Petitioners Brief — Dead Sea Bromine Co., Ltd. v. Patrickson
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Suaeeiie LOW, UD.
FILED
yy AUG 23 2002
No. 01-594 of
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
DEAD SEA BROMINE CO., LTD. and BROMINE
COMPOUNDS LIMITED,
Petitioners,
v.
GERARDO DENNIS PATRICKSON, et ai.,
Respondents.
On Writ oF CERTIORARI TO THE
Unitep States Court OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS
Tuomas C. WALSH PeTeR R. PADEN
James F. BENNETT Counsel of Record
Bryan Cave LLP Puitip E. KARMEL
One Metropolitan Square LAURENCE A. HorvaTH
St. Louis, Missouri 63102 Bryan Cave LLP
1290 Avenue of the Americas
Georce W. BRANDT
Lyons, BRANDT, Cook
& HIRAMATSU
1800 Davis Pacific Center
841 Bishop Street
Honolulu, Hawaii 96813
Attorneys for Petitioners
175858 g
COUNSEL PRESS
(800) 274-3321 + (800) 359-6859
New York, New York 10104
(212) 541-2000
Nee
iy > Ng sO Bi er C,
er rn ae
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (the “FSIA” or
“Act”) establishes the ground rules for claims against a
foreign state and, also, an “agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a), 1603(a). The term
“agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” is defined in
pertinent part as “any entity . . . a majority of whose shares
or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state... .”
Id. § 1603(b)(2).
The Court granted the petition for a writ of certiorari to
resolve the following questions:
1. Whether a corporation is an “agency or
instrumentality” if a foreign state owns a majority of the
shares of a corporate enterprise that in turn owns a majority
of the shares of the corporation.
2. Whether a corporation is an “agency or instru-
mentality” if a foreign state owned a majority of the shares
of the corporation at the time of the events giving rise to
litigation, but the foreign state does not own a majority of
those shares at the time that a plaintiff commences a suit
against the corporation.
ii
STATEMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 29.6
Petitioners’ Rule 29.6 Statement was set forth at page ii
of their Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, and there are no
amendments to that Statement.
ili
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ...................
STATEMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 29.6 ......
TABLE OF CONTENTS ....cccccccccccccccees
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES ............
TET cntewsdsccccececocecccces
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION .............
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED .......
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................
1. The Nature of the Case and the Proceedings
DU PUMECPScESeGeeeeesseeccescccccss
ccc ccccccee
a.
The State of Israel Created DSB to
Develop and Market the State-Owned
Resources of the Dead Sea. ..........
During the Time of the Acts at Issue, the
State of Israel Owned a Substantial
Majority of DSB’s Shares Through Its
Ownership of DSB’s Parent Corporation
and Thus Had a Substantial Majority
Ownership Interest in DSB. .........
iv
Contents
Pursuant to Israel’s Government
Companies Law, the State of Israel
Controlled and Managed DSB Until Its
Privatization in 1995 in the Same or Like
Manner as a Company Directly Owned
SGD EI. occdsésecececcweectess
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
The State’s Control Over Govern-
ment-Owned Companies Such as
DSB Involved the Highest Ranking
Officials and Bodies of the Israeli
ee wee
The Government Controlled DSB’s
Board of Directors in the Same or
Like Manner as a Company Directly
Owned By the State of Israel. ....
The Government Appointed and/or
Approved the Appointment of the
Chairman of the Board and the CEO
of DSB in the Same or Like Manner
as a Company Directly Owned by
the State of Ieracl. ..............
Government Approval was Required
for All Changes in DSB’s Capital
Structure, Business Purposes or the
Purchase of Securities in the Same
or Like Manner as a Company
Directly Owned by the State of
BE sev cccvsdecsacecacedtsces
Page
11
11
(v)
(vi)
(vii)
Vv
Contents
The Government Controlled the
Budget and Business Plans of DSB
in the Same or Like Manner as a
Company Directly Owned by the
En
The Government Required DSB to
Use Consolidated Financial Reports
in the Same or Like Manner as a
Company Directly Owned by the
ee
DSB Had to Obtain Government
Approval for the Appointment of its
Auditors and Attorneys in the Same
or Like Manner as a Company
Directly Owned by the State of
Kdekedonhsnsdedeseneses
(viii) The Government Had Access to
(ix)
Information Concerning DSB in the
Same or Like Manner as a Company
Directly Owned by the State of
BD Se waddevedadsoecoceseees
DSB Had to Obtain Government
Approval for Privatization in the
Same or Like Manner as a Company
Directly Owned by the State of
ED Sontpededeecéucdueeesese
The State of Israel Repeatedly Exercised
its Far-Reaching Ownership Rights to
Control DSB’s Affairs. .............
Page
12
13
13
13
14
14
vi
Contents
I DSB IS AN AGENCY OR INSTRU-
MENTALITY OF ISRAEL BECAUSE THE
STATE OWNED A MAJORITY OF THE
OUTSTANDING SHARES THROUGH ITS
OWNERSHIP OF DSB’S PARENT
CORPORATION AND HAD A MAJORITY
OWNERSHIP INTEREST IN THE
GREET occcccdscccessscesecceoocs
A. The State of Israel Owned a Majority of
the Shares' and Had a Majority
Ownership Interest in DSB Under the
Plain and Ordinary Meaning of These
WE ceesecesncebecteseneveseees
l.
The Plain Language of the Statute
Does Not Require a Foreign State
To Directly Own a Majority of a
Company’s Shares. .............
The Words “Majority . .. Ownership
Interest,” in Their Plain and
Ordinary Meaning, Refer to a Broad
Range of Ownership Rights and
Relationships That Encompass the
Nature of the Stake that a Majority
Shareholder of a Corporation Has
in an Entity Owned by that
SGI. dc cikcccccescsccscs
19
19
20
25
3.
vil
Contents
Israel’s Government Companies
Law Established the Legal
Framework Pursuant to Which the
State of Israel Owned and
Controlled DSB and Provides
Additional Support for the
Conclusion that the Plain and
Ordinary Meaning of the Terms
“Owned” and “Ownership Interest”
Encompass the Nature of the State’s
Interest in the Company. ........
The Interpretation of “Owned By” and
“Majority . . . Ownership Interest” Urged
Here Is Consistent With the FSIA’s
Legislative History and Would Further
the Statutory Objectives. ............
l.
The Objective of the FSIA was to
Create a Broad-Based Scheme
Encompassing All Entities in Which
Foreign States Possessed a Majority
Ownership Interest. ............
A Narrow Interpretation of “Owned
By” and “Ownership Interest” Is
Inconsistent With the Purposes of
REED sa vecsecscteendcéocese
A Narrow Interpretation Would
Represent a Return to the Separate
Entity Rule That Congress Rejected
in Enacting the FSIA. ...........
Page
28
30
31
33
36
Il.
vill
Contents
C. The Ninth Circuit’s Rationale for
Interpreting the Terms “Owned” and
“Majority ... Ownership Interest” so as
to Exclude the Interest That a Foreign
State Has in State-Owned Companies
Held Through a Tiered Subsidiary
Structure Does Not Make Sense. .....
THE RELEVANT TIME PERIOD FOR
DETERMINING WHETHER AN ENTITY
IS AN AGENCY OR INSTRUMENTALITY
OF A FOREIGN STATE INCLUDES THE
TIME OF THE ACTIONS GIVING RISE
Ves CR Es oS cee ctcccccsévocicees
A. A Holding that an Entity Is an Agency
or Instrumentality of a Foreign State
Based on its Status at the Time of the
Alleged Wrongdoing is Consistent With
the Statutory Language. .............
B. Applying the FSIA to a Suit Stating
Allegations Against an Entity that was
an Agency or Instrumentality of a
Foreign State at the Time of its
Alleged Conduct Serves the Statutory
Purpose of Protecting Foreign Relations,
Channeling Allegations of this Character
to Federal Courts, and Providing
Immunity in Non-Commercial Cases.
Page
38
41
41
ix
Contents
Page
C. Considering an Entity’s Sovereign Status
Under the FSIA at the Time of Its Alleged
Wrongdoing Is Consistent with the Rule
Applicable to Other Immunities. ..... 46
D. Every Appellate Court to Address the
Timing Issue Has Held that the
FSIA’s Definition of a Foreign State
Includes an Entity that was an Agency
or Instrumentality of a Foreign State at
the Time of the Acts Upon Which the
PE cadcoenecdesetenceues 47
GUESS vc cccccccccceeeveccesnsoceses 49
| PPPTTTTTTTTTITI TTT Al
x
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES
Abercrombie v. Clarke,
920 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
$02 U.S. BOD (1991) ... ccc ceccccccccecees
Access Now, Inc. v. AMH CGH, Inc.,
2001 WL. 1005593 (S.D.Fla. May 11, 2001) ...
Adler v. Federal Republic of Nigeria,
107 F.3d 720 (9th Cir. 1997) ...........0000.
In re Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, Indiana,
96 F.3d 932 (7th Cir. 1996) ..........0.0005.
Aldy v. Valmet,
74 F.3d 72 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied,
$19 U.S. 817 (1996) ........cccccccceeceees
Allendale Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Bull Data Systems, Inc.,
10 F.3d 425 (7th Cir. 1993) .......... eee ees
Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors,
761 F.2d 1527 (11th Cir.) , cert. denied,
SUNT GID cca vcvensekneseecsstas
Ardestani v. INS,
S02 U.S. 12D (UGDT) 2... rccccccceseseseces
Bailey v. United States,
S16 U.S. 137 (IDDS) 0. rcccccccccccccccess
Page
xi
Cited Authorities
Page
Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v.
Bangor & Aroostoock R.R.,
ee es SED ode anbdcdoccvccacecs 23, 24, 28
Bank of United States v. Planters’ Bank
of Georgia,
DT tivicadheauhakyisacéee ns 36
Belgrade v. Sidex International Furniture Corp.,
2 F. Supp. 2d 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ........... 48, 49
Burnet v. Clark,
ee le og a 24
Byrd v. Corporacion Forestal y Industrial
de Olancho S.A.,
182 F.3d 380 (Sth Cir. 1999) ................ 35
Cargill International S.A. v. M/T Pavel Dybenko,
991 F.2d 1012 (2nd Cir. 1993) ............... 44, 48
In re Chase & Sanborn Corp.,
835 F.2d 1341 (11th Cir. 1988), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom Granfinanciera, S.A.
v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989) ............. 48
Chickasaw Nation v. United States,
ee a we ia 40
Coalition for Clean Air v. Southern
California Edison Co.,
971 F.2d 219 (9th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 507 U.S. 950 (1993) ............ 42
xii
Cited Authorities
Page
Connecticut National Bank v. Germain,
SOB UD. BED IGG) cc cccccccccccccccscsess 40
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.,
GGT US. TES CIOS) cccccccccccccccscvcsces 23, 24
Corporacion Mexicana de Servicios Maritimos,
S.A. de C.V. v. M/T Respect,
89 F.3d 650 (9th Cir. 1996) ...........20455. 34
Daly v. Llanes,
30 F. Supp. 2d 407 (S.D.N.Y 1998) ........... 48
Delgado v. Shell Oil Co.,
890 F. Supp. 1315 (S.D. Tex. 1995), aff'd, 231
F.3d 165 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S.
Pe ED 6.0 osn Genbuaecdancunaeeetes 4, 20, 24, 47
In re Delta America Re Insurance Co.,
900 F.2d 890 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
SIO SESE sabe ve vesccececsasceces 32
FDIC v. Meyer,
FO GEO CD cckcccsteccccéasetesvese 25
Ferro Union, Inc. v. United States,
44 F. Supp. 2d 1310 (Int’] Trade 1999) ........ 27
Fertilizantes Fosfatados Mexicanos, S.A. v. Chen,
1992 WL. 204394 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) ........... 27
First National City Bank v.
Banco Nacional de Cuba,
GEG POPGNEED Bod ce sce ceccusesseceves 45
xiii
Cited Authorities
Page
First National City Bank v. Banco Para el
Comercio Exterior de Cuba,
Te ee eee 34
Flink v. Paladini,
ED ec cincubeadasede 23, 24, 25, 28
Franchise Tax Board of California v.
Alcan Aluminium Ltd.,
ss ca cinenwkebeun tases passim
GE Capital Corp. v. Grossman,
991 F.2d 1376 (8th Cir. 1993) .............. passim
Gates v. Victor Fine Foods,
54 F.3d 1457 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
og BR Ee Pe eee 38, 39, 40
Gould, Inc. v. Pechiney Ugine Kuhimann,
853 F.2d 445 (6th Cir. 1988) ................ 48
Hanil Bank v. PT. Bank Negara Indon.,
ta feeds i+ 3 Se era 43
Harris v. United States,
175 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 1999) .............. 27
7
In Re Clearsky Shipping Corp.,
1999 WL. 1021825 (E.D.La. Nov. 8,1999) .... 20
K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,
486 U.S. 281 (1988) ............. 16, 21, 24, 28, 30
xiv
Cited Authorities
Kalamazoo River Study Group v. Menasha Corp.,
228 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2000) ................
Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp.,
SP SEE GUND cccsececissevncoosscess
Kern v. Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc.,
867 F.Supp. 525 (S.D. Tex. 1994) ............
Papanos v. Lufthansa German Airlines,
No. 94-2667- CIV, slip op. (S.D.Fla. 1995) ....
Lopez Del Valle v. Gobierno de la Capital,
855 F. Supp. 34 (D.P.R. 1994) ...............
Mitchell v. Forsythe,
No so
Musopole v. South African Airways,
172 F. Supp. 2d 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) .........
New Jersey Turnpike Authority v.
PPG Industries, Inc.,
197 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 1999) ............0.005.
Nolan v. Boeing Co.,
919 F.2d 1058 (Sth Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
499 U.S. 962 (1991) .... cc cece ec eeceeeeee
NutraSweet Co. v. X-L Engineering Co.,
227 F.3d 776 (7th Cir. 2000) .............0..
Page
43
36
48
48
35
XV
Cited Authorities
Page
O’Connell Machinery Co., Inc. v. M.V. “Americana”,
566 F. Supp. 1381 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd,
734 F.2d 115, 116-17 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied,
ED co devicdepeeenseedvess 36
Ocasek vy. Flintkote Co.,
796 F. Supp. 362 (N.D. Ill. 1992) ............ 48
Oetjen v. Central Leather Co.,
RS 45
Pere v. Nuovo Pignone, Inc.,
150 F.3d 477 (Sth Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
er 18, 44, 48
Perrin v. United States,
DP Sh towed eededeusesebecses 25
Platt v. Union Pacific R.R.,
te ett feces adbeded sede et 40
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover,
a 43
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,
ee ne i itneh ne bed beeses 33
Rodriguez v. Shell Oil Co.,
932 F. Supp. 177 (S.D. Tex. 1996) ............ 4
Ruggiero v. Compania Peruana De Vapores,
pe ee Pe GE Ge BOUED cc ccccncccscecces 33
xvi
Cited Authorities
Rutkowski v. Occidental Chemical Corp.,
1998 WL. 107342 (N.D. Ill. 1988) ..........
Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. United States Shipping
Board Emergency Fleet Corp.,
250 US. SED CIGEDD 6. occ ccvnnccvncvecteen
Smith v. United States,
FOS US. 223 (IGS) .ccccvesiuccsecessseses
In re Stratford of Texas, Inc.,
635 F.2d 365 (Sth Cir. 1981) ............4..
Straub v. A.P. Green,
38 F.3d 448 (9th Cir. 1994) .............0..
Talbot v. Saipem A.G.,
835 F. Supp. 352 (S.D. Tex. 1993) ...........
The Western Maid v. Thompson,
291 US. GID CITES) ccccvcccccccceesvessss
Trump Taj Mahal Associates v. Costruzioni
Aeronautiche Giovanni Agusta S.p.A.,
761 F. Supp. 1143 (D.N.J. 1991), aff'd, 958 F.2d
365 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 826 (1992)
“es eeeeeeneneneneeneneeneeneneeneeeeeeeeee eee ee ee
United States v. Bestfoods,
$36 US. 98 COOGED s,s cenkacesusueeee
United States v. James,
S76 08, 900 GIN osc iaisiusanandesdean
Page
48
36
25
42
48
a
xvii
Cited Authorities
Page
Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria,
i cee ceeeeeseseccececes passim
Walters v. Metropolitan Educational
Enterprises, Inc.,
ee ee ieee ceenesene et 25
Watkiss v. Corporate Jets, Inc.,
2001 WL 1344578 (N.D. Oh. 2001) .......... 20
STATE CASES
Bowers v. Wurzburg,
202 W. Va. 43, 501 S.E.2d 479 (1998) ........ 27
Gay v. State of Maryland Deposit
Insurance Fund Corp.,
308 Md. 707, 521 A.2d 1205 (1987) .......... 26
Kreutter v. McFadden Oil Corp.,
71 N.Y.2d 460, 522 N.E.2d 40 (1988) ......... 26
Linton v. Airbus Industrie,
934 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. Civ. App. 1996) ........ 36
Loudon v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co..,
PS PE, GUD cc ccvcccecccceccces 29
Schaffer v. Edward D. Jones & Co.,
521 N.W.2d 921 (S. Dak. 1994) .............. 27
xvili
Cited Authorities
Page
FEDERAL STATUTES
19 U.S.C. § 1SBE(e) ... wc cn ccccccccccccccccens 21
BB UBC. 6 UBSETE) .nccccccccccccccccccccecs l
2B UBC. § ISSGER) ... wc cccccccsccccece i, 1, 18, 32, 45
BB UBC. 6 UDTBED onc ccccccccccccvccsesscoss 1
BB UBS. 6 ISDE 2. cccccccccccccccccccccscs l
2B U.S.C. § 1441(@) 2... cr ecccccccess 1, 2, 18, 32, 45
BO UBL. © OGRE ccccccccccccccesscnsccescces l
BB UBL. 6 OGD o cccccccccccscvcessescccses passim
BB UBL. 8 BGS oc ccccccccccccccsnsescsceces 32
28 U.S.C. § 1605(aX(2) ...........--- 17, 32, 38, 42, 43
QB UBC. SSGRHAME) 20 ccccccccsccccccscccss 43
4B UBC. SSGISIE) 2. ccccccccccccccccccess 43
17 C.F.R. § 210.3A-02(a) ... 2.6... ee eee eee 23
STATE STATUTES
Bak, GEE. 6 EGE .n cccccccccccccccccccccesss 28
Dak. GELS SEE nn ccccccccccccccccescccccces 29
xix
Cited Authorities
RULES
FX 8 2 ee ee
Fe UE EES cccectésacdeeseuseesesss
Re ee
Pe A OE OED Rh edssedncnceusénccessesees
Se ED oc cctnndcdvébdeaseansuess
Supreme Court Rule W121) .... 2... ccc ccccccees
MISCELLANEOUS
Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed. 1979) ..........
Comment, The Jurisdictional Immunity of
Foreign Sovereigns,
er ey SPEED woveccceesesceussces
Fensterwald, Sovereign Immunity and
Soviet State Trading, |
63 Harv. L. Rev. 614 (1950) .................
Fletcher's Cyclopedia of the Law of Private
Corporations (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1999) .......
Friedmann, Government Enterprise: A Comparative
Study (W. Friedmann & J.F. Garner eds. 1970)
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, reprinted in 5 U.S.C.C_AN.
25
37
a Se 32, 33, 37, 44, 45
xXx
Cited Authorities
R. Pence and D. Emery, A Grammar of Present-Day
Bea GG GB) oc ccccvcccccccccccccsscecs
Report of the Working Group of the American Bar
Association, Reforming The Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, 40 Colum. J. Transnat’! Law 489
SEED nnonesn06ceceesbsedeesnetesetsasade
BD, GRD. FED. DEEROD ccccvcncccvcccessesccesess
Ward, Folk on the Delaware General Corporations
Law (4" ed. 2002-2 Supp.) ...........-.0005-
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1985)
Page
l
OPINIONS BELOW
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion is reported at 251 F.3d 795
(9th Cir. 2001) and is reproduced in the appendix to the petition
for a writ of certiorari in No. 01-594 (“Pet. App.”) at la. The
district court’s orders holding that it had jurisdiction, denying
rehearing of that order, dismissing the action for forum non
conveniens, and denying rehearing of that order are reproduced
at Pet. App. 55a, 49a, 34a and 27a, respectively.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The court of appeals entered judgment on May 30, 2001,
and entered its order denying timely petitions for rehearing en
banc on July 10, 2001. Pet. App. 120a. The petitions for a writ
of certiorari in No. 01-593 and No. 01-594 were filed on October
9, 2001. In an order dated June 28, 2002, the petitions were
granted and the cases consolidated. This Court has jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSLA” or “Act’’)
is codified at sections 1330, 1332(a)(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-
11 of title 28, United States Code. It provides, among other
things, that “[a}ny civil action brought in a State court against a
foreign state as defined in section 1603(a) of this title may be
removed” to federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d). Section 1603(a)
of title 28, United States Code defines “foreign state” to include
any “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state,” which is in
turn defined as any entity:
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or
otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political
subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose shares
or other ownership interes: is owned by a foreign
state or political subdivision thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States
... nor created under the laws of any third country.
28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (italics added). The questions presented
involve the language in italics.
2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. The Nature of the Case and the Proceedings Below
This case presents claims by citizens and residents of Costa
Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala and Panama who contend that, while
employed on banana farms in their home countries, they suffered
personal injuries from exposure to dibromochloropropane
(DBCP), a pesticide formerly used on banana trees.
The plaintiffs (“Respondents”) filed their complaint on
October 3, 1997, in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit of the
State of Hawaii. The defendants are alleged manufacturers of
DBCP and operators of the foreign banana farms where
Respondents were employed.
Defendant Dole Food Company, Inc. (“Dole”), the lead
petitioner in No. 01-593, impleaded Dead Sea Bromine Co.,
Ltd. (“DSB” or “Petitioner”) and its subsidiary, Bromine
Compounds Limited (“BCL”), the petitioners in No. 01-594,
alleging that DSB and BCL (collectively, the “Dead Sea
Companies” or “Petitioners”) manufactured and sold DBCP to
one or more defendants. Petitioners removed the action to the
U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii.
The removal was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d), which
provides that any foreign state may remove claims asserted
against it to federal court. The FSIA defines “foreign state”
to include an “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state,”
28 U.S.C. § 1603(a), which is, in turn, defined in pertinent part
as “any entity . . . amajority of whose shares or other ownership
interest is owned by a foreign state. ...” Jd. § 1603(b)(2).
Petitioners contend that they are agencies or instrumentalities
within the meaning of the Act, because during the period of
time of the actions giving rise to the claims asserted against
them, the State of Israel held a majority ownership interest in
both Companies through a tiered ownership structure.
After the Dead Sea Companies removed the action, Dole
filed a supplemental notice of removal alleging federal question
jurisdiction. Pet. App. Sa, 58a. Respondents moved to remand
on the ground that Petitioners are not agencies or
3
instrumentalities of Israel within the meaning of the Act and
that there was no subject matter jurisdiction on the alternative
theory set forth in Dole’s notice. The defendants moved to
dismiss the claims on the ground of forum non conveniens.
On September 9, 1998, the district court held that
Petitioners do not qualify as agencies or instrumentalities of
the State of Israel. Jd. 71a. The court agreed with Petitioners’
position — and that of every appellate court that has addressed
the issue — that, although the State of Israel no longer owned a
majority interest in the Companies by the time the suit was filed,
an entity is within the purview of the FSIA if it was an agency
or instrumentality of a foreign state during the period of time of
the alleged conduct on which the claims for relief against it are
based. /d. 62a-64a. Nevertheless, the court held that during this
relevant time period, neither DSB nor BCL was an entity a
“majority of whose shares or other ownership interest” were
owned by the State of Israel. The court acknowledged that the
State of Israel had “indirect ownership” of both companies, but,
in its view, such ownership was insufficient to establish
jurisdiction under the Act. /d. 71a.' The district court concluded,
however, that it had federal question jurisdiction and granted
the defendants’ motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens.
Id. 115a, 117a-118a.
The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s conclusion
that the Dead Sea Companies do not qualify as agencies or
instrumentalities of Israel, on the ground that Israel was not the
direct shareholder of either company. /d. 23a-24a. The court of
appeals reversed the district court’s finding of federal question
jurisdiction and, accordingly, ordered that the action be
remanded to state court. /d. 26a.
The Dead Sea Companies’ status under the FSIA has been
the subject of litigation in a number of other DBCP cases for
the past eight years. In several lawsuits brought in Texas state
1. There is no dispute that DSB and BCL meet the other
requirements of § 1603(b): they are entities separate from the State of
Israel (§ 1603(b)(1)) and are not citizens of or created under the laws of
the United States or any third country (§ 1603(b)(3)).
4
courts against the same principal defendants as in this case,
thousands of individuals alleged that they too had labored on
banana farms in Central America and other regions of the globe
and had suffered injuries from exposure to DBCP. One or both
Dead Sea Companies were impleaded and removed the cases
to federal court, where they were consolidated. In response to a
motion to remand, Judge Sim Lake of the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Texas concluded that the Dead Sea
Companies are agencies or instrumentalities under the FSIA
and thereupon granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for
forum non conveniens. See Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 890
F. Supp. 1315, 1318-19, 1340.33 (S.D. Tex. 1995), Rodriguez
v. Shell Oil Co., 932 F. Supp. 177, 180 n.6 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit expressly
affirmed Judge Lake’s FSIA rulings in Delgado v Shell Oil Co.,
231 F.3d 165, 176 (Sth Cir. 2000) (“Delgado”), cert. denied,
§32 U.S. 972 (2001). The Ninth Circuit, in its ruling below,
rejected the holding of Delgado. Pet. App. 23a-24a.
Upon ectitions for a writ of certioran filed by the Dead Sea
Companies and the defendants, this Court, after requesting the
Solicitor General to submit a brief expressing the views of the
United States,’ granted the petitions.
2. Statement of Facts
a. The State of Israel Created DSB to Develop and
Market the State-Owned Resources of the Dead
Sea.
The Dead Sea is a 400-square-mile lake located between
Israel and Jordan. Its rich mineral deposits, which include
bromine, potassium, and magnesium, are among Israel’s
relatively few natural resources. Joint Appendix (“JA”) at 70,
75, 80, 125-26. The State of Israel created DSB, a corporation
organized under the laws of Israel and headquartered in Beer
Sheeva, Israel, in 1955 to develop and market the Dead Sea’s
bromine resources in a manner consistent with Israel’s national
interests. JA 70-71.
2. Brief for the United States dated May 2002 (“U.S. Amicus
Brief”).
5
DSB has, since the early 1960s, operated under an exclusive
subconcession granted by its parent company, Dead Sea Works
Ltd. (“Dead Sea Works’), to extract bromine and bromine
compounds from the Dead Sea. JA 70-71, 153-76. Dead Sea
Works, in turn, holds the exclusive concession, granted by
Israel’s national legislature (the Knesset), to extract minerals
from the Dead Sea. JA 124-50. The concession states that its
object is “to regulate the efficient exploitation” of the “minerals
of the Dead Sea,” which as “natural resources of the State of
Israel” should serve “the interests of the economy of the State.”
JA 125.
DSB’s Articles of Association declare that the State
possesses “Vital Interests” in the Company, including: (1) the
“{s]upervision of the control of . . . natural resources for their
efficient development and exploitation, including maximum
application in Israel of the results of the investments, research
and development”; (ii) the “[p]reservation of the character of
the Company as an Israeli company whose center of business
and management is in Israel”; and (iii) the “[p}revention of the
achievement of a position of influence in the Company by .. .
elements which may prejudice the State’s foreign and defense
interests.” JA 107-08; see also JA 73-74.
b. During the Time of the Acts at Issue, the State
of Israel Owned a Substantial Majority of DSB’s
Shares Through Its Ownership of DSB’s Parent
Corporation and Thus Had a Substantial
Majority Ownership Interest in DSB.
The State of Israel held a substantial majority ownership
interest in DSB during the time period 1968-95.° From 1968-
75, the State held a 99% ownership interest in DSB. During
this period: (i) the State owned 99% of the shares of Dead Sea
Works, an Israeli company whose principal offices are in Beer
3. This time period is over inclusive for purposes of the questions
presented in this case, in view of Respondents’ allegation that they were
first exposed to DBCP manufactured or distributed by the Dead Sea
Companies after 1975, JA 24, and that DBCP was not used after the
mid-1980s. JA 26.
6
Sheva, Israel and (ii) Dead Sea Works owned virtually all shares
of DSB (99.9% of its shares), except for a single share owned
directly by the State. JA 71-72, 82, 86.
From 1975-77, the State had a 98% ownership interest in
DSB. During this period: (i) the State transferred its shares in
Dead Sea Works to Israel Chemicals Ltd. (“ICL”), an Israeli
company owned entirely by the State of Israel; (ii) ICL owned
approximately 98% of the shares of Dead Sea Works, which
continued to own 99.9% of the shares of DSB; and (iii) the
State continued to directly own the one other share of DSB.
JA 72, 82, 84, 86.
From 1978-83, the State had a 91% ownership interest in
DSB. During this period: (i) ICL, which continued to be owned
entirely by the State, reduced its ownership in Dead Sea Works
to approximately 91%; (ii) Dead Sea Works continued to own
99.9% of the shares of DSB; and (iii) the State continued to
directly own the one other share of DSB. /d.
From 1983-86, the State had an 88% ownership interest in
DSB. During this period: (i) ICL, which continued to be owned
entirely by the State, reduced its ownership in Dead Sea Works
to approximately 88%; (ii) Dead Sea Works continued to own
99.9% of the shares of DSB; and (iii) the State continued to
directly own the one other share of DSB. /d.
From 1986-1992, the State continued to hold an 88%
ownership interest in DSB. During this period: (i) Dead Sea
Works transferred one share of DSB to ICL and one share to
each of four ICL subsidiaries to be held in trust for Dead Sea
Works and (ii) all other ownership arrangements remained the
same. JA 86.
From 1992-95, the State had a 70% (computed as 80.03%
x 88%) ownership interest in DSB, including a Special State
Share. During this period: (i) the State took the first steps to
privatize ICL (up until this time, the State had owned 100% of
ICL’s shares) by offering 19.97% of ICL stock for public sale;
(ii) the State continued to own the remaining 80.03% of ICL’s
shares; and (iii) ICL continued its ownership of 88% of Dead
-
Sea Works, which continued to own almost 99.9% of the shares
of DSB. JA 72-73, 82, 86.
In connection with ICL’s contemplated privatization, the
State converted its one ordinary share of DSB into a Special
State Share, which entitles the State to separately approve or
disapprove: (i) any merger of DSB, (ii) any alteration of its
structure; (111) any acquisition or holding of 14% or more of its
share capital; (iv) any acquisition or holding of 25% or more of
such share capital; (v) the holding of share capital that confers
upon its holder the nght or ability to appoint directly or indirectly
50% or more of DSB’s directors; and (vi) any action by ICL to
sell DSB stock or assets. JA 74, 86-87, 104-09.
From 1995 to the present, the State has continued to hold
the Special State Share but no longer holds a majority ownership
interest in DSB. During this period: (i) the State sold an
additional 24.9% of its ICL stock which, taken together with
certain minor transactions in the intervening years, reduced the
State’s ownership in ICL to 48.5%; (ii) in March 1997, the State
sold an additional 17% of ICL stock, which reduced the State’s
share ownership of ICL to 31.52%; (iii) Dead Sea Works
transferred its shares in DSB to ICL, so that today both Dead
Sea Works and DSB are direct subsidiaries of ICL; and (iv) the
State continued to own the Special State Share in DSB that it
was issued in 1992. JA 72-73, 84.
A chart illustrating the State of Israel’s ownership of DSB
in the period 1970-1985 is in the record (JA 95) and is annexed
to ‘Ls brief as an addendum.‘
4. Dole also impleaded Petitioner BCL, a wholly or partially owned
subsidiary of DSB from 1968 to 1995. During the period of time of the
acts complained of, the State of Israel held a majority ownership interest
in BCL, although the precise percentages varied somewhat and were
slightly less than its percentage stake in DSB. The particular facts
concerning BCL’s ownership history are set forth in the record. JA 71-
72, 86-88, 92-94. The arguments presented here with respect to DSB
apply with equal force to BCL. For the sake of simplicity, however, this
brief focuses on the State of Israel’s ownership of DSB. If DSB is an
instrumentality of Israel, the case was properly removed to federal court,
and the judgment below must be reversed.
8
c. Pursuant to Israel’s Government Companies
Law, the State of Israel Controlled and Managed
DSB Until Its Privatization in 1995 in the Same
or Like Manner as a Company Directly Owned
by the State.
DSB did not hold the status of an ordinary, private business
corporation in Israel. Rather, because it was majority owned by
the State, it was organized and operated pursuant to the
Government Companies Law (“GCL”), an English translation
of which is reproduced at JA 175-222. This statute, which was
enacted in 1975, establishes the legal mechanism by which the
State of Israel controls and supervises entities, such as
Petitioners, a majority of whose shares are owned, directly or
indirectly, by the State. The GCL’s provisions with regard to
companies that are directly owned by the State (referred to in
the GCL as “Government Companies”) apply “in like manner”
to subsidiaries of such companies (referred to in the GCL as
“Government Subsidiary Companies”), with very limited and
specified differences. See GCL §§ 57, 1(a) (JA 208-09, 177).
As discussed in detail below, until the privatization of ICL in
1995, the State of Israel, by virtue of its indirect ownership of a
majority of DSB’s shares, controlled the company in the same
way and through the same administrative mechanism that it
controlled companies a majority of whose shares were directly
owned by the State.
The State, as owner of all or almost all of the shares of
DSB’s ultimate parent company, exercised substantial contro]
and oversight over the Company through the GCL’s approval
and appointment mechanisms, and these incidences of
ownership were not diminished by the fact that the State held
its majority ownership interest through a tiered subsidiary
structure. In this respect, the GCL vests the State of Israel
with far greater direct control over subsidiaries of government-
owned companies than is permitted under U.S. corporate law.
Post, at 28-29.
9
(i) The State’s Control Over Government-
Owned Companies Such as DSB Involved
the Highest Ranking Officials and Bodies
of the Israeli Government.
As with directly owned companies, the Government's
control over their subsidiaries, such as DSB, involved the highest
ranking officials and bodies of the Israeli government.
These officials and bodies included the Minister of Finance and
other Ministers of the Government, see GCL §§ 1(a), 5, 6(3),
11(b), 1SA(b), 18(a), 18B, 22(a)(3), 22(c), 24(a), 26(b), 34(a),
37(a), 44(c), 47(c), 57(1), 57(2) (JA 177-209); the Knesset
Finance Committee, see GCL §§ 1(a), 5(b), 10, 11(b), ISA(a),
17 (JA 177-87); the Appointments Review Committee,
appointed, in part, by the Minister of Finance and Attorney
General, see GCL § 18B (JA 189); and a Cabinet Committee on
privatization that included the Prime Minister, Minister of
Finance and Minister of Justice, see GCL §§ 1, S9A (JA 177,
211). In addition, the Government Companies Authority
(the “Authority”), whose director was an appointee of the
Government upon the proposal of the Ministry of Finance,
see GCL §§ 51-56 (JA 206-08), was charged with advising and
assisting government-owned companies and their subsidianes
in the conduct of their business; monitoring their activities,
course of business, financial position and wage policies; and
communicating its findings to the Government’s Ministers.
GCL §§ 54, 57 (JA 207-09).
(ii) The Government Controlled DSB’s Board
of Directors in the Same or Like Manner as
a Company Directly Owned By the State of
Israel.
The Government controlled the Board of Directors of DSB
through appointment of the directors of ICL (DSB’s parent
company) and approving the appointment of DSB’s directors.
GCL §§ 18(a), 57(3) (JA 188, 209). The approval of a director
was to be made by the Minister of Finance and the Minister of
TL ne
10
Industry and Trade,’ after consultation with an Appointments
Review Committee comprised of representatives of the Attorney
General, an individual chosen from a select list of persons put
forward by the Minister of Finance and Minister of Justice, and
a representative of the Authority. GCL §§ 57(3), 18B(a)
(JA 209, 189). Had DSB been directly owned by the State of
Israel, the only difference would have been that its directors
would have been appointed — in addition to being approved —
by the Ministers. As it was, the GCL required the DSB directors
to be appointed by the directors of DSB’s parent companies,
who themselves were subject to appointment by or approval of
the Ministers. GCL §§ 18(a), 57(3) (JA 188, 209). In all other
respects, the Government’s control over the Board of a directly
owned company (such as ICL) and the Board of its subsidiary
(such as DSB) was the same. GCL § 57 (JA 208-09).
The Government, through the Minister of Finance, after
consultation with the Authority, was empowered to set the
remuneration of directors of both directly owned companies
and their subsidiaries. GCL § 19 (JA 190-91). The Government,
through the request of the Minister of Finance, the Minister of
Industry and Trade, or the Authority, was also empowered to
direct that a special meeting of their respective boards of
directors be held to deal with any matters specified in the request.
GCL § 26(b) (JA 195). Finally, the Authority sent a non-voting
director to each board meeting to participate in the meeting as a
director. GCL § 27(b) (JA 195).
5. The GCL defines the term “Ministers” — a term used throughout
the statute — as “the Minister of Finance, together with the Minister
designated by Law as responsible for the affairs of the company.”
GCL § 1(a) (JA 177). The record establishes that, at least for most of the
time period at issue here, the “Minister designated by Law as responsible
for the affairs” of DSB was the Minister of Industry and Trade, although
during some time penods this Minister is referred to as the Minister of
Trade and Industry or the Minister of Industry, Trade and Tourism.
See, e.g., Petitioners’ Lodging (“L-”) at L-17-19, L=22, L-25, L-45,
L—47, L-49-50, L-159. For the sake of simplicity, the Brief will refer to
this Minister as the Minister of Industry and Trade.
11
(iii) The Government Appointed and/or
Approved the Appointment of the
Chairman of the Board and the CEO of
DSB in the Same or Like Manner as a
Company Directly Owned by the State of
Israel.
DSB’s Chairman of the Board of Directors and its Chief
Executive Officer® (who could not be the same individual) could
be appointed only with the approval of the Minister of Finance
and the Minister of Industry and Trade. GCL §§ 24(a), 37(a),
24(b) (JA 193, 201). The Ministers’ approval could be given
only after consultation with the State’s Appointments Review
Committee. GCL § 18B (JA 189). However, if the Government
deemed it necessary to do so, the Government, after consultation
with the Appointrients Review Committee, was empowered
to appoint a director as Chairman or to appoint the CEO.
GCL §§ 24(a), 37(a) (JA 193, 201). The Government also had
the power to remove the CEO from office. GCL §§ 42(a)(2),
42(a)(Sa) (JA 202-03). These powers applied equally to
companies directly owned by the State of Israel as they did to
indirectly owned companies, such as DSB. GCL §§ 24(a), 37(a),
42(a) (JA 193, 201, 202-03).
(iv) Government Approval was Required for All
Changes in DSB’s Capital Structure,
Business Purposes or the Purchase of
Securities in the Same or Like Manner as a
Company Directly Owned by the State of
Israel.
Both routine and extraordinary changes in the capital
structure of DSB required approval of the Government
(the Prime Minister and his cabinet). With respect to such
approvals, the only difference between a directly owned
company and its subsidiary, such as DSB, was that the approvals
6. This brief uses the familiar title Chief Executive Officer or CEO,
whereas the GCL uses the title general manager, which has the same
meaning under Israeli law. JA 77, 193, 201-04.
12
for DSB were forwarded to the Government through its parent
companies. GCL § 57(2) (JA 209). The Government could
decide to approve the changes only if they were proposed to the
Government by the Minister of Finance and the Minister of
Industry and Trade and submitted to the Government with an
opinion of the Authority. GCL §§ 11(b), 57(2) (JA 183, 209).
Such approvals were required for: (i) change in the objects
(business purposes) of the company; (ii) increase in registered
share capital; (iii) change in the rights attached to the shares;
(iv) allotment of shares of the company, or consent to transfer
of shares if such allotment or transfer would alter the balance
of power among shareholders or confer upon a new shareholder
ten percent or more of share capital or voting power or the nght
to appoint a director; (v) issuance of redeemable shares or
convertible debentures; (vi) conversion of the company into a
private company; (vii) reorganization or dissolution of the
company; (viii) establishment of a subsidiary or purchase of
another company’s shares; and (ix) an undertaking to effect any
act referred to above. GCL § 11(a) (JA 182-83).
(v) The Government Controlled the Budget
and Business Plans of DSB in the Same or
Like Manner as a Company Directly Owned
by the State of Israel.
The Government Companies Law required DSB’s board
of directors, as well as all other Government companies, to draw
up and submit an annual draft budget to the Authority, the
Minister of Finance, the Minister of Industry and Trade, the
State Comptroller, and, upon its request, the Knesset Finance
Committee. GCL § 34 (JA 199-200). The GCL also required
such companies to submit a report of the company’s resources
and the manner of their use; a balance sheet; and a profit-and-
loss account, including the purposes to which profits were to be
applied. GCL § 33(a) (JA 198-99). A decision as to the use of
profits by a board of directors of either a directly owned
Government company or its subsidiary was subject to approval
by the Authority. GCL § 33(c) (JA 199).
13
(vi) The Government Required DSB to Use
Consolidated Financial Reports in the Same
or Like Manner as a Company Directly
Owned by the State of Israel.
The Government Companies Law generally required
consolidated financial reporting of all government companies
and their subsidiaries. GCL § 33(a)(4) (JA 199). ICL, Dead Sea
Works, and DSB, as commonly owned members of the same
family of government companies, presented consolidated
financial statements to the Government for its review. L—29,
L-296, L-316.
(vii) DSB Had to Obtain Government Approval for
the Appointment of its Auditors and Attorneys
in the Same or Like Manner as a Company
Directly Owned by the State of Israel.
The Authority was required to approve the accountant
selected to serve as the auditor for DSB. GCL § 44(a) (JA 204).
The appointment of a legal advisor to DSB also required the
Authority’s approval. GCL § 47(a) (JA 205). The Minister of
Finance and Minister of Justice, with the approval of the Knesset —
Finance Committee, were empowered to prescribe rules as to
the appointment of auditors and legal advisors. GCL §§ 44(c),
47(c) (JA 204-05). The GCL provisions imposed the same
requirements on directly owned companies.
(viii) The Government Had Access to Information
Concerning DSB in the Same or Like Manner
as a Company Directly Owned by the State of
Israel.
The Authority was empowered to receive any requested
information from DSB and inspect its records and documents.
GCL § 55 (JA 208). In addition, DSB’s Chairman was required
to submit to the Minister of Finance, Minister of Industry and
Trade, and the Authority, twice yearly and at any time requested,
a written report on the Company’s activities and the work of its
board of directors. GCL § 25 (JA 194).
14
(ix) DSB Had to Obtain Government Approval for
Privatization in the Same or Like Manner as a
Company Directly Owned by the State of Israel.
Government approval was also required before the sale
of shares of subsidiary companies. GCL § 15A (JA 185).
Thus, Government approval was required before ICL, Dead Sea
Works, or DSB could sell their holdings of shares in Dead Sea
Works, DSB, or BCL. The mechanism for approval involved
proposals of the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Industry
and Trade, submitted to the Government with the opinion of
the Authority. /d.
d. The State of Israel Repeatedly Exercised its Far-
Reaching Ownership Rights to Control DSB’s
Affairs.
The Government's extensive ability to supervise and
regulate DSB in the same manner as a company directly owned
by the State of Israel was by no means merely theoretical. The
Government's pervasive control over DSB manifested itself in
every facet of the company’s operations and activities.
Acting through its highest officials and levels of
government, the State of Israel: (i) regularly appointed
employees of the Ministnes of Finance and Industry and Trade
to DSB’s Board of Directors (L—1-22, L-344); (ii) issued
directives as to the procedures to be followed by DSB’s Board
of Directors, prohibiting the appointment of alternative or
substitute directors, terminating the tenure of directors for
excessive absences and specifying the content of the Board’s
minutes (L—23-42); (iii) approved all DSB’s directors (L-43-
50); (iv) appointed the Authority’s employees to participate in
meetings of DSB’s Board and its committees, such as the balance
sheet committee (L—5 1-60); (v) monitored the attendance and
the activities of members of the company’s Board of Directors
(L-61-73); (vi) approved the company’s managing directors
(CEOs) and their compensation (L—74-76); (vii) established
procedures for the selection and remuneration of legal advisors,
including the requirement that the Authority approve such
15
selection (L—77-108); (viii) established procedures for the
selection and remuneration of auditors, including the
requirement that the Authority approve such selection (L—109-
17); (ix) restricted the circumstances and amounts of DSB’s
charitable contributions (L—131-50); (x) on multiple occasions
required and/or strongly encouraged DSB to purchase Israeli
products even if the cost was higher than the cost of non-Israeli
goods (L—159-78); (xi) required DSB to freeze salaries and
wages (L-179-81); (xii) approved or set the compensation to
be paid to DSB executives, including retirement benefits
(L-187-89); (xiii) established policies as to the use of company
cars (L—190-97); (xiv) issued directives regarding hiring and
promotion policies (L—214-21); (xv) encouraged DSB to become
more efficient and to curb its expenses (L—222-34); (xvi)
approved DSB’s investments (L—235-44); (xvii) approved
changes to DSB’s capital structure and the issuance, sale and
transfer of shares (L-245-78); (xviii) approved employee
bonuses (L—279-88); (xix) approved the formation of a
subsidiary (L—289-90); (xx) required changes in DSB’s corporate
charter (L—291-304); (xxi) restricted ICL from changing DSB’s
objects, transferring their shares, changing their share capital
or selling their assets without Government approval (L—305-
14); and (xxi) reviewed, approved and made recommendations
with respect to DSB’s budget, business plan and operations
(L-—315-29).
In sum, the record provides overwhelming evidence that
the State’s indirect ownership of the majority of the shares of
DSB gave it pervasive oversight and control and other incidences
of ownership over the company, and that the State exercised its
powers in this regard on a routine basis on matters great and
small.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I. DSB is an entity a majority of whose shares were
“owned by” the State of Israel within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1603(b)(2). Under the plain and ordinary meaning of the words
“owned by,” a majority of DSB’s shares were “owned by” the
16
State through the State’s ownership of the Company’s parent
corporations. In the context of tiered corporate subsidiaries, this
Court has held that the statutory phrase “owned by” may be
reasonably interpreted to include a shareholder’s interest in the
assets of its subsidiaries. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S.
281, 292, 298-99, 318-19 (1988). Similarly, this Court has used
the words “sole shareholder” to describe a parent corporation’s
relationship to its wholly owned subsidiary’s wholly owned
subsidiary. Franchise Tax Board of California v. Alcan
Aluminium Ltd., 493 U.S. 331, 339 (1990) (“Alcan”). The court
of appeals erred in holding that the State of Israel had to be a
“direct” owner of DSB’s shares. The statute imposes no such
requirement. As the usage of the words “owned by” by this Court
and many lower courts makes clear, the plain and ordinary
meaning of these words encompasses direct as well as indirect
ownership through a subsidiary.
Additionally, it is clear that the State of Israel held a
“majority .. . ownership interest” in DSB within the meaning
of 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2). The plain and ordinary meaning of
the term “ownership interest” encompasses the nature of the
stake that a shareholder (such as the State of Israel) has in the
subsidiaries of the corporation that the shareholder owns directly.
This Court has used the term “ownership interest” in precisely
this way, see Alcan, 493 U.S. at 335, as have numerous lower
courts in a wide variety of contexts. This usage is supported by
definitions of the term “interest” in legal and ordinary
dictionaries, which establish that it is a broad and general term,
encompassing a wide variety of ownership stakes, including
those other than title to an asset.
Application of “owned by” and “majority ownership
interest” in accordance with their plain and ordinary meanings
would further the statutory purpose of allowing a uniform and
principled resolution of claims of agency or instrumentality
status across a wide variety of legal systems around the world.
It would undermine Congress’ legislative intent for an entity’s
entitlement to such status to turn on such legal formalities as
whether title to its shares was directly vested in the foreign state
17
or vested in some other entity owned by the foreign state. Rather,
Congress intended that an entity’s entitlement to agency or
instrumentality status should turn on whether the foreign state
has a majority ownership stake, broadly defined, in the entity
claiming such status.
The facts of the present case illustrate the importance of
interpreting the statute in this manner. Under Israel's
Government Companies Law, the State of Israel had direct
powers of ownership and control over DSB in the same or like
manner as entities that the State owned directly.
II. The State’s ownership of DSB during the time period
of its allegedly tortious conduct is sufficient for it to qualify as
an “agency or instrumentality.” Such an interpretation is
consistent with the language of the statute because the use of
the word “is” in 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2) does not identify
when an entity must be majority owned by the foreign state.
See, e.g., GE Capital Corp. v. Grossman, 991 F.2d 1376, 1381
(8th Cir. 1993) (“use of the word ‘is’ [in § 1603(b)(2)] could
speak to a variety of situations, including the time of the alleged
wrongdoing”). The four circuit courts that have ruled on this
issue have all held that state ownership at the time of an entity’s
alleged wrongdoing is sufficient for it to invoke “agency or
instrumentality” status under the FSIA. Such an interpretation
of § 1603(b)(2) is supported by the use of present tense verbs in
other statutory provisions that clearly refer to the time period of
the events giving rise to the lawsuit rather than the date on which
a suit is commenced in court. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2)
(“causes a direct effect in the United States”, a phrase that has
uniformly been interpreted by this Court and lower courts as
referring to the effect caused by alleged wrongdoing at the time
of such conduct).
An essential purpose of the statute is to promote harmonious
foreign relations, a purpose that Congress determined would be
served by channeling all claims against foreign states and their
agencies or instrumentalities to non-jury trial in federal courts.
Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493
18
(1983); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a), 1441(d). Suits against an entity
that was an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state at the
time of its alleged wrongdoing implicate the foreign relations
concerns that the statute was enacted to address. Such suits may
raise “foreign policy concerns” to the extent they require a court
in this country to “judg[e] the acts of another nation” regarding
allegations that it, or its agencies or instrumentalities, committed
a tort, breached a contract, or otherwise committed a legal wrong.
GE Capital Corp. v. Grossman, 991 F.2d at 1381. See also Pere
v. Nuovo Pignone, Inc., 150 F.3d 477, 480-81 (Sth Cir. 1998),
cert. denied, 525 J.S. 1141 (1999). Failure to include such suits
within the scope of the FSIA could, for example, subject the ~
acts of an instrumentality of a foreign state to adjudication before
a jury in a state court proceeding, a result the Act was specifically
designed to foreclose. Accordingly, the statute should be
interpreted to apply to claims asserted against entities owned
by a foreign state at the time of the entity’s alleged wrongdoing.
The application of immunity doctrines in other contexts in
which a defendant’s status jas changed between the date of
alleged wrongdoing and a lawsuit supports the interpretation of
the statute urged here. For example, this Court has held that a
government-owned vessel does not lose its sovereign status
merely because it is sold to private owners prior to the litigation.
The Western Maid v. Thompson, 257 U.S. 419, 432-33 (1922).
Nor does a federal official or judge forfeit his or her qualified
or absolute immunity from suit with respect to acts taken in an
official capacity upon retirement from office or the bench.
19
ARGUMENT
I. DSB IS AN AGENCY OR INSTRUMENTALITY OF
ISRAEL BECAUSE THE STATE OWNED
A MAJORITY OF THE OUTSTANDING SHARES
THROUGH ITS OWNERSHIP OF DSB’S PARENT
CORPORATION AND HAD A MAJORITY OWNER-
SHIP INTEREST IN THE COMPANY.
The State of Israel possessed an overwhelming iiiajority
ownership interest in DSB during the time period in which
Respondents allege that they were exposed to DBCP. From 1968
to 1983, the State held an ownership interest in DSB that ranged
from 91% to 99%, by virtue of holding one share in DSB directly
and virtually all of DSB’s remaining shares through its parent
company or companies. Ante, at 5-7. Through a tiered ownership
structure, the State of Israel indirectly owned a substantial
majority of DSB’s shares. Plainly, DSB was an entity “a majority
of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign
state.” 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2).
A. The State of Israel Owned a Majority of the Shares
and Had a Majority Ownership Interest in DSB
Under the Plain and Ordinary Meaning of These
Words.
“The starting point in statutory interpretation is the
‘language [of the statute] itself.’” Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S.
129, 135 (1991) (alteration in original, quoting United States v.
James, 478 U.S. 597, 604 (1986)). The statutory language at
issue here — “a majority of whose shares or other ownership
interest is owned by a foreign state” — requires that the foreign
state must own a majority of the “shares” or a majority of some
“other ownership interest” in order for a company to be an
agency or instrumentality of the state. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2).
DSB meets both tests. Indisputably, the State of Israel indirectly
owned a majority of DSB’s shares, and, by virtue of owning the
parent corporation’s shares, had a majority ownership interest
in DSB.
20
1. The Plain Language of the Statute Does Not
Require a Foreign State To Directly Own a
Majority of a Company’s Shares.
The statute provides that an entity is majority owned by a
foreign state, and thus is an “agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state,” if “a majority of [its] shares . . . is owned by a
foreign state.” 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2). On its face, the statute
makes no reference to any requirement that the ownership of
shares be direct. Indeed, to require that the foreign state directly
own a majority of the shares of the entity claiming status as an
instrumentality would be to read an additional, substantive
requirement into the statutory language. As stated by the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, “[t]he plain language
of the statute simply requires ‘ownership’ by a foreign state.
It draws no distinction between direct and indirect ownership;
neither does it expressly impose a requirement of direct
ownership.” Delgado, 231 F.3d at 176.
Numerous courts, recognizing the statutory text compels
this conclusion, have similarly interpreted the statute. See, e.g.,
Musopole v. South African Airways, 172 F. Supp.2d 443, 447
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“where, as here, the Republic of South Africa
owns an eighty percent beneficial interest in SAA, the fact that
it does so indirectly, through its wholly owned subsidiary
Transnet, rather than directly, is immaterial to the analysis”);
Watkiss v. Corporate Jets, Inc., 2001 WL 1344578, *2 (N.D.
Oh. 2001) (“Eurocopter was indirectly owned by the French
government through an intermediary corporation [and, thus, flor
purposes of the FSIA, ... was owned by the French
Government.”); Jn Re Clearsky Shipping Corp., 1999
WL 1021825, *5 (E.D.La. Nov. 8, 1999) (“neither the plain
language of the statute nor the legislative history suggests that
indirect majority ownership through intermediaries was outside
the contemplation of § 1603(b)(2)”); Talbot v. Saipem A.G, 835
F.Supp. 352, 353 n.2 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (“That Saipem’s
ownership by the Italian government is indirect is immaterial.”).
Indeed, a significant majority of the cases that have specifically
addressed the tiering issue hz ve held that indirectly majority-
21
owned tiered subsidiary entities are “owned” by the government
under § 1603(b)(2). Compare Dead Sea Companies’ Petition
for a Wnt of Certiorari at 12-14 (citing cases) with id. at 16
(citing contrary authority).
This Court has previously acknowledged that a statutory
reference to “owned by” may reasonably be read to include the
indirect ownership that a parent corporation — that is, a
shareholder — has in the assets of 2 lower tiered subsidiary.
See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988) (“K
Mart’). The statute at issue in K Mart prohibited the importation
into the U.S. of “any merchandise of foreign manufacture
if such merchandise ... bears a trademark owned by ...
a corporation . . . created or organized within, the United States.
...” 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (emphasis added). The Treasury
Department’s implementing regulations permitted, in certain
circumstances, the importation of a product trademarked in the
United States by the U.S. subsidiary of a foreign corporation.
The validity of such a regulation turned on whether, in the parent-
subsidiary context, the foreign corporate parent could be
recognized as the true “owner” of the trademark, rather than the
U.S. subsidiary in whose name it was registered in this country,
permitting the conclusion that the merchandise did not bear a
trademark “owned by” a U.S. corporation.
The Court, in three opinions reflecting a different majority
for each of two holdings, agreed on one point: that the statutory
phrase “owned by .. . a corporation . . . created or organized
within . . . the United States” reasonably could be interpreted to
refer either to the U.S. subsidiary that directly owned the
U.S. trademark or its parent company that, through its subsidiary,
indirectly owned the U.S. trademark. 486 U.S. at 292 (Kennedy,
J.); id. at 298-99 (Brennan, J.); id. at 318-19 (Scalia, J.).
All members of the Court agreed that Treasury’s view that the
foreign corporation should be deemed the “owner” of the
trademark, notwithstanding that the mark was registered in the
United States by its U.S. subsidiary, was a reasonable
interpretation of the statute and did not conflict with its plain
language. /d. In explaining why this is so, Justice Brennan stated:
22
“The term [‘owner’] is . . . nomen generalissimum,
and its meaning is to be gathered from the connection
in which it is used, and from the subject-matter to
which it is applied.” Black’s Law Dictionary 996
(Sth ed. 1979). But whether ‘ownership’ is the
‘{cJollection of rights to use and enjoy property,
including [the] right to transmit it to others,’ or ‘(t]he
complete dominion, title, or proprietary nght in a
thing,’ or ‘[t]he entirety of the powers of use and
disposal allowed by law,’ id., at 997, the parent
corporation — not the subsidiary whose every
decision it controls — better fits the bill as the true
owner of any property that the subsidiary nominally
possesses.
Id. at 298-99. Accord id. at 292 (Kennedy, J.); id. at 318
(Scalia, J.).
This Court’s discussion and analysis in Franchise Tax Board
of California v. Alcan Aluminium Ltd., 493 U.S. 331 (1990)
(“Alcan”), affirming 860 F.2d 688 (7th Cir. 1988), further
illustrates common understanding and usage concerning
concepts of ownership in the context of multi-tiered corporate
relationships. At issue in that case was whether a foreign
corporation, Alcan Aluminium Limited (“Alcan Limited”),
had standing to raise claims on behalf of its second tier
U.S. subsidiary, Alcan Aluminum Corporation (“Alcan Corp.”).’
This Court characterized Alcan Limited as the “sole shareholder”
of Alcan Corp. 493 U.S. at 339. Moreover, responding to the
argument that the second tier U.S. subsidiary was the only entity
with standing under California law to bring a state court
challenge to the tax scheme at issue, the Court noted that, as the
“sole shareholder,” Alcan Limited had “total contro!” over Alcan
Corp. and, thus, could cause Alcan Corp. to bring such a
challenge if it wished to do so. To disregard this reality, said the
Court, “would be to elevate form over substance.” Jd. at 339.
7. Alcan Limited was the sole shareholder of Alcan Aluminium of
Canada, Ltd., which, in turn, owned 100% of the shares of Alcan Corp.
See 860 F.2d at 690 n.1.
23
The language employed by the Court in these decisions
does not reflect isolated or idiosyncratic usage. In Flink v.
Paladini, 279 U.S. 59, 63 (1929) (“Flink’), Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, wnting for the Court, noted that the word
“owner” in the statute there at issue 1s an “untechnical word,”
and went on to observe that “‘[ijn common speech the
stockholders would be called owners’” of a corporation’s assets.
See also Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostoock
R.R.,417 U.S. 703, 706 (1974) (“Bangor Punta”) (Bangor Punta,
a parent company, controlled and directed its third-tier subsidiary
through Bangor Punta’s “ownership of about 98.3% of the
outstanding stock” of that entity); Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 759 (1984)
(“Copperweld’) (noting that “‘a parent and its subsidiary are
subject to common ownership” in holding that a parent
corporation cannot conspire with its subsidiary to violate the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act); Fletcher s Cyclopedia of the Law of
Private Corporations § 43, at 733-34 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1999)
(“The holding company may be regarded as the ‘owner’ of the
subsidiary’s property. . . .”).*
The everyday use of the word “own” to include the interest
of a corporate parent more than one step removed from a
subsidiary entity is well illustrated by language chosen in this
very litigation by Respondents’ counsel. In their brief to the
court of appeals below, Respondents described DSB as being
“majority-owned by the State of Israel.” Bnef of Plaintiffs-
Appellants/Cross-Appellees dated October 15, 1999 at 7.
Numerous courts have accepted tiered ownership as meeting
the requirements of § 1603(b)(2) with no little or no discussion,
8. Other examples of the common usage of “own” to include
indirect ownership of tiered subsidiary entities may be found in
the language of government regulations. For example, Securities
and Exchange Commission regulations generally require that publicly
traded companies “consolidate entities that are majority owned”
for financial reporting purposed. 17 C.F.R. § 210.3A-02(a) (emphasis
added).
24
as though the conclusion were obvious. See Dead Sea
Companies’ Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 15-16 (citing
cases). For example, in Allendale Mutual Ins. Co. v. Bull Data
Systems, Inc., 10 F.3d 425, 427 (7th Cir. 1993), in reference to
two second tier subsidiaries of France, Chief Judge Posner
paused to consider whether the court had jurisdiction under the
FSIA and concluded that “(t]here is no problem” because
§ 1603(b)(2) “confers federal jurisdiction over civil suits against
foreign states as defined by the [FSIA], and the Act’s definition
includes companies a majority of whose shares are owned by a
foreign state.” The relative lack of analysis in many of these
decisions confirms that the understanding of the relationship
between tiered parent-subsidiary corporate entities reflected in
this Court’s discussions in K Mart, Alcan, Flink, Bangor Punta
and Copperweld quite naturally applies to the common sense
reading of the statute. These decisions recognize that, under the
plain and ordinary meaning of its language, the Act’s application
tums on the substance of the foreign state’s ownership and
resulting control, not the form of the state’s ownership.
The United States has argued that the word “direct” must
be read into the statute in order to bring it into conformity with
“basic legal understandings” that “‘[a] corporation and its
stockholders are generally to be treated as separate entities,””
U.S. Amicus Brief at 7 (quoting Burnet v. Clark, 287 U.S. 410,
415 (1932)), and “bedrock principles of corporate law.” Jd. at 8
(quoting United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 62 (1998)).
This contention is entirely misplaced. There is no dispute that
the State of Israel is a separate entity from a corporation in which
it owns a majority of the shares, directly or indirectly, and that
neither DSB’s immediate corporate parent nor the State are
answerable for the company’s allegedly tortious acts. Neither
fact has any relevance to whether, in common parlance and
understanding, a majority of DSB’s shares were “owned by”
the State of Israel.
The discussion in Delgado and many of the other lower
court FSIA tiering cases cited above mixes reference to the
State’s indirect ownership of the subsidiary’s shares with a
25
discussion of the State’s “ownership interest.” In fact, the two
statutory phrases are closely related and reinforce the argument
that indirect share ownership is encompassed by both. Congress
could have chosen to provide that only an entity “a majority of
whose shares are owned by a foreign state” is within the purview
of the FSLA’s reach. It chose instead immediately thereafter to
add the notably broad and general phrase “or other ownership
interest.” Its presence in the statutory definition lends particular
weight to the argument that “share ownership” should be
construed to include indirect ownership. Surely, Congress’
decision to include any entity that possesses a majority
ownership interest in a tiered subsidiary, of whatever kind or
nature, strongly supports the interpretation that share ownership
should be read in an “untechnical” way, see Flink v. Paladini,
279 U.S. at 63, to include indirect ownership.
2. The Words “Majority .. . Ownership Interest,”
in Their Plain and Ordinary Meaning, Refer
to a Broad Range of Ownership Rights and
Relationships That Encompass the Nature of the
Stake that a Majority Shareholder of a Corporation
Has in an Entity Owned by that Corporation.
An alternative and independent ground for deeming DSB
to be an “agency or instrumentality” under the Act is that the
State of Israel had a “majority . . . ownership interest” in DSB
within the meaning of § 1603(b)(2). The FSIA does not
specifically define the term “ownership interest.” Under settled
principles of statutory construction, that term should be
construed in accordance with its “ordinary or natural meaning.”
Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993), see also
Walters v. Metropolitan Educational Enterprises, Inc., 51 9US.
202, 207 (1997); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994);
Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979).
An “interest” is the “most general term that can be employed
to denote a right, claim, title, or legal share in something.”
Black's Law Dictionary at 729 (Sth ed. 1979). “More particularly
it means a right to have the advantage accruing from anything;
any right in the nature of property, but less than title.” Id.
26
(emphasis added). See also Webster's Ninth New Collegiate
Dictionary at 631 (1985) (defining “interest” as “right, title, or
legal share in something [or] . . . participation in advantage and
responsibility”). While it did not directly hold title to DSB’s
shares, the State of Israel clearly had an interest in the Company
that allowed the State to accrue an advantage from its success
and control its management and affairs.
The ordinary meaning of the term “ownership interest” quite
plainly encompasses the stake that a shareholder has in its
corporation’s subsidiary. In Alcan, this Court used the term
precisely this way when it characterized as an “ownership
interest” the nature of the interest that Alcan Limited had in
Alcan Corp., its second tier subsidiary. 493 U.S. at 335.
Numerous other courts, ruling in a wide range of contexts,
have also used the term “ownership interest” to describe the
stake of a corporate entity, or the shareholder of such an entity,
in a multi-tiered subsidiary corporation. In a case involving an
insolvent bank with several tiered subsidiaries, Maryland’s
highest court noted that the bank’s receiver had the powers of
the bank and “of any corporation in which [the bank] . . . has a
100% ownership interest, directly or through first, second, or
third tier subsidiaries.” Gay v. State of Maryland Deposit
Insurance Fund Corp., 308 Md. 707, 719, 521 A.2d 1205, 1210
(1987) (emphasis added). New York’s highest court has used
the term “ownership interest” to encompass both direct
ownership of shares in a corporation and the nature of the interest
acquired in a corporation by owning shares in another entity
that owns shares in the corporation, as in the sentence “he had a
direct ownership interest in it through personally held shares
and also an indirect ownership interest in it through another
company he owned ... which held . .. shares.” Kreutter v.
McFadden Oil Corp., 71 N.Y.2d 460, 464, 522 N.E.2d 40,
42 (1988). South Dakota’s highest court, describing the purchase
by a subsidiary of Edward D. Jones & Co. (“Jones”) of
one-third of the shares in a small oil exploration company,
characterized the transaction as one in which “Jones, through
an affiliated subsidiary, purchased a one-third ownership interest
27
in [the oil company)” and stated that “Jones paid $5 million. . .
for its ownership interest in [the oil company].” Schaffer v.
Edward D. Jones & Co., 521 N.W.2d 921, 924 (S. Dak. 1994).”
The United States asserts that Congress “typically” uses
language to signify its intention that a broad reading should be
given to such words as “owns.” U.S. Amicus Brief at 9 n.4.
As noted above, the inclusion of the phrase “or other ownership
interest” serves precisely such a function and makes clear, should
clarification be needed, that the foreign state need not directly
own the shares of a tiered subsidiary in which it owns a majority
ownership interest.
9. See also Harris v. United States, 175 F.3d 1318, 1321
(11th Cir. 1999) (in a tax case, the court stated that a shareholder of a
subsidiary’s publicly-owned parent company had an “indirect ownership
interest” in the subsidiary); Access Now, Inc. v. AMH CGH, Inc., 2001
WL 1005593 *1 (S.D.Fla. May 11, 2001) (in an action brought under
the Americans with Disabilities Act, the court described the action as
one stating claims “against medical facilities, in which [defendant] Tenet
Healthcare Corporation . . . had, directly or though one of its subsidiary
corporations, a majority ownership interest”), Ferro Union, Inc. v. United
States, 44 F. Supp.2d 1310, 1327 n.39 (Int'l Trade 1999) (in an
antidumping case, court described a situation in which a “Mr. X owned
25 percent of MG. . _[, which] owned a 20 percent share of six subsidiary
Petitioners” as one in which “Mr. X’s indirect ownership interest” in
these subsidiary Petitioners was less than the requisite 20 percent under
the applicable legal standard); Bowers v. Wurzburg, 202 W.Va. 43,47,
$01 S.E.2d 479, 483 (1998) (two corporations that owned 69.9% of the
shares of a retailing corporation through an intervening holding
corporation described as having an indirect “ownership interest” in the
retailing corporation); Fertilizantes Fosfatados Mexicanos, S.A. v. Chen,
1992 WL 204394 *1 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (in a judgment collection case,
the court used the term “controlling ownership interest” to describe the
relationship between the principal shareholder of a parent corporation
and the parent corporation’s subsidiaries); Trump Taj Mahal Associates
v. Costruzioni Aeronautiche Giovanni Agusta S.p.A., 761 F. Supp. 1143,
1150(D.N.J. 1991) (foreign state has a majority “ownership interest” in
a subsidiary of a state-owned corporation), aff ‘d, 958 F.2d 365 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 826 (1992).
28
3. Israel’s Government Companies Law Established
the Legal Framework Pursuant to Which the State
of Israel Owned and Controlled DSB and Provides
Additional Support for the Conclusion that the
Plain and Ordinary Meaning of the Terms “Owned”
and “Ownership Interest” Encompass the Nature
of the State’s Interest in the Company.
Under the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory
language at issue here, it should be sufficient that the State of
Israel indirectly “owned” a majority of DSB’s shares and thereby
had a “majority . . . ownership interest” in the Company. Yet, in
applying the statutory language to the State of Israel’s ownership
of DSB, the legal framework under which the State owned the
Company provides additional support for the conclusion that
the Company’s shares can fairly be said to have been “owned
by” the State and that the State had a “majority . . . ownership
interest” in the Company. Under this legal framework, which
was established by Israel’s Government Companies Law, the
State had far more of the qualities of an “owner” of the Company
than would a similarly situated indirect shareholder under
American law. Since K Mart, Alcan, Flink, Bangor Punta and
all of the other cases discussed above that construed or used the
terms “owned” or “ownership interest” as encompassing the
nature of the stake that an ultimate shareholder has in a tiered
subsidiary reached this conclusion under American corporate
law principles, the conclusion is reached even more readily under
the legal framework under which the State of Israel held its
ownership interest in DSB.
Under the law of Delaware, for example, a shareholder’s
statutory rights, even with respect to the corporation in which it
directly holds shares, are quite limited.'° Significantly, in this
10. The Delaware General Corporations Law (“Del. GCL”)
provides that the “business and affairs” of the corporation shall be
“managed by or under the direction of the board of directors.”
Del. GCL § 141(a). Thus, “‘{a] fundamental precept of Delaware
corporation law is thet it is the board of directors, and neiihes Oe
29
context, a shareholder of a Delaware corporation has no formal
right to elect or approve the appointment of directors of
subsidiary corporations, attend their annual meetings, vote on
changes to their corporate charters, or otherwise interact with
them in a direct fashion. In these respects, Delaware corporate
law is similar to that of New York and other important
commercial centers in the United States.
In marked contrast, under Israel’s Government Companies
Law, the State of Israel, by virtue of its majority ownership
interest in DSB, had numerous direct levers of control over and
incidences of ownership with respect to that entity. With
immaterial exceptions, the GCL’s provisions with regard to
companies directly owned by the State applied “in like manner”
to subsidiaries of such companies. Ante, at 8-14. The State, acting
through its senior ministers and the Government Companies
Authority, controlled the board of directors of DSB, ante, at
9-10, appointed or approved the appointment of its Chairman
of the Board and CEO, ante, at 11, had approval authority over
all changes to its capital structure, business purposes or purchase
of securities, ante, at 12, controlled its budget and business
plans, including the purpose to which profits were applied,
ante, at 12, approved the appointment of its auditors and
attorneys, ante, at 13, and had plenary access to information
(Cont'd)
shareholders nor managers, that has ultimate responsibility for the
management of the enterprise.’” Ward, Folk on the Delaware General
Corporations Law at GCL-IV-14 (4th ed. 2002-2 Supp.) (citation
omitted). One of the few rights a shareholder has is to attend, in person
or by proxy, the annual meeting of stockholders to elect directors. Del.
GCL § 211(b). Even at the annual meeting, however, stockholders have
no right to ask questions, see Loudon v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co.,
700 A.2d 135, 146 (Del. 1997), nor 4o they have a right to call a special
meeting. Del. GCL § 211(d). Apart from voting for the board of directors
at the annual meeting, a shareholders’ other rights are, in essence,
limited to seeking to enforce the directors’ fiduciary duties
and voting on amendments to the corporate charter, a merger,
sale of substantially all of the corporation’s assets, or dissolution.
Id. §§ 242(b)(1), 275(B), 271(A).
30
concerning its affairs, ante, at 13. The record indicates,
moreover, that these rights were by no means theoretical but
were, in fact, routinely exercised in a myriad of ways and
contexts. See ante, at 14-15.'' Thus, by virtue of owning DSB’s
parent corporation, the State of Israel had far more day-to-day
input and control over DSB than a majority shareholder in the
United States would have over a corporation in which the
shareholder held a direct majority stake.
In view of the State of Israel’s creation of DSB, its
overwhelming majority ownership of the Company and its
pervasive control and oversight through the mechanism of the
Government Companies Law, the State of Israel, in Justice
Brennan’s words, “fits the bill as the true owner” of DSB.
K Mart, 486 U.S. at 299. Like the ultimate parent entity in Alcan,
the State was the “shareholder” of DSB, 493 U.S. at 339, with
an indisputable majority “ownership interest” in the company.
Id. at 335. To disregard these realities in interpreting the language
of § 1603(b)(2) “would be to elevate form over substance.”
Id. at 339. Since the State had all of the incidents of “ownership”
(and then some) that a shareholder has in a corporation in which
it owns a majority of shares, it clearly “owned a majority of the
shares” and, as well, owned a “majority . . .ownership interest”
under any common sense definition of those terms.
B. The Interpretation of “Owned By” and “Majority
... Ownership Interest” Urged Here Is Consistent
With the FSIA’s Legislative History and Would
Further the Statutory Objectives.
The interpretation of “owned by” and “majority . ..
ownership interest” urged here is fully consistent with the
11. The United States erroneously assumes that the same basic
principles of United States corporate law, which in any event in no way
preclude the interpretation urged by DSB, would apply to the relationship
between the State of Israel and DSB under Israeli law. U.S. Amicus
Brief at 8 & 12 n.5. Thus, the su.,zestion in the U.S. Amicus Brief that
a “different approach” might be appropriate under legal regimes
dissimilar to that of the United States, id. at 12 n.5, is in fact quite
applicable.
31
legislative history of the statute and would further its objectives.
An important goal of the FS.A was to define broadly the universe
of entities intended to come within its scope. Congress was
concerned that suits against such entities, and particularly those
suits arising out of commercial activities where the defense of
sovereign immunity would not be available, implicate the
foreign relations of the United States insofar as they may compel
a court to pass judgment on the acts of a foreign sovereign or its
agencies or instrumentalities. Post, at 32. Congress was also
cognizant of the fact that foreign sovereigns were increasingly
establishing separately constituted state-owned and controlled
enterprises to perform a variety of commercial functions.
Congress intended that the definition of “agency or
instrumentality” cover a broad spectrum of these state-owned
entities. Post, at 33. Congress also intended to move away from
the rigid application of the “separate entity” rule and an era of
judicial decisions that had favored form over substance, by
eliminating the significance of separate incorporation in the
context of foreign sovereign immunity. Post, at 36. A cramped
interpretation of “owned” in § 1603(b)(2), reading into the
statute the limiting modifier “directly owned,” and of “ownership
interest” would work against all these Congressional objectives.
1. The Objective of the FSLA was to Create a Broad-
Based Scheme Encompassing All Entities in
Which Foreign States Possessed a Majority
Ownership Interest.
Congress enacted the FSIA to establish uniform “standards
governing claims of immunity in every civil action against a
foreign state or its political subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities.” Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria,
461 U.S. 480, 488 (1983) (“Verlinden”). The entities
to be accorded foreign sovereign status under the Act are
broadly defined to include the foreign sovereign and its political
subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1603(b).
The Act provides that all such foreign sovereign entities
shall be immune from the jurisdiction of courts in the United
32
States, subject to various exceptions. 28 U.S.C. § 1604. In fact,
the exceptions describe a fairly wide range of cases in which
foreign states and their agencies and instrumentalities may be
sued, as, for example, where the claims arise out of commercial
activities conducted or having a direct effect in the United States.
Id. § 1605(a)(2). Where an exception applies, such suits may
be maintained, but the Act accords certain protections to the
foreign sovereign entities. Among other things, they are entitled,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a), 1441(d), to federal court
jurisdiction, by way of a grant of original jurisdiction’ and a
broad right of removal,'"? and to a non-jury trial.'*
The provision of a federal forum for such suits is designed
to protect the “foreign relations of the United States,” Verlinden,
461 U.S. at 493; to reduce the potential for conflicting results,
id. at 497; and to “avoid any local bias . . . inherent in state
court proceedings.” Jn re Delta America Re Ins. Co., 900 F.2d
890, 893 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 890 (1990).
Such suits may raise “foreign policy concerns” to the extent
they require a court in this country to “judg[e] the acts of another
nation” regarding allegations that it, or its agencies or
instrumentalities, committed a tort, breached a contract, or
otherwise committed a legal wrong. GE Capital Corp. v.
Grossman, 991 F.2d 1376, 1381 (8th Cir. 1993). All of
these concerns are implicated in a judicial interpretation of the
reach of the Act’s definition of “agency or instrumentality” of a
foreign state.
12. “Such broad jurisdiction in the Federal courts should be
conducive to uniformity in decision, which is desirable since a disparate
treatment of cases involving foreign governments may have adverse
foreign relations consequences.” H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487,
at 13, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6611.
13. “In view of the potential sensitivity of actions against foreign
states and the importance of developing a uniform body of law in this
area, it is important to give foreign states clear authority to remove to a
Federal forum . . .” /d. at 32, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6631.
14. “Actions tried by a court without [a] jury will tend to promote
a uniformity of decision where foreign governments are involved.”
Id. xt 13, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6611-12.
33
Congress thus intended the FSIA to create a comprehensive
set of ground rules for suits against foreign states and all entities
in which such states have a substantial interest, which Congress
chose to define, in part, as a majority ownership interest. It did
so, because it perceived that suits against such entities, especially
in those commercial cases where sovereign imimunity was not
to be available, and where the actions of state-owned entities
would thus be subject to judicial process, adjudication and
enforcement, have obvious potential to implicate significant
foreign relations interests, requiring the protections afforded by
a federal forum and non-jury trial. It is this background and
context against which the provisions of the FSIA must be
interpreted. See generally Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S.
337, 341 (1997) (when seeking to ascertain the intent of statutory
language, particular attention should be paid to the specific
context in which the language is used as well as the broader
context of the statute as a whole).
2. A Narrow Interpretation of “Owned By” and
“Ownership Interest” Is Inconsistent With the
Purposes of the Act.
The House Report on the FSIA, H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487,
94th Cong., 2™ Sess., reprinted in 5 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604 (1976),
makes plain that Congress intended to cast the agency or
instrumentality net broadly. See, e.g., Verlinden, 461 U.S. at
488; Ruggiero v. Compania Peruana De Vapores, 639 F.2d 872,
877-78 (2d Cir. 1981) (Friendly, J.). The Act was crafted to cover
a myriad of governmental, social, and economic systems.
See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487 at 15-16, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6614. The Report notes the widely varying
types of enterprises that Congress had in mind (including trading
enterprises, shipping lines, 2irlines, steel companies, and mining
enterprises) and reflects Congress’ understanding that these
entities would be engaged in commercial activities for profit.
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487 at 16, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 6614-15; see also S. Rep. No. 94-1310 at 15-16 (“entities
which 1 ~et the definition of ‘agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state’ could assume a variety of forms, including a state
34
trading corporation, a mining enterprise, a transport organization
such as a shipping line or airline, a steel company, a central
bank, an export association”’).
The circumstances of DSB’s ownership, in which the
foreign state chose to hold its ownership interest through a tiered
corporate structure, are far from unique. As this Court observed
in First National City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior
de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611 (1983), “{iJncreasingly during this
century, governments throughout the world have established
separately constituted legal entities to perform a variety of tasks.”
462 U.S. at 624 (citing Friedmann, Government Enterprise:
A Comparative Study at 333-34 (W. Friedmann & J.F. Garner
eds. 1970) (“Friedmann”)); see also Friedmann at 307
(“The variety of forms in which the various States have, at
different times, proceeded to establish public enterprises is
almost infinite. ...”); id. at 333-34 (noting use of tiered
subsidiary structures). Were this Court to hold that a foreign
state does not have an ownership interest in a company owned
through an intervening holding corporation, it would
significantly restrict the scope of the statute and make its
application turn on a formalistic distinction as to how a
government chooses to structure its ownership interest in a state-
owned company that has nothing to do with the nature or extent
of the government’s real life interest in or control over the entity.
There is no reason to assume that the strength of a foreign
state’s interests or the scope of its involvement dissipate when
it employs a tiered ownership structure. See Report of the
Working Group of the American Bar Association, Reforming
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 40 Colum. J. Transnat’]
Law 489, 523 (2002). For example, Mexico, the sole owner of
that nation’s petroleum resources, formerly carried out all
production, manufacturing, transportation and distribution
through the state petroleum company Petroleus Mexicanos
(“Pemex”). See Corporacion Mexicana de Servicios Maritimos,
S.A. de C.V. v. M/T Respect, 89 F.3d 650, 653-54 (9th Cir. 1996).
In 1992, Mexico restructured its ownership by establishing
Pemex as a holding company with four operating subsidiaries.
35
Id. Surely, Mexico’s interests in its state-owned petroleum
enterprise were not materially different before and after that
reorganization. Similarly, Honduras holds interests in its lumber
industry through a tiered ownership structure, see Byrd v.
Corporacion Forestal y Industrial de Olancho S§.A., 182 F.3d
380, 382 (Sth Cir. 1999), and Venezuela holds its interest in its
national oil industry through a tiered ownership structure.
See Lopez Del Valle v. Gobierno de la Capital, 855 F. Supp. 34,
35-6 (D.P.R. 1994).
There is no reason to conclude that these foreign states have
any less interest in their critical state-owned resources as a result
of their decision to structure the corporate form in which they
are held and managed. Nor is there reason to conclude that a
suit filed against a tiered subsidiary has the potential to implicate
interests that are materially different from those potentially
implicated by suits against directly owned corporate entities. In
this case, the State of Israel created DSB in 1955 to develop
and market primary natural resources of that nation in a manner
consistent with the national interests. The Congressional policy
concerns underlying the FSIA are in no way diminished by the
fact that Israel chose to own and control the company through a
tiered corporate ownership structure.
The Ninth Circuit did not articulate any rationale as to why
a company that is 100% owned by a foreign state should be
entitled to remove a case to federal court but a wholly owned
subsidiary of that company should not. Such a result would
contravene the clear and significant Congressional objective that
entities in which a state holds a majority ownership interest
should be within the purview of the Act. Similarly, it would be
illogical to read a direct ownership requirement into the statute
with the result that a company 51% owned by a foreign state
would be entitled to the Act’s protections, but a second tier
subsidiary in which the state had 100% ownership, albeit
indirectly, would not. Under the clear language of statute,
the sole focus should be on whether the State’s ownership
interest, however structured, is greater than 50%. As one court
36
has observed, the “FSIA specifically provides that “corporate
form’ — in and of itself — be immaterial.” O ‘Connell Machinery
Co., Inc. v. M.V. “Americana”, 566 F. Supp. 1381, 1385
(S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 734 F.2d 115, 116-17 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1086 (1984). Because there is “no policy
reason why tiering through an intermediary majority owned by
a foreign state should not be permitted under the FSIA,”
Linton v. Airbus Industrie, 934 S.W.2d 754, 762 (Tex. Civ. App.
1996), there is no reason to depart from the plain language of
the statute, which requires only that a foreign state have a
majority “ownership interest” for the FSIA to apply. The foreign
sovereign’s internal, administrative decision as to how its
ownership interest is held or structured under its form of
government and its legal and economic systems is immaterial
to the purposes and objectives of the statute and should not
control the statute’s application to an entity that is majority
owned by the foreign state.
3. A Narrow Interpretation Would Represent a
Return to the Separate Entity Rule That
Congress Rejected in Enacting the FSIA.
There is an additional reason why the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation of the statute is not consistent with its origin and
purpose. Prior to the FSIA, the “separate entity” rule often
prevented foreign corporations from asserting sovereign
immunity. Premised on the assumption that states do not perform
sovereign acts through corporations, this doctrine provided that
corporations owned by a sovereign state were presumed to be
separate entities and thus not entitled to assert sovereign
immunity. See, e.g., Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance
Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 388 (1939) (“the [federal] government
does not become the conduit of its immunity in suits against its
agents or instrumentalities merely because they do its work’’);
Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. United States Shipping Board
Emergency Fleet Corp., 258 U.S. 549, 567 (1922) (“An
instrumentality of Government he might be and for the greatest
ends, but the agent, because he is [but an] agent” may not assert
sovereign immunity); Bank of United States v. Planters’ Bank
37
of Georgia, 22 U.S. 904, 907 (1824) (bank incorporated by and
partly owned by the State of Georgia held not entitled to assert
sovereign immunity); Comment, The Jurisdictional Immunity
of Foreign Sovereigns, 63 Yale L. J. 1148, 1152-53 (1954);
Fensterwald, Sovereign Immunity and Soviet State Trading,
63 Harv. L. Rev. 614, 619 (1950).
As governments increased their use of corporate entities
during the last century to perform a variety of tasks to further
their interests, the “restrictive” theory of sovereign immunity
emerged. Under that approach, immunity from suit is limited to
claims based on the foreign sovereign’s public acts, and does
not extend to cases arising out of a foreign state’s strictly
commercial acts. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487. Under the
“restrictive” theory, courts began to look at various factors to
determine whether a corporation, owned or controlled by a
government, engaged in either sovereign or commercial acts.
While this test appears straightforward, courts applied it in an
inconsistent manner. Jd. at 487-88.
The FSIA was enacted, in large part, to codify the restrictive
theory of immunity. See id. at 488; H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487,
at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6605. And by including
an “agency or instrumentality” of a foreign state as an entity
subject to the FSIA’s procedural protections (e.g., federal court
jurisdiction) and, in appropriate cases, immunity from suit,
Congress unequivocally rejected the separate entity rule and
sought to end the confusion surrounding the conflicting
applications of that doctrine to claims of foreign sovereign
immunity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(1) (requiring that an “agency
or instrumentality of a foreign state” be “a separate legal person,
corporate or otherwise” from the foreign state).
In enacting the FSIA, Congress chose to provide procedural
protections both to foreign states and their legally distinct
agencies or instrumentalities and to regulate claims of sovereign
immunity of both, and the ground rules for permitting suits in
those cases where immunity from suit is not available, under
the same uniform standards. It is thus clear from the structure
of the statute that it sought to eliminate the fact of separate
38
incorporation from the immunity analysis and, instead, focus
the court’s inquiry on the substance of the State’s involvement
(e.g., does it own a majority of the shares or other ownership
interest of the entity) and the character of the action at issue in
the case (e.g., is it a “commercial” act that “cause[d] a direct
effect in the United States,” id. § 1605(a)(2)).
By rejecting the separate entity rule, the Act can be fairly
said to have repudiated its underlying doctrinal premise, i.e.,
that the mere fact of separate incorporation should have
dispositive significance in the application of the doctrine of
foreign sovereign immunity. The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation
of the statute — which attaches dispositive significance to the
fact that DSB is incorporated as a “separate entity” from its
parent corporation — thus represents a step backwards toward
the formalistic approach rejected by Congress. Instead of
focusing judicial attention on the substantive role of the State
and the nature of the conduct undertaken by an entity majority
owned by a foreign state, as the statute requires, the Ninth
Circuit’s approach exhumes the separate entity concept and
ignores the Congressional effort to replace that discredited
doctrinal framework with new statutory standards.
C. The Ninth Circuit’s Rationale for Interpreting
the Terms “Owned” and “Majority ...
Ownership Interest” so as to Exclude the
Interest That a Foreign State Has in State-
Owned Companies Held Through a Tiered
Subsidiary Structure Does Not Make Sense.
The court of appeals based its decision in this case
principally on its conclusion that it was bound by its prior
decision in Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, 54 F.3d 1457 (9th Cir.)
(“Gates’’), cert. denied sub nom. 516 U.S. 869 (1995), see Pet.
App. 22a-24a, a case that presented a distinctly different and,
indeed, unusual factual backdrop. In Gates, the “original”
owning entity — the Alberta Pork Producers Development
Corporation (“Alberta Pork”) — was neither a sovereign state
nor a political subdivision, nor was it owned, directly or
indirectly by a state or political subdivision. It was, however,
39
held to be an “organ” of a political subdivision (the Province of
Alberta). See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2) (referencing an entity
which is “an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision”).
Alberta Pork’s subsidiary was unable to assert its status as an
“agency or instrumentality” based solely on the language of
§ 1603(b)(2) (referencing majority ownership) because its parent
corporation was not owned, directly or indirectly, by a foreign
s.ate or political subdivision. Rather, it contended that since its
parent, Alberta Pork, was an “organ” of a state, the parent was
therefore an “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” by
virtue of § 1603(b). And therefore, went the argument, Alberta
Pork was itself a “foreign state” by virtue of § 1603(a), which
provides that a “foreign state” includes an “agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state” as defined in § 1603(b). On
this basis, Alberta Pork’s subsidiary argued that it was itself
owned by a “foreign state” (Alberta Pork). It is this far more
complex statutory analysis, based upon the arguably recursive
inter-relationship between §§ 1603(a) and 1603(b)(2), that Gates
rejected, on the ground that it could unduly expand the reach of
the Act to entities far removed from state ownership. Gates, 54
F.3d at 1462."°
The court in Gates never focused on the language of
§ 1603(b)(2) alone. The facts there did not present a case in
which a foreign sovereign entity had any ownership interest,
direct or indirect, since Alberta did not directly or indirectly
own either Alberta Pork or its subsidiary. However, in the ruling
below, the Ninth Circuit interpreted Gates more broadly, to
require direct share ownership by the foreign state — a result not
required by the facts of Gates.
15. Although this recursive inter-relationship between
§§ 1603(b)(a) and 1603(b)(2) has been adopted by several courts,
see, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, Indiana, 96 F.3d 932
(7th Cir. 1996), Petitioners here base their argument on the plain meaning
of “owned” and “ownership interest.” Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit's
critique of the recursive interpretation in Gates has no bearing on
Petitioners’ argument.
40
Although it placed primary reliance on Gates, the Ninth
Circuit did briefly address DSB’s contention that the State of
Israel held a “majority . . . ownership interest” in the Company.
The court rejected that argument, because, in the court’s view,
it would “make the majority-shareholder requirement
superfluous.” Pet. App. 23a. Yet the canon “‘a legislature is
presumed to have used no superfluous words,” Bailey v. United
States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995) (quoting Platt v. Union Pacific
R.R., 99 U.S. 48, 58 (1879)), is merely an aid to interpretation
and cannot ' used to alter the plain meaning of statutory
language. See Connecticut National Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S.
249, 254 (1992); Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 122 S. Ct.
528, 535 (2001). For the reasons already explained above,
the court of appeals’ constricted interpretation of “ownership
interest” is contrary to the plain and ordinary meaning of these
words, as well as the Congressional intent behind the statute,
and must therefore be rejected.
There are two additional reasons why the “no superfluous
words” canon does not apply here. First, the presence of the
word “other” in “other ownership interest” specifically conveys
the notion that “shares” are one type of “ownership interest.”
Thus, the conclusion that an “ownership interest” includes share
ownership is implicit in the very grammar of the sentence.
In seeking to interpret “ownership interest” narrowly to exclude
share ownership so as to give the reference to “shares”
independent meaning, the court of appeals twisted the meaning
of the statutory language past the breaking point.'* Second, if,
contrary to the argument presented here, the phrase “a majority
of whose shares . . . are owned by a foreign state” is limited to
16. The word “other” is used routinely in the way it is used in
§ 1603(b)(2). For example, Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h) provides for “service
upon a domestic or foreign corporation or upon a partnership or other
unincorporated association.” The word “other” in this Rule indicates
that an “unincorporated association” includes, but is not limited to, a
“partnership.” Similar uses of the word “other” are legion.
See, e.g., Supreme Court Rule 9(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(j)(2), 8(c), 9(b);
Fed. R. Cr. P. 4(d)(1).
41
direct share ownership, the most logical interpretation of “other
ownership interest” would be that it encompasses indirect
ownership, eliminating any redundancy in the phrase.
Il. THE RELEVANT TIME PERIOD FOR
DETERMINING WHETHER AN ENTITY IS AN
AGENCY OR INSTRUMENTALITY OF A FOREIGN
STATE INCLUDES THE TIME OF THE ACTIONS
GIVING RISE TO THE CLAIM.
Respondents argued in the district court that, since the FSIA
defines “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” as
“any entity . . . a majority of whose shares or other ownership
interest is owned by a foreign state,” 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2)
(emphasis added), the relevant time period for determining a
party’s foreign sovereign status is the date of the filing of the
lawsuit. Therefore, claimed Respondents, even if DSB were an
agency or instrumentality of the State of Israel at the time of the
acts giving rise to the DBCP-related claims asserted against it,
DSB lost that status with regard to such claims when Israel
became a minority shareholder in 1995, two years before the
action was commenced. In rejecting that argument, the district
court followed the ruling of every appellate court that has faced
this issue and held that it is sufficient if the foreign state had
majority ownership at the time of the events giving rise to the
suit. Pet. App. 62a-64a. The court of appeals did not reach the
issue, but expressed skepticism as to the district court’s
conclusion. /d. 20a-22a. The district court’s interpretation of
the Act is consistent with its statutory language, the statutory
purpose, other laws on immunities, and well established caselaw.
A. A Holding that an Entity Is an Agency or
Instrumentality of a Foreign State Based on its
Status at the Time of the Alleged Wrongdoing
is Consistent With the Statutory Language.
The use of the present tense “is” in the phrase “a majority
of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign
state,” 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2), does not establish which point
in time an entity’s shares or other ownership interest must be
owned by the foreign state. GE Capital Corp. v. Grossman,
42
991 F.2d at 1381 (“{t}he use of the word ‘is’ [in § 1603(b)(2)]
could speak to a variety of situations, including the time of the
alleged wrongdoing.”). For the reasons explained below, it
should be sufficient under the Act if an entity met the statutory
requirements at the time of its alleged wrongdoing.
The present tense is commonly employed to refer to both
the past and future as well as the present time frame. Such an
interpretation of the statute here is thus entirely consistent with
everyday usage of language and commonly understood
principles of grammar:
[T]he present tense of a verb may sometimes refer
to the past and to the future as well as to the present.
R. Pence and D. Emery, A Grammar of Present-Day
English 262-63 (2d ed.). For example, the historical
present tense is used in narratives to express past
events in the present tense. Furthermore, the present
tense may be used when the time is actually
indefinite. Jd.
In re Stratford of Texas, Inc., 635 F.2d 365, 369 (Sth Cir. 1981).
Courts have frequently recognized such use of the present tense
by Congress in its legislative enactments. See Coalition for
Clean Air v. Southern California Edison Co., 971 F.2d 219,
225 (9th Cir. 1992) (congressional legislation commonly uses
verbs in the present tense to refer to the past, present, or future
“all at the same time”), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 950 (1993);
Abercrombie v. Clarke, 920 F.2d 1351, 1359 (7th Cir.)
(“it is abundantly clear that Congress intended the present tense
language [of the banking statute under review] to apply to past
acts”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 809 (1991).
One need look no further than other language in the FSIA
to demonstrate that Congress’ use of the present tense in that
statute cannot be interpreted to refer exclusively to the period
that a lawsuit is filed or pending. Section 1605(a)(2) grants a
district court subject matter jurisdiction over an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state if the plaintiff's claim is based
upon a “commercial activity . . . that causes a direct effect in
43
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (emphasis added).
Although this phrase is in the present tense, like the definitional
language in § 1603(b)(2), this Court and others have focused
on whether the commercial act caused a direct effect at the time
of the act giving rise to the suit, not whether it causes such an
effect on the date the suit is commenced. See Republic of
Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 611, 618-19 (1992);
Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 498 n.23; Hanil Bank v. PT. Bank Negara
Indon., 148 F.3d 127, 129 (2d Cir. 1998); Adler v. Federal
Republic of Nigeria, 107 F.3d 720, 727 (9th Cir. 1997); Aldy v.
Valmet, 74 F.3d 72, 75-76 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 817
(1996)."’
B. Applying the FSIA to a Suit Stating Allegations
Against an Entity that was an Agency or
Instrumentality of a Foreign State at the Time
of its Alleged Conduct Serves the Statutory
Purpose of Protecting Foreign Relations,
Channeling Allegations of this Character to
Federal Courts, and Providing Immunity in
Non-Commercial Cases.
A primary reason Congress chose to provide a broad right
of access to federal courts for foreign states, including their
17. Analogous usage is found in the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”). Under
CERCLA a company may be held liable if it “accepted any hazardous
substances for transport to disposal .. . facilities . . . from which there
is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of
response costs, of a hazardous substance.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(4) (emphasis added). Although the phrase “from which there
is a release” is in the present tense, courts look at releases that have
occurred at the CERCLA site in the past, well prior to initiation of
CERCLA litigation. See, e.g., Kalamazoo River Study Group v. Menasha
Corp., 228 F.3d 648, 655-56, 658-59 (6th Cir. 2000); NutraSweet Co. v.
X-L Engineering o., 227 F.3d 776, 784-85 (7th Cir. 2000); New Jersey
Turnpike Authority v. PPG Industries, Inc., 197 F.3d 96, 103-04 (3d Cir.
1999). Similarly, the term “causes” does not require that the release be
causing response costs to be incurred on the date a CERCLA lawsuit is
filed to recover past response costs. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2)
(limitations period expires 3 years after completion of removal action).
44
agencies or instrumentalities, was its recognition that “[a]ctions
against foreign sovereigns in our courts raise sensitive issues
concerning the foreign relations of the United States.” Verlinden,
461 U.S. at 493; see also H.R. No. 94-1487 at 32, reprinted in
U.S.C.C.AN. at 6631 (citing “the political sensitivity of actions
against foreign states” as the rationale for allowing them to
remove actions to federal court).
To restrict the application of the FSIA to those cases where
the entity whose status is at issue has the requisite relationship
with the foreign state at the time suit is commenced would be at
odds with the statute’s essential purpose of promoting
harmonious international relations. Lawsuits based on actions
taken while an entity was an agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state raise the same types of foreign policy concerns
that the FSIA and sovereign immunity in general seek to address.
Any lawsuit against a former agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state will inevitably be premised on the facts and
circumstances that existed at the time the alleged wrongdoing
occurred. The fact that the entity is not a foreign state at the
time suit is brought does not diminish the foreign policy
implications of such a lawsuit or the corresponding comity
considerations, as the court will necessarily be called upon to
pass judgment on the foreign state’s actions at the time the cause
of action arose. See GE Capital Corp. v. Grossman, 991 F.2d at
1381 (suits against entities formerly owned by a foreign state
will likely require a court in this country to “judg[e] the acts of
another nation” regarding allegations that it, or its agencies or
instrumentalities, committed a legal wrong); Pere v. Nuovo
Pignone, Inc., 150 F.3d 477, 480-81 (Sth Cir. 1998) (the FSIA
was designed to promote harmonious international relations and
effectuate notions of comity among nations; such concerns do
not vanish when a corporate entity is divested of government
ownership before an action is commenced), cert. denied, 525
U.S. 1141 (1999); Cargill International S.A. v. M/T Pavel
Dybenko, 991 F.2d 1012, 1016 (2d Cir. 1993) (the interests
sought to be promoted by the statute are implicated even after
privatization has begun).
45
Even the court of appeals below, which expressed some
solicitude to Respondents’ argument on the timing issue,
acknowledged that “[w]here the defendant was a foreign state
at the time of the alleged wrong, the complaint perforce alleges
that the foreign state did something wrong. By adjudicating that
claim, the court may have to pass judgment on the acts or
decisions of a foreign sovereign.” Pet. App. 21a."
Through passage of the FSIA, Congress sought to promote
and preserve harmonious international relations by
implementing “‘comprehensive rules governing sovereign
immunity’ [of which] the jurisdictional provisions of the Act
are simply one part.” Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 496 (citation
omitted). In particular, the FSLA “represent[s] a comprehensive
effort ‘to provide when and how parties can maintain a lawsuit
against a foreign state or its entities in the courts of the United
States and to provide when a foreign state is entitled to sovereign
immunity.’” Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors, 761 F.2d 1527,
1531 (11th Cir.) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487 at 6),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 995 (1985). The Act accords certain
procedural protections to such entities even in commercial cases
in which they cannot assert immunity from suit, including a
right to federal court jurisdiction and a non-jury trial. 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1330(a), 1441(d). Denying foreign state status to an entity
that is privatized prior to the filing of a lawsuit but after the
alleged acts at issue occurred could result in the actions of a
foreign sovereign, taken at the time the cause of action arose,
being assessed by a jury in state court. This result would
18. The Court has cited the same foreign relations concerns as
one rationale for the analogous act of state doctrine. See Oetjen v. Central
Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 304 (1918) (“To permit the validity of the
acts of one sovereign state to be reexamined and perhaps condemned
by the courts of another would very certainly imperil the amicable
relations between governments and vex the peace of nations.”);
First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 765
(1972) (“[J)uridical review of acts of state of a foreign power could
embarrass the conduct of foreign relations by the political branches of
the government.”).
46
undermine the FSIA’s goal of “render[ing] uniform in procedure
and substance the treatment of foreign sovereigns subjected to
suit in American courts.” Nolan v. Boeing Co., 919 F.2d 1058,
1065 (Sth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 962 (1991).
Accordingly, the statutory purpose of the FSIA requires that
federal courts assume jurisdiction under the statute in cases
where the actions of an agency or instrumentality are at issue,
even if that party is no longer an agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state.
C. Considering an Entity’s Sovereign Status Under the
FSIA at the Time of Its Alleged Wrongdoing Is
Consistent with the Rule Applicable to Other
Immunities.
The application of the FSIA to entities that were agencies
or instrumentalities at the time of their allegedly tortious conduct
is also consistent generally with how other immunity doctrines
deal with a change in a defendant’s status between the time of
the allegedly tortious or unlawful! acts and the date of the lawsuit.
In the context of domestic sovereign immunity, for example,
the status-at the time of the alleged wrongdoing is generally
dispositive.
This Court has previously held that a defendant retains
immunity even if government ownership of the defendant is
transferred to a private party between the time of the alleged
acts and a suit to recover upon such acts. The Western Maid v.
Thompson, 257 U.S. 419 (1922). This case addressed in rem
proceedings against vessels for collisions that occurred while
the vessels were owned by or under charter to the United States
government. In each instance, the United States government
had transferred ownership of the vessel to private hands after
the alleged wrongdoing but prior to suit. The Court, in an opinion
by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, held that the sovereign
immunity that attached while the vessels were government
owned was not lost when the vessels were transferred to private
ownership. /d. at 432-33.
The same principles may be found in other immunity
contexts. A governmental employee who enjoys qualified
47
immunity for his official acts does not forefeit his immunity
merely because he happens to leave his position with the
government before a plaintiff initiates a lawsuit. See, e.g.
Mitchell v. Forsythe, 472 U.S. 511 (1985). Similarly, a federal
judge who enjoys absolute immunity from suit based on judicial
acts is not suddenly stripped of such immunity upon leaving
the bench.
That such immunities are not lost when the status of the
protected entity changes before an action is commenced is
equally applicable in the context of the FSIA. As in these
examples, an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state is
cloaked with certain protections attributable to its sovereign
status at the time of the alleged actions giving rise to a lawsuit.
Where such an entity is alleged to have committed some
wrongful act while it had such status, it is free to invoke these
protections. Because such protections are rooted in the doctrine
of sovereign immunity, there is no basis to deny their
applicability to an entity that was an agency or instrumentality
of a foreign state when the act occurred but not at the time
of suit.
D. Every Appellate Court to Address the Timing
Issue Has Held that the FSIA’s Definition of 2
Foreign State Includes an Entity that was an
Agency or instrumentality of a Foreign State at
the Time of the Acts Upon Which the Suit is
Based.
The district court held that DSB is entitled to FSIA foreign
state status if it was an agency or instrumentality of the State of
Israel at the time the alleged wrongdoing occurred. Pet. App.
62a-64a. Similarly, in Delgado, Judge Lake held that “[s]ince
Israel owned a majority of the shares of Dead Sea when plaintiffs
were allegedly exposed to DBCP manufactured by Dead Sea,
FSIA jurisdiction exists notwithstanding subsequent changes
in ownership.” Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 890 F. Supp. 1324,
1340 n.33 (S.D. Tex. 1995), aff'd, 231 F.3d 165 (Sth Cir. 2000),
cert. denied, 532 U.S. 972 (2001). The holding of these courts
is consistent with well established case law.
48
Four circuits have expressly held that the status of the
defendant as an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state at
the time of the alleged wrongdoing is sufficient to create FSIA
jurisdiction. See Pere v. Nuovo Pignone, Inc., 150 F.3d at 480-
81; GE Capital Corp. v. Grossman, 991 F.2d at 1381; Gould,
Inc. v. Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann, 853 F.2d 445, 450 (6th Cir.
1988); In re Chase & Sanborn Corp., 835 F.2d 1341, 1347-48
(11th Cir. 1988), rev’d on other grounds sub nom.
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989); accord
Cargill International S.A. v. M/T Pavel Dybenko, 991 F.2d at
1016 (noting that sensitive foreign relations interests could well
remain in any given case even after a company has been
privatized).'®
A number of district courts have also followed Gould,
Grossman and their progeny. See, e.g., Daly v. Llanes,
30 F. Supp.2d 407, 418-19 (S.D.N.Y 1998); Belgrade v. Sidex
International Furniture Corp., 2 F.Supp.2d 407, 412-14
(S.D.N.Y. 1998); Kern v. Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc., 867 F.Supp.
525, 530 (S.D. Tex. 1994); Papanos v. Lufthansa German
Airlines, No. 94-2667-CIV, slip op. at 7 (S.D.Fla. 1995); but
see Ocasek v. Flintkote Co., 796 F. Supp. 362, 365 (N.D. Ill.
1992).
19. Two of these decisions even indicated that the importance of
the FSIA is diminished in the context of protecting entities that were not
government-owned at the time of the underlying events. See Gould, 853
F.2d at 450 (“[a]s to completed acts upon which the complaint is based,
the parties are bound by the jurisdictional facts existing at the time of
those acts”); Chase & Sanborn, 835 F.2d at 1347-48 (implying that the
only relevant time for assessing the status of an entity claiming to be an
agency or instrumentality is the time of the underlying violation).
20. A few courts have held that an entity’s status as an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state at the time a lawsuit is filed also qualifies
it to assert the protections of the statute. See Straub v. A.P. Green, 38
F.3d 448, 451 (9th Cir. 1994); Rutkowski v. Occidental Chemical Corp.,
1998 WL 107342, *2 (N.D. Ill. 1988). These cases do not address Corr)
(Cont’
49
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit should be reversed.
Dated: August 23, 2002
Respectfully submitted,
Tuomas C. WALSH PeTeR R. PADEN
JAMES F, BENNETT Counsel of Record
Bryan Cave LLP Puiuip E. KARMEL
One Metropolitan Square LAURENCE A. HORVATH
St. Louis, Missouri 63102 Bryan Cave LLP
1290 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10104
(212) 541-2000
Georce W. BRANDT
Lyons, BRANDT, Cook
& HIRAMATSU
1800 Davis Pacific Center
841 Bishop Street
Honolulu, Hawaii 96813
Attorneys for Petitioners
(Cont'd)
foreign state status at the time the cause of action arose would be
sufficient or insufficient under the FSIA. Thus, they do not conflict with
the many decisions that have held that agency or instrumentality status
at the time of the alleged acts giving rise to liability is sufficient. Rather,
these cases support DSB’s position that the FSIA applies if a party is a
foreign state either at the time of the alleged acts giving rise to suit or at
the time of suit. See Belgrade, 2 F.Supp.2d at 413 (“The particular
concerns that underlie FSIA jurisdiction are safeguarded under both
approaches.”).
—
Al
ADDENDUM
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BROMINE Lael nee
98 % 88 % +
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.