Joint Appendix Vol I — Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Ayers

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No. 01-963 Rox:

IN THE

Supreme Court of the

NORFOLK & WESTERN RAILWAY

V.

FREEMAN AYERS, ef al.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the Circuit Court of

Kanawha County, West Virginia

JOINT APPENDIX

Volume One

CARTER G. PHILLIPS* JAMES A. MCKOWEN*

STEPHEN B. KINNAIRD JAMES F. HUMPHREYS &

MICHAEL L. POST ASSOCIATES, L.C.

COURTNEY J. EDMONDS Bank One Center

KATHRYN R. HAUN Suite 1113

ERIC A. SHUMSKY 707 Virginia Street, East

SIDLEY AUSTIN BROWN & Charleston, W.V. 25301

WOOD LLP Counsel for Respondents

1501 K Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 736-8000

FRED ADKINS

RODNEY L. BAKER, II

HUDDLESTON, BOLEN, BEATTY,

PORTER & COPEN, LLP

611 Third Avenue

P.O. Box 2185

Huntington, W.V. 25722-2185

(304) 529-6181

LAURA D. HUNT

NORFOLK SOUTHERN

CORPORATION

Three Commercial Place

Norfolk, VA 23510-9242 * Counsel of Record

(757) 664-5022

Counsel for Petitioner June 17, 2002

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED JANUARY 2, 2002

CERTIORARI GRANTED APRIL 1, 2002

. Py 5

4 ‘

>

c

Sp eae | TABLE OF CONTENTS

SAG , VOLUME ONE

Kanawha County Circuit Court, West Virginia,

ERE ER l

Complaint, Vace v. Consolidated Rail Corp., Civil

Action No. 92-C-7820 (Kanawha County Cir. Ct. filed

ee allt ae Si A cE a 4

Complaint, Ayers v. CSX Transp., Inc., Civil Action

No. 93-C-6857; Butler v. CSX Transp., Inc., Civil

Action No. 93-C-6876; Spangler v. CSX Transp., Inc.,

Civil Action No. 93-C-7004 (Kanawha County Cir. Ct.

I a iatins 41

Norfolk And Western Railway Company’s Motion /n

Limine To Exclude Cancer Evidence, Ayers v. Norfolk

& W. Ry., Civil Action Nos. 93-C-6857 et al.

(Kanawha County Cir. Ct. filed Apr. 10, 1998)............. 52

Trial Transcripts, Ayers v. Norfolk & W. Ry., Civil

Action Nos. 93-C-6857 et al. (Kanawha County Cir.

Ct.)

Trial Tr. at 155-65, 232-48 (Apr. 14, 1998)............. 66

Trial Tr. at 71, 98-99, 109-10, 115-16, 118-22,

132-36, 147-48, 150 (Apr. 15, 1998) (Brody

italia lan caai lille aeeaatekdcanineniaiapiaets 85

Trial Tr. at 169-214 (Apr. 15, 1998) (Vance Test.).. 98

Trial Tr. at 4-21 (Apr. 16, 1998)... 126

Trial Tr. at 25-194 (Apr. 16, 1998) (Gaziano Test.). 138

“The complaints of Respondents Johnson (Civil Action No. 92-C-

8888) and Shirley (Civil Action No. 92-C-8970) are substantially similar

to the complaints of Respondents Ayers, Butler, Spangler and Vance, and

therefore are not reproduced in this Joint Appendix in order to avoid

Log > oa ge

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued’

Page

Trial Tr. at 194-221 (Apr. 16, 1998) (Butler Test.)- 245

Trial Tr. (Apr. 17, 1998) (Ayers Test.) ................... 263

Trial Tr. (Apr. 17, 1998) (Shirley Test.) .................. 278

Trial Tr. (Apr. 17, 1998) (Johnson Test.)................. 300

Trial Tr. at 29-77 (Apr. 20, 1998) (Spangler Test.).. 333

Trial Tr. at 31-60 (Apr. 21, 1998) (Weir Test.)........ 365

Trial Tr. at 30-48 (Apr. 22, 1998) (Weir Test.)........ 383

Trial Tr. at 89-190 (Apr. 22, 1998) (Renn Test.)...... 395

Trial Tr. at 4-116 (Apr. 24, 1998) (Renn Test.)........ 455

VOLUME TWO

SPOTINE STINE 8 ovievnssspsscensssciesebincceuanaeiannne 525

Norfolk And Western Railway Company’s Memoran-

dum Regarding Causation and Apportionment, Ayers

v. Norfolk & W. Ry., Civil Action Nos. 93-C-6857 et

al. (Kanawha County Cir. Ct. filed Apr. 23, 1998) ........ 526

Norfolk and Western Railway Company’s Proposed

Jury Instructions (ExCerpts) ................:cccccccessssecererreseeees 539

Norfolk and Western Railway Company’s Proposed

VRIES TRODIIID 0 5000+0s:s1ssecoseesavenssestpesennuseneninnnnannnnannan 549

Trial Transcripts, Ayers v. Norfolk & W. Ry., Civil

Action Nos. 93-C-6857 et al. (Kanawha County Cir.

Ct.)

Trial Tr. at 15-24 (Apr. 27, 1998) (Jury Instruc-

III. nsneccessinincinimadanmalenniaen naieciaiaieliesinn 561

Trial Tr. at 45, 94-95, 196 (Apr. 27, 1998) (Plain-

CED” CROGIID GIIIITIITED 5c. 0ssccencrassvnsesounecamiannae 575

iil

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

Page

Verdict Forms, Ayers v. Norfolk & W. Ry., Civil

Action Nos. 93-C-6857 et al. (Kanawha County Cir.

i cosssonovons 578

Judgment Orders, Ayers v. Norfolk & W. Ry., Civil

Action Nos. 93-C-6857 et al. (Kanawha County Cir.

a. sssunsesontocsencove 590

Docketing Statement, Vance v. Norfolk & W. Ry., No.

011209 (W. Va. filed Aug. 13, 2001) 00.0. 614

Amended Petition for Appeal, Vance v. Norfolk & W.

Ry., No. 011209 (W. Va. filed Aug. 13, 2001)............... 619

Schepers Dep. at 48-49, 52-53, 86-87, 118, 121-23,

Judd v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. (In re. FELA Asbestos

Litig.), CP-84-1 (W.D. Va. taken Oct. 8, 1984)............. 666

NOTICE

The following documents have been omitted in the printing of

this Joint Appendix. They may be found in the Petitioner’s

Appendix of the 01-963 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at the

following pages:

APPENDIX A: Page

Order, Vance v. Norfolk & W. Ry., No. 011209

a scescneneee la-2a

APPENDIX B:

Order, Vance v. Norfolk & W. Ry., Civ. No. 92-C-

5829 et al. (Cir. Ct. Kanawha County, W. Va.

AR 3a-Sa

APPENDIX C:

l

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF KANAWHA COUNTY,

WEST VIRGINIA

Case No. 92-C-16-8888

IN RE: ASBESTOS III,

RELEVANT DOCKET ENTRIES

= =

DATE PROCEEDINGS

2/06/95 # Mot to amd C’s to add Railroad D’s W/Attach;

Not of HRG W/COS.

2

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF KANAWHA COUNTY,

WEST VIRGINIA

Case No. 92-C-19-8888

IN RE: ASBESTOS III,

RELEVANT DOCKET ENTRIES

DATE

PROCEEDINGS

4/10/1998

4/29/1998

1/06/1999

1/06/1999

1/06/1999

1/06/1999

1/06/1999

1/06/1999

1/19/1999

1/19/1999

1/19/1999

Memo of Law in Supp of Mot W/EXH’s.

Verdict Form of James Spangler; Verdict Form

of Vance; Verdict Form of Ayers; Verdict Form

of Shirley; Verdict Form of Johnson; Verdict

Form of Butler.

<O:MAC.

<O: JDGMT O/MAC (S93-C-7004).

<O: JOGMT O/MAC (92-C-8970).

<O: JOGMT O/MAC (92-C-8888).

<O: JDGMT O/MAC (93-C-6857).

<O: JDGMT O/MAC (93-C-6876).

D, Norfolk & Western Railway Co’s Mot for

Judg or For New Trial (92-C-5829, 93-C-6857,

93-C-6876, 93-C-7004, 92-C-8899, 92-C-8970).

COS as to D. Norfolk & Western Railway Co’s

Mot for Judg or For New Trial & Not of HRG

(93-C-6857)

Not of HRG (93-C-6857).

3

DATE PROCEEDINGS

2/22/2001 <O: Grting Norfolk Souther Railway Comp Mot

to Vacate Entry of O Denying Mot for New

Trial/MacMac (S2/12/01).

3/12/2001 Pet WVSCA; Desig; Cos; Docking Stmt;

(92-C-5829; 93-C-7004; 93-C-6857; 92-C-8888;

92-C-8970; 93-C-6876) By Fred Adkins

3/12/2001 By Ck $150.00; RCT#319189

10/19/2001 * O Fr SCA Refusing Pet for Ap (92-C-5829).

7 te

4

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF KANAWHA COUNTY,

WEST VIRGINIA

. Delbert R. Adkins and

Rosella Adkins, his wife

. Jeff Adkins, Jr. and

Loretta Adkins, his wife

. Richard Curtis Akers and

Ruby Akers, his wife

. Gene Thurman Archey and

Norma Lee Archey, his wife

Lester Kenneth Arnett and

Glenoka M. Arnett, his wife

. James Harry Arthur and

Betty June Arthur, his wife

Burton Bailey Atkins and

Glenna S. Atkins, his wife

James Roy Ball and

Ruby Ball, his wife

Joel Dee Baisden and

Brookie Baisden, his wife

. Everett E. Ballard, Sr. and

Donna J. Ballard, his wife

. Arthur L. Barker and

Peggy J. Barker, his wife

. Clyde Bates

. Paul J. Bellomy and

Marilyn P. Bellomy, his wife

. Bernard Blake and

Sarah F. Blake, his wife

. Grant Blevins

. Randall L. Blevins and

Katheryn Blevins, his wife

. Carlos Elmo Blum and

Margaret Blum, his wife

. Harold Ray Boggs and

Betty Boggs, his wife

(Filed Oct. 15, 1992]

Civil Action No. 92-C-7698

Civil Action No. 92-C-7699

Civil Action No. 92-C-7700

Civil Action No. 92-C-7701

Civil Action No. 92-C-7702

Civil Action No. 92-C-7703 ©

Civil Action No. 92-C-7704

Civil Action No. 92-C-7705

Civil Action No. 92-C-7706

Civil Action No. 92-C-7707

Civil Action No. 92-C-7708

Civil Action No. 92-C-7709

Civil Action No. 92-C-7710

Civil Action No. 92-C-7711

Civil Action No. 92-C-7712

Civil Action No. 92-C-7713

Civil Action No. 92-C-7714

Civil Action No. 92-C-7715

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

36.

37.

38.

Charles Bowen, Jr. and

Pauline Bowen, his wife

Colombus Bowen, Jr. and

Mable Bowen, his wife

Sterling Bowen and

Violet Bowen, his wife

Bobby J. Bowea and

Barbara Bowen, his wife

Jack Glen Bowling and

Mildred L, Bowling, his wife

Willard T. Bradberry and

Mary Bradberry, his wife

Leon E. Bradshaw and

» ty Bradshaw, his wife

James E. Bretz and

Orpha May Bretz, his wife

Lovin Stout Brooks and

Trula Brooks, his wife

Charles E. Brown and

Virginia R. Brown, his wife

Raymond E. Burkhardt and

Georgia Burkhardt, his wife

Paul E. Campbell and

Sheila Campbell, his wife

Lewis B. Carico and

Wanda Carico, his wife

Jesse J. Cavanaugh and

Lucille Cavanaugh, his wife

Kathleen Chaney

William I. Chapman and

Betty J. Chapman, his wife

Basil Curtis Coleman and

Edith Coleman, his wife

Douglas L. Combs and

Phyllis Combs, his wife

Paul James Cooper

Clyde E. Copley and

Betty J. Copley, his wife

Civil Action No. 92-C-7716

Civil Action No, 92-C-7717

Civil Action No. 92-C-7718

Civil Action No. 92-C-7719

Civil Action No. 92-C-7720

Civil Action No. 92-C-7721

Civil Action No. 92-C-7722

Civil Action No, 92-C-7723

Civil Action No. 92-C-7724

Civil Action No. 92-C-7725

Civil Action No. 92-C-7726

Civil Action No. 92-C-7727

Civil Action No. 92-C-7728

Civil Action No. 92-C-7729

Civil Action No. 92-C-7730

Civil Action No. 92-C-7731

Civil Action No. 92-C-7732

Civil Action No..92-C-7733

Civil Action No. 92-C-7734

Civil Action No. 92-C-7735

Se ee

. Glen J. Corder and

Alice Corder, his wife

Earl Cox and

Velma Mae Cox, his wife

. Clyde E. Crouse and

Janice Crouse, his wife

. Clyde M. Damron and

Beth Ann Damron, his wife

. Paul H. Eastham and

Pauline Eastham, his wife

Ray Enyart and

Mary Belle Enyart, his wife

. Henry E. Fankhouser

. Paul A. Freeman and

Emma J. Freeman, his wife

. Billie E. Gibson and

Esther Gibson, his wife

. Carl Ray Gibson and

Patricia Gibson, his wife

. Clarence G. Godby and

Carolyn J. Godby, his wife

James E. Gray and

Elva G. Gray, his wife

. Gene T. Grove and

Dorothy J. Grove, his wife

. James Hagley

. Herbert E. Harris and

Lynn M. Harris, his wife

Wilbur S. Hayes

. Shelby W. Hazel, Sr. and

Barbara Ann Hazel, his wife

. Wilkie L. Hensley and

Betty H. Hensley, his wife

. Ernest E. Higginbotham and

Clara Higginbotham, his wife

. Dana Holcomb (deceased) and

Cora Holcomb, his wife

Civil Action No. 92-C-7736

Civil Action No. 92-C-7737

Civil Action No. 92-C-7738

Civil Action No. 92-C-7739

Civil Action No. 92-C-7740

Civil Action No. 92-C-7741

Civil Action No. 92-C-7742

Civil Action No. 92-C-7743

Civil Action No. 92-C-7744

Civil Action No. 92-C-7745

Civil Action No. 92-C-7746

Civil Action No. 92-C-7747

Civil Action No. 92-C-7748

Civil Action No. 92-C-7749

Civil Action No. 92-C-7750

Civil Action No. 92-C-7751

Civil Action No. 92-C-7752

Civil Action No. 92-C-7753

Civil Action No. 92-C-7754

Civil Action No. 92-C-7755

59.

Edward Honeycutt and

Bonnie Honeycutt, his wife

Joe D. Howard and

Loretta Howard, his wife

. Clarence O. Hughes, Jr. and

Norma E. Hughes, his wife

. Frank E. Johnson and

Joyce E. Johnson, his wife

. Roscoe Johnson and

Bonnie Johnson, his wife

. Maurice L. Jones and

Ann P. Jones, his wife

. Elmer J. Kazee and

Arbutus Kazee, his wife

Robert E. Keeton and

Phyllis Keeton, his wife

. William R. Kegley and

Virginia Kegley, his wife

. William A. Kelly

John R. Kessler and

Estelle Kessler, his wife

. Charles D. Kinder and

Shirley Kinder, his wife

. Darrell R. King and

Reba J. King, his wife

. Hessie E. Lake and

Edith Lake, his wife

. Charles L. Lambert and

Ruth E.. Lambert, his wife

. Albert B. Leadmon and

Alice Leadmon, his wife

. Elmer W. Lengyel and

Anna H. Lengyel, his wife

. Wesley E. Lipford and

Margaret Lipford, his wife

. Charles E. Littleton and

Naomi Littleton, his wife

. Guy C. Lockhart, Sr. and

Freda Lockhart, his wife

Civil Action No. 92-C-7756

Civil Action No. 92-C-7757

Civil Action No. 92-C-7758

Civil Action No. 92-C-7759

Civil Action No. 92-C-7760

Civil Action No. 92-C-7761

Civil Action No. 92-C-7762

Civil Action No. 92-C-7763

Civil Action No. 92-C-7764

Civil Action No. 92-C-7765

Civil Action No. 92-C-7766

Civil Action No. 92-C-7767

Civil Action No. 92-C-7768

Civil Action No. 92-C-7769

Civil Action No. 92-C-7770

Civil Action No. 92-C-7771

Civil Action No. 92-C-7772

Civil Action No. 92-C-7773

Civil Action No. 92-C-7774

Civil Action No. 92-C-7775

97.

98.

. Bobby D. Logan and

Jewell K. Logan, his wife

Bob Carroll McCoy

. Ralph Mason McCroskey and

Eva J. McCroskey, his wife

. James McDonald and

Mae McDonald, his wife

. Earsel Marcum and

Irene Marcum, his wife

Homer B. Martin and

Margaret Martin, his wife

. Robert K. Martin and

Rebecca Martin, his wife

Glen E. Mathews and

Marilyn Mathews, his wife

. Alfred C. Mayle

William M. Menefree and

Dorothy Menefree, his wife

. Robert L. Messer and

Eula M. Messer, his wife

. Charles R. Miller and

Nole A. Miller, his wife

. Martin M. Moody

. Ronald J. Morrison and

Linda L. Morrison, his wife

. John M. Mullins, Jr. and

Donna Mullins, his wife

. Ona T. Mullins and

Audrey A. Mullins, his wife

. Standard V. Mullins and

Mary F. Mullins, his wife

. Paul R. Payne and

Barbara S. Payne. his wife

Henry Payne

Stanley E. Pennington and

Phyllis Pennington, his wife

Shelby Peters and

Opal Peters, his wife

Civil Action No. 92-C-7776

Civil Action No. 92-C-7777

Civil Action No. 92-C-7778

Civil Action No. 92-C-7779

Civil Action No. 92-C-7780

Civil Action No. 92-C-7781

Civil Action No. 92-C-7782

Civil Action No. 92-C-7783 |

Civil Action No. 92-C-7784

Civil Action No. 92-C-7785

Civil Action No. 92-C-7786

Civil Action No. 92-C-7787

Civil Action No. 92-C-7788

Civil Action No. 92-C-7789

Civil Action No. 92-C-7790

Civil Action No. 92-C-7791

Civil Action No. 92-C-7792

Civil Action No. 92-C-7793

Civil Action No. 92-C-7794

Civil Action No. 92-C-7795

Civil Action No. 92-C-7796

100.

101.

102.

103.

104.

105.

106.

107.

108.

109.

110.

112.

113.

114.

115.

116.

117.

118.

119.

AG. Pettrey, Jr. and

Margaret Pettrey, his wife

James Pilney and

Sophie Pilney, his wife

Robert L. Porter and

Lorene Porter, his wife

George Franklin Rice and

Rosalee Rice, his wife

Kenneth W. Richmond and

Lois Richmond, his wife

Gerald E. Roark and

Ellouise Roark, his wife

Mitchell Roark and

Virgie M. Roark, his wife

Charles E. Rogers

Dan L. Rowsey and

Norma Rowsey, his wife

Stanley Royster and

Helen Royster, his wife

Joe S. Saunders and

Mosby A. Saunders, his wife

Paul D. Searls and

Rita S. Searls, his wife

James M. Siple and

Betty Jo Siple, his wife

Arlie M. Sparks

Carl Stevens and

Vetta Stevens, his wife

Eugene Stowers and

June Stowers, his wife

Clarence Stratton and

Freda Stratton, his wife

Loren G. Stratton and

Lola M. Stratton, his wife

George P. Tardy and

Marhla Tardy, his wife

Charles Thompson and

Lillie Thompson, his wife

Civil Action No. 92-C-7797

Civil Action No. 92-C-7798

Civil Action No 92-C-7799

Civil Action No. 92-C-7800

Civil Action No. 92-C-7801

Civil Action No. 92-C-7802

Civil Action No. 92-C-7803

Civil Action No. 92-C-7804

Civil Action No. 92-C-7805

Civil Action No. 92-C-7806

Civil Action No. 92-C-7807

Civil Action No. 92-C-7808

Civil Action No. 92-C-7809

Civil Action No. 92-C-7810

Civil Action No. 92-C-781 |

Civil Action No. 92-C-7812

Civil Action No. 92-C-7813

Civil Action No 92-C-7814

Civil Action No. 92-C-7815

Civil Action No. 92-C-7816

oe

Vv.

10

. Charles R. Thompson and

Edra Thompson, his wife

. Manley A. Thompson

. Carl E. Toney and

Pearlie Toney, his wife

. Clifford A. Vance and

Evelyn Vance, his wife

. Beechie M. Ward

. Ronald L. Ward

. Larry O. Webb and

Sandra Webb, his wife

. Gene Wells and

Phyllis Wells, his wife

. Ira E. Wells, Jr. and

Sara Wells, his wife

. Herman C. Whitney

. Cliffors L. Williams and

Hazel Williams, his wife

. Cledith A. Wilson

Edsel F. Yates and

Ruth M. Yates, his wife

Plaintiffs,

Civil Action No. 92-C-7817

Civil Action No. 92-C-7818

Civil Action No. 92-C-7819

Civil Action No. 92-C-7820

Civil Action No. 92-C-7821

Civil Action No. 92-C-7822

Civil Action No. 92-C-7823

Civil Action No. 92-C-7824

Civil Action No. 92-C-7825

Civil Action No. 92-C-7826

Civil Action No. 92-C-7827

Civil Action No. 92-C-7828

Civil Action No. 92-C-7829

CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORPORATION (CONRAIL)

Penn Central Corporation (PCC)

As successor to Penn Central Company,

Penn Central Railroad and

Central Railroad of New York

A Pennsylvania Corporation

Serve: CT Corporation

1600 Charleston Nat’! Plaza

Charleston, WV 25301

11

CSX TRANSPORTATION

INCORPORATION, INC.

Individually and as successor

to the Chesapeake & Ohio

Railroad Company,

A Virginia Corporation

Serve: A.F. Bobersky ;

Chafin Bldg, 517 9th Street

Huntington, WV 25701

NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY CO.

Individually as successor to

Southern Railway Company

and the Virginian Railroad,

A Virginia Corporation

Serve: President/CEO

3 Commercial Place

Norfolk, VA 23510-2108

NORFOLK SOUTHERN CORPORATION

Individually and as successor

to the Virginian Railroad,

A Virginian Corporation

Serve: President/CEO

3 Commercial Place

Norfolk, VA 23510-2108

NORFOLK AND WESTERN RAILWAY CO.

Individually and as successor

to the Norfolk Southern

Railway Company,

A Virginia Corporation

Serve: Richard A. Keeney

8 North Jefferson Street a5

Roanoke, VA 24042

12

OWENS CORNING FIBERGLAS CORP.

Serve: President/CEO

National Bank Building

Toledo, OH 43604

A&I COMPANY

Serve: C.P. Guthrie

5020 Kanawha Turnpike

Box 9277

Charleston, WV 25309

ABEX CORPORATION

Serve: President/CEO

485 Frontage Road

Burr Ridge, IL 60521

ANCHOR PACKING COMPANY

Serve: CT Corporation Systems

2 Peachtree Street

Atlanta, GA 30383

A.P. GREEN INDUSTRIES, INC.

Serve: Corporate Trust Company

1209 Orange Street

Wilmington, DE 19801

ARMSTRONG WORLD INDUSTRIES, INC.

Serve: W.M. Woodroe

Charleston National Plaza

Charleston, WV 25301

CERTAINTEED CORPORATION.

Serve: President/CEO

P. O. Box 860

Valley Forge, PA 19482

DURAMETALLIC CORPORATION

Serve: C.T. Corporation Systems

P. O. Box 951

Charleston, WV 25323

13

FIBREBOARD CORPORATION

Serve: President/CEO

1000 Burnett Avenue

Suite 410

Concord, CA 94520

FLEXITALLIC, INC.

Serve: President/CEO

P. O. Box 848

Bellmar, NJ 08031

THE FLINTKOTE COMPANY

Serve: President/CEO

c/o Mossman, Guther,

Knox and Elliott

50 California Street

34th Floor

San Francisco, CA 94111

GAF CORPORATION

Serve: Prentice Hall Corporation

32 Lockerman Square, East

Suite L-100

Dover, DE 19901

GARLOCK, INC.

Serve: President/CEO

1666 Division Street

Palmyra, NY 14522

GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORPORATION

Serve: C.T. Corporation Systems

P. O. Box 951

Charleston, WV 25323

4GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY

Serve: President/CEO

3135 Easton Turnpike

Fairfield, CONN 06431

14

INSUL COMPANY INCORPORATED

- Serve: President/CEO

110 N. Market Street

East Palestine, OH 44413-2095

J.A. JONES CONSTRUCTION COMPANY

Serve: President/CEO

6060 St. Albans Street

One South Executive Park

Charlotte, NC 28287

KEENE CORPORATION

Serve: President/CEO

200 Park Avenue

New York, NY 10166

METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY

Serve: President/CEO

1 Madison Avenue

New York, NY, 10010

M.H. DETRICK COMPANY

Serve: President/CEO

19444 S. 97th Avenue

Box 270

Makena, IL 60448

NATIONAL GYPSUM COMPANY

Serve: President/CEO

325 Delaware Avenue

Buffalo, NY 14202

PITTSBURGH CORNING CORPORATION

Serve: President/CEO

800 Presque Isle Drive

Pittsburgh, PA 15239

15

PPG INDUSTRIES, INC.

Serve: President/CEO

One PPG Place

Pittsburgh, PA 15272

QUIGLEY COMPANY, INC.

Serve: C.T. Corporation Systems

P. O. Box 951

Charleston, WV 25323

QUIN-T CORPORATION

Serve: CENTER FOR CLAIMS RESOLUTION

500 College Road East

Princet yn, NJ 54840

ROCKWOOL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION

Serve: President/CEO

500 Thornton Avenue

Leeds, AL 35094

TURNER & NEWELL, PLC

Serve: President/CEO

Bowden House

Ashburton Road West

Trafford Park

Manchester M!7 IRA

England

UNION BOILER

Serve: David K. Baxter °

P.O. Box 1425

Nitro, WV 21543

UNITED STATES GYPSUM COMPANY

Serve: President/CEO

101 S. Wacker Drive

Chicago, IL 60606

16

WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION

Serve: President/CEO

Six Gateway Center

Pittsburgh, PA 15222

W.R. GRACE COMPANY—CONN.

Serve: C.T. Corporation Systems

P. O. Box 951

Charleston, WV 25323

Defendants.

ORIGINAL COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND

The plaintiffs, by their undersigned counsel, hereby bring

suit against the defendants and for causes of action allege as

follows:

(JURISDICTION AND VENUE)

1. The plaintiffs named herein are residents and citizens of

the State of West Virginia, Kentucky and Ohio and were

exposed to asbestos and other harmful dusts in West Virginia,

Kentucky and Ohio.

2. The defendants herein are corporations some of which

are West Virginia corporations and some of which are Ohio

corporations.

3. All of the defendants are either licensed and registered

to do business in the State of West Virginia or have done

business in the state by putting their products into the stream

of commerce in the State of West Virginia.

4. All of the plaintiffs’ claims exceed the jurisdictional

minimum for this court.

5. Based upon the above, jurisdiction and venue is proper

in this case.

17

COUNT I

(FELA—Railroad Defendants Only)

6. This is an action for asbestos related personal injuries

arising under the provisions of the Federal Employer’s

Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. Section 51, et seq., specifically

including the Federal Safety Appliance Act, 45 U.S.C.

Sections | through 16, The Locomotive Boiler Inspection

Act, 45 U.S.C. Sections 22 through 34 and common law

negligence principles.

7. This Court has jurisdiction over this case under 45

U.S.C. Section 51 et seq. and 28 U.S.C. Section 1445 (non-

removable actions).

8. The Plaintiffs were all employees of the railroad and

contracted occupational diseases within the scope of that

employment.

9. The amount in controversy, exclusive of interest and

costs, exceeds the jurisdictional amount of this Court and this

Court has jurisdiction and venue hereof.

10. CSX Transportation, Inc. is a successor to the Chesa-

peake & Ohio Railroad Company and is a Virginia corpo-

ration. Hereinafter, this defendant is referred to as “the

railroad”.

11. Norfolk and Western Railway Company is a Virginia

corporation and is a wholly owned subsidiary of Norfolk

Southern Railway Company. Hereinafter, this defendant is

referred to as “N&W”. All of the allegations contained in

Count I attributable to “the railroad” are likewise attributable

to this defendant.

12. During his employment with the railroad, each

Plaintiff was exposed to asbestos and asbestos-containing

products on a repeated basis as well as other harmful dusts.

Plaintiff was required by the railroad to work with and near

toxic asbestos and asbestos-containing products and other

harmful dusts.

13. The Plaintiffs were unaware of the toxic propensities

of the asbestos and asbestos-containing products and other

harmful dusts to which they were exposed.

14. As a direct and proximate result of their exposure to

asbestos and asbestos-containing products and other harmful

dusts, without any lack of due care on their part, each

Plaintiff contracted asbestosis and other dust diseases related

to such exposure.

15. The Plaintiffs were unaware of the cause of their latent

and deteriorating medical condition until diagnosed as suf-

fering from same within the last two (2) years.

16. The railroad owed each Plaintiff a duty to have him,

work in a safe employment environment under the Federal

Employer’s Liability Act.

17. The railroad, by and through its duly authorized

agents, breached this duty to each plaintiff by:

(a) Failing to provide Plaintiff with a reasonably safe

work place;

(b) Failing to furnish Plaintiff with safe and suitable

tools and equipment including adequate protective

masks and protective inhalation devices;

(c) Failing to warn Plaintiff of the true nature and

hazardous effects of asbestos and asbestos-

containing products;

(d) Failing to operate a locomotive repair facility in a

reasonably safe manner;

(e) Failing to provide instructions or a method for the

safe use of asbestos;

(f) Failing to provide adequate, if any, instructions in

the use or removal of old asbestos products;

19

(g) Failing to test asbestos-containing products prior to

requiring employees to work with the same, to

determine their ultra-hazardous nature;

(h) Formulating and using a method of handling

asbestos and asbestos-containing products which

exposed Plaintiff to high concentrations of asbestos

fibers;

(i) Failing to provide Plaintiff with safe and proper

ventilation systems in the railroad facilities;

(j) Allowing unsafe practices to become standard

practice;

(k) Failing to exercise reasonable care in publishing and

enforcing a safety plan and method of handling and

installing asbestos and asbestos-containing products,

(1) Failing to inquire of the suppliers of asbestos and

asbestos-containing products, the nature of asbestos;

(m) Requiring Plaintiff to work with ultra-hazardous

asbestos and asbestos-containing products;

(n) Failing to exercise adequate, if any, care for the

health and safety of Plaintiff;

(o) Failing to periodically test and examine Plaintiff to

determine if he was subject to any ill effects of his

exposure to asbestos and asbestos-containing

products; and

(p) Failing to periodically inspect its locomotives,

boilers and their appurtenances in order to ascertain

any contamination by asbestos fibers.

18. As a direct and proximate result of the breach of duty

by the railroad, each Plaintiff was exposed to toxic asbestos

and asbesios-containing products and other harmful dusts.

20

19. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of

the railroad, each Plaintiff has suffered personal injury, great

pain, extreme anxiety, and he truly believes his injuries and

disability are permanent; his earning capacity has been

greatly reduced; his enjoyment of life has been greatly dimin-

ished; and his expected life span has been greatly shortened.

20. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of

the railroad, each Plaintiff, because of health problems caused

by this negligence, has been forced to incur medical expenses

for doctors, hospitals, drugs and health care services, and he

truly believes that he will be forced to incur additional

expenses in the future in an effort to treat his condition.

21. Each Plaintiff was a strong, able-bodied workman

capable of gainful employment at the time of the mani-

festation of his illness. As a result of his illness, each

Plaintiff has suffered damages by way of lost wages and a

diminished ability to render services, society, affection,

counseling and support to his household.

WHEREFORE, each Plaintiff claims compensatory

damages in the amount deemed sufficient by the jury with

interest and costs of suit herein.

COUNT II

(Negligence)

22. Over the course of their working years, the first named

plaintiffs (hereinafter “the plaintiffs”) worked with and/or

around products containing asbestos and/or other harmful

minerals manufactured, supplied, sold, distributed and

installed by the defendants. As a result, the plaintiffs breathed

asbestos and other harmful dusts created by the use of said

products, and developed serious, permanent and disabling

lung diseases.

23. The defendants and each of them by their agents,

servants and employees were negligent in that they knew or

21

should have known that the use of their products would cause

serious lung diseases and cancer, and knowing same, did fail

to take reasonable precautions to warn the plaintiffs of the

dangers to which they were exposed, did fail to inform the

plaintiffs of what would be safe and sufficient wearing

apparel and safety equipment for persons who were exposed

to their products, did fail to inform the plaintiffs of what

would be safe and proper methods of handling and using the

products, did fail to remove the products from the market

when they knew or should have known of the hazards

associated with the use of the products, did fail to properly

and adequately label the products, did sell the products which

were not in a reasonably safe condition, did fail to supply

accurate and complete warnings of the known dangers

involved in the use of and exposure to the products, did fail to

use safe, substitute products when such were available, did

negligently install the products without taking precautions to

warn and protect the plaintiffs.

24. Such actions and failure to act on the part of each

defendant constituted malicious, willful and wanton

misconduct with complete disregard for the safety and rights

of others, amounting to extraordinary and outrageous conduct

especially when the defendants were aware of scientific and

medical data made available to them that their products were

harmful and deadly to workers who were exposed to them.

25. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of

the defendants which caused them to develop serious,

permanent and disabling lung diseases, each plaintiff has |

suffered damages including but not limited to medical

expenses, great pain of body and mind, embarrassment,

inconvenience, loss of wages and wage earning capacity, loss

of the quality and enjoyment of their lives, shortening of their

life expectancy, increased risk of cancer and mesothelioma

with the worry and concern that naturally flows from such

increased ris’, permanent and disabling injury, all of which

will continue into the future.

22

WHEREFORE, each plaintiff individually demands

judgment against the defendants, jointly and severally, for

compensatory damages in an amount deemed just and proper

by the jury to adequately and fully compensate them for their

damages and punitive damages in an amount deemed just by

the jury, with interest and costs of suit herein.

COUNT III—STRICT LIABILITY

26. The plaintiffs incorporate by reference as if fully

set forth herein the allegations contained in paragraphs

1-25 above.

27. At the time the defendants placed their products on the

market, such products contained defects which created an

unreasonable risk of harm to those likely to use or be exposed

to the product, to wit; (a) exposure to the product caused

cancer and lung diseases, (b) no warning or an inadequate

warning was given to users or persons exposed to the product.

28. At the time of plaintiffs exposure, the products were

being used for the purposes for which they were intended, the

products were in substantially the same condition as when

they left the control of each of the defendants and the

plaintiffs had no knowledge of the defects and no reason to

suspect a defective condition.

29. As a sole, direct and proximate result of the defective

products manufactured, supplied and sold by the defendants,

the plaintiffs developed severe, permanent and disabling lung

diseases and suffered the damages and losses enumerated in

Count I above.

WHEREFORE, each plaintiff individually demands judg-

ment against the defendants, jointly and severally, for com-

pensatory damages in an amount deemed just and proper by

the jury to adequately and fully compensate them for their

damages and punitive damages in an amount deemed just by

the jury, with interest and costs of suit herein.

23

COUNT IV—CONSPIRACY

30. The plaintiffs were employed in capacities which

placed them in close proximity with asbestos and asbestos-

related materials, manufactured and/or distributed by one or

more of the defendants. Plaintiffs’ presence was known or

should have been known to the defendants and each of them.

31. The plaintiffs were exposed to the asbestos products

manufactured by one or more of the defendants named in

paragraph 16 below. The exposure to the asbestos or

asbestos-related products manufactured by the defendants

proximately contributed to the disease suffered by plaintiffs

as described below.

32. The defendants as specifically identified below,

individually and as agents of one another and as co-

conspirators, agreed and conspired among themselves and

with other asbestos manufacturers and distributors to injure

the plaintiff in the following fashion:

(a) Beginning in approximately 1934, conspirator

Johns-Manville Corporation, through its agents, Vandiver

Brown and attorneys J.C. Hobart, and conspirator Raybestos-

Manhattan, through its agents, Sumner Simpson and J.

Rohrbach, suggested, to Dr. Anthony Lanza, Associate

Director, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (insurers of

Manville and Raybestos), that Lanza publish a study on

asbestosis in which Lanza would affirmatively misrepresent a

material fact about asbestos exposure; that is the seriousness

of the disease process, asbestosis. This was accomplished

through intentional deletion of Lanza’s description of

asbestosis as “fatal” and through other selective editing that

affirmatively misrepresented asbestos [sic] as a disease

process less serious than it actually is and was known to be

then. As a result, Lanza’s study was published in the medical

literature in this misleading fashion in 1935. The conspirators

were motivated, in part, to effectuate this fraudulent

24

misrepresentation and fraudulent nondisclosure by the desire

to influence proposed legislation to regulate asbestos

exposure and to provide a defense in lawsuits involving

Manville, Raybestos and Metropolitan Life, as insurer.

(b) In 1936, conspirators American Brake Block Cor-

poration, Asbestos Manufacturing Company, Gatke Corpora-

tion, Johns-Manville Corporation, Keasby & Mattison

Company (then an alter-ego to conspirator Turner & Newall),

Raybestos-Manhattan, Russell Manufacturing (whose liabil-

ities have been assumed by H.K. Porter Company), Union

Asbestos and Rubber Company and United States Gypsum

Company, entered into an agreement with the Saranac

Laboratories. Under this agreement, these conspirators

acquired the power to decide what information Saranac

Laboratories could publish about asbestos disease and could

also control in what form such publications were to occur.

This agreement gave these conspirators power to affirma-

tively misrepresent the results of the work at Saranac, and

also gave these conspirators power to suppress material facts

included in any study. On numerous occasions thereafter, the

conspirators exercised their power to prevent Saranac

scientists from disclosing material scientific data, resulting in

numerous misstatements of fact being made at scientific

meetings.

(c) On November 11, 1948, representatives of the

following conspirators met at the headquarters of Johns-

Manville Corporation: American Brake Block Division of

American Brake and Shoe Foundry, Gatke Corporation,

Keasby & Mattison Company (then an alter-ego to

conspirator Turner & Newall), Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.,

Thermoid Company (whose assets and liabilities were later

purchased by H.K. Porter Company), Union Asbestos and

Rubber Company and United States Gypsum Company. U.S.

Gypsum did not send a representative to the meeting, but

25

instead authorized Vandiver Brown of Johns-Manville to

represent its interest at the meeting and to take action on

its behalf.

(d) At this November 11, 1948 meeting, these defend-

ants and their representatives decided to exert their influence

to materially alter and misrepresent material facts about the

substance of research started by Dr. Leroy Gardner at the

Saranac Laboratories beginning in 1936. Dr. Gardner’s

research involved the carcinogenicity of asbestos in mice and

also included an evaluation of the health effects of asbestos

on humans with a critical review of the then-existing

standards of dust exposure for asbestos and asbestos products.

(e) At this meeting, these defendants intentionally and

affirmatively determined that Dr. Gardner’s work should be

edited to specifically delete material facts about the cancer-

causing propensity of asbestos and the health effects of

asbestos on humans and the critique of the dust standards and

then published same in the medical literature as edited by Dr.

Vorwald. These defendants thereby fraudulently misrepre-

sented the risks of asbestos exposure to the public, in general,

and the class of persons exposed to asbestos, including

the plaintiffs. -

(f) As a direct result of influence exerted by the above-

described conspirators, Dr. Vorwald published Dr. Gardner’s

edited work in the Journal of Industrial Hygiene, AMA

Archives of Industrial Hygiene and Occupational Health in

1951 in a form that stressed those portions of Dr. Gardner’s

work that the conspirators wished stressed, but which omitted

references to human asbestosis and cancer, thereby fraud-

ulently and affirmatively misrepresenting the extent of the

risks. The conspirators affirmatively and deliberately dissem-

inated this misleading Vorwald publication to university

libraries, government officials, agencies and others.

26

(g) Such action constited [sic] a material affirmative

misrepresentation of the total context of material facts

involved in Dr. Gardner’s work and resulted in creating an

appearance that inhalation of asbestos was less of a health

problem than Dr. Gardner’s unedited work indicated.

(h) The following conspirators were members of the

trade association known as Quebec Asbestos Mining Asso-

ciation (Q.A.M.A.): Johns-Manville Corporation, Carey-

Canada, individually and as successor to Quebec Asbestos

Corporation, the Celotex Corporation, successor to Quebec

Asbestos Corporation, National Gypsum Company, and

Turner & Newall, individually and successor to Bell

Asbestos. These conspirators, members of Q.A.M.A.., partic-

ipated in the above-described misrepresentation of the work

of Dr. Leroy Gardner published by Arthur Vorwald in the

AMA Archives of Industrial Health in 1951. Evidence of

the Q.A.M.A.’s involvement in this misrepresentation arises

from co-conspirator Johns-Manville’s membership of the

Q.A.M.A., as well as correspondence from co-conspirators

dated 10/29/47, 11/26/47, 3/6/38, 10/15/48, 3/8/49 and

9/6/50, and all indicating close monitoring of the editing

process of Q.A.M.A.’s representative, Ivan Sabourin, acting

on behalf of all Q.A.M.A. members.

(i) Defendants who were members of the Q.A.M.A. as

described above, began on or about 1950 to formulate a plan

to influence public opinion about the relationship between

asbestos and cancer by influencing the medical literature on

this subject and then touting and disseminating this literature

to the public and to organizations and legislative bodies

responsible for regulatory control of asbestos with the

specific intent of misrepresenting the existing scientific

information and suppressing contrary scientific data in their

possession and control.

(j) This plan of misrepresentation and influence over

the medical literature began on or about 1950 when the

27

aforementioned Q.A.M.A. members selected Saranac Labor-

atories to do an evaluation of whether cancer was related to

asbestos. After a preliminary report authored by Arthur

Vorwald in 1952 indicated that a cancer/asbestos relationship

might exist in experimental animals, these Q.A.M.A.

members refused to further fund the study and it was

terminated and never publicly discussed.

(k) As a result of the termination of this study, these

defendants fraudulently withheld information from the public

and affirmatively misrepresented to the public and respons-

ible legislative and regulatory bodies that asbestos did not

cause cancer, including affirmative misrepresentations by

conspirators’ agents K.W. Smith, M.D., Paul Cartier, M.D.,

A.J. Vorwald, M.D., A. J. Lanza, M.D., Vandiver Brown and

Ivan Sabourin, said misrepresentations being directed to inter

alia, U.S. Government officials, Canadian government offi-

cials, U.S. National Cancer Institute, other medical organi-

zations and the general public, including plaintiffs.

(1) Subsequently, the Q.A.M.A. defendant conspira-

tors contracted with the Industrial Hygiene Foundation and

Dr. Daniel Braun to further study the relationship between

asbestos exposure, asbestosis and lung cancer. In 1957, Drs.

Brown and Truan reported to the Q.A.M.A. that asbestosis

did increase a worker’s chances of incurring lung cancer.

(m) The Q.A.M.A. defendant conspirators/members

the. cafter caused, in 1958, a publication of the work by Braun

and Truan in which the findings regarding increased inci-

dence of cancer in persons with asbestosis was edited out by

agents of the Q.A.M.A. The published version of this study

contained a conclusion that asbestos exposure, alone, did not

increase the incidence of lung cancer, a conclusion known by

the defendant conspirators to be patently false.

(n) By falsifying and causing publication of studies

concluding that asbestos exposure did not cause lung cancer

and simultaneously omitting a documented finding that

28

asbestosis did increase the risk of lung cancer, these

Q.A.M.A. defendant conspirators affirmatively misrepre-

sented to the public and concealed from the public the extent

of risks associated with inhalation of asbestos fibers.

(0) In approximately 1958, these Q.A.M.A. defendant

conspiiate’s publicized the edited works of Drs. Braun and

Truan at a symposium in an effort to fraudulently mis-

represent to the public and persons exposed to asbestos that

the inhalation of asbestos dust would not cause cancer.

(p) The fraudulent misrepresentations beginning in 1946

as elaborated above and continuing with the publication of

the 1958 Braun/Truan study influenced the standards set for

threshold limit values for development of such standards to

fail to lower the threshold limit value because of a cancer risk

associated with asbestos inhalation.

(q) In 1967, Q.A.M.A. conspirators determined at their

trade association meeting that they would intentionally

mislead consumers about the extent of risks involved in

inhalation of asbestos products.

(r) In 1952, a Symposium regarding the health effects of

asbestos was held at the Saranac Laboratories. The following

conspirators were in attendance: Johns-Manville, Turner &

Newall, Raybestos-Manhattan, and Q.A.M.A. members by

way of their agents, Cartier, Sabourin and LaChance.

(s) At this meeting, the occurrence of lung cancer and

asbestosis in product users was discussed and the car-

cinogenic properties of all fiber types of asbestos was also

discussed. In an affirmative attempt to mislead the public

about the extent of health risks associated with asbestos, and

in an effort to fraudulently conceal those risks from the

public, these defendants conspired to prevent publication of

the record of this 1952 Saranac Symposium and it was not

published. In addition, the conspirators induced Vorwald not

to announce the results of his and Gardner’s animal studies

29

showing excess cancers in animals which thereby fraud-

ulently misrepresented existing secret data which could not be

publicized owing to the secrecy provisions contained in the

1936 Saranac agreement heretofore described.

(t) The following conspirators were members of the

trade organization known as the Asbestos Textile Institute

(ATI): Raybestos-Manhattan, Johns-Manville, H.K. Porter,

Keasby & Mattison, individually and through its alter-ego

Turner & Newall and National Gypsum.

(u) In 1947, these conspirators, members of the ATI,

received a report from W.C.L. Hemeon regarding asbestosis,

which suggested re-evalua'ion of the then-existing threshold

limit values for asbestos exposure. These defendants caused

this report not to be published and thereby fraudulently

concealed material facts about asbestos exposure from the

public and affirmatively misrepresented to the public and

class of persons exposed to asbestos that the existing

threshold limit value was acceptable. Thereafter, these

defendant conspirators withheld additional material informa-

tion on the dust standards from The American Conference of

Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH), thereby further

influencing evaluations of threshold limit values for asbestos

exposure.

(v) In 1953, conspirator National Gypsum, through its

agents, in response to an inquiry from the Indiana Division of

Industrial Hygiene regarding health hazards of asbestos spray

products, refused to mail a proposed response to that division

indicating that respirators should be worn by applicators of

the products. National Gypsum’s response distorted and

fraudulently misrepresented the need for applicators of

asbestos spray products to wear respirators and fraudulently

concealed from such applicators the need for respirators.

(w) In 1955, conspirator Johns-Manville, through its

agent Kenneth Smith, caused to be published in the AMA

Archives of Industrial Health, an article entitled “Pul-

30

monary Disability in Asbestos Workers.” This published

study materially altered the results of an earlier study in 1949

concerning the same set of workers. This alteration of Dr.

pt way ton constituted a fraudulent and material misrep-

resentation t the extent of the ri

| vo risk associated with

(x) In 1955, the National Cancer Institute held a meet-

ing at which conspirator Johns-Manville, individually and as

an agent for other alleged co-conspirators and A. Vorwald, as

agent of co-conspirators, affirmatively misrepresented that

there were no existing animal studies concerning the

relationship between asbestos exposure and cancer, when, in

fact, the conspirators were in secret possession of several

studies which demonstrated that positive evidence did exist.

= (y) In 1957, these conspirators, members of the ATI

jointly rejected a propose [sic] research study on cancer and

asbestos and this resulted in fraudulently concealed from the

public material facts regarding asbestos exposure and also

constituted an affirmative misrepresentation of the then-

existing knowledge about asbestos exposure and lung cancer.

(z) In 1964, conspirators who were members of the ATI

met to formulate a plan for rebutting the association between

lung cancer and asbestos exposure that had been recently

discussed by Dr. Irving J. Selikoff. Thereafter, these members

of the ATI embarked upon a campaign to further misrepresent

(aa) All conspirators identified above

ratified and furthered the previous eR © gly

conspirators Johns-Manville, Raybestos Manhattan and A.J.

Lanza, acting on behalf of Metropolitan Life Insurance

company, and all alleged co-conspirators during the dates and

circumstances alleged above, acted as agents and co-

conspirators for the other conspirators.

31

33. The acts of the defendant conspirators as described

above, constitute a fraudulent concealment and/or a fraud-

ulent misrepresentation which proximately caused injury to

the plaintiffs in the following manner:

(a) The material published or caused to be published by

the defendants was false and incomplete in that the

defendants knowingly and deliberately deleted references to

the known health hazards of asbestos and asbestos-related

products.

(b) Defendants individually, as members of a conspir-

acy, and as agents or other co-conspirators, intended that the

publication of false and misleading reports and/or the

nondisclosure of documented reports of the health hazards of

asbestos:

(1) maintain a favorable atmosphere for the continued

sale and distribution of asbestos and asbestos-related

products;

(2) assist in the continued pecuniary gain of the

defendants through the sale of their products;

(3) influence in the defendants’ favor proposed

legislation to regulate asbestos exposure and;

(4) to provide a defense in law suits brought for

injury resulting from asbestos disease.

(c) Plaintiffs reasonably relied upon the published medi-

cal and scientific data documenting the purported safety of

asbestos and asbestos-related products, and the absence of

published medical and scientific reports on the hazards of

asbestos and asbestos-related products to continue their

exposure to asbestos because they believed it to be safe.

(d) Defendants individually, as members of a con-

spiracy, and as agents of other co-conspirators intended that

plaintiffs rely upon the published reports regarding the safety

of asbestos and asbestos-related products and upon the

32

absence of published medical and scientific data regarding the

hazards of asbestos and asbestos-related products, to continue

their exposure to those products.

(e) Defendants individually, as members of a conspir-

acy, and as agents of other co-conspirators are in a position of

superior knowledge regarding the health hazards of asbestos

and therefore plaintiffs had a right to rely on the published

reports commissioned by the defendants regarding the health

hazards of asbestos and the absence of published medical and

scientific data regarding the hazards of asbestos and asbestos-

related products.

(f) Plaintiffs suffered injury as a direct and proximate

result of the acts alleged herein, and damages as described in

Count I above.

WHEREFORE, each plaintiff individually demands judg-

ment against the defendants, jointly and severally, for

compensatory damages in an amount deemed just and proper

by the jury to adequately and fully compensate them for their

damages and punitive damages in an amount deemed just by

the jury, with interest and costs of suit herein.

COUNT V—WRONGFUL DEATH

34. The plaintiffs incorporate by reference as if fully set

forth herein the allegations contained in paragraphs | through

33 above.

35. Certain plaintiffs are representatives of the estates of

deceased workers. In those cases, this action is brought

pursuant to the Wrongful Death Statute since the decedent

died as a direct and proximate result of exposure to asbestos

and other harmful dusts caused by the wrongful acts and

omissions and defective products of the defendants herein.

The decedents at the time of death had beneficiaries and

distributees as defined by the Wrongful Death Statute.

33

36. As a proximate result of the aforementioned wrongful

acts and omissions of the defendants and exposure to the

defendants’ defective products, the decedents suffered prior

to their death severe physical pain, mental anguish, worry,

loss of enjoyment of life, loss of income and medical

expenses. As a result of the decedents’ death, funeral and

burial expenses were incurred, there was a loss of future

income and the decedents’ beneficiaries and statutory distrib-

utees have suffered sorrow mental anguish, loss of society,

loss of companionship, loss of comfort, loss of guidance and

advice, loss of services, protection, care and assistance as

well as a loss of the benefit of the decedents’ income.

WHEREFORE, each plaintiff individually demands judg-

ment against the defendants, jointly and severally, for com-

pensatory damages in an amount deemed just and proper by

the jury to adequately and fully compensate them for their

damages and punitive damages in an amount deemed just by

the jury, with interest and costs of suit herein.

COUNT VI—LOSS OF CONSORTIUM

37. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference as if fully set forth

herein the allegations contained in paragraphs | through 20

above. Plaintiffs’ spouses have by reason of the lung diseases

and disabilities suffered by the first named plaintiff have

themselves suffered and will continue to suffer into the future

the permanent loss of the consortium, guidance, kindly office,

support and services of their spouses as well as damage to the

marital relationship.

WHEREFORE, each plaintiffs’ spouse individually de-

mands judgment against the defendants, jointly and severally,

for compensatory damages in an amount deemed just and

proper by the jury to adequately and fully compensate them

for their damages and punitive damages in an amount deemed

just by the jury, with interest and costs of suit herein.

34

COUNT VII (PPG ONLY)

(Negligence)

38. Defendant PPG Industries, Inc. (hereinafter “PPG”)

is the parent corporation of Pittsburgh-Corning Corporation,

(hereinafter “subsidiary”) a former manufacturer and mar-

keter of asbestos-containing products.

39. Plaintiffs were exposed to the asbestos-containing

products manufactured by the subsidiary.

40. At all times relevant herein, defendant PPG intervened

on behalf of its subsidiary and researched the dangers and

health consequences of asbestos exposure.

41. Defendant and its subsidiary shared a common medical

director who conducted the research on the hazards of

asbestos exposure.

42. Through this undertaking, defendant created a duty to

those, like plaintiffs, who would come in contact with the

asbestos contained in the products manufactured by its

subsidiary.

43. Defendant, upon assuming this duty and responsibility,

failed to perform with reasonable care.

44. Defendant PPG created a dangerous, harmful and

potentially deadly situation by not sharing its data on the

dangers of asbestos exposure with those reasonably likely to

be exposed, such as plaintiffs.

45. Defendant breached its duty to plaintiffs by:

(a) failing to reasonably warn plaintiffs of the hazards of

asbestos exposure;

(b) failing to act reasonably with regard to the infor-

mation it possessed concerning the hazards of exposure to

asbestos;

35

(c) failing to provide plaintiffs with the knowledge as to

the possible precautions to protect against the harmful effects

of asbestos exposure;

(d) failing to share its data on the dangers of asbestos

exposure with those reasonably likely to be exposed, such as

plaintiffs;

(e) concealing the information it possessed about the

hazards of asbestos from those reasonably likely to be

exposed, such as plaintiffs; and

(f) was otherwise negligent.

46. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of

defendant PPG Industries, Inc., plaintiffs developed severe,

permanent and disabling lung diseases and suffered the

damages and losses enumerated in Count I above.

WHEREFORE, each plaintiff individually demands judg-

ment against the defendant, PPG Industries, Inc., jointly and

severally, for compensatory damages in an amount deemed

just and proper by the jury to adequately and fully com-

pensate them for their damages and punitive damages in an

amount deemed just by the jury, with interest and costs of

suit herein.

COUNT VIII (PPG ONLY)

(Restatement of Torts Sec. 324A(a))

47. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege all allegations contained

in paragraphs 38 to 46 above.

48. Defendant PPG undertook to render services for its

subsidiary; to wit; research on the health effects of asbestos

exposure.

49. Defendant PPG did or reasonably should have

recognized this undertaking was necessary for the protection

of third parties.

36

50. Defendant PPG breached this duty to third parties,

such as the plaintiffs, by failing to exercise reasonable care to

protect them from or warn them of the health hazards of

asbestos exposure.

51. Defendant’s failure to exercise reasonable care in-

creased the risk of harm.

52. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of

defendant PPG Industries, Inc., plaintiffs developed severe,

permanent and disabling lung diseases and suffered the

damages and losses enumerated in Count I above.

WHEREFORE, each plaintiff individually demands

judgment against the defendant, PPG Industries, Inc., jointly

and severally, for compensatory damages in an amount

deemed just and proper by the jury to adequately and fully

compensate them for their damages and punitive damages in

an amount deemed just by the jury, with interest and costs of

suit herein.

COUNT IX (PPG ONLY)

(Restatement of Torts Sec. 324A(b))

53. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege all allegations contained

in paragraphs 38 through 52 above.

54. Defendant PPG’s subsidiary owed a duty to plaintiffs

to reasonably research the health effects of asbestos exposure.

55. Defendant PPG undertook to perform this duty owed

to plaintiffs.

56. Defendant PPG breached this duty it undertook to

perform for its subsidiary by:

(a) failing to reasonably warn plaintiffs of the hazards of

asbestos exposure;

(b) failing to act reasonably with regard to the

information it possessed with regard to the hazards of

exposure to asbestos;

37

(c) failing to provide plaintiffs with the knowledge as to

the possible precautions to protect against the harmful effects

of asbestos exposure;

(d) failing to share its data on the dangers of asbestos

exposure with those reasonably likely to be exposed, such as

plaintiffs;

(e) concealing the information it possessed about the

hazards of asbestos from those reasonably likely to be

exposed, such as plaintiffs; and

(f) was otherwise negligent.

57. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of

defendant PPG Industries, Inc., plaintiffs developed severe,

permanent and disabling lung diseases and suffered the

damages and losses enumerated in Count I above.

WHEREFORE, each plaintiff individually demands

judgment against the defendant, PPG Industries, Inc., jointly

and severally, for compensatory damages in an amount

deemed just and proper by the jury to adequately and fully

compensate them for their damages and punitive damages .in

an amount deemed just by the jury, with interest and costs of

suit herein.

COUNT X (PPG ONLY)

(Restatement of Torts Sec. 324(c))

58. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege all allegations contained

in paragraphs 38 through 57 above.

59. Plaintiffs relied to their detriment on the undertaking

of defendant PPG to research and warn them of the health

hazards of asbestos exposure.

60. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of

defendant PPG Industries, Inc., plaintiffs developed severe,

permanent and disabling lung diseases and suffered the

damages and losses enumerated in Count I above.

38

WHEREFORE, each plaintiff individually demands

judgment against the defendant, PPG Industries, Inc., jointly

and severally, for compensatory damages in an amount

deemed just and proper by the jury to adequately and fully

compensate them for their damages and punitive damages in

an amount deemed just by the jury, with interest and costs of

suit herein.

COUNT XI (PPG ONLY)

(Conspiracy)

61. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege all allegations contained

in paragraphs 38 through 60 above.

62. Defendant PPG and its subsidiary, individually and in

concert with each other and others, knowingly agreed and

conspired among themselves to engage in a course of conduct

that was reasonably likely to result in injury to the plaintiffs.

63. Defendant PPG knew or should have known that the

failure of its subsidiary to warn plaintiffs of the harmful

effects of asbestos exposure would cause plaintiffs injury.

64. Defendant PPG gave substantial assistance and/or

encouragement to its subsidiary is [sic] accomplishing the

injury to the plaintiffs.

65. As a direct and proximate result of the conspiracy

between defendant PPG and its subsidiary, plaintiffs

developed severe, permanent and disabling lung diseases and

suffered the damages and losses enumerated in Count i

above.

WHEREFORE, each plaintiff individually demands

judgment against the defendant, PPG Industries, Inc., jointly

and severally, for compensatory damages in an amount

deemed just and proper by the jury to adequately and fully

compensate them for their damages and punitive damages in

an amount deemed just by the jury, with interest and costs of

suit herein.

39

COUNT XII (PPG ONLY)

(Punitive Damages)

. 66. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege all allegations contained

in paragraphs 38 through 65 above.

67. The acts of defendant PPG were willful, wanton,

malicious and in total disregard for the rights, health and

safety of the plaintiff and others.

68. As a direct and proximate result of these acts, plaintiffs

deveiuped severe, permanent and disabling lung diseases and

suffered the damages and losses enumerated in Count |

above.

WHEREFORE, each plaintiff individually demands

judgment against the defendant, PPG Industries, Inc., for

punitive damages in an amount deemed just by the jury, with

interest and costs of suit herein.

JURY DEMAND

The plaintiffs demand a trial by jury on all issues presented

herein.

Plaintiffs

By Counsel

James F. Humphreys

Charleston National Plaza

Suite 1113

Charleston, WV 25301

(304) 343-4185

Ness, Motley, Loadholt,

Richardson & Poole

James H. Rion, Jr.

P. O. Box 1137

Charleston, SC 29402

(803) 577-6747

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF KANAWHA COUNTY

WEST VIRGINIA

[Filed Feb. 3, 1995]

Frank Adams,

Thomas F. Adams,

Clarence Howard Anderson,

Freeman Ray Ayers,

James Michael Barlow,

Henry Ross Bartholow,

Benjamin Maywood Blecher,

George Garland Beloat,

Nathan Donald Bennett,

Nolice Eugene Berry,

John Walker Berryman,

Doyle Thomas Bias,

Richard Mitchell Bland

Robert Everett Bledsoe,

Verrell Leon Bledsoe,

Henry Block,

Charles Frederick Bonner,

James Patrick Bowers,

Joe Bradac,

Melvin Minor Bragg, Sr.,

Billy Clay Brown,

Danny Joe Brown,

William Henry Brown,

Henry Maury Bryant,

Clarence Burmon Burgess,

Carl Richard Butler,

Lewis Edward Campbell,

Walter James Campbell,

Robert Gehrling Carey,

William Burdette Carroll,

Harvey Cornelius Carter,

James Edward Carter,

Rondel Lee Christian,

Jackie David Church, Sr.,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-3884

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-3886

CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-7857

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6857

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4891

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4892

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-3913

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-153

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6159

CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-4052

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-3921

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-3925

CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-4055

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-3943

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-3944

CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-4057

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4859

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6863

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6166

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6865

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6871

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-3960

CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-7954

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6874

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6875

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6876

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6172

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6878

CIVIL ACITON NO. 93-C-4514

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4906

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6176

CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-5727

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6884

CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-8017

Ronald Clark,

Henry Coleman, Sr.,

Orrin P. Collins,

Oppie Thurman Conley,

James Lewis Coss,

George Allen Cripple,

Clifford Damron,

Jack Okey Dawson,

Robert DeTemple, Sr.,

Richard Curtis Decker, Sr.,

Charles Denver Dillon,

George Edward Dixon,

Melvin Arthur Dutcher,

Leslie Joe Edelman,

Billy Joe Edwards,

Robert Franklin Ellenberg,

Homer Mont Farley,

Harry Warren Ferguson,

James Delano Fernihough,

Burl Jackson Ferrell,

Charles Edward Fletcher,

George Forney,

Wayne Fortner, Jr.,

Garland Stewart Fowler,

Bobby Joe Frye,

Claude Cecil Gallion,

Grant Gilbert, Jr.,

Eldon Edward Gillium,

William Delford Gragg,

Lloyd Dale Gullett,

Lester Lee Haas,

Richard Arlen Haas,

Archie Grey Hall,

William Arthur Handley,

Woodrow Wilson Haney, Jr.,

Dewey Hardin,

_ Farnia Harold Harvey,

Clarence Heater,

Bottie Archie Holdren,

42

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4908

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-184

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6889

CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-4091

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4027

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6183

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-193

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6898

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6899

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4519

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6184

CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-8094

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6186

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4066

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6902

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6190

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6191

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4077

CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-4130

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6908

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4083

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-691 1

CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-8150

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6912

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4090

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4093

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4100

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6193

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6918

CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-8196

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4122

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4123

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4125

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6922

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6923

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6924

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6926

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-494]

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6931

Ralph Veron Holesapple,

Herbert Holmes,

Carl Elwood Hood,

Burgess Horn,

Carl Howard,

Jessie Howard,

Johnnie Hudnall,

Robert William Hugus,

Russell James,

Charles Edward Jarnett,

Homer Lawrence Jeffers,

Ralph O’Jay Jeffrey,

Hobert Johnson,

Malcolm Earl Johnson, Jr.,

Robert Joseph Johnson,

Ava Jones, Jr.,

William Kenneth Kazee,

Steve Kelemen,

Arden Clyde Knight,

Robert Frank Kotson, Sr.,

Donald Caltee Kuhn,

Charles Donald Langley,

Robert Ray Large,

Walter Lavender,

John L. Lawhorn,

Paul Harrison Leach,

Danny Lee Lewis,

Edgar Ear! Little,

Orazio Lucento,

Henry Alex Lunsford,

Edward Jackson Lynch,

Walter J. Mallory,

Louis Eugene Martin,

Harold Massie,

Lynden Bernadine Massie,

Billy Ray Matics,

Everett Maynard,

John Russell McCabe,

James Wheeler McConnell,

43

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6201

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4944

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4165

CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-8260

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6932

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4170

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4174

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6205

CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-8284

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-261

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6206

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4186

CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-4185

CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-4186

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6207

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4206

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4215

CIVIC ACTION NO. 93-C-4219

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6949

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4228

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4230

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4233

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6209

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4235

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6210

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4237

CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-4215

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-1623

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6214

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4249

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4250

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6958

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-696 |

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4530

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4263

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6215

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4960

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4270

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6962

James William McFarland, Sr.,

William Edward McGivern,

William Joe McNeely,

Sterling McPeek,

Berman Earl Meadows, Jr.,

Harry Robert Meeks,

Charles Henry Melvin,

Lonnie Burton Mick,

Frank Ernest Miller,

Ernest Griffith Moore,

Ralph Grayden Moore,

George Carlton Mosby,

Harlo Robert Nance,

John Hershel Neace,

Raymond Allison Nelson,

Arnold Adolphus Newhouse,

Dewey Gene Newman,

Chester James Nibert,

Hubert Lee Niswander,

James Samuel Parsons,

Joseph Pavlovic,

Marty Lee Penix,

James Elwood Perry,

James Henry Pyles,

Glen Freeman Queen,

Joe Radcliff,

Robert Milton Rayburn,

Woodrow Wilson Reed,

David E. Rhodes,

Larry Eugene Riffe,

Gail Riggs,

Cobern Rigsby, Jr.,

Hassil Parker Robinett,

Henry Clay Robinson,

Hollis Virgil Rose,

' James Rufford Rowe,

Kenneth Rowe,

William Edward Rowe, Sr.,

Harry Cecil Rucker,

as

CIVIL ACTION NO. 69-C-6965

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6220

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6967

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6968

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6223

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6970

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6971

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4963

CIVIL ACITON NO. 93-C-1639

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6972

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4297

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4301

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4313

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-305

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6976

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6977

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4536

CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-8504

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6979

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6984

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6229

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-315

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4974

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6990

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-317

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6236

CIVIL ACTION-NO. 93-C-318

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-320

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6237

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4364

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6992

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4367

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4979

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-330

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4375

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6242

CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-8624

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4379

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4982

Kenneth Warren Rumbaugh,

Paul Frank Rymer,

George Dewey Scott,

Leonard N. Sears,

David Allen Sevier

James Thomas Sheets,

Hollis Curl Short,

Francis Dean Simpson,

John Phillip Simpson,

Ronald Eugene Sines,

William Eugene Slater,

Lester Slawter,

Claude Junior Smith, —

Charles Lewis Snyder,

James McCoy Spangler,

Claude William Stinson,

George F. Stock,

Marshall Ray Tackett,

James Kenneth Taylor,

Daniel Wilson Thomas,

Walter Martin Thomason,

Willard Raymond Todd,

John Cecil Towles,

Frederick Ray Trusty,

James Thomas Turner,

Eli Lee Tyo, Jr.,

Bennie Franklin Vanhorn,

Andrew Douglas Vaughn,

James Elbert Vaught, Sr.,

William Franklin Ward,

Roy Emmitt Warren,

Albert Richard Waters,

Paul Edward Webb,

Owen Lawrence Weldon,

James Oris Whaley,

Harold Emile Willis,

George Garland Wilson,

Leonard Eugene Wilson,

Carl Everett Wimmer,

45

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4380

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6997

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4387

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6998

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6999

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4398

CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-8670

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-7000

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-7001

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-7002

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4407

CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-470

CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-8684

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4414

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-7004

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4422

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6252

CIVIL ACTION NO: 92-C-8747

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6255

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-7018

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-7019

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6257

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-7021

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4440

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-5002

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4443

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4449

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-385

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4450

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-5003

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-5005

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6262

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-5006

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-4470

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-5012

CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-8837

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-2027

CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-8840

CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-703 |

46

Floyd Ester Woods, CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-8859

George Denzil Yolcum, CIVIL ACTION NO: 92-C-4397

Cyril Eugene Yost, CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-1733

Plaintiffs,

V.

CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC.

Individually and as successor

to the Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad Company,

Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, Western Maryland Railway,

and the Chessie System

A Virginia Corporation

Serve: A.F. Bobersky

Chafin Bldg, 517 9th Street

Huntington, WV 25701

CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORPORATION (CONRAIL)

As Successor to Penn Central Company, Penn Central

Corporation,

Pennsylvania-New York Central Transportation Company,

and the Pennsylvania Railroad

Serve: CT Corporation

Bank One Center, Suite 1600

Charleston, WV 25301

AMERICAN PREMIER UNDERWRITERS, INC.

NORFOLK AND WESTERN RAILWAY CO.

Individually and as a successor to

the Norfolk Southern Railway Co.,

A Virginia Corporation

Serve: Richard A. Keeney

8th North Jefferson Street

Roanoke, VA 24042

Defendants.

47

ORIGINAL COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND

The plaintiffs, by their undersigned counsel, hereby brings

suit against the defendants and for causes of action allege

as follows:

1. This is an action for asbestos related personal injuries

arising under the provisions of the Federal Employer’s

Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. Section 51, et seq., specifically

including the Federal Safety Appliance Act, 45 U.S.C.

Sections | through 16, The Locomotive Boiler Inspection

Act, 45 U.S.C. Sections 22 through 34 and common law

negligence principles.

2. This Court has jurisdiction over this case under 45

U.S.C. Section 51 et seq. and 28 U.S.C. Section 1445 (non-

removable actions).

3. The Plaintiffs were employees of the railroad and

contacted occupational diseases within the scope of that

employment.

4. The amount in controversy, exclusive of interest and

costs, exceeds the jurisdictional amount of this Court and this

Court has jurisdiction and venue hereof.

5. CSX Transportation, Inc. is a successor to the

Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad Company and is a Virginia

Corporation. Hereinafter, this defendant is referred to as “the

railroad”.

6. Consolidated Rail Corporation is a successor to various

railroads which employed the plaintiff, including but not

limited to, Penn Central Transportation Company, Penn

Central Corporation, Pennsylvania-New York Central Trans-

portation Company, the Pennsylvania Railroad and New York

Central Railroad.

7. Norfolk and Western Railway Company is a Virginia

Corporation and is a wholly owned subsidiary of Norfolk

48

Southern Railway Company. Hereinafter, this defendant is

referred to as “N&W”.

All of the allegations contained in Count { are attributable

to “the railroad” and are likewise attributable to all the above-

referenced defendants.

8. During their employment with the railroad, the

Plaintiffs were exposed to asbestos and asbestos-containing

products on a repeated basis as well as other harmful dusts.

Plaintiffs were required by the railroad to work with and near

toxic asbestos and asbestos-containing products and other

harmful dusts. :

9. The Plaintiffs were unaware of the toxic propensities of

the asbestos and asbestos-containing products and other

harmful dusts to which they were exposed.

10. As a direct and proximate result of their exposure

asbestos and asbestos-containing products and other harmft

dusts, without any lack of due rare on his part, the Plaintiff

contracted asbestosis and other dust diseases related to

such exposure.

11. The Plaintiffs were unaware of the cause of their

latent and deteriorating medical condition until diagnosed as

suffering from same within the last two (2) years.

12. The railroad owed the Plaintiffs a duty to have them

work in a safe employment environment under the Federal

Employer’s Liability Act.

13. The railroad, by and through its duly authorized

agents, breached this duty to the plaintiffs by:

(a) Failing to provide the Plaintiffs with a reasonably

safe work place;

(b) Failing to furnish the Plaintiffs with safe and

suitable tools and equipment including adequate

protective masks and protective inhalation devices,

49

(c) Failing to warn the Plaintiffs of the true nature and

hazardous efforts of asbestos and asbestos-

containing products;

(d) Failing to operate a locomotive repair facility in a

reasonably safe manner;

(e) Failing to provide instructions or a method for the

safe use of asbestos;

(f) Failing to provide adequate, if any, instructions in

the use or removal of old asbestos products;

(g) Failing to test asbestos-containing products prior to

requiring employees to work with the same, to

determine their ultra-hazardous nature:

(h) Formulating and using a method of handling

asbestos and asbestos-containing products which

exposed the Plaintiffs to high concentrations of

asbestos fibers;

(i) Failing to provide the Plaintiffs with safe and proper

ventilation systems in the railroad facilities:

(j) Allowing unsafe- practices to become standard

practice;

(k) Failing to exercise reasonable care in publishing and

enforcing a safety plan and method of handling and

installing asvestos and asbestos-containing products;

(I) Failing to inquire of the suppliers of asbestos and

asbestos-containing products, the nature of asbestos;

(m) Requiring the Plaintiffs to work with ultra-hazardous

asbestos and asbestos-containing products;

(n) Failing to exercise adequate, if any, care for the

health and safety of the Plaintiffs;

(0) Failing to periodically test and examine the

Plaintiffs to determine if they were subject to any ill

50

effects of their exposure to asbestos and asbestos-

containing products; and

(p) Failing to periodically inspect its locomotives,

boilers and their appurtenances in order to ascertain

any contamination by asbestos fibers.

14. As a direct and proximate result of the breach of duty

by the railroad, the Plaintiffs was exposed to toxic asbestos

and asbestos-containing products and other harmful dusts.

15. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of

the railroad, the Plaintiffs have suffered personal injury, great

pain, extreme anxiety, and they truly believe their injuries and

disabilities are permanent; their earning capacity has been

greatly reduced; their enjoyment of life has been greatly

diminished; and their expected life span has been greatly

shortened.

16. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of

the railroad, the Plaintiffs, because of health problems caused

by this negligence, has [sic] been forced to incur medical

expenses for doctors, hospitals, drugs and health care

services, and they truly believe that they will be forced to

incur additional expenses in the future in an effort to treat

their condition.

17. The Plaintiffs were strong, able-bodied workman [sic]

capable of gainful employment at the time of the mani-

festation of their illness. As a result of their illness, the

Plaintiffs have suffered damages by way of lost wages and a

diminished ability to render services, society, affection,

counseling and support to his household [sic].

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs claims [sic] compensatory

damages in the amount deemed sufficient by the jury with

interest and costs of suit herein.

51

JURY DEMAND

The plaintiff: : . .

herein. P iffs demand a trial by jury on all issues presented

Plaintiffs

By Counsel

/s/ [illegible]

JAMES F. HUMPHREYS

Bank One Center, Suite 1113

707 Virginia Street East

Charleston, WV 25301

(304) 343-4185

Ness, Motley, Loadholt,

Richardson & Poole

By: /s/ [illegible]

JAMES H. RION, Jr.

P.O. Box 1137

Charleston, SC 29402

(803) 577-6747

52

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF KANAWHA COUNTY,

WEST VIRGINIA

FREEMAN AYERS, CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6857

DOYLE JOH? ON, CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-8888

JAMES SPANGLER, CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-7004

RALPH BAILEY, CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-8979

CLIFFORD VANCE, CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-5829

JOHN SHIRLEY, CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-8970

CARL BUTLER, CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6876

Plaintiffs,

v.

NORFOLK AND WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY

a corporation, et al.,

Defendants.

NORFOLK AND WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY'S

MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE CANCER EVIDENCE

NOW COMES the Defendant, Norfolk and Western Rail-

way Company (“defendant” or “N&W”) by counsel, Fred

Adkins and Rodney L. Baker II, and pursuant to Rule 103(c)

and 403 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence and moves

this Court in limine to exclude all evidence referring to cancer

at the trial of the above-referenced civil action. As support for

its Motion, defendant state as follows:

1. That no plaintiff allegedly suffers from any form of

cancer, they merely allege asbestos related disease, or mixed

dust pneumoconiosis;

2. That asbestosis, asbestos related pleural disease, and

mixed dust pneumoconiosis alone do not necessarily result in

an increased risk of cancer;

3. That evidence of Plaintiffs’ “fear of cancer”, or any

mention of cancer is irrelevant,

53

4. That the introduction of cancer evidence would

inflame the jury and invite consideration by the jury of a

terminal illness when there is no evidence whatsoever to

support such a proposition;

5. That extreme prejudice will flow to defendant if

cancer evidence is admitted at the trial of this action; and

6. That all cancer evidence should be excluded from the

trial of the claims of these plaintiffs under Rule 403 of the

West Virginia Rules of Evidence.

In further support of defendant’s position, defendant

hereby incorporates by reference its contemporaneously fled

Memorandum in Support of this Motion /n Limine in the

above-captioned action.

WHEREFORE, for all of the above reasons, defendant

respectfully requests that its Motion /n Limine be granted.

NORFOLK AND WESTERN RAILWAY CO.

By /s/ Rodney Baker, II

Of Counsel

Fred Adkins, Esquire (WVSBNo.: 0076)

Rodney Baker II, Esquife (WVSBNo.: 6859)

HUDDLESTON, BOLEN, BEATTY, PORTER & COPEN

611 Third Avenue

P.O. Box 2185

Huntington, WV 25722-2185

(304) 691-8310

Counsel for Defendant,

Norfolk and Western Railway Company

54

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF KANAWHA COUNTY,

WEST VIRGINIA

FREEMAN AYERS, CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6857

DOYLE JOHNSON, CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-8888

JAMES SPANGLER, CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-7004

RALPH BAILEY, CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-8979

CLIFFORD VANCE, CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-5829

JOHN SHIRLEY, CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-C-8970

CARL BUTLER, CIVIL ACTION NO. 93-C-6876

Plaintiffs,

V.

NORFOLK AND WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY

a corporation, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF

DEFENDANT, NORFOLK AND WESTERN RAILWAY

COMPANY ’S, MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE

CANCER EVIDENCE

Norfolk and Western Railway Company, (“defendant” or

“N&W”), by counsel, hereby moves this Court for an Order

excluding evidence of plaintiffs’ alleged asbestos exposure

and the development of cancer, the alleged increased risk of

developing cancer, the fear of cancer, or any other mention of

the alleged relationship between asbestos exposure and

cancer. The grounds for this Motion include: (1) the claims of

plaintiffs’ are predicated upon an allegation of asbestosis,

asbestos related pleural disease, or mixed dust pneumo-

coniosis; (2) no plaintiff alleges that he now has cancer; (3)

evidence concerning cancer is irrelevant to the issues of this

case; and (4) the admission of evidence regarding cancer

would result in extreme prejudice to defendant.

55

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiffs filed with this Court Complaints alleging, inter

alia, that they had suffered a severe injury to their bodies and

respiratory systems as a result of exposure to irritants while in

the employ of Defendant, Norfolk and Western Railway

Company. The Complaints sought to establish causes of

action under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.

§ 51 et..seq. (FELA)' against the Defendant. In the

Complaints, plaintiffs maintain that Defendant violated

various duties allegedly owed to them by failing, among other

things, to provide them with a reasonably safe place within

which to work. See, Complaints. As a result of these alleged

breaches of duty, the plaintiffs maintain that they were

exposed to hazardous substances which caused severe and

permanent injury to their persons. See Complaints.

ARGUMENT

Plaintiffs’ do not present an “actionable injury” which

would allow the introduction of cancer evidence. As such, the

evidence is irrelevant to the instant action. Moreover, the

evidence should not be admitted on the issue of liability

because the extreme prejudice which would flow to the

defendants is substantially outweighed by its probative value.

' Under FELA, a railroad has a duty to provide its employees with a

reasonably safe place to work. This duty, however, is not absolute and a

railroad is not deemed an insurer of its employees’ safety. Inman v.

Baltimore and O.R. Co., 361 U.S. 138 (1960); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.

v. Craven, 185 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1950), cert. denied 340 U.S. 952. A

railroad’s duty to warn is limited to those perils which may be reasonably

anticipated. A railroad is held to the standard of care of a reasonably

prudent person. Fowler v. Gulf, if and 0. R Co., 286 S.W.2d 404

(Mo.App. 1956).

56

AVE AN

A. EVIDENCE THAT PLAINTIFFS MAY H

INCREASED RISK OF CONTRACTING CANCER

SHOULD BE EXCLUDED.

Indeed, cancer evidence may be introduced in a non-cancer

case to establish damages in connection with cancer which

will probably develop in the future. Jackson v. Johns-

Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314, 1321 (Sth Cir. 1985)

(Jackson Il). However, as the Third Circuit Court of Appeals

has held, the damages of which the cancer evidence would be

probative must be available to the plaintiff as a matter of law.

Id. The Jackson Court expounded:

Whether these damages are available in the instant case

may depend on the nature of the actionable injury. If the

actionable injury here was the exposure to asbestos, as

Jackson insists, he may be entitled to recover damages

for those future consequences, such as the manifestation

of cancer, that could be established in terms of rea-

sonable probabilities and for the mental suffering that is

the direct consequence of the increased risk of cancer

caused by the asbestos exposure. If, on the other hand,

exposure to asbestos is regarded as too abstract an

invasion, either as a general rule or in the context of

latent disease, mass tort litigation, and instead Jackson s

asbestosis itself is considered to be the only actionable

harm, Jackson may have no right to recover these

damages since asbestosis alone does not result in an

increased risk of cancer.

Id. at 1322. Simply stated, as the Jackson Court recognized,

the question turns on a matter of probabilities.

Unlike some states’ definition, a plaintiff's “actionable

injury” in a FELA action is that injury which is manifest. See

45 U.S.C. § 51. Section 51 provides, in part, that “every

; common carrier by railroad . . . shall be liable in damages to

any person suffering injury while he is employed by such

57

carrier . . . for such injury . . . resulting in whole or in part

from the negligence of any . . . such carrier. . . .” (emphasis

added). Moreover, for statute of limitations purposes in a

FELA action, “the afflicted employee can be held to be

‘injured’ only when the accumulated effects of the deleterious

substance manifest themselves. . . .” Urie v. Thompson, 337

U.S. 163, 170 (1949)(citations omitted) (emphasis added).

Recall, Plaintiffs allege asbestosis, asbestos related pleural

disease, or mixed dust pneumoconiosis. The Third Circuit

Court of Appeals has held, as a matter of federal law, that a

FELA action for an asbestos-related injury does not exist

before manifestation of an injury. Schweitzer v. Consolidated

Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936, 942 (3rd Cir. 1985), cert. denied

__ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 183. The court explained:

If mere exposure to asbestos were sufficient to give rise

to a FELA cause of action, countless seemingly healthy

railroad workers, workers who might never manifest

injury, would have tort claims cognizable in Federal

court. /t is obvious that proof of damages in such cases

would be highly speculative, likely resulting in windfalls

for those who never take ill and insufficient compen-

sation for those who do. Requiring manifest injury as a

necessary element of an asbestos. related tort action

avoids these problems and best serves the underlying

purpose of tort law: the compensation of victims who

have suffered.

Id. (emphasis added).

As the Schweitzer Court recognizes, sound public policy

dictates that a plaintiffs injury must be defined in concrete

‘terms. To allow a plaintiff recovery for cancer-related dam-

ages prematurely, would result in over-compensation if a

plaintiff never contracts cancer. To like effect, if a plaintiff

later develops cancer, the compensation paid earlier may well

be inadequate. In other words, limiting the type of damages

58

which a plaintiff may recover in a FELA asbestos action

ensures that adequate and just compensation is available

for all railroad workers. who allegedly have asbestos-

related injuries.

Under the FELA, mere exposure to asbestos is clearly not

an actionable injury. Instead, a plaintiff has an actionable

injury when he can present an apparent physical injury. In the

present case, plaintiffs’ only allegation of an asbestos-related

physical injury is that they have asbestosis, asbestos related

pleural disease and\or mixed dust pneumoconiosis. Plaintiffs

can offer no evidence that their alleged conditions will likely

result in a cancerous condition, and any evidence of an

increased risk of cancer is inherently speculative in nature.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs have no right to recover damages for

cancer which may develop in the future or for mental anguish

based on an increased risk of cancer. Because Plaintiffs

cannot recover the damages of which the cancer evidence

would be probative, the cancer evidence itself is irrelevant

and thus, should be excluded.

Asbestosis and cancer are distinct diseases. The only

relationship between the two is that both can be precipitated

by exposure to asbestos. Evidence of an increased risk of

cancer is, thus, surmise. The law is well-settled that future

damages are recoverable only if there is a reasonable cer-

tainty that future damages will result. Shelton v. Thompson,

148 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1945). To introduce evidence of the

relationship between asbestos exposure and cancer, a plaintiff

must, therefore, show to a reasonable degree of medical

certainty that a plaintiff has cancer or will contract cancer as a

result of his exposure to asbestos. /d.

Other West Virginia Circuit Courts have excluded similar

evidence because of its speculative nature. For instance, as

the Honorable Robert A. Burnside of the Raleigh County

‘Circuit Court held, “I think your motion [in limine to exclude

evidence of Plaintiff's increased risk of cancer] is granted. Its

59

ee Now I don’t know if the doctor’s said there’s a

ti sateen hap the greater chance Statistically, then we

problem. Fortunately or unfortunately, however

oy look at it, that isn’t before us. Apparently, all we're going

ren is two doctors saying there is a statistical link

- a this thing and cancer somewhere in the future.” 7r.

= ay Harvey v. CSX 7 ransportation, Inc., Civil Action

0. | -1224-B (Raieigh Co. Cir. Ct. W.Va. 1995), relevant

Portions attached hereto as Exhibit A. Simply stated, as the

circuit court recognizes, an action for an increased risk of

——T cancer is a “speculative claim to a future injury.”

. at 21. What is absent here is a present injury or evidence

of a metabolic or a somatic change that, aside from statistics,

can be seen physically to be

condition.” /d. at 98. : RTT ee ee

B. EVIDENCE OF PLAINTIFFS’

FEAR

SHOULD BE EXCLUDED. eo

Defendants anticipate that plaintiffs will assert

entitled to introduce evidence of their fear fomman

— In actuality, plaintiffs seek compensation for a wholly

~ a In this case, there is no evidence that plaintiffs

ate suffered any physical harm from alleged mental anguish

d on fear of contracting cancer in the future. There is

nothing in the plaintiffs’ depositions, any of the medical

a or plaintiffs’ witness lists to indicate that plaintiffs

ve suffered physica! harm from their alleged mental

anguish based on fear of contracting cancer

Deposition Transcript of F. Ayers a 113, pobre ld

as Exhibit B, D. Johnson at Pgs. 69-70, attached hereto as

one C, J. Spangler at Pgs. 153-154, attached hereto as

hibit D, R. Bailey at Pg. 70, attached hereto as Exhibit E

C. Vance at Pgs. 75-76, attached hereto as Exhibit F. J.

2

As reflected by Mr. Vance’s deposition testimony, he mistakenly

believes that he has asbestos induced cancer. However, nothing in his

60

hirley at Pgs. 102-109, attached hereto as Exhibit G’,

3 Butler at i 107-108, attached hereto as Exhibit H. No

plaintiff has sought medical or psychological treatment for an

alleged fear of cancer. The threat of future harm, not yet

realized, is not enough to support the introduction of fear

of cancer evidence. Consequently, the evidence should be

excluded.

A recent Second Circuit Opinion delineates the circum-

stances under which a fear of cancer-claim is viable. The

plaintiff in Marchica v. Long Island Railroad Co., 31 F.3d

1197, 1202 (2nd Cir. 1994), unlike the plaintiffs in the case at

bar, alleged a claim for negligent infliction of emotional

distress. Accordingly, the court applied the “zone of danger

test as delineated in Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, Pee

U.S. . 114 S.Ct. 2396 (1994).* As the Marchica Court

i | records supports his erroneous belief. Mr. Vance admitted at page

7 ett deposition that no doctor has ever diagnosed him om

Irrespective of his belief, Mr. Vance offered ‘no testimony that he 4

experienced any form of physical manifestation of an alleged fear 0

cancer. Similarly, Mr. Vance has not sought treatment or counseling for

his alleged fear of cancer. osiniteel

> Mr. Shirle fesses to have a fear of cancer despite having no

ntamutten Gad Coatan etgume can'ee eaatally tahnad to eanans. 02.

Shirley admits that he is a worry wart, that he has never thrown up as a

result of his alleged “fear of cancer”, and that he has never sought

treatment or counseling for his “alleged fear of cancer”.

* In Gottshall, the Court adopted a very narrow view of claims for

negligent infliction of emotional distress holding that this cause of action

did not encompass claims for workplace related stress and harassment. 1d

at 2409. Imposing a duty to avoid a stressful work environment wou

“make railroads the insurers of the emotional well being and mental health

of their employees.” /d. at 2409. Unwilling to take this radical step, the

Court stated with clarity that FELA is “not an insurance statute. Id. The

Gottshall court adopted the common law “zone of danger” test delimiting

the proper scope of an employer’s duty under FELA for claims of

negligent infliction of emotional distress. Those claims, the court stated,

are reserved to those cases where severe emotional distress occurs as a

61

explained, in fear-of-developing-disease cases “the exposure

requirement—plus actual likelihood of developing the

disease—. . . is a means of ensuring the genuineness of the

claim.” Marchica, 31 F.3d at 1205. In other words, “mental

anxiety is not considered reasonable unless there is, at the

very least, some evidence substantiating both actual exposure

to the disease-causing agent . . . and a likelihood of

contracting the disease as a result. Doner v. Adams

Contracting Inc., 617 N.Y.S. 2d 565, 566 (A.D. 3 Dep’t

1994). The plaintiff in Marchica sustained a puncture wound

from a discarded hypodermic needle. The court found that

because the plaintiff suffered a physical impact he was

entitled to receive compensation for his emotional injuries.

Moreover, the court noted that the plaintiff, unlike the current

plaintiffs, had physical manifestations of his emotional

distress such as post traumatic stress disorder, accompanied

by sleeplessness, weight loss, and vomiting which was indicia

of the genuiness of his emotional distress claim.

result of an impact or threat of physical impact where the plaintiff was

within the “zone of danger.” As the Circuit Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia emphasized, the emotional injuries presented by a

FELA plaintiff must be “serious and verifiable.” McMillan v. National

R.R. Passenger Corp., 648 A.2d 428, 433 (D.C. App. 1994).

The “zone of danger” test further limits recovery for emotional injury

to “those plaintiffs who sustain a physical impact as a result of a

defendant's conduct, or who are placed in immediate risk of physical

harm by that conduct.” Gottshall, 114 S.Ct. at 2406 (emphasis added).

Physical impact under the “zone of danger” test announced in Gottshall

contemplates an impact relating to the resulting emotional distress.

Accord Bloom v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 41 F.3d 911 (3rd Cir. 1994)

(holding that engineer did not sustain a physical impact when the

locomotive engine struck a pedestrian); Grube v. Pacifre R. Co., 886 P.2d

845, 852 (Kan.1994)(holding that engineer did not sustain a physical

impact when he was thrown against the console of the locomotive

engine). Where a plaintiff can not [sic] demonstrate that he suffered a

physical impact, he must show that the threat of physical impact is more

than “minimal or negligible.” McMillan, 648 A.2d at 434.

62

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recent [sic] held that

a railroad worker may recover for his fear of contracting an

asbestos-related disease based solely on his exposure to

asbestos where the worker had contracted an asbestos-related

disease or exhibited any symptoms of an asbestos related

disease. Buckley v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad, No.

95-7399, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 6096 (2nd Cir. 1996). On

appeal, the United States Supreme Court of Appeals reversed

the Second Circuit’s decision finding that the ‘physical

impact” required for recovery of damages for negligent

infliction of emotional distress did not include “a contact that

amounts to no more than an exposure—an exposure, such as

that before us, to a substance that poses some future risk of

disease and which contact causes emotional distress only

because the worker learns that he may become ill after a

substantial period of time.” Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co.

v. Buckley 117 S.Ct 2113, 2118 (1997). Relying on the

Supreme Court’s decision in Buckley, the Superior Court of

Chatham County, Georgia, held that a plaintiff may not

recover for emotional distress arising from fear of cancer

until plaintiff begins to manifest symptoms of cancer. See

Order attached hereto as Exhibit /. Plaintiffs in the case at bar

can nc? offer objective proof to establish that they suffered an

emotional injury. To the contrary, as previously noted,

plaintiffs do not exhibit physical manifestations of an alleged

fear of contrac ung cancer.

Unquestionably, the “zone of danger” standard does not

allow recovery for all alleged emotional distress and as such

plaintiffs should be precluded in the instant matter from

introducing any cancer evidence.

63

C. CANCER EVIDENCE SHOULD NOT BE

ADMITTED ON THE ISSUE OF THE RAIL-

ROAD’S LIABILITY BECAUSE THE PROBATIVE

VALUE OF THE EVIDENCE IS SUBSTAN.

TIALLY OUTWEIGHED BY ITS PREJUDICIAL

EFFECT.

As previously noted, plaintiffs have no right under FELA

to recover future damages for cancer or damages for mental

anguish based on an increased risk of cancer. The cancer

evidence, therefore, is irrelevant and inadmissible under Rule

402. If this Court finds, however, that the cancer evidence is

admissible on the issue of the Railroad’s liability, the

evidence should be excluded under Rule 403 of the West

Virginia Rules of Evidence.

As the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia

directed in Voelker v. The Frederick Business Properties

Company, 465 S.E.2d 246 (W.Va. 1995), West Virginia

Rules of Evidence 401, 402,° and 403 “are to be read together

and are not to be applied in isolation.” Rule 403 provides that

- “[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its

probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of

unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the

jury, or by consideration of undue delay, waste of time, or

needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” The term

“unfair prejudice”, as used in Rule 403, means “an undue

tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly

- + » €@n emotional one.” W.V.R.E. 403 advisory committee’s

note. Of course, the mere fact that evidence is prejudicial

* Rule 402 states that “All relevant evidence is admissible, except as

otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by the

Constitution of West Virginia, by these rules, or other rules adopted by

the Supreme Court of Appeals.” Rule 401 defines relevant evidence as

“evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of

consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less

probable than it would be without the evidence.” __

64

does not, by itself, require its exclusion. Rather, the court

must determine whether the prejudice is substantially

outweighed by the probative value of the evidence. In making

this determination, the court should consider the probable

effectiveness of a iimiting instruction. See W.V.R.E. 403

advisory committee’s note.

The rules of relevancy, 401, 402, and 403, dictate against

the admission of cancer evidence in the instant case for

several reasons. First, plaintiffs do not have cancer. Thus, the

evidence should be excluded because it is irrelevant. Further,

a limiting instruction on the proper consideration of the

cancer evidence will be ineffective because the mention of

“cancer” evokes a strong response in all of us. In other words,

the jury will consider the cancer evidence in ascertaining

plaintiffs’ damages and compensate them for injuries they do

not have and more likely than not will never incur. The jury

should not deliberate on a possibility that has no medical

basis. Clearly, a mere possibility does not meet the reasonable

degree of medical certainty standard.

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons and for such

other reasons as may appear to this Court, Defendant

respectfully requests that its Motion Jn Limine To Exclude

Cancer Evidence be granted.

NORFOLK AND WESTERN RAILWAY CO.

By /s/ Rodney Baker, II

Of Counsel

65

Fred Adkins, Esquire (WVSBNO.: 0076)

Rodney Baker II, Esquire (WVSBNo.: 6859)

HUDDLESTON, BOLEN, BEATTY, PORTER & COPEN

611 Third Avenue

P.O. Box 2185

Huntington, WV 25722-2185

(304) 691-8310

Counsel for Defendant,

Norfolk and Western Railway Company

66

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF KANAWHA COUNTY,

WEST VIRGINIA

FREEMAN AYERS,

DOYLE JOHNSON,

JAMES SPANGLER,

CLIFFORD VANCE,

JOHN SHIRLEY,

CARL BUTLER,

Plaintiffs,

vs. Civil Action No. 93-C-6857

92-C-8979

93-C-6876 |

92-C-8970

93-C-7004

92-C-5829

NORFOLK AND WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY

a corporation,

Defendant.

TRIAL TRANSCRIPT

April 14, 1998

* *+ * *

[155] want to—

MR. RION: We oppose it.

THE COURT: Oppose it, okay. Well, let's go ahead and

talk about this in order, then. Why don’t you just summarize

this issue of other cases and settlements?

My inclination is to believe, based on what my research

has been, is that that’s largely a question of discretion.

My habit in the past has been to be completely silent with

respect to those -issues of settlement unless there’s an

agreement between counsel to the contrary.

67

MR. BOITER: Essentially, there are several cases, the

Gauldin case, which is a Supreme Court case out of Kansas.

It’s a Kansas Supreme Court case, it’s not a federal case and

FELA is federal law.

A St. Louis, Southwestern Railroad case is out of the

District Court, Kansas, and in the United States District Court

out of Kentucky.

All of those cases are saying the same thing, which is if

FELA makes no provision for the reduction of damages

recoverable by an employee against the railroad. And whai ii

says is the railroad can go out, if they [156] think someone

else was a contributing factor, they can go out and sue them

all day long, but the damages for a Plaintiff, when they sue

the railroad, is not recoverable; and it sort of comes off the

Rogers case where it says that the railroad is responsible if

their negligence contributes to the injury in whole or in part,

they [sic] responsible for the entire injury. And because it’s a

creature of federal law the federal law and the federal courts

have ruled there is no provision in FELA for the reduction of

damages, or whoever is going to go out and sue the ather

person, so it had no relevance to these proceedings.

MR. BAKER: Your Honor, I think this goes back to what

we started on yesterday, the misinterpretation—the deliberate

misinterpretation of the Rogers case. The Rogers case stands

for the proposition that a FELA plaintiff's burden to get his

case before the jury is to show negligence, however slight, on

the part of the railroad.

It does not speak to damages, who is responsible for

payment of the damages.

I have a United States District Court case decided of

January 24, 1997. It’s Barrow Smith versus [157] New Jersey

Transit Rail Operations that discusses a portion of damages

in FELA cases.

68

It says the railroad’s only responsible for the—I’m sorry,

this case may not particularly say the railroad’s only

responsible for the portion of damages it caused. Dell versus

Baltimore and Lionel Railroad Company, a Supreme Court of

Pennsylvania case decided January 24, 1989; in that case it

says that the railroad is only responsible for the damages

it causes.

If the jury in these cases finds that the Plaintiff's alleged

injury breathing impairment is 90 percent caused by

Plaintiff's smoking, 50 percent caused by Plaintiff's smoking,

40 percent caused by the manufacturer or any other parties

the Plaintiff has sued, and 10 percent caused by the railroad,

the railroad is only liable for that 10 percent.

Now, I would be happy to let you look at copies of either

the Barrow Smith or Dell versus Baltimore, an Ohio case. |

will get you copies of those if you would like.

THE COURT: How do you—how do you propose to

allocate fault in this case between N&W and the

manufacturers?

[158] MR. BAKER: Well, Your Honor, I think the jury’s

entitled to know, via introduction of the—possible intro-

duction of the Complaints filed against the manufacturers,

that each of these Plaintiffs has made claims against other

parties for the exact same injury they’re claiming in this one.

THE COURT: Now, wait a minute. You’re not saying that

you’re going to ask the jury to apportion fault or that you’re

going to put any evidence in in support of that proposition. So

it’s a red herring, isn’t it?

MR. BAKER: No, Your Honor. We will ask the jury to

apportion fault.

THE COURT: Based on what, that was my question?

MR. BAKER: Well, Your Honor, one, it’s going to be all

the Plaintiffs except one in these cases smoked cigarettes.

69

THE COURT: It doesn’t ha

eoant “ ve anything to do with

MR. BAKER: Okay. But as far as apportioning fault

regarding the settlements, unless you let the jury know that

these Plaintiffs have made claims [159] against other parties

for the exact injuries they’re claiming now, not the amounts

of the settlements. If you wish to set off the settlements and

never advise the jury that there has been settlements against

the other Parties that is in your discretion, but the fact—I

think the jury is given—the jury has to be informed in some

way that there has been other cases filed and—

THE COURT: In aide of what?

MR. BAKER: In ai :

i | aide of their apportionment of damages

THE COURT: Well, wait a minute. The only thing that |

understood you said you were going to have them apportion

is ‘the Plaintiffs relative fault. Are you going to put on

evidence about Pittsburgh Corning?

MR. BAKER: I’m not going to put

Pj h Corning — g put on evidence that

THE COURT: Well, what are the i i

. I, Y going to rtion

with? What are they going to use to proportion? eas

MR. BAKER: | think we will put on evidence that the

manufacturers were, in general terms, I can’t speak to the

specifics of this, you know, it will depend on how the

evidence comes in at trial, but there may [160] well be

evidence that the manufacturers knew more than they have

told and, therefore, the railroad’s conduct was permissible

given the knowledge that it had.

THE COURT: Well, you can’t just say we can’t give this

jury a verdict that says N&W Plaintiffs and

aad manufacturers,

70

MR. BAKER: My view—and there will be other factors,

Your Honor.

MR. ADKINS: Judge, I just—

THE COURT: You've got to tell me exactly what evidence

you're going to put on that we could entrust this jury with to

allocate relative fault between Norfolk and Western and the

manufacturers, now.

MR. ADKINS: I think we’re confusing two things here.

First of all, I think you are right. If we are going to try to say,

from a fault standpoint, that we need evidence, and I think we

will have evidence, some evidence at least, of manufactur-

ers in generally, not specifically evidence, as to what the

manufacturers know or what they should’ve done, et cetera,

“et cetera.

The second issue, though, is the apportionment of the

damages. Certainly, if the doctors testify, and [161] they will

in this case, that Dr. Gaziano, Dr. Renn, all of them, there’s

no dispute on this, that cigarette smoking causes problems,

there’s no dispute that many of these men have problems

related to their cigarette smoking.

Now, what we were proposing in the jury form is that when

you get to the part of apportioning the damage of this that, for

example, using 100 as a number, and the jury would say that

40 of that is railroad and 60 is smoking, we’re only

responsible for 40 percent; and that’s just common sense

and logic.

I mean, certainly the railroad would not be responsible for

injury caused by someone’s fault anymore than it would be

caused by someone shot himself in the hand, you know.

THE COURT: Although—and this is an entirely separate

issue, but unless I’m mistaken you're going to have a witness

that says that the specific Plaintiffs are suffering from

smokers disease—

71

MR. ADKINS: Emphysema.

rh... ae —and the Plaintiffs are going to have

tnesses are going to ‘ i

pe os going to say that they’re suffering from

[162] MR. ADKINS: —and emphysema.

THE COURT: Okay. That’s my point.

MR. ADKINS: Now, | agree, if there’s a di

i Ae ’ . a dispute t

there $ going to be a dispute as to degree, I mean __ sspsaie

THE COURT: That doesn’t have anything to do with—

P MR. ADKINS: I understand, Your Honor. So the appor-

ionment, clearly we re not responsible. I mean, that can’t, |

mean, that can’t be the law and it’s not the law that the

railroad is responsible for someone smoking.

THE COURT: No, correct.

P MR. ADKINS: So if the doctor testifies that all of his

yen a re by smoking, another doctor testifies

that none of it, jury is going to i

if they want to decide part— ea eee

THE COURT: None of this i

question of fault. n anyway relates to this

MR. ADKINS: I agree.

THE COURT: Other cases have shown this.

i" = nay cng Well, you’re right. The only [163] thing I

paemageh et on the other cases and settlement is, I think in

oO Jury understanding and knowing what’s going

on, that, and I understand the Court can make sure that

someone doesn’t recover twice for the same thing, so we’re

entitled to a setoff. But I think in order for the jury to

know that there are other cases pending these same

individuals for the same disease process. ad

72

ime i ; where we

We do this all the time in these cases we have; w

ask them. We did it in the discovery depositions that we -

of these individuals, that they were part of Mon Mass Il or I ,

whatever the number was up there. And that’s all we’re going

to ask them. a

i i —well, in

We are going to ask them if they got—well, '

deposition we did ask them that they—if they got com

pensation and the answer was I don’t remember or I don't

know, or I don’t know how much. But I don’t intend to get

into that part of it. Only to ask them if they have a lawsuit

pending or if it’s been dismissed, why, for the same—

THE COURT: Why?

MR. ADKINS: Why? So the jury understands [164]

what’s going on with these Plaintiffs. It’s part of why you ask

any of these questions, I guess. :

You know, for the jury it’s relative information about what

the Plaintiffs have done. It might be relevant on the statute of

limitations as to why they filed the suit up there.

THE COURT: Why?

MR. ADKINS: Well, because as to when they knew or

should’ve known that they had a disease process. I don’t

know when that case was filed in relation to the statute, so

until we hear their answer we don’t know.

THE COURT: It still doesn’t have anything to do with

whether they made claims against somebody else.

MR. ADKINS: I think all these cases were filed first

down here.

MR. RION: All these cases were filed first down here.

MR. ADKINS: Well, whatever, but the point is I ought to

be able to inquire about it is all I’m saying, Judge. I don’t

know what their answers are.

73

THE COURT: I’m going to grant the [165] Plaintiffs

motion. I think it’s complete rhetoric.

How about this issue of come back for cancer?

Let me just—this is a pure seat of pants, but the one case

we've got is the Bethany College case and my understanding

from it would be that if an additional disease manifests itself

after there’s been a recovery by settlement or verdict that

you're stuck in West Virginia. We’re a one cause of action

State and it’s not been specifically addressed. And the

question is do we—is that something we decided here today?

MR. RION: That's really my point is that it’s not right,

Judge. There’s no clear guidance and it’s not really in a

posture where it can and should be decided, so—J mean, I’d

like from an advocate standpoint, to be able to stand-up say,

this is our last chance. This is all we get.

I’m sure Fred would like to say, oh, they can come back if

they get cancer. In a way he’d like to say that, but on the

other hand you've got the impact passed [sic] this case, and in

some instances the client may not want him to Say it because

he’d be stuck with it and everything.

* ¢ * &

[232] with occupational disease under FELA, later also

brought those type of claims under recovery to the Boiler

Inspection Act in limited circumstances.

THE COURT: I'll read your memoranda. If I need

anything else I’ll let you know.

MR. BAKER: Okay.

MR. RION: On the other things we’ve got here, I think, I

can’t remember if you ruled on the other.

THE COURT: I will. Are there any other issues that the

Plaintiffs want to take up now that we’ve got some time that

are not just related to opening statements?

74

MR. RION: I think our motions in limine cover everything

that we want to cover. I guess that one other point that was

raised in the argument that I don’t think is—that you're not

going to really need to decide, excuse me, until the instruction

phase that I can introduce now, and that’s simply that we

disagree with Mr. Adkins’ contention that, Number One, that

smoking is contributory fault in these cases; and, Number

Two, that the Rogers case stands for anything other than the

proposition that the FELA causation [233] standard is does

the railroad’s negligence contribute, however slightly, to the

injury, and I don’t think I need to argue that.

You have the case, Your Honor. If you would just read it I

don’t think there would be any question in your mind

whatever. Once you read it the question—the debate is does it

apply to how much negligence or how much cause; and Mr.

Adkins says it’s how much negligence and I say it’s how

much cause, and Your Honor can read the case and make

that decision.

I think the form jury instruction, pattern jury instruction in

FELA cases says the railroad’s responsible if it’s negligence

contributes, however slightly, to an employee’s injury.

THE COURT: Mr. Boiter, you snagged my copy of

Rogers.

MR. ADKINS: Judge, read Dale versus B&O, which is a

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania case. It’s an asbestos case.

It’s this very issue—it was denied to the U.S. Supreme Court

on this issue. It deals with smoking and the fact that the

railway is not responsible for any disease process other than

what was caused by asbestos related exposure. It’s not a—

[234] THE COURT: Dale?

MR. ADKINS: Dale versus B&O, and | think we have a

copy of it here we can give to you.

MR. BAKER: I'll go make you a copy right now if

you'd like.

75

MR. RION: And I agree with—

THE COURT: Do you know if it’s j

sauna yo w if it’s just attached to

MR. BAKER: I didn’t—we haven’t filed a motion on this.

That’s a f |

ref Poy ba Lenape Smith versus New Jersey Transit

THE COURT: Is it Dale?

roe 4 RION: I agree they Properly represent what Dale

says. I just think it’s an aberration and it is in conflict with the

Rogers case, and there are a number, I believe, Mr. Boiter

you cited a case that says smoking is not contributory fault in

a pneumoconiosis case, didn’t you?

MR. BOITER: The Farmer case.

MR. RION: Yes, and it comes back to the general concept

Judge, I think it’s proper for them to show it, but it’s,

although this is not a Texas case, this issue came up in front

of Judge Parker in the [235] Salino case, is smoking con-

tributory fault in an asbestos case? And his ruling was that it

can be and I agree that it can be under certain circumstances.

Number One, you’ve got to show that smoki

_ Num e, moking caused th

injury in question, and that would apply, rer in a Sein

cancer case most clearly. So, the one point that we have is

smoking doesn’t cause asbestosis.

. Second, you've got to prove that the Plaintiff was careless

in his smoking with regards to asbestos, so you’ve got to

show some level of knowledge of the Plaintiff about the

Synergistic effect, and that was—we can get you Judge

\ Parker’s instruction.

Jane, can you call the office and j

. get Judge Parker’s

instruction on contributory fault of smoking? We think ia és

absence, and I don’t think there’s any here in the absence. of

some kind of proof about the synergistic effect.

76

It’s, you know, in a way some other trial Judges in other

jurisdictions, Judge, you can almost analogize to, if I get in an

automobile wreck—this is the most extreme example, but it

sort of makes a point. If I’m an alcoholic and have a bad liver

and I [236] get in an automobile wreck and have trauma to

my abdomen, the fact that I’m careless in drinking is really

not contributory fault with regard to that accident. Unless I —

was drinking when I was driving.

But if I’m a former alcoholic with a damaged liver who

gets stomach trauma, the fact that I was careless in drinking is

carelessness, but it’s not contributory fault with regard to

an accident.

The same thing concept. Of course, it can go both ways. |

mean, the decisions that I’ve seen in cases I’ve tried have

been all over the board. Judge Watt, for example, permitted it

in lung cancer cases, but not in asbestosis cases.

Other Judges have—there have been some Judges won't

even permit it in a lung cancer case. Then you've got Judge

Parker’s view is a little bit more in the middle of the road. He

permits it, but it has a different—

THE COURT: I ruled on, but it’s been forever since I’ve

done it because we’ve tried damage cases. I can’t remember

how I dealt with it, except that—

MR. ADKINS: I understand that FELA is a [237] little

different, Judge, but I can’t believe that anybody—that the

law would even consider a concept that says that if you can

prove that something, some damage was not caused by a

particular Defendant, that that Defendant is responsible for

that. I mean, if that’s what the law is.

THE COURT: No, no, no. Oh, no, but that may be an on

and off switch.It may be a jury’s responsibility to determine

between competing experts whether the man has asbestosis,

which might be aggravated by the smoking, or smokers

disease.

77

If it’s smokers disease you’re not responsible.

MR. ADKINS: That’s not what they’re arguing, Judge.

They’re sayi if it’ i

I a that only if it’s a smoking disease and

THE COURT: No, I think what they’re arguing is that it’s

not a place for comparative fault if it is a sole proximate

cause. It’s a different story all together.

. pone ADKINS: Okay, if I understand what you’re saying

is, the damage aspect of it, the jury could apportion that. For

example, if—and I don’t [238] kn

but that’s the problem. _ wre how you would do this,

If it’s—say it’s 50/50 and the j |

jury says, you know, it’s

$100.00. Now, as I understand, if the total damage is $100.00,

then we’re only responsible for $50 i i

pene: .00 of it. See, is that what

THF COURT: Well, 50/50 you don’t pay anything.

MR. ADKINS: Well, no, Judge, this is FELA again.

MR. RION: Okay, it’s pure com i i

1 tive. M

be, Judge, that the smoking— mn ae

oe one a me interrupt just a second and see if

can—bo sides can kind of respond

perspective is on this. Wea ce yo

I think it’s going to depend entire!

S goir y on what the docto

about each individual Plaintiff, but let’s take the poet mo

of circumstances. Gaziano Says that he’s got asbestosis and

the—your doctor says he’s got smoker’s disease.

There’s no way, under those circ j

’ umstances, a can

come up with a 50/50 split. That’s allowing i © just

ome . 4.

= — the verdict because they’ve got conflicting

78

[239] Under those circumstances the jury would simply have

to determine which of those two witnesses they want to

believe. So if the person’s condition was caused by asbestos,

then they can recover and there’s no fault attributed to them.

If smoking, on the other hand, they get nothing, period.

MR. ADKINS: But that’s not the way the evidence comes

in. As you know, is it’s going to be combination.

THE COURT: Okay, now—

MR. RION: Most of these cases we’re going to have the

Plaintiff's case will be, not for most, but some of the cases,

the Plaintiff's evidence will be that there is lung impairment

that’s caused in part by smoking and in part by asbestos.

I guess, you know, my point is, Number One, the smoking

doesn’t cause the asbestosis.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. RION: It’s a different injury and I guess, you know, I

think they should be instructed they are not to compensate

him for any injury unless asbestos was a contributing factor to

the injury.

[240] I guess where we differ is | don’t think that under the

Rogers case that the Court can send an instruction that says

what’s 100 percent of his loss for “his lung injury” and then

apportion between cigarettes and asbestos.

Although, that’s exactly what the Dale case is and | think

the Dale case is wrong if you read Rogers, and then the

only way they get a apportionment percentage, in my view,

under the FELA structure is if they prove the Plaintiff was at

fault with regard to his injury. Meaning, with regard to his

asbestos disease.

only way to prove that is that the smoking con-

. a ong the aan } mae and | think Judge Watt may

79

have been right in saying I’m only going to permit it in a lung

cancer case, because that’s where there is a causation.

And second, if he had some conduct with regard to his

asbestos disease from smoking for which he could be held at

fault. So, I think you have to show some knowledge of the

synergism. So, I would say if there’s no knowledge of the

synergism, then they’re not going to get a place on the verdict

form for a percentage.

THE COURT: Synergism doesn’t make any [241] differ-

ence in this case because we don’t have any lung cases.

MR. RION: Unless they can show some connection

between asbestosis and smoking. However, I think they’re

entitled to an instruction that you're not to compensate

somebody for any injury unless it’s caused by asbestos, and

to argue that to the extent these people’s problems are caused

by cigarette smoking they shouldn’t be compensated for that.

And I intend to also say and | think, in fact, I think Fred

would be entitled to argue, and in fact—I can remember in

the Carper case that Al Parnell was permitted to argue this,

although it wasn’t on the verdict form. That of his lung injury

60 percent—of course, 60 percent of his lung problem is due

to smoking, 40 percent’s due to asbestos and whatever you

think his total loss is, if you want to, this is one way of going

about it. You could figure out what his total loss from his

lung problem is and do that apportionment.

I think what I’m more likely to tell them is just don’t

compensate him for his COPD, that we admit he wouldn’t be

as bad off if he hadn’t have smoked and that his—

[242] THE COURT: How can the—I mean, is there going to

be some evidence from some source that the jury’s going to

be able to decide what portion of a person’s disability is

attributable to asbestosis?

80

MR. RION: I don’t think there’s going to be—no doctor's

going to sell a percentage. I mean, I don’t think anybody’s

going to give them any guidance on it. 4

That’s another objection I have to having it on the form.

There’s not going to be anybody who’s willing to say that it’s

20 percent this, 30 percent that.

I think in Mr. Spangler’s case there’s a heavy enough

smoking history that Dr. Rasmussen said he thinks more of

his total pulmonary disability is from smoking disease than

from asbestos. He’s fairly substantially impaired.

I think Dr. Gaziano will probably say he can’t say. It’s

moderately severe and he can’t sort it out. I don't think

there’s going to be any expert testimony by a doctor saying

it’s X percent this, X percent that.

s the disagreement between the parties is more a

P< of ential how do you go about [243] the

notion that the jury’s to compensate these folks for asbestos

disease and not smoking disease. I don’t think there’s really

any disagreement on that.

It’s how do you go about it. I guess the caviat [sic] is I

think if you read the Rogers case, if the jury were to find that

the pulmonary disability is an injury that totally can’t be

separated out at all and that the railroad’s conduct was d

substantial contributing factor—not a substantial contributing

factor. Contributed however slightly under the FELA stand-

ard or statutorily or in whole or in part, is how it reads.

Then in the absence of contributory fault I believe it would be

100 percent.

it 1 inj i *t sort out

If it is an injury that can’t be—that you cant sot

between the asbestos and the smoking and there’s no

contributory fault, it’s 100 percent. I do believe that.

MR. ADKINS: Judge, it’s interesting to me, just since

we're talking about this is that we’re saying the railroads are

81

negligent because they failed to warn about the dangers of

asbestos. There have been warnings on Cigarette packs, |

think, since about 1968, maybe even earlier, that warns

everybody of all the problems.

[244] Now, how can we sit here and say that without

warning on there that anybody that smokes that and has a

disease process from that is not at least contributorily

negligent?

Now, they may not be totally at fault for it because

everything else that’s involved in that, but to say that, you

know, on one hand you’re saying to the railroad you didn’t

put a warning. You didn’t tell these men that exposure to

asbestos would cause lung disease.

Yet, there’s a warning right here with the cigarette in their

hand on the pack saying it could cause emphysema. It can

cause, you know, low birth rate for women, et cetera, et

cetéra, et cetera, and to say that that at least is not negligence

or contributory negligence on their part, I don’t understand

how we can say that.

THE COURT: Well, you could say that if you ultimately

tell the jury that they don’t compensate him for any of the

smoking related injury.

MR. ADKINS: Okay, we’re talking about the same thing.

THE COURT: Well, I’m not sure we are and [245] the

reason is—I mean, the reason why we get—why this is a

confusing issue is because we’ve got different injuries to the

same worker. If we’re talking about somebody that cut a leg

off and a hand off, that’s a lot easier to deal with.

In this particular case, because there’s so much—a doctor

can’t just go down to the cellular level and tell you what

percentage of the lung is damaged from smoking and what

percentage of it is done—damaged from asbestos, but

basically that would probably be the best way to approach it.

82

So it isn’t a question of fault, it’s a question to the extent to

which damage is caused by one or the other.

Now, I just don’t know how we deal with it.

MR. ADKINS: Well, we’ve done this, Judge, in hearing

loss cases, for example. All the time in hearing loss cases you

have hearing loss caused by noise.

You have hearing loss caused by (inaudible), you have

hearing loss caused by any number of things, and the jury

hears that. And then they’re instructed, then, to find, in other

words, again, the employer, the railroad, is only responsible

for the noise induced part [246] of that.

Now, the doctors don’t come in and say it’s, you know, 10

percent (inaudible), it’s 20 percent noise at work it’s 20

percent running a power saw at home. That kind of thing.

The jury hears all the evidence-and based on that they go

out and make a finding as to what, I mean, juries do that all

the time. It’s not—it doesn’t have to be a precise thing for

them in order for them to do it.

It’s the same thing with the smoking or with whatever else

is contributing to, excluding asbestos, is contributing to

the condition that the person has in his lungs. It could

be smoking.

It could be pneumonia. It could be a lot of things. And if

the railroad didn’t cause any of those things all I’m saying is

we’re not responsible to compensate that individual for it.

To the extent that we caused damage to his lungs from

exposure to asbestos, if the jury finds us negligent, we're

responsible. There’s no issue on that. We're not contending

that there is, but that’s the whole, and how you do it is, I

guess, is really what [247] we’re maybe sort of talking about

here, how we handle that with the jury.

83

THE COURT: Yeah, I think that’s probably correct.

MR. RION: Judge, I’ve got to discount

| " one—-sort of one

parting notion here that we took up. It goes back to this

comparative fault issue.

If you take a lung cancer case let’s say the manufacturing

context—or let's say the gentleman quit smoking in 1965, so

there’s no question of comparative fault, and he has a lung

cancer synergistically caused by asbestos and smoking. It’s

not the whole cause, but it’s a substantial contributing factor

It meets the legal standard, whatever that might be. |

I think in those cases fairly clearly because you can’t

apportion out some relative contribution and because there’s

no comparative fault, if my Plaintiff proves his causation he’s

entitled to 100 percent of his damages under the Joint Several

Liability Concept of West Virginia law.

: would say if you read the Rogers case, and I’m going to

as = to just read Rogers and read Dale and I think you'll

see that they’re—I just think [248] they’re inconsistent unless

you've got separate injuries.

But, I mean, so if you’ve got a unified single inj

: gle injury that’s

simply can’t be viewed separately, then if the railroad’s

ae _ ret standard and contributes, we get 100

our loss in the absence of f of i

of contributory fault. ———

Although, again, | mean, the obvious thing is if, you know,

Wr a Cat wreck and hurt my arm and then get in a train

urt ,

ly my leg, the railroad doesn’t have to pay for

MR. ADKINS: And I don’t have to pay for the part of the

arm that was damaged as a result of the first wreck. I’m not

responsible for the aggravation of the preexisting condition

not for the preexisting condition. So under his—under his

84

example there, clearly I’m only responsible for the part of the

arm that I additionally injured.

The preexisting part I’m not responsible for.

THE COURT: Let me look at the cases and Ill tell you

before we get started the first thing in

85

TRIAL TRANSCRIPT

April 15, 1998

Brody Testimony

[71] and Blood Institute, the National Institute of Envir-

onmental Health Sciences, and the National Institute of

Allergy and Infectious Disease also support my work.

Q_ And you’re doing research primarily on what subject?

A My work is to try to understand how inhaled particles,

like asbestos, for example, cause scar tissue in the lung and

cause cancer.

Q___ What is the ultimate goal of that research?

A Well, all of this research that’s funded by the National

Institutes of Health, the goal is to develop an understanding

of the disease so it can be treated. So, hopefully, it can be

blocked, at least, help the individual who’s inflicted with

the disease.

Q Currently, is there an effective treatment for

asbestosis?

A There is not.

Q And—but, you’re one of the scientific researchers

who’s trying to find a cure?

A That’s correct.

Q_ Are you a medical doctor or are you a Ph.D. doctor?

77> *+ *¢ &

[98] gas exchange region of the lung.

Q_ Wait a minute, I’ve got something I want to ask you,

the smaller fibers that can actually get into the lung?

A Right.

Q_ Are they visible to the naked eye?

A_ No, not at all.

Q_ So, the fibers that actually get in your lung and do

a Oe oom om ares ae SY GEE WD Oe

naked eye?

A That’s correct.

Okay.

But i add to this dusty atmosphere, though. If we

get enough small fibers kind of backing up on one another

they can refract light and add to what looks like a dusty

environment, but the individual particles, if you can see them,

they’re not (inaudible), but if it’s asbestos, that means that if

there are particles that you can see, like this (indicating), then

that means there are thousands of them.

Q So, there’ll be evidence later in the trial that a

gentleman named Dr. Meriwether wrote, way back in the

1930's, that if asbestos—let’s just stick with asbestos, that if

asbestos is in a concentration in [99] the air where you can

see dust in the air, then, in his words, the invisible particle

must be in dangerous concentration. Is that still true in

modern science?

A That’s exactly what I’m saying. That’s correct.

Q Because Dr. Meriwether said that in 1938. In your

opinion, based on today’s state of the art science, that would

still be true?

A That is correct.

; ~_ 4 next slide, then, I’m going to show you what

happens when an aerosol of this dust is inhaled. And so, here,

for now, we’re going back to the lung, and you recognize

where we are now because you’re all experts of the

microanatomy of the lung. So, here we are at the end of the

terminal bronchial where it opens into the gas exchange area

and all these little air spaces are, and in the next slide I'm

going to show you this area of the lung right here (indicating)

immediately after that hour of exposure.

So, we’re going to focus in right here (indicating) and now

you can see the fibers. You see here’s a lung (indicating) and

then one’s sticking up like this (indicating). There’s a curly

one right here

87 7

[109] A_ Right, well, this is what we call—or what the

doctor’s call abnormalities of gas diffusion, where a diffusing

capacity becomes compromised, and that means that—it

simply means that you cannot move oxygen and carbon

dioxide as efficiently through an area that has scar tissue in it

as you can under normal conditions.

Q Once the lung becomes compromised, or injured,

from scar tissue .n that area—

A Yes.

Q —is there anyway to reverse that process, once it

becomes sufficiently compromised that you have detectable

abnormalities and gas exchange, clinically, is there anyway to

reverse or cure that process today?

A Not that I know of, no. I mean, the cells that are living

here, actually, you can see them right here (indicating), they

live in this connective tissue space. They keep the lungs with

a very normal balance of connective tissue.

They’re called fibroblast, F-I-B-R-O-B-L-A-S-T. The

fibroblast makes the connective tissue on your skin, or your

liver, or your lungs. It’s the same cell, and it’s—and when it

[110] confronts asbestos it makes scar tissue.

Just how depends on how much asbestos you're getting

into. Now, you remember, the macrophages was supposed to

have been here to clean up this mess, and they try to do that

as contact out on the surface of the lung, and I show you one,

two, three, four, five macrophages and some asbestos coming

down here. They’re sharing asbestos fibers with one another.

So, they’ve come—they’ ve actually—in my laboratory we’ve

discovered the signal thai calls the macrophages into find the

asbestos fibers.

It’s a chemical signal that they use to find the fiber, and

they pick them up and they do clear off large numbers of

them, but in an individual, an animal or a human, that gets too

many fibers, they’re not able to clean them off sufficiently to

prevent disease.

a

88

; _ 89

Okay, I’m going to talk about lung injury and then what indicati ;

happens in people in the next few minutes. a por taper tay and oa at it to know that there

, . S right.

Me ah phan. be pes agp Medhnadhny ~* “om Ph ann — here is that what is in this scar, this pink

; i

ao berg ag 7 page just showed = the —— tissue. That's w Bo ince (indicating), it’s connective

(indicating) DS cr ln -yeyealtery A wthyoondhorr Purple dots are the fibroblasts that make the rer, litle

and if ws , cs ; ve the macrophages. € the connective tissue,

lente ine ere’s the macrophage right here (ind;

ere '

[115] here’s the tube right here (indicating). ak ay ag ( indicating) that nemetunw

out.

Instead of the walls being absolutely normal like this this tissue that ae are also asbestos fibers imbedded in

(indicating) they have the scar tissue, and the scar tissue runs to show you, but we’ve p oe electron mi

. . . , a — ,

all the way down the walls near these ducts (indicating), you We've shows te we ve shown that

can see. It should look like this (indicating), instead it looks ene ttn d t. So, this is just—this is fro

like this (indicating). ur. Now, if you keep it, as I said, o 8 Sage

‘the scar is spread out, and let m °€P exposing, then

Okay, now, at the ends of all of these airways you see these looks like in a person who’s been € show you, then, what it

scars coming out from the asbestos. Now, does this animal— time, so— exposed continuously over

is this animal going to be short of breath? No. Is this animal Q This;

going to come to the clinic? No. If I kept exposing him these 's ts human lung here (indicating)?

scars would eventually extend out into the rest of the lung and ** © «

he would have diffuse interstitial fibrosis asbestosis. [418] Here’s the airspace (j ndicating), H

Q That’s a—this is a good point to ask this question. In _ Wall over here (indicating) 8). Here's the thin normal

this understanding of this area, Dr. Brocy, in a human, how Here’s another aj i ia it

much of the lung has to be damaged by this scarring process wall (indicating), and a , a pare and here’s a thick

before it typically begins to show up on chest x-ray at scar? Now, I can actual! ‘In the rat, what’s in this

the clinic? thi laily make the is of asbestosis ;

clinic 1S person by answering what’s in this tosis in

We ong are Wolf of, Fino te tines pg

an 5-t8y that he was exposed to asbestos He io a

° lungs. tage. ‘ Scar ti

Q So, you may have ten or twenty percent of your lung This ig 9 YOu See this pink material back here (indicanmen

that’s already affected by asbestos and [116] there would be (indicat; Scar tissue. He has asbestos fibers j -

no effect on x-ray? ig). m hove

A That’s correct. You wouldn’t be able to see it. You’d Do you see this right here (indicating)? This is call

; Is ed an

have to actually open the lung and take a section out like this asbestos body. There’s another one right here (indi

indicating).

90

These are all microfibers and fiberglass that made connective

tissue. This person has asbestosis. *

Q Now, can smoking cause fibrosis in the lungs that you

would get confused with asbestosis?

A No, certainly not. What, actually, smoking causes a

very different pattern. Smoking can give you some scars at

the ends of these airways but they don’t become diffuse out

into the lung. In fact, what happens is, the lung tissue actu-

ally breaks down [119] out here in smokers rather than

getting scarred.

Q That’s a different pattern?

A It’s a different pattern, that’s correct. Okay, so, I’ve

made the diagnosis of asbestosis in this person. I have a

one final summary slide that explains just what happened

now. So, here’s a typical medical textbook illustration of

asbestosis.

So, here’s a person that’s been exposed for a long period of

time. Here’s the whole lung, as you can see, and then there’s

this white material infiltrating the lung (indicating). This is

scar tissue, and if I were to take a little piece of this tissue out

and go backwards from the way I just was, you would see it

like this (indicating), and if I went farther back, you would

see the electron micrographs of it so you'd know exactly what

the lung looks like; and this person, then, has the scar tissue

infiltrating the lung, and he has what’s called the stiff lurg.

He also has scarring of the pleura.

Q Medically, the doctors use a different term for this

scarring in the pleura versus this scarring on the inside

the lungs? .

A Right. This scarting on the inside of the lung, if it’s

caused by asbestos, is asbestosis. If [120] you have scarring

out here in the pleura it’s generally called pleural fibrosis, and

if it’s circumscribed and just—actually, you can see it over

here on the surface of the lung (indicating), following the

pattern of the ribs, it’s called pleural plaque.

91

There’s a plaque. It’s a circumscri

8 ribed area of scarring, and

that s what’s shown over here (indicating), and this is Thnsee

diffuse pattern and this is a plaque.

Q Now, we can separate asbestosi

» We Stosis scarring inside th

lung and then diff ~ ining

p> arse ifferent asbestos pleural changes on the lining

A Yeah. You can separate th

| em anatomically, but th

a is the same. I mean, it’s still a result of “a A Aa

ee ts from injury. Okay, and then, finally, this is what the

ung actually looks like in a worker (indicating).

Here’s that scar tissue

ipvmeadh , you see as infiltrating the lun

er — : a pleural thickening right here (indi

’ Is :

cohen individual’s lung would surely cause a lung

Q Let me ask you this, Dr. Brod

, Dr. y, Can—can you have

worker who works around asbestos and breaths 2 atta

dust for, say, ten or fifteen [121]

, Say, years, and th

retire and have a normal chest X-ray? Bitvadid

- Sure, it’s possible.

And he later developed scarrin S Visi

g that’s visible on chest

X-ray, even though he’s retired and doesn’t

showing up when he retires? To

A Right, that’s called i

, progression. That

disease gets worse even after exposure has Pony cei

Q How can that happen that he develops more scarring

even after he’s retired and no longer works around asbest

how can that be? in

A The reason is because th

he re ere are asbestos fibe

sega in this connective tissue plain of the lung “a =

ong as there are asbestos fibers in that plain they will

continue to cause a reaction that can cause the disease itself

It doesn’t happen in everybod i

, certain

4 vith ag 2 “ : inly, but it has been

92

‘ i for the fact

When we say—what’s the medical term

P. somebody can be exposed to asbestos for decades and

yet it may not show up on chest x-ray until ten years after

they retire? :

H That’s called latency, and asbestosis [122] has a—you

have a latency of anywhere from ten to fifty years. It ~—

just depends on how much the person’s been exposed to an

their natural—their idiosyncrasy, their susceptibility.

Q Does that pretty much take care of asbestosis?

A Right.

Q Have you done any research, Dr. Brody, on the

question of how asbestos can cause cancer?

A Yes, I have.

Q Have you done research on whether asbestos

cancer?

ar No. When I started my work that was established, and

as I’ve done here, more interested in the process rather than

hether or not it causes it.

7 Q My understanding, when you came on the picture as a

medical researcher, there was no need to look at —

asbestos caused cancer because everybody understood that’

A That’s correct, but it doesn’t mean all the questions

were answered. I mean, there is epidemiology to do, you have

to know how much, but whether or not it causes it 1s not

my problem. . .

Q And you are looking at the precise

A = That’s correct. ' ’

“? Can—we sort of looked at the mechanism by which

that happens. Dr. Brody, you mentioned when you began

doing this research it was established that asbestos ay ..

fact, cause cancer in humans. Are you familiar = :

human epidemiology on the cancer risk, or persons who have

the disease, asbestosis?

A_ Yes, I’ve seen that literature.

93

Q___Let’s—maybe, we can turn the lights on and—

A This one up here.

Q_ Yes, sir. Dr. Brody, I’m going to write up here

(indicating) the two major forms of cancer caused by asbestos

that we’ve discussed, mesothelioma and lung cancer, and in

the studies you’ve reviewed, Dr. Brody, for people who’ve

been diagnosed with the disease—excuse me, asbestosis,

what is the percentage of deaths attributable to mesothelioma

in the mortality studies?

A Mesothelioma?

Qs Yes, sir.

A __ I’ve seen around ten percent in a couple of different

Studies. So that means that ten percent of [133] the people

who have the disease, asbestosis, have died of mesothelioma.

Q ‘Among asbestosis patients who are smokers, or for-

mer smokers, what is the lung cancer rate, first of all, meso-

thelioma, smoking has nothing to do with the risk, correct?

A That’s right. :

Q_ That’s just asbestos. In a lung cancer it’s a com-

bination of smoking and asbestos?

A That’s correct.

Q_ Fair enough. On—I’ve got a couple of the studies—or

two of the studies, Doctor, that you have reviewed in this

area. Does that include the studies by Mr.—Dr. Coots and

Dr. Berry on mortality of workers diagnosed by a

pneumoconiosis panel?

A I think I’ve seen those.

Q_ Take a look and see if these are two of them.

A _ Right, the Coot study is from 1987 which is relatively

recent in this field, and the other one is from Jeffrey Berry.

Actually, Jeffrey Berry was the person I worked with when I

first went to Wales and the United Kingdom.

That’s where he’s from. He’s published this [134] in the

British Journal of Industrial Medicine in 1981, and I believe

this paper showed a similar kind of percent.

94

Q_Let’s do both of them. On mesothelioma what did Dr.

Coots show?

A About ten percent.

Q Ten percent, and what did Dr. Berry show? .

A I believe it was quite close. I think it was nine, ten

percent. Something like that.

Q Do you got the—? = -

A I’m looking. Yes, well, here he says increased wit

percentage of disability”. He doesn’t name the exact percent

- but he says it’s increased.

Coots actually gives ten percent as a number. ‘

Q Allright, on lung cancer, Coots gives what percent:

A About thirty-nine percent.

MR. ADKINS: Is that with—excuse me, is that with

smoking, Doctor?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

BY MR. RION:

Q In individuals who are smokers, Dr. Brody, who were

not asbestosis patients, do you see [135] anything close to the

forty percent lung cancer rates in smokers who do not have

asbestosis?

A No, I’m sure it’s much less than that.

Q Do we have a figure on what Dr. Berry found for

lung cancer?

A Yes, it was actually the same. I don’t know what

the standard deviations were, but, again, it was about thirty-

ine ent.

ye Q ge percent. That’s a pretty consistent

result, though?

A That’s right.

Q_ Again, > are—the lung cancer risks were dealing

with asbestosis patients who are smokers?

A That’s my understanding.

;

95

Q__ Well, if you combine these two risks, the risk of either

mesothelioma or lung cancer, combined, approaches fifty

percent, although it’s not quite that?

A That’s right.

Q_ That’s not just with anybody exposed to asbestos,

that’s for those who have the disease asbestosis?

A That’s right, meaning they’ve had the [136] high»st

kinds of exposure.

Q__In your opinion, are those who are exposed but do not

have the disease asbestosis also have an increased risk of both

of these diseases?

A_ Well, they do, quite clearly, have an increased risk. It

doesn’t reach these levels but it does—they certainly have an

increased risk.

Q Dr. Brody, when you leave Tulane and travel like this

to testify in Court do you charge for your time?

A Certainly.

Q_ And what’s your hourly rate for this type work?

A Three hundred dollars per hour.

Q_ Have you testified in Court before regarding your

asbestos research?

A Yes, I have.

Q___Do you know how many times?

A Oh, it’s something—maybe a dozen times a year.

Something like that.

Q_ Has that been, on most occasions, at the request of

lawyers who represent victims?

A Most of the time, yes.

Q The first time you ever testified in a

* * *& *&

[147] background, is what we’re talking about. The back-

ground of people who are not occupationally exposed.

Q_ Well, could people that are not occupationally

exposed have more than a million?

96

A __ It’s possible but a million seems to be about the upper

limit that’s been established.

Q Okay, and, how many grams of lung do we have; how

much would a lung weigh?

A Well, lungs weigh about four pounds. There’s four

hundred and fifty four grams in a pound, so about four times

what your—

Q So we'd have probably over a trillion fibers in our

lungs? And if I understand you right on your direct exam-

ination, then, from what Mr. Rion asked you, then, a trillion

fibers if, I guess, of asbestos, then, would fit into a thimble, is

that what you’re saying?

A Easily.

Q And, the people—all of us that are not occupation-

ally exposed to asbestos are normally healthy individuals,

aren’t they?

A [hope so.

Q You’re not saying that everyone occupationally

exposed to asbestos fibers is going to [148] get asbestosis?

A Certainly not.

Q And it’s not gonna make them sick and it’s not going

to make them go to a doctor, necessarily?

A Not necessarily, no.

Q People that are occupationally exposed, it is variable

as to how they’re exposed, some people might be exposed

heavily, some might be exposed by lightly, and sort of even

in the same environment; isn’t that true?

A _ That’s true.

Q And you’re not saying that a single asbestos fiber in

the lungs is going to cause asbestosis, are you?

A Notatall.

Q You cannot testify to a reasonable degree of

medical—scientific certainty that any particular person ex-

posed to asbestos will develop either—any of these cancers or

asbestos that you’ve talked about?

A I cannot say specifically, no.

97

Q Also, in terms of pro

‘ gression, asbestosis does

always progress, does it? not

A That’s correct.

*_* * &

[150] A. Now, you’ve got the ion ri

_A. . question right,

smoking in the first one. Yes. oo genio

Q_ I'msorry.

A In

a.m. — who are exposed to asbestos who smoke,

Q My point is, though, if

‘ » 1f you are a nonsmoker and

you re exposed to asbestos occupational! i

cancer is less than two; isn’t it? —

Ml In — cases—it’s small. I’m not sure, less than two

me say five percent, but certainly it’s signi

rte ter dag y it's significantly less

Q So it would appear here that tha

t confound

problem here is smoking; is that— uae

A The point is that cigarette use

, plus asbestos exposure

— a synergy. That means, you don’t just add to the affect,

affect is multiplied. So, you take the affect of Cigarette use

—_ which causes along a thirty-fold increase, plus

~ — you don’t o Just an increase of that small asbestos

ung, you get this multiplicati i i

pattie plicative effect which takes it

Q_ Right. And that fifty-fold increase i

fact that the person is smoking? ane ty Ge

*_ *+ * «&

98

TRIAL TRANSCRIPT

April 15, 1998

Vance Testimony

* * * *

[169] THEREUPON CAME,

CLIFFORD VANCE

who, having been first duly sworn according to law, testified

follows

B98 DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. BOITER:

Q Good afternoon, Mr. Vance, how are you?

A All right. it

Q Okay. Are you a little nervous about testifying?

A Probably. /

Q Have ad actually ever testified in a Court of Law

before?

A No. ere |

Q Well, I’m going let you—the first thing I’m going to

get you to do, if you don’t mind, is tell the jury youf full

name.

A Clifford Oscar Vance.

Q Are you married, Mr. Vance?

A Yes, sir.

Q What is s your wife’s name?

A Edra.

THE COURT: If you would, please, sir, why don’t you

pull that microphone down just a little bit [170] closer?

THE WITNESS: All righty. I don’t talk too loud anyway.

THE COURT: Can you hear okay, folks? Go ahead.

BY MR. BOITER:

Q How long have the two of you been married?

99

A I believe it’s fifty-six years, this November—coming

November.

Q Is Mrs. Vance actually in court with you today?

A_ No, sir.

Q Is she just physically unable to be here?

A Well, I can’t say she wouldn’t be able to be here, but

it would disturb the way she takes her medication and stuff.

and it would be hard on her.

Q Did the two of you have any children?

A Yes, sir. We have twin boys and a daughter.

QI believe you told me last night it was kind of a

surprise when the two of you had twins?

A _ Yes, sir. My granddaughter’s got twins [171] already.

Q Where do you and your wife live?

A_ We live in between Bluefield and Princeton, in the

Glenwood area.

Q_ And about how long have you-all lived there?

A About three years this past December.

Q_ Where did you live before that?

A We lived down next to (inaudible) address, but we

lived on about six acres.

Q Would you tell the members of the jury how far you

went in school?

I completed the ninth grade.

Where did you actually go to school?

laeger, West Virginia.

Is that where you were born?

Yes, sir.

How old are you, sir?

Seventy-seven this past February.

Were you ever in the military?

No, sir.

Did you ever volunteer for the military and were

turned down? :

A Yes, sir.

[172] Q Why do you think you were turned down?

OPrOPrO>O?>O>

100

i I have a

A Well, they had a lot of things on my report.

valvular heart disease, and some—I don’t know what all they

did have on it, but, anyhow, what it - erngeometin need I

only weighed 110 pounds and was six foot, one inc t

Q Have you ever been diagnosed with a heart problem

since then?

No, sit.

One hundred and ten pounds, and six feet one?

Six feet one, with bright red hair.

Growing up, did you ever smoke?

Yes, sir.

When did you stop smoking?

I would say in the middle of the late *30s.

You stopped smoking in °85 and haven't smoked

, right?

Yes, sir.

Did you ever try to quit prior to 1985?

Yes, sir. it

You just weren’t successful until ’85?

That’s correct.

[173] Q Tell the jury when it was that you first started

working for Norfolk and Western Railroad. .

A I started to work for Norfolk and Western Railroad on

the 4th day of November, 1942. .

Q What was the date when you graduated from high

school?

A I didn’t graduate.

Q Well, ninth grade, I’m sorry.

A Around, I'd say °35.

Q What did you do between ’35 and °42 when you went

to work for the railroad?

A I drove a coal truck a little bit. House coal, back then,

was very popular, a two ton of coal. So, I drove a small dump

truck and just worked in a grocery store or whatever I could

find just to make an honest living.

>POPOP>RBO>FOPO>O>

101

Q Just sort of odd job type stuff during that period

of time? 7

A Yes, just whatever somebody wanted.

Q_ Were there any jobs in that period of time that you

believe you worked where you would’ve been exposed

to asbestos?

A No.

Q_ So you started to work at the railroad [174] in °42;

how long did you work for them, when did you retire?

A I retired—I had, actually, almost thirty-three years,

and I retired April 3, in 81. I was cut off in the 70s.

Q_ So you think you worked from °42 to ’81 but you

were cut off for about seven years in between?

A Yes.

Q’ When you went to work at the railroad in 1942, what

shop facility did you start working in?

A I started in the pump house. They would pump water

up to the tank, and mixing the chemicals to treat it, and that’s

about all I did for the first couple of months.

Q That probably wasn’t a real good question. Let me ask

it to you this way, what railroad yard did you actually start

working in?

A _laeger.

Q Okay. So you went to work in laeger in the pump

house?

A Yes, sir.

Q How long did you actually work in the pump house

when you started at laeger?

A Oh, a couple of months.

(175) Q What was the mixing of the chemicals that you

were doing actually for, what were you actually doing?

A They had chemicals that was to treat the water and

keep it from foaming so bad, and keep down corrosion, and I

can’t tell you what all that they were. But they had a big old

tub with a peddle in it and you added so much of this, that

102

and the other, to get your mixture just right so it could be

pumped in with the water.

Q_ While you were on the job at the pump house for

those two weeks, do you know or do you believe you were

exposed to any asbestos products?

A I don’t think so. Not that I know of.

Q_ After you left the pump house, where did you go

from there?

A __I went over to the shop, which is all the same place,

but just went across the tracks.

Q Is that still at laeger?

A Yes, sir.

Q_ Was it in the roundhouse, was there more than one

shop or was it just a roundhouse, or what?

A What we call a running track which inspected the

engines, and we had what you call the dead [176] track of two

tracks in the roundhouse, and my job at that time was to clean

up the roundhouse. If they had to remove a jacket on the

steam engine or something then they’d have asbestos to clean

up; brake shoes and whatever.

Q_ Were they parallel lines that just run up to a long

straight building; is that how it worked?

A __ It was more or less a roundhouse with a machine shop

in part of it, and it just—it just held one steam engine. It was

built for one steam engine on two tracks.

One on each track?

Yeah, one on each track.

About how far apart were the two tracks?

Possibly twenty or twenty-five feet, something like

of >o>re

You said one was a running track and one was a dead

track. Explain to the jury what the difference is between a

running track and a dead track. .

A A running track is where we service the steam engines

from each stage of work, and it would be inspected and the

brake shoes, and see that there’s nothing seriously wrong with

103

them—if they was able to make another tri

er trip. And the dead

a where we [177] knocked the fire out of the engines

he y came in to do a monthly inspection, or something

happened that you had to wash them out.

They had to be washed out once a month and checked out

real . good, the boilers and leaks repaired—minor leaks

repaired, Just minor problems. In the shop where I worked

we didn t do any heavy work. Usually the minor leaks was

repaired. Just minor problems was repaired there, usually in

one day. Sometimes we’d run into two days. ) ”

Pa. | During the period of time when you were a laborer in

~ seg what was a typical day like; can you describe

. + ,ury sort of what you’d do during the course of a day?

. I used to—after I came to the first shift, I usually went

out and serviced the Passengers and coaches. We had a

Passenger train up until 49. Cleaned them out inside, just the

ery cleaned them out, did what | could for about an hour.

ced them up, the coolers. At that time you used ice in the

coolers, you di

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