Joint Appendix Vol I — New York v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

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Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

‘

\ -

Nos. 00-568 anv 00-809 JUN 18 2001

In The q CLERK

Supreme Court of the Anited States

People of the State of New York and the Public

Service Commission of the State of New York, etal.

Petitioners,

v.

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, et al.,

Respondents.

Enron Power Marketing, Inc.,

Petitioner,

vV.

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, et al.,

Respondents.

On Waits Or Cerriorart To Tue Unitep STATES

Court Or Appeacs For Tue District Or CotumBia Circuit

JOINT APPENDIX (Vol. 1 of 2)

Louis R. Cohen * Theodore B. Olson *

Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering Solicitor General

2445 M Street, N.W. Edwin S. Kneedler

Washington, D.C. 20037-1420 Deputy Solicitor General

(202) 663-6000 Austin C. Schlick

For Petitioner/Respondent, artmentof Justice

Enron Power Mkt., Inc. 950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.

Room 5259

Lawrence G. Malone * Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

Public Service Commission (202) 514-2217

of the State of New York For Respondent, Federal

Three Empire State Plaza Energy Regulatory

Albany, NY 12223-1350 Commission

(518) 474-2510

For Petitioners, People of * COUNSEL OF RECORD

the State of New York. et al.

BECKER GALLAGHER LEGAL PUBLISHING, INC.

CINCINNATI, OH 800-890-5001

James Bradford Ramsay

General Counsel

Sharla M. Barklind

Associate General Counsel

National Association of

Regulatory Utility Commissioners

1101 Vermont Ave., N.W., Ste. 200

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 898-2208

Catherine D. Bedell

General Counsel

Richard Bellak

Associate General Counsel

Florida Public Service

Commission

2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard

Tallahassee, FL 32399-0850

(850) 413-6092

Alan G. Lance

Attorney General

Donald L. Howell, I!

a Attorney General

Idaho Public Utilities

Commission

472 W. Washington Street

P.O. Box 8372

Boise, ID 83720-0074

(208) 334-0312

John J. Farmer, Jr.

Attorney General

State of New Jersey

Helene S. Wallenstein

Sr. Deputy Attorney General

Attorney for New Jersey Board

of Public Utilities

124 Halsey Street, Sth Floor

P.O. Box 45029

Newark, New Jersey 07101

(973) 648-4846

Counsel for Petitioners/Respondents Raleigh, NC 27626-0520

State Public Service Commissions

(Counsel continued on inside back cover)

William H. Chambliss

General Counsel

C. Meade Browder, Jr.

Attorney

Virginia State Corp. Comm'n

Office of General Counsel

P.O. Box 1197

Richmond, VA 23218

(804) 371-9671

Christine O. Gregoire

Attorney Genera

William Berggren Collins

Sr. Assistant Attorney General

Robert D. Cedarbaum, Sr. Counsel

(forthe Washington Utilities and

Transportation Commission)

P.O. Box 40128

Olympia, WA 98504-0128

(360) 664-1188

Harvey L. Reiter

(for Vermont Dept. of Public Service)

Morrison & Hecker

1150 18th Street, N.W., Ste. 800

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 785-9100

Harry Ivey

(for Wyoming Public Service Comm'n)

Attorney General's Office

State of Wyoming

123 Capitol

Cheyenne, WY 82002

(307) 777-7824

Jo Anne Sanford

North Carolina Utilities Comm'n

Robert P. Gruber

Public Staff - North Carolina

Utilities Comm'n

Gisele L. Rankin, Staff Attorney

P.O. Box 29520

(919) 733-2435

ie

TABLE OF CONTENTS

VOLUME I:

Relevant Docket Entries in District of

jee esse shee eeveescceess App. 5

Relevant Docket Entries Before Federal Energy

Regulatory Commission ................. App. 15

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking - Recovery of

Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting

Utilities in Docket No. RM 94-7-000,

59 Fed Reg. 35,274, 35,283-86; 7/11/94 ...... App. 17

Comments of North Carolina Utilities Commission

and the Public Staff of the North Carolina Utilities

Commission; pp. 1, 2-4, 6-7; 5/10/95 ........ App. 34

Order No. 888 Promoting Wholesale Competition

Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory

Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery

of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting

Utilities; pp. 31,632-31 684; 31,687-31,703;

31,718-31,736; 31,743-31,753; 31,764-31,766;

31,770-31,785; 31,898-31,899; 31,919-31,926;

PUES ITED ccc ccc ccc eccees App. 42

VOLUME II:

Part 35 - Filing of Rate Schedules - 61 Fed. Reg.

EE App. 431

Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission’s Petition

for Rehearing; pp. 1-2, 18-35; 5/23/96 ...... App. 444

App. 1

Virginia State Corporation Commission’s Request

for Rehearing; pp. 1, 3-9; 5/24/96 ......... App. 467

Motion for Rehearing of the Public Service

Commission of the State of New York; pp. 1-22;

PE + oetksinece sens bhebe ended ms App. 475

Request of the National Association of Regulatory

Utility Commissioners for Rehearing; pp. 1, 4-9;

DE 00d céuhedcseeséewetewesoaken App. 499

Application of the Coalition for a Competitive Electric

Market For Reconsideration and Clarification or, in the

Alternative, Rehearing; pp. 1, 4-8; 5/24/96 ... App. 509

Order No. 888-A - Order on Rehearing;

pp. 30,172-30,188; 30,200-30,218; 30,255-30,226;

30,278-30,281; 30,334-30,350; 30,402-30,424;

waste eadeadbeean App. 517

Brief for the Public Service Commissions of New

York, Arkansas and Florida, et al.; pp. 1-20; 30-32;

DE vsete¥adsabevuecuueelaueee App. 792

Excerpts from Electric Power Flow Research Institute:

A Primer on Electric Power Flow for Economists and

Utility Planners, “Resistance and Ohm’s Law”

pp. 2-6 - 2-11; “Structures of Utility Systems”

pp. 3-1 - 3-2; “Transmission and Distribution”

Te fe) TUTTE RT ore ee eee App. 818

NOTICE

The following documents have been omitted in the printing of

this Appendix. These documents may be found in Petitioner

Enron Power Marketing, Inc.’s Appendix to its Petition for

Writ of Certiorari (00-809) at the following pages:

APPENDIX A:

Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals

for the District of Colombia Circuit filed

ai a rns a OP ia ae as a ee a a la

APPENDIX B:

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for

the District of Columbia Circuit filed 6/30/00 ....... 3a

APPENDIX C:

Order of the United States Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit filed 8/22/00 ....... 123a

APPENDIX F:

Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open

Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services

by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by

Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, Notice of

Proposed Rulemaking and Supplemental Notice of

Proposed Rulemaking, Notice of Proposed

Rulemaking, [1988-1998 Proposed Regs.] F.E.R.C.

Stats, & Regs. 432,514 (1995) (pertinent portion)

SEED 6 6:00 © 04446 4000600 68 Re 8 eH 553a

APPENDIX G:

sn ci wnhedenbeceswun 645a

APPENDIX H:

List of Parties to the Proceeding .............. 683a

Some may also be found in the Petitioner’s People of the State

of New York and The Public Service Commission of the State

of New York’s Appendix to its Petition for Writ of Certiorari

(00-568) at the following pages:

APPENDIX A:

Order of United States Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit filed 8/22/00 ........ A-l

APPENDIX B:

Judgment of United States Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit filed 6/30/00 ........ B-1

APPENDIX C:

Opinion of United States Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit decided 6/30/00 ...... C-1

APPENDIX G:

Statutory Provisions Involved ....... ae aed eae G-1

RELEVANT DOCKET ENTRIES IN

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

DOCKET FOR CASE NOS.: 00-568 and 00-809

(Court of Appeals Docket No.: 97-1715, Complex)

12/5/97

1/2/98

1/12/98

4/30/98

PETITION FOR REVIEW CASE docketed.

Petition for Review filed by Petition Transm

Access Picy. [314268-1] (mcm) [97-1715]

CLERK’S ORDER filed granting non-party

motion to intervene filed by VT Dept Pub Srvc

[316424-1]. (sha) [97-1715]

CLERK’S ORDER filed granting non-party

motion to intervene filed by Edison Elec Inst

[320723-1] granting non-party motion to

intervene filed by City & Cty San [320823-1]

granting non-party motion to intervene filed by

Oprt Co Amer elec [318537-1]. (mcm) [97-

1715]

CLERK’S ORDER filed, on court’s own

motion, that cases are consolidated;

FURTHER ORDERED that EEI motion for

leave to amend is granted. The amended

motions are dismissed as moot, in light of

1/12/98 order granting EEI leave to intervene

in 97-1715; FURTHER ORDERED that

motions of WA Util, So CA Gas, KS City, PSI

Energy, and Cincinnati Gas to intervene be

granted; FURTHER ORDERED that parties

advise the court by 5/15/98 of any remaining

motions, etc.; FURTHER ORDERED that

petitioners show cause, by 6/01/98 why the

App. 5

6/2/98

petitions for review in 98-1110, 98-1117, 98-

1121, 98-1130, 98-1133, 98-1135, 98-1138,

98-1144, 98-1151, 98-1157, 98-1158, 98-

1161, 98-1164, 98-1167, 98-1179 should not

be dismissed as incurably premature.

Responses limited to 20 pages and failure to

respond will result in dismissal. Respondent

may file a reply, limited to 10 pages, within 10

days thereafter; FURTHER ORDERED that

by 6/01/98, parties shall provide a list of five

lead counsel. Within 30 days thereafter,

counsel shall provide joint proposed briefing

schedule, etc.; FURTHER ORDERED that

parties shall resubmit Rule 26.1 disclosure

Statements by 6/01/98, etc.; FURTHER

ORDERED that respondent shall provide by

5/15/98 a current master service list; Clerk is

directed to send a copy of this order by

certified mail to petitioners in cases identified

above. (su) [97-1715 98-1179 98-1180}

CLERK’S ORDER filed granting non-party

motion to intervene filed by Suffolk Cty Elec

[355394-1] granting non-party motion to

intervene filed by Fl Pub Svc Cmsn [354722-

1] granting non-party to intervene filed by

Rochester Gas & Elec [354086-1] granting

non-party motion to intervene filed by

Carolina Power [353289-1] granting non-party

motion to intervene filed by FL Power & Light

[353301-1] granting non-party motion to

intervene filed by Pub Svc Elec Gas (353314-

1] granting non-party motion to intervene filed

by OH Consum Coun, Natl Assn St Util

[353328-1] granting non-party motion to

App. 6

8/13/98

intervene filed by Dairyland Power Coop

[353189-1] granting non-party motion to

intervene filed by Natl Rural Elec Coop

[353333-1] granting non-party motion to

intervene filed by NE TX Elec Coop Inc, Sam

Rayburn Elec G&T, TX-LA Elec Coop TX

[352000-1] granting non-party motion to

intervene filed by FL Muni Power Agcy

[352033-1] granting non-party motion to

intervene filed by MI S Ctrl Power Agcy

[352034-1] granting non-party motion to

intervene filed by Wolverine Power [352035-

1] granting non-party motion to intervene filed

by Pub Svc Cmsn St NY [352047-1] granting

non-party motion to intervene filed by Natl

Assn Reg Util [352050-1] granting non-party

motion to intervene filed by NY St Elec & Gas

[350758-1] granting non-party motion to

intervene filed by GA Transm Corp [354045-

1]. (mem) [97-1715]

PER CURIAM ORDER: on the court’s own

motion, that these case be designated

“COMPLEX”. FURTHER ORDERED that

the order to show cause be discharged.

FURTHER ORDERED that the petitions for

review in No. 98-1110, 98-1117, 98-1121, 98-

1130, 98-1133, 98-1135, 98-1138, 98-1144,

98-1151, 98-1157, 98-1161, 98-1167 and 98-

1179 be dismissed as incurably premature.

[374127-1] FURTHER ORDERED that the

initial briefing schedule is as follows (SEE

ORDER FOR BRIEFING FORMATS)

[374127-2]: Petitioner’s brief due on 10/1/98

in 97-1715; Intervenor supprtng Petitioner’s

App. 7

brief due 10/1/98 in 97-1715; Respondent’s

brief due on 2/1/99 in 97-1715; Intervenor

supportg Respondent’s brief due 4/1/99 in 97-

1715; Petitioner’s reply brief due 5/3/99 in 97-

1715; Intervenor supprt Petitioner’s reply brief

due 5/3/99 in 97-1715; Deferred appendix due

on 6/10/99 in 97-1715; Final briefs due on

6/24/99 in 97-1715. FURTHER ORDERED

that motion for leave to file joint proposed

briefing schedule be granted. The Clerk is

directed to file the lodged pleading [363672-1].

FURTHER ORDERED that the motion to

exceed page limits be granted. FURTHER

ORDERED that the motion to change party

name be granted. The Clerk is directed to

amend the docket to reflect that the

intervenor’s name is Enron Power Marketing,

Inc. rather than the Coalition for a Competitive

Elec Market [360864-1]. FURTHER

ORDERED that the motion to intervene filed

by IL Power Co [360901-1] be granted.

FURTHER ORDERED that the motions

adding a new attorney [356458-1] filed by 11

movants and Ontario Hydro [356721-1] be

granted. Lead counsel are as follows: John

Conway (FERC), Susan Court (FERC),

Robert Zener, Robert Jablon, Jonathan

Feinberg, Sara Schotland, Peter Kirby and

Isaac Benkin (lead counsel for petitioners and

intervenors). FURTHER ORDERED that the

motion of Pacific Legal Fndtn for leave to

participate as amicus [353194-1] and for leave

to dispense with service on all parties be

denied [353194-2]. This denial is without

prejudice to PLF’s refiling the motion for

App. 8

os ee are. ee oe =

8/13/98

10/1/98

10/1/98

leave within ten days of the date of this order,

after serving all parties listed in the current

master list. Before Judges Wald, Sentelle,

Randolph. [97-1715] (mcm) [97-1715 98-1110

98-1117 98-1121 98-1130 98-1133 98-1135

98-1138 98-1144 98-1151 98-1157 98-1161

98-1167 98-1179]

PER ABOVE ORDER lodged motion

establishing the initial briefing schedule

[363672-1] is filed. (mcm) [97-1615]

BRIEF [DISCRIMINATORY

DISCOUNTING AND FUNCTIONAL

UNBUNDLING] filed by Petitioner Transm

Access Plicy in 97-1715, Petitioner Transm

Dpndnt Util in 98-1145, Petitioner Enron

Power Mkt Inc in 98-1178 [386444-1].

Copies: 15. of service date 10/1/98. (97-1715,

98-1145, 98-1178] (mcm) [97-1715 98-1145

98-1178]

BRIEF [INVESTOR OWNED UTILITY

PETITIONERS] filed by Investor IL Power

Co in 97-1715, Petitioner Pub Svc Elec & Gas

in 98-1119, Petitioner FL Power & Light in

98-1120, Petitioner Rochester Gas & Elec in

98-1124, Petitioner Carolina Power in 98-

1125, Petitioner NE Util Svc Co in 98-1126,

Petitioner NE Util Sve Co in 98-1127,

Petitioner NY St Elec & Gas in 98-1139,

Petitioner Boston Edison Co in 98-1162,

Petitioner Ctrl VT Pub Svc Corp in 98-1162,

Petitioner Niagra Mohawk Power in 98-1168,

Petitioner Con Edison Co NY Inc in 98-1174,

App. 9

10/2/98

Petitioner Con Edison Co NY Inc in 98-1175,

Petitioner GPU Engy in 98-1176, Petitioner

Edison Elec Inst in 98-1180 [386545-1].

Copies: 7. Certificate of service date 10/1/98.

[97-1715, 98-1119, 98-1120, 98-1124, 98-

1125, 98-1126, 98-1127, 98-1139, 98-1162,

98-1168, 98-1174, 97-1175, 98-1176, 98-

1180] (mem) [97-1715 98-1119 98-1120 98-

1124 98-1125 98-1126 98-1127 98-1139 98-

1162 98-1168 98-1174 98-1175 98-1176 98-

1180}

BRIEF W/2 VOLUME APPENDIX OF

LEGESLATIVE HISTORY [STATE

COMMISSIONS] filed by Intervenor for

Petitioner WA Util Trans Cmsn in 97-1715,

Intervenor St NJ Bd Pub Util in 97-1715,

Intervenor WY Pub Svc Cmsn in 97-1715,

Intervenor for Petitioner ID Pub Util Cmsn in

97-1715, Intervenor for Petitioner NC Util

Cmsn in 97-1715, Intervenor for Petitioner

Natl Assn Reg Util in 97-1715, Intervenor for

Petitioner FL Pub Svc Cmsn in 97-1715,

Petitioner People St NY in 98-1111, Petitioner

Pub Scv Cmsn St NY in 98-1111, Petitioner

VA St Corp Cmsn in 98-1142, Petitioner AR

Pub Svc Cmsn in Petitioner VT Dept Pub Srvc

in 98-1148, Petitioner OH Coun in 98-1150,

Petitioner Natl Assn St Util in 98-1155

[386734-1]. Copies: 7. Certificate of service

date 10/1/98. [97-1715, 98-111, 98-1142, 98-

1147, 98-1148, 98-1150, 98-1155] (mcm) [97-

1715 97-1111 98-1142 98-1147 98-1148 98-

1150 98-1155]

App. 10

2/16/99

4/16/99

5/18/99

5/19/99

BRIEF filed by Respondent FERC in 97-1715

[416562-1]. Copies: 6. Certificate of service

date 2/16/99. (mcm) [97-1715]

BRIEF filed by Intervenor Edison Elec Inst in

97-1715, Intervenor NY St Elec & Gas in 97-

1715, Intervenor Cm Edison Co in 97-1715,

Intervenor Consum Engy Co in 97-1715,

Intervenor VA Elec Power Co in 97-1715,

Intervenor New Engl Power Co in 97-1715,

Intervenor WI Pub Svc Corp in 97-1715,

Intervenor Atl City Elec Co in 97-1715,

Intervenor for Repsondent FL Power & Light

in 97-1715, Intervenor Rochester Gas & Elec

in 97-1715; Intervenor FL Power Corp in 97-

1715 [430200-1]. Copies: 6. Certificate of

service date 4/16/99. (mcm) [97-1715]

REPLY BRIEF [DISCRIMINATORY

DISCOUNTING AND FUNCTIONAL

UNBUNDLING] filed by Petitioner Transm

Access Plicy in 97-1715, Petitioner Transm

Dpndnt Util in 98-1145, Petitioner Enron

Power Mkt Inc in 98-1178 [436794-1].

Copies: 7. Certificate of service date 5/18/99.

(97-1715, 98-1145, 98-1178] (mcm) [97-1715

98-1145 98-1178]

REPLY BRIEF [STATE COMMISSIONS]

filed by Intervenor for Petitioner WA Util

Trans Cmsn in 97-1715, Intervenor St NJ Bd

Pub Util in 97-1715, Intervenor WY Pub Svc

Cmsn in 97-1715, Intervenor for Petitioner

Pub Stf NC Util Cmsn in 97-1715, Intervenor

for Petitioner NC Util Cmsn in 97-1715,

App. 11

8/19/99

8/19/99

Intervenor for Petitioner Natl Assn Reg Util in

97-1715, Intervenor FL Pub Svc in 97-1715,k

Petitioner People St NY in 98-1111, Petitioner

Pub Svc Cmsn St NY in 98-1111, Petitioner

VA St Corp Cmsn in 98-1142, Petitioner VT

Dept Pub Srvc in 98-1148, Petitioner OH

Consum Coun in 98-1150, Petitioner Natl

Assn St Util in 98-1155 [436812-1]. Copies: 7.

Certificate of service date 5/18/99. (97-1715,

98-1111, 98-1142, 98-1147, 98-1148, 98-

1150, 98-1155] (mem) [97-1715 98-1111 98-

1142 98-1147 98-1148 98-1150 98-1155]

FINAL BRIEF filed by Intervenors for

Respondent, Enron Power Marketing, Inc.,

Electricity Consumers Resource Council,

American Public Power Association, NE TX

Elec Coop Inc, Sam Rayburn Elec G&T, Tex-

La Elec Coop TX, Natl Rural Electric

Cooperative Assoc., et al. in 97-1715 [458098-

1}. Copies: 15. Certificate of service date

8/19/99. [STYLED AS JOINT BRIEF FOR

ALL OTHER INTERVENORS IN SUPPORT

OF RESPONDENT]. (ivs) [97-1715]

FINAL BRIEF filed by Petitioners Transm

Access Plicy, Transm Dpndnt Util, Enron

Power Mkt Inc [488131-1]. Copies: 15.

Certificate of service date 8/19/99. [STYLED

AS INITIAL BRIEF OF THE

TRANSMISSION ACCESS POLICY STUDY

GROUP, ENRON POWER MARKETING,

INC. AND TRANSMISSION DEPENDENT

UTILITY SYSTEMS ON FUNCTIONAL

UNBUNDLING AND DISCOUNTING]. [97-

App. 12

8/19/99

8/20/99

8/20/99

1715, 98-1145, 98-1178] (lvs) [97-1715 98-

1145 98-1178]

FINAL REPLY BRIEF filed by Petitioners

Transm Access Plcy, Transm Dpndnt Util,

Enron Power Mkt Inc [458144-1]. Copies: 15.

Certificate of service date 8/19/99. [STYLED

AS REPLY BRIEF OF THE

TRANSMISSION ACCESS POLICY STUDY

GROUP, ENRON POWER MARKETING,

INC. AND TRANSMISSION DEPENDENT

UTILITY SYSTEMS ON FUNCTIONAL

UNBUNDLING AND DISCOUNTING]. [97-

1715, 98-1145, 98-1178] (Ivs) [97-1715 98-

1145 98-1178]

FINAL BRIEF for the Public Service

Commissions of New York, Arkansas and

Florida, ID Pub Util Cmsn, NC Util Cmsn,

WY Pub Svc Cmsn, NJ Board of Public, VA

Corp Cmsn, WA Util Trans Cmsn, VT Dept

Pub Srvc, Natl Assn Reg Util [458523-1].

Copies: 15. Certificate of service date 8/19/99.

(97-1715, 98-1142, 98-1147, 98-1148, 98-

1162, 98-1169] (Ivs) [97-1715 98-1142 98-

1147 98-1148 98-1162 98-1169]

FINAL REPLY BRIEF ffiled by

Petitioners/Intervenors VA St Public Service

Commissions of NY, AR and FL, Natl Assn

of Regulatory Util Cmsn, Pub Util Cmsn ID,

NC and WY, NJ Board Pub Util, VA Corp

Cmsn, WA Util Trans Cmsn, VT Dept Pub

Srvc, OH Consum Coun, Natl Assn St Util

([458643-1]. Copies: 15. Certificate of service

App. 13

8/20/99

date 8/19/99. (97-1715, 98-1142, 98-1147, 98-

1148, 98-1150, 98-1155, 98-1162, 98-1169]

(Ivs) [97-1715 98-1142 98-1147 98-1148

98-1150 98-1155 98-1162 98-1169]

APPENDIX [VOLUME I & II] OF

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY FOR STATE

COMMISSIONS’ BRIEF filed by

Petitioners/Intervenors Pub Svc Cmsn NY,

AR, FL, Natl Assn of Regulatory Util Cmsn,

Pub Util Cmsn ID, NC and WY, NJ Board

Pub Util, VA Corp Cmsn, WA Util/Trans

Cmsn, VT Dept Pub Srvc, OH Consum Coun

[458663-1]. Copies: 10. Certificate of service

date 8/19/99. (97-1715, 98-1142, 98-1147, 98-

1148, 98-1150, 98-1155, 98-1162, 98-1169]

(lvs) [97-1715 98-1142 98-1147 98-1148

98-1150 98-1155 98-1162 98-1169]

App. 14

ee I te

RELEVANT DOCKET ENTRIES BEFORE

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

Issuance

19980421-0175

Submittal

19960530-0195

Submittal

19960530-0202

Submittal

3/4/97

5/24/96

5/24/96

5/24/96

App. 15

Ltr to Vice President A

Gore, Jr providing final

rules issued on

promoting wholesale

competition through

open access non-

discriminatory

transmission servs by

public utils etc under

RM95-8 et al. Portland

General Elec Co

submits.

Motion for rehearing of

Public Serv

Commission of New

York of Order 888 &

889 re open access

transmission & stranded

costs under RM95-8 &

RM94-7.

Pennsylvania _— Public

Util Commission

member J Hanger

submits ltr of dissent re

960523 petition for

rehearing of Order 888

under RM95-8 &

RM94-7.

Appl of Coalition for

19960530-0279

Submittal

19960530-0188

Issuance

19960425-0263

Submittal

199508 1 1-0061

5/23/96-

5/24/96

4/24/96

8/7/95-

8/10/95

App. 16

Competitive Elec

Market for reconside-

ration & clarification or

in alternative rehearing

of FERC’s Order 888

re promoting wholesale

competition etc.

Request of Virginia

State Corp Commission

for rehearing of Order

888 re open access

transmission etc under

RM94-7 & RM95-8.

Order 888 final rule re

promoting wholesale

competition thru open

ee-ces -s

nondiscriminatory

svc/recovery of

stranded costs by public

utils. Corrected

Hoecker.

Comments of NC

Utilities Commission re

notice of proposed

rulemaking & suppl

notice of proposed

rulemaking re recovery

of stranded cost by

public utilities etc under

RM95-8, et al.

NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING -

RECOVERY OF STRANDED COSTS BY PUBLIC

UTILITIES AND TRANSMITTING UTILITIES IN

DOCKET NO. RM-94-7-000

59 FED. REG. 35,274; 35,283-86

[pp. 35,274; 35,283-86]

[35,274]

SUMMARY: The Commission is proposing to amend its

regulations to establish provisions concerning the recovery of

wholesale and retail stranded costs by public utilities and

transmitting utilities under sections 205, 206, 211 and 212 of

the Federal Power Act. The Commission seeks public

comment concerning the issues raised by the proposed

rulemaking.

DATES: Written comments must be received by the

Commission by September 9, 1994. Reply comments must be

received by the Commission by October 11, 1994.

ADDRESSES: Send comments to: Office of the Secretary,

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 825 North Capitol

Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

James H. Douglass, Office of the General Counsel, Federal

Energy Regulatory Commission, 825 North Capitol Street,

NE., Washington, DC 20426; Telephone: (202) 208-2143

(legal issues).

Michael A. Coleman, Office of Electric Power Regulation,

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 825 North Capitol

App. 17

59 Fed. Reg. 35,274; 35,283-86

Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426; Telephone: (202) 208-

1236 (technical issues).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In addition to

publishing the full text of this document in the Federal

Register, the Commission also provides all interested persons

an Opportunity to inspect or copy the contents of this

document during normal business hours in room 3104, at 941

North Capitol Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426.

The Commission Issuance Posting System (CIPS), an

electronic bulletin board service, provides access to the texts

of formal documents issued by the Commission. CIPS is

available at no charge to the user and may be accessed using

a personal computer with a modem by dialing (202) 208-

1397. To access CIPS, set your communications software to

use 300, 1200, or 2400 bps, full duplex, no parity, 8 data bits

and 1 stop bit. CIPS can also be accessed at 9600 bps by

dialing (202) 208-1781. The full text of this order will be

available on CIPS for 30 days from the date of issuance. The

complete text on diskette in WordPerfect format may also be

purchased from the Commission's copy contractor, La Dorn

Systems Corporation, also located in room 3104, 941 North

Capitol Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426.

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

June 29, 1994.

Table of Contents

I. Introduction

Il. Public Reporting Burden

App. 18

59 Fed. Reg. 35,274; 35,283-86

Ill. Discussion

A. Background

B. Current Stranded Cost Policy

1. Wholesale Customers Leaving The System

2. Retail-Turned-Wholesale Customers Leaving The

System

.3. Retail Customers Leaving The System

C. The Proposed Regulations

1. Recovery of Stranded Costs Associated With New

Wholesale Power Sales Contracts

2. Recovery of Stranded Costs Associated With

Existing Wholesale Power Sales Contracts

3. Recovery Of Wholesale Stranded Costs In

Wholesale Transmission Rates

4. Filing Requirements For Wholesale Stranded Cost

Recovery

5. Evidentiary Demonstration For Wholesale Stranded

Cost Recovery

6. Recovery Of Retail Stranded Costs

i. Jurisdictional Analysis

ii. Treatment of Retail Costs

IV. Regulatory Flexibility Act

V. Environmental Statement

VI. Information Collection Statement

VII. Public Comment Procedures

Regulatory Text

I. Introduction

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

(Commission) seeks public comment on amending its

regulations to establish provisions concerning the recovery of

wholesale and retail stranded costs by public utilities and

App. 19

59 Fed. Reg. 35,274; 35,283-86

transmitting utilities under sections 205, 206, 211 and 212 of

the Federal Power Act (FPA).' Wholesale stranded costs are

defined as any legitimate, prudent and verifiable costs

incurred by a public utility or a transmitting utility to provide

service to a wholesale requirements customer that

subsequently becomes, in whole or in part, an unbundled

transmission services customer’ of that public utility or

transmitting utility. Retail stranded .. .

[35283]

'A public utility is defined under section 201(e) of the FPA

as “any person who owns or operates facilities subject to the

jurisdiction of the Commission under this Part (other than facilities

subject to such jurisdiction solely by reason of section 210, 211, or

212)." A transmitting utility is defined under section 3(23) of the

FPA as “any electric utility, qualifying cogeneration facility,

qualifying small power production facility, or Federal power

marketing agency which owns or operates electric power

transmission facilities which are used for the sale of electric energy

at wholesale." Not all transmitting utilities are public utilities. For

instance, a municipally-owned electric utility that owns transmission

facilities which are used for the sale of electric energy at wholesale

is a transmitting utility, but is not a public utility.

24n unbundled transmission services customer is one who

purchases transmission as a product that is separate from the

purchase of generation.

App. 20

59 Fed. Reg. 35,274; 35,283-86

6. Recovery of Retail Stranded Costs

As discussed earlier, there are two general ways in

which retail stranded costs are likely to occur: (1) A retail

franchise customer may, through State or local government

action, become a wholesale customer who can then obtain

unbundled transmission services in order to reach a new

power supplier;*' (2) a retail franchise customer may obtain

voluntary unbundled retail transmission services from its

existing power supplier in order to reach a new power

supplier, or there may be a State or local action that results in

the existing supplier [35,281] providing such retail

transmission services.

In the first example (a retail franchise customer

becomes an unbundled wholesale power and transmission

customer), the Commission clearly has exclusive jurisdiction

under sections 201, 205 and 206, or section 212 of the FPA,

over the rate for the wholesale interstate transmission

services” used by the new wholesale entity in order to reach

its new generation supplier. In the second example, in which

Retail stranded costs may result from "self-help" actions

such as customer self-generation, and this has long been a fact of

life for utilities. See, supra, n.18. This proceeding does not address

these situations.

*'In addition, certain retail customers may become retail

customers of a newly-created wholesale entity.

Under FPA section 211, the Commission's authority to

order wheeling does not turn on whether the transmission services

will be in interstate commerce.

App. 21

59 Fed. Reg. 35,274; 35,283-86

a retail franchise customer becomes a retail unbundled

transmission customer of its former franchise utility, and a

retail power customer of another utility, we conclude that we

also have exclusive jurisdiction over the rates, tems uaa

conditions for the retail interstate transmission services.”

(i) Jurisdictional Analysis

The Commission's jurisdiction over the rates, terms

and conditions of transmission in interstate commerce derives

from Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce under

the United States Constitution™ and the FPA. When Congress

enacted the FPA, it gave the Commission exclusive

jurisdiction over the rates, terms and conditions of

transmission in interstate commerce by public utilities. The

Supremacy Clause of the Constitution provides that federal

laws enacted pursuant to the powers delegated to the federal

government by the United States Constitution are the supreme

law of the land.* Accordingly, to the extent that retail

wheeling involves transmission in interstate commerce by

public utilities, the rates, terms and conditions of such service

‘3We make no determination here regarding the physical or

jurisdictional distinctions between transmission and local

distribution. Section 201(b)(1) of the FPA states that the

Commission has no jurisdiction, except as specifically provided in

Parts Il and Ill of the FPA, over facilities used for local

distribution. Nor do we address here whether States have authority

to order retail wheeling in interstate commerce.

US. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl.3.

5S. Const. Art. VI, cl.2.

App. 22

ee EEL

59 Fed. Reg. 35,274; 35,283-86

are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission,

and the rates for such service must be filed with the

Commission.”

Section 201 of the FPA, by its very words, does not

limit the Commission's jurisdiction over transmission to

transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce sold at

wholesale.

Subsection 201(b)(1) of the FPA provides:

(b)(1) The provisions of this Part shall apply to the

transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and to

the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce

* * * The Commission shall have jurisdiction over all

facilities for such transmission or sale of electric energy * *

+

16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1).

Much of the legislative history of the FPA indicates

that Congress intended the Commission's jurisdiction to

extend only to those matters which the Aftleboro decision”

held to be beyond the reach of the States. For instance, the

*°See Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public

Service Co., 341 U.S. 246, 251-52 (1951) (Montana-Dakota).

*’Public Utilities Commission v. Attleboro Steam &

Electric Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927) (Attleboro). In Attleboro, the

Supreme Court held that State regulation of the interstate sale of

electricity was barred by the Commerce Clause because such

regulation would impose a “direct burden" on interstate commerce.

App. 23

59 Fed. Reg. 35,274; 35, 283-86

report accompanying the Senate bill states that subsection (b)

"leaves to the States the authority to fix local rates even in

cases where the energy is brought in from another state. "**

The Senate report also states:

The rate-making powers of the Commission are

confined to those wholesale transactions which the Supreme

Court held in [Attleboro] to be beyond the reach of the States.

Jurisdiction is asserted also over all interstate transmission

lines whether or not there is sale of the energy carried by

those lines. * * *

S. Rep. No. 621, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. 48 (1935). Thus,

federal jurisdiction over transmission lines is not dependent on

whether those lines are used to effect a sale, wholesale or

otherwise.

While the provisions of section 201 reserving certain

regulatory authority to the States have been interpreted

narrowly,” the courts have construed "in interstate

commerce" broadly. The term does not turn on whether the

‘85 Rep. No. 621, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. 48 (1935). See

also H.R. Rep. No. 1318, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. 8 (1935).

While Congress may exercise its Commerce Clause

authority to grant the States that “ability to restrict the flow of

interstate commerce that they would not otherwise enjoy," Lewis

v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 44 (1980), States

may not exercise such regulatory powers unless Congress has

expressly stated its intention to make such an affirmative grant of

power. New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 55 U.S. 331,

343 (1982).

App. 24

fe sheets ot. iheied

59 Fed. Reg. 35,274; 35,283-86

contract path for a particular power or transmission sale

crosses state lines, but rather follows the physical flow of

electricity. Because of the highly integrated nature of the

electric system, this results in most transmission of electric

energy being "in interstate commerce.

For example, in Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v.

FPC, 319 U.S. 61 (1943), the Court stated:

It is impossible for us to conclude that this definition

[of transmission in interstate commerce] means less than it

says and applies only to the energy at the instant it crosses the

state line and so only to the facilities which cross the line and

only to the company which owns the facilities that cross the

line.

_ 319 U.S. at 71. Thus, a critical question regarding the

jurisdictional status of a wheeling transaction is whether the

facilities used to provide the service transmit electric energy

in interstate commerce. See also Connecticut Light & Power

Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 515 (1945) (CL&P); FPC v. Florida

Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453 (1972). In CL&P, the

Court emphasized that whether certain facilities transmit

electric energy in interstate commerce is more a technical than

a legal question. The Court stated, "[fledera! jurisdiction was

to follow the flow of electric energy, an engineering and

scientific, rather than a legalistic or governmental, test." 324

U.S. at 529.

In all of the above cases, the Court's decisions turned

on whether energy flowed in interstate commerce as a

technical matter. The decisions did not turn on whether the

energy flowing in interstate commerce was being sold for

App. 25

59 Fed. Reg. 35,274; 35,283-86

resale or was being sold to an end user. However, under FPA

section 201(b), the Commission does not have jurisdiction

over facilities used in local distribution. In CL&P, the Court

stated that local distribution facilities are exempt from

Commission jurisdiction even if those facilities “carry no

energy except extra-state energy." 324 U.S. at 531. The

Court rejected the argument that transmission and local

distribution facilities could be distinguished by the proportion

or amount of interstate energy that they carried:

We do not find that Congress has conditioned the

jurisdiction of the Commission upon any particular volume or

proportion of interstate energy involved, and we do not think

it would be appropriate to supply such a jurisdictional

limitation by construction.

324 U.S. at 536. The determination of whether facilities are

local distribution facilities remains a factual matter to be

decided in the first instance by the Commission. See FPC v.

Southern California Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205 (1964).

While the precise demarcation between transmission

and local distribution remains unclear, and the Commission

has not yet definitively addressed this issue, there is nothing

in the statute, its legislative history, or the case law to indicate

that the Commission's jurisdiction over rates, terms and

conditions of transmission in interstate commerce extends

only to [35,285] wholesale transmission and not retail

transmission.

App. 26

ete oe i

59 Fed. Reg. 35,274; 35,283-86

(ii) Treatment of Retail Costs

Because the Commission has jurisdiction over the

rates, terms and conditions of both wholesale and retail

transmission services in interstate commerce by public

utilities, arguably it may allow retail stranded cost recovery

in rates for either wholesale or retail transmission services.

There nevertheless may be important legal or policy reasons

to exclude retail stranded costs from transmission rates. As

noted earlier, however, the Commission has been presented

only with the question of whether it should permit public

utilities to seek recovery in wholesale transmission rates of

stranded investment costs incurred to serve former retail

customers (Scenario 2, section III.A.). The Commission has

not been presented with the question of whether it should

permit public utilities to seek recovery in retail transmission

rates of stranded costs incurred to serve the customer when it

was a retail customer (Scenario 3, section III.A.).

While we believe the Commission has the authority to

address retail stranded costs through its jurisdiction over the

rates, terms and conditions of interstate transmission services

used by retail or newly-created wholesale customers, we also

believe that the recovery of the costs of transition to

competition at the retail level is a matter that should be

addressed by State authorities. This is because retail stranded

costs will occur primarily as a result of State and local

decisionmaking regarding retail franchise areas and the

creation of new wholesale entities. In particular, the

Commission believes it is incumbent upon states to deal with

the consequences of stranded costs that occur as a result of

retail wheeling. Our strong policy preference is that states

explicitly address the issue. State and local decisionmakers

App. 27

59 Fed. Reg. 35,274; 35,283-86

have a first-hand understanding of the regulatory bargain with

respect to stranded costs incurred to serve retail customers,

and they are familiar with the planning, investment and

purchase activities of the utilities they regulate.

There are a number of procedural mechanisms which

we believe States can use to address retail stranded costs. For

example, a State that permits a retail franchise customer to

become a wholesale entity may consider whethef to impose an

exit fee prior to, or as a condition of, creating the wholesale

entity. Similarly, a State may consider whether to require

payment of an exit fee prior to a franchise customer being

permitted to obtain unbundled retail wheeling. In situations in

which local distribution facilities are used by a retail wheeling

customer, the State may consider whether to allow recovery

of stranded costs through rates for local distribution services.

If a State decides not to impose exit fees, or a surcharge

through distribution rates, it may consider whether to allow

recovery of stranded costs from remaining customers.

In situations in which a new wholesale entity obtains

ownership or control of a franchise utility's transmission or

distribution facilities, it is possible that State condemnation

proceedings will provide a forum for a utility to seek recovery

of ary stranded costs. What types of payments, if any, do new

municipal utilities make to prior service providers? Do these

reimbursements allow for recovery of stranded generation

costs? Is there variation among the States as to the legal

ability of local entities to municipalize? Is there variation

among the States as to the payments made by new municipal

utilities to previous suppliers ?

App. 28

59 Fed. Reg. 35,274; 35, 283-86

There may, of course, be other mechanisms which

States can use to determine whether to allow stranded cost

recovery, and from whom to allow recovery. The Commission

solicits comments on what other mechanisms might be used,

and whether these mechanisms are adequate to deal with

retail stranded costs.

While our strong preference is for States to address

retail stranded costs in whatever way they deem appropriate,

we are willing to explore whether there are circumstances

under which this Commission should consider claims for

recovery of retail stranded costs. We will therefore present

two proposed alternatives regarding retail stranded costs, and

seek comment on both. However, as noted above, we express

no preference in favor of either alternative.

Under the first alternative, the proposed rule provides

that if in a specific circumstance an appropriate State authority

explicitly considers and deals with retail stranded costs and

there is no conflict within or among State regulatory bodies

regarding a State's disposition of the issue, this Commission

will not entertain a request for retail stranded cost recovery.

However, in the absence of a clear expression by an

appropriate State authority that it has dealt with the issue, or

in the event of « conflict between States” or among State

“For example, a conflict between States could result if

State A's legislature allows a former retail customer to become a

wholesale entity and the wholesale entity obtains transmission

services so that it now takes only one half of its 100 MW load from

its current utility supplier, which is a multistate utility. As a result

of State A's action, the utility has retail stranded costs for 50 MW

of generation. State A's commission allocates the utility's retail

App. 29

59 Fed. Reg. 35,274; 35,283-86

officials within a single state, the Commission proposes to

entertain requests to recover retail stranded costs.

Under the second alternative, the proposed rule

provides that the Commission will not enter.au any request

for recovery of retail stranded costs. Under inis proposal,

State or local authorities will be the only forum for addressing

the issue. The aforementioned preference for States to address

retail stranded costs in whatever way they deem appropriate,

the need for regulatory certainty, and the States’ knowledge

and expertise regarding utility planning, investment and

purchase activities arguably favors the second alterative.

However, we solicit comment on whether there should be

limited exceptions to the second alternative rule.

As to both alternatives, the Commission solicits

comments on the following questions.

Are there circumstances under which it is not

necessarily appropriate to defer to the States (e.g., where one

State takes an action regarding retail stranded costs which

has adverse consequences for another State)? Are there

circumstances under which a State may not have an adequate

mechanism for addressing retail stranded costs, and may want

the Commission to provide a forum?

costs so that State A's retail customers are responsible for only one

half of the stranded costs. State B's commission, the other State in

which the utility operates, allocates the utility's retail costs so that

none of the retail stranded costs are allocated to State B's retail

customers.

App. 30

et

59 Fed. Reg. 35,274; 35,283-86

If a State does not explicitly address stranded costs

resulting from an action that allows retail customers to

purchase from a supplier other than the franchised utility,

should this Commission entertain requests from the utilities

left with the stranded costs? Beyond silence from the State,

are there other factors that the Commission should consider

before accepting requests for retail stranded cost recovery?

Specifically, would financial health and possible adverse

impacts on reliability be sufficient reason for Federal action?

The Commission further solicits comments on the

following questions:

(1) Does the Commission have legal authority to allow

retail stranded costs in rates for wholesale transmission

services ? Should the Commission do so as a matter of policy?

If so, which costs?

(2) Does the Commission have legal authority to allow

retail stranded costs [35,286] in rates for retail transmission

service? Should the Commission do so as a matter of policy?

If so, which costs?

(3) Does FPA section 212 give the Commission legal

authority to allow recovery of retail stranded costs in rates for

wholesale transmission services under FPA section 211?

(4) Are there legal or policy reasons why in Scenario

2 (p. 15), the Commission should ente;tain requests for

recovery of retail stranded costs in wholesale transmission

rates, but should not entertain requests for recovery of retail

stranded costs in retail transmission rates in Scenario 3

(section II1.A.)?

App. 31

59 Fed. Reg. 35,274; 35,283-86

If the Commission determines that it will entertain

requests for recovery of retail stranded costs through rates for

wholesale or retail transmission in interstate commerce, the

Commission proposes not to apply the “reasonable

expectation" test used for wholesale stranded costs. To apply

such a test would require a hearing on whether the franchise

utility had a reasonable expectation, e.g., of having its

franchise renewed, of municipalization occurring, or of a

section 212(h) non-sham wholesale entity being created by the

State or local authority. No such test appears warranted

because, in general, there is at the retail level an obligation to

serve which is much stronger than any contractual obligation

to serve at the wholesale level. The regulatory compact that

has governed provision of retail service includes an implicit

obligation to purchase concomitant with the utility's obligation

to serve.

The Commission requests comments on whether these

assumptions are correct, i.e., is the reasonable expectation

test inapplicable to retail stranded costs ? Are there situations,

for instance, in which utilities could have expected

municipalization to occur based on an established course of

dealing?

Based on these assumptions, if the Commission

determines that it will entertain requests for retail stranded

costs, the proposed regulations for retail stranded costs would

require only a showing of the dollar amounts that have been

stranded as a result of the retail customer no longer taking

bundled service from the franchise utility's system. In

essence, this results in direct assignment of retail stranded

costs to the former franchise customer. The Commission

requests comments on how to determine retail stranded costs

App. 32

Lt ee

59 Fed. Reg. 35,274; 35,283-86

as a general matter. Is there a future time when a retail

customer's action of leaving a local franchise no longer has

any adverse economic consequences on the franchise utility?

If so, what is an appropriate way to make such a

determination?

App. 33

[pp. 1-4]

Comments of North Carolina Utilities Commission

and the Public Staff of the North Carolina Utilities

Commission

Designated Pages - 1-4, 6-7

[2]

COMMENTS OF THE

NORTH CAROLINA UTILITIES COMMISSION

AND THE

PUBLIC STAFF - NORTH CAROLINA UTILITIES

COMMISSION

TO THE

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGARDING

NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING AND

SUPPLEMENTAL

NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING

DOCKET NO. RM95-8-000

PROMOTING WHOLESALE COMPETITION

THROUGH OPEN ACCESS NON-DISCRIMINATORY

TRANSMISSION SERVICES BY PUBLIC UTILITIES

DOCKET NO. RM94-7-00 |

RECOVERY OF STRANDED COSTS BY

PUBLIC UTILITIES AND TRANSMITTING UTILITIES

App. 34

Comments of NC Util Comn - 5/10/95

[3]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BEFORE THE

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Filed August 10, 1995] —

Docket Nos. RM95-8-000 and RM94-7-001

Promoting Wholesale Competition

Through Open Access

Non-discriminatory Transmission

Services by Public Utilities

Recovery of Stranded Costs by

Public Utilities and Transmitting

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Utilities )

)

INITIAL COMMENTS OF THE NORTH CAROLINA

UTILITIES COMMISSION AND THE PUBLIC STAFF-

NORTH CAROLINA UTILITIES COMMISSION

The North Carolina Utilities Commission (NCUC) and

the Public Staff of the North carolina Utilities Commission

(Public Staff) respectfully offer the following comments for

consideration by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

(FERC) in its proposed rulemaking in Docket Nos. RM95-8-

000 and RM94-7-001 regarding open access to the electric

transmission system and the recovery of stranded costs

occasioned by open access.

App. 35

Comments of NC Util Comn - 5/10/95

1. C HED ON A

The NCUC and the Public Staff are concerned that the

FERC is proposing a generic remedy for a less-than-generic

problem. The FERC position that the anti-discrimination

provisions of the Federal Power Act (FPA) require across-the-

board tariffs for open access to the electric transmission

system of every utility is misguided. We recognize that the

FERC and various states may disagree about whether a

generic approach to open access is legal.' Nevertheless, even

assuming that such an approach is legal, we believe that a

case-by-case approach to open access would be far preferable

from a policy standpoint for a number of reasons.

Discriminatory wholesale wheeling rates and

discriminatory denial of wholesale access to the electric,

utilities’ transmission systems vary greatly among the states

and are simply not consistently present to the extent necessary

to justify a generic approach to open access. The NCUC is

unaware of complaints to the FERC by any wholesale

customer regarding discriminatory denial of access to [3] or

of discriminatory rates for use of the transmission system in

North Carolina. The absence of such complaints strongly

‘This legal argument, as we understand it, is based on the

fact that § 211 of the FPA, 16 U.S.C. § 824j, as amended by § 721

of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (the source of the FERC's

authority to order wholesale wheeling) provides that the FERC can

order a transmitting utility to provide transmission service upon

application and after notice and an opportunity for an evidentiary

hearing. We will be monitoring with great interest the comments of

others with respect to this issue.

App. 36

ee ne

Comments of NC Util Comn - 5/10/95

Suggests that discrimination is not a problem in North

Carolina.

If anything, the generic open access proposal by the

FERC has the potential to cause undue discrimination where

none existed before. For example, the electric transmission

system of each utility is interconnected with neighboring

transmission systems in order to ensure greater reliability.

However, this interconnection exposes each transmission

system to greater loop flows.* Open access will greatly

complicate loop flows by increasing the number of

participants contributing to such loop flows, and it will also

cause an unfairly disproportionate burden of dealing with the

impact of loop flows to fall on many utilities that are not

direct participants in an open access wheeling transaction.

*As the FERC is well aware, the actual path taken by

electric power flow across a transmission system is difficult to

predict. Because of its interconnection with neighboring systems,

a transmission system typically consists of a number of possible

paths between any two points. . Electric current essentially flows on

a path of least resistance. An electric load placed on the

transmission system will usually cause electric current to flow in all

possible paths, but the amount of flow in each path will vary

depending on the amount of resistance to flow in a given path. The

resulting circuitous route (or mutes) that electric current actually

takes in order for electric power to be transferred between two

points is called loop flow. In sum, the actual flow of electricity

typically diverges significantly from the contract path, with the

result that the supposed economics of the contract path frequently

have little to do with the actual cost of the power transfer.

App. 37

Comments of NC Util Comn - 5/10/95

Section 211 of the Federal Power Act, as mended by

the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPACT), provides that an

electric utility, power marketing agency or non-utility

generator may apply to the FERC for an order requiring

access to the electric transmission system ora transmitting

utility (including enlargement of transmitting capacity as

necessary). Thus, the EPACT clearly contemplates the

ordering of wholesale wheeling upon request. We believe

this reflects a congressional intent for wholesale wheeling to

be required on a case-by-case basis and that the FERC should

review issues of “undue discrimination" on a case-by-case

basis as intended by the EPACT.

The FERC's current generic approach to pricing may

well inhibit greater competition in the wholesale generation

market. The FERC's authority to require new transmission

facilities to be built, for example, is dependent upon the states

granting authority for the new facilities to be constructed.

Because the granting of a certificate by a state commission for

the construction of transmission facilities could well preclude

that commission from disallowing recovery in retail rates,

many states may be reluctant to grant such authority with little

or no assurance that retail ratepayers will not be required by

default to carry a disproportionate share of the costs. Of

substantial concern in this regard is the fact that many utilities

appear to be unwilling to challenge the FERC's authority

and/or its determinations with regard to open access because

such action is perceived as endangering approval of market

based rates for affiliated generating companies. Obviously, to

the extent transmission costs are not recovered by the users of

the transmission system, there is a danger that the utilities’

captive retail ratepayers will end up covering these costs.

App. 38

Comments of NC Util Comn - 5/10/95

xx kK kK *

(pp. 6-7]

[6]

3. EACH UTILITY'S GENERATIN A T

PANSION PLAN REF AN O ATION

ERVE THAT TRANSCENDS ITS CONTRACTUA

OBLIGATIONS TO CUSTOMERS.

The NCUC and the Public Staffare concerned about

the negative impact that open access to the electric

transmission system will have on each utility unless its

obligation to serve its wholesale customers is waived. State

regulators have charged each utility with an obligation to

serve at the retail level in their respective states, and the

FERC has created a "de facto" obligation to serve at the

wholesale level.

The obligation to serve is reflected in each utility's

generating Capacity expansion plan, and it transcends any

contractual obligation the utility may incur with a customer at

either the retail level or the wholesale level. Any "reasonable

expectation" that a wholesale customer will remain on a

utility's system for the duration of the cost to serve that

customer is based on the utility's "de facto" obligation to

serve and the resulting generating capacity expansion plan.

Until the obligation to serve wholesale customers is clarified,

the NCUC and other state commissions will have little choice

but to require each utility's integrated resource planning to

include the assumption that the obligation to serve extends

past the expiration date of its wholesale contracts.

App. 39

Comments of NC Util Comn - 5/10/95

Mandatory wholesale wheeling and a _ utility's

obligation to serve wholesale customers are inconsistent with

each other. The obligation to serve arises from a utility's

monopoly status. If open access to the electric transmission

system is required for wholesale customers in order to

promote greater competition, then a utility's obligation to

serve them must be waived. Otherwise, the utilities are under

a handicap and true competition cannot exist. We urge the

FERC to recognize this inconsistency.

4. THE DIVISION OF J DICTION BETWEEN THE

FERC AND T STATES IN TH PEN

PR LEMAKING IS NOT SUPPORT Y

THE FPA OR BY CASE LAW.

The NCUC and the Public Staff are concerned that the

division of jurisdiction between the FERC itself and the states

in the open access proposed rulemaking is not supported by

the FPA or the relevant case law. The FERC open access

proposal contains the assertion that the FERC has jurisdiction

over all transmission facilities, on the assumption that all

transmission facilities are interconnected with neighboring

transmission systems and are, therefore, directly or indirectly

used [7] to serve wholesale customers. While it is generally

recognized that the FERC has jurisdiction over transmission

facilities serving wholesale customers and over transmission

facilities used for inter-utility transactions, the FISA and the

case law provide that the FERC has no jurisdiction over

facilities used in local distribution. Local distribution facilities

have been defined as facilities used to deliver electric energy

to the ultimate consumer. Therefore, because retail customers

in many instances are served directly off the transmission

App. 40

Comments of NC Util Comn - 5/10/95

system, transmission facilities can be facilities used in local

distribution.

Open access to the transmission facilities that directly

serve retail customers will invite sham transactions and sham

municipalization by those transmission level retail customers

seeking to become wholesale customers and thereby gain

access to wholesale wheeling. This is an issue that is certain

to invite litigation and potentially delay true wholesale open

access. An example of this is the case involving Falls Church,

Virginia, and Virginia Electric & Power Company. The

NCUC and the Public Staff believe that the FERC has

underestimated the creativity with which those individuals

who are consultants to large retail customers will approach

this issue. A significant cottage industry may well arise solely

to convert retail customers into wholesale customers, thereby

subverting the intent of Congress as expressly set forth in

EPACT.

App. 41

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

ORDER 888

[Issued April 24, 1996]

Docket Nos. RM95-8-000 and RM94-7-001

Order No. 888

** * kK *

[pp. 31,632 - 31,684]

[31,036]

61 F.R. 21540 (May 10, 1996)

18 CFR Parts 35 and 385

Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access

Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public

Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities

and Transmitting Utilities

AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, DOE.

ACTION: Final Rule.

SUMMARY: The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

(Commission) is issuing a Final Rule requiring all public

utilities that own, control or operate facilities used for

transmitting electric energy in interstate commerce to have on

file open access non-discriminatory transmission tariffs that

contain minimum terms and conditions of non-discriminatory

service. The Final Rule also permits public utilities and

transmitting utilities to seek recovery of legitimate, prudent

App. 42

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

and verifiable stranded costs associated with providing open

access and Federal Power Act section 211 transmission

services. The Commission's goal is to remove impediments to

competition in the wholesale bulk power marketplace and to

bring [31,633] more efficient, lower cost power to the

Nation's electricity consumers.

EFFECTIVE DATE: This Final Rule will become effective

on July 9, 1996.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: David D.

Withnell (Legal Information -- Docket No. RM95-8-000)

Office of the General Counsel Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission 888, First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426

(202) 208-2063

Deborah B. Leahy (Legal Information -- Docket No.

RM94-7-001) Office of the General Counsel Federal Energy

Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington,

DC 20426 (202) 208-2039

Michael A. Coleman (Technical Information) Office

of Electric Power Regulation Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission 888, First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426

(202) 208-1236

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In addition to

publishing the full text of this document in the Federal

Register, the Commission also provides all interested persons

an opportunity to inspect or copy the contents of this

document during normal business hours in the Public

Reference Room at 888, First Street, NE., Washington, DC

20426.

App. 43

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

The Commission Issuance Posting System (CIPS), an

electronic bulletin board service, provides access to the texts

of formal documents issued by the Commission. CIPS is

available at no charge to the user and may be accessed using

a personal computer with a modem by dialing 202-208-1397

if dialing locally, or 1- 800-856-3920 if dialing long distance.

CIPS is also available through the Fed World system (by

modem or Internet). To access CIPS, set your

communications software to 19200, 14400, 12000, 9600,

7200, 4800, 2400, or 1200 bps, full duplex, no parity, 8 data

bits and | stop bit. The full text of this order will be available

on CIPS indefinitely in ASCII and WordPerfect 5.1 format.

The complete text on diskette in Wordperfect format may also

be purchased from the Commission's copy contractor, La

Dorn Systems Corporation, also located in the Public

Reference Room at 888 First Street, N.E., Washington, D.C.

20426.

Table of Contents

I. Introduction/Summary

II. Public Reporting Burden

Ill. Background

IV. Discussion

A. Scope of the Rule

1. Introduction

2. Functional Unbundling

3. Market-based Rates

4. Merger Policy

5. Contract Reform

6. Flow-based Contracting and Pricing

B. Legal Authority

1. Bases for Legal Authority

App. 44

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

2. Response to Commenters Opposing our Legal

Authority

C. Comparability

1. Eligibility to Receive Non-discriminatory Open

Access Transmission

2. Service that Must be Provided by Transmission

Provider

3. Who Must Provide Non-discriminatory Open

Access Transmission

4. Reservation of Transmission Capacity by

Transmission Customers

5. Reservation of Transmission Capacity for Future

Use by Utility

6. Capacity Reassignment :

7. Information Provided to Transmission Customers

8. Consequences of Functional Unbundling

D. Ancillary Services

1. Definitions and Descriptions

2. Obligations of Transmission Providers and

Transmission Customers with Respect to Ancillary

Services

3. Unbundling and Bundling Ancillary Services

4. Reassignment of Ancillary Services

5. Pricing of Ancillary Services

6. Accounting for Ancillary Services

E. Real-Time Information Networks

F. Coordination Arrangements: Power Pools, Public

Utility Holding Companies, Bilateral Coordination

Arrangements, and Independent System Operators

1. Tight Power Pools

2. Loose Pools

3. Public Utility Holding Companies

[31,634]

App. 45

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

4. Bilateral Coordination Arrangements

G. Pro Forma Tariff

1. Tariff Provisions That Affect The Pricing

Mechanism '

2. Priority for Obtaining Service

3. Curtailment Provisions

4. Specific Tariff Provisions

H. Implementation

I. Federal and State Jurisdiction: Transmission/Local

Distribution

J. Stranded Costs

1. Justification for Allowing Recovery of Stranded

Costs

2. Cajun Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. v. FERC

3. Responsibility for Wholesale Stranded Costs

(Whether to Adopt Direct Assignment to Departing

Customers)

4. Recovery of Stranded Costs Associated with New

Wholesale Requirements Contracts

5. Recovery of Stranded Costs Associated with .

Existing Wholesale Requirements Contracts

6. Recovery of Stranded Costs Caused by Retail-

Turned-Wholesale Customers

7. Recovery of Stranded Costs Caused by Retail

Wheeling

8. Evidentiary Demonstration Necessary -- Reasonable

Expectation Standard

9. Calculation of Recoverable Stranded Costs

10. Stranded Costs in the Context of Voluntary

Restructuring

11. Accounting Treatment for Stranded Costs

12. Definitions, Application, and Summary

K. Other

App. 46

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

1. Information Reporting Requirements for Public

Utilities

. Small Utilities -

Regional Transmission Groups

Pacific Northwest

. Power Marketing Agencies -

. Tennessee Valley Authority

Hydroelectric Power

8. Residential Customers

V. Environmental Statement

VI. Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification

VII. Information Collection Statement

VIII. Effective Date

Regulatory Text

Appendices (These Appendices will not appear in the Code of

| Federal Regulations)

A. List of Section 211 Applications

B. List of Commenters in Docket Nos. RM95-8-000

and RM94-7-001

C. Allegations of Public Utilities Exercising

Transmission Dominance

D. Pro Forma Open Access Transmission Tariff

E. List of Group 1 Public Utilities

F. List of Group 2 Public Utilities

G. Legal Analysis of Commission Jurisdiction Over

the Rates, Terms and Conditions of Unbundled Retail

Transmission In Interstate Commerce

H. U.S. NO/X/ Emissions

Statement of Commissioner Hoecker

Statement of Commissioner Massey

NAWSwWH

App. 47

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

I. Introduction/Summary

Today the Commission issues three final, interrelated

rules designed to remove impediments to competition in the

wholesale bulk power marketplace and to bring more

efficient, lower cost power to the Nation’s electricity

consumers.' The legal and policy cornerstone of these rules is

to remedy undue discrimination in access to the monopoly

owned transmission wires that control whether and to whom

electricity can be transported in interstate commerce. A

second critical aspect of the [31,635] rules is to address

recovery of the transition costs of moving from a monopoly-

regulated regime to one in which all sellers can compete on a

fair basis and in which electricity is more competitively

priced.

‘These rules are the rules on open access and stranded costs

in the above dockets (FERC Statutes and Regulations - 431,036),

and an accompanying rule on Open Access Same-Time Information

System and Standards of Conduct (OASIS Final Rule) (FERC

Statutes and Regulations {3 | ,037) being issued contemporaneously.

The Commission also is issuing contemporaneously a notice of

proposed rulemaking on capacity reservation open access

transmission tariffs in Docket No. RM96-11-000, FERC Statutes

and Regulations 432,517. These final rules and proposed rule are

being published concurrently in the Federal Register.

App. 48

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

In the year since the proposed rules were issued,’ the

pace of competitive changes in the electric utility industry has

accelerated. By March of last year, 38 public utilities had

filed wholesale open access transmission tariffs with the

Commission. Today, prodded by such competitive changes

and encouraged by our proposed rules, 106 of the

approximately 166 public utilities that own, control, or

operate’ transmission facilities used in interstate commerce

have filed some form of wholesale open access tariff. In

addition, since the time the proposed rules were issued,

numerous state regulatory commissions have adopted or are

On March 29, 1995, the Commission issued two notices

of proposed rulemaking concerning open access transmission and

stranded cost recovery. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through

Open-Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Service by Public

Utilities and Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and

Transmitting Utilities, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and

Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 60 FR 17662 (April

7, 1995), FERC Statutes and Regulations 432,514 (1995). On

December 13, 1995, the Commission issued a notice of proposed

rulemaking on information systems. Real- Time Information

Networks and Standards of Conduct, Notice of Proposed

Rulemaking, 60 FR 66182 (December 21, 1995), FERC Statutes

and Regulations 432,516 (1995).

>The Commission's notice of proposed rulemaking in the

above dockets proposed to apply the proposed requirements to

public utilities that own and/or control facilities used for the

transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce. "Own

and/or control" is intended to include public utilities that "operate"

facilities used for the transmission of electric energy in interstate

commerce. However, we have modified the Final Rule regulatory

text to remove any ambiguity.

App. 49

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

actively evaluating retail customer choice programs or other

utility restructuring alternatives. These events have been

spurred by continuing pressures in the marketplace for

changes in the way electricity is bought, sold, and

transported. Increasingly, customers are demanding the

benefits of competition in the growing electricity commodity

market.

The Commission estimates the potential quantitative

benefits from the Final Rule will be approximately $3.8 to

$5.4 billion per year of cost savings, in addition to the non-

quantifiable benefits that include better use of existing assets

and institutions, new market mechanisms, technical

innovation, and less rate distortion. The continuing

competitive changes in the industry and the prospect of these

benefits to customers make it imperative that this Commission

take the necessary steps within its jurisdiction to ensure that

all wholesale buyers and sellers of electric energy can obtain

non-discriminatory transmission access, that the transition to

competition is orderly and fair, and that the integrity and

reliability of our electricity infrastructure is maintained.

In this Rule, the Commission seeks to remedy both

existing and future undue discrimination in the industry and

realize the significant customer benefits that will come with

open access. Indeed, it is our statutory obligation under

sections 205 and 206 of the Federal Power Act (FPA) to

remedy undue discrimination.

To do so, we must eliminate the remaining patchwork

of closed and open jurisdictional transmission systems and

ensure that all these systems, including those that already

provide some form of open access, cannot use monopoly

App. 50

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

power over transmission to unduly discriminate against

others. If we do not take this step now, the result will be

benefits to some customers at the expense of others. We have

learned from our experience in the natural gas area the

importance of addressing competitive transition issues early

and with as much certainty to market participants as possible.

Accordingly, in this proceeding and in _ the

accompanying proceeding on OASIS, the Commission,

pursuant to its authorities under sections 205 and 206 of the

FPA:

eRequires all public utilities that own, control or

operate facilities used for transmitting electric energy in

interstate commerce

°To file open access non-discriminatory transmission

tariffs that contain minimum terms and conditions of non-

discriminatory service;

[31,636]

To take transmission service (including ancillary

services) for their own new wholesale sales and purchases of

electric energy under the open access tariffs;

To develop and maintain a same-time information

system that will give existing and potential transmission users

the same access to transmission information that the public

utility enjoys, and further requires public utilities to separate

transmission from generation marketing functions and

communications;

App. 51

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

Clarifies Federal/state jurisdiction over transmission

in interstate commerce and local distribution and provides for

deference to certain state recommendations; and

¢Permits public utilities and transmitting utilities to

seek recovery of legitimate, prudent and verifiable stranded

costs associated with providing open access and FPA section

211 transmission services.

Open Access

The Final Rule requires public utilities to file a single

open access tariff that offers both network, load-based service

and point-to-point, contract-based service. The Rule contains

a pro forma tariff that reflects modifications to the NOPR's

proposed terms and conditions and also permits variations for

regional practices. All public utilities subject to the Rule,

including those that already have tariffs on file, will be

required to make section 206 compliance filings to meet the

new pro forma tariff non-price minimum terms and conditions

of non-discriminatory transmission. Utilities may propose

their own rates in a section 205 compliance filing.

The Rule provides that public utilities may seek a

waiver of some or all of the requirements of the Final Rule.

In addition, non-public utilities may seek a waiver of the tariff

reciprocity provisions.

The Final Rule does not generically abrogate existing

requirements contracts, but will permit customers and public

utilities to seek modification, or termination, of certain

existing requirements contracts on a case-by-case basis. As to

coordination arrangements and contracts, the Rule finds that

App. 52

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

these arrangements and contracts may need to be modified to

remove unduly discriminatory transmission access and/or

pricing provisions. Such arrangements and agreements include

power pool agreements, public utility holding company

agreements, and certain bilateral coordination agreements.

The Rule provides guidance and timelines for modifying

unduly discriminatory coordination arrangements and

contracts, and specifies when the members of such

arrangements must begin to conduct trade with each other

using the same open access tariff offered to others. The Rule

also provides guidance regarding the formation of independent

system operators (ISOs).

The Rule does not require any form of corporate

restructuring, but will accommodate voluntary restructuring

that is consistent with the Rule’s open access and

comparability policies.

As discussed in the NOPR, not all owners or

controllers of interstate transmission facilities are subject to

the Commission s jurisdiction under sections 205 and 206 of

the FPA and therefore are not subject to this Rule’s open

access requirements. Therefore, the Final Rule retains the

proposed reciprocity provision in the pro forma tariff.

Without such a provision, non-open access utilities could take

advantage of the competitive opportunities of open access,

while at the same time offering inferior access, or no access

at all, over their own facilities. Thus, open access utilities

would be unfairly burdened. We note that some non-

jurisdictional utilities have expressed an interest in a

mechanism for obtaining a Commission determination that

their transmission tariffs satisfy the reciprocity provisions in

App. 53

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

the pro forma tariffs, and we provide such a mechanism in the

Rule.

The Final Rule does not generically provide for

market-based generation rates. Although the Rule codifies the

Commission’s prior decision that there is no generation

dominance in new generating capacity, intervenors in cases

may raise generation dominance issues related to new

capacity. In addition, to obtain market-based rates for existing

generation, we will continue to require public utilities to

show, on a case-by-case basis, that there is no generation

dominance in existing capacity. Further, in all market-based

rate cases, we will continue to look at whether an applicant

and its affiliates could erect other barriers to entry and

[31,637] whether there may be problems due to affiliate abuse

or reciprocal dealing.

Finally, contemporaneously with this Rule the

Commission issues a NOPR on capacity reservation tariffs as

an alternative, and perhaps superior, means of remedying

undue discrimination.

Transmission/Local Distribution ,

The Rule clarifies the Commission's interpretation of

the Federal/state jurisdictional boundaries over transmission

and local distribution. While we reaffirm our conclusion that

this Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over the rates,

terms, and conditions of unbundled retail transmission in

interstate commerce by public utilities, we nevertheless

recognize the very legitimate concerns of state regulatory

authorities as they contemplate direct retail access or other

State restructuring programs. Accordingly, we specify

App. 54

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

circumstances under which we will give deference to state

recommendations. Although jurisdictional boundaries may

shift as a result of restructuring programs in wholesale and

retail markets, we do not believe this will change fundamental

state regulatory authorities, including authority to regulate the

vast majority of generation asset costs, the siting of generation

and transmission facilities, and decisions regarding retail

service territories. We intend to be respectful of state

objectives so long as they do not balkanize interstate

transmission of power or conflict with our interstate open

access policies.

Stranded Costs

With regard to stranded costs, the Final Rule adopts

the Commission’s supplemental proposal. It will permit

utilities to seek extra-contractual recovery of stranded costs

associated with a limited set of existing (executed on or before

July 11, 1994) wholesale requirements contracts and provides

that the Commission will be the primary forum for utilities to

seek recovery of stranded costs associated with retail-turned-

wholesale transmission customers. It also will allow utilities

to seek recovery of stranded costs caused by retail wheeling

only in circumstances in which the state regulatory authority

does not have authority to address retail stranded costs at the

time the retail wheeling is required. The Rule retains the

revenues lost approach for calculating stranded costs and

provides a formula for calculating such costs.

Environmental Issues

The Commission has prepared a Final Environmental

Impact Statement (FEIS) evaluating the possible

App. 55

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

environmental consequences of changes in the bulk power

marketplace expected to occur as a result of the open access

requirements of this Final Rule. The FEIS focuses, as do most

commenters, on possible increases in emissions of nitrogen

oxides (NO/X/) from certain fossil-fuel fired generators,

which could affect air quality in the producing region and in

areas to which these emissions may be carried.

In response to comments on the Draft EIS, the

Commission performed numerous additional studies. The

FEIS finds that the relative future competitiveness of coal and

natural gas generation is the key variable affecting the impact

of the Final Rule. If competitive conditions favor natural gas,

the Rule is likely to lead to environmental benefits. Both EPA

and the Commission staff believe this projected scenario is the

more likely one. If competitive conditions favor coal, the Rule

may lead to small negative environmental impacts. However,

even using the most extreme, unlikely assumptions about the

future of the industry, the negative consequences are not

likely to occur until after the turn of the century. Because the

impacts will remain modest at least until 2010, there is no

need for an interim mitigation program. In addition, even if

the data showed more significant negative consequences

requiring mitigation, the Commission does not have the

Statutory authority under the Federal Power Act or the

expertise to address this possible far- term problem. The

Commission believes, however, that there is time for federal

and state air quality authorities to address any potential

adverse impact as part of a comprehensive NO, regulatory

program under the Clean Air Act.‘

*42 U.S.C. §7401, et seq.

App. 56

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

Despite our conclusions regarding the lack of

environméntal impacts expected to result from the Rule, the

Commission has examined a wide variety of proposals for

mitigating possible adverse effects. We share the view of most

commenters [31,638] that the preferred approach for

mitigating increased NO/X/ emissions generally is a NO/X/

cap and trading regulatory program comparable to that

developed by Congress to address sulfur dioxide emissions in

the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.° The Commission

has examined various means of establishing such a program,

including use of existing federal authorities under the Clean

Air Act, cooperative efforts by state and federal air quality

regulators, and development of a new emissions regulatory

program administered by the Commission under the Federal

Power Act. The Commission has concluded that a NO/X/

regulatory program could best be developed and administered

under the Clean Air Act, in cooperation with interested states,

and offers to lend Commission support to that effort should it

become necessary.

Conclusion

The Commission believes that the Final Rule will

remedy undue discrimination in transmission services in

interstate commerce and provide an orderly and fair transition

to competitive bulk power markets.

542 U.S.C.A. §7651b-e.

App. 57

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

II. Public Reporting Burden

The Open Access Final Rule and the Stranded Cost

Final Rule specify filing requirements to be followed by

public utilities that own, control or operate transmission

facilities in interstate commerce in making non-discriminatory

open access tariff filings and filings to recover legitimate,

prudent and verifiable stranded costs. The information

collection requirements of the final rules are attributable to

FERC-516 “Electric Rate Filings." The current total annual

reporting burden for FERC-516 is 828,300 hours.

A. Docket No. RM95-8-000 (Open Access Final Rule)

The Open Access Final Rule requires public utilities

filing non-discriminatory open access tariffs to provide certain

infermation to the Commission. The Commission estimated

that the public reporting burden for the information collection

_ would average 300 hours per response. This estimate included

time for reviewing the requirements of the Commission's

regulations, searching existing data sources, gathering and

maintaining the necessary data, completing and reviewing the

collection of information, and filing the revised information.

No comments on the burden estimate were received. Because

the Final Rule adopts essentially the same information

requirements that are contained in the proposed rule, we

believe that the average filing burden is same for the Final

Rule.

In the proposed rule, the Commission noted that there

are approximately 328 public utilities, including marketers

and wholesale generation entities. We initially estimated that

137 public utilities own, control or operate facilities used for

App. 58

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce,

and would be subject to the filing requirements of the

proposed rule. Upon further review, the Commission believes

that approximately 166 public utilities will respond to the

information collection. Accordingly, the public reporting

burden is estimated to be 49,800 hours.

\

B. Docket No. RM94-7-001 (Stranded Cost Final Rule)

In the supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking, the

Commission estimated that the information requirements of

the proposed rule would not differ substantially from those

contained in the initial proposed rule. In that notice, the

Commission estimated that the public reporting burden for the

information requirements contained in the proposed rule

would be 50 hours per response with 10 responses annually.

No comments on this filing burden were received. The

information requirements adopted in the Stranded Cost Final

Rule are not substantially different from those in the proposed

rule. Therefore, the Commission concludes that there will be

no additional public filing burden associated with the Stranded

Cost Final Rule.

III. Background

In the NOPR, we set out a detailed statement of the

events leading up to this rulemaking. We repeat that

background here, updated to reflect what has happened since

March 1995, and discuss why it is necessary to undertake

regulatory reform in the electric industry at this time. We do

so to provide the necessary [31,639] backdrop to our action

in adopting this Rule.

App. 59

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

A. Structure of the Electric Industry at Enactment of Federal

Power Act

The Federal Power Act was enacted in an age of

mostly self-sufficient, vertically integrated electric utilities, in

which generation, transmission, and distribution facilities

were owned by a single entity and sold as part of a bundled

service (delivered electric energy) to wholesale and retail

customers. Most electric utilities built their own power plants

and transmission systems, entered into interconnection and

coordination arrangements with neighboring utilities, and

entered into long-term contracts to make wholesale

requirements sales (bundled sales of generation and

transmission) to municipal, cooperative, and other investor-

owned utilities (IOUs) connected to each utility's transmission

system. Each system covered limited service areas. This

structure of separate systems arose naturally due primarily to

the cost and technological limitations on the distance over

which electricity could be transmitted.

Through much of the 1960s, utilities were able to

avoid price increases, but still achieve increased profits,

because of substantial increases in scale economies,

technological improvements, and only moderate increases in

input prices.° Thus, there was no pressure on regulatory

*Paul L. Joskow, Inflation and Environmental Concern:

Structural Change in the Process of Public Utility Regulation, 17 J.

Law & Econ. 291, 312 (1974); see also Charles F. Phillips, Jr.,

The Regulation of Public Utilities 11 (1988).

App. 60

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

commissions to use regulation to affect the structure of the

industry.’

B. Significant Changes in the Electric Industry

In the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, a number

of significant events occurred in the electric industry that

changed the perceptions of utilities and began a shift to a more

competitive marketplace for wholesale power.* This was the

beginning of periods of rapid inflation, higher nominal

interest rates, and higher electricity rates.” During this time,

consumers became concerned about higher electricity rates

and questioned any price increases filed by utilities.'°

During this same time frame, the construction of

nuclear and other capital-intensive baseload facilities--

actively encouraged by federal and some state governments--

- contributed to the continuing cost increases and uncertainties

’See Joskow, supra at p. 312; see also Phillips, supra at

p. 12.

*See Joskow, supra at p. 312; see also Phillips, supra at

pp. 12-13.

*See Joskow, supra at pp. 312-13; see also Phillips, supra

at p. 13. The Arab oil embargo resulted in significantly higher oil

prices through the 1970s. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The

Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in Retrospect: Canceled Plants

and Excess Capacity, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 497, 501 (1984).

See Joskow, supra at p. 313; see also Phillips, supra at p.

13.

App. 61 |

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

in the industry.'' These investments were made based on the

assumptions that there would be steady increases in the

demand for electricity and continued large increases in the

price of oil.'* However, due to conservation and economic

downturns, the expected demand increases did not

materialize. Load growth virtually disappeared in some areas,

and many utilities unexpectedly found themselves with excess

capacity. In addition, by the 1980s, the oil cartel collapsed,

with a resulting glut of low-priced oil.'* At the same time,

inflation substantially increased the costs of these large

baseload generating plants.'° Surging interest rates further

increased the cost of the capital needed to finance and

capitalize these projects and completion schedules were

'' See generally Jersey Central Power & Light Company v.

FERC, 810 F.2d 1168, 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

21d.

"See Pierce, supra at 503. By 1983, the Department of

Energy had estimated that the sunk costs for canceled nuclear plants

alone amounted to $10 billion. /d. at 498.

41d.

'SSee Bernard S. Black & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The

Choice Between Markets and Central Planning in Regulating the

U.S. Electricity Industry, 93 Col. L. Rev. 1339, 1346 (1993)

("Actual costs of nuclear power plants vastly exceeded estimates,

sometimes by as much as 1000%.").

App. 62

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

significantly [31,640] extended by, in part, more stringent

safety and environmental requirements. '°

As a result, expensive large baseload plants for which

there was little or no demand, came onto the market or were

in the process of being constructed. Accordingly, between

1970 and 1985, average residential electricity prices more

than tripled in nominal terms, and increased by 25% after

adjusting for general inflation.'’ Moreover, average electricity

prices for industrial customers more than quadrupled in

nominal terms over the same period and increased 86% after

adjusting for inflation.'* The rapidly increasing rates for

electric power during this period, together with the

Opportunities provided by the Public Utility Regulatory

‘See Phillips, supra at p. 13. Fossil fuel-fired plants

became subject to increased regulation as a result of the Clean Air

Act of 1970, and its 1977 amendments. 42 U.S.C. §§7401-7642.

In 1971, nuclear plant licensing became subject to the

environmental impact statement requirements of the National

Environmental Policy Act of 1969. 42 U.S.C. §4332. Following

the 1979 accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear plant, nuclear

plants also became subject to additional safety regulations, resulting

in higher costs. See Energy Information Administration, The

Changing Structure of the Electric Power Industry 1970-1991

(March 1993) 35. Between 1976 and 1980, most states and many

localities instituted laws governing power plant siting.

"Based on retail prices reported in Energy Information

Administration (EIA), Monthly Energy Review, January 1995,

Table 9.9 (Prices adjusted for inflation using the GDP Deflator

(1987 = 100)).

S/d.

App. 63

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA) (discussed infra), also

prompted some industrial customers to bypass utilities by

constructing their own generation facilities. This further

exacerbated rate increases for remaining customers --

primarily residential and commercial customers.

Consumers responded to these “rate shocks" by

exerting pressure on regulatory bodies to investigate the

prudence of management decisions to build generating plants,

especially when construction resulted in cost overruns, excess

capacity, or both. Between 1985 and 1992, writeoffs of

nuclear power plants totalled $22.4 billion.'? These writeoffs

significantly reduced the earnings of the affected utilities.”

Delays in obtaining rate increases to reflect the effects of

inflation further reduced investor returns. Thus, many utilities

became reluctant to commit capital to long-term construction

decisions involving large scale generating plants.”'

In addition to economic changes in the industry,

significant technological changes in both generation and

transmission have occurred since 1935. Through the 1960s,

bigger was cheaper in the generation sector and the industry

was able to capitalize on economies of scale to produce power

"See Black & Pierce, supra at p. 1346 (These writeoffs

were “about 17% of the book value of total 1992 utility

investment. ")

201d.

*\Id. ("The high perceived risk of future disallowances

reversed utilities’ incentives to overinvest, and made utilities

extremely reluctant to build new power plants.").

App. 64

et ek ee cnt

!

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

at lower per-unit costs from larger and larger plants.” As a

result, large utility companies that could finance and manage

construction projects of larger scale had a price advantage

over smaller utility companies and customers who might

otherwise have considered building their own generating

units. Scale economies encouraged power generation by large

vertically-integrated utility companies that also transmitted

and distributed power. Beginning in the 1970s, however,

additional economies of scale in generation were no longer

being achieved.” A significant factor was that larger

generation units were found to need reiatively greater

maintenance and experience longer downtimes.” The electric

[31,641] industry faced the situation "where the price of each

incremental unit of electric power exceeded the average

cost." Bigger was no longer better.

See Preston Michie, Billing Credits for Conservation,

Renewable, and Other Electric Power Resources: an Alternative to

Marginal-Cost-Based Power Rates in the Pacific Northwest, 13

Environmental Law 963, 964-65 (1983).

Id. at p. 965.

Energy Information Administration, The Changing

Structure of the Electric Power Industry 1970-1991 (March 1993)

37 ("As larger units were constructed, however, utilities discovered

that downtime was as much as 5 times greater for units larger than

600 megawatts than for units in the 100-megawatt range.")

*Id.; see also George A. Perrault, Downsizing Generation:

Utility Plans for the 1990s, Pub. Util. Fort. 15-16 (Sept. 27, 1990)

("The large base-load generating units that form the backbone of

utility systems are almost totally absent from capacity plans for the

1990s.").

App. 65.

“

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

Further dictating against larger generation units were

advances in technologies that allowed scale economies to be

exploited by smaller size units, therebv allowing smaller new

plants to be brought on line at costs below those of the large

plants of the 1970s and earlier. Such new technologies include

combined cycle units and conventional steam units that use

circulating fluidized bed boilers.”

The combined cycle generating plants generally use

natural gas as their primary fuel. This technology has been

made possible by the development of more efficient gas

turbines, shorter construction lead times, lower capital costs,

increased reliability, and relatively minimal environmental

impacts.*’ Similarly, the circulating fluidized bed combustion

boilers, fueled by coal and other conventional fuels, provide

a more efficient and less polluting resource.

Today, "the optimum size (of generation plants) has

shifted from (more than 500 MW) (10-year lead time) to

smaller units (one-year lead time) (in the 50- to 150-MW

"From 1982 through 1991, the average capacity of

fluidized-bed units increased rapidly to 72 megawatts for 4 units in

1991. The average capacity for the 19 units planned to begin

operating in 1992 through 1995 increases to 83 megawatts." Energy

Information Administration, The Changing Structure of the Electric

Power Industry 1970-1991 (March 1993) 38.

>” See Charles E. Bayless, Less is More: Why Gas Turbines

Will Transform Electric Utilities, Pub. Util. Fort. (Dec. 1, 1994)

21.

App. 66

ee eee

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

range)."** Indeed, smaller and more efficient gas-fired

combined-cycle generation facilities can produce power on the

grid at a cost ranging from 5 cents per kWh to less than 3

cents per kWh.” This is significantly less than the costs for

large plants constructed and installed by utilities over the last

decade, which were typically in the range of 4 to 7 cents per

kWh for coal plants and 9 to 15 cents for nuclear plants.”

Significant changes have also occurred in the transmission

sector of the industry. Technological advances in transmission

have made possible the economic transmission of electric

power over long distances at higher voltages.*' This has made

81d. at p. 24. See also Wallace E. Brand, Is Bigger Better?

Market Power in Bulk Power Supply: From FDR to NOPR, Pub.

Util. Fort. (Feb. 15, 1996) 23 at p. 25 (while the optimal baseload

unit size is about 500 MW for coal-fired steam turbines, the optimal

size for gas fired combined-cycle units is about 150 to 200 MW).

°FERC staff calculations based in part on combined-cycle

plant cost data reported in 1994 FERC Form No. | for a sample of

units placed in service during 1990-94. Costs vary with regional

fuel and construction costs, among other reasons.

Coal and Nuclear plant cost data reported in 1994 FERC

Form No. | and the EIA report, Electric Plant Cost and Power

Production Expenses 1991, 1993 DOE/EIA-0455(91), for plants

placed in service during 1986-94; see also The 1994 Electric

Executives’ Forum, Bakke (President and CEO of the AES

Corporation), Pub. Util. Fort. (June 1, 1994) 45 ("New generation

can be built at about 3 cents per kilowatt-hour (U.S. average). Old

generation costs about twice that * * *").

*'See Black & Pierce, supra at p. 1345 (In the late 1960s

and 1970s, improved transmission efficiency and development of

App. 67

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

it technically feasible for utilities with lower cost generation

sources to reach previously isolated systems where customers

had been captive to higher cost generation. In addition, the

nature and magnitude of coordination transactions” have

changed dramatically since enactment of the FPA, allowing

increased coordinated operations and reduced reserve

margins. Substantial amounts of electricity now move between

regions, as well as between utilities in the same region.

Physically isolated systems have become a thing of the past.

[31,642]

C. The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act and the Growth

of Competition

In enacting PURPA,* Congress recognized that the

rising costs and decreasing efficiencies of utility-owned

generating facilities.were increasing rates and harming the

regional transmission networks "made it possible to build power

plants up to 1000 miles from power users.").

“Coordination transactions are voluntary sales or

exchanges of specialized electricity services that allow buyers to

realize cost savings or reliability gains that are not attainable if they

rely solely on their own resources. For sellers, these transactions

provide opportunities to earn additional revenue, and to lower

customer rates, from capacity that is temporarily excess to native

load capacity requirements.

3Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified in U.S.C.

sections 15, 16, 26, 30, 42, and 43).

App. 68

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

economy as a whole. To lessen dependence on expensive

foreign oil, avoid repetition of the 1977 natural gas shortage,

and control consumer costs, Congress sought to encourage

electric utilities to conserve oil and natural gas.” In

particular, Congress sanctioned the development of alternative

generation sources designated as "qualifying facilities" (QFs)

as a means of reducing the demand for traditional fossil

fuels.*° PURPA required utilities to purchase power from QFs

See generally FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 745-46

(1982).

“The Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978.

Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified in U.S.C. sections 15,

16, 26, 30, 42, and 43).

*°QFs include certain cogenerators and small power

producers. PURPA also added sections 210, 211, and 212 to the

FPA, providing the Commission with authority to approve

applications for interconnections and, in limited circumstances,

wheeling. However, under section 211, as enacted in PURPA, the

Commission could approve an application for wheeling only if it

found, inter alia, that the order "would reasonably preserve existing

competitive relationships." Because of this and other limitations in

sections 211 and 212 as originally enacted, the provision was

virtually ineffective. Only one section 211 order was ever issued

pursuant to the original provision, and it was pursuant to a

settlement. See Public Service Company of Oklahoma, 38 FERC

461,050 (1987). As discussed infra, section 211 was subsequently

revised by the Energy Policy Act of 1992.

App. 69

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

at a price not to exceed the utility's avoided costs and to sell

backup power to QFs.””

PURPA specifically set forth limitations on who, and

what, could qualify as QFs. In addition to technological and

size criteria, PURPA set limits on who could own QFs.*

Notwithstanding these limitations, QFs proliferated. In 1989,

there were 576 QF facilities. By 1993, there were more than

1,200 such facilities.*’ For the same time period, installed QF

capacity increased from 27,429 megawatts to 47,774

megawatts.“ The rapid expansion and performance of the QF

industry demonstrated that traditional, vertically integrated

public utilities need not be the only sources of reliable power.

7456 U.S. at p. 750. Congress recognized that

encouragement was needed in part because utilities had been

reluctant to purchase electric power from, and sell power to,

nonutility generators. /d. at pp. 750-51.

**For example, PURPA provided that a cogeneration

facility or small power production facility could not be owned by

a person primarily engaged in the generation or sale of electric

power (other than from cogeneration or small power production

facilities). See 16 U.S.C.

“Energy Information Administration, Electric Power

Annual 1993 (December 1994) 124 (Table 77).

“Id. EIA data for 1989 through 1991 was for facilities of

5 megawatts or more and for 1992 and 1993 was for facilities of 1

megawatt or more. A comparison with Table 74 on page 121 for

the years 1992 and 1993 reveals that this mixing of data bases is

likely of minimal effect.

App. 70

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

During this period, the profile of generation

investment began to change, and a market for non-traditional

power supply beyond the purchases required by PURPA

began to emerge. QFs were limited to cogenerators and small

power producers. *'

However, other non-traditional power producers who

could not meet the QF criteria began to build new capacity to

compete in bulk power markets, without such PURPA

benefits as the mandatory purchase requirements. These

producers, known as independent power producers (IPPs),

were predominantly single-asset generation companies that did

not Own any transmission or distribution facilities. While

traditional utilities were generally [31,643] reluctant at that

time to invest in new generating facilities under cost of

service regulation, utilities increasingly became interested in

participating in this new generation sector. They organized

affiliated power producers (APPs), with assets not included in

utility rate base, and sought to sell power in their own service

territories and the territories of other utilities. At the same

*'Generally, the law has imposed an 80 MW cap on small

power producers. A limited exception enacted in 1990 permitted

small power facilities that could exceed 80 MW and still qualify as

QFs under PURPA. This exception was limited to certain solar,

wind, waste, and geothermal small power production facilities and

only covered applications for certification of facilities as qualifying

small power production facilities that were submitted no later than

December 31, 1994 and for which construction commences no later

than December 31, 1999. See Solar, Wind, Waste, and Geothermal

Power Production Incentives Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-575,

104 Stat. 2834 (1990), amended, Pub. L. No. 102-46, 105 Stat.

249 (1991).

App. 71

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

time, power marketers arose. These entities -- owning no

transmission or generation -- buy and sell power.”

There were two major impediments to the development

of IPPs and APPs. First, the ownership restrictions of the

Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA)”® severely

inhibited these new entities from entering the generation

business.“* Second, these entities needed transmission service

in order to compete in electricity markets.

While the Commission had no authority to remove

PUHCA restrictions,* it encouraged the development of IPPs

and APPs, as well as emerging power marketers, by

authorizing market-based rates for their power sales on a case-

by-case basis and by encouraging more widely available

transmission access. From 1989 through 1993, facilities

owned by IPPs and other non-traditional generators (other

“The first power marketer in the electric industry was

Citizens Energy Corporation. See Citizens Energy Corporation, 35

FERC 461,198 (1986). Power marketers take title to electric

energy. Power brokers, on the other hand, do not take title and are

limited to a matchmaking role.

15 U.S.C. §79 et seq.

“As discussed infra, Congress eventually provided a means

to avoid the PUHCA restrictions by creating exempt wholesale

generators (EWGs) in the Energy Policy Act.

““The industry was successful to some extent in developing

ownership structures that permitted such investment. See, e.g.,

Commonwealth Atlantic Limited Partnership, 51 FERC 461 ,368 at

p. 62,240 and n.20 (1990).

App. 72

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

than QFs) increased from 249 to 634 and their installed

Capacity increased from 9,216 megawatts to 13,004

megawatts.“ Indeed, "[{iJn 1992, for the first time, generating

capacity added by independent producers exceeded capacity

added by utilities. "*’

Market-based rates helped to develop competitive bulk

power markets. A generating utility allowed to sell its power

at market-based rates could move more quickly to take

advantage of short-term or even long-term market

opportunities than those laboring under traditional cost-of-

service tariffs, which entail procedural delays in achieving

tariff approvals and changes.

In approving these market-based rates, the

Commission required, inter alia, that the seller and any of its

affiliates lack market power or mitigate any market power that

they may have possessed.” The major concern of the

Commission was whether the seller or its affiliates could limit

competition and thereby drive up prices. A key inquiry

“Energy Information Administration, Electric Power

Annual 1993 (December 1994) 124 (Table 77).

“Black & Pierce, supra at p. 1349 n.25.

"See, e.g., Ocean State Power, 44 FERC 461,261 (1988);

Commonwealth Atlantic Limited Partnership, 51 FERC 461,368

(1990); Citizens Power & Light Company, 48 FERC 461,210

(1989); Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc., 42 FERC 461,012

(1988); Doswell Limited Partnership, 50 FERC 461,251 (1990)

(Doswell); and Dartmouth Power Associates Limited Partnership,

53 FERC 461,117 (1990).

App. 73

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

became whether the seller or its affiliates owned or controlled

transmission facilities in the relevant service area and

therefore, by denying access or imposing discriminatory terms

or conditions on transmission service, could foreclose other

generators from competing.” As we have previously

explained:

The most likely route to market power in today's

electric utility industry lies through ownership or control of

transmission facilities. Usually, the source of market power

is dominant or exclusive ownership of the facilities. However,

market power also may be gained without ownership.

Contracts can confer the same rights of control. Entities with

“contractual control over transmission facilities can withhold

supply and extract monopoly prices just as effectively as those

who control facilities through ownership.”

As entry into wholesale power generation markets

increased, the ability of customers to gain access to the

transmission services necessary to reach competing [31,644]

“See, e.g., Doswell, 50 FERC at p. 61,757.

Citizens Power & Light Corporation, 48 FERC 461,210

at p. 61,777 (1989) (emphasis in original); see also Utah Power &

Light Company, PacifiCorp and PC/UP&L Merging Corporation,

45 FERC 461,095 at pp. 61,287-89 (1988), order on reh'g, 47

FERC 461,209, order on reh'g, 48 FERC 461,035 (1989),

remanded in part sub nom. Environmental Action, Inc. v. FERC,

939 F.2d 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1991), order on remand, 57 FERC

461,363 (1991).

App. 74

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

Suppliers became increasingly important.*' In addition,

beginning in the late 1980s, in order to mitigate their market

power to meet Commission conditions, public utilities seeking

Commission approval of mergers or consolidations under

section 203 of the FPA or Commission authorization for

blanket approval of market-based rates for generation services

under section 205 of the FPA, filed "open access"

transmission tariffs of general applicability. The

*'In earlier years, a few customers were able to obtain

access as a result of litigation, beginning with the Supreme Court's

decision in Otter Tail Power Company v. United States, 410 U.S.

366 (1973). Additionally, some customers gained access by virtue

of Nuclear Regulatory Commission license conditions and

voluntary preference power transmission arrangements associated

with federal power marketing agencies. See, e.g., Consumers

Power Company, 6 NRC 887, 1036-44 (1977) and The Toledo

Edison Company and Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, 10

NRC 265, 327-34 (1979). See Florida Municipal Power Agency v.

Florida Power and Light Company, 839 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Fla.

1993). See also Electricity Transmission: Realities, Theory and

Policy Alternatives, The Transmission Task Force Report to the

Commission, October 1989, 197.

"See, e.g., Public Service Company of Colorado, 59 FERC

461,311 (1992), reh'g denied, 62 FERC 461,013 (1993); Utah

Power & Light Company, et al., Opinion No. 318, 45 FERC

461,095 (1988), order on reh ‘g, Opinion No. 318-A, 47 FERC

{61,209 (1989), order on reh'g, Opinion No. 318-B, 48 FERC

461,035 (1989), aff'd in relevant part sub nom. Environmental

Action Inc. v. FERC, 939 F.2d 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Northeast

Utilities Service Company (Public Service Company of New

Hampshire), Opinion No. 364-A, 58 FERC 461,070, reh'g denied,

Opinion No. 364-B, 59 FERC 461,042, order granting motion to

App. 75

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

Commission applied its market rate analysis to IOUs, as well

as IPPs, APPs, and marketers, and allowed IOUs to sell at

market-based rates only if they opened their transmission

systems to competitors.’ The Commission also approved

proposed mergers on the condition that the merging

companies remedy anticompetitive effects potentially caused

by the merger by filing "open access" tariffs. These early

"open access" tariffs required only that the companies provide

point-to-point transmission services, which is a much

narrower requirement than that being imposed in this Rule

and did not require transmission owners to provide to others

the same quality of service that they themselves enjoyed.

Following PURPA, the economic and technological

changes in the transmission and generation sectors helped give

impetus to the many new entrants in the generating markets

who could sell electric energy profitably with smaller scale

technology at a lower price than many utilities selling from

their existing generation facilities at rates reflecting cost.

However, it became increasingly clear that the potential

consumer benefits that could be derived from these

technological advances could be realized only if more efficient

generating plants could obtain access to the regional

transmission grids. Because many traditional vertically

vacate and dismissing request for rehearing, 59 FERC 461,089

(1992), affirmed in relevant part sub nom. Northeast Utilities

Service Company v. FERC, 993 F.2d 937 (Ast Cir. 1993).

3See, e.g., Public Service of Indiana, Inc., 51 FERC

461,367 (1990), reh’g denied, 52 FERC 461,260 (1990), appeal

dismissed sub nom. Northern Indiana Public Service Company v.

FERC, 954 F.2d 736 (D.C.Cir. 1992).

App. 76 :

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

integrated utilities still did not provide open access to third

parties and still favored their own generation if and when they

provided transmission access to third parties, barriers

continued to exist to cheaper, more efficient generation

sources.

D. The Energy Policy Act

In response to the competitive developments following

PURPA, and the fact that PUHCA and lack of transmission

access remained major barriers to new generators, Congress

enacted Title VII of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (Energy

Policy Act).* A goal of the Energy Policy Act was to

promote greater competition in bulk power markets by

encouraging new generation entrants, known as exempt

wholesale generators (EWGs), and [31,645] by expanding the

Commission's authority under sections 211 and 212 of the

FPA to approve applications for transmission services .~

An EWG is defined as

“Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992), codified at,

among other places, 15 U.S.C. §79z-5a and 16 U.S.C. §796(22-

25), 824j-1.

**See El Paso Electric Company and Central and South

West Services Inc., 68 FERC 461,181 at p. 61,914 (1994) (CSW);

see also Paul Kemezis, FERC's Competitive Muscle: The

Comparability Standard, Electrical World 45 (Jan. 1995) ("In

EPAct, Congress made it clear that the electric-power industry was

to move toward a fully competitive market system, but left most of

the implementation to FERC.").

App. 77

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

Any person determined by the Federal Energy

Regulatory Commission to be engaged directly, or indirectly

through one or more affiliates as defined in [PUHCA] section

2(a)(11)(B), and exclusively in the business of owning or

operating, or both owning and operating, all or part of one or

more eligible facilities and selling electric energy at

wholesale.

If the Commission, upon an application, determines

that a person is an EWG, that person will be exempt from

PUHCA.” This provision removed a significant impediment

to the development of IPPs and APPs by allowing them to

develop projects as EWGs free from the strictures of PUHCA

or the QF PURPA limitations.

While sections 211 and 212, as enacted by PURPA,

were intended to provide greater access to the transmission

grid, the limitations placed on these sections made them

unusable in virtually all circumstances.** However, as

amended by the Energy Policy Act, these sections now give

the Commission broader authority to order transmitting

utilities to provide wholesale transmission services, upon

application, to any electric utility, Federal power marketing

agency, or any other person generating electric energy for

sale for resale.

4615 U.S.C. §792z-5Sa.

5715 U.S.C. §79z-Sa(e).

**See supra note 36.

App. 78

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

The Energy Policy Act also added section 213 to the

FPA. Section 213(a) requires a transmitting utility that does

not agree to provide wholesale transmission service in

accordance with a good faith request to provide a written

explanation of its proposed rates, terms, and conditions and

its analysis of any physical or other constraints.’ Section

213(b) required the Commission to enact a rule requiring

transmitting utilities to submit annual information concerning

potentially available transmission capacity and known

constraints.”

E. The Present Competitive Environment

Following the Energy Policy Act, the Commission

established rules: (1) for certain generators to obtain EWG

See Policy Statement Regarding Good Faith Requests for

Transmission Services and Responses by Transmitting Utilities

Under Sections 211(a) and 213(a) of the Federal Power Act, as

Amended and Added by the Energy Policy Act of 1992, 58 FR

38964 (July 21, 1993), FERC Statutes and Regulations 430,975

(1993) (Policy Statement Regarding Good Faith Requests for

Transmission Services).

“See New Reporting Requirements Implementing Section

213(b) of the Federal Power Act and Supporting Expanded

Regulatory Responsibilities Under the Energy Policy Act of 1992,

and Conforming and Other Changes to Form No. FERC-714, 58

FR 52420 (October 8, 1993), FERC Statutes and Regulations

430,980 (Order No. 558), reh 'g denied, Order No. 558-A, 65

FERC 461,324 (1993), regulations modified, 59 FR 15333 (April

1, 1994) FERC Statutes and Regulations 30,993.

App. 79

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

status and thus an exemption from PUHCA;” and (2) that

required transmission information availability. The

Commission also pursued a number of initiatives aimed at

fostering the development of more competitive bulk power

markets, including aggressive implementation of section 211,

a new look at undue discrimination under the FPA, easing of

market entry for sellers of generation from new facilities, and

initiation of a number of industry-wide reforms. As stated by

the Commission, in recognition of the Congressional goal in

[31,646] the Energy Policy Act of creating competitive bulk

power markets:

Our goal is to facilitate the development of competitively

priced generation supply options, and to ensure that wholesale

purchasers of electric energy can reach alternative power

suppliers and vice versa.”

6! See Order No. 550, Filing Requirements and Ministerial

Procedures for Persons Seeking Exempt Wholesale Generator

Status, 58 FR 8897 (February 18, 1993), FERC Statute and

Regulations 430,964, order on reh’g, Order No. 550-A, 58 FR

21250 (April 20, 1993), FERC Statutes and Regulations 430,969

(1993). As recognized by Congress and the Commission,

availability of transmission information is critival in developing

competitive markets. See supra notes 59 and 60. This opened the

“black box" of information that previously was available only to

transmission Owners.

®2See Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and

Transmitting Utilities, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 59 FR

35274 (July 11, 1994), FERC Statutes and Regulations 432,507 at

p. 32,866 (Stranded Cost NOPR); American Electric Power Service

Corporation, 67 FERC 461,168, clarified, 67 FERC 461,317

(1994).

App. 80

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

1. Use of Sections 211 and 212 to Obtain Transmission

Access

The Commission has aggressively implemented

sections 211 and 212 of the FPA, as amended by the Energy

Policy Act, in order to promote competitive markets.°? When

wheeling requests under sections 211 and 212 have been

made, the Commission has required wheeling in almost all of

the requests it has processed. To date, the Commission has

issued orders (proposed or final) requiring wheeling in 12 of

the 14 cases it has acted on.™

As a general matter, section 211 has permitted some

inroads to be made by customers in obtaining transmission

service from public utilities that historically have declined to

provide access to their systems, or have offered service only

on a discriminatory basis. Under section 211, the Commission

has granted requests for the broader type of service that most

utilities historically have refused to provide -- network

service. Although transmission owners have provided limited

amounts of unbundled point-to-point transmission service,

third- party customers have not been able to obtain the

flexibility of service that transmission owners enjoy.

*°16 U.S.C.A. §§824j-824k (West 1985 and Supp. 1994).

"See, e.g., final orders issued in City of Bedford, 68 FERC

{61,003 (1994), reh'g denied, 73 FERC 461,322 (1995); Florida

Municipal Power Agency v. Florida Power & Light Company, 67

FERC 461,167 (1994), order on reh 'g, 74 FERC 461,006 (1996):

Minnesota Municipal Power Agency, 68 FERC 461,060 (1994):

and Tex-La Electric Cooperative of Texas, 69 FERC 461,269

(1994); see also Appendix A.

App. 81

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

In Florida Municipal, a section 211 case, the

Commission ordered "network," rather than the narrower

"point-to-point, " service.” Network service permits the

applicant to fully integrate load and resources on an

instantaneous basis in a manner similar to the transmission

owner's integration of its own load and resources. At the

same time, the Commission made the generic finding that the

availability of transmission service will enhance competition

in the market for power supplies and lead to lower costs for

consumers. The Commission explained that as long as the

transmitting utility is fully and fairly compensated and there

is no unreasonable impairment of reliability, transmission

service is in the public interest.”

As discussed infra, based on the mounting competitive

pressures in the industry and rapidly evolving markets, we

°5 See Florida Municipal Power Agency v. Florida Power &

Light Company, 65 FERC 461,125, reh'g dismissed, 65 FERC

461,372 (1993), final order, 67 FERC 461,167 (1994), order on

reh'g, 74 FERC 461,006 (1996). The Commission has

"characterized point-to-point service as involving designated points

of entry into and exit from the transmitting utility's system, with a

designated amount of transfer capability at each point." El Paso

Electric Company v. Southwestern Public Service Company, 68

FERC 461,182 at p. 61,926 n.9 (1994) (citing Entergy Services,

Inc., 58 FERC 461,234 at p. 61,768 (1993), reh'g dismissed, 68

FERC 461,399 (1994)). Network service allows more flexibility by

allowing a transmission customer to use the entire transmission

network to provide generation service for specified resources and

specified loads without having to pay multiple charges for each

resource-load pairing.

% Florida Municipal, 67 FERC at p. 61,477.

App. 82

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FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

have concluded that section 211 alone is not enough to

eliminate undue discrimination. The comments received on

the proposed rules, discussed in detail infra, confirm this

conclusion. The significant time delays involved in filing an

individual service request for bilateral service under section

211 place the customer at a severe disadvantage compared to

the transmission owner and can result in discriminatory

treatment in the use of the transmission system. It is an

inadequate procedural substitute for readily available service

under a filed non-discriminatory open access tariff. As the

Commission noted in Hermiston Generating Company,

[31,647] "[t}he ability to spend time and resources litigating

the rates, terms and conditions of transmission access is not

equivalent to an enforceable voluntary offer to provide

comparable service under known rates, terms and

conditions. "°

2. Commission's Comparability Standard

In the Spring of 1994, the Commission began to

address the problem of the disparity in transmission service

that utilities provided to third parties in comparison to their

own uses of the transmission system. In the seminal case in

this area, American Electric Power Service Corporation

(AEP), the company voluntarily proposed a tariff of general

applicability that would offer firm, point-to-point transmission

*769 FERC 461,035 at p. 61,165 (1994), reh'g denied, 72

FERC 461,071 (1995); see also Southwest Regional Transmission

Association, 69 FERC 461,100 at p. 61,398 (1994), order on

compliance filing, 73 FERC 461,147 (1995) (SWRTA).

App. 83

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

service for a minimum of one month.” The Commission

accepted the proposed transmission tariff for filing and

suspended its effectiveness for one day, subject to refund.”

Rehearing requests challenged the Commission's summary

approval of the restriction of service to point-to-point as being

discriminatory and anticompetitive.” The rehearing requests

argued that the tariff should be expanded to include network

services such as those used by the transmission owner. On

rehearing, the Commission announced a new standard for

evaluating claims of undue discrimination.

The Commission found that a voluntarily offered, new

open access transmission tariff that did not provide for

services comparable to those that the transmission Owner

provided itself was unduly discriminatory and

anticompetitive.’ In reaching that conclusion, the

864 FERC 61,279 (1993), reh'g granted, 67 FERC

461,168, clarified, 67 FERC 461,317 (1994).

“The Commission explained that AEP could limit the

service it was offering because it was “providing the service

voluntarily under a tariff of general applicability." 64 FERC at p.

62,978.

AEP, 67 FERC at p. 61,489.

”!With respect to anticompetitive effects, the Commission

explained that it has "adhered to the Supreme Court's determination

that the Commission's ‘important and broad regulatory power * *

* carries with it the responsibility to consider, in appropriate

circumstances, the anticompetitive effects of regulated aspects of

interstate utility operations pursuant to sections 202 and 203, and

under like directives contained in sections 205, 206 and 207.' Gulf

App. 84

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

Commission broadened its undue discrimination analysis

(which traditionally had focused on the rates. terms, and

conditions faced by similarly situated third- party customers)

to include a focus on the rates, terms, and conditions of a

utility's own uses of the transmission system:

(A)n open access tariff that is not unduly

discriminatory or anticompetitive should offer third parties

access on the same or comparable basis, and under the same

or comparable terms and conditions, as the transmission

provider's uses of its system.”

Refocusing the analysis was necessitated by the

changing conditions in the electric utility industry, including

the emergence of non-traditional Suppliers and greater

competition in bulk power markets. Because a transmission

provider may use its system in different ways (e€.g., to

integrate load and resources when serving retail native load,

to make off-system sales or purchases, or to serve wholesale

requirements customers), the Commission set for hearing the

factual issues associated with identifying those uses, as well

as any potential impediments or consequences to providing

comparable services to third parties.”

States Utilities Company v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747, 758-59 (1972)."

Id. at p. 61,490 (footmote omitted). The Commission reaffirmed

that it would examine how best to fulfill this responsibility, as well

as its responsibility to prevent undue discrimination, in light of the

changing conditions in the electric utility industry. /d.

"Id. at p. 61,490.

"Id. at pp. 61,490-91.

App. 85

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

After AEP, the Commission applied this comparability

standard to a proposed open access transmission tariff that

was filed by Kansas City Power & Light Company (KCP&L)

in support of a proposal to sell generation at market-based

rates." The Commission explained that, in light of AEP, the

utility's proposed open access transmission tariff (which

provided only [31,648] for point-to-point service) did not

adequately mitigate its transmission market power so as to

justify allowing the requested market-based rates. KCP&L

could charge market-based rates for sales only if it modified

its proposed transmission tariff to reflect the AEP

comparability standard.

Since then, the Commission has required comparable

service in a variety of contexts, and has set for hearing the

factual issues associated with comparable service. For

example, the Commission found that market power can be

adequately mitigated only if a merged company offers

transmission services in accordance with the AEP

comparability standard.”* The Commission further held that,

even if a merger does not result in an increase in market

power, the merger would not be consistent with the public

interest under section 203 of the FPA unless the merged

company offers comparable transmission services, as defined

in AEP.” The Commission therefore announced a

transmission comparability requirement for all new mergers:

“See Kansas City Power & Light Company, 67 FERC

461,183 (1994), reh'g pending.

SE. g., CSW, supra, 68 FERC at p. 61,914.

"ld.

App. 86

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

Given the transition of the electric utility industry as

a whole, we conclude that, absent other compelling public

interest considerations, coordination in the public interest can

best be secured only if merging utilities offer comparable

transmission services.”

In Heartland Energy Services, Inc. ,”* the Commission

applied its comparability standard to an affiliated electric

power marketer seeking blanket authorization to sell

electricity at market-based rates. The Commission explained

that

For all future cases involving blanket approval of

market-based rates an offer of comparable transmission

services will be required before the Commission will be able

to find that transmission market power has been adequately

mitigated. In the context of an affiliated power marketer, this

means that all of its affiliated utilities must have a comparable

transmission tariff on file.”

“Id. at p. 61,915 (footnote omitted).

68 FERC 461,223 (1994).

“Id. at p. 62,060. IW InterCoast Power Marketing

Company, 68 FERC 461,248, clarified, 68 FERC 461,324 (1994),

the Commission rejected an affiliated marketer's proposal to sell at

market rates without its affiliate utility offering comparable

transmission services. The Commission stated that the only way to

ensure that InterCoast does not have transmission market power is

to require its affiliated public utility to offer comparable

transmission services. See also LG&E Power Marketing Inc , 68

FERC 461,247 at pp. 62,120-21 (1994). The Commission added

App. 87

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

The Commission also denied a request by a company

affiliated with a transmission-owning utility seeking

permission to sell power at market-based rates to a particular

customer. The denial was without prejudice to refiling such a

request in a new section 205 proceeding, but only after the

affiliated transmission-owning utility filed a comparable

transmission service tariff.“ The Commission added that it

Will require comparability in any situation in which a

seller seeking market-based rates is affiliated with an owner

or controller of transmission facilities.”

The Commission has also stated that “it will

henceforth apply the transmission comparability standard

announced in the AEP case to all transmitting utility members

of an RTG."”

that this is consistent with encouraging competitive bulk power

markets as envisioned by the Energy Policy Act of 1992. /d. at

p. 62,132.

% Soe Hermiston Generating Company, 69 FERC 461,035

at p. 61,164 (1994), reh'g pending. The Commission subsequently

accepted the rates on a cost basis. See Letter Order dated

November 10, 1994.

S\/d. at p. 61,165.

82 Soe SWRTA, 69 FERC at p. 61,397; see also PacifiCorp,

the California Municipal Utilities Association, and the Independent

Energy Producers (on behalf of Western Regional Transmission

Association), 69 FERC 461,099, order on reh'g, 69 FERC 461,352

(1994), order on compliance filing, 71 FERC 461,158 (1995)

(WRTA). An RTG is a regional transmission group. It is defined as

App. 88

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

[31,649]

The Commission further declared that comparable

services must be provided through "open access” tariffs rather

than only on a contract-by-contract basis:

(T)ariffs are essential to the provision of comparable

services. Tariffs set out the services that are available and the

terms and conditions under which those services will be made

available * * *. (In contrast), a negotiation process creates

uncertainty- and imposes on customers delay and other

transaction costs that the transmitting utility members of an

RTG do not incur when using the transmission for their own

benefit. Moreover, the ability to execute separate transmission

agreements with different but similarly situated customers is

the ability to unduly discriminate among them. A tariff

ensures against such discrimination in the RTG.®

Thus, the Commission required the RTGs to amend

their bylaws to commit all transmitting utility members to

offer comparable transmission services to other RTG

members pursuant to a transmission tariff or tariffs.

As discussed below, since the AEP comparability

standard was announced, the Commission has set for hearing

“a voluntary organization of transmission owners, transmission

users, and other entities interested in coordinating transmission

planning (and expansion), operation and use on a regional (and

inter- regional.” Policy Statement Regarding Regional Transmission

Groups, 58 FR 41626 (August 5, 1993), FERC Statutes and

Regulations 30,976, at p. 30,870 n.4 (RTG Policy Statement).

Cie

"SWRTA, 69 FERC at p. 61,398.

App. 89

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

44 open access tariffs to determine what constitutes

comparable service. This number includes tariffs filed

subsequent to the Open Access NOPR. All tariffs have now

been made subject to the outcome of the Final Rule.

3. Lack of Market Power in New Generation

In 1994 in the KCP&L case, discussed in the prior

section, the Commission continued to recognize that

transmission remains a natural monopoly. However, it found

that, in light of the industry and statutory changes that now

allow ease of market entry, no wholesale seller of generation

has market power in generation from new facilities.” In

particular, the Commission explained that it had previously

noted in Entergy Services, Inc. that

There was significant evidence that non-traditional

power project developers, including qualifying facilities and

independent power projects, are becoming viable competitors

in long-run markets.”

The Commission further explained that since Entergy,

Congress had enacted the Energy Policy Act, which had

lowered barriers to the entry of new suppliers by creating a

new class of power suppliers -- EWGs -- that are exempt from

“KX CP&L, 67 FERC 461,183 (1994).

Sid. at p. 61,557 (citing Entergy Services, Inc., 58 FERC

461,234 at p. 61,756 and nn.63 and 65 (Entergy)).

App. 90

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FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

the provisions of PUHCA.™ The Commission concluded that,

in considering market-based rate proposals for generation

sales, it need only focus on market power in transmission,

generation market power in short-run markets, and other

barriers to entry.”’

4. Further Commission Action Addressing a More

Competitive Electric Industry

To address the fact that the electric industry is

becoming more competitive, and to remove barriers that

might inhibit a more competitive industry, the Commission

has initiated a number of proceedings: (1) Stranded Cost

NOPR,™ (2) Transmission Pricing Policy Statement,” (3)

Pooling Notice of Inquiry ,” (4) Regional Transmission Group

“Id. The Commission added that “after examining

generation dominance in many different cases over the years, we

have yet to find an instance of generation dominance in long-run

bulk power markets.” /d.

"Id.

"FERC Statutes and Regulations 432,507 (1994).

"Inquiry Concerning the Commission's Pricing Policy for

Transmission Services Provided by Public Utilities Under the

Federal Power Act, 59 FR 55031 (November 3, 1994), FERC

Statutes and Regulations 431,005 (Transmission Pricing Policy

Statement).

Inquiry Concerning Alternative Power Pooling Institutions

Under the Federal Power Act, 59 FR 54851 (October 26, 1994),

FERC Statutes and Regulations 435,529 (1995) (Pooling Notice of

App. 91

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

(RTG) Policy Statement,”' and (5) Notice of Inquiry on

Merger Policy.”

In the Stranded Cost NOPR the Commission

recognized that the trend toward greater transmission access

and the transition [31,650] to a fully competitive bulk power

market could cause some utilities to incur stranded costs as

wholesale requirements customers (or retail customers) use

their supplier's transmission to purchase power elsewhere. As

the Commission noted, a utility may have built facilities or

entered into long-term fuel or purchased power supply

contracts with the reasonable expectation that its customers

would renew their contracts and would pay their share of

long-term investments and other incurred costs. If the

customer obtains another power supplier, the utility may have

stranded costs. If the utility cannot locate an alternative buyer

or somehow mitigate the stranded costs, the Commission

explained that "the costs must be recovered from either the

departing customer or the remaining customers or borne by

the utility's shareholders."”’ Accordingly, the Commission

proposed to establish provisions concerning the recovery of

wholesale and retail stranded costs by public utilities and

transmitting utilities.

Inquiry).

FERC Statutes and Regulations 430,976 (RTG Policy

Statement).

“FERC Statutes and Regulations 35,531 (1996).

3 FERC Statutes and Regulations {32,507 at p. 32,864.

App. 92

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

In the Transmission Pricing Policy Statement, the

Commission announced a new policy providing greater

flexibility in the pricing of transmission services provided by

public utilities and transmitting utilities. The Commission

traditionally had allowed only postage-stamp, contract-path

pricing.” Under the new policy, we will permit a variety of

proposals, including distance sensitive and flow-based pricing,

which may be more suitable for competitive wholesale power

markets.” The Commission explained that this "(g)reater

pricing flexibility is appropriate in light of the significant

competitive changes occurring in wholesale generation

markets, and in light of our expanded wheeling authority

**Most transmission contracts set a single price for energy

flow over a utility's transmission system. This single- price policy

is called "postage stamp" pricing because the rate does not depend

on how far the power moves within a company's transmission

system. If power flows through several companies, traditional

industry practice is to specify that power flows along a “contract

path" consisting of the transmission-owning utilities between the

ultimate receipt and delivery points. See Indiana Michigan Power

Company, 64 FERC 461,184 at p. 62,545 (1993).

**Unlike with postage stamp pricing, with distance-sensitive

pricing the cost of moving power through a company depends on

how far the power moves within the company. In contrast to

contract path pricing, flow-based pricing establishes a price based

on the costs of the various parallel paths actually used when the

power flows. Because flow-based pricing can account for all

parallel paths used by the transaction, all transmission owners with

facilities on any of the parallel paths could be compensated for the

transaction.

App. 93

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

under the Energy Policy Act of 1992." However, the

Commission explained that any new transmission pricing

proposal must meet the Commission's AEP comparability

standard. The Commission further explained that

comparability of service applies to price as well as to terms

and conditions.”

The Commission issued the Pooling Notice of Inquiry

to receive comments on traditional power pools and on

alternative power pooling institutions that are being explored

in today's more competitive environment. The Commission

expressed concern that

(G)iven the ongoing changes in the competitive

environment of the electric utility industry -- in particular, the

potential for substantially increased access to transmission --

we must consider whether we are appropriately balancing our

dual objectives of promoting coordination and competition.”

Accordingly, the Commission explained that it wished

to look at alternative power pooling institutions and to re-

examine the role of more traditional power pools in today's

environment of increased competition. In particular the

Commission expressed its intent to ensure that its policies "are

%*FERC Statutes and Regulations 431,005 at p. 31,136.

Id. at p. 31,142.

% FERC Statutes and Regulations 435,529 at p. 35,715.

App. 94

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

consistent with the development of a competitive bulk power

market."”

In the RTG Policy Statement, the Commission

announced a policy encouraging the development of RTGs.

The Commission explained that a primary purpose of RTGs

is to facilitate transmission access for potential users and

voluntarily resolve [31,651] disputes over such service. The

Commission has approved the formation of three RTGs.'”

One of the conditions is that each RTG member must offer

comparable transmission services by tariff to other RTG

members.

In the merger NOI, the Commission indicated that it

will review whether its criteria and policy for evaluating

mergers need to be modified in light of the changing

circumstances occurring in the electric industry. In addition

to the Commission's actions, a number of states have initiated

proceedings concerning retail wheeling or proposed legislation

for retail wheeling, that is, for ultimate consumers to choose

their supplier of power, or other restructuring proposals. '”!

Id. at p. 35,714. As explained below, the Commission

held technical conferences on issues surrounding power pools and

competition.

See WRTA and SWRTA, supra, and Northwest Regional

Transmission Association, 71 FERC 461,397 (1995).

"At least 12 states have retail wheeling proposals,

legislation, or pilot programs underway -- Alabama, California,

Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire,

New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin. At least

App. 95

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

5. Events Since Issuance of Open Access NOPR

Since issuance of the Open Access NOPR, public

utilities have filed, in some form or another, 47 open access

tariffs. In acting on those filings, the Commission has made

all of the non- rate terms and conditions of those proposed

tariffs subject to the outcome of this Final Rule. =

Over the last year, the Commission also has received

and analyzed more than 20,000 pages of comments that were

received from over 400 commenters, as well as additional

information provided by industry participants at a number of

Commission-initiated technical conferences.'”’ Those technical

14 other states are investigating retail wheeling. Currently,

according to a report of the NARUC-affiliated National Council on

competition and the Electric Industry, 41 States are actively

involved in investigating whether and how to restructure their

respective electric power markets. Of this total, 29 State regulatory

authorities * * * have initiated investigations. In addition, five State

legislatures are involved in similar investigations, while seven other

States have joint regulatory/legislative proceedings underway.

Testimony of the Honorable Cheryl L. Parrino, Chair of

the Wisconsin Public Service Commission, on behalf of the

National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, before

the United States Senate Committee on Energy and Natural

Resources (March 6, 1996).

102 See American Electric Power Service Corporation, etal.,

72 FERC 461,287 at p. 61,238 (1995).

1034 tached to this Final Rule as Appendix B is a list of

commenters and the abbreviations used to designate them, including

App. 96

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

conferences addressed several issues -- ancillary services, pro

forma tariffs, power pools, and ISOs -- and provided

significant input to the Commission's formulation of this Final

Rule.

F. Need for Reform

The many changes discussed above have converged to

create a situation in which new generating capacity can be

built and operated at prices substantially lower than many

utilities’ embedded costs of generation. As discussed above,

new generation facilities can produce power on the grid at a

cost of less than 3 cents per kWh to 5 cents per kWh, yet the

costs for large plants constructed and installed over the last

decade were typically in the range of 4 to 7 cents per kWh for

coal plants and 9 to 15 cents for nuclear plants.

Non-traditional generators are taking advantage of this

Opportunity to compete. Indeed, the non-traditional

generators’ share of total U.S. electricity generation increased

from 4 percent in 1985 to 10 percent in 1993.'* Much of this

increased share of generation is the result of competitive

bidding for new generation resources that has occurred in 37

states. Since 1984, almost 4,000 projects, representing over

400,000 MW, have been offered in response to requests. Over

350 projects have been selected to supply 20,000 MW, and,

those commenters that filed late.

‘Energy Information Administration, Performance Issues

for a Changing Electric Power Industry (January 1995) 10 and

(Figure 5).

App. 97

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

of these, 126 are now online producing almost 7,800 MW of

power. '®°

In addition, the cost of utility-generated electricity

differs widely across the major regions of the United States.

Average utility rates range from 3 to 5 cents in the Northwest

to 9 to 11 cents in California. [31,652] Electricity consumers

are demanding access to lower cost supplies available in other

regions of the United States, and access to the newer, lower

cost generation resources. Therefore, it is important that the

non-traditional generators of cheaper power be able to gain

access to the transmission grid on a non-discriminatory open

access basis. |

The Commission's goal is to ensure that customers

have the benefits of competitively priced generation.

However, we must do so without abandoning our traditional

obligation to ensure that utilities have a fair opportunity to

recover prudently incurred costs and that they maintain power

supply reliability. As well, the benefits of competition should

not come at the expense of other customers. The Commission

believes that requiring utilities to provide non-discriminatory

open access transmission tariffs, while simultaneously

resolving the extremely difficult issue of recovery of

transition costs (discussed infra), is the key to reconciling

these competing demands.

Non-discriminatory open access to transmission

services is critical to the full development of competitive

'65Current Competition, November 1994, Vol. 5, No. 8, at

p. 8.

App. 98

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

wholesale generation markets and the lower consumer prices

achievable through such competition. '® Transmitting utilities

own the transportation system over which bulk power

competition occurs and transmission service continues to be

a natural monopoly. Denials of access (whether they are

blatant or subtle), and the potential for future denials of

access, require the Commission to revisit and reform its

regulation of transmission in interstate commerce. As

discussed in detail in Section IV .B., such action is required by

the FPA's mandate that the Commission remedy undue

discrimination.

Since the time the NOPR issued, the Commission staff

has completed an FEIS that provides a quantitative estimate of

some of the cost savings expected from this Rule:

approximately $3.8 to $5.4 billion per year. Other non-

quantifiable benefits are also expected from this Rule and

include: (1) better use of existing assets and institutions; (2)

new market mechanisms; (3) technical innovation; and (4) less

rate distortion. These potential benefits to the Nation's

electricity consumers and the economy as a whole confirm the

need to take generic action to remove barriers to competition.

In what follows, we set out the changes necessary to remedy

undue discrimination and to ensure a fair transition to a more

competitive regulatory regime.

“As discussed above, a significant number of public

utilities still do not have any form of an “open access” tariff on file

with the Commission and no public utility has on file a non-

discriminatory open access tariff as defined by this Rule.

App. 99

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

IV. Discussion

A. Scope of the Rule

1. Introduction

The Commission has determined that non-

discriminatory open access transmission services (including

access to transmission information) and stranded cost recovery

are the most critical components of a successful transition to

competitive wholesale electricity markets. These issues are the

focal point of this Rule, the accompanying rule on open access

same-time information systems, and the accompanying

proposed rule on capacity reservation tariffs.

In undertaking these initiatives, however, we are

mindful that they are part of a broader picture of evolving

issues affecting the electric industry and that other

Commission policies will play an important role in ensuring

the full development of competitive markets. Among the many

issues that are important to competitive bulk power markets

are: independent system operators (ISOs); regiona’

transmission groups; generation market power; utility merger

policy; and the development of innovative transmission

pricing alternatives, such as flow-based, distance-sensitive

transmission pricing methodologies that reflect incremental

costs. In particular, we believe that ISOs have great potential

to assist us and the industry to help provide regional

efficiencies, to facilitate economically efficient pricing, and,

especially in the context of power pools, to remedy undue

discrimination and mitigate market power. Although we

discuss some of these issues in this Rule, we will further

App. 100

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

develop our policies in other proceedings as well to

accommodate and encourage more efficient market structures.

[31,653]

We now address the comments received on the scope

of the proposed rulemaking.

2. Functional Unbundling

In the NOPR, the Commission preliminarily found that

functional unbundling of wholesale generation and

transmission services is necessary to implement non-

discriminatory open access transmission.” At the same time,

the Commission explained that the proposed rule would

accommodate, but not require, corporate unbundling (which

could include selling generation or transmission assets to a

non-affiliate (divestiture) or the less aggressive step of

establishing separate corporate affiliates to manage a utility's

transmission and generation assets). However, we invited

comments on functional unbundling and asked whether it is a

strong enough measure to ensure non-discriminatory open

access transmission without some form of corporate

restructuring.

Comments

Commenters take both sides on whether functional

unbundling is sufficient to assure non-discriminatory open

access transmission or whether a stronger measure, such as

"FERC Statutes and Regulations 432,514, at p. 33,080.

App. 101

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

corporate unbundling, is needed. Supporting functional

unbundling

Various commenters, including utilities and state

commissions, generally support functional unbundling as

sufficient to assure non-discriminatory open access

transmission and oppose requiring corporate unbundling or

divestiture." Several commenters state that functional

unbundling will remedy discrimination without creating the

inefficiencies and additional costs that corporate restructuring

would create. '”

A number of other commenters argue that the

Commission has no authority under the FPA to require

divestiture of transmission assets.'"° Several of these

commenters assert that, even if the Commission has the

authority, the electric industry, unlike the natural gas

industry, is not ready for mandated corporate unbundling

because electric utilities still serve a high percentage of retail

customers and own large amounts of the generating capacity.

SF 2., Ohio Edison, UtiliCorp, Pennsylvania P&L,

Atlantic City, Montana Power, IL Com, Seattle, OK Com, TX

Industrials, MidAmerican, Southwestern, Southern, DOD, Public

Service Co of CO, SC Public Service Authority, Florida Power

Corp, DOE, WP&L, Com Ed, SBA, Consumers Power, CA Com,

- UT Com, Houston L&P, KCPL, EEI.

‘°F 2., Florida Power Corp, El Paso, PSNM, and SC

Public Service Authority.

‘OF g., Southwestern, PECO, El Paso, Florida Power

Corp, NSP, Public Service E&G, MidAmerican.

App. 102

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

They assert that transmission system operation requires the

operator to have control over much of the generating capacity.

Various other commenters also support functional

unbundling, but believe that safeguards are needed to make it

work.''' Power Marketing Association, for example, suggests

a number of safeguards: adoption of cost allocation

mechanisms to ensure that utilities do not shift costs from

generation to transmission; random audits of utility books; a

requirement that each utility file a code of conduct that

provides for maximum separation of generation and

transmission functions; and active oversight and complaint

procedures with strong penalties for abuse. OK Com and GA

Com believe that functional unbundling along with the

safeguard of the Commission's complaint process will provide

sufficient incentive for non-discriminatory open access

transmission.

Supporting Corporate Unbundling

A number of commenters see weaknesses in functional

unbundling and argue that some form of corporate unbundling

is mecessary to assure non-discriminatory open access

transmission.''* American Forest & Paper says that there is

''E.g., NRECA, IN Com, Power Marketing Association,

TDU Systems, NorAm, Turlock, Texaco, Utility Shareholders,

NSP, El Paso, Utility Investors Analysts, PECO, Florida Power

Corp, UT Com, Sierra, Carolina P&L, SoCal Gas, OK Com, FL

Com, Southern.

'E.g., American Forest & Power, American National

Power, ND Com, IL Com, UAMPS, NIEP, APPA, Public Power

App. 103

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

affiliate abuse in the gas industry and argues that [31,654] the

electric industry presents even more serious potential for

abuse because it is still dominated by vertically iategrated

utilities.''"? UAMPS asserts that functional unbundling is

insufficient because the utility will still favor itself on issues

related to transmission planning, capital investment, and

operation and maintenance and replacement costs.

NIEP argues that divestitus > of generation assets from

transmission and distribution is the preferred mechanism for

mitigating market power. It further suggests that if corporate

divestiture is not feasible the Commission should

Seek to achieve “virtual divestiture" by requiring that

the utility generation function be separated from transmission

and distribution functions in a separate corporate affiliate, or

business unit, and that affiliate transaction rules be established

to guard against possible abuses. ''*

It maintains that the Commission has broad authority

to protect against undue discrimination and anticompetitive

Council, Municipal Energy Agency Nebraska, Missouri Basin

MPA, Texaco, Direct Services Industries, Calpine, CCEM,

Wisconsin Coalition, VT DPS.

'\3S¢e also American National Power, ND Com, Calpine.

'4NIEP Initial Comments at p. 4.

App. 104

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

behavior and can order divestiture if such action is required

to remedy such behavior.'’®

FTC and DOJ argue that operational unbundling, an

example of which is the formation of an independent system

operator (ISQ), likely would be more effective than functional

_unbundling and less costly than industry-wide divestiture. ''®

FTC describes operational unbundling as "structural

institutional arrangements, short of divestiture, that would

separate operation of the transmission grid and access to it

from economic interests in generation." It gives as an example

the California proposal under which utilities would continue

to own transmission lines, but an independent system operator

would have operational control. DOJ also suggests "a separate

authority" to manage the grid and access to the grid, joint

ventures, and voluntary pooling arrangements. These

commenters argue that operational unbundling would be

easier to enforce than functional unbundling.

DOE states that separation of the control of

transmission from vertically-integrated companies does not

necessarily require a poolco or any particular market

mechanism. It suggests the possibility of an ISO that is

functionally separate from any buyer or seller of generation,

but would not perform all the functions of a poolco.

''’See also Municipal Energy Agency Nebraska, Direct

Services Indusiries.

"Others oppose operational unbundling. See, e.g.,

Carolina P&L, Salt River.

App. 105

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

United Illuminating supports "operational unbundling"

that would either (1) eliminate vertical integration and

divestiture of transmission assets, leading to the formation of

a regional transmission company, or (2) develop a regional

contractual approach to transmission services that eliminates

the transmission owner's market power and fairly allocates

support of the transmission facilities between native load and

third-party users of the system. Commission Conclusion

We conclude that functional unbundling of wholesale

services is necessary to implement non-discriminatory open

access transmission and that corporate unbundling should not

now be required. As we explained in the NOPR, functional

unbundling means three things:

(1) A public utility must take transmission services

(including ancillary services) for all of its new wholesale sales

and purchases of energy under the same tariff of general

applicability as do others;

(2) A public utility must state separate rates for

wholesale generation, transmission, and ancillary services;

(3) A public utility must rely on the same electronic

information network that its transmission customers rely on to

obtain information about its transmission system when buying

or selling power.

We believe that these requirements are necessary to

ensure that public utilities provide non-discriminatory

App. 106

FERC Order No. 888 - 4/24/96

service.''’ These requirements also will give public [31,655]

utilities an incentive to file fair and efficient rates, terms, and

conditions, since they will be subject to those same rates,

terms, and conditions.

However, we recognize that additional safeguards are

necessary to protect against market power abuses. Functional

unbundling will work only if a strong code of conduct

(including a requirement to separate employees involved in

transmission functions from those involved in wholesale

power merchant functions) is in place. In the RINs NOPR, the

Commission proposed a code of conduct that would apply to

all public utility transmission providers. As the Commission

explained,

[T]his code of conduct would require, among other

matters, a separation of the utilities’ transmission system

operations and wholesale marketing functions, and would

define permissible and impermissible contacts between

employees that conduct wholesale generation marketing

functions and employees that handle tr

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Joint Appendix Vol I — New York v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission · 533 U.S. 947 | Frix