Reply Brief — TRW Inc. v. Andrews

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Supreme Court, U.S

‘~TLED

JUN 28 200)

No. 00-1045

IN THE CLERK

Supreme Court of the

TRW INC.,

Petitioner,

v.

ADELAIDE ANDREWS,

Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

DANIEL MCLOON DANIEL H. BROMBERG

EUGENIA C. SALAMON (Counsel of Record)

JONES, DAY, REAVIS & GLEN D. NAGER

POGUE JONES, DAY, REAVIS &

555 WEST FIFTH STREET POGUE

SUITE 4600 51 LOUISIANA AVENUE,

Los ANGELES, CA 90013 N.W.

(213) 489-3939 WASHINGTON, DC 20001

(202) 879-3939

Counsel for Petitioner

———

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ARGUMENT

I.

CONCLUSION

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

THE LANGUAGE OF SECTION 618

EXPRESSES THE TRADITIONAL

COMMENCEMENT RULE, NOT A

GENERAL DISCOVERY RULE. ........

THE MISREPRESENTATION

EXCEPTION ALSO SUPPORTS THE

TRADITIONAL COMMENCEMENT

PEE Amb aeeedvcnedesedeessvescocese

THE POLICY ARGUMENTS OF

RESPONDENT AND THE

GOVERNMENT ARE IRRELEVANT

AND UNPERSUASIVE. ...............

NEITHER RESPONDENT NOR HER

AMICI DEFEND THE PRESUMPTION

APPLIED BY THE NINTH CIRCUIT. ....

RESPONDENT’S ACTUAL DAMAGES

ARGUMENT IS NOT PROPERLY

BEFORE THIS COURT AND, IN ANY

EVENT, WITHOUT MERIT.............

“er eneeneeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee # # # @ @

ieout 5

seca OF

foto

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Akutowicz v. United States, 859 F.2d 1122

(28 Cle. 1968)... cc cvccsecvesseseune see 10

Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, Alaska,

460 U.S. $31 (19GF) oo eccecseccsue enn 4

Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust

Fund v. Ferbar Corp., 522 U.S. 192 (1997) ......... 2

Bergman v. United States, 751 F.2d 314

Ci Ye 3) rr 10

Birdsall v. Coolidge, 93 U.S. (3 Otto) 64 (1876)....... 19

Bowyer v. United States Dep't of Air Force,

87S F.2d 632 (Fis Cir. 19GB) . wc cccvccccvsvcsesss 10

Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115 (1994) ...........4.. 2

Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945)... 12

Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group,

Jnc., 121 8. Ce. 1GTB GABBER) onc cseccscscuuenseuen 19

Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen,

$14 US. 73 (1906) ..ccccvcscocnnsecuneeeneneee 11

Englerius v. Veterans Admin., 837 F.2d 895

(Sta Cle. 1968)... occccccsccscnscuueu ene 10

Estate of Cowart v. Nickles Drilling Co.,

$05 U.S. 460 (IGS) 2. ccccvcccnnsseussuueeenee 11

Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635 (1930) ......... 3

Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980) ............ 18

Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179 (1997) ....... 18

McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25 (1951) ........ 3

Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993) ....... 12

Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 515 U.S. 291 (1995)... 11

Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Armstrong, 604 A.2d 47

(DEE. 1992) . 0 oc cvcsccessessecennenneneeee 3,5

Rawlings v. Ray, 312 U.S. 96 (1941) «2.2... eee ee ee eee 2

Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522 (1987) ... 11, 12

Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549 (2000) ............ 17,18

Tijerina v. Walters, 821 F.2d 789 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ..... 10

ili

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page

United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38 (1998) ......... 6

United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347 (1997) ....... 6

United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979) ...... 4,18

Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949) .............. 4

West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey,

eee cece tcccceccces 13

Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985) .............. 12

Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,

EEE 17, 18

STATUTES

peeveey Ast, SUS.C. 6 SS2m .... ccc ccc ccc ccces 9,10

Fair Credit Reporting Act,

Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 609, 84 Stat. 1131 .......... 13

EEE TTT TTTTORET 10

eee ect c ck eccccccccees 10

EEL EEE 12

ee ene ccccccécceceeses 8, 10

ee reac ccccecsccceecescse 10

eee eke ccocccccacccecccec: 1,7

Chee en ececcccecceececcccce 15

EE 16

Nee a cc ccccevceces 15

Ga. Code Ann. § 10-1-393 ... 22... 0. ccc cece 16

Ohio Rev. Code § 3904.13 ........... ccc cece 16

CS 16

MISCELLANEOUS

Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) ............ 3,19

Ii Calvin C. Corman, Limitation of Actions

eee cc cccccccccccecse 2

Bryan A. Garner, A Dictionary of Modern

Ee 5

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Fed. Trade Comm'n, JD Theft: When Bad

Things Happen To Your Good Name

CRD, FREED ivecvcccccccesesecoeccovescoss 13, 15

Fed. Trade Comm'n, /dentity Theft Complaints:

Figures and Trends November 1999 through

March 2001, available at http://www.consumer/

gov/idtheft/charts/nov99-mar0l-pdf .............. 14

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652H (1977) ......... 19

2 Rodney A. Smolla, Law of Defamation

PPG occcnvececececanssncocensesoesss 20

Robert L. Stern et al., Supreme Court Practice

GG BOSD cocccecéccavoncsdusbacedesacesee 18

The American Heritage Dictionary (4th ed. 2000) ...... 2

1 The Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989) ........ 2

The Random House Dictionary of the English

Language (unabridged ed. 1973) ............650055 2

Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary

CRINGE, GEGED cc ccccccccescccsccesvesess 2

eS RIED

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

Petitioner demonstrated in its opening brief that the statute

of limitations in Section 618 of the Fair Credit Reporting Act,

15 U.S.C. § 1681p, incorporates the traditional commence-

ment rule rather than the discovery rule applied below by the

Ninth Circuit. This conclusion is dictated by the language of

Section 618 and is confirmed by the section’s misrepre-

sentation exception, the overall structure of the FCRA, and the

Act's history. In addition, as the opening brief also showed,

the strong presumption in favor of the discovery rule employed

by the Ninth Circuit in departing from the traditional

commencement rule is without foundation and, in any event,

is rebutted by the text, structure, and history of Section 618.

Neither respondent nor her amici casts any reasonable doubt

upon these points.

I. THE LANGUAGE OF SECTION 618 EXPRESSES

THE TRADITIONAL COMMENCEMENT RULE,

NOT A GENERAL DISCOVERY RULE.

Over the last two decades, a half dozen federal courts of

appeals decisions, a dozen district court decisions, and a

number of commentators have all concluded that Section 618

incorporates the traditional commencement rule starting the

statute of limitations when the formal right to sue under the

Act attaches. See Pet. Br. at 12-13 nn.4-7. As the opening

brief demonstrated, these decisions reflect the language of

Section 618, which expresses the traditional commencement

rule, id. at 14-16, and the decisions of this Court interpreting

statutes with similar language, id. at 16-17. Neither

respondent nor her amici has an answer to this demonstration.

1. Respondent’s interpretation of the language of Section

618 focuses, as it should, upon the meaning of the word

“arise” in the portion of the section's statute of limitations

stating the general commencement rule. Contrary to

respondent’s contention, however, that word expresses the

traditional rule, not a discovery rule.

2

As respondent acknowledges, Resp. Br. at 22, the word

“arise” means to “come[] into existence” or to “originate.” 1

The Oxford English Dictionary 629 (2d ed. 1989); see also

The American Heritage Dictionary 96 (4th ed. 2000) (defining

“arise” to mean “[t]o come into being; originate”); The

Random House Dictionary of the English Language 80

(unabridged ed. 1973) (“to come into being” or to “originate”’);

Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 117 (unabridged ed.

1976) (“to come into being” or to “come about”). If “arise” is

understood in this common and ordinary sense, Section 618's

statute of limitations is naturally and easily read to begin

running upon “the date liability originates or comes into

existence.” As this Court has observed, under the traditional

commencement rule, the statute of limitations begins to run

when the plaintiff has a “complete and present cause of

action.” Rawlings v. Ray, 312 U.S. 96, 98 (1941); see

generally Il Calvin C. Corman, Limitation of Actions § 11.1.1,

at 1341991). Moreover, because a defendant’s liability is the

converse of a plaintiff's right to sue, see Gov. Br. at 13, a

defendant’s liability comes into existence when a plaintiff's

right of action becomes complete. See id.; accord Resp. Br. at

37 n.26. Thus, as respondent concedes, see Resp. Br. at 22, if

“arise” is understood to mean to come into existence, Section

618 expresses the traditional commencement rule.

Noting that the word “arise” can also mean “to spring up,”

“to come into . . . notice,” or to “present itself,” 1 The Oxford

English Dictionary at 629, respondent contends that the

language of Section 618 expresses a generally applicable

discovery rule. Resp. Br. at 13. The meaning of statutory

language is, however, “a creature not of definitional

possibilities, but of statutory context.” Brown v. Gardner, 513

U.S. 115, 118 (1994). As the opening brief pointed out, Pet.

Br. at 16-17, this Court has interpreted statutes of limitations

commencing when a claim or cause of action “arises” to begin

running when a plaintiff has a “complete and present cause of

action,” Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust

3

Fund v. Ferbar Corp., 522 U.S. 192, 201 (1997), or upon the

“date of injury,” McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 26

(1951). See also Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Armstrong, 604 A.2d

47, 54 (Md. 1992) (“Giving the word its ordinary meaning, we

believe that a cause of action arises when it first comes into

existence.”). The legal dictionary used by respondent

recognizes this usage as well: according to the dictionary,

when a statute of limitations uses the word “arise,” the

limitations period starts running “when [a] party has a right to

apply to [a] proper tribunal for relief.” Black's Law

Dictionary 108 (6th ed. 1990); see also Jamison v.

Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635, 641 (1930) (noting that a

defendant’s “liability arises when one suffers injury as a result

of any breach of duty owed to him for another’).

Far from showing that the word “arise” is used in a different

sense in Section 618, respondent fails to identify a single

situation in which the word “arise” has been used to refer to a

discovery rule. In fact, to petitioner's knowledge,

respondent’s application of this definition to a statute of

limitations — which respondent did not urge in either the

court of appeals or the district court below — is

unprecedented. Thus, respondent does not even begin to show

that her interpretation reflects the common, ordinary

understanding of the language of Section 618.

Indeed, respondent fails to explain how a discovery rule can

be culled out of Section 618 even if her definition of “arise” is

used. Under that definition, the limitations period in the

section would begin to run when “liability springs up, comes

into notice, or presents itself.” Although respondent contends

that this occurs when “a plaintiff actually or constructively

discovers that he has been injured,” Resp. Br. at 10 (quotation

omitted), she does not explain why that is so: the phrase

created by her definition does not mention either plaintiff or

discovery, and it refers to liability rather than injury. Thus,

respondent’s ability to identify an alternative definition of the

4

word “arise” does not establish that Section 618 can validly be

read to incorporate a general discovery rule.

2. In their brief in support of respondent, the United States

and the Federal Trade Commission do not attempt to defend

respondent’s analysis of the language of Section 618. Nor, for

that matter, does the Government contend that this language is

naturally read to incorporate a discovery rule. Instead, it

simply argues that the language “will bear that construction.”

Gov. Br. at 6; see also id. at 9-15. This argument is flawed.

In the first place, the Government’s argument starts from an

erroneous legal premise. In contending that Section 618 will

“bear” a discovery rule and then arguing that such a rule is

good policy, Gov. Br. at 9, 24, the Government assumes that

the text of a statute of limitations is relevant only to the extent

it permits a discovery rule and that whether the statute in fact

incorporates such a rule is a matter of policy left to judicial

determination in light of the purpose and structure of the

statute. That is not the law. As this Court has observed,

“deference to the supremacy of the Legislature, as well as

recognition that Congressmen typically vote on the language

of a bill, generally requires us to assume that the legislative

purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words

used.” Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambeli, Alaska, 480

U.S. 531, 548 (1987) (quotations omitted). Thus, in the

absence of “strong evidence that Congress actually intended

another meaning,” courts must apply the natural, ordinary

meaning of the language Congress enacts, whether or not that

language theoretically permits alternative interpretations. /d.

In addition, the Government fails to show that the language

of Section 618 permits a discovery rule. In arguing that it

does, the Government relies on decisions construing statutes

of limitations that commence when claims or causes of actions

“accrue.” Gov. Br. at 10-13 (discussing United States v.

Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979), and Urie v. Thompson, 337

U.S. 163 (1949)). Section 618, however, uses the word

5

“arise,” not “accrue,” and the two words are not

interchangeable. As previously demonstrated, see Pet. Br. at

19-20, the word “accrue” is more elastic and, unlike “arise,”

can be interpreted to refer to the discovery rule. See Owens-

Illinois, 604 A.2d at 53-54 (distinguishing between when a

claim “arises” and when it “accrues”); see also Bryan A.

Garner, A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage 16 (2d ed. 1995)

(“Arise may refer to the onset of the underlying wrong (e.g.,

exposure to asbestos), whereas accrue may refer to the

ripeness of the claim (e.g., contraction of asbestosis or

discovery of the disease).”). In short, the Government’s

interpretation is defective as well as illegitimate.

II. THE MISREPRESENTATION EXCEPTION ALSO

SUPPORTS THE TRADITIONAL COMMENCE-

MENT RULE.

In addition to showing that Section 618 explicitly adopts the

traditional commencement rule, the opening brief showed that

the misrepresentation exception is inconsistent with a general

discovery rule for two separate reasons. First, an unstated

general discovery rule should not be implied into the section

in the face of an explicit exception to the general

commencement rule itself containing an express discovery

provision. See Pet. Br. at 21-23. Second, a general discovery

rule would, as a practical matter, deprive the misrepresentation

exception of any meaningful effect. See id. at 23-25.

Respondent and her amici do not cast any doubt upon the first

reason, which is fatal to the construction that they urge, and

they fail to undermine the second one as well.

1. In arguing that the presence of the misrepresentation

exception casts doubt upon the existence of a general

discovery rule, petitioner relied upon the well-established

interpretive principle, which this Court has recently applied to

statutes of limitations, that the presence of an express

exception generally precludes implication of an unstated one.

See Pet. Br. at 21-23 (discussing United States v. Beggerly,

6

524 U.S. 38 (1998), and United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S.

347, 351-52 (1997)). Unable to dispute the validity of this

principle, respondent asserts that it is not absolute and does not

“necessarily rule out the finding of other implied exceptions.”

Resp. Br. at 35. Respondent does not, however, distinguish

this Court’s decisions applying the principle to other statutes

of limitations or otherwise explain why it is inapplicable here.’

Although the Government attempts to offer such an

explanation, its explanation is unpersuasive. Cataloguing the

differences between the equitable estoppel doctrine, the

discovery rule, and equitable tolling, the Government argues

that inclusion of an exception codifying the equitable estoppel

doctrine does not raise an inference that Congress intended to

preclude application of a general discoyery rule. Gov. Br. at

15-21; see also Pet. Br. at 35 (explaining why equitable tolling

is inapplicable here). This Court has not, however, been

concerned with such doctrinal distinctions in refusing to imply

exceptions into statutes of limitations in prior cases, see, e.g.,

Beggerly, 524 U.S. at 48 (finding equitable tolling barred by

explicit presence of discovery rule); Brockamp, 519 U.S. at

351-52 (finding equitable tolling barred by presence of explicit

exceptions to general commencement rule), and the

' Instead, respondent launches into an attack on the “‘violation occurrence’

rule.” Resp. Br. at 36. This is a strawman that respondent employs at

several times in her brief. See id. at 11, 17 n.10, 20, 22-29, 35-37 & n.26,

41. As the opening brief clearly stated, however, petitioner’s position is

not that Section 618's statute of limitations adopts a “violation occurrence”

rule, but rather that Section 618 “adopts the traditional commencement rule

beginning the statute when the formal right to sue under the Act attaches.”

Pet. Br. at 15; see also id. at 16 (noting that in this case the injury was

suffered and the cause of action became complete when the violation

occurred). Other statements by respondent and her amici characterizing

petitioner's arguments, describing petitioner's conduct, and depicting the

credit reporting industry are similarly inaccurate and unfounded.

7

Government offers no reason why it should be specially

concerned about those distinctions in this case.

In any event, the presence of an explicit discovery provision

in the misrepresentation exception raises an inference that

Congress did not intend Section 618 implicitly to incorporate

a general discovery rule. Congress knows how to incorporate

a discovery rule into statutes of limitations clearly and

unequivocally and has done so frequently. See Pet. Br. at 17-

19 & nn.8-10. Congress did so in the misrepresentation

exception in providing that the exception would delay

commencement until “after discovery by the individual of the

misrepresentation.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681p. As Congress did not

use such language in Section 618's general commencement

rule but instead used the phrase “liability arises,” language that

it has used in the past to distinguish the discovery rule from

the traditional commencement rule, see Pet. Br. at 20, the

misrepresentation exception raises a natural — and powerful

— inference that Congress did not intend to incorporate a

general discovery rule into Section 618.

2. In addition to showing that the misrepresentation

exception with its explicit discovery provision should preclude

the implication of an unstated general discovery rule,

petitioner also explained that a general discovery rule would

render the misrepresentation exception largely redundant. Pet.

Br. at 23-25. In response, both respondent and the

Government offer hypotheticals about possible residual

applications of the misrepresentation exception. Neither

hypothetical, however, identifies a substantial independent

application for the exception, which is petitioner’s point.

Respondent posits discovery of “misconduct or its

ramifications” in one year and of “a willful misrepresentation

material to the reporting agency’s extant FCRA liability” in

the next. Resp. Br. at 32-33. Petitioner has not, however,

argued that a general discovery rule would, as a theoretical

matter, duplicate the operation of the misrepresentation

8

exception; it contends that such a rule would, “/a/s a practical

matter,” operate similarly enough to deprive the exception of

meaningful, independent effect. Pet. Br. at 24 (emphasis

added). Because respondent’s hypothetical lacks any concrete

details about the injury suffered, the facts misrepresented, or

their discovery, it is too abstract to undermine petitioner's

pragmatic point and the interpretive inference that flows from

it.

Although the Government’s hypothetical is more concrete,

it does not work either because it ignores the operation of the

Act. ‘a that hypothetical,-a consumer who is denied credit

based upon an inaccurate report from a credit agency asks the

agency if it supplied a report, but is falsely told that the agency

did not do so. See Gov. Br. at 22. Under these circumstances,

the Government contends that the statute of limitations would

begin running under a general discovery rule when the

consumer learns that credit has been denied because the

consumer would be “put on inquiry notice of the violation” at

that time, but that the statute would not begin running under

the misrepresentation exception until later when the consumer

discovers that a report was in fact issued. Jd.

In fact, however, the consumer should learn about the report

at the same time that he discovers that credit has been denied,

because the FCRA requires that consumers who are denied

' credit based upon a report be notified of the denial and of the

identity of the credit reporting agency. See 15 U.S.C.

§ 1681m(a)(1) (requiring disclosure of adverse action); id.

§ 1681m(a)(2) (requiring disclosure of identity of the agency

furnishing report on which adverse action based). The

Government does not explain why the misrepresentation

exception would apply in that situation or, if so, why it would

operate differently there than the discovery rule. Even more

importantly, the Government also fails to explain how in such

a situation the misrepresentation exception would serve any

function intended by Congress. Thus, the Government’s

9

hypothetical fails to show that the misrepresentation exception

has any meaningful role to play in the presence of a general

discovery rule.

It is, of course, possible that, with more time and reflection,

either respondent or the Government might come up with a

concrete hypothetical in which the misrepresentation exception

plays a meaningful role despite the presence of a general

discovery rule. If, however, neither respondent nor the Federal

Trade Commission, the agency primarily responsible for

enforcing the FCRA, can easily identify such a situation, such

situations must be relatively anomalous and therefore unlikely

to have prompted Congress to include the exception. In any

event, even if respondent could point to some meaningful role

that the misrepresentation exception would play despite a

general discovery rule, that fact would not affect the basic

textual point that the express inclusion of a discovery

provision in the exception undermines any suggestion that

language adopted at the same time, in the same amendment

implicitly incorporates a general discovery rule.

3. In arguing that the language of Section 618 is

compatible with a general discovery rule, respondent and the

Government both rely upon appellate decisions construing the

Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a. Resp. Br. at 37-39; Gov. Br. at

13-15. This reliance is misplaced.

Neither respondent nor the Government explains why this

Court should look to cases under the Privacy Act, rather than

the numerous cases and commentators considering Section

618 and concluding that it generally applies the traditional

commencement rule. See Pet. Br. at 12-13 nn.4-7. These

latter authorities reflect the breadth and depth of legal opinion

that formed the previously settled understanding of Section

618 for the better part of two decades and that was left

undisturbed (and thereby embraced) when Congress reworked

the FCRA in 1996. See id. at 39-40. If this Court is to rely

upon authority, this is the proper authority.

10

In any event, the Privacy Act cases cited by respondent and

the Government are unpersuasive. None of them explain how

a discovery rule can be culled out of the language of that

statute. In all but one, there is no analysis of the text; instead,

they simply declare that they are applying the discovery rule in

the absence of any apparent objection by the Government.

See Bowyer v. United States Dep't of Air Force, 875 F.2d 632,

636 (7th Cir. 1989); Akutowicz v. United States, 859 F.2d

1122, 11265 (2d Cir. 1988); Englerius v. Veterans Admin., 837

F.2d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 1988); Bergman v. United States, 751

F.2d 314, 316 (10th Cir. 1984). Moreover, the remaining

decision considered only whether a discovery rule would

render the misrepresentation exception in the Privacy Act’s

statute of limitations superfluous. See Tijerina v. Walters, 821

F.2d 789, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1987). And the decision’s contrary

conclusion is irrelevant here, because it was based upon the

theoretical differences between the discovery rule and the

misrepresentation exception there rather than their practical

operation in the context of the Privacy Act, see id., which in

any event differs materially from the FCRA in its notice,

access, and remedial provisions. Compare 5 U.S.C.

§§ 552a(b), (d) & (g) with 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b, 1681d &

1681m-1681lo0. Similarly, policy arguments concerning the

difficulty of discovering violations of the Privacy Act (see

Englerius, 837 F.2d at 897; Tijerna, 821 F.2d at 797-98) are

inapposite here because of the differences in the notice and

access provisions of the two statutes. For these reasons as

well, the lower court decisions construing the Privacy Act

provide no basis for ignoring the language of Section 618 and

the cases construing it.

Ill. THE POLICY ARGUMENTS OF RESPONDENT

AND THE GOVERNMENT ARE IRRELEVANT

AND UNPERSUASIVE.

The Government contends that a general discovery rule

should be implied into Section 618 based upon its reading of

11

the purposes of that section and related policies. Gov. Br. at

24-30. It does not, however, contend that the ordinary

meaning of the statute's language violates the clear intention of

Congress or leads to a patent absurdity. Instead, assuming that

this language can be read to incorporate a general discovery

rule, the Government argues that such a rule would best serve

the statute’s purposes and policies. As that assumption is

false, these arguments are irrelevant. Moreover, even

considered on their own merits, the Government’s arguments

are unpersuasive because, among other things, they ignore the

structure and history of the Act.

1. As this Court has repeatedly observed, “‘[w]hen a

Statute speaks with clarity to an issue, judicial inquiry into the

Statute’s meaning, in all but the most extraordinary

circumstance, is finished.’” Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo,

515 U.S. 291, 295 (1995) (quoting Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos

Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475 (1992)). Accordingly, where,

as here, “the text alone yields a clear answer,” this Court has

been “reluctant to indulge an argument based on legislative

purpose.” Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S.

73, 81 (1995); see generally Rodriguez v. United States, 480

U.S. 522, 526 (1987). Such forbearance is especially

appropriate here, because there is no suggestion of any

extraordinary circumstances justifying disregard of the

statute’s language, and because the legislative history shows

that Congress specifically considered the proper commence-

ment rule for Section 618 — and rejected a proposal for a

discovery rule in so doing. See Pet. Br. at 35-39. Thus, the

ordinary meaning of the language of Section 618 controls.

2. In any event, the policy arguments offered by the

Government are unpersuasive.

a. Tle Government’s policy arguments ignore relevant

policies. Contending that Congress’ goal of “encourag[ing]

the prompt presentation of claims” would not be served by

commencing Section 618’s limitations period before a plaintiff

12

suspects injury, the Government asserts that the discovery rule

would serve the purposes of the statute. Gov. Br. at 25-30.

That goal is not, however, Section 618’s only goal. To the

contrary, as petitioner pointed out, Pet. Br. at 29-30, statutes of

limitations are also intended to serve the interests of

defendants and the public in avoiding the litigation of stale

claims and the interests of defendants in certainty and peace of

mind. See, e.g., Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271 (1985);

Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945).

As it “frustrates rather than effectuates legislative intent

simplistically to assume that whatever furthers the statute’s

primary objective must be the law,” Rodriguez, 480 U.S. at

526 (emphasis omitted); see also Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs.,

508 U.S. 248, 261-62 (1993) (noting that a statute cannot be

interpreted based upon “‘vague notions of [the] statute’s “basic

purpose’”), the Government’s one-sided policy argument is

inadequate.

b. In addition, the Government ignores Section 609 of the

FCRA, even though petitioner’s brief showed (Pet. Br. at 31-

32) that the section is inconsistent with any suggestion that

Congress intended to permit improper disclosure claims to be

brought more than two years after discovery of the disclosure.

Section 609 gives consumers the right to learn who has

received their credit reports, see 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(3), a

right that is normally essential to bringing improper disclosure

claims because of the inherent difficulty of discovering such

disclosures. This right does not, however, extend for an

indefinite period of time. To the contrary, as the opening brief

pointed out, Pet. Br. at 32, Section 609 generally requires

credit reporting agencies to identify recipients of reports only

for the “l-year period preceding the date on which the

[consumer’s] request is made.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(3)(11);

see also id. § 1681g(a)(3){i) (two-year period for reports

requested for employment purposes). Moreover, when the

FCRA was passed, agencies were generally required to

13

disclose recipients going back only six months. See FCRA,

Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 609, 84 Stat. 1131. As these restrictions

effectively prevent many (if not most) plaintiffs who do not

request access to their files within a year or two of disclosure

from bringing improper disclosure claims, they are

inconsistent with a general discovery rule presumably intended

to allow such claims to be brought within two years after

discovery of disclosure.

In fact, Section 609 casts serious doubt upon any claim that

Congress intended to incorporate a general discovery rule into

Section 618. As the Government acknowledges, Gov. Br. at

27, the notice and access provisions in the FCRA help to

ensure that consumers discover any injuries suffered as a result

of an inaccuracy in a credit report as well as any injuries

suffered as the result of the disclosure of an investigative

consumer report. See Pet. Br. at 26-28. Consequently, a

general discovery rule would apply primarily to improper

disclosure claims (and, indeed, to improper disclosure claims

dealing with ordinary, rather than investigative, consumer

reports). As Section 609 undermines the ability of consumers

to bring such claims more than two years after disclosure, it

also undermines any suggestion that Congress intended to

incorporate a general discovery rule into Section 618.

Moreover, because the ‘est evidence of [congressional]

purpose is the statutory text adopted by both Houses of

Congress and submitted to the President,” West Virginia Univ.

Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98 (1991), Section 609

offers more significant evidence of Congress’ purposes than

any of the Government’s arguments.

c. The Government’s reliance upon the identity theft

problem (Gov. Br. at 29) is misplaced.

First, as both respondent and the Government note, Gov.

Pr. at 29; Resp. Br. at 2, the issue of identity theft only became

prominent in the last decade. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n,

ID Theft: When Bad Things Happen To Your Good Name 2

14

(Aug. 2000) (hereinafter, JD Theft]. It therefore cannot fairly

be said that Congress was concerned with identity theft in

1970, when Section 618 was enacted. Moreover, if Congress

had intended Section 618 to deal with identity theft, it could

have amended the Act to do so in 1996 when tie Act was

overhauled. See Pet. Br. at 39-40.

Second, a general discovery rule is not needed to deal with

the identity theft problem. When an imposter poses as a

consumer, he typically obtains and then abuses credit, leaving

the consumer to deal with the fallout. As a consequence,

consumers victimized by identity theft are often denied credit

as a result of the thief’s activities or are hounded by bill

collectors seeking payments evaded by the imposter. See

Resp. Br. at 3. For example, in this case, respondent

(allegedly) was denied a loan in late May 1995, Pet. App. 18a,

and in October of that year, she was contacted by two

collection agencies seeking to collect on separate debts due

from the imposter who assumed her identity. Resp. Br. at 5,

7; ER 75, 138. Thus, a market mechanism ensures consumers

will discover identity theft and thereby receive notice of any

improper disclosure claims they may have under the FCRA.

No doubt anticipating this argument, the Government

asserts, based upon data assembled by the Federal Trade

Commission, that more than 25% of the victims of identity

theft take more than a year to discover the theft. Gov. Br. at

29. That same data, however, also shows that approximately

35% of the victims of identity theft discover the theft within a

month, that another 30% do so in the next five months, and

that over 80% of the victims learn of thefts by the end of two

years. See Fed. Trade Comm'n, /dentity Theft Complaint

Data: Figures and Trends November 1999 through March

2001, Figure 8, available at

http://www.consumer.gov/idtheft/charts/nov99-mar01 .pdf

(last visited June 27, 2001). Thus, if the Government’s figures

are correct, the vast majority of identity theft victims receive

15

notice of their injuries long before the statute of limitations

expires under a traditional commencement rule.

Third, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to distort the

language of the FCRA to deal with the problem of identity

theft. The primary means of dealing with that problem is not

private lawsuits against credit reporting agencies; it is actions,

either civil or criminal, against identity thieves. See, e.g., 18

U.S.C. § 1028 (criminal); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-571h (civil).

Moreover, because identity theft is currently the subject of

legislation at both the state and federal levels, see /D Theft at

10-12, the problem is best left to legislatures to remedy.

3. Respondent does not contend that policy considerations

demand a general discovery rule. Instead, she argues more

modestly that policy supports her interpretation of the text of

Section 618. Resp. Br. at 40-46. Even these limited

arguments are, however, unpersuasive.

a. In addition to echoing the Government’s concerns over

identity theft and improper disclosures, respondent objects that

the FCRA’s notice and access provisions do not afford

consumers enough time to bring their claims because,

according to her, a consumer typically needs two years to

prepare a FCRA suit. Resp. Br. at 41-43. At trial, however,

respondent revealed that she filed suit within two months after

contacting counsel. See Trial Tr. 52, 1955 (noting contact in

August 1996 and filing in October 1996). As respondent fails

to explain why a typical counsel would need much longer than

that, her conclusory assertions concerning the time needed to

bring a suit deserve no weight.

b. Respondent similarly errs in disputing petitioner’s

demonstration that a discovery rule would not impose a

significant burden upon the credit reporting industry because

the costs of data storage are “plummeting.” Resp. Br. at 44-45

& n.32. In the first place, storage costs are not the only costs

imposed by a discovery rule. As the opening brief pointed out,

16

a general discovery rule would undermine the ability of

potential defendants to project their potential liabilities and

require them to litigate claims that have grown stale. Pet. Br.

at 29-31, 41-42. In addition, discovery rules impose

transaction costs upon defendants and courts alike because

they require resolution of often nettlesome questions over

when injuries should have been discovered. See id. at 42.

Finally, even if respondent’s claims about the cost of data

storage were substantiated by more than a press release, it

would not follow that a general discovery rule would have no

impact on credit reporting agencies. Given the sheer volume

of information stored and processed by credit agencies —

hundreds of millions of consumer credit files, more than half

a billion reports each year, and more than two billion pieces of

information each month, see id. at 30-31 — even a tiny per

unit increase in the cost of data storage would cost the industry

millions of dollars a year.

c. Respondent also asserts that incorporating a general

discovery rule into Section 618 would not significantly add to

the credit industry’s burdens, because statutes dealing with

credit reporting in California, Georgia, and Ohio have

limitations periods incorporating the rule that already compel

the necessary data storage. See Resp. Br. at 45. The

California statute, however, sets an outside limit on the age of

suits brought under it that would not be present under either of

respondent’s readings of Section 618, see Cal. Civ. Code

§ 1785.33 (requiring suits to be brought “not more than seven

years from the earliest date on which liability could have

arisen’’), and the other statutes impose only limited obligations

in connection with either willful violations, see Ga. Code Ann. —

§ 10-1-393(b)(29), or insurance transactions, see Ohio Rev.

Code §§ 3904.13, 3904.21(B). Thus, these limited provisions

do not have the same import that the sweeping and unlimited

discovery rule urged by respondent would have, and, like the

rest of the policy arguments advanced by respondent and the

17

Government, they cannot justify departure from the plain and

ordinary meaning of the language of Section 618.

IV. NEITHER RESPONDENT NOR HER AMICI

DEFEND THE PRESUMPTION APPLIED BY

THE NINTH CIRCUIT.

As the opening brief demonstrated, the strong presumption

that the Ninth Circuit used in implying a general discovery rule

into Section 618 has no basis in the decisions of this Court,

which have not applied any presumption in favor of a

discovery rule to statute of limitations that contains an explicit

commencement provision. Pet. Br. at 40-45. As also

demonstrated, such a presumption makes no sense in light of

Congress’ repeated practice of including explicit discovery

provisions in statutes as well as the uncertainty about how a

discovery rule would affect the balance between protecting

valid claims and enabling repose struck in particular statutes

of limitations. /d. at 41-42. Neither respondent nor her amici

attempt to defend the Ninth Circuit’s presumption, or any

other presumption in favor of the discovery rule, against these

objections. Indeed, the Government appears to reject the

presumption. Gov. Br. at 11 n.3 (recognizing the traditional

rule as the “standard” one “in most circumstances”) (quotation

omitted).’

? Respondent does assert that the discovery rule applies beyond the realm

of bodily injuries and medical malpractice, where “the cry for a discovery

rule is loudest.” Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 555 (2000); accord

Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 126 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Although respondent

relies upon Zenith Radio Carp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321

(1971), in doing so, she does not invoke the case’s treatment of claims for

lost future profits. Instead, noting Zenith’s statement that a cause of action

accrues “if a plaintiff feels the adverse impact of an antitrust conspiracy,”

Zenith, 401 U.S. at 339 (emphasis added), respondent asserts that this

Court implicitly adopted a discovery rule on the ground that a plaintiff

“feels” an injury only when he “consciously suffers” it. Resp. Br. at 19-

20. This is frivolous. Far from suggesting that an injury must be

18

Vv. RESPONDENT’S ACTUAL DAMAGES

ARGUMENT IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS

COURT AND, IN ANY EVENT, WITHOUT

MERIT.

No doubt recognizing the flaws in her attempt to read a

discovery rule into Section 618 and in the presumption applied

by the Ninth Circuit, respondent advances a new, alternative

argument in her opposition brief. While asserting that

petitioner breached her “financial privacy” and that these

breaches facilitated the theft of her identity, see Resp. Br. at 4,

respondent also contends that she did not suffer any “actual

damages” cognizable under the FCRA until she realized that

her privacy had been invaded by the allegedly improper

disclosure of her credit records. See id. at 22-29. This new

argument is not properly before this Court and, in any event,

is meritless.

Although a party that prevailed below can go beyond the

question presented in defending the judgment at issue, as a

general rule, this Court “will not consider a claim that was not

presented to the courts below.” Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S.

231, 234 n.1 (1980); see generally Robert L. Stern et ai.,

Supreme Court Practice 344 (7th ed. 1993). As respondent

did not advance her “actual damages” argument in either the

district court or the court of appeals, this argument should not

be considered here. First, respondent does not cite any lower

court decisions pertinent to her argument, and petitioner is

unaware of any. As a consequence, this Court lacks the

consciously suffered to trigger the limitations period, Zenith states that

future damages accrue “on the date they are suffered,” without any

reference to consciousness. Zenith, 401 U.S. at 339; see also id. at 338

(noting that a claim accrues “each time a plaintiff is injured”). Thus, as

this Court has noted, Zenith articulates the traditional “injury occurrence”

tule, not a discovery rule. See Rotella, 528 U.S. at 553-54 & n.2; Klehr v.

A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 198 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring in part

and concurring in the judgment).

—_—-

19

benefit of the views of the lower courts on this argument.

Second, focusing largely on strawman arguments concerning

the “violation occurrence” theory not advanced by petitioner,

see supra p. 6 n.1, respondent ignores the real issue raised by

her new argument, which is whether an invasion of privacy

unknown to its victim constitutes a cognizable injury sufficient

to warrant a damage award under the FCRA and therefore to

start the Act’s statute of limitations running. On that issue, she

simply asserts in a footnote, without argument or authority,

that the “unwitting victim suffers no actual damages unless

and until some personal realization occurs, usually through

discovery.” Resp. Br. at 24.n.17. As this conclusory assertion

offers no real guidance to petitioner or to the Court, this Court

should decline to address it and, instead, treat respondent’s

actual damages argument as waived below.

In any event, the actual damages argument is without merit.

As noted above, respondent contends that the allegedly

improper disclosure of her credit reports breached her financial

privacy, and it is hornbook law that an individual may recover

damages not only for emotional distress and pecuniary harm

resulting from an invasion of privacy, but also for the “harm

to his interest in privacy resulting from the invasion.”

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652H (1977).

Nor is there any reason to think that, by providing for

recovery of “actual damages,” Congress intended to prevent

consumers from receiving compensation for such injuries

under the FCRA. The term “actual damages” refers to

amounts awarded to “compensate for a proven injury or loss.”

Black's Law Dictionary 394; see also Birdsall v. Coolidge, 93

U.S. (3 Otto) 64, 64 (1876) (interpreting “actual damages” to

refer to damages resulting from “injury alleged and proved”).

Thus, the term is used to distinguish compensatory damages

from punitive and nominal ones, see, e.g., Cooper Indus., Inc.

v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 1678, 1686, 1688

(2001) and, in the defamation and privacy contexts, to

20

distinguish unproven “presumed” damages from proven ones,

see, e.g., 2 Rodney A. Smolla, Law of Defamation § 9:22, at

9-11 (2000). Consequently, the actual damages requirement

does not preclude a plaintiff from seeking damagés due to

improper disclosure of her purchasing habits and other private

financial information and therefore does not save the judgment

below.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, and those stated in petitioner’s

opening brief, the judgment of the United States Comt of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

DANIEL J. MCLOON DANIEL H. BROMBERG

EUGENI/. CASTRUCCIO SALAMON = (Counsel of Record)

JONES, DAY, REAVIS & POGUE GLEN D.NAGER

555 West Fifth Street JONES, DAY, REAVIS & POGUE

Suite 4600 51 Louisiana Avenue, N.W.

Los Angeles, CA 90013 Washington, DC 20001

(213) 489-3939 (202) 879-3939

Counsel for Petitioner TRW Inc.

June 28, 2001

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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