added “while he is employed” in two provisions when it

reenacted FELA in 1908 in order to address the constitutional concerns

this Court raised in striking down FELA’s predecessor law, by ensuring

that the regulated activities had sufficient nexus to interstate commerce.

See 35 Stat. 65 (1908); 34 Stat. 232 (1906); 42 Cong. Rec. 4526-27 (1908) (Sen.

Dolliver); The Employer's Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 504 (1908).

40

are also consistent with the common law ‘liability rules

applicable under FELA. Petitioner misstates the role of

apportionment under both traditional and evolving common

law principles, which provide for the possibility of

apportionment only in circumstances far narrower than

petitioner suggests and not for the kind of indivisible injuries

suffered by respondents.

1. To avoid FELA’s plain meaning, petitioner alternatively

claims (Br. 35-39) that FELA silently incorporated a common

law rule allegedly prevalent in 1908 mandating apportionment

of damages in multiple-cause cases. Not only would sucha rule

fail to overcome FELA’s language and remedial purposes

(Sinkler v. Missouri P.R. Co., 356 U.S. 326, 329 (1958); Rogers,

352 U.S. at 508), but petitioner's exaggerated account of the

common law at the time of FELA’s enactment is wrong. It is

simply not true that “[s]everal liability was not only the general

rule, but the overwhelming rule.” Pet. Br. 35.

FELA’s common law liability scheme was expressly modeled

upon the “liberal interpretations * * * that now prevail in the

admiralty courts of the United States” (42 Cong. Rec. 4536 (1908)

(introductory statement of Senator Dolliver)), which in 1908

firmly embraced joint and several liability. See Thomas J.

Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 5-155 (2d ed. 1994).

As described by the Ccurt in Phoenix Ins. Co. v. The Atlas, 93

U.S. 302 (1876), in which two vessels negligently collided and

caused the sinking of a third vesse! owned by the plaintiff,

“[njothing is more clear than the right of a plaintiff, having

suffered such a loss, to sue in a common-law action all the

wrong-doers, or any one of them * * * and it is equally clear,

that, * * * he is entitled to judgment in either case for the full amoun:

of his loss.” Id. at 315 (emphasis supplied), citing Murray v.

Lovejoy, 3 Wall. 19 (1863); Smith v. Hines, 2 Sumn. 348 (Me.

1836). Nor was the then-prevailing admiralty rule out of step

with common law at the time. The admiralty rule favoring

joint and several liability was “in accord with the common law”

in “allow[ing] an injured party to sue a tortfeasor for the full

amount of damages for an indivisible injury that the tortfeasor’ s

negligence was a substantial factor in causing * * *.” Edmonds,

443 US. at 260-61 & n.7. See Pet. 22 (describing joint and

4]

several liability as “the traditional rule”).

Unlike petitioner, we are willing to acknowledge that there

was “considerable difference of opinion” in 1908 concerning the

precise scope of joint and several liability.” Universal

consensus, however, is not required for the application of such

a standard under FELA both because joint and several liability

then reflected the clear majority view and because it is the view

consistent with FELA’s remedial purposes and plain language.

The 1906 edition of Judge Cooley’s celebrated treatise on torts

surveyed the case law and concluded that, notwithstanding

“considerable difference in opinion,” the “weight of authority”

supported application of joint and several liability “where the

negligences of two or more persons concur in producing a

single, indivisible injury” even in the absence of any “common

duty, common design or concert[ed] action.” T. Cooley, Treatise

on the Law of Torts, 247 (3d ed. 1906); Dobbs, supra, § 390 (same).

There can be no question, moreover, regarding what standard

of liability is more in harmony with FELA, even if FELA’s

statutory language did not already plainly impose entire

liability on railroads whose negligence was at least a “ part[ial]”

cause of the employee’s injury. A “progressive rule of liability

that [i]s less restrictive * * * [is] more consistent with * * *

* Because scholars in 1906 found it impossible to “harmonize all the

authorities” (T. Cooley, Treatise on the Law of Torts, 246 (3d ed. 1906)),

petitioner can find some early cases that press for a strict rule of causal

apportionment in multiple tortfeasor cases. But petitioner cannot

possibly maintain its claim that several liability was so

“overwhelming|ly]” the rule (Br. 35) that Congress must be deemed, sub

silentio, to have adopted it. At least one of petitioner's citations, sampled

because of its illustrious author, is even wholly inapposite. Justice

Holmes’ opinion for the court in Middlesex Co. v. City of Lowell, 21 N.E. 872,

873 (Mass. 1889), arose from a bill of equity to abate a nuisance caused by

two polluters and hence says little about the availability of joint liability

in damages actions at common law. In 1902, the same court applied joint

and several liability to independent tortfeasors who caused a single

personal injury. See Corey v. Havener, 65 N.E. 69 (Mass. 1902). Because,

moreover, some of those courts’ preference for several liability was based

on restrictions on contribution among joint tortfeasors long since

abandoned, those rulings provide an especially poor historical basis for

petitioner's arguments. See Prosser & Keeton on Torts, § 52 (5" ed. 1984).

42

FELA’s broad remedial goals.” Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 555

(adopting zone of danger test).

2. Petitioner’s claim that the common law has since evolved

away from joint and several liability for the kind of indivisible

injuries suffered by respondents in favor of apportionment is no

more persuasive. Both the First and Second Restatement of Torts

confirm the pedigree and contemporary acceptance of joint and

several liability for indivisible injury.

Section 879 of the First Restatement (1939) provides that “each

of two persons who is independently guilty of tortious conduct

which is a substantial factor in causing a harm to another is

liable for the entire harm, in the absence of a superseding

cause.” The commentary explains that “[a] person whose

tortious conduct is otherwise one of the legal causes of an

injurious result is not relieved from liability for the entire harm

by the fact that the tortious act of another responsible person

contributes to the result.” Id. § 879 comment a.

The Second Restatement of Torts, published in 1965 and 1979, is

entirely in accord. Section 875 provides that “[e]ach of two or

more persons whose tortious conduct is a legal cause of a single

and indivisible harm to the injured party is subject to liability

to the injured party for the entire harm.” The Second

Restatement also makes clear that the kind of injuries being

suffered by respondents in this case constitute the paradigmatic

example of the kind of “indivisible harm” for which joint and

several liability rather than apportionment applies.

Respondents suffer from a physical disease, asbestosis, and

from a variety of physical and mental impairments resulting

from that disease. The Second Restatement commentary explains

that, “[c]ertain kinds of harm, by their very nature, are normally

incapable of any logical, reasonable, or practical division” and

offers as examples of such “indivisible” harms “death” and

“any single wound,” which fairly describes the impact of

asbestosis upon the lung. Id. § 433A comment i (“By far the

greater number of personal injuries * * * are thus normally

single and indivisible.”).

Relevant Restatement provisions also specifically reject

petitioner’s claim (Br. 36) that the common law distinguished

between joint causation caused by successive and simultaneous

43

torts of independent actors. According to the First Restatement,

there is liability for the entire harm “where both are

simultaneously negligent * * * and also where the act of one

either occurs or takes harmful effect after that of the other.”§

879 comment a. The Second Restatement even more directly

refutes petitioner's claim. Section 879 provides that where joint

and several liability is otherwise applicable, “each is subject to

liability for the entire harm, irrespective of whether their

conduct is concurring or consecutive.”

3. Contrary to petitioner's claim (Br. 40-42), Section 433A of

the Second Restatement does not support petitioner’s view that

the common law rule provides for apportionment in the kind of

factual circumstances presented by this case. Section 433A

provides for apportionment between multiple causes only for

“divisible” injuries, which are present only if either “there are

distinct harms” or “there is a reasonable basis for determining

the contribution of each cause toa single harm.” Respondents,

however, are not suffering from distinct harms, as are

presented, for instance, when a victim is suffering from a

broken leg caused by one action and a broken arm caused by

another. Nor are they suffering from the kind of single harm

for which there could remotely exist a “reasonable basis” for

determining the causal contribution. Instead, as previously

described, their injuries arise from their asbestosis, which is

quintessentially an “indivisible” personal injury under

longstanding and contemporary tort law principles. See, e.g.,

Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1094-

96 (5 Cir. 1973) (asbestosis as indivisible injury); Owens

Corning Fiberglass v. Parrish, 58 S.W.3d 467, 476-77 (Ky. 2001)

(same). The accompanying Second Restatement commentary

specifically explains that “indivisible” injury is not subject to

apportionment and contrasts “personal injury,” which is

generally indivisible, from injury to real property in nuisance

law, which is more susceptible to being considered divisible.

Second Restatement § 433A comments d & i; see First

Restatement § 881 (apportionment for nuisance).”°

© This longstanding judicial distinction between real property and

personal injury in applying joint and several liability is also why

44

Petitioner’s reliance on common law apportionment rules is,

in all events, misguided because the burden is on the party

seeking to “apportion” damages based on causation to establish

that a reasonable basis of apportionment exists and therefore

that the injury at issue is in fact divisible.” At trial, however,

petitioner introduced hardly any evidence on the question,

despite multiple opportunities. Petitioner’s effort to construct

a basis for apportionment for the first time now, based

exclusively on sketchy testimony, is too little, too late.

The beginning and end of the evidentiary basis for

petitioner’s current claim that an apportionment instruction

should have been given was testimony by respondents’

witnesses that two of the respondents (Butler and Ayers) may

have been exposed to asbestos in nonrailroad employment.”

When respondents’ medical expert was asked on direct

petitioner is mistaken (Br. 38-39, 49) in relying on nuisance, trespass, and

polluted stream cases as “analogous” to “ pollution of a lung by asbestos,

and the resulting asbestosis” (id. at 49).

” See Second Restatement § 433B(2) (“Where the tortious conduct of

two or more actors has combined to bring about harm to the plaintiff, and

one or more of the actors seeks to limit his liability on the ground that the

harm is capable of apportionment among them, the burden of proof as to

the apportionment is upon each such actor.”); Third Restatement § 26

comment h (“Whether damages are divisible is a question of fact. A party

alleging that damages are divisible has the burden to prove that they are

divisible.”); Dobbs, supra, § 174; Second Restatement App. §§174-423, at

pp. 271-302 (1995) (listing cases); Tracy v. Cottrell, 206 W.Va. 363 (1999).

* The trial judge during voir dire specifically asked petitioner's counsel

whether they intended to put on evidence regarding negligence and

causation of third parties. JA 69-70. In the ensuing colloquy, the only third

parties counsel mentioned were asbestos manufacturers. Petitioner's

counsel at first denied any intent to introduce evidence regarding the

manufacturers, but then suggested that they might. /d. But, in all events,

petitioner never introduced such evidence (see pp. 7-8 & note 6, supra) and

both its proposed jury instruction, verdict form, and new trial motion

referred exclusively to nonrailroad employment and made no mention of

manufacturers. JA 539, 550, 647-49. Thus, despite petitioner's plea (Br.

50), it long ago forfeited its opportunity to base apportionment on asbestos

manufacturers. Respondents’ settlements with some manufacturers were

also the basis of setoffs from the final award. See p. 9, supra.

45

examination about the relative asbestos exposure to which

Ayers had been subjected in his railroad job as compared to his

automotive maintenance job, the doctor simply replied “Well,

It's hard for me to say. I’m just going to say that they’re

probably equivalent.” JA 205. On direct examination, the same

witness testified, in addressing the relative exposure to which

Butler was subjected in his three months working in the

locomotive engine repair shop as compared to his thirty years

as a pipefitter, that the railroad employment was a

“contributing cause” and the nonrailroad employment was “a

bigger contributor.” JA 195. On cross examination, the witness

refused to acquiesce in petitioner’s counsel's characterization of

the exposure during railroad employment as “very minimal”

and instead said the role was “minimal” but “I don’t know how

much,” at which point petitioner’ s counsel declined to allow the

witness to elaborate any further. JA 236-37. In describing the

contribution of nonrailroad employment to Butler’s asbestos

exposure, petitioner’s own expert likewise acknowledged that

because he “didn’t take any measurements” at those locations,

he could conclude only that Butler had “ample opportunity for

exposure” at nonrailroad employment. “ JA 376. He further

conceded he could not even recall how one possible “model for

attributing causation in asbestos disease” might apply. JA 392.

Such evidence establishes at most that there may have been

other nonrailroad causes of the two respondents’ injuries. The

evidence does not remotely establish that their personal injury

is divisible based on causation. The paucity of evidence is no

doubt why the trial record is devoid of any argument by

petitioner, in support of his apportionment instruction, verdict

forms, or new trial motion, actually setting forth a “reasonable

basis” for apportionment. Petitioner made no argument

because a personal injury such as asbestosis, including the

physical and mental harms resulting from that physical disease,

is precisely the kind of classic “indivisible” injury appropriate

for joint and several liability and not subject to apportionment.

Nor can petitioner now, in any event, correct its lapses at trial.

The evidence must be read in the light most favorable to

respondents as the prevailing party and petitioner cannot

proffer possible bases for apportionment and new evidence.

46

Hence, while petitioner now suggests that damages might be

apportioned based on “volumetric evidence” (Br. 38, 49),

derived presumably from “the length of the plaintiff's periods

of exposure, the quantity of asbestos contained in each product,

and the extent to which those products emitted asbestos fibers”

(Br. 42, 49), petitioner could have introduced such specific

evidence with regard to Butler or Ayers, but did not do so. No

reasonable basis for apportionment was ever proffered at trial.

Indeed, petitioner's own brief undercuts its theory (Br. 49)

that the mere fact that Butler worked at one location for three

months and at other locations for a nonrailroad employer for 30

years creates a reasonable basis for apportionment. The causal

mechanics of asbestos exposure to asbestosis are hardly so

simple. As petitioner itself explains (Br. 3, 24), because the risks

created by asbestos exposure, including asbestosis are “dose-

related,” they “vary significantly with fiber type” as well as

with “intensity and duration of asbestos exposure.” See id. at 24

& n.19 (“certain asbestos fibers are less hazardous”). While

there was evidence that the asbestos fibers at petitioner's

employment were hazardous and that the exposure, especially

in the repair shop where Butler worked for three months

without any protection, was particularly intense (see note 3,

supra), petitioner failed to introduce any evidence of fiber type,

intensity or duration of actual exposure, presence or absence of

protective measures, or ventilation, at any nonrailroad

employment, let alone of the similarly absent “epidemiological

evidence” to which petitioner now elusively refers (Br. 49).”

In arguing that a more “relaxed” apportionment standard

should apply, petitioner also confuses the essential distinction

between apportionment principles that limita plaintiff's recovery

and contribution principles that do not limit a plaintiff's

recovery but apply instead only in lawsuits between jointly

responsible defendants. Precisely because contribution does

* OSHA regulations reflect the complexity of the causal mechanics

related to asbestos exposure and resulting disease. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. §

1910.1001 (exposure rate depends, inter alia, on fiber concentration, air

flow rate, and fiber size); 59 Fed. Reg. 40964, 40970, 40992 (1994)

(regulatory changes based on complexity).

° 47

not affect the plaintiff's ability to recover in full for her injuries,

the courts do in contribution cases apply a dramatically

reduced standard of divisibility and are much more willing to

engage in rough speculation in allocating damages between

various defendants. United States v. Brighton, 153 F.3d 307,319

(6" Cir. 1998). Petitioner nonetheless cites in support of relaxed

apportionment, which would deny plaintiff recovery, cases that

are contribution actions. For instance, in Moore v. Johns-Manville

Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 1061 (5 Cir. 1986), cited by petitioner (Br.

42), the court was merely allocating damages in contribution

between defendants. In direct conflict with petitioner's

apportionment arguments here, the Moore court made clear that

each of the defendants was jointly and severally liable for the

plaintiff's entire injury. Id. at 1063. We do not deny the

availability of contribution actions under FELA, and, as

previously noted, FELA defendants have routinely filed such

actions in the past. See p.36 & note 22, supra. But the availability

of contribution, which diminishes the harshness of joint and

several liability without doing violence to FELA’s purposes, is

a reason why apportionment is not available. It is not evidence

of judicial acceptance of a relaxed standard of apportionment.”

* Petitioner similarly mischaracterizes the import of lower court cases

arising under the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq.

Although courts have held that “apportionment is available” (Pet. Br. 44),

they have further held that pursuant to “traditional and evolving common

law principles” it is available only when the injury is divisible and not, as

in this case and virtually all CERCLA cases, where the injury is indivisible.

See, e.g., Chem Nuclear System v. Bush, 292 F.3d 254, 259-61 (D.C. Cir.

2002); U.S. v. Hercules, 247 F.3d 706, 716-19 (8" Cir. 2001); Brighton, 153

F.3d at 317-18 (6" Cir.); O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 178-80 (1" Cir.

1989); U.S. v. Monsanto, 858 F.2d 160, 171-73 & n.23 (4" Cir. 1988); U.S. v.

Chem-Dyne, 572 F.Supp. 802, 808 (S.D.Ohio. 1983). In determining,

moreover, when such indivisibility is present, the courts have uniformly

rejected the kind of unduly simplistic volumetric approximation that

petitioner here suggests (Br. 38, 49). See Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 172; Chem-

Dyne, 572 F.Supp. at 811. In both U.S. v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d

711,722 (2d Cir. 1993) and U.S. v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 270

(3d Cir. 1992) cited by petitioner (Br. 45), the courts did not apportion

damages; they simply concluded that a defendant was liable for no

48

4. Finally, FELA’s language, structure, and well-established

remedial purposes would compel rejection of any more relaxed

standard for apportionment pursuant to either petitioner's

unsupported account of common law principles (Br. 42-43) or

its penultimate invitation (Br. 45-48) to this Court to adopt a

new fault-based standard of apportionment.

As previously described, FELA’s “simple and direct”

language leaves no doubt that Congress intended for joint and

several liability to apply where, as in this case, a railroad’s

negligence has been a partial cause of an indivisible injury. See

pp. 34-39, supra. Pursuant to the statute’s plain meaning, “[i]t

does not matter that, from the evidence, the jury may also with

reason, on grounds of probability, attribute the result to other

causes * * *” or that “the immediate reason” for the injury was

“some cause not identified by the evidence.” Rogers, 352 U.S.

at 503, 506-07. For this reason, petitioner's characterization of

how the common law should evolve to be more consistent with

petitioner's “ policy considerations” (Br. 45) is wholly beside the

point. Petitioner's preferred policies cannot trump FELA’s. In

FELA, Congress “introduced a new policy and quite radically

changed the existing law” to further “humanitarian purposes”

by “permit[ting] recovery, in cases where recovery could not be

had before, and tak[ing] from the defendant defenses which

formerly were available.” Winfree v. Northern P. R. Co., 227

U.S. 296, 302 (1913); Gottschall, 512 U.S. at 543.

Indeed, petitioner’s account of what the common law should

be or is becoming is both fictional and self-defeating. It is

simply not true either that “most States now apportion even

indivisible harms” or that joint and several liability has been

“long abandoned” Pet. Br. 42, 50. Joint and several liability for

damages if it was not a cause of the injury in the first instance. And, in In

re Bell Petroleum Servs., 3 F.3d 889, 903-04 (5" Cir. 1993), unlike in this case,

the source of the injury was the same facility operated by different

defendants and the defendant offered extensive, numerical evidence of the

relative contribution for each time period. See id. at 903-04; Hercules, 247

F.3d at 718 (“Evidence supporting divisibility must be concrete and

specific.”) (emphasis supplied); Chem Nuclear Sys., 292 F.3d at 261 (ruling

“some circumstantial evidence” insufficient for geographic divisibility).

49

indivisible harms clearly remains a dominant rule.

Most directly relevant to this case, joint and several liability

remains today the settled rule in admiralty cases (see

Schoenbaum, supra, § 514; Edmonds, 443 U.S. at 260-61)" and

under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. App. § 688, which “adopts ‘the

entire judicially developed doctrine of liability’ under [FELA].”

American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 456 (1994),

quoting Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 439

(1958). Federal courts apply joint and several liability under

the Jones Act because, as this Court explained in Edmonds,

describing the policies favoring joint and several liability in

admiralty, otherwise “there will be many circumstances where

the [employee] will not be able to recover in any way the full

amount of the damages determined in his suit ** *.” 443 U.S. at

269; see Joia v. Jo-Ja Service Corp., 817 F.2d 908, 916-17 (1" Cir.

1983); Self v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 832 F.2d 1540,

1548 (11™ Cir. 1987); Coats v. Penrod Drilling Corp., 61 F.3d

1113, 1134 (5" Cir. 1995) (en banc). Similar uniformity is

evident in federal hazardous waste law. Virtually every federal

court to address the issue has concluded in the past two

decades that “ traditional and evolving common law principles”

mandate the application of joint and several liability for

indivisible injuries. See note 30, supra.

Nor does the Restatement (Third) of Torts (2000) compel a

contrary view. The Third Restatement itself “takes no position

on whether joint and several liability, several liability, or some

combination of the two should be adopted for independent

tortfeasors who cause an indivisible injury.” § 17 comment a.

The Restatement instead presents a varied list of five different

possible approaches that reflect the diversity of state legislative

efforts. Id. §§ A18-E21. The Restatement’s accompanying survey

further reveals that as of its writing 14 States and the District of

* The Court's treatment in McDermott of the impact of settlement on

defendant liability is similarly not inconsistent with the defendants’ joint

and several liability. In McDermott, the Court made clear that it was

addressing only the impact of settlement and not disputing the threshold

applicability of joint and several liability or otherwise disturbing its prior

endorsement of that standard in Edmonds. See 511 U.S. at 210 n.10.

50

Columbia had retained joint and several liability substantially

unmodified and of the states adopting hybrid schemes, many

would apply joint and several liability in the circumstances of

this case, involving toxic substances and absent third parties.

Id. at § 17 comment a (pp. 149-59). Thus, approximately the

same number of jurisdictions embrace traditional joint and

several liability as did the “zone of danger” test characterized

by this Court as “well-established” in Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 555.

But even the fact that some states have recently decided to

adopt more limited joint and several liability standards

undermines, rather than supports, petitioner’s case. Almost all

of these tort reform initiatives have resulted from the action of

state legislatures responding to the competing and complex

factors relevant to fashioning a liability standard. Whatever the

respective merits of the many, widely divergent hybrid schemes

emerging from that legislative process, they clearly reflect an

evolutionary process suited to legislative action. They do not

supply a precedential basis for judicial amendment of a

compensation system, like FELA, which is “an interface of

statutory and judge-made law,” because “[o]nce Congress has

relied upon conditions that the courts have created, [the Court

is] not as free as we would otherwise be to change them.”

Edmonds, 443 U.S. at 272-73.

CONCLUSION

The judgments of the circuit court should be affirmed or in

the alternative the petition for writ of certiorari should be

dismissed as improvidently granted.”

* Were this Court not to affirm the judgments below in their entirety,

in no event would full reversal be warranted. On the first issue, only the

amount of damages would be at issue, and petitioner's liability would not

need to be retried. On the second issue, only the judgments for Butler and

Ayers would be subject to remand because only for those two did

petitioner argue below that there was evidence of asbestos exposure at

nonrailroad employment that required an apportionment instruction.

Respectfully submitted.

SEAN DONAHUE

WASHINGTON & LEE UNIV.

SCHOOL OF LAW

LEXINGTON, VA 24450

JAMES H. RION, JR.

NESS MOTLEY

28 BRIDGESIDE BLVD

MT. PLEASANT, SC 29465

LAWRENCE M. MANN

ALPER & MANN, P.C.

1667 K STREET, N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006

51

RICHARD J. LAZARUS*

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

LAW CENTER

600 NEW JERSEY AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

(202) 662-9129

JAMES A. MCKOWEN

JAMES F. HUMPHREYS &

ASSOCIATES, L.C.

500 VIRGINIA STREET, EAST

CHARLESTON, WV 25301

(304) 347-5050

* Counsel of Record

Counsel for Respondents

August 19, 2002

APPENDIX

Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 2 (17RR-1)

Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 3 (17RR-2) Defendant's Exhibit No. 1

THE DIAGNOSIS OF NONMALIGNANT DISEASES

RELATED TO ASBESTOS

THIS OFFICIAL STATEMENT OF THE

AMERICAN THORACIC SOCIETY WAS ADOPTED BY THE ATS

BOARD OF DIRECTORS. MARCH 1986

Objective

The health effects of asbestos have become a cause of serious

concern in recent years. It has been estimated that from 1940 to

1979, in the United States alone, 27,500,000 individuals were

exposed to this mineral at work. Recognition of the diseases

caused by asbestos exposure has led manufacturers to reduce

exposure in a variety of ways, such as by using alternative

materials and by instituting improved work practices. It has also

led to wide-spread public concern over the presence of asbestos

in the environment, and fear on the part of persons with minimal

exposure. This and projections of future asbestos related illness

have posed important public policy questions -- whether to

remove all asbestos in public buildings and what to do about the

enormous estimated legal liability. In this context, physicians

are commonly asked ior advice. Furthermore, they are also

consulted regarding the diagnosis of an asbestos-related

respiratory condition in an exposed individual. While abundant

literature exists on the health effects of asbestos, there is much

that is conflicting. Accordingly, this report has been prepared by

a group of experts to present an authoritative consensus view of

the current state of knowledge while pointing out areas where

additional information is necessary. An attempt is made to

summarize our present knowledge on the diagnosis of

nonmalignant asbestos-related pulmonary disease and provide

the sources on which the opinion is based.

A-2 A-3

Asbestos -- the Mineral

The generic term "asbestos" is used to describe a group of

minerals which, when crushed, break into fibers rather than dust.

They are hydrated fibrous silicates which have great tensile

strength, heat resistance, acid resistance, and some varieties are

also flexible. This weavable rock has numerous important uses

in an industrial society, and world production and use climbed

steadily since its commercial introduction in the late 19th

century. Geology, mineralogy, and uses have been well

described elsewhere (1,2). World production of asbestos has

dropped markedly since the mid 1970's. The cumulative

production of asbestos, however, continues to increase. There

has been a good deal of debate about the mineralogic definitions

of asbestos and asbestiform fibers. The most complete recent

discussion on trends in asbestos production and now widely

accepted mineralogic definitions are found in the NAS Report on

asbestiform fibers (3).

Asbestos in Lung Tissue

Inhaled asbestos that is retained in the lung can become coated

with a proteinaceous iron staining material. The resulting

asbestos or ferruginous body is a most characteristic index of

asbestos exposure. It is usually recognized by its beaded-

necklace or drumstick appearance. The longer fibers are more

likely to become coated (2-22). The core of asbestos, i.e., bodies

found in human lungs, is more likely to be an amphibole fiber

than to be chrysotile, perhaps due to the greater ability of the

former to survive in lung tissue, while chrysotile tends to

disappear over time. The majority of the lung burden of

asbestos, however, is uncoated and consists of short fibers, i.e.,

less than 5 microns (2-21). These are poorly visible or invisible

on light microscopy but have been demonstrated by phase

microscopy and electron microscopy. Asbestos bodies are

commonly found in small numbers in lungs of city dwellers at

routine autopsies in the absence of occupational exposure to

A-4

asbestos and asbestos related illness. These are usually few in

number and unassociated with pathologic abnormality in the

parenchyma. This observation emphasizes the importance of

developing standardized techniques to quantify the number and

type of asbestos fibers in lung tissue (to be discussed below).

Benign Pleural Abnormalities Associated with Asbestos

Asbestos causes pleural plaques, pleural thickening and pleural

effusion. Pleural plaques are discrete, elevated, opaque, shiny,

rounded lesions. They characteristically occur on the

posterolateral aspect of the lower parietal pleura or diaphragm,

but usually not on the visceral pleura, at the costophrenic angles,

or at the apices. Thin plaques are smooth and grayish-white.

Thicker ones are ivory-colored or gray and may have either a

smooth surface or bosselated surface, or be coarsely nodular with

the consistency of cartilage. Plaques are of two types, diffuse or

nodular, and elevated. They can vary in size and shape. On

inspection of gross specimens, calcification may be present but

is not common. Microscopically, plaques are seen to be

laminated collagenous connective tissue, acellular, with few

inflammatory or fibrocytic nuclei; many are covered by a thin

layer of regular and well-differentiated mesothelial cells.

Capillaries are rare (23, 24). Elastic staining shows intact

lamellae beneath the plaque in continuity with the surrounding

normal parietal pleural connective tissue, suggesting that

plaques are extrapleural and develop between the latter and its

covering layer of mesothelial cells (23). On microscopic

examination, calcium deposition is present in a large proportion

of plaques, and occurs as deposits along with the course of the

collagen fibers, ceasing abruptly where the connective tissue

changes into normal pleural tissue (23). Well-differentiated

cuboidal mesothelial cells are present on the surface and the

edges of the plaque (23); metaplastic changes are uncommon

(24, 25).

Although coated asbestos fibers have not been reported in

A-5

relation to pleural plaques in the extensive series of 172 sections

examined by Meurman (23) using polarized light, the presence

of many uncoated fibers may be noted when ashed tissue is

studied (26, 27). Recent studies of the digestate of a small

number of plaques has demonstrated the presence of

submicroscopic fibers of both chrysotile and amosite fiber in

these structures. It is of interest that these are more concentrated

in the calcified zones than in the fibrous zones (28).

The usual effect of asbestos on the visceral pleura is a focal or

diffuse thickening. This varies from a thin, milky white

discoloration, detectable only on gross visualization to a thick

peel encasing the lung and easily seen on chest roentgenogram.

In contrast to plaques, which are frequently diagnosed

roentgenologically in asymptomatic persons, pleural fibrosis may

cause symptoms and impair pulmonary function.

Pleural effusion may be caused by inhalation of asbestos; this

is an early manifestation and is usually an exudate. On rare

occasions it may persist for months or years. It may recur on the

same or the opposite side after several years of exposure. In

unusual circumstances it may be bilateral. Macroscopically, the

fluid may be blood stained with variable numbers of

erythrocytes, macrophages, lymphocytes, and mesothelial cells

(29).

Pulmonary Asbestosis

Definition

The term asbestosis should be reserved for the interstitial fibrosis

of the pulmonary parenchyma in which asbestos bodies of fibers

may be demonstrated. While pleural abnormalities are

commonly associated with a parenchymal disease, they should

be separately classified as there are differences between pleural

and parenchymal fibrosis in epidemiology, clinical features, and

prognosis.

A-6

Pathologic Features

In lungs with minimal or moderate fibrosis, the changes may be

subtle and difficult to demonstrate. On examination of gross

specimens, they appear as gray opaque areas devoid of air spaces

in an otherwise brown lung. The microscopic changes in

pulmonary asbestosis vary from small areas of basal fibrosis to

a diffuse, fine fibrosis of both lungs.

In general, the more extensive the process the smaller the volume

of the lungs. The cut surface of the lung has a dark brown color

with streaks of a fine, gray-colored fibrosis that generally

appears to affect subpleural areas first and, frequently, in

multiple and separate areas. This fibrosis may accentuate lobar

and lobular septa and extends projections into the lung

parenchyma. The parenchymal fibrosis, which has a linear and

reticular appearance by X-ray, affects the lower lobes first, and

extends upward with prolonged or heavy exposure (10, 30, 31).

The fibrosis may take one of three forms. One is a diffuse

fibrosis without air space enlargement; a second form is called

honeycombing. This form may affect the lower lobes and

subpleural regions (31). The third form is a combination of both

diffuse fibrosis and honeycombing. This latter form is the one

most frequently observed. The honeycombing is characterized

by enlarged thick-walled air spaces ranging in size from | to 15

mm (32). The pleural surface adjacent to the fibrosis is

invariably involved in the fibrotic process, either mildly with the

appearance of a milky covering to the fibrosis, or with

widespread fibrosis and symphysis (30, 31). The hilar lymph

nodes are only sightly enlarged and soft unless other disease

coexists. While emphysema has been reported in the past, it is

unusual, and may have been incorrectly labeled as

honeycombing (10, 33).

Microscopic Appearances

There is little information on the early pathophysiology of

A-7

asbestosis in humans. Current opinion is largely based on

inferences from animal studies. Some evidence exists that

release of lysosomal enzymes may result from the partial

ingestion of the asbestos fibers and the incomplete fusions of the

phagosome membrane, so allowing the release of enzymes into

the medium from lyosomes which have fused with the

phagosome. The cytotoxic activity of asbestos exhibited by the

release of lysosomal enzymes may result from the fibers

penetrating intracellular structures, such as the nucleus and

lysosomes, by preventing the movement of organelles within the

cytoplasm, or by disrupting the cytoplasmic organization

provided by microfilaments and microtubules (34). In any case,

the initial reaction to asbestos fiber introduced into the lung is

the immediate exudation of neutrophils and macrophages into

the alveolar spaces in the locus of asbestos. This exudate varies

with the age of the lesion. In the initial stages the exudate may

be predominantly neutrophilic. Macrophages are the most

common cells in the infiltrate. The inflammatory infiltrate soon

is associated with varying degrees of organization with fibrosis

(35, 36). The process is believed to be concentrated initially in

peribronchiolar regions (10, 30). The initial lesion after

exposure by inhalation is in the region of the respiratory or

terminal bronchioles. There is a macrophage exudate in the

lumen associated with asbestos fibers and bodies. Metaplasia of

the cuboidal epithelium to squamous type may occur. In the

early states, fibrosis may be minimal but, when present, is in the

respiratory and terminal bronchiolar regions and in the alveoli

arising from the most proximal alveolar ducts. Alternatively,

there may be coboidalization of the epithelial cells.

Characteristically, in early stages only an occasional pulmonary

subunit is involved. More advanced cases show a diffuse

fibrosis, involving the interstitium, frequently associated with

areas of extensive fibrosis with obliteration of air spaces and

condensation of the bronchovascular structures. Areas adjacent

to the fibrosis may show accumulation of alveolar macrophages,

some of which have ingested asbestos fibers or other fragments.

Alveolar epithelial hyperplasia may also occur. When moderate

A-8

or severe degrees of fibrosis are present, the small pulmonary

arteries and arterioles are thickened and sclerotic (30). (The

presence of uncoated asbestos fibers and asbestos bodies in the

presence of interstitial fibrosis is mandatory for the pathologic

diagnosis of asbestosis.)

Before a pathologic diagnosis of asbestosis can be made we must

consider a number of problems, including the following:

1. There are numerous other causes of interstitial fibrosis.

2. The distribution of interstitial fibrosis in asbestosis may be

irregular, and therefore, adequate sampling of the lung must

be done. The lingula and the right middle lobe are

particularly prone to nonspecific fibrosis and sampling must

take this into consideration.

3. While advanced asbestosis characteristically shows

numerous asbestos bodies, they may not always be found

because many fibers are cleared from the lungs and some,

particularly chrysotile, may undergo dissolution and

fragmentation with time (32). Thus, in unusual cases it may

be difficult to demonstrate fibers or asbestos bodies in the

histologic preparation. When that is the case, 5 to 10

additional sections from the same block, and 5 to 10

additional new blocks from areas with fibrosis, should be

prepared, stained, and surveyed for asbestos bodies. If they

are not found, the diagnosis of asbestosis is unlikely.

4. Even in the absence of a history of asbestos exposure, the

presence of several or more asbestos bodies in areas of

extensive interstitial fibrosis is sufficient evidence for a

morphologic diagnosis of asbestosis.

5. Not everyone who inhales an asbestos fiber, or even a few

fibers, develops even microscopic asbestosis. Normal lung

defense mechanisms remove fibers via several well-

A-9

described mechanisms.

The Pneumoconiosis Committee of the American College of

Pathologists and National Institute for Occupational Safety and

Health dealt with these considerations when formulating the

following statement with which we concur:

"The criteria that permit the pathologist to establish the

diagnosis of asbestosis have evolved during a review of

many cases of the disease. Presently, the minimal features

that permit the diagnosis are the demonstration of discrete

foci of fibrosis in the walls of respiratory bronchioles

associated with accumulations of asbestos bodies. These

morphologic findings, although adequate to establish the

diagnosis of asbestosis in an early evolutionary stage, have

not been shown to result in functional and radiologic

alterations. The demonstration of asbestos bodies in the

absence of fibrosis is insufficient evidence to justify the

diagnosis of asbestosis. Conversely, a definite diagnosis of

asbestosis cannot be made by the pathologist in cases that

show characteristic fibrosis in the absence of asbestos bodies

or other evidence of fibers. Because asbestos bodies are

unevenly distributed in tissue, an adequate number of

samples should be examined thoroughly." (32)

They further state that although the demonstration of asbestos

fibers by the electron microscopic study of tissue digestates

provides evidence of exposure, ultrastructural technique alone

cannot be used to establish definitively the etiologic role of

asbestos in disease (32).

This Committee has published guidelines for methods of

assessing lung fiber concentration and pathologic grading of

asbestosis. The certainty of the cause and effect relationship of

asbestos to the fibrotic process increases with increasing

numbers of such particles and fibers visualized by light

microscopy. Electron microscopy of digested lung preparation

A-10

from documented cases of asbestosis shows very large numbers

of uncoated fiber fragments (37).

Since asbestos bodies and fibers appear in lungs without

evidence of asbestos-related disease, the question arises as to

how many such bodies are necessary to infer a cause and effect

relationship between asbestos particles and fibrosis. No precise

answer exists, but efforts to quantify the numbers of asbestos

particles in known cases indicate that it is high. In the cases of

asbestos studied by Whitwell, the lungs nearly always showed

three million light visible fibers per gram; control lungs

generally show less than 20,000 fibers per gram (*S).

Electron microscopy is a more_sensitive index of asbestos

exposure than light microscopy. ft will detect 10 to 100 times

more fibers than seen by light microscopy. Fibers seen only by

light or electron microscopy, in the absence of parenchymal

fibrosis, indicates only that exposure to asbestos has occurred.

Additional studies are required to define the number of fibers in

the lungs of persons with a variety of occupational exposures,

and with varying periods of exposure, as well as in

nonoccupational populations.

Investigations have demonstrated that as many as a million fibers

per gram of dry tissue of chrysotile may be present in the lungs

from nonoccupational exposures in the general population. By

contrast, lungs containing a million fibers of amosite or

crocidolite per gram are considered to reflect substantial

occupational exposure to asbestos dust (39). An electron

microscopic field of necessity represents a small sample of the

lung and analysis of multiple fields is required to reflect the true

asbestos lung burden. In our opinion, additional studies on the

numbers and types of asbestos fibers in the lungs of contro! and

exposed persons must be performed to provide the informational

bases for interpretation of quantitative data concerning asbestos

fibers in the lung and their relation to the presence of asbestosis

or other asbestos related diseases.

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Exposure History

Numerous studies have shown that asbestosis has a relatively

close association with both the magnitude and the duration of

exposure to inhaled asbestos; the more intense and longer the

exposure, the greater the numbers of affected workers and the

greater the severity of their illness. There is no evidence that

casual or indirect exposure, such as occurs in the general

population, causes asbestosis. The major problem facing the

clinician is to assess whether an exposure has been sufficient to

cause disease. Although dust levels have been measured in

many industries for many years, they are not usually available to

or easily interpreted by clinicians. Nevertheless, some general

statements can be made. A careful sequential history of all

exposures to all potentially harmful substances is obviously

important. Particular attention should be paid to occupations in

which direct contact with asbestos has occurred. Consultation

with physicians trained in occupational medicine or with

industrial hygienists may be helpful in unclear cases.

Evidence of asbestosis has been found many years after

relatively brief but extremely heavy exposure. Such exposure

often occurred in the asbestos textile industry over 50 years ago

and has occurred more recently in workers who have not used

respiratory protection while spraying dry asbestos on steel

beams. Fortunately, such exposure is rare at this time. With

levels of exposure camymon in the past few decades, the latent

period between the state of the exposure and the discovery of the

manifestations of asbestosis is likely to be a minimum of 15

years, and more often considerably longer. With exposures

below the current recommended permissible exposure limit

value, asbestosis is not likely to be found during he course of a

working career. With proper engineering controls, work

practice, and where necessary, personal respiratory protective

devices, asbestosis should not occur.

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Clinical Diagnosis

In the usual clinical setting, the diagnosis of asbestosis has to be

made in the absence of histologic examination of lung tissue.

Open lung biopsy is rarely indicated in the assessment of

workers for compensation purposes. The benefit of the doubt

should be given whenever the clinical features and occupational

exposure data are compatible with the diagnosis. In most

instances, the clinician and epidemiologist must still rely on

indirect methods of diagnosing asbestosis. These principles of

diagnosis are based on observations from pathologically proven

cases. When biopsy is done, careful attention must be paid to the

sampling considerations mentioned above and the surgical

technique employed (40). Assessment of lung dust burden in

such biopsy material is desirable. Diagnosis of asbestosis does

not mean that measurable impairment of lung function or

physical disability is necessarily present.

_

Clinical Features

In advanced stages, asbestosis is a restrictive lung disease

associated with dyspnea, clubbing of the fingers, basilar crackles

and wide-spread irregular opacifications on roentgenograms.

The latter are usually more prominent at the lung bases.

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Respondents Brief — Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Ayers · 538 U.S. 135 | Frix