Petition for Writ of Certiorari — National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan
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No. 01614 APR 23 2001
OFFICE OF T.
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
Vv.
ABNER MORGAN, JR.,
Respondent.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
KATHLEEN J. FORD *
MELISSA B. ROGERS
NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER
CORPORATION
60 Massachusetts Ave., N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20002
* Counsel of Record (202) 906-3296
Counsel for Petitioner
ad
WILSON-EPES PRINTING Co., INC. — (202) 789-0096 -— WASHINGTON, D. C. 20001
© <E «
-_— oc ~—m
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit correctly held, in conflict with every other circuit that
has decided the question, that a plaintiff who has knowingly
allowed the statute of limitations to lapse on alleged
violations of federal anti-discrimination statutes may
nevertheless sue on such time-barred claims whenever
incidents within the limitations period are “sufficiently
related” to the otherwise time-barred claims.
(i)
ii
RULE 14.1(b) AND 29.6 STATEMENT TABLE OF CONTENTS
The following are the parties to the proceeding in the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: EE
1. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, a RULE 14(b) AND 29.6 STATEMENT .....ccccccccccsoococoses
pevome ee dba Amtrak, TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .....cccccsssseooooooee
' a ee ana
menetedds me A
2. Abner Morgan, Jr., plaintifl-appetant. JURISDICTION .o..cccscccsscesssneesnn
vutiene Need OPE IE erection neuen
federally chartered and is not a publicly traded corporation. STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED .....cscccseee
The United States of America owns 100% of the preferred a
shares under the name of the Secretary of Transportation. A. Morgan’s Empl :
The following companies each own 10% or more of the B Peesesdie “om AE ARRREEE, cncereneen
corporation’s common stock: Burlington Northern/Santa Fe gs Sooeecocororocococoococooccoososoecococes
Railroad Company and American Premier Underwriters REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT........ccccec0s..
(successor to the Penn Central Railroad). Il. THE NINTH’ CIRCUIT’S DECISION
CONFLICTS WITH THE LANGUAGE OF
SECTION 706(e¢) AND SUPREME COURT
PRECEDENT HOLDING THAT A
DISCRETE EVENT TRIGGERS AN
EMPLOYEE’S OBLIGATION TO FILE A
CHARGE PURSUANT TO TITLE VI..............
fl. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION
A. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision Conflicts
With Decisions Of Every Other Circuit :
Court That Has Decided The Issue ............
B. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Conflicts
With This Court’s Rulings on The
Continuing Violation Doctrine ..................
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES Page
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36
(1974) ..eccccsccossesersessrssrsosenensensesenssrssssssssensnsenenenses 11,12
Alldread v. City of Grenada, 988 F.2d 1425 (Sth
Cir, 1993) ...ccccocccorcceresesssesscesssossnssesssessenssnosossoess 16
Anderson v. Reno, 190 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 1999)... Z)
Ashley v. Boyle’s Famous Corned Beef Co., 66
F.3d 164 (Bth Cir, 1995) .....cccserveereeeseerenneenennenes 15
Bell v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 929 F.2d 220
(Gth Cir, 1991)......c.ccscecsereereseesessnrsnsnnnnennensnnenennes 21
Berry v. Bd. of Supervisors, 715 F.2d 971 (Sth
Cli, 1963) .cccccccccccccrcccsccsccsscccscnsecssecsees 2, 3, 8, 18, 19, 21
Bosley v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 162 F.3d 665
(Fed. Cir, 1998).......cccsssesererserenensnnnnsennnnsensnnenanens 21
Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d
1301 (1OtH Cir, 1999)........ccccccereereeennenenennnnnnnnnns 15
Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424
(1965) ...cccocccserecsecesssereseosernrerensnsssssssssessosssnsenenees 23
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917)... 12
Cedeck v. Hamiltonian Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
$51 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1977) .......cccceeeeeeenennes 16
Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6 (1981)... 13, 24
Cox v. United States Gypsum Co., 409 F.2d 289
(Th Cir, 1969).......ccerersesersrenensnensnennennnsnsnnnnenenens 16
Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345
(19GB) ...cccocccscsecesesereresesersscossevsnssssesessssssnsssnsoosooss 23
Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560 (2d
Cie. DODD) .0.ecccreccccrecsereesessersccccsesscsessessssessessessess 21
Curry v. District of Columbia, 195 F.3d 654
(D.C. Cit, 1999) ....cccecerssereseresenssenensesnensnensnnenenees 21
Delaware State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250
(19BD) .ercreccccccsercrensersesccscsccssseseosenses 2, 13, 14, 23, 24, 25
Draper v. Coeur Rochester, Inc., \47 F.3d 1104
(Dt Cir, 199B)........cccreeerersesessersnsnnnnsnnenennnnennnnens 9
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Dumas v. Town of Mount Vernon, 612 F.2d
ES EE es eens 3 : 17
Emmert v. Runyon, No. 98-2027, 1999 WL
253632 (4th Cir. Apr. 29, 1999) ooo. cccccccceceenses 21
Fielder vy. UAL Corp., 218 F.3d 973 (9th Cir.
2000), petition for cert. filed, 69 US.L.W.
3619 (U.S. March 7, 2001) (No. 00-1937) ........ 2,9, 10
Galloway v. General Motors Serv. Parts
Operations, 78 F.3d 1164 (7th Cir.
1996) sensccncnemnentsiemmmanetenentiodaiennens .2, 3, 8, 17, 18, 19, 20
Garrison v. Burke, 165 F.3d 565 (7th Cir. 1999) .. 18
Green v. Los Angeles County Superintendent Of
Schools, 883 F.2d 1472 (9th Cir. 1989)
maneseenenee 10
Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S.
564 (1982)... 12
Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 US.
ig a ee ee 22
a Vv. Tillamook County, 493 US. 20
- 13
Harris v. Forklift Sys. tnc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) = 2
“aa Co. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363
pamesdabesmeneueumensnssenes 13
High v. Univ. of Minnesota, 236 F.3d 909 8th
CS 15
Huckabay v. Moore, 142 F.3d 233° (Sth Cir.
1998) : 15
International Union of Electrical, Radio a
Machine Workers, v. Robbins & Myers, Inc.,
429 U.S. 229 (1976).. — 12, 13, 14, 23, 24
Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d
(8th Cir. 1997).. 0 20
Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S.
454 (1975)........ 11, 24, 25
Klein v . McGowan, 198 F.3d 705 (8th Cir.
1999) an 20
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
Landrau-Romero v. Banco Popular de Puerto
Rico, 212 F.3d 607 (1st Cir. 2000).......ceeceevees 19
Martin v. Nannie & the Newborns, Inc., 3 F.3d
1410 (10th Cir. 1991)......ccccrceveereereereenennseesnnnnes 21
Milton v. Weinberger, 645 F.2d 1070 (D.C. Cir.
19B2) ..cccecceccccccerccsersscrecsocssesscsscssnsssssssocsonsoossosesse 3
O’ Rourke v. City of Providence, 235 F.3d 713
(Ist Cir, 2001) ......cccceccessrssssrensersesensesersevsrsnesnenses 21,22
Order of Railway Telegraphers v. Ry. Express
Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342 (1944) ..cvesesvevereenenes
Provencher v. CVS Pharmacy, 145 F.3d 5 (ist
Cle, 19 9B) ...ceccococecccccsscseecssccssecsesssscscessseseoensceses 3, 19, 21
Purrington v. Univ. of Utah, 996 F.2d 1025 (10th
Cie. 1993) ...cccccccsecccccsecccccseeccscsscccsscssessscossessosscess 18
Richard v. McDonnell Douglas Co., 469 F.2d
1249 (Bth Cir. 1972)......ccccseseerserssereereeeensennnnnnns 16
Roberts v. Gadsen Mem’! Hosp., 835 F.2d 793,
as modified at 850 F.2d 1549 (llth Cir.
GBB) .ccocccecoscrssecccsccecsscrscreccscsscssssssssssssnssssonseeses 3, 8, 21
Rush v. Scott Specialty Gases, Inc., 113 F.3d 476
(38 Cis. 199) cececrcccscccccssssecseccerssscssssenscnsenccasssese 1S, Si
Sabree v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners Local, 33, 921 F.2d 396 (ist Cir.
ee
Salgado v. City of New York, 2001 WL 290051
(S.D.N.Y. March 26, 2001)........:ccseseeseeeerennsnnnnes 22
Seward v. Harford County, 2001 WL 283090
(D. Md. March 13, 2001) ......serserserserenrenennnes 21
Stewart v. Booker T. Washington Inst., 232 F.3d
844 (11th Cir. 2000). -_ 15
United Airlines v. Evans, 431 US. "$53 (1977).. — 12, 13,
23, 24, 25
United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979)...... 22
United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S.
235 (19B9) .....ccecsvrserersserenrensersensenssnsnsennnnnssnnenenees 12
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
Van Zant v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 80 F.3d
3S 18, 19, 21
Webb v. Cardiothoracic Surgery Ass’ n., 139 F.3d
TD Wie hrncentecnssnensnesncscnseneneceeneemenssnees 18, 19
West v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744 (3d
Se 15, 20, 21
Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S 135 (1879) .....cccc00 22, 23
Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385
I 2,17
STATUTES
BO UBL. § EBSEL1) (IDB) cececccccccecccccscccscscssneccscee l
42 U.S.C. § 2O0De]-2 (19B2).......ccccccececsccccerererererees 2
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (1982)........ccccccececesesesesessecsees 2
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5S(e)(1) (1982) ....cccccccececeeees 1,2, 12, 13
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-S()(1) (1982) ....cccccccccececececeeees 12
MISCELLANEOUS
T. A. Crivens, The Continuing Violation Theory
and Systematic Discrimination: In Search of a
Judicial Standard for Timely Filing, 41 Vand. L.
Be Bere I cicterncesennenensseneniecaees 17
2 Barbara Lindemann & Paul Grossman,
Employment Discrimination Law 1351 (3d ed
Oe 17
Note, Continuing Confusion: The Application of
the Continuing Violation Doctrine to Sexual
gy path» gym 531 (2000)....... 17
Pactzold & A.M. O'Leary-Kelly, Con-
ee and Hostile Environment
arassment: When is Enough, h?,
31 Am. Bus. LJ. 365 (1993).......cccccees oes some 17
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
National Railroad Passenger Corporation, dba Amtrak,
respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the
judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in this case.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (App., infra, 1a) is
reported at 232 F.3d 1008. The order of the court denying
rehearing and rehearing en banc (App., infra, 23a) is
unreported. The district court’s opinion granting partial
summary judgment to petitioner ‘App., infra, 24a) is
unreported.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
November 8, 2000. App., infra, la. A petition for rehearing
and rehearing en banc was denied on January 22, 2001. App.,
_ infra, 23a. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28
U.S.C. § 1254(1).
STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED
Section 706(e) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)
(1982), provides:
A charge under this section shall be filed [with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)]
within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged
unlawful employment practice occurred * * *, except
[when] the person aggrieved has initially instituted
proceedings with a State or local agency with authority
to grant or seek relief from such practice * * *, such
charge shall be filed [with the EEOC] * * * within three
hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment
practice occurred * * *.
2
STATEMENT
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits
employment discrimination on the basis of race. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2 et. seg. Prohibited discrimination includes racial
harassment and retaliation. Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510
U.S. 17 (1993); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3.
Title VII requires employees who believe that they have
been subjected to unlawful discrimination to file a claim with
an administrative agency prior to proceeding to court. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). A claim is time-barred unless the
employee files a charge of discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) within 180
days of the incident, or within 300 days of the incident if the
employee first files the charge with a state or local agency.
Id. The limitations period begins to run on the date of the
alleged “unlawful employment practice.” /d.; Delaware State
Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 257 (1980). When the unlawful
employment practice is a discrete event—such as a
termination—the limitations period runs from the date of that
event. Ricks, 449 U.S. at 503-04; Berry v. Bd. of Supervisors,
715 F.2d 971, 980 (Sth Cir. 1983).
Although there is no statutory exception to the limitations
period, this Court recognized that the 300-day filing period,
like a statute of limitations, may be subject to waiver,
estoppel and equitable tolling. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 455 U.S. 385 (1982). Accordingly, the courts of appeals
recognize a variant of the equitable “continuing violation”
doctrine which allows plaintiffs to join time-barred Title VII
claims with related claims that are the subject of a timely-
filed administrative charge under certain circumstances. See
e.g., Fielder v. UAL Corp., 218 F.3d 973 (9th Cir. 2000),
petition for cert. filed, 69 U.S.L.W. 3619 (U.S. March 7,
2001) (No. 00-1937); Galloway v. General Motors Serv.
Parts Operations, 78 F.3d 1164 (7th Cir. 1996); Sabree v.
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners Local 33, 921
3
F.2d 396 (Ist Cir. 1990); Roberts v. Gadsen Mem’! Hosp.,
835 F.2d 793, as modified at 850 F.2d 1549 (11th Cir. 1988):
Berry, 715 F.2d 971.
The most widely accepted approach for analyzing the
continuing violation doctrine was articulated by the Fifth
Circuit in Berry. Berry, 715 F.2d at 981. The Berry standard
permits use of the continuing violation doctrine to save
otherwise time-barred claims if the alleged acts are similar, if
they are recurring, and if the untimely acts did not have the
degree of permanence which would trigger an employee’s
awareness of and duty to assert his rights. Jd. The Seventh
Circuit’s standard as set forth in Galloway and adopted by the
First and Federal circuit courts of appeals limits the
application of the continuing violation doctrine to cases in
which “it would have been unreasonable to expect the
plaintiff to sue before the statute ran on [the time-barred]
conduct.” Galloway, 232 F.3d at 1014-15. With the
exception of the Ninth Circuit, the courts of appeals
uniformly refuse to allow the invocation of the doctrine to
revive stale claims that a knowing plaintiff allowed to lapse.
See e.g., Provencher v. CVS Pharmacy, 145 F.3d 5, 14 (ist
Cir. 1998); Roberts, 835 F.2d 793; Milton v. Weinberger, 645
F.2d 1070, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
In this case, a panel of the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected
the Seventh Circuit’s continuing violation analysis in
Galloway and reaffirmed its recent rejection of Berry. App.,
infra, 15a. Relying on its decision in Fielder, the court of
appeals allowed the plaintiff who knowingly permitted
numerous claims to lapse to use the continuing violation
doctrine to revive those stale claims. /d. The court of appeals
held that there was no “notice” limitation on the continuing
violation doctrine and that a plaintiff was permitted to use the
doctrine and recover damages for pre-limitations conduct so
long as it is “sufficiently related” to post-limitations conduct.
App., infra, 15a; 18a. In so doing, the court effectively
eradicated Title VII's limitations period.
4
A. Morgan’s Employment At Amtrak’
Abner J. Morgan, Jr. (“Morgan”), an African-American
male, began working at Amtrak in August 1990 as an
electrician’s helper in the Oakland Maintenance Yard (the
“Yard”). App., infra, 7a. Morgan claimed that he believed
that he was being hired as an electrician, that he performed
the work of an electrician and that less qualified Caucasians
were hired as electricians. Jd. According to Morgan, his job
was not-reclassified nor his pay increased until April 1992.
Id.
Morgan claims that shortly after he began working at
Amtrak, he was subjected to a pattern of racially
discriminatory and retaliatory acts perpetrated by a group of
Amtrak managers, specifically Robert Vandenburg, the
Facility Manager of the Yard, Jerry Denton, Mike Bordenave,
Ray Borge and Earl Geske. App., infra, 6a. This conduct
allegedly continued throughout his employment with Amtrak
and culminated in his termination in March 1995. /d.
Morgan testified that the first discriminatory act occurred
in February 1991 when he was charged with violating a
disciplinary rule for refusing to attend a meeting without
union representation. App., infra, 7a. Under applicable work
rules, an employee is entitled to union representation at any
meeting that might lead to disciplinary action. /d. at 7a n.4.
Morgan was ordered to attend a meeting with Vandenburg
and Denton the day after he had called in sick. Believing that
' For purposes of ruling on and reviewing the grant of partial summary
judgment, the district court and the court of appeals accepted Morgan's
statement of facts as true. The court of appeals, however, supplemented
Morgan’s statement of facts with trial testimony where it favored Morgan.
At trial, Amtrak disputed many of the facts relied on by Morgan in
opposing summary judgment, and the fully developed trial record
demonstrates that many of the allegations were unfounded. For the
purposes of this petition, Amtrak is limited to the facts as described by the
courts below.
5
the meeting might lead to disciplinary action, Morgan refused
to attend. On March 22, 1991, following a full investigatory
hearing into the incident, Morgan was terminated.? Id. The
termination later was reduced to a ten-day suspension and
Morgan received back pay for all but ten days. /d.
Morgan claims that he requested entrance into the
electrician apprentice program in August 1991. App., infra,
7a-8a. He claims that he received no official response from
Amtrak's personnel office, but that Vandenburg told him that
he stood “a snowball’s chance in hell of becoming an
electrician.” /d. at 8a.
Morgan recognized early in his employment that the
alleged conduct of his supervisors and co-workers could be
grounds for legal action. In October 1991, following the
termination/suspension and the alleged denial of training,
Morgan first complained about racial discrimination at
Amtrak. App., infra, 28a. Morgan filed a written complaint
with Amtrak’s internal EEO office citing “blatant racism” and
offering specific instances of allegedly discriminatory
conduct. /d. He sent a copy of this letter to Congressman
Dellums. Jd. Morgan testified that he never received a
formal response to this complaint. /d.
Throughout the remainder of Morgan’s employment at
Amtrak, he continued to make complaints of racial
discrimination and retaliation both externally and internally to
* Morgan's employment was covered by a collective bargaining
agreement. App., infra, 27a. Therefore, before he could be disciplined
for rules infractions, he was entitled to be notified of the charges against
him and to have a full investigatory hearing at which he was represented
by his union and could present evidence and cross-examine witnesses. /d.
at 27a n.4. The hearing was conducted by a Hearing Officer who
determined whether the charges were proven. If the charges were proven,
the Hearing Officer’s decision was forwarded to the department head who
imposed discipline. /d. These determinations were subject to muiti-
layered review and ultimately could be appealed to the National Railroad
Adjustment Board.
6
Amtrak’s EEO office. Morgan and a group of other Amtrak
employees met with Congresswoman Boxer to express their
concerns about discriminatory conditions at the Yard in late
1991. App., infra, 8a. In response to the complaint,
Congresswoman Boxer contacted Amtrak’s Inspector
General, Fred Weiderhold. /d. at 40a. Weiderhold visited the
Yard three times in 1992. Jd. On one of these occasions,
Weiderhold met Morgan. Jd. Morgan claims that he “tried
repeatedly to bring the continuing discriminatory _and
retaliatory practices at Amtrak to [Weiderhold’s] attention.
Id.
Morgan also continued to complain about racial dis-
crimination to Amtrak’s EEO office. In May 1993, Morgan
filed two separate internal complaints alleging racial
discrimination and retaliation with Amtrak’s EEO office.
App., infra, 29a; 30a. Morgan claims that in October 1993,
Vandenburg assaulted him by placing his hands on Morgan's
shoulders, pushing down and whispering in his ear. /d. at 10a.
Morgan reported the alleged assault to the police and filed a
formal complaint with Amtrak’s EEO office. Jd. at 3la.
Morgan testified that Amtrak did not investigate his
complaint. In January 1994, Morgan again complained about
racial discrimination to Amtrak’s EEO office following the
cancellation of scheduled training. /d. at 1la. Again, Morgan
claims that Amtrak did not formally respond to the complaint.
Id. In October 1994, Morgan made his last complaint of
racial discrimination to Amtrak’s EEO office and again,
according to Morgan, no response was forthcoming. /d. In
sum, by the time Morgan was suspended in February 1995, he
had complained about racial discrimination or retaliation at
least nine times over the course of four years.
Despite his complaints, Morgan claims that the discrim-
ination and harassment never stopped. Morgan claims that he
was subjected to discriminatory or retaliatory discipline on at
least ten occasions between October 1991 and the end of his
7
employment in March 1995. App., infra, 8a-12a. This
discipline consisted of being issued written and oral
counselings, being unfairly charged with rules violations,
being suspended and ultimately his employment being
terminated. In addition, he claims that he was unfairly denied
training on four occasions.
Although Morgan believed that the alleged conduct was
discriminatory and unlawful, he nevertheless refrained from
filing an administrative charge until February 27, 1995, two
days after he was suspended. App., infra, 13a. At that time,
he filed a charge alleging discrimination and retaliation with
the EEOC and cross-filed with the California Department of
Fair Employment and Housing. /d. On March 3, 1995,
following a full investigatory hearing, Morgan was
terminated. /d. at 12a. On March 8, 1995, Morgan amended
his charge to allege that this termination constituted unlawful
discrimination and retaliation. /d. at 37a. At the time he filed
his administrative charge in February 1995, only six allegedly
discriminatory incidents fell within the 300-day limitations
period.
B. Proceedings Below
The district court granted partial summary judgment in
petitioner’s favor on all acts of alleged discrimination which
occurred more than 300 days before Morgan filed his
administrative charge of discrimination. App., infra, 38a-40a.
The court also granted partial summary judgment on three of
Morgan’s six timely claims of alleged discrimination: (1)
denial of pay for jury duty in June 1994 and January and
February 1995, (2) denial of access to review his work file in
December 1994, and (3) denial of union representation during
a December 1994 meeting—ruling that Morgan failed to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination with respect to
each of those claims. /d. at 49a-50a; 51a. The court held that
Morgan failed to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination for denial of pay for jury duty because he
offered no evidence that the action was discriminatory or
retaliatory. Jd. at 49a-S0a. The district court held that
Morgan failed to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination relating to the alleged refusal to allow him to
review his work file because he could not identify an adverse
employment action flowing from that denial. /d. at 51a. The
district court also held that Morgan could not recover for the
alleged denial of union representation at a December 1994
meeting because he never addressed this claim in his
opposition to Amtrak’s summary judgment motion. /d.
In rejecting Morgan’s argument that the continuing
violation doctrine resuscitated all of his claims dating back to
1991, the district court relied on Galloway, 78 F.3d 1164,
1167; Roberts, 835 F.2d 793, and Berry, 715 F.2d 971, 981.
App., infra, 38a-40a. The court held that a plaintiff may not
recover for conduct that “occurred outside the statute of
limitations unless it would have been unreasonable to expect
the plaintiff to sue before the statute ran on that conduct, as in
a case in which the conduct could constitute, or be
recognized, as actionable harassment only in light of events
that occurred later, within the period of the statute of
limitations.” Jd. at 39a (quoting Galloway, 78 F.3d at 1167).
The court held that Morgan was not entitled to invoke the
continuing violation doctrine because as early as 1991 he
claimed to be the victim of discrimination and retaliation by
Amtrak and yet he did not file his administrative charge until
1995.’ App., infra, 39a-40a.
The three remaining claims of alleged discrimination—
suspension in September 1994, denial of training in October
1994, suspension in February 1995 leading to termination of
Morgan’s employment in March 1995—were tried before a
> The court, however, did permit Morgan to present evidence at trial of
acts occurring prior to the limitations period to the extent they were
relevant to his timely claims of discrimination and retaliation. /d. at
40a n.9.
jury. App., infra, 13a. During the trial, Morgan introduced
evidence spanning the entire period of his employment at
Amtrak. The jury returned a unanimous verdict in favor of
Amtrak on November 8, 1998. Judgment was entered on
conduct at issue is “sufficiently related” to the post-
limitations conduct. App., infra, at 18a. Using that test,
articulated for (he first time in Fielder, the court of appeals
analyzed Morgan's “three distinct Title VII claims .. .
discrimination, hostile environment and retaliation” and held
that Morgan could rely on the continuing violation doctrine
Sa eneal oF tie dase cate, Id. at 18a-20a. The
appeals vacated the grant of i
4 et
Morgan a new trial on all of his claims. /d. at 22a.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
The petition for writ of certiorari should be granted in this
matter as the outcome in this case conflicts with decisions of
this Court regarding the enforcement of Title VII's limitations
10
period. In addition, the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected the
analyses of the continuing violation doctrine articulated by
the Fifth and Seventh circuit courts of appeals. Finally, the
Ninth Circuit’s decision effectively nullifies Title VII's
statute of limitations for a wide array of cases, and thus, is
inconsistent with both the statute itself and the purposes
behind the limitations period. In this case, the Ninth Circuit
openly acknowledged the conflict between the circuits and
reaffirmed its adherence to the “sufficiently related” test.
On March 7, 2001, UAL Corporation filed a petition for
writ of certiorari seeking review of a decision of the Ninth
Circuit court of appeals. UAL v. Fielder, 69 U.S.L.W. 3619
(U.S. March 7, 2001) (No. 00-1937) seeking review of 218
F.3d 973 (9th Cir. 2000). In Fielder, the Ninth Circuit held
that in hostile environment and sexual harassment cases, a
plaintiff may use the continuing violation doctrine to link
timely and untimely Title VII claims whenever the “alleged
discriminatory acts [which occurred within Title VII's
limitations period] are related closely enough to constitute a
continuing violation.” Fielder, 218 F.3d at 987, (quoting
Green v. Los Angeles County Superintendent Of Schools, 883
F.2d 1472, 1480-81 (9th Cir. 1989)). In this case, the Ninth
Circuit has gone a step farther—holding that its “related
closely enough” or “sufficiently related” test is not limited to
cases of hostile environment and sexual harassment but
applies to all cases of discrimination. App., infra, 17a-18a.
In both this case and in Fielder, the Ninth Circuit applied its
holding and allowed plaintiffs to recover for an assortment of
very different time-barred claims under a continuing violation
theory, notwithstanding their failure to file timely admin-
istrative charges challenging conduct which they concluded
was unlawful at or shortly after the time it occurred. /d.;
Fielder, 218 F.3d at 989. Indeed, in this case, the Ninth
Circuit acknowledged that its continuing violation test yields
results at odds with those in other circuits. It noted that under
the Berry and Galloway tests, the plaintiff in Fielder would
not have been able to rely on the continuing violation doctrine
to recover because “the harassing behavior was such that a
reasonable person would have been on notice that her rights
were violated ...” App., infra, 15a.
This case, like Fielder, presents the Court with an
opportunity to provide guidance as to what events trigger the
running of the limitations period under Title VII and when, if
ever, a plaintiff can join untimely claims of alleged
discrimination with claims that were the subject of a timely
charge. Further review is warranted.
I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION CON-
FLICTS WITH THE LANGUAGE OF SECTION
706(e) AND SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
HOLDING THAT A DISCRETE EVENT TRIG-
GERS AN EMPLOYEE’S OBLIGATION TO
FILE A CHARGE PURSUANT TO TITLE VII
The Ninth Circuit effectively nullified Title VII's
limitations period by permitting recovery for discrete acts of
alleged discrimination years after the expiration of the
limitations period. There is no statutory basis for this
interpretation of Section 706(e). Moreover, the Ninth
Circuit's decision expressly conflicts with this Court's rulings
that a discrete event triggers the running of the limitations
period. Finally, the Ninth Circuit's decision conflicts with
the decisions of other courts of appeals which adhere to the
rule that a discrete event triggers Section 706(e)’s limitations
period. The decision below is erroneous and should be
Title VII was enacted to “assure equality of employment
opportunities by eliminating those practices and devices that
discriminate on the basis of race . . .” Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974). It creates a compre-
hensive statutory system to vindicate civil rights. Johnson v.
Ry. Express Agency, Inc. 421 U.S. 454, 455 (1975). That
12
system includes a limitations period—Section 706(e). Sec-
tion 706(e) requires employees who believe that they have
been subjected to unlawful discrimination to file a claim with
an administrative agency prior to proceeding to court. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5S(e)(1). A claim is time-barred unless the
employee files a charge of discrimination with the EEOC
within 180 days of the alleged unlawful occurrence, or within
300 days of the allegedly unlawful occurrence if the
employee first files the charge with a state or local agency.
Id; United Airlines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 555 n.4 (1977)
(holding that “[tjimely filing is a prerequisite to maintenance
of a Title VII action.”). If, after 180 days, the EEOC is not
successful in obtaining voluntary compliance from the
employer and elects not to file suit on behalf of the employee,
the employee may demand a right-to-sue letter and institute a
private action against the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 2000ce-
5(f)(1). The employee must institute the lawsuit within 90
days after receiving the right-to-sue letter or risk losing his
claim. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 47.
Congress defined Title VII's jurisdictional prerequisites
“with precision,” /d., and there is no statutory exception to
this limitations period. The sole statutory extension of Section
706(e)'s limitations period occurs when the “person
aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with a State or
local agency with authority to grant or seek relief from” the
alleged discriminatory practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(S)(e)(1);
International Union of Electrical Radio & Machine Workers
v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 240 (1976). It is
well-settled that where a statute’s language is plain, “the sole
function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.”
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917); see
also United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S.
235, 242 (1989) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors,
Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982) (finding the terms of the
statute of limitations applicable because this “is not one of the
rare cases in which ‘the literal application of the statute will
13
produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of
its drafters."”)); Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20,
28 (1989) (noting that the words of the statute are
conclusive). The language of Section 706(e) is plain—it
provides that a charge of discrimination “shall be filed” with
the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged unlawful
employment action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5S(e)(1). As this
Court noted, “[a]s a general rule, if an action is barred by the
terms of a statute, it must be dismissed.” Hallstrom, 493 U.S.
at 31.
Moreover, this Court has ruled that the Title VII limitations
period begins to run from the date of the discrete
discriminatory act, not from the date the last effect of that act
is felt.’ Ricks, 449 U.S. at 257-8; Chardon v. Fernandez, 454
U.S. 6, 8 (1981) (noting that “the proper focus is on the time
of the discriminatory act, not at the point at which the
consequences of the act become painful.”); see also Evans,
431 U.S. at 558 (noting that the focus is on whether there is a
present violation not on whether there are present effects of a
past violation.); Robbins & Myers, 429 U.S. at 234; Cf,
Havens Realty Co. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 381 (1982)
(holding that under the Fair Housing Act a tester could not
invoke the continuing violation doctrine to recover for “four
isolated occasions” on which she was given false infor-
mation). Accordingly, this Court has rejected attempts to
extend the limitations period when a discrete allegedly
ne ance dence eimaneeaienes meme
“eaieiaiariet alates sa tainspartamear names
that she was fired because of her race in violation of both the
applicable collective bargaining agreement and Title VII.
She promptly filed a grievance with the union alleging unfair
action, but waited until after the expiration of Title VII's
* Continuity of employment alone is not sufficient to extend the
limitations period. Ricks, 449 U.S. at 257.
14
limitations period to file her charge with the EEOC. Robbins
& Myers, 429 U.S. at 229. The plaintiff conceded that filing
her grievance did not prevent her from immediately filing an
EEOC charge. /d. at 238, n.10. She argued that her charge
was timely filed because the alleged unlawful employment
practice occurred at the conclusion of the grievance-
arbitration proceedings, not on the date of her termination.
Id. at 238. This Court rejected plaintiff's argument holding
that the effective date for purposes of the limitations period
was the date of her termination. /d. at 234-35.
Likewise, in Ricks, this Court rejected a plaintiff's attempt
to use the continuing violation doctrine to extend the
limitations period to resuscitate his time-barred discrim-
ination claim. Ricks, 449 U.S. at 257-58. In Ricks, a black
Liberian college professor was denied tenure in February
1973. Id. at 252. Following a denial of an appeal of the
tenure decision, the college’s Board of Trustees offered Ricks
a one-year terminal contract. /d. at 253. Ricks accepted the
contract and worked until its expiration in June 1975. /d. at
253-54. In April 1975, Ricks filed a charge with the EEOC
alleging discrimination based on national origin. /d. at 254.
The district court held that Ricks’ claim was time-barred
because the denial of tenure occurred more than 180 days
prior to the filing of the EEO charge. /d. at 254-55. The
court of appeals reversed, holding that the limitations period
did not begin to run until June 1975 upon the expiration of the
one-year contract. Jd. at 255-56. This Court reversed and
held that for purposes of the limitations period, the inquiry
must focus on the date of the allegedly unlawful conduct—
the denial of tenure. Jd. at 256-57. This Court held that the
limitations period normally commences when the employer’s
decision is made even when the effects of that decision linger
for some time thereafter. /d. at 261.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision clearly conflicts with this
Court’s rulings in Ricks and Robbins & Myers, and with the
15
decisions of the other circuit courts of appeals.’ The Ninth
Circuit’s “sufficiently related” test effectively eliminates the
limitations period in any case in which an alleged act of
discrimination occurs within the 300 days prior to plaintiff
filing an EEO charge. In this case, the first alleged act of
discrimination occurred in February 1991, when Amtrak
initially terminated Morgan. App., infra, 7a.. Shortly after
that termination, Morgan complained that he was the victim
of racial discrimination and specifically cited the termination
as an example of discrimination. Jd. at 8a. This Court’s
rulings mandate that the limitations period for that
termination runs from the date of the termination. Likewise,
* With the exception of the Ninth Circuit, the courts of appeals have
followed this Court's precedent and have held that discrete events such as
denial of promotion, denial of training, and termination trigger the
running of Title VII's limitations period for such events even in cases in
which the plaintiff alleges subsequent discriminatory acts. See ¢.g., High
v. Univ. of Minnesota, 236 F.3d 909 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding failure to
promote is a discrete event triggering ihe limitations period); Stewart v.
Booker T. Washington Inst., 232 F.3d 844, 850 (llth Cir. 2000)
(precluding use of continuing violation doctrine as denial of transfer is a
discrete event triggering the limitations period); Bullington v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1310 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding refusal to hire
is a discrete event triggering limitations period; claim could not be revived
by combining it with timely refusal to hire claim); Huckabay v. Moore,
142 F.3d 233, 239-40 (Sth Cir. 1998) (preventing combining stale
demotion and failure to promote claims with timely harassment claims as,
“demotion is the sort of discrete and salient event that should put an
employee on notice that a cause of action has accrued”); Rush v. Scott
Specialty Gases, Inc., 113 F.3d 476, 483-84 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding
failure to promote and denial of training claims are discrete events that
“cannot be regarded as having been timely by reason of (plaintiff's) other
allegations of discriminatory treatment.”); Ashley v. Boyle's Famous
Corned Beef Co., 66 F.3d 164, 167 (8th Cir. 1995) (en banc); Cf, West v.
Philadelphia Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 756 (3d Cir. 1995) (“{TJhe
harassment did not cause a discrete event such as a lost job or a denied
promotion and, thus did not trigger a duty of the plaintiff to assert his
rights arising from the deprivation”).
* This termination was later reduced to # suspension. App., infra, 7a.
16
other discrete events complained of by Morgan—including
denial of training and failure to promote—should trigger the
300-day limitations period for those events. The Ninth
Circuit, however, ignored precedent and permitted Morgan to
use the continuing violation doctrine and reach back four
years to resuscitate his stale claims. In fact, under the Ninth
Circuit’s analysis, the plaintiffs in Robbins & Myers and
Ricks both would have been permitted to recover for any
allegedly discriminatory event stretching back to the
beginning of their employment. The Ninth Circuit’s decision
conflicts with this Court’s precedent and is erroneous. This
Court should intervene to correct this decision.
Il. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION CON-
FLICTS WITH OTHER CIRCUITS’ AND THE
SUPREME COURT’S LIMITED APPROACH
TO THE CONTINUING VIOLATION DOC-
TRINE
Shortly after the passage of Title VII, the courts began to
recognize a judicially-created continuing violation exception
to Title VII’s short limitations period in cases where a
defendant’s conduct was deemed continuing in nature. See
e.g., Cedeck v. Hamiltonian Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 551
F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1977); Richard v. McDonnell Douglas
Co., 469 F.2d 1249 (8th Cir. 1972); Cox v. United States
Gypsum Co., 409 F.2d 289, 290-91 (7th Cir. 1969). In these
cases, the courts used the continuing violation doctrine to
allow plaintiffs to recover based on acts that otherwise would
be time-barred. The continuing violation doctrine is premised
on the equitable notion that the statute of limitations should
not begin to run until a reasonable person would be aware
that his or her rights have been violated. Alldread v. City of
Grenada, 988 F.2d 1425, 1432 (Sth Cir. 1993). This Court
tacitly approved the use of the continuing violation doctrine
under certain circumstance when it held that Title VII's
17
limitations period may be subject to waiver, estoppel and
equitable tolling. Zipes, 455 U.S. 385.
Early development of the continuing violation doctrine was
aptly described as “inconsistent and confusing.” Dumas v.
Town of Mount Vernon, 612 F.2d 974, 977 (Sth Cir. 1980).
This confusion continues today. The courts of appeals have
interpreted the doctrine in widely divergent ways and apply
different standards to interpret similar facts resulting in
contradictory outcomes. The widespread inconsistency and
confusion has been recognized by both the courts and
commentators. See Galloway, 78 F.3d at 1165 (“The
question when conduct occurring outside the statute of
limitations may, by virtue of its link with recent conduct, be
made a basis for a legal claim is a vexing one . . .”); Note,
Continuing Confusion: The Application of the Continuing
Violation Doctrine to Sexual Harassment Law, 79 Tex. L.
Rev. 531 (2000) (describing the “increasingly complex and
divergent application of the continuing violation doctrine in
sexual harassment and other types of employment discrim-
ination cases.”); 2 Barbara Lindemann & Paul Grossman,
Employment Discrimination Law 1351 (3d ed. 1996) (citing
the continuing violation doctrine as “the most muddled area
in all of employment discrimination law”); R.L. Paetzold &
A.M. O’Leary-Kelly, Continuing Violation and Hostile
Environment Sexual Harassment: When is Enough, Enough?,
31 Am. Bus. L.J. 365, 382-83 (1993) (noting that “[bJecause
of the limited guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court, the
federal circuits have adopted different standards for
implementing the continuing violation doctrine”); T. Crivens,
The Continuing Violation Theory and _ Systematic
Discrimination: In Search of a Judicial Standard for Timely
Filing, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 1171, 1172 (1988) (stating that the
continuing violation doctrine is “one of the most confusing
theories in employment discrimination law. . .”).
Prior to the Ninth Circuit’s decisions in this case and
Fielder, the courts of appeals agreed that use of the
18
continuing violation doctrine was inappropriate in cases
where the plaintiff was aware of the discriminatory nature of
the acts at the time they were taking place. See e.g., Garrison
v. Burke, 165 F.3d 565 (7th Cir. 1999); Van Zant v. KLM
Royal Dutch Airlines, 80 F.3d 708 (2d Cir. 1996); Webb v.
Cardiothoracic Surgery Ass’n., 139 F.3d 532, 538 (Sth Cir.
1998); Purrington v. Univ. of Utah, 996 F.2d 1025 (10th Cir.
1993); Sabree, 921 F.2d 396. The Ninth Circuit has now
explicitly rejected the analyses used by other circuits. As
such, review by this Court is necessary to establish uniformity
in the application of the continuing violation doctrine.
A. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision Conflicts With
Decisions Of Every Other Circuit Court That
Has Decided The Issue.
The decision below is in direct conflict with, and rejects
the analyses of, both the Seventh Circuit in Galloway, 78
F.3d at 1167 and the Fifth Circuit in Berry, 715 F.2d 971. In
Galloway, the Seventh Circuit held that a plaintiff may not
rely on the continuing violation doctrine “unless it would
have been unreasonable to expect the plaintiff to sue before
the statute ran on that conduct, as in a case in which the
conduct could constitute, or be recognized, as actionable
harassment only in the light of events that occurred later,
within the period of the statute of limitations.” Galloway, 78
F.3d at 1167. In arriving at this conclusion, the Seventh
Circuit balanced the competing social fry My pr Lana
the prompt filing of claims y doing so 0
enhancing the likelihood of accuraie determinations and
removing debilitating uncertainty about legal liabilities,” with
equitable interest in protecting a plaintiff who files a Title VI
charge as soon as he is aware that his rights have been
violated. /d. at 1165; 1166.
In Berry, the Fifth Circuit adopted a three-factor analysis to
balance these competing interests. Berry, 715 F.2d at 979-
980. Under the Fifth Circuit’s analysis, before being
19
permitted tc use the continuing violation doctrine, a plaintiff
must show first that the acts involve the same type of
discrimination, and second, that they are recurring rather than
an isolated work assignment or employment decision. The
third factor, which the Fifth Circuit considers the most
important, is whether the early untimely act had “a degree of
permanence which should trigger an employee’s awareness of
and duty to assert his or her rights” or which should indicate
that the discrimination will continue “without being
dependent on a continuing intent to discriminate ...” /d. at
981. If the early untimely act is sufficiently permanent in
nature, a plaintiff is not permitted to rely on the continuing .
violation doctrine.
Under both the Berry and the Galloway analyses, the
continuing violation doctrine cannot be used by a plaintiff
who knows that he is a victim of discrimination, but fails to
file a charge within the limitations period. See Landrau-
Romero v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 212 F.3d 607, 612
(ist Cir. 2000) (holding handwritten note by plaintiff
identifying acts as discriminatory written over a year before
the charge filed precluded plaintiff from relying on the
continuing violation doctrine); Provencher, 145 F.3d at 15
(holding plaintiff's admission that he knew he was being
harassed long before he filed charge precluded invocation of
the continuing violation doctrine); Van Zant, 80 F.3d at 713
(stating that the timeliness of a discrimination claim is to be
measured “from the date the claimant had notice of the
allegedly discriminatory action”); Webb, 139 F.3d 532, 538
(holding that plaintiff was precluded from relying on
continuing violation doctrine where she admitted that she
knew she was being harassed and failed to file a timely
charge).
Although the Ninth Circuit distinguished Berry in its
decision in Fielder on the basis that Berry was an equal pay
and gender discrimination case, Fielder, 218 F.3d at 987 n.10,
20
it dropped an nse of distinguishing Berry and Galloway
in this av = infra, 15a. Here, the court of appeals
rejected both Berry and Galloway and held that Ninth Circuit
precedent “precludes such a notice limitation on the
continuing violation doctrine.” Jd. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit s
“sufficiently related” test does not balance the competing
interests recognized in Berry and Galloway. Under the Ninth
Circuit’s test, the societal interest in promoting prompt filing
of claims is absent and the scales tip entirely in favor of
allowing plaintiffs to combine iimely and untimely claims
without regard to the existence of the limitations period. In
fact, the Ninth Circuit’s decision permits a plaintiff who knew
that his rights were being violated to sit on his rights
indefinitely. App., infra, 15a. As Judge Kleinfeld noted in
his dissent in Fielder, “[t}he practical consequence of the
majority opinion is to keep alive incidents of claimed
[discrimination] permanently, with no statute of limitations at
all.” Fielder, 218 F.3d at 990. This is precisely the outcome
that the Berry and Galloway courts sought to avoid.
Despite the Ninth Circuit’s rejection of the Berry an
Galloway analyses, other courts of appeals have adopted
these two analyses.’ The Third, Sixth, Tenth and Eleventh
Circuits apply the Berry factors in determining whether use of
’ The Eighth Circuit is the only other circuit with case law resembling
the Ninth Circuit’s “sufficiently related” test. However, the Eighth
Circuit does not appear to have adopted a uniform standard for analyzing
continuing violations. Compare Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d
1287, 1303 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that when a plaintiff alleges an
ongoing practice or pattern of discrimination, a continuing violation is
present “if the plaintiff established that any violation took place during
the statutory period) (emphasis added) with Klein v. McGowan, 198 F.3d
705, 709 (8th Cir. 1999) (requiring a plaintiff to show “some incident of
harassment” occurring within the limitations period and a sufficient
nexus” between the incident and the other incidents of harassment),
(citing West v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 755 (3d Cir. 1995)).
21
the continuing violation doctrine is appropriate.* These
courts of appeals—like the Fifth Circuit—consider the third
factor, permanence, to be the most important. See West v.
Philadelphia Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 755 & n. 9 (3d Cir.
1995); Martin v. Nannie & the Newborns, Inc., 3 F.3d 1410,
1415 & n. 6 (10th Cir. 1993); Bell v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry.,
929 F.2d 220, 223-25 (6th Cir. 1991); Roberts v. Gadsen
Mem'l. Hosp., 835 F.2d 793, 801 (11th Cir. 1988). The
Second Circuit, while not expressly adopting the Berry
analysis, uses a similar standard to determine whether a
continuing violation exists. The Second Circuit asks whether
the instances of discrimination are “specific and related” and
the plaintiff must be without notice of the discriminatory
nature of events when they occur. See e.g., Cruz v. Coach
Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 569 n.4 (2nd Cir. 2000); Van Zant,
80 F.3d at 713. The First and Federal Circuits have adopted
the Seventh Circuit’s Galloway approach. See O’Rourke v.
City of Providence, 235 F.3d 713, 731-33 (1st Cir. 2001);
Provencher v. CVS Pharmacy, 145 F.3d 5, 14-15 (1st Cir.
1998); Sabree, 921 F.2d 399-400; Bosley v. Merit Sys. Prot.
Bd., 162 F.3d 665, 667 (Fed. Cir. 1998). There is no doubt
that under the analyses adopted by any of these courts,
Morgan’s continuing violation claim would have failed. Not
only did Morgan believe himself to be the victim of racial
* The District of Columbia Circuit has not explicitly adopted Berry or
Galloway, but cites both analyses with approval. See Curry v. District of
Columbia, 195 F.3d 654, 661 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1999) cert. denied, 530 U.S.
1215 (2000) (citing Sabree, 921 F.2d at 401-02); Rush v. Scott Specialty
Gases, Inc., 113 F.3d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 1997); West, 45 F.3d at 755-56;
Berry, 715 F.2d at 981. The Fourth Circuit, likewise, has “never
delineated what constitutes a ‘continuing violation,”” but it cites with
approval to the Fifth and Seventh Circuits’ analyses. Emmert v. Runyon,
No. 98-2027, 1999 WL 253632 at *4 (4th Cir. Apr. 29, 1999). Moreover,
the district court for the District of Maryland relies on Berry describing it
as “[a] useful analysis of the (continuing violation] theory borrowed from
the Fifth Circuit but consistent with Fourth Circuit precedent.” Seward v.
Harford County, 2001 WL 283090, at *4 (D. Md. March 13, 2001).
22
discrimination four years prior to filing his charge, he also
complained about racial discrimination to Amtrak's
management, Amtrak’s internal EEO office and members of
Congress.
The Ninth Circuit openly acknowledged the conflict it
created between the circuits by adopting its “sufficiently
related” standard and explicitly rejecting Galloway and Berry.
App., infra, 15a. This conflict has also been recognized by
the First Circuit in O’ Rourke when it reaffirmed its adherence
to its own analysis consistent with Berry and recognized that
“only the Ninth Circuit has taken a different position .. .”
235 F.3d at 731 n.6; see also Salgado v. City of New York,
2001 WL 290051, at *6 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. March 26, 2001)
(acknowledging conflict). The “inconsistency and confusion”
surrounding the continuing violation doctrine will increase
exponentially as a result of the Ninth Circuit’s decision
below. It is time for this Court to intervene and resolve the
conflict.
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision Conflicts With
This Court’s Rulings on The Continuing
Violation Doctrine
The Ninth Circuit’s decision also is inconsistent with this
Court’s precedent regarding the continuing violation doctrine.
This Court adheres to the proposition that statutes of
limitation are to be strictly enforced. Statutes of limitation
have been characterized as a “meritorious defense, in itself
serving a public interest.” Guaranty Trust Co. v. United
States, 304 U.S. 126, 136 (1938). This Court noted that
“[s]tatutes of limitations, which ‘are found and approved in
all systems of enlightened jurisprudence,’ represent 4
pervasive legislative judgment that it is unjust to fail to put
the adversary on notice” of the right to defend himself.
United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (citing
Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S 135, 139 (1879)). Statutes of
limitations are “statutes of repose” which balance plaintiffs’
23
needs for ample time to pursue claims with defendants’ and
courts’ rights to be free of stale claims. /d. at 117; Order of
Railway Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S.
342, 348-49 (1944); Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S.
424, 428 (1965). This Court described the purposes behind
statutes of limitations as “promot[{ing] justice by preventing
surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed
to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded
and witnesses have disappeared . . . even if one has a just
claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend
within the period of limitation and that the right to be free of
stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to
ry them.” Order of Railway Telegraphers, 321 U.S. at
. This Court repeatedly has recognized that Title VII's
limitations period facilitates the delicate balance between the
interests of the employee in protecting his civil rights, the
societal interest in promoting prompt filing of discrimination
claims thereby enhancing the likelihood of accurate
determinations, and the employer’s interest in being protected
from untimely claims. Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker
462 U.S. 345, 352 (1983) (noting that limitations periods are
peepee seep Gem on notice of adverse claims and
prevent iffs sleeping on their rights”); Ricks,
449 U.S. at 259-60 (noting that “it should fom ee
that time-limitations provisions themselves promote
important interests; ‘the period allowed for instituting suit
inevitably reflects a value judgment concerning the point at
which the interests in favor of protecting valid claims are
outweighed by the interests in prohibiting the prosecution of
stale ones.”””) (citation omitted); Evans, 454 U.S. at 559
(noting that employer is “entitled to treat that past
[discriminatory] act as lawful after [the employee] failed to
file a charge of discrimination” within the limitations
period.); Robbins & Myers, 429 U.S. at 240 (noting that
“[ajdherence to the limitations period assures prompt
24
notification to the employer of a charge of an alleged
violation of Title VI... .”). Thus, this Court expressly has
rejected equitable tolling rules that would extend the
limitations period for plaintiffs who knowingly fail to assert
their rights pursuant to Section 706(e).' Ricks, 449 USS. at
257-8: Chardon, 454 U.S. at 8; Evans, 431 U.S. at 558;
Robbins & Myers, 429 U.S. at 239-40.
For example, in Robbins & Myers, this Court rejected an
employee's argument that the Title VII limitations period was
tolled during the pendency of a grievance procedure chal-
lenging her allegedly discriminatory and unfair termination.
Robbins & Myers, 429 U.S. 229. The employee filed a
grievance pursuant to the applicable collective bargaining
agreement two days after her termination challenging it as
“unfair.” However, she waited until after the grievance
procedure was complete and after the Title VII limitations
period had run to file her charge with the EEOC. /d. at 231-
32. In arguing that Title VII's statutory limitations period
should be tolled during the pendency of grievance/arbitration
proceedings, the employee noted that any delay would be
minimal and that failure to permit such tolling might force an
* Likewise, this Court has rejected an equitable tolling rule when a
plaintiff tried to rely on Title VII to extend the limitations period for his
Section 1981 claim. In Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421
U.S. 454 (1975), the plaintiff filed a timely charge with the EEOC
Section 1981. He argued that the one-year limitations
peony} to his Section 1981 claim was tolled during the
pendency of the processing of his Title VII claim by the EEOC. This
period on his Section 1981 claim had expired. This Court held, “plaintiff
has slept on his § 1981 rights. Tho hen Gus bie denhe may toe
induced by faith in the adequacy of his Title VII remedy is of
25
employee into court prematurely. This Court, citing its
decisions in Alexander, 415 U.S. 36 and Johnson, 421 U.S.
454, reaffirmed the independence of remedies under a
collective bargaining agreement and Title VII and held that:
Congress has already spoken with respect to what it
considers acceptable delay when it established a 90-day
limitations period, and gave no indication that it
considered a ‘slight’ delay followed by 90 days equally
acceptable. In defining Title VII's jurisdicti
prerequisites ‘with precision,’ Congress did not leave to
courts the decision as to which delays might or might not
be ‘slight.’ Jd. at 240 (citation omitted).
This Court has also rejected attempts by plaintiffs who
knowingly permitted the limitations period to expire to use
the continuing violation doctrine to salvage stale claims. As
discussed above, the Court rejected the plaintiff's attempt to
use the continuing violation doctrine to extend Title VII's
limitations period in Ricks. Ricks, 449 U.S. 252. There the
plaintiff argued that the continuing violation doctrine should
apply to save his discriminatory denial of tenure claim in part
because a number of “unusual incidents”—including an
alleged assault by the department chairman—occurred
between the denial of tenure and his termination over a year
later. Jd. at 257 n. 8. This Court noted, “[tJhe limitations
periods, while guaranteeing the protection of the civil rights
laws to those who promptly assert their rights, also protect
employers from the burden of defending claims arising from
employment decisions tiiat are long past.” /d. at 256-57
(citation omitted). Accordingly, this Court rejected plaintiff's
reliance on the continuing violation doctrine and held that his
claim was time-barred. See also Evans, 431 U.S. 553
(rejecting plaintiff's reliance on continuing violation doctrine
to save discriminatory seniority claim where the allegedly
plaintiff's claim was based on the current effects of the past
policy).
26
Under the Ninth Circuit’s “sufficiently related” test, the
plaintiff in Ricks would have been able to recover without
regard for the limitations period because some act had
occurred within the 300 days prior to his filing of the
administrative charge. Indeed, in almost every conceivable
case, the Ninth Circuit would allow a plaintiff to salvage
time-barred claims by relying on the continuing violation
doctrine to link untimely claims with timely claims. The
Ninth Circuit has rendered Section 706(e)’s limitations period
a nullity. The Ninth Circuit’s disregard for this limitations
period serves none of the meritorious purposes underlying
statutes of limitations. It undermines the language of Title
VIL, the purposes behind Section 706(e)’s limitations period
and the delicate balance that is served by statutes of
limitations. For all these reasons, the Ninth Circuit’s decision
is wrong and conflicts with the decisions of this Court and
decisions of the other circuit courts of appeals.
CONCLUSION
The petition for writ of certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
KATHLEEN J. FORD *
MELISSA B. RUGERS
NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER
CORPORATION
60 Massachusetts Ave., N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20002
* Counsel of Record (202) 906-3296
April 2001 Counsel for Petitioner
APPENDICES
la
APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-15374
| D.C. No.
<4. 3 CV-96-03585-SYI
OPINION
ABNER J. MORGAN, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER
CORPORATION, dba AMTRAK,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States Mistrict Court
for the Northern District of ‘alifornia
Susan Yvonne Illston, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted
June 14, 2000—San Francisco, California
Filed November 8, 2000
) 3 Before: Donald P. Lay,’ Dorothy W. Nelson and Sidney R.
\ : Thomas, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge Lay
: ' The Honorable Donald P. Lay, Senior United States Circuit Judge for
} the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
2a
SUMMARY
Labor and Employment/Employment Discrimination
The court of appeals reversed a judgment of the district
court and remanded for a new trial. The court held that when
an employer's pre-limitations period discriminatory conduct
is part of a series or pattern of discrimination, retaliation, and
hostile environment, the continuing violation doctrine applies
and the pre-iimitations period conduct should be presented to
the jury for purposes of liability.
Appellant Abner Morgan, an African-American male,
» for a job with appellee Amtrak in 1990. From the date
of his hire to his termination five years later, Morgan was
subject to numerous disciplinary actions, including written
and verbal counselings and suspensions from work without
pay, allegedly for rules violations and absenteeism. On
several occasions, Morgan requested and was denied career
opportunities with Amtrak.
Morgan made numerous complaints to Amtrak's Equal
Employment Office and external authorities alleging
discriminatory conduct throughout his tenure with Amtrak.
Often, Morgan never received an official response to his
complaints and an allegedly unrelated discipline was leveled
against him within a short period.
In February 1995, after his suspension but prior to his
termination, Morgan filed a charge of discrimination against
Amtrak with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC). EEOC issued a right to sue letter and
Morgan filed suit against Amtrak in federal court “ileging
violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act \ cluding
discrimination, retaliation and a hostile work environment.
Amtrak moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was
3a
entitled to judgment on all incidents that occurred more than
300 days before the filing of Morgan’s EEOC charge
The district court granted summary judgment in part to
Amtrak, holding that Amtrak could not be liable for conduct
that occurred prior to May 3, 1994, because such conduct was
outside the 300-day limitations period.
A trial proceeded on the remaining allegations. Morgan
presented the testimony of several witnesses, fellow Amtrak
employees, who testified about the racially-laden atmosphere
at the Amtrak yard where Morgan worked. Evidence was
presented that Amtrak supervisors used racial epithets, made
racially derogatory comments and performed racially
derogatory acts.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Amtrak. Morgan
appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
Amtrak as to conduct that occurred prior to May 3, 1994.
Before a suit may be filed under Title VII, a plaintiff must
file a complaint with the EEOC within 180 or 300 days. Title
VII's limitation period limits liability to conduct occurring
within the applicable limitations period; the continuing
violations doctrine, however, allows courts to consider
conduct that would ordinarily be time barred as long as the
untimely incidents represent an ongoing unlawful
employment practice.
A plaintiff can establish a continuing violation by showing
a series of related acts one or more of which are within the
limitations period—a serial violation; or by showing a
systematic policy or practice of discrimination that operated,
in part, within the limitations period—a systemic violation.
To survive summary judgment after failing to satisfy the
limitations period requirement, Morgan had to raise a genuine
issue of disputed fact as to |) the existence of a continuing
4a
violation, and 2) that the violation continued into the
limitations period.
The pre-limitations conduct was sufficiently related to the
post-limitations conduct to invoke the continuing violation
doctrine. The district court erred in granting a partial
summary judgment holding that Amtrak could not be liable
for conduct occurring prior to May 3, 1994.
To prove racial discrimination, Morgan had to show that he
belonged to a class protected by Title VII, was qualified for
the position in question, and suffered an adverse employment
action. The incidents of questionable disciplines and
counselings, and denied career opportunities, taken together
with the abundant evidence of the racially discriminatory
atmosphere at the yard were sufficiently related to the alleged
incidents of discrimination that occurred within the
limitations period. These incidents revealed a consistent pat-
tern of similar employment actions over the entire five-year
employment period, perpetuated by the same core group of
managers.
The pre-and post-limitations period incidents involved the
same type of employment actions, occurred relatively
frequently, and were perpetrated by the same managers. In
light of this, there was sufficient evidence to employ the
continuing violation doctrine and allow the jury to consider
the whole of Morgan’s tenure for purposes of liability on his
hostile environment claim.
To establish a prima facie case for retaliation, a plaintiff
must show: he has engaged in a protected activity; he has
suffered an adverse employment decision; and there was a
causal link between the protected activity and the adverse
employment decision.
The pre-limitations conduct was sufficiently related to the
conduct within the limitations period so that the continuing
Sa
violation doctrine worked to allow a jury to find liability on
Morgan’s retaliation claim.
Viewed in the context of the totality of Morgan’s
relationship with Amtrak, the pre-limitations events were part
of a series or pattern of discrimination, retaliation, and hostile
environment that started nearly contemporaneously with
Morgan’s employment and continued throughout his tenure.
In light of the relatedness of the incidents, Morgan
sufficiently presented a genuine issue of disputed fact as to
whether a continuing violation existed. Pre-limitations period
conduct should have been presented to the jury not merely as
back-ground information, but also for purposes of liability.
COUNSEL
Pamela Y. Price, Price and Associates, Oakland, California,
for the plaintiff-appellant.
Kay M. Long-Martin and Theodora R. Lee, Littler
Mendelson, Oakland, California, for the defendant-appellee.
OPINION
LAY, Circuit Judge:
Abner J. Morgan, Jr. (Morgan) filed suit against National
Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak), alleging violations
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended in
1991. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Title VID). Morgan
claims that, because of his race, he suffered discrimination
and retaliation, and endured a hostile work environment. The
district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of
Amtrak, holding that Amtrak could not be liable for conduct
occurring prior to May 3, 1994. A trial was held on the
remaining allegations, and the jury returned a verdict in favor
ee
6a
of Amtrak. Morgan now appeals both the ruling on summary
judgment and the judgment rendered on the jury verdict.
With regard to the grant of partial summary judgment,
Morgan argues the district court erred in limiting the liability
time frame. As to the judgment on the jury verdict, Morgan
asserts the district court erred in four ways: 1) instructing the
jury that evidence of pre-limitations period conduct was for
“background” or “context” only; 2) excluding certain
testimony by Morgan and co-workers regarding the racially
hostile environment;? 3) improperly instructing the jury on
the hostile environment claim; and 4) imposing improper time
limits on the presentation of Morgan's case. We find the
district court erred in entering judgment as a matter of law.
Thus, we reverse and remand for a new trial,
I. BACKGROUND
A) Factual Background
Morgan, an African-American male, alleges that from the
beginning of his employment with Amtrak, and throughout
his tenure, he was subjected to discriminatory and retaliatory
acts and endured a racially hostile work environment. He
alleges that the managers at the Oakland Maintenance Yard
(the Yard), specifically, Robert Vandenburg, Ray Borge,
Jerry Denton, Earl Geske, and Mike Bordenave, primarily
perpetrated the acts. As we must, we construe the facts in the
light most favorable to Morgan.
2 ‘The district court excluded portions of testimony by Morgan and
Mary Fontaine, and it excluded all of Joe George's testimony.
At trial, Morgan’s first witness was to be Joe George; however, as
noted supra, the district court excluded his testimony in its entirety.
Morgan's attorney requested a continuance to prepare Morgan, who was
to be the next witness. The court indicated that if a continuance was
granted, time would be deducted from the overall time allotted for the
case. Morgan took the stand immediately.
Ta
1) Incidents Prior To the Limitations Period
Morgan applied for a job with Amtrak in 1990. Although
trained and experienced in electrical work, Morgan began
working in August 1990 as an “Electrician Helper.” Morgan
asserts he believed he was being hired as an electrician, from
the beginning he performed the work of an electrician, and
that less qualified Caucasians were hired as electricians.
Morgan is the only person ever hired as a “helper” at the
Yard. Eventually, Morgan's position was reclassified and his
pay brought in line with that of electricians in April 1992.
In February 1991, Vandenburg and Denton instructed
Morgan to attend a meeting in Vandenburg’s office. Fearing
the meeting might lead to disciplinary action because he had
recently called in sick, Morgan refused to attend without
union representation.* Vandenburg and Denton then charged
Morgan with a Rule L violation for refusing to follow orders
and attend the meeting.’ Following a hearing, Morgan was
terminated jor this violation. Morgan filed a grievance and, in
response, Amtrak reinstated him, reducing the termination to
a suspension and paying him for all but ten days. Amtrak's
Inspector General testified at trial that this ten-day suspension
was the most severe discipline imposed on an employee from
1989-1992.
In August of 1991, Morgan made a written request to
Amtrak's Los Angeles personnel office asking to participate
in Amtrak's apprenticeship program. Within days of filing
* Under the collective bargaining agreement in place at the time,
Amtrak employees had a nght to union representation at mectungs which
mught lead to discaplinary action.
* Rule L prohibits insubordination ination and provides m relevant part,
“le)mployees must obey instructions, directions and orders trom Auirak
supervisor personne! and officers, except when confronted by a clear and
immediate danger to themselves, property or the publi. lnsubordunaie
conduct will not be tolerated.”
8a
stood “a
snowball’s chance in hell of becoming an electrician at his
yard. He never received a written response from Amtrak's
Los Angeles office.*
In early October 1991, Morgan sent a letter complaining of
onan Gentatestion tb k’s Equal E oy Off;
EEO) and copied it to his congressperson. Morgan never
ccoived 0 formal sexpense to die complaint from Asntak.
On October 16, 1991, Denton gave Morgan a written
counseling for violating Rule L because he ignored a direct
order to desist while helping an escorting officer pack a co-
worker’s belongings. Morgan immediately protested this
counseling, alleging that it was racially motivated.
In the fall of 1991, Morgan and other employees met with
their congresswoman to complain about conditions at the
Yard. Shortly after this meeting, on December 13, 1991,
Vandenburg placed a letter of counseling in Morgan's file,
accusing him of being argumentative and threatening. Early
in 1992, the congresswoman contacted Amtrak regarding the
employee complaints. In response, Amtrak’s Inspector
General conducted an investigation of the Yard. Amtrak
insists that a list of primary concerns was then drafted and
improvements made. At trial, however, Amtrak s EEO
representative responsible for the Yard during the relevant
time period denied knowledge of the investigation.
On September 17, 1992, Vandenburg and Borge counseled
Morgan for alleged absenteeism. Morgan contends that the
charged absenteeism included several months of previously
approved leave, which had been granted so that he could care
for his son.
“
* Amtrak insists that Morgan was scheduled to go through the program
the following year but the program was discontinued prior to his
aver
9a
On September 19, 1992, Mike Fabian, an Amtrak foreman,
ordered Morgan to clean up tar on one of the tracks. This
work was outside of Morgan’s job description. Then, on
November 29, 1992, Morgan was again assigned a task out-
side his craft, specifically, Geske assigned him the task of
picking up tie wraps.’ Morgan asserts that he picked up as
many tie wraps as possible during his shift, but he could not
possibly pick up all of them. Regardless, on December 1,
1992, Geske gave Morgan a written counseling for a Rule L
violation for failing to pick up all of the tie wraps.
In April 1993, Morgan received another written counseling
from Denton for absenteeism. This counseling targeted
Morgan's tardiness and attendance on three days—including
one excused absence. This counseling occurred despite a
recommendation from Amtrak’s Inspector General that
management should not be strict with regard to minor
absenteeism.
In May 1993, Morgan requested, first verbally and then in
writing, a one-day leave of absence, in addition to the eight
days of vacation for which he was scheduled. Vandenburg
denied the requests. Morgan did not appear at work on the
day in question. As a result, Morgan was charged with a Rule
L violation and suspended for fifteen days. Morgan filed a
letter of complaint with Amtrak's EEO office and his union.
Eventually, Morgan received back pay and the suspension
was ordered expunged from his file.
On May 25, 1993, Morgan asked Vandenburg, in writing,
why his name was removed from the list of employees
scheduled to be trained on heating, air, and ventilation
systems. On that same day Morgan filed a written complaint
with Amtrak’s EEO office alleging ongoing racial
discrimination and retaliation. Then on May 30, 1993,
" Amtrak asserts everyone was assisting in a general cleanup in
preparation for an audit; however, no other employee testified to having to
perform these specific tasks on the same occasion.
10a
Morgan filed another written complaint with Amtrak’ s EEO
office.
In September 1993, Vandenburg received a letter
requesting an investigation of an alleged conversation during
which Morgan made improper comments to a union
representative. A prelimi investigation confirmed that a
conversation had occurred.” Morgan, however, would not
discuss the incident with Vandenburg and instead asked for a
formal investigation. In October 1993, Morgan was charged
with violating Rules F-1 and F-3.? After an investigatory
hearing, the charges against Morgan were dropped and the
incident ordered expunged from his record.
During a training session in October 1993, Vandenburg
physically touched Morgan. The contact consisted of
Vandenburg approaching from behind, placing his hands on
Morgan’s shoulders, pushing down, and whispering in his
ear. Interpreting the contact as an assault, Morga: reported
the incident to the Southern Pacific police, the Oakland
police, and filed a written complaint with Amtrak’s EEO
office. Morgan asserts that Amtrak did not investigate or
respond to the situation.
* The conversation between Morgan and the union representative w.\s
overheard by another employee. Apparently, this employee's recollection
initially supported the union representative's position but later changed to
corroborate Morgan's version. At trial the employee testified that a
number of supervisors pressured him to change his statement to support
the union representative. Specifically, he testified that Vandenburg stated,
“Abner was a problem employee, and that they were going to fire him
anyways [sic}.”
* Rule F governs employee conduct. Rule F-1 states: “All employees
are required to conduct themselves in a courteous and professional manner
in dealing with the public and other Amtrak employees. Boisterous
conduct or horseplay and profane or vulgar language are prohibited.
Rule F-3 states: “Conduct involving dishonesty, immorality, or indecency
is prohibited. Employees must conduct themselves on and off the job so
as not to subject Amtrak to criticism and loss of goodwill.” :
lla
In December 1993, Morgan’s scheduled training was
cancelled. In January 1994, Morgan wrote a letter to
Amtrak’s EEO complaining of such cancellation. Morgan
asserts that Amtrak never formally responded.
In January 1994, Morgan called in sick to work for one
day. When he returned, Borge and other supervisors required
him to produce a doctor’s note before he could return to
work. Despite the fact a note was not required under
Amtrak’s sick leave policy, when he could not produce a note
Morgan lost three days of pay. After filing a grievance,
Amtrak paid Morgan for the lost days, excluding the one sick
day.
2) Incidents Within the Limitations Period
On September 2, 1994, Morgan was assigned to work on
multiple trains. At the end of his shift Morgan had completed
work on only one of the trains. Morgan’s immediate
supervisor spoke with him about not finishing the work and
he was subsequently charged with a Rule L violation for
failing to complete work assigned to him. Morgan argues
that turning over unfinished work to the next shift was not
uncommon. There was an investigatory hearing and Morgan
was suspended for fifteen days.'°
In October 1994, Morgan was again denied training and
complained to Amtrak’s EEO office regarding the
cancellation of such training. He received no response.
In December 1994, Morgan was accused of threatening
Bordenave during a meeting. Despite investigation, the
allegation was unsubstantiated and no action was taken
against Morgan.
On February 4, 1995, Bordenave reported to Denton that
Morgan had threatened him. Morgan paints a different
picture. He asserts that Bordenave falsely claimed he had
© This suspension was affirmed on appeal to the National Railroad
Adjustment Board.
12a
been threatened and that when ordered into Denton’s office,
he asked for union representation or the presence of a co-
worker as a witness. Denton denied both, ordered everyone
out of the office, and yelled at Morgan to get his “black ass”
into the office. Morgan refused and went home. As a result
of the incidents. Morgan was suspended and charged with
violations of Rules L and F. An investigatory hearing was
held and on March 3, 1995, Morgan was terminated.
3) Overall Environment
Morgan presented evidence from a number of fellow
Amtrak employees regarding the racially-laden atmosphere at
the Yard. Specifically: 1) Art Conley, a former manager,
testifted that Borge made racial jokes, used the “n” word, per-
formed racially derogatory acts in front of Vandenburg, and
that Vandenburg made negative comments regarding African-
Americans’ cenacity to be supervisors; 2) two African-
American Amtrak supervisors testified to Borge’s racially
offensive conduct; 3) two African-American co-workers
testified Denton made racially derogatory comments; 4) a
number of other witnesses testi‘ied to hearing Denton and
Bordenave use racial epithets; 5) Joe George, a former
employee, was to testify Vandenburg made racially
derogatory comments and referred to him as “boy”, and that
Geske made racially derogatory statements, including that he
would kill his daughter before he would allow her to date a
black man; '' and 6) Mary Fontaine, a former employee,
testified to the demeaning manner in which Denton treated
African-Americans and to racial slurs she heard.'?
'"' As noted supra, the district court entirely excluded George's
testimony because Morgan had not properly submitted an offer of proof in
the pre-trial report and because such testimony was cumulative and more
prejudicial than probative.
'2 At trial, the district court excluded two other pieces of Fontaine's
testimony. First, the district court excluded testimony of her knowledge of
13a
B) Procedural Background
On February 27, 1995, after his suspension but prior to his
termination, Morgan filed a charge of discrimination and
retaliation against Amtrak with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and cross-filed with the
California Department of Fair Employment and Housing. On
July 3, 1996, the EEOC issued a “Notice of Right to Sue” and
Morgan filed the instant lawsuit on October 2, 1996. Amtrak
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing in part that it
was entitled to judgment on all incidents that occurred more
than 300 days before the filing of Morgan’s EEOC charge."
On September 11, 1998, the district court granted in part
Amtrak’s Motion for Summary Judgment, holding that
Amtrak could not be liable for conduct that occurred prior to
May 3, 1994, because such conduct was outside the
applicable 300-day limitations period. The district court went
on to find that Morgan had raised a genuine issue of material
fact sufficient to proceed to trial on a number of his timely ~
filed claims. A trial proceeded on the remaining allegations,‘
and the jury returned a verdict in Amtrak’s favor on
November 19, 1998. This appeal ensued.
Denton’s comment regarding working “niggers to death” because such
testimony was hearsay and was more prejudicial than probative. Second,
the district court excluded her testimony regarding disparate discipline
based on race because it was beyond the scope of the case.
'- Title VII actions cannot proceed in federal court unless a charge of
discrimination is first filed with the EEOC. Generally, a complaint must
be filed within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice. If a
plaintiff initially institutes proceedings with an appropriate state agency,
however, the deadline is extended to 300 days. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(e)(1). The parties in this case agree that the applicable limitations period
is 300 days.
'* Specifically, the district court found Morgan had raised a genuine
issue of material fact regarding his September 1994 suspension, the Octo-
ber 1994 cancellation of training, his February 1995 suspension, and his
wee
l4a
ll. DISCUSSION
This court reviews a district court’s grant or denial of a
motion for summary judgment de novo. See Robi v. Reed, 173
F.3d 736, 739 (9th Cir. 1999). The question of whether the
pre-1994 claims are time barred is a question of law reviewed
de novo. See Bouman v. Block, 940 F.2d 1211, 1218-19 (9th
Cir. 1991). In reviewing an order denying or granting
summary judgment, we must determine whether, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the
district court correctly applied the substantive law. See Robi,
173 F.3d at 739.
Morgan argues that the conduct delineated above,
including those incidents dating back to the beginning of his
employment, constitutes a violation of his Title VIl rights.
The district court granted partial summary judgment, holding
that all claims arising from occurrences prior to May 1994
were time barred.
A. Continuing Violation Theory
As noted supra, before a suit may be filed under Title VII,
a plaintiff must file a complaint with the EEOC within 180 or
300 days. See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-S(e)(1). Title VII's limitation
period limiis liability to conduct occurring within the
applicable limitations period; the continuing violations
doctrine. however, allows courts to consider conduct that
would ordinarily be time barred “as long as the untimely inci-
dents represent an ongoing unlawful employment practice.”
Anderson vy. Reno, 190 F.3d 930, 936 (9th Cir. 1999); see e.g.,
Draper V. Coeur Rochester, Inc., 147 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th
Cir. 1998). In limiting the time frame to events taking place
after May 3, the district court relied on Galloway v. General
Motors Serv. Parts Operations, 78 F.3d 1164 (7th Cir. 1996).
In Galloway, the Seventh Circuit held the continuing
violations doctrine does not apply “unless it would have been
unreasonable to expect the plaintiff to sue before the statute
15a
ran on that conduct.” /d. at 1167. Relying on Galloway, the
district cour: concluded that “[bJecause Morgan believed that
he was being discriminated against at the time that all of these
acts occurred, it would not be unreasonable to expect that
Morgan should have filed an EEOC charge on these acts.
before the limitations period on these claims ran.”
The district court’s reliance on Galloway was mistaken.
This court has never adopted a strict notice requirement as the
litmus test for application of the continuing violation
doctrine; in fact, in Fiedler v. UAL Corp., 218 F.3d 973 (9th
Cir. 2000), we explicitly rejected such an approach from the
Fifth Circuit. See id. at 987 n.10. Fiedler examined Berry v.
Board of Sup'rs of L.S.U., 715 F.2d 971 (Sth Cir. 1983), a
case which involved equal pay based upon gender
discrimination, where the F.fth Circuit created a multi-factor
test for determining whether discrete acts of harassment are
closely related enough to satisfy the continuing violation
theory. The Berry court's final factor, “perhaps of most
importance,” asked whether the harassing act “sould trigger
an employee’s awareness of and duty to assert his or her
rights.” Berry, 715 F.2d at 981. We rejected the Berry
analysis, holding that test was not “applicable in determining
the continuation of a hostile environment.” Fiedler, 218 F.3d
at 987 n.10.
Indeed, this court’s decision in Fiedler, as well as
Anderson and Draper, precludes such a notice limitation on
the continuing violation doctrine. In Fiedler, for example,
plaintiff filed suit in mid-1995, after being subject to a pattern
of harassing behavior stretching back to 1991. See Fiedler,
218 F.3d at 977, 983. Even though the harassing behavior
was such that a reasonable person would have been on notice
that her rights were violated,'” we held that the continuing
'S For example, plaintiff in Fiedler told her harasser in 1991 to “stop
touching her and that if he continued, she would obtain legal counsel and
16a
violation doctrine applied. See id. at 988. Likewise, in
Draper, plaintiff began employment in November of 1992,
and began suffering harassment shortly thereafter. See
Draper, 147 F.3d at 1105. Even though she brought her
harassment claim in mid-1995, we held:
[bJecause [plaintiff's] hostile work environment claim is
not based upon a series of discrete and unrelated
discriminatory actions, but is instead premised upon a
series of closely related similar occurrences that took
place within the same general time period and stemmed
from the same source, her allegations set forth a claim of
a continuing violation.
Id. at 1108. Finally, Anderson involved a similar situation. In
Anderson, we applied the continuing violation doctrine where
plaintiff filed suit in 1994 after experiencing harassment
stretching back to 1986. See Anderson, 190 F.3d at 936-37.
Based on this circuit’s decisions in Fiedler, Anderson, and
Draper, this court rejects the rigid test of both Galloway and
Berry.
According to Fielder, a plaintiff can establish a continuing
violation in one of two ways. First, by showing a series of
related acts one or more of which are within the limitations
period—a serial violation. A serial violation is established if
the evidence indicates that the alleged acts of discrimination
occurring prior to the limitations period are sufficiently
related to those occurring within the limitations period. See
id. See also Green, 883 F.2d at 1480-81. Precedent makes
clear that the alleged incidents of discrimination cannot be
isolated, sporadic, or discrete, see Draper, 147 F.3d at 1107-
10. In Sosa v. Hiraoka, 920 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1990),
this court found a sufficient relationship where the acts were
“plausibly related as acts of discrimination against Sosa
pursue a claim against him.” See Fiedler, 218 F.3d at 977. Further, she
obtained counsel in 1993 to deal with the hostile work environment.
+ nee ee etree Se
17a
because of his identification as a Mexican-American.”
(emphasis added).
The second way to establish a continuing violation is to
show a systematic policy or practice of discrimination that
operated, in part, within the limitations period—a systemic
violation. See id. Systemic violations involve “demonstrating
a company wide policy or practice” and most often occur in
matters of placement or promotion. Green, 883 F.2d at 1480.
B. Application of Continuing Violation to Morgan's Title
Vil Claims
To survive summary judgment after failing to satisfy the
limitations period requirement, Morgan must raise a genuine
issue of disputed fact as to 1) the existence of a continuing
violation—be it serial or systemic, and 2) that the violation
contifued into the limitations period. See Fielder, 218 F.3d at
983. In applying the first prong, the Fielder court noted, “[s]o
long as the conduct has the capacity of being considered [a
violation], it becomes an issue for the fact finder.” /d. at 986.
With regard to the second prong, this court looks to see
whether the acts during the period “involve the same type of
discrimination as those committed before the period. We
must inquire whether there is a common type of discrim-
ination, such as [racial] harassment, or if there is a common
kind of employment action, such as repeated denial of a
miomotion.” /d.
Morgan alleges three distinct Title VII claims, each which
have different legal elements; consequently, “[wJe consider
the allegations with respect to each theory separately, in
determining whether any of the events underlying these
claims occurred within the relevant period of limitations.”
Draper, 147 F.3d at 1108. Thus, we analyze Morgan's claims
of discrimination, hostile environment, and_ retaliation
Sa
discretely.'” In light of the totality of the circumstances, we
are satisfied that the pre-limitations conduct at issue in this
case is sufficiently related to the post-limitations conduct to
invoke the continuing violation doctrine. We hold that the
district court erred in granting a partial summary judgment
holding that Amtrak could not be liable for conduct occurring
prior to May 3, 1994.
i) Discrimination
To prove racial discrimination, Morgan must show that he
1) belonged to a class protected by-Title VII, 2) was qualified
for the position in question, and 3) suffered an adverse
employment action. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). The alleged pre-limitations
discriminatory conduct which Morgan points to includes: 1)
numerous questionable disciplines and counselings (the
February 1991 Rule L violation and termination which was
eventually reduced to a suspension, the September 1992
counseling for absenteeism, the December 1992 counseling
for his failure to pick up tie wraps, the April 1993 counseling
for absenteeism, the July 1993 suspension which was later
ordered expunged, the October 1993 rule violation, of which
Morgan was eventually found not guilty, and the January
1994 improper withholding of pay for failure to produce a
doctor’s note), and 2) numerous instances in which Amtrak
denied him career opportunities (his 1990 hiring as an
electrician helper, the 1991 application to Amtrak's
apprenticeship program, the May 1993 removal of Morgan's
name from training, and the December 1993 cancellation of
training). We find that these incidents, taken together with the
abundant evidence from other employees and management
regarding the racially discriminatory atmosphere at the Yard
We note. however, that the evidence of each alleged violation
significantly overlaps, and segregating them is both a difficult and
artificial task.
19a
are “sufficiently related” to the alleged incidents of
discrimination that occurred within the limitations period.
These incidents reveal a consistent pattern of similar
employment actions (¢.g., discipline and denial of
professional training) over the entire five-year period of
employment, perpetrated by the same core group of
managers. Such incidents are not discrete or isolated. We are
satisfied that the pre-limitations period is closely enough
related to the acts occurring during the limitations period to
trigger the operation of a continuing violation theory on
Morgan's claim of racial discrimination.
ii) Hostile Environment
“A ‘hostile work environment’ occurs when there is a pat-
tern of ongoing and persistent harassment severe enough to
alter the conditions of employment.” Draper, 147 F.3d at
1108 (citing Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66-67
(1986)). As this court noted in Fielder, “[m]ost instances of
hostile environments are not capable of facile identification.
‘{IJnstead, the day-to-day harassment [is] particularly
significant, both as a legal and a practical matter, in its
cumulative effect.’” Fielder, 218 F.3d at 985 (quoting
Draper, 147 F.3d at 1108).
Evidence of the Yard's pre-limitations period hostile
environment includes the decision to hire Morgan at a lower
grade than others, Morgan's multiple disciplines and denial of
training, the use of racially derogatory language, and the
over-all racially-laden environment. We note that the jury,
when commenting on the verdict, stated that it had found
“evidence of a hostile work environment at the Oakland Yard
during May 1994 and February, 1995” but found there was
insufficient evidence to establish it was severe and pervasive.
This court finds the pre-and post-limitations period incidents
involve the same type of employment actions, occurred
relatively frequently, and were perpetrated by t.. same
- —a~ —— on. «
20a
managers. In light of this, we find sufficient evidence to
employ the continuing violation doctrine and allow the jury to
consider the whole of Morgan's tenure for purposes of
liability on his hostile environment claim.
iit) Retaliation
To establish a prima facie case for retaliation, plaintiff
must show: 1) he has engaged in a protected activity; 2) he
has suffered an adverse employment decision; and 3) there
was a causal link between the protected activity and the
adverse employment decision. See Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809
F.2d 1371. 1375 (9th Cir. 1987). Morgan presented evidence
of his numerous complaints to Amtrak's EEO office, as well
as the complaints he made to external authorities, regarding
the racially hostile environment in the Yard. Further, the
evidence reveals that while Morgan often did not receive an
official response, an allegedly unrelated discipline was
inevitably leveled against him within a short period.
Specifically, on October 4, 1991, Morgan filed a complaint
with Amtrak’s EEO office and on October 16, he received a
written counseling for a Rule L violation; in the fall of 1991,
Morgan and others met with their congresswoman and
discussed concerns about discrimination and in December
1991. a letter of counseling was placed in Morgan’s file; in
May 1993, he filed a race discrimination complaint with
Amtrak’s EEO office and within days Morgan asserts that his
shift was changed.
As was noted above, the same players were involved in
each of these incidents, and the incidents demonstrate a
regular pattern of potentially retaliatory conduct throughout
Morgan’s tenure. We find that the pre-limitations conduct is
sufficiently related to the conduct within the limitations
period and, thus, hold the continuing violation doctrine works
to allow a jury to find liability on Morgan's retaliation claim.
2la
il. CONCLUSION
When the pre-limitations events in this case are viewed in
the context of the totality of Morgan's relationship with
Amtrak, it is apparent that they are part of a series or pattern
of discrimination, retaliation, and hostile environment
that started nearly contemporaneously with Morgan's
employment and continued throughout his tenure. In light of
the relatedness of the incidents, we find that Morgan has
sufficiently presented a genuine issue of disputed fact as to
whether a continuing violation existed. Thus, we hold that
pre-limitations period conduct should have been presented to
the jury not merely as background information, but also for
purposes liability. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a
new trial.
In light of our ruling, we need not specifically rule on the
evidentiary issues raised by Morgan; however, because these
issues may arise again on retrial, we voice a general
comment. We note that one of the main issues in a hostile
environment or discrimination case is the pervasiveness of of
the conduct at issue. In this case, the district court excluded
significant pieces of information regarding such environment,
specifically, portions of Morgan and Fontaine's testimony
and the whole of George's testimony. This evidence went to
the overall environment of the Yard. This court has
previously recognized that an employer's conduct tending to
demonstrate its general hostility towards a group is both
relevant and admissible. See Heyne v. Caruso, 69 F.3d 1475,
1479 (9th Cir. 1995). See also Spulak v. K Mart Corp., 894
F.2d 1150, 1156 (10th Cir. 1990) (noting that “[a]s a general
rule, the testimony of other employees about their treatment
by the defendant [employer] is relevant to the issue of the
employer's discriminatory intent.”) We further note that, in
returning the verdict, the jury expressed concern about the
overall environment at the Yard. The jury commented:
22a
We find the management at the Oakland Yard during the
time of Mr. Morgan's employment to have engaged in
grossly unprofessional & questionable ethical conduct.
Most especially, the EEO office of Amtrak was
woefully remiss in following up & supervising its
recommendation for procedural changes at the Oakland
facility, and their general sincerity questionable.
The testimony of Morgan and his co-workers goes to the per-
vasiveness of the conduct at issue. On retrial, we encourage
the district court, when ruling on admissibility of evidence, to
consider all evidence in light of its relevance to whether the
defendant's conduct may be considered severe and pervasive.
We vacate the grant of partial summary judgment, as well
the judgment on the verdict, and we grant a new trial on the
overall issues of discrimination, hostile environment, and
retaliation.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
23a
APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[Filed Jan 22, 2001]
No.99- 15374
D.C. No. CV-96-03585-S YI
ARNER J. MORGAN, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Vv.
NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER
CORPORATION, dba AMTRAK,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER
Before: LAY' and D.W. NELSON, Senior Circuit Judges
and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
The panel has voted to deny the petition for rehearing.
Judge Thomas voted to reject the suggestion for rehearing en
banc and Judges Lay and Nelson so recommend.
The full court has been advised of the suggestion for
rehearing en banc, and no judge of the court has requested a
vote on the suggestion for rehearing en banc. Fed. R. App. P.
35(b).
' The Honorable Donald P. Lay, Senior United States Circuit Judge for
the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
24a
The petition for rehearing is denied and the suggestion for
rehearing en banc is rejected.
25a
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
{Filed Sep 11 1998}
No. C 96-3585 SI
ABNER J. MORGAN, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION,
d.b.a. AMTRAK and Does 1-10,
Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
On August 28, 1998, this Court heard argument on a
motion for summary judgment filed by defendant National
Railroad Passenger Corporation (“Amtrak”). Having
considered the arguments of counsel and the papers
submitted, the Court hereby GRANTS in part and DENIES in
part defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Abner J. Morgan, Jr. (“Morgan”) filed this Title
Vil race discrimination suit against defendant Amtrak
alleging that from 1990 to 1995 Morgan was consistently
harassed and disciplined more harshly than other employees
on account of his race. Morgan is African-American.
Presently before the Court is Amtrak’s motion for summary
judgment. Amtrak argues that it is entitled to summary
judgment because (1) some of the incidents of alleged
discrimination are time-barred in that they occurred more
26a
than 300 days before Morgan filed his charges of
discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”)'; (2) some of the incidents are not
exhausted in that they were not specifically mentioned in
Morgan's EEOC complaints; and (3) all of Morgan's
discrimination and retaliation claims fail either because
Morgan cannot state a prima facie case, or because Amtrak
had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for disciplining and
ultimately terminating Morgan. Morgan opposes Amtrak's
motion, arguing that all of his claims are properly before the
Court, and that he has raised triable issues of material fact
regarding these claims sufficient to defeat summary
judgment.
BACKGROUND
|. Factual Background’
A. Untimely Claims: 1990 to May 2, 1994
Morgan began working for Amtrak in August 1990 as an
electrician’s helper at the Oakland Maintenance Yard
(“Yard”). Morgan asserts that when he was hired he believed
he was being hired as an electrician, not as an electrician’s
helper, and that similarly qualified and less qualified
Caucasian electricians were hired as electricians at a higher
rate of pay. Morgan does not submit any evidence in support
of this assertion. Morgan asserts that it was only after several
months of working at the Yard that he realized he was not an
electrician and that despite performing the duties of an
electrician, for at least a year, Morgan's position was not
reclassified and his pay was not increased until April 1992
following a lengthy union grievance. Morgan also claims that
' Morgan's EEOC complaint was cross-filed with the Department of
Fair Employment and Housing, and accordingly the relevant statutory
period is 300 days.
’ The following statement of facts is derived from both parties’ papers.
- Bete ame Ue oo ales. -
27a
he was the only person ever hired by Amtrak as an
electrician’s helper at the Yard.
During the period of Morgan's employment with Amtrak,
Robert D. Vandenburg (“Vandenburg”) was the Facility
Manager at the Yard. Morgan claims that throughout his
employment with Amtrak he was subjected to a pattern and
practice of racially discriminatory acts, followed by
retaliatory acts after he complained about discrimination.
Morgan alleges that the discrimination and retaliation were
perpetrated primarily by the same managers, including
Vandenburg, Jerry Denton (“Denton”), Mike Bordenave
(“Bordenave”), Ray Borge (“Borge”), and Earl Geske
(“Geske”).
On February 25, 1991, Vandenburg and Denton charged
Morgan with a violation of Rule L’ for refusing to come to a
meeting without a union representative.’ Amtrak employees
have a right to union representation when they are required to
’ Rule L of Amtrak's Rules of Conduct provides:
Employees must obey instructions, directions, and orders from
Amtrak supervisory personnel and officers except when confronted
by a clear and immediate danger to themselves, property, or the
public. Insubordinate conduct will not be tolerated.
Declaration of Louis G. Bellotti, Exh. D at 6.
* According to Amtrak, when an Amtrak employee is accused of
violating a disciplinary rule, the employee is given a letter notifying him
of the charges against him and of the date set for an investigatory hearing.
An investigatory hearing is then conducted by an Amtrak Hearing Officer
for the purpose of determining whether the employee has violated the rule
as charged. The Hearing Officer takes testimony from witnesses and
receives exhibits. If the Hearing Officer decides that the employee did not
violate the rule, no further action is taken. If the Hearing Officer decides
that the rule was violated, however, the Hearing Officer's decision ts then
forwarded to the head of the department in which the employee works.
The department head determines what discipline should be imposed. See
Declaration of Carlos R. Henandez, ¢ 2; Declaration of Joseph W. Deely,
Exh. B; Declaration of Gerald T. Mescall, Exh. B.
28a
attend a meeting that might lead to disciplinary action;
Morgan believed that the February 25, 1991 meeting might
lead to disciplinary action because he had called in sick the
previous evening, and accordingly refused to attend the
meeting without representation. On March 22, 1991, Amtrak
terminated Morgan for the alleged Rule L violation. After
Morgan filed a grievance, Amtrak reinstated him and reduced
the termination to a 10 day suspension.
On August 13, 1991, Morgan filed a written request to
Amtrak's personnel office in Los Angeles for admission to
Amtrak’s apprenticeship program. Morgan alleges that
Amtrak did not formally respond to his request, but that
Vandenburg informed him that Ae ran the Yard, and that
Morgan stood a “snowball’s chance in hell of becoming an
electrician.” See Amended Declaration of Abner J. Morgan,
Jr., 4 10.
On October 4, 1991, Morgan filed a complaint for race
discrimination with Amtrak’s Equal Employment
Opportunity (“EEO”) office. Morgan states that he never
received a formal response to his complaint. Two weeks later
on October 16, 1991, Denton gave Morgan a “written
counseling” for allegedly violating Rule L by helping a co-
worker pack up his belongings after he was fired. Morgan
states that he protested in writing that the counseling was
racially motivated. On December 13, 1991, Vandenburg
placed a letter of counseling in Morgan’s work file, allegedly
without Morgan’s knowledge, accusing Morgan of being
argumentative and threatening.
On September 17, 1992, Vandenburg and Borge counseled
Morgan for alleged absenteeism. According to Morgan,
Vandenburg acknowledged that Morgan’s absenteeism was in
part due to Morgan's taking time off to care for his son, who
had recently attempted to commit suicide. See Morgan
Decl., ¥ 17.
29a
On December 1, 1992, Geske gave Morgan a written
counseling for allegedly violating Rule L for failing to pick
up “tie wraps” during his shift. Morgan states that although
picking up tie wraps was outside of his craft and not in his job
description, he nevertheless picked up as many tie wraps as
possible during his shift and stopped only when it became too
dark to see. Morgan states that when he asked Geske why he
was being charged with a Rule L violation, Geske replied that
he was only doing what “they” told him to do, and that
Vandenburg gave him the order.
On April 26, 1993, Denton issued Morgan a written
counseling for alleged absenteeism. On May 13, 1993,
Morgan requested a shift change in order to take care of his
son while his family went on a trip to Boston. Alternatively,
Morgan requested a one day leave of absence in addition to
eight days of vacation. Morgan asserts that he was entitled to
take leave based on his seniority, but that Vandenburg denied
both requests.
On May 21, 1993, Morgan questioned why his name was
taken off a list of employees scheduled for training on
heating, air and ventilation systems. According to Morgan,
Vandenburg told him that he did not have the mental capacity
for such training. Morgan has submitted deposition testimony
of Elwood Conley, a former Amtrak foreman who was
terminated in 1992, who testified that Vandenburg
commented to him that African-Americans were less
intelligent than Caucasians, and that Vandenburg “didn’t
want too many blacks because of . . . problems.” See
Declaration of Pamela Price, Exh. H at 14-23
On May 25, 1993, Morgan filed another written complaint
with Amtrak’s EEO office regarding alleged ongoing racial
discrimination he was experiencing at the Yard. According to
* According to Morgan, tie wraps are small pieces of wire like the ties
used on plastic bread loaf wrappers.
30a
Morgan, three days later his job was “abolished” and he was
reassigned to the graveyard shift. Morgan does not explain
exactly how his job was “abolished.” On May 30, Morgan
filed another written complaint with Amtrak’s EEO office.
On July 14, 1993, Morgan was charged with a violation of
Rule O° and suspended for 15 days for taking an extra
vacation day with his family in May. Following a lengthy
union grievance, Amtrak settled the dispute in November
1994, and Morgan received back pay. The suspension was
ordered expunged from his ‘ile, although Morgan alleges that
Vandenburg did not comply with the expungement order.
On October 13, 1993, Morgan was charged with Rule F-1’
and F-3* violations for allegedly making improper remarks to
a union representative, Henry Bios, in July 1993. An
investigatory hearing was held in December 1993 at which
Morgan was found not guilty of the charges, and according to
Morgan all mention of the matter was ordered expunged from
his file. Morgan-alleges that Vandenburg did not comply with
the expungement order.
The conversation between Morgan and Rios was overheard
by another Amtrak employee, Kenneth Phillips. Although the
record is somewhat unclear on this matter, it appears that
Phillips initially substantiated Rios’ version of events, and
then sometime later changed his account so that it
corroborated Morgan's. Morgan alleges that after Phillips
changed his account, Vandenburg and other managers
* The parties have not provided the Court with the text of Rule O.
’ Rule F-1 states: “All employees are required to conduct themselves in
a courteous and professional manner in dealing with the public and other
Amtrak employees. Boisterous conduct or horseplay and profane or
vulgar language are prohibited.”
*Rule F-3 states “Conduct involving dishonesty, immorality or
indecency is prohibited. Employees must conduct themselves on and off
the job so as not to subject Amtrak to criticism or loss of goodwill.”
3la
pressured Phillips to lie and say that Morgan acted
improperly. In support, Morgan has submitted the deposition
testimony of Ken Phillips, in which he states he was called to
Vandenburg’s office, and that Vandenburg, Denton, Geske,
and Louis Bellotti spoke to Phillips about the incident.
Phillips was asked if Morgan had threatened him, and if that
was the reason why Phillips had changed his account and was
now lying about the incident. Phillips testified that he
reassured them that he was not lying and that he in fact did
not know Morgan. Phillips then testified that Vandenburg
asked the other managers to leave, and that once Phillips and
Vandenburg were alone, Vandenburg stated that “Abner is
going to be fired anyways{sic],” and “I need you to change
your story so we can fire Abner.” According to Phillips,
Vandenburg offered to “protect” Phillips if he changed his
story, and that if Phillips changed his story “great things”
could happen for Phillips at Amtrak. See Price Decl., Exh. M
at 58:8-60:19.
Morgan alleges that on October 14, 1993 Vandenburg
assaulted him by placing both of his hands on Morgan's
shoulders and forcing his upper torso to his knees. Morgan
reported the incident to the police and filed a formal
complaint with Amtrak’s EEO office. Morgan contends that
Amtrak did not investigate his complaint.
In December 1993, Bellotti canceled a training scheduled
for Morgan. Morgan complained about the cancellation on
January 18, 1994, and alleges that he received no response
from Amtrak.
On January 14, 1994, Bellotti and Denton required Morgan
to bring a doctor’s note for one day’s absence due to illness
before Morgan could return to work. Morgan contends that
this requirement was not included in Amtrak’s sick leave
policy, and that as a result of Bellotti’s and Denton’s refusal
to allow him to return to work, Morgan lost three day's pay.
Morgan appealed the loss of his pay for the three days, and on
32a
June 14, 1994 Amtrak settled the matter by agreeing to pay
Morgan for the time he was not permitted to work See Price
Decl., Exh. D.
B. Timely Claims: May 3, 1994 to February 1995
(1) 15 Day Suspension in September 1994
On September 9, 1994, Morgan was charged with a
violation of Rule L for allegedly failing to complete his work
assignments on September 2. On September 2, Morgan
worked a midnight to 8:00 am shift under the supervision of
Luerean Butler Van de Streek. According to Amtrak, Van de
Streek assigned Morgan to work all of the cars on train
number 702 and the last two cars on train number 704 (cars
53503 and 54013). Morgan completed his work on train
number 702, and that train left on time at 6:30 am. At 6:45, in
the presence of Earl Geske, Van de Streek reminded Morgan
that he needed to work the last two cars on train number 704.
Geske was Van de Streek’s direct supervisor. Morgan did not
complete the work on these cars, and Van de Streek gave
Morgan an “oral counseling” on the matter. After the oral
counseling, Borge charged Morgan with a violation of Rule L
for failing to complete his work.
On October 3, 1994, Amtrak held an investigatory hearing
on the Rule L charge. The Hearing Officer, Carlos
Hernandez, concluded that Morgan was guilty of the charge.
Hernandez forwarded his decision to Gerald Thomas Mescall,
who was at that time the Mechanical Superintendent for
Amtrak’s Western Division. Mescall decided to suspend
Morgan for 15 days.
Morgan contends that while he was assigned to work on
car 53503 on train 704, the other car —number 54013—was
assigned to a Caucasian electrician, George Guse. Morgan
further contends that although Guse did not complete his
work on that car, Guse was never charged with a Rule L
violation, or disciplined in any way. See Morgan Decl., { 34;
33a
Declaration of Robert Ramirez, ¢ 10. Additionally, Morgan
contends that it was Amtrak’s policy not to levy charges of
rules violations if an oral or written counseling was given to
the employee on the matter, and thus after Van de Streek gave
Morgan an oral counseling about the allegedly unfinished
work the Rule L charge should have never been filed against
him.
(2) February 1995 Termination
In December 1994, electrician Robert Craven and foreman
Michael Bordenave accused Morgan of threatening
Bordenave during a safety meeting. The allegations were not
substantiated, and no disciplinary action was taken against
Morgan.
On February 4, 1995, Bordenave again accused Morgan of
threatening him. The parties present markedly different
versions of events. According to Arntrak, on that day Morgan
was working the midnight to 8:00 am shift, and his immediate
supervisor was Bordenave. At the beginning of the shift,
Bordenave gave Morgan his assignments for the evening.
Later in the shift, Bordenave asked Morgan about his
progress. Morgan ignored the question, announced that he
had to “go shit,” and walked away. As he walked away,
Morgan mumbled profanity. Bordenave confronted Morgan
about his inappropriate reaction to Bordenave’s question, at
which point Morgan stated, “If you keep fucking with me,
punk motherfucker, you are going to find out.” Bordenave
left the area and reported the incident to the General
Foreman, Denton. Shortly thereafter, Morgan confronted
Bordenave in the lunchroom, stating, “You fucked up. I will
be waiting for you outside the gate and you will see how
Amtrak protects you now.”
Bordenave reported this second incident to Denton. Denton
instructed Bordenave and Morgan to report to his office so
they could discuss the matter. Morgan refused, stating he
would only enter Denton’s office if he was accompanied by a
34a
union representative. Denton told Morgan that his repre-
sentative was not needed because Denton only wanted to
discuss the matter. Morgan continued to refuse to enter the
office, and walked away. As a result, Denton informed
Morgan that he was being removed from service for
disobeying a direct order and for threatening a supervisor.
Morgan was then instructed to leave the property.
Morgan’s version of events is as follows: On February 4,
1995, Bordenave told Morgan that he would falsely claim that
Morgan threatened him and that Amtrak’s management
would believe Bordenave, not Morgan. Morgan states be
never threatened Bordenave, and has submitted the
declaration of Meriola Gotthardt, a fomer Amtrak employee,
which states that Gotthardt heard Bordenave say be would
falsely accuse Morgan. See Declaration of Meriola Gothardt,
{ 6. Morgan states that when Denton ordered him to go into
his office, he asked for a union representative because he
believed that the meeting could lead to disciplinary action.
When his request for a union representative was denied,
Morgan asked if co-worker Michael Shaw could be a witness
to the meeting. Denton responded by ordering everyone to
leave the main office, and screamed at Morgan to “get his
black ass” into Denton’s office. Morgan refused to enter
Denton’s office without union representation or a witness,
and was offended by Denton’s remark.
Morgan was formally charged with violating Rule F-2 and
Rule L, and an investigatory hearing was held. Hearing
Officer John Eschenbach determined that the charges against
Morgan were proven, and referred his decision to Joseph W.
Deely, the Director of Amtrak's California Corridor. Deely
made the decision to terminate Morgan's empioyment
(3) Denial of Jury Duty Pay
Morgan claims that be was denied pay for jury duty in June
1994, and again in January/February of 1995 in violation of
the collective bargaining agreement between Amtrak and the
35a
union. There are few facts in the record regarding the June
1994 jury duty, as Morgan simply alleges that he was not paid
for serving and Amtrak does not respond to this allegation.
With regard to the 1995 jury duty, Morgan served on January
30, 1995 and February 1, 1995. It is undisputed that Morgan
was not entitled to jury duty pay for February |, because that
day was Morgan’s regular rest day. However, the parties
dispute whether Morgan was in fact ever paid for serving on
January 30, 1995.
(4) Cancellation of Training
Morgan alleges that in October 1994 Borge directed Gary
Biemborn to cancel a scheduled training for Morgan because
Morgan had a “bad attitude.” The factual record is unclear as
to whether the training was in fact canceled.
(5) Denial of Access to Work File
Morgan claims that he made numerous requests to view his
work file as early as November 1991, and that Vandenburg
continued to deny Morgan's requests up to and including
December 1994. Amtrak explains that Amtrak maintains an
officiat “personnel” file and an unofficial “work” file on each
employee: in December 1994 the personnel files were
maintained by Amtrak's personnel department in Los
Angeles, while the work files were kept at the Oakland Yard.
Amtrak states that Vandenburg interpreted Amtrak's policy
as requiring employee access to their personnel files, but not
to their work files, and that based on this understanding,
Vane ourg denied Morgan’s December 1994 request to
view his “work” file. Vandenburg has submitted a declaration
stating based on his interpretation of Amtrak policies, it was
his general practice not to allow employees to view their
work files. See Declaration of Robert D. Vandenburg, ¢ 4.
————
36a
(6) Denial of Union Representation in December 1994
Although Morgan has identified in discovery responses
that he believes Amtrak discriminated against him by denying
him union representation at a meeting in December 1994,
Morgan does not address this allegation in his opposition to
Amtrak's motion, nor has Morgan provided any evidence in
support of this allegation.
(7) Posting Notice Regarding Grievance/Denial of
Bid for Job 515
Morgan alleges that in January 1995, Vandenburg posted a
notice at the Oakland Yard “to all concerned” regarding a
pending grievance that Morgan had filed regarding his
electrician seniority date. Amtrak has submitted evidence that
Vandenburg posted the notice because he was directed to do
so by the National Railroad Adjustment Board, and Morgan
does not dispute this fact. See Plaintiff's Amended Separate
Statement of Facts # 18.
Morgan also alleges that the denial of his bid for a
supervisory position (Job Number 515) was discriminatory
because, had his electrician seniority date been set at his
initial hiring date in 1990, he would have had the most
seniority of all the applicants for the position. However,
because Morgan did not become an electrician until 1992,
Morgan was not selected, and instead Luerean Butler Van de
Streek, an African-American woman, was hired.
2. Procedural Background
On February 27, 1995—after Morgan's suspension but
prior to his termination—Morgan filed a charge of
discrimination against Amtrak with the EEOC. In !.is charge,
Morgan stated that beginning in 1991 he protested Amtrak's
discriminatory treatment of himself and other African-
American employees, and that since that time he had been
subjected to retaliation. Morgan then identified four
37a
discriminatory and/or retaliatory acts: (1) denial of
refrigeration and air conditioning training in October 1994;
(2) denial of access to his work record in December 1994; (3)
suspension without pay pending the investigation of the
charge of threatening his supervisor, and (4) denial of pay for
jury duty in February 1995. See Complaint, Exh. 1. After
Morgan was terminated from Amtrak, he amended his EEOC
charge on March 8, 1995 to allege that his termination was
discriminatory and retaliatory. On July 3, 1996, the EEOC
issued a “Notice of Right to Sue.” Morgan filed the instant
lawsuit on October 2, 1996.
LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary
adjudication when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
In a motion for summary judgment, “[if] the moving party
for summary judgment meets its initial burden of identifying
for the court those portions of the materials on file that it
believes demonstrate the absence of any genuine issues of
material fact, “the burden of production then shifts so that
“the non-moving party must set forth, by affidavit or as
otherwise provided in Rule 56, ‘specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial."” T.W. Elec. Service, Inc. v.
Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.
1987) (citing Celotex Corp v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106
S. Ct. 317 (1986)).
In judging evidence at the summary judgment stage, the
Court does not make credibility determinations or weigh
conflicting evidence, and draws all inferences in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. See T.W. Electric,
809 F.2d at 630-31 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus Co. Ltd. v.
38a
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986));
Ting v. United States, 927 F.2d 1504, 1509 (9th Cir. 1991).
The evidence presented by the parties must be admissible.
Fed, R. Civ. P. 56(e). Conclusory, speculative testimony in
affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine
issues of fact and defeat summary judgment. See Falls
Riverway Realty Inc. v. City of Niagara Falls, 754 F.2d 49
(2d Cir. 1985); Thornhill Publ’ g Co., Inc. v. GTE Corp., 594
F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979). Hearsay statements found in
affidavits are inadmissible. See e.g., Fong v. American
Airlines, Inc. 626 F.2d 759, 762-63 (9th Cir. 1980).
DISCUSSION
1. Morgan’s Claims Prior to the Limitations Period are
Time-Barred
In its motion for summary judgment, Amtrak first argues
that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all acts of
alleged discrimination which occurred more than 300 days
before Morgan filed his complaint with the EEOC. Morgan
argues that his allegations of conduct occurring prior to the
300 day period are actionable under the “continuing
violations” doctrine.
Under the continuing violations doctrine, “allegations of
conduct occurring prior to the limitations period are
actionable if the complainant can show that they are part of a
series of related acts against the complainant,” Has‘imoto v.
Dalton, 118 F.3d 671, 678 (9th Cir. 1997), cert denied,—
U.S.—, 118 S. Ct. 1803 (1998), and at least one of the
allegedly discriminatory acts falls within the limitations
period. See Draper v. Couer Rochester, Inc., 1998 WL
340411, at *4 (9th Cir. June 29, 1998) (to be reported at 147
F.3d 1104). However, even if both of these conditions are
met, courts have found that allegations of discrimination prior
to the limitations period are barred if the allegedly
discriminatory act would or should have triggered the
plaintiff's awareness of a violation and accompanying duty to
39a
assert his rights See e.g., Galloway v. General Motors Service
Parts Operations, 78 F.3d 1164, 1167 (7th Cir. 1996);
Roberts v. Gadsden Memorial Hosp. 835 F.2d 793, as
modified at 850 F.2d 1549 (11th Cir. 1988); Berry v. Board of
Supervisors, 715 F.2d 971, 981 (Sth Cir. 1983). As the
Seventh Circuit has noted,
The most difficult case arises when a long-continued
series of harassing acts definitely are a series, a pattern,
and not merely a set of discrete events, yet it was evident
long before the plaintiff finally sued that she was the
victim of actionable harassment. It seems to us that in
such a case, while she can still sue provided that the last
act of harassment occurred within the statute of
limitations, she cannot reach back and base her suit also
on conduct that occurred outside the statute of
limitations; for she had no excuse for waiting that long.
Galloway, 78 F.3d at 1167. The Galloway court then held that
“the plaintiff may not base her (in some cases his) suit on
conduct that occurred outside the statute of limitations unless
it would have been unreasonable to expect the plaintiff to sue
before the statute ran on that conduct, as in a case in which
the conduct could constitute, or be recognized, as actionable
harassment only in the light of events that occurred later,
within the period of the statute of limitations.” /d.
The factual record clearly establishes that Morgan believed
as early as 1991 that Amtrak and its managers were
discriminating against him on the basis of his race and
retaliating against him for his complaints. For example, on
October 4, 1991, Morgan filed a written complaint with
Amtrak’. EEO office complaining of “blatant racism” at the
Oakland Maintenance Yard, and specifically alleging the
following acts as discriminatory: (1) the March 22, 1991
termination for a Rule L violation; (2) Amtrak’s hiring of
Morgan as an electrician’s helper rather than as an electrician;
and (3) Amtrak’s failure to respond to Morgan’s request to
enter Amtrak's apprenticeship program. See Morgan Decl.,
40a
Exh. D. Morgan further states in his declaration that when
Denton charged him with a Rule L violation on October 16,
1991, he “protested strenuously” that this action was racially
motivated, and complained in writing. /d. at 4 12. In late
1991, Morgan and other Amtrak employees met with then-
Congresswoman Barbara Boxer to complain about
discriminatory conditions at Amtrak. /d. at ¢ 13. Morgan
States that as a result of this meeting, Rep. Boxer contacted
Amtrak's General Inspector, Fred Weiderhold, who visited
the Yard three times in 1992. Morgan personally met with
Weiderhold, and Morgan “tried repeatedly to bring the
continuing discriminatory and retaliatory practices at Amtrak
to his attention.” /d. at ¢ 16. Throughout 1992, 1993 and 1994
Morgan continued to complain to Amtrak of race discrim-
ination. See Morgan Decl., Exh G. (Oct. 21, 1993 EEO
complaint); Exh. F (Sept. 17, 1992 letter to Weiderhold) Exh.
H. (Jan. 18, 1994 EEO complaint).
Statutes of limitations “serve the important purpose of
encouraging the prompt filing of claims and by doing so
enhancing the likelihood of accurate determinations and
removing debilitating uncertainty about legal liabilities.”
Galloway, 78 F.3d at 1165. In the instant case, Morgan did
not file his complaints with the EEOC until February 1995,
despite the fact that he believed as early as 1991 that Amtrak
was discriminating and retaliating against him. Because
Morgan believed that he was being discriminated against at
the time that all of these acts occurred, it would not be
unreasonable to expect that Morgan should have filed an
EEOC charge on these acts before the limitations period on
these claims ran. Accordingly, the Court holds that all
allegations of discrimination occurring prior to the limitations
period are time-barred.”
” This holding does not preclude Morgan from presenting evidence of
acts that occurred prior to the limitations period if they are relevant to his
4la
2. Some Claims Not Specifically Mentioned in the
EEOC Charges That Occurred Within the Limitations
Period are Actionable
Amtrak next argues that Morgan is limited to litigating
only those timely claims that were specifically mentioned in
his February and March of 1995 EEOC complaints. In those
charges, Morgan listed four matters: (1) the alleged denial of
“updated refrigeration and air conditioning training” in
October 1994; (2) the alleged denial of access to his work
record in December 1994; (3) the alleged docking of his pay
for days served on jury duty in February 1995; and (4) the
suspension and subsequent termination for threatening and
using profanity against his supervisor and general foreman. In
addition to these acts of alleged discrimination, Morgan
contends in this lawsuit that Amtrak discriminated against
him by denying him pay for jury duty in June 1994,
suspending him without pay for 15 days in September 1994
for allegedly failing to complete his work assignments,
denying him union representation at a meeting in December
1994, posting a notice about a pending grievance in early
1995, and denying Morgan’s bid for a job in January 1995.
“The remedial purpose of Title VII and the paucity of legal
training among those whom it is designed to protect require
charges filed before the EEOC to be construed liberally.”
Stache v. International Union of Bricklayers and Allied
Craftsmen, 852 F.2d 1231, 1233 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 815, 110 S. Ct. 64 (1989). If a plaintiff files a
lawsuit based on incidents not specifically listed in his EEOC
charge, a federal court may hear the additional claims if they
are “like or reasonably related to the allegations contained in
the the EEOC charge.” Sosa v. Hiraoka, 920 F.2d 1451, 1456
(Mh Cir. 1990); accord EEOC v. Farmer Bros. Co., 3\ F.3d
891, 899 (9th Cir. 1994).
timely claims of discrimination and retaliation; this holding simply
precludes Morgan from recovering damages on these claims.
42a
“In determining whether an allegation under Title VII is
like or reasonably related to allegations contained in a
previous EEOC charge, the court inquires whether the
original EEOC investigation would have encompassed the
additional charges.” Green v. Los Angeles Cty. Superin-
tendent of Schools, 883 F.2d 1472, 1476 (9th Cir. 1989). The
Court concludes that the additional allegations regarding
unpaid jury duty, the 15 day suspension in September 1994,
and the denial of union representation at a December 1994
meeting are “like or reasonably related” to the claims Morgan
specifically mentioned in his EEOC charges. With regard to
unpaid jury duty, Morgan alleges that Amtrak denied him pay
for jury duty in violation of Amtrak policy both in June 1994
and in January-February 1995. These claims are virtually
identical. As for the September 1994 suspension, Morgan
claims that the initiation of the charges against him was
discriminatory and retaliatory, the same allegation he levies
against the February 1995 charges. In the Court’s view, these
charges are similar, and accordingly Morgan may pursue
these claims in this litigation. Finally, Morgan claim that he
was denied union representation at a meeting in December
1994 is “like or reasonably related” to his allegation that he
was denied union representation in connection with the
February 1995 termination.
However, the Court concludes that Morgan’s allegations
regarding the posting of a grievance in early 1995 and the fact
that Morgan was not selected for job number 515 are not
“like or reasonably related” to the allegations contained in his
EEOC charges, and accordingly these allegations are not
actionable. “Where claims are not so closely related that
agency action would be redundant, the EEOC must be
afforded an opportunity to consider disputes before federal
suits are initiated.” Brown v. Puget Sound Elec. Appren-
ticeship & Training Trust, 732 F.2d 726, 730 (9th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1108, 105 S. Ct. 784 (1985). In the
view of the Court, Morgan’s allegations regarding the posting
43a
of a notice and job number 515 are not so closely related that
the EEOC would have investigated these claims in the course
of investigating the claims in Morgan’s EEOC charges.
In any event, even if Morgan had included these allegations
in his EEOC charges, the Court concludes that Morgan has
not sustained his burden to defeat summary judgment. As
noted earlier, Morgan does not dispute that Vandenburg
posted the notice of the pending grievance because he had
been directed to do so by the National Railroad Adjustment
Board. Accordingly, there is no evidence that the posting of
the notice was discriminatory. Moreover, Morgan does not
allege that any adverse employment consequences flowed
from the posting of the grievance.
With regard to job number 515, Morgan alleges that he
should have been awarded the position because, had his
seniority date been set when he was first hired as an
electrician’s helper, rather than when he became an
electrician, he would have had the most seniority of all
applicants for job number 515. However, because Amtrak did
not reclassify Morgan’s position until 1992, “the subsequent
selection of any of the later-hired electricians for promotions
instead of Mr. Morgan is suspect and inherently based on
unfair advantage.” Plaintiff's Opposition, 23:11-13. Even if
this allegation had been contained in Morgan’s EEOC
charges, it would not withstand summary judgment because
Morgan has failed to establish a prima facie case of race
discrimination. Morgan has not produced any evidence in
support of his allegation that “Amtrak hired other less
qualified Caucasian Electricians between the beginning of
1991 and April 1992 and paid them at an Electrician’s rate.”
Morgan Decl. § 5. Furthermore, it is undisputed that
employee selected for job number 515 was Luerean Butler
Van de Streek, an African-American woman. As _ such,
Morgan has failed to offer evidence tha’ “give[s] rise to an
inference of unlawful discrimination,” a necessary element of
44a
a prima facie case. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 US. 248, 253, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1094 (1981).
3. Morgan has Raised Genuine Issues of Material Fact
with Regard to Some of His Actionable Claims
Amtrak finally argues that it is entitled to summary
judgment on Morgan’s timely claims because it has provided
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for Morgan’s Septem-
ber 1994 suspension and February 1995 termination, and
because Morgan cannot establish a prima facie case of
discrimination with regard to his jury duty, work file, denial
of training, and denial of union representation claims.
A. September 1994 Suspension
Amtrak asserts that there was a legitimate and nondis-
criminatory reason for Morgan’s 15 day suspension in
September 1994, and that Morgan has failed to produce any
evidence of pretext. Amtrak argues that Mescall’s decision to
suspend Morgan was based upon the Hearing Officer’s
decision that Morgan had violated Rule L for failing to
complete his work assignments. Amtrak argues that Morgan
has not shown that the suspension decision was motivated by
his race or an intent to retaliate against him, and that its
“honest belief’ that Morgan violated Rule L entitles it to
summary judgment on this claim.
The Ninth Circuit has recently held that in a discrimination
lawsuit, once a defendant has articulated nondiscriminatory
reasons for the allegedly discriminatory conduct, a plaintiff
may rebut chis presumption and raise a triable issue of fact to
defeat summary judgment in two ways. First, “[wJhen the
plaintiff offers direct evidence of discriminatory motive, a
triable issue as to the actual motivation of the employer is
created even if the evidence is not substantial.” Godwin v.
Hunt Wesson Inc., 1998 WL 547238, at *4 (9th Cir. Aug. 11
1998) (to be published at__F.3d___). Alternatively, “[iJn
45a
those cases where direct evidence is unavailable, however,
the plaintiff may come forward with circumstantial evidence
that tends to show that the employer’s proffered movtives
were not the actual motives because they are inconsisent or
otherwise not believable. Such evidence of ‘pretense’ must be
‘specific’ and substantial in order to create a triable issue [of
fact)...” Id. at *5.
In the instant case, Morgan submits the following evidence
that Amtrak selectively enforced its rules against Morgan.
Robert Ramirez, who from 1990 to 1995 was in charge of
filing and processing grievances and representing Amtrak
electricians from the Yard at investigatory hearings, has
submitted a declaration stating that during that time period no
other electricians at the Yard were charged with a Rule L
violation. See Declaration of Robert Ramirez, | 2. Ramirez
represented Morgan in the hearing on the alleged September
1994 Rule L violation, as well as the February 1995 charges.
Ramirez states that during the October 3, 1994 hearing,
“testimony and evidence showed that Car 54013 [one of the
cars Morgan was charged with not completing work on] was
not assigned to Mr. Morgan, but was assigned to George
Guse, a white Electrician. George Guse was never disciplined
for not working on Car 54013.” /d. at ¥ 10.'° Morgan has
also submitted the deposition testimony of Earl Geske, in
which he states that once an employee has been given a
written or oral counseling about a matter, the employee is not
also charged with a rule violation. See Price Decl., Exh. J at
'° Morgan has submitted other evidence of selective enforcement of
rules by Amtrak. Morgan has submitted evidence that a Caucasian
electrician was not charged with a Rule L violation for refusing to attend a
meeting without his union representative, while Morgan was charged with
a Rule L violation for the same offense, see Price, Decl., 4 12 and Exh. K,
and that a Caucasian electrician was not brought up on charges for cursing
at his supervisors, while Morgan was charged with a rule violation for
such conduct. See id. at ¢ 10 and Exh. I.
46a
100:10-26. However, Morgan has submitted evidence that
Butler Van de Streek gave him an oral counseling on the
matter, but that Morgan was nevertheless brought up on Rule
_ Lcharges.
Morgan has also submitted the deposition testimony of
Elwood Conley, a former Amtrak employee, who testified
that Borge, the charging officer, had a habit of referring to
African-Americans as “shuffle-butt niggers.” See Price Decl.,
Exh. H at 21:14-17. Finally, Morgan has submitted evidence
suggesting that since at least July 1993 both Borge and Geske
(who testified at the hearing) were intent on getting Morgan
fired. Kenneth Phillips, a former Amtrak employee, testified
at his deposition that Geske was among a group of managers
who attempted to pressure Phillips to lie so that Amtrak could
fire Morgan. See Price Decl., Exh. M at 58:18-60:9. Gary
Biemborn, an Amtrak trainer, testified in his deposition that
in October 1994 Borge instructed Biemborn not to provide
training to Morgan. See Price Decl., Exit F. at 86:16-23.
The above evidence persuades the Court that Morgan has
raised a genuine issue of fact as to whether Amtrak’s
nondiscriminatory explanation for its actions is the true
reason or whether it masks discriminatory motives. Amtrak
argues that regardless of whether Borge, Geske and other
Amtrak employees acted with discriminatory intent, the fact
that the hearing officer, Hernandez, and the official who
ultimately decided to suspend Morgan, Mescall, acted on a
good faith belief that Morgan had violated Rule L, Amtrak is
not liable for discrimination or retaliation. In advancing this
argument, Amtrak relies primarily on Elrod v. Sears Roebuck
& Co., 939 F.2d 1466 (11th Cir. 1991). In Elrod, the Eleventh
Circuit found that a plaintiff alleging age discrimination had
failed to offer any substantially probative evidence at trial
that age more likely than not motivated his discharge. At trial,
the defendant, Sears, Roebuck and Company, justified
terminating Elrod on the ground that it believed he had
47a
engaged in sexual harassment of numerous female
employees. Sears believed so after it conducted a lengthy
investigation of charges, and the pleintiff repeatedly
acknowledged in writing that he had acted inappropriately.
However, at trial Elrod contended that he was innocent of the
sexual harassment charges. The Eleventh Circuit held that it
was irrelevant whether Elrod was in fact guilty of the sexual
harassment charges; rather, what was salient was whether
Sears believed that Elrod was guilty of harassment, and if so,
if that belief was the reason behind his discharge. Moreover,
the court noted that Elrod had not offered any substantially
probative evidence that age more likely than not motivated
his discharge.
The Court initially notes that Elrod is not binding authority
in the Ninth Circuit, and that therefore the Court is not
required to apply Elrod as Amtrak argues. It is unclear
whether the Ninth Circuit would adopt the Elrod court’s
analysis. See Mitchell v. Keith, 752 F.2d 385, 388-89 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, General Motors Corp. v. Mitchell, 472
U.S. 1028, 105 S. Ct. 3502 (1985) (“It is the law of this
circuit that an employer who acted in good faith in firing an
employee may be liable where the action complained of was
that of a supervisor, authorized to hire, fire, discipline or
promote, or at least to participate in or recommend such
actions . .. .”) (internal quotation omitted).
However, even if the Court were to apply Elrod, the Court
would nevertheless deny Amtrak’s motion for summary
judgment on this claim because of significant factual
differences between Elrod and this case. First, the plaintiff in
Elrod complained only that the discharge was discriminatory;
in the instant case, Morgan alleges that not only was the
ultimate suspension discriminatory, but that the initiation of
the charges was itself discriminatory. Second, the Elrod court
held that Sears was entitled to judgment because it had a good
faith belief that Elrod had engaged in misconduct. In light of
the evidence presented suggesting that Amtrak’s initiation
48a
and prosecution of rule violations was discriminatory and
retaliatory, there is a question of triable fact as to whether
Amtrak had a good faith belief that the charges were founded.
Similarly, Morgan has submitted evidence that the hearing
itself was not fair. See Ramirez Decl. 99 3, 10. Third, the
Elrod court made it clear that Sears was entitled to a directed
verdict not only because Sears had acted on its good faith
belief, but also because Elrod had not put forth substantially
probative evidence that age was the motivating factor for his
discharge. See Elrod, 939 F.2d at 1471. In the instant case
Morgan has submitted a significant amount of evidence
suggesting that Amtrak managers and supervisors may have
acted with discriminatory intent in initiating and prosecuting
charges of rule violations against Morgan. For these reasons,
the Court hereby DENIES defendant’s motion for summary
judgment on this claim.
B. February 1995 Termination.
As with the September 1994 suspension, Amtrak argues
that it has legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for
terminating Morgan because Amtrak believed, based upon the
Hearing Officer’s decision, that Morgan was guilty of the
charged violations. For the reasons set forth above, the Court
rejects this argument. The Court finds that Morgan has raised
a genuine issue of fact as to whether Amtrak’s proffered
reason for terminating him was simply pretext for race
discrimination and retaliation. Much of the same evidence
that Morgan submitted in relation to the September 1994
suspension is relevant to the February 1995 termination
because it raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether the
initiation of disciplinary charges against Morgan was
discriminatory. Morgan has also submitted evidence that the
investigatory hearing was unfair; Ramirez states in his
declaration that Borge “directed and controlled” the hearing
and that the Hearing Officer reversed his position after Borge
expressed his opinion regarding the issue. See Ramirez Decl.,
49a
{ 3. Morgan has submitted the declaration of Meriola
Gotthardt, a former Amtrak engineer, who states that in 1992
she overheard Chuck Berg, a road foreman, tell J.W. Deely
(the Amtrak official who decided to terminate Morgan) that
he was going to give some work to one of those “nigger
bitches,” and that Deely did not reprimand Berg. See
Gottbardt Decl. ¢ 1'' Gotthardt also states that in 1993 she
heard Deely state that “the problem with these niggers is that
after you train them, they walk out on you.” /d. at { 2.
Gotthardt states she complained to Deely regarding the use of
racial slurs at the Yard, and that nothing was done in response
io her complaint. /d. at ¢ 5. Finally, Gotthardt states that in
approximately late 1994 or carly 1995, she saw Bordenave
and Morgan having a “heated discussion,” and that she heard
Bordenave say he was going to accuse Morgan of threatening
him and that “they” would believe him. /d. at ¢ 6.
For the reasons described above, the Court hereby DENIES
defendant’s motion for summary judgment on this claim.
C. Jury Duty
Morgan alleges that Amtrak did not pay him for jury duty
served in June 1994 and January and February 1995. Amtrak
argues Morgan has not established a prima facie case with
regard to these allegations because the denial of jury pay is
not an “adverse employment action” under Title VII and
because Morgan has not submitted any evidence giving rise
to an inference of discrimination. Morgan responds that the
'' Amtrak objects to Gotthardt’s declaration on the ground that Morgan
did not identify Gotthardt in his response to an interrogatory asking for all
facts regarding Morgan’s contention that Deely harbored racial animus.
Amtrak requests that the Court strike Gotthardt’s declaration, citing
School Dist. No. 1J. Multnomah Cty. v. Acands Inc., et al. 5 F.3d 1255
(9h Cir. 1993). The Court declines to strike Gotthardt’s declaration,
concluding that it contains relevant evidence and that Morgan's failure to
identify Gotthardt in his interrogatories was not in bad faith.
50a .
denial of jury duty pay is an adverse employment action, but
does not address Amtrak’s contention that there is no
evidence in the record suggesting that the denial of jury pay
was discriminatory or retaliatory.
Upon the Court’s review of the record, the Court finds that
Morgan has not put forth any evidence suggesting that the
alleged denials of jury duty pay in 1994 and 1995 were
discriminatory or retaliatory. Accordingly the Court finds that
Morgan has not stated a prima facie case, and hereby
GRANTS Amtrak’s motion for summary judgment on these
claims.
D. Canceled Training
Morgan alleges that Amtrak canceled training that was
scheduled for him in October 1994. Amtrak advances two
arguments in its motion for summary judgment on this claim:
(1) no one was provided training in October 1994, and
therefore Morgan was not treated differently on the basis of
his race; and (2) Morgan was certified to work on all Amtrak
equipment, and therefore any denial of training did not
constitute an “adverse employment action.”
The Court rejects Amtrak’s arguments and finds that there
are disputed issues of material fact regarding Morgan's claim
of canceled training. Morgan has submitted evidence that
Borge told Biemborn not to train Morgan in October 1994
because Morgan had a “bad attitude.” Morgan has also
submitted evidence that Borge was known to make racially
discriminatory remarks, and that Borge was part of a group of
managers who desired to have Morgan terminated. Amtrak's
assertion that no other Amtrak employee was provided
training in October 1994 has no bearing on whether Amtrak
discriminated and/or retaliated against Morgan by canceling
his training.
The Court also rejects Amtrak’s argument that Morgan’s
claim fails because the denial of training did not constitute an
Sla
“adverse employment action,” concluding that there are
genuine issues of disputed fact whether the denial of training
adversely affected Morgan’s employment. For these reasons,
the Court DENIES defendant’s motion for summary
judgment on this claim.
E. Denial of Access to Work File
Morgan claims that in December 1994, Vandenburg denied
his requests to view his work file, and that these denials were
discriminatory and retaliatory. Amtrak argues that the denial
of access to a work file is not an adverse employment action,
and therefore that Morgan has not established a prima facie
case regarding this claim. The Court agrees, finding that
Morgan has not alleged any particular adverse consequences
that flowed from the denial of access to his files. Based upon
the facts of this case, it appears that this allegation is better
viewed not as a separate claim, but merely as evidence that
Morgan may submit of Amtrak’s alleged discrimination and
retaliation against him. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS
Amtrak's motion for summary judgment on this claim.
F. Denial of Union Representation
As noted earlier, although Morgan has stated in discovery
responses that he believes Amtrak discriminated and/or
retaliated against him by denying him union representation at
a meeting in December 1994, Morgan does not discuss this
allegation in his opposition papers, nor does he present any
evidence in support of this allegation. Accordingly, the Court
GRANTS Amtrak’s motion for summary judgment on this
claim, as Morgan has failed to establish a prima facie case
regarding this allegation.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS
defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Morgan's
claims regarding: (1) alleged discrimination or retaliation
52a
which occurred prior to the 300-day limitations period, or
May 3, 1994; (2) posting the notice of the grievance in early
1995; (3) denial of Morgan’s bid for job number 515 in 1995;
(4) denial of jury duty pay in 1994 and 1995; (5) denial of
access to work files in December 1994; and (6) denial of
union representation in December 1994.
Finding there are triable issues of fact, the Court hereby
DENIES defendant’s motion for summary judgment on
Morgan’s claims regarding: (1) the September 1994 suspen-
sion; (2) the February 1995 suspension and termination; and
(3) cancellation of training in October 1994.
IT IS SO ORDERED
Dated: September 10, 1998
/s/ Susan [llston
SUSAN ILLSTON
United States District Judge
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.