Joint Appendix Vol I — Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Ayers
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No. 01-963 Rox:
IN THE
Supreme Court of the
NORFOLK & WESTERN RAILWAY
V.
FREEMAN AYERS, ef al.,
Respondents.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the Circuit Court of
Kanawha County, West Virginia
JOINT APPENDIX
Volume One
CARTER G. PHILLIPS* JAMES A. MCKOWEN*
STEPHEN B. KINNAIRD JAMES F. HUMPHREYS &
MICHAEL L. POST ASSOCIATES, L.C.
COURTNEY J. EDMONDS Bank One Center
KATHRYN R. HAUN Suite 1113
ERIC A. SHUMSKY 707 Virginia Street, East
SIDLEY AUSTIN BROWN & Charleston, W.V. 25301
WOOD LLP Counsel for Respondents
1501 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 736-8000
FRED ADKINS
RODNEY L. BAKER, II
HUDDLESTON, BOLEN, BEATTY,
PORTER & COPEN, LLP
611 Third Avenue
P.O. Box 2185
Huntington, W.V. 25722-2185
(304) 529-6181
LAURA D. HUNT
NORFOLK SOUTHERN
CORPORATION
Three Commercial Place
Norfolk, VA 23510-9242 * Counsel of Record
(757) 664-5022
Counsel for Petitioner June 17, 2002
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED JANUARY 2, 2002
CERTIORARI GRANTED APRIL 1, 2002
. Py 5
4 ‘
>
c
Sp eae | TABLE OF CONTENTS
SAG , VOLUME ONE
Kanawha County Circuit Court, West Virginia,
ERE ER l
Complaint, Vace v. Consolidated Rail Corp., Civil
Action No. 92-C-7820 (Kanawha County Cir. Ct. filed
ee allt ae Si A cE a 4
Complaint, Ayers v. CSX Transp., Inc., Civil Action
No. 93-C-6857; Butler v. CSX Transp., Inc., Civil
Action No. 93-C-6876; Spangler v. CSX Transp., Inc.,
Civil Action No. 93-C-7004 (Kanawha County Cir. Ct.
I a iatins 41
Norfolk And Western Railway Company’s Motion /n
Limine To Exclude Cancer Evidence, Ayers v. Norfolk
& W. Ry., Civil Action Nos. 93-C-6857 et al.
(Kanawha County Cir. Ct. filed Apr. 10, 1998)............. 52
Trial Transcripts, Ayers v. Norfolk & W. Ry., Civil
Action Nos. 93-C-6857 et al. (Kanawha County Cir.
Ct.)
Trial Tr. at 155-65, 232-48 (Apr. 14, 1998)............. 66
Trial Tr. at 71, 98-99, 109-10, 115-16, 118-22,
132-36, 147-48, 150 (Apr. 15, 1998) (Brody
italia lan caai lille aeeaatekdcanineniaiapiaets 85
Trial Tr. at 169-214 (Apr. 15, 1998) (Vance Test.).. 98
Trial Tr. at 4-21 (Apr. 16, 1998)... 126
Trial Tr. at 25-194 (Apr. 16, 1998) (Gaziano Test.). 138
“The complaints of Respondents Johnson (Civil Action No. 92-C-
8888) and Shirley (Civil Action No. 92-C-8970) are substantially similar
to the complaints of Respondents Ayers, Butler, Spangler and Vance, and
therefore are not reproduced in this Joint Appendix in order to avoid
Log > oa ge
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued’
Page
Trial Tr. at 194-221 (Apr. 16, 1998) (Butler Test.)- 245
Trial Tr. (Apr. 17, 1998) (Ayers Test.) ................... 263
Trial Tr. (Apr. 17, 1998) (Shirley Test.) .................. 278
Trial Tr. (Apr. 17, 1998) (Johnson Test.)................. 300
Trial Tr. at 29-77 (Apr. 20, 1998) (Spangler Test.).. 333
Trial Tr. at 31-60 (Apr. 21, 1998) (Weir Test.)........ 365
Trial Tr. at 30-48 (Apr. 22, 1998) (Weir Test.)........ 383
Trial Tr. at 89-190 (Apr. 22, 1998) (Renn Test.)...... 395
Trial Tr. at 4-116 (Apr. 24, 1998) (Renn Test.)........ 455
VOLUME TWO
SPOTINE STINE 8 ovievnssspsscensssciesebincceuanaeiannne 525
Norfolk And Western Railway Company’s Memoran-
dum Regarding Causation and Apportionment, Ayers
v. Norfolk & W. Ry., Civil Action Nos. 93-C-6857 et
al. (Kanawha County Cir. Ct. filed Apr. 23, 1998) ........ 526
Norfolk and Western Railway Company’s Proposed
Jury Instructions (ExCerpts) ................:cccccccessssecererreseeees 539
Norfolk and Western Railway Company’s Proposed
VRIES TRODIIID 0 5000+0s:s1ssecoseesavenssestpesennuseneninnnnannnnannan 549
Trial Transcripts, Ayers v. Norfolk & W. Ry., Civil
Action Nos. 93-C-6857 et al. (Kanawha County Cir.
Ct.)
Trial Tr. at 15-24 (Apr. 27, 1998) (Jury Instruc-
III. nsneccessinincinimadanmalenniaen naieciaiaieliesinn 561
Trial Tr. at 45, 94-95, 196 (Apr. 27, 1998) (Plain-
CED” CROGIID GIIIITIITED 5c. 0ssccencrassvnsesounecamiannae 575
iil
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
Page
Verdict Forms, Ayers v. Norfolk & W. Ry., Civil
Action Nos. 93-C-6857 et al. (Kanawha County Cir.
i cosssonovons 578
Judgment Orders, Ayers v. Norfolk & W. Ry., Civil
Action Nos. 93-C-6857 et al. (Kanawha County Cir.
a. sssunsesontocsencove 590
Docketing Statement, Vance v. Norfolk & W. Ry., No.
011209 (W. Va. filed Aug. 13, 2001) 00.0. 614
Amended Petition for Appeal, Vance v. Norfolk & W.
Ry., No. 011209 (W. Va. filed Aug. 13, 2001)............... 619
Schepers Dep. at 48-49, 52-53, 86-87, 118, 121-23,
Judd v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. (In re. FELA Asbestos
Litig.), CP-84-1 (W.D. Va. taken Oct. 8, 1984)............. 666
NOTICE
The following documents have been omitted in the printing of
this Joint Appendix. They may be found in the Petitioner’s
Appendix of the 01-963 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at the
following pages:
APPENDIX A: Page
Order, Vance v. Norfolk & W. Ry., No. 011209
a scescneneee la-2a
APPENDIX B:
Order, Vance v. Norfolk & W. Ry., Civ. No. 92-C-
5829 et al. (Cir. Ct. Kanawha County, W. Va.
AR 3a-Sa
APPENDIX C:
l
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF KANAWHA COUNTY,
WEST VIRGINIA
Case No. 92-C-16-8888
IN RE: ASBESTOS III,
RELEVANT DOCKET ENTRIES
= =
DATE PROCEEDINGS
2/06/95 # Mot to amd C’s to add Railroad D’s W/Attach;
Not of HRG W/COS.
2
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF KANAWHA COUNTY,
WEST VIRGINIA
Case No. 92-C-19-8888
IN RE: ASBESTOS III,
RELEVANT DOCKET ENTRIES
DATE
PROCEEDINGS
4/10/1998
4/29/1998
1/06/1999
1/06/1999
1/06/1999
1/06/1999
1/06/1999
1/06/1999
1/19/1999
1/19/1999
1/19/1999
Memo of Law in Supp of Mot W/EXH’s.
Verdict Form of James Spangler; Verdict Form
of Vance; Verdict Form of Ayers; Verdict Form
of Shirley; Verdict Form of Johnson; Verdict
Form of Butler.
<O:MAC.
<O: JDGMT O/MAC (S93-C-7004).
<O: JOGMT O/MAC (92-C-8970).
<O: JOGMT O/MAC (92-C-8888).
<O: JDGMT O/MAC (93-C-6857).
<O: JDGMT O/MAC (93-C-6876).
D, Norfolk & Western Railway Co’s Mot for
Judg or For New Trial (92-C-5829, 93-C-6857,
93-C-6876, 93-C-7004, 92-C-8899, 92-C-8970).
COS as to D. Norfolk & Western Railway Co’s
Mot for Judg or For New Trial & Not of HRG
(93-C-6857)
Not of HRG (93-C-6857).
3
DATE PROCEEDINGS
2/22/2001 <O: Grting Norfolk Souther Railway Comp Mot
to Vacate Entry of O Denying Mot for New
Trial/MacMac (S2/12/01).
3/12/2001 Pet WVSCA; Desig; Cos; Docking Stmt;
(92-C-5829; 93-C-7004; 93-C-6857; 92-C-8888;
92-C-8970; 93-C-6876) By Fred Adkins
3/12/2001 By Ck $150.00; RCT#319189
10/19/2001 * O Fr SCA Refusing Pet for Ap (92-C-5829).
7 te
4
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF KANAWHA COUNTY,
WEST VIRGINIA
. Delbert R. Adkins and
Rosella Adkins, his wife
. Jeff Adkins, Jr. and
Loretta Adkins, his wife
. Richard Curtis Akers and
Ruby Akers, his wife
. Gene Thurman Archey and
Norma Lee Archey, his wife
Lester Kenneth Arnett and
Glenoka M. Arnett, his wife
. James Harry Arthur and
Betty June Arthur, his wife
Burton Bailey Atkins and
Glenna S. Atkins, his wife
James Roy Ball and
Ruby Ball, his wife
Joel Dee Baisden and
Brookie Baisden, his wife
. Everett E. Ballard, Sr. and
Donna J. Ballard, his wife
. Arthur L. Barker and
Peggy J. Barker, his wife
. Clyde Bates
. Paul J. Bellomy and
Marilyn P. Bellomy, his wife
. Bernard Blake and
Sarah F. Blake, his wife
. Grant Blevins
. Randall L. Blevins and
Katheryn Blevins, his wife
. Carlos Elmo Blum and
Margaret Blum, his wife
. Harold Ray Boggs and
Betty Boggs, his wife
(Filed Oct. 15, 1992]
Civil Action No. 92-C-7698
Civil Action No. 92-C-7699
Civil Action No. 92-C-7700
Civil Action No. 92-C-7701
Civil Action No. 92-C-7702
Civil Action No. 92-C-7703 ©
Civil Action No. 92-C-7704
Civil Action No. 92-C-7705
Civil Action No. 92-C-7706
Civil Action No. 92-C-7707
Civil Action No. 92-C-7708
Civil Action No. 92-C-7709
Civil Action No. 92-C-7710
Civil Action No. 92-C-7711
Civil Action No. 92-C-7712
Civil Action No. 92-C-7713
Civil Action No. 92-C-7714
Civil Action No. 92-C-7715
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
Charles Bowen, Jr. and
Pauline Bowen, his wife
Colombus Bowen, Jr. and
Mable Bowen, his wife
Sterling Bowen and
Violet Bowen, his wife
Bobby J. Bowea and
Barbara Bowen, his wife
Jack Glen Bowling and
Mildred L, Bowling, his wife
Willard T. Bradberry and
Mary Bradberry, his wife
Leon E. Bradshaw and
» ty Bradshaw, his wife
James E. Bretz and
Orpha May Bretz, his wife
Lovin Stout Brooks and
Trula Brooks, his wife
Charles E. Brown and
Virginia R. Brown, his wife
Raymond E. Burkhardt and
Georgia Burkhardt, his wife
Paul E. Campbell and
Sheila Campbell, his wife
Lewis B. Carico and
Wanda Carico, his wife
Jesse J. Cavanaugh and
Lucille Cavanaugh, his wife
Kathleen Chaney
William I. Chapman and
Betty J. Chapman, his wife
Basil Curtis Coleman and
Edith Coleman, his wife
Douglas L. Combs and
Phyllis Combs, his wife
Paul James Cooper
Clyde E. Copley and
Betty J. Copley, his wife
Civil Action No. 92-C-7716
Civil Action No, 92-C-7717
Civil Action No. 92-C-7718
Civil Action No. 92-C-7719
Civil Action No. 92-C-7720
Civil Action No. 92-C-7721
Civil Action No. 92-C-7722
Civil Action No, 92-C-7723
Civil Action No. 92-C-7724
Civil Action No. 92-C-7725
Civil Action No. 92-C-7726
Civil Action No. 92-C-7727
Civil Action No. 92-C-7728
Civil Action No. 92-C-7729
Civil Action No. 92-C-7730
Civil Action No. 92-C-7731
Civil Action No. 92-C-7732
Civil Action No..92-C-7733
Civil Action No. 92-C-7734
Civil Action No. 92-C-7735
Se ee
. Glen J. Corder and
Alice Corder, his wife
Earl Cox and
Velma Mae Cox, his wife
. Clyde E. Crouse and
Janice Crouse, his wife
. Clyde M. Damron and
Beth Ann Damron, his wife
. Paul H. Eastham and
Pauline Eastham, his wife
Ray Enyart and
Mary Belle Enyart, his wife
. Henry E. Fankhouser
. Paul A. Freeman and
Emma J. Freeman, his wife
. Billie E. Gibson and
Esther Gibson, his wife
. Carl Ray Gibson and
Patricia Gibson, his wife
. Clarence G. Godby and
Carolyn J. Godby, his wife
James E. Gray and
Elva G. Gray, his wife
. Gene T. Grove and
Dorothy J. Grove, his wife
. James Hagley
. Herbert E. Harris and
Lynn M. Harris, his wife
Wilbur S. Hayes
. Shelby W. Hazel, Sr. and
Barbara Ann Hazel, his wife
. Wilkie L. Hensley and
Betty H. Hensley, his wife
. Ernest E. Higginbotham and
Clara Higginbotham, his wife
. Dana Holcomb (deceased) and
Cora Holcomb, his wife
Civil Action No. 92-C-7736
Civil Action No. 92-C-7737
Civil Action No. 92-C-7738
Civil Action No. 92-C-7739
Civil Action No. 92-C-7740
Civil Action No. 92-C-7741
Civil Action No. 92-C-7742
Civil Action No. 92-C-7743
Civil Action No. 92-C-7744
Civil Action No. 92-C-7745
Civil Action No. 92-C-7746
Civil Action No. 92-C-7747
Civil Action No. 92-C-7748
Civil Action No. 92-C-7749
Civil Action No. 92-C-7750
Civil Action No. 92-C-7751
Civil Action No. 92-C-7752
Civil Action No. 92-C-7753
Civil Action No. 92-C-7754
Civil Action No. 92-C-7755
59.
Edward Honeycutt and
Bonnie Honeycutt, his wife
Joe D. Howard and
Loretta Howard, his wife
. Clarence O. Hughes, Jr. and
Norma E. Hughes, his wife
. Frank E. Johnson and
Joyce E. Johnson, his wife
. Roscoe Johnson and
Bonnie Johnson, his wife
. Maurice L. Jones and
Ann P. Jones, his wife
. Elmer J. Kazee and
Arbutus Kazee, his wife
Robert E. Keeton and
Phyllis Keeton, his wife
. William R. Kegley and
Virginia Kegley, his wife
. William A. Kelly
John R. Kessler and
Estelle Kessler, his wife
. Charles D. Kinder and
Shirley Kinder, his wife
. Darrell R. King and
Reba J. King, his wife
. Hessie E. Lake and
Edith Lake, his wife
. Charles L. Lambert and
Ruth E.. Lambert, his wife
. Albert B. Leadmon and
Alice Leadmon, his wife
. Elmer W. Lengyel and
Anna H. Lengyel, his wife
. Wesley E. Lipford and
Margaret Lipford, his wife
. Charles E. Littleton and
Naomi Littleton, his wife
. Guy C. Lockhart, Sr. and
Freda Lockhart, his wife
Civil Action No. 92-C-7756
Civil Action No. 92-C-7757
Civil Action No. 92-C-7758
Civil Action No. 92-C-7759
Civil Action No. 92-C-7760
Civil Action No. 92-C-7761
Civil Action No. 92-C-7762
Civil Action No. 92-C-7763
Civil Action No. 92-C-7764
Civil Action No. 92-C-7765
Civil Action No. 92-C-7766
Civil Action No. 92-C-7767
Civil Action No. 92-C-7768
Civil Action No. 92-C-7769
Civil Action No. 92-C-7770
Civil Action No. 92-C-7771
Civil Action No. 92-C-7772
Civil Action No. 92-C-7773
Civil Action No. 92-C-7774
Civil Action No. 92-C-7775
97.
98.
. Bobby D. Logan and
Jewell K. Logan, his wife
Bob Carroll McCoy
. Ralph Mason McCroskey and
Eva J. McCroskey, his wife
. James McDonald and
Mae McDonald, his wife
. Earsel Marcum and
Irene Marcum, his wife
Homer B. Martin and
Margaret Martin, his wife
. Robert K. Martin and
Rebecca Martin, his wife
Glen E. Mathews and
Marilyn Mathews, his wife
. Alfred C. Mayle
William M. Menefree and
Dorothy Menefree, his wife
. Robert L. Messer and
Eula M. Messer, his wife
. Charles R. Miller and
Nole A. Miller, his wife
. Martin M. Moody
. Ronald J. Morrison and
Linda L. Morrison, his wife
. John M. Mullins, Jr. and
Donna Mullins, his wife
. Ona T. Mullins and
Audrey A. Mullins, his wife
. Standard V. Mullins and
Mary F. Mullins, his wife
. Paul R. Payne and
Barbara S. Payne. his wife
Henry Payne
Stanley E. Pennington and
Phyllis Pennington, his wife
Shelby Peters and
Opal Peters, his wife
Civil Action No. 92-C-7776
Civil Action No. 92-C-7777
Civil Action No. 92-C-7778
Civil Action No. 92-C-7779
Civil Action No. 92-C-7780
Civil Action No. 92-C-7781
Civil Action No. 92-C-7782
Civil Action No. 92-C-7783 |
Civil Action No. 92-C-7784
Civil Action No. 92-C-7785
Civil Action No. 92-C-7786
Civil Action No. 92-C-7787
Civil Action No. 92-C-7788
Civil Action No. 92-C-7789
Civil Action No. 92-C-7790
Civil Action No. 92-C-7791
Civil Action No. 92-C-7792
Civil Action No. 92-C-7793
Civil Action No. 92-C-7794
Civil Action No. 92-C-7795
Civil Action No. 92-C-7796
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
AG. Pettrey, Jr. and
Margaret Pettrey, his wife
James Pilney and
Sophie Pilney, his wife
Robert L. Porter and
Lorene Porter, his wife
George Franklin Rice and
Rosalee Rice, his wife
Kenneth W. Richmond and
Lois Richmond, his wife
Gerald E. Roark and
Ellouise Roark, his wife
Mitchell Roark and
Virgie M. Roark, his wife
Charles E. Rogers
Dan L. Rowsey and
Norma Rowsey, his wife
Stanley Royster and
Helen Royster, his wife
Joe S. Saunders and
Mosby A. Saunders, his wife
Paul D. Searls and
Rita S. Searls, his wife
James M. Siple and
Betty Jo Siple, his wife
Arlie M. Sparks
Carl Stevens and
Vetta Stevens, his wife
Eugene Stowers and
June Stowers, his wife
Clarence Stratton and
Freda Stratton, his wife
Loren G. Stratton and
Lola M. Stratton, his wife
George P. Tardy and
Marhla Tardy, his wife
Charles Thompson and
Lillie Thompson, his wife
Civil Action No. 92-C-7797
Civil Action No. 92-C-7798
Civil Action No 92-C-7799
Civil Action No. 92-C-7800
Civil Action No. 92-C-7801
Civil Action No. 92-C-7802
Civil Action No. 92-C-7803
Civil Action No. 92-C-7804
Civil Action No. 92-C-7805
Civil Action No. 92-C-7806
Civil Action No. 92-C-7807
Civil Action No. 92-C-7808
Civil Action No. 92-C-7809
Civil Action No. 92-C-7810
Civil Action No. 92-C-781 |
Civil Action No. 92-C-7812
Civil Action No. 92-C-7813
Civil Action No 92-C-7814
Civil Action No. 92-C-7815
Civil Action No. 92-C-7816
oe
Vv.
10
. Charles R. Thompson and
Edra Thompson, his wife
. Manley A. Thompson
. Carl E. Toney and
Pearlie Toney, his wife
. Clifford A. Vance and
Evelyn Vance, his wife
. Beechie M. Ward
. Ronald L. Ward
. Larry O. Webb and
Sandra Webb, his wife
. Gene Wells and
Phyllis Wells, his wife
. Ira E. Wells, Jr. and
Sara Wells, his wife
. Herman C. Whitney
. Cliffors L. Williams and
Hazel Williams, his wife
. Cledith A. Wilson
Edsel F. Yates and
Ruth M. Yates, his wife
Plaintiffs,
Civil Action No. 92-C-7817
Civil Action No. 92-C-7818
Civil Action No. 92-C-7819
Civil Action No. 92-C-7820
Civil Action No. 92-C-7821
Civil Action No. 92-C-7822
Civil Action No. 92-C-7823
Civil Action No. 92-C-7824
Civil Action No. 92-C-7825
Civil Action No. 92-C-7826
Civil Action No. 92-C-7827
Civil Action No. 92-C-7828
Civil Action No. 92-C-7829
CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORPORATION (CONRAIL)
Penn Central Corporation (PCC)
As successor to Penn Central Company,
Penn Central Railroad and
Central Railroad of New York
A Pennsylvania Corporation
Serve: CT Corporation
1600 Charleston Nat’! Plaza
Charleston, WV 25301
11
CSX TRANSPORTATION
INCORPORATION, INC.
Individually and as successor
to the Chesapeake & Ohio
Railroad Company,
A Virginia Corporation
Serve: A.F. Bobersky ;
Chafin Bldg, 517 9th Street
Huntington, WV 25701
NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY CO.
Individually as successor to
Southern Railway Company
and the Virginian Railroad,
A Virginia Corporation
Serve: President/CEO
3 Commercial Place
Norfolk, VA 23510-2108
NORFOLK SOUTHERN CORPORATION
Individually and as successor
to the Virginian Railroad,
A Virginian Corporation
Serve: President/CEO
3 Commercial Place
Norfolk, VA 23510-2108
NORFOLK AND WESTERN RAILWAY CO.
Individually and as successor
to the Norfolk Southern
Railway Company,
A Virginia Corporation
Serve: Richard A. Keeney
8 North Jefferson Street a5
Roanoke, VA 24042
12
OWENS CORNING FIBERGLAS CORP.
Serve: President/CEO
National Bank Building
Toledo, OH 43604
A&I COMPANY
Serve: C.P. Guthrie
5020 Kanawha Turnpike
Box 9277
Charleston, WV 25309
ABEX CORPORATION
Serve: President/CEO
485 Frontage Road
Burr Ridge, IL 60521
ANCHOR PACKING COMPANY
Serve: CT Corporation Systems
2 Peachtree Street
Atlanta, GA 30383
A.P. GREEN INDUSTRIES, INC.
Serve: Corporate Trust Company
1209 Orange Street
Wilmington, DE 19801
ARMSTRONG WORLD INDUSTRIES, INC.
Serve: W.M. Woodroe
Charleston National Plaza
Charleston, WV 25301
CERTAINTEED CORPORATION.
Serve: President/CEO
P. O. Box 860
Valley Forge, PA 19482
DURAMETALLIC CORPORATION
Serve: C.T. Corporation Systems
P. O. Box 951
Charleston, WV 25323
13
FIBREBOARD CORPORATION
Serve: President/CEO
1000 Burnett Avenue
Suite 410
Concord, CA 94520
FLEXITALLIC, INC.
Serve: President/CEO
P. O. Box 848
Bellmar, NJ 08031
THE FLINTKOTE COMPANY
Serve: President/CEO
c/o Mossman, Guther,
Knox and Elliott
50 California Street
34th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94111
GAF CORPORATION
Serve: Prentice Hall Corporation
32 Lockerman Square, East
Suite L-100
Dover, DE 19901
GARLOCK, INC.
Serve: President/CEO
1666 Division Street
Palmyra, NY 14522
GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORPORATION
Serve: C.T. Corporation Systems
P. O. Box 951
Charleston, WV 25323
4GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
Serve: President/CEO
3135 Easton Turnpike
Fairfield, CONN 06431
14
INSUL COMPANY INCORPORATED
- Serve: President/CEO
110 N. Market Street
East Palestine, OH 44413-2095
J.A. JONES CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
Serve: President/CEO
6060 St. Albans Street
One South Executive Park
Charlotte, NC 28287
KEENE CORPORATION
Serve: President/CEO
200 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10166
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
Serve: President/CEO
1 Madison Avenue
New York, NY, 10010
M.H. DETRICK COMPANY
Serve: President/CEO
19444 S. 97th Avenue
Box 270
Makena, IL 60448
NATIONAL GYPSUM COMPANY
Serve: President/CEO
325 Delaware Avenue
Buffalo, NY 14202
PITTSBURGH CORNING CORPORATION
Serve: President/CEO
800 Presque Isle Drive
Pittsburgh, PA 15239
15
PPG INDUSTRIES, INC.
Serve: President/CEO
One PPG Place
Pittsburgh, PA 15272
QUIGLEY COMPANY, INC.
Serve: C.T. Corporation Systems
P. O. Box 951
Charleston, WV 25323
QUIN-T CORPORATION
Serve: CENTER FOR CLAIMS RESOLUTION
500 College Road East
Princet yn, NJ 54840
ROCKWOOL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION
Serve: President/CEO
500 Thornton Avenue
Leeds, AL 35094
TURNER & NEWELL, PLC
Serve: President/CEO
Bowden House
Ashburton Road West
Trafford Park
Manchester M!7 IRA
England
UNION BOILER
Serve: David K. Baxter °
P.O. Box 1425
Nitro, WV 21543
UNITED STATES GYPSUM COMPANY
Serve: President/CEO
101 S. Wacker Drive
Chicago, IL 60606
16
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION
Serve: President/CEO
Six Gateway Center
Pittsburgh, PA 15222
W.R. GRACE COMPANY—CONN.
Serve: C.T. Corporation Systems
P. O. Box 951
Charleston, WV 25323
Defendants.
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND
The plaintiffs, by their undersigned counsel, hereby bring
suit against the defendants and for causes of action allege as
follows:
(JURISDICTION AND VENUE)
1. The plaintiffs named herein are residents and citizens of
the State of West Virginia, Kentucky and Ohio and were
exposed to asbestos and other harmful dusts in West Virginia,
Kentucky and Ohio.
2. The defendants herein are corporations some of which
are West Virginia corporations and some of which are Ohio
corporations.
3. All of the defendants are either licensed and registered
to do business in the State of West Virginia or have done
business in the state by putting their products into the stream
of commerce in the State of West Virginia.
4. All of the plaintiffs’ claims exceed the jurisdictional
minimum for this court.
5. Based upon the above, jurisdiction and venue is proper
in this case.
17
COUNT I
(FELA—Railroad Defendants Only)
6. This is an action for asbestos related personal injuries
arising under the provisions of the Federal Employer’s
Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. Section 51, et seq., specifically
including the Federal Safety Appliance Act, 45 U.S.C.
Sections | through 16, The Locomotive Boiler Inspection
Act, 45 U.S.C. Sections 22 through 34 and common law
negligence principles.
7. This Court has jurisdiction over this case under 45
U.S.C. Section 51 et seq. and 28 U.S.C. Section 1445 (non-
removable actions).
8. The Plaintiffs were all employees of the railroad and
contracted occupational diseases within the scope of that
employment.
9. The amount in controversy, exclusive of interest and
costs, exceeds the jurisdictional amount of this Court and this
Court has jurisdiction and venue hereof.
10. CSX Transportation, Inc. is a successor to the Chesa-
peake & Ohio Railroad Company and is a Virginia corpo-
ration. Hereinafter, this defendant is referred to as “the
railroad”.
11. Norfolk and Western Railway Company is a Virginia
corporation and is a wholly owned subsidiary of Norfolk
Southern Railway Company. Hereinafter, this defendant is
referred to as “N&W”. All of the allegations contained in
Count I attributable to “the railroad” are likewise attributable
to this defendant.
12. During his employment with the railroad, each
Plaintiff was exposed to asbestos and asbestos-containing
products on a repeated basis as well as other harmful dusts.
Plaintiff was required by the railroad to work with and near
toxic asbestos and asbestos-containing products and other
harmful dusts.
13. The Plaintiffs were unaware of the toxic propensities
of the asbestos and asbestos-containing products and other
harmful dusts to which they were exposed.
14. As a direct and proximate result of their exposure to
asbestos and asbestos-containing products and other harmful
dusts, without any lack of due care on their part, each
Plaintiff contracted asbestosis and other dust diseases related
to such exposure.
15. The Plaintiffs were unaware of the cause of their latent
and deteriorating medical condition until diagnosed as suf-
fering from same within the last two (2) years.
16. The railroad owed each Plaintiff a duty to have him,
work in a safe employment environment under the Federal
Employer’s Liability Act.
17. The railroad, by and through its duly authorized
agents, breached this duty to each plaintiff by:
(a) Failing to provide Plaintiff with a reasonably safe
work place;
(b) Failing to furnish Plaintiff with safe and suitable
tools and equipment including adequate protective
masks and protective inhalation devices;
(c) Failing to warn Plaintiff of the true nature and
hazardous effects of asbestos and asbestos-
containing products;
(d) Failing to operate a locomotive repair facility in a
reasonably safe manner;
(e) Failing to provide instructions or a method for the
safe use of asbestos;
(f) Failing to provide adequate, if any, instructions in
the use or removal of old asbestos products;
19
(g) Failing to test asbestos-containing products prior to
requiring employees to work with the same, to
determine their ultra-hazardous nature;
(h) Formulating and using a method of handling
asbestos and asbestos-containing products which
exposed Plaintiff to high concentrations of asbestos
fibers;
(i) Failing to provide Plaintiff with safe and proper
ventilation systems in the railroad facilities;
(j) Allowing unsafe practices to become standard
practice;
(k) Failing to exercise reasonable care in publishing and
enforcing a safety plan and method of handling and
installing asbestos and asbestos-containing products,
(1) Failing to inquire of the suppliers of asbestos and
asbestos-containing products, the nature of asbestos;
(m) Requiring Plaintiff to work with ultra-hazardous
asbestos and asbestos-containing products;
(n) Failing to exercise adequate, if any, care for the
health and safety of Plaintiff;
(o) Failing to periodically test and examine Plaintiff to
determine if he was subject to any ill effects of his
exposure to asbestos and asbestos-containing
products; and
(p) Failing to periodically inspect its locomotives,
boilers and their appurtenances in order to ascertain
any contamination by asbestos fibers.
18. As a direct and proximate result of the breach of duty
by the railroad, each Plaintiff was exposed to toxic asbestos
and asbesios-containing products and other harmful dusts.
20
19. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of
the railroad, each Plaintiff has suffered personal injury, great
pain, extreme anxiety, and he truly believes his injuries and
disability are permanent; his earning capacity has been
greatly reduced; his enjoyment of life has been greatly dimin-
ished; and his expected life span has been greatly shortened.
20. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of
the railroad, each Plaintiff, because of health problems caused
by this negligence, has been forced to incur medical expenses
for doctors, hospitals, drugs and health care services, and he
truly believes that he will be forced to incur additional
expenses in the future in an effort to treat his condition.
21. Each Plaintiff was a strong, able-bodied workman
capable of gainful employment at the time of the mani-
festation of his illness. As a result of his illness, each
Plaintiff has suffered damages by way of lost wages and a
diminished ability to render services, society, affection,
counseling and support to his household.
WHEREFORE, each Plaintiff claims compensatory
damages in the amount deemed sufficient by the jury with
interest and costs of suit herein.
COUNT II
(Negligence)
22. Over the course of their working years, the first named
plaintiffs (hereinafter “the plaintiffs”) worked with and/or
around products containing asbestos and/or other harmful
minerals manufactured, supplied, sold, distributed and
installed by the defendants. As a result, the plaintiffs breathed
asbestos and other harmful dusts created by the use of said
products, and developed serious, permanent and disabling
lung diseases.
23. The defendants and each of them by their agents,
servants and employees were negligent in that they knew or
21
should have known that the use of their products would cause
serious lung diseases and cancer, and knowing same, did fail
to take reasonable precautions to warn the plaintiffs of the
dangers to which they were exposed, did fail to inform the
plaintiffs of what would be safe and sufficient wearing
apparel and safety equipment for persons who were exposed
to their products, did fail to inform the plaintiffs of what
would be safe and proper methods of handling and using the
products, did fail to remove the products from the market
when they knew or should have known of the hazards
associated with the use of the products, did fail to properly
and adequately label the products, did sell the products which
were not in a reasonably safe condition, did fail to supply
accurate and complete warnings of the known dangers
involved in the use of and exposure to the products, did fail to
use safe, substitute products when such were available, did
negligently install the products without taking precautions to
warn and protect the plaintiffs.
24. Such actions and failure to act on the part of each
defendant constituted malicious, willful and wanton
misconduct with complete disregard for the safety and rights
of others, amounting to extraordinary and outrageous conduct
especially when the defendants were aware of scientific and
medical data made available to them that their products were
harmful and deadly to workers who were exposed to them.
25. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of
the defendants which caused them to develop serious,
permanent and disabling lung diseases, each plaintiff has |
suffered damages including but not limited to medical
expenses, great pain of body and mind, embarrassment,
inconvenience, loss of wages and wage earning capacity, loss
of the quality and enjoyment of their lives, shortening of their
life expectancy, increased risk of cancer and mesothelioma
with the worry and concern that naturally flows from such
increased ris’, permanent and disabling injury, all of which
will continue into the future.
22
WHEREFORE, each plaintiff individually demands
judgment against the defendants, jointly and severally, for
compensatory damages in an amount deemed just and proper
by the jury to adequately and fully compensate them for their
damages and punitive damages in an amount deemed just by
the jury, with interest and costs of suit herein.
COUNT III—STRICT LIABILITY
26. The plaintiffs incorporate by reference as if fully
set forth herein the allegations contained in paragraphs
1-25 above.
27. At the time the defendants placed their products on the
market, such products contained defects which created an
unreasonable risk of harm to those likely to use or be exposed
to the product, to wit; (a) exposure to the product caused
cancer and lung diseases, (b) no warning or an inadequate
warning was given to users or persons exposed to the product.
28. At the time of plaintiffs exposure, the products were
being used for the purposes for which they were intended, the
products were in substantially the same condition as when
they left the control of each of the defendants and the
plaintiffs had no knowledge of the defects and no reason to
suspect a defective condition.
29. As a sole, direct and proximate result of the defective
products manufactured, supplied and sold by the defendants,
the plaintiffs developed severe, permanent and disabling lung
diseases and suffered the damages and losses enumerated in
Count I above.
WHEREFORE, each plaintiff individually demands judg-
ment against the defendants, jointly and severally, for com-
pensatory damages in an amount deemed just and proper by
the jury to adequately and fully compensate them for their
damages and punitive damages in an amount deemed just by
the jury, with interest and costs of suit herein.
23
COUNT IV—CONSPIRACY
30. The plaintiffs were employed in capacities which
placed them in close proximity with asbestos and asbestos-
related materials, manufactured and/or distributed by one or
more of the defendants. Plaintiffs’ presence was known or
should have been known to the defendants and each of them.
31. The plaintiffs were exposed to the asbestos products
manufactured by one or more of the defendants named in
paragraph 16 below. The exposure to the asbestos or
asbestos-related products manufactured by the defendants
proximately contributed to the disease suffered by plaintiffs
as described below.
32. The defendants as specifically identified below,
individually and as agents of one another and as co-
conspirators, agreed and conspired among themselves and
with other asbestos manufacturers and distributors to injure
the plaintiff in the following fashion:
(a) Beginning in approximately 1934, conspirator
Johns-Manville Corporation, through its agents, Vandiver
Brown and attorneys J.C. Hobart, and conspirator Raybestos-
Manhattan, through its agents, Sumner Simpson and J.
Rohrbach, suggested, to Dr. Anthony Lanza, Associate
Director, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (insurers of
Manville and Raybestos), that Lanza publish a study on
asbestosis in which Lanza would affirmatively misrepresent a
material fact about asbestos exposure; that is the seriousness
of the disease process, asbestosis. This was accomplished
through intentional deletion of Lanza’s description of
asbestosis as “fatal” and through other selective editing that
affirmatively misrepresented asbestos [sic] as a disease
process less serious than it actually is and was known to be
then. As a result, Lanza’s study was published in the medical
literature in this misleading fashion in 1935. The conspirators
were motivated, in part, to effectuate this fraudulent
24
misrepresentation and fraudulent nondisclosure by the desire
to influence proposed legislation to regulate asbestos
exposure and to provide a defense in lawsuits involving
Manville, Raybestos and Metropolitan Life, as insurer.
(b) In 1936, conspirators American Brake Block Cor-
poration, Asbestos Manufacturing Company, Gatke Corpora-
tion, Johns-Manville Corporation, Keasby & Mattison
Company (then an alter-ego to conspirator Turner & Newall),
Raybestos-Manhattan, Russell Manufacturing (whose liabil-
ities have been assumed by H.K. Porter Company), Union
Asbestos and Rubber Company and United States Gypsum
Company, entered into an agreement with the Saranac
Laboratories. Under this agreement, these conspirators
acquired the power to decide what information Saranac
Laboratories could publish about asbestos disease and could
also control in what form such publications were to occur.
This agreement gave these conspirators power to affirma-
tively misrepresent the results of the work at Saranac, and
also gave these conspirators power to suppress material facts
included in any study. On numerous occasions thereafter, the
conspirators exercised their power to prevent Saranac
scientists from disclosing material scientific data, resulting in
numerous misstatements of fact being made at scientific
meetings.
(c) On November 11, 1948, representatives of the
following conspirators met at the headquarters of Johns-
Manville Corporation: American Brake Block Division of
American Brake and Shoe Foundry, Gatke Corporation,
Keasby & Mattison Company (then an alter-ego to
conspirator Turner & Newall), Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.,
Thermoid Company (whose assets and liabilities were later
purchased by H.K. Porter Company), Union Asbestos and
Rubber Company and United States Gypsum Company. U.S.
Gypsum did not send a representative to the meeting, but
25
instead authorized Vandiver Brown of Johns-Manville to
represent its interest at the meeting and to take action on
its behalf.
(d) At this November 11, 1948 meeting, these defend-
ants and their representatives decided to exert their influence
to materially alter and misrepresent material facts about the
substance of research started by Dr. Leroy Gardner at the
Saranac Laboratories beginning in 1936. Dr. Gardner’s
research involved the carcinogenicity of asbestos in mice and
also included an evaluation of the health effects of asbestos
on humans with a critical review of the then-existing
standards of dust exposure for asbestos and asbestos products.
(e) At this meeting, these defendants intentionally and
affirmatively determined that Dr. Gardner’s work should be
edited to specifically delete material facts about the cancer-
causing propensity of asbestos and the health effects of
asbestos on humans and the critique of the dust standards and
then published same in the medical literature as edited by Dr.
Vorwald. These defendants thereby fraudulently misrepre-
sented the risks of asbestos exposure to the public, in general,
and the class of persons exposed to asbestos, including
the plaintiffs. -
(f) As a direct result of influence exerted by the above-
described conspirators, Dr. Vorwald published Dr. Gardner’s
edited work in the Journal of Industrial Hygiene, AMA
Archives of Industrial Hygiene and Occupational Health in
1951 in a form that stressed those portions of Dr. Gardner’s
work that the conspirators wished stressed, but which omitted
references to human asbestosis and cancer, thereby fraud-
ulently and affirmatively misrepresenting the extent of the
risks. The conspirators affirmatively and deliberately dissem-
inated this misleading Vorwald publication to university
libraries, government officials, agencies and others.
26
(g) Such action constited [sic] a material affirmative
misrepresentation of the total context of material facts
involved in Dr. Gardner’s work and resulted in creating an
appearance that inhalation of asbestos was less of a health
problem than Dr. Gardner’s unedited work indicated.
(h) The following conspirators were members of the
trade association known as Quebec Asbestos Mining Asso-
ciation (Q.A.M.A.): Johns-Manville Corporation, Carey-
Canada, individually and as successor to Quebec Asbestos
Corporation, the Celotex Corporation, successor to Quebec
Asbestos Corporation, National Gypsum Company, and
Turner & Newall, individually and successor to Bell
Asbestos. These conspirators, members of Q.A.M.A.., partic-
ipated in the above-described misrepresentation of the work
of Dr. Leroy Gardner published by Arthur Vorwald in the
AMA Archives of Industrial Health in 1951. Evidence of
the Q.A.M.A.’s involvement in this misrepresentation arises
from co-conspirator Johns-Manville’s membership of the
Q.A.M.A., as well as correspondence from co-conspirators
dated 10/29/47, 11/26/47, 3/6/38, 10/15/48, 3/8/49 and
9/6/50, and all indicating close monitoring of the editing
process of Q.A.M.A.’s representative, Ivan Sabourin, acting
on behalf of all Q.A.M.A. members.
(i) Defendants who were members of the Q.A.M.A. as
described above, began on or about 1950 to formulate a plan
to influence public opinion about the relationship between
asbestos and cancer by influencing the medical literature on
this subject and then touting and disseminating this literature
to the public and to organizations and legislative bodies
responsible for regulatory control of asbestos with the
specific intent of misrepresenting the existing scientific
information and suppressing contrary scientific data in their
possession and control.
(j) This plan of misrepresentation and influence over
the medical literature began on or about 1950 when the
27
aforementioned Q.A.M.A. members selected Saranac Labor-
atories to do an evaluation of whether cancer was related to
asbestos. After a preliminary report authored by Arthur
Vorwald in 1952 indicated that a cancer/asbestos relationship
might exist in experimental animals, these Q.A.M.A.
members refused to further fund the study and it was
terminated and never publicly discussed.
(k) As a result of the termination of this study, these
defendants fraudulently withheld information from the public
and affirmatively misrepresented to the public and respons-
ible legislative and regulatory bodies that asbestos did not
cause cancer, including affirmative misrepresentations by
conspirators’ agents K.W. Smith, M.D., Paul Cartier, M.D.,
A.J. Vorwald, M.D., A. J. Lanza, M.D., Vandiver Brown and
Ivan Sabourin, said misrepresentations being directed to inter
alia, U.S. Government officials, Canadian government offi-
cials, U.S. National Cancer Institute, other medical organi-
zations and the general public, including plaintiffs.
(1) Subsequently, the Q.A.M.A. defendant conspira-
tors contracted with the Industrial Hygiene Foundation and
Dr. Daniel Braun to further study the relationship between
asbestos exposure, asbestosis and lung cancer. In 1957, Drs.
Brown and Truan reported to the Q.A.M.A. that asbestosis
did increase a worker’s chances of incurring lung cancer.
(m) The Q.A.M.A. defendant conspirators/members
the. cafter caused, in 1958, a publication of the work by Braun
and Truan in which the findings regarding increased inci-
dence of cancer in persons with asbestosis was edited out by
agents of the Q.A.M.A. The published version of this study
contained a conclusion that asbestos exposure, alone, did not
increase the incidence of lung cancer, a conclusion known by
the defendant conspirators to be patently false.
(n) By falsifying and causing publication of studies
concluding that asbestos exposure did not cause lung cancer
and simultaneously omitting a documented finding that
28
asbestosis did increase the risk of lung cancer, these
Q.A.M.A. defendant conspirators affirmatively misrepre-
sented to the public and concealed from the public the extent
of risks associated with inhalation of asbestos fibers.
(0) In approximately 1958, these Q.A.M.A. defendant
conspiiate’s publicized the edited works of Drs. Braun and
Truan at a symposium in an effort to fraudulently mis-
represent to the public and persons exposed to asbestos that
the inhalation of asbestos dust would not cause cancer.
(p) The fraudulent misrepresentations beginning in 1946
as elaborated above and continuing with the publication of
the 1958 Braun/Truan study influenced the standards set for
threshold limit values for development of such standards to
fail to lower the threshold limit value because of a cancer risk
associated with asbestos inhalation.
(q) In 1967, Q.A.M.A. conspirators determined at their
trade association meeting that they would intentionally
mislead consumers about the extent of risks involved in
inhalation of asbestos products.
(r) In 1952, a Symposium regarding the health effects of
asbestos was held at the Saranac Laboratories. The following
conspirators were in attendance: Johns-Manville, Turner &
Newall, Raybestos-Manhattan, and Q.A.M.A. members by
way of their agents, Cartier, Sabourin and LaChance.
(s) At this meeting, the occurrence of lung cancer and
asbestosis in product users was discussed and the car-
cinogenic properties of all fiber types of asbestos was also
discussed. In an affirmative attempt to mislead the public
about the extent of health risks associated with asbestos, and
in an effort to fraudulently conceal those risks from the
public, these defendants conspired to prevent publication of
the record of this 1952 Saranac Symposium and it was not
published. In addition, the conspirators induced Vorwald not
to announce the results of his and Gardner’s animal studies
29
showing excess cancers in animals which thereby fraud-
ulently misrepresented existing secret data which could not be
publicized owing to the secrecy provisions contained in the
1936 Saranac agreement heretofore described.
(t) The following conspirators were members of the
trade organization known as the Asbestos Textile Institute
(ATI): Raybestos-Manhattan, Johns-Manville, H.K. Porter,
Keasby & Mattison, individually and through its alter-ego
Turner & Newall and National Gypsum.
(u) In 1947, these conspirators, members of the ATI,
received a report from W.C.L. Hemeon regarding asbestosis,
which suggested re-evalua'ion of the then-existing threshold
limit values for asbestos exposure. These defendants caused
this report not to be published and thereby fraudulently
concealed material facts about asbestos exposure from the
public and affirmatively misrepresented to the public and
class of persons exposed to asbestos that the existing
threshold limit value was acceptable. Thereafter, these
defendant conspirators withheld additional material informa-
tion on the dust standards from The American Conference of
Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH), thereby further
influencing evaluations of threshold limit values for asbestos
exposure.
(v) In 1953, conspirator National Gypsum, through its
agents, in response to an inquiry from the Indiana Division of
Industrial Hygiene regarding health hazards of asbestos spray
products, refused to mail a proposed response to that division
indicating that respirators should be worn by applicators of
the products. National Gypsum’s response distorted and
fraudulently misrepresented the need for applicators of
asbestos spray products to wear respirators and fraudulently
concealed from such applicators the need for respirators.
(w) In 1955, conspirator Johns-Manville, through its
agent Kenneth Smith, caused to be published in the AMA
Archives of Industrial Health, an article entitled “Pul-
30
monary Disability in Asbestos Workers.” This published
study materially altered the results of an earlier study in 1949
concerning the same set of workers. This alteration of Dr.
pt way ton constituted a fraudulent and material misrep-
resentation t the extent of the ri
| vo risk associated with
(x) In 1955, the National Cancer Institute held a meet-
ing at which conspirator Johns-Manville, individually and as
an agent for other alleged co-conspirators and A. Vorwald, as
agent of co-conspirators, affirmatively misrepresented that
there were no existing animal studies concerning the
relationship between asbestos exposure and cancer, when, in
fact, the conspirators were in secret possession of several
studies which demonstrated that positive evidence did exist.
= (y) In 1957, these conspirators, members of the ATI
jointly rejected a propose [sic] research study on cancer and
asbestos and this resulted in fraudulently concealed from the
public material facts regarding asbestos exposure and also
constituted an affirmative misrepresentation of the then-
existing knowledge about asbestos exposure and lung cancer.
(z) In 1964, conspirators who were members of the ATI
met to formulate a plan for rebutting the association between
lung cancer and asbestos exposure that had been recently
discussed by Dr. Irving J. Selikoff. Thereafter, these members
of the ATI embarked upon a campaign to further misrepresent
(aa) All conspirators identified above
ratified and furthered the previous eR © gly
conspirators Johns-Manville, Raybestos Manhattan and A.J.
Lanza, acting on behalf of Metropolitan Life Insurance
company, and all alleged co-conspirators during the dates and
circumstances alleged above, acted as agents and co-
conspirators for the other conspirators.
31
33. The acts of the defendant conspirators as described
above, constitute a fraudulent concealment and/or a fraud-
ulent misrepresentation which proximately caused injury to
the plaintiffs in the following manner:
(a) The material published or caused to be published by
the defendants was false and incomplete in that the
defendants knowingly and deliberately deleted references to
the known health hazards of asbestos and asbestos-related
products.
(b) Defendants individually, as members of a conspir-
acy, and as agents or other co-conspirators, intended that the
publication of false and misleading reports and/or the
nondisclosure of documented reports of the health hazards of
asbestos:
(1) maintain a favorable atmosphere for the continued
sale and distribution of asbestos and asbestos-related
products;
(2) assist in the continued pecuniary gain of the
defendants through the sale of their products;
(3) influence in the defendants’ favor proposed
legislation to regulate asbestos exposure and;
(4) to provide a defense in law suits brought for
injury resulting from asbestos disease.
(c) Plaintiffs reasonably relied upon the published medi-
cal and scientific data documenting the purported safety of
asbestos and asbestos-related products, and the absence of
published medical and scientific reports on the hazards of
asbestos and asbestos-related products to continue their
exposure to asbestos because they believed it to be safe.
(d) Defendants individually, as members of a con-
spiracy, and as agents of other co-conspirators intended that
plaintiffs rely upon the published reports regarding the safety
of asbestos and asbestos-related products and upon the
32
absence of published medical and scientific data regarding the
hazards of asbestos and asbestos-related products, to continue
their exposure to those products.
(e) Defendants individually, as members of a conspir-
acy, and as agents of other co-conspirators are in a position of
superior knowledge regarding the health hazards of asbestos
and therefore plaintiffs had a right to rely on the published
reports commissioned by the defendants regarding the health
hazards of asbestos and the absence of published medical and
scientific data regarding the hazards of asbestos and asbestos-
related products.
(f) Plaintiffs suffered injury as a direct and proximate
result of the acts alleged herein, and damages as described in
Count I above.
WHEREFORE, each plaintiff individually demands judg-
ment against the defendants, jointly and severally, for
compensatory damages in an amount deemed just and proper
by the jury to adequately and fully compensate them for their
damages and punitive damages in an amount deemed just by
the jury, with interest and costs of suit herein.
COUNT V—WRONGFUL DEATH
34. The plaintiffs incorporate by reference as if fully set
forth herein the allegations contained in paragraphs | through
33 above.
35. Certain plaintiffs are representatives of the estates of
deceased workers. In those cases, this action is brought
pursuant to the Wrongful Death Statute since the decedent
died as a direct and proximate result of exposure to asbestos
and other harmful dusts caused by the wrongful acts and
omissions and defective products of the defendants herein.
The decedents at the time of death had beneficiaries and
distributees as defined by the Wrongful Death Statute.
33
36. As a proximate result of the aforementioned wrongful
acts and omissions of the defendants and exposure to the
defendants’ defective products, the decedents suffered prior
to their death severe physical pain, mental anguish, worry,
loss of enjoyment of life, loss of income and medical
expenses. As a result of the decedents’ death, funeral and
burial expenses were incurred, there was a loss of future
income and the decedents’ beneficiaries and statutory distrib-
utees have suffered sorrow mental anguish, loss of society,
loss of companionship, loss of comfort, loss of guidance and
advice, loss of services, protection, care and assistance as
well as a loss of the benefit of the decedents’ income.
WHEREFORE, each plaintiff individually demands judg-
ment against the defendants, jointly and severally, for com-
pensatory damages in an amount deemed just and proper by
the jury to adequately and fully compensate them for their
damages and punitive damages in an amount deemed just by
the jury, with interest and costs of suit herein.
COUNT VI—LOSS OF CONSORTIUM
37. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference as if fully set forth
herein the allegations contained in paragraphs | through 20
above. Plaintiffs’ spouses have by reason of the lung diseases
and disabilities suffered by the first named plaintiff have
themselves suffered and will continue to suffer into the future
the permanent loss of the consortium, guidance, kindly office,
support and services of their spouses as well as damage to the
marital relationship.
WHEREFORE, each plaintiffs’ spouse individually de-
mands judgment against the defendants, jointly and severally,
for compensatory damages in an amount deemed just and
proper by the jury to adequately and fully compensate them
for their damages and punitive damages in an amount deemed
just by the jury, with interest and costs of suit herein.
34
COUNT VII (PPG ONLY)
(Negligence)
38. Defendant PPG Industries, Inc. (hereinafter “PPG”)
is the parent corporation of Pittsburgh-Corning Corporation,
(hereinafter “subsidiary”) a former manufacturer and mar-
keter of asbestos-containing products.
39. Plaintiffs were exposed to the asbestos-containing
products manufactured by the subsidiary.
40. At all times relevant herein, defendant PPG intervened
on behalf of its subsidiary and researched the dangers and
health consequences of asbestos exposure.
41. Defendant and its subsidiary shared a common medical
director who conducted the research on the hazards of
asbestos exposure.
42. Through this undertaking, defendant created a duty to
those, like plaintiffs, who would come in contact with the
asbestos contained in the products manufactured by its
subsidiary.
43. Defendant, upon assuming this duty and responsibility,
failed to perform with reasonable care.
44. Defendant PPG created a dangerous, harmful and
potentially deadly situation by not sharing its data on the
dangers of asbestos exposure with those reasonably likely to
be exposed, such as plaintiffs.
45. Defendant breached its duty to plaintiffs by:
(a) failing to reasonably warn plaintiffs of the hazards of
asbestos exposure;
(b) failing to act reasonably with regard to the infor-
mation it possessed concerning the hazards of exposure to
asbestos;
35
(c) failing to provide plaintiffs with the knowledge as to
the possible precautions to protect against the harmful effects
of asbestos exposure;
(d) failing to share its data on the dangers of asbestos
exposure with those reasonably likely to be exposed, such as
plaintiffs;
(e) concealing the information it possessed about the
hazards of asbestos from those reasonably likely to be
exposed, such as plaintiffs; and
(f) was otherwise negligent.
46. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of
defendant PPG Industries, Inc., plaintiffs developed severe,
permanent and disabling lung diseases and suffered the
damages and losses enumerated in Count I above.
WHEREFORE, each plaintiff individually demands judg-
ment against the defendant, PPG Industries, Inc., jointly and
severally, for compensatory damages in an amount deemed
just and proper by the jury to adequately and fully com-
pensate them for their damages and punitive damages in an
amount deemed just by the jury, with interest and costs of
suit herein.
COUNT VIII (PPG ONLY)
(Restatement of Torts Sec. 324A(a))
47. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege all allegations contained
in paragraphs 38 to 46 above.
48. Defendant PPG undertook to render services for its
subsidiary; to wit; research on the health effects of asbestos
exposure.
49. Defendant PPG did or reasonably should have
recognized this undertaking was necessary for the protection
of third parties.
36
50. Defendant PPG breached this duty to third parties,
such as the plaintiffs, by failing to exercise reasonable care to
protect them from or warn them of the health hazards of
asbestos exposure.
51. Defendant’s failure to exercise reasonable care in-
creased the risk of harm.
52. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of
defendant PPG Industries, Inc., plaintiffs developed severe,
permanent and disabling lung diseases and suffered the
damages and losses enumerated in Count I above.
WHEREFORE, each plaintiff individually demands
judgment against the defendant, PPG Industries, Inc., jointly
and severally, for compensatory damages in an amount
deemed just and proper by the jury to adequately and fully
compensate them for their damages and punitive damages in
an amount deemed just by the jury, with interest and costs of
suit herein.
COUNT IX (PPG ONLY)
(Restatement of Torts Sec. 324A(b))
53. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege all allegations contained
in paragraphs 38 through 52 above.
54. Defendant PPG’s subsidiary owed a duty to plaintiffs
to reasonably research the health effects of asbestos exposure.
55. Defendant PPG undertook to perform this duty owed
to plaintiffs.
56. Defendant PPG breached this duty it undertook to
perform for its subsidiary by:
(a) failing to reasonably warn plaintiffs of the hazards of
asbestos exposure;
(b) failing to act reasonably with regard to the
information it possessed with regard to the hazards of
exposure to asbestos;
37
(c) failing to provide plaintiffs with the knowledge as to
the possible precautions to protect against the harmful effects
of asbestos exposure;
(d) failing to share its data on the dangers of asbestos
exposure with those reasonably likely to be exposed, such as
plaintiffs;
(e) concealing the information it possessed about the
hazards of asbestos from those reasonably likely to be
exposed, such as plaintiffs; and
(f) was otherwise negligent.
57. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of
defendant PPG Industries, Inc., plaintiffs developed severe,
permanent and disabling lung diseases and suffered the
damages and losses enumerated in Count I above.
WHEREFORE, each plaintiff individually demands
judgment against the defendant, PPG Industries, Inc., jointly
and severally, for compensatory damages in an amount
deemed just and proper by the jury to adequately and fully
compensate them for their damages and punitive damages .in
an amount deemed just by the jury, with interest and costs of
suit herein.
COUNT X (PPG ONLY)
(Restatement of Torts Sec. 324(c))
58. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege all allegations contained
in paragraphs 38 through 57 above.
59. Plaintiffs relied to their detriment on the undertaking
of defendant PPG to research and warn them of the health
hazards of asbestos exposure.
60. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of
defendant PPG Industries, Inc., plaintiffs developed severe,
permanent and disabling lung diseases and suffered the
damages and losses enumerated in Count I above.
38
WHEREFORE, each plaintiff individually demands
judgment against the defendant, PPG Industries, Inc., jointly
and severally, for compensatory damages in an amount
deemed just and proper by the jury to adequately and fully
compensate them for their damages and punitive damages in
an amount deemed just by the jury, with interest and costs of
suit herein.
COUNT XI (PPG ONLY)
(Conspiracy)
61. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege all allegations contained
in paragraphs 38 through 60 above.
62. Defendant PPG and its subsidiary, individually and in
concert with each other and others, knowingly agreed and
conspired among themselves to engage in a course of conduct
that was reasonably likely to result in injury to the plaintiffs.
63. Defendant PPG knew or should have known that the
failure of its subsidiary to warn plaintiffs of the harmful
effects of asbestos exposure would cause plaintiffs injury.
64. Defendant PPG gave substantial assistance and/or
encouragement to its subsidiary is [sic] accomplishing the
injury to the plaintiffs.
65. As a direct and proximate result of the conspiracy
between defendant PPG and its subsidiary, plaintiffs
developed severe, permanent and disabling lung diseases and
suffered the damages and losses enumerated in Count i
above.
WHEREFORE, each plaintiff individually demands
judgment against the defendant, PPG Industries, Inc., jointly
and severally, for compensatory damages in an amount
deemed just and proper by the jury to adequately and fully
compensate them for their damages and punitive damages in
an amount deemed just by the jury, with interest and costs of
suit herein.
39
COUNT XII (PPG ONLY)
(Punitive Damages)
. 66. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege all allegations contained
in paragraphs 38 through 65 above.
67. The acts of defendant PPG were willful, wanton,
malicious and in total disregard for the rights, health and
safety of the plaintiff and others.
68. As a direct and proximate result of these acts, plaintiffs
deveiuped severe, permanent and disabling lung diseases and
suffered the damages and losses enumerated in Count |
above.
WHEREFORE, each plaintiff individually demands
judgment against the defendant, PPG Industries, Inc., for
punitive damages in an amount deemed just by the jury, with
interest and costs of suit herein.
JURY DEMAND
The plaintiffs demand a trial by jury on all issues presented
herein.
Plaintiffs
By Counsel
James F. Humphreys
Charleston National Plaza
Suite 1113
Charleston, WV 25301
(304) 343-4185
Ness, Motley, Loadholt,
Richardson & Poole
James H. Rion, Jr.
P. O. Box 1137
Charleston, SC 29402
(803) 577-6747
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF KANAWHA COUNTY
WEST VIRGINIA
[Filed Feb. 3, 1995]
Frank Adams,
Thomas F. Adams,
Clarence Howard Anderson,
Freeman Ray Ayers,
James Michael Barlow,
Henry Ross Bartholow,
Benjamin Maywood Blecher,
George Garland Beloat,
Nathan Donald Bennett,
Nolice Eugene Berry,
John Walker Berryman,
Doyle Thomas Bias,
Richard Mitchell Bland
Robert Everett Bledsoe,
Verrell Leon Bledsoe,
Henry Block,
Charles Frederick Bonner,
James Patrick Bowers,
Joe Bradac,
Melvin Minor Bragg, Sr.,
Billy Clay Brown,
Danny Joe Brown,
William Henry Brown,
Henry Maury Bryant,
Clarence Burmon Burgess,
Carl Richard Butler,
Lewis Edward Campbell,
Walter James Campbell,
Robert Gehrling Carey,
William Burdette Carroll,
Harvey Cornelius Carter,
James Edward Carter,
Rondel Lee Christian,
Jackie David Church, Sr.,
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-3884
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-3886
CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-7857
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6857
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4891
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4892
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-3913
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-153
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6159
CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-4052
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-3921
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-3925
CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-4055
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-3943
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-3944
CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-4057
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4859
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6863
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6166
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6865
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6871
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-3960
CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-7954
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6874
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6875
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6876
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6172
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6878
CIVIL ACITON NO. 93-C-4514
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4906
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6176
CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-5727
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6884
CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-8017
Ronald Clark,
Henry Coleman, Sr.,
Orrin P. Collins,
Oppie Thurman Conley,
James Lewis Coss,
George Allen Cripple,
Clifford Damron,
Jack Okey Dawson,
Robert DeTemple, Sr.,
Richard Curtis Decker, Sr.,
Charles Denver Dillon,
George Edward Dixon,
Melvin Arthur Dutcher,
Leslie Joe Edelman,
Billy Joe Edwards,
Robert Franklin Ellenberg,
Homer Mont Farley,
Harry Warren Ferguson,
James Delano Fernihough,
Burl Jackson Ferrell,
Charles Edward Fletcher,
George Forney,
Wayne Fortner, Jr.,
Garland Stewart Fowler,
Bobby Joe Frye,
Claude Cecil Gallion,
Grant Gilbert, Jr.,
Eldon Edward Gillium,
William Delford Gragg,
Lloyd Dale Gullett,
Lester Lee Haas,
Richard Arlen Haas,
Archie Grey Hall,
William Arthur Handley,
Woodrow Wilson Haney, Jr.,
Dewey Hardin,
_ Farnia Harold Harvey,
Clarence Heater,
Bottie Archie Holdren,
42
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4908
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-184
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6889
CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-4091
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4027
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6183
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-193
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6898
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6899
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4519
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6184
CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-8094
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6186
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4066
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6902
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6190
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6191
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4077
CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-4130
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6908
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4083
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-691 1
CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-8150
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6912
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4090
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4093
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4100
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6193
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6918
CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-8196
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4122
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4123
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4125
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6922
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6923
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6924
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6926
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-494]
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6931
Ralph Veron Holesapple,
Herbert Holmes,
Carl Elwood Hood,
Burgess Horn,
Carl Howard,
Jessie Howard,
Johnnie Hudnall,
Robert William Hugus,
Russell James,
Charles Edward Jarnett,
Homer Lawrence Jeffers,
Ralph O’Jay Jeffrey,
Hobert Johnson,
Malcolm Earl Johnson, Jr.,
Robert Joseph Johnson,
Ava Jones, Jr.,
William Kenneth Kazee,
Steve Kelemen,
Arden Clyde Knight,
Robert Frank Kotson, Sr.,
Donald Caltee Kuhn,
Charles Donald Langley,
Robert Ray Large,
Walter Lavender,
John L. Lawhorn,
Paul Harrison Leach,
Danny Lee Lewis,
Edgar Ear! Little,
Orazio Lucento,
Henry Alex Lunsford,
Edward Jackson Lynch,
Walter J. Mallory,
Louis Eugene Martin,
Harold Massie,
Lynden Bernadine Massie,
Billy Ray Matics,
Everett Maynard,
John Russell McCabe,
James Wheeler McConnell,
43
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6201
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4944
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4165
CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-8260
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6932
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4170
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4174
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6205
CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-8284
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-261
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6206
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4186
CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-4185
CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-4186
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6207
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4206
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4215
CIVIC ACTION NO. 93-C-4219
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6949
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4228
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4230
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4233
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6209
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4235
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6210
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4237
CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-4215
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-1623
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6214
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4249
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4250
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6958
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-696 |
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4530
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4263
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6215
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4960
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4270
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6962
James William McFarland, Sr.,
William Edward McGivern,
William Joe McNeely,
Sterling McPeek,
Berman Earl Meadows, Jr.,
Harry Robert Meeks,
Charles Henry Melvin,
Lonnie Burton Mick,
Frank Ernest Miller,
Ernest Griffith Moore,
Ralph Grayden Moore,
George Carlton Mosby,
Harlo Robert Nance,
John Hershel Neace,
Raymond Allison Nelson,
Arnold Adolphus Newhouse,
Dewey Gene Newman,
Chester James Nibert,
Hubert Lee Niswander,
James Samuel Parsons,
Joseph Pavlovic,
Marty Lee Penix,
James Elwood Perry,
James Henry Pyles,
Glen Freeman Queen,
Joe Radcliff,
Robert Milton Rayburn,
Woodrow Wilson Reed,
David E. Rhodes,
Larry Eugene Riffe,
Gail Riggs,
Cobern Rigsby, Jr.,
Hassil Parker Robinett,
Henry Clay Robinson,
Hollis Virgil Rose,
' James Rufford Rowe,
Kenneth Rowe,
William Edward Rowe, Sr.,
Harry Cecil Rucker,
as
CIVIL ACTION NO. 69-C-6965
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6220
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6967
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6968
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6223
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6970
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6971
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4963
CIVIL ACITON NO. 93-C-1639
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6972
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4297
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4301
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4313
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-305
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6976
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6977
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4536
CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-8504
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6979
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6984
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6229
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-315
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4974
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6990
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-317
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6236
CIVIL ACTION-NO. 93-C-318
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-320
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6237
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4364
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6992
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4367
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4979
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-330
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4375
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6242
CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-8624
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4379
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4982
Kenneth Warren Rumbaugh,
Paul Frank Rymer,
George Dewey Scott,
Leonard N. Sears,
David Allen Sevier
James Thomas Sheets,
Hollis Curl Short,
Francis Dean Simpson,
John Phillip Simpson,
Ronald Eugene Sines,
William Eugene Slater,
Lester Slawter,
Claude Junior Smith, —
Charles Lewis Snyder,
James McCoy Spangler,
Claude William Stinson,
George F. Stock,
Marshall Ray Tackett,
James Kenneth Taylor,
Daniel Wilson Thomas,
Walter Martin Thomason,
Willard Raymond Todd,
John Cecil Towles,
Frederick Ray Trusty,
James Thomas Turner,
Eli Lee Tyo, Jr.,
Bennie Franklin Vanhorn,
Andrew Douglas Vaughn,
James Elbert Vaught, Sr.,
William Franklin Ward,
Roy Emmitt Warren,
Albert Richard Waters,
Paul Edward Webb,
Owen Lawrence Weldon,
James Oris Whaley,
Harold Emile Willis,
George Garland Wilson,
Leonard Eugene Wilson,
Carl Everett Wimmer,
45
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4380
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6997
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4387
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6998
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6999
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4398
CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-8670
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-7000
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-7001
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-7002
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4407
CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-470
CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-8684
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4414
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-7004
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4422
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6252
CIVIL ACTION NO: 92-C-8747
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6255
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-7018
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-7019
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6257
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-7021
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4440
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-5002
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4443
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4449
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-385
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4450
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-5003
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-5005
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6262
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-5006
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4470
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-5012
CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-8837
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-2027
CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-8840
CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-703 |
46
Floyd Ester Woods, CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-8859
George Denzil Yolcum, CIVIL ACTION NO: 92-C-4397
Cyril Eugene Yost, CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-1733
Plaintiffs,
V.
CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC.
Individually and as successor
to the Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad Company,
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, Western Maryland Railway,
and the Chessie System
A Virginia Corporation
Serve: A.F. Bobersky
Chafin Bldg, 517 9th Street
Huntington, WV 25701
CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORPORATION (CONRAIL)
As Successor to Penn Central Company, Penn Central
Corporation,
Pennsylvania-New York Central Transportation Company,
and the Pennsylvania Railroad
Serve: CT Corporation
Bank One Center, Suite 1600
Charleston, WV 25301
AMERICAN PREMIER UNDERWRITERS, INC.
NORFOLK AND WESTERN RAILWAY CO.
Individually and as a successor to
the Norfolk Southern Railway Co.,
A Virginia Corporation
Serve: Richard A. Keeney
8th North Jefferson Street
Roanoke, VA 24042
Defendants.
47
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND
The plaintiffs, by their undersigned counsel, hereby brings
suit against the defendants and for causes of action allege
as follows:
1. This is an action for asbestos related personal injuries
arising under the provisions of the Federal Employer’s
Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. Section 51, et seq., specifically
including the Federal Safety Appliance Act, 45 U.S.C.
Sections | through 16, The Locomotive Boiler Inspection
Act, 45 U.S.C. Sections 22 through 34 and common law
negligence principles.
2. This Court has jurisdiction over this case under 45
U.S.C. Section 51 et seq. and 28 U.S.C. Section 1445 (non-
removable actions).
3. The Plaintiffs were employees of the railroad and
contacted occupational diseases within the scope of that
employment.
4. The amount in controversy, exclusive of interest and
costs, exceeds the jurisdictional amount of this Court and this
Court has jurisdiction and venue hereof.
5. CSX Transportation, Inc. is a successor to the
Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad Company and is a Virginia
Corporation. Hereinafter, this defendant is referred to as “the
railroad”.
6. Consolidated Rail Corporation is a successor to various
railroads which employed the plaintiff, including but not
limited to, Penn Central Transportation Company, Penn
Central Corporation, Pennsylvania-New York Central Trans-
portation Company, the Pennsylvania Railroad and New York
Central Railroad.
7. Norfolk and Western Railway Company is a Virginia
Corporation and is a wholly owned subsidiary of Norfolk
48
Southern Railway Company. Hereinafter, this defendant is
referred to as “N&W”.
All of the allegations contained in Count { are attributable
to “the railroad” and are likewise attributable to all the above-
referenced defendants.
8. During their employment with the railroad, the
Plaintiffs were exposed to asbestos and asbestos-containing
products on a repeated basis as well as other harmful dusts.
Plaintiffs were required by the railroad to work with and near
toxic asbestos and asbestos-containing products and other
harmful dusts. :
9. The Plaintiffs were unaware of the toxic propensities of
the asbestos and asbestos-containing products and other
harmful dusts to which they were exposed.
10. As a direct and proximate result of their exposure
asbestos and asbestos-containing products and other harmft
dusts, without any lack of due rare on his part, the Plaintiff
contracted asbestosis and other dust diseases related to
such exposure.
11. The Plaintiffs were unaware of the cause of their
latent and deteriorating medical condition until diagnosed as
suffering from same within the last two (2) years.
12. The railroad owed the Plaintiffs a duty to have them
work in a safe employment environment under the Federal
Employer’s Liability Act.
13. The railroad, by and through its duly authorized
agents, breached this duty to the plaintiffs by:
(a) Failing to provide the Plaintiffs with a reasonably
safe work place;
(b) Failing to furnish the Plaintiffs with safe and
suitable tools and equipment including adequate
protective masks and protective inhalation devices,
49
(c) Failing to warn the Plaintiffs of the true nature and
hazardous efforts of asbestos and asbestos-
containing products;
(d) Failing to operate a locomotive repair facility in a
reasonably safe manner;
(e) Failing to provide instructions or a method for the
safe use of asbestos;
(f) Failing to provide adequate, if any, instructions in
the use or removal of old asbestos products;
(g) Failing to test asbestos-containing products prior to
requiring employees to work with the same, to
determine their ultra-hazardous nature:
(h) Formulating and using a method of handling
asbestos and asbestos-containing products which
exposed the Plaintiffs to high concentrations of
asbestos fibers;
(i) Failing to provide the Plaintiffs with safe and proper
ventilation systems in the railroad facilities:
(j) Allowing unsafe- practices to become standard
practice;
(k) Failing to exercise reasonable care in publishing and
enforcing a safety plan and method of handling and
installing asvestos and asbestos-containing products;
(I) Failing to inquire of the suppliers of asbestos and
asbestos-containing products, the nature of asbestos;
(m) Requiring the Plaintiffs to work with ultra-hazardous
asbestos and asbestos-containing products;
(n) Failing to exercise adequate, if any, care for the
health and safety of the Plaintiffs;
(0) Failing to periodically test and examine the
Plaintiffs to determine if they were subject to any ill
50
effects of their exposure to asbestos and asbestos-
containing products; and
(p) Failing to periodically inspect its locomotives,
boilers and their appurtenances in order to ascertain
any contamination by asbestos fibers.
14. As a direct and proximate result of the breach of duty
by the railroad, the Plaintiffs was exposed to toxic asbestos
and asbestos-containing products and other harmful dusts.
15. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of
the railroad, the Plaintiffs have suffered personal injury, great
pain, extreme anxiety, and they truly believe their injuries and
disabilities are permanent; their earning capacity has been
greatly reduced; their enjoyment of life has been greatly
diminished; and their expected life span has been greatly
shortened.
16. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of
the railroad, the Plaintiffs, because of health problems caused
by this negligence, has [sic] been forced to incur medical
expenses for doctors, hospitals, drugs and health care
services, and they truly believe that they will be forced to
incur additional expenses in the future in an effort to treat
their condition.
17. The Plaintiffs were strong, able-bodied workman [sic]
capable of gainful employment at the time of the mani-
festation of their illness. As a result of their illness, the
Plaintiffs have suffered damages by way of lost wages and a
diminished ability to render services, society, affection,
counseling and support to his household [sic].
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs claims [sic] compensatory
damages in the amount deemed sufficient by the jury with
interest and costs of suit herein.
51
JURY DEMAND
The plaintiff: : . .
herein. P iffs demand a trial by jury on all issues presented
Plaintiffs
By Counsel
/s/ [illegible]
JAMES F. HUMPHREYS
Bank One Center, Suite 1113
707 Virginia Street East
Charleston, WV 25301
(304) 343-4185
Ness, Motley, Loadholt,
Richardson & Poole
By: /s/ [illegible]
JAMES H. RION, Jr.
P.O. Box 1137
Charleston, SC 29402
(803) 577-6747
52
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF KANAWHA COUNTY,
WEST VIRGINIA
FREEMAN AYERS, CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6857
DOYLE JOH? ON, CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-8888
JAMES SPANGLER, CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-7004
RALPH BAILEY, CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-8979
CLIFFORD VANCE, CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-5829
JOHN SHIRLEY, CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-8970
CARL BUTLER, CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6876
Plaintiffs,
v.
NORFOLK AND WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY
a corporation, et al.,
Defendants.
NORFOLK AND WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY'S
MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE CANCER EVIDENCE
NOW COMES the Defendant, Norfolk and Western Rail-
way Company (“defendant” or “N&W”) by counsel, Fred
Adkins and Rodney L. Baker II, and pursuant to Rule 103(c)
and 403 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence and moves
this Court in limine to exclude all evidence referring to cancer
at the trial of the above-referenced civil action. As support for
its Motion, defendant state as follows:
1. That no plaintiff allegedly suffers from any form of
cancer, they merely allege asbestos related disease, or mixed
dust pneumoconiosis;
2. That asbestosis, asbestos related pleural disease, and
mixed dust pneumoconiosis alone do not necessarily result in
an increased risk of cancer;
3. That evidence of Plaintiffs’ “fear of cancer”, or any
mention of cancer is irrelevant,
53
4. That the introduction of cancer evidence would
inflame the jury and invite consideration by the jury of a
terminal illness when there is no evidence whatsoever to
support such a proposition;
5. That extreme prejudice will flow to defendant if
cancer evidence is admitted at the trial of this action; and
6. That all cancer evidence should be excluded from the
trial of the claims of these plaintiffs under Rule 403 of the
West Virginia Rules of Evidence.
In further support of defendant’s position, defendant
hereby incorporates by reference its contemporaneously fled
Memorandum in Support of this Motion /n Limine in the
above-captioned action.
WHEREFORE, for all of the above reasons, defendant
respectfully requests that its Motion /n Limine be granted.
NORFOLK AND WESTERN RAILWAY CO.
By /s/ Rodney Baker, II
Of Counsel
Fred Adkins, Esquire (WVSBNo.: 0076)
Rodney Baker II, Esquife (WVSBNo.: 6859)
HUDDLESTON, BOLEN, BEATTY, PORTER & COPEN
611 Third Avenue
P.O. Box 2185
Huntington, WV 25722-2185
(304) 691-8310
Counsel for Defendant,
Norfolk and Western Railway Company
54
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF KANAWHA COUNTY,
WEST VIRGINIA
FREEMAN AYERS, CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6857
DOYLE JOHNSON, CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-8888
JAMES SPANGLER, CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-7004
RALPH BAILEY, CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-8979
CLIFFORD VANCE, CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-5829
JOHN SHIRLEY, CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-8970
CARL BUTLER, CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6876
Plaintiffs,
V.
NORFOLK AND WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY
a corporation, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT, NORFOLK AND WESTERN RAILWAY
COMPANY ’S, MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE
CANCER EVIDENCE
Norfolk and Western Railway Company, (“defendant” or
“N&W”), by counsel, hereby moves this Court for an Order
excluding evidence of plaintiffs’ alleged asbestos exposure
and the development of cancer, the alleged increased risk of
developing cancer, the fear of cancer, or any other mention of
the alleged relationship between asbestos exposure and
cancer. The grounds for this Motion include: (1) the claims of
plaintiffs’ are predicated upon an allegation of asbestosis,
asbestos related pleural disease, or mixed dust pneumo-
coniosis; (2) no plaintiff alleges that he now has cancer; (3)
evidence concerning cancer is irrelevant to the issues of this
case; and (4) the admission of evidence regarding cancer
would result in extreme prejudice to defendant.
55
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs filed with this Court Complaints alleging, inter
alia, that they had suffered a severe injury to their bodies and
respiratory systems as a result of exposure to irritants while in
the employ of Defendant, Norfolk and Western Railway
Company. The Complaints sought to establish causes of
action under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.
§ 51 et..seq. (FELA)' against the Defendant. In the
Complaints, plaintiffs maintain that Defendant violated
various duties allegedly owed to them by failing, among other
things, to provide them with a reasonably safe place within
which to work. See, Complaints. As a result of these alleged
breaches of duty, the plaintiffs maintain that they were
exposed to hazardous substances which caused severe and
permanent injury to their persons. See Complaints.
ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs’ do not present an “actionable injury” which
would allow the introduction of cancer evidence. As such, the
evidence is irrelevant to the instant action. Moreover, the
evidence should not be admitted on the issue of liability
because the extreme prejudice which would flow to the
defendants is substantially outweighed by its probative value.
' Under FELA, a railroad has a duty to provide its employees with a
reasonably safe place to work. This duty, however, is not absolute and a
railroad is not deemed an insurer of its employees’ safety. Inman v.
Baltimore and O.R. Co., 361 U.S. 138 (1960); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.
v. Craven, 185 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1950), cert. denied 340 U.S. 952. A
railroad’s duty to warn is limited to those perils which may be reasonably
anticipated. A railroad is held to the standard of care of a reasonably
prudent person. Fowler v. Gulf, if and 0. R Co., 286 S.W.2d 404
(Mo.App. 1956).
56
AVE AN
A. EVIDENCE THAT PLAINTIFFS MAY H
INCREASED RISK OF CONTRACTING CANCER
SHOULD BE EXCLUDED.
Indeed, cancer evidence may be introduced in a non-cancer
case to establish damages in connection with cancer which
will probably develop in the future. Jackson v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314, 1321 (Sth Cir. 1985)
(Jackson Il). However, as the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
has held, the damages of which the cancer evidence would be
probative must be available to the plaintiff as a matter of law.
Id. The Jackson Court expounded:
Whether these damages are available in the instant case
may depend on the nature of the actionable injury. If the
actionable injury here was the exposure to asbestos, as
Jackson insists, he may be entitled to recover damages
for those future consequences, such as the manifestation
of cancer, that could be established in terms of rea-
sonable probabilities and for the mental suffering that is
the direct consequence of the increased risk of cancer
caused by the asbestos exposure. If, on the other hand,
exposure to asbestos is regarded as too abstract an
invasion, either as a general rule or in the context of
latent disease, mass tort litigation, and instead Jackson s
asbestosis itself is considered to be the only actionable
harm, Jackson may have no right to recover these
damages since asbestosis alone does not result in an
increased risk of cancer.
Id. at 1322. Simply stated, as the Jackson Court recognized,
the question turns on a matter of probabilities.
Unlike some states’ definition, a plaintiff's “actionable
injury” in a FELA action is that injury which is manifest. See
45 U.S.C. § 51. Section 51 provides, in part, that “every
; common carrier by railroad . . . shall be liable in damages to
any person suffering injury while he is employed by such
57
carrier . . . for such injury . . . resulting in whole or in part
from the negligence of any . . . such carrier. . . .” (emphasis
added). Moreover, for statute of limitations purposes in a
FELA action, “the afflicted employee can be held to be
‘injured’ only when the accumulated effects of the deleterious
substance manifest themselves. . . .” Urie v. Thompson, 337
U.S. 163, 170 (1949)(citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Recall, Plaintiffs allege asbestosis, asbestos related pleural
disease, or mixed dust pneumoconiosis. The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals has held, as a matter of federal law, that a
FELA action for an asbestos-related injury does not exist
before manifestation of an injury. Schweitzer v. Consolidated
Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936, 942 (3rd Cir. 1985), cert. denied
__ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 183. The court explained:
If mere exposure to asbestos were sufficient to give rise
to a FELA cause of action, countless seemingly healthy
railroad workers, workers who might never manifest
injury, would have tort claims cognizable in Federal
court. /t is obvious that proof of damages in such cases
would be highly speculative, likely resulting in windfalls
for those who never take ill and insufficient compen-
sation for those who do. Requiring manifest injury as a
necessary element of an asbestos. related tort action
avoids these problems and best serves the underlying
purpose of tort law: the compensation of victims who
have suffered.
Id. (emphasis added).
As the Schweitzer Court recognizes, sound public policy
dictates that a plaintiffs injury must be defined in concrete
‘terms. To allow a plaintiff recovery for cancer-related dam-
ages prematurely, would result in over-compensation if a
plaintiff never contracts cancer. To like effect, if a plaintiff
later develops cancer, the compensation paid earlier may well
be inadequate. In other words, limiting the type of damages
58
which a plaintiff may recover in a FELA asbestos action
ensures that adequate and just compensation is available
for all railroad workers. who allegedly have asbestos-
related injuries.
Under the FELA, mere exposure to asbestos is clearly not
an actionable injury. Instead, a plaintiff has an actionable
injury when he can present an apparent physical injury. In the
present case, plaintiffs’ only allegation of an asbestos-related
physical injury is that they have asbestosis, asbestos related
pleural disease and\or mixed dust pneumoconiosis. Plaintiffs
can offer no evidence that their alleged conditions will likely
result in a cancerous condition, and any evidence of an
increased risk of cancer is inherently speculative in nature.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs have no right to recover damages for
cancer which may develop in the future or for mental anguish
based on an increased risk of cancer. Because Plaintiffs
cannot recover the damages of which the cancer evidence
would be probative, the cancer evidence itself is irrelevant
and thus, should be excluded.
Asbestosis and cancer are distinct diseases. The only
relationship between the two is that both can be precipitated
by exposure to asbestos. Evidence of an increased risk of
cancer is, thus, surmise. The law is well-settled that future
damages are recoverable only if there is a reasonable cer-
tainty that future damages will result. Shelton v. Thompson,
148 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1945). To introduce evidence of the
relationship between asbestos exposure and cancer, a plaintiff
must, therefore, show to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty that a plaintiff has cancer or will contract cancer as a
result of his exposure to asbestos. /d.
Other West Virginia Circuit Courts have excluded similar
evidence because of its speculative nature. For instance, as
the Honorable Robert A. Burnside of the Raleigh County
‘Circuit Court held, “I think your motion [in limine to exclude
evidence of Plaintiff's increased risk of cancer] is granted. Its
59
ee Now I don’t know if the doctor’s said there’s a
ti sateen hap the greater chance Statistically, then we
problem. Fortunately or unfortunately, however
oy look at it, that isn’t before us. Apparently, all we're going
ren is two doctors saying there is a statistical link
- a this thing and cancer somewhere in the future.” 7r.
= ay Harvey v. CSX 7 ransportation, Inc., Civil Action
0. | -1224-B (Raieigh Co. Cir. Ct. W.Va. 1995), relevant
Portions attached hereto as Exhibit A. Simply stated, as the
circuit court recognizes, an action for an increased risk of
——T cancer is a “speculative claim to a future injury.”
. at 21. What is absent here is a present injury or evidence
of a metabolic or a somatic change that, aside from statistics,
can be seen physically to be
condition.” /d. at 98. : RTT ee ee
B. EVIDENCE OF PLAINTIFFS’
FEAR
SHOULD BE EXCLUDED. eo
Defendants anticipate that plaintiffs will assert
entitled to introduce evidence of their fear fomman
— In actuality, plaintiffs seek compensation for a wholly
~ a In this case, there is no evidence that plaintiffs
ate suffered any physical harm from alleged mental anguish
d on fear of contracting cancer in the future. There is
nothing in the plaintiffs’ depositions, any of the medical
a or plaintiffs’ witness lists to indicate that plaintiffs
ve suffered physica! harm from their alleged mental
anguish based on fear of contracting cancer
Deposition Transcript of F. Ayers a 113, pobre ld
as Exhibit B, D. Johnson at Pgs. 69-70, attached hereto as
one C, J. Spangler at Pgs. 153-154, attached hereto as
hibit D, R. Bailey at Pg. 70, attached hereto as Exhibit E
C. Vance at Pgs. 75-76, attached hereto as Exhibit F. J.
2
As reflected by Mr. Vance’s deposition testimony, he mistakenly
believes that he has asbestos induced cancer. However, nothing in his
60
hirley at Pgs. 102-109, attached hereto as Exhibit G’,
3 Butler at i 107-108, attached hereto as Exhibit H. No
plaintiff has sought medical or psychological treatment for an
alleged fear of cancer. The threat of future harm, not yet
realized, is not enough to support the introduction of fear
of cancer evidence. Consequently, the evidence should be
excluded.
A recent Second Circuit Opinion delineates the circum-
stances under which a fear of cancer-claim is viable. The
plaintiff in Marchica v. Long Island Railroad Co., 31 F.3d
1197, 1202 (2nd Cir. 1994), unlike the plaintiffs in the case at
bar, alleged a claim for negligent infliction of emotional
distress. Accordingly, the court applied the “zone of danger
test as delineated in Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, Pee
U.S. . 114 S.Ct. 2396 (1994).* As the Marchica Court
i | records supports his erroneous belief. Mr. Vance admitted at page
7 ett deposition that no doctor has ever diagnosed him om
Irrespective of his belief, Mr. Vance offered ‘no testimony that he 4
experienced any form of physical manifestation of an alleged fear 0
cancer. Similarly, Mr. Vance has not sought treatment or counseling for
his alleged fear of cancer. osiniteel
> Mr. Shirle fesses to have a fear of cancer despite having no
ntamutten Gad Coatan etgume can'ee eaatally tahnad to eanans. 02.
Shirley admits that he is a worry wart, that he has never thrown up as a
result of his alleged “fear of cancer”, and that he has never sought
treatment or counseling for his “alleged fear of cancer”.
* In Gottshall, the Court adopted a very narrow view of claims for
negligent infliction of emotional distress holding that this cause of action
did not encompass claims for workplace related stress and harassment. 1d
at 2409. Imposing a duty to avoid a stressful work environment wou
“make railroads the insurers of the emotional well being and mental health
of their employees.” /d. at 2409. Unwilling to take this radical step, the
Court stated with clarity that FELA is “not an insurance statute. Id. The
Gottshall court adopted the common law “zone of danger” test delimiting
the proper scope of an employer’s duty under FELA for claims of
negligent infliction of emotional distress. Those claims, the court stated,
are reserved to those cases where severe emotional distress occurs as a
61
explained, in fear-of-developing-disease cases “the exposure
requirement—plus actual likelihood of developing the
disease—. . . is a means of ensuring the genuineness of the
claim.” Marchica, 31 F.3d at 1205. In other words, “mental
anxiety is not considered reasonable unless there is, at the
very least, some evidence substantiating both actual exposure
to the disease-causing agent . . . and a likelihood of
contracting the disease as a result. Doner v. Adams
Contracting Inc., 617 N.Y.S. 2d 565, 566 (A.D. 3 Dep’t
1994). The plaintiff in Marchica sustained a puncture wound
from a discarded hypodermic needle. The court found that
because the plaintiff suffered a physical impact he was
entitled to receive compensation for his emotional injuries.
Moreover, the court noted that the plaintiff, unlike the current
plaintiffs, had physical manifestations of his emotional
distress such as post traumatic stress disorder, accompanied
by sleeplessness, weight loss, and vomiting which was indicia
of the genuiness of his emotional distress claim.
result of an impact or threat of physical impact where the plaintiff was
within the “zone of danger.” As the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia emphasized, the emotional injuries presented by a
FELA plaintiff must be “serious and verifiable.” McMillan v. National
R.R. Passenger Corp., 648 A.2d 428, 433 (D.C. App. 1994).
The “zone of danger” test further limits recovery for emotional injury
to “those plaintiffs who sustain a physical impact as a result of a
defendant's conduct, or who are placed in immediate risk of physical
harm by that conduct.” Gottshall, 114 S.Ct. at 2406 (emphasis added).
Physical impact under the “zone of danger” test announced in Gottshall
contemplates an impact relating to the resulting emotional distress.
Accord Bloom v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 41 F.3d 911 (3rd Cir. 1994)
(holding that engineer did not sustain a physical impact when the
locomotive engine struck a pedestrian); Grube v. Pacifre R. Co., 886 P.2d
845, 852 (Kan.1994)(holding that engineer did not sustain a physical
impact when he was thrown against the console of the locomotive
engine). Where a plaintiff can not [sic] demonstrate that he suffered a
physical impact, he must show that the threat of physical impact is more
than “minimal or negligible.” McMillan, 648 A.2d at 434.
62
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recent [sic] held that
a railroad worker may recover for his fear of contracting an
asbestos-related disease based solely on his exposure to
asbestos where the worker had contracted an asbestos-related
disease or exhibited any symptoms of an asbestos related
disease. Buckley v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad, No.
95-7399, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 6096 (2nd Cir. 1996). On
appeal, the United States Supreme Court of Appeals reversed
the Second Circuit’s decision finding that the ‘physical
impact” required for recovery of damages for negligent
infliction of emotional distress did not include “a contact that
amounts to no more than an exposure—an exposure, such as
that before us, to a substance that poses some future risk of
disease and which contact causes emotional distress only
because the worker learns that he may become ill after a
substantial period of time.” Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co.
v. Buckley 117 S.Ct 2113, 2118 (1997). Relying on the
Supreme Court’s decision in Buckley, the Superior Court of
Chatham County, Georgia, held that a plaintiff may not
recover for emotional distress arising from fear of cancer
until plaintiff begins to manifest symptoms of cancer. See
Order attached hereto as Exhibit /. Plaintiffs in the case at bar
can nc? offer objective proof to establish that they suffered an
emotional injury. To the contrary, as previously noted,
plaintiffs do not exhibit physical manifestations of an alleged
fear of contrac ung cancer.
Unquestionably, the “zone of danger” standard does not
allow recovery for all alleged emotional distress and as such
plaintiffs should be precluded in the instant matter from
introducing any cancer evidence.
63
C. CANCER EVIDENCE SHOULD NOT BE
ADMITTED ON THE ISSUE OF THE RAIL-
ROAD’S LIABILITY BECAUSE THE PROBATIVE
VALUE OF THE EVIDENCE IS SUBSTAN.
TIALLY OUTWEIGHED BY ITS PREJUDICIAL
EFFECT.
As previously noted, plaintiffs have no right under FELA
to recover future damages for cancer or damages for mental
anguish based on an increased risk of cancer. The cancer
evidence, therefore, is irrelevant and inadmissible under Rule
402. If this Court finds, however, that the cancer evidence is
admissible on the issue of the Railroad’s liability, the
evidence should be excluded under Rule 403 of the West
Virginia Rules of Evidence.
As the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
directed in Voelker v. The Frederick Business Properties
Company, 465 S.E.2d 246 (W.Va. 1995), West Virginia
Rules of Evidence 401, 402,° and 403 “are to be read together
and are not to be applied in isolation.” Rule 403 provides that
- “[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by consideration of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” The term
“unfair prejudice”, as used in Rule 403, means “an undue
tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly
- + » €@n emotional one.” W.V.R.E. 403 advisory committee’s
note. Of course, the mere fact that evidence is prejudicial
* Rule 402 states that “All relevant evidence is admissible, except as
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by the
Constitution of West Virginia, by these rules, or other rules adopted by
the Supreme Court of Appeals.” Rule 401 defines relevant evidence as
“evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.” __
64
does not, by itself, require its exclusion. Rather, the court
must determine whether the prejudice is substantially
outweighed by the probative value of the evidence. In making
this determination, the court should consider the probable
effectiveness of a iimiting instruction. See W.V.R.E. 403
advisory committee’s note.
The rules of relevancy, 401, 402, and 403, dictate against
the admission of cancer evidence in the instant case for
several reasons. First, plaintiffs do not have cancer. Thus, the
evidence should be excluded because it is irrelevant. Further,
a limiting instruction on the proper consideration of the
cancer evidence will be ineffective because the mention of
“cancer” evokes a strong response in all of us. In other words,
the jury will consider the cancer evidence in ascertaining
plaintiffs’ damages and compensate them for injuries they do
not have and more likely than not will never incur. The jury
should not deliberate on a possibility that has no medical
basis. Clearly, a mere possibility does not meet the reasonable
degree of medical certainty standard.
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons and for such
other reasons as may appear to this Court, Defendant
respectfully requests that its Motion Jn Limine To Exclude
Cancer Evidence be granted.
NORFOLK AND WESTERN RAILWAY CO.
By /s/ Rodney Baker, II
Of Counsel
65
Fred Adkins, Esquire (WVSBNO.: 0076)
Rodney Baker II, Esquire (WVSBNo.: 6859)
HUDDLESTON, BOLEN, BEATTY, PORTER & COPEN
611 Third Avenue
P.O. Box 2185
Huntington, WV 25722-2185
(304) 691-8310
Counsel for Defendant,
Norfolk and Western Railway Company
66
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF KANAWHA COUNTY,
WEST VIRGINIA
FREEMAN AYERS,
DOYLE JOHNSON,
JAMES SPANGLER,
CLIFFORD VANCE,
JOHN SHIRLEY,
CARL BUTLER,
Plaintiffs,
vs. Civil Action No. 93-C-6857
92-C-8979
93-C-6876 |
92-C-8970
93-C-7004
92-C-5829
NORFOLK AND WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY
a corporation,
Defendant.
TRIAL TRANSCRIPT
April 14, 1998
* *+ * *
[155] want to—
MR. RION: We oppose it.
THE COURT: Oppose it, okay. Well, let's go ahead and
talk about this in order, then. Why don’t you just summarize
this issue of other cases and settlements?
My inclination is to believe, based on what my research
has been, is that that’s largely a question of discretion.
My habit in the past has been to be completely silent with
respect to those -issues of settlement unless there’s an
agreement between counsel to the contrary.
67
MR. BOITER: Essentially, there are several cases, the
Gauldin case, which is a Supreme Court case out of Kansas.
It’s a Kansas Supreme Court case, it’s not a federal case and
FELA is federal law.
A St. Louis, Southwestern Railroad case is out of the
District Court, Kansas, and in the United States District Court
out of Kentucky.
All of those cases are saying the same thing, which is if
FELA makes no provision for the reduction of damages
recoverable by an employee against the railroad. And whai ii
says is the railroad can go out, if they [156] think someone
else was a contributing factor, they can go out and sue them
all day long, but the damages for a Plaintiff, when they sue
the railroad, is not recoverable; and it sort of comes off the
Rogers case where it says that the railroad is responsible if
their negligence contributes to the injury in whole or in part,
they [sic] responsible for the entire injury. And because it’s a
creature of federal law the federal law and the federal courts
have ruled there is no provision in FELA for the reduction of
damages, or whoever is going to go out and sue the ather
person, so it had no relevance to these proceedings.
MR. BAKER: Your Honor, I think this goes back to what
we started on yesterday, the misinterpretation—the deliberate
misinterpretation of the Rogers case. The Rogers case stands
for the proposition that a FELA plaintiff's burden to get his
case before the jury is to show negligence, however slight, on
the part of the railroad.
It does not speak to damages, who is responsible for
payment of the damages.
I have a United States District Court case decided of
January 24, 1997. It’s Barrow Smith versus [157] New Jersey
Transit Rail Operations that discusses a portion of damages
in FELA cases.
68
It says the railroad’s only responsible for the—I’m sorry,
this case may not particularly say the railroad’s only
responsible for the portion of damages it caused. Dell versus
Baltimore and Lionel Railroad Company, a Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania case decided January 24, 1989; in that case it
says that the railroad is only responsible for the damages
it causes.
If the jury in these cases finds that the Plaintiff's alleged
injury breathing impairment is 90 percent caused by
Plaintiff's smoking, 50 percent caused by Plaintiff's smoking,
40 percent caused by the manufacturer or any other parties
the Plaintiff has sued, and 10 percent caused by the railroad,
the railroad is only liable for that 10 percent.
Now, I would be happy to let you look at copies of either
the Barrow Smith or Dell versus Baltimore, an Ohio case. |
will get you copies of those if you would like.
THE COURT: How do you—how do you propose to
allocate fault in this case between N&W and the
manufacturers?
[158] MR. BAKER: Well, Your Honor, I think the jury’s
entitled to know, via introduction of the—possible intro-
duction of the Complaints filed against the manufacturers,
that each of these Plaintiffs has made claims against other
parties for the exact same injury they’re claiming in this one.
THE COURT: Now, wait a minute. You’re not saying that
you’re going to ask the jury to apportion fault or that you’re
going to put any evidence in in support of that proposition. So
it’s a red herring, isn’t it?
MR. BAKER: No, Your Honor. We will ask the jury to
apportion fault.
THE COURT: Based on what, that was my question?
MR. BAKER: Well, Your Honor, one, it’s going to be all
the Plaintiffs except one in these cases smoked cigarettes.
69
THE COURT: It doesn’t ha
eoant “ ve anything to do with
MR. BAKER: Okay. But as far as apportioning fault
regarding the settlements, unless you let the jury know that
these Plaintiffs have made claims [159] against other parties
for the exact injuries they’re claiming now, not the amounts
of the settlements. If you wish to set off the settlements and
never advise the jury that there has been settlements against
the other Parties that is in your discretion, but the fact—I
think the jury is given—the jury has to be informed in some
way that there has been other cases filed and—
THE COURT: In aide of what?
MR. BAKER: In ai :
i | aide of their apportionment of damages
THE COURT: Well, wait a minute. The only thing that |
understood you said you were going to have them apportion
is ‘the Plaintiffs relative fault. Are you going to put on
evidence about Pittsburgh Corning?
MR. BAKER: I’m not going to put
Pj h Corning — g put on evidence that
THE COURT: Well, what are the i i
. I, Y going to rtion
with? What are they going to use to proportion? eas
MR. BAKER: | think we will put on evidence that the
manufacturers were, in general terms, I can’t speak to the
specifics of this, you know, it will depend on how the
evidence comes in at trial, but there may [160] well be
evidence that the manufacturers knew more than they have
told and, therefore, the railroad’s conduct was permissible
given the knowledge that it had.
THE COURT: Well, you can’t just say we can’t give this
jury a verdict that says N&W Plaintiffs and
aad manufacturers,
70
MR. BAKER: My view—and there will be other factors,
Your Honor.
MR. ADKINS: Judge, I just—
THE COURT: You've got to tell me exactly what evidence
you're going to put on that we could entrust this jury with to
allocate relative fault between Norfolk and Western and the
manufacturers, now.
MR. ADKINS: I think we’re confusing two things here.
First of all, I think you are right. If we are going to try to say,
from a fault standpoint, that we need evidence, and I think we
will have evidence, some evidence at least, of manufactur-
ers in generally, not specifically evidence, as to what the
manufacturers know or what they should’ve done, et cetera,
“et cetera.
The second issue, though, is the apportionment of the
damages. Certainly, if the doctors testify, and [161] they will
in this case, that Dr. Gaziano, Dr. Renn, all of them, there’s
no dispute on this, that cigarette smoking causes problems,
there’s no dispute that many of these men have problems
related to their cigarette smoking.
Now, what we were proposing in the jury form is that when
you get to the part of apportioning the damage of this that, for
example, using 100 as a number, and the jury would say that
40 of that is railroad and 60 is smoking, we’re only
responsible for 40 percent; and that’s just common sense
and logic.
I mean, certainly the railroad would not be responsible for
injury caused by someone’s fault anymore than it would be
caused by someone shot himself in the hand, you know.
THE COURT: Although—and this is an entirely separate
issue, but unless I’m mistaken you're going to have a witness
that says that the specific Plaintiffs are suffering from
smokers disease—
71
MR. ADKINS: Emphysema.
rh... ae —and the Plaintiffs are going to have
tnesses are going to ‘ i
pe os going to say that they’re suffering from
[162] MR. ADKINS: —and emphysema.
THE COURT: Okay. That’s my point.
MR. ADKINS: Now, | agree, if there’s a di
i Ae ’ . a dispute t
there $ going to be a dispute as to degree, I mean __ sspsaie
THE COURT: That doesn’t have anything to do with—
P MR. ADKINS: I understand, Your Honor. So the appor-
ionment, clearly we re not responsible. I mean, that can’t, |
mean, that can’t be the law and it’s not the law that the
railroad is responsible for someone smoking.
THE COURT: No, correct.
P MR. ADKINS: So if the doctor testifies that all of his
yen a re by smoking, another doctor testifies
that none of it, jury is going to i
if they want to decide part— ea eee
THE COURT: None of this i
question of fault. n anyway relates to this
MR. ADKINS: I agree.
THE COURT: Other cases have shown this.
i" = nay cng Well, you’re right. The only [163] thing I
paemageh et on the other cases and settlement is, I think in
oO Jury understanding and knowing what’s going
on, that, and I understand the Court can make sure that
someone doesn’t recover twice for the same thing, so we’re
entitled to a setoff. But I think in order for the jury to
know that there are other cases pending these same
individuals for the same disease process. ad
72
ime i ; where we
We do this all the time in these cases we have; w
ask them. We did it in the discovery depositions that we -
of these individuals, that they were part of Mon Mass Il or I ,
whatever the number was up there. And that’s all we’re going
to ask them. a
i i —well, in
We are going to ask them if they got—well, '
deposition we did ask them that they—if they got com
pensation and the answer was I don’t remember or I don't
know, or I don’t know how much. But I don’t intend to get
into that part of it. Only to ask them if they have a lawsuit
pending or if it’s been dismissed, why, for the same—
THE COURT: Why?
MR. ADKINS: Why? So the jury understands [164]
what’s going on with these Plaintiffs. It’s part of why you ask
any of these questions, I guess. :
You know, for the jury it’s relative information about what
the Plaintiffs have done. It might be relevant on the statute of
limitations as to why they filed the suit up there.
THE COURT: Why?
MR. ADKINS: Well, because as to when they knew or
should’ve known that they had a disease process. I don’t
know when that case was filed in relation to the statute, so
until we hear their answer we don’t know.
THE COURT: It still doesn’t have anything to do with
whether they made claims against somebody else.
MR. ADKINS: I think all these cases were filed first
down here.
MR. RION: All these cases were filed first down here.
MR. ADKINS: Well, whatever, but the point is I ought to
be able to inquire about it is all I’m saying, Judge. I don’t
know what their answers are.
73
THE COURT: I’m going to grant the [165] Plaintiffs
motion. I think it’s complete rhetoric.
How about this issue of come back for cancer?
Let me just—this is a pure seat of pants, but the one case
we've got is the Bethany College case and my understanding
from it would be that if an additional disease manifests itself
after there’s been a recovery by settlement or verdict that
you're stuck in West Virginia. We’re a one cause of action
State and it’s not been specifically addressed. And the
question is do we—is that something we decided here today?
MR. RION: That's really my point is that it’s not right,
Judge. There’s no clear guidance and it’s not really in a
posture where it can and should be decided, so—J mean, I’d
like from an advocate standpoint, to be able to stand-up say,
this is our last chance. This is all we get.
I’m sure Fred would like to say, oh, they can come back if
they get cancer. In a way he’d like to say that, but on the
other hand you've got the impact passed [sic] this case, and in
some instances the client may not want him to Say it because
he’d be stuck with it and everything.
* ¢ * &
[232] with occupational disease under FELA, later also
brought those type of claims under recovery to the Boiler
Inspection Act in limited circumstances.
THE COURT: I'll read your memoranda. If I need
anything else I’ll let you know.
MR. BAKER: Okay.
MR. RION: On the other things we’ve got here, I think, I
can’t remember if you ruled on the other.
THE COURT: I will. Are there any other issues that the
Plaintiffs want to take up now that we’ve got some time that
are not just related to opening statements?
74
MR. RION: I think our motions in limine cover everything
that we want to cover. I guess that one other point that was
raised in the argument that I don’t think is—that you're not
going to really need to decide, excuse me, until the instruction
phase that I can introduce now, and that’s simply that we
disagree with Mr. Adkins’ contention that, Number One, that
smoking is contributory fault in these cases; and, Number
Two, that the Rogers case stands for anything other than the
proposition that the FELA causation [233] standard is does
the railroad’s negligence contribute, however slightly, to the
injury, and I don’t think I need to argue that.
You have the case, Your Honor. If you would just read it I
don’t think there would be any question in your mind
whatever. Once you read it the question—the debate is does it
apply to how much negligence or how much cause; and Mr.
Adkins says it’s how much negligence and I say it’s how
much cause, and Your Honor can read the case and make
that decision.
I think the form jury instruction, pattern jury instruction in
FELA cases says the railroad’s responsible if it’s negligence
contributes, however slightly, to an employee’s injury.
THE COURT: Mr. Boiter, you snagged my copy of
Rogers.
MR. ADKINS: Judge, read Dale versus B&O, which is a
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania case. It’s an asbestos case.
It’s this very issue—it was denied to the U.S. Supreme Court
on this issue. It deals with smoking and the fact that the
railway is not responsible for any disease process other than
what was caused by asbestos related exposure. It’s not a—
[234] THE COURT: Dale?
MR. ADKINS: Dale versus B&O, and | think we have a
copy of it here we can give to you.
MR. BAKER: I'll go make you a copy right now if
you'd like.
75
MR. RION: And I agree with—
THE COURT: Do you know if it’s j
sauna yo w if it’s just attached to
MR. BAKER: I didn’t—we haven’t filed a motion on this.
That’s a f |
ref Poy ba Lenape Smith versus New Jersey Transit
THE COURT: Is it Dale?
roe 4 RION: I agree they Properly represent what Dale
says. I just think it’s an aberration and it is in conflict with the
Rogers case, and there are a number, I believe, Mr. Boiter
you cited a case that says smoking is not contributory fault in
a pneumoconiosis case, didn’t you?
MR. BOITER: The Farmer case.
MR. RION: Yes, and it comes back to the general concept
Judge, I think it’s proper for them to show it, but it’s,
although this is not a Texas case, this issue came up in front
of Judge Parker in the [235] Salino case, is smoking con-
tributory fault in an asbestos case? And his ruling was that it
can be and I agree that it can be under certain circumstances.
Number One, you’ve got to show that smoki
_ Num e, moking caused th
injury in question, and that would apply, rer in a Sein
cancer case most clearly. So, the one point that we have is
smoking doesn’t cause asbestosis.
. Second, you've got to prove that the Plaintiff was careless
in his smoking with regards to asbestos, so you’ve got to
show some level of knowledge of the Plaintiff about the
Synergistic effect, and that was—we can get you Judge
\ Parker’s instruction.
Jane, can you call the office and j
. get Judge Parker’s
instruction on contributory fault of smoking? We think ia és
absence, and I don’t think there’s any here in the absence. of
some kind of proof about the synergistic effect.
76
It’s, you know, in a way some other trial Judges in other
jurisdictions, Judge, you can almost analogize to, if I get in an
automobile wreck—this is the most extreme example, but it
sort of makes a point. If I’m an alcoholic and have a bad liver
and I [236] get in an automobile wreck and have trauma to
my abdomen, the fact that I’m careless in drinking is really
not contributory fault with regard to that accident. Unless I —
was drinking when I was driving.
But if I’m a former alcoholic with a damaged liver who
gets stomach trauma, the fact that I was careless in drinking is
carelessness, but it’s not contributory fault with regard to
an accident.
The same thing concept. Of course, it can go both ways. |
mean, the decisions that I’ve seen in cases I’ve tried have
been all over the board. Judge Watt, for example, permitted it
in lung cancer cases, but not in asbestosis cases.
Other Judges have—there have been some Judges won't
even permit it in a lung cancer case. Then you've got Judge
Parker’s view is a little bit more in the middle of the road. He
permits it, but it has a different—
THE COURT: I ruled on, but it’s been forever since I’ve
done it because we’ve tried damage cases. I can’t remember
how I dealt with it, except that—
MR. ADKINS: I understand that FELA is a [237] little
different, Judge, but I can’t believe that anybody—that the
law would even consider a concept that says that if you can
prove that something, some damage was not caused by a
particular Defendant, that that Defendant is responsible for
that. I mean, if that’s what the law is.
THE COURT: No, no, no. Oh, no, but that may be an on
and off switch.It may be a jury’s responsibility to determine
between competing experts whether the man has asbestosis,
which might be aggravated by the smoking, or smokers
disease.
77
If it’s smokers disease you’re not responsible.
MR. ADKINS: That’s not what they’re arguing, Judge.
They’re sayi if it’ i
I a that only if it’s a smoking disease and
THE COURT: No, I think what they’re arguing is that it’s
not a place for comparative fault if it is a sole proximate
cause. It’s a different story all together.
. pone ADKINS: Okay, if I understand what you’re saying
is, the damage aspect of it, the jury could apportion that. For
example, if—and I don’t [238] kn
but that’s the problem. _ wre how you would do this,
If it’s—say it’s 50/50 and the j |
jury says, you know, it’s
$100.00. Now, as I understand, if the total damage is $100.00,
then we’re only responsible for $50 i i
pene: .00 of it. See, is that what
THF COURT: Well, 50/50 you don’t pay anything.
MR. ADKINS: Well, no, Judge, this is FELA again.
MR. RION: Okay, it’s pure com i i
1 tive. M
be, Judge, that the smoking— mn ae
oe one a me interrupt just a second and see if
can—bo sides can kind of respond
perspective is on this. Wea ce yo
I think it’s going to depend entire!
S goir y on what the docto
about each individual Plaintiff, but let’s take the poet mo
of circumstances. Gaziano Says that he’s got asbestosis and
the—your doctor says he’s got smoker’s disease.
There’s no way, under those circ j
’ umstances, a can
come up with a 50/50 split. That’s allowing i © just
ome . 4.
= — the verdict because they’ve got conflicting
78
[239] Under those circumstances the jury would simply have
to determine which of those two witnesses they want to
believe. So if the person’s condition was caused by asbestos,
then they can recover and there’s no fault attributed to them.
If smoking, on the other hand, they get nothing, period.
MR. ADKINS: But that’s not the way the evidence comes
in. As you know, is it’s going to be combination.
THE COURT: Okay, now—
MR. RION: Most of these cases we’re going to have the
Plaintiff's case will be, not for most, but some of the cases,
the Plaintiff's evidence will be that there is lung impairment
that’s caused in part by smoking and in part by asbestos.
I guess, you know, my point is, Number One, the smoking
doesn’t cause the asbestosis.
THE COURT: Right.
MR. RION: It’s a different injury and I guess, you know, I
think they should be instructed they are not to compensate
him for any injury unless asbestos was a contributing factor to
the injury.
[240] I guess where we differ is | don’t think that under the
Rogers case that the Court can send an instruction that says
what’s 100 percent of his loss for “his lung injury” and then
apportion between cigarettes and asbestos.
Although, that’s exactly what the Dale case is and | think
the Dale case is wrong if you read Rogers, and then the
only way they get a apportionment percentage, in my view,
under the FELA structure is if they prove the Plaintiff was at
fault with regard to his injury. Meaning, with regard to his
asbestos disease.
only way to prove that is that the smoking con-
. a ong the aan } mae and | think Judge Watt may
79
have been right in saying I’m only going to permit it in a lung
cancer case, because that’s where there is a causation.
And second, if he had some conduct with regard to his
asbestos disease from smoking for which he could be held at
fault. So, I think you have to show some knowledge of the
synergism. So, I would say if there’s no knowledge of the
synergism, then they’re not going to get a place on the verdict
form for a percentage.
THE COURT: Synergism doesn’t make any [241] differ-
ence in this case because we don’t have any lung cases.
MR. RION: Unless they can show some connection
between asbestosis and smoking. However, I think they’re
entitled to an instruction that you're not to compensate
somebody for any injury unless it’s caused by asbestos, and
to argue that to the extent these people’s problems are caused
by cigarette smoking they shouldn’t be compensated for that.
And I intend to also say and | think, in fact, I think Fred
would be entitled to argue, and in fact—I can remember in
the Carper case that Al Parnell was permitted to argue this,
although it wasn’t on the verdict form. That of his lung injury
60 percent—of course, 60 percent of his lung problem is due
to smoking, 40 percent’s due to asbestos and whatever you
think his total loss is, if you want to, this is one way of going
about it. You could figure out what his total loss from his
lung problem is and do that apportionment.
I think what I’m more likely to tell them is just don’t
compensate him for his COPD, that we admit he wouldn’t be
as bad off if he hadn’t have smoked and that his—
[242] THE COURT: How can the—I mean, is there going to
be some evidence from some source that the jury’s going to
be able to decide what portion of a person’s disability is
attributable to asbestosis?
80
MR. RION: I don’t think there’s going to be—no doctor's
going to sell a percentage. I mean, I don’t think anybody’s
going to give them any guidance on it. 4
That’s another objection I have to having it on the form.
There’s not going to be anybody who’s willing to say that it’s
20 percent this, 30 percent that.
I think in Mr. Spangler’s case there’s a heavy enough
smoking history that Dr. Rasmussen said he thinks more of
his total pulmonary disability is from smoking disease than
from asbestos. He’s fairly substantially impaired.
I think Dr. Gaziano will probably say he can’t say. It’s
moderately severe and he can’t sort it out. I don't think
there’s going to be any expert testimony by a doctor saying
it’s X percent this, X percent that.
s the disagreement between the parties is more a
P< of ential how do you go about [243] the
notion that the jury’s to compensate these folks for asbestos
disease and not smoking disease. I don’t think there’s really
any disagreement on that.
It’s how do you go about it. I guess the caviat [sic] is I
think if you read the Rogers case, if the jury were to find that
the pulmonary disability is an injury that totally can’t be
separated out at all and that the railroad’s conduct was d
substantial contributing factor—not a substantial contributing
factor. Contributed however slightly under the FELA stand-
ard or statutorily or in whole or in part, is how it reads.
Then in the absence of contributory fault I believe it would be
100 percent.
it 1 inj i *t sort out
If it is an injury that can’t be—that you cant sot
between the asbestos and the smoking and there’s no
contributory fault, it’s 100 percent. I do believe that.
MR. ADKINS: Judge, it’s interesting to me, just since
we're talking about this is that we’re saying the railroads are
81
negligent because they failed to warn about the dangers of
asbestos. There have been warnings on Cigarette packs, |
think, since about 1968, maybe even earlier, that warns
everybody of all the problems.
[244] Now, how can we sit here and say that without
warning on there that anybody that smokes that and has a
disease process from that is not at least contributorily
negligent?
Now, they may not be totally at fault for it because
everything else that’s involved in that, but to say that, you
know, on one hand you’re saying to the railroad you didn’t
put a warning. You didn’t tell these men that exposure to
asbestos would cause lung disease.
Yet, there’s a warning right here with the cigarette in their
hand on the pack saying it could cause emphysema. It can
cause, you know, low birth rate for women, et cetera, et
cetéra, et cetera, and to say that that at least is not negligence
or contributory negligence on their part, I don’t understand
how we can say that.
THE COURT: Well, you could say that if you ultimately
tell the jury that they don’t compensate him for any of the
smoking related injury.
MR. ADKINS: Okay, we’re talking about the same thing.
THE COURT: Well, I’m not sure we are and [245] the
reason is—I mean, the reason why we get—why this is a
confusing issue is because we’ve got different injuries to the
same worker. If we’re talking about somebody that cut a leg
off and a hand off, that’s a lot easier to deal with.
In this particular case, because there’s so much—a doctor
can’t just go down to the cellular level and tell you what
percentage of the lung is damaged from smoking and what
percentage of it is done—damaged from asbestos, but
basically that would probably be the best way to approach it.
82
So it isn’t a question of fault, it’s a question to the extent to
which damage is caused by one or the other.
Now, I just don’t know how we deal with it.
MR. ADKINS: Well, we’ve done this, Judge, in hearing
loss cases, for example. All the time in hearing loss cases you
have hearing loss caused by noise.
You have hearing loss caused by (inaudible), you have
hearing loss caused by any number of things, and the jury
hears that. And then they’re instructed, then, to find, in other
words, again, the employer, the railroad, is only responsible
for the noise induced part [246] of that.
Now, the doctors don’t come in and say it’s, you know, 10
percent (inaudible), it’s 20 percent noise at work it’s 20
percent running a power saw at home. That kind of thing.
The jury hears all the evidence-and based on that they go
out and make a finding as to what, I mean, juries do that all
the time. It’s not—it doesn’t have to be a precise thing for
them in order for them to do it.
It’s the same thing with the smoking or with whatever else
is contributing to, excluding asbestos, is contributing to
the condition that the person has in his lungs. It could
be smoking.
It could be pneumonia. It could be a lot of things. And if
the railroad didn’t cause any of those things all I’m saying is
we’re not responsible to compensate that individual for it.
To the extent that we caused damage to his lungs from
exposure to asbestos, if the jury finds us negligent, we're
responsible. There’s no issue on that. We're not contending
that there is, but that’s the whole, and how you do it is, I
guess, is really what [247] we’re maybe sort of talking about
here, how we handle that with the jury.
83
THE COURT: Yeah, I think that’s probably correct.
MR. RION: Judge, I’ve got to discount
| " one—-sort of one
parting notion here that we took up. It goes back to this
comparative fault issue.
If you take a lung cancer case let’s say the manufacturing
context—or let's say the gentleman quit smoking in 1965, so
there’s no question of comparative fault, and he has a lung
cancer synergistically caused by asbestos and smoking. It’s
not the whole cause, but it’s a substantial contributing factor
It meets the legal standard, whatever that might be. |
I think in those cases fairly clearly because you can’t
apportion out some relative contribution and because there’s
no comparative fault, if my Plaintiff proves his causation he’s
entitled to 100 percent of his damages under the Joint Several
Liability Concept of West Virginia law.
: would say if you read the Rogers case, and I’m going to
as = to just read Rogers and read Dale and I think you'll
see that they’re—I just think [248] they’re inconsistent unless
you've got separate injuries.
But, I mean, so if you’ve got a unified single inj
: gle injury that’s
simply can’t be viewed separately, then if the railroad’s
ae _ ret standard and contributes, we get 100
our loss in the absence of f of i
of contributory fault. ———
Although, again, | mean, the obvious thing is if, you know,
Wr a Cat wreck and hurt my arm and then get in a train
urt ,
ly my leg, the railroad doesn’t have to pay for
MR. ADKINS: And I don’t have to pay for the part of the
arm that was damaged as a result of the first wreck. I’m not
responsible for the aggravation of the preexisting condition
not for the preexisting condition. So under his—under his
84
example there, clearly I’m only responsible for the part of the
arm that I additionally injured.
The preexisting part I’m not responsible for.
THE COURT: Let me look at the cases and Ill tell you
before we get started the first thing in
85
TRIAL TRANSCRIPT
April 15, 1998
Brody Testimony
[71] and Blood Institute, the National Institute of Envir-
onmental Health Sciences, and the National Institute of
Allergy and Infectious Disease also support my work.
Q_ And you’re doing research primarily on what subject?
A My work is to try to understand how inhaled particles,
like asbestos, for example, cause scar tissue in the lung and
cause cancer.
Q___ What is the ultimate goal of that research?
A Well, all of this research that’s funded by the National
Institutes of Health, the goal is to develop an understanding
of the disease so it can be treated. So, hopefully, it can be
blocked, at least, help the individual who’s inflicted with
the disease.
Q Currently, is there an effective treatment for
asbestosis?
A There is not.
Q And—but, you’re one of the scientific researchers
who’s trying to find a cure?
A That’s correct.
Q_ Are you a medical doctor or are you a Ph.D. doctor?
77> *+ *¢ &
[98] gas exchange region of the lung.
Q_ Wait a minute, I’ve got something I want to ask you,
the smaller fibers that can actually get into the lung?
A Right.
Q_ Are they visible to the naked eye?
A_ No, not at all.
Q_ So, the fibers that actually get in your lung and do
a Oe oom om ares ae SY GEE WD Oe
naked eye?
A That’s correct.
Okay.
But i add to this dusty atmosphere, though. If we
get enough small fibers kind of backing up on one another
they can refract light and add to what looks like a dusty
environment, but the individual particles, if you can see them,
they’re not (inaudible), but if it’s asbestos, that means that if
there are particles that you can see, like this (indicating), then
that means there are thousands of them.
Q So, there’ll be evidence later in the trial that a
gentleman named Dr. Meriwether wrote, way back in the
1930's, that if asbestos—let’s just stick with asbestos, that if
asbestos is in a concentration in [99] the air where you can
see dust in the air, then, in his words, the invisible particle
must be in dangerous concentration. Is that still true in
modern science?
A That’s exactly what I’m saying. That’s correct.
Q Because Dr. Meriwether said that in 1938. In your
opinion, based on today’s state of the art science, that would
still be true?
A That is correct.
; ~_ 4 next slide, then, I’m going to show you what
happens when an aerosol of this dust is inhaled. And so, here,
for now, we’re going back to the lung, and you recognize
where we are now because you’re all experts of the
microanatomy of the lung. So, here we are at the end of the
terminal bronchial where it opens into the gas exchange area
and all these little air spaces are, and in the next slide I'm
going to show you this area of the lung right here (indicating)
immediately after that hour of exposure.
So, we’re going to focus in right here (indicating) and now
you can see the fibers. You see here’s a lung (indicating) and
then one’s sticking up like this (indicating). There’s a curly
one right here
87 7
[109] A_ Right, well, this is what we call—or what the
doctor’s call abnormalities of gas diffusion, where a diffusing
capacity becomes compromised, and that means that—it
simply means that you cannot move oxygen and carbon
dioxide as efficiently through an area that has scar tissue in it
as you can under normal conditions.
Q Once the lung becomes compromised, or injured,
from scar tissue .n that area—
A Yes.
Q —is there anyway to reverse that process, once it
becomes sufficiently compromised that you have detectable
abnormalities and gas exchange, clinically, is there anyway to
reverse or cure that process today?
A Not that I know of, no. I mean, the cells that are living
here, actually, you can see them right here (indicating), they
live in this connective tissue space. They keep the lungs with
a very normal balance of connective tissue.
They’re called fibroblast, F-I-B-R-O-B-L-A-S-T. The
fibroblast makes the connective tissue on your skin, or your
liver, or your lungs. It’s the same cell, and it’s—and when it
[110] confronts asbestos it makes scar tissue.
Just how depends on how much asbestos you're getting
into. Now, you remember, the macrophages was supposed to
have been here to clean up this mess, and they try to do that
as contact out on the surface of the lung, and I show you one,
two, three, four, five macrophages and some asbestos coming
down here. They’re sharing asbestos fibers with one another.
So, they’ve come—they’ ve actually—in my laboratory we’ve
discovered the signal thai calls the macrophages into find the
asbestos fibers.
It’s a chemical signal that they use to find the fiber, and
they pick them up and they do clear off large numbers of
them, but in an individual, an animal or a human, that gets too
many fibers, they’re not able to clean them off sufficiently to
prevent disease.
a
88
; _ 89
Okay, I’m going to talk about lung injury and then what indicati ;
happens in people in the next few minutes. a por taper tay and oa at it to know that there
, . S right.
Me ah phan. be pes agp Medhnadhny ~* “om Ph ann — here is that what is in this scar, this pink
; i
ao berg ag 7 page just showed = the —— tissue. That's w Bo ince (indicating), it’s connective
(indicating) DS cr ln -yeyealtery A wthyoondhorr Purple dots are the fibroblasts that make the rer, litle
and if ws , cs ; ve the macrophages. € the connective tissue,
lente ine ere’s the macrophage right here (ind;
ere '
[115] here’s the tube right here (indicating). ak ay ag ( indicating) that nemetunw
out.
Instead of the walls being absolutely normal like this this tissue that ae are also asbestos fibers imbedded in
(indicating) they have the scar tissue, and the scar tissue runs to show you, but we’ve p oe electron mi
. . . , a — ,
all the way down the walls near these ducts (indicating), you We've shows te we ve shown that
can see. It should look like this (indicating), instead it looks ene ttn d t. So, this is just—this is fro
like this (indicating). ur. Now, if you keep it, as I said, o 8 Sage
‘the scar is spread out, and let m °€P exposing, then
Okay, now, at the ends of all of these airways you see these looks like in a person who’s been € show you, then, what it
scars coming out from the asbestos. Now, does this animal— time, so— exposed continuously over
is this animal going to be short of breath? No. Is this animal Q This;
going to come to the clinic? No. If I kept exposing him these 's ts human lung here (indicating)?
scars would eventually extend out into the rest of the lung and ** © «
he would have diffuse interstitial fibrosis asbestosis. [418] Here’s the airspace (j ndicating), H
Q That’s a—this is a good point to ask this question. In _ Wall over here (indicating) 8). Here's the thin normal
this understanding of this area, Dr. Brocy, in a human, how Here’s another aj i ia it
much of the lung has to be damaged by this scarring process wall (indicating), and a , a pare and here’s a thick
before it typically begins to show up on chest x-ray at scar? Now, I can actual! ‘In the rat, what’s in this
the clinic? thi laily make the is of asbestosis ;
clinic 1S person by answering what’s in this tosis in
We ong are Wolf of, Fino te tines pg
an 5-t8y that he was exposed to asbestos He io a
° lungs. tage. ‘ Scar ti
Q So, you may have ten or twenty percent of your lung This ig 9 YOu See this pink material back here (indicanmen
that’s already affected by asbestos and [116] there would be (indicat; Scar tissue. He has asbestos fibers j -
no effect on x-ray? ig). m hove
A That’s correct. You wouldn’t be able to see it. You’d Do you see this right here (indicating)? This is call
; Is ed an
have to actually open the lung and take a section out like this asbestos body. There’s another one right here (indi
indicating).
90
These are all microfibers and fiberglass that made connective
tissue. This person has asbestosis. *
Q Now, can smoking cause fibrosis in the lungs that you
would get confused with asbestosis?
A No, certainly not. What, actually, smoking causes a
very different pattern. Smoking can give you some scars at
the ends of these airways but they don’t become diffuse out
into the lung. In fact, what happens is, the lung tissue actu-
ally breaks down [119] out here in smokers rather than
getting scarred.
Q That’s a different pattern?
A It’s a different pattern, that’s correct. Okay, so, I’ve
made the diagnosis of asbestosis in this person. I have a
one final summary slide that explains just what happened
now. So, here’s a typical medical textbook illustration of
asbestosis.
So, here’s a person that’s been exposed for a long period of
time. Here’s the whole lung, as you can see, and then there’s
this white material infiltrating the lung (indicating). This is
scar tissue, and if I were to take a little piece of this tissue out
and go backwards from the way I just was, you would see it
like this (indicating), and if I went farther back, you would
see the electron micrographs of it so you'd know exactly what
the lung looks like; and this person, then, has the scar tissue
infiltrating the lung, and he has what’s called the stiff lurg.
He also has scarring of the pleura.
Q Medically, the doctors use a different term for this
scarring in the pleura versus this scarring on the inside
the lungs? .
A Right. This scarting on the inside of the lung, if it’s
caused by asbestos, is asbestosis. If [120] you have scarring
out here in the pleura it’s generally called pleural fibrosis, and
if it’s circumscribed and just—actually, you can see it over
here on the surface of the lung (indicating), following the
pattern of the ribs, it’s called pleural plaque.
91
There’s a plaque. It’s a circumscri
8 ribed area of scarring, and
that s what’s shown over here (indicating), and this is Thnsee
diffuse pattern and this is a plaque.
Q Now, we can separate asbestosi
» We Stosis scarring inside th
lung and then diff ~ ining
p> arse ifferent asbestos pleural changes on the lining
A Yeah. You can separate th
| em anatomically, but th
a is the same. I mean, it’s still a result of “a A Aa
ee ts from injury. Okay, and then, finally, this is what the
ung actually looks like in a worker (indicating).
Here’s that scar tissue
ipvmeadh , you see as infiltrating the lun
er — : a pleural thickening right here (indi
’ Is :
cohen individual’s lung would surely cause a lung
Q Let me ask you this, Dr. Brod
, Dr. y, Can—can you have
worker who works around asbestos and breaths 2 atta
dust for, say, ten or fifteen [121]
, Say, years, and th
retire and have a normal chest X-ray? Bitvadid
- Sure, it’s possible.
And he later developed scarrin S Visi
g that’s visible on chest
X-ray, even though he’s retired and doesn’t
showing up when he retires? To
A Right, that’s called i
, progression. That
disease gets worse even after exposure has Pony cei
Q How can that happen that he develops more scarring
even after he’s retired and no longer works around asbest
how can that be? in
A The reason is because th
he re ere are asbestos fibe
sega in this connective tissue plain of the lung “a =
ong as there are asbestos fibers in that plain they will
continue to cause a reaction that can cause the disease itself
It doesn’t happen in everybod i
, certain
4 vith ag 2 “ : inly, but it has been
92
‘ i for the fact
When we say—what’s the medical term
P. somebody can be exposed to asbestos for decades and
yet it may not show up on chest x-ray until ten years after
they retire? :
H That’s called latency, and asbestosis [122] has a—you
have a latency of anywhere from ten to fifty years. It ~—
just depends on how much the person’s been exposed to an
their natural—their idiosyncrasy, their susceptibility.
Q Does that pretty much take care of asbestosis?
A Right.
Q Have you done any research, Dr. Brody, on the
question of how asbestos can cause cancer?
A Yes, I have.
Q Have you done research on whether asbestos
cancer?
ar No. When I started my work that was established, and
as I’ve done here, more interested in the process rather than
hether or not it causes it.
7 Q My understanding, when you came on the picture as a
medical researcher, there was no need to look at —
asbestos caused cancer because everybody understood that’
A That’s correct, but it doesn’t mean all the questions
were answered. I mean, there is epidemiology to do, you have
to know how much, but whether or not it causes it 1s not
my problem. . .
Q And you are looking at the precise
A = That’s correct. ' ’
“? Can—we sort of looked at the mechanism by which
that happens. Dr. Brody, you mentioned when you began
doing this research it was established that asbestos ay ..
fact, cause cancer in humans. Are you familiar = :
human epidemiology on the cancer risk, or persons who have
the disease, asbestosis?
A_ Yes, I’ve seen that literature.
93
Q___Let’s—maybe, we can turn the lights on and—
A This one up here.
Q_ Yes, sir. Dr. Brody, I’m going to write up here
(indicating) the two major forms of cancer caused by asbestos
that we’ve discussed, mesothelioma and lung cancer, and in
the studies you’ve reviewed, Dr. Brody, for people who’ve
been diagnosed with the disease—excuse me, asbestosis,
what is the percentage of deaths attributable to mesothelioma
in the mortality studies?
A Mesothelioma?
Qs Yes, sir.
A __ I’ve seen around ten percent in a couple of different
Studies. So that means that ten percent of [133] the people
who have the disease, asbestosis, have died of mesothelioma.
Q ‘Among asbestosis patients who are smokers, or for-
mer smokers, what is the lung cancer rate, first of all, meso-
thelioma, smoking has nothing to do with the risk, correct?
A That’s right. :
Q_ That’s just asbestos. In a lung cancer it’s a com-
bination of smoking and asbestos?
A That’s correct.
Q_ Fair enough. On—I’ve got a couple of the studies—or
two of the studies, Doctor, that you have reviewed in this
area. Does that include the studies by Mr.—Dr. Coots and
Dr. Berry on mortality of workers diagnosed by a
pneumoconiosis panel?
A I think I’ve seen those.
Q_ Take a look and see if these are two of them.
A _ Right, the Coot study is from 1987 which is relatively
recent in this field, and the other one is from Jeffrey Berry.
Actually, Jeffrey Berry was the person I worked with when I
first went to Wales and the United Kingdom.
That’s where he’s from. He’s published this [134] in the
British Journal of Industrial Medicine in 1981, and I believe
this paper showed a similar kind of percent.
94
Q_Let’s do both of them. On mesothelioma what did Dr.
Coots show?
A About ten percent.
Q Ten percent, and what did Dr. Berry show? .
A I believe it was quite close. I think it was nine, ten
percent. Something like that.
Q Do you got the—? = -
A I’m looking. Yes, well, here he says increased wit
percentage of disability”. He doesn’t name the exact percent
- but he says it’s increased.
Coots actually gives ten percent as a number. ‘
Q Allright, on lung cancer, Coots gives what percent:
A About thirty-nine percent.
MR. ADKINS: Is that with—excuse me, is that with
smoking, Doctor?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
BY MR. RION:
Q In individuals who are smokers, Dr. Brody, who were
not asbestosis patients, do you see [135] anything close to the
forty percent lung cancer rates in smokers who do not have
asbestosis?
A No, I’m sure it’s much less than that.
Q Do we have a figure on what Dr. Berry found for
lung cancer?
A Yes, it was actually the same. I don’t know what
the standard deviations were, but, again, it was about thirty-
ine ent.
ye Q ge percent. That’s a pretty consistent
result, though?
A That’s right.
Q_ Again, > are—the lung cancer risks were dealing
with asbestosis patients who are smokers?
A That’s my understanding.
;
95
Q__ Well, if you combine these two risks, the risk of either
mesothelioma or lung cancer, combined, approaches fifty
percent, although it’s not quite that?
A That’s right.
Q_ That’s not just with anybody exposed to asbestos,
that’s for those who have the disease asbestosis?
A That’s right, meaning they’ve had the [136] high»st
kinds of exposure.
Q__In your opinion, are those who are exposed but do not
have the disease asbestosis also have an increased risk of both
of these diseases?
A_ Well, they do, quite clearly, have an increased risk. It
doesn’t reach these levels but it does—they certainly have an
increased risk.
Q Dr. Brody, when you leave Tulane and travel like this
to testify in Court do you charge for your time?
A Certainly.
Q_ And what’s your hourly rate for this type work?
A Three hundred dollars per hour.
Q_ Have you testified in Court before regarding your
asbestos research?
A Yes, I have.
Q___Do you know how many times?
A Oh, it’s something—maybe a dozen times a year.
Something like that.
Q_ Has that been, on most occasions, at the request of
lawyers who represent victims?
A Most of the time, yes.
Q The first time you ever testified in a
* * *& *&
[147] background, is what we’re talking about. The back-
ground of people who are not occupationally exposed.
Q_ Well, could people that are not occupationally
exposed have more than a million?
96
A __ It’s possible but a million seems to be about the upper
limit that’s been established.
Q Okay, and, how many grams of lung do we have; how
much would a lung weigh?
A Well, lungs weigh about four pounds. There’s four
hundred and fifty four grams in a pound, so about four times
what your—
Q So we'd have probably over a trillion fibers in our
lungs? And if I understand you right on your direct exam-
ination, then, from what Mr. Rion asked you, then, a trillion
fibers if, I guess, of asbestos, then, would fit into a thimble, is
that what you’re saying?
A Easily.
Q And, the people—all of us that are not occupation-
ally exposed to asbestos are normally healthy individuals,
aren’t they?
A [hope so.
Q You’re not saying that everyone occupationally
exposed to asbestos fibers is going to [148] get asbestosis?
A Certainly not.
Q And it’s not gonna make them sick and it’s not going
to make them go to a doctor, necessarily?
A Not necessarily, no.
Q People that are occupationally exposed, it is variable
as to how they’re exposed, some people might be exposed
heavily, some might be exposed by lightly, and sort of even
in the same environment; isn’t that true?
A _ That’s true.
Q And you’re not saying that a single asbestos fiber in
the lungs is going to cause asbestosis, are you?
A Notatall.
Q You cannot testify to a reasonable degree of
medical—scientific certainty that any particular person ex-
posed to asbestos will develop either—any of these cancers or
asbestos that you’ve talked about?
A I cannot say specifically, no.
97
Q Also, in terms of pro
‘ gression, asbestosis does
always progress, does it? not
A That’s correct.
*_* * &
[150] A. Now, you’ve got the ion ri
_A. . question right,
smoking in the first one. Yes. oo genio
Q_ I'msorry.
A In
a.m. — who are exposed to asbestos who smoke,
Q My point is, though, if
‘ » 1f you are a nonsmoker and
you re exposed to asbestos occupational! i
cancer is less than two; isn’t it? —
Ml In — cases—it’s small. I’m not sure, less than two
me say five percent, but certainly it’s signi
rte ter dag y it's significantly less
Q So it would appear here that tha
t confound
problem here is smoking; is that— uae
A The point is that cigarette use
, plus asbestos exposure
— a synergy. That means, you don’t just add to the affect,
affect is multiplied. So, you take the affect of Cigarette use
—_ which causes along a thirty-fold increase, plus
~ — you don’t o Just an increase of that small asbestos
ung, you get this multiplicati i i
pattie plicative effect which takes it
Q_ Right. And that fifty-fold increase i
fact that the person is smoking? ane ty Ge
*_ *+ * «&
98
TRIAL TRANSCRIPT
April 15, 1998
Vance Testimony
* * * *
[169] THEREUPON CAME,
CLIFFORD VANCE
who, having been first duly sworn according to law, testified
follows
B98 DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. BOITER:
Q Good afternoon, Mr. Vance, how are you?
A All right. it
Q Okay. Are you a little nervous about testifying?
A Probably. /
Q Have ad actually ever testified in a Court of Law
before?
A No. ere |
Q Well, I’m going let you—the first thing I’m going to
get you to do, if you don’t mind, is tell the jury youf full
name.
A Clifford Oscar Vance.
Q Are you married, Mr. Vance?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is s your wife’s name?
A Edra.
THE COURT: If you would, please, sir, why don’t you
pull that microphone down just a little bit [170] closer?
THE WITNESS: All righty. I don’t talk too loud anyway.
THE COURT: Can you hear okay, folks? Go ahead.
BY MR. BOITER:
Q How long have the two of you been married?
99
A I believe it’s fifty-six years, this November—coming
November.
Q Is Mrs. Vance actually in court with you today?
A_ No, sir.
Q Is she just physically unable to be here?
A Well, I can’t say she wouldn’t be able to be here, but
it would disturb the way she takes her medication and stuff.
and it would be hard on her.
Q Did the two of you have any children?
A Yes, sir. We have twin boys and a daughter.
QI believe you told me last night it was kind of a
surprise when the two of you had twins?
A _ Yes, sir. My granddaughter’s got twins [171] already.
Q Where do you and your wife live?
A_ We live in between Bluefield and Princeton, in the
Glenwood area.
Q_ And about how long have you-all lived there?
A About three years this past December.
Q_ Where did you live before that?
A We lived down next to (inaudible) address, but we
lived on about six acres.
Q Would you tell the members of the jury how far you
went in school?
I completed the ninth grade.
Where did you actually go to school?
laeger, West Virginia.
Is that where you were born?
Yes, sir.
How old are you, sir?
Seventy-seven this past February.
Were you ever in the military?
No, sir.
Did you ever volunteer for the military and were
turned down? :
A Yes, sir.
[172] Q Why do you think you were turned down?
OPrOPrO>O?>O>
100
i I have a
A Well, they had a lot of things on my report.
valvular heart disease, and some—I don’t know what all they
did have on it, but, anyhow, what it - erngeometin need I
only weighed 110 pounds and was six foot, one inc t
Q Have you ever been diagnosed with a heart problem
since then?
No, sit.
One hundred and ten pounds, and six feet one?
Six feet one, with bright red hair.
Growing up, did you ever smoke?
Yes, sir.
When did you stop smoking?
I would say in the middle of the late *30s.
You stopped smoking in °85 and haven't smoked
, right?
Yes, sir.
Did you ever try to quit prior to 1985?
Yes, sir. it
You just weren’t successful until ’85?
That’s correct.
[173] Q Tell the jury when it was that you first started
working for Norfolk and Western Railroad. .
A I started to work for Norfolk and Western Railroad on
the 4th day of November, 1942. .
Q What was the date when you graduated from high
school?
A I didn’t graduate.
Q Well, ninth grade, I’m sorry.
A Around, I'd say °35.
Q What did you do between ’35 and °42 when you went
to work for the railroad?
A I drove a coal truck a little bit. House coal, back then,
was very popular, a two ton of coal. So, I drove a small dump
truck and just worked in a grocery store or whatever I could
find just to make an honest living.
>POPOP>RBO>FOPO>O>
101
Q Just sort of odd job type stuff during that period
of time? 7
A Yes, just whatever somebody wanted.
Q_ Were there any jobs in that period of time that you
believe you worked where you would’ve been exposed
to asbestos?
A No.
Q_ So you started to work at the railroad [174] in °42;
how long did you work for them, when did you retire?
A I retired—I had, actually, almost thirty-three years,
and I retired April 3, in 81. I was cut off in the 70s.
Q_ So you think you worked from °42 to ’81 but you
were cut off for about seven years in between?
A Yes.
Q’ When you went to work at the railroad in 1942, what
shop facility did you start working in?
A I started in the pump house. They would pump water
up to the tank, and mixing the chemicals to treat it, and that’s
about all I did for the first couple of months.
Q That probably wasn’t a real good question. Let me ask
it to you this way, what railroad yard did you actually start
working in?
A _laeger.
Q Okay. So you went to work in laeger in the pump
house?
A Yes, sir.
Q How long did you actually work in the pump house
when you started at laeger?
A Oh, a couple of months.
(175) Q What was the mixing of the chemicals that you
were doing actually for, what were you actually doing?
A They had chemicals that was to treat the water and
keep it from foaming so bad, and keep down corrosion, and I
can’t tell you what all that they were. But they had a big old
tub with a peddle in it and you added so much of this, that
102
and the other, to get your mixture just right so it could be
pumped in with the water.
Q_ While you were on the job at the pump house for
those two weeks, do you know or do you believe you were
exposed to any asbestos products?
A I don’t think so. Not that I know of.
Q_ After you left the pump house, where did you go
from there?
A __I went over to the shop, which is all the same place,
but just went across the tracks.
Q Is that still at laeger?
A Yes, sir.
Q_ Was it in the roundhouse, was there more than one
shop or was it just a roundhouse, or what?
A What we call a running track which inspected the
engines, and we had what you call the dead [176] track of two
tracks in the roundhouse, and my job at that time was to clean
up the roundhouse. If they had to remove a jacket on the
steam engine or something then they’d have asbestos to clean
up; brake shoes and whatever.
Q_ Were they parallel lines that just run up to a long
straight building; is that how it worked?
A __ It was more or less a roundhouse with a machine shop
in part of it, and it just—it just held one steam engine. It was
built for one steam engine on two tracks.
One on each track?
Yeah, one on each track.
About how far apart were the two tracks?
Possibly twenty or twenty-five feet, something like
of >o>re
You said one was a running track and one was a dead
track. Explain to the jury what the difference is between a
running track and a dead track. .
A A running track is where we service the steam engines
from each stage of work, and it would be inspected and the
brake shoes, and see that there’s nothing seriously wrong with
103
them—if they was able to make another tri
er trip. And the dead
a where we [177] knocked the fire out of the engines
he y came in to do a monthly inspection, or something
happened that you had to wash them out.
They had to be washed out once a month and checked out
real . good, the boilers and leaks repaired—minor leaks
repaired, Just minor problems. In the shop where I worked
we didn t do any heavy work. Usually the minor leaks was
repaired. Just minor problems was repaired there, usually in
one day. Sometimes we’d run into two days. ) ”
Pa. | During the period of time when you were a laborer in
~ seg what was a typical day like; can you describe
. + ,ury sort of what you’d do during the course of a day?
. I used to—after I came to the first shift, I usually went
out and serviced the Passengers and coaches. We had a
Passenger train up until 49. Cleaned them out inside, just the
ery cleaned them out, did what | could for about an hour.
ced them up, the coolers. At that time you used ice in the
coolers, you di
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