Appendix Vol I — New York v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

Supreme Court brief2001

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

jr Dp

No. - __ OFFICE OF THE CLERK j

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

Petitioner,

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, ef al. ,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia Circuit

APPENDIX TO —

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

(Volume I)

JEFFREY D. WATKISS LOouIs R. COHEN

BRACEWELL & Counsel of Record

PATTERSON, L.L.P. JOSEPH E. KILLORY, JR.

2000 K Street, N.W. IJAY PALA KY

Suite 500 MICHAEL PLOTNICK

Washington, D.C. 20006 WILMER, CUTLER & PICKERING

(202) 828-5800 2445 M Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20037-1420

(202) 663-6000

- Counsel for Petitioner Enron Power Marketing, Inc.

313 ep

_ TABLE OF CONTENTS

APPENDICES: Page

A.

Q

Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for

the District of Colombia Circuit filed June 30, 2000 .... la

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for

the District of Columbia Circuit filed June 30, 2000 ....3a

Order of the United States Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit filed Aug. 22, 2000 .....123a

Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open

Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services

by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities,

Order No. 888, [1991-96 Reg. Preambles] F.E.R.C.

Stats. & Regs. J 31,036 (1996) (pertinent portions).. 125a

Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open

Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services

by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by

Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, Order

No. 888-A, [Reg. & Preambles] [II F.E.R.C. Stats.

& Regs. J 31,048 (1997) (pertinent portions) ........... 37la

Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open

Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services

by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by

Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, Notice

of Proposed Rulemaking and Supplemental Notice

of Proposed Rulemaking, Notice of Proposed

Rulemaking, [1988-1998 Proposed Regs.] F.E.R.C.

Stats. & Regs. | 32,514 (1995) (pertinent portion) ...553a

a cciasehdens 645a

List of Parties to the Proceeding .....................0.0000. 683a

APPENDIX A

Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the

District of Colombia Circuit filed June 30, 2000

la

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 97-1715 September Term, 1999

Transmission Access Policy Study Group, et al.

Petitioner

Vv.

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,

Respondent

Vermont Department of Public Service, et al.,

Intervenors

Consolidated with 98-1111, 98-1112, 98-1113,

98-1114, 98-1115, 98-1118, 98-1119, 98-1120,

98-1122, 98-1124, 98-1125, 98-1126, 98-1127,

98-1128, 98-1129, 98-1131, 98-1132, 98-1134,

98-1136, 98-1137, 98-1139, 98-1140, 98-1141,

98-1142, 98-1143, 98-1145, 98-1147, 98-1148,

98-1149, 98-1150, 98-1152, 98-1153, 98-1154,

98-1155, 98-1156, 98-1159, 98-1162, 98-1163,

98-1166, 98-1168, 98-1169, 98-1170, 98-1171,

98-1172, 98-1173, 98-1174, 98-1175, 98-1176,

98-1178, 98-1180

On Petitions for Review of Orders of the

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

BEFORE: Sentelle, Randolph, and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

2a

JUDGMENT

These causes came on to be heard on the petitions for

review of orders of the Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission and were argued by counsel. On consideration

thereof, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED, by the Court, that the

petitions for review are granted in part and denied in part, in

accordance with the opinion for the Court filed herein this

date.

FOR THE COURT:

Mark J. Langer, Clerk

By: s/Robert A. Bonner

Robert A. Bonner

Deputy Clerk

Date: June 30, 2000

Opinion Per Curiam

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Filed: JUN 30 2000

Clerk

MANDATE

Pursuant to the provisions of Fed. R. App. Pro. 41(a)

ISSUED: 8/30/00

By: €E. Brown

ATTACHED: —Amending Order

—Opinion

—Order on Costs

er =

id

_

+.

APPENDIX B

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit filed June 30, 2000

3a

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 3, 1999 Decided June 30, 2000

No. 97-1715

Transmission Access Policy Study Group, et al.

Petitioner

Vv.

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,

Respondent

Vermont Department Of Public Service, et al.,

Intervenors

[Page 2}Consolidated with

98-1111, 98-1112, 98-1113, 98-1114, 98-1115, 98-1118, 98-

1119, 98-1120, 98-1122, 98-1124, 98-1125, 98-1126, 98-

1127, 98-1128, 98-1129, 98-1131, 98-1132, 98-1134, 98-

1136, 98-1137, 98-1139, 98-1140, 98-1141, 98-1142, 98-

1143, 98-1145, 98-1147, 98-1148, 98-1149, 98-1150, 98-

1152, 98-1153, 98-1154, 98-1155, 98-1156, 98-1159, 98-

1162, 98-1163, 98-1166, 98-1168, 98-1169, 98-1170, 98-

1171, 98-1172, 98-1173, 98-1174, 98-1175, 98-1176, 98-

1178, 98-1180

Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out of

time.

4a

On Petitions for Review of Orders of the

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

Sherilyn Peterson, John T. Miller, Jr., Robert C.

McDiarmid, Stanley C. Fickle, Sara D. Schotland, Jeffrey L.

Landsman, Lawrence G. Malone, Jeffery D. Watkiss, Richard

M. Lorenzo, Isaac A. Benkin, Wallace E. Brand, Daniel |.

Davidson, Cynthia S. Bogorad, Harvey L. Reiter and

Randolph Lee Elliott argued the causes for petitioners. With

them on the briefs were William R. Maurer, Ben Finkelstein,

David E. Pomper, Ronald N. Carroll, John Michael

Adragna, Sean T. Beeny, Wallace F. Tillman, Susan N. Kelly,

Craig W. Silverstein, A. Hewitt Rose, Bryan G. Tabler, James

D. Pembroke, David C Vladeck, Robert F. Shapiro, Lynn N.

Hargis, Wallace L. Duncan, Richmond F Allan, Alan H.

Richardson, Michael A. Mullett, C. Kirby Mullen, Robert A.

Jablon, Sara C. Weinberg, John F. Wickes, Jr.. Todd A.

Richardson, Brian A. Statz, John P. C ook, Charles F.

Wheatley, Jr., Christine C. Ryan, Robert S. Tongren, Joseph

| P. Serio, Barry E. Cohen, Carrol S. Verosky, Jennifer S.

4 McGinnity, Jonathan D. Feinberg, Charles D. Gray, Robert

Vandiver, Cynthia Miller, Helene S. Wallenstein, William H.

Chambliss, C. Meade Browder. Jr., Mary W. Cochran, Paul

R. Hightower, Brad M. Purdy, Gisele L. Rankin, Robert D.

Cedarbaum, Edward H. Comer, Edward Berlin, (Page 3]

Robert V. Zener, Elizabeth W. Whittle, James H. McGrew,

Donald K. Dankner, Frederick J Killion, Joseph L.

Lakshmanan, Stephen C. Palmer, Michael E. Ward, Steven J

Ross, Marvin T. Griff and Thomas C. Trauger. Leja D.

Courter, Robert E. Glennon, Jr., Neil Butterklee, Zachary D.

Wilson, Sheila S. Hollis, Janice I. Lower and James B.

Ramsay entered appearances.

John H. Comay, Deputy Solicitor, Federal Energy

Regulatory Commission, and Timm [. Abendroth and Larry

D. Gasteiger, Attorneys, argued the causes for respondent.

With them on the brief was Jay L. Witkin, Solicitor. Susan J.

a tS 2 te eR oe

BEE

Sa

Court, Special Counsel, and Edward S. Geldermann,

Attorney, entered appearances.

Edward Berlin argued the cause for intervenors. With

him on the briefs were J. Phillip Jordan, Robert V. Zener,

Edward H. Comer, William M. Lange, Deborah A. Moss,

James H. McGrew, Steven J. Ross, Elizabeth W. Whittle,

Richard M. Lorenzo, David M. Stahl, D. Cameron Findlay,

Peter Thornton, J. Phillip Jordan, Robert V. Zener, Robert dl

McDiarmid, Cynthia S. Bogorad, Ben Finkelstein, Peter J.

Hopkins, Margaret A. McGoldrick, Jeffery D. Watkiss,

Ronald N. Carroll, Sara D. Schotland, Alan H. Richardson,

Wallace L. Duncan, Richmond F. Allan, A. Hewitt Rose,

Wallace F. Tillman, Susan N. Kelly, John M. Adragna, Sean

T Beeny and Randolph Lee Elliott. Edward J. Twomey,

Richard P. Bonnifield, Frederick H. Ritts, David L. Huard,

Dan H. McCrary, Mark A. Crosswhite, John N. Estes, III,

Kevin J. McIntyre, John S. Moot, Clark E. Downs, Martin V.

Kirkwood, Robert A. Waters, John T. Stough, Jr., Bruce L.

Richardson, Floyd L. Norton, IV, William S. Scherman,

Douglas F. John, Gary D. Bachman, Nicholas W. Fels,

Robert Weinberg, Robert A. Jablon, Peter G. Esposito,

Christine C. Ryan, Sheila S. Hollis, Stephen L. Teichler,

James K. Mitchell, Gordon J. Smith, Edward J. Brady, Kevin

F. Duffy, Michael P. May, Barbara S. Brenner, Michael J.

Rustum, Sandra E. Rizzo, Kirk H. Betts, Pierre F. de Ravel

d’Esclapon, Glen L. Ortman and William D. DeGrandis

entered appearances.

[Page 4] Before: SENTELLE, RANDOLPH and TATEL,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM’:

. Following our normal practice in complex cases, we shared the

writing of this opinion. Judge Sentelle wrote Section II, Section III, and

Section VII. Judge Randolph wrote Section IV, Section VI, and Section

VIII. Judge Tatel wrote Section I Section V, and Section IX.

Il.

Il.

IV.

6a

Table of Contents

I iinticntnamaiereicl Mioimccclgees ada ete 8

FERC’S AUTHORITY TO REQUIRE OPEN ACCESS

son cnaenantennesiepsidiiasnndaddamatininbibipiiuiatabddadadeniea madam cadbasntan tin 12

A. ‘er Challenges: FPA §§ 205 and 206 .......... 16

§§ 205 and 206 and Otter Tail Power Company

16

2. § 206(a) Procedural and Evidentiary Require-

INTE! evsebbuiiniicigeietencscsssntiemnonmsbiasinemesesoonunmenes 19

3. Discriminatory Effect of Order 888................ 22

B. Constitutional Challenge: Fifth Amendment Takings

SUNNY Meoniabiinemmetincenekietana eres 25

FEDERAL VERSUS STATE JURISDICTION OVER

TRANSMISSION SERVICES 000000. 26

A. Bundled Retail Sales 000000000. 29

B. Local Distribution Facilities... 34

8. g EES See een ES ....38

A. Indirect Regulation of Non-Jurisdictional Utilities 39

B. Limitation on Reciprocity 000000000. 41

STRANDED COST RECOVERY PROVISIONS ..... 42

A. Wholesale Stranded Costs 0.0.0.0... 44

1. FERC’s Authority to Provide for Stranded Cost

RRR Ee ANE Ran 48

a. Reasonable expectation of continued

RSET EEN ALS aR A ae 48

[Page S]b........ Sections 206 and 212 of the FPA

Sineritinecesnetiitiealiilatittiatiaiaias teat a ten pe 50

c. Implications of Cajun 00000000... 53

2. Natural Gas Precedent and Conformance to

Cost Causation Principles .................... 54

a. Natural gas precedent: AGD, KN Energy,

a. I eee 54

b. Conformance to cost causation principles 59

3. FERC’s Mobile-Sierra Findings ................. 62

a. FERC’s authority to make a generic public

interest finding ..............eccceerereereereeeeeers 64

b. FERC’s stranded cost public interest

FINDING, .........sscererevesessererssrenessossersseseresees 66

c. FERCs public interest finding regarding

CUBLOMGIG .......000cccrcercscvercoossceesererensossseees 68

4. Availability of Stranded Cost Recovery to

Nonjurisdictional Utilities and G & T

COOPETARIVES ........cceseseceenererenerensncesernsnsesnensess 69

5. Challenges to Technical Aspects of Order 888’s

Stranded Cost Recovery Provisions .............. 72

a. POSCRs challenges to the stranded cost

RID ncccsscnccetccsnevesesscccsssconosobonsonesescors 73

b. Inclusion of known and measurable costs 74

c. Treatment of energy costs in the market

OPTION .......scercrssrrscsreecersnsssersnesecsesrserneees 75

d._ Rescission of notice of termination

PFOVISION ..........20ceseeeeesesenersrseeerersenseeenens 77

e. Provision for benefits lost ...................... 77

B. Retail Stranded Costs ..................cccceceeeeeeeteeeeeeeees 78

1. Stranded Costs Arising from Retail Wheeling 79

a. FERC’s jurisdiction over retail stranded

ae caseindielinsinennd 80

b. FERC’s refusal to assert jurisdiction over

all retail stranded costs......................008 84

[Page 6]2. Stranded Costs Relating to Retail-

Turned-Wholesale Customers ......................- 88

VI CREDITS FOR CUSTOMER-OWNED FACILITIES

AND BEHIND-THE-METER GENERATION .......... 93

VIL LIABILITY, INTERFACE ALLOCATION AND

IIT 1, senstsonnrenennssnnsnrocconansnenes O8

A. Liability and Indemnification ...................:..:.0 99

B. Interface Allocation ..................c:ccccccccceeesseeeeeeees 103

C. Delivery-Point-Specific Discounting ................. 105

VIIL TARIFF TERMS AND CONDITIONS .................-. 110

A. Headroom Allocation ............:.:cccccccceceessreeeeees 110

B. Headroom Prioritization 200.0....0.0.0..0..ccccccccceeeeeeee 112

C. Deplicative Changes ........ccscssscssssssssccensessesersoees 112

D. Multiple Control Areas 2.000000.000000.0.00ccccccccccceeeeeees 113

E. Right-of-First-Refusal o.2000000000000000.ccccccccccccceseseees 114

IX. NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT AND

REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT COMPLIANCE ..

soeecesocesoesoneessosoncesseeessenenmeeesnnaisniinnnnnnnnnnnnnnnE 115

115

1. Adequacy of Base Case o000..0.0....ccccccceeeees 115

2. Failure to Adopt Mitigation Measures ......... 118

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act Compliance .............. 119

Following two notices of proposed rulemaking, the

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission issued Orders 888

and 889 on April 24, 19967. Reflecting the Commission’s

effort to end [Page 7} discriminatory and anticompetitive

practices in the vational electricity market and to ensure that

electricity customers pay the lowest prices possible, these

orders represent, as the Commission described in a later order

not before us, “the foundation necessary to develop

competitive bulk power markets....”. Regional Transmission

Organizations, Order No. 2000, 65 Fed. Reg. 810, 812

(2000).

Open access is the essence of Orders 888 and 889.

Under these orders, utilities must now provide access to their

” Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access

Nondiscrimina‘ory Transmission Services by Public Utilities, Recovery

of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, Order

No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¥ 31,036, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (1996),

clarified, 76 FERC 4 61,009 and 76 FERC 4 61,347 (1996) (“Order

888”), on reh’g, Order No. 888-A, FERC Stats. and Regs. { 31,048, 62

Fed. Reg. 12,274, clarified, 79 FERC 4 61,182 (1997), on reh’g, Order

No. 888-B, 81 FERC 4 61,248, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,688 (1997), on reh’g,

Order No. 888-C, 82 FERC 4 61,046 (1998); Open Access Same-Time

Information System and Standards of Conduct, Order No. 889, FERC

Stats. & Regs. 4 31,035, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,737 (1996) (“Order 889”), on

reh’g, Order No. 889-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. 4 31,049, 62 Fed. Reg.

12,484 (1997), on reh’g, Order No. 889-B, 81 FERC 4 61,253 (1997).

All key players in the electricity market have challenged

various provisions of Orders 888 and 889. Their claims

range from the hypertechnical to arguments that FERC lacks

authority to order open access transmission at all. Finding

few defects in the orders we uphold them in nearly all

respects.

1. INTRODUCTION

Historically, vertically integrated utilities owned

ion. transmission, and distribution facilities. They

sold gen-[Page 8]eration, transmission, and distribution

services as part of a “bundled” package. Due to

technological limitations on the distance over which

electricity could be transmitted, each utility served only

customers in a limited geographic area. And because of their

natural monopoly characteristics, utilities have been heavily

regulated at both the federal and state levels.

Since enactment of the Federal Power Act in 1935, the

electricity industry has undergone significant change, both

10a

MW)

generation facilities, such as nuclear power plants.

Technological advances in the 1970s and 1980s have

well. See

Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of

Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities,

FERC Stats. & Regs. 32,514 at 33,059-60, 60 Fed. Reg.

17,662 (1995) (“Open Access NOPR”). Technological

improvements also made feasible the transmission of electric

power over long distances at high voltages. See id. 4 32,514

low-cost power.

The growth of this new wholesale market faced a serious

obstacle. “As entry into wholesale power generation markets

increased,” FERC explained, “the ability of customers to gain

access to the transmission services necessary to reach

competing suppliers became increasingly important.” Id. at

33,062. Yet the owners of transmission lines, the traditional

utilities that had built the high-cost generation capacity,

denied alternative producers access to their transmission lines

On competitive terms and conditions. FERC therefore began

requiring utilities to file open access transmission tariffs that

permitted other suppliers to transmit power over [Page 9]

their lines under certain circumstances, such as when a utility

sought authorization to merge with another utility or to sell

power at market-based rather than cost-based rates.

Then, in 1992, Congress enacted the Energy Policy Act,

which amended sections 211 and 212 of the FPA to authorize

FERC to order utilities to “wheel” power—i.e., transmit

lla

power for Wholesale sellers of power over the utilities’

transmission lines—on a case-by-case basis. Pub. L. No.

102-486, 106 Stat. 2776, 2915-16 (1992) (codified at 16

U.S.C. §§824j-k). FERC “ i

Rulemaking, Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities

NOPR”)).

prices.” Open Access NOPR, { 32,514 at 33,052. Power

generators not permitted to use utilities’ transmission lines on

reasonable terms have no way to transmit their power to

customers.

Invoking its authority under sections 205 and 206 of the

FPA to remedy unduly discriminatory or preferential rules,

regulations, practices, or contracts affecting public utility

rates for transmission in interstate commerce, 16 U.S.C. §§

824d-e, and building on its experience in restructuring the

natural gas industry, see Associated Gas Distribs. v. FERC,

824 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1987), the Commission issued

Orders [Page 10] 888 and 889 to “prevent this discrimination

by ‘tee all public utiliti ie enfin Hh

12a

transmission facilities to offer open

access transmission service.” Open Access NOPR, § 32,514

at 33,052. Orders 888 and 889 mandate what FERC terms

“functional unbundling,” i.e., separating utilities’ wholesale

transmission functions from their wholesale electricity

merchant functions. Specifically, the orders require utilities

to (1) file open access nondiscriminatory tariffs that contain

the minimum terms and conditions of nondiscriminatory

services prescribed by FERC through its pro forma tariff. (2)

take transmission service for their own new Wholesale sales

and purchases of electric energy under the same terms and

conditions as they offer that service to others; (3) develop

and maintain a same-time information system that will give

potential and existing transmission users the same access to

transmission information that the utility enjoys (called the

“Open Access Same-Time Information System” or

“OASIS”); and (4) state separate rates for wholesale

generation, transmission, and ancillary services. See Order

888, 7 31,036 at 31,635-36.

In requiring utilities to provide open access transmission,

FERC acknowledged the dramatic change the orders would

bring about, explaining that “(t]he most critical transition

issue that arises as a result of the Commission’s actions in

this rule-making is how to deal with the uneconomic sunk

costs that utilities prudently incurred under an industry

regime that rested on a regulatory framework and a set of

expectations that are being fundamentally altered.” Order

888-A, 31,048 at 30,346. Known as “stranded costs,” these

“uneconomic sunk costs” are costs that utilities incurred not

only with regulatory approval, but with the expectation of

continuing to serve their current customers. These costs will

become “stranded” when customers take advantage of open

access transmission to purchase cheaper power from

suppliers other than their historic utilities. Order 888 affords

utilities an opportunity to recover stranded costs from their

wholesale requirements customers, but only from those

customers who use their utility’s transmission service to

13a

purchase power from new suppliers, and only if the utility

can [Page 11] prove that it had a reasonable expectation of

continued service to that customer.

further rehearing. All petitions for review of Orders 888 and

889 were consolidated and transferred to this circuit. We

consider these petitions in this opinion. Section II considers

challenges to FERC’s authority to require utilities to file

retail sales. Section IV addresses FERC’s authority to

require nonpublic utilities to provide reciprocal open access

transmission service. Section V considers challenges to

Order 888’s stranded cost recovery provisions. Section VI

evaluates petitioners’ arguments relating to credits for

customer-owned facilities and behind-the-meter generation.

Section VII addresses discounting interface allocation, and

liability. Section VII evaluates other arguments relating to

the terms and conditions of the pro forma tariff. Section IX

assesses FERC’s compliance with the National

Environmental Policy Act and the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

In the end, we affirm the orders in all respects except

two: we remand for FERC to explain its treatment of energy

costs in the stranded cost market option (Section V.A.5.c)

and to provide a reasonable cap on contract extensions under

existing customers’ right-of-first-refusal (Section VIII.E).

Il. FERC’S AUTHORITY TO REQUIRE OPEN ACCESS

Although FERC asserts that “mounting claims of undue

discrimination in transmission access” prompted its

movement toward open access, the open access requirement

of Order 888 is premised not on individualized findings of

discrimination by specific transmission providers, but on

FERC’s identification of a fundamental systemic problem in

l4a

the industry. Generally, those entities that own or control

interstate transmission facilities are vertically-integrated

public utilities that also generate and sell electricity. In its

1995 [Page 12] notice of proposed rulemaking, FERC

observed that there were at that time approximately 328

public utilities, marketers, and wholesale generation entities

with transmission needs, and that approximately 137 of those

owned or controlled the transmission facilities. See Open

Access NOPR, $32,514 at 33,051. Entry into the

transmission market is difficult and restricted, so those

utilities that already own transmission facilities enjoy a

natural monopoly over that field. The transmission-owning

utilities can use their position to favor their own generated

electricity and to exclude competitors from the market,

whether by denying transmission access outright, or by

providing transmission services to competitors only at

comparatively unfavorabte~ rates, terms, and conditions.

Utilities that own or control transmission facilities naturally

wish to maximize profit. The transmission-owning utilities

thus can be expected to act in their own interest to maintain

their monopoly and to use that position to retain or expand

the market share for their own generated electricity, even if

they do so at the expense of lower-cost generation companies

and consumers.

Even before Order 888, some transmission-owning

utilities voluntarily opened their transmission facilities to

third party suppliers and purchasers of electricity; and FPA

§211 explicitly gives FERC the authority to order

involuntary wheeling on a case-by-case basis. The

Commission decided, however, that relying upon voluntary

arrangements and § 211 orders would not remedy the

fundamentally anti-competitive structure of the transmission

industry. Instead, the Commission concluded, such a

piecemeal approach would result in an inefficient

“patchwork” of transmission systems nationwide. “The

ultimate loser in such a regime is the consumer.” Open

Access NOPR, 4 32,514 at 33,071.

15a

As an alternative, the Commission interpreted the anti-

discrimination language of FPA §§ 205 and 206, 16 U.S.C.

§§ 824d, 824e (1994), as giving it the authority to impose

open access as a generic remedy for its findings of systemic

i itive behavior. Invoking that broad authority,

in Order 888, FERC requires every transmission-owning

public utility within FERC’s jurisdiction to file an Open

Access [Page 13] Transmission Tariff (OATT) containing

minimum terms and conditions for non-discriminatory

service and to take transmission service for their own

wholesale sales and purchases of electric energy under those

filed OATTs. In other words, this order requires the public

utilities to provide the same transmission services to anyone

purchasing or selling wholesale power—other public utilities,

federal power suppliers and marketers, municipalities,

cooperatives, independent power producers, qualifying

facilities, or power marketers—as they provide to

themselves. The Board of Water, Light and Sinking Fund

Commissioners of the City of Dalton (Dalton) operates a

municipally-owned utility system which provides electric

power to residential, commercial, and industrial consumers in

the city of Dalton, Georgia. Dalton obtains transmission

services from the Georgia Integrated Transmission System

(ITS), which it owns along with public utility George Power

Company (GPC) and two other utilities that are not subject to

FERC’s jurisdiction, and which GPC operates according to

the terms of various filed agreements. Puget Sound Energy,

Inc. (Puget) is a public utility in the Pacific Northwest,

where Bonneville Power Administration, which is not a

public utility subject to Order 888’s requirements,’ [Page 14]

> Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) “is a power marketing

agency in the Pacific Northwest that markets power from thirty federal

hydroelectric projects constructed and operated by the Corps of Engineers

and the Bureau of Reclamation.” In re Bonneville Power Administration,

Power Sale and Transmission Rates, 54 FERC. $62,143 (1991). In

Order 888, FERC concluded that BPA is not a public utility as defined by

Federal Power Act (FPA) § 201(e), and thus is not subject to Order 888’s

l6a

dominates the electricity transmission market. These two

industry petitioners challenge the open access requirement of

Order 888 on various Statutory, constitutional, and other

grounds.

Turning first to the FPA itself, Puget and Dalton argue

that §§ 205 and 206 do not give the Commission the

authority to order open access as a generic remedy; and even

if the FPA does give the agency such authority, FERC has

failed to satisfy the statutory requirements for invoking it.

Dalton also argues that Order 888 itself violates the FPA by

discriminating against transmission facility owners who have

invested in those assets. Shifting to constitutional concerns,

Puget and Dalton, along with amicus curiae Pacific Legal

Foundation, maintain that Order 888 violates the Takings

Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Finally, Dalton argues that

the open access requirements of the OATT interfere with the

antitrust conditions of outstanding nuclear licenses, and thus

are unlawful. While we consider each of these challenges

separately, we hold that Order 888’s open access

requirements. Order 888, { 31,036 at 31,858. FERC admitted, however,

to three circumstances under which it might review BPA’s transmission

access and pricing policies: (1) if BPA files an open access tariff for

review and confirmation under the Northwest Power Act and asks FERC

to find that the tariff meets FERC’s open access policies: (2) to the extent

that BPA “Is a transmitting utility subject to a request for

transmission services” under FPA § 211; and (3) to the extent that BPA

receives open access transmission from a public utility and is thereby

subject to the reciprocity provision in that public utility’s pro-forma tariff

Id.

17a

requirement is authorized by and consistent with the FPA and

the Takings Clause. We conclude also that Dalton has not

yet suffered injury from the alleged conflict between open

access and the nuclear license antitrust conditions, and that

its complaint on that issue is therefore not yet ripe for judicial

review.

A. Statutory Challenges: FPA §§ 205 and 206

Section 205 of the FPA broadly precludes public

utilities, in any transmission or sale subject to FERC’s

jurisdiction, from “mak[ing] or grant[ing] any undue

preference or advantage to [Page 15] any person or

subject[ing] any person to any undue prejudice or

disadvantage... .” 16 U.S.C. § 824d(b). Section 206 of the

FPA further provides in relevant part that

[w]henever the Commission, after a hearing had

upon its own motion or upon complaint, shall find

that any rate, charge, or classification, demanded,

observed, charged, or collected by any public utility

for any transmission or sale subject to the

jurisdiction of the Commission, or that any rule,

regulation, practice, or contract affecting such rate,

charge, or classification is unjust, unreasonable,

unduly discriminatory or preferential, the

Commission shall determine the just and reasonable

rate, charge, classification, rule, regulation, practice,

or contract to be thereafter observed arid in force,

and shall fix the same by order.

16 U.S.C. § 824e(a). The statutory issues before us are

whether these provisions give FERC the authority to order

involuntary wheeling as a generic remedy, and if they do,

whether FERC satisfied the procedural and evidentiary

requirements imposed by these provisions.

Order 888’s open access requirement, and that we have jurisdiction to

18a

1. §§ 205 and 206 and Otter Tail Power Company

The Commission did not write on a blank slate when it

interpreted FPA §§ 205 and 206 as giving it the authority to

order involuntary wheeling as a generic remedy for systemic

anti-competitive behavior. Puget and Dalton argue

principally that the Supreme Court’s decision in Otter Tail

Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973), controls

the disposition of this issue. Otter Tail was an antitrust case

in which the Supreme Court addressed whether the district

court could require Otter Tail Power Company to wheel

power for its competitors as a remedy for monopolistic

practices. Contrary to the company’s arguments, the

Supreme Court concluded that the district court’s order did

not impermissibly conflict with the authority of the Federal

Power Commission, FERC’s predecessor, because the

agency did not have the power itself to order involuntary

wheeling under Part II of the FPA, which includes §§ 205

and 206. Puget and Dalton [Page 16] cite various circuit

court precedents, including one from this circuit, as

construing Ctter Tail to prevent the Commission from

ordering involuntary wheeling as a generic remedy. See,

e.g., Florida Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 660 F.2d 668 (Sth

Cir. Unit B Nov. 1981); New York State Electric & Gas

Corp. v. FERC, 638 F.2d 388 (2d Cir. 1980); Richmond

Power & Light v. FERC, 574 F.2d 610 (DC. Cir. 1978).

Finally, Puget and Dalton note that subsequent to Otter Tail,

Congress enacted FPA § 211, 16 U.S.C. § 824), giving FERC

the authority to impose open access on a case-by-case basis

to remedy a broad range of problems. The petitioners argue

that, if FPA §§ 205 and 206 authorize the Commission to

impose open access, and if Otter Tail does not prohibit such

action, then there was no reason for Congress to enact § 211.

In response, the Commission contends that we should

not read Otter Tail as limiting its authority under FPA § 206

to remedy discriminatory behavior, since Otter Tail was an

antitrust case and not an undue discrimination case. The

19a

by the petitioners are not on point and do not prohibit a

generic open access remedy. The Commission points instead

to our decision in Associated Gas Distributors v. FERC, 824

F.2d 981, 998 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (AGD), in which we upheld a

similar open access transportation requirement imposed by

FERC on natural gas transmission, as the controlling

precedent. Finally, FERC argues that Congress enacted FPA

§ 211 to broaden its already existing authority to order

involuntary wheeling, as FPA §§ 205 and 206 authorize such

action only as a remedy-for undue discrimination. -

We agree with FERC that our decision in AGD controls

the disposition of this issue. In AGD, we reviewed a FERC

order imposing open access conditions on pipelines

transporting natural gas. See 824 F.2d at 997-1001.

Considering arguments quite similar to those made by the

petitioners here, we concluded that Otter Tail does not

constrain FERC from mandating open access where it finds

circumstances of undue discrimination to exist. See id. at

998-99. Turning to relevant circuit precedent, we construed

Richmond Power & Light as supporting only the proposition

that a refusal to [Page 17] provide transmission services to

another utility was not per se unduly discriminatory and we

noted that the court in Florida Power & Light expressly left

open the question of whether FERC could impose open

access conditions as a remedy for anti-competitive behavior.

See id. at 999. Further, we pointed out that our reading of

Richmond is consistent with other precedent, specifically

Central lowa Power Coop. v. FERC, 606 F.2d. 1156 (D.C.

Cir. 1979), in which we upheld FERC’s use of its authority to

prevent undue discrimination to condition its approval of a

power-pooling agreement upon removal of membership

criteria which denied certain privileges to some but not all

participants. See AGD, 824 F.2d at 999. Indeed, in AGD,

we noted that open access relies upon the very same

principles that we upheld in Central Iowa. See id. Although

AGD addressed open access under the anti-discrimination

20a

provisions of the Natura! Gas Act (NGA) rather than FPA §§

205 and 206, we have repeatedly recognized the similarity of

the two statutes and held that they should be interpreted

consistently. See Environmental Action v. FERC, 996 F. 2d

401, 410 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v.

FERC, 860 F.2d 446, 454 (DC. Cir. 1988); see also

Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 577 n.7 (1981).

Thus, AGD counsels the conclusion that, while Otter Tail

may represent a general rule that FERC’s authority to order

open access is limited, the FPA, like the NGA, makes an

exception to that rule where FERC finds undue

discrimination.

Moreover, as in AGD, the deferential standard of

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,

467 US. 837 (1984), governs our review of FERC’s

interpretation of FPA §§ 205 and 206. See AGD, 824 F.2d at

1001. If we agreed with Puget and Dalton that the Supreme

Court’s Otter Tail opinion dictates a particular construction

of §§ 205 and 206, then the Commission’s contrary

interpretation would not be entitled to Chevron deference.

See Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S.

116, 131 (1990) (“Once we have determined a Statute’s clear

meaning, we adhere to that determination under the doctrine

of stare decisis, and we judge an agency’s later interpretation

of the statute against [Page 18] our prior determination of the

statute’s meaning.”). But having concluded that Otter Tail

does not govern the disposition of this case, we are faced

solely with considering the validity of FERC’s interpretation

of the FPA, a statute that the Commission administers. In

AGD, we concluded that FERC reasonably interpreted the

NGA’s ambiguous anti-discrimination provisions as giving it

broad authority to remedy unduly discriminatory behavior

through a generic open access requirement. See AGD, 824

F.2d at 1001. Given the FPA’s similar language, we can

only reach the same conclusion with respect to Order 888.

For all of these reasons, we find that the Commission has the

2la

authority under FPA §§ 205 and 206 to require open access

as a generic remedy to prevent undue discrimination.

2. § 206(a) Procedural and Evidentiary Requirements

Puget and Dalton next argue that, even if FPA §§ 205

and 206 authorize FERC to impose open access generically,

§ 206(a) imposes certain procedural and evidentiary

requirements for action which the Commission failed in two

separate but related ways to satisfy. First, the petitioners

claim that FPA § 206(a) requires substantial evidence of

contemporaneous “unjust, unreasonable, unduly

discriminatory or preferential” behavior before the

Commission can act. The Commission made no finding of

discrimination or monopoly control on the part of Georgia

Power Company or Puget. None of the applications or

complaints filed with the Commission accused these

petitioners of unduly discriminatory or anti-competitive

behavior. Instead, the Commission premised Order 888 on a

generic finding that public utility holders as a group have

sufficient monopoly power over the transmission of

electricity to engage in unduly discriminatory and anti-

competitive practices, and that this condition will worsen in

the future. To support its finding, the Commission relied

upon unsubstantiated allegations of discriminatory conduct in

public comments, its own experience in reviewing

applications and complaints, and its own understanding of

the incentives for monopolists to behave discriminatorily.

[Page 19] Puget and Dalton additionally assert that FPA

§ 206(a) requires that the requisite findings of undue

discrimination be made in the context of a hearing. Although

they concede that a rulemaking proceeding can satisfy the

statute’s hearing requirement, Puget and Dalton maintain that

the rulemaking proceeding nevertheless must clearly identify

the challenged activities and actors, and give the accused

actors the opportunity to demonstrate that their activities

were not unlawful. The petitioners protest that the

22a

Commission’s notice-and-comment rulemaking process did

not afford them such opportunity.

FERC claims the discretion under NLRB v. Bell

Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 293 (1974), to choose between

rulemaking and case-by-case adjudication, and FERC

contends that its generic rulemaking process fully satisfied

the requirements of FPA § 206(a). FERC concedes that it

relied upon general findings of systemic monopoly

conditions and the resulting potential for anti-competitive

behavior, rather than evidence of monopoly and undue

discrimination on the part of individual utilities. Citing our

opinion in Wisconsin Gas Co. v. FERC, 770 F.2d 1144, 1166

(D.C. Cir. 1985), however, FERC maintains that such

findings are sufficient to substantiate its decision to impose

the open access requirement. Finally, FERC observes that

we rejected these same arguments in AGD. See 824 F.2d at

1008 (citing Wisconsin Gas, 770 F.2d at 1165-68).

Again, we must agree with the Commission. In

American Public Gas Ass’n v. FPC, we held that the

Commission could exercise its authority under NGA § 5(a),

the provision parallel to FPA § 206, through rulemaking as

well as adjudication. See 567 F.2d 1016, 1064-67 (D.C. Cir.

1977); See also Wisconsin Gas, 770 F.2d at 1153

(articulating the American Public Gas holding). Congress

subsequently ratified the American Public Gas holding when

it enacted the Department of Energy Organization Act, 42

U.S.C. § 7173(c) (1994). See Wisconsin Gas, 770 F.2d at

1153 n.8 (acknowledging the Act). That statute provides that

“the establishment of rates and charges under the Federal

Power Act [16 U.S.C. 79a et seq.] or the Natural Gas Act

[15 U.S.C. 717 et seq.], may be conducted by [Page 20] rule

making procedures.” 42 USC. § 7173(c) (brackets in

original). By passing a statute adopting the holding of

American Public Gas, and explicitly applying that rule to the

FPA as well as the NGA, Congress signaled its intent that the

23a

hearing requirements of NGA § S(a) and FPA § 206(a) be

: similarly.

holding that the Commission was required to make

specific findings that individual rater charged by individual

pipelines were unlawful, or to offer empirical proof for all

a generic rule to eliminate

discrimination. See AGD, 824 F.2d at 1008-09. Upon

comparison of the order considered in AGD with Order 888,

if anything, FERC more thoroughly documented the reasons

for its actions in Order 888 than in the earlier natural gas

order.

claims that AGD and Wisconsin Gas are

distinguishable, and that this case is governed by Electricity

Consumers Resource Council v. FERC, 747 F.2d 1511 (DC.

Cir. 1984), in which we reversed FERC’s adoption of a rate

based on an economic theory in the absence of a discussion

of the practical applications of that theory. See 747 F.2d at

1514. As the AGD court recognized, however, the court in

Electricity Consumers was persuaded that the Commission

had distorted the economic theory it claimed to apply. See

AGD, 824 F.2d at 1008. Just as the pipelines in AGD did,

Puget has failed to articulate exactly how FERC has distorted

the theories on which it relies in Order 888. Additionally, the

AGD court rejected the idea that “Electricity Consumer's

reference to ‘economic theory’ was intended to invalidate

agency reliance on generic factual predictions merely

because they are typically studied in the field called

economics.” Id. Following the rationale of Wisconsin Gas

24a

and AGD, we conclude that [Page 21] FERC has satisfied the

requirements for invoking its authority under FPA § 206(a).

3. Discriminatory Effect of Order 888

Dalton charges that, even if the FPA permits FERC to

impose involuntary wheeling generally, the open access

requirement of Order 888 causes rather than remedies

discrimination, and therefore violates FPA § 206(a)’s express

requirement that FERC act against undue discrimination.

Specifically, Dalton and the other non-jurisdictional owners

of the Georgia ITS facilities invested millions of dollars in

those facilities in order to use the facilities each owns and

receive reciprocal open access transmission services from the

other owners. Under the Open Access Transmission Tariff

(OATT), other customers do not have to make such

investments to use the Georgia ITS facilities FERC

responds that Order 888 does not unduly discriminate

between old and new customers of integrated transmission

systems like the Georgia ITS; and that if Dalton has evidence

that the tariff results in undue discrimination in its individual

circumstances, Dalton remains free to file a petition under

FPA § 206 for redress, and FERC will consider its claim.

FERC’s conclusion that its open access requirement is

not unduly discriminatory is subject only to arbitrary and

capricious review. See 5 USC. § 706(2)(A) (1994):

Sithe/Independence Power Partners, LP v. FERC, 165 F.3d

944, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Union Pacific Fuels, Inc. v.

FERC, 129 F.3d 157, 161 (D.C. Cir. 1997). We conclude

that FERC has adequately explained why its open access

requirement is not unduly discriminatory. Relying upon

extensive commentary as well as its own experiences, FERC

concluded that, as a general matter, transmission industry

conditions were conducive to discriminatory practices and

anti—competitive behavior, such that case-by-case

adjudication could not adequately address the problem.

FERC also recognized that its generic findings may have

exceptions, and thus that Order 888 may in individual

In another stab at demonstrating the discriminatory

imposed by Order 888 on Dalton’s rights upon termination of

the ITS Agreement are inconsistent with GPC’s obligations

under the nuclear licenses, and that the interference will

result in discrimination against Dalton. FERC maintains that

it agreed in addressing GPC’s Order 888 compliance filing to

treat the ITS Agreements separately

Ultimately, Dalton has offered no present injury from the

alleged conflict, so this issue is mot mpe for review. Dalton

will only be injured if, upon termination of the ITS

Agreement, Order 888 interferes with Dalton’s might to

transmission services. Dalton’s own argument suggests as

much, observing that FERC “left to GPC the decision

25a

whether it ‘must, but cannot, comply with separate orders’ of

NRC and FERC and whether it will present evidence of such

conflict to either Commission,” and complaining that even if

GPC does act, “the orders under review provide no assurance

provided by the nuclear licenses will be respected under the

OATT.” Br. [Page 23]of Petitioner Dalton at 23 (quoting

Order 888-A, 4 41,048 at 30,452). In short, GPC and FERC

are still in the process of determining whether the antitrust

provisions even conflict with Order 888, as well as hc. to

deal with any such inconsistency’ Accordingly, this issue is

not appropriate for judicial review at this time

B. Constitutional Challenge Fifth Amendment Takings

Clause

Puget and amicus curiae Pacific Legal Foundation

(Pacific) contend that Order 888 violates the Takings Clause

of the Fifth Amendment. These petitioners maintain that

Order 888’s open access requirement engineers a “taking” in

two ways: First, that FERC’s open access requirement effects

a regulatory taking by arbitrarily changing pricing

methodology in a way that excessively deprives transmission

owners of their investments in facilities; and, second, that the

open access requirement allows a physical invasion, a

permanent physical occupation, by taking away the

transmission owners’ right to exclude competitors from their

transmission property. We cannot grant relief on either

ground

When the action of the federal government effects a

“taking” for Fifth Amendment purposes, there is no inherent

constitutional defect, provided just compensation is available

At bottom, both of the petitioners’ Fifth Amendment claims

turn not on whether open access effects a taking, but whether

$

GPC’s management of the Georgia ITS is subject to the direction

of a committee that includes Dalton representatives

27a

FERC’s cost-based transmission pricing policies in the end

provide just compensation. The remedy of just compensation

is not within our jurisdiction but that of the United States

Court of Federal Claims, under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1491. See Bell Atlantic Tel. Cos. v. Federal

Communications Comm'n, 24 F.3d 1441, 1444 n.1 (DC. Cir.

1994); Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. United States,

987 F.2d 806, 815-16 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

We recognize that our jurisdiction to review an agency's

construction of a statute necessarily involves an exercise of

[Page 24]the policy of avoiding constitutional issues where

possible, even though the issues may concern arguable

takings amenable to Tucker Act remedy, “when ‘there is an

identifiable class of cases in which application of a statute

will necessarily constitute a taking.” Bell Atlantic, 24 F.3d

at 1445 (DC. Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Riverside

Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 128 n.5 (1985)). We

need not decide whether this case falls within that category,

however, because even if it did, any takings problem created

by Order 888 does not raise such significant constitutional

doubt as to require us to construe the FPA to prohibit FERC

from ordering open access. If there is a taking, and a claim

for just compensation, then that is a Tucker Act matter to be

pursued in the Court of Federal Claims, and not before us.

lI] FEDERAL VERSUS STATE JURISDICTION OVER

TRANSMISSION SERVICES

Vertically integrated utilities use their own facilities to

generate, transmit, and distribute electricity to their

customers. Traditionally, the customer paid one combined

rate for both the power and its delivery, thus the industry

refers to such sales as “bundled.” To the extent that bundled

sales are made directly to the end user of the electricity, they

are also recognized as retail sales. Utilities may also sell the

electricity they generate at wholesale to other utilities or

other resellers of power, which then resell that power to their

own customers. Thus, the same utility may use its facilities

28a

to serve both retail and wholesale customers. Vertically

integrated utilities use their transmission facilities to move

electricity over long distances, and use local distribution lines

to deliver the electricity to the end user.

Even before Congress enacted the FPA, the Supreme

Court held that states could not regulate wholesale sales of

electricity. See Public Utils. Comm’n of RI. v. Attleboro

Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927). A few years later in

1935, Congress included in the FPA a provision giving the

Federal Power Commission, FERC’s predecessor agency, the

authority to regulate “the sale of [electric] energy at whole-

[Page 25]sale,” as well as “the transmission of electric energy

in interstate commerce.” FPA § 201(a), 16 US.C. § 824(a)

(1994) FERC also limited federal regulation “to those

matters which are not subject to regulation by the States,” id ,

and reserved to the states “jurisdiction .. over facilities used

for the generation of electric energy or over facilities used in

local distribution or only for the transmission of electric

energy in intrastate commerce...” FPA § 201(b), 16 U.S.C

§ 824(b). Pursuant to these provisions, FERC has regulated

wholesale power sales and interstate transmissions, and state

agencies have retained jurisdiction over bundled retail

transactions, including service issues and the intrastate sale

and distribution of electricity through local distribution

facilities.

Initially, as most transactions involved either a

wholesale or a retail sale, and correspondingly transmission

or local distribution facilities, this regulatory division of

labor was straight-forward in application. Indeed, in 1935,

when Congress enacted the FPA, the networks of high-

voltage, long-distance transmission lines which today

crisscross the United States did not exist. Instead, vertically

integrated utilities individually built facilities sufficient to

meet the power needs of their customers. Over time,

however, the landscape of the electric industry changed.

to consumers. These industry participants do not

transmission lines, so they rely upon the utilities that

such facilities to provide transmission services. In addition

electricity at wholesale. Some states even mandate

unbundling of retail services. As a result of these changes,

facilities once used solely for local distribution of bundled

retail sales now engage regularly in [Page 26}Junbundled

wholesale transmissions and retail delivery as well. Thus,

while the electricity world once neatly divided into spheres

of retail versus wholesale sales and local distribution versus

transmission facilities, such is no longer the case

In Order 888, FERC reinterpreted FPA § 201 to

accommodate the new industry practices and conditions.

FERC left the regulation of bundled retail transmissions to

the states, concluding that “when transmission is sold at retail

as part and parcel of the delivered product called electric

energy, the transaction is a sale of electric energy at retail.”

Order 888, 9 31,036 at 31,781. Nevertheless, FERC asserted

jurisdiction over all unbundled retail transmissions, and left

to the states only the sales portion of unbundled retail

transactions, on the ground that FPA § 201 gives it

jurisdiction without qualification over all transmission by

public utilities in interstate commerce. See id. Also, while

acknowledging that FPA § 201(b) explicitly places retail

transmissions by “facilities used in local distribution” beyond

the Commission’s jurisdiction, FERC adopted a seven factor

that category, and claimed exclusive authority over those that

30a

do not. See id. at 31,780, 31,784. In the present litigation,

each of these changes is challenged, with some petitioners

claiming that FERC went too far, and others contending that

the Commission did not go far enough in asserting

jurisdiction.

A. Bundled Retail Sales

Several state regulatory commissions complain that

FERC exceeded the boundaries of its statutory authority by

asserting jurisdiction over unbundled retail transmissions.

These state petitioners argue that the plain meaning and

history of FPA § 201(a) gives FERC the authority to regulate

only transmissions of electricity consumed in a state other

than that in which the electricity was generated, if the

transmission was not otherwise subject to state regulation.

The states historically have regulated retail transmissions as

part of bundled retail sales of electricity, while FERC has

regulated wholesale transmissions; and the division of

regulatory jurisdiction should not change merely because

those transac-[Page 27]tions have now been unbundled into

separate generation, transmission, and sales components.

Two groups of transmission dependent utilities, TAPS

and TDU Systems, and the nation’s largest power wholesaler,

Enron Power Marketing (collectively the “unbundling and

discounting” or “U&D” petitioners), both intervene on the

side of FERC with respect to the states’ claim, and separately

challenge FERC’s interpretation of its jurisdiction on

different grounds. The U&D petitioners contend that FERC

impermissibly limited its jurisdiction by leaving the

regulation of bundled retail transmissions to the states.

These parties maintain that FERC has the authority to

regulate both bundled and unbundled retail transmissions,

and that FERC violates FPA § 206 by limiting the scope of

Order 888 to the latter. To establish that bulk transmission

by utilities is transmission in interstate commerce regardless

of whether the power is sold at wholesale or retail, the U&D

petitioners cite particularly FPC v. Florida Power & Light

3la

Co., 404 U.S. 453 (1972), and Jersey Central Power & Light

Co. v. FPC, 319 U.S. 61 (1943), two of the cases relied upon

by FERC in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, ] 32,514 at

33,135-42. As further support that FERC’s jurisdiction

extends to all interstate transmissions, the U&D petitioners

offer NGA precedent recognizing FERC’s authority over all

interstate gas transportation, if not the gas being transported.

See, e.g. FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 406 U.S. 621,

636 (1972); United Distribution Cos. v. FERC, 88 F.3d 1105,

1153 (DC. Cir. 1996) (UDC); Mississippi River

Transmission Corp. v. FERC, 969. F.2d 1215 (D.C. Cir.

1992). These petitioners contend that excluding bundled

retail transmissions from the OATT will permit

discrimination and give owners a competitive advantage,

contrary to the mandate of FPA § 206(a) that FERC

eliminate undue. discrimination. Accordingly, the U&D

petitioners claim that FERC erred when it declined to

mandate functional unbundling for an owner’s transmissions

to bundled retail customers of (1) its own generated power or

(2) power purchased at wholesale.

In response to these challenges, FERC maintains that the

plain meaning of FPA § 201 gives the Commission jurisdic-

[Page 28]tion over all interstate transmissions without

qualification, while at the same time limiting jurisdiction

over sales to wholesale sales. Relying particularly on Florida

Power & Light and Jersey Central Power & Light, FERC

asserts broad jurisdiction over all transmission activities in

interstate commerce.- As for bundled retail sales, FERC’s

position is that once the transmission service is bundled with

generation and local distribution, it becomes merely a

component of the retail sale itself, over which FERC has no

jurisdiction. FERC maintains that natural gas jurisprudence

is inapplicable because the language of the NGA and FPA

differ on this issue, and the natural gas cases turned on the

existence of a regulatory gap that does not exist in the

electricity feld. FERC also asserts that its interpretation of

the FPA’s jurisdictional grant is entitled to deference under

32a

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,

467 U. S. 837 (1984).

Both FPA § 201(a) and (b) clearly and unambiguously

confer upon FERC jurisdiction over the “transmission of

electric energy in interstate commerce.” FPA § 201(c)

further provides that “electric energy shall be held to be

transmitted in interstate commerce if transmitted from a State

and consumed at any point outside thereof.” 16 U.S.C. §

824(c). In both Florida Power & Light and Jersey Central

Power & Light, the Supreme Court considered whether

certain indirect transmissions of electrical power across state

lines represented transmissions in interstate commerce.

Jersey Central Power & Light involved the transmission

of energy generated by Jersey Central in New Jersey. Jersey

Central transmitted electricity to the New Jersey transmission

facilities of another company, Public Service, which then

transmitted the power first to another of its New Jersey

facilities, and then on to a facility owned by yet a third

company and located in the middle of a body of water

separating New Jersey from Staten Island, New York. The

third company in the chain then transmitted the energy first

to its own facilities in New York, then finally and ultimately

to consumers in New York. Jersey Central’s own

transmission facilities were located solely in New Jersey, and

as were [Page 29]the facilities used by Public Service to

receive the transmissions from Jersey Central.

The Supreme Court recognized that Jersey Central had

no control over the transmissions’ destination once the

electricity was delivered to Public Service, see Jersey

Central, 319 U.S. at 65, and that the total flow of electricity

from Jersey Central to New York was small. See id. at 66.

Nevertheless, because some electricity generated by Jersey

Central in New Jersey was consumed in New York, the Court

upheld FERC’s jurisdiction under FPA § 201, over Jersey

Central’s transmission facilities as utilized for transmissions

in interstate’s commerce. See id. at 67. The Court said that,

33a

under FPA § 201(a) and (b), FERC’s power extends over all

facilities “which transmit energy actually moving in

interstate commerce.” Id at 72. The Court emphasized,

however, that “mere connection” of one utility’s transmission

facilities to those of another transmitting in interstate

commerce was insufficient for jurisdiction under FPA § 201.

Id.

The Court revisited the issue in Florida Power & Light,

which involved certain Florida and Georgia utilities who

voluntarily connected their transmission facilities to

coordinate their activities and exchange power as required to

meet temporary needs. Like Jersey Central, FP&L’s

transmission facilities were confined to Florida, and none of

FP&L’s transmission lines directly connected with those of

out-of-state companies. Nevertheless, because FP&L was a

member of a group of interconnected utilities, its

transmission lines connected with those of other Florida

utilities; and the lines of one of those other utilities, Florida

Power Corp., interconnected just short of Florida’s northern

border with those of Georgia Power Co. Records indicated

that power transfers between FP&L and Florida Power

coincided with transfers between Florida Power and Georgia

Power.

In Jersey Central, logs of the relevant companies

demonstrated at least a dozen occasions when facilities in

New York drew power from certain lines at times when

Jersey Central was the only supplier of electricity to those

lines. See Florida Power & Light, 404 U.S. at 459. By way

of contrast, [Page 30] there was no similar evidence that

power generated by FP&L specifically passed through

Florida Power to Georgia Power, with Florida Power serving

as a mere conduit. See id. At best, company records

demonstrated instances when transfers between FP&L and

Florida Power occurred at or about the same time as transfers

between Florida Power and Georgia Power. See id. at 457.

34a

Instead, the Court considered two theories by which

FP&L’s power could be deemed transmitted across state

lines. The first posited a cause and effect relationship by

which every flick of a light switch would cause every

generator on a multi-state interconnected system to produce

some quantity of additional electricity to maintain the

system’s balance, and thus to transmit electric energy

throughout the system and across state lines. The second

theory suggested that where the transmission lines of two

utilities interconnect, their energy commingles, such that

inevitably some energy transmitted by FP&L to Florida

» wer was then transmitted to Georgia Power and across

state lines.

Despite its statement in Jersey Central that “mere

connection determines nothing,” 319 U.S. at 72, the Court

relied on the second of these theories to conclude that FP&L

facilities were transmitting energy in interstate commerce,

and left open the possible validity of the cause and effect

theory. See 404 U.S. at 462-63. Writing in dissent, Justice

Douglas characterized the Court’s opinion as “mean{ing] that

every privately owned interconnected facility in the United

States...is within the [Federal Power Commission’s]

jurisdiction,” such that otherwise local utilities would now be

subject to the mandates of the federal bureaucracy. Id. at 471

(Douglas, J., dissenting).

The Supreme Court has interpreted the language in FPA

§ 201 regarding FERC’s jurisdiction over transmissions in

interstate commerce. We are bound by the High Court's

dictates to conclude that the FPA gives FERC the authority

to regulate transmissions at issue here, whether retail or

wholesale. Even if the Court had not so spoken, however,

and even if we independently concluded that the statute’s text

[Page 31]was less than clear, it is the law of this circuit that

the deferential standard of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural

Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), applies to

an agency’s interpretation of its own statutory jurisdiction.

35a

See Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. FERC, 28 F.3d 1281,

1283-84 (D.C. Cir. 1994). As guided by Chevron, unless

Congress has directly spoken to the contrary, or FERC has

unreasonably or impermissibly interpreted the statute, we

must defer to the Commission’s construction of ambiguous

provisions of the FPA. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. In

this age of interconnected transmission grids, and given the

accompanying technological complexities, we would be hard

pressed to conclude that FERC’s interpretation of § 201(c) as

giving it jurisdiction over both wholesale and retail

transmissions is unreasonable or impermissible.

Nevertheless, we are not persuaded that this conclusion

requires FERC to mandate unbundling and assert jurisdiction

overall retail transmissions. Just as FPA § 201 gives FERC

jurisdiction over transmissions in interstate commerce and

sales at wholesale, the statute also clearly contemplates state

jurisdiction over local distribution facilities and retail sales.

The statute is much less clear about exactly where the lines

between those activities are to be drawn. A regulator could

reasonably construe transmissions bundled with generation

and delivery services and sold to a consumer for a single

charge as either transmission services in interstate commerce

or as an integral component of a retail sale. Yet FERC has

jurisdiction over one, while the states have jurisdiction over

the other. FERC’s decision to characterize bundled

transmissions as part of retail sales subject to state

jurisdiction therefore represents a statutorily permissible

policy choice to which we must also defer under Chevron.

Accordingly, we affirm FERC’s decisions in Order 888 to

assert jurisdiction over unbundled retail transmissions while

leaving regulation of bundled retail transmissions to the

states.

B. Local Distribution Facilities

FPA §201(b) explicitly excludes from FERC jurisdiction

“facilities used in local distribution or only for the transmis-

[Page 32]sion of electric energy in intrastate commerce.” 16

36a

U.S.C. § 824(b)(1). Historically, wholesale sales have not

for the most part involved local distribution facilities. FERC

claims that increased unbundling gives resellers the

opportunity to reconfigure the wholesale sales so that they

might now occur on those facilities which traditionally have

been treated as local distribution facilities. | Moreover,

FERC’s assertion of jurisdiction over the transmission

component of unbundled retail sales blurred the line between

local distribution facilities and facilities used for transmission

in interstate commerce

In Order 888, FERC claimed exclusive authority over

the regulation of facilities which sell and transmit electricity

at wholesale to customers who will resell the electricity to

end users. With respect to unbundled retail sales, FERC

acknowledged that transmissions by “facilities used in local

distribution” are beyond the Commission’s jurisdiction,

while facilities engaged in interstate transmission are subject

to FERC jurisdiction under FPA § 201(a). Thus FERC

adopted a seven factor jurisdictional test to identify whether a

facility is a local distribution facility subject to state

jurisdiction or a facility engaged in interstate transmission

subject to FERC jurisdiction.” In short, under Order 888,

’ The Commission’s seven factor test involves evaluating on a case-

by-case basis whether the activities of the facilities in question

correspond with seven specific indicators of local distribution:

(1) Local distribution facilities are normally in close proximity to

retail customers.

(2) Local distribution facilities are primarily radial in character.

(3) Power flows into local distribution systems; it rarely, if ever,

flows out.

(4) When power enters a local distribution system, it is not

reconsigned or transported on to some other market.

(5) Power entering a local distribution system is consumed in a

comparatively restricted geographic area.

(6) Meters are based at the transmission/local distribution interface

to measure flows into the local distribution system.

(7) Local distribution systems will be of reduced voltage.

Order 888, 4 31,036 at 31,981.

37a

when a [Page 33)public utility is engaged in wholesale

transmission, FERC has jurisdiction regardless of the nature

of the facility, but when the public utility is engaged in

unbundled retail transmission, the facts and circumstances

will determine whether the facilities are subject to FERC or

state jurisdiction.

The state petitioners argue that FERC’s dual approach

radically expands its jurisdiction and violates Congress’

explicit directive in FPA § 201(b) that regulation of local

distribution facilities be left to the states. The states contend

that Congress clearly intended to preserve state jurisdiction

over local distribution facilities, regardless of whether the

energy comes from out of state or the sale is a wholesale sale

The states maintain that, by claiming jurisdiction over any

facility transporting energy for resale, regardless of whether

the facility might otherwise be a local distribution facility

under the seven factor test, FERC has adopted the circular

reasoning that wholesale sales do not occur on local

distribution facilities, so any facility that engages in

wholesale activities is not a local distribution facility. The

states contend further that FERC offers no reasoned analysis

of why local distribution should be defined differently for

wholesale versus retail sales. The states finally charge that,

under Order 888, nearly identical facilities would be under

federal jurisdiction and state jurisdiction for different

customers receiving indistinguishable service. Such a

situation, they contend, will only encourage energy marketers

to choose their regulator by using middlemen to shift the

point at which title to the power transfers, and thus

undermine the jurisdictional certainty that Order 888 states is

necessary for competition.

FERC responds that it is not asserting jurisdiction over

local distribution facilities, but assers that when a public

utility delivers unbundled energy at wholesale to a supplier

for the purpose of resale to an end user, FPA § 201 gives

FERC unqualified authority to assert jurisdiction over the

38a

facility used to effect that transaction. When the public

utility is engaged in unbundled retail transmission, however,

[Page 34] the circumstances of a specific case will determine

whether the facilities used are subject to FERC or state

jurisdiction. The arguments by the states do no more than

raise policy concerns which are for FERC and not the court.

See Arent v. Shalala, 70 F.3d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

Intervening again on FERC’s behalf on this issue, the

U&D petitioners add that FERC’s use of different tests is

appropriate given the differences in the two separate

jurisdictional grants of FPA § 201. The interveners argue

that, given the statute’s clear grant to FERC of jurisdictior

over all aspects of wholesale sales FERC is fully justified in

employing a functional test to identify wholesale

transmissions. In contrast, because FERC’s jurisdiction over

retail sales is limited to transmissions in interstate commerce,

the seven factor test is more appropriate.

We agree that FERC’s dual approach to assessing its

jurisdiction stems from the fact that FPA § 201 contains

more than one jurisdictional grant. FPA § 201(b) denies

FERC jurisdiction over local distribution facilities “except as

specifically provided in this subchapter and subchapter III.

16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (emphasis added). FPA § 201(a)

makes clear that all aspects of wholesale sales are subject to

federal regulation, regardless of the facilities used. FERC’s

assertion of jurisdiction over all wholesale transmissions,

regardless of the nature of the facility, is clearly within the

scope of its statutory authority. Moreover, various cases

support the proposition that FERC regulates all aspects of

wholesale transactions. See, e.g, Duke Power Co. v. FPC,

401 F.2d 930, 935-36 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (noting that the FPC

regulates public utility facilities used in wholesale

transmissions or sales in interstate commerce), Arkansas

Power & Light Co. v. FPC, 368 F.2d 376, 383 (8th Cir.

1966) (stating that the functional use of the transmission

lines—wholesale versus retail—controls), | Wisconsin-

39a

Michigan Power Co. v. FPC, 197 F.2d 472, 477 (7th Cir.

1952) (finding that transmission facilities used at wholesale

are not “local distribution facilities”).

[Page 35] The seven factor test applies only to

unbundled retail sales, where FERC seeks to regulate

pursuant to the separate grant of jurisdictional authority over

transmissions in interstate commerce. In this context, the

definition of “facilities used in local distribution” becomes

relevant. The statute does not define “facilities used in local

distribution,” but instead leaves that task to FERC. As

Chevron counsels us, FERC’s interpretation of undefined and

ambiguous statutory terms is entitled to deference. See

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.

FERC has adopted a multi-factor test to determine the

nature of transmission facilities. In a footnote, Order 888

says that distribution-only facilities which sell only at retail

will still be considered local distribution facilities. See Order

888, | 31,036 at 31,981 n.99. This is consistent with the fact

that states historically have regulated bundled retail sales to

end users. However, Order 888 implicitly recognizes the

current reality that many primarily retail utilities engage in

both local distribution and interstate transmissions, and seeks

through the seven factors to discern each facility’s primary

function. We cannot agree with the state petitioners that this

approach is unreasonable or otherwise impermissible

IV. RECIPROCITY

Section 6 of the Tariff contains a reciprocity provision

resting on the principle that any public utility offering “non-

discriminatory open access transmission for the benefit of

customers should be able to obtain the same non-

discriminatory access in return.” Order 888, J 31,036 at

31,760. Non-public _utilities—those outside _ the

state-owned, see 16 U.S.C. § 824(f)}—would otherwise not

have to offer open-access. Under the Tariff, a public utility

40a

does not have to offer them access unless they reciprocate.

In order to avoid controversies between public and non-

public utilities regarding reciprocal service, the Commission

adopted a voluntary “safe harbor” provision pursuant to

which non-public utilities could submit a transmission tariff

to the Commission for a [Page 36]determination whether it

satisfied the reciprocity condition. If it did, the public utility

would have to offer service; if it did not, the public utility

could refuse service (although it had the option of waiving

the reciprocity condition, as did the Commission itself).

A. Indirect Regulation of Non-Jurisdictional Utilities

Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD), a state entity,

provides electrical generation, transmission and distribution

service to wholesale and retail customers throughout

Nebraska.’ It claims that the Commission, through the

reciprocity provision, has reached beyond its statutory

authority and is illegally attempting to regulate entities,

including NPPD, over which the Commission has no

jurisdiction, in violation of the Federal Power Act and the

Tenth Amendment to the Constitution. NPPD admits that

pursuant to Nebraska law, all state power districts are

obligated to provide open access transmission service. They

have been doing so for years. This is doubtless why, after

Order No. 888 issued, another Nebraska public power district

so easily obtained a safe harbor declaration. See Omaha Pub.

Power Dist., 81 F.E.R.C. 4 61,054 (1997). In light of this,

the Commission argues—and we agree—that NPPD’s

petition is unripe. Since NPPD already offers open access

transmission, it is far from certain that the reciprocity

7 “Nebraska is unique among the States in the Union in that all

seston and distributi =n ided by

generation, Wansmuenes Seton ond distribution ey — - =

responsible to, and serve at the voting pleasure of, the rate-payers they

serve.” NPPD Brief at 2.

4la

provision will have any effect on it.* It certainly

demonstrated any particular hardship that it would

we refused to engage in judicial review

See AT&T Corp. v. lowa Utils. Bd., 525 U. S. 366, 386

(1999). From all that appears, no public utility has refused,

or even threatened to refuse, to give NPPD access to its

transmission system in the wake of [Page 37] Order No.

888.” Given the fact that public utilities may waive the

reciprocity provision anyway, and that NPPD has the same

option of obtaining a safe harbor as did the Omaha Public

Power District, we are not persuaded that the provision is

currently altering NPPD’s conduct of its affairs or that

withholding judicial review will cause it any hardship

whatever. “Unlike the drug manufacturers in Abbott

Laboratories [v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967)], but like the

cosmetics companies in Toilet Goods Ass’n v. Gardner, 387

U.S. 158, 164 (1967), NPPD need not change its “behavior

or risk costly sanctions.” Clean Air Implementation Project

v. EPA, 150 F.3d 1200, 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Furthermore,

exactly how the Commission will fill in the contours of the

reciprocity provision remains to be seen. That it may defer to

state commissions) as it indicated in Houston Lighting &

Power Co., 81 F.E.R.C. ¥ 61,015 (1997), order on reh’g, 83

F.E.R.C. J 61,181 (1998), affects NPPD’s contention that the

Commission is seeking to bring about nationwide uniformity

by forcing non-public utilities to comply with its “detailed

mandates.” NPPD Brief at 5. We therefore believe the

issues raised would benefit from a more concrete setting in

which NPPD can demonstrate exactly how the reciprocity

provision has affected its primary conduct. See Clean Air

. The Commission made clear thai existing contracts will not be

affected. See Order 888-A, 4 31,048 at 30,181.

’ For this reason we find unpersuasive NPPD’s claim that the

Tariff's reciprocity provision places it at a disadvantage in negotiations

because a public utility may simply refuse to provide service without any

fear of a Commission caforcement action. See NPPD Reply Brief at 4-5.

42a

Implementation Project, 150 F.3d at 1204. For all these

reasons, NPPD’s challenge to the reciprocity provision is not

ripe for judicial review.

B. Limitation on Reciprocity

The Investor Owned Utilities (IOUs) challenge the

following limitation on reciprocity: non-public utilities owe

reciprocal open access only to the public utility from which

they take open access service—not to all utilities. See IOU

Brief at 40-44; IOU Reply Brief at 18-29. These petitioners

argue that the Commission has left open the door for non-

public utilities [Page 38] to discriminate against all other

utilities and that it has done so solely because of tax

considerations that no longer apply.

We agree with Commission counsel that tax

considerations were not the only basis on which the

Commission’s limitation rested. The Commission stated that

“the reciprocity requirement strikes an appropriate balance

by limiting its application to circumstances in which the non-

public utility seeks to take advantage of open access on a

public utility’s system.” Order 888, 31,036 at 31,762. The

Commission also explained that it “dof[es] not have the

authority to require non-public utilities to make their systems

generally available.” Id. at 31,761. The Commission stated

also that it did not want broad open access reciprocity to

jeopardize the tax-exempt financing non-public utilities

enjoy,'° that the IRS was then reexamining the question, id.

at 31,762, and that if the tax issue is favorably resolved, it

will reconsider the matter. Order 888-A, 9 31,048 at 30,287.

The IRS has now acted. See Temporary Regulations

§ 1.141-7T(f), in 63 Fed. Reg. 3256 (1998). The lOUs argue

that we must therefore remand for reconsideration. See IOU

Brief at 44 (citing Panhandle Eastern Pipeline v. FERC, 890

10 See 26 U.S.C. §§ 141, 142 (permitting “private activity” bonds and

“local furnishing” bonds, respectively).

43a

F.2d 435, 439 (D.C. Cir, 1989); National Fuel Gas

Corp. v. FERC, 899 F.2d 1244, 1249-50 (D.C. Cir. 1990):

Ciba-Geigy v. EPA, 46 F.3d 1208 (D.C. Cir, 1995)).

We think not. So far as we know, the IRS has not

finalized its temporary and proposed regulations. The IRS

acknowledges that its temporary regulations “raised[ ] a

number of complex technical issues” many of which “may

need to be addressed legislatively” and it anticipates that the

finalization process will take three years to accomplish. 63

Fed. Reg. at 3258-59. Second, as the Commission indicates,

the possible tax consequences of requiring open access from

non-jurisdictional utilities was its secondary concern. The

Commission’s greater concern was its lack of jurisdiction to

do what the IOUs ask And lastly the Commission should be

[Page 39] taken at its word that it will reconsider the scope of

reciprocity when and if the temporary tax regulations are

finalized.

V. STRANDED COST RECOVERY PROVISIONS

Ordering open access transmission, Order 888-A

explains that “[t]he most critical transition issue that arises as

a result of the Commission’s actions in this rulemaking is

how to deal with the uneconomic sunk costs that utilities

prudently incurred under an industry regime that rested on a

regulatory framework and a set of expectations that are being

fundamentally altered.” Order 888-A, 7 31,048 at 30,346.

“If a former wholesale requirements customer or a former

retail customer uses the new open access to reach a new

supplier,” FERC said, “we believe that the utility is entitled

to recover legitimate, prudent and verifiable costs that it

incurred under the prior regulatory regime.” Order 888, 1

31,036 at 31,789. |

According to FERC, these “stranded” costs consist pre

dominantly of costs of building generation capacity, which

utilities incurred with the expectation that they would use the

additional capacity to serve existing customers. See Notice

44a

of Proposed Rulemaking, Recovery of Stranded Costs by

Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, FERC Stats. &

Regs. 932,507 at 32,863-64, 59 Fed. Reg. 35,274 (1994)

(“Stranded Cost NOPR”). Because of the increased

competition in the generation market that will result from

open access, this capacity may become underutilized or

uneconomical, i.e., “stranded.” Stranded costs also include

nonrecurring costs approved by regulators that, in order to

avoid rate increases, were recovered over a period of years

instead of at the time the expenditures were made. Known as

“regulatory assets,” these costs include deferred income

taxes, deferred pension and other employee benefit and

retirement costs, research and development, extraordinary

property losses, and the phase-in of new plant costs. Nuclear

decommissioning costs and costs to buy out high-priced fuel

and power contracts may also become stranded as a result of

open access.

[Page 40] Exercising its exclusive jurisdiction over

wholesale power sales, FERC through Order 888 gave

utilities the opportunity to recover their stranded costs from

former wholesale customers who take advantage of open

access transmission to purchase power from other suppliers.

Order 888, J 31,036 at 31,810. With respect to stranded

costs resulting from state-ordered retail wheeling, Order 888

provides that FERC will consider stranded cost claims only

when state regulatory agencies lack authority to do so. Id. at

31,824-25. Order 888 also designated FERC as the primary

forum for stranded cost claims stemming from what are

known as new municipalizations and municipal annexations.

See Order 888-A, 9 31,048 at 30,404; Order 888-B, 81 FERC

at 62,104. Stranded costs in these situations result from retail

(as opposed to wholesale) power sales.

Petitioners challenge nearly every aspect of FERC’s

stranded cost policy as set forth in Order 888, from the

mechanics of calculating customers’ stranded cost

obligations to whether FERC has authority to address

45a

stranded costs at all. We begin with those challenges that

relate to the recovery of wholesale stranded costs (Section

V.A), then turn to challenges to Order 888’s treatment of

retail stranded costs (Section V.B). We affirm FERC’s

stranded cost policy in all respects, except we vacate that

portion of the orders dealing with the treatment of energy

costs in the market option and remand to FERC for further

explanation. See Section V.A.5.c.

A. V_ ‘‘esale Stranded Costs

In... _ ™"@ nondiscriminatory open access transmission

as a remedy for undue discrimination, FERC recognized that

it “cannot change the rules of the game without providing a

mechanism for recovery of the costs caused by such

regulatory-mandated change.” Order 888-A, J 31,048 at

30,346. Under the pre-open access regulatory regime,

utilities entered into long-term contracts to make wholesale

power sales to municipal, cooperative, and investor-owned

utilities. See Stranded Cost NOPR, { 32,507 at 32,862.

Because these customers had no source of power supply

other than [Page 41] their historic utility, these contracts were

typically extended at the end of their term. This produced an

implicit obligation by the utilities to continue satisfying their

customers’ power needs, as well as a reciprocal expectation

by customers of continued service. See-id. at 32,863-64. To

satisfy expected customer demand, utilities invested money,

built facilities, and entered into long-term fuel or power

contracts, relying on the “regulatory compact” under which

utility shareholders accepted lower rates of return on their

investment in exchange for the certainty of regulated rates

and resulting ability to recover prudently incurred costs. See

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Promoting Wholesale

Competition Through Open Access Non-discriminatory

Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of

Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities,

FERC Stats. & Regs. 32,514 at 33,049, 60 Fed. Reg. 17,662

(1995).

46a

Order 888 fundamentally undermines utilities’

expectation of continued service and cost recovery. A

utility's requirements customers may now use the utility's

open access transmission service to purchase power from

other suppliers at the end of their contract terms. if

customers leave before paying their share of costs the historic

utility incurred on their behalf, the utility will be left with

stranded costs, which it will either absorb or shift to

remaining customers.

Unless utilities are able to recover stranded costs, FERC

reasoned, their ability to compete and attract investor capital

in a deregulated market may be seriously impaired. FERC

therefore decided that it had to “address recovery of the

transition costs of moving from a monopoly-regulated regime

to one in which all sellers can compete on a fair basis and in

which electricity is more competitively priced.” Order 888, {

31,036 at 31,635. In reaching this conclusion, FERC relied

on its experience in restructuring the natural gas industry,

where this court faulted it for failing to provide transitional

mechanisms such as stranded cost recovery. FERC

explained: “We have learned from our experience in the

natural gas area the importance of addressing competitive

transition issues early and with as much certainty to market

participants as possible.” Id.

[Page 42] In shaping its stranded cost recovery

mechanism, FERC had to balance two competing interests:

speeding the transition to competition versus protecting

utilities that had incurred costs with the expectation that their

customers would remain and eventually pay those costs

through electricity rates. Allowing recovery of stranded

costs, FERC acknowledged, would delay full realization of

the benefits of open access-lower electricity rates—because

customers facing stranded cost liability might continue

purchasing power from their historic utility even though

competitors are selling power at lower rates. See Order 888-

A, 9 31,048 at 30,355. Indeed, a customer would only switch

47a

suppliers if the competitor offered a rate less than the historic

utility’s rate plus the customer’s stranded cost liability. But

given the highly regulated nature of the electricity industry,

in which utilities incurred costs with the expectation of

recouping them, FERC concluded that the delay was a

necessary component of its open access program. See id.

Mindful of its ultimate goal of converting the electricity

industry into a competitive market, however, FERC

fashioned the stranded cost recovery provisions to be

transitional, allowing utilities to recover stranded costs only

in connection with wholesale requirements contracts entered

into on or before July 11, 1994 (the date of the stranded cost

notice of proposed rulemaking). See 18 CFR.

§ 35.26(b)(8), 35.26(c)(1)(v)-(vi).

As to precisely who should pay for stranded costs,

utilities and customers not surprisingly had dramatically

different positions. Customers argued that utilities should

absorb most, if not all, stranded costs. Utilities (and their

investors) argued that customers should pay.

Facing an enormously difficult task in balancing these

sharply conflicting positions, FERC crafted a rule that

requires customers to pay stranded costs but only in certain

circumstances. Most important, in order to recover stranded

costs from a customer, the historic utility must prove that it

had a reasonable expectation of continued service to that

particular customer for a certain number of years beyond the

end of the contract term, a utility unable to prove such an

expectation may not recover stranded costs under Order 888.

[Page 43] See 18 C.F.R. § 35.26(c)(2)(i). Moreover, a utility

able to demonstrate a reasonable expectation of continued

service may recover stranded costs only if its wholesale

customer actually takes advantage of the utility’s open access

tariff to obtain access to a new generation supplier at the end

of its contract term (i.e., the former customer continues to use

the historic utility’s transmission service but no longer

purchases power from it). See 18 CFR. § 35,26(b)(1)(i).

48a

Through these two limitations, FERC balanced the interests

of utilities and customers by allowing utilities to recover their

stranded costs only if they can demonstrate a reasonable

expectation of continued service and requiring customers to

pay those costs only if they take advantage of their historic

utility’s open access transmission to reach cheaper sources of

power. And of course, no customer will have to pay stranded

costs at all if it continues purchasing power from its historic

utility throughout the period during which the utility has a

reasonable expectation of continued service—precisely what

the customer would have done in the absence of Order 888's

open access requirement.

Under Order 888, stranded costs are calculated on a

“revenues lost” basis. A departing customer’s stranded cost

obligation equals the estimated revenue it would have paid

had it continued to purchase power from the historic utility

minus the current market value of the power it would have

purchased, calculated over the period the utility is determined

to have a reasonable expectation of continued service to that

customer. See 18 C.F.R. § 35.26(c)(2)(iii). In other words,

the stranded cost formula is not tied to particular stranded

assets or contractual commitments, but rather awards utilities

the difference between the pre-open access cost-based rate

and the post-open access market rate. Once a customer's

stranded cost liability is calculated, it may pay through a

lump-sum payment, installment payments, or a surcharge to

the transmission rate charged by the historic utility. See

Order 888, J 31,036 at 31,799.

Before turning to petitioners’ arguments, we emphasize

what should be obvious from the foregoing summary of

Order 888: Order 888 awards stranded costs to no one. It

does [Page 44] nothing more than establish a mechanism by

which utilities may seek to recover stranded costs. To

recover stranded costs, a utility must demonstrate its

continued expectation of service at an evidentiary hearing.

The customer may appear at that hearing and, through

49a

evidentiary submissions of its own, attempt to demonstrate

that the utility had no such expectation. Only after such a

hearing may FERC decide whether a utility can recover

stranded costs and, if so, how much.

Petitioners mount many challenges to Order 888’s

stranded cost recovery provisions. For purposes of analysis,

we group these challenges into five categories: (1) challenges

to FERC’s authority to provide for stranded cost recovery

(section V.A.1); (2) claims that Order 888 conflicts with cost

causation principles and case law developed under the

Natural Gas Act (section V.A.2); (3) challenges to FERC’s

Mobile-Sierra findings (section V.A.3); (4) claims that FERC

arbitrarily and capriciously failed to provide for stranded cost

recovery by certain entities, such as transmission dependent

utilities and generation and transmission cooperatives

(section V.A.4); and (5) challenges to various technical

aspects of Order 888’s stranded cost recovery provisions

(section V.A.5).

1. FERC’s Authority to Provide for Stranded Cost

Recovery

A group called Petitioners Opposing Stranded Cost

Recovery (“POSCR”) advances three challenges to FERC’s

authority to provide for stranded cost recovery: (1) as a

factual matter, utilities could never have had a reasonable

expectation of continued service to wholesale customers

beyond the contract term; (2) sections 206 and 212 of the

Federal Power Act (“FPA”) forbid stranded cost recovery;

and (3) our decision in Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v.

FERC, 28 F.3d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1994), holds that stranded cost

recovery is anticompetitive. We consider each argument in

turn.

a Reasonable expectation of continued service

To recover stranded costs relating to a specific departing

wholesale requirements customer, a utility must show that it

[Page 45]had a reasonable expectation of service to that

50a

customer beyond the term of its existing contract. See 18

CFR. § 35.26(c)(2)(i). Pointing out that contracts define

the extent of the parties’ obligations and that customers have

long exercised their rights to purchase power from other

suppliers at the end of their contract terms. POSCR contends

that utilities could never have had an expectation of service

eyond their contract terms. In considering this argument it

important to remember that Order 888 does not itself

award stranded costs; it merely establishes a procedure by

which utilities may petition FERC in individual proceedings

to recover stranded costs from a specific customer based on a

specific evidentiary showing. Utilities failing to show an

expectation of continued service will be unable to recover

stranded costs. POSCRs challenge thus amounts to a claim

that no utility could ever, under any circumstances, have had

a reasonable expectation to serve a wholesale customer

beyond the term of its contract. We review this claim under

the APA’s familiar arbitrary and capricious standard. See 5

U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Williams Field Services Group, Inc. v.

FERC, 194 F.3d 110, 115 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

Responding to this same challenge in Order 888-A,

FERC explained that utilities historically had an implicit

obligation to serve customers beyond the contract term for a

simple reason: Customers had no means of reaching

alternative suppliers. See Order 888-A, 4 31,048 at 30,354.

As part of that obligation to serve, FERC found, a local

utility “had a concomitant obligation to plan to supply [its]

customers’ continuing needs, and planned its system taking

account of the wholesale load. In many cases the wholesale

customers participated by supplying load forecasts.” Id. In

making capital decisions and predicting future demand,

utilities frequently consulted with their wholesale

requirements customers. For these reasons, FERC

concluded, utilities may have a reasonable expectation of

continued service to particular customers. See id. at 30,354-

55.

Sla

Not only is FERC’s judgment about utilities’ reasonable

expectations precisely the type of policy assessment to which

we owe great deference, but POSCR points to nothing sug-

[Page 46]gesting that FERC’s reasoning is arbitrary and

capricious. In fact, POSCRs argument completely ignores

the highly regulated nature of the electricity industry prior to

Order 888. Unlike competitive markets, where buyers may

freely purchase from many sellers, the monopolistic character

of the electricity industry, combined with the congressionally

highly dependent on a single supplier—their historic utility

Indeed, as interveners point out, utilities were even unable to

choose not to renew an expiring wholesale requirements

contract without first notifying FERC. See 18 C.F.R. § 35.15

(1995) (repealed by Order 888). Although it may well be

true, as POSCR argues, that some wholesale customers have

long been able to purchase unbundled transmission service,

we think such evidence is best reserved for individual

proceedings, where a department customer can attempt to

refute the utility’s claim that it had an expectation of

b. Sections 206 and 212 of the FPA

Section 206(a) of the FPA gives FERC authority to

“determine the just and reasonable rate, charge,

classification, rule, regulation, practice, or contract to be

thereafter observed and in force” if it finds that any existing

arrangement “is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory

or preferential.” 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a). Relying on section

206(a) as the basis for Order 888, FERC found that utilities

had used their monopoly transmission power to discriminate

against potential competitors and that such practices would

increase as competitive pressures in the industry increased.

Order 888, 31,036 at 31,676, 31,682.

POSCR contends that Order 888’s stranded cost

recovery provisions themselves violate FERC’s own

construction of section 206, the construction FERC relied on

52a

as the basis for the open access rule. According to POSCR,

“(t]he stranded cost rule perpetuates the very ‘discrimination’

FERC found unlawful, and subjects the same victims—

customers held hostage to uneconomic electric generation by

transmission monopolists—to continued abuse.”

[Page 47]In challenging FERC’s policy decision to

provide for stranded cost recovery, POSCR conflates the

violation (FERC’s generic determination that utilities’

practice of prohibiting access to their transmission lines on

reasonable terms was unduly discriminatory) with the

remedy (FERC’s more limited finding that recovery of

stranded costs in particular circumstances would not be

unduly discriminatory). FERC has not, as POSCR contends,

given “unduly discriminatory” different meanings, rather, it

has applied the term in different contexts.

POSCR’s argument thus boils down to a challenge to

FERC’s conclusion that the stranded cost recovery prescribed

in Order 888 is not unduly discriminatory, a challenge

meriting arbitrary and capricious review. Viewed through

this lens, we think FERC more than adequately explained

why it concluded that stranded cost recovery is not unduly

discriminatory—stranded cost recovery, FERC said, is

transitional only, follows cost causation principles, and

requires utilities to prove that they had a reasonable

expectation of continued service. FERC faced an

enormously difficult task. It had to balance the transition to

competitive markets against the need to maintain the

competitiveness of utilities that had incurred costs based on a

reasonable expectation that they would recoup them. We

find nothing either arbitrary or capricious in how FERC

struck this balance.

POSCR next contends that stranded cost recovery

violates section 212 of the FPA, which governs the rates for

transmission ordered by FERC pursuant to section 211. 16

U.S.C. §§ 824j-k. Because FERC-jurisdictional utilities are

no longer subject to sections 211 and 212, this argument

53a

relates only to those situations in which FERC orders

211 and these utilities then seek to recover stranded costs in

their transmission rates. See 18 C.F.R. § 35.26(c)(1)(vi)-

(vii). Section 212 allows FERC to order “rates, char zes,

terms, and conditions which permit the recovery by [a

transmitting] utility of all the costs incurred in connection

services, including, but not limited to, an appropriate share, if

any, of legitimate, verifiable and [Page 48] economic costs,

including taking into account any benefits to the transmission

system of providing the transmission service, and the costs of

any enlargement of transmission facilities.” 16 USC. §

824k(a). Contending that economic costs” cannot be read to

include payment of stranded costs, which by definition relate

to generation (not transmission) services, POSCR reads

section 212 to preclude stranded cost recovery.

Straightforward application of the Chevron doctrine

demonstrates the lack of merit in this argument. See

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,

467 U.S. 837 (1984). Because Congress has not “directly

spoken to the precise question at issue”—do “economic

costs” include stranded costs?—and because nothing in the

Statute precludes recovering through transmission rates costs

that were traditionally recovered through generation rates, the

term “economic costs” is ambiguous. Id. at 842.

Proceeding to Chevron’s second step, we ask whether

FERC has reasonably interpreted the term “economic costs.”

See id. at 843. We have no doubt that it has. As FERC

explained, but for section 211 wheeling orders, there would

be no stranded costs. Stranded costs, according to FERC, are

therefore economic costs of section 211 wheeling. See Order

888-A, J 31,048 at 30,390. POSCR offers nothing to

undermine this eminently reasonable interpretation of the

Statute.

c. Implications of Cajun

54a

Next, POSCR contends that our decision in Cajun Elec.

Power Coop., Inc. v. FERC, 28 F.3d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1994),

condemns stranded cost recovery as anticompetitive. A pre-

Order 888 decision, Cajun reviewed two tariffs allowing a

utility, Entergy Corporation, to sell power at market rates,

and a third tariff providing for open access to Entergy’s

transmission services at cost-based rates. The third tariff

gave Entergy an opportunity to recover stranded costs from

customers who no longer purchase power from Entergy but

use its transmission lines to reach other suppliers—exactly

the circumstances in which Order 888 provides for stranded

cost recovery. Under the tariff, the stranded cost charge was

included in Entergy’s transmission rate. See id. at 175-77.

[Page 49] Characterizing the stranded cost provision as a

“tying arrangement” under antitrust law, Cajun explained that

under the tariff, Entergy could charge a former customer for

the cost of generation services when the customer wished to

purchase only transmission services, because Entergy has a

monopoly over transmission, customers would have no

choice but to pay costs relating to generation they no longer

wanted from Entergy. Id. at 177-78. Thus, because “Entergy

could use its monopoly over transmission services to

eliminate competition in the market for generation services,”

the net effect of the tariffs may be anticompetitive. Id. at

176.

Of significance to this case, however, we did not strike

down the tariffs. Instead, we remanded the case for FERC to

determine “how much competition in fact is dampened” by

the stranded cost provision. Id. at 178. Thus, contrary to

POSCR’s suggestion, Cajun does not represent a blanket

condemnation of stranded cost recovery; rather, recognizing

that such recovery could be anticompetitive, Cajun directed

FERC to evaluate and justify the potential anticompetitive

impact. This is precisely what FERC has done in Order 888.

It expressly considered the anticompetitive effects of

stranded cost recovery. See Order 888-A, § 31,048 at

30,372-74. Then, stressing the transitional nature

prediction about the future impact of its own

policies to which we ordinarily defer.” Louisiana Energy and

Power Auth. v. FERC, 141 F.3d 364, 370 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

2. Natural Gas Precedent and Conformance to Cost

Causation Principles

Having rejected POSCR’s arguments that FERC lacks

authority to authorize stranded cost recovery, we turn to its

[Page SOJargument that FERC has failed adequately to

explain why Order 888 requires departing customers to pay

one-hundred percent of stranded costs. In support of this

argument, POSCR claims that our decisions reviewing

FERC’s restructuring of the natural gas industry require cost

sharing, it also argues that Order 888’s stranded cost

recovery conflicts with the cost causation principles that

traditionally govern allocation of costs.

a. Natural gas precedent: AGD, K N Energy, and UDC

In introducing competition into the electricity industry,

FERC has taken essentially the same path that it took in

restructuring the natural gas industry, although what FERC

has done in a single order in the electricity industry (Order

888) it did in a series of orders in the natural gas industry.

Because POSCR relies so heavily on FERC’s natural gas

orders and our decisions reviewing them, we begin by

summarizing them in some detail

Finding practices in the natural gas industry “unduly

discriminatory” in violation of the Natural Gas Act, FERC

56a

began by issuing Order 436, which “unbundled” pipeline

transportation and merchant functions. Regulation of Natural

Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, Order No.

436, FERC Stats. & Regs, J 30,665, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,408

(1985) (rehearing orders omitted). At the time of Order 436,

pipelines were facing enormous liabilities under long-term

“take-or-pay” contracts. Entered into when gas prices were

expected to rise, these contracts obligated pipelines to

purchase minimum quantities of gas from wellhead

producers at fixed prices that turned out to be well in excess

of market prices. See Associated Gas Distributors v. FERC,

824 F.2d 981, 1021 (DC. Cir. 1987) (*AGD”). Although

FERC estimated take-or-pay liabilities at billions of dollars,

and although Order 436 would exacerbate the take-or-pay

problem by providing incentives to pipeline customers to

purchase gas from cheaper suppliers, FERC declined to take

any action with respect to the contracts. In AGD, we found

that FERC’s decision to do nothing failed to meet the

requirements of reasoned decisionmaking, citing FERC’s

“seeming [Page 51] blindness to the possible impact of Order

No. 436 on take-or-pay liability’ and permanent market

distortions that may result from FERC’s inaction. Id. at

1021-23, 1025. Specifically, we noted, in words echoed by

FERC years later in Order 888, that consumers who

purchased from the “least nimble” local distribution

companies would “be stuck with the burden of the overpriced

gas.” Id. at 1023.

In response to AGD, FERC issued Order 500,

Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead

Decontrol, Order No. 500, FERC Stats. & Regs. 4 30,761, 52

Fed. Reg. 30,334 (1987) (rehearing orders omitted).

Recognizing that no one segment of the gas industry was

wholly responsible for the take-or-pay problem, Order 500

allowed pipelines to recover take-or-pay costs through

“equitable sharing.” Pipelines that willingly absorbed

twenty-five to fifty percent of their costs could require sales

customers to match that amount through a fixed charge.

57a

Pipelines could recover any balance through commodity rates

or volumetric surcharges, borne by both sales and

transportation customers. For an overview of these

components of Order 500, see KN Energy, Inc. v. FERC, 968

F.2d 1295, 1297-98 (D.C. Cir. 1992). We sustained this

approach in KN Energy, holding that even though Order 500

replaced traditional “cost causation” principles with cost

spreading and value-of-service concepts, it did not violate

Natural Gas Act section 4’s requirement that rates be just and

reasonable. Id. at 1301-02. Citing statements in AGD that

“all actors in the natural gas industry” are “candidates” for

absorbing take-or-pay liability, we relied on “the unusual

circumstances surrounding the take-or-pay problem, and the

limited nature—both in time and scope—of the

Commission’s departure from the cost-causation principle.”

Id. at 1301.

Concluding that Order 436 had been only partially

successful in introducing competition into the natural gas

industry, FERC issued its third major restructuring order,

Order 636. Pipeline Service Obligations and Revisions to

Regulations Governing Self-Implementing Transportation;

and Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial

Wellhead Decontrol, Order No. 636, FERC Stats. & Regs.

7 30,939, 57 Fed. [Page 52] Reg. 13,267 (1992) (rehearing

orders omitted). That order imposed mandatory unbundling

of sales and transportation services and allowed sales

customers to reduce the amount of gas they had to purchase

pursuant to existing contracts. When customers took

advantage of this option and purchased gas from sources

other than the pipelines, the pipelines were once again left

with substantial take-or-pay liabilities. Labeling the costs of

reducing these liabilities gas supply realignment or GSR

costs, Order 636 authorized pipelines to bill current

transportation customers for one hundred percent of their

GSR costs by charging either a negotiated exit fee or

reservation fee surcharge. Order 636 also authorized

pipelines to recover all stranded costs in rate filings. In the

58a

natural gas industry, stranded costs represented the costs of

pipeline assets (such as storage facilities) used to provide

bundled sales services that were not directly assignabie to

transportation customers. For an overview of these

components of Order 636, see United Distribution Cos. v.

FERC, 88 F.3d 1105, 1125-27, 1176-78 (D.C. Cir. 1996)

(“UDC”).

In UDC, we affirmed FERC’s determination that

pipelines could recover all stranded costs through filed rates,

so long as FERC “adequately balanced the interests of

investors and ratepayers.” Id. at 1180. Reaffirming the

appropriateness of the cost spreading and value-of-service

princip’’s approved in K N Energy, we found that FERC’s

allocation of GSR costs to pipeline transportation customers,

as opposed to the pipelines themselves, properly applied

those principles. Id. at 1182. Although recognizing that

GSR costs stemmed from pipeline sales customers, not

transportation customers, we found that FERC appropriately

imposed the costs on transportation customers because these

customers benefited from the availability of lower-priced

transportation and also because FERC could not spread costs

to the pre-Order 636 sales customers since those customers

no longer purchased gas from the pipelines. Id. at 1185-86.

We remanded for FERC to explain more fully why pipelines

should not have to pay some of the costs, noting an

inconsistency in the Commission’s analysis: While FERC

applied cost spreading principles to justify imposing costs on

transportation customers, it [Page 53]invoked cost causation

principles in concluding that pipelines should not have to pay

any of these costs. Id. at 1188-90. We explicitly stated,

however, that we were not saying that “it is impossible, or

even improbable, that the Commission on remand can

establish a convincing rationale for exempting the pipelines.”

Id. at 1189.

POSCR reads this history to require FERC to order cost

sharing, but it ignores Order 888’s explanation of the

59a

difference between natural gas restructuring and the situation

in the electricity industry. Most fundamentally, Order 888

explains, stranded cost recovery in the electricity. industry

conforms to cost causation principles, which normally govern

the allocation of costs and require customers to pay the costs

they caused. See Order 888, 7 31,036 at 31,798. Cost

causation principles could not be applied in natural gas

restructuring, Order 888 explains, because many customers

had already begun purchasing gas from other suppliers before

FERC bad addressed the take-or-pay problem on remand

from AGD, and because the filed rate doctrine prohibits

assessing charges against former customers. Id. at 31,800-

01. Order 888 also explains that unlike stranded costs in the

electricity industry, the take-or-pay liabilities in the gas

industry were extraordinary. The billions of dollars of take-

or-pay liabilities resulted not from Order 636, but from

earlier regulatory policies that had encouraged pipelines to

enter into long-term, fixed-price gas purchase contracts,

combined with declining gas prices that made those contracts

uneconomical. See Order 888-A, J 31,048 at 30,380. Under

all of these circumstances, “[t]o have allocated these costs

solely to any one segment of the industry would have

imposed a crushing new burden on that segment.” Id. at

30,380-81.

Stranded costs in the electricity industry, Order 888

explains, are quite different. Resulting directly from Order

888, they represent “ordinary costs that have always been,

and are currently, included in the utility’s rates for electric

generation approved by the Commission.” Id. at 30,382.

Moreover, wholesale customers may avoid stranded cost

liability by continuing to purchase power from their historic

utility, precisely what they probably would have done in the

[Page 54] absence of Order 888. In other words, in contrast

to the natural gas industry, where customers would have

faced enormous new burdens had FERC forced them to pay

take-or-pay costs, customers in the electricity industry face

no new burdens; instead, Order 888 requires them to pay

60a

nothing more than costs they would have had to pay in the

absence of Order 888. In the electricity industry, the only

effect of stranded cost recovery is delayed realization of the

full benefits of a competitive market.

In light of these differences between the natural gas and

electricity industries and FERC’s exhaustive treatment of the

natural gas restructuring in Order 888, POSCR’s contention

that FERC has failed “to offer a coherent rationale, rising to

the level of reasoned decisionmaking” for not imposing cost

sharing is wholly without merit. Equally without merit is

POSC® 5 assertion that UDC “teaches that, were customers

and utilities benefit from an open access rule/order that leads

to early contract termination and where anticompetitive

conduct by utilities has given rise to the need for the open

access order, utilities must share transition costs.” POSCR

ignores three important points. First, FERC, not this court,

determined that cost sharing was appropriate with respect to

take-or-pay liabilities. _ UDC merely affirmed FERC’s

decision. Second, KN Energy recognized that cost sharing in

the natural gas industry was a departure from the cost

causation principles that normally apply, a departure justified

by extraordinary circumstances in the natural gas industry.

KN Energy, 968 F.2d at 1301-02. And finally, as to stranded

costs that more closely resemble those at issue in this case—

for example, pipeline assets that would no longer be fully

employed when customers took advantage of unbundling to

purchase gas from alternative suppliers—FERC ordered and

UDC affirmed, that pipelines recover one-hundred percent of

those costs.

b. Conformance to cost causation principles

Having established that the natural gas cases impose no

obligation on FERC to order cost sharing, we next consider

POSCR’s argument, that the inclusion of stranded costs in

[Page 55] transmission rates does not conform to cost

causation principles. This is so, POSCR asserts, because

Order 888’s stranded cost provisions require customers to

6la

pay through transmission rates for costs the utility previously

incurred to provide generation services.

aimed only at the method of payment, not at the fact that

payment is required. But even viewing POSCR’s challenge

more broadly, as a claim that stranded cost recovery no

matter what the method of payment violates cost causation

principles, we think it lacks merit.

We have explained the cost causation principle as

follows: “Simply put, it has been traditionally required that

all approved rates reflect to some degree the costs actually

caused by the customer who must pay them.” KN Energy,

968 F.2d at 1300. Given this definition, we are puzzled by

POSCR’s claim that because inclusion of stranded costs in

transmission rates requires customers to pay currently for

costs incurred in the past, it violates cost causation principles.

To some degree, all utility rates reflect past costs; utilities

typically expend funds today (for example, constructing

generation facilities), fully expecting to recover those costs

through future rates. In fact, current rates often include past

costs that utilities deferred in order to avoid rate increases.

Cost causation requires not that costs be incurred at the same

time they are included in rates, but that the rates “reflect to

some degree the costs actually caused by the customer who

must pay them.” Id.

In fashioning Order 888’s stranded cost recovery

provisions, FERC went to great lengths to ensure that

customers would be responsible for only those costs they

caused.

[T]he Rule is consistent with the traditional cost

causation principle because it recognizes the link

62a

between the incurrence of the stranded costs and the

decision of a [Page S6]particular generation

customer to use open-access transmission on the

utility’s system to leave the utility’s generation

system and shop for power, and bases the utility’s

ability to recover stranded costs on its ability to

demonstrate that it incurred costs with the

reasonable expectation that the customer would

remain on its generation system beyond the term of

the contract.

Order 888-A, 9 31,048 at 30,382.

We cannot see how including stranded costs in

transmission rates instead of lump sum payments changes

this analysis. To the extent POSCR is arguing that including

in a transmission rate costs incurred to provide generation

services violates cost causation principles, we reiterate that

stranded costs are not costs of providing the physical

transmission services but, as Order 888-A explains, they are

utilities’ cost of open access transmission. See Order 888-A,

q 31,048 at 30,389 & n.634. More generally, given the

fundamental changes wrought by Order 888 and the

unprecedented opportunity for customers to purchase power

from alternative suppliers, we are quite comfortable deferring

to FERC’s judgment that stranded cost recovery—through

transmission rates or otherwise—conforms to cost causation

principles. In fact, FERC may have violated cost causation

principles had it failed to assign stranded costs to customers

who caused them.

POSCR next argues that Order 888 is unduly

discriminatory because including stranded costs in

transmission rates forces transmission customers who

previously used a utility's generation capacity to pay higher

costs than new transmission customers. Disagreeing, FERC

determined that requiring customers receiving similar

services to pay different rates is necessitated by Order 888's

open access requirement. See Order 888-A, 31,048 at

63a

30,388-90. Cf. AGD, 824 F.2d at 1009 (“[T]he mere fact of

a rate disparity is not enough to constitute unlawful

discrimination.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Moreover, FERC concluded the application of cost causation

principles justifies this different treatment. See Order 888-A,

] 31,048 at 30,379, 30,388-90. Seeing noth-[Page 57]ing

unreasonable (let alone arbitrary or capricious) in FERC’s

policy judgment, we reject POSCR’s challenge.

Nor do we agree with POSCR’s argument that stranded

cost recovery violates the filed rate doctrine, which “forbids a

regulated entity to charge rates for its services other than

those properly filed with the appropriate federal regulatory

authority.” Western Resources, Inc. v. FERC, 72 F.3d 147,

149 (D.C. Cir. 1995). In Western Resources, we held that

FERC’s assignment to current customers of costs relating to

take-or-pay liabilities did not violate the filed rate doctrine.

Recognizing that “a central purpose of the doctrine is to

enable purchasers to know in advance the consequences of

the purchasing decisions they make,” we determined that the

doctrine was satisfied where customers received “adequate

notice of a rate in advance of the service to which it relates.”

Id. at 149-50 (internal quotation marks omitted). Order 888’s

stranded cost policy satisfies this requirement because

customers electing to purchase power generation from a

source other than the transmitting utility from which they had

purchased power in the past will be aware of the costs when

making that decision.

3. FERC’s Mobile-Sierra Findings

Under the Supreme Court’s Mobile-Sierra doctrine,

where parties have negotiated a contract that sets firm prices

or dictates a specific method of computing charges and

includes a clause denying either party the right to change

such prices or charges unilaterally, “FERC may abrogate or

modify the contract only if the public interest so requires.”

Texaco, Inc. v. FERC, 148 F.3d 1091, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1998);

see also FPC v. Sierra Pacific Power Co., 350 US. 348, 353-

64a

55 (1956); United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv.

Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1956). We have recognized

that “the ‘public interest’ that permits FERC to modify

private contracts is different from and more exacting than the

‘public interest’ that FERC seeks to serve when it

promulgates its rules.” Texaco, 148 F.3d at 1097.

FERC usually makes Mobile-Sierra determinations on a

case-by-case basis. A party seeking to modify a contract

[Page 58]containing a Mobile-Sierra clause petitions FERC.

That party bears the burden of convincing FERC that the

modification is in the public interest.

Order 888 departs from this normal case-by-case

practice by making two generic public interest findings, one

focused on utilities, the other on customers. These generic

findings relieve utilities and customers of the burden of

demonstrating in individual proceedings that the proposed

modifications are in the public interest. As to utilities, Order

888 ruled that it was in the public interest to allow them to

add stranded cost amendments to their contracts if they could

demonstrate, in accordance with Order 888, that they had a

reasonable expectation of continued service. See Order 888-

A, § 31,048 at 30,394-95. This finding rested on two

considerations: that the burden of unrecoverable stranded

costs could impair utilities’ access to capital markets, which

could in turn precipitate the departure of other customers,

thus worsening the utilities’ financial condition and

threatening its ability to provide reliable service, and that

allowing customers to leave a utility without paying their

share of costs would shift those costs to other customers who

lack alternative power sources. See Order 888, J] 31,036 at

31,811. For its second generic finding, FERC concluded that

it was in the public interest to allow customers to modify

their wholesale requirements contracts in any way upon a

showing that the terms are no longer just and reasonable. See

Order 888-A, § 31,048 at 30,189. Observing that the

contracts in question “were entered into during an era in

65a

Over access to their transmission facilities,” FERC based this

finding on the unequal bargaining power between utilities

and customers. Id. at 30,193. Because “[mJany of these

contracts -vere the result of uneven bargaining power

that have occurred (and are continuing to occur) in the

industry may render their contracts to be no longer in the

public interest or just and reasonable.” Id.

Challenging the first finding, POSCR argues that FERC

lacks authority to make a generic public interest finding that

[Page S9]allows for contract modification in an entire class

of cases. POSCR insists that FERC can only proceed on a

case-by-case basis, determining in each case whether a

particular contract modification is in the public interest.

Even if FERC has authority to make generic findings,

POSCR goes on to argue, FERC’s Order 888 finding is

unsupported by substantial evidence. The investor owned

utilities (“IOUs”) challenge the second finding, arguing that

allowing customers to seek modification of all contract

terms, while limiting utilities to stranded cost provisions,

fails adequately to balance competing interests.

a. FERC’s authority to sake a generic public interest

finding

66a

contractual rights and the regulatory power to modify

contracts when necessary to protect the public interest.”

Northeast Utilities Serv. Co. v. FERC, 55 F.3d 686, 689 (Ist

Cir. 1995). In Mobile, the Supreme Court reognized that

intervening circumstances may create a situation im which

contractual terms and conditions that were just and

reasonable at the time the contract was executed are no

longer just and reasonable. 350 U.S. at 344-45. But

concluding that a utility is not typically “entitled to be

relieved of its improvident bargain,” the Sierra Court

required that FERC’s predecessor, the Federal Power

Commission, show more than that the contract was unjust

and unreasonable—the-Commission had to find that contract

modification was in the public interest. 350 U.S. at 355.

In most cases, intervening circumstances are unique to

the relationship between contracting parties. See, eg.

Northeast [Page 60] Utilities, 55 F.3d 686 (affirming FERC’s

modification to the rate schedule of a contract as a condition

for approval of a merger between two parties to the contract).

But where intervening circumstances—in this instance,

FERC—mandated open access transmission—affect an ent're

class of contracts in an identical manner, we find nothing in

the Mobile-Sierra doctrine to prohibit FERC from responding

with a public interest finding applicable to all contracts of

that class. Moreover, in providing for stranded cost recovery,

FERC has not relieved utilities of “improvident bargains,”

the concern of the Sierra Court, rather, it has recognized that

open access affects all utilities in the same manner, namely

leaving them vulnerable to potentially unrecoverable

stranded costs. In fact, to deny FERC authority to make

generic findings in such a case would simply impose on it

and the parties the repetitive burden of proving the public

interest in each and every case.

In sustaining FERC’s generic finding, we are influenced

by the fact that before recovering stranded costs, a utility

must prove that it had a reasonable expectation of continued

67a

service to a particular customer. As the IOUs intervening on

behalf of FERC explain, the need to make this showing adds

a particularized element to FERC’s generic public interest

finding. Viewed this way, Order 888’s generic is

We stress that generic Mobile-Sierra findings are

b. FERC’s stranded cost public interest finding

Having concluded that the Mobile-Sierra doctrine

permits a generic finding in this case, we turn to POSCR’s

claim that the finding was unsupported by substantial

evidence. POSCR faults FERC for failing to adduce

evidence to support its conclusion that denying stranded cost

POSCR also thinks that the impact on customers of failing to

provide for stranded cost recovery is insufficient to support a

68a

With respect to POSCR’s first point, it is certainly true

that Sierra identified impairment of “the financial ability of

the public utility to continue its service” as one factor

supporting a public interest finding. Sierra, 350 U. S. at 355.

Although public interest findings made on a case-by-

case basis necessarily evaluate the harm to the particular

utility seeking modification, that is not true where, as here,

FERC implements a generic change in the industry. Just as

that change can support a generic public interest finding, that

generic finding can be supported by generic industry -wide

evidence. FERC has produced such evidence. The record

contains estimates of stranded costs amounting to $200

billion or more. See Stranded Cost NOPR, q 32,507 at

32,866. It also includes comments from representatives of

the financial community stating that “the prospect of not

recovering stranded costs could erode a utility’s ability to

attract capital.”

POSCR points out that eighty-five to ninety percent of

the estimated $200 billion of stranded costs relates to retail

sales, not wholesale sales. True enough, but we find no basis

for questioning FERC’s conclusion that unrecovered

stranded [Page 62] costs of even ten percent of 200 billion—

the low end of the wholesale stranded cost estimate—could

have serious consequences for utilities. See Order 888,

31,036 at 31,790. In any event, if POSCR turns out to be

correct about the absence of a wholesale stranded cost

problem, few utilities will avail themselves of Order 888's

stranded cost recovery provisions.

excessive burden on the remaining customers who, for

whatever reason, cannot leave and therefore may have to bear

69a

those costs.” Order 888, 7 31,036 at 31,811. POSCR does

not agree with FERC that the failure to recover stranded costs

will create an “‘undue burden” on remaining customers. But

disagreeing with FERC is not enough. To prevail in this

court, POSCR must demonstrate that FERC’s prediction that

failure to recover stranded costs will create an undue burden

on remaining customers is unsupported by substantial

evidence, see 16 U.S.C. § 8251(b), which is another way of

saying it is arbitrary and capricious. See Michigan

Consolidated Gas Co. v. FERC, 883 F.2d 117, 124 (D.C. Cir.

1989) (“[M]aking ... predictions is clearly within the

Commission’s expertise and will be upheld if rationally

based on record evidence.”) (internal quotation marks

omitted). This POSCR has failed to do.

c. FERC’s public interest finding regarding customers

The IOUs mount two challenges to FERC’s second

public interest finding—that it was in the public interest to

allow customers to seek modification of their wholesale

requirements contracts. Unlike POSCR, the IOUs make no

claim that the finding lacks substantial evidence; rather, they

contend that FERC’s decision to allow customers to seek

modification of all contract terms, while limiting utilities to

adding stranded cost provisions, fails to balance FERC’s

competing concerns: respecting existing contractual

commitments and accelerating the transition to competition.

They also complain that FERC has failed adequately to

explain [Page 63] why affording customers this broad ability

to modify their contracts is in the public interest.

FERC gave two justifications for affording customers a

broader opportunity than utilities to modify their contracts,

both of which seem perfectly rational to us. First, Order 888-

A explains, “these contracts were entered into during an era

in which transmission providers exercised monopoly control

over access to their transmission facilities.” Order 888-A,

31,048 at 30,193. Also, the “unprecedented competitive

changes ... may affect whether such contracts continue to be

70a

just and reasonable or not unduly discriminatory both as to

the direct customers of the contracts, as well as to indirect,

third-party consumers....” Id. at 30,193-94. In fact, Order

888 rests on the very premise that by denying competitors

access to their transmission lines, utilities engaged in undue

discrimination. Confined to purchasing power from their

local utilities, customers suffered from this lack of access. In

the natural gas restructuring, we affirmed FERC’s decision to

allow customers to seek to modify their sales contracts

because those contracts “necessarily reflect the pipelines’

monopoly power.” AGD, 824 F.2d at 1017. The same

reasons call for affirming FERC’s decision here. In addition,

as FERC has explained, the harm to third parties (i.e.,

customers of the wholesale requirements customers) that may

result from adherence to uneconomical contracts further

justifies its conclusion. Sze Order 888-A, J 31,048 at 30,194.

Remedying potential un.airness to utilities by allowing them

to seek stranded cost recovery if a customer shortens the term |

of a contract, FERC struck a balance between customers and )

utilities that can hardly be characterized as arbitrary or

capricious.

4. Availability of Stranded Cost Recovery to

——.. Nonjurisdictional Utilities and G&T Cooperatives

Section 201 of the FPA gives FERC jurisdiction over

“public utilities” but not over federal and state utilities. 16

U.S.C. § 824. Although FERC required utilities not subject

to its jurisdiction ( “nonjurisdictional utilities”) to provide

reciprocal open access transmission when they use a jurisdic-

[Page 64]tional utility’s open access tariff, it declined to

provide a mechanism for them to recover stranded costs,

Explaining that it promulgated its reciprocity provision

pursuant to fairness concerns, not statutory authority, FERC

reasoned that it lacked jurisdiction to provide stranded cost

recovery for nonjurisdictional utilities. See Order 888-A,

31,048 at 30,364. FERC recommended that these utilities

include stranded cost provisions in their open access tariffs;

Provisions, its lack of jurisdiction over entities like

Dairyland, and the ability of nonjurisdictional utilities to

include stranded cost provisions in their Open access tariffs,

We see no reason to question FERC’s judgment on this issue.

The same is true with respect to the transmission

dependent utilities (“TDUs”). Like the Dairyland petitioners,

they claim that FERC acted arbitrarily and Capriciously by

failing to provide a mechanism for them to recover stranded

costs Owning few or no transmission facilities, TDUs serve

their loads using other utilities’ transmission systems. Not

only are TDUs nonjurisdictional utilities, but, as Order 888-

_ Aexplains, open access does not Cause their costs to become

stranded—their customers have always had an option to use

other utilities’ transmission services to purchase power. See

Order 888-A, 9 31,048 at 30,365.

Dairyland also contends that FERC acted arbitrarily and

capriciously when it declined to treat a generation and

72a

function as single economic units, Dairyland claims that

G&T cooperatives have reasonable expectations of continued

service to retail customers of their member cooperatives that

with respect to retail customers of their wholesale customers.

This difference, Dairyland argues, requires FERC to allow

G&T cooperatives to recover stranded costs from their

member cooperatives’ customers.

Rejecting Dairyland’s petition for rehearing on this

point, FERC noted that treating a G&T cooperative and its

members as a single economic unit for purposes of stranded

cost recovery would conflict with its treatment of these same

cooperatives as distinct entities in its reciprocity provisions.

Order 888-A, J 31,048 at 30,366. There, FERC agreed with

Dairyland’s proposal that if a G&T cooperative seeks open

access transmission from a public utility, “then only the G&T

cooperative, and not its member distribution cooperatives,

would be required to offer [reciprocal] transmission service.”

Order 888, § 31,036 at 31,763. Moreover, FERC reasoned,

recovering from a retail customer of a member cooperative

is, in effect, recovering from an indirect customer, a situation

that FERC declined to include in its stranded cost rule. See

Order 888-A, J 31,048 at 30,166.

It is true that FERC could have treated G&T

cooperatives and their members as single economic units for

stranded cost purposes. But FERC’s explanation of why it

chose not to do s0, particularly the fact that G&T

cooperatives and their members were treated is distinct

entities for reciprocity purposes, is entirely reasonable.

5. Challenges to Technical Aspects of Order 888's

Stranded Cost Recovery Provisions

Several petitioners mount challenges to various technical

aspects of the stranded cost recovery provisions. Before

[Page 66] addressing these challenges, we emphasize the

very limited scope of our review. For us to undo what FERC

73a

has done, petitioners must persuade us that FERC’s actions

were arbitrary or capricious. “Highly deferential,” the

arbitrary and capricious standard “presumes the validity of

agency action.” National Mining Ass’n. v. Mine Safety and

Health Admin., 116 F.3d 520, 536 (1997). Where, as here,

the issue before us “requires a high level of technical

expertise, we must defer to the informed discretion of the

responsible federal agencies.” Marsh v. Oregon Natural

Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 (1989) (internal

quotation marks omitted). It is not enough for petitioners to

convince us of the reasonableness of their views, see UDC,

88 F.3d at 1169 (“The existence of a second reasonable

course of action does not invalidate an agency’s

determination.”); those arguments should be presented to

FERC, whose commissioners are appointed by the President

and confirmed by the Senate with the expectation that they,

not Article III courts, will make policy judgments.

To prevail in this court, petitioners must demonstrate

that FERC’s policy judgments are arbitrary or capricious, a

heavy burden indeed. See National Treasury Employees

Union v. Hefler, 53 F.3d 1289, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“The

‘scope’ of review under the “arbitrary and capricious”

standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its

judgment for that of the agency.”) (quoting Motor Vehicles

Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,

43 (1983.)). With this very deferential scope of review in

mind, we turn to petitioners’ arguments.

a. POSCR’s challenges to the stranded cost formula

Reasoning that it would be burdensome to identify each

and every asset that would become underutilized as a result

of Order 888, FERC adopted a “revenues lost” formula to

determine a departing customer’s stranded cost obligation.

Order 888, 7 31,036 at 31,839. For each year a utility can

prove that it had a reasonable expectation of continued

service to a particular customer, the formula calculates the

customer’s stranded cost obligation by subtracting the com-

74a

[Page 67]petitive market value of the power the customer

would have purchased from the utility (as estimated by the

utility) from the amount the customer would have paid had it

remained a generation customer of the utility (based on

FERC-approved rates that the customer paid the prior three

years). Id. at 31,839-40.

POSCR claims that this formula gives utilities no

incentive to mitigate their stranded costs. Not so. The

formula automatically provides such an incentive by

subtracting from utilities’ recovery the market price of the

power—utilities that fail to sell the power at market prices

will not recover their full costs. POSCR also claims that the

formula fails accurately to measure stranded costs because it

is based on an estimate of those costs at one point in time.

Responding, FERC explained why it rejected a “true-up”

provision that would have made adjustments to the amount

the customer owed to reflect market conditions over the

reasonable expectation period. According to FERC, such an

approach would have created enormous uncertainty,

outweighing any potential increase in accuracy. See Order

888-A, J 31,048 at 30,427-28. POSCR has offered no basis

for us to question this reasoning.

POSCR’s claim that the formula gives utilities an

incentive to minimize their estimate of the market value of

the power the customer would have purchased is similarly

groundless. To avoid precisely this result, Order 888 gives

customers an option to either market or broker the capacity

and associated energy they would have purchased from their

historic utility, effectively reducing their stranded cost

obligations by the difference between the actual market value

of the power and the utility’s estimate of the market value.

See Order 888, 9 31,036 at 31,844. Order 888 also gives

customers an option to substitute the price of power under the

customer’s contract with a new supplier for the utility’s

estimate of the market value. See id.

b. Inclusion of known and measurable costs

The IOUs take issue with Order 888’s stranded cost

recovery formula because the estimate of the price the

customer would have paid for the power is based on rates for

the prior three years: according to the IOUs, this approach

fails to consider known and measurable costs resulting from

regulatory mandates that may have been deferred pursuant to

filed rate schedules and FERC-approved settlements. The

costs they cite include deferred costs of generation that have

already been approved for inclusion in the rate base, costs

relating to approved qualifying facility contracts, and

government-imposed costs such as deferred taxes and nuclear

decommissioning.

Although it is true that the revenue calculation measures

only current rates and not deferred costs, Order 888 allows

customers and utilities to file for a change in the rates before

the customer’s requirements contract terminates; in such

cases, FERC will calculate the customer’s stranded cost

obligation based on those new rates. See Order 888-A_

] N31,048 at 30,427. While seeking to avoid detailed listings

of specific costs that may become stranded, FERC has

adequately preserved utilities’ ability to include known,

measurable costs in revenue estimates through a ratemaking

proceeding.

c. Treatment of energy costs in the market option

The IOUs challenge FERC’s treatment of energy costs in

the market option. To mitigate utilities’ incentives to

76a

minimize their estimates of the market value of the power

(the competitive market value estimate or “CMVE”), Order

888 affords customers an option to buy the power stranded

by their departure from the utility and resell it. Order 888,

31,036 at 31,844. Customers would purchase generation

[Page 69] capacity at the utility’s estimated market value of

the capacity and associated energy at average system variable

cost. Id. at 31,845. Thus if a customer believes that a utility

is underestimating the price at which it could sell the power,

the customer can buy the power and then resell it. While

customers exercising this option would still have to pay their

stranded cost obligation as calculated under the formula, they

would effectively offset the obligation by keeping the profit

on the resale of the power. Id. at 31,845 n.879.

The IOUs contend that allowing customers to pay

average variable cost for the associated energy is inconsistent

with Order 888’s definition of the CMVE, which equals the

market value of both the generation capacity and associated

energy. See id. at 31,839 (defining CMVE as “the utility’s

estimate of the average annual revenues ... that it can receive

by selling the released capacity and associated energy, based

on a market analysis performed by the utility”). Customers

could receive a windfall, the IOUs claim, by exercising the

market option although they will pay average variable cost

for the associated energy, they will be able to resell it at the

presumably higher market price. At the same time, utilities

will be unable to recover the full market value of the power

because they will be forced to sell the associated energy at

cost.

Responding to this argument in Order 888-A, FERC

offered two justifications for allowing customers to purchase

the associated energy at average variable cost. First, because

the capacity being marketed would not generally be

associated with a single asset, customers exercising this

option are purchasing a “slice of the system” and thus should

pay average variable cost. Second, customers should be able

77a

to purchase energy at the price they pay, typically

average variable cost. See Order 888-A, 7 31,048 at 30,433.

But neither explanation responds to the IOUs argument that

defining CMVE as the market price of both the Capacity and

associated energy is inconsistent with allowing customers

exercising the market option to purchase associated energy at

average variable cost. In its brief in this court, FERC

continues to misapprehend the IOUs’ argument, largely reit-

[Page 70] erating the same arguments and failing to address

The market option’s stated intention is to reduce a

utility’s incentive to understate the CMVE. See Order 888,

31,036 at 31,842. If it did understate the CMVE, then

keeping the difference. But FERC’s policy of allowing

customers to purchase the associated energy at cost gives

customers an incentive to exercise the market option even

when a utility has appropriately estimated CMVE because

they can buy the energy at cost and resell it at the presumably

higher market price. FERC’s failure to explain whether it

intended this result and if so, the justification for permitting

customers to receive a windfall while undercompensating

utilities constitutes a failure of reasoned decisionmaking.

See AGD, 824 F.2d at 1030 (“We do not require that FERC

reach any particular conclusion; we merely mandate that it

reach its conclusion by reasoned decisionmaking.”). We

therefore vacate this portion of the orders and remand the

issue to FERC for further consideration.

d. Rescission of notice of termination provision

Until FERC issued Orders 888 and 889, it had required

parties to power sales contracts to notify it sixty days prior to

cancellation of a contract or termination of a contract by its

Own terms. See 18 C.F.R. § 35.15 (repealed by Order 888).

Orders 888 and 889 eliminate the requirement that parties

notify FERC in advance when a contract terminates by its

Own terms, but only with respect to contracts executed after

78a

July 9, 1996; in other cases of contract cancellation or

termination, parties must still notify FERC in advance. See

18 C.F.R. § 35.15 (1999). TDU petitioners claim that in

rescinding the notice requirement, FERC ignored the fact that

utilities still have substantial market power. That some

utilities retain market power in generation, however, does not

undermine Orders 888 and 889. Through these orders, FERC

sought to move the electricity industry toward competition;

by providing an open access mechanism through which

buyers may purchase power from suppliers other than trans-

[Page 71]mitting utilities. FERC substantially reduced.

Utilities’ market power. Eliminating the notice requirement

furthered that policy. Moreover, customers who believe

termination of their contracts is unjust can seek relief from

FERC pursuant to section 206 of the FPA; See Order 888-A,

4 31,048 at 30,393.

e. Provision for benefits lost

The TDU petitioners claim that FERC acted arbitrarily

and capriciously by failing to provide a mechanism for

customers purchasing power at below-market rates to

preserve those rates at the termination of their contract with

their historic utility. Just as utilities may have expectations

of continued service to particular customers, the TDU

petitioners contend, customers may have _ reasonable

expectations of continuing to receive wholesale requirements

service from their historic utility at cost-based rates. Order

888-A says that the Commission does “not have a sufficient

basis on which to make generic findings that customers under

such contracts may be entitled to extend a contract at the

existing rate.” Order 888-A, J 31,048 at 30,393 (emphasis

removed). Moreover, the order explains, “the consequences

of customers’ expectations as a general matter would not

have the potential to shift significant costs to other

customers,” whereas utilities’ failure to recover stranded

costs could potentially shift the costs to other customers. Id.

Most important, FERC has not foreclosed customers in this

situation from seeking relief As Order 888-A explains,

customer may “exercise its procedural rights under section

requirement.” Id. (footnote omitted). Given that agencies

“enjoy ] broad discretion in determining how best to handle

related, yet discrete, issues in terms of procedures ... and

priorities,” we think FERC’s refusal to promulgate a generic

rule on this issue was entirely reasonable. Mobil Oil Explo-

[Page 72]ration & Producing Southeast, Inc. v. United

Distrib. Cos., 498 U.S. 211, 230 (1990).

B. Retail Stranded Costs

Recognizing state agency authority to address stranded

costs that relate to retail power sales, Order 888 limits

FERC’s role as a forum for the recovery of these costs to two

situations: when customers take advantage of state-ordered

wheeling to reach new power suppliers and when former

retail customers become wholesale customers through what

is known as municipalization or municipal annexation. See

Order 888-A_ 7 31,048 at 30,402, 30,410. In the former

scenario, FERC will consider Proposals for the recovery of

stranded costs only when the appropriate state regulatory

1. Stranded Costs Arising from Retail Wheeling

Stranded costs may result from state unbundling of retail

, where retail customers take advantage of state-ordered

retail wheeling to reach new generation suppliers. See Order

888, 9 31,036 at 31,819. Observing that both FERC and the

EE

80a

states have authority to address these stranded costs, Order

888 explains that:

[B]ecause it is a state decision to permit or require

the retail wheeling that causes retail stranded costs

to occur, we will leave it to state regulatory

authorities to deal with any stranded costs

occasioned by retail wheeling. The only

circumstance in which we will entertain requests to

recover stranded costs caused by retail wheeling is

when the state regulatory authority does not have

authority under state law to address stranded costs

when the retail wheeling is required.

Order 888, § 31,036 at 31,824-25 (footnote omitted). FERC

will provide for recovery of those stranded costs through the

transmission rate the former supplying utility charges the

departing customer. Order 888-A, | 31,048 at 30,410. (As

discussed in Section III supra, FERC has jurisdiction over

[Page 73]the transmission component of unbundled retail

sales.). In evaluating claims for stranded cost recovery,

FERC will use the same standards as it applies with respect

to wholesale stranded costs (i.e., it will require utilities to

demonstrate a reasonable expectation of continued service).

See Order 888, 4 31,036 at 31,819 n.722.

Two sets of petitioners challenge FERC’s retail stranded

cost recovery provisions from opposite sides. The States and

POSCR contend that FERC exceeded its jurisdiction by

asserting rate authority over retail stranded costs. The IOUs

argue that FERC abdicated its statutory authority by failing

to agree to consider all proposals for recovery of stranded

costs that arise from retail wheeling. Because we think

FERC has appropriately exercised its jurisdiction, we reject

both claims.

a. FERC’s jurisdiction over retail stranded costs

The States’ and POSCR’s arguments boil down to the

following: Because retail stranded costs relate primarily to

rr yaar

Status of these costs.

commissions, not this Commission, have

“jurisdiction” over cer-[Page 74]tain “costs. “

Neither the state commissions nor this Commission

has exclusive jurisdiction over “costs.” Each

regulatory authority has jurisdiction to determine

“rates” for services subject to its jurisdiction and, in

determining rates, may take into account all of the

costs incurred by the utility.

Order 888-A, 9 31,048 at 30,414. In other words, as FERC

explained in its brief “regulatory authorities do not carve out

so-called ‘wholesale costs’ that only FERC can take into

account in determining rates subject to state jurisdiction.”

Instead. “{uJnder historical cost-of-service ratemaking, each

regulato y authority, in exercising its respective

jurisdiction, reviews the total costs incurred by a utility to

82a

provide service and makes its separate and independent

determination of what costs may be recovered through rates

within its jurisdiction.” Order 888-A, J 31,048 at 30,414.

Thus, while petitioners correctly point out that section

201(b) of the FPA denies FERC jurisdiction over “facilities

used for the generation of electric energy,” that provision

does not necessarily prevent FERC from including costs

relating to generating facilities in iransmission rates, over

which FERC indisputably has jurisdiction 16 USC. §

824(b). This is so because this part of section 201(b) is

modified by the phrase “except as specifically provided in

this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter.” Id.

Given that section 201(a) grants FERC jurisdiction over “the

transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce” and,

therefore, over transmission rates, 16 U.S.C. § 824(a), FERC

may exercise jurisdiction over generation facilities to the

extent necessary to regulate interstate transmission.

This is exactly the construction that we gave section

201(b) in Mississippi Industries v. FERC, 808 F.2d 1525,

1543-45 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (subsequent history omitted).

There, petitioners challenged FERC’s authority to reallocate

costs relating to generation facilities among utilities that were

parties to a power sales agreement. Justifying its authority to

reallo-[Page 75]cate such costs, FERC relied on its

“undisputed jurisdiction over interstate sales of electric

energy at wholesale.” Id. at 1543. We agreed: “[A]lthough

allocating cost does, to some extent, result in the ‘regulation

of matters relating to generation,’ such regulation is valid

under the FPA when it is the byproduct of a legitimate

exercise of FERC’s power to regulate wholesale rates.” Id.

In reaching this conclusion, we rejected petitioners’ argument

that “the statutory prohibition of federal regulation of

[generation] facilities in section 201(b) becomes meaningless

if FERC is permitted to allocate the costs of a plant,” given

FERC’s undisputed responsibility to regulate the wholesale

sale of power. Id. at 1543-44. Under Mississippi Industries,

stranded cost recovery provisi ns run afoul of section 201(a)

petitioners point out that the case “involved authority to

allocate generation costs to a wholesale sales rate (which

may, of course, include generation costs)” True, but

Mississippi Industries provides clear authority for the

Proposition that there is no per se jurisdictional bar to

FERC’s including generation costs in jurisdictional rates,

whether wholesale sales rates or transmission rates. Thus

narrowed, the question before us is this: Is inclusion of

stranded costs relating to generation facilities in transmission

rates the byproduct of a legitimate exercise of FERC’s

authority over transmission rates? In most cases the answer

would be no, but given the highly unusual circumstances of

this case, we think the answer is yes. Just as FERC may

include generation-related wholesale stranded costs in

transmission rates (see Section V.A.1.b), it may include

generation-related retail stranded costs in transmission rates.

That retail stranded costs were [Page 76]originally reflected

“costs” of providing transmission services: “While such

costs are not a cost of operating the physical transmission

system, nevertheless, they are an economic cost incurred as a

result of being required to provide retai] transmission.”

Order 888-A, ¥ 31,048 at 30,414 n.708 While we agree that

generation-related retail costs are not typically “costs”

relating to transmission services, the fundamental changes

84a

wrought by state-ordered retail wheeling, as well as the

narrow circumstances in which FERC will consider stranded

cost recovery claims, justify the conclusion that these costs

are costs of providing transmission service.

Petitioners claim that by agreeing to consider retail

stranded cost recovery claims, FERC has unduly interfered

with state legislative processes and decisions. We disagree.

FERC has limited its “interference” to instances where state

commissions have no authority even to address stranded cost

recovery claims. Describing its role as limited to “fill[ing]

any regulatory gap,” FERC made it clear that it will deny

consideration to any utility seeking stranded cost recovery “if

a state regulatory authority with authority to address retail

wheeling stranded costs has in fact addressed such costs,

regardless of whether the state regulatory authority has

allowed full recovery, partial recovery, or no recovery.”

Order 888-A, 931,048 at 30,415. Under _ these

circumstances, it can hardly be said that FERC has usurped

state authority.

b. FERC’s refusal to assert jurisdiction over all retail

stranded costs.

Contending that FERC did not go far enough, the [OUs

challenge the agency’s refusal to consider claims for stranded

costs resulting from state-ordered retail wheeling unless the

relevant state regulatory commission lacks authority to

address such claims. They claim that FERC should have

agreed to consider proposals for retail stranded cost recovery

whether or not the state commission had authority to address

the claim, and even whether or not a state commission with

such authority had already addressed the claim. In support

[Page 77]of their position the IOUs advance three related

arguments. They allege first that by concluding that it had

jurisdiction over retail stranded costs but declining to

exercise it, FERC abdicated its legal authority. Second, they

say, FERC violated its statutory obligation to ensure just and

reasonable rates. And finally, they contend that FERC erred

With respect to their first argument, the IOUs claim that

once FERC determined that it had jurisdiction over retail

stranded costs, the agency had to exercise that jurisdiction.

In making this argument, the IOUs make the same mistake

POSCR made: They confuse FERC jurisdiction over costs

with its jurisdiction over rates. FERC has not “concluded

that it shares jurisdiction over retail stranded costs with the

states,” as the IOUs assert. As we explained above, “costs”

are not jurisdictional. The FPA speaks not in terms of

“costs,” but in terms of “rates,” requiring FERC to ensure

that rates are just, reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory.

FERC indisputably has jurisdiction over interstate

transmission rates. In essence, then, the IOUs claim that

FERC has no discretion to leave retail stranded cost recovery

to state authorities.

We review claims that an agency lacks discretion to

follow (or decline to follow) a certain course of action by

examining the agency’s governing statute as well as its own

regulations. See, e. 8., National Wildlife Federation v.

statute gives EPA “substantial room to exercise its expertise

in determining the appropriate grounds for listing”). The

1OUs have failed to point to any Statutory provision that robs

FERC of discretion to decide, as a matter of policy, that state

regulato-[Page 78)]ry commissions should serve as the

primary forum for retail stranded cost recovery. Our own

examination of the FPA reveals no such provision either.

pues

86a

Sections of the statute giving FERC jurisdiction over

transmission in interstate commerce, 16 U.S.C. § 824(a), and

requiring FERC to ensure that rates are just and reasonable,

16 U.S.C. § 824d(a), do not alone create a mandatory duty to

consider proposals for retail stranded cost recovery.

The two Supreme Court cases the 1OUs rely on provide

no support for their position, for in both cases the agencies,

unlike FERC in this case, failed to comply with a specific

statutory mandate. In MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218 (1994),

the Supreme Court held that the FCC could not exempt

certain communication common carriers from filing a tariff,

the statute specified that all carriers must file tariffs.

Similarly, in FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S. 380 (1974), the

Supreme Court determined that the FPC could not exempt

certain producers from the statute’s requirement that rates be

just and reasonable. Under these cases, FERC would

abdicate its statutory obligations if it, for example, exempted

certain utilities from the requirement that rates be just and

reasonable (as in Texaco), or if it refused to review

transmission rate filings altogether. These cases do not hold

that in carrying out its statutory obligations, FERC has no

discretion to determine as a matter of policy that states are

better positioned to address costs originally included in retail

rate Lases. What

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.

Appendix Vol I — New York v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission · 533 U.S. 947 | Frix