Petition for Writ of Certiorari — National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan

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No. 01614 APR 23 2001

OFFICE OF T.

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

Vv.

ABNER MORGAN, JR.,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

KATHLEEN J. FORD *

MELISSA B. ROGERS

NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER

CORPORATION

60 Massachusetts Ave., N.E.

Washington, D.C. 20002

* Counsel of Record (202) 906-3296

Counsel for Petitioner

ad

WILSON-EPES PRINTING Co., INC. — (202) 789-0096 -— WASHINGTON, D. C. 20001

© <E «

-_— oc ~—m

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit correctly held, in conflict with every other circuit that

has decided the question, that a plaintiff who has knowingly

allowed the statute of limitations to lapse on alleged

violations of federal anti-discrimination statutes may

nevertheless sue on such time-barred claims whenever

incidents within the limitations period are “sufficiently

related” to the otherwise time-barred claims.

(i)

ii

RULE 14.1(b) AND 29.6 STATEMENT TABLE OF CONTENTS

The following are the parties to the proceeding in the Court

of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: EE

1. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, a RULE 14(b) AND 29.6 STATEMENT .....ccccccccccsoococoses

pevome ee dba Amtrak, TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .....cccccsssseooooooee

' a ee ana

menetedds me A

2. Abner Morgan, Jr., plaintifl-appetant. JURISDICTION .o..cccscccsscesssneesnn

vutiene Need OPE IE erection neuen

federally chartered and is not a publicly traded corporation. STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED .....cscccseee

The United States of America owns 100% of the preferred a

shares under the name of the Secretary of Transportation. A. Morgan’s Empl :

The following companies each own 10% or more of the B Peesesdie “om AE ARRREEE, cncereneen

corporation’s common stock: Burlington Northern/Santa Fe gs Sooeecocororocococoococooccoososoecococes

Railroad Company and American Premier Underwriters REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT........ccccec0s..

(successor to the Penn Central Railroad). Il. THE NINTH’ CIRCUIT’S DECISION

CONFLICTS WITH THE LANGUAGE OF

SECTION 706(e¢) AND SUPREME COURT

PRECEDENT HOLDING THAT A

DISCRETE EVENT TRIGGERS AN

EMPLOYEE’S OBLIGATION TO FILE A

CHARGE PURSUANT TO TITLE VI..............

fl. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION

A. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision Conflicts

With Decisions Of Every Other Circuit :

Court That Has Decided The Issue ............

B. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Conflicts

With This Court’s Rulings on The

Continuing Violation Doctrine ..................

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES Page

Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36

(1974) ..eccccsccossesersessrssrsosenensensesenssrssssssssensnsenenenses 11,12

Alldread v. City of Grenada, 988 F.2d 1425 (Sth

Cir, 1993) ...ccccocccorcceresesssesscesssossnssesssessenssnosossoess 16

Anderson v. Reno, 190 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 1999)... Z)

Ashley v. Boyle’s Famous Corned Beef Co., 66

F.3d 164 (Bth Cir, 1995) .....cccserveereeeseerenneenennenes 15

Bell v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 929 F.2d 220

(Gth Cir, 1991)......c.ccscecsereereseesessnrsnsnnnnennensnnenennes 21

Berry v. Bd. of Supervisors, 715 F.2d 971 (Sth

Cli, 1963) .cccccccccccccrcccsccsccsscccscnsecssecsees 2, 3, 8, 18, 19, 21

Bosley v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 162 F.3d 665

(Fed. Cir, 1998).......cccsssesererserenensnnnnsennnnsensnnenanens 21

Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d

1301 (1OtH Cir, 1999)........ccccccereereeennenenennnnnnnnnns 15

Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424

(1965) ...cccocccserecsecesssereseosernrerensnsssssssssessosssnsenenees 23

Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917)... 12

Cedeck v. Hamiltonian Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n,

$51 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1977) .......cccceeeeeeenennes 16

Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6 (1981)... 13, 24

Cox v. United States Gypsum Co., 409 F.2d 289

(Th Cir, 1969).......ccerersesersrenensnensnennennnsnsnnnnenenens 16

Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345

(19GB) ...cccocccscsecesesereresesersscossevsnssssesessssssnsssnsoosooss 23

Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560 (2d

Cie. DODD) .0.ecccreccccrecsereesessersccccsesscsessessssessessessess 21

Curry v. District of Columbia, 195 F.3d 654

(D.C. Cit, 1999) ....cccecerssereseresenssenensesnensnensnnenenees 21

Delaware State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250

(19BD) .ercreccccccsercrensersesccscsccssseseosenses 2, 13, 14, 23, 24, 25

Draper v. Coeur Rochester, Inc., \47 F.3d 1104

(Dt Cir, 199B)........cccreeerersesessersnsnnnnsnnenennnnennnnens 9

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Dumas v. Town of Mount Vernon, 612 F.2d

ES EE es eens 3 : 17

Emmert v. Runyon, No. 98-2027, 1999 WL

253632 (4th Cir. Apr. 29, 1999) ooo. cccccccceceenses 21

Fielder vy. UAL Corp., 218 F.3d 973 (9th Cir.

2000), petition for cert. filed, 69 US.L.W.

3619 (U.S. March 7, 2001) (No. 00-1937) ........ 2,9, 10

Galloway v. General Motors Serv. Parts

Operations, 78 F.3d 1164 (7th Cir.

1996) sensccncnemnentsiemmmanetenentiodaiennens .2, 3, 8, 17, 18, 19, 20

Garrison v. Burke, 165 F.3d 565 (7th Cir. 1999) .. 18

Green v. Los Angeles County Superintendent Of

Schools, 883 F.2d 1472 (9th Cir. 1989)

maneseenenee 10

Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S.

564 (1982)... 12

Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 US.

ig a ee ee 22

a Vv. Tillamook County, 493 US. 20

- 13

Harris v. Forklift Sys. tnc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) = 2

“aa Co. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363

pamesdabesmeneueumensnssenes 13

High v. Univ. of Minnesota, 236 F.3d 909 8th

CS 15

Huckabay v. Moore, 142 F.3d 233° (Sth Cir.

1998) : 15

International Union of Electrical, Radio a

Machine Workers, v. Robbins & Myers, Inc.,

429 U.S. 229 (1976).. — 12, 13, 14, 23, 24

Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d

(8th Cir. 1997).. 0 20

Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S.

454 (1975)........ 11, 24, 25

Klein v . McGowan, 198 F.3d 705 (8th Cir.

1999) an 20

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Landrau-Romero v. Banco Popular de Puerto

Rico, 212 F.3d 607 (1st Cir. 2000).......ceeceevees 19

Martin v. Nannie & the Newborns, Inc., 3 F.3d

1410 (10th Cir. 1991)......ccccrceveereereereenennseesnnnnes 21

Milton v. Weinberger, 645 F.2d 1070 (D.C. Cir.

19B2) ..cccecceccccccerccsersscrecsocssesscsscssnsssssssocsonsoossosesse 3

O’ Rourke v. City of Providence, 235 F.3d 713

(Ist Cir, 2001) ......cccceccessrssssrensersesensesersevsrsnesnenses 21,22

Order of Railway Telegraphers v. Ry. Express

Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342 (1944) ..cvesesvevereenenes

Provencher v. CVS Pharmacy, 145 F.3d 5 (ist

Cle, 19 9B) ...ceccococecccccsscseecssccssecsesssscscessseseoensceses 3, 19, 21

Purrington v. Univ. of Utah, 996 F.2d 1025 (10th

Cie. 1993) ...cccccccsecccccsecccccseeccscsscccsscssessscossessosscess 18

Richard v. McDonnell Douglas Co., 469 F.2d

1249 (Bth Cir. 1972)......ccccseseerserssereereeeensennnnnnns 16

Roberts v. Gadsen Mem’! Hosp., 835 F.2d 793,

as modified at 850 F.2d 1549 (llth Cir.

GBB) .ccocccecoscrssecccsccecsscrscreccscsscssssssssssssnssssonseeses 3, 8, 21

Rush v. Scott Specialty Gases, Inc., 113 F.3d 476

(38 Cis. 199) cececrcccscccccssssecseccerssscssssenscnsenccasssese 1S, Si

Sabree v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and

Joiners Local, 33, 921 F.2d 396 (ist Cir.

ee

Salgado v. City of New York, 2001 WL 290051

(S.D.N.Y. March 26, 2001)........:ccseseeseeeerennsnnnnes 22

Seward v. Harford County, 2001 WL 283090

(D. Md. March 13, 2001) ......serserserserenrenennnes 21

Stewart v. Booker T. Washington Inst., 232 F.3d

844 (11th Cir. 2000). -_ 15

United Airlines v. Evans, 431 US. "$53 (1977).. — 12, 13,

23, 24, 25

United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979)...... 22

United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S.

235 (19B9) .....ccecsvrserersserenrensersensenssnsnsennnnnssnnenenees 12

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Van Zant v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 80 F.3d

3S 18, 19, 21

Webb v. Cardiothoracic Surgery Ass’ n., 139 F.3d

TD Wie hrncentecnssnensnesncscnseneneceeneemenssnees 18, 19

West v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744 (3d

Se 15, 20, 21

Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S 135 (1879) .....cccc00 22, 23

Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385

I 2,17

STATUTES

BO UBL. § EBSEL1) (IDB) cececccccccecccccscccscscssneccscee l

42 U.S.C. § 2O0De]-2 (19B2).......ccccccececsccccerererererees 2

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (1982)........ccccccececesesesesessecsees 2

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5S(e)(1) (1982) ....cccccccececeeees 1,2, 12, 13

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-S()(1) (1982) ....cccccccccececececeeees 12

MISCELLANEOUS

T. A. Crivens, The Continuing Violation Theory

and Systematic Discrimination: In Search of a

Judicial Standard for Timely Filing, 41 Vand. L.

Be Bere I cicterncesennenensseneniecaees 17

2 Barbara Lindemann & Paul Grossman,

Employment Discrimination Law 1351 (3d ed

Oe 17

Note, Continuing Confusion: The Application of

the Continuing Violation Doctrine to Sexual

gy path» gym 531 (2000)....... 17

Pactzold & A.M. O'Leary-Kelly, Con-

ee and Hostile Environment

arassment: When is Enough, h?,

31 Am. Bus. LJ. 365 (1993).......cccccees oes some 17

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

National Railroad Passenger Corporation, dba Amtrak,

respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the

judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit in this case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (App., infra, 1a) is

reported at 232 F.3d 1008. The order of the court denying

rehearing and rehearing en banc (App., infra, 23a) is

unreported. The district court’s opinion granting partial

summary judgment to petitioner ‘App., infra, 24a) is

unreported.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on

November 8, 2000. App., infra, la. A petition for rehearing

and rehearing en banc was denied on January 22, 2001. App.,

_ infra, 23a. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28

U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED

Section 706(e) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)

(1982), provides:

A charge under this section shall be filed [with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)]

within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged

unlawful employment practice occurred * * *, except

[when] the person aggrieved has initially instituted

proceedings with a State or local agency with authority

to grant or seek relief from such practice * * *, such

charge shall be filed [with the EEOC] * * * within three

hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment

practice occurred * * *.

2

STATEMENT

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits

employment discrimination on the basis of race. 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-2 et. seg. Prohibited discrimination includes racial

harassment and retaliation. Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510

U.S. 17 (1993); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3.

Title VII requires employees who believe that they have

been subjected to unlawful discrimination to file a claim with

an administrative agency prior to proceeding to court. 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). A claim is time-barred unless the

employee files a charge of discrimination with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) within 180

days of the incident, or within 300 days of the incident if the

employee first files the charge with a state or local agency.

Id. The limitations period begins to run on the date of the

alleged “unlawful employment practice.” /d.; Delaware State

Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 257 (1980). When the unlawful

employment practice is a discrete event—such as a

termination—the limitations period runs from the date of that

event. Ricks, 449 U.S. at 503-04; Berry v. Bd. of Supervisors,

715 F.2d 971, 980 (Sth Cir. 1983).

Although there is no statutory exception to the limitations

period, this Court recognized that the 300-day filing period,

like a statute of limitations, may be subject to waiver,

estoppel and equitable tolling. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines,

Inc., 455 U.S. 385 (1982). Accordingly, the courts of appeals

recognize a variant of the equitable “continuing violation”

doctrine which allows plaintiffs to join time-barred Title VII

claims with related claims that are the subject of a timely-

filed administrative charge under certain circumstances. See

e.g., Fielder v. UAL Corp., 218 F.3d 973 (9th Cir. 2000),

petition for cert. filed, 69 U.S.L.W. 3619 (U.S. March 7,

2001) (No. 00-1937); Galloway v. General Motors Serv.

Parts Operations, 78 F.3d 1164 (7th Cir. 1996); Sabree v.

United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners Local 33, 921

3

F.2d 396 (Ist Cir. 1990); Roberts v. Gadsen Mem’! Hosp.,

835 F.2d 793, as modified at 850 F.2d 1549 (11th Cir. 1988):

Berry, 715 F.2d 971.

The most widely accepted approach for analyzing the

continuing violation doctrine was articulated by the Fifth

Circuit in Berry. Berry, 715 F.2d at 981. The Berry standard

permits use of the continuing violation doctrine to save

otherwise time-barred claims if the alleged acts are similar, if

they are recurring, and if the untimely acts did not have the

degree of permanence which would trigger an employee’s

awareness of and duty to assert his rights. Jd. The Seventh

Circuit’s standard as set forth in Galloway and adopted by the

First and Federal circuit courts of appeals limits the

application of the continuing violation doctrine to cases in

which “it would have been unreasonable to expect the

plaintiff to sue before the statute ran on [the time-barred]

conduct.” Galloway, 232 F.3d at 1014-15. With the

exception of the Ninth Circuit, the courts of appeals

uniformly refuse to allow the invocation of the doctrine to

revive stale claims that a knowing plaintiff allowed to lapse.

See e.g., Provencher v. CVS Pharmacy, 145 F.3d 5, 14 (ist

Cir. 1998); Roberts, 835 F.2d 793; Milton v. Weinberger, 645

F.2d 1070, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

In this case, a panel of the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected

the Seventh Circuit’s continuing violation analysis in

Galloway and reaffirmed its recent rejection of Berry. App.,

infra, 15a. Relying on its decision in Fielder, the court of

appeals allowed the plaintiff who knowingly permitted

numerous claims to lapse to use the continuing violation

doctrine to revive those stale claims. /d. The court of appeals

held that there was no “notice” limitation on the continuing

violation doctrine and that a plaintiff was permitted to use the

doctrine and recover damages for pre-limitations conduct so

long as it is “sufficiently related” to post-limitations conduct.

App., infra, 15a; 18a. In so doing, the court effectively

eradicated Title VII's limitations period.

4

A. Morgan’s Employment At Amtrak’

Abner J. Morgan, Jr. (“Morgan”), an African-American

male, began working at Amtrak in August 1990 as an

electrician’s helper in the Oakland Maintenance Yard (the

“Yard”). App., infra, 7a. Morgan claimed that he believed

that he was being hired as an electrician, that he performed

the work of an electrician and that less qualified Caucasians

were hired as electricians. Jd. According to Morgan, his job

was not-reclassified nor his pay increased until April 1992.

Id.

Morgan claims that shortly after he began working at

Amtrak, he was subjected to a pattern of racially

discriminatory and retaliatory acts perpetrated by a group of

Amtrak managers, specifically Robert Vandenburg, the

Facility Manager of the Yard, Jerry Denton, Mike Bordenave,

Ray Borge and Earl Geske. App., infra, 6a. This conduct

allegedly continued throughout his employment with Amtrak

and culminated in his termination in March 1995. /d.

Morgan testified that the first discriminatory act occurred

in February 1991 when he was charged with violating a

disciplinary rule for refusing to attend a meeting without

union representation. App., infra, 7a. Under applicable work

rules, an employee is entitled to union representation at any

meeting that might lead to disciplinary action. /d. at 7a n.4.

Morgan was ordered to attend a meeting with Vandenburg

and Denton the day after he had called in sick. Believing that

' For purposes of ruling on and reviewing the grant of partial summary

judgment, the district court and the court of appeals accepted Morgan's

statement of facts as true. The court of appeals, however, supplemented

Morgan’s statement of facts with trial testimony where it favored Morgan.

At trial, Amtrak disputed many of the facts relied on by Morgan in

opposing summary judgment, and the fully developed trial record

demonstrates that many of the allegations were unfounded. For the

purposes of this petition, Amtrak is limited to the facts as described by the

courts below.

5

the meeting might lead to disciplinary action, Morgan refused

to attend. On March 22, 1991, following a full investigatory

hearing into the incident, Morgan was terminated.? Id. The

termination later was reduced to a ten-day suspension and

Morgan received back pay for all but ten days. /d.

Morgan claims that he requested entrance into the

electrician apprentice program in August 1991. App., infra,

7a-8a. He claims that he received no official response from

Amtrak's personnel office, but that Vandenburg told him that

he stood “a snowball’s chance in hell of becoming an

electrician.” /d. at 8a.

Morgan recognized early in his employment that the

alleged conduct of his supervisors and co-workers could be

grounds for legal action. In October 1991, following the

termination/suspension and the alleged denial of training,

Morgan first complained about racial discrimination at

Amtrak. App., infra, 28a. Morgan filed a written complaint

with Amtrak’s internal EEO office citing “blatant racism” and

offering specific instances of allegedly discriminatory

conduct. /d. He sent a copy of this letter to Congressman

Dellums. Jd. Morgan testified that he never received a

formal response to this complaint. /d.

Throughout the remainder of Morgan’s employment at

Amtrak, he continued to make complaints of racial

discrimination and retaliation both externally and internally to

* Morgan's employment was covered by a collective bargaining

agreement. App., infra, 27a. Therefore, before he could be disciplined

for rules infractions, he was entitled to be notified of the charges against

him and to have a full investigatory hearing at which he was represented

by his union and could present evidence and cross-examine witnesses. /d.

at 27a n.4. The hearing was conducted by a Hearing Officer who

determined whether the charges were proven. If the charges were proven,

the Hearing Officer’s decision was forwarded to the department head who

imposed discipline. /d. These determinations were subject to muiti-

layered review and ultimately could be appealed to the National Railroad

Adjustment Board.

6

Amtrak’s EEO office. Morgan and a group of other Amtrak

employees met with Congresswoman Boxer to express their

concerns about discriminatory conditions at the Yard in late

1991. App., infra, 8a. In response to the complaint,

Congresswoman Boxer contacted Amtrak’s Inspector

General, Fred Weiderhold. /d. at 40a. Weiderhold visited the

Yard three times in 1992. Jd. On one of these occasions,

Weiderhold met Morgan. Jd. Morgan claims that he “tried

repeatedly to bring the continuing discriminatory _and

retaliatory practices at Amtrak to [Weiderhold’s] attention.

Id.

Morgan also continued to complain about racial dis-

crimination to Amtrak’s EEO office. In May 1993, Morgan

filed two separate internal complaints alleging racial

discrimination and retaliation with Amtrak’s EEO office.

App., infra, 29a; 30a. Morgan claims that in October 1993,

Vandenburg assaulted him by placing his hands on Morgan's

shoulders, pushing down and whispering in his ear. /d. at 10a.

Morgan reported the alleged assault to the police and filed a

formal complaint with Amtrak’s EEO office. Jd. at 3la.

Morgan testified that Amtrak did not investigate his

complaint. In January 1994, Morgan again complained about

racial discrimination to Amtrak’s EEO office following the

cancellation of scheduled training. /d. at 1la. Again, Morgan

claims that Amtrak did not formally respond to the complaint.

Id. In October 1994, Morgan made his last complaint of

racial discrimination to Amtrak’s EEO office and again,

according to Morgan, no response was forthcoming. /d. In

sum, by the time Morgan was suspended in February 1995, he

had complained about racial discrimination or retaliation at

least nine times over the course of four years.

Despite his complaints, Morgan claims that the discrim-

ination and harassment never stopped. Morgan claims that he

was subjected to discriminatory or retaliatory discipline on at

least ten occasions between October 1991 and the end of his

7

employment in March 1995. App., infra, 8a-12a. This

discipline consisted of being issued written and oral

counselings, being unfairly charged with rules violations,

being suspended and ultimately his employment being

terminated. In addition, he claims that he was unfairly denied

training on four occasions.

Although Morgan believed that the alleged conduct was

discriminatory and unlawful, he nevertheless refrained from

filing an administrative charge until February 27, 1995, two

days after he was suspended. App., infra, 13a. At that time,

he filed a charge alleging discrimination and retaliation with

the EEOC and cross-filed with the California Department of

Fair Employment and Housing. /d. On March 3, 1995,

following a full investigatory hearing, Morgan was

terminated. /d. at 12a. On March 8, 1995, Morgan amended

his charge to allege that this termination constituted unlawful

discrimination and retaliation. /d. at 37a. At the time he filed

his administrative charge in February 1995, only six allegedly

discriminatory incidents fell within the 300-day limitations

period.

B. Proceedings Below

The district court granted partial summary judgment in

petitioner’s favor on all acts of alleged discrimination which

occurred more than 300 days before Morgan filed his

administrative charge of discrimination. App., infra, 38a-40a.

The court also granted partial summary judgment on three of

Morgan’s six timely claims of alleged discrimination: (1)

denial of pay for jury duty in June 1994 and January and

February 1995, (2) denial of access to review his work file in

December 1994, and (3) denial of union representation during

a December 1994 meeting—ruling that Morgan failed to

establish a prima facie case of discrimination with respect to

each of those claims. /d. at 49a-50a; 51a. The court held that

Morgan failed to establish a prima facie case of

discrimination for denial of pay for jury duty because he

offered no evidence that the action was discriminatory or

retaliatory. Jd. at 49a-S0a. The district court held that

Morgan failed to establish a prima facie case of

discrimination relating to the alleged refusal to allow him to

review his work file because he could not identify an adverse

employment action flowing from that denial. /d. at 51a. The

district court also held that Morgan could not recover for the

alleged denial of union representation at a December 1994

meeting because he never addressed this claim in his

opposition to Amtrak’s summary judgment motion. /d.

In rejecting Morgan’s argument that the continuing

violation doctrine resuscitated all of his claims dating back to

1991, the district court relied on Galloway, 78 F.3d 1164,

1167; Roberts, 835 F.2d 793, and Berry, 715 F.2d 971, 981.

App., infra, 38a-40a. The court held that a plaintiff may not

recover for conduct that “occurred outside the statute of

limitations unless it would have been unreasonable to expect

the plaintiff to sue before the statute ran on that conduct, as in

a case in which the conduct could constitute, or be

recognized, as actionable harassment only in light of events

that occurred later, within the period of the statute of

limitations.” Jd. at 39a (quoting Galloway, 78 F.3d at 1167).

The court held that Morgan was not entitled to invoke the

continuing violation doctrine because as early as 1991 he

claimed to be the victim of discrimination and retaliation by

Amtrak and yet he did not file his administrative charge until

1995.’ App., infra, 39a-40a.

The three remaining claims of alleged discrimination—

suspension in September 1994, denial of training in October

1994, suspension in February 1995 leading to termination of

Morgan’s employment in March 1995—were tried before a

> The court, however, did permit Morgan to present evidence at trial of

acts occurring prior to the limitations period to the extent they were

relevant to his timely claims of discrimination and retaliation. /d. at

40a n.9.

jury. App., infra, 13a. During the trial, Morgan introduced

evidence spanning the entire period of his employment at

Amtrak. The jury returned a unanimous verdict in favor of

Amtrak on November 8, 1998. Judgment was entered on

conduct at issue is “sufficiently related” to the post-

limitations conduct. App., infra, at 18a. Using that test,

articulated for (he first time in Fielder, the court of appeals

analyzed Morgan's “three distinct Title VII claims .. .

discrimination, hostile environment and retaliation” and held

that Morgan could rely on the continuing violation doctrine

Sa eneal oF tie dase cate, Id. at 18a-20a. The

appeals vacated the grant of i

4 et

Morgan a new trial on all of his claims. /d. at 22a.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The petition for writ of certiorari should be granted in this

matter as the outcome in this case conflicts with decisions of

this Court regarding the enforcement of Title VII's limitations

10

period. In addition, the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected the

analyses of the continuing violation doctrine articulated by

the Fifth and Seventh circuit courts of appeals. Finally, the

Ninth Circuit’s decision effectively nullifies Title VII's

statute of limitations for a wide array of cases, and thus, is

inconsistent with both the statute itself and the purposes

behind the limitations period. In this case, the Ninth Circuit

openly acknowledged the conflict between the circuits and

reaffirmed its adherence to the “sufficiently related” test.

On March 7, 2001, UAL Corporation filed a petition for

writ of certiorari seeking review of a decision of the Ninth

Circuit court of appeals. UAL v. Fielder, 69 U.S.L.W. 3619

(U.S. March 7, 2001) (No. 00-1937) seeking review of 218

F.3d 973 (9th Cir. 2000). In Fielder, the Ninth Circuit held

that in hostile environment and sexual harassment cases, a

plaintiff may use the continuing violation doctrine to link

timely and untimely Title VII claims whenever the “alleged

discriminatory acts [which occurred within Title VII's

limitations period] are related closely enough to constitute a

continuing violation.” Fielder, 218 F.3d at 987, (quoting

Green v. Los Angeles County Superintendent Of Schools, 883

F.2d 1472, 1480-81 (9th Cir. 1989)). In this case, the Ninth

Circuit has gone a step farther—holding that its “related

closely enough” or “sufficiently related” test is not limited to

cases of hostile environment and sexual harassment but

applies to all cases of discrimination. App., infra, 17a-18a.

In both this case and in Fielder, the Ninth Circuit applied its

holding and allowed plaintiffs to recover for an assortment of

very different time-barred claims under a continuing violation

theory, notwithstanding their failure to file timely admin-

istrative charges challenging conduct which they concluded

was unlawful at or shortly after the time it occurred. /d.;

Fielder, 218 F.3d at 989. Indeed, in this case, the Ninth

Circuit acknowledged that its continuing violation test yields

results at odds with those in other circuits. It noted that under

the Berry and Galloway tests, the plaintiff in Fielder would

not have been able to rely on the continuing violation doctrine

to recover because “the harassing behavior was such that a

reasonable person would have been on notice that her rights

were violated ...” App., infra, 15a.

This case, like Fielder, presents the Court with an

opportunity to provide guidance as to what events trigger the

running of the limitations period under Title VII and when, if

ever, a plaintiff can join untimely claims of alleged

discrimination with claims that were the subject of a timely

charge. Further review is warranted.

I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION CON-

FLICTS WITH THE LANGUAGE OF SECTION

706(e) AND SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT

HOLDING THAT A DISCRETE EVENT TRIG-

GERS AN EMPLOYEE’S OBLIGATION TO

FILE A CHARGE PURSUANT TO TITLE VII

The Ninth Circuit effectively nullified Title VII's

limitations period by permitting recovery for discrete acts of

alleged discrimination years after the expiration of the

limitations period. There is no statutory basis for this

interpretation of Section 706(e). Moreover, the Ninth

Circuit's decision expressly conflicts with this Court's rulings

that a discrete event triggers the running of the limitations

period. Finally, the Ninth Circuit's decision conflicts with

the decisions of other courts of appeals which adhere to the

rule that a discrete event triggers Section 706(e)’s limitations

period. The decision below is erroneous and should be

Title VII was enacted to “assure equality of employment

opportunities by eliminating those practices and devices that

discriminate on the basis of race . . .” Alexander v. Gardner-

Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974). It creates a compre-

hensive statutory system to vindicate civil rights. Johnson v.

Ry. Express Agency, Inc. 421 U.S. 454, 455 (1975). That

12

system includes a limitations period—Section 706(e). Sec-

tion 706(e) requires employees who believe that they have

been subjected to unlawful discrimination to file a claim with

an administrative agency prior to proceeding to court. 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-5S(e)(1). A claim is time-barred unless the

employee files a charge of discrimination with the EEOC

within 180 days of the alleged unlawful occurrence, or within

300 days of the allegedly unlawful occurrence if the

employee first files the charge with a state or local agency.

Id; United Airlines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 555 n.4 (1977)

(holding that “[tjimely filing is a prerequisite to maintenance

of a Title VII action.”). If, after 180 days, the EEOC is not

successful in obtaining voluntary compliance from the

employer and elects not to file suit on behalf of the employee,

the employee may demand a right-to-sue letter and institute a

private action against the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 2000ce-

5(f)(1). The employee must institute the lawsuit within 90

days after receiving the right-to-sue letter or risk losing his

claim. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 47.

Congress defined Title VII's jurisdictional prerequisites

“with precision,” /d., and there is no statutory exception to

this limitations period. The sole statutory extension of Section

706(e)'s limitations period occurs when the “person

aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with a State or

local agency with authority to grant or seek relief from” the

alleged discriminatory practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(S)(e)(1);

International Union of Electrical Radio & Machine Workers

v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 240 (1976). It is

well-settled that where a statute’s language is plain, “the sole

function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.”

Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917); see

also United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S.

235, 242 (1989) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors,

Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982) (finding the terms of the

statute of limitations applicable because this “is not one of the

rare cases in which ‘the literal application of the statute will

13

produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of

its drafters."”)); Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20,

28 (1989) (noting that the words of the statute are

conclusive). The language of Section 706(e) is plain—it

provides that a charge of discrimination “shall be filed” with

the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged unlawful

employment action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5S(e)(1). As this

Court noted, “[a]s a general rule, if an action is barred by the

terms of a statute, it must be dismissed.” Hallstrom, 493 U.S.

at 31.

Moreover, this Court has ruled that the Title VII limitations

period begins to run from the date of the discrete

discriminatory act, not from the date the last effect of that act

is felt.’ Ricks, 449 U.S. at 257-8; Chardon v. Fernandez, 454

U.S. 6, 8 (1981) (noting that “the proper focus is on the time

of the discriminatory act, not at the point at which the

consequences of the act become painful.”); see also Evans,

431 U.S. at 558 (noting that the focus is on whether there is a

present violation not on whether there are present effects of a

past violation.); Robbins & Myers, 429 U.S. at 234; Cf,

Havens Realty Co. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 381 (1982)

(holding that under the Fair Housing Act a tester could not

invoke the continuing violation doctrine to recover for “four

isolated occasions” on which she was given false infor-

mation). Accordingly, this Court has rejected attempts to

extend the limitations period when a discrete allegedly

ne ance dence eimaneeaienes meme

“eaieiaiariet alates sa tainspartamear names

that she was fired because of her race in violation of both the

applicable collective bargaining agreement and Title VII.

She promptly filed a grievance with the union alleging unfair

action, but waited until after the expiration of Title VII's

* Continuity of employment alone is not sufficient to extend the

limitations period. Ricks, 449 U.S. at 257.

14

limitations period to file her charge with the EEOC. Robbins

& Myers, 429 U.S. at 229. The plaintiff conceded that filing

her grievance did not prevent her from immediately filing an

EEOC charge. /d. at 238, n.10. She argued that her charge

was timely filed because the alleged unlawful employment

practice occurred at the conclusion of the grievance-

arbitration proceedings, not on the date of her termination.

Id. at 238. This Court rejected plaintiff's argument holding

that the effective date for purposes of the limitations period

was the date of her termination. /d. at 234-35.

Likewise, in Ricks, this Court rejected a plaintiff's attempt

to use the continuing violation doctrine to extend the

limitations period to resuscitate his time-barred discrim-

ination claim. Ricks, 449 U.S. at 257-58. In Ricks, a black

Liberian college professor was denied tenure in February

1973. Id. at 252. Following a denial of an appeal of the

tenure decision, the college’s Board of Trustees offered Ricks

a one-year terminal contract. /d. at 253. Ricks accepted the

contract and worked until its expiration in June 1975. /d. at

253-54. In April 1975, Ricks filed a charge with the EEOC

alleging discrimination based on national origin. /d. at 254.

The district court held that Ricks’ claim was time-barred

because the denial of tenure occurred more than 180 days

prior to the filing of the EEO charge. /d. at 254-55. The

court of appeals reversed, holding that the limitations period

did not begin to run until June 1975 upon the expiration of the

one-year contract. Jd. at 255-56. This Court reversed and

held that for purposes of the limitations period, the inquiry

must focus on the date of the allegedly unlawful conduct—

the denial of tenure. Jd. at 256-57. This Court held that the

limitations period normally commences when the employer’s

decision is made even when the effects of that decision linger

for some time thereafter. /d. at 261.

The Ninth Circuit’s decision clearly conflicts with this

Court’s rulings in Ricks and Robbins & Myers, and with the

15

decisions of the other circuit courts of appeals.’ The Ninth

Circuit’s “sufficiently related” test effectively eliminates the

limitations period in any case in which an alleged act of

discrimination occurs within the 300 days prior to plaintiff

filing an EEO charge. In this case, the first alleged act of

discrimination occurred in February 1991, when Amtrak

initially terminated Morgan. App., infra, 7a.. Shortly after

that termination, Morgan complained that he was the victim

of racial discrimination and specifically cited the termination

as an example of discrimination. Jd. at 8a. This Court’s

rulings mandate that the limitations period for that

termination runs from the date of the termination. Likewise,

* With the exception of the Ninth Circuit, the courts of appeals have

followed this Court's precedent and have held that discrete events such as

denial of promotion, denial of training, and termination trigger the

running of Title VII's limitations period for such events even in cases in

which the plaintiff alleges subsequent discriminatory acts. See ¢.g., High

v. Univ. of Minnesota, 236 F.3d 909 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding failure to

promote is a discrete event triggering ihe limitations period); Stewart v.

Booker T. Washington Inst., 232 F.3d 844, 850 (llth Cir. 2000)

(precluding use of continuing violation doctrine as denial of transfer is a

discrete event triggering the limitations period); Bullington v. United Air

Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1310 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding refusal to hire

is a discrete event triggering limitations period; claim could not be revived

by combining it with timely refusal to hire claim); Huckabay v. Moore,

142 F.3d 233, 239-40 (Sth Cir. 1998) (preventing combining stale

demotion and failure to promote claims with timely harassment claims as,

“demotion is the sort of discrete and salient event that should put an

employee on notice that a cause of action has accrued”); Rush v. Scott

Specialty Gases, Inc., 113 F.3d 476, 483-84 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding

failure to promote and denial of training claims are discrete events that

“cannot be regarded as having been timely by reason of (plaintiff's) other

allegations of discriminatory treatment.”); Ashley v. Boyle's Famous

Corned Beef Co., 66 F.3d 164, 167 (8th Cir. 1995) (en banc); Cf, West v.

Philadelphia Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 756 (3d Cir. 1995) (“{TJhe

harassment did not cause a discrete event such as a lost job or a denied

promotion and, thus did not trigger a duty of the plaintiff to assert his

rights arising from the deprivation”).

* This termination was later reduced to # suspension. App., infra, 7a.

16

other discrete events complained of by Morgan—including

denial of training and failure to promote—should trigger the

300-day limitations period for those events. The Ninth

Circuit, however, ignored precedent and permitted Morgan to

use the continuing violation doctrine and reach back four

years to resuscitate his stale claims. In fact, under the Ninth

Circuit’s analysis, the plaintiffs in Robbins & Myers and

Ricks both would have been permitted to recover for any

allegedly discriminatory event stretching back to the

beginning of their employment. The Ninth Circuit’s decision

conflicts with this Court’s precedent and is erroneous. This

Court should intervene to correct this decision.

Il. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION CON-

FLICTS WITH OTHER CIRCUITS’ AND THE

SUPREME COURT’S LIMITED APPROACH

TO THE CONTINUING VIOLATION DOC-

TRINE

Shortly after the passage of Title VII, the courts began to

recognize a judicially-created continuing violation exception

to Title VII’s short limitations period in cases where a

defendant’s conduct was deemed continuing in nature. See

e.g., Cedeck v. Hamiltonian Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 551

F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1977); Richard v. McDonnell Douglas

Co., 469 F.2d 1249 (8th Cir. 1972); Cox v. United States

Gypsum Co., 409 F.2d 289, 290-91 (7th Cir. 1969). In these

cases, the courts used the continuing violation doctrine to

allow plaintiffs to recover based on acts that otherwise would

be time-barred. The continuing violation doctrine is premised

on the equitable notion that the statute of limitations should

not begin to run until a reasonable person would be aware

that his or her rights have been violated. Alldread v. City of

Grenada, 988 F.2d 1425, 1432 (Sth Cir. 1993). This Court

tacitly approved the use of the continuing violation doctrine

under certain circumstance when it held that Title VII's

17

limitations period may be subject to waiver, estoppel and

equitable tolling. Zipes, 455 U.S. 385.

Early development of the continuing violation doctrine was

aptly described as “inconsistent and confusing.” Dumas v.

Town of Mount Vernon, 612 F.2d 974, 977 (Sth Cir. 1980).

This confusion continues today. The courts of appeals have

interpreted the doctrine in widely divergent ways and apply

different standards to interpret similar facts resulting in

contradictory outcomes. The widespread inconsistency and

confusion has been recognized by both the courts and

commentators. See Galloway, 78 F.3d at 1165 (“The

question when conduct occurring outside the statute of

limitations may, by virtue of its link with recent conduct, be

made a basis for a legal claim is a vexing one . . .”); Note,

Continuing Confusion: The Application of the Continuing

Violation Doctrine to Sexual Harassment Law, 79 Tex. L.

Rev. 531 (2000) (describing the “increasingly complex and

divergent application of the continuing violation doctrine in

sexual harassment and other types of employment discrim-

ination cases.”); 2 Barbara Lindemann & Paul Grossman,

Employment Discrimination Law 1351 (3d ed. 1996) (citing

the continuing violation doctrine as “the most muddled area

in all of employment discrimination law”); R.L. Paetzold &

A.M. O’Leary-Kelly, Continuing Violation and Hostile

Environment Sexual Harassment: When is Enough, Enough?,

31 Am. Bus. L.J. 365, 382-83 (1993) (noting that “[bJecause

of the limited guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court, the

federal circuits have adopted different standards for

implementing the continuing violation doctrine”); T. Crivens,

The Continuing Violation Theory and _ Systematic

Discrimination: In Search of a Judicial Standard for Timely

Filing, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 1171, 1172 (1988) (stating that the

continuing violation doctrine is “one of the most confusing

theories in employment discrimination law. . .”).

Prior to the Ninth Circuit’s decisions in this case and

Fielder, the courts of appeals agreed that use of the

18

continuing violation doctrine was inappropriate in cases

where the plaintiff was aware of the discriminatory nature of

the acts at the time they were taking place. See e.g., Garrison

v. Burke, 165 F.3d 565 (7th Cir. 1999); Van Zant v. KLM

Royal Dutch Airlines, 80 F.3d 708 (2d Cir. 1996); Webb v.

Cardiothoracic Surgery Ass’n., 139 F.3d 532, 538 (Sth Cir.

1998); Purrington v. Univ. of Utah, 996 F.2d 1025 (10th Cir.

1993); Sabree, 921 F.2d 396. The Ninth Circuit has now

explicitly rejected the analyses used by other circuits. As

such, review by this Court is necessary to establish uniformity

in the application of the continuing violation doctrine.

A. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision Conflicts With

Decisions Of Every Other Circuit Court That

Has Decided The Issue.

The decision below is in direct conflict with, and rejects

the analyses of, both the Seventh Circuit in Galloway, 78

F.3d at 1167 and the Fifth Circuit in Berry, 715 F.2d 971. In

Galloway, the Seventh Circuit held that a plaintiff may not

rely on the continuing violation doctrine “unless it would

have been unreasonable to expect the plaintiff to sue before

the statute ran on that conduct, as in a case in which the

conduct could constitute, or be recognized, as actionable

harassment only in the light of events that occurred later,

within the period of the statute of limitations.” Galloway, 78

F.3d at 1167. In arriving at this conclusion, the Seventh

Circuit balanced the competing social fry My pr Lana

the prompt filing of claims y doing so 0

enhancing the likelihood of accuraie determinations and

removing debilitating uncertainty about legal liabilities,” with

equitable interest in protecting a plaintiff who files a Title VI

charge as soon as he is aware that his rights have been

violated. /d. at 1165; 1166.

In Berry, the Fifth Circuit adopted a three-factor analysis to

balance these competing interests. Berry, 715 F.2d at 979-

980. Under the Fifth Circuit’s analysis, before being

19

permitted tc use the continuing violation doctrine, a plaintiff

must show first that the acts involve the same type of

discrimination, and second, that they are recurring rather than

an isolated work assignment or employment decision. The

third factor, which the Fifth Circuit considers the most

important, is whether the early untimely act had “a degree of

permanence which should trigger an employee’s awareness of

and duty to assert his or her rights” or which should indicate

that the discrimination will continue “without being

dependent on a continuing intent to discriminate ...” /d. at

981. If the early untimely act is sufficiently permanent in

nature, a plaintiff is not permitted to rely on the continuing .

violation doctrine.

Under both the Berry and the Galloway analyses, the

continuing violation doctrine cannot be used by a plaintiff

who knows that he is a victim of discrimination, but fails to

file a charge within the limitations period. See Landrau-

Romero v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 212 F.3d 607, 612

(ist Cir. 2000) (holding handwritten note by plaintiff

identifying acts as discriminatory written over a year before

the charge filed precluded plaintiff from relying on the

continuing violation doctrine); Provencher, 145 F.3d at 15

(holding plaintiff's admission that he knew he was being

harassed long before he filed charge precluded invocation of

the continuing violation doctrine); Van Zant, 80 F.3d at 713

(stating that the timeliness of a discrimination claim is to be

measured “from the date the claimant had notice of the

allegedly discriminatory action”); Webb, 139 F.3d 532, 538

(holding that plaintiff was precluded from relying on

continuing violation doctrine where she admitted that she

knew she was being harassed and failed to file a timely

charge).

Although the Ninth Circuit distinguished Berry in its

decision in Fielder on the basis that Berry was an equal pay

and gender discrimination case, Fielder, 218 F.3d at 987 n.10,

20

it dropped an nse of distinguishing Berry and Galloway

in this av = infra, 15a. Here, the court of appeals

rejected both Berry and Galloway and held that Ninth Circuit

precedent “precludes such a notice limitation on the

continuing violation doctrine.” Jd. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit s

“sufficiently related” test does not balance the competing

interests recognized in Berry and Galloway. Under the Ninth

Circuit’s test, the societal interest in promoting prompt filing

of claims is absent and the scales tip entirely in favor of

allowing plaintiffs to combine iimely and untimely claims

without regard to the existence of the limitations period. In

fact, the Ninth Circuit’s decision permits a plaintiff who knew

that his rights were being violated to sit on his rights

indefinitely. App., infra, 15a. As Judge Kleinfeld noted in

his dissent in Fielder, “[t}he practical consequence of the

majority opinion is to keep alive incidents of claimed

[discrimination] permanently, with no statute of limitations at

all.” Fielder, 218 F.3d at 990. This is precisely the outcome

that the Berry and Galloway courts sought to avoid.

Despite the Ninth Circuit’s rejection of the Berry an

Galloway analyses, other courts of appeals have adopted

these two analyses.’ The Third, Sixth, Tenth and Eleventh

Circuits apply the Berry factors in determining whether use of

’ The Eighth Circuit is the only other circuit with case law resembling

the Ninth Circuit’s “sufficiently related” test. However, the Eighth

Circuit does not appear to have adopted a uniform standard for analyzing

continuing violations. Compare Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d

1287, 1303 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that when a plaintiff alleges an

ongoing practice or pattern of discrimination, a continuing violation is

present “if the plaintiff established that any violation took place during

the statutory period) (emphasis added) with Klein v. McGowan, 198 F.3d

705, 709 (8th Cir. 1999) (requiring a plaintiff to show “some incident of

harassment” occurring within the limitations period and a sufficient

nexus” between the incident and the other incidents of harassment),

(citing West v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 755 (3d Cir. 1995)).

21

the continuing violation doctrine is appropriate.* These

courts of appeals—like the Fifth Circuit—consider the third

factor, permanence, to be the most important. See West v.

Philadelphia Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 755 & n. 9 (3d Cir.

1995); Martin v. Nannie & the Newborns, Inc., 3 F.3d 1410,

1415 & n. 6 (10th Cir. 1993); Bell v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry.,

929 F.2d 220, 223-25 (6th Cir. 1991); Roberts v. Gadsen

Mem'l. Hosp., 835 F.2d 793, 801 (11th Cir. 1988). The

Second Circuit, while not expressly adopting the Berry

analysis, uses a similar standard to determine whether a

continuing violation exists. The Second Circuit asks whether

the instances of discrimination are “specific and related” and

the plaintiff must be without notice of the discriminatory

nature of events when they occur. See e.g., Cruz v. Coach

Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 569 n.4 (2nd Cir. 2000); Van Zant,

80 F.3d at 713. The First and Federal Circuits have adopted

the Seventh Circuit’s Galloway approach. See O’Rourke v.

City of Providence, 235 F.3d 713, 731-33 (1st Cir. 2001);

Provencher v. CVS Pharmacy, 145 F.3d 5, 14-15 (1st Cir.

1998); Sabree, 921 F.2d 399-400; Bosley v. Merit Sys. Prot.

Bd., 162 F.3d 665, 667 (Fed. Cir. 1998). There is no doubt

that under the analyses adopted by any of these courts,

Morgan’s continuing violation claim would have failed. Not

only did Morgan believe himself to be the victim of racial

* The District of Columbia Circuit has not explicitly adopted Berry or

Galloway, but cites both analyses with approval. See Curry v. District of

Columbia, 195 F.3d 654, 661 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1999) cert. denied, 530 U.S.

1215 (2000) (citing Sabree, 921 F.2d at 401-02); Rush v. Scott Specialty

Gases, Inc., 113 F.3d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 1997); West, 45 F.3d at 755-56;

Berry, 715 F.2d at 981. The Fourth Circuit, likewise, has “never

delineated what constitutes a ‘continuing violation,”” but it cites with

approval to the Fifth and Seventh Circuits’ analyses. Emmert v. Runyon,

No. 98-2027, 1999 WL 253632 at *4 (4th Cir. Apr. 29, 1999). Moreover,

the district court for the District of Maryland relies on Berry describing it

as “[a] useful analysis of the (continuing violation] theory borrowed from

the Fifth Circuit but consistent with Fourth Circuit precedent.” Seward v.

Harford County, 2001 WL 283090, at *4 (D. Md. March 13, 2001).

22

discrimination four years prior to filing his charge, he also

complained about racial discrimination to Amtrak's

management, Amtrak’s internal EEO office and members of

Congress.

The Ninth Circuit openly acknowledged the conflict it

created between the circuits by adopting its “sufficiently

related” standard and explicitly rejecting Galloway and Berry.

App., infra, 15a. This conflict has also been recognized by

the First Circuit in O’ Rourke when it reaffirmed its adherence

to its own analysis consistent with Berry and recognized that

“only the Ninth Circuit has taken a different position .. .”

235 F.3d at 731 n.6; see also Salgado v. City of New York,

2001 WL 290051, at *6 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. March 26, 2001)

(acknowledging conflict). The “inconsistency and confusion”

surrounding the continuing violation doctrine will increase

exponentially as a result of the Ninth Circuit’s decision

below. It is time for this Court to intervene and resolve the

conflict.

B. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision Conflicts With

This Court’s Rulings on The Continuing

Violation Doctrine

The Ninth Circuit’s decision also is inconsistent with this

Court’s precedent regarding the continuing violation doctrine.

This Court adheres to the proposition that statutes of

limitation are to be strictly enforced. Statutes of limitation

have been characterized as a “meritorious defense, in itself

serving a public interest.” Guaranty Trust Co. v. United

States, 304 U.S. 126, 136 (1938). This Court noted that

“[s]tatutes of limitations, which ‘are found and approved in

all systems of enlightened jurisprudence,’ represent 4

pervasive legislative judgment that it is unjust to fail to put

the adversary on notice” of the right to defend himself.

United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (citing

Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S 135, 139 (1879)). Statutes of

limitations are “statutes of repose” which balance plaintiffs’

23

needs for ample time to pursue claims with defendants’ and

courts’ rights to be free of stale claims. /d. at 117; Order of

Railway Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S.

342, 348-49 (1944); Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S.

424, 428 (1965). This Court described the purposes behind

statutes of limitations as “promot[{ing] justice by preventing

surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed

to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded

and witnesses have disappeared . . . even if one has a just

claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend

within the period of limitation and that the right to be free of

stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to

ry them.” Order of Railway Telegraphers, 321 U.S. at

. This Court repeatedly has recognized that Title VII's

limitations period facilitates the delicate balance between the

interests of the employee in protecting his civil rights, the

societal interest in promoting prompt filing of discrimination

claims thereby enhancing the likelihood of accurate

determinations, and the employer’s interest in being protected

from untimely claims. Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker

462 U.S. 345, 352 (1983) (noting that limitations periods are

peepee seep Gem on notice of adverse claims and

prevent iffs sleeping on their rights”); Ricks,

449 U.S. at 259-60 (noting that “it should fom ee

that time-limitations provisions themselves promote

important interests; ‘the period allowed for instituting suit

inevitably reflects a value judgment concerning the point at

which the interests in favor of protecting valid claims are

outweighed by the interests in prohibiting the prosecution of

stale ones.”””) (citation omitted); Evans, 454 U.S. at 559

(noting that employer is “entitled to treat that past

[discriminatory] act as lawful after [the employee] failed to

file a charge of discrimination” within the limitations

period.); Robbins & Myers, 429 U.S. at 240 (noting that

“[ajdherence to the limitations period assures prompt

24

notification to the employer of a charge of an alleged

violation of Title VI... .”). Thus, this Court expressly has

rejected equitable tolling rules that would extend the

limitations period for plaintiffs who knowingly fail to assert

their rights pursuant to Section 706(e).' Ricks, 449 USS. at

257-8: Chardon, 454 U.S. at 8; Evans, 431 U.S. at 558;

Robbins & Myers, 429 U.S. at 239-40.

For example, in Robbins & Myers, this Court rejected an

employee's argument that the Title VII limitations period was

tolled during the pendency of a grievance procedure chal-

lenging her allegedly discriminatory and unfair termination.

Robbins & Myers, 429 U.S. 229. The employee filed a

grievance pursuant to the applicable collective bargaining

agreement two days after her termination challenging it as

“unfair.” However, she waited until after the grievance

procedure was complete and after the Title VII limitations

period had run to file her charge with the EEOC. /d. at 231-

32. In arguing that Title VII's statutory limitations period

should be tolled during the pendency of grievance/arbitration

proceedings, the employee noted that any delay would be

minimal and that failure to permit such tolling might force an

* Likewise, this Court has rejected an equitable tolling rule when a

plaintiff tried to rely on Title VII to extend the limitations period for his

Section 1981 claim. In Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421

U.S. 454 (1975), the plaintiff filed a timely charge with the EEOC

Section 1981. He argued that the one-year limitations

peony} to his Section 1981 claim was tolled during the

pendency of the processing of his Title VII claim by the EEOC. This

period on his Section 1981 claim had expired. This Court held, “plaintiff

has slept on his § 1981 rights. Tho hen Gus bie denhe may toe

induced by faith in the adequacy of his Title VII remedy is of

25

employee into court prematurely. This Court, citing its

decisions in Alexander, 415 U.S. 36 and Johnson, 421 U.S.

454, reaffirmed the independence of remedies under a

collective bargaining agreement and Title VII and held that:

Congress has already spoken with respect to what it

considers acceptable delay when it established a 90-day

limitations period, and gave no indication that it

considered a ‘slight’ delay followed by 90 days equally

acceptable. In defining Title VII's jurisdicti

prerequisites ‘with precision,’ Congress did not leave to

courts the decision as to which delays might or might not

be ‘slight.’ Jd. at 240 (citation omitted).

This Court has also rejected attempts by plaintiffs who

knowingly permitted the limitations period to expire to use

the continuing violation doctrine to salvage stale claims. As

discussed above, the Court rejected the plaintiff's attempt to

use the continuing violation doctrine to extend Title VII's

limitations period in Ricks. Ricks, 449 U.S. 252. There the

plaintiff argued that the continuing violation doctrine should

apply to save his discriminatory denial of tenure claim in part

because a number of “unusual incidents”—including an

alleged assault by the department chairman—occurred

between the denial of tenure and his termination over a year

later. Jd. at 257 n. 8. This Court noted, “[tJhe limitations

periods, while guaranteeing the protection of the civil rights

laws to those who promptly assert their rights, also protect

employers from the burden of defending claims arising from

employment decisions tiiat are long past.” /d. at 256-57

(citation omitted). Accordingly, this Court rejected plaintiff's

reliance on the continuing violation doctrine and held that his

claim was time-barred. See also Evans, 431 U.S. 553

(rejecting plaintiff's reliance on continuing violation doctrine

to save discriminatory seniority claim where the allegedly

plaintiff's claim was based on the current effects of the past

policy).

26

Under the Ninth Circuit’s “sufficiently related” test, the

plaintiff in Ricks would have been able to recover without

regard for the limitations period because some act had

occurred within the 300 days prior to his filing of the

administrative charge. Indeed, in almost every conceivable

case, the Ninth Circuit would allow a plaintiff to salvage

time-barred claims by relying on the continuing violation

doctrine to link untimely claims with timely claims. The

Ninth Circuit has rendered Section 706(e)’s limitations period

a nullity. The Ninth Circuit’s disregard for this limitations

period serves none of the meritorious purposes underlying

statutes of limitations. It undermines the language of Title

VIL, the purposes behind Section 706(e)’s limitations period

and the delicate balance that is served by statutes of

limitations. For all these reasons, the Ninth Circuit’s decision

is wrong and conflicts with the decisions of this Court and

decisions of the other circuit courts of appeals.

CONCLUSION

The petition for writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

KATHLEEN J. FORD *

MELISSA B. RUGERS

NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER

CORPORATION

60 Massachusetts Ave., N.E.

Washington, D.C. 20002

* Counsel of Record (202) 906-3296

April 2001 Counsel for Petitioner

APPENDICES

la

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-15374

| D.C. No.

<4. 3 CV-96-03585-SYI

OPINION

ABNER J. MORGAN, JR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER

CORPORATION, dba AMTRAK,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States Mistrict Court

for the Northern District of ‘alifornia

Susan Yvonne Illston, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

June 14, 2000—San Francisco, California

Filed November 8, 2000

) 3 Before: Donald P. Lay,’ Dorothy W. Nelson and Sidney R.

\ : Thomas, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Lay

: ' The Honorable Donald P. Lay, Senior United States Circuit Judge for

} the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.

2a

SUMMARY

Labor and Employment/Employment Discrimination

The court of appeals reversed a judgment of the district

court and remanded for a new trial. The court held that when

an employer's pre-limitations period discriminatory conduct

is part of a series or pattern of discrimination, retaliation, and

hostile environment, the continuing violation doctrine applies

and the pre-iimitations period conduct should be presented to

the jury for purposes of liability.

Appellant Abner Morgan, an African-American male,

» for a job with appellee Amtrak in 1990. From the date

of his hire to his termination five years later, Morgan was

subject to numerous disciplinary actions, including written

and verbal counselings and suspensions from work without

pay, allegedly for rules violations and absenteeism. On

several occasions, Morgan requested and was denied career

opportunities with Amtrak.

Morgan made numerous complaints to Amtrak's Equal

Employment Office and external authorities alleging

discriminatory conduct throughout his tenure with Amtrak.

Often, Morgan never received an official response to his

complaints and an allegedly unrelated discipline was leveled

against him within a short period.

In February 1995, after his suspension but prior to his

termination, Morgan filed a charge of discrimination against

Amtrak with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (EEOC). EEOC issued a right to sue letter and

Morgan filed suit against Amtrak in federal court “ileging

violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act \ cluding

discrimination, retaliation and a hostile work environment.

Amtrak moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was

3a

entitled to judgment on all incidents that occurred more than

300 days before the filing of Morgan’s EEOC charge

The district court granted summary judgment in part to

Amtrak, holding that Amtrak could not be liable for conduct

that occurred prior to May 3, 1994, because such conduct was

outside the 300-day limitations period.

A trial proceeded on the remaining allegations. Morgan

presented the testimony of several witnesses, fellow Amtrak

employees, who testified about the racially-laden atmosphere

at the Amtrak yard where Morgan worked. Evidence was

presented that Amtrak supervisors used racial epithets, made

racially derogatory comments and performed racially

derogatory acts.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of Amtrak. Morgan

appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to

Amtrak as to conduct that occurred prior to May 3, 1994.

Before a suit may be filed under Title VII, a plaintiff must

file a complaint with the EEOC within 180 or 300 days. Title

VII's limitation period limits liability to conduct occurring

within the applicable limitations period; the continuing

violations doctrine, however, allows courts to consider

conduct that would ordinarily be time barred as long as the

untimely incidents represent an ongoing unlawful

employment practice.

A plaintiff can establish a continuing violation by showing

a series of related acts one or more of which are within the

limitations period—a serial violation; or by showing a

systematic policy or practice of discrimination that operated,

in part, within the limitations period—a systemic violation.

To survive summary judgment after failing to satisfy the

limitations period requirement, Morgan had to raise a genuine

issue of disputed fact as to |) the existence of a continuing

4a

violation, and 2) that the violation continued into the

limitations period.

The pre-limitations conduct was sufficiently related to the

post-limitations conduct to invoke the continuing violation

doctrine. The district court erred in granting a partial

summary judgment holding that Amtrak could not be liable

for conduct occurring prior to May 3, 1994.

To prove racial discrimination, Morgan had to show that he

belonged to a class protected by Title VII, was qualified for

the position in question, and suffered an adverse employment

action. The incidents of questionable disciplines and

counselings, and denied career opportunities, taken together

with the abundant evidence of the racially discriminatory

atmosphere at the yard were sufficiently related to the alleged

incidents of discrimination that occurred within the

limitations period. These incidents revealed a consistent pat-

tern of similar employment actions over the entire five-year

employment period, perpetuated by the same core group of

managers.

The pre-and post-limitations period incidents involved the

same type of employment actions, occurred relatively

frequently, and were perpetrated by the same managers. In

light of this, there was sufficient evidence to employ the

continuing violation doctrine and allow the jury to consider

the whole of Morgan’s tenure for purposes of liability on his

hostile environment claim.

To establish a prima facie case for retaliation, a plaintiff

must show: he has engaged in a protected activity; he has

suffered an adverse employment decision; and there was a

causal link between the protected activity and the adverse

employment decision.

The pre-limitations conduct was sufficiently related to the

conduct within the limitations period so that the continuing

Sa

violation doctrine worked to allow a jury to find liability on

Morgan’s retaliation claim.

Viewed in the context of the totality of Morgan’s

relationship with Amtrak, the pre-limitations events were part

of a series or pattern of discrimination, retaliation, and hostile

environment that started nearly contemporaneously with

Morgan’s employment and continued throughout his tenure.

In light of the relatedness of the incidents, Morgan

sufficiently presented a genuine issue of disputed fact as to

whether a continuing violation existed. Pre-limitations period

conduct should have been presented to the jury not merely as

back-ground information, but also for purposes of liability.

COUNSEL

Pamela Y. Price, Price and Associates, Oakland, California,

for the plaintiff-appellant.

Kay M. Long-Martin and Theodora R. Lee, Littler

Mendelson, Oakland, California, for the defendant-appellee.

OPINION

LAY, Circuit Judge:

Abner J. Morgan, Jr. (Morgan) filed suit against National

Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak), alleging violations

of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended in

1991. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Title VID). Morgan

claims that, because of his race, he suffered discrimination

and retaliation, and endured a hostile work environment. The

district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of

Amtrak, holding that Amtrak could not be liable for conduct

occurring prior to May 3, 1994. A trial was held on the

remaining allegations, and the jury returned a verdict in favor

ee

6a

of Amtrak. Morgan now appeals both the ruling on summary

judgment and the judgment rendered on the jury verdict.

With regard to the grant of partial summary judgment,

Morgan argues the district court erred in limiting the liability

time frame. As to the judgment on the jury verdict, Morgan

asserts the district court erred in four ways: 1) instructing the

jury that evidence of pre-limitations period conduct was for

“background” or “context” only; 2) excluding certain

testimony by Morgan and co-workers regarding the racially

hostile environment;? 3) improperly instructing the jury on

the hostile environment claim; and 4) imposing improper time

limits on the presentation of Morgan's case. We find the

district court erred in entering judgment as a matter of law.

Thus, we reverse and remand for a new trial,

I. BACKGROUND

A) Factual Background

Morgan, an African-American male, alleges that from the

beginning of his employment with Amtrak, and throughout

his tenure, he was subjected to discriminatory and retaliatory

acts and endured a racially hostile work environment. He

alleges that the managers at the Oakland Maintenance Yard

(the Yard), specifically, Robert Vandenburg, Ray Borge,

Jerry Denton, Earl Geske, and Mike Bordenave, primarily

perpetrated the acts. As we must, we construe the facts in the

light most favorable to Morgan.

2 ‘The district court excluded portions of testimony by Morgan and

Mary Fontaine, and it excluded all of Joe George's testimony.

At trial, Morgan’s first witness was to be Joe George; however, as

noted supra, the district court excluded his testimony in its entirety.

Morgan's attorney requested a continuance to prepare Morgan, who was

to be the next witness. The court indicated that if a continuance was

granted, time would be deducted from the overall time allotted for the

case. Morgan took the stand immediately.

Ta

1) Incidents Prior To the Limitations Period

Morgan applied for a job with Amtrak in 1990. Although

trained and experienced in electrical work, Morgan began

working in August 1990 as an “Electrician Helper.” Morgan

asserts he believed he was being hired as an electrician, from

the beginning he performed the work of an electrician, and

that less qualified Caucasians were hired as electricians.

Morgan is the only person ever hired as a “helper” at the

Yard. Eventually, Morgan's position was reclassified and his

pay brought in line with that of electricians in April 1992.

In February 1991, Vandenburg and Denton instructed

Morgan to attend a meeting in Vandenburg’s office. Fearing

the meeting might lead to disciplinary action because he had

recently called in sick, Morgan refused to attend without

union representation.* Vandenburg and Denton then charged

Morgan with a Rule L violation for refusing to follow orders

and attend the meeting.’ Following a hearing, Morgan was

terminated jor this violation. Morgan filed a grievance and, in

response, Amtrak reinstated him, reducing the termination to

a suspension and paying him for all but ten days. Amtrak's

Inspector General testified at trial that this ten-day suspension

was the most severe discipline imposed on an employee from

1989-1992.

In August of 1991, Morgan made a written request to

Amtrak's Los Angeles personnel office asking to participate

in Amtrak's apprenticeship program. Within days of filing

* Under the collective bargaining agreement in place at the time,

Amtrak employees had a nght to union representation at mectungs which

mught lead to discaplinary action.

* Rule L prohibits insubordination ination and provides m relevant part,

“le)mployees must obey instructions, directions and orders trom Auirak

supervisor personne! and officers, except when confronted by a clear and

immediate danger to themselves, property or the publi. lnsubordunaie

conduct will not be tolerated.”

8a

stood “a

snowball’s chance in hell of becoming an electrician at his

yard. He never received a written response from Amtrak's

Los Angeles office.*

In early October 1991, Morgan sent a letter complaining of

onan Gentatestion tb k’s Equal E oy Off;

EEO) and copied it to his congressperson. Morgan never

ccoived 0 formal sexpense to die complaint from Asntak.

On October 16, 1991, Denton gave Morgan a written

counseling for violating Rule L because he ignored a direct

order to desist while helping an escorting officer pack a co-

worker’s belongings. Morgan immediately protested this

counseling, alleging that it was racially motivated.

In the fall of 1991, Morgan and other employees met with

their congresswoman to complain about conditions at the

Yard. Shortly after this meeting, on December 13, 1991,

Vandenburg placed a letter of counseling in Morgan's file,

accusing him of being argumentative and threatening. Early

in 1992, the congresswoman contacted Amtrak regarding the

employee complaints. In response, Amtrak’s Inspector

General conducted an investigation of the Yard. Amtrak

insists that a list of primary concerns was then drafted and

improvements made. At trial, however, Amtrak s EEO

representative responsible for the Yard during the relevant

time period denied knowledge of the investigation.

On September 17, 1992, Vandenburg and Borge counseled

Morgan for alleged absenteeism. Morgan contends that the

charged absenteeism included several months of previously

approved leave, which had been granted so that he could care

for his son.

“

* Amtrak insists that Morgan was scheduled to go through the program

the following year but the program was discontinued prior to his

aver

9a

On September 19, 1992, Mike Fabian, an Amtrak foreman,

ordered Morgan to clean up tar on one of the tracks. This

work was outside of Morgan’s job description. Then, on

November 29, 1992, Morgan was again assigned a task out-

side his craft, specifically, Geske assigned him the task of

picking up tie wraps.’ Morgan asserts that he picked up as

many tie wraps as possible during his shift, but he could not

possibly pick up all of them. Regardless, on December 1,

1992, Geske gave Morgan a written counseling for a Rule L

violation for failing to pick up all of the tie wraps.

In April 1993, Morgan received another written counseling

from Denton for absenteeism. This counseling targeted

Morgan's tardiness and attendance on three days—including

one excused absence. This counseling occurred despite a

recommendation from Amtrak’s Inspector General that

management should not be strict with regard to minor

absenteeism.

In May 1993, Morgan requested, first verbally and then in

writing, a one-day leave of absence, in addition to the eight

days of vacation for which he was scheduled. Vandenburg

denied the requests. Morgan did not appear at work on the

day in question. As a result, Morgan was charged with a Rule

L violation and suspended for fifteen days. Morgan filed a

letter of complaint with Amtrak's EEO office and his union.

Eventually, Morgan received back pay and the suspension

was ordered expunged from his file.

On May 25, 1993, Morgan asked Vandenburg, in writing,

why his name was removed from the list of employees

scheduled to be trained on heating, air, and ventilation

systems. On that same day Morgan filed a written complaint

with Amtrak’s EEO office alleging ongoing racial

discrimination and retaliation. Then on May 30, 1993,

" Amtrak asserts everyone was assisting in a general cleanup in

preparation for an audit; however, no other employee testified to having to

perform these specific tasks on the same occasion.

10a

Morgan filed another written complaint with Amtrak’ s EEO

office.

In September 1993, Vandenburg received a letter

requesting an investigation of an alleged conversation during

which Morgan made improper comments to a union

representative. A prelimi investigation confirmed that a

conversation had occurred.” Morgan, however, would not

discuss the incident with Vandenburg and instead asked for a

formal investigation. In October 1993, Morgan was charged

with violating Rules F-1 and F-3.? After an investigatory

hearing, the charges against Morgan were dropped and the

incident ordered expunged from his record.

During a training session in October 1993, Vandenburg

physically touched Morgan. The contact consisted of

Vandenburg approaching from behind, placing his hands on

Morgan’s shoulders, pushing down, and whispering in his

ear. Interpreting the contact as an assault, Morga: reported

the incident to the Southern Pacific police, the Oakland

police, and filed a written complaint with Amtrak’s EEO

office. Morgan asserts that Amtrak did not investigate or

respond to the situation.

* The conversation between Morgan and the union representative w.\s

overheard by another employee. Apparently, this employee's recollection

initially supported the union representative's position but later changed to

corroborate Morgan's version. At trial the employee testified that a

number of supervisors pressured him to change his statement to support

the union representative. Specifically, he testified that Vandenburg stated,

“Abner was a problem employee, and that they were going to fire him

anyways [sic}.”

* Rule F governs employee conduct. Rule F-1 states: “All employees

are required to conduct themselves in a courteous and professional manner

in dealing with the public and other Amtrak employees. Boisterous

conduct or horseplay and profane or vulgar language are prohibited.

Rule F-3 states: “Conduct involving dishonesty, immorality, or indecency

is prohibited. Employees must conduct themselves on and off the job so

as not to subject Amtrak to criticism and loss of goodwill.” :

lla

In December 1993, Morgan’s scheduled training was

cancelled. In January 1994, Morgan wrote a letter to

Amtrak’s EEO complaining of such cancellation. Morgan

asserts that Amtrak never formally responded.

In January 1994, Morgan called in sick to work for one

day. When he returned, Borge and other supervisors required

him to produce a doctor’s note before he could return to

work. Despite the fact a note was not required under

Amtrak’s sick leave policy, when he could not produce a note

Morgan lost three days of pay. After filing a grievance,

Amtrak paid Morgan for the lost days, excluding the one sick

day.

2) Incidents Within the Limitations Period

On September 2, 1994, Morgan was assigned to work on

multiple trains. At the end of his shift Morgan had completed

work on only one of the trains. Morgan’s immediate

supervisor spoke with him about not finishing the work and

he was subsequently charged with a Rule L violation for

failing to complete work assigned to him. Morgan argues

that turning over unfinished work to the next shift was not

uncommon. There was an investigatory hearing and Morgan

was suspended for fifteen days.'°

In October 1994, Morgan was again denied training and

complained to Amtrak’s EEO office regarding the

cancellation of such training. He received no response.

In December 1994, Morgan was accused of threatening

Bordenave during a meeting. Despite investigation, the

allegation was unsubstantiated and no action was taken

against Morgan.

On February 4, 1995, Bordenave reported to Denton that

Morgan had threatened him. Morgan paints a different

picture. He asserts that Bordenave falsely claimed he had

© This suspension was affirmed on appeal to the National Railroad

Adjustment Board.

12a

been threatened and that when ordered into Denton’s office,

he asked for union representation or the presence of a co-

worker as a witness. Denton denied both, ordered everyone

out of the office, and yelled at Morgan to get his “black ass”

into the office. Morgan refused and went home. As a result

of the incidents. Morgan was suspended and charged with

violations of Rules L and F. An investigatory hearing was

held and on March 3, 1995, Morgan was terminated.

3) Overall Environment

Morgan presented evidence from a number of fellow

Amtrak employees regarding the racially-laden atmosphere at

the Yard. Specifically: 1) Art Conley, a former manager,

testifted that Borge made racial jokes, used the “n” word, per-

formed racially derogatory acts in front of Vandenburg, and

that Vandenburg made negative comments regarding African-

Americans’ cenacity to be supervisors; 2) two African-

American Amtrak supervisors testified to Borge’s racially

offensive conduct; 3) two African-American co-workers

testified Denton made racially derogatory comments; 4) a

number of other witnesses testi‘ied to hearing Denton and

Bordenave use racial epithets; 5) Joe George, a former

employee, was to testify Vandenburg made racially

derogatory comments and referred to him as “boy”, and that

Geske made racially derogatory statements, including that he

would kill his daughter before he would allow her to date a

black man; '' and 6) Mary Fontaine, a former employee,

testified to the demeaning manner in which Denton treated

African-Americans and to racial slurs she heard.'?

'"' As noted supra, the district court entirely excluded George's

testimony because Morgan had not properly submitted an offer of proof in

the pre-trial report and because such testimony was cumulative and more

prejudicial than probative.

'2 At trial, the district court excluded two other pieces of Fontaine's

testimony. First, the district court excluded testimony of her knowledge of

13a

B) Procedural Background

On February 27, 1995, after his suspension but prior to his

termination, Morgan filed a charge of discrimination and

retaliation against Amtrak with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and cross-filed with the

California Department of Fair Employment and Housing. On

July 3, 1996, the EEOC issued a “Notice of Right to Sue” and

Morgan filed the instant lawsuit on October 2, 1996. Amtrak

filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing in part that it

was entitled to judgment on all incidents that occurred more

than 300 days before the filing of Morgan’s EEOC charge."

On September 11, 1998, the district court granted in part

Amtrak’s Motion for Summary Judgment, holding that

Amtrak could not be liable for conduct that occurred prior to

May 3, 1994, because such conduct was outside the

applicable 300-day limitations period. The district court went

on to find that Morgan had raised a genuine issue of material

fact sufficient to proceed to trial on a number of his timely ~

filed claims. A trial proceeded on the remaining allegations,‘

and the jury returned a verdict in Amtrak’s favor on

November 19, 1998. This appeal ensued.

Denton’s comment regarding working “niggers to death” because such

testimony was hearsay and was more prejudicial than probative. Second,

the district court excluded her testimony regarding disparate discipline

based on race because it was beyond the scope of the case.

'- Title VII actions cannot proceed in federal court unless a charge of

discrimination is first filed with the EEOC. Generally, a complaint must

be filed within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice. If a

plaintiff initially institutes proceedings with an appropriate state agency,

however, the deadline is extended to 300 days. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-

5(e)(1). The parties in this case agree that the applicable limitations period

is 300 days.

'* Specifically, the district court found Morgan had raised a genuine

issue of material fact regarding his September 1994 suspension, the Octo-

ber 1994 cancellation of training, his February 1995 suspension, and his

wee

l4a

ll. DISCUSSION

This court reviews a district court’s grant or denial of a

motion for summary judgment de novo. See Robi v. Reed, 173

F.3d 736, 739 (9th Cir. 1999). The question of whether the

pre-1994 claims are time barred is a question of law reviewed

de novo. See Bouman v. Block, 940 F.2d 1211, 1218-19 (9th

Cir. 1991). In reviewing an order denying or granting

summary judgment, we must determine whether, viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,

there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the

district court correctly applied the substantive law. See Robi,

173 F.3d at 739.

Morgan argues that the conduct delineated above,

including those incidents dating back to the beginning of his

employment, constitutes a violation of his Title VIl rights.

The district court granted partial summary judgment, holding

that all claims arising from occurrences prior to May 1994

were time barred.

A. Continuing Violation Theory

As noted supra, before a suit may be filed under Title VII,

a plaintiff must file a complaint with the EEOC within 180 or

300 days. See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-S(e)(1). Title VII's limitation

period limiis liability to conduct occurring within the

applicable limitations period; the continuing violations

doctrine. however, allows courts to consider conduct that

would ordinarily be time barred “as long as the untimely inci-

dents represent an ongoing unlawful employment practice.”

Anderson vy. Reno, 190 F.3d 930, 936 (9th Cir. 1999); see e.g.,

Draper V. Coeur Rochester, Inc., 147 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th

Cir. 1998). In limiting the time frame to events taking place

after May 3, the district court relied on Galloway v. General

Motors Serv. Parts Operations, 78 F.3d 1164 (7th Cir. 1996).

In Galloway, the Seventh Circuit held the continuing

violations doctrine does not apply “unless it would have been

unreasonable to expect the plaintiff to sue before the statute

15a

ran on that conduct.” /d. at 1167. Relying on Galloway, the

district cour: concluded that “[bJecause Morgan believed that

he was being discriminated against at the time that all of these

acts occurred, it would not be unreasonable to expect that

Morgan should have filed an EEOC charge on these acts.

before the limitations period on these claims ran.”

The district court’s reliance on Galloway was mistaken.

This court has never adopted a strict notice requirement as the

litmus test for application of the continuing violation

doctrine; in fact, in Fiedler v. UAL Corp., 218 F.3d 973 (9th

Cir. 2000), we explicitly rejected such an approach from the

Fifth Circuit. See id. at 987 n.10. Fiedler examined Berry v.

Board of Sup'rs of L.S.U., 715 F.2d 971 (Sth Cir. 1983), a

case which involved equal pay based upon gender

discrimination, where the F.fth Circuit created a multi-factor

test for determining whether discrete acts of harassment are

closely related enough to satisfy the continuing violation

theory. The Berry court's final factor, “perhaps of most

importance,” asked whether the harassing act “sould trigger

an employee’s awareness of and duty to assert his or her

rights.” Berry, 715 F.2d at 981. We rejected the Berry

analysis, holding that test was not “applicable in determining

the continuation of a hostile environment.” Fiedler, 218 F.3d

at 987 n.10.

Indeed, this court’s decision in Fiedler, as well as

Anderson and Draper, precludes such a notice limitation on

the continuing violation doctrine. In Fiedler, for example,

plaintiff filed suit in mid-1995, after being subject to a pattern

of harassing behavior stretching back to 1991. See Fiedler,

218 F.3d at 977, 983. Even though the harassing behavior

was such that a reasonable person would have been on notice

that her rights were violated,'” we held that the continuing

'S For example, plaintiff in Fiedler told her harasser in 1991 to “stop

touching her and that if he continued, she would obtain legal counsel and

16a

violation doctrine applied. See id. at 988. Likewise, in

Draper, plaintiff began employment in November of 1992,

and began suffering harassment shortly thereafter. See

Draper, 147 F.3d at 1105. Even though she brought her

harassment claim in mid-1995, we held:

[bJecause [plaintiff's] hostile work environment claim is

not based upon a series of discrete and unrelated

discriminatory actions, but is instead premised upon a

series of closely related similar occurrences that took

place within the same general time period and stemmed

from the same source, her allegations set forth a claim of

a continuing violation.

Id. at 1108. Finally, Anderson involved a similar situation. In

Anderson, we applied the continuing violation doctrine where

plaintiff filed suit in 1994 after experiencing harassment

stretching back to 1986. See Anderson, 190 F.3d at 936-37.

Based on this circuit’s decisions in Fiedler, Anderson, and

Draper, this court rejects the rigid test of both Galloway and

Berry.

According to Fielder, a plaintiff can establish a continuing

violation in one of two ways. First, by showing a series of

related acts one or more of which are within the limitations

period—a serial violation. A serial violation is established if

the evidence indicates that the alleged acts of discrimination

occurring prior to the limitations period are sufficiently

related to those occurring within the limitations period. See

id. See also Green, 883 F.2d at 1480-81. Precedent makes

clear that the alleged incidents of discrimination cannot be

isolated, sporadic, or discrete, see Draper, 147 F.3d at 1107-

10. In Sosa v. Hiraoka, 920 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1990),

this court found a sufficient relationship where the acts were

“plausibly related as acts of discrimination against Sosa

pursue a claim against him.” See Fiedler, 218 F.3d at 977. Further, she

obtained counsel in 1993 to deal with the hostile work environment.

+ nee ee etree Se

17a

because of his identification as a Mexican-American.”

(emphasis added).

The second way to establish a continuing violation is to

show a systematic policy or practice of discrimination that

operated, in part, within the limitations period—a systemic

violation. See id. Systemic violations involve “demonstrating

a company wide policy or practice” and most often occur in

matters of placement or promotion. Green, 883 F.2d at 1480.

B. Application of Continuing Violation to Morgan's Title

Vil Claims

To survive summary judgment after failing to satisfy the

limitations period requirement, Morgan must raise a genuine

issue of disputed fact as to 1) the existence of a continuing

violation—be it serial or systemic, and 2) that the violation

contifued into the limitations period. See Fielder, 218 F.3d at

983. In applying the first prong, the Fielder court noted, “[s]o

long as the conduct has the capacity of being considered [a

violation], it becomes an issue for the fact finder.” /d. at 986.

With regard to the second prong, this court looks to see

whether the acts during the period “involve the same type of

discrimination as those committed before the period. We

must inquire whether there is a common type of discrim-

ination, such as [racial] harassment, or if there is a common

kind of employment action, such as repeated denial of a

miomotion.” /d.

Morgan alleges three distinct Title VII claims, each which

have different legal elements; consequently, “[wJe consider

the allegations with respect to each theory separately, in

determining whether any of the events underlying these

claims occurred within the relevant period of limitations.”

Draper, 147 F.3d at 1108. Thus, we analyze Morgan's claims

of discrimination, hostile environment, and_ retaliation

Sa

discretely.'” In light of the totality of the circumstances, we

are satisfied that the pre-limitations conduct at issue in this

case is sufficiently related to the post-limitations conduct to

invoke the continuing violation doctrine. We hold that the

district court erred in granting a partial summary judgment

holding that Amtrak could not be liable for conduct occurring

prior to May 3, 1994.

i) Discrimination

To prove racial discrimination, Morgan must show that he

1) belonged to a class protected by-Title VII, 2) was qualified

for the position in question, and 3) suffered an adverse

employment action. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). The alleged pre-limitations

discriminatory conduct which Morgan points to includes: 1)

numerous questionable disciplines and counselings (the

February 1991 Rule L violation and termination which was

eventually reduced to a suspension, the September 1992

counseling for absenteeism, the December 1992 counseling

for his failure to pick up tie wraps, the April 1993 counseling

for absenteeism, the July 1993 suspension which was later

ordered expunged, the October 1993 rule violation, of which

Morgan was eventually found not guilty, and the January

1994 improper withholding of pay for failure to produce a

doctor’s note), and 2) numerous instances in which Amtrak

denied him career opportunities (his 1990 hiring as an

electrician helper, the 1991 application to Amtrak's

apprenticeship program, the May 1993 removal of Morgan's

name from training, and the December 1993 cancellation of

training). We find that these incidents, taken together with the

abundant evidence from other employees and management

regarding the racially discriminatory atmosphere at the Yard

We note. however, that the evidence of each alleged violation

significantly overlaps, and segregating them is both a difficult and

artificial task.

19a

are “sufficiently related” to the alleged incidents of

discrimination that occurred within the limitations period.

These incidents reveal a consistent pattern of similar

employment actions (¢.g., discipline and denial of

professional training) over the entire five-year period of

employment, perpetrated by the same core group of

managers. Such incidents are not discrete or isolated. We are

satisfied that the pre-limitations period is closely enough

related to the acts occurring during the limitations period to

trigger the operation of a continuing violation theory on

Morgan's claim of racial discrimination.

ii) Hostile Environment

“A ‘hostile work environment’ occurs when there is a pat-

tern of ongoing and persistent harassment severe enough to

alter the conditions of employment.” Draper, 147 F.3d at

1108 (citing Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66-67

(1986)). As this court noted in Fielder, “[m]ost instances of

hostile environments are not capable of facile identification.

‘{IJnstead, the day-to-day harassment [is] particularly

significant, both as a legal and a practical matter, in its

cumulative effect.’” Fielder, 218 F.3d at 985 (quoting

Draper, 147 F.3d at 1108).

Evidence of the Yard's pre-limitations period hostile

environment includes the decision to hire Morgan at a lower

grade than others, Morgan's multiple disciplines and denial of

training, the use of racially derogatory language, and the

over-all racially-laden environment. We note that the jury,

when commenting on the verdict, stated that it had found

“evidence of a hostile work environment at the Oakland Yard

during May 1994 and February, 1995” but found there was

insufficient evidence to establish it was severe and pervasive.

This court finds the pre-and post-limitations period incidents

involve the same type of employment actions, occurred

relatively frequently, and were perpetrated by t.. same

- —a~ —— on. «

20a

managers. In light of this, we find sufficient evidence to

employ the continuing violation doctrine and allow the jury to

consider the whole of Morgan's tenure for purposes of

liability on his hostile environment claim.

iit) Retaliation

To establish a prima facie case for retaliation, plaintiff

must show: 1) he has engaged in a protected activity; 2) he

has suffered an adverse employment decision; and 3) there

was a causal link between the protected activity and the

adverse employment decision. See Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809

F.2d 1371. 1375 (9th Cir. 1987). Morgan presented evidence

of his numerous complaints to Amtrak's EEO office, as well

as the complaints he made to external authorities, regarding

the racially hostile environment in the Yard. Further, the

evidence reveals that while Morgan often did not receive an

official response, an allegedly unrelated discipline was

inevitably leveled against him within a short period.

Specifically, on October 4, 1991, Morgan filed a complaint

with Amtrak’s EEO office and on October 16, he received a

written counseling for a Rule L violation; in the fall of 1991,

Morgan and others met with their congresswoman and

discussed concerns about discrimination and in December

1991. a letter of counseling was placed in Morgan’s file; in

May 1993, he filed a race discrimination complaint with

Amtrak’s EEO office and within days Morgan asserts that his

shift was changed.

As was noted above, the same players were involved in

each of these incidents, and the incidents demonstrate a

regular pattern of potentially retaliatory conduct throughout

Morgan’s tenure. We find that the pre-limitations conduct is

sufficiently related to the conduct within the limitations

period and, thus, hold the continuing violation doctrine works

to allow a jury to find liability on Morgan's retaliation claim.

2la

il. CONCLUSION

When the pre-limitations events in this case are viewed in

the context of the totality of Morgan's relationship with

Amtrak, it is apparent that they are part of a series or pattern

of discrimination, retaliation, and hostile environment

that started nearly contemporaneously with Morgan's

employment and continued throughout his tenure. In light of

the relatedness of the incidents, we find that Morgan has

sufficiently presented a genuine issue of disputed fact as to

whether a continuing violation existed. Thus, we hold that

pre-limitations period conduct should have been presented to

the jury not merely as background information, but also for

purposes liability. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a

new trial.

In light of our ruling, we need not specifically rule on the

evidentiary issues raised by Morgan; however, because these

issues may arise again on retrial, we voice a general

comment. We note that one of the main issues in a hostile

environment or discrimination case is the pervasiveness of of

the conduct at issue. In this case, the district court excluded

significant pieces of information regarding such environment,

specifically, portions of Morgan and Fontaine's testimony

and the whole of George's testimony. This evidence went to

the overall environment of the Yard. This court has

previously recognized that an employer's conduct tending to

demonstrate its general hostility towards a group is both

relevant and admissible. See Heyne v. Caruso, 69 F.3d 1475,

1479 (9th Cir. 1995). See also Spulak v. K Mart Corp., 894

F.2d 1150, 1156 (10th Cir. 1990) (noting that “[a]s a general

rule, the testimony of other employees about their treatment

by the defendant [employer] is relevant to the issue of the

employer's discriminatory intent.”) We further note that, in

returning the verdict, the jury expressed concern about the

overall environment at the Yard. The jury commented:

22a

We find the management at the Oakland Yard during the

time of Mr. Morgan's employment to have engaged in

grossly unprofessional & questionable ethical conduct.

Most especially, the EEO office of Amtrak was

woefully remiss in following up & supervising its

recommendation for procedural changes at the Oakland

facility, and their general sincerity questionable.

The testimony of Morgan and his co-workers goes to the per-

vasiveness of the conduct at issue. On retrial, we encourage

the district court, when ruling on admissibility of evidence, to

consider all evidence in light of its relevance to whether the

defendant's conduct may be considered severe and pervasive.

We vacate the grant of partial summary judgment, as well

the judgment on the verdict, and we grant a new trial on the

overall issues of discrimination, hostile environment, and

retaliation.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

23a

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[Filed Jan 22, 2001]

No.99- 15374

D.C. No. CV-96-03585-S YI

ARNER J. MORGAN, JR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Vv.

NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER

CORPORATION, dba AMTRAK,

Defendant-Appellee.

ORDER

Before: LAY' and D.W. NELSON, Senior Circuit Judges

and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

The panel has voted to deny the petition for rehearing.

Judge Thomas voted to reject the suggestion for rehearing en

banc and Judges Lay and Nelson so recommend.

The full court has been advised of the suggestion for

rehearing en banc, and no judge of the court has requested a

vote on the suggestion for rehearing en banc. Fed. R. App. P.

35(b).

' The Honorable Donald P. Lay, Senior United States Circuit Judge for

the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.

24a

The petition for rehearing is denied and the suggestion for

rehearing en banc is rejected.

25a

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

{Filed Sep 11 1998}

No. C 96-3585 SI

ABNER J. MORGAN, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION,

d.b.a. AMTRAK and Does 1-10,

Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

On August 28, 1998, this Court heard argument on a

motion for summary judgment filed by defendant National

Railroad Passenger Corporation (“Amtrak”). Having

considered the arguments of counsel and the papers

submitted, the Court hereby GRANTS in part and DENIES in

part defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Abner J. Morgan, Jr. (“Morgan”) filed this Title

Vil race discrimination suit against defendant Amtrak

alleging that from 1990 to 1995 Morgan was consistently

harassed and disciplined more harshly than other employees

on account of his race. Morgan is African-American.

Presently before the Court is Amtrak’s motion for summary

judgment. Amtrak argues that it is entitled to summary

judgment because (1) some of the incidents of alleged

discrimination are time-barred in that they occurred more

26a

than 300 days before Morgan filed his charges of

discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”)'; (2) some of the incidents are not

exhausted in that they were not specifically mentioned in

Morgan's EEOC complaints; and (3) all of Morgan's

discrimination and retaliation claims fail either because

Morgan cannot state a prima facie case, or because Amtrak

had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for disciplining and

ultimately terminating Morgan. Morgan opposes Amtrak's

motion, arguing that all of his claims are properly before the

Court, and that he has raised triable issues of material fact

regarding these claims sufficient to defeat summary

judgment.

BACKGROUND

|. Factual Background’

A. Untimely Claims: 1990 to May 2, 1994

Morgan began working for Amtrak in August 1990 as an

electrician’s helper at the Oakland Maintenance Yard

(“Yard”). Morgan asserts that when he was hired he believed

he was being hired as an electrician, not as an electrician’s

helper, and that similarly qualified and less qualified

Caucasian electricians were hired as electricians at a higher

rate of pay. Morgan does not submit any evidence in support

of this assertion. Morgan asserts that it was only after several

months of working at the Yard that he realized he was not an

electrician and that despite performing the duties of an

electrician, for at least a year, Morgan's position was not

reclassified and his pay was not increased until April 1992

following a lengthy union grievance. Morgan also claims that

' Morgan's EEOC complaint was cross-filed with the Department of

Fair Employment and Housing, and accordingly the relevant statutory

period is 300 days.

’ The following statement of facts is derived from both parties’ papers.

- Bete ame Ue oo ales. -

27a

he was the only person ever hired by Amtrak as an

electrician’s helper at the Yard.

During the period of Morgan's employment with Amtrak,

Robert D. Vandenburg (“Vandenburg”) was the Facility

Manager at the Yard. Morgan claims that throughout his

employment with Amtrak he was subjected to a pattern and

practice of racially discriminatory acts, followed by

retaliatory acts after he complained about discrimination.

Morgan alleges that the discrimination and retaliation were

perpetrated primarily by the same managers, including

Vandenburg, Jerry Denton (“Denton”), Mike Bordenave

(“Bordenave”), Ray Borge (“Borge”), and Earl Geske

(“Geske”).

On February 25, 1991, Vandenburg and Denton charged

Morgan with a violation of Rule L’ for refusing to come to a

meeting without a union representative.’ Amtrak employees

have a right to union representation when they are required to

’ Rule L of Amtrak's Rules of Conduct provides:

Employees must obey instructions, directions, and orders from

Amtrak supervisory personnel and officers except when confronted

by a clear and immediate danger to themselves, property, or the

public. Insubordinate conduct will not be tolerated.

Declaration of Louis G. Bellotti, Exh. D at 6.

* According to Amtrak, when an Amtrak employee is accused of

violating a disciplinary rule, the employee is given a letter notifying him

of the charges against him and of the date set for an investigatory hearing.

An investigatory hearing is then conducted by an Amtrak Hearing Officer

for the purpose of determining whether the employee has violated the rule

as charged. The Hearing Officer takes testimony from witnesses and

receives exhibits. If the Hearing Officer decides that the employee did not

violate the rule, no further action is taken. If the Hearing Officer decides

that the rule was violated, however, the Hearing Officer's decision ts then

forwarded to the head of the department in which the employee works.

The department head determines what discipline should be imposed. See

Declaration of Carlos R. Henandez, ¢ 2; Declaration of Joseph W. Deely,

Exh. B; Declaration of Gerald T. Mescall, Exh. B.

28a

attend a meeting that might lead to disciplinary action;

Morgan believed that the February 25, 1991 meeting might

lead to disciplinary action because he had called in sick the

previous evening, and accordingly refused to attend the

meeting without representation. On March 22, 1991, Amtrak

terminated Morgan for the alleged Rule L violation. After

Morgan filed a grievance, Amtrak reinstated him and reduced

the termination to a 10 day suspension.

On August 13, 1991, Morgan filed a written request to

Amtrak's personnel office in Los Angeles for admission to

Amtrak’s apprenticeship program. Morgan alleges that

Amtrak did not formally respond to his request, but that

Vandenburg informed him that Ae ran the Yard, and that

Morgan stood a “snowball’s chance in hell of becoming an

electrician.” See Amended Declaration of Abner J. Morgan,

Jr., 4 10.

On October 4, 1991, Morgan filed a complaint for race

discrimination with Amtrak’s Equal Employment

Opportunity (“EEO”) office. Morgan states that he never

received a formal response to his complaint. Two weeks later

on October 16, 1991, Denton gave Morgan a “written

counseling” for allegedly violating Rule L by helping a co-

worker pack up his belongings after he was fired. Morgan

states that he protested in writing that the counseling was

racially motivated. On December 13, 1991, Vandenburg

placed a letter of counseling in Morgan’s work file, allegedly

without Morgan’s knowledge, accusing Morgan of being

argumentative and threatening.

On September 17, 1992, Vandenburg and Borge counseled

Morgan for alleged absenteeism. According to Morgan,

Vandenburg acknowledged that Morgan’s absenteeism was in

part due to Morgan's taking time off to care for his son, who

had recently attempted to commit suicide. See Morgan

Decl., ¥ 17.

29a

On December 1, 1992, Geske gave Morgan a written

counseling for allegedly violating Rule L for failing to pick

up “tie wraps” during his shift. Morgan states that although

picking up tie wraps was outside of his craft and not in his job

description, he nevertheless picked up as many tie wraps as

possible during his shift and stopped only when it became too

dark to see. Morgan states that when he asked Geske why he

was being charged with a Rule L violation, Geske replied that

he was only doing what “they” told him to do, and that

Vandenburg gave him the order.

On April 26, 1993, Denton issued Morgan a written

counseling for alleged absenteeism. On May 13, 1993,

Morgan requested a shift change in order to take care of his

son while his family went on a trip to Boston. Alternatively,

Morgan requested a one day leave of absence in addition to

eight days of vacation. Morgan asserts that he was entitled to

take leave based on his seniority, but that Vandenburg denied

both requests.

On May 21, 1993, Morgan questioned why his name was

taken off a list of employees scheduled for training on

heating, air and ventilation systems. According to Morgan,

Vandenburg told him that he did not have the mental capacity

for such training. Morgan has submitted deposition testimony

of Elwood Conley, a former Amtrak foreman who was

terminated in 1992, who testified that Vandenburg

commented to him that African-Americans were less

intelligent than Caucasians, and that Vandenburg “didn’t

want too many blacks because of . . . problems.” See

Declaration of Pamela Price, Exh. H at 14-23

On May 25, 1993, Morgan filed another written complaint

with Amtrak’s EEO office regarding alleged ongoing racial

discrimination he was experiencing at the Yard. According to

* According to Morgan, tie wraps are small pieces of wire like the ties

used on plastic bread loaf wrappers.

30a

Morgan, three days later his job was “abolished” and he was

reassigned to the graveyard shift. Morgan does not explain

exactly how his job was “abolished.” On May 30, Morgan

filed another written complaint with Amtrak’s EEO office.

On July 14, 1993, Morgan was charged with a violation of

Rule O° and suspended for 15 days for taking an extra

vacation day with his family in May. Following a lengthy

union grievance, Amtrak settled the dispute in November

1994, and Morgan received back pay. The suspension was

ordered expunged from his ‘ile, although Morgan alleges that

Vandenburg did not comply with the expungement order.

On October 13, 1993, Morgan was charged with Rule F-1’

and F-3* violations for allegedly making improper remarks to

a union representative, Henry Bios, in July 1993. An

investigatory hearing was held in December 1993 at which

Morgan was found not guilty of the charges, and according to

Morgan all mention of the matter was ordered expunged from

his file. Morgan-alleges that Vandenburg did not comply with

the expungement order.

The conversation between Morgan and Rios was overheard

by another Amtrak employee, Kenneth Phillips. Although the

record is somewhat unclear on this matter, it appears that

Phillips initially substantiated Rios’ version of events, and

then sometime later changed his account so that it

corroborated Morgan's. Morgan alleges that after Phillips

changed his account, Vandenburg and other managers

* The parties have not provided the Court with the text of Rule O.

’ Rule F-1 states: “All employees are required to conduct themselves in

a courteous and professional manner in dealing with the public and other

Amtrak employees. Boisterous conduct or horseplay and profane or

vulgar language are prohibited.”

*Rule F-3 states “Conduct involving dishonesty, immorality or

indecency is prohibited. Employees must conduct themselves on and off

the job so as not to subject Amtrak to criticism or loss of goodwill.”

3la

pressured Phillips to lie and say that Morgan acted

improperly. In support, Morgan has submitted the deposition

testimony of Ken Phillips, in which he states he was called to

Vandenburg’s office, and that Vandenburg, Denton, Geske,

and Louis Bellotti spoke to Phillips about the incident.

Phillips was asked if Morgan had threatened him, and if that

was the reason why Phillips had changed his account and was

now lying about the incident. Phillips testified that he

reassured them that he was not lying and that he in fact did

not know Morgan. Phillips then testified that Vandenburg

asked the other managers to leave, and that once Phillips and

Vandenburg were alone, Vandenburg stated that “Abner is

going to be fired anyways{sic],” and “I need you to change

your story so we can fire Abner.” According to Phillips,

Vandenburg offered to “protect” Phillips if he changed his

story, and that if Phillips changed his story “great things”

could happen for Phillips at Amtrak. See Price Decl., Exh. M

at 58:8-60:19.

Morgan alleges that on October 14, 1993 Vandenburg

assaulted him by placing both of his hands on Morgan's

shoulders and forcing his upper torso to his knees. Morgan

reported the incident to the police and filed a formal

complaint with Amtrak’s EEO office. Morgan contends that

Amtrak did not investigate his complaint.

In December 1993, Bellotti canceled a training scheduled

for Morgan. Morgan complained about the cancellation on

January 18, 1994, and alleges that he received no response

from Amtrak.

On January 14, 1994, Bellotti and Denton required Morgan

to bring a doctor’s note for one day’s absence due to illness

before Morgan could return to work. Morgan contends that

this requirement was not included in Amtrak’s sick leave

policy, and that as a result of Bellotti’s and Denton’s refusal

to allow him to return to work, Morgan lost three day's pay.

Morgan appealed the loss of his pay for the three days, and on

32a

June 14, 1994 Amtrak settled the matter by agreeing to pay

Morgan for the time he was not permitted to work See Price

Decl., Exh. D.

B. Timely Claims: May 3, 1994 to February 1995

(1) 15 Day Suspension in September 1994

On September 9, 1994, Morgan was charged with a

violation of Rule L for allegedly failing to complete his work

assignments on September 2. On September 2, Morgan

worked a midnight to 8:00 am shift under the supervision of

Luerean Butler Van de Streek. According to Amtrak, Van de

Streek assigned Morgan to work all of the cars on train

number 702 and the last two cars on train number 704 (cars

53503 and 54013). Morgan completed his work on train

number 702, and that train left on time at 6:30 am. At 6:45, in

the presence of Earl Geske, Van de Streek reminded Morgan

that he needed to work the last two cars on train number 704.

Geske was Van de Streek’s direct supervisor. Morgan did not

complete the work on these cars, and Van de Streek gave

Morgan an “oral counseling” on the matter. After the oral

counseling, Borge charged Morgan with a violation of Rule L

for failing to complete his work.

On October 3, 1994, Amtrak held an investigatory hearing

on the Rule L charge. The Hearing Officer, Carlos

Hernandez, concluded that Morgan was guilty of the charge.

Hernandez forwarded his decision to Gerald Thomas Mescall,

who was at that time the Mechanical Superintendent for

Amtrak’s Western Division. Mescall decided to suspend

Morgan for 15 days.

Morgan contends that while he was assigned to work on

car 53503 on train 704, the other car —number 54013—was

assigned to a Caucasian electrician, George Guse. Morgan

further contends that although Guse did not complete his

work on that car, Guse was never charged with a Rule L

violation, or disciplined in any way. See Morgan Decl., { 34;

33a

Declaration of Robert Ramirez, ¢ 10. Additionally, Morgan

contends that it was Amtrak’s policy not to levy charges of

rules violations if an oral or written counseling was given to

the employee on the matter, and thus after Van de Streek gave

Morgan an oral counseling about the allegedly unfinished

work the Rule L charge should have never been filed against

him.

(2) February 1995 Termination

In December 1994, electrician Robert Craven and foreman

Michael Bordenave accused Morgan of threatening

Bordenave during a safety meeting. The allegations were not

substantiated, and no disciplinary action was taken against

Morgan.

On February 4, 1995, Bordenave again accused Morgan of

threatening him. The parties present markedly different

versions of events. According to Arntrak, on that day Morgan

was working the midnight to 8:00 am shift, and his immediate

supervisor was Bordenave. At the beginning of the shift,

Bordenave gave Morgan his assignments for the evening.

Later in the shift, Bordenave asked Morgan about his

progress. Morgan ignored the question, announced that he

had to “go shit,” and walked away. As he walked away,

Morgan mumbled profanity. Bordenave confronted Morgan

about his inappropriate reaction to Bordenave’s question, at

which point Morgan stated, “If you keep fucking with me,

punk motherfucker, you are going to find out.” Bordenave

left the area and reported the incident to the General

Foreman, Denton. Shortly thereafter, Morgan confronted

Bordenave in the lunchroom, stating, “You fucked up. I will

be waiting for you outside the gate and you will see how

Amtrak protects you now.”

Bordenave reported this second incident to Denton. Denton

instructed Bordenave and Morgan to report to his office so

they could discuss the matter. Morgan refused, stating he

would only enter Denton’s office if he was accompanied by a

34a

union representative. Denton told Morgan that his repre-

sentative was not needed because Denton only wanted to

discuss the matter. Morgan continued to refuse to enter the

office, and walked away. As a result, Denton informed

Morgan that he was being removed from service for

disobeying a direct order and for threatening a supervisor.

Morgan was then instructed to leave the property.

Morgan’s version of events is as follows: On February 4,

1995, Bordenave told Morgan that he would falsely claim that

Morgan threatened him and that Amtrak’s management

would believe Bordenave, not Morgan. Morgan states be

never threatened Bordenave, and has submitted the

declaration of Meriola Gotthardt, a fomer Amtrak employee,

which states that Gotthardt heard Bordenave say be would

falsely accuse Morgan. See Declaration of Meriola Gothardt,

{ 6. Morgan states that when Denton ordered him to go into

his office, he asked for a union representative because he

believed that the meeting could lead to disciplinary action.

When his request for a union representative was denied,

Morgan asked if co-worker Michael Shaw could be a witness

to the meeting. Denton responded by ordering everyone to

leave the main office, and screamed at Morgan to “get his

black ass” into Denton’s office. Morgan refused to enter

Denton’s office without union representation or a witness,

and was offended by Denton’s remark.

Morgan was formally charged with violating Rule F-2 and

Rule L, and an investigatory hearing was held. Hearing

Officer John Eschenbach determined that the charges against

Morgan were proven, and referred his decision to Joseph W.

Deely, the Director of Amtrak's California Corridor. Deely

made the decision to terminate Morgan's empioyment

(3) Denial of Jury Duty Pay

Morgan claims that be was denied pay for jury duty in June

1994, and again in January/February of 1995 in violation of

the collective bargaining agreement between Amtrak and the

35a

union. There are few facts in the record regarding the June

1994 jury duty, as Morgan simply alleges that he was not paid

for serving and Amtrak does not respond to this allegation.

With regard to the 1995 jury duty, Morgan served on January

30, 1995 and February 1, 1995. It is undisputed that Morgan

was not entitled to jury duty pay for February |, because that

day was Morgan’s regular rest day. However, the parties

dispute whether Morgan was in fact ever paid for serving on

January 30, 1995.

(4) Cancellation of Training

Morgan alleges that in October 1994 Borge directed Gary

Biemborn to cancel a scheduled training for Morgan because

Morgan had a “bad attitude.” The factual record is unclear as

to whether the training was in fact canceled.

(5) Denial of Access to Work File

Morgan claims that he made numerous requests to view his

work file as early as November 1991, and that Vandenburg

continued to deny Morgan's requests up to and including

December 1994. Amtrak explains that Amtrak maintains an

officiat “personnel” file and an unofficial “work” file on each

employee: in December 1994 the personnel files were

maintained by Amtrak's personnel department in Los

Angeles, while the work files were kept at the Oakland Yard.

Amtrak states that Vandenburg interpreted Amtrak's policy

as requiring employee access to their personnel files, but not

to their work files, and that based on this understanding,

Vane ourg denied Morgan’s December 1994 request to

view his “work” file. Vandenburg has submitted a declaration

stating based on his interpretation of Amtrak policies, it was

his general practice not to allow employees to view their

work files. See Declaration of Robert D. Vandenburg, ¢ 4.

————

36a

(6) Denial of Union Representation in December 1994

Although Morgan has identified in discovery responses

that he believes Amtrak discriminated against him by denying

him union representation at a meeting in December 1994,

Morgan does not address this allegation in his opposition to

Amtrak's motion, nor has Morgan provided any evidence in

support of this allegation.

(7) Posting Notice Regarding Grievance/Denial of

Bid for Job 515

Morgan alleges that in January 1995, Vandenburg posted a

notice at the Oakland Yard “to all concerned” regarding a

pending grievance that Morgan had filed regarding his

electrician seniority date. Amtrak has submitted evidence that

Vandenburg posted the notice because he was directed to do

so by the National Railroad Adjustment Board, and Morgan

does not dispute this fact. See Plaintiff's Amended Separate

Statement of Facts # 18.

Morgan also alleges that the denial of his bid for a

supervisory position (Job Number 515) was discriminatory

because, had his electrician seniority date been set at his

initial hiring date in 1990, he would have had the most

seniority of all the applicants for the position. However,

because Morgan did not become an electrician until 1992,

Morgan was not selected, and instead Luerean Butler Van de

Streek, an African-American woman, was hired.

2. Procedural Background

On February 27, 1995—after Morgan's suspension but

prior to his termination—Morgan filed a charge of

discrimination against Amtrak with the EEOC. In !.is charge,

Morgan stated that beginning in 1991 he protested Amtrak's

discriminatory treatment of himself and other African-

American employees, and that since that time he had been

subjected to retaliation. Morgan then identified four

37a

discriminatory and/or retaliatory acts: (1) denial of

refrigeration and air conditioning training in October 1994;

(2) denial of access to his work record in December 1994; (3)

suspension without pay pending the investigation of the

charge of threatening his supervisor, and (4) denial of pay for

jury duty in February 1995. See Complaint, Exh. 1. After

Morgan was terminated from Amtrak, he amended his EEOC

charge on March 8, 1995 to allege that his termination was

discriminatory and retaliatory. On July 3, 1996, the EEOC

issued a “Notice of Right to Sue.” Morgan filed the instant

lawsuit on October 2, 1996.

LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary

adjudication when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

In a motion for summary judgment, “[if] the moving party

for summary judgment meets its initial burden of identifying

for the court those portions of the materials on file that it

believes demonstrate the absence of any genuine issues of

material fact, “the burden of production then shifts so that

“the non-moving party must set forth, by affidavit or as

otherwise provided in Rule 56, ‘specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial."” T.W. Elec. Service, Inc. v.

Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.

1987) (citing Celotex Corp v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106

S. Ct. 317 (1986)).

In judging evidence at the summary judgment stage, the

Court does not make credibility determinations or weigh

conflicting evidence, and draws all inferences in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party. See T.W. Electric,

809 F.2d at 630-31 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus Co. Ltd. v.

38a

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986));

Ting v. United States, 927 F.2d 1504, 1509 (9th Cir. 1991).

The evidence presented by the parties must be admissible.

Fed, R. Civ. P. 56(e). Conclusory, speculative testimony in

affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine

issues of fact and defeat summary judgment. See Falls

Riverway Realty Inc. v. City of Niagara Falls, 754 F.2d 49

(2d Cir. 1985); Thornhill Publ’ g Co., Inc. v. GTE Corp., 594

F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979). Hearsay statements found in

affidavits are inadmissible. See e.g., Fong v. American

Airlines, Inc. 626 F.2d 759, 762-63 (9th Cir. 1980).

DISCUSSION

1. Morgan’s Claims Prior to the Limitations Period are

Time-Barred

In its motion for summary judgment, Amtrak first argues

that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all acts of

alleged discrimination which occurred more than 300 days

before Morgan filed his complaint with the EEOC. Morgan

argues that his allegations of conduct occurring prior to the

300 day period are actionable under the “continuing

violations” doctrine.

Under the continuing violations doctrine, “allegations of

conduct occurring prior to the limitations period are

actionable if the complainant can show that they are part of a

series of related acts against the complainant,” Has‘imoto v.

Dalton, 118 F.3d 671, 678 (9th Cir. 1997), cert denied,—

U.S.—, 118 S. Ct. 1803 (1998), and at least one of the

allegedly discriminatory acts falls within the limitations

period. See Draper v. Couer Rochester, Inc., 1998 WL

340411, at *4 (9th Cir. June 29, 1998) (to be reported at 147

F.3d 1104). However, even if both of these conditions are

met, courts have found that allegations of discrimination prior

to the limitations period are barred if the allegedly

discriminatory act would or should have triggered the

plaintiff's awareness of a violation and accompanying duty to

39a

assert his rights See e.g., Galloway v. General Motors Service

Parts Operations, 78 F.3d 1164, 1167 (7th Cir. 1996);

Roberts v. Gadsden Memorial Hosp. 835 F.2d 793, as

modified at 850 F.2d 1549 (11th Cir. 1988); Berry v. Board of

Supervisors, 715 F.2d 971, 981 (Sth Cir. 1983). As the

Seventh Circuit has noted,

The most difficult case arises when a long-continued

series of harassing acts definitely are a series, a pattern,

and not merely a set of discrete events, yet it was evident

long before the plaintiff finally sued that she was the

victim of actionable harassment. It seems to us that in

such a case, while she can still sue provided that the last

act of harassment occurred within the statute of

limitations, she cannot reach back and base her suit also

on conduct that occurred outside the statute of

limitations; for she had no excuse for waiting that long.

Galloway, 78 F.3d at 1167. The Galloway court then held that

“the plaintiff may not base her (in some cases his) suit on

conduct that occurred outside the statute of limitations unless

it would have been unreasonable to expect the plaintiff to sue

before the statute ran on that conduct, as in a case in which

the conduct could constitute, or be recognized, as actionable

harassment only in the light of events that occurred later,

within the period of the statute of limitations.” /d.

The factual record clearly establishes that Morgan believed

as early as 1991 that Amtrak and its managers were

discriminating against him on the basis of his race and

retaliating against him for his complaints. For example, on

October 4, 1991, Morgan filed a written complaint with

Amtrak’. EEO office complaining of “blatant racism” at the

Oakland Maintenance Yard, and specifically alleging the

following acts as discriminatory: (1) the March 22, 1991

termination for a Rule L violation; (2) Amtrak’s hiring of

Morgan as an electrician’s helper rather than as an electrician;

and (3) Amtrak’s failure to respond to Morgan’s request to

enter Amtrak's apprenticeship program. See Morgan Decl.,

40a

Exh. D. Morgan further states in his declaration that when

Denton charged him with a Rule L violation on October 16,

1991, he “protested strenuously” that this action was racially

motivated, and complained in writing. /d. at 4 12. In late

1991, Morgan and other Amtrak employees met with then-

Congresswoman Barbara Boxer to complain about

discriminatory conditions at Amtrak. /d. at ¢ 13. Morgan

States that as a result of this meeting, Rep. Boxer contacted

Amtrak's General Inspector, Fred Weiderhold, who visited

the Yard three times in 1992. Morgan personally met with

Weiderhold, and Morgan “tried repeatedly to bring the

continuing discriminatory and retaliatory practices at Amtrak

to his attention.” /d. at ¢ 16. Throughout 1992, 1993 and 1994

Morgan continued to complain to Amtrak of race discrim-

ination. See Morgan Decl., Exh G. (Oct. 21, 1993 EEO

complaint); Exh. F (Sept. 17, 1992 letter to Weiderhold) Exh.

H. (Jan. 18, 1994 EEO complaint).

Statutes of limitations “serve the important purpose of

encouraging the prompt filing of claims and by doing so

enhancing the likelihood of accurate determinations and

removing debilitating uncertainty about legal liabilities.”

Galloway, 78 F.3d at 1165. In the instant case, Morgan did

not file his complaints with the EEOC until February 1995,

despite the fact that he believed as early as 1991 that Amtrak

was discriminating and retaliating against him. Because

Morgan believed that he was being discriminated against at

the time that all of these acts occurred, it would not be

unreasonable to expect that Morgan should have filed an

EEOC charge on these acts before the limitations period on

these claims ran. Accordingly, the Court holds that all

allegations of discrimination occurring prior to the limitations

period are time-barred.”

” This holding does not preclude Morgan from presenting evidence of

acts that occurred prior to the limitations period if they are relevant to his

4la

2. Some Claims Not Specifically Mentioned in the

EEOC Charges That Occurred Within the Limitations

Period are Actionable

Amtrak next argues that Morgan is limited to litigating

only those timely claims that were specifically mentioned in

his February and March of 1995 EEOC complaints. In those

charges, Morgan listed four matters: (1) the alleged denial of

“updated refrigeration and air conditioning training” in

October 1994; (2) the alleged denial of access to his work

record in December 1994; (3) the alleged docking of his pay

for days served on jury duty in February 1995; and (4) the

suspension and subsequent termination for threatening and

using profanity against his supervisor and general foreman. In

addition to these acts of alleged discrimination, Morgan

contends in this lawsuit that Amtrak discriminated against

him by denying him pay for jury duty in June 1994,

suspending him without pay for 15 days in September 1994

for allegedly failing to complete his work assignments,

denying him union representation at a meeting in December

1994, posting a notice about a pending grievance in early

1995, and denying Morgan’s bid for a job in January 1995.

“The remedial purpose of Title VII and the paucity of legal

training among those whom it is designed to protect require

charges filed before the EEOC to be construed liberally.”

Stache v. International Union of Bricklayers and Allied

Craftsmen, 852 F.2d 1231, 1233 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,

493 U.S. 815, 110 S. Ct. 64 (1989). If a plaintiff files a

lawsuit based on incidents not specifically listed in his EEOC

charge, a federal court may hear the additional claims if they

are “like or reasonably related to the allegations contained in

the the EEOC charge.” Sosa v. Hiraoka, 920 F.2d 1451, 1456

(Mh Cir. 1990); accord EEOC v. Farmer Bros. Co., 3\ F.3d

891, 899 (9th Cir. 1994).

timely claims of discrimination and retaliation; this holding simply

precludes Morgan from recovering damages on these claims.

42a

“In determining whether an allegation under Title VII is

like or reasonably related to allegations contained in a

previous EEOC charge, the court inquires whether the

original EEOC investigation would have encompassed the

additional charges.” Green v. Los Angeles Cty. Superin-

tendent of Schools, 883 F.2d 1472, 1476 (9th Cir. 1989). The

Court concludes that the additional allegations regarding

unpaid jury duty, the 15 day suspension in September 1994,

and the denial of union representation at a December 1994

meeting are “like or reasonably related” to the claims Morgan

specifically mentioned in his EEOC charges. With regard to

unpaid jury duty, Morgan alleges that Amtrak denied him pay

for jury duty in violation of Amtrak policy both in June 1994

and in January-February 1995. These claims are virtually

identical. As for the September 1994 suspension, Morgan

claims that the initiation of the charges against him was

discriminatory and retaliatory, the same allegation he levies

against the February 1995 charges. In the Court’s view, these

charges are similar, and accordingly Morgan may pursue

these claims in this litigation. Finally, Morgan claim that he

was denied union representation at a meeting in December

1994 is “like or reasonably related” to his allegation that he

was denied union representation in connection with the

February 1995 termination.

However, the Court concludes that Morgan’s allegations

regarding the posting of a grievance in early 1995 and the fact

that Morgan was not selected for job number 515 are not

“like or reasonably related” to the allegations contained in his

EEOC charges, and accordingly these allegations are not

actionable. “Where claims are not so closely related that

agency action would be redundant, the EEOC must be

afforded an opportunity to consider disputes before federal

suits are initiated.” Brown v. Puget Sound Elec. Appren-

ticeship & Training Trust, 732 F.2d 726, 730 (9th Cir. 1984),

cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1108, 105 S. Ct. 784 (1985). In the

view of the Court, Morgan’s allegations regarding the posting

43a

of a notice and job number 515 are not so closely related that

the EEOC would have investigated these claims in the course

of investigating the claims in Morgan’s EEOC charges.

In any event, even if Morgan had included these allegations

in his EEOC charges, the Court concludes that Morgan has

not sustained his burden to defeat summary judgment. As

noted earlier, Morgan does not dispute that Vandenburg

posted the notice of the pending grievance because he had

been directed to do so by the National Railroad Adjustment

Board. Accordingly, there is no evidence that the posting of

the notice was discriminatory. Moreover, Morgan does not

allege that any adverse employment consequences flowed

from the posting of the grievance.

With regard to job number 515, Morgan alleges that he

should have been awarded the position because, had his

seniority date been set when he was first hired as an

electrician’s helper, rather than when he became an

electrician, he would have had the most seniority of all

applicants for job number 515. However, because Amtrak did

not reclassify Morgan’s position until 1992, “the subsequent

selection of any of the later-hired electricians for promotions

instead of Mr. Morgan is suspect and inherently based on

unfair advantage.” Plaintiff's Opposition, 23:11-13. Even if

this allegation had been contained in Morgan’s EEOC

charges, it would not withstand summary judgment because

Morgan has failed to establish a prima facie case of race

discrimination. Morgan has not produced any evidence in

support of his allegation that “Amtrak hired other less

qualified Caucasian Electricians between the beginning of

1991 and April 1992 and paid them at an Electrician’s rate.”

Morgan Decl. § 5. Furthermore, it is undisputed that

employee selected for job number 515 was Luerean Butler

Van de Streek, an African-American woman. As _ such,

Morgan has failed to offer evidence tha’ “give[s] rise to an

inference of unlawful discrimination,” a necessary element of

44a

a prima facie case. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v.

Burdine, 450 US. 248, 253, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1094 (1981).

3. Morgan has Raised Genuine Issues of Material Fact

with Regard to Some of His Actionable Claims

Amtrak finally argues that it is entitled to summary

judgment on Morgan’s timely claims because it has provided

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for Morgan’s Septem-

ber 1994 suspension and February 1995 termination, and

because Morgan cannot establish a prima facie case of

discrimination with regard to his jury duty, work file, denial

of training, and denial of union representation claims.

A. September 1994 Suspension

Amtrak asserts that there was a legitimate and nondis-

criminatory reason for Morgan’s 15 day suspension in

September 1994, and that Morgan has failed to produce any

evidence of pretext. Amtrak argues that Mescall’s decision to

suspend Morgan was based upon the Hearing Officer’s

decision that Morgan had violated Rule L for failing to

complete his work assignments. Amtrak argues that Morgan

has not shown that the suspension decision was motivated by

his race or an intent to retaliate against him, and that its

“honest belief’ that Morgan violated Rule L entitles it to

summary judgment on this claim.

The Ninth Circuit has recently held that in a discrimination

lawsuit, once a defendant has articulated nondiscriminatory

reasons for the allegedly discriminatory conduct, a plaintiff

may rebut chis presumption and raise a triable issue of fact to

defeat summary judgment in two ways. First, “[wJhen the

plaintiff offers direct evidence of discriminatory motive, a

triable issue as to the actual motivation of the employer is

created even if the evidence is not substantial.” Godwin v.

Hunt Wesson Inc., 1998 WL 547238, at *4 (9th Cir. Aug. 11

1998) (to be published at__F.3d___). Alternatively, “[iJn

45a

those cases where direct evidence is unavailable, however,

the plaintiff may come forward with circumstantial evidence

that tends to show that the employer’s proffered movtives

were not the actual motives because they are inconsisent or

otherwise not believable. Such evidence of ‘pretense’ must be

‘specific’ and substantial in order to create a triable issue [of

fact)...” Id. at *5.

In the instant case, Morgan submits the following evidence

that Amtrak selectively enforced its rules against Morgan.

Robert Ramirez, who from 1990 to 1995 was in charge of

filing and processing grievances and representing Amtrak

electricians from the Yard at investigatory hearings, has

submitted a declaration stating that during that time period no

other electricians at the Yard were charged with a Rule L

violation. See Declaration of Robert Ramirez, | 2. Ramirez

represented Morgan in the hearing on the alleged September

1994 Rule L violation, as well as the February 1995 charges.

Ramirez states that during the October 3, 1994 hearing,

“testimony and evidence showed that Car 54013 [one of the

cars Morgan was charged with not completing work on] was

not assigned to Mr. Morgan, but was assigned to George

Guse, a white Electrician. George Guse was never disciplined

for not working on Car 54013.” /d. at ¥ 10.'° Morgan has

also submitted the deposition testimony of Earl Geske, in

which he states that once an employee has been given a

written or oral counseling about a matter, the employee is not

also charged with a rule violation. See Price Decl., Exh. J at

'° Morgan has submitted other evidence of selective enforcement of

rules by Amtrak. Morgan has submitted evidence that a Caucasian

electrician was not charged with a Rule L violation for refusing to attend a

meeting without his union representative, while Morgan was charged with

a Rule L violation for the same offense, see Price, Decl., 4 12 and Exh. K,

and that a Caucasian electrician was not brought up on charges for cursing

at his supervisors, while Morgan was charged with a rule violation for

such conduct. See id. at ¢ 10 and Exh. I.

46a

100:10-26. However, Morgan has submitted evidence that

Butler Van de Streek gave him an oral counseling on the

matter, but that Morgan was nevertheless brought up on Rule

_ Lcharges.

Morgan has also submitted the deposition testimony of

Elwood Conley, a former Amtrak employee, who testified

that Borge, the charging officer, had a habit of referring to

African-Americans as “shuffle-butt niggers.” See Price Decl.,

Exh. H at 21:14-17. Finally, Morgan has submitted evidence

suggesting that since at least July 1993 both Borge and Geske

(who testified at the hearing) were intent on getting Morgan

fired. Kenneth Phillips, a former Amtrak employee, testified

at his deposition that Geske was among a group of managers

who attempted to pressure Phillips to lie so that Amtrak could

fire Morgan. See Price Decl., Exh. M at 58:18-60:9. Gary

Biemborn, an Amtrak trainer, testified in his deposition that

in October 1994 Borge instructed Biemborn not to provide

training to Morgan. See Price Decl., Exit F. at 86:16-23.

The above evidence persuades the Court that Morgan has

raised a genuine issue of fact as to whether Amtrak’s

nondiscriminatory explanation for its actions is the true

reason or whether it masks discriminatory motives. Amtrak

argues that regardless of whether Borge, Geske and other

Amtrak employees acted with discriminatory intent, the fact

that the hearing officer, Hernandez, and the official who

ultimately decided to suspend Morgan, Mescall, acted on a

good faith belief that Morgan had violated Rule L, Amtrak is

not liable for discrimination or retaliation. In advancing this

argument, Amtrak relies primarily on Elrod v. Sears Roebuck

& Co., 939 F.2d 1466 (11th Cir. 1991). In Elrod, the Eleventh

Circuit found that a plaintiff alleging age discrimination had

failed to offer any substantially probative evidence at trial

that age more likely than not motivated his discharge. At trial,

the defendant, Sears, Roebuck and Company, justified

terminating Elrod on the ground that it believed he had

47a

engaged in sexual harassment of numerous female

employees. Sears believed so after it conducted a lengthy

investigation of charges, and the pleintiff repeatedly

acknowledged in writing that he had acted inappropriately.

However, at trial Elrod contended that he was innocent of the

sexual harassment charges. The Eleventh Circuit held that it

was irrelevant whether Elrod was in fact guilty of the sexual

harassment charges; rather, what was salient was whether

Sears believed that Elrod was guilty of harassment, and if so,

if that belief was the reason behind his discharge. Moreover,

the court noted that Elrod had not offered any substantially

probative evidence that age more likely than not motivated

his discharge.

The Court initially notes that Elrod is not binding authority

in the Ninth Circuit, and that therefore the Court is not

required to apply Elrod as Amtrak argues. It is unclear

whether the Ninth Circuit would adopt the Elrod court’s

analysis. See Mitchell v. Keith, 752 F.2d 385, 388-89 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, General Motors Corp. v. Mitchell, 472

U.S. 1028, 105 S. Ct. 3502 (1985) (“It is the law of this

circuit that an employer who acted in good faith in firing an

employee may be liable where the action complained of was

that of a supervisor, authorized to hire, fire, discipline or

promote, or at least to participate in or recommend such

actions . .. .”) (internal quotation omitted).

However, even if the Court were to apply Elrod, the Court

would nevertheless deny Amtrak’s motion for summary

judgment on this claim because of significant factual

differences between Elrod and this case. First, the plaintiff in

Elrod complained only that the discharge was discriminatory;

in the instant case, Morgan alleges that not only was the

ultimate suspension discriminatory, but that the initiation of

the charges was itself discriminatory. Second, the Elrod court

held that Sears was entitled to judgment because it had a good

faith belief that Elrod had engaged in misconduct. In light of

the evidence presented suggesting that Amtrak’s initiation

48a

and prosecution of rule violations was discriminatory and

retaliatory, there is a question of triable fact as to whether

Amtrak had a good faith belief that the charges were founded.

Similarly, Morgan has submitted evidence that the hearing

itself was not fair. See Ramirez Decl. 99 3, 10. Third, the

Elrod court made it clear that Sears was entitled to a directed

verdict not only because Sears had acted on its good faith

belief, but also because Elrod had not put forth substantially

probative evidence that age was the motivating factor for his

discharge. See Elrod, 939 F.2d at 1471. In the instant case

Morgan has submitted a significant amount of evidence

suggesting that Amtrak managers and supervisors may have

acted with discriminatory intent in initiating and prosecuting

charges of rule violations against Morgan. For these reasons,

the Court hereby DENIES defendant’s motion for summary

judgment on this claim.

B. February 1995 Termination.

As with the September 1994 suspension, Amtrak argues

that it has legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for

terminating Morgan because Amtrak believed, based upon the

Hearing Officer’s decision, that Morgan was guilty of the

charged violations. For the reasons set forth above, the Court

rejects this argument. The Court finds that Morgan has raised

a genuine issue of fact as to whether Amtrak’s proffered

reason for terminating him was simply pretext for race

discrimination and retaliation. Much of the same evidence

that Morgan submitted in relation to the September 1994

suspension is relevant to the February 1995 termination

because it raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether the

initiation of disciplinary charges against Morgan was

discriminatory. Morgan has also submitted evidence that the

investigatory hearing was unfair; Ramirez states in his

declaration that Borge “directed and controlled” the hearing

and that the Hearing Officer reversed his position after Borge

expressed his opinion regarding the issue. See Ramirez Decl.,

49a

{ 3. Morgan has submitted the declaration of Meriola

Gotthardt, a former Amtrak engineer, who states that in 1992

she overheard Chuck Berg, a road foreman, tell J.W. Deely

(the Amtrak official who decided to terminate Morgan) that

he was going to give some work to one of those “nigger

bitches,” and that Deely did not reprimand Berg. See

Gottbardt Decl. ¢ 1'' Gotthardt also states that in 1993 she

heard Deely state that “the problem with these niggers is that

after you train them, they walk out on you.” /d. at { 2.

Gotthardt states she complained to Deely regarding the use of

racial slurs at the Yard, and that nothing was done in response

io her complaint. /d. at ¢ 5. Finally, Gotthardt states that in

approximately late 1994 or carly 1995, she saw Bordenave

and Morgan having a “heated discussion,” and that she heard

Bordenave say he was going to accuse Morgan of threatening

him and that “they” would believe him. /d. at ¢ 6.

For the reasons described above, the Court hereby DENIES

defendant’s motion for summary judgment on this claim.

C. Jury Duty

Morgan alleges that Amtrak did not pay him for jury duty

served in June 1994 and January and February 1995. Amtrak

argues Morgan has not established a prima facie case with

regard to these allegations because the denial of jury pay is

not an “adverse employment action” under Title VII and

because Morgan has not submitted any evidence giving rise

to an inference of discrimination. Morgan responds that the

'' Amtrak objects to Gotthardt’s declaration on the ground that Morgan

did not identify Gotthardt in his response to an interrogatory asking for all

facts regarding Morgan’s contention that Deely harbored racial animus.

Amtrak requests that the Court strike Gotthardt’s declaration, citing

School Dist. No. 1J. Multnomah Cty. v. Acands Inc., et al. 5 F.3d 1255

(9h Cir. 1993). The Court declines to strike Gotthardt’s declaration,

concluding that it contains relevant evidence and that Morgan's failure to

identify Gotthardt in his interrogatories was not in bad faith.

50a .

denial of jury duty pay is an adverse employment action, but

does not address Amtrak’s contention that there is no

evidence in the record suggesting that the denial of jury pay

was discriminatory or retaliatory.

Upon the Court’s review of the record, the Court finds that

Morgan has not put forth any evidence suggesting that the

alleged denials of jury duty pay in 1994 and 1995 were

discriminatory or retaliatory. Accordingly the Court finds that

Morgan has not stated a prima facie case, and hereby

GRANTS Amtrak’s motion for summary judgment on these

claims.

D. Canceled Training

Morgan alleges that Amtrak canceled training that was

scheduled for him in October 1994. Amtrak advances two

arguments in its motion for summary judgment on this claim:

(1) no one was provided training in October 1994, and

therefore Morgan was not treated differently on the basis of

his race; and (2) Morgan was certified to work on all Amtrak

equipment, and therefore any denial of training did not

constitute an “adverse employment action.”

The Court rejects Amtrak’s arguments and finds that there

are disputed issues of material fact regarding Morgan's claim

of canceled training. Morgan has submitted evidence that

Borge told Biemborn not to train Morgan in October 1994

because Morgan had a “bad attitude.” Morgan has also

submitted evidence that Borge was known to make racially

discriminatory remarks, and that Borge was part of a group of

managers who desired to have Morgan terminated. Amtrak's

assertion that no other Amtrak employee was provided

training in October 1994 has no bearing on whether Amtrak

discriminated and/or retaliated against Morgan by canceling

his training.

The Court also rejects Amtrak’s argument that Morgan’s

claim fails because the denial of training did not constitute an

Sla

“adverse employment action,” concluding that there are

genuine issues of disputed fact whether the denial of training

adversely affected Morgan’s employment. For these reasons,

the Court DENIES defendant’s motion for summary

judgment on this claim.

E. Denial of Access to Work File

Morgan claims that in December 1994, Vandenburg denied

his requests to view his work file, and that these denials were

discriminatory and retaliatory. Amtrak argues that the denial

of access to a work file is not an adverse employment action,

and therefore that Morgan has not established a prima facie

case regarding this claim. The Court agrees, finding that

Morgan has not alleged any particular adverse consequences

that flowed from the denial of access to his files. Based upon

the facts of this case, it appears that this allegation is better

viewed not as a separate claim, but merely as evidence that

Morgan may submit of Amtrak’s alleged discrimination and

retaliation against him. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS

Amtrak's motion for summary judgment on this claim.

F. Denial of Union Representation

As noted earlier, although Morgan has stated in discovery

responses that he believes Amtrak discriminated and/or

retaliated against him by denying him union representation at

a meeting in December 1994, Morgan does not discuss this

allegation in his opposition papers, nor does he present any

evidence in support of this allegation. Accordingly, the Court

GRANTS Amtrak’s motion for summary judgment on this

claim, as Morgan has failed to establish a prima facie case

regarding this allegation.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS

defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Morgan's

claims regarding: (1) alleged discrimination or retaliation

52a

which occurred prior to the 300-day limitations period, or

May 3, 1994; (2) posting the notice of the grievance in early

1995; (3) denial of Morgan’s bid for job number 515 in 1995;

(4) denial of jury duty pay in 1994 and 1995; (5) denial of

access to work files in December 1994; and (6) denial of

union representation in December 1994.

Finding there are triable issues of fact, the Court hereby

DENIES defendant’s motion for summary judgment on

Morgan’s claims regarding: (1) the September 1994 suspen-

sion; (2) the February 1995 suspension and termination; and

(3) cancellation of training in October 1994.

IT IS SO ORDERED

Dated: September 10, 1998

/s/ Susan [llston

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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Petition for Writ of Certiorari — National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan · 536 U.S. 101 | Frix