Opposition Brief — US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett

Supreme Court brief2002

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

6 Supreme Geert. 98

g FILED |

: |

ö

No. 00-1250

IN THE —

Supreme Court of the United States

US AIRWAYS, IN.,

Petitioner,

V.

ROBERT BARNETT,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Wnt of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

William C. McNeill, III Todd Schneider

Claudia Center* SCHNEIDER, MCCORMAC

THE EMPLOYMENT LAW & WALLACE

CENTER, A PROJECT OF 1700 California Street

THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY Suite 340

OF SAN FRANCISCO San Francisco, CA 94109

1663 Mission Street (415) 440-3440

Suite 400

San Francisco, CA 94103

(415) 864-8848

— —

Counsel of Record

Richard L. Davis Robert W. Rychlik

18161 North Timber P.O. Box 10847

Ridge Dnve Palm Desert, CA 92255

Surprise, AZ 85374 (760) 772-4737

(623) 544-0354

Attorneys for Respondent

ROBERT BARNETT

—

PETITIONER’S QUESTIONS PRESENTED

l. Whether, as the en banc Ninth Circuit held below. the

ADA requires an employer to reassign a disabled

employee to a different position as a “reasonable

accommodation” even though another employee is

entitled to hold the position under the employer’ s

bona fide and established seniority system, or

whether, as other courts of appeals have held, the

ADA’s “reasonable accommodation” requirement

does not compel an employer to disregard the rights

of other employees under its seniority policy.

2. Whether, as the en banc Ninth Circuit held below.

evidence of an employer's failure to engage in an

interactive process with a disabled employee to

identify reasonable accommodations precludes the

employer from obtaining summary judgment in an

ADA action, or whether, as other courts of appeals

have held, any failure on the part of the employer to

engage in such an interactive process is of no legal

consequence in determining whether the employer

violated the ADA.

il

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PETITIONER’S QUESTIONS PRESENTED..................... i

OL ii

7 ———ůůů N

. — vi

,.. ——ꝛ 1

nnn crcecccccceccsscesessssessessesees 2

— ——— 5

L THE CIRCUITS ARE IN SUBSTANTIAL

AGREEMENT THAT A DISABLED EMPLOYEE

UNABLE TO PERFORM THE ESSENTIAL

FUNCTIONS OF THE CURRENT JOB MAY

SEEK REASSIGNMENT, EVEN IF THE

TRANSFER IS NOT EXPRESSLY PERMITTED

BY THE EMPLOYER’S OWN POLICIBG............ 7

A. There is No Material Dispute that

Modification of an Employer's Transfer

Policy May Be a Reasonable

a 9

B. The Only Exception That Has Developed in

the Case Law is When the Requested Transfer

is Barred by an Applicable Collective

Bargaining Agreement; Even Then, Such

Agreements Are Scrutinized Closely to

Determine Whether Any Provision in the

Agreement Would Permit the Transfer......13

2 Neither the Recent Dicta in EEOC v. Sara

Lee Corporation Nor the 1997 Obiter Dicta in

Foreman Justify this Court’s Intervention. 16

1. Further Development of the Case Law

Will Likely Resolve Any Differences

Between the Case-by-Case Analysis

Used by Most Circuits and the Fourth

Circuit's Dicta Suggesting a Per Se

—: , , , 17

2. Here. Unlike the Seniority Policy

Discussed in Sara Lee, the Employer's

Policy Had Been Unilaterally

Modified to Assign Vacancies

Regardless of Seniority, and Created

No Contract Rights; Additionally, the

Employer Presented No Specific

Evidence That Permitting Mr. Barnett

to Remain in the Position Would Be

THERE IS NO CONFLICT IN THE CIRCUITS

REGARDING THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF

AN EMPLOYER'S FAILURE TO ENGAGE IN AN

INTERACTIVE PROCESS WITH ITS DISABLED

EMPLOYEE: THE CIRCUITS AGREE THAT

SUCH A FAILURE HAS NO INDEPENDENT

LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE, BUT IS RELEVANT

EVIDENCE OF AN EMPLOYER'S FAILURE TO

QO +—— —j—ẽ— 22

— |

iv Vv

A. While an Employer's Failure to Engage in the | LIST OF APPENDICES

Interactive Process May Be Evidence

Relevant to the Question of Whether the Appendix A

Employer Failed to Provide Accommodation, In the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,

No Circuit Has Held that an Employer's Situng En Banc

Failure to Engage Constitutes an Independent June 22, 2000

eee 24 Reporter s Transcript of Proceeding

(from official audiotape)

B. The Opinion in Barnett Joins Several Circuits

Noting That Where a Plaintiff Has Identified

a Possible Accommodation, and Presents

Evidence that the Employer Failed to Engage

in an Interactive Process, Summary Judgment

BP IIIIIOD, cccsscssrescsscecseensvsmmemmncscens 25

2. There is No Conflict Among the Circuits that

Summary Judgment May Be Granted Against

Appendix B

Lawrence Deposition, Exhibit X

Appellee’s Excerpt of Record, p. Il

— —

an ADA Plaintiff Where No Possible

Accommodation Has Been Identified,

Regardless of Whether There is Evidence that

the Employer Failed to Engage 28

D yr. 7 29

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Aka v. Washington Hospital Center, 156 F.3d 1284

(D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc) ..... passim

Aldrich v. Boeing, 146 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998)........... 14

Allen v. Rapides Parish School Board, 204 F.3d 619

— 28

Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626 (7th

Re Ly ee 8,9, 27

Barnett v. U.S. Air, 228 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2000)

— passim

Beck v. University of Wis., 75 F.3d 1130 (7th Cir.

— 10. 23. 28

Benson v. Northwest Airlines, 62 F.3d 1108 (8th Cir

—— — —— 14

Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946). 21

Bratton v. SSI Servs., 185 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 1999)............ 8

Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134 (2d Cir.

Bouzianis v. U.S. Air, Inc., 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

15470 D. Mass. Sept. 30, 1985). 20

Buckingham v. United States, 998 F.2d 735 (9th Cir.

vii

Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Community Schs., 100

.. 23

Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917) ...........0.. 16

Cannice v. Norwest Bank lowa, 189 F.3d 723 (8th

. —ñ̃ —̃ —— Ä—Ä— 24

Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19-23 (1980). . 21

Cassidy v. Detroit Edison Co., 138 F.3d 629 (6th Cir.

Cehrs v. Northeast Ohio Alzheimer's Research

Center, 155 F.3d 775 (6th Cir. 1998) 23

Cravens v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas

City, 214 F.3d 1011 (8th Cir. 2000)............... passim

Criado v. IBM Corp., 145 F.3d 437 (Ist Cir. 1998) ....23, 26

Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu, 141 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 1998)

scenseilibinssscupasannoemeseosnosnenessonenecessosssenescseass 9, 11, 18, 27

Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695 (SthCir. —--

Davis v. Florida Power & Light Co., 205 F.3d 1301

0 14. 15

Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 242-48 (1979)... . 21

Davoll v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116 (10th Cir. 1999 ͥ 10

Vili

Deane v. Poncono Medical Center, 142 F.3d 138 (3d

I.— — 23

Deas v. River West, 152 F.3d 471 (Sth Cir. 1998)............... 8

Donahue v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 224 F.3d 226

„ 24. 28

Duckett v. Dunlop Tire Corporation, 120 F.3d 1222

. ee 11

Earl v. Mervyns, Inc., 2007 F.3d 1361 (11th Cir.

— . ˙ 28

Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041 (7th

11% 10, 14. 15

E. E. O. C. v. Humiston-Keeling, 227 F.3d 1024 (7th

J — 11

E. E. O. C. v. MCI Telecommunications Com., 993 F.

Sump. T26 CD. AB. 0909.8 26

E. E. O. C. v. Sara Lee, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 268

lee 4) | passim

Fedro v. Reno, 21 F.3d 1391 (7th Cir. 1994) . 10

Feliberty v. Kember Corp., 98 F.3d 274 (7th Cir.

ix

Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut, 188 F.3d 944 (8th Cir. 1999)

— n passim

Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800

r 8, 13,17

Garcia-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, 212 F.3d 638

n 10, 17

Gaul v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 134 F.3d 576 (3rd

C 7

Gile v. United Airlines, 213 F.3d 365 (7th Cir. 2000) 10

Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 95 F.3d 492 (7th Cir.

Hansen v. Henderson, 233 F.3d 521 (7th Cir. 2000)...23, 26

Hendricks-Robinson v. Excel Corp., 154 F.3d 685

. 9, 10, 23

Humphrey v. Memorial Hospitals Association,

F.3d —. 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 2099 (9th

.... · x 25

Hunt-Golliday v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation

District, 104 F.3d 1004 (7th Cir. 1997)... 28

Jackan v. New York Department of Labor, 205 F.3d

e 11, 15, 28

x

Jacques v. Clean-Up Group, Inc., 96 F.3d 506 (Ist

„ 1—. 24, 27

Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76 (3d Cir. 1997).............. 13. 15

Layne & Bowler Corp. v. Western Well Works, 261

I erticatiginicincaditainintaninincincnnninl 6

Loulseged v. Akzo Nobel Inc., 178 F.3d 731 (Sth Cir.

— 23, 28

Mengine v. Runyon, 114 F.3d 415 (3rd Cir. 1997)

—- 3 23, 28

Miller v. Illinois Department of Corrections, 107

hE Fe ee 23, 28

Moses v. American Nonwovens, 97 F.3d 446 (11th

a, 1—— . ˙ 24. 28

Mustafa v. Clark County Sch. District, 157 F.3d 1169

1 T—T—P—— 26

Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 1995) . 8,17

N.L.R.B. v. Pittsburgh Steamship Co., 340 U.S. 498

— 6

Norville v. Staten Island University Hospital, 196

929990 7. 16

Pritchard v. Southern Company Services, 92 F.3d

reer 7

xi

Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetary, Inc.,

, 6

Ross v. Indiana State Teachers Association, 159

F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 1998). 28

Rudolph v. United States, 370 U.S. 269 (1962). . . 6

Salanger v. U.S. Air, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 427 (N.D.

e . a, 20

Smith v. Midland Brake, 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir.

ERNIE e. passim

Soto-Ocasio v. Federal Express, 150 F.3d 14 (Ist

D ! 24, 28

Southern Power Co. v. North Carolina Public

Service Co., 263 U.S. 508 (1924). 6, 20

Steffes v. Stepan Company, 144 F.3d 1070 (7th Cir.

RRR aR caries ere eis SL ee 28

Steel Workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) 21

Stewart v. Happy Hermans Cheshire Bridge, Inc.,

117 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 1997)... eee . 28

xii

Taylor v. The Principal Finance Group, 93 F.3d 155

KK 23

Terrell v. U.S. Air, 132 F.3d 621 (11th Cir. 1998)............ 13

The Monrosa v. Carbon Black Export Inc., 359 U.S.

—T—7———— 6-7

Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63

TK ea 15

United States v. City and County of Denver, 943 F.

Supp. 1304 OD. Colo. 1996) ... 12-13

Williams v. Channel Master Satellite Systems, 101

26000 ee 8, 18

Willis v. Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d 282 (11th Cir.

— — 8. 24. 28

Willis v. Pacific Maritime Association, 108 F. 3d 282

Ge, BD ——— 14, 15

Woodman v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1330 (10th Cir. 1997)......14

Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 276 (1986)......21

Statutes and Regulations

U.S. C. S. Supreme Ct. R. 10—L.u——)eů]n.——9——.———.“)ê 5

20.169 04.!1!ñ!ñUñẽtüéñüñũV 7

I veccecsneenecrenesenemnenenecinintatimanennmananians 7

42 U.S.C. 6 18681 26

Xili

r 16

American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101,

660 —̃ —— passim

r 7

JJ... hinscncnsccnscnitentrneuanisinnoninnasusiinenesenenites 9

WW ee 16

üer 7, 16

r 16-17

. 22

eee 20

Additional Authorities

S. Rep. No. 116, 10lst Cong. Ist Sess. (1989) 22

House Comm. on Educ. & Labor H.R. Rep. No.

485(I1), 101" Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) 7

29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(0) . . .. 8

E. E. O. C. Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable

Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the ADA

(March 1, 1999), at 39; accord 29 C. FR. Pt. 1630, App. §

r 8. 11

2B Sutherland Construction § 51.02 at pp. 200-201

c 16

INTRODUCTION

Respondent Robert Barnett respectfully requests that

the Court reject the Petitioner's request for a writ of certiorari

for the following reasons: There is no material conflict in

the Circuits with regard to the questions presented. As to the

first question, the Circuits are in complete agreement that a

disabled employee unable to perform the essential functions

of the current position may seek a transfer as a reasonable

accommodation, so long as the transfer does not directly

contravene the bargained-for seniority provisions of a

governing collective bargaining agreement. Further, the

Circuits are in overwhelming agreement that such a transfer

may be an accommodation even when not expressly

recognized by the employer's own policies. Recent dicta

from the Fourth Circuit stands alone in suggesting a per se

rule against any transfer requiring a modification of an

employer's unilaterally adopted seniority policy. Moreover,

the Fourth Circuit position will likely be reconciled with the

majority view without the intervention or resources of this

Court.

As to the second question, the Circuits are in accord

that an employer's failure to engage in the interactive process

can be considered evidence relevant to whether the employer

failed to accommodate the disabled employee. Furthermore,

and despite the Petitioner’s allusions to the contrary, no

Circuit has held that an employer's failure to engage in the

interactive process states an independent cause of action.

Significantly, the Respondent in this matter has never

asserted, nor did the Ninth Circuit find, that the Petitioner's

failures with regard to the interactive process constitute a

claim regardless of whether a reasonable and effective

accommodation was available.

2

Additionally, the petition’s characterizations

notwithstanding, the Ninth Circuit simply did not rule that an

employer's failure to engage in the interactive process

reflexively bars summary judgment. Rather, the Ninth

Circuit ruled precisely the same as has every other Circuit

which has considered the question: Where the plainuff has

demonstrated that a possible accommodation existed, the

employer's failure to engage in the interactive process is to

be construed as additional evidence precluding summary

judgment. This is only logical and practical, as this

additional evidence bars any conclusion as a matter of law

that it was the employee's fault that the possible

accommodation was not implemented. Certainly, where the

plaintiff cannot demonstrate that a possible accommodation

existed, the employer's failure to engage will not bar

summary judgment on the defendant's behalf.

Finally, and importantly, the Ninth Circuit found

disputed issues of fact as to three possible reasonable

accommodations, only one of which would have required a

modification of the Petitioner’s seniority policy. Under these

circumstances, the Ninth Circuit's decision to reverse

summary judgment was clearly proper. Thus, for all of these

reasons, the petition should be denied.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc,

held that an employer is not automatically enutled to

summary judgment merely because the disabled employee

sought among other possible accommodations — a

reassignment that required a modification of the employer s

unilaterally adopted seniority policy. It concluded that

additional evidence is required before such an employer may

obtain judgment as a matter of law: “It would seem that the

seniority system without more should not bar reassignment.

3

A per se bar conflicts with the basic premise of the

ADA, which grounds accommodation in the individualized

needs of the disabled employee and the specific burdens

which such accommodation places on an employer.” Barnett

v. U.S. Air, 228 F.3d 1105, 1119-20 (9th Cir. 2000) (en

banc). Significantly, the court also found disputed issues of

material fact as to whether two other proposed

accommodations, not requiring modification of the

Petitioner’s seniority policy, would have been effective. Id

at 1116-17. In light of these specific facts, the court reversed

, Sara, Id.

at 1122.

As the record establishes, Respondent Barnett

successfully worked for the Petitioner U.S. Air for ten years

before he became disabled through an on-the-job injury. At

that time, Respondent transferred into a mailroom position

that effectively accommodated his disability. Two years

later, Respondent learned that he would be displaced from

this position through the application of Petitioner’s seniority

policy. This policy was not part of a collective bargaining

agreement; rather, it was contained in the 1992 Personnel

Policy Guide. Ironically, the Petitioner U.S. Air has argued

in past cases that this Personnel Policy Guide creates no

legally enforceable rights for employees.

After learning that he would be displaced from his

existing position, Respondent contacted the Petitioner in

August of 1992 and requested accommodations for his

disability, and suggested a modification of the seniority

policy to permit him to remain in the mailroom. As noted by

' Tellingly, in the oral argument, counsel for the Petitioner was asked

more than one dozen times whether the seniority policy created legally

enforceable contract rights. At no time did counsel provide an answer to

this question. Respondent's Appendix A at 26-29, 31-33, 40-41.

4

the en banc panel, “U.S. Air did not respond to Barnett for

five months,” and then only “informed Barnett that he would

be removed from the mailroom.” 228 F.3d at 1109. At that

time, the Respondent also suggested special lifting

equipment permitting him to perform the functions of a

cargo position, or restructuring of the cargo position. A

month and a half later, in March of 1993, the Respondent

summarily denied any and all of the requested

accommodations. “U.S. Air rejected all three of Barnett’s

proposed reasonable accommodations and offered no

practical alternatives. ... U.S. Air did not seek to have a

dialogue with Barnett but instead rejected his proposed

accommodations by letter.” 228 F.3d at 1116-17.

The court found disputed issues of material fact as to

each of the three accommodations requested by the

Respondent. First, as to the Respondent's request to remain

in the mailroom position, the court declined to accept that the

existence of a seniority policy unilaterally adopted by an

employer is, without more, a per se bar to a reasonable

accommodation reassignment. Id. at 1120. Instead, the

court required a “case-by-case fact intensive analysis” to

determine whether reassignment is required by the ADA. /d.

Here, the court perceived no specific evidence of hardship or

disruption. Id. Second, the court found that the requested

lifting equipment was another “potentially reasonable

accommodation.” Id. at 1116-17. Finally, as to the third

requested accommodation, the court found disputed issues of

material fact as to whether the proposed job restructuring

would have been an appropriate accommodation. Id. at

1117.

The court further held that employers who have

received a request for accommodation must engage in an

interactive process with employees to determine appropriate

accommodations. Wie join explicitly with the vast

5

majority of our sister circuits in holding that the interactive

process is a mandatory rather than a permissive obligation on

the part of employers under the ADA and that this obligation

is triggered by an employee or an employee s representative

giving notice of the employee’s disability and the desire for

accommodation.” Id. at 1114.

In short, the court held. tj his is not a case where it

is obvious that no modification could enable the employee to

perform the essential functions of a job or where the

employee has caused the process to break down. Given U.S.

Air's failure to engage in the interactive process, liability

would be appropriate if a reasonable accommodation would

otherwise have been possible. There remains conflicting

evidence in the record as to whether a reasonable

accommodation without undue hardship to the employer was

possible. Thus, a triable issue of fact exists on this issue.”

Id. at 1117.

The court’s ruling follows black letter principles of

ADA jurisprudence. Where triable evidence exists that any

of three proposed accommodations - only one of which

would have required a modification of the Petitioner’s

seniority policy - would have enabled the Respondent to

continue working, and that the Petitioner failed to engage in

appropriate interaction with the Respondent, it is proper and

unremarkable that summary judgment for the employer was

reversed. The petition should be denied.

ARGUMENT

Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right,

but of judicial discretion. U.S.C.S. Supreme Ct. R. 10. A

petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only for

compelling reasons. /d. Petitions for certiorari seeking

resolution of a purported conflict in the courts are granted

6

only “in cases where there is a real and embarrassing

conflict of opinion and authority between the circuit courts

of appeals.” V. LR. B. v. Pittsburgh Steamship Co., 340 U.S.

498, 502 (1951) (quoting Layne & Bowler Corp. v. Western

Well Works, 261 U.S. 387, 393 (1923)) (emphasis added);

see also Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetary, Inc.,

349 U.S. 70, 74 (1955). No such conflict exists here. There

is no holding by another court of appeals that creates any real

or intolerable conflict with the decision of the Ninth Circuit.

The Circuits are in substantial agreement as to the first

question proffered by Petitioner, and the conflicting dicta

from the Fourth Circuit will certainly be resolved by further

development of the case law without the intervention or

resources of this Court. Additionally, and contrary to

Petitioner’s brief, there is no conflict as to the second

question. Accordingly, the petition should be rejected.

Moreover, the ruling below found disputed issues of

material fact as to two accommodations unrelated to

Petitioner’s first question. It is plain that a Circuit court may

properly find unreviewable and triable issues of fact as to

whether lifting equipment or job restructuring would have

effectively accommodated an employee. Illt is not for this

Court to re-examine the evidence, and disturb [the court's]

findings.” Rudolph v. United States, 370 U.S. 269, 278

(1962). Furthermore, Petitioner’s brief is disingenuous at

best in its discussion at footnote 3 of the Ninth Circuit's

plain holding with regard to these additional reasonable

accommodations. See Southern Power Co. v. North

Carolina Public Service Co., 263 U.S. 508, 509 (1924)

Wie have pointed out the necessity for clear, definite and

complete disclosures concerning the controversy when

applying for certiorari.”). As the ruling below was clearly

appropriate as to the alternative accommodations, the

petition should be denied. See The Monrosa v. Carbon

Black Export Inc., 359 U.S. 180, 183 (1959) (“It appears that

7

in any event the respondent will be able to try its claim in the

district court.”).

I. THE CIRCUITS ARE IN SUBSTANTIAL

AGREEMENT THAT A DISABLED

EMPLOYEE UNABLE TO PERFORM THE

ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS OF THE CURRENT

JOB MAY SEEK REASSIGNMENT, EVEN IF

THE TRANSFER IS NOT EXPRESSLY

PERMITTED BY THE EMPLOYER’S OWN

POLICIES.

In enacting the Americans with Disabilities Act of

1990 (ADA), Congress announced its sweeping intention “to

provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the

elimination of discrimination against individuals with

disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). The ADA expressly

includes “not making reasonable accommodations to an

otherwise qualified individual with a disability” as prohibited

employment discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5). The

right to accommodations is a “key requirement” of the Act.

House Comm. on Educ. & Labor, H.R. Rep. No. 4850),

101st Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1990). The ADA specifically

identifies “reassignment to a vacant position” as a reasonable

accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B); cf. 29 U.S.C. 88

791(g), 794(d) (reflecting 1992 amendments).

In light of the ADA’s express mandate, it is

unremarkable that the Circuit courts have universally

acknowledged that reassignment must be considered as a

possible accommodation for a disabled employee unable to

perform the essential functions of the current position.? The

* Feliciano v. Rhode Island, 160 F.3d 780, 785-86 (1st Cir. 1998);

Norville v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 196 F.3d 89, 99 (2d Cir. 1999);

Gaul v. Lucent Technologies, Inc, 134 F.3d 576, 580 (3 Cir. 1998).

E.E.0.C. v. Sara Lee, 237 F.3d 349 (stating in dicta that even if

8

en banc ruling in Barnett only falls into rank with this

considerable line of cases. 228 F.3d at 1118.

That a reassignment is a possible reasonable

accommodation under the ADA does not create an unfettered

right. As clarified by the E. E. O. C. regulations and guidance,

reassignment to a vacant position is “the reasonable

accommodation of last resort,” which need only be

considered when an employee is not able to perform the

essential functions of his or her job even with

accommodations. E. E. O. C. Enforcement Guidance:

Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the

ADA (March 1, 1999), at 39; accord 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630,

App. § 1630.2(0); Aka v. Washington Hospital Center, 156

F.3d 1284, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc). An employer

need only transfer the employee to a position for which the

employee is otherwise qualified. Baert v. Euclid Beverage,

Lid., 149 F.3d 626, 633 (7th Cir. 1998). Further, the

employer is not required to “bump” other employees to

create a vacancy, or to create a new position for the disabled

employee disabled, reassignment required only when position is vacant);

Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 811 (Sth Cir. 1997),

cert denied, 522 U.S. 1115 (1998) (noting in dicta that even if employee

were disabled, his request for reassignment could not prevail because the

proposed transfer would violate the collective bargaining agreement);

Deas v. River West, L.P., 152 F.3d 471 (Sth Cir. 1998) (noting in dicta

that even if employee were disabled, she failed to identify an available

position); Bratten v. SSI Servs., 185 F.3d 625, 634 (6th Cir. 1999); Gile v.

United Airlines, Inc., 95 F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir. 1996); Cravens v. Blue

Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas City, 214 F.3d 1011, 1018 (8th Cir.

2000); Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut, 188 F.3d 944, 950 (8th Cir. 1999); Smith

y. Midland Brake, 180 F.3d 1154, 1167 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc); Willis

v. Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d 282, 284 (11th Cir. 1997); Pritchard v.

Southern Company Services, 92 F.3d 1130, 1134 (11th Cir. 1996)

(permitting failure to transfer case to go forward), Aka v. Washington

Hospital Center, 156 F.3d 1284, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc); contra.

Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 284 (4th Cir. 1995); but see Williams v.

Channel Master Satellite Systems, 101 F.3d 346, 350 & n.4 (4th Cir.

1996) (recognizing rea.signment as possible accommodation).

9

employee. Id. Ar r ployer need not convert

positions into permanent ones. Dalton v. Subaru - Isuxu

Automotive, 141 F.3d 667, 680 (7th Cir. 1998); Hendricks-

Robinson v. Excel Corp., 154 F.3d 685, 697 (7th Cir. 1998)

Indeed, the Barmen court did not hold otherwise. |

The employer is not required to provide the

with the accommodation or transfer he — —

employer need only provide some effective accommodation

Baer. 149 F.3d 626, 633. “[W]hen an employee requests a

transfer as reasonable accommodation and the employer

offers alternative reasonable accommodation, which the

employee then refuses, the employer cannot be liable for

failing to reasonably accommodate the employee by not

transferring him to another position.” Gile v. United Airlines

95 F.3d 499 (7th Cir. 1996). Finally, an employer need not

provide a transfer that imposes an undue hardship. 42

og § 12112(b)(S)(A). Barnett is in accord. 228 F.3d at

A. There is No Material Dispute that Modification of

an Employer's Transfer Policy May Be a

Reasonable Accommodation.

The Petitioner asserts that the ADA can nev

a deviation from an employer's own — 1

policies, and that this “principle” has been adopted by the

‘virtually all circuits.” Brief at p. 17. This statement is

misleading and plainly wrong. ¶ A] djustment or

modification of . . . policies” is expressly listed as a possible

accommodation in the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9\B)2

* Notably, the “principle” against policy modification asserted

Petitioner would eviscerate the — to — —

accommodation See Smith v. Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1176. Any

accommodation could be deemed subject to the employer's voluntarily

adopted policies and therefore unavailing to the requesting employee.

10

An overwhelming majority of Circuit courts have

endorsed such modifications. These cases are legion:

Garcia-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638, 646

(Ist Cir. 2000) (“The company's apparent position that the

ADA can never impose an obligation on a company to grant

an accommodation beyond the leave allowed under the

company's own leave policy is flatly wrong under our

precedent.”); Fedro v. Reno, 21 F.3d 1391, 1396 (7th Cir.

1994) (“reasonable accommodation may even include a

requirement that an employer alter existing policies or

procedures that it would not change for nonhandicapped

employees”); Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d

1041, 1051-52 (7th Cir. 1996) (provisions of union contract

may be modified so long as modification does not implicate

collectively-bargained seniority rights); Hendricks-Robinson,

154 F.3d at 694-700 (defendant's medical layoff and

reinstatement policy which excluded certain vacant jobs, and

which required “physical fitness” for new positions, did not

meet accommodation obligation); Gile v. United Airlines,

213 F.3d 365, 374 (7th Cir. 2000) (employee not required to

comply with United's bidding and competitive transfer

procedures) Beck v. Univ. of Wis., 75 F.3d 1130, 1135 (7th

Cir. 1996) (“employer must be willing to consider making

changes in its ordinary work rules, facilities, terms, and

conditions”); Cravens v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 214

F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (8th Cir. 2000) (employer's internal

application procedure insufficient to provide accommodation

to employee who requested assistance in locating job within

the company); Davoll v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116, 1134 (10th

Cir. 1999) (duty to reassign disabled police officers required

modification of employer’s policy against transferring

Fortunately, there is no need for the Court to clarify this basic analysis,

as the en banc panel properly ruled in Barnert that the employer’s policy

could be modified to effectuate an effective accommodation. 228 F.3d at

1118-20.

11

officers to Career Service positions, and employer’s request

for jury instruction that ADA simply requires equal

treatment was properly denied — An employer’s policy that

does not provide accommodations for non-disabled workers .

. . will not excuse the employer’s failure to reasonably

accommodate disabled workers.”).*

Of particular note are the en banc panels of the Tenth

and D.C. Circuits. These courts recognize the plain language

of the statute by holding that the accommodation duty is not

limited to simply making available existing policies of the

employer, but may require adjustments to these policies:

If the ADA requires [the employer] to reassign [the

employee], and [the employer) has the power to make

the reassignment without violating the CBA rights of

its other employees, [the employer] must make the

reassignment, and may not refuse to do so on the

See also E. E. O. C. Guidance at 41 (“If an employer has a policy

prohibiting transfers, it would have to modify that policy in order to

reassign an employee with a disability, unless it could show undue

hardship.”); Jackan v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 205 F.3d 562, 565

(2d Cir. 2000) (refusing to affirm the trial court on the grounds that the

civil service rules in effect would have prohibited the plaintiff's transfer,

and instead affirming on other grounds; cf. Duckett v. Dunlop Tire

Corporation, 120 F.3d 1222, 1225 (11th Cir. 1997) (court cited

employer's policy against transfers from management to production line,

but also noted that reassignment was barred by applicable collective

bargaining agreement and that plaintiff testified that he was unable to

work at all); E. E. O C. v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024, 1028-29

(7th Cir. 2000) (anti-discrimination laws may require employers to

change policies adopted for non-discriminatory reasons, but employer not

required to deviate from “consistent and honest” policy of selecting best

candidate for vacancy); Dalton, 141 F.3d at 679-680 (discussing in dicta

concept of “legitimate nondiscriminatory prerequisites,” and concluding

that employer not required to convert temporary, “light duty” positions

available persons with on-the-job injuries to permanent positions for

persons with disabilities).

12

grounds that it subjectively judges the CBA's

standard not to be satisfied.

[T]he word ‘reassign’ must mean more than allowing

an employee to apply for a job on the same basis as

anyone else.. Numerous courts have assumed

that the reassignment obligation means something

more than treating a disabled employee like any other

job applicant. -

Aka, 156 F.3d at 1303 n.25, 1304.

If the reassignment language merely requires

employer to consider on an equal basis with all other

applicants an otherwise qualified existing employee

with a disability for reassignment to a vacant

position, that language would add nothing to the

obligation not to discriminate, and would thereby be

redundant. [T]he reassignment obligation must

mean something more than merely allowing a

disabled person to compete equally with the rest of

the world for a vacant position.

[O}ther policies of an employer might have to be

subordinated to an employer’s reassignment

obligation under the ADA because to do otherwise

would essentially vitiate the employer’s express

statutory obligation.

Smith, 180 F.3d at 1164-65, 1176; see also United States v.

City and County of Denver, 943 F. Supp. 1304, 1310 D.

Colo. 1996) (“If reassignment is only required where a

reassignment policy already exists for all employees, there

13

would be no need for the ADA to provide that it be available

for people with disabilities.”).°

Indeed, the plain wording of the statute belies the

Petitioner’s stance, and the en banc ruling below merely

joins this long and properly decided line of cases. “[A]

modification in workplace policy can be a reasonable

accommodation, absent undue hardship.” Barnett, 228 F.3d

at 1117-18. The employer’s “seniority system without more

should not bar reassignment.” Id.

B. The Only Exception That Has Developed in the

Case Law is When the Requested Transfer is

Barred by an Applicable Collective Bargaining

Agreement; Even Then, Such Agreements Are

Scrutinized Closely to Determine Whether Any

Provision in the Agreement Would Permit the

Transfer.

Concerning situations not pertinent here, Circuit

courts have constructed an exception to the right to a

reasonable accommodation transfer where the sought-after

vacancy is subject to the seniority provisions of a collective

bargaining agreement, and permitting the disabled employee

to fill the vacancy would conflict with the bargained-for

seniority nghts of other employees. Feliciano, 160 F.3d at

786-87; Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76, 79 (3d Cir. 1997);

Foreman, 117 F.3d at 810; Cassidy v. Detroit Edison Co.,

Modifications permitting an employee to transfer to a vacant position

and thereby avoid job loss and unemployment are not the “preferential

treatment” critiqued in Terrell v. U.S. Air, 132 F.3d 621, 627 (11th Cir.

1998). In that case, the plaintiff sought a transfer to a particular, part-

time position, despite the fact that no such vacancy existed as all of those

jobs had been eliminated. The court noted that the plaintiff's argument

would give her a job while all similarly situated persons would be

unemployed. The Barnett decision does not conflict with this

conclusion.

14

138 F.3d 629, 634 (6th Cir. 1998); Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1051;

Benson v. Northwest Airlines, 62 F.3d 1108, 1114 (8th Cir.

1995); Willis v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 236 F.3d 1160, 1162

(9th Cir. 2001), petition for ren g filed (Jan. 30, 2001);

Aldrich v. Boeing Co., 146 F.3d 1265, 1271 n.5 (10th Cir.

1998); Davis v. Florida Power & Light Co., 205 F.3d 1301,

1306-07 (11th Cir. 2000). Under these cases, CBA seniority

rights have a special status, as they, like accommodation

rights, are protected by federal statutes. Ecxles. 94 F.3d at

1045. Accordingly, disabled employees who seek

reassignment into a position, but who are not next in line for

the job under the union contract, are in effect asking to

“bump” other employees who are contractually entitled to

the position. Because a reasonable accommodation can not

bump another, nondisabled employee, this type of transfer is

not permitted. There is no conflict with these cases

presented here.

However, at the same time, the courts of appeal have

attempted to reconcile union contracts with an employer's

statutory duty to accommodate, and therefore they closely

scrutinize collective bargaining agreements to determine

whether any provision permits the reassignment. See, e. g.

Kralik, 130 F.3d at 81, 83 (transfer might be reasonable

accommodation if union waives objection); Buckingham v.

United States, 998 F.2d 735, 741 (9th Cir. 1993)

(transferring employee with HIV would not violate union

agreement which permitted exceptions for “unusual

circumstances”); Willis v. Pacific Maritime Association, 236

F.3d at 1162 (rule that reassignment in violation of CBA not

required by ADA “is only applicable where there is a direct

conflict between the proposed accommodation and the

collectively-bargained seniority rights of other employees”);

Woodman v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1330, 1347 (10th Cir. 1997)

(reassignment is reasonable accommodation where not

expressly prohibited by collective bargaining agreement);

15

Aka, 156 F.3d at 1303 (“an interpretation of [CBA] section

14.5 which allows WHC to implement its ADA obligations

is distinctly preferred”); accord Jackson v. New York Dep't

of Labor, 205 F.3d 562 (2d Cir. 2000) (concluding that

provision in civil service rules permitted reasonable

accommodation transfers); Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1052 (limiting

holding to collectively bargained seniority rights, and

expressly declining to find that all provisions found in

collective bargaining agreements take precedence over the

ADA duty to reasonably accommodate.)

The Petitioner baldly asserts on page 16 that there is

no basis for distinguishing between a seniority system

established by a collective bargaining agreement and an

employer's voluntarily adopted seniority policy. This is not

the case. In virtually every decision discussing the

interaction between the accommodation duties required by

the ADA and the seniority rights established by collective

bargaining agreements, the stated rationale for the exception

relies upon the special nature of collectively bargained

seniority rights as protected by federal laws. “Collective

bargaining, aimed at effecting workable and enforceable

agreements between management and labor, lies at the core

of our national labor policy, and seniority provisions are

universally included in these contracts.” Eckles, 94 F.3d at

1048 (quoting Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S.

63, 79 (1977)). In the words of the Third, Seventh, and

Eleventh Circuits, these rights have “a pre-existing special

Status in the law. Kralik, 130 F.3d at 82; Eckles, 94 F.3d at

1052; Davis, 205 F.3d at 1307. As the Ninth Circuit has

recently concluded, “[w]e are persuaded that it would be

improper to subject an employer to the Hobson's choice of

violating the ADA or the NLRA, or at least subjecting itself

to the threat of litigation under these statutes.” Willis, 236

F.3d at 1162.

16

By contrast, an employer's unilaterally adopted

seniority policy creates no federally protected rights for any

of its employees. Often such policies create no legal nghts

at all, whether under state or federal law. Moreover, they

can be withdrawn at any time.

C. Neither the Recent Dicta in E. ER. O. C. v. Sara Lee

Corporation Nor the 1997 Obiter Dicta in Foreman

Justify this Court’s Intervention.

There is no language in the ADA exempting

employers that have adopted senicrity policies from the duty

to provide reasonable accommodation. “(T]he meaning of a

statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language

in which the act is framed, and if that is plain, . . . the sole

function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.”

Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917).

Congress was capable of drafting an exception for seniority

systems, as it did in Title VII, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-

2(h)(2000), but chose not to do so. Where a statute, with

reference to one subject contains a given provision, the

omission of such a provision from a similar statute is

significant to show that a different intention existed.” 2B

Sutherland Construction § 51.02 at pp. 200-201 (6th Ed.

2000).

Thus, where an employee has demonstrated that no

accommodation will permit continuation in the current job,

and there is the existence of a funded, vacant position for

which the employee is qualified, then the only statutory

defense is whether the proposed transfer would impose an

undue hardship. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)(2000); Norville

v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 196 F.3d 89, 99 (2d Cir. 1999).

“Undue hardship” is an action requiring significant difficulty

or expense, with reference to the statutory and regulatory

factors. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10A)(2000); 29 C.F.R. §

17

1630.2(p). “Undue hardships are not limited to financial

impacts; the term includes accommodations that are unduly

extensive, substantially disruptive, or that would

fundamentally alter the nature or operation of the business.”

Garcia-Ayala, 212 F.3d at 650.

In support of its request for certiorari, the Petitioner

relies heavily on the recent Fourth Circuit ruling in E. E. O. C.

v. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d 349 (4th Cir. 2001). In Sara

Lee, the court of appeals suggested, in dicta, a per se rule

against transfers not authorized by the employer s seniority

policy. Id. at 354-55 (even if employee disabled, she is not

enutled to reassignment that would supercede employer's

senionty system); see also Foreman, 117 F.3d at 810 (even

if employee disabled, employer not required to provide

reassignment in violation of rights of other employees under

collective bargaining agreement. and “even if there were no

CBA in place,” employer not required to provide

reassignment). Despite the apparent conflict suggested by

the Fourth Circuit dicta, the dispute is rhetorical rather than

real: dicta simply does not create an intolerable conflict, and

further case law is likely to reconcile any differences. The

attention of the Court is not necessary.

1. Further Development of the Case Law Will

be Fourth Circuit was alone in its 1995 ruling that an employer need

not reassign an employee who is unable to meet the demands of his or

her present position. Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d at 284. One year later, that

Circuit recognized the error in its ways and stepped back from its solitary

position. See Williams v. Channel Master Satellite Systems, 101 F.3d at

350 n. 4 (4th Cir. 1996). As that Circuit has already demonstrated its

ability to reconcile its internal conflicts, there is no need for this Court to

18

As the Tenth Circuit has explained, also in dicta,

under particular facts a requested accommodation may

amount to a fundamental alteration of the employer's

business and is therefore not mandated by the ADA. Such

facts might include “a well entrenched seniority system

which, even though not rooted in a collecuve bargaining

agreement, is so well established that it gives rise to

legitimate expectations by other, more senior employees toa

job that the disabled employee might desire.” Smith v.

Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d at 1176.

Under those circumstances, “[rlequiring an employer

to disrupt and violate any such well-established reasonable

expectations of seniority rights in order to favor a disabled

employee in a job reassignment could, at least under some

circumstances, constitute a fundamental and unreasonable

alteration in the nature of the employer s business. Id. |

(emphasis added). However, the mere adoption of a policy

is not enough: “An employer cannot, of course, convert its

responsibility to look into a broad range of jobs into a "

‘narrow band’ simply by adopting a ‘no transfer’ policy.

Id. at 1176 (quoting Dalton, 141 F.3d at 679).

Appropriately, the Tenth Circuits ruling proposes a

case-by-case, fact-specific analysis of whether a parucular

employment policy, including a non-collectively bargained

seniority policy, can bar a reasonable accommodation

transfer. The Barnett ruling endorses a similar case-by-case

analysis. [A] seniority system is a factor in the undue .

hardsh‘p analysis. A case-by-case fact intensive analysis is

required to determine whether any particular reassignment

would constitute an undue hardship to the employer. 228

F. zd at 1120. Such an individualized analysis substantially

19

reconciles the Fourth Circuit’s dicta in EE O C. v. Sara Lee

with the overwhelming majority view.’

Under the approach outlined by both Smith and

Barnett, the nature and terms of an employer’ s seniority

policy would be facts relevant to whether a reassignment in

violation of the policy would constitute an undue hardship.

One important factor is whether the seniority policy creates

legally enforceable rights, as do collective bargaining

agreements, and the corresponding possibility of litigation.

Alteration of such a policy under these circumstances may

impose undue hardship. For example, the Fifth Circuit has

noted that a reassignment in violation of a legally

enforceable city charter would constitute an undue hardship.

Daugherty, 56 F.3d at 699-700.

Similar considerations were highlighted in the Sara

Lee case. “To mandate that a company exempt workers from

” The establishment of any per se rules barring or authorizing a transfer is

antithetical to the structure and design of the ADA, which favors case-

by-case determinations. Contrary to the repeated mischaracterizations

found in Petitioner's brief, see pages 11, 14 and 15, the Ninth Circuit’s

ruling in Barnert did not create a per se rule that reassignment is always

required. Indeed, the opinion specifically rejected any per se rule one

way or the other. 228 F.3d at 1120 (We hold that reassignment is a

reasonable accommodation and that a seniority system is not a per se bar

to reassignment. However, a seniority system is a factor in the undue

hardship analysis.).

20

this long-standing policy would disrupt the legitimate

expectations of Sara Lee's longtime employees. It could

potentially expose the company to the threat of lawsuits by

disgruntied employees who were placed behind employees in

need of accommodation.” 237 F.3d at 355 (noting possible

claim of breach of implied contract based on employer's

policy).

In stark contrast, Petitioner’s seniority policy creates

no legally enforceable rights for U.S. Air's employees. Cal.

Labor Code § 2922 (California — a, 4

will”); Respondent's A dix at 26-29, 31-33, ;

— v. U.S. Air, Ine., NO. 84-3798-K, 1985 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 15470, at *5 (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 1985) (U.S. Air

successfully argued that “personnel policy guide” did not

create enforceable contract); Salanger v. U.S. Air, Inc., 611

F. Supp. 427 (N.D. N.Y. 1985) (same). Petitioner’ s footnote

6, stating that employer initiated policies, like collective

bargaining agreements, frequently create legal rights, is

remarkably contradictory to U.S. Air’s own stated position

that its policy does not create contract rights.

Another relevant factor is whether the policy has

been maintained in the same form over time, or if it has been

unilaterally amended by the employer. In the Sara Lee case,

the court noted that Sara Lee has maintained [its] policy for

at least thirty years, and it has been in its present form for the

last fifteen years.” 237 F.3d at 354. In the seniority policy

considered here, the Petitioner U.S. Air unilaterally amended

its seniority policy in 1993 - three years after th unendment

* Indeed, judicial estoppel should preclude the petition being granted.

Judicial estoppel “prevents a party from asserting a factual position in a

legal proceeding that is contrary to a position previously taken by [the

party] in a prior legal proceeding.” Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 201

F.3d 134, 141 (2d Cir. 2000). It is so here, and the petition should thus

be denied. See Southern Power Co., 263 U.S. at 509.

21

of the ADA by adding an exception for persons with

catastrophic illness or with family members with

catastrophic illness. Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1121 n.11:

Respondent’s Appendix B at 1-2.

Also consistent with a case-by-case analysis would

be any factual evidence of disruption that likely would be

caused by the proposed reassignment.” In this matter, the

Petitioner has presented no evidence of disruption. To the

contrary, Mr. Barnett had successfully worked in his

mailroom position for two years with no identified hardship

to the defendant. Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1120-21. Moreover,

Mr. Barnett had more than a decade’s worth of faithful

service, became disabled in the course and scope of this

service, and was then subjected to an employer’ s

discretionary policy that operated to foreclose entirely a

critical accommodation. The disruption to his expectations

was severe, and the result was not the loss of a desired shift

or assignment, but the loss of his job.'°

In Daugherty, the city’s director of personnel not that plaintiff, a part-

time employee with only nine months of service, would supercede a full-

time employee with five years of service who had been waiting and

preparing for the position. 56 F.3d at 699. Similarly, in Sara Lee, the

court noted that the person filling the vacancy sought by the plaintiff had

20 years more seniority, and was displaced because a plant had closed.

persons with disabilities who can no longer perform their current

positions face imminent job loss, and not similarly situated to their non-

disabled co-workers who seek a transfer. This court has determined that

the denial of a possible future employment opportunity does not present

the same concern as the loss of an existing position. See, eg. Wygant v.

Jackan Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 276, 282-83 (1986); Firefighters v. Stotts,

467 U.S. 561, 574-76 (1984); Steel Workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208

(1979). While Petitioner emphasizes its concern for the expectations of

its nondisabled workers, Respondent holds a concurrent expectation that

his federal rights will be recognized and effectively enforced. Cf. Beli v.

Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 242-

48 (1979); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19-23 (1980).

22

Under the prevailing case-by-case analysis adopted

by the Ninth Circuit below, some factual record that included

an employer s seniority policy might well support a finding

of undue hardship or fundamental alteration, such that

reassignment was not appropriate or required. However, the

Ninth Circuit concluded as it may that on this record, triable

issues remain. The petition should be rejected.

II. THERE IS NO CONFLICT IN THE CIRCUITS

REGARDING THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE

OF AN EMPLOYER'S FAILURE TO ENGAGE

IN AN INTERACTIVE PROCESS WITH ITS

DISABLED EMPLOYEE: THE CIRCUITS

AGREE THAT SUCH A FAILURE HAS NO

INDEPENDENT LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE, BUT

IS RELEVANT EVIDENCE OF AN

EMPLOYER'S FAILURE TO

ACCOMMODATE.

“[ T]he reasonable accommodation requirement is

best understood as a process in which barriers to a particular

individual's equal employment opportunity are removed.” S.

Rep. No. 116 101st Cong. Ist Sess. 33 (1989). “To

determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may

be necessary for the covered entity to initiate an informal,

interactive process with the qualified individual with a

disability in need of the accommodation.” 29 C.F.R. §

1630.2(0)(3). “A problem-solving approach should be used

to identify . . . possible accommodations that will result in a

meaningful equal opportunity for the individual with a

disability.” S. Rep. No. 116 at 33.

The employer's participation is critical, particularly

where the most suitable accommodation may be

reassignment. This is because the employee usually

possesses incomplete, and often inaccurate, information

23

about the options available, including the existence of

appropriate vacancies. See, e.g., Mengine v. Runyon, 114

F.3d 415, 420 (3 Cir. 1997); Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch.

Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 316 (3 Cir. 1999); Bultemeyer v. Fort

Wayne Community Sch.s, 100 F.3d 1281, 1285-86 (7th Cir.

1996); Miller v. Illinois Dep't of Corrections, 107 F.3d 483,

486-87 (7th Cir. 1997); Smith, 180 F.3d at 1173; Aka, 156

F.3d at 1304 n.27.

The overwhelming majority of circuits have stated

that once an employee requests accommodation, the ADA

imposes an obligation upon both sides to engage in an

interactive process to identify and implement an effective

accommodation. “Once an employer knows of an

employee's disability and the employee has requested

reasonable accommodations, the ADA and its implementing

regulations require that the parties engage in an interactive

process to determine what precise accommodations are

necessary.” Beck, 75 F.3d at 1137. At least one circuit has

opined that the process, while advised, is not mandated.

Moses v. American Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F.3d 446, 448 (11th

Cir. 1996).'* However, regardless of whether or not the

interactive process is characterized as required or advised,

'' Grenier v Cyanamid Plastics, Inc., 70 F.3d 667, 677 (Ist Cir. 1995);

Criado v. IBM Corp., 145 F.3d 437, 444 (1st Cir. 1998); Mengine, supra

at 419; Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist. 184 F.3d at 312-313, 317;

Taylor v. Principal Financial Group, Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 165 (Sth Cir.

1996); Loulseged v. Akzo Nobel Inc., 178 F.3d 731, 735-36 (Sth Cir.

1999); Cehrs v. Northeast Ohio Alzheimer's Research Center, 155 F.3d

775, 783-784 (6th Cir. 1998); Hansen v. Henderson, 233 F.3d 521, 523

(7th Cir. 2000); Hendricks-Robinson, 154 F.3d at 693; Beck, 75 F.3d at

1135-1136; Feliberty v. Kember Corp., 98 F.3d 274, 280 (7th Cir. 1996);

Bultemeyer, 100 F.3d at 1285-1286; Fjellestad 188 F.3d at 952, Smith,

180 F.3d at 1172.

fe interactive process is also endorsed as an inexpensive form of

mediation designed to avoid litigation. Deane v. Pocono Medical

Center, 142 F.3d 138, 149 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc); Taylor v.

Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d at 316 n.6.

24

the identifiable rules regarding this issue are identical

throughout the Circuits.

A. While an Employer's Failure to Engage in the

Interactive Process May Be Evidence Relevant to

the Question of Whether the Employer Failed to

Provide Accommodation, No Circuit Has Held

that an Employer's Failure to Engage Constitutes

an Independent Basis of Liability.

The courts are unanimous that an employer's failure

to engage in the interactive process may be evidence relevant

to the question of whether the employer failed to provide

accommodation. See, e. g., cases cited in foomote 11, ante.

However, no court — including the Ninth Circuit in this case

has held that an employer's failure to engage constitutes an

independent basis of liability. Rather, those courts which

have considered the question directly have expressly rejected

any separate cause of action for an employer's failure to

engage. See, e.g., Soto-Ocasio v. Federal Express, 150 F.3d

14, 19 (Ist Cir. 1998) (plaintiff's assertion that employer

failed to engage in meaningful interaction “is of no moment”

where plaintiff not qualified); accord Donahue v. Consol.

Rail Corp., 224 F.3d 226, 234-35 (3d Cir. 2000); Rehling v.

The City of Chicago, 207 F.3d 1009, 1015-16 (7th Cir.

2000); Cravens, 214 F.3d at 1021; Cannice v. Norwest Bank

Iowa, 189 F.3d 723, 727 (8th Cir. 1999); Fjellestad, 188

F.3d at 952; Willis v. Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d at 285; Moses,

97 F.3d at 448; see also Jacques v. Clean-Up Group, Inc., 96

F.3d 506, 513 (1st Cir. 1996) (upholding jury verdict against

employee on failure to accommodate despite plaintiff's

allegations of employer's failure to engage).

Moreover, Respondent did not claim failure to engage in the

interactive process as a separate cause of action regardless of possible

accommodation, nor is this a case where Respondent has failed to

identify a possible accommodation:

25

Thus, the Petitioner's brief is again incorrect on page

22, where it suggests that there is a conflict among the

circuits as to whether an employer's failure to engage can

constitute an independent violation. There is no such

conflict.

B. The Opinion in Barnett Joins Several Circuits

Noting That Where a Plaintiff Has Identified a

Possible Accommodation, and Presents Evidence

that the Employer Failed to Engage in an

Interactive Process, Summary Judgment is

Inappropriate.

The Court in Barnett ruled that where the plaintiff

presented evidence of the employer's failure to engage in the

interactive process despite the employee's request, and the

presence of a possible effective accommodation, summary

judgment is inappropriate. “We hold that employers, who

fail to engage in the interactive process in good faith, face

liability for the remedies imposed by the statute if a

reasonable accommodation would have been possible. We

further hold that an employer cannot prevail at the summary

judgment stage if there is a genuine dispute as to whether the

employer engaged in good faith in the interactive process.”

228 F.3d at 1116 (emphasis added); Humphrey v. Memorial

Hospitals Association, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 2099, at *32

(9th Cir. Feb. 13, 2001) (“Given MHA's failure to engage in

the *nteractive process, liability is appropriate if a reasonable

accommodation without undue hardship to the employer

would otherwise have been possible,” citing Barnett.

be various judicial references to “split(s]” and “conflicts” cited by

the Petitioner have undoubtedly created a perception of divergent views.

A closer examination, however, reveals that the substantive analysis is

consistent throughout the Circuits, as described herein.

26

This ruling concurs with decisions from several other

Circuits which have held that summary judgment is

inappropriate where the disabled employee has shown that

the employer did not make a good faith effort to assist the

employee in seeking accommodation, and that the employee

could have been reasonably accommodated but for the

employer's lack of good faith efforts to accommodate. Taylor

v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d at 318-319; Cravens, 214

F.3d at 1021; Fjellestad, 188 F.3d at 952; see also Criado,

145 F.3d at 444 (Ist Cir. 1998)."°

An employee who cannot demonstrate a possible

accommodation does not benefit from the rule: “The

employee still carries the burden of showing that a particular

accommodation. would have made the employee

qualified to perform the essential functions of the job.”

Fjellestad, 188 F.3d at 954 (citing Taylor v. Phoenixville

Sch.): see also Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1113 n.3 (plainuff “bears

the initial burden of showing that the suggested

accommodation would, more probably than not, have

resulted in his ability to perform the essential functions of his

job”) (citing Mustafa v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 157 F.3d

1169, 1176 (9th Cir. 1998), and at 1116 (citing Fjellestad

and Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch.); Hansen v. Henderson, 233

F.3d 521, 523 (7th Cir. 2000). The Petitioner's brief neglects

to mention this key requirement.

As the Seventh Circuit recently explained, in those

cases precluding summary judgment, the claims were “(not]

based solely on the employer's failure to engage”; instead,

the courts “found potential liability based on an employer's

'S The Petitioner's argument that 42 U.S.C. § 1981a somehow

demonstrates a Congressional intent that courts must disregard the

interactive process during the liability phase of litigation has been

implicitly rejected. EE O. C. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp. 993 F.

Supp. 726 n.10 (D. Az. 1998).

27

failure to engage in an interactive process in circumstances

where the plaintiff alleged that the result of that breakdown

was the employer's failure to provide a reasonable

accommodation.” Rehling v. City of Chicago, 207 F.3d

1009, 1016 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Baert, 149 F.3d at 634

(summary judgment improper where plaintiff identified

potential vacancies, and produced evidence disputing who

was responsible for the breakdown in the interactive

process); Dalton, 141 F.3d at 677 (summary judgment

improper where plaintiffs offered evidence of possible

accommodations, and of the employer's failure to engage).

Under these circumstances, there are simply disputed

material questions of fact regarding whether the employer

failed to accommodate the employee.

While not every Circuit has considered the question,

none has ruled that summary judgment is somehow

appropriate where a plaintiff has presented evidence both of

possible accommodation and of the employer's failure to

engage. Accordingly, there is no conflict requiring this

Court's attention.

'° Similarly, where the plaintiff proves at trial that the interactive process

would have made the difference, the employer faces liability. Jacques, 96

F.3d at 515 (“There may well be situations in which the employer's

failure to engage in an informal interactive process would constitute a

failure to provide reasonable accommodation that amounts to a violation

of the ADA.”). The Petitioner's characterization of the 1996 Jacques

dicta in footnote 10 is unpersuasive. The Jacques panel considered a

plaintiff s appeal of a jury verdict, and concluded that there was no

discrimination as a matter of law for the defendant's purported failure to

engage, because the jury could have reasonably concluded that any such

failure did not cause a failure to accommodate, in that there was evidence

that the proposed transportation accommodation was not necessary and

the proposed scheduling accommodation would eliminate an essential

function. In light of that context, the dicta only means that liability may

— —— GENT Gd GNSS

termined by the jury in Jacques - the failure to en

made the difference. N *

28

C. There is No Conflict Among the Circuits that

Summary Judgment May Be Granted Against an

ADA Plaintiff Where No Possible Accommodation

Has Been Identified, Regardless of Whether There

is Evidence that the Employer Failed to Engage.

There is no conflict among the Circuits that summary

judgment may be granted against an ADA plaintiff where no

possible accommodation has been identified, regardless of

whether there is admissible evidence that the employer failed

to engage in the interactive process. Soto-Ocasio, 150 F.3d

at 19 (failure to engage of no moment” where plaintiff

undisputable not qualified); accord Mengine, 114 F.3d at

420-21; Donahue, 224 F.3d at 234; Taylor v. Pepsi-Cola

Company, 196 F.3d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1999); Willis v.

Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d at 285; Moses, 97 F.3d at 448; Earl

v Mervyns, Inc., 207 F.3d 1361, 1366-67 (11th Cir. 2000),

see also Jackan, 205 F.3d at 566 (plaintiff bears burden of

providing that an accommodation exists that permits her to

perform the job's essential functions); Allen v. Rapides

Parish Sch. Board, 204 F.3d 619, 622 (Sth Cir. 2000)

(employer's failure to engage does not create liability where

employer provided reasonable accommodation).

'7 Conversely, summary judgment against an ADA plaintiff may be

appropriate where it is undisputed that the plaintiff caused the breakdown

in the interactive process. See Loulseged, 178 F.3d at 740; Beck, 75 F.3d

at 1136: Ross v. Indiana State Teacher's Association, 159 F.3d 1001,

1016 (7th Cir. 1998); Steffes v. Stepan Company, 144 F.3d 1070, 1072

(7th Cir. 1998); Stewart v. Happy Herman's Cheshire Bridge Inc. 117

F.3d 1278, 1286-87 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Miller, 107 F.3d at 486

(summary judgment affirmed where plaintiff stated she was not

interested in vacant positions for which she was qualified); Hunt.

Golliday v Metropolitan Water Reclamation Dist., 104 F.3d 1004, 1013

(7th Cir. 1997) (summary judgment affirmed where plaintiff failed to

request accommodation). There is no conflict among the Circuits as to

29

Thus, the Petitioner's brief is again incorrect at

22, where it suggests that there is conflict among the cheits

as to whether an employer's failure to engage at the time of

the events in question eliminates the plaintiff's subsequent

burden, during litigation, to identify and establish a possible

accommodation that would have effectively permitted the

plaintiff to perform the position's essential functions. No

court of appeals has so held, and there is no such conflict.

The en banc opinion in Barnett certainly does not create such

a conflict: the plaintiff in this matter established multiple

possible effective accommodations.

CONCLUSION

There is no real conflict as to the uestions presen

and there are additional and — grounds for 1

lower court's decision. For all of the reasons stated herein

the petition should be denied. ;

Dated: March 3, 2001 Respectfully submi

Claudia Center

Counsel of Record

For Respondent

Robert Barnett

'* Contrary to the Petitioner’s brief at 9, the ruli j

* . — de

eliminate the plainuff i — —

accommodation; the discussion cited related to the burdens of the parties

at the time that the employee requests accommodation. In that context,

it would make little sense to insist that the employee must have arrived

at the end product of the interactive process before the employer has a

duty to participate in that process.” Barnert, 228 F.3d at 1113. The same

passage cites Buckingham, 998 F.2d at 740 and Mustafa, 157 F.3d at

1176 for the proposition that the plaintiff bears the burden during

litigation of showing possible accommodation. 228 F.3d at 1113 n.3.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A

In the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit, Sitting En Banc

June 22, 2000

Reporter’s Transcript of Proceeding

(from official audiotape)

THE COURT: So ladies and gentlemen, time set for

the hearing of Barnett vs. [unintelligibie] for employment

opportunity information and U.S. Air. The EEOC is amicus

curiae [unintelligible] party. Let's hear from the appellants.

MR. WHITEMAN: Good morning, distinguished

Chief Judge and distinguished circuit judges. May it please

the Court. I am Bob Whiteman, and I represent

Mr. Bob Barnett, the plaintiff appellant in this case.

THE COURT: I should mention -- sorry, I would

have [unintelligible] -- that we have two of our judges who

are joining us on the telephone. Judge Gregorson and

Judge Fletcher. And I, before we start I want to make sure

that they are with us.

JUDGE FLETCHER: Well I'm here, Judge Fletcher.

And I can hear everything.

THE COURT: All right. Judge Gregorson? Not

here.

A MALE VOICE: Harry, where are you?

THE COURT: You can be seated if you like. You

don’t have to stand until we get the connect. We had -- we

had both judges on hold. Something happened.

A MALE VOICE: We were here for unintelligible}.

THE COURT: Mr. Clerk, I presume we do have

someone that’s going to be reconnecting us?

THE. CLERK: Yes.

THE COURT: Judge Gregorson?

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 2

A MALE VOICE: [Unintelligible}.

JUDGE FLETCHER: Judge [unintelligible]?

THE COURT: Yes, Judge Fletcher.

JUDGE FLETCHER: We're back, I think.

THE COURT: Judge Gregorson, are you with us?

JUDGE GREGORSON: Im back.

THE COURT: All right. Good. All right, we'll

proceed to hear from the appellant.

MR. WHITEMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.

The appellant is urging that the matter be reversed

and remanded for three essential reasons.

Number one, that the case in its present configuration

by the decision of the appellate majority panel is tantamount

to applying a per se rule of exclusion for seniority systems,

bounded by seniority systems, and linking them directly with

the same level of per se analysis totally attributable only to

collective bargaining agreements where there are contractual

rights.

Secondly the appeilant urges that the case as it

presently stands allows a company to completely disregard

any responsibility for engaging in an interactive process.

And thirdly, I do believe that because of the various

illustrations in the record of modified disputes of essential

facts in the motion for summary judgment, that this case

now represents a destructive position regarding the high bar

that this court has normally reserved for employment

discrimination cases.

It is clear that when the appellant in this case

established through his affidavits and declarations what

occurred chronologically that he met all of the three

elements required for a case under the ADA as he brought it.

In particular, it was undisputed at the trial level that for

purposes of the summary judgment, Mr. Barnett was in fact

a qualified disabled employee.

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 3

Then we enter into a completely unrealistic

examination of what is a reasonable accommodation.

Reasonable accommodation cannot be an absolute

accommodation, but the case concluded that no matter what

Mr. Barnett would recommend to the company, the company

could merely hold its hands, disregard any obligations it had

to examine, to confer, to participate, and simply exclude him

under the shield of this unilateral seniority policy. It was not

a bargained-for seniority policy.

THE COURT: Why does that make a difference?

MR. WHITEMAN: It makes a difference because if

it is not a bargained-for seniority policy, but unilateral, that

means the company is required to participate in the

interactive process. If it’s not a seniority policy where

there’s contractual rights, and the company can unilaterally

make changes to it, all the more reason why it should

participate in reasonable accommodation.

It should enter into a way to find a way to keep the

employee working. The important --

A MALE VOICE: It seems to me you may be

interchanging two different concepts there. You've got the

association part off to one side, and it seems to me that

maybe there’s some overlap here. As I understand it, nine

circuits have held that there is no requirement to trump the

seniority system in these kinds of cases.

MR. WHITEMAN: Well, we have many words that

are used that are akin to a collective bargaining environment.

Comments like “trump” might do a lot of things. There's no

question but what the legislation requires employers to do

something, and the something may very well have an effect

where I’m going to adverse another employee.

A MALE VOICE: I’m just following up on the Chief

Judge’s question, which I think is quite pertinent here. Why

should the fact that the seniority system, which is in effect,

adopted by the company and followed so far as we know

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 4

completely, why should that make any difference that it is a

company-imposed rather than a collectively-bargained plan?

The -- in terms of the company operation it shouldn’t make

any difference.

MR. WHITEMAN: Well, it does make a difference,

because number one, it’s unilateral. In a collective

bargaining situation the two are dissimilar in the sense that

there are no absolute rights that the employees have that they

have contracted for.

A MALE VOICE: What does absolute mean as

compared to rights? I mean the other side tells us that this

seniority system does create rights enforceable in court.

MR. WHITEMAN: Well, I don’t know. It’s been

argued in the brief that U.S. Air was successfully argued in

another case a few years ago that their personnel policy

guide does not create any rights in the employees. They

successfully urged that.

So I think if you look at it, we have to realize that

personnel policies, if they’re unilateral, as admittedly it was

in this case, even though they say, please follow it, it is not

absolute because if they wanted to add a position, they

did, as they did in April of 1993.

If they want to set up the category, they do so, and it

is not contracted work, as they did with the emergency or

catastrophic illness policy.

If they want to change things, they can do so because

Barnett, you'll recall. only represented a mere 5 percent of

this particular work element of the Cargo Department. He’s

one employee. And when he bids, he doesn’t bid like a

collective bargaining unit, he bids for himself. He bids for

shift and base [unintelligible] and the supervisor assigns

specific duties.

So in that sense it’s not the same as the kind of

policy where we’re worried that, gee, now the ADA comes

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 5

in, we ve got these clear rights that are contracted for and

somehow we re going to go trump them.

A FEMALE VOICE: Well, Counsel, one thing that’s

a little different here that is like collective bargaining,

different from other cases. It is like a collective bargaining

agreement, is that they’re -- in established seniority system,

there’s someone else who otherwise would -- would rely on

getting a position by virtue of seniority. So that this -- so

that your client, in effect you’re arguing, would bump

someone else.

And what I’m wondering is, are there any cases

under this statute that suggest that bumping someone else

is -- must be done by the employer for it to be a reasonable

accommodation?

MR. WHITEMAN: The cases that I’m aware of have

prohibited that only when it flows out of a collective

bargaining agreement where there are contracted rights. The

[unintelligible] and so forth say, well, if you’ ve got one of

those, that there’s nothing in the ADA that we can see that

mandates we can allow bumping.

7 On the other hand, bumping or taking another

position, is very interesting when applied to this case

because there are so many other alternatives that the

company refused to participate in. He wanted to stay. He

didn’t want to bump anybody.

And they says: Well, we decided now we’re going to

open it up for bid and you have to go.

He’s there for two years doing the same thing. Then

they say gratuitously: Well, we created another position for

you for five months. That’s part of our, quote, you know,

interactive process or reasonable accommodation.

It meant nothing of the kind. He just happened to

Stay there.

In addition to that, when Mr. Barnett asked for

consideration for a couple of other reasonable things. And

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 6

then I want to mention here is something that really -- I think

it’s important for the whole effectiveness of the ADA. And

that is it’s a vehicle to make adjustments to retain skilled

workers.

He’s got ten years in the company, so he’s got rights

and U.S. Air’s going to deal with him in the California

version of good faith [unintelligible] dealing. He’s going to

have an opportunity to suggest; they’re going to have an

opportunity to participate. .

They say: No. If you want expert equipment or

something, we summarily say that if you nse the word

“robotic,” we re going to claim that that’s somehow high

tech, too expensive, and we can’t afford it.

A MALE VOICE: Is he still an employee of the

company?

MR. WHITEMAN: He is not.

THE COURT: You hesitate.

MR. WHITEMAN: Well, it’s a categorization

problem. He doesn’t get paid and he doesn’t get any

benefits, and he’s in like a limbo status where he has --

A MALE VOICE: The other side says he’s still an

employee and he hasn’t exercised his opportunities to bid on

any other jobs, and that when asked if he would move to

another station he said no.

MR. WHITEMAN: That is -- that is incorrect, Your

Honor, and the record -- the record clearly says that before

he got this famous -- I don’t know how the panel

characterized it -- but this request to go to a meeting on

January 20" of 1993, where he was informed that he was out

for three days. Two days before, he had bid for a job in the

Cargo Department.

Now they’re not listening to his request for assistance

and to find an accommodation. They’re simply saying, you

want to go back there, but your doctor says you have a

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 7

lifting restriction. We’re not going to examine that. You

can’t go back there.

He bid before he was kicked out. And when less

senior people were there. So he tried to use the system, too,

and they just says, no, you can’t do that.

A MALE VOICE: Well, was he asked if he was

willing to go to another station and did he say no through

counsel?

MR. WHITEMAN: No, that is absolutely incorrect,

and he met that in his declaration.

And here’s what occurred very simply: He was

characterized by the attorney for the corporation, Mr. Comb,

saying he had heard an out-of-court statement that he was

trying to incorporate in his statement as being factual that

somehow the EEOC officer talked to Barnett, and Barnett

Says, well, I don’t want to go anywhere and I won’t go

anywhere. And that is not true. And he met that with his

declaration.

Otherwise --

A MALE VOICE: Is this - I’m sorry. Is this case

like Buckingham in your view?

MR. WHITEMAN: I don’t know if it’s quite like

Buckingham because it’s a new situation where we have to

show through reasonable efforts to take an employee who

has identified specific accommodations in a so-called

seniority system that’s unilateral, and he has to be met with

some kind of an effort on the part of the company. He must

have some kind of an effort. We say that the reciprocity was

not there.

A MALE VOICE: Well, if I remember Buckingham

correctly it said the seniority system in that case was

different because it accommodated various options, and so

it’s not a locked-in seniority system.

And I sort of take your argument here as saying

because this isn’t bargained-for in a collective bargaining

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 8

setting, that it’s open to the company to do what it wants

with the system. And it's kind of like Buckingham s

seniority system, isn’t it?

MR. WHITEMAN: But in Buckingham, the

Buckingham case stands for a narrow proposition that I

would worry about for the effectiveness of the ADA being

implemented to this extent. That if you’ve got a seniority

system, and even if it’s unilateral like we have, then a

company like U.S. Air would say: Well, Buckingham says,

unless can show me a lot of exceptions, then you can’t even

come in and get assistance under ADA in a unilateral

situation.

So Buckingham -- I would not want this court in

these western states to say: You've got to have a seniority

system with the most exceptions and then we'll let you

vindicate your rights under ADA. I don’t think that’s --

that’s too narrow.

A MALE VOICE: What's the rule? We have to

write a rule that people can follow out there in the real world

of employers and employees. What’s the rule that you

would have us write in connection with the ADA and

seniority systems?

MR. WHITEMAN: I think if the seniority system is

unilateral, like it is here, because obviously if this case

continues to go against Barnett, then companies are going to

come up with all kinds of, quote, seniority policies, and

they Il have to worry about ADA any more.

But here’s what I would like. I would require the

same stricture for having a qualified injury. I would write

the same stricture for having the disabled employee identify.

He’s able to do that. Keep the onus on him as part of his

case. Identify, and make it specific.

If it’s reasonably specific, that’s kind of like a trior of

fact problem, I understand, then have the company be under

responsibility for communication.

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 9

And we've got so many badges of circumstantial

evidence here --

A MALE VOICE: But what’s the rule on seniority

systems? How do they play in -- in the process? The

unilateral, they’re out. You don’t pay any attention to them

at all?

MR. WHITEMAN: No. With seniority systems --

even what --

A MALE VOICE: It sounds to me that you just said

even if it’s a seniority system, that if it’s unilateral, you

don’t pay any attention to it at all. Did I hear you wrong?

MR. WHITEMAN: Well by distinguishing a

seniority system imposed by the company alone and a

seniority system --

A MALE VOICE: Yeah, and that’s what I’m asking

about. I’m asking about.

MR. WHITEMAN: -- and a seniority system that’s

part of a CBA.

A MALE VOICE: We're not talking about CBAs

now. There's no CBA here. But the rule that I’m hearing

_ you asking -- that I hear you asking for is one that says you

can disregard the seniority system all together so long as it’s

unilaterally imposed. Is that the rule that you're asking?

MR. WHITEMAN: No, that is not the rule I’m

asking for, because if a seniority system has, who knows

what kind, and there are many variations of seniority

systems. It may be possible to do the variety of

accommodations that are indicated in the law for job

restructuring, a different kind of reassignment part time;

there’s a whole range of solutions to that.

A MALE VOICE: So you’ re saying if there's a

seniority system that has within it an accommodation for

something like this, then you have to use it.

But what if there’s one that says we do all of these

things based on seniority. That’s it, over and out. You’re

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 10

asking us to disregard that in connection with the AD -- to

say that’s irrelevant in connection with the ADA.

MR. WHITEMAN: If it’s a unilateral system I would

Say. yes.

A MALE VOICE: Okay, that's

THE COURT: Counsel -- excuse me.

JUDGE GREGORSON: This is Judge Gregorson.

Let me ask you a question, Counsel.

Have you thought about whether the existence of the

unilateral seniority system ought to be a factor to consider in

the reasonableness of the accommodation offered by the

employer? Have you thought about that?

MR. WHITEMAN: Yes. Yes, because reasonable as

far as I’m aware in the ADA confidential plan, reasonable is

not an absolute. So some consideration should have to bear

on the company’s attitude toward reasonable --

JUDGE GREGORSON: But what you're if I

understand what you’re saying is if you've got a collective

bargaining agreement, then the employee -- and the

employee is represented through the union -- and the

employer --they’ ve agreed on a deal.

And some of those collective bargaining agreements |

understand do have provisions for disabled employees.

That’s something the employees collectively have agreed to.

But if you have a -- a system that’s just created by

the employer, and that system doesn’t have that type of

accommodation in it for disabled employees, then the -- that

pure unilateral system, that doesn’t provide for an

accommodation, would then be a factor to consider in the

reasonableness equation? Is that what you’re saying?

MR. WHITEMAN: I think it would be a factor, but

that’s why this case illustrates the extreme difficulty of being

able to ascertain what’s taking place by the appellate level

when there is no duty to communicate and participate --

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 1)

JUDGE GREGORSON: Let me ask you this: Was

discovery taken here?

MR. WHITEMAN: Discovery was taken. It was not

closed. And all of the conflicted facts as indicated in our

briefs were adjudicated against the appellant.

JUDGE GREGORSON: So you mean you went to

summary judgment and you hadn't completed discovery?

MR. WHITEMAN: Correct.

JUDGE GREGORSON: Did you point that out to

the trial judge?

MR. WHITEMAN: In our briefing, I believe -- or in

our argument I believe we did.

JUDGE GREGORSON: Did you say: Your Honor,

can we have a continuance? We haven't completed our

discovery.

JUDGE FLETCHER: This is Judge Fletcher

speaking. If | understand this standard, accommodations are

to be adjusted and tried to be worked out. And only if the

employer finds that it's an undue hardship does he not have

to give the job placement or the accommodation. So it

seems to me one needs to think about hardship.

MR. WHITEMAN: Hardship generally follows after

there's an attempted reasonable accommodation, but even if

hardship is claimed, in contrast to what Oliver Lawrence,

who was responsible for the whole program said, I thought

they ruled it out immediately without an analysis on

hardship.

If hardship is claimed, it must be proven by specifics

depending on the size of the company, the resources

available, and so forth. It was not done in this case. Yet

they claimed hardship and the court so found.

A MALE VOICE: Could you clarify what standard

the plainuff has to meet here? Because I -- now I'm

confused.

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 12

The panel opinion says that the plaintiff must be able

to point to at least one specific reasonable accommodation

that was available to the employer. Do you quarrel with

that?

MR. WHITEMAN: No, absolutely not.

A MALE VOICE: So you think that’s in a that

states the prima facie burden that they have to meet.

MR. WHITEMAN: Part of it, yes, sir. He did three,

and all were rejected.

A MALE VOICE: But he has to -- he has to

identify -- because the EEOC talks about a plausible

alternative. You're -- you're comfortable with the

formulation that's in the panel opinion?

MR. WHITEMAN: A reasonable accommodation.

And I believe that's adjudicated by a trior of fact if there s a

dispute.

A MALE VOICE: The direct link --

MR. WHITEMAN: And the reserve --

A MALE VOICE: I don’t know how much -- just a

minute. I don’t know how much time we have left, but at

some point, I think you ought to address this Thompson vs.

Holy Family Hospital. And frankly, | don’t think your

supplemental brief on that was very strong. And if you can’t

get by Thompson, your client's not qualified under the ADA;

he's not disabled.

MR. WHITEMAN: May I respectfully reserve that

for my rebuttal?

A MALE VOICE: Fine.

MS. STAR: May it please the Court. My name is

Susan Star. | represent the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission as amicus.

The American's With Disabilities Act does more

than require competition on an equal basis. It mandates

equal opportunity by requiring employers to take the

affirmative step of removing barriers to employment for

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 13

persons with disabilities. So that what results is a level

playing field. 7

The weight barriers are to be removed through

accommodation.

A MALE VOICE: How do you measure level? |

mean the other sides tells us “level” means you take the

seniority system and that's part of the leveling factor that

you have to look at.

MS. STAR: Congress made clear that

accommodations is a modification in either the workplace or

in workplace policies. A seniority system is not -- Congress

did not make a distinction among seniority systems versus

any other employer policy. That's the track of the Title VII

in the ADEA.

in both of those statutes Congress said, it specifically

said, in the legislative -- in the language, that bona fide

seniority systems are excepted --

A MALE VOICE: Yeah, that's true, but what do

y —

MS. STAR: in the prohibitions of both statutes.

A MALE VOICE: That's right, but what do you do

with the Rehabilitation Act of 1973? It seems that Congress

with the ADA said that the Rehabilitation Act should pretty

much track -- the ADA should pretty much track the

Rehabilitation Act.

In all the cases that I can find, pretty much

shove seniority -- say seniority systems trump all the other

concerns.

MS. STAR: The Rehabilitation — in the

Rehabilitation Act, that changed. Parts of the ADA, the

Rehabilitation Act, did not -- did not just reassign them as

one of your reasonable accommodations.

And you're nght, that is how the courts interpreted

that. Once the ADA was enacted, Congress amended the

Rehabilitation Act to provide the reasonable

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 14

accommodations for -- I'm sorry, for reassignment as one of

the reasonable accommodations.

And so post-1992 approximately, when Congress

made that alteration, the case law on Rehabilitation Act is

consistent with the ADA.

A MALE VOICE: How do you --

MS. STAR: | agree with you --

A MALE VOICE: How do you -- how do you think

a seniority system should be handled in this precise context?

Ignored or become a factor?

MS. STAR: Your Honor, that’s the Commissions --

one of the primary problems we have with the panel

decision. It's the allocation of burdens.

A seniority system certainly should be considered.

But it should be considered under the prong of undue

hardship.

It is the employer s burden to demonstrate that a

seniority system -- the alteration of the seniority system

would be so destructive on the workforce and in the

workplace as to create an undue hardship.

If they can do that, then they do not have to make an

exception to that seniority policy.

A MALE VOICE: It seems that everybody is being -

- is left at sea by that test, though.

If I'm the practicing lawyer and companies and

unions and everybody comes to me, or nonunion people

come to me and they say, how do we handle this? You

know, if these things -- if they turn into a factor, it seems

everything ends up in a court, because there isn t sufficient

guidance so that you can determine how to handle these

things.

1 MS. STAR: I understand the dilemma. Congress

said that this has to be a case-by-case system.

A MALE VOICE: You mean everything is going to

have to go to court?

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 15

MS. STAR: What? What? [Unintelligible}.

A MALE VOICE: You see my problem? There has

to be some guidance out there when you call these things “a

factor.” What kind of “a factor

So the company says, all right, we've taken into

consideration as a factor. We have a seniority system and

it's going to 200 it up, so we're not going to make this

accommodation.

The other side says, here we go to court.

Because “a factor,” what do you do with that?

Always take it to a trior of fact, to a judge?

— MS. STAR: The nature of undue hardship is

to dem -- is for an [unintelligible] to demonstrate with

concrete evidence that undue hardship wouldn't result.

Congress wanted modifi --

An employer is responsible to make a reasonable

accommodation. Failure to make a reasonable

accommodation is discrimination under the Americans With

Disabilities Act.

A MALE VOICE: Okay, let's take this case.

MS. STAR: Okay.

A MALE VOICE: Let's say the seniority system is a

factor.

MS. STAR: Right.

A MALE VOICE: How do you work this case

through then regarding this seniority system as a factor?

MS. STAR: That's the problem. Because U.S. Air

utterly failed to meet its burden on undue hardship, there is

absolutely no concrete evidence in this record as to how --

how this could put --

A MALE VOICE: They say -- they say -- they say

it's an undue hardship because you're taking at least one

employee who has seniority rights and telling that employee,

you don’t get what you're entitled to based on the long-

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 16

standing policies of the company. They say, there it is.

That's the hardship.

MS. STAR: Your Honor, they only pointed to the

long-stand -- the only concrete evidence -- that’s -- that's

hypoth -- that’s not concrete.

The only concrete evidence they pointed to is that it

is a long-standing policy.

For example, we don’t know how many people over

which Barnett would have to jump in order to remain in the

mail room position.

A MALE VOICE: So one is not enough, but

twenty

MS. STAR: It's a way, Your Honor.

A MALE VOICE: Every time you have a single

person, though, I guess you're only going to have one person

displaced in a seniority system. So it's always going to be

only one person. And it sounds like you’ re telling me that

never can only one person be a hardship or a problem.

MS. STAR: I -- I don’t think that that’s necessarily

the case.

A MALE VOICE: Well, when could the

displacement --

MS. STAR: For example --

A MALE VOICE: - of one person be a problem,

then?

MS. STAR: Okay. If you have a situation in which

you have a 45-year employee. He has a sterling record. And

he’s been waiting for a position to open up for years. Then

you have somebody that's come in and maybe he’s worked

one year, and they are an okay performer, not a great

performer. They need an accommodation and they want that

position, that position that this person who has sterling

qualifications has waited for years and years and years for.

That situation under those facts, it seems to me that

an employer can certainly prove undue hardship because the

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 17

disruption on the workplace of something like that. Once

this information got out --

A MALE VOICE: It’s a hardship to the person, then

that becomes involved, not the hardship to the workplace or

the employer.

MS. STAR: No, it’s to the workplace, Your Honor,

because what I’m suggesting with that example is that once

that information got out to the workforce, that this person

who has been such a sterling performer for 35 years is not

getting his position that he’s been waiting for because this

mediocre performer that just was employed six months

previously is getting that position --

A MALE VOICE: So if the workplace

MS. STAR: You look to the --

A MALE VOICE: -- if the workplace raises hell and

all the employees turn out and start picketing and

threatening --

MS. STAR: I don’t think it would have to go --

A MALE VOICE: then that becomes a hardship?

MS. STAR: Your Honor, Congress, as it defines

unreasonable accommodations, looked also to destruction in

the workforce. Again, is it a burden? Is it a burden on the

employer to -- to provide a reasonable accommodation to

alter workplace policies?

A MALE VOICE: Counsel --

MS. STAR: But, Your Honor could view allowing

an individual to have a parking space closer to the building

than anyone else as a preference under the panel's decision.

A MALE VOICE: Counsel --

MS. STAR: Because everybody would want to be

able to park closer to the job.

THE COURT: You might stop for a minute and let

some questions --

A MALE VOICE: Okay. Counsel, I'm just

wondering whether this court has not already spoken in

=

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 18

[unintelligible] on this very matter. Now it is a Title VII

case and the issue was religious accommodation. But in

Valent vs. Carson City the Court held that such an

accommodation need only be made short of interfering with

the city’s seniority system and with no more than a

diminimous cost to the city. And that was a non-CBA

environment.

Haven’t we already established that we have to

recognize a seniority system and follow it?

MS. STAR: Your Honor, seniority -- the reasonable

accommodation in Title VII is dramatically different than the

reasonable accommodation provision in the ADA.

In the legislative history, Congress specifically

rejected the diminimous test of undue hardship. And the

reason that it is --

A MALE VOICE: I’m focusing on the seniority

system aspect. That’s been the focus of this entire

discussion so far.

MS. STAR: But the preface -- yes, I understand that,

Your Honor, but the preface of that statement that you have

read from is that it would -- all the employer has to show is

diminimous harm. |

A MALE VOICE: No, no. Short of interfering with

the city’s seniority system.

In other words, the Court held in that case that one

should not -- that one was not required -- the employer was

not required to change its seniority system for the

accommodation there.

And I grant you it’s Title VIL But aren't the

principles pretty comparable?

MS. STAR: No, they’re not comparable, because

what it takes to prove an undue hardship under Title VII is

dramatically different than what it takes to prove a hardship

under the ADA.

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 19

Under Title VII all you have to prove is a

diminimous harm. All the employer would have to show is

barely some hardship. And then they don’t have to make an

exception to their seniority policy. That is dramatically

different.

Congress specifically rejected that kind of approach

to undue hardship in enacting ADA.

A MALE VOICE: Well what about the qualified

definition? Is the employee qualified if he doesn’t have

enough seniority?

MS. STAR: No, Your Honor. In the recent case of

this court it, in [unintelligible] vs. [unintelligible] this court

said that to measure the ability to do the job is what -- the

definition of what qualification is the ability to do a job, and

that the standards must go to job performance.

In fact Congress made it very clear in the legislative

history that an expanse of the interpretation of the work

qualifications is exactly what’s led to the kind of

discrimination against individuals with disabilities that the

ADA was enacted to fight against.

A MALE VOICE: Counsel, does it matter if the

seniority system is contractual or not, even if it’s not a

collective bargaining agreement. But apart from that, does it

matter whether this unilaterally-established seniority system

creates contractual rights in the other employees?

And is that established in this record, or is that

something that would have to be proven at a trial to establish

undue hardship?

MS. STAR: Your Honor, those kind of contractual

rights which state law claims and the federal claim with the

Americans With Disabilities Act would preempt them. So --

And I do also want to make it clear that the

Commission’s position is that there isn’t that much of a

difference between a seniority system embodied in a

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 20

collective bargaining agreement and one outside of a

collective bargaining agreement.

The court [unintelligible] said that there is a

difference have pointed to the fact that a seniority systems

outside of a collective bargaining agreements are unilaterally

imposed and that within the seniority system you're dealing

with legal rights. =

A MALE VOICE: Well, why does that make --

excuse me. Why does that make a difference, to follow up

on Judge Gould’s question.

MS. STAR: Yes.

A MALE VOICE: It seems to me that maybe the

unilateral rights question isn’t particularly relevant. That the

question is, do you force the employer to violate someone's

legal rights, either contractually, implied in contracts, or by

virtue of a collective bargaining agreement?

So doesn’t the real question here come down to the

nature of the seniority system? In other words, if it’s an

informal custom, that’s one thing. If it’s part of a collective

bargaining agreement, it’s another. If it’s part of a contract,

it’s yet another obligation.

MS. STAR: Well, I would like to point the Court's

attention to Sarah Jacobs vs. United Airlines. It's this

panel’s -- this court’s decision. In which it said that there is

this inevitable tension between the ADA and the collective

bargaining agreements.

A MALE VOICE: Well, what’s the answer to Judge

Thomas’s question?

MS. STAR: What -- the answer is that —

A MALE VOICE: I mean, you seem to be saying

that seniority rights can be trumped regardless of the

circumstances.

Now it seems to me that there -- it really depends not

on the nature of the disability or the employee or the nature

of the exception, but rather the nature of the obligation that

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 21

the company either assumes or has imposed on it in terms of

a seniority system.

MS. STAR: We are not saying that seniority systems

are automatically trumped at all. What we're saying is that’s

the employer's burden. Whether it’s in a collective

bargaining agreement; whether it’s outside of a collective

bargaining agreement; whether or not there’s a contract:

whether or not it’s loosely formed. All of that goes to undue

hardship.

I would assume that the more - when you have a

collective vargaining agreement, then it might be easier to

prove undue hardship than in a situation where it’s you have

a seniority system that’s kind of loosely based.

A MALE VOICE: But along the logic of this --

MS. STAR: But again it’s the employee’s burden.

A MALE VOICE: It’s not [unintelligible], but the

logic of the collective bargaining agreement cases seems to

be that we don’t want to force employers to violate another

federal law. So you start with that end of the continuum.

So then you move down it. Do we want to force

employers to violate someone’s cont..:ct rights?

MS. STAR: Yeah, but those are state rights that if

A MALE VOICE: Then you're saying, yes, that's

MS. STAR: There’s tranche ou: -- yes, federal rights

[unintelligible] state rights. The state rights sometimes are

preempted.

And the Commission’s position on the federal rights

is the position of this Court, which is that the ADA rights are

not subject to the rights under a collective bargaining

agreement.

And the Commission proposes that the union and the

employer, both of which are covered entities under the ADA,

and are required to abide by its provisions, get together and

agree to a variance of that collective bargaining agreement

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 22

SO as to not put the employer and the union in this kind of

awkward Catch-22 position, which I can see exists.

A MALE VOICE: Counsel, can I just ask whether

you agree with counsel that the definition of the plaintiff's

burden as set forth in the panel opinion is acceptable to the

EEOC or not?

MS. STAR: The definition is acceptable. It’s the

application that’s not. Because it said that to prove

reasonable [unintelligible], an employee has to show that it

would not unreasonably burden the employer. That is

incorrect. That’s the employer’s burden.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay, Counsel.

A MALE VOICE: We'll give the couple of moments

to respond.

MR. THOMAS: Good Morning, Your Honors. May

it please the Court, my name is Random Thomas, and I

represent U.S. Air, now U.S. Airways, in this matter.

And the discussion has been interesting so far. I

think we’ve hit on the main issues before the Court.

There are really two: Whether or not there’s an

independent violation of the ADA by failing to engage in --

sufficiently in an interactive process.

And understand that the facts in this case are not that

the employer refused to do so or would not do so. What

we re really talking about is whether or not it was done to

the satisfaction of the appellant in this case. There’s no

question but that process was engaged in.

The question is are we going to create a right, a cause

of action, independent of actually -- of actual violation of the

ADA for engaging in an insufficient interactive process.

Did the employer react too fast? Did it take the employer

too long? Was the letter long enough that was responded to?

In this particular case, there was lots of interaction.

There were -- there were communications from the plaintiff,

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 23

from the appellant’s lawyer, from several of appellant’s

doctors. These went to people at the corporate offices. They

went to local management. They went to people in the

workers’ compensation side of things. There was lots of

interaction over many months.

The problem is, in the end, is that the appellant was

not happy with the result that was reached. And our position

on the interactive process is simply that it should not and

cannot become an independent violation disconnected

completely from the actual existence of a reasonable

accommodation.

In this case after full discovery the appellant was

never in our view able to point to an actual -- the existence

of an actual accommodation that was reasonable.

JUDGE GREGORSON: This is Judge Gregorson.

Let me just interrupt for a moment:

So, I gather from what you’ re saying is that you agree

that the employer is required to engage in an interactive

process. Is that right?

MR. THOMAS: Well, if -- you mean when you’re

using the word “required” means that it somehow the --

JUDGE GREGORSON: Well that the ADA requires

the employer to engage in an interactive process. The

employer just can’t say: Get lost. I don’t want to talk to

you. Don’t bother me.

MR. THOMAS: Well, I think actually the ADA does

not require where you're at pain of violating the law to

engage in an interactive process.

What I -- our main point is if at the end of the day the

appellant or the employee cannot actually point to a specific

accommodation that was reasonable, after full discovery,

which they have in this case, then the fact that there was no

interactive process engaged in, or in the appellant’s view, as

is applicable here, it was somehow insufficient or

unsatisfactory, that we should not be litigating as a separate

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 24

violation the satisfactory-ness of that process. But actually

we --

JUDGE GREGORSON: But isn’t whether the

employer engage in -- engages in an interactive process, isn’t

that a factor to consider in determining whether there was 4

reasonable accommodation or an effort made for a

reasonable accommodation?

MR. THOMAS: Well, in almost -- in every case that

I’m aware of that has discussed the interactive process and

faulted an employer, it was always, always coupled with a

finding by the court that there was an -- actually was an

accommodation that could have been made.

In my view an employer acts at its peril when it

doesn’t engage in that process because it could well miss an

accommodation that is indeed reasonable.

JUDGE GREGORSON: Let me ask you this: So

your position is that the employer doesn’t have to sit down

with the employee face to face and talk about what would or

would not be a reasonable accommodation.

MR. THOMAS: I don’t think that’s a requirement of

the law, but again, I think an employer acts at its peril when

it doesn’t have that type of dialog, and we certainly did have

that in this particular case.

JUDGE GREGORSON: You would have face-to-

face meetings between the employer and the employee?

MR. THOMAS: Well, again, that occurred in this

case. I would not say as a -- as a prac -- as a legal matter --

JUDGE GREGORSON: I mean, that occurred in this

case that there were face-to-face meetings?

MR. THOMAS: There were definitely face-to-face

meetings. There were many meetings. There were -- there

was lots of communication. There were many, many players

involved in this dialog that went on for many months.

A MALE VOICE: Counsel, to follow up on

Judge Gregorson’s question. It seems that there 8 a

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 25

regulation at 29 CFR, Appendix 1630.9 that describes an

interactive process, including analyzing a particular job in

determining essential functions, consulting with the

individual with a disability to assess what they can do and

what might be a reasonable accommodation, and identifying

potential accommodations, and considering the person's

preferences, and so on. I'm not going to read the whole reg.

Im sure you're familiar with it.

But first, was that a process consistent with that

regulation engaged in here?

MR. THOMAS: All of that was done. But I want to

make clear that the regulation actually uses the word “may.”

A MALE VOICE: Well, it says “may -- it may be

necessary.” So it has the word “necessary” in it.

And I was impressed with Judge Fletcher's dissent,

pointing why “may be necessary” cannot possibly be a

totally permissive standard. If it has the word “necessary” in

it, doesn’t that suggest that there are situations Where

where it's a requirement?

MR. THOMAS: Well, I think in the case -- I think in

the end, no, not if there is no reasonable accommodation at

the end of the road to be identified, and which is what our

view is of this particular case.

But | do want to emphasize, and in this particular

case we believe we did engage in all of those steps. Maybe

not to the satisfaction of the appellant, but we engaged in

them.

And that’s what I'm most concerned about with this

issue. Are we going to have a due process laden, very

structured, technically-driven type of requirement, where

we're simply going to be having litigation in the federal

courts about the interactive process and how it was done,

and not really focusing on whether or not there was an

accommodation that was available and reasonable that this

individual should or should not have had.

BARNETT V. U.S. AR 26

A MALE VOICE: Weill, turning - turning to that, I

want to ask you a question that I didn’t get a complete

answer from the government on that you may be familiar

with the record. Is it absolutely clear in this record that the

seniority system is contractual in the sense that if a person

were moved to accommodate Mr. Barnett, that that person's

legal rights would be violated?

Because as we know, sometimes unilateral systems

policies create contract obligations, and other times they

don't. What's the situation here? Has there been a record

made on that?

MR. THOMAS: Well, I think what the record is

clear on is that this particular seniority system has been in

place for decades. And the word “unilateral” has been

thrown around a lot here. I don’t believe it is unilateral.

A MALE VOICE: Okay. But decades doesn't

necessarily mean contractual. | don’t -- so I'm asking you:

Is it contractual or is it not contractual? And is there any

truth to the argument of appellant that U.S. Air has taken the

position in other litigation that its personnel policies are not

contractual?

MR. THOMAS: | am unaware of what appellant's

counsel is referring to on that particular point.

I would say as an employment lawyer who defends

employers all the time, I can tell you that many many cases

are brought based on a lot less than a written policy such as

this alleging that, first of all it is an express contract, and

certainly an implied contract.

I think the real key thing here is though, it isn’t

unilateral. Employees come to work. They trust in the

system. They work year after year.

A MALE VOICE: Okay. I understand, but and I

don't mean to interrupt you. But it's my last point. It

sounds to me like from what you're saying that that record

does not establish, that it has not been adjudicated or

BARNETT V. U.S. AR 27

determined or stipulated that this seniority system is

contractual as to all the employees. That's the point I'm

trying to address.

MR. THOMAS: I think what the Court found was

that to deviate from this established system would violate the

legitimate rights and expectations of Mr. Barneti's fellow

employees.

A MALE VOICE: Where did the Court find that?

MR. THOMAS: When it found that -- when it found

that there was no -- there was -- it would not be reasonable --

it would not be a reasonable accommodation to depart from

the seniority system.

A MALE VOICE: Well, you're reading an awful lot

into that by saying the Court concluded that it was a right --

contractual right that would be violated, aren't you?

MR. THOMAS: No, I think what I said was, I think

that the Court found that it would violate the legitimate

rights and expectations of employees --

A MALE VOICE: Well, when you say legitimate

rights, do you equate that with legally enforceable rights?

MR. THOMAS: I certainly have been involved in

many cases trying to defend employers for a lot less.

A MALE VOICE: Well, how does that square with

the catastrophic --

A MALE VOICE: [Unintelligible] position usually

is that those cases are with out merit. I'm asking you in your

opinion, your position, are they legally enforceable rights?

MR. THOMAS: I think an employee could certainly

file --

A MALE VOICE: I'm asking you your position. Is

it the company’s position that their rights arising from the

seniority system are legally enforceable by the employee?

MR. THOMAS: I think that we have an obligation

to enforce the rights and expectations created by this system.

BARNETT V. U.S. AR 28

A MALE VOICE: How does that square with the

catastrophic medical policy adopted by U.S. Air that says, if

you're awarded a catastrophic medical transfer you will

receive a position in your desired location regardless of your

seniority date? What's the history and application of that?

MR. THOMAS: Well, it just -- as it says, there is

some limited exceptions, which the employees are all aware

of, and they are part of the system --

A MALE VOICE: Who put that system in place?

MR. THOMAS: The company did to react --

A MALE VOICE: And what was the employees

participation?

MR. THOMAS: I- I have no idea of that.

A MALE VOICE: So U.S. Air was able to upset the

[unintelligible] expectations under its decades-old policy by

putting that in without breaching somebody's contact rights“

MR. THOMAS: Well, I --

A MALE VOICE: Implied contracts rights.

MR. THOMAS: Since there is no record on when

that first went in, | couldn't tell the panel or the en

[unintelligible] court why or when that went in. All we

know is that the particular exception that everybody is aware

of, and it’s still -- in this particular thing, it is not unilateral.

Let's remember -- we want the Court to understand

that the customer service agent classification is a very broad

classification. It involves virtually everybody you see at the

airport: The people who load the luggage, the people who

fuel the planes, the people who take tickets, the people who

are out, you know, out on the ramp in the middle of the

winter, the people who are taking tickets in St. Thomas in

the Caribbean.

This system decides each and every job that this

person gets; where they can work, when they re going to

work, what kind of job they're going to have. This governs

all of their expectations. All of them.

BARNETT V.U.S.AIR 29

A MALE VOICE: Counsel, maybe to test that

question that has been presented, suppose the existing

mailroom person, who has the mailroom job today, is told by

management, sorry, we have an ADA-eligible employee who

needs to take your position. We're going to move you

someplace. What rights does that employee have?

MR. THOMAS: Well, what-would happen, it would

affect in most -- in almost every circumstance, more than

one employee. That employee would then likely ask to

exercise his or her seniority, take a position that they want,

which could then affect another employee, who would then

want to exercise his or her seniority to get the position that

they want. You would -- you could -- you would very likely

have bumping and movement throughout the entire system.

And. you know -- and it does I mean, people.

End of Tape 1, Side A.

MR. THOMAS: . waiting a long time to get a

particular shift so maybe they can get their kids to school or

pick them up, so that they can go to school themselves.

There's a variety -- as you can imagine, of reasons that

people want particular jobs at particular times. And it's

extremely upsetting.

A MALE VOICE: Where's the showing in the

record that supports what you just said? Where's that

developed so that we know that that is in fact more than your

experience speculation as opposed to what really -- the

impact on this particular employer would be?

MR. THOMAS: | don’t think there is a lot of that in

the record. I think it's clear when you have 14,000

employees under such a system, and you understand that as

it is in the record, that every single job, every variety of job

imaginable almost in -- in the airline industry is covered by

BARNETT V. U.S. AR 30

this system, that people are going to make those sorts of

decisions and make --

What type of record would you need? It’s absolutely

patently obvious that that would be the case.

A MALE VOICE: Well, we're on summary

judgment. Of course they have to construe the facts in a

light most favorable to the plaintiff. So why isn’t there a

genuine issue of material fact in this seniority system, as in a

collective bargaining agreement that we can read and we

know is legal and enforceable, and then you would be

subject to labor law violations if you violate it? Why isn’t

the genuine issue of material fact as to the nature of the

seniority system and whether or not exceptions could be

made?

MR. THOMAS: Well, there is a record on that

particular point. It’s clear that an employee who would

otherwise be entitled to the job is not going to get it. And in

our view that is enough.

A MALE VOICE: Why is that more of a hardship to

accommodate a disabled person than it is with the exception

with regard to catastrophic illness?

MR. THOMAS: Weill, one is if -I don’t know if

this has been developed in the record, but I could certainly

say that one, there's going to be fewer of those. I mean the

ADA is a very broad statute. It covers a lot of things that are

beyond what we would normally -- might normally consider

a disability, and it could have monumental -- it would have

monumental effects to allow anybody with any type of ADA-

protected disability to require an accommodation that would

require us to deviate from the seniority system.

Obviously Mr. Barnett is not the only person in the

company that has a back problem. And there are many,

many people who have these types of issues, and it would

lead to basically a disintegration of the entire system.

BARNETT V. U.S. AR 31

A MALE VOICE: Would that be something that

would factually be developed rather than at summary

judgment stage”

MR. THOMAS: Well, I think -- I think the summary

judgment is pos -- on the seniority system is positive on the

basic idea. It's clear that if I had the seniority and I had a

right to that job, am I required to have my right violated --

A MALE VOICE: Well, that’s also true with the

other exception though, too.

MR. THOMAS: Yes, that is, that’s true. I grant you

that. And it is -- but it is part of the policy and nobody is

deviating from the policy. There have been exceptions. |

think there were exceptions in some of the other cases we

talked about already where there was some limited

exceptions to a seniority system where the court found

that's that’s not enough, we're not deviating from the

policy.

A MALE VOICE: This question of a right to a job

that you mentioned, though, sounds fuzzy in the record to

me. I mean, is the seniority system in a policy handbook? Is

that --

MR. THOMAS: Oh, absolutely.

A MALE VOICE: Does the handbook have any

qualifying statements in it indicating it's not contractual, or

does the handbook say it is contractual?

MR. THOMAS: I don’t think it says either one.

A MALE VOICE: It doesn't say either one?

Shouldn't there have been a hearing to determine whether

the seniority system was contractual or not?

MR. THOMAS: I don’t think in my view that the

analysis is dependent upon having to be contractual.

A MALE VOICE: How do you square that with

Valent? You know, we talked about that. It's a Tide VII

case. One of the holdings of Valent, which I think is

instructive on a variety of issues that cut a number of

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 32

different ways, is that it’s not -- a seniority system in and of

itself doesn’t trump. You have to look at the undue hardship

factor, when -- and mix that into the analysis, which may be

a factual question. -

How do you square with what you're just saying with

Valent and our treatment in that case? .

MR. THOMAS: Well, I think that --

A MALE VOICE: Because your position is basically

not -- from what I understand that seniority systems trump,

night?

MR. THOMAS: Right.

A MALE VOICE: And we said they don’t in Valent.

How do you square that?

MR. THOMAS: Well, I think in that particular case,

as I recall you -- the Court simply went on and said, and, you

know, because it would require some minimal cost, they

don’t have to do it because that’s part of the - the Title VII

analysis that’s used in a religious discrimination case.

But I think in this particular -- in our case, you're

talking about again -- and I think that case talked about

being able to move people around potentially without

violating their rights.

For example, in Buckingham. Certainly in that case

the seniority system was so fuzzy and left so many openings

and a few slots allocated. There was plenty of room as the

Court -- District Court found below and then the Appellate

Court agreed, that there was plenty of room for the employer

to be able to accommodate the disability without violating

actually any rights that any particular employee held. That's

not the case here.

A MALE VOICE: Are you aware of any case that --

where an employee has sued the company claiming that his

or her seniority nghts were somehow violated in a context

such as this?

MR. THOMAS: Well --

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 33

A MALE VOICE: Has it been adjudicated what the

nature of these would be -- everybody’s calling them rights.

What the nature of these, the standing of these at law are?

MR. THOMAS: Clearly in the collective bargaining

context there are many because there are seniority grievances

filed all the time.

This particular case does present a fairly rare animal,

which is a very strict non-collectively-bargained seniority

system. But that doesn’t mean that it still doesn’t create the

same rights and expectations.

Im not aware of anybody -- and I don’t handle all of

U.S. Air’s work on them, so I don’t know. I don’t know

whether or not any agent has actually ever sued under this

particular policy even though it’s not collectively bargained.

A MALE VOICE: Is Mr. Barnett an at-will

employee?

MR. THOMAS: I don't I don’t -- again, that was

never raised below. I'd have to check. I’m not sure that he

ever signed -- would have signed an at-will statement in the

kind of position he’s in now.

And I should add that just -- the roof of employees is

now actually is unionized. So at this point in time I'd have

to refer to whatever agreement has been reached between the

union and --

A MALE VOICE: Mr. Thomas, do you agree that

Mr. Barnett has an ADA-covered disability?

MR. THOMAS: The panel asked us to brief

Thompson, which we did. It was never really addressed.

And I think in our response that we took the position that we

did not think he was disabled. But the panel did not address

that in oral argument or in its opinion. But we did brief that

below and we believe he is not.

JUDGE FLETCHER: But Counsel, was that

presented on appeal?

MR. THOMAS: I'm sorry?

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 34

JUDGE FLETCHER: This is Judge Fletcher

speaking.

Was the issue of his not being disabled presented on

appeal to the original panel?

MR. THOMAS: It wasn’t originally presented by

parties, but the court asked us to brief it.

JUDGE FLETCHER: Yes, but it was never

presented as an issue by you to the panel in the first hearing.

MR. THOMAS: Correct. We -- we, as I recall at the

oral argument, I raised it, and perhaps - it may have been

you, Your Honor, who made the point that that had not been

raised. But we were asked by the panel at that time to brief

the subject and we did.

A MALE VOICE: Counsel, there was a question

raised by one of our colleagues earlier with respect to

whether U.S. Air had ever offered a transfer to a different

station, which would have met the accommodation. And

your opposing counsel indicated that that either was not in

the record or was simply not true. What - what's the

what’s your version?

MR. THOMAS: I'm going to cite to the record. If

you look at the Excerpts of Record, page 98, which is a

Declaration of --

A MALE VOICE: Did you say 98?

MR. THOMAS: Yes, 98.

A MALE VOICE: Paragraphs 3 and 4?

MR. THOMAS: Correct.

The -- Mr. Cohen, an attorney for U.S. Air, was

contacted by the EEOC and informed -- he informed her that

there were no positions available at SFO, San Francisco

Airport, where he could perform the essential functions of

the job with or without accommodation.

And I’m summarizing here: Mr. Cohen asked

Ms. Horn to find out whether it be -- Mr. Barnett would be

interested in transferring to another location. Ms. Horn --

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 35

This is during the conciliation process after the charge had

been filed that the EEOC was acting as a conciliator.

Ms. Horn came back to Mr. Cohen and advised him

that he was unwilling to relocate to another station and that

he was insisting on the accommodations he had previously

requested.

If you look at the Excerpts of Record, page 225, you

see Mr. Barnett’s response to that. Which he stated, and I’m

reading from paragraph 20, “I never stated to Investigator

Diana Horn at EEOC that I was unwilling to relocate to

another U.S. Air station, or that I was insisting only on the

accommodations I had previously requested. I told Ms.

Horn only that I did not want to leave the Bay Area because

both of my parents are living here, are elderly and disabled,

and need my presence. She told me in her opinion that I did

not have to leave the Bay Area to be reasonably

accommodated. I don’t know what she may have said to

Attorney Cohen of U.S. Air or how she may have said it.”

So certainly the company offered that to the EEOC

as part of the conciliation process, and we were Certainly

told that he was not interested. And I think his own response

is somewhat illustrative.

And it’s clear also it was one of the undisputed facts

below on summary judgment that Mr. Barnett has never

attempted to utilize his seniority to bid for another position

or to another station.

And also there was another statement made about

discovery not being complete. Discovery was complete. |

mean, I -- in my entire career I don’t think I ve ever filed a

motion for summary judgment early. And in this particular

case, discovery was completed.

So there is no question that everybody had a full

opportunity to identify what potential jobs were out there, to

raise any issues, to discuss any of the proposed

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 36

accommodations. That was all fully investigated, full

discovery, fully briefed, and fully addressed.

A MALE VOICE: You mentioned that he had not

used the system counsel for -- Mr. Barnett indicated that he

in fact had one bid outstanding. What’s the resolution?

MR. THOMAS: Well I really don’t know what he’s

referring to. What happened as to the original dispute, was

that he asked, I want to stay in the mailroom on the swing

shift job.

When after several months he was allowed to have

his limited-duty extra- person job, continuing to perform that

duty as an extra person, when that came to an end, he then

quickly asked that additional accommodations be made with

respect to the cargo position.

So he didn’t really even exercise his seniority bid to

those jobs.

And I should state, U.S. Air never told him he

couldn't have the position. Never told him that.

So he’s on leave. And he’s never been told he can’t

come back. He’s never been told he can’t exercise his

seniority. He’s free today to exercise his seniority, to look at

any openings that we have, and to work with us to find any

type of accommodation that could be reasonable.

Essentially he put all his eggs in the basket of the

seniority system, and then thereafter with respect to the

Cargo position, he want to have a cargo position that didn’t

involve working with cargo, which is a problem. And he

wanted a robotics device where there was absolutely no

showing by him that it would allow him to do anything that

he couldn’t do using a forklift. And that’s why those

accommodations were not accepted.

But at no time has he been prevented from coming

dack to the cargo position. The only thing he’s been

prevented from doing by the company was to in our view

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 37

violate our seniority policy and the legitimate rights and

expectations of his co-employees.

A MALE VOICE: Is it correct that under this

directive the only suggestions of what might be a reasonable

accommodation were made by the plaintiff, and U.S. Air

never suggested what its own view was as to what might be

a reasonable accommodation?

MR. THOMAS: Well, I think once he was told that

the seniority was not -- you know, we weren’t going to

violate the seniority policy, and he fairly promptly after that

filed this charge and went to the EEOC and we were in

conciliation, I would say that yes, we did talk to the EEOC

as the conciliator about whether or not he would be

interested in trying to find a position at another station. And

to that we were told he wasn’t interested.

A MALE VOICE: What kind of a position were you

talking about?

MR. THOMAS: Well, I don’t think anybody had a

position in mind. If you look at his restrictions, which

basically said: No prolonged standing, no prolonged sitting,

no excessive bending, twisting, turning, pushing, pulling

It’s very hard for an employer under those circumstances to

figure out, well what exactly can this person do?

So when you're looking at vacancies, that’s where I

think if he had been interested in trying to leave this, the Bay

Area, there could have been a more of an interactive process

to talk about what types of jobs might have been available.

But he never pursued that.

A MALE VOICE: If the seniority system were not a

problem, there was a position -- there were positions in the

mailroom, obviously, in San Francisco; were there not?

MR. THOMAS: Well, what happens is that when

schedules change, and as we said in our briefs below

obviously U.S. Air’s presence in California Bay Area has

dramatically gone down to almost zero, if not zero at this

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 38

point. There -- what happens when there are schedule

changes, the entire station is rebid, because all of a sudden

you might need more here or less there. A new schedule is

posted or new flights coming in at different times and

changes. The whole schedule is rebid.

So there were mailroom positions, but there were

people who -- with seniority who wanted them and had more

seniority. And as I --

A MALE VOICE: [Unintelligible.}

MR. THOMAS: All right. Let me make one extra

point there, if I can connect if for you.

A MALE VOICE: All right. Go ahead.

MR. THOMAS: Let’s keep in mind that he only

wanted the swing shift mail position. He would not take the

day, and he would not take the graveyard mail position. It

was only one shift in one position.

His own doctor said he could not perform the

graveyard mail position. So there was -- I think there were

two swing shift mail positions for which he could not hold

because of his seniority.

A MALE VOICE: Well, were they vacant? Were

they -- was that an option?

MR. THOMAS: No, because when they go up for

rebid, they’re bid by seniority. That’s the same way he got

the position, was by utilizing his seniority. So no, they

weren't vacant in that sense that another employee had a

right to those positions.

A MALE VOICE: But would his own seniority have

been high enough to bump the graveyard shift employee, if

he -- if he so choose?

MR. THOMAS: AS I recall, yes, but he was clear

that he could not perform that job. He did not want that job.

A MALE VOICE: In other words, he could have had

it, but he declined to pursue it.

BARNETT V. U.S. AIR 39

MR. THOMAS: I want to make sure Im not

misstating the record. It was either the graveyard cargo or

graveyard mailroom.

But he was very clear -- and in fact the doctors and

the evaluators evaluated some of these other positions -- he

was very clear he would only take the swing shift position.

A MALE VOICE: Well, but --

JUDGE FLETCHER: Where is that in the record,

Counsel?

MR. THOMAS: It’s in many places in the record. If

you look at the job analyses that were prepared, you will see

that those job analyses included some of these other

positions. And it is -- which his counsel and Mr. Barnett

signed off on as being accurate.

And his own doctor came back and said, we can

only -- he can only perform the mailroom swing position.

A MALE VOICE: The ADA is real -- is silent on

this. And when you contrast that to Title VII, you wonder

why. The panel opinion itself said silence suggests that

Congress did not intend for a seniority system always to

trump reasonable accommodations of a disabled employee.

Congress knew how to write this into the ADA if it

wanted to, and it apparently chose not to. What do we make

of that? The Senate Report says that it should be considered

one factor of a collective bargaining agreement.

MR. THOMAS: Well, I think when we look, again,

the ADA is in many respects modeled on the Rehabilitation

Act. And we have a -- we do have a long history under the

Rehabilitation Act of recognizing bona fide seniority

systems. So we do have that bit of history and --

A MALE VOICE: All the more reason why it could

have and should have been in if your position is correct.

MR. THOMAS: Well, except that I think that the

Congress is fairly clear about really saying that they were

piggybacking on the Rehab -- under the Rehab Act.

BARNETT V. US. AIR 40

And, you know --

A MALE VOICE: Fairly clear. What does “fairly”

mean? I mean the Senate Report says the collective

bargaining agreement could be relevant.

MR. THOMAS: Well, I think fundamentally what

this comes down to is, I mean, is a seniority system a

always a trump?

In my view what makes Mr. Barnett's request

unreasonable is that I can think of a lot of reasons that an

employer wants a seniority system. It keeps people longer.

It gives them an easy way to -- a rational way to make

assignments, and so on. But really the most fundamental

issue to me is it violates another employee s rights and

expectations. And this may have -- this may have

application beyond just a seniority system.

A MALE VOICE: Where in the record does it make

clear specifically that it would violate another employees

rights, that it’s a contractual obligation that would violate

another employee s nights?

MR. THOMAS: Well, what's clear in the record is --

A MALE VOICE: But is there --

MR. THOMAS: it is in the record that it's a

policy --

A MALE VOICE: I understand it's a long-standing

policy. But is it -- was it adjudicated below, or is it clear

through some stipulation that it would violate another

employee s legally enforceable rights?

MR. THOMAS: Well, I think those are

characterizations or getting a particular act or event or

reading a certain characterization that it’s a legally

protectable right. I think that’s what the panel is going to

decide.

But it's very clear in the record that this policy is

long-standing, that the employees depend upon it, that

BARNETT V. U.S. AR 41

another employee wouldn't receive this job if Mr. Barnett

took it, even though the other employee had more seniority.

A MALE VOICE: But couldn't there have been a

hearing in the trial court to determine the issue whether other

employees had a contractually legal right to this seniority

system?

If U.S. Air is sued tomorrow by a different employee

on a different issue relating to the seniority system, are you

free on behalf of U.S. Air -- not necessarily you personally,

but can U.S. Air have it counsel get up and take the position

that it’s not a contractual policy?

MR. THOMAS: I don’t think they would take that

position.

A MALE VOICE: Weill, but are they free to do that

as far as any stipulation’s concerned?

MR. THOMAS: Well, I mean, in the respect -- is

there some legal prohibition in existence that would prohibit

them from doing that? I'm not I don’t -- I'm not aware of

one.

But the point -- the point is they would not take that

position because this is how they have operated, and this is

what they think is a fair way to operate, and that’s how

everybody has relied on it operating all these years.

A MALE VOICE: All right. Mr. Thomas,

[unintelligible], Counsel.

MR. THOMAS: Thank you.

THE COURT: [unintelligible] has two minutes to

respond.

A MALE VOICE: Barry [unintelligible], Your

Honor. To pick up a couple of things.

First of all, the -- I believe the response of the

appellant concerning the Thompson case is that we have

submitted very careful evidence through the vocational

rehabilitation counselor expert that Mr. Barnett’s restrictions

met the test of Thompson because he had specific inabilities,

BARNETT V. U.S. AR 42

and it prevented him from a broad range of jobs in various

classes that was submitted in the record below.

Secondly, the accurate citation to the existing record

that | made concerning contrary information to what counsel

said about U.S. Air's position or not is contained in the brief

of --

A MALE VOICE: You're referring now to U.S. Air

taking a position that this seniority system creates no rights?

A MALE VOICE: Correct. This is in the BREF

brief submitted as amicus curiae in support of our position.

And I'm referring specifically to page --

Excuse me I just keep missing it in my --

A MALE VOICE: This is in an amicus brief, not

part of the record?

MR. THOMAS: It is an amicus brief. It is part of

the record. It was authorized to be filed and it was filec .

And a citation is contained in the footnote on page 9

of their specific brief in support of appellant on rehearing

involved. They submitted two briefs, which is why I was

confused. One for the petition, and then one on

{unintelligible}.

A MALE VOICE: Who's the “they”?

MR. THOMAS: The “they” is a collection of amicus

called Disability Rights Advocates, Disability Rights

Education and Defense Fund, Employment Loss Center,

San Francisco, and New York Lawyers for the Public

Interest, and the Western Law Center for Disability Rights

and World Institute on Disability.

Page 9, footnote 3, from their brief reads as follows:

California Labor Code, Sec. 2922, California employees

presumed at will. See also (unintelligible) U.S. Air. 1985

case in Massachusetts, U.S. Air successfully argued the

personnel policy guide did not create enforceable contract.

And same argument accepted in another case. U.S. Air Inc.

as challenger. U.S. Air Inc. 1985.

BARNETT V. U.S. AR 43

A MALE VOICE: Who is the onus to U.S. Air? Is

that the 1985 (unintelligible) cite 15470?

MR. THOMAS: That is correct.

THE COURT: Okay, Counsel. Your time is

expired.

A MALE VOICE: Yes. Thank you very much.

THE COURT: The case will be submitted and

{unintelligible}.

BARNETT V. U.S. AR 44

STATE OF CALIFORNIA )

88.

CONTRA COSTA COUNTY

I, Nancy S. Oram, do hereby declare, under the laws

of the State of California:

~_ That I have been transcribing legal documents since

| That the foregoing transcript was transcribed by me

into typewriting from cassette tape(s);

That the foregoing transcript constitutes a full, true,

and correct report of the proceedings recorded on the

cassette(s), except as otherwise noted;

That I am a disinterested part to the foregoin

proceeding. *

IN WITNESS THEREOF, I have hereunto subscribed

my hard.

Dated: February 19, 2001

Nancy S. Oram

USAir 9

Agent

personnel Policy Guide

3-10, Page 5

December |, 1993

Employees may a transfer if only they or a

member of their immediate family* are suffering from a

catastrophic illness.

*Note: For the purpose of this policy, the immediate family

is defined as spouse and children only.

You may transfer within the same or to a different

geographic location in the same classification only.

A confidential written transfer request explaining the reason

you desire the transfer must be submitted to your local

manager along with a written statement from your physician,

or at USAir’s request and expense, a USAir appointed

physician, revealing the nature of the illness. Your medical

information will remain confidential at all times.

An employee awarded a catastrophic medical transfer may

be required to submit an updated medical certification from a _

health-care provider in the event of a reduction in force, or

other circumstances, as deemed necessary.

In the event of a reduction in force, the employee will be

exempt from displacement from the location, if it is

determined by the Department Officer that the catastrophic

medical condition still exists; if it does not, you may be

subject to displacement based on adjusted company

senionity.

Catastrophic medical transfer requests must be approved by

the Department Officer, or his/her designee, or a case-by-

case basis.

If awarded a catastrophic medical transfer you:

- will receive a position in your desired location,

regardless of your seniority date.

pay the entire moving costs and settlement

expenses.

cannot use the catastrophic medical transfer

policy again to return to your onginal location or

any other location.

cannot bid or request transfer for one (1) year.

continued...

(Lawrence Exhibit No. X, 12/8/95)

(ER P. 11)

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.

Opposition Brief — US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett · 535 U.S. 391 | Frix