Petitioners Brief — Dead Sea Bromine Co., Ltd. v. Patrickson

Supreme Court brief2003

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

ee eee ret Sa

Suaeeiie LOW, UD.

FILED

yy AUG 23 2002

No. 01-594 of

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

DEAD SEA BROMINE CO., LTD. and BROMINE

COMPOUNDS LIMITED,

Petitioners,

v.

GERARDO DENNIS PATRICKSON, et ai.,

Respondents.

On Writ oF CERTIORARI TO THE

Unitep States Court OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

Tuomas C. WALSH PeTeR R. PADEN

James F. BENNETT Counsel of Record

Bryan Cave LLP Puitip E. KARMEL

One Metropolitan Square LAURENCE A. HorvaTH

St. Louis, Missouri 63102 Bryan Cave LLP

1290 Avenue of the Americas

Georce W. BRANDT

Lyons, BRANDT, Cook

& HIRAMATSU

1800 Davis Pacific Center

841 Bishop Street

Honolulu, Hawaii 96813

Attorneys for Petitioners

175858 g

COUNSEL PRESS

(800) 274-3321 + (800) 359-6859

New York, New York 10104

(212) 541-2000

Nee

iy > Ng sO Bi er C,

er rn ae

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (the “FSIA” or

“Act”) establishes the ground rules for claims against a

foreign state and, also, an “agency or instrumentality of a

foreign state.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a), 1603(a). The term

“agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” is defined in

pertinent part as “any entity . . . a majority of whose shares

or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state... .”

Id. § 1603(b)(2).

The Court granted the petition for a writ of certiorari to

resolve the following questions:

1. Whether a corporation is an “agency or

instrumentality” if a foreign state owns a majority of the

shares of a corporate enterprise that in turn owns a majority

of the shares of the corporation.

2. Whether a corporation is an “agency or instru-

mentality” if a foreign state owned a majority of the shares

of the corporation at the time of the events giving rise to

litigation, but the foreign state does not own a majority of

those shares at the time that a plaintiff commences a suit

against the corporation.

ii

STATEMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 29.6

Petitioners’ Rule 29.6 Statement was set forth at page ii

of their Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, and there are no

amendments to that Statement.

ili

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ...................

STATEMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 29.6 ......

TABLE OF CONTENTS ....cccccccccccccccees

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES ............

TET cntewsdsccccececocecccces

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION .............

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED .......

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................

1. The Nature of the Case and the Proceedings

DU PUMECPScESeGeeeeesseeccescccccss

ccc ccccccee

a.

The State of Israel Created DSB to

Develop and Market the State-Owned

Resources of the Dead Sea. ..........

During the Time of the Acts at Issue, the

State of Israel Owned a Substantial

Majority of DSB’s Shares Through Its

Ownership of DSB’s Parent Corporation

and Thus Had a Substantial Majority

Ownership Interest in DSB. .........

iv

Contents

Pursuant to Israel’s Government

Companies Law, the State of Israel

Controlled and Managed DSB Until Its

Privatization in 1995 in the Same or Like

Manner as a Company Directly Owned

SGD EI. occdsésecececcweectess

(i)

(ii)

(iii)

(iv)

The State’s Control Over Govern-

ment-Owned Companies Such as

DSB Involved the Highest Ranking

Officials and Bodies of the Israeli

ee wee

The Government Controlled DSB’s

Board of Directors in the Same or

Like Manner as a Company Directly

Owned By the State of Israel. ....

The Government Appointed and/or

Approved the Appointment of the

Chairman of the Board and the CEO

of DSB in the Same or Like Manner

as a Company Directly Owned by

the State of Ieracl. ..............

Government Approval was Required

for All Changes in DSB’s Capital

Structure, Business Purposes or the

Purchase of Securities in the Same

or Like Manner as a Company

Directly Owned by the State of

BE sev cccvsdecsacecacedtsces

Page

11

11

(v)

(vi)

(vii)

Vv

Contents

The Government Controlled the

Budget and Business Plans of DSB

in the Same or Like Manner as a

Company Directly Owned by the

En

The Government Required DSB to

Use Consolidated Financial Reports

in the Same or Like Manner as a

Company Directly Owned by the

ee

DSB Had to Obtain Government

Approval for the Appointment of its

Auditors and Attorneys in the Same

or Like Manner as a Company

Directly Owned by the State of

Kdekedonhsnsdedeseneses

(viii) The Government Had Access to

(ix)

Information Concerning DSB in the

Same or Like Manner as a Company

Directly Owned by the State of

BD Se waddevedadsoecoceseees

DSB Had to Obtain Government

Approval for Privatization in the

Same or Like Manner as a Company

Directly Owned by the State of

ED Sontpededeecéucdueeesese

The State of Israel Repeatedly Exercised

its Far-Reaching Ownership Rights to

Control DSB’s Affairs. .............

Page

12

13

13

13

14

14

vi

Contents

I DSB IS AN AGENCY OR INSTRU-

MENTALITY OF ISRAEL BECAUSE THE

STATE OWNED A MAJORITY OF THE

OUTSTANDING SHARES THROUGH ITS

OWNERSHIP OF DSB’S PARENT

CORPORATION AND HAD A MAJORITY

OWNERSHIP INTEREST IN THE

GREET occcccdscccessscesecceoocs

A. The State of Israel Owned a Majority of

the Shares' and Had a Majority

Ownership Interest in DSB Under the

Plain and Ordinary Meaning of These

WE ceesecesncebecteseneveseees

l.

The Plain Language of the Statute

Does Not Require a Foreign State

To Directly Own a Majority of a

Company’s Shares. .............

The Words “Majority . .. Ownership

Interest,” in Their Plain and

Ordinary Meaning, Refer to a Broad

Range of Ownership Rights and

Relationships That Encompass the

Nature of the Stake that a Majority

Shareholder of a Corporation Has

in an Entity Owned by that

SGI. dc cikcccccescsccscs

19

19

20

25

3.

vil

Contents

Israel’s Government Companies

Law Established the Legal

Framework Pursuant to Which the

State of Israel Owned and

Controlled DSB and Provides

Additional Support for the

Conclusion that the Plain and

Ordinary Meaning of the Terms

“Owned” and “Ownership Interest”

Encompass the Nature of the State’s

Interest in the Company. ........

The Interpretation of “Owned By” and

“Majority . . . Ownership Interest” Urged

Here Is Consistent With the FSIA’s

Legislative History and Would Further

the Statutory Objectives. ............

l.

The Objective of the FSIA was to

Create a Broad-Based Scheme

Encompassing All Entities in Which

Foreign States Possessed a Majority

Ownership Interest. ............

A Narrow Interpretation of “Owned

By” and “Ownership Interest” Is

Inconsistent With the Purposes of

REED sa vecsecscteendcéocese

A Narrow Interpretation Would

Represent a Return to the Separate

Entity Rule That Congress Rejected

in Enacting the FSIA. ...........

Page

28

30

31

33

36

Il.

vill

Contents

C. The Ninth Circuit’s Rationale for

Interpreting the Terms “Owned” and

“Majority ... Ownership Interest” so as

to Exclude the Interest That a Foreign

State Has in State-Owned Companies

Held Through a Tiered Subsidiary

Structure Does Not Make Sense. .....

THE RELEVANT TIME PERIOD FOR

DETERMINING WHETHER AN ENTITY

IS AN AGENCY OR INSTRUMENTALITY

OF A FOREIGN STATE INCLUDES THE

TIME OF THE ACTIONS GIVING RISE

Ves CR Es oS cee ctcccccsévocicees

A. A Holding that an Entity Is an Agency

or Instrumentality of a Foreign State

Based on its Status at the Time of the

Alleged Wrongdoing is Consistent With

the Statutory Language. .............

B. Applying the FSIA to a Suit Stating

Allegations Against an Entity that was

an Agency or Instrumentality of a

Foreign State at the Time of its

Alleged Conduct Serves the Statutory

Purpose of Protecting Foreign Relations,

Channeling Allegations of this Character

to Federal Courts, and Providing

Immunity in Non-Commercial Cases.

Page

38

41

41

ix

Contents

Page

C. Considering an Entity’s Sovereign Status

Under the FSIA at the Time of Its Alleged

Wrongdoing Is Consistent with the Rule

Applicable to Other Immunities. ..... 46

D. Every Appellate Court to Address the

Timing Issue Has Held that the

FSIA’s Definition of a Foreign State

Includes an Entity that was an Agency

or Instrumentality of a Foreign State at

the Time of the Acts Upon Which the

PE cadcoenecdesetenceues 47

GUESS vc cccccccccceeeveccesnsoceses 49

| PPPTTTTTTTTTITI TTT Al

x

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

FEDERAL CASES

Abercrombie v. Clarke,

920 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,

$02 U.S. BOD (1991) ... ccc ceccccccccecees

Access Now, Inc. v. AMH CGH, Inc.,

2001 WL. 1005593 (S.D.Fla. May 11, 2001) ...

Adler v. Federal Republic of Nigeria,

107 F.3d 720 (9th Cir. 1997) ...........0000.

In re Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, Indiana,

96 F.3d 932 (7th Cir. 1996) ..........0.0005.

Aldy v. Valmet,

74 F.3d 72 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied,

$19 U.S. 817 (1996) ........cccccccceeceees

Allendale Mutual Insurance Co. v.

Bull Data Systems, Inc.,

10 F.3d 425 (7th Cir. 1993) .......... eee ees

Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors,

761 F.2d 1527 (11th Cir.) , cert. denied,

SUNT GID cca vcvensekneseecsstas

Ardestani v. INS,

S02 U.S. 12D (UGDT) 2... rccccccceseseseces

Bailey v. United States,

S16 U.S. 137 (IDDS) 0. rcccccccccccccccess

Page

xi

Cited Authorities

Page

Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v.

Bangor & Aroostoock R.R.,

ee es SED ode anbdcdoccvccacecs 23, 24, 28

Bank of United States v. Planters’ Bank

of Georgia,

DT tivicadheauhakyisacéee ns 36

Belgrade v. Sidex International Furniture Corp.,

2 F. Supp. 2d 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ........... 48, 49

Burnet v. Clark,

ee le og a 24

Byrd v. Corporacion Forestal y Industrial

de Olancho S.A.,

182 F.3d 380 (Sth Cir. 1999) ................ 35

Cargill International S.A. v. M/T Pavel Dybenko,

991 F.2d 1012 (2nd Cir. 1993) ............... 44, 48

In re Chase & Sanborn Corp.,

835 F.2d 1341 (11th Cir. 1988), rev'd on other

grounds sub nom Granfinanciera, S.A.

v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989) ............. 48

Chickasaw Nation v. United States,

ee a we ia 40

Coalition for Clean Air v. Southern

California Edison Co.,

971 F.2d 219 (9th Cir. 1992),

cert. denied, 507 U.S. 950 (1993) ............ 42

xii

Cited Authorities

Page

Connecticut National Bank v. Germain,

SOB UD. BED IGG) cc cccccccccccccccscsess 40

Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.,

GGT US. TES CIOS) cccccccccccccccscvcsces 23, 24

Corporacion Mexicana de Servicios Maritimos,

S.A. de C.V. v. M/T Respect,

89 F.3d 650 (9th Cir. 1996) ...........20455. 34

Daly v. Llanes,

30 F. Supp. 2d 407 (S.D.N.Y 1998) ........... 48

Delgado v. Shell Oil Co.,

890 F. Supp. 1315 (S.D. Tex. 1995), aff'd, 231

F.3d 165 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S.

Pe ED 6.0 osn Genbuaecdancunaeeetes 4, 20, 24, 47

In re Delta America Re Insurance Co.,

900 F.2d 890 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,

SIO SESE sabe ve vesccececsasceces 32

FDIC v. Meyer,

FO GEO CD cckcccsteccccéasetesvese 25

Ferro Union, Inc. v. United States,

44 F. Supp. 2d 1310 (Int’] Trade 1999) ........ 27

Fertilizantes Fosfatados Mexicanos, S.A. v. Chen,

1992 WL. 204394 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) ........... 27

First National City Bank v.

Banco Nacional de Cuba,

GEG POPGNEED Bod ce sce ceccusesseceves 45

xiii

Cited Authorities

Page

First National City Bank v. Banco Para el

Comercio Exterior de Cuba,

Te ee eee 34

Flink v. Paladini,

ED ec cincubeadasede 23, 24, 25, 28

Franchise Tax Board of California v.

Alcan Aluminium Ltd.,

ss ca cinenwkebeun tases passim

GE Capital Corp. v. Grossman,

991 F.2d 1376 (8th Cir. 1993) .............. passim

Gates v. Victor Fine Foods,

54 F.3d 1457 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.

og BR Ee Pe eee 38, 39, 40

Gould, Inc. v. Pechiney Ugine Kuhimann,

853 F.2d 445 (6th Cir. 1988) ................ 48

Hanil Bank v. PT. Bank Negara Indon.,

ta feeds i+ 3 Se era 43

Harris v. United States,

175 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 1999) .............. 27

7

In Re Clearsky Shipping Corp.,

1999 WL. 1021825 (E.D.La. Nov. 8,1999) .... 20

K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,

486 U.S. 281 (1988) ............. 16, 21, 24, 28, 30

xiv

Cited Authorities

Kalamazoo River Study Group v. Menasha Corp.,

228 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2000) ................

Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp.,

SP SEE GUND cccsececissevncoosscess

Kern v. Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc.,

867 F.Supp. 525 (S.D. Tex. 1994) ............

Papanos v. Lufthansa German Airlines,

No. 94-2667- CIV, slip op. (S.D.Fla. 1995) ....

Lopez Del Valle v. Gobierno de la Capital,

855 F. Supp. 34 (D.P.R. 1994) ...............

Mitchell v. Forsythe,

No so

Musopole v. South African Airways,

172 F. Supp. 2d 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) .........

New Jersey Turnpike Authority v.

PPG Industries, Inc.,

197 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 1999) ............0.005.

Nolan v. Boeing Co.,

919 F.2d 1058 (Sth Cir. 1990), cert. denied,

499 U.S. 962 (1991) .... cc cece ec eeceeeeee

NutraSweet Co. v. X-L Engineering Co.,

227 F.3d 776 (7th Cir. 2000) .............0..

Page

43

36

48

48

35

XV

Cited Authorities

Page

O’Connell Machinery Co., Inc. v. M.V. “Americana”,

566 F. Supp. 1381 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd,

734 F.2d 115, 116-17 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied,

ED co devicdepeeenseedvess 36

Ocasek vy. Flintkote Co.,

796 F. Supp. 362 (N.D. Ill. 1992) ............ 48

Oetjen v. Central Leather Co.,

RS 45

Pere v. Nuovo Pignone, Inc.,

150 F.3d 477 (Sth Cir. 1998), cert. denied,

er 18, 44, 48

Perrin v. United States,

DP Sh towed eededeusesebecses 25

Platt v. Union Pacific R.R.,

te ett feces adbeded sede et 40

Republic of Argentina v. Weltover,

a 43

Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,

ee ne i itneh ne bed beeses 33

Rodriguez v. Shell Oil Co.,

932 F. Supp. 177 (S.D. Tex. 1996) ............ 4

Ruggiero v. Compania Peruana De Vapores,

pe ee Pe GE Ge BOUED cc ccccncccscecces 33

xvi

Cited Authorities

Rutkowski v. Occidental Chemical Corp.,

1998 WL. 107342 (N.D. Ill. 1988) ..........

Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. United States Shipping

Board Emergency Fleet Corp.,

250 US. SED CIGEDD 6. occ ccvnnccvncvecteen

Smith v. United States,

FOS US. 223 (IGS) .ccccvesiuccsecessseses

In re Stratford of Texas, Inc.,

635 F.2d 365 (Sth Cir. 1981) ............4..

Straub v. A.P. Green,

38 F.3d 448 (9th Cir. 1994) .............0..

Talbot v. Saipem A.G.,

835 F. Supp. 352 (S.D. Tex. 1993) ...........

The Western Maid v. Thompson,

291 US. GID CITES) ccccvcccccccceesvessss

Trump Taj Mahal Associates v. Costruzioni

Aeronautiche Giovanni Agusta S.p.A.,

761 F. Supp. 1143 (D.N.J. 1991), aff'd, 958 F.2d

365 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 826 (1992)

“es eeeeeeneneneneeneneeneeneneeneeeeeeeeee eee ee ee

United States v. Bestfoods,

$36 US. 98 COOGED s,s cenkacesusueeee

United States v. James,

S76 08, 900 GIN osc iaisiusanandesdean

Page

48

36

25

42

48

a

xvii

Cited Authorities

Page

Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria,

i cee ceeeeeseseccececes passim

Walters v. Metropolitan Educational

Enterprises, Inc.,

ee ee ieee ceenesene et 25

Watkiss v. Corporate Jets, Inc.,

2001 WL 1344578 (N.D. Oh. 2001) .......... 20

STATE CASES

Bowers v. Wurzburg,

202 W. Va. 43, 501 S.E.2d 479 (1998) ........ 27

Gay v. State of Maryland Deposit

Insurance Fund Corp.,

308 Md. 707, 521 A.2d 1205 (1987) .......... 26

Kreutter v. McFadden Oil Corp.,

71 N.Y.2d 460, 522 N.E.2d 40 (1988) ......... 26

Linton v. Airbus Industrie,

934 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. Civ. App. 1996) ........ 36

Loudon v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co..,

PS PE, GUD cc ccvcccecccceccces 29

Schaffer v. Edward D. Jones & Co.,

521 N.W.2d 921 (S. Dak. 1994) .............. 27

xvili

Cited Authorities

Page

FEDERAL STATUTES

19 U.S.C. § 1SBE(e) ... wc cn ccccccccccccccccens 21

BB UBC. 6 UBSETE) .nccccccccccccccccccccecs l

2B UBC. § ISSGER) ... wc cccccccsccccece i, 1, 18, 32, 45

BB UBC. 6 UDTBED onc ccccccccccccvccsesscoss 1

BB UBS. 6 ISDE 2. cccccccccccccccccccccscs l

2B U.S.C. § 1441(@) 2... cr ecccccccess 1, 2, 18, 32, 45

BO UBL. © OGRE ccccccccccccccesscnsccescces l

BB UBL. 6 OGD o cccccccccccscvcessescccses passim

BB UBL. 8 BGS oc ccccccccccccccsnsescsceces 32

28 U.S.C. § 1605(aX(2) ...........--- 17, 32, 38, 42, 43

QB UBC. SSGRHAME) 20 ccccccccsccccccscccss 43

4B UBC. SSGISIE) 2. ccccccccccccccccccess 43

17 C.F.R. § 210.3A-02(a) ... 2.6... ee eee eee 23

STATE STATUTES

Bak, GEE. 6 EGE .n cccccccccccccccccccccesss 28

Dak. GELS SEE nn ccccccccccccccccescccccces 29

xix

Cited Authorities

RULES

FX 8 2 ee ee

Fe UE EES cccectésacdeeseuseesesss

Re ee

Pe A OE OED Rh edssedncnceusénccessesees

Se ED oc cctnndcdvébdeaseansuess

Supreme Court Rule W121) .... 2... ccc ccccccees

MISCELLANEOUS

Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed. 1979) ..........

Comment, The Jurisdictional Immunity of

Foreign Sovereigns,

er ey SPEED woveccceesesceussces

Fensterwald, Sovereign Immunity and

Soviet State Trading, |

63 Harv. L. Rev. 614 (1950) .................

Fletcher's Cyclopedia of the Law of Private

Corporations (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1999) .......

Friedmann, Government Enterprise: A Comparative

Study (W. Friedmann & J.F. Garner eds. 1970)

H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, reprinted in 5 U.S.C.C_AN.

25

37

a Se 32, 33, 37, 44, 45

xXx

Cited Authorities

R. Pence and D. Emery, A Grammar of Present-Day

Bea GG GB) oc ccccvcccccccccccccsscecs

Report of the Working Group of the American Bar

Association, Reforming The Foreign Sovereign

Immunities Act, 40 Colum. J. Transnat’! Law 489

SEED nnonesn06ceceesbsedeesnetesetsasade

BD, GRD. FED. DEEROD ccccvcncccvcccessesccesess

Ward, Folk on the Delaware General Corporations

Law (4" ed. 2002-2 Supp.) ...........-.0005-

Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1985)

Page

l

OPINIONS BELOW

The Ninth Circuit’s opinion is reported at 251 F.3d 795

(9th Cir. 2001) and is reproduced in the appendix to the petition

for a writ of certiorari in No. 01-594 (“Pet. App.”) at la. The

district court’s orders holding that it had jurisdiction, denying

rehearing of that order, dismissing the action for forum non

conveniens, and denying rehearing of that order are reproduced

at Pet. App. 55a, 49a, 34a and 27a, respectively.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The court of appeals entered judgment on May 30, 2001,

and entered its order denying timely petitions for rehearing en

banc on July 10, 2001. Pet. App. 120a. The petitions for a writ

of certiorari in No. 01-593 and No. 01-594 were filed on October

9, 2001. In an order dated June 28, 2002, the petitions were

granted and the cases consolidated. This Court has jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSLA” or “Act’’)

is codified at sections 1330, 1332(a)(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-

11 of title 28, United States Code. It provides, among other

things, that “[a}ny civil action brought in a State court against a

foreign state as defined in section 1603(a) of this title may be

removed” to federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d). Section 1603(a)

of title 28, United States Code defines “foreign state” to include

any “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state,” which is in

turn defined as any entity:

(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or

otherwise, and

(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political

subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose shares

or other ownership interes: is owned by a foreign

state or political subdivision thereof, and

(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States

... nor created under the laws of any third country.

28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (italics added). The questions presented

involve the language in italics.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. The Nature of the Case and the Proceedings Below

This case presents claims by citizens and residents of Costa

Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala and Panama who contend that, while

employed on banana farms in their home countries, they suffered

personal injuries from exposure to dibromochloropropane

(DBCP), a pesticide formerly used on banana trees.

The plaintiffs (“Respondents”) filed their complaint on

October 3, 1997, in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit of the

State of Hawaii. The defendants are alleged manufacturers of

DBCP and operators of the foreign banana farms where

Respondents were employed.

Defendant Dole Food Company, Inc. (“Dole”), the lead

petitioner in No. 01-593, impleaded Dead Sea Bromine Co.,

Ltd. (“DSB” or “Petitioner”) and its subsidiary, Bromine

Compounds Limited (“BCL”), the petitioners in No. 01-594,

alleging that DSB and BCL (collectively, the “Dead Sea

Companies” or “Petitioners”) manufactured and sold DBCP to

one or more defendants. Petitioners removed the action to the

U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii.

The removal was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d), which

provides that any foreign state may remove claims asserted

against it to federal court. The FSIA defines “foreign state”

to include an “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state,”

28 U.S.C. § 1603(a), which is, in turn, defined in pertinent part

as “any entity . . . amajority of whose shares or other ownership

interest is owned by a foreign state. ...” Jd. § 1603(b)(2).

Petitioners contend that they are agencies or instrumentalities

within the meaning of the Act, because during the period of

time of the actions giving rise to the claims asserted against

them, the State of Israel held a majority ownership interest in

both Companies through a tiered ownership structure.

After the Dead Sea Companies removed the action, Dole

filed a supplemental notice of removal alleging federal question

jurisdiction. Pet. App. Sa, 58a. Respondents moved to remand

on the ground that Petitioners are not agencies or

3

instrumentalities of Israel within the meaning of the Act and

that there was no subject matter jurisdiction on the alternative

theory set forth in Dole’s notice. The defendants moved to

dismiss the claims on the ground of forum non conveniens.

On September 9, 1998, the district court held that

Petitioners do not qualify as agencies or instrumentalities of

the State of Israel. Jd. 71a. The court agreed with Petitioners’

position — and that of every appellate court that has addressed

the issue — that, although the State of Israel no longer owned a

majority interest in the Companies by the time the suit was filed,

an entity is within the purview of the FSIA if it was an agency

or instrumentality of a foreign state during the period of time of

the alleged conduct on which the claims for relief against it are

based. /d. 62a-64a. Nevertheless, the court held that during this

relevant time period, neither DSB nor BCL was an entity a

“majority of whose shares or other ownership interest” were

owned by the State of Israel. The court acknowledged that the

State of Israel had “indirect ownership” of both companies, but,

in its view, such ownership was insufficient to establish

jurisdiction under the Act. /d. 71a.' The district court concluded,

however, that it had federal question jurisdiction and granted

the defendants’ motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens.

Id. 115a, 117a-118a.

The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s conclusion

that the Dead Sea Companies do not qualify as agencies or

instrumentalities of Israel, on the ground that Israel was not the

direct shareholder of either company. /d. 23a-24a. The court of

appeals reversed the district court’s finding of federal question

jurisdiction and, accordingly, ordered that the action be

remanded to state court. /d. 26a.

The Dead Sea Companies’ status under the FSIA has been

the subject of litigation in a number of other DBCP cases for

the past eight years. In several lawsuits brought in Texas state

1. There is no dispute that DSB and BCL meet the other

requirements of § 1603(b): they are entities separate from the State of

Israel (§ 1603(b)(1)) and are not citizens of or created under the laws of

the United States or any third country (§ 1603(b)(3)).

4

courts against the same principal defendants as in this case,

thousands of individuals alleged that they too had labored on

banana farms in Central America and other regions of the globe

and had suffered injuries from exposure to DBCP. One or both

Dead Sea Companies were impleaded and removed the cases

to federal court, where they were consolidated. In response to a

motion to remand, Judge Sim Lake of the U.S. District Court

for the Southern District of Texas concluded that the Dead Sea

Companies are agencies or instrumentalities under the FSIA

and thereupon granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for

forum non conveniens. See Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 890

F. Supp. 1315, 1318-19, 1340.33 (S.D. Tex. 1995), Rodriguez

v. Shell Oil Co., 932 F. Supp. 177, 180 n.6 (S.D. Tex. 1996).

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit expressly

affirmed Judge Lake’s FSIA rulings in Delgado v Shell Oil Co.,

231 F.3d 165, 176 (Sth Cir. 2000) (“Delgado”), cert. denied,

§32 U.S. 972 (2001). The Ninth Circuit, in its ruling below,

rejected the holding of Delgado. Pet. App. 23a-24a.

Upon ectitions for a writ of certioran filed by the Dead Sea

Companies and the defendants, this Court, after requesting the

Solicitor General to submit a brief expressing the views of the

United States,’ granted the petitions.

2. Statement of Facts

a. The State of Israel Created DSB to Develop and

Market the State-Owned Resources of the Dead

Sea.

The Dead Sea is a 400-square-mile lake located between

Israel and Jordan. Its rich mineral deposits, which include

bromine, potassium, and magnesium, are among Israel’s

relatively few natural resources. Joint Appendix (“JA”) at 70,

75, 80, 125-26. The State of Israel created DSB, a corporation

organized under the laws of Israel and headquartered in Beer

Sheeva, Israel, in 1955 to develop and market the Dead Sea’s

bromine resources in a manner consistent with Israel’s national

interests. JA 70-71.

2. Brief for the United States dated May 2002 (“U.S. Amicus

Brief”).

5

DSB has, since the early 1960s, operated under an exclusive

subconcession granted by its parent company, Dead Sea Works

Ltd. (“Dead Sea Works’), to extract bromine and bromine

compounds from the Dead Sea. JA 70-71, 153-76. Dead Sea

Works, in turn, holds the exclusive concession, granted by

Israel’s national legislature (the Knesset), to extract minerals

from the Dead Sea. JA 124-50. The concession states that its

object is “to regulate the efficient exploitation” of the “minerals

of the Dead Sea,” which as “natural resources of the State of

Israel” should serve “the interests of the economy of the State.”

JA 125.

DSB’s Articles of Association declare that the State

possesses “Vital Interests” in the Company, including: (1) the

“{s]upervision of the control of . . . natural resources for their

efficient development and exploitation, including maximum

application in Israel of the results of the investments, research

and development”; (ii) the “[p]reservation of the character of

the Company as an Israeli company whose center of business

and management is in Israel”; and (iii) the “[p}revention of the

achievement of a position of influence in the Company by .. .

elements which may prejudice the State’s foreign and defense

interests.” JA 107-08; see also JA 73-74.

b. During the Time of the Acts at Issue, the State

of Israel Owned a Substantial Majority of DSB’s

Shares Through Its Ownership of DSB’s Parent

Corporation and Thus Had a Substantial

Majority Ownership Interest in DSB.

The State of Israel held a substantial majority ownership

interest in DSB during the time period 1968-95.° From 1968-

75, the State held a 99% ownership interest in DSB. During

this period: (i) the State owned 99% of the shares of Dead Sea

Works, an Israeli company whose principal offices are in Beer

3. This time period is over inclusive for purposes of the questions

presented in this case, in view of Respondents’ allegation that they were

first exposed to DBCP manufactured or distributed by the Dead Sea

Companies after 1975, JA 24, and that DBCP was not used after the

mid-1980s. JA 26.

6

Sheva, Israel and (ii) Dead Sea Works owned virtually all shares

of DSB (99.9% of its shares), except for a single share owned

directly by the State. JA 71-72, 82, 86.

From 1975-77, the State had a 98% ownership interest in

DSB. During this period: (i) the State transferred its shares in

Dead Sea Works to Israel Chemicals Ltd. (“ICL”), an Israeli

company owned entirely by the State of Israel; (ii) ICL owned

approximately 98% of the shares of Dead Sea Works, which

continued to own 99.9% of the shares of DSB; and (iii) the

State continued to directly own the one other share of DSB.

JA 72, 82, 84, 86.

From 1978-83, the State had a 91% ownership interest in

DSB. During this period: (i) ICL, which continued to be owned

entirely by the State, reduced its ownership in Dead Sea Works

to approximately 91%; (ii) Dead Sea Works continued to own

99.9% of the shares of DSB; and (iii) the State continued to

directly own the one other share of DSB. /d.

From 1983-86, the State had an 88% ownership interest in

DSB. During this period: (i) ICL, which continued to be owned

entirely by the State, reduced its ownership in Dead Sea Works

to approximately 88%; (ii) Dead Sea Works continued to own

99.9% of the shares of DSB; and (iii) the State continued to

directly own the one other share of DSB. /d.

From 1986-1992, the State continued to hold an 88%

ownership interest in DSB. During this period: (i) Dead Sea

Works transferred one share of DSB to ICL and one share to

each of four ICL subsidiaries to be held in trust for Dead Sea

Works and (ii) all other ownership arrangements remained the

same. JA 86.

From 1992-95, the State had a 70% (computed as 80.03%

x 88%) ownership interest in DSB, including a Special State

Share. During this period: (i) the State took the first steps to

privatize ICL (up until this time, the State had owned 100% of

ICL’s shares) by offering 19.97% of ICL stock for public sale;

(ii) the State continued to own the remaining 80.03% of ICL’s

shares; and (iii) ICL continued its ownership of 88% of Dead

-

Sea Works, which continued to own almost 99.9% of the shares

of DSB. JA 72-73, 82, 86.

In connection with ICL’s contemplated privatization, the

State converted its one ordinary share of DSB into a Special

State Share, which entitles the State to separately approve or

disapprove: (i) any merger of DSB, (ii) any alteration of its

structure; (111) any acquisition or holding of 14% or more of its

share capital; (iv) any acquisition or holding of 25% or more of

such share capital; (v) the holding of share capital that confers

upon its holder the nght or ability to appoint directly or indirectly

50% or more of DSB’s directors; and (vi) any action by ICL to

sell DSB stock or assets. JA 74, 86-87, 104-09.

From 1995 to the present, the State has continued to hold

the Special State Share but no longer holds a majority ownership

interest in DSB. During this period: (i) the State sold an

additional 24.9% of its ICL stock which, taken together with

certain minor transactions in the intervening years, reduced the

State’s ownership in ICL to 48.5%; (ii) in March 1997, the State

sold an additional 17% of ICL stock, which reduced the State’s

share ownership of ICL to 31.52%; (iii) Dead Sea Works

transferred its shares in DSB to ICL, so that today both Dead

Sea Works and DSB are direct subsidiaries of ICL; and (iv) the

State continued to own the Special State Share in DSB that it

was issued in 1992. JA 72-73, 84.

A chart illustrating the State of Israel’s ownership of DSB

in the period 1970-1985 is in the record (JA 95) and is annexed

to ‘Ls brief as an addendum.‘

4. Dole also impleaded Petitioner BCL, a wholly or partially owned

subsidiary of DSB from 1968 to 1995. During the period of time of the

acts complained of, the State of Israel held a majority ownership interest

in BCL, although the precise percentages varied somewhat and were

slightly less than its percentage stake in DSB. The particular facts

concerning BCL’s ownership history are set forth in the record. JA 71-

72, 86-88, 92-94. The arguments presented here with respect to DSB

apply with equal force to BCL. For the sake of simplicity, however, this

brief focuses on the State of Israel’s ownership of DSB. If DSB is an

instrumentality of Israel, the case was properly removed to federal court,

and the judgment below must be reversed.

8

c. Pursuant to Israel’s Government Companies

Law, the State of Israel Controlled and Managed

DSB Until Its Privatization in 1995 in the Same

or Like Manner as a Company Directly Owned

by the State.

DSB did not hold the status of an ordinary, private business

corporation in Israel. Rather, because it was majority owned by

the State, it was organized and operated pursuant to the

Government Companies Law (“GCL”), an English translation

of which is reproduced at JA 175-222. This statute, which was

enacted in 1975, establishes the legal mechanism by which the

State of Israel controls and supervises entities, such as

Petitioners, a majority of whose shares are owned, directly or

indirectly, by the State. The GCL’s provisions with regard to

companies that are directly owned by the State (referred to in

the GCL as “Government Companies”) apply “in like manner”

to subsidiaries of such companies (referred to in the GCL as

“Government Subsidiary Companies”), with very limited and

specified differences. See GCL §§ 57, 1(a) (JA 208-09, 177).

As discussed in detail below, until the privatization of ICL in

1995, the State of Israel, by virtue of its indirect ownership of a

majority of DSB’s shares, controlled the company in the same

way and through the same administrative mechanism that it

controlled companies a majority of whose shares were directly

owned by the State.

The State, as owner of all or almost all of the shares of

DSB’s ultimate parent company, exercised substantial contro]

and oversight over the Company through the GCL’s approval

and appointment mechanisms, and these incidences of

ownership were not diminished by the fact that the State held

its majority ownership interest through a tiered subsidiary

structure. In this respect, the GCL vests the State of Israel

with far greater direct control over subsidiaries of government-

owned companies than is permitted under U.S. corporate law.

Post, at 28-29.

9

(i) The State’s Control Over Government-

Owned Companies Such as DSB Involved

the Highest Ranking Officials and Bodies

of the Israeli Government.

As with directly owned companies, the Government's

control over their subsidiaries, such as DSB, involved the highest

ranking officials and bodies of the Israeli government.

These officials and bodies included the Minister of Finance and

other Ministers of the Government, see GCL §§ 1(a), 5, 6(3),

11(b), 1SA(b), 18(a), 18B, 22(a)(3), 22(c), 24(a), 26(b), 34(a),

37(a), 44(c), 47(c), 57(1), 57(2) (JA 177-209); the Knesset

Finance Committee, see GCL §§ 1(a), 5(b), 10, 11(b), ISA(a),

17 (JA 177-87); the Appointments Review Committee,

appointed, in part, by the Minister of Finance and Attorney

General, see GCL § 18B (JA 189); and a Cabinet Committee on

privatization that included the Prime Minister, Minister of

Finance and Minister of Justice, see GCL §§ 1, S9A (JA 177,

211). In addition, the Government Companies Authority

(the “Authority”), whose director was an appointee of the

Government upon the proposal of the Ministry of Finance,

see GCL §§ 51-56 (JA 206-08), was charged with advising and

assisting government-owned companies and their subsidianes

in the conduct of their business; monitoring their activities,

course of business, financial position and wage policies; and

communicating its findings to the Government’s Ministers.

GCL §§ 54, 57 (JA 207-09).

(ii) The Government Controlled DSB’s Board

of Directors in the Same or Like Manner as

a Company Directly Owned By the State of

Israel.

The Government controlled the Board of Directors of DSB

through appointment of the directors of ICL (DSB’s parent

company) and approving the appointment of DSB’s directors.

GCL §§ 18(a), 57(3) (JA 188, 209). The approval of a director

was to be made by the Minister of Finance and the Minister of

TL ne

10

Industry and Trade,’ after consultation with an Appointments

Review Committee comprised of representatives of the Attorney

General, an individual chosen from a select list of persons put

forward by the Minister of Finance and Minister of Justice, and

a representative of the Authority. GCL §§ 57(3), 18B(a)

(JA 209, 189). Had DSB been directly owned by the State of

Israel, the only difference would have been that its directors

would have been appointed — in addition to being approved —

by the Ministers. As it was, the GCL required the DSB directors

to be appointed by the directors of DSB’s parent companies,

who themselves were subject to appointment by or approval of

the Ministers. GCL §§ 18(a), 57(3) (JA 188, 209). In all other

respects, the Government’s control over the Board of a directly

owned company (such as ICL) and the Board of its subsidiary

(such as DSB) was the same. GCL § 57 (JA 208-09).

The Government, through the Minister of Finance, after

consultation with the Authority, was empowered to set the

remuneration of directors of both directly owned companies

and their subsidiaries. GCL § 19 (JA 190-91). The Government,

through the request of the Minister of Finance, the Minister of

Industry and Trade, or the Authority, was also empowered to

direct that a special meeting of their respective boards of

directors be held to deal with any matters specified in the request.

GCL § 26(b) (JA 195). Finally, the Authority sent a non-voting

director to each board meeting to participate in the meeting as a

director. GCL § 27(b) (JA 195).

5. The GCL defines the term “Ministers” — a term used throughout

the statute — as “the Minister of Finance, together with the Minister

designated by Law as responsible for the affairs of the company.”

GCL § 1(a) (JA 177). The record establishes that, at least for most of the

time period at issue here, the “Minister designated by Law as responsible

for the affairs” of DSB was the Minister of Industry and Trade, although

during some time penods this Minister is referred to as the Minister of

Trade and Industry or the Minister of Industry, Trade and Tourism.

See, e.g., Petitioners’ Lodging (“L-”) at L-17-19, L=22, L-25, L-45,

L—47, L-49-50, L-159. For the sake of simplicity, the Brief will refer to

this Minister as the Minister of Industry and Trade.

11

(iii) The Government Appointed and/or

Approved the Appointment of the

Chairman of the Board and the CEO of

DSB in the Same or Like Manner as a

Company Directly Owned by the State of

Israel.

DSB’s Chairman of the Board of Directors and its Chief

Executive Officer® (who could not be the same individual) could

be appointed only with the approval of the Minister of Finance

and the Minister of Industry and Trade. GCL §§ 24(a), 37(a),

24(b) (JA 193, 201). The Ministers’ approval could be given

only after consultation with the State’s Appointments Review

Committee. GCL § 18B (JA 189). However, if the Government

deemed it necessary to do so, the Government, after consultation

with the Appointrients Review Committee, was empowered

to appoint a director as Chairman or to appoint the CEO.

GCL §§ 24(a), 37(a) (JA 193, 201). The Government also had

the power to remove the CEO from office. GCL §§ 42(a)(2),

42(a)(Sa) (JA 202-03). These powers applied equally to

companies directly owned by the State of Israel as they did to

indirectly owned companies, such as DSB. GCL §§ 24(a), 37(a),

42(a) (JA 193, 201, 202-03).

(iv) Government Approval was Required for All

Changes in DSB’s Capital Structure,

Business Purposes or the Purchase of

Securities in the Same or Like Manner as a

Company Directly Owned by the State of

Israel.

Both routine and extraordinary changes in the capital

structure of DSB required approval of the Government

(the Prime Minister and his cabinet). With respect to such

approvals, the only difference between a directly owned

company and its subsidiary, such as DSB, was that the approvals

6. This brief uses the familiar title Chief Executive Officer or CEO,

whereas the GCL uses the title general manager, which has the same

meaning under Israeli law. JA 77, 193, 201-04.

12

for DSB were forwarded to the Government through its parent

companies. GCL § 57(2) (JA 209). The Government could

decide to approve the changes only if they were proposed to the

Government by the Minister of Finance and the Minister of

Industry and Trade and submitted to the Government with an

opinion of the Authority. GCL §§ 11(b), 57(2) (JA 183, 209).

Such approvals were required for: (i) change in the objects

(business purposes) of the company; (ii) increase in registered

share capital; (iii) change in the rights attached to the shares;

(iv) allotment of shares of the company, or consent to transfer

of shares if such allotment or transfer would alter the balance

of power among shareholders or confer upon a new shareholder

ten percent or more of share capital or voting power or the nght

to appoint a director; (v) issuance of redeemable shares or

convertible debentures; (vi) conversion of the company into a

private company; (vii) reorganization or dissolution of the

company; (viii) establishment of a subsidiary or purchase of

another company’s shares; and (ix) an undertaking to effect any

act referred to above. GCL § 11(a) (JA 182-83).

(v) The Government Controlled the Budget

and Business Plans of DSB in the Same or

Like Manner as a Company Directly Owned

by the State of Israel.

The Government Companies Law required DSB’s board

of directors, as well as all other Government companies, to draw

up and submit an annual draft budget to the Authority, the

Minister of Finance, the Minister of Industry and Trade, the

State Comptroller, and, upon its request, the Knesset Finance

Committee. GCL § 34 (JA 199-200). The GCL also required

such companies to submit a report of the company’s resources

and the manner of their use; a balance sheet; and a profit-and-

loss account, including the purposes to which profits were to be

applied. GCL § 33(a) (JA 198-99). A decision as to the use of

profits by a board of directors of either a directly owned

Government company or its subsidiary was subject to approval

by the Authority. GCL § 33(c) (JA 199).

13

(vi) The Government Required DSB to Use

Consolidated Financial Reports in the Same

or Like Manner as a Company Directly

Owned by the State of Israel.

The Government Companies Law generally required

consolidated financial reporting of all government companies

and their subsidiaries. GCL § 33(a)(4) (JA 199). ICL, Dead Sea

Works, and DSB, as commonly owned members of the same

family of government companies, presented consolidated

financial statements to the Government for its review. L—29,

L-296, L-316.

(vii) DSB Had to Obtain Government Approval for

the Appointment of its Auditors and Attorneys

in the Same or Like Manner as a Company

Directly Owned by the State of Israel.

The Authority was required to approve the accountant

selected to serve as the auditor for DSB. GCL § 44(a) (JA 204).

The appointment of a legal advisor to DSB also required the

Authority’s approval. GCL § 47(a) (JA 205). The Minister of

Finance and Minister of Justice, with the approval of the Knesset —

Finance Committee, were empowered to prescribe rules as to

the appointment of auditors and legal advisors. GCL §§ 44(c),

47(c) (JA 204-05). The GCL provisions imposed the same

requirements on directly owned companies.

(viii) The Government Had Access to Information

Concerning DSB in the Same or Like Manner

as a Company Directly Owned by the State of

Israel.

The Authority was empowered to receive any requested

information from DSB and inspect its records and documents.

GCL § 55 (JA 208). In addition, DSB’s Chairman was required

to submit to the Minister of Finance, Minister of Industry and

Trade, and the Authority, twice yearly and at any time requested,

a written report on the Company’s activities and the work of its

board of directors. GCL § 25 (JA 194).

14

(ix) DSB Had to Obtain Government Approval for

Privatization in the Same or Like Manner as a

Company Directly Owned by the State of Israel.

Government approval was also required before the sale

of shares of subsidiary companies. GCL § 15A (JA 185).

Thus, Government approval was required before ICL, Dead Sea

Works, or DSB could sell their holdings of shares in Dead Sea

Works, DSB, or BCL. The mechanism for approval involved

proposals of the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Industry

and Trade, submitted to the Government with the opinion of

the Authority. /d.

d. The State of Israel Repeatedly Exercised its Far-

Reaching Ownership Rights to Control DSB’s

Affairs.

The Government's extensive ability to supervise and

regulate DSB in the same manner as a company directly owned

by the State of Israel was by no means merely theoretical. The

Government's pervasive control over DSB manifested itself in

every facet of the company’s operations and activities.

Acting through its highest officials and levels of

government, the State of Israel: (i) regularly appointed

employees of the Ministnes of Finance and Industry and Trade

to DSB’s Board of Directors (L—1-22, L-344); (ii) issued

directives as to the procedures to be followed by DSB’s Board

of Directors, prohibiting the appointment of alternative or

substitute directors, terminating the tenure of directors for

excessive absences and specifying the content of the Board’s

minutes (L—23-42); (iii) approved all DSB’s directors (L-43-

50); (iv) appointed the Authority’s employees to participate in

meetings of DSB’s Board and its committees, such as the balance

sheet committee (L—5 1-60); (v) monitored the attendance and

the activities of members of the company’s Board of Directors

(L-61-73); (vi) approved the company’s managing directors

(CEOs) and their compensation (L—74-76); (vii) established

procedures for the selection and remuneration of legal advisors,

including the requirement that the Authority approve such

15

selection (L—77-108); (viii) established procedures for the

selection and remuneration of auditors, including the

requirement that the Authority approve such selection (L—109-

17); (ix) restricted the circumstances and amounts of DSB’s

charitable contributions (L—131-50); (x) on multiple occasions

required and/or strongly encouraged DSB to purchase Israeli

products even if the cost was higher than the cost of non-Israeli

goods (L—159-78); (xi) required DSB to freeze salaries and

wages (L-179-81); (xii) approved or set the compensation to

be paid to DSB executives, including retirement benefits

(L-187-89); (xiii) established policies as to the use of company

cars (L—190-97); (xiv) issued directives regarding hiring and

promotion policies (L—214-21); (xv) encouraged DSB to become

more efficient and to curb its expenses (L—222-34); (xvi)

approved DSB’s investments (L—235-44); (xvii) approved

changes to DSB’s capital structure and the issuance, sale and

transfer of shares (L-245-78); (xviii) approved employee

bonuses (L—279-88); (xix) approved the formation of a

subsidiary (L—289-90); (xx) required changes in DSB’s corporate

charter (L—291-304); (xxi) restricted ICL from changing DSB’s

objects, transferring their shares, changing their share capital

or selling their assets without Government approval (L—305-

14); and (xxi) reviewed, approved and made recommendations

with respect to DSB’s budget, business plan and operations

(L-—315-29).

In sum, the record provides overwhelming evidence that

the State’s indirect ownership of the majority of the shares of

DSB gave it pervasive oversight and control and other incidences

of ownership over the company, and that the State exercised its

powers in this regard on a routine basis on matters great and

small.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

I. DSB is an entity a majority of whose shares were

“owned by” the State of Israel within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1603(b)(2). Under the plain and ordinary meaning of the words

“owned by,” a majority of DSB’s shares were “owned by” the

16

State through the State’s ownership of the Company’s parent

corporations. In the context of tiered corporate subsidiaries, this

Court has held that the statutory phrase “owned by” may be

reasonably interpreted to include a shareholder’s interest in the

assets of its subsidiaries. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S.

281, 292, 298-99, 318-19 (1988). Similarly, this Court has used

the words “sole shareholder” to describe a parent corporation’s

relationship to its wholly owned subsidiary’s wholly owned

subsidiary. Franchise Tax Board of California v. Alcan

Aluminium Ltd., 493 U.S. 331, 339 (1990) (“Alcan”). The court

of appeals erred in holding that the State of Israel had to be a

“direct” owner of DSB’s shares. The statute imposes no such

requirement. As the usage of the words “owned by” by this Court

and many lower courts makes clear, the plain and ordinary

meaning of these words encompasses direct as well as indirect

ownership through a subsidiary.

Additionally, it is clear that the State of Israel held a

“majority .. . ownership interest” in DSB within the meaning

of 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2). The plain and ordinary meaning of

the term “ownership interest” encompasses the nature of the

stake that a shareholder (such as the State of Israel) has in the

subsidiaries of the corporation that the shareholder owns directly.

This Court has used the term “ownership interest” in precisely

this way, see Alcan, 493 U.S. at 335, as have numerous lower

courts in a wide variety of contexts. This usage is supported by

definitions of the term “interest” in legal and ordinary

dictionaries, which establish that it is a broad and general term,

encompassing a wide variety of ownership stakes, including

those other than title to an asset.

Application of “owned by” and “majority ownership

interest” in accordance with their plain and ordinary meanings

would further the statutory purpose of allowing a uniform and

principled resolution of claims of agency or instrumentality

status across a wide variety of legal systems around the world.

It would undermine Congress’ legislative intent for an entity’s

entitlement to such status to turn on such legal formalities as

whether title to its shares was directly vested in the foreign state

17

or vested in some other entity owned by the foreign state. Rather,

Congress intended that an entity’s entitlement to agency or

instrumentality status should turn on whether the foreign state

has a majority ownership stake, broadly defined, in the entity

claiming such status.

The facts of the present case illustrate the importance of

interpreting the statute in this manner. Under Israel's

Government Companies Law, the State of Israel had direct

powers of ownership and control over DSB in the same or like

manner as entities that the State owned directly.

II. The State’s ownership of DSB during the time period

of its allegedly tortious conduct is sufficient for it to qualify as

an “agency or instrumentality.” Such an interpretation is

consistent with the language of the statute because the use of

the word “is” in 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2) does not identify

when an entity must be majority owned by the foreign state.

See, e.g., GE Capital Corp. v. Grossman, 991 F.2d 1376, 1381

(8th Cir. 1993) (“use of the word ‘is’ [in § 1603(b)(2)] could

speak to a variety of situations, including the time of the alleged

wrongdoing”). The four circuit courts that have ruled on this

issue have all held that state ownership at the time of an entity’s

alleged wrongdoing is sufficient for it to invoke “agency or

instrumentality” status under the FSIA. Such an interpretation

of § 1603(b)(2) is supported by the use of present tense verbs in

other statutory provisions that clearly refer to the time period of

the events giving rise to the lawsuit rather than the date on which

a suit is commenced in court. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2)

(“causes a direct effect in the United States”, a phrase that has

uniformly been interpreted by this Court and lower courts as

referring to the effect caused by alleged wrongdoing at the time

of such conduct).

An essential purpose of the statute is to promote harmonious

foreign relations, a purpose that Congress determined would be

served by channeling all claims against foreign states and their

agencies or instrumentalities to non-jury trial in federal courts.

Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493

18

(1983); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a), 1441(d). Suits against an entity

that was an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state at the

time of its alleged wrongdoing implicate the foreign relations

concerns that the statute was enacted to address. Such suits may

raise “foreign policy concerns” to the extent they require a court

in this country to “judg[e] the acts of another nation” regarding

allegations that it, or its agencies or instrumentalities, committed

a tort, breached a contract, or otherwise committed a legal wrong.

GE Capital Corp. v. Grossman, 991 F.2d at 1381. See also Pere

v. Nuovo Pignone, Inc., 150 F.3d 477, 480-81 (Sth Cir. 1998),

cert. denied, 525 J.S. 1141 (1999). Failure to include such suits

within the scope of the FSIA could, for example, subject the ~

acts of an instrumentality of a foreign state to adjudication before

a jury in a state court proceeding, a result the Act was specifically

designed to foreclose. Accordingly, the statute should be

interpreted to apply to claims asserted against entities owned

by a foreign state at the time of the entity’s alleged wrongdoing.

The application of immunity doctrines in other contexts in

which a defendant’s status jas changed between the date of

alleged wrongdoing and a lawsuit supports the interpretation of

the statute urged here. For example, this Court has held that a

government-owned vessel does not lose its sovereign status

merely because it is sold to private owners prior to the litigation.

The Western Maid v. Thompson, 257 U.S. 419, 432-33 (1922).

Nor does a federal official or judge forfeit his or her qualified

or absolute immunity from suit with respect to acts taken in an

official capacity upon retirement from office or the bench.

19

ARGUMENT

I. DSB IS AN AGENCY OR INSTRUMENTALITY OF

ISRAEL BECAUSE THE STATE OWNED

A MAJORITY OF THE OUTSTANDING SHARES

THROUGH ITS OWNERSHIP OF DSB’S PARENT

CORPORATION AND HAD A MAJORITY OWNER-

SHIP INTEREST IN THE COMPANY.

The State of Israel possessed an overwhelming iiiajority

ownership interest in DSB during the time period in which

Respondents allege that they were exposed to DBCP. From 1968

to 1983, the State held an ownership interest in DSB that ranged

from 91% to 99%, by virtue of holding one share in DSB directly

and virtually all of DSB’s remaining shares through its parent

company or companies. Ante, at 5-7. Through a tiered ownership

structure, the State of Israel indirectly owned a substantial

majority of DSB’s shares. Plainly, DSB was an entity “a majority

of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign

state.” 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2).

A. The State of Israel Owned a Majority of the Shares

and Had a Majority Ownership Interest in DSB

Under the Plain and Ordinary Meaning of These

Words.

“The starting point in statutory interpretation is the

‘language [of the statute] itself.’” Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S.

129, 135 (1991) (alteration in original, quoting United States v.

James, 478 U.S. 597, 604 (1986)). The statutory language at

issue here — “a majority of whose shares or other ownership

interest is owned by a foreign state” — requires that the foreign

state must own a majority of the “shares” or a majority of some

“other ownership interest” in order for a company to be an

agency or instrumentality of the state. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2).

DSB meets both tests. Indisputably, the State of Israel indirectly

owned a majority of DSB’s shares, and, by virtue of owning the

parent corporation’s shares, had a majority ownership interest

in DSB.

20

1. The Plain Language of the Statute Does Not

Require a Foreign State To Directly Own a

Majority of a Company’s Shares.

The statute provides that an entity is majority owned by a

foreign state, and thus is an “agency or instrumentality of a

foreign state,” if “a majority of [its] shares . . . is owned by a

foreign state.” 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2). On its face, the statute

makes no reference to any requirement that the ownership of

shares be direct. Indeed, to require that the foreign state directly

own a majority of the shares of the entity claiming status as an

instrumentality would be to read an additional, substantive

requirement into the statutory language. As stated by the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, “[t]he plain language

of the statute simply requires ‘ownership’ by a foreign state.

It draws no distinction between direct and indirect ownership;

neither does it expressly impose a requirement of direct

ownership.” Delgado, 231 F.3d at 176.

Numerous courts, recognizing the statutory text compels

this conclusion, have similarly interpreted the statute. See, e.g.,

Musopole v. South African Airways, 172 F. Supp.2d 443, 447

(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“where, as here, the Republic of South Africa

owns an eighty percent beneficial interest in SAA, the fact that

it does so indirectly, through its wholly owned subsidiary

Transnet, rather than directly, is immaterial to the analysis”);

Watkiss v. Corporate Jets, Inc., 2001 WL 1344578, *2 (N.D.

Oh. 2001) (“Eurocopter was indirectly owned by the French

government through an intermediary corporation [and, thus, flor

purposes of the FSIA, ... was owned by the French

Government.”); Jn Re Clearsky Shipping Corp., 1999

WL 1021825, *5 (E.D.La. Nov. 8, 1999) (“neither the plain

language of the statute nor the legislative history suggests that

indirect majority ownership through intermediaries was outside

the contemplation of § 1603(b)(2)”); Talbot v. Saipem A.G, 835

F.Supp. 352, 353 n.2 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (“That Saipem’s

ownership by the Italian government is indirect is immaterial.”).

Indeed, a significant majority of the cases that have specifically

addressed the tiering issue hz ve held that indirectly majority-

21

owned tiered subsidiary entities are “owned” by the government

under § 1603(b)(2). Compare Dead Sea Companies’ Petition

for a Wnt of Certiorari at 12-14 (citing cases) with id. at 16

(citing contrary authority).

This Court has previously acknowledged that a statutory

reference to “owned by” may reasonably be read to include the

indirect ownership that a parent corporation — that is, a

shareholder — has in the assets of 2 lower tiered subsidiary.

See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988) (“K

Mart’). The statute at issue in K Mart prohibited the importation

into the U.S. of “any merchandise of foreign manufacture

if such merchandise ... bears a trademark owned by ...

a corporation . . . created or organized within, the United States.

...” 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (emphasis added). The Treasury

Department’s implementing regulations permitted, in certain

circumstances, the importation of a product trademarked in the

United States by the U.S. subsidiary of a foreign corporation.

The validity of such a regulation turned on whether, in the parent-

subsidiary context, the foreign corporate parent could be

recognized as the true “owner” of the trademark, rather than the

U.S. subsidiary in whose name it was registered in this country,

permitting the conclusion that the merchandise did not bear a

trademark “owned by” a U.S. corporation.

The Court, in three opinions reflecting a different majority

for each of two holdings, agreed on one point: that the statutory

phrase “owned by .. . a corporation . . . created or organized

within . . . the United States” reasonably could be interpreted to

refer either to the U.S. subsidiary that directly owned the

U.S. trademark or its parent company that, through its subsidiary,

indirectly owned the U.S. trademark. 486 U.S. at 292 (Kennedy,

J.); id. at 298-99 (Brennan, J.); id. at 318-19 (Scalia, J.).

All members of the Court agreed that Treasury’s view that the

foreign corporation should be deemed the “owner” of the

trademark, notwithstanding that the mark was registered in the

United States by its U.S. subsidiary, was a reasonable

interpretation of the statute and did not conflict with its plain

language. /d. In explaining why this is so, Justice Brennan stated:

22

“The term [‘owner’] is . . . nomen generalissimum,

and its meaning is to be gathered from the connection

in which it is used, and from the subject-matter to

which it is applied.” Black’s Law Dictionary 996

(Sth ed. 1979). But whether ‘ownership’ is the

‘{cJollection of rights to use and enjoy property,

including [the] right to transmit it to others,’ or ‘(t]he

complete dominion, title, or proprietary nght in a

thing,’ or ‘[t]he entirety of the powers of use and

disposal allowed by law,’ id., at 997, the parent

corporation — not the subsidiary whose every

decision it controls — better fits the bill as the true

owner of any property that the subsidiary nominally

possesses.

Id. at 298-99. Accord id. at 292 (Kennedy, J.); id. at 318

(Scalia, J.).

This Court’s discussion and analysis in Franchise Tax Board

of California v. Alcan Aluminium Ltd., 493 U.S. 331 (1990)

(“Alcan”), affirming 860 F.2d 688 (7th Cir. 1988), further

illustrates common understanding and usage concerning

concepts of ownership in the context of multi-tiered corporate

relationships. At issue in that case was whether a foreign

corporation, Alcan Aluminium Limited (“Alcan Limited”),

had standing to raise claims on behalf of its second tier

U.S. subsidiary, Alcan Aluminum Corporation (“Alcan Corp.”).’

This Court characterized Alcan Limited as the “sole shareholder”

of Alcan Corp. 493 U.S. at 339. Moreover, responding to the

argument that the second tier U.S. subsidiary was the only entity

with standing under California law to bring a state court

challenge to the tax scheme at issue, the Court noted that, as the

“sole shareholder,” Alcan Limited had “total contro!” over Alcan

Corp. and, thus, could cause Alcan Corp. to bring such a

challenge if it wished to do so. To disregard this reality, said the

Court, “would be to elevate form over substance.” Jd. at 339.

7. Alcan Limited was the sole shareholder of Alcan Aluminium of

Canada, Ltd., which, in turn, owned 100% of the shares of Alcan Corp.

See 860 F.2d at 690 n.1.

23

The language employed by the Court in these decisions

does not reflect isolated or idiosyncratic usage. In Flink v.

Paladini, 279 U.S. 59, 63 (1929) (“Flink’), Justice Oliver

Wendell Holmes, wnting for the Court, noted that the word

“owner” in the statute there at issue 1s an “untechnical word,”

and went on to observe that “‘[ijn common speech the

stockholders would be called owners’” of a corporation’s assets.

See also Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostoock

R.R.,417 U.S. 703, 706 (1974) (“Bangor Punta”) (Bangor Punta,

a parent company, controlled and directed its third-tier subsidiary

through Bangor Punta’s “ownership of about 98.3% of the

outstanding stock” of that entity); Copperweld Corp. v.

Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 759 (1984)

(“Copperweld’) (noting that “‘a parent and its subsidiary are

subject to common ownership” in holding that a parent

corporation cannot conspire with its subsidiary to violate the

Sherman Anti-Trust Act); Fletcher s Cyclopedia of the Law of

Private Corporations § 43, at 733-34 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1999)

(“The holding company may be regarded as the ‘owner’ of the

subsidiary’s property. . . .”).*

The everyday use of the word “own” to include the interest

of a corporate parent more than one step removed from a

subsidiary entity is well illustrated by language chosen in this

very litigation by Respondents’ counsel. In their brief to the

court of appeals below, Respondents described DSB as being

“majority-owned by the State of Israel.” Bnef of Plaintiffs-

Appellants/Cross-Appellees dated October 15, 1999 at 7.

Numerous courts have accepted tiered ownership as meeting

the requirements of § 1603(b)(2) with no little or no discussion,

8. Other examples of the common usage of “own” to include

indirect ownership of tiered subsidiary entities may be found in

the language of government regulations. For example, Securities

and Exchange Commission regulations generally require that publicly

traded companies “consolidate entities that are majority owned”

for financial reporting purposed. 17 C.F.R. § 210.3A-02(a) (emphasis

added).

24

as though the conclusion were obvious. See Dead Sea

Companies’ Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 15-16 (citing

cases). For example, in Allendale Mutual Ins. Co. v. Bull Data

Systems, Inc., 10 F.3d 425, 427 (7th Cir. 1993), in reference to

two second tier subsidiaries of France, Chief Judge Posner

paused to consider whether the court had jurisdiction under the

FSIA and concluded that “(t]here is no problem” because

§ 1603(b)(2) “confers federal jurisdiction over civil suits against

foreign states as defined by the [FSIA], and the Act’s definition

includes companies a majority of whose shares are owned by a

foreign state.” The relative lack of analysis in many of these

decisions confirms that the understanding of the relationship

between tiered parent-subsidiary corporate entities reflected in

this Court’s discussions in K Mart, Alcan, Flink, Bangor Punta

and Copperweld quite naturally applies to the common sense

reading of the statute. These decisions recognize that, under the

plain and ordinary meaning of its language, the Act’s application

tums on the substance of the foreign state’s ownership and

resulting control, not the form of the state’s ownership.

The United States has argued that the word “direct” must

be read into the statute in order to bring it into conformity with

“basic legal understandings” that “‘[a] corporation and its

stockholders are generally to be treated as separate entities,””

U.S. Amicus Brief at 7 (quoting Burnet v. Clark, 287 U.S. 410,

415 (1932)), and “bedrock principles of corporate law.” Jd. at 8

(quoting United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 62 (1998)).

This contention is entirely misplaced. There is no dispute that

the State of Israel is a separate entity from a corporation in which

it owns a majority of the shares, directly or indirectly, and that

neither DSB’s immediate corporate parent nor the State are

answerable for the company’s allegedly tortious acts. Neither

fact has any relevance to whether, in common parlance and

understanding, a majority of DSB’s shares were “owned by”

the State of Israel.

The discussion in Delgado and many of the other lower

court FSIA tiering cases cited above mixes reference to the

State’s indirect ownership of the subsidiary’s shares with a

25

discussion of the State’s “ownership interest.” In fact, the two

statutory phrases are closely related and reinforce the argument

that indirect share ownership is encompassed by both. Congress

could have chosen to provide that only an entity “a majority of

whose shares are owned by a foreign state” is within the purview

of the FSLA’s reach. It chose instead immediately thereafter to

add the notably broad and general phrase “or other ownership

interest.” Its presence in the statutory definition lends particular

weight to the argument that “share ownership” should be

construed to include indirect ownership. Surely, Congress’

decision to include any entity that possesses a majority

ownership interest in a tiered subsidiary, of whatever kind or

nature, strongly supports the interpretation that share ownership

should be read in an “untechnical” way, see Flink v. Paladini,

279 U.S. at 63, to include indirect ownership.

2. The Words “Majority .. . Ownership Interest,”

in Their Plain and Ordinary Meaning, Refer

to a Broad Range of Ownership Rights and

Relationships That Encompass the Nature of the

Stake that a Majority Shareholder of a Corporation

Has in an Entity Owned by that Corporation.

An alternative and independent ground for deeming DSB

to be an “agency or instrumentality” under the Act is that the

State of Israel had a “majority . . . ownership interest” in DSB

within the meaning of § 1603(b)(2). The FSIA does not

specifically define the term “ownership interest.” Under settled

principles of statutory construction, that term should be

construed in accordance with its “ordinary or natural meaning.”

Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993), see also

Walters v. Metropolitan Educational Enterprises, Inc., 51 9US.

202, 207 (1997); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994);

Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979).

An “interest” is the “most general term that can be employed

to denote a right, claim, title, or legal share in something.”

Black's Law Dictionary at 729 (Sth ed. 1979). “More particularly

it means a right to have the advantage accruing from anything;

any right in the nature of property, but less than title.” Id.

26

(emphasis added). See also Webster's Ninth New Collegiate

Dictionary at 631 (1985) (defining “interest” as “right, title, or

legal share in something [or] . . . participation in advantage and

responsibility”). While it did not directly hold title to DSB’s

shares, the State of Israel clearly had an interest in the Company

that allowed the State to accrue an advantage from its success

and control its management and affairs.

The ordinary meaning of the term “ownership interest” quite

plainly encompasses the stake that a shareholder has in its

corporation’s subsidiary. In Alcan, this Court used the term

precisely this way when it characterized as an “ownership

interest” the nature of the interest that Alcan Limited had in

Alcan Corp., its second tier subsidiary. 493 U.S. at 335.

Numerous other courts, ruling in a wide range of contexts,

have also used the term “ownership interest” to describe the

stake of a corporate entity, or the shareholder of such an entity,

in a multi-tiered subsidiary corporation. In a case involving an

insolvent bank with several tiered subsidiaries, Maryland’s

highest court noted that the bank’s receiver had the powers of

the bank and “of any corporation in which [the bank] . . . has a

100% ownership interest, directly or through first, second, or

third tier subsidiaries.” Gay v. State of Maryland Deposit

Insurance Fund Corp., 308 Md. 707, 719, 521 A.2d 1205, 1210

(1987) (emphasis added). New York’s highest court has used

the term “ownership interest” to encompass both direct

ownership of shares in a corporation and the nature of the interest

acquired in a corporation by owning shares in another entity

that owns shares in the corporation, as in the sentence “he had a

direct ownership interest in it through personally held shares

and also an indirect ownership interest in it through another

company he owned ... which held . .. shares.” Kreutter v.

McFadden Oil Corp., 71 N.Y.2d 460, 464, 522 N.E.2d 40,

42 (1988). South Dakota’s highest court, describing the purchase

by a subsidiary of Edward D. Jones & Co. (“Jones”) of

one-third of the shares in a small oil exploration company,

characterized the transaction as one in which “Jones, through

an affiliated subsidiary, purchased a one-third ownership interest

27

in [the oil company)” and stated that “Jones paid $5 million. . .

for its ownership interest in [the oil company].” Schaffer v.

Edward D. Jones & Co., 521 N.W.2d 921, 924 (S. Dak. 1994).”

The United States asserts that Congress “typically” uses

language to signify its intention that a broad reading should be

given to such words as “owns.” U.S. Amicus Brief at 9 n.4.

As noted above, the inclusion of the phrase “or other ownership

interest” serves precisely such a function and makes clear, should

clarification be needed, that the foreign state need not directly

own the shares of a tiered subsidiary in which it owns a majority

ownership interest.

9. See also Harris v. United States, 175 F.3d 1318, 1321

(11th Cir. 1999) (in a tax case, the court stated that a shareholder of a

subsidiary’s publicly-owned parent company had an “indirect ownership

interest” in the subsidiary); Access Now, Inc. v. AMH CGH, Inc., 2001

WL 1005593 *1 (S.D.Fla. May 11, 2001) (in an action brought under

the Americans with Disabilities Act, the court described the action as

one stating claims “against medical facilities, in which [defendant] Tenet

Healthcare Corporation . . . had, directly or though one of its subsidiary

corporations, a majority ownership interest”), Ferro Union, Inc. v. United

States, 44 F. Supp.2d 1310, 1327 n.39 (Int'l Trade 1999) (in an

antidumping case, court described a situation in which a “Mr. X owned

25 percent of MG. . _[, which] owned a 20 percent share of six subsidiary

Petitioners” as one in which “Mr. X’s indirect ownership interest” in

these subsidiary Petitioners was less than the requisite 20 percent under

the applicable legal standard); Bowers v. Wurzburg, 202 W.Va. 43,47,

$01 S.E.2d 479, 483 (1998) (two corporations that owned 69.9% of the

shares of a retailing corporation through an intervening holding

corporation described as having an indirect “ownership interest” in the

retailing corporation); Fertilizantes Fosfatados Mexicanos, S.A. v. Chen,

1992 WL 204394 *1 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (in a judgment collection case,

the court used the term “controlling ownership interest” to describe the

relationship between the principal shareholder of a parent corporation

and the parent corporation’s subsidiaries); Trump Taj Mahal Associates

v. Costruzioni Aeronautiche Giovanni Agusta S.p.A., 761 F. Supp. 1143,

1150(D.N.J. 1991) (foreign state has a majority “ownership interest” in

a subsidiary of a state-owned corporation), aff ‘d, 958 F.2d 365 (3d Cir.),

cert. denied, 506 U.S. 826 (1992).

28

3. Israel’s Government Companies Law Established

the Legal Framework Pursuant to Which the State

of Israel Owned and Controlled DSB and Provides

Additional Support for the Conclusion that the

Plain and Ordinary Meaning of the Terms “Owned”

and “Ownership Interest” Encompass the Nature

of the State’s Interest in the Company.

Under the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory

language at issue here, it should be sufficient that the State of

Israel indirectly “owned” a majority of DSB’s shares and thereby

had a “majority . . . ownership interest” in the Company. Yet, in

applying the statutory language to the State of Israel’s ownership

of DSB, the legal framework under which the State owned the

Company provides additional support for the conclusion that

the Company’s shares can fairly be said to have been “owned

by” the State and that the State had a “majority . . . ownership

interest” in the Company. Under this legal framework, which

was established by Israel’s Government Companies Law, the

State had far more of the qualities of an “owner” of the Company

than would a similarly situated indirect shareholder under

American law. Since K Mart, Alcan, Flink, Bangor Punta and

all of the other cases discussed above that construed or used the

terms “owned” or “ownership interest” as encompassing the

nature of the stake that an ultimate shareholder has in a tiered

subsidiary reached this conclusion under American corporate

law principles, the conclusion is reached even more readily under

the legal framework under which the State of Israel held its

ownership interest in DSB.

Under the law of Delaware, for example, a shareholder’s

statutory rights, even with respect to the corporation in which it

directly holds shares, are quite limited.'° Significantly, in this

10. The Delaware General Corporations Law (“Del. GCL”)

provides that the “business and affairs” of the corporation shall be

“managed by or under the direction of the board of directors.”

Del. GCL § 141(a). Thus, “‘{a] fundamental precept of Delaware

corporation law is thet it is the board of directors, and neiihes Oe

29

context, a shareholder of a Delaware corporation has no formal

right to elect or approve the appointment of directors of

subsidiary corporations, attend their annual meetings, vote on

changes to their corporate charters, or otherwise interact with

them in a direct fashion. In these respects, Delaware corporate

law is similar to that of New York and other important

commercial centers in the United States.

In marked contrast, under Israel’s Government Companies

Law, the State of Israel, by virtue of its majority ownership

interest in DSB, had numerous direct levers of control over and

incidences of ownership with respect to that entity. With

immaterial exceptions, the GCL’s provisions with regard to

companies directly owned by the State applied “in like manner”

to subsidiaries of such companies. Ante, at 8-14. The State, acting

through its senior ministers and the Government Companies

Authority, controlled the board of directors of DSB, ante, at

9-10, appointed or approved the appointment of its Chairman

of the Board and CEO, ante, at 11, had approval authority over

all changes to its capital structure, business purposes or purchase

of securities, ante, at 12, controlled its budget and business

plans, including the purpose to which profits were applied,

ante, at 12, approved the appointment of its auditors and

attorneys, ante, at 13, and had plenary access to information

(Cont'd)

shareholders nor managers, that has ultimate responsibility for the

management of the enterprise.’” Ward, Folk on the Delaware General

Corporations Law at GCL-IV-14 (4th ed. 2002-2 Supp.) (citation

omitted). One of the few rights a shareholder has is to attend, in person

or by proxy, the annual meeting of stockholders to elect directors. Del.

GCL § 211(b). Even at the annual meeting, however, stockholders have

no right to ask questions, see Loudon v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co.,

700 A.2d 135, 146 (Del. 1997), nor 4o they have a right to call a special

meeting. Del. GCL § 211(d). Apart from voting for the board of directors

at the annual meeting, a shareholders’ other rights are, in essence,

limited to seeking to enforce the directors’ fiduciary duties

and voting on amendments to the corporate charter, a merger,

sale of substantially all of the corporation’s assets, or dissolution.

Id. §§ 242(b)(1), 275(B), 271(A).

30

concerning its affairs, ante, at 13. The record indicates,

moreover, that these rights were by no means theoretical but

were, in fact, routinely exercised in a myriad of ways and

contexts. See ante, at 14-15.'' Thus, by virtue of owning DSB’s

parent corporation, the State of Israel had far more day-to-day

input and control over DSB than a majority shareholder in the

United States would have over a corporation in which the

shareholder held a direct majority stake.

In view of the State of Israel’s creation of DSB, its

overwhelming majority ownership of the Company and its

pervasive control and oversight through the mechanism of the

Government Companies Law, the State of Israel, in Justice

Brennan’s words, “fits the bill as the true owner” of DSB.

K Mart, 486 U.S. at 299. Like the ultimate parent entity in Alcan,

the State was the “shareholder” of DSB, 493 U.S. at 339, with

an indisputable majority “ownership interest” in the company.

Id. at 335. To disregard these realities in interpreting the language

of § 1603(b)(2) “would be to elevate form over substance.”

Id. at 339. Since the State had all of the incidents of “ownership”

(and then some) that a shareholder has in a corporation in which

it owns a majority of shares, it clearly “owned a majority of the

shares” and, as well, owned a “majority . . .ownership interest”

under any common sense definition of those terms.

B. The Interpretation of “Owned By” and “Majority

... Ownership Interest” Urged Here Is Consistent

With the FSIA’s Legislative History and Would

Further the Statutory Objectives.

The interpretation of “owned by” and “majority . ..

ownership interest” urged here is fully consistent with the

11. The United States erroneously assumes that the same basic

principles of United States corporate law, which in any event in no way

preclude the interpretation urged by DSB, would apply to the relationship

between the State of Israel and DSB under Israeli law. U.S. Amicus

Brief at 8 & 12 n.5. Thus, the su.,zestion in the U.S. Amicus Brief that

a “different approach” might be appropriate under legal regimes

dissimilar to that of the United States, id. at 12 n.5, is in fact quite

applicable.

31

legislative history of the statute and would further its objectives.

An important goal of the FS.A was to define broadly the universe

of entities intended to come within its scope. Congress was

concerned that suits against such entities, and particularly those

suits arising out of commercial activities where the defense of

sovereign immunity would not be available, implicate the

foreign relations of the United States insofar as they may compel

a court to pass judgment on the acts of a foreign sovereign or its

agencies or instrumentalities. Post, at 32. Congress was also

cognizant of the fact that foreign sovereigns were increasingly

establishing separately constituted state-owned and controlled

enterprises to perform a variety of commercial functions.

Congress intended that the definition of “agency or

instrumentality” cover a broad spectrum of these state-owned

entities. Post, at 33. Congress also intended to move away from

the rigid application of the “separate entity” rule and an era of

judicial decisions that had favored form over substance, by

eliminating the significance of separate incorporation in the

context of foreign sovereign immunity. Post, at 36. A cramped

interpretation of “owned” in § 1603(b)(2), reading into the

statute the limiting modifier “directly owned,” and of “ownership

interest” would work against all these Congressional objectives.

1. The Objective of the FSLA was to Create a Broad-

Based Scheme Encompassing All Entities in

Which Foreign States Possessed a Majority

Ownership Interest.

Congress enacted the FSIA to establish uniform “standards

governing claims of immunity in every civil action against a

foreign state or its political subdivisions, agencies or

instrumentalities.” Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria,

461 U.S. 480, 488 (1983) (“Verlinden”). The entities

to be accorded foreign sovereign status under the Act are

broadly defined to include the foreign sovereign and its political

subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1603(b).

The Act provides that all such foreign sovereign entities

shall be immune from the jurisdiction of courts in the United

32

States, subject to various exceptions. 28 U.S.C. § 1604. In fact,

the exceptions describe a fairly wide range of cases in which

foreign states and their agencies and instrumentalities may be

sued, as, for example, where the claims arise out of commercial

activities conducted or having a direct effect in the United States.

Id. § 1605(a)(2). Where an exception applies, such suits may

be maintained, but the Act accords certain protections to the

foreign sovereign entities. Among other things, they are entitled,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a), 1441(d), to federal court

jurisdiction, by way of a grant of original jurisdiction’ and a

broad right of removal,'"? and to a non-jury trial.'*

The provision of a federal forum for such suits is designed

to protect the “foreign relations of the United States,” Verlinden,

461 U.S. at 493; to reduce the potential for conflicting results,

id. at 497; and to “avoid any local bias . . . inherent in state

court proceedings.” Jn re Delta America Re Ins. Co., 900 F.2d

890, 893 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 890 (1990).

Such suits may raise “foreign policy concerns” to the extent

they require a court in this country to “judg[e] the acts of another

nation” regarding allegations that it, or its agencies or

instrumentalities, committed a tort, breached a contract, or

otherwise committed a legal wrong. GE Capital Corp. v.

Grossman, 991 F.2d 1376, 1381 (8th Cir. 1993). All of

these concerns are implicated in a judicial interpretation of the

reach of the Act’s definition of “agency or instrumentality” of a

foreign state.

12. “Such broad jurisdiction in the Federal courts should be

conducive to uniformity in decision, which is desirable since a disparate

treatment of cases involving foreign governments may have adverse

foreign relations consequences.” H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487,

at 13, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6611.

13. “In view of the potential sensitivity of actions against foreign

states and the importance of developing a uniform body of law in this

area, it is important to give foreign states clear authority to remove to a

Federal forum . . .” /d. at 32, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6631.

14. “Actions tried by a court without [a] jury will tend to promote

a uniformity of decision where foreign governments are involved.”

Id. xt 13, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6611-12.

33

Congress thus intended the FSIA to create a comprehensive

set of ground rules for suits against foreign states and all entities

in which such states have a substantial interest, which Congress

chose to define, in part, as a majority ownership interest. It did

so, because it perceived that suits against such entities, especially

in those commercial cases where sovereign imimunity was not

to be available, and where the actions of state-owned entities

would thus be subject to judicial process, adjudication and

enforcement, have obvious potential to implicate significant

foreign relations interests, requiring the protections afforded by

a federal forum and non-jury trial. It is this background and

context against which the provisions of the FSIA must be

interpreted. See generally Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S.

337, 341 (1997) (when seeking to ascertain the intent of statutory

language, particular attention should be paid to the specific

context in which the language is used as well as the broader

context of the statute as a whole).

2. A Narrow Interpretation of “Owned By” and

“Ownership Interest” Is Inconsistent With the

Purposes of the Act.

The House Report on the FSIA, H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487,

94th Cong., 2™ Sess., reprinted in 5 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604 (1976),

makes plain that Congress intended to cast the agency or

instrumentality net broadly. See, e.g., Verlinden, 461 U.S. at

488; Ruggiero v. Compania Peruana De Vapores, 639 F.2d 872,

877-78 (2d Cir. 1981) (Friendly, J.). The Act was crafted to cover

a myriad of governmental, social, and economic systems.

See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487 at 15-16, reprinted in 1976

U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6614. The Report notes the widely varying

types of enterprises that Congress had in mind (including trading

enterprises, shipping lines, 2irlines, steel companies, and mining

enterprises) and reflects Congress’ understanding that these

entities would be engaged in commercial activities for profit.

H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487 at 16, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.

at 6614-15; see also S. Rep. No. 94-1310 at 15-16 (“entities

which 1 ~et the definition of ‘agency or instrumentality of a

foreign state’ could assume a variety of forms, including a state

34

trading corporation, a mining enterprise, a transport organization

such as a shipping line or airline, a steel company, a central

bank, an export association”’).

The circumstances of DSB’s ownership, in which the

foreign state chose to hold its ownership interest through a tiered

corporate structure, are far from unique. As this Court observed

in First National City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior

de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611 (1983), “{iJncreasingly during this

century, governments throughout the world have established

separately constituted legal entities to perform a variety of tasks.”

462 U.S. at 624 (citing Friedmann, Government Enterprise:

A Comparative Study at 333-34 (W. Friedmann & J.F. Garner

eds. 1970) (“Friedmann”)); see also Friedmann at 307

(“The variety of forms in which the various States have, at

different times, proceeded to establish public enterprises is

almost infinite. ...”); id. at 333-34 (noting use of tiered

subsidiary structures). Were this Court to hold that a foreign

state does not have an ownership interest in a company owned

through an intervening holding corporation, it would

significantly restrict the scope of the statute and make its

application turn on a formalistic distinction as to how a

government chooses to structure its ownership interest in a state-

owned company that has nothing to do with the nature or extent

of the government’s real life interest in or control over the entity.

There is no reason to assume that the strength of a foreign

state’s interests or the scope of its involvement dissipate when

it employs a tiered ownership structure. See Report of the

Working Group of the American Bar Association, Reforming

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 40 Colum. J. Transnat’]

Law 489, 523 (2002). For example, Mexico, the sole owner of

that nation’s petroleum resources, formerly carried out all

production, manufacturing, transportation and distribution

through the state petroleum company Petroleus Mexicanos

(“Pemex”). See Corporacion Mexicana de Servicios Maritimos,

S.A. de C.V. v. M/T Respect, 89 F.3d 650, 653-54 (9th Cir. 1996).

In 1992, Mexico restructured its ownership by establishing

Pemex as a holding company with four operating subsidiaries.

35

Id. Surely, Mexico’s interests in its state-owned petroleum

enterprise were not materially different before and after that

reorganization. Similarly, Honduras holds interests in its lumber

industry through a tiered ownership structure, see Byrd v.

Corporacion Forestal y Industrial de Olancho S§.A., 182 F.3d

380, 382 (Sth Cir. 1999), and Venezuela holds its interest in its

national oil industry through a tiered ownership structure.

See Lopez Del Valle v. Gobierno de la Capital, 855 F. Supp. 34,

35-6 (D.P.R. 1994).

There is no reason to conclude that these foreign states have

any less interest in their critical state-owned resources as a result

of their decision to structure the corporate form in which they

are held and managed. Nor is there reason to conclude that a

suit filed against a tiered subsidiary has the potential to implicate

interests that are materially different from those potentially

implicated by suits against directly owned corporate entities. In

this case, the State of Israel created DSB in 1955 to develop

and market primary natural resources of that nation in a manner

consistent with the national interests. The Congressional policy

concerns underlying the FSIA are in no way diminished by the

fact that Israel chose to own and control the company through a

tiered corporate ownership structure.

The Ninth Circuit did not articulate any rationale as to why

a company that is 100% owned by a foreign state should be

entitled to remove a case to federal court but a wholly owned

subsidiary of that company should not. Such a result would

contravene the clear and significant Congressional objective that

entities in which a state holds a majority ownership interest

should be within the purview of the Act. Similarly, it would be

illogical to read a direct ownership requirement into the statute

with the result that a company 51% owned by a foreign state

would be entitled to the Act’s protections, but a second tier

subsidiary in which the state had 100% ownership, albeit

indirectly, would not. Under the clear language of statute,

the sole focus should be on whether the State’s ownership

interest, however structured, is greater than 50%. As one court

36

has observed, the “FSIA specifically provides that “corporate

form’ — in and of itself — be immaterial.” O ‘Connell Machinery

Co., Inc. v. M.V. “Americana”, 566 F. Supp. 1381, 1385

(S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 734 F.2d 115, 116-17 (2d Cir.),

cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1086 (1984). Because there is “no policy

reason why tiering through an intermediary majority owned by

a foreign state should not be permitted under the FSIA,”

Linton v. Airbus Industrie, 934 S.W.2d 754, 762 (Tex. Civ. App.

1996), there is no reason to depart from the plain language of

the statute, which requires only that a foreign state have a

majority “ownership interest” for the FSIA to apply. The foreign

sovereign’s internal, administrative decision as to how its

ownership interest is held or structured under its form of

government and its legal and economic systems is immaterial

to the purposes and objectives of the statute and should not

control the statute’s application to an entity that is majority

owned by the foreign state.

3. A Narrow Interpretation Would Represent a

Return to the Separate Entity Rule That

Congress Rejected in Enacting the FSIA.

There is an additional reason why the Ninth Circuit’s

interpretation of the statute is not consistent with its origin and

purpose. Prior to the FSIA, the “separate entity” rule often

prevented foreign corporations from asserting sovereign

immunity. Premised on the assumption that states do not perform

sovereign acts through corporations, this doctrine provided that

corporations owned by a sovereign state were presumed to be

separate entities and thus not entitled to assert sovereign

immunity. See, e.g., Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance

Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 388 (1939) (“the [federal] government

does not become the conduit of its immunity in suits against its

agents or instrumentalities merely because they do its work’’);

Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. United States Shipping Board

Emergency Fleet Corp., 258 U.S. 549, 567 (1922) (“An

instrumentality of Government he might be and for the greatest

ends, but the agent, because he is [but an] agent” may not assert

sovereign immunity); Bank of United States v. Planters’ Bank

37

of Georgia, 22 U.S. 904, 907 (1824) (bank incorporated by and

partly owned by the State of Georgia held not entitled to assert

sovereign immunity); Comment, The Jurisdictional Immunity

of Foreign Sovereigns, 63 Yale L. J. 1148, 1152-53 (1954);

Fensterwald, Sovereign Immunity and Soviet State Trading,

63 Harv. L. Rev. 614, 619 (1950).

As governments increased their use of corporate entities

during the last century to perform a variety of tasks to further

their interests, the “restrictive” theory of sovereign immunity

emerged. Under that approach, immunity from suit is limited to

claims based on the foreign sovereign’s public acts, and does

not extend to cases arising out of a foreign state’s strictly

commercial acts. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487. Under the

“restrictive” theory, courts began to look at various factors to

determine whether a corporation, owned or controlled by a

government, engaged in either sovereign or commercial acts.

While this test appears straightforward, courts applied it in an

inconsistent manner. Jd. at 487-88.

The FSIA was enacted, in large part, to codify the restrictive

theory of immunity. See id. at 488; H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487,

at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6605. And by including

an “agency or instrumentality” of a foreign state as an entity

subject to the FSIA’s procedural protections (e.g., federal court

jurisdiction) and, in appropriate cases, immunity from suit,

Congress unequivocally rejected the separate entity rule and

sought to end the confusion surrounding the conflicting

applications of that doctrine to claims of foreign sovereign

immunity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(1) (requiring that an “agency

or instrumentality of a foreign state” be “a separate legal person,

corporate or otherwise” from the foreign state).

In enacting the FSIA, Congress chose to provide procedural

protections both to foreign states and their legally distinct

agencies or instrumentalities and to regulate claims of sovereign

immunity of both, and the ground rules for permitting suits in

those cases where immunity from suit is not available, under

the same uniform standards. It is thus clear from the structure

of the statute that it sought to eliminate the fact of separate

38

incorporation from the immunity analysis and, instead, focus

the court’s inquiry on the substance of the State’s involvement

(e.g., does it own a majority of the shares or other ownership

interest of the entity) and the character of the action at issue in

the case (e.g., is it a “commercial” act that “cause[d] a direct

effect in the United States,” id. § 1605(a)(2)).

By rejecting the separate entity rule, the Act can be fairly

said to have repudiated its underlying doctrinal premise, i.e.,

that the mere fact of separate incorporation should have

dispositive significance in the application of the doctrine of

foreign sovereign immunity. The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation

of the statute — which attaches dispositive significance to the

fact that DSB is incorporated as a “separate entity” from its

parent corporation — thus represents a step backwards toward

the formalistic approach rejected by Congress. Instead of

focusing judicial attention on the substantive role of the State

and the nature of the conduct undertaken by an entity majority

owned by a foreign state, as the statute requires, the Ninth

Circuit’s approach exhumes the separate entity concept and

ignores the Congressional effort to replace that discredited

doctrinal framework with new statutory standards.

C. The Ninth Circuit’s Rationale for Interpreting

the Terms “Owned” and “Majority ...

Ownership Interest” so as to Exclude the

Interest That a Foreign State Has in State-

Owned Companies Held Through a Tiered

Subsidiary Structure Does Not Make Sense.

The court of appeals based its decision in this case

principally on its conclusion that it was bound by its prior

decision in Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, 54 F.3d 1457 (9th Cir.)

(“Gates’’), cert. denied sub nom. 516 U.S. 869 (1995), see Pet.

App. 22a-24a, a case that presented a distinctly different and,

indeed, unusual factual backdrop. In Gates, the “original”

owning entity — the Alberta Pork Producers Development

Corporation (“Alberta Pork”) — was neither a sovereign state

nor a political subdivision, nor was it owned, directly or

indirectly by a state or political subdivision. It was, however,

39

held to be an “organ” of a political subdivision (the Province of

Alberta). See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2) (referencing an entity

which is “an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision”).

Alberta Pork’s subsidiary was unable to assert its status as an

“agency or instrumentality” based solely on the language of

§ 1603(b)(2) (referencing majority ownership) because its parent

corporation was not owned, directly or indirectly, by a foreign

s.ate or political subdivision. Rather, it contended that since its

parent, Alberta Pork, was an “organ” of a state, the parent was

therefore an “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” by

virtue of § 1603(b). And therefore, went the argument, Alberta

Pork was itself a “foreign state” by virtue of § 1603(a), which

provides that a “foreign state” includes an “agency or

instrumentality of a foreign state” as defined in § 1603(b). On

this basis, Alberta Pork’s subsidiary argued that it was itself

owned by a “foreign state” (Alberta Pork). It is this far more

complex statutory analysis, based upon the arguably recursive

inter-relationship between §§ 1603(a) and 1603(b)(2), that Gates

rejected, on the ground that it could unduly expand the reach of

the Act to entities far removed from state ownership. Gates, 54

F.3d at 1462."°

The court in Gates never focused on the language of

§ 1603(b)(2) alone. The facts there did not present a case in

which a foreign sovereign entity had any ownership interest,

direct or indirect, since Alberta did not directly or indirectly

own either Alberta Pork or its subsidiary. However, in the ruling

below, the Ninth Circuit interpreted Gates more broadly, to

require direct share ownership by the foreign state — a result not

required by the facts of Gates.

15. Although this recursive inter-relationship between

§§ 1603(b)(a) and 1603(b)(2) has been adopted by several courts,

see, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, Indiana, 96 F.3d 932

(7th Cir. 1996), Petitioners here base their argument on the plain meaning

of “owned” and “ownership interest.” Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit's

critique of the recursive interpretation in Gates has no bearing on

Petitioners’ argument.

40

Although it placed primary reliance on Gates, the Ninth

Circuit did briefly address DSB’s contention that the State of

Israel held a “majority . . . ownership interest” in the Company.

The court rejected that argument, because, in the court’s view,

it would “make the majority-shareholder requirement

superfluous.” Pet. App. 23a. Yet the canon “‘a legislature is

presumed to have used no superfluous words,” Bailey v. United

States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995) (quoting Platt v. Union Pacific

R.R., 99 U.S. 48, 58 (1879)), is merely an aid to interpretation

and cannot ' used to alter the plain meaning of statutory

language. See Connecticut National Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S.

249, 254 (1992); Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 122 S. Ct.

528, 535 (2001). For the reasons already explained above,

the court of appeals’ constricted interpretation of “ownership

interest” is contrary to the plain and ordinary meaning of these

words, as well as the Congressional intent behind the statute,

and must therefore be rejected.

There are two additional reasons why the “no superfluous

words” canon does not apply here. First, the presence of the

word “other” in “other ownership interest” specifically conveys

the notion that “shares” are one type of “ownership interest.”

Thus, the conclusion that an “ownership interest” includes share

ownership is implicit in the very grammar of the sentence.

In seeking to interpret “ownership interest” narrowly to exclude

share ownership so as to give the reference to “shares”

independent meaning, the court of appeals twisted the meaning

of the statutory language past the breaking point.'* Second, if,

contrary to the argument presented here, the phrase “a majority

of whose shares . . . are owned by a foreign state” is limited to

16. The word “other” is used routinely in the way it is used in

§ 1603(b)(2). For example, Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h) provides for “service

upon a domestic or foreign corporation or upon a partnership or other

unincorporated association.” The word “other” in this Rule indicates

that an “unincorporated association” includes, but is not limited to, a

“partnership.” Similar uses of the word “other” are legion.

See, e.g., Supreme Court Rule 9(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(j)(2), 8(c), 9(b);

Fed. R. Cr. P. 4(d)(1).

41

direct share ownership, the most logical interpretation of “other

ownership interest” would be that it encompasses indirect

ownership, eliminating any redundancy in the phrase.

Il. THE RELEVANT TIME PERIOD FOR

DETERMINING WHETHER AN ENTITY IS AN

AGENCY OR INSTRUMENTALITY OF A FOREIGN

STATE INCLUDES THE TIME OF THE ACTIONS

GIVING RISE TO THE CLAIM.

Respondents argued in the district court that, since the FSIA

defines “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” as

“any entity . . . a majority of whose shares or other ownership

interest is owned by a foreign state,” 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2)

(emphasis added), the relevant time period for determining a

party’s foreign sovereign status is the date of the filing of the

lawsuit. Therefore, claimed Respondents, even if DSB were an

agency or instrumentality of the State of Israel at the time of the

acts giving rise to the DBCP-related claims asserted against it,

DSB lost that status with regard to such claims when Israel

became a minority shareholder in 1995, two years before the

action was commenced. In rejecting that argument, the district

court followed the ruling of every appellate court that has faced

this issue and held that it is sufficient if the foreign state had

majority ownership at the time of the events giving rise to the

suit. Pet. App. 62a-64a. The court of appeals did not reach the

issue, but expressed skepticism as to the district court’s

conclusion. /d. 20a-22a. The district court’s interpretation of

the Act is consistent with its statutory language, the statutory

purpose, other laws on immunities, and well established caselaw.

A. A Holding that an Entity Is an Agency or

Instrumentality of a Foreign State Based on its

Status at the Time of the Alleged Wrongdoing

is Consistent With the Statutory Language.

The use of the present tense “is” in the phrase “a majority

of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign

state,” 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2), does not establish which point

in time an entity’s shares or other ownership interest must be

owned by the foreign state. GE Capital Corp. v. Grossman,

42

991 F.2d at 1381 (“{t}he use of the word ‘is’ [in § 1603(b)(2)]

could speak to a variety of situations, including the time of the

alleged wrongdoing.”). For the reasons explained below, it

should be sufficient under the Act if an entity met the statutory

requirements at the time of its alleged wrongdoing.

The present tense is commonly employed to refer to both

the past and future as well as the present time frame. Such an

interpretation of the statute here is thus entirely consistent with

everyday usage of language and commonly understood

principles of grammar:

[T]he present tense of a verb may sometimes refer

to the past and to the future as well as to the present.

R. Pence and D. Emery, A Grammar of Present-Day

English 262-63 (2d ed.). For example, the historical

present tense is used in narratives to express past

events in the present tense. Furthermore, the present

tense may be used when the time is actually

indefinite. Jd.

In re Stratford of Texas, Inc., 635 F.2d 365, 369 (Sth Cir. 1981).

Courts have frequently recognized such use of the present tense

by Congress in its legislative enactments. See Coalition for

Clean Air v. Southern California Edison Co., 971 F.2d 219,

225 (9th Cir. 1992) (congressional legislation commonly uses

verbs in the present tense to refer to the past, present, or future

“all at the same time”), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 950 (1993);

Abercrombie v. Clarke, 920 F.2d 1351, 1359 (7th Cir.)

(“it is abundantly clear that Congress intended the present tense

language [of the banking statute under review] to apply to past

acts”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 809 (1991).

One need look no further than other language in the FSIA

to demonstrate that Congress’ use of the present tense in that

statute cannot be interpreted to refer exclusively to the period

that a lawsuit is filed or pending. Section 1605(a)(2) grants a

district court subject matter jurisdiction over an agency or

instrumentality of a foreign state if the plaintiff's claim is based

upon a “commercial activity . . . that causes a direct effect in

43

the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (emphasis added).

Although this phrase is in the present tense, like the definitional

language in § 1603(b)(2), this Court and others have focused

on whether the commercial act caused a direct effect at the time

of the act giving rise to the suit, not whether it causes such an

effect on the date the suit is commenced. See Republic of

Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 611, 618-19 (1992);

Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 498 n.23; Hanil Bank v. PT. Bank Negara

Indon., 148 F.3d 127, 129 (2d Cir. 1998); Adler v. Federal

Republic of Nigeria, 107 F.3d 720, 727 (9th Cir. 1997); Aldy v.

Valmet, 74 F.3d 72, 75-76 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 817

(1996)."’

B. Applying the FSIA to a Suit Stating Allegations

Against an Entity that was an Agency or

Instrumentality of a Foreign State at the Time

of its Alleged Conduct Serves the Statutory

Purpose of Protecting Foreign Relations,

Channeling Allegations of this Character to

Federal Courts, and Providing Immunity in

Non-Commercial Cases.

A primary reason Congress chose to provide a broad right

of access to federal courts for foreign states, including their

17. Analogous usage is found in the Comprehensive Environmental

Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”). Under

CERCLA a company may be held liable if it “accepted any hazardous

substances for transport to disposal .. . facilities . . . from which there

is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of

response costs, of a hazardous substance.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 9607(a)(4) (emphasis added). Although the phrase “from which there

is a release” is in the present tense, courts look at releases that have

occurred at the CERCLA site in the past, well prior to initiation of

CERCLA litigation. See, e.g., Kalamazoo River Study Group v. Menasha

Corp., 228 F.3d 648, 655-56, 658-59 (6th Cir. 2000); NutraSweet Co. v.

X-L Engineering o., 227 F.3d 776, 784-85 (7th Cir. 2000); New Jersey

Turnpike Authority v. PPG Industries, Inc., 197 F.3d 96, 103-04 (3d Cir.

1999). Similarly, the term “causes” does not require that the release be

causing response costs to be incurred on the date a CERCLA lawsuit is

filed to recover past response costs. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2)

(limitations period expires 3 years after completion of removal action).

44

agencies or instrumentalities, was its recognition that “[a]ctions

against foreign sovereigns in our courts raise sensitive issues

concerning the foreign relations of the United States.” Verlinden,

461 U.S. at 493; see also H.R. No. 94-1487 at 32, reprinted in

U.S.C.C.AN. at 6631 (citing “the political sensitivity of actions

against foreign states” as the rationale for allowing them to

remove actions to federal court).

To restrict the application of the FSIA to those cases where

the entity whose status is at issue has the requisite relationship

with the foreign state at the time suit is commenced would be at

odds with the statute’s essential purpose of promoting

harmonious international relations. Lawsuits based on actions

taken while an entity was an agency or instrumentality of a

foreign state raise the same types of foreign policy concerns

that the FSIA and sovereign immunity in general seek to address.

Any lawsuit against a former agency or instrumentality of a

foreign state will inevitably be premised on the facts and

circumstances that existed at the time the alleged wrongdoing

occurred. The fact that the entity is not a foreign state at the

time suit is brought does not diminish the foreign policy

implications of such a lawsuit or the corresponding comity

considerations, as the court will necessarily be called upon to

pass judgment on the foreign state’s actions at the time the cause

of action arose. See GE Capital Corp. v. Grossman, 991 F.2d at

1381 (suits against entities formerly owned by a foreign state

will likely require a court in this country to “judg[e] the acts of

another nation” regarding allegations that it, or its agencies or

instrumentalities, committed a legal wrong); Pere v. Nuovo

Pignone, Inc., 150 F.3d 477, 480-81 (Sth Cir. 1998) (the FSIA

was designed to promote harmonious international relations and

effectuate notions of comity among nations; such concerns do

not vanish when a corporate entity is divested of government

ownership before an action is commenced), cert. denied, 525

U.S. 1141 (1999); Cargill International S.A. v. M/T Pavel

Dybenko, 991 F.2d 1012, 1016 (2d Cir. 1993) (the interests

sought to be promoted by the statute are implicated even after

privatization has begun).

45

Even the court of appeals below, which expressed some

solicitude to Respondents’ argument on the timing issue,

acknowledged that “[w]here the defendant was a foreign state

at the time of the alleged wrong, the complaint perforce alleges

that the foreign state did something wrong. By adjudicating that

claim, the court may have to pass judgment on the acts or

decisions of a foreign sovereign.” Pet. App. 21a."

Through passage of the FSIA, Congress sought to promote

and preserve harmonious international relations by

implementing “‘comprehensive rules governing sovereign

immunity’ [of which] the jurisdictional provisions of the Act

are simply one part.” Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 496 (citation

omitted). In particular, the FSLA “represent[s] a comprehensive

effort ‘to provide when and how parties can maintain a lawsuit

against a foreign state or its entities in the courts of the United

States and to provide when a foreign state is entitled to sovereign

immunity.’” Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors, 761 F.2d 1527,

1531 (11th Cir.) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487 at 6),

cert. denied, 474 U.S. 995 (1985). The Act accords certain

procedural protections to such entities even in commercial cases

in which they cannot assert immunity from suit, including a

right to federal court jurisdiction and a non-jury trial. 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1330(a), 1441(d). Denying foreign state status to an entity

that is privatized prior to the filing of a lawsuit but after the

alleged acts at issue occurred could result in the actions of a

foreign sovereign, taken at the time the cause of action arose,

being assessed by a jury in state court. This result would

18. The Court has cited the same foreign relations concerns as

one rationale for the analogous act of state doctrine. See Oetjen v. Central

Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 304 (1918) (“To permit the validity of the

acts of one sovereign state to be reexamined and perhaps condemned

by the courts of another would very certainly imperil the amicable

relations between governments and vex the peace of nations.”);

First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 765

(1972) (“[J)uridical review of acts of state of a foreign power could

embarrass the conduct of foreign relations by the political branches of

the government.”).

46

undermine the FSIA’s goal of “render[ing] uniform in procedure

and substance the treatment of foreign sovereigns subjected to

suit in American courts.” Nolan v. Boeing Co., 919 F.2d 1058,

1065 (Sth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 962 (1991).

Accordingly, the statutory purpose of the FSIA requires that

federal courts assume jurisdiction under the statute in cases

where the actions of an agency or instrumentality are at issue,

even if that party is no longer an agency or instrumentality of a

foreign state.

C. Considering an Entity’s Sovereign Status Under the

FSIA at the Time of Its Alleged Wrongdoing Is

Consistent with the Rule Applicable to Other

Immunities.

The application of the FSIA to entities that were agencies

or instrumentalities at the time of their allegedly tortious conduct

is also consistent generally with how other immunity doctrines

deal with a change in a defendant’s status between the time of

the allegedly tortious or unlawful! acts and the date of the lawsuit.

In the context of domestic sovereign immunity, for example,

the status-at the time of the alleged wrongdoing is generally

dispositive.

This Court has previously held that a defendant retains

immunity even if government ownership of the defendant is

transferred to a private party between the time of the alleged

acts and a suit to recover upon such acts. The Western Maid v.

Thompson, 257 U.S. 419 (1922). This case addressed in rem

proceedings against vessels for collisions that occurred while

the vessels were owned by or under charter to the United States

government. In each instance, the United States government

had transferred ownership of the vessel to private hands after

the alleged wrongdoing but prior to suit. The Court, in an opinion

by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, held that the sovereign

immunity that attached while the vessels were government

owned was not lost when the vessels were transferred to private

ownership. /d. at 432-33.

The same principles may be found in other immunity

contexts. A governmental employee who enjoys qualified

47

immunity for his official acts does not forefeit his immunity

merely because he happens to leave his position with the

government before a plaintiff initiates a lawsuit. See, e.g.

Mitchell v. Forsythe, 472 U.S. 511 (1985). Similarly, a federal

judge who enjoys absolute immunity from suit based on judicial

acts is not suddenly stripped of such immunity upon leaving

the bench.

That such immunities are not lost when the status of the

protected entity changes before an action is commenced is

equally applicable in the context of the FSIA. As in these

examples, an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state is

cloaked with certain protections attributable to its sovereign

status at the time of the alleged actions giving rise to a lawsuit.

Where such an entity is alleged to have committed some

wrongful act while it had such status, it is free to invoke these

protections. Because such protections are rooted in the doctrine

of sovereign immunity, there is no basis to deny their

applicability to an entity that was an agency or instrumentality

of a foreign state when the act occurred but not at the time

of suit.

D. Every Appellate Court to Address the Timing

Issue Has Held that the FSIA’s Definition of 2

Foreign State Includes an Entity that was an

Agency or instrumentality of a Foreign State at

the Time of the Acts Upon Which the Suit is

Based.

The district court held that DSB is entitled to FSIA foreign

state status if it was an agency or instrumentality of the State of

Israel at the time the alleged wrongdoing occurred. Pet. App.

62a-64a. Similarly, in Delgado, Judge Lake held that “[s]ince

Israel owned a majority of the shares of Dead Sea when plaintiffs

were allegedly exposed to DBCP manufactured by Dead Sea,

FSIA jurisdiction exists notwithstanding subsequent changes

in ownership.” Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 890 F. Supp. 1324,

1340 n.33 (S.D. Tex. 1995), aff'd, 231 F.3d 165 (Sth Cir. 2000),

cert. denied, 532 U.S. 972 (2001). The holding of these courts

is consistent with well established case law.

48

Four circuits have expressly held that the status of the

defendant as an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state at

the time of the alleged wrongdoing is sufficient to create FSIA

jurisdiction. See Pere v. Nuovo Pignone, Inc., 150 F.3d at 480-

81; GE Capital Corp. v. Grossman, 991 F.2d at 1381; Gould,

Inc. v. Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann, 853 F.2d 445, 450 (6th Cir.

1988); In re Chase & Sanborn Corp., 835 F.2d 1341, 1347-48

(11th Cir. 1988), rev’d on other grounds sub nom.

Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989); accord

Cargill International S.A. v. M/T Pavel Dybenko, 991 F.2d at

1016 (noting that sensitive foreign relations interests could well

remain in any given case even after a company has been

privatized).'®

A number of district courts have also followed Gould,

Grossman and their progeny. See, e.g., Daly v. Llanes,

30 F. Supp.2d 407, 418-19 (S.D.N.Y 1998); Belgrade v. Sidex

International Furniture Corp., 2 F.Supp.2d 407, 412-14

(S.D.N.Y. 1998); Kern v. Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc., 867 F.Supp.

525, 530 (S.D. Tex. 1994); Papanos v. Lufthansa German

Airlines, No. 94-2667-CIV, slip op. at 7 (S.D.Fla. 1995); but

see Ocasek v. Flintkote Co., 796 F. Supp. 362, 365 (N.D. Ill.

1992).

19. Two of these decisions even indicated that the importance of

the FSIA is diminished in the context of protecting entities that were not

government-owned at the time of the underlying events. See Gould, 853

F.2d at 450 (“[a]s to completed acts upon which the complaint is based,

the parties are bound by the jurisdictional facts existing at the time of

those acts”); Chase & Sanborn, 835 F.2d at 1347-48 (implying that the

only relevant time for assessing the status of an entity claiming to be an

agency or instrumentality is the time of the underlying violation).

20. A few courts have held that an entity’s status as an agency or

instrumentality of a foreign state at the time a lawsuit is filed also qualifies

it to assert the protections of the statute. See Straub v. A.P. Green, 38

F.3d 448, 451 (9th Cir. 1994); Rutkowski v. Occidental Chemical Corp.,

1998 WL 107342, *2 (N.D. Ill. 1988). These cases do not address Corr)

(Cont’

49

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit should be reversed.

Dated: August 23, 2002

Respectfully submitted,

Tuomas C. WALSH PeTeR R. PADEN

JAMES F, BENNETT Counsel of Record

Bryan Cave LLP Puiuip E. KARMEL

One Metropolitan Square LAURENCE A. HORVATH

St. Louis, Missouri 63102 Bryan Cave LLP

1290 Avenue of the Americas

New York, New York 10104

(212) 541-2000

Georce W. BRANDT

Lyons, BRANDT, Cook

& HIRAMATSU

1800 Davis Pacific Center

841 Bishop Street

Honolulu, Hawaii 96813

Attorneys for Petitioners

(Cont'd)

foreign state status at the time the cause of action arose would be

sufficient or insufficient under the FSIA. Thus, they do not conflict with

the many decisions that have held that agency or instrumentality status

at the time of the alleged acts giving rise to liability is sufficient. Rather,

these cases support DSB’s position that the FSIA applies if a party is a

foreign state either at the time of the alleged acts giving rise to suit or at

the time of suit. See Belgrade, 2 F.Supp.2d at 413 (“The particular

concerns that underlie FSIA jurisdiction are safeguarded under both

approaches.”).

—

Al

ADDENDUM

QEAD SEA BROMINE COMPANY LTD.

OWNERSHIP CHART

inzh-1917 1278-1935

— STATE

= STATE

100 % ne

4

— ICL

98% 91-83%

7

DEAD SEA DEAD SEA

,

One

—_ 99.9% a 99.9%

OGAD SHA DEAD SEA

>

BROMINE Lael nee

98 % 88 % +

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.