Appendix Vol I — New York v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Supreme Court brief2001
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No. - __ OFFICE OF THE CLERK j
IN THE
Supreme Court of the Anited States
Petitioner,
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, ef al. ,
Respondents.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit
APPENDIX TO —
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
(Volume I)
JEFFREY D. WATKISS LOouIs R. COHEN
BRACEWELL & Counsel of Record
PATTERSON, L.L.P. JOSEPH E. KILLORY, JR.
2000 K Street, N.W. IJAY PALA KY
Suite 500 MICHAEL PLOTNICK
Washington, D.C. 20006 WILMER, CUTLER & PICKERING
(202) 828-5800 2445 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037-1420
(202) 663-6000
- Counsel for Petitioner Enron Power Marketing, Inc.
313 ep
_ TABLE OF CONTENTS
APPENDICES: Page
A.
Q
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Colombia Circuit filed June 30, 2000 .... la
Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit filed June 30, 2000 ....3a
Order of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit filed Aug. 22, 2000 .....123a
Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open
Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services
by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities,
Order No. 888, [1991-96 Reg. Preambles] F.E.R.C.
Stats. & Regs. J 31,036 (1996) (pertinent portions).. 125a
Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open
Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services
by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by
Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, Order
No. 888-A, [Reg. & Preambles] [II F.E.R.C. Stats.
& Regs. J 31,048 (1997) (pertinent portions) ........... 37la
Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open
Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services
by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by
Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking and Supplemental Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, [1988-1998 Proposed Regs.] F.E.R.C.
Stats. & Regs. | 32,514 (1995) (pertinent portion) ...553a
a cciasehdens 645a
List of Parties to the Proceeding .....................0.0000. 683a
APPENDIX A
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Colombia Circuit filed June 30, 2000
la
APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 97-1715 September Term, 1999
Transmission Access Policy Study Group, et al.
Petitioner
Vv.
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
Respondent
Vermont Department of Public Service, et al.,
Intervenors
Consolidated with 98-1111, 98-1112, 98-1113,
98-1114, 98-1115, 98-1118, 98-1119, 98-1120,
98-1122, 98-1124, 98-1125, 98-1126, 98-1127,
98-1128, 98-1129, 98-1131, 98-1132, 98-1134,
98-1136, 98-1137, 98-1139, 98-1140, 98-1141,
98-1142, 98-1143, 98-1145, 98-1147, 98-1148,
98-1149, 98-1150, 98-1152, 98-1153, 98-1154,
98-1155, 98-1156, 98-1159, 98-1162, 98-1163,
98-1166, 98-1168, 98-1169, 98-1170, 98-1171,
98-1172, 98-1173, 98-1174, 98-1175, 98-1176,
98-1178, 98-1180
On Petitions for Review of Orders of the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
BEFORE: Sentelle, Randolph, and Tatel, Circuit Judges.
2a
JUDGMENT
These causes came on to be heard on the petitions for
review of orders of the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission and were argued by counsel. On consideration
thereof, it is
ORDERED and ADJUDGED, by the Court, that the
petitions for review are granted in part and denied in part, in
accordance with the opinion for the Court filed herein this
date.
FOR THE COURT:
Mark J. Langer, Clerk
By: s/Robert A. Bonner
Robert A. Bonner
Deputy Clerk
Date: June 30, 2000
Opinion Per Curiam
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Filed: JUN 30 2000
Clerk
MANDATE
Pursuant to the provisions of Fed. R. App. Pro. 41(a)
ISSUED: 8/30/00
By: €E. Brown
ATTACHED: —Amending Order
—Opinion
—Order on Costs
er =
id
_
+.
APPENDIX B
Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit filed June 30, 2000
3a
APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued November 3, 1999 Decided June 30, 2000
No. 97-1715
Transmission Access Policy Study Group, et al.
Petitioner
Vv.
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
Respondent
Vermont Department Of Public Service, et al.,
Intervenors
[Page 2}Consolidated with
98-1111, 98-1112, 98-1113, 98-1114, 98-1115, 98-1118, 98-
1119, 98-1120, 98-1122, 98-1124, 98-1125, 98-1126, 98-
1127, 98-1128, 98-1129, 98-1131, 98-1132, 98-1134, 98-
1136, 98-1137, 98-1139, 98-1140, 98-1141, 98-1142, 98-
1143, 98-1145, 98-1147, 98-1148, 98-1149, 98-1150, 98-
1152, 98-1153, 98-1154, 98-1155, 98-1156, 98-1159, 98-
1162, 98-1163, 98-1166, 98-1168, 98-1169, 98-1170, 98-
1171, 98-1172, 98-1173, 98-1174, 98-1175, 98-1176, 98-
1178, 98-1180
Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.
The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out of
time.
4a
On Petitions for Review of Orders of the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Sherilyn Peterson, John T. Miller, Jr., Robert C.
McDiarmid, Stanley C. Fickle, Sara D. Schotland, Jeffrey L.
Landsman, Lawrence G. Malone, Jeffery D. Watkiss, Richard
M. Lorenzo, Isaac A. Benkin, Wallace E. Brand, Daniel |.
Davidson, Cynthia S. Bogorad, Harvey L. Reiter and
Randolph Lee Elliott argued the causes for petitioners. With
them on the briefs were William R. Maurer, Ben Finkelstein,
David E. Pomper, Ronald N. Carroll, John Michael
Adragna, Sean T. Beeny, Wallace F. Tillman, Susan N. Kelly,
Craig W. Silverstein, A. Hewitt Rose, Bryan G. Tabler, James
D. Pembroke, David C Vladeck, Robert F. Shapiro, Lynn N.
Hargis, Wallace L. Duncan, Richmond F Allan, Alan H.
Richardson, Michael A. Mullett, C. Kirby Mullen, Robert A.
Jablon, Sara C. Weinberg, John F. Wickes, Jr.. Todd A.
Richardson, Brian A. Statz, John P. C ook, Charles F.
Wheatley, Jr., Christine C. Ryan, Robert S. Tongren, Joseph
| P. Serio, Barry E. Cohen, Carrol S. Verosky, Jennifer S.
4 McGinnity, Jonathan D. Feinberg, Charles D. Gray, Robert
Vandiver, Cynthia Miller, Helene S. Wallenstein, William H.
Chambliss, C. Meade Browder. Jr., Mary W. Cochran, Paul
R. Hightower, Brad M. Purdy, Gisele L. Rankin, Robert D.
Cedarbaum, Edward H. Comer, Edward Berlin, (Page 3]
Robert V. Zener, Elizabeth W. Whittle, James H. McGrew,
Donald K. Dankner, Frederick J Killion, Joseph L.
Lakshmanan, Stephen C. Palmer, Michael E. Ward, Steven J
Ross, Marvin T. Griff and Thomas C. Trauger. Leja D.
Courter, Robert E. Glennon, Jr., Neil Butterklee, Zachary D.
Wilson, Sheila S. Hollis, Janice I. Lower and James B.
Ramsay entered appearances.
John H. Comay, Deputy Solicitor, Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, and Timm [. Abendroth and Larry
D. Gasteiger, Attorneys, argued the causes for respondent.
With them on the brief was Jay L. Witkin, Solicitor. Susan J.
a tS 2 te eR oe
BEE
Sa
Court, Special Counsel, and Edward S. Geldermann,
Attorney, entered appearances.
Edward Berlin argued the cause for intervenors. With
him on the briefs were J. Phillip Jordan, Robert V. Zener,
Edward H. Comer, William M. Lange, Deborah A. Moss,
James H. McGrew, Steven J. Ross, Elizabeth W. Whittle,
Richard M. Lorenzo, David M. Stahl, D. Cameron Findlay,
Peter Thornton, J. Phillip Jordan, Robert V. Zener, Robert dl
McDiarmid, Cynthia S. Bogorad, Ben Finkelstein, Peter J.
Hopkins, Margaret A. McGoldrick, Jeffery D. Watkiss,
Ronald N. Carroll, Sara D. Schotland, Alan H. Richardson,
Wallace L. Duncan, Richmond F. Allan, A. Hewitt Rose,
Wallace F. Tillman, Susan N. Kelly, John M. Adragna, Sean
T Beeny and Randolph Lee Elliott. Edward J. Twomey,
Richard P. Bonnifield, Frederick H. Ritts, David L. Huard,
Dan H. McCrary, Mark A. Crosswhite, John N. Estes, III,
Kevin J. McIntyre, John S. Moot, Clark E. Downs, Martin V.
Kirkwood, Robert A. Waters, John T. Stough, Jr., Bruce L.
Richardson, Floyd L. Norton, IV, William S. Scherman,
Douglas F. John, Gary D. Bachman, Nicholas W. Fels,
Robert Weinberg, Robert A. Jablon, Peter G. Esposito,
Christine C. Ryan, Sheila S. Hollis, Stephen L. Teichler,
James K. Mitchell, Gordon J. Smith, Edward J. Brady, Kevin
F. Duffy, Michael P. May, Barbara S. Brenner, Michael J.
Rustum, Sandra E. Rizzo, Kirk H. Betts, Pierre F. de Ravel
d’Esclapon, Glen L. Ortman and William D. DeGrandis
entered appearances.
[Page 4] Before: SENTELLE, RANDOLPH and TATEL,
Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM’:
. Following our normal practice in complex cases, we shared the
writing of this opinion. Judge Sentelle wrote Section II, Section III, and
Section VII. Judge Randolph wrote Section IV, Section VI, and Section
VIII. Judge Tatel wrote Section I Section V, and Section IX.
Il.
Il.
IV.
6a
Table of Contents
I iinticntnamaiereicl Mioimccclgees ada ete 8
FERC’S AUTHORITY TO REQUIRE OPEN ACCESS
son cnaenantennesiepsidiiasnndaddamatininbibipiiuiatabddadadeniea madam cadbasntan tin 12
A. ‘er Challenges: FPA §§ 205 and 206 .......... 16
§§ 205 and 206 and Otter Tail Power Company
16
2. § 206(a) Procedural and Evidentiary Require-
INTE! evsebbuiiniicigeietencscsssntiemnonmsbiasinemesesoonunmenes 19
3. Discriminatory Effect of Order 888................ 22
B. Constitutional Challenge: Fifth Amendment Takings
SUNNY Meoniabiinemmetincenekietana eres 25
FEDERAL VERSUS STATE JURISDICTION OVER
TRANSMISSION SERVICES 000000. 26
A. Bundled Retail Sales 000000000. 29
B. Local Distribution Facilities... 34
8. g EES See een ES ....38
A. Indirect Regulation of Non-Jurisdictional Utilities 39
B. Limitation on Reciprocity 000000000. 41
STRANDED COST RECOVERY PROVISIONS ..... 42
A. Wholesale Stranded Costs 0.0.0.0... 44
1. FERC’s Authority to Provide for Stranded Cost
RRR Ee ANE Ran 48
a. Reasonable expectation of continued
RSET EEN ALS aR A ae 48
[Page S]b........ Sections 206 and 212 of the FPA
Sineritinecesnetiitiealiilatittiatiaiaias teat a ten pe 50
c. Implications of Cajun 00000000... 53
2. Natural Gas Precedent and Conformance to
Cost Causation Principles .................... 54
a. Natural gas precedent: AGD, KN Energy,
a. I eee 54
b. Conformance to cost causation principles 59
3. FERC’s Mobile-Sierra Findings ................. 62
a. FERC’s authority to make a generic public
interest finding ..............eccceerereereereeeeeers 64
b. FERC’s stranded cost public interest
FINDING, .........sscererevesessererssrenessossersseseresees 66
c. FERCs public interest finding regarding
CUBLOMGIG .......000cccrcercscvercoossceesererensossseees 68
4. Availability of Stranded Cost Recovery to
Nonjurisdictional Utilities and G & T
COOPETARIVES ........cceseseceenererenerensncesernsnsesnensess 69
5. Challenges to Technical Aspects of Order 888’s
Stranded Cost Recovery Provisions .............. 72
a. POSCRs challenges to the stranded cost
RID ncccsscnccetccsnevesesscccsssconosobonsonesescors 73
b. Inclusion of known and measurable costs 74
c. Treatment of energy costs in the market
OPTION .......scercrssrrscsreecersnsssersnesecsesrserneees 75
d._ Rescission of notice of termination
PFOVISION ..........20ceseeeeesesenersrseeerersenseeenens 77
e. Provision for benefits lost ...................... 77
B. Retail Stranded Costs ..................cccceceeeeeeeteeeeeeeees 78
1. Stranded Costs Arising from Retail Wheeling 79
a. FERC’s jurisdiction over retail stranded
ae caseindielinsinennd 80
b. FERC’s refusal to assert jurisdiction over
all retail stranded costs......................008 84
[Page 6]2. Stranded Costs Relating to Retail-
Turned-Wholesale Customers ......................- 88
VI CREDITS FOR CUSTOMER-OWNED FACILITIES
AND BEHIND-THE-METER GENERATION .......... 93
VIL LIABILITY, INTERFACE ALLOCATION AND
IIT 1, senstsonnrenennssnnsnrocconansnenes O8
A. Liability and Indemnification ...................:..:.0 99
B. Interface Allocation ..................c:ccccccccceeesseeeeeeees 103
C. Delivery-Point-Specific Discounting ................. 105
VIIL TARIFF TERMS AND CONDITIONS .................-. 110
A. Headroom Allocation ............:.:cccccccceceessreeeeees 110
B. Headroom Prioritization 200.0....0.0.0..0..ccccccccceeeeeeee 112
C. Deplicative Changes ........ccscssscssssssssccensessesersoees 112
D. Multiple Control Areas 2.000000.000000.0.00ccccccccccceeeeeees 113
E. Right-of-First-Refusal o.2000000000000000.ccccccccccccceseseees 114
IX. NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT AND
REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT COMPLIANCE ..
soeecesocesoesoneessosoncesseeessenenmeeesnnaisniinnnnnnnnnnnnnnnE 115
115
1. Adequacy of Base Case o000..0.0....ccccccceeeees 115
2. Failure to Adopt Mitigation Measures ......... 118
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act Compliance .............. 119
Following two notices of proposed rulemaking, the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission issued Orders 888
and 889 on April 24, 19967. Reflecting the Commission’s
effort to end [Page 7} discriminatory and anticompetitive
practices in the vational electricity market and to ensure that
electricity customers pay the lowest prices possible, these
orders represent, as the Commission described in a later order
not before us, “the foundation necessary to develop
competitive bulk power markets....”. Regional Transmission
Organizations, Order No. 2000, 65 Fed. Reg. 810, 812
(2000).
Open access is the essence of Orders 888 and 889.
Under these orders, utilities must now provide access to their
” Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access
Nondiscrimina‘ory Transmission Services by Public Utilities, Recovery
of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, Order
No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¥ 31,036, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (1996),
clarified, 76 FERC 4 61,009 and 76 FERC 4 61,347 (1996) (“Order
888”), on reh’g, Order No. 888-A, FERC Stats. and Regs. { 31,048, 62
Fed. Reg. 12,274, clarified, 79 FERC 4 61,182 (1997), on reh’g, Order
No. 888-B, 81 FERC 4 61,248, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,688 (1997), on reh’g,
Order No. 888-C, 82 FERC 4 61,046 (1998); Open Access Same-Time
Information System and Standards of Conduct, Order No. 889, FERC
Stats. & Regs. 4 31,035, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,737 (1996) (“Order 889”), on
reh’g, Order No. 889-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. 4 31,049, 62 Fed. Reg.
12,484 (1997), on reh’g, Order No. 889-B, 81 FERC 4 61,253 (1997).
All key players in the electricity market have challenged
various provisions of Orders 888 and 889. Their claims
range from the hypertechnical to arguments that FERC lacks
authority to order open access transmission at all. Finding
few defects in the orders we uphold them in nearly all
respects.
1. INTRODUCTION
Historically, vertically integrated utilities owned
ion. transmission, and distribution facilities. They
sold gen-[Page 8]eration, transmission, and distribution
services as part of a “bundled” package. Due to
technological limitations on the distance over which
electricity could be transmitted, each utility served only
customers in a limited geographic area. And because of their
natural monopoly characteristics, utilities have been heavily
regulated at both the federal and state levels.
Since enactment of the Federal Power Act in 1935, the
electricity industry has undergone significant change, both
10a
MW)
generation facilities, such as nuclear power plants.
Technological advances in the 1970s and 1980s have
well. See
Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of
Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities,
FERC Stats. & Regs. 32,514 at 33,059-60, 60 Fed. Reg.
17,662 (1995) (“Open Access NOPR”). Technological
improvements also made feasible the transmission of electric
power over long distances at high voltages. See id. 4 32,514
low-cost power.
The growth of this new wholesale market faced a serious
obstacle. “As entry into wholesale power generation markets
increased,” FERC explained, “the ability of customers to gain
access to the transmission services necessary to reach
competing suppliers became increasingly important.” Id. at
33,062. Yet the owners of transmission lines, the traditional
utilities that had built the high-cost generation capacity,
denied alternative producers access to their transmission lines
On competitive terms and conditions. FERC therefore began
requiring utilities to file open access transmission tariffs that
permitted other suppliers to transmit power over [Page 9]
their lines under certain circumstances, such as when a utility
sought authorization to merge with another utility or to sell
power at market-based rather than cost-based rates.
Then, in 1992, Congress enacted the Energy Policy Act,
which amended sections 211 and 212 of the FPA to authorize
FERC to order utilities to “wheel” power—i.e., transmit
lla
power for Wholesale sellers of power over the utilities’
transmission lines—on a case-by-case basis. Pub. L. No.
102-486, 106 Stat. 2776, 2915-16 (1992) (codified at 16
U.S.C. §§824j-k). FERC “ i
Rulemaking, Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities
NOPR”)).
prices.” Open Access NOPR, { 32,514 at 33,052. Power
generators not permitted to use utilities’ transmission lines on
reasonable terms have no way to transmit their power to
customers.
Invoking its authority under sections 205 and 206 of the
FPA to remedy unduly discriminatory or preferential rules,
regulations, practices, or contracts affecting public utility
rates for transmission in interstate commerce, 16 U.S.C. §§
824d-e, and building on its experience in restructuring the
natural gas industry, see Associated Gas Distribs. v. FERC,
824 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1987), the Commission issued
Orders [Page 10] 888 and 889 to “prevent this discrimination
by ‘tee all public utiliti ie enfin Hh
12a
transmission facilities to offer open
access transmission service.” Open Access NOPR, § 32,514
at 33,052. Orders 888 and 889 mandate what FERC terms
“functional unbundling,” i.e., separating utilities’ wholesale
transmission functions from their wholesale electricity
merchant functions. Specifically, the orders require utilities
to (1) file open access nondiscriminatory tariffs that contain
the minimum terms and conditions of nondiscriminatory
services prescribed by FERC through its pro forma tariff. (2)
take transmission service for their own new Wholesale sales
and purchases of electric energy under the same terms and
conditions as they offer that service to others; (3) develop
and maintain a same-time information system that will give
potential and existing transmission users the same access to
transmission information that the utility enjoys (called the
“Open Access Same-Time Information System” or
“OASIS”); and (4) state separate rates for wholesale
generation, transmission, and ancillary services. See Order
888, 7 31,036 at 31,635-36.
In requiring utilities to provide open access transmission,
FERC acknowledged the dramatic change the orders would
bring about, explaining that “(t]he most critical transition
issue that arises as a result of the Commission’s actions in
this rule-making is how to deal with the uneconomic sunk
costs that utilities prudently incurred under an industry
regime that rested on a regulatory framework and a set of
expectations that are being fundamentally altered.” Order
888-A, 31,048 at 30,346. Known as “stranded costs,” these
“uneconomic sunk costs” are costs that utilities incurred not
only with regulatory approval, but with the expectation of
continuing to serve their current customers. These costs will
become “stranded” when customers take advantage of open
access transmission to purchase cheaper power from
suppliers other than their historic utilities. Order 888 affords
utilities an opportunity to recover stranded costs from their
wholesale requirements customers, but only from those
customers who use their utility’s transmission service to
13a
purchase power from new suppliers, and only if the utility
can [Page 11] prove that it had a reasonable expectation of
continued service to that customer.
further rehearing. All petitions for review of Orders 888 and
889 were consolidated and transferred to this circuit. We
consider these petitions in this opinion. Section II considers
challenges to FERC’s authority to require utilities to file
retail sales. Section IV addresses FERC’s authority to
require nonpublic utilities to provide reciprocal open access
transmission service. Section V considers challenges to
Order 888’s stranded cost recovery provisions. Section VI
evaluates petitioners’ arguments relating to credits for
customer-owned facilities and behind-the-meter generation.
Section VII addresses discounting interface allocation, and
liability. Section VII evaluates other arguments relating to
the terms and conditions of the pro forma tariff. Section IX
assesses FERC’s compliance with the National
Environmental Policy Act and the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
In the end, we affirm the orders in all respects except
two: we remand for FERC to explain its treatment of energy
costs in the stranded cost market option (Section V.A.5.c)
and to provide a reasonable cap on contract extensions under
existing customers’ right-of-first-refusal (Section VIII.E).
Il. FERC’S AUTHORITY TO REQUIRE OPEN ACCESS
Although FERC asserts that “mounting claims of undue
discrimination in transmission access” prompted its
movement toward open access, the open access requirement
of Order 888 is premised not on individualized findings of
discrimination by specific transmission providers, but on
FERC’s identification of a fundamental systemic problem in
l4a
the industry. Generally, those entities that own or control
interstate transmission facilities are vertically-integrated
public utilities that also generate and sell electricity. In its
1995 [Page 12] notice of proposed rulemaking, FERC
observed that there were at that time approximately 328
public utilities, marketers, and wholesale generation entities
with transmission needs, and that approximately 137 of those
owned or controlled the transmission facilities. See Open
Access NOPR, $32,514 at 33,051. Entry into the
transmission market is difficult and restricted, so those
utilities that already own transmission facilities enjoy a
natural monopoly over that field. The transmission-owning
utilities can use their position to favor their own generated
electricity and to exclude competitors from the market,
whether by denying transmission access outright, or by
providing transmission services to competitors only at
comparatively unfavorabte~ rates, terms, and conditions.
Utilities that own or control transmission facilities naturally
wish to maximize profit. The transmission-owning utilities
thus can be expected to act in their own interest to maintain
their monopoly and to use that position to retain or expand
the market share for their own generated electricity, even if
they do so at the expense of lower-cost generation companies
and consumers.
Even before Order 888, some transmission-owning
utilities voluntarily opened their transmission facilities to
third party suppliers and purchasers of electricity; and FPA
§211 explicitly gives FERC the authority to order
involuntary wheeling on a case-by-case basis. The
Commission decided, however, that relying upon voluntary
arrangements and § 211 orders would not remedy the
fundamentally anti-competitive structure of the transmission
industry. Instead, the Commission concluded, such a
piecemeal approach would result in an inefficient
“patchwork” of transmission systems nationwide. “The
ultimate loser in such a regime is the consumer.” Open
Access NOPR, 4 32,514 at 33,071.
15a
As an alternative, the Commission interpreted the anti-
discrimination language of FPA §§ 205 and 206, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 824d, 824e (1994), as giving it the authority to impose
open access as a generic remedy for its findings of systemic
i itive behavior. Invoking that broad authority,
in Order 888, FERC requires every transmission-owning
public utility within FERC’s jurisdiction to file an Open
Access [Page 13] Transmission Tariff (OATT) containing
minimum terms and conditions for non-discriminatory
service and to take transmission service for their own
wholesale sales and purchases of electric energy under those
filed OATTs. In other words, this order requires the public
utilities to provide the same transmission services to anyone
purchasing or selling wholesale power—other public utilities,
federal power suppliers and marketers, municipalities,
cooperatives, independent power producers, qualifying
facilities, or power marketers—as they provide to
themselves. The Board of Water, Light and Sinking Fund
Commissioners of the City of Dalton (Dalton) operates a
municipally-owned utility system which provides electric
power to residential, commercial, and industrial consumers in
the city of Dalton, Georgia. Dalton obtains transmission
services from the Georgia Integrated Transmission System
(ITS), which it owns along with public utility George Power
Company (GPC) and two other utilities that are not subject to
FERC’s jurisdiction, and which GPC operates according to
the terms of various filed agreements. Puget Sound Energy,
Inc. (Puget) is a public utility in the Pacific Northwest,
where Bonneville Power Administration, which is not a
public utility subject to Order 888’s requirements,’ [Page 14]
> Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) “is a power marketing
agency in the Pacific Northwest that markets power from thirty federal
hydroelectric projects constructed and operated by the Corps of Engineers
and the Bureau of Reclamation.” In re Bonneville Power Administration,
Power Sale and Transmission Rates, 54 FERC. $62,143 (1991). In
Order 888, FERC concluded that BPA is not a public utility as defined by
Federal Power Act (FPA) § 201(e), and thus is not subject to Order 888’s
l6a
dominates the electricity transmission market. These two
industry petitioners challenge the open access requirement of
Order 888 on various Statutory, constitutional, and other
grounds.
Turning first to the FPA itself, Puget and Dalton argue
that §§ 205 and 206 do not give the Commission the
authority to order open access as a generic remedy; and even
if the FPA does give the agency such authority, FERC has
failed to satisfy the statutory requirements for invoking it.
Dalton also argues that Order 888 itself violates the FPA by
discriminating against transmission facility owners who have
invested in those assets. Shifting to constitutional concerns,
Puget and Dalton, along with amicus curiae Pacific Legal
Foundation, maintain that Order 888 violates the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Finally, Dalton argues that
the open access requirements of the OATT interfere with the
antitrust conditions of outstanding nuclear licenses, and thus
are unlawful. While we consider each of these challenges
separately, we hold that Order 888’s open access
requirements. Order 888, { 31,036 at 31,858. FERC admitted, however,
to three circumstances under which it might review BPA’s transmission
access and pricing policies: (1) if BPA files an open access tariff for
review and confirmation under the Northwest Power Act and asks FERC
to find that the tariff meets FERC’s open access policies: (2) to the extent
that BPA “Is a transmitting utility subject to a request for
transmission services” under FPA § 211; and (3) to the extent that BPA
receives open access transmission from a public utility and is thereby
subject to the reciprocity provision in that public utility’s pro-forma tariff
Id.
17a
requirement is authorized by and consistent with the FPA and
the Takings Clause. We conclude also that Dalton has not
yet suffered injury from the alleged conflict between open
access and the nuclear license antitrust conditions, and that
its complaint on that issue is therefore not yet ripe for judicial
review.
A. Statutory Challenges: FPA §§ 205 and 206
Section 205 of the FPA broadly precludes public
utilities, in any transmission or sale subject to FERC’s
jurisdiction, from “mak[ing] or grant[ing] any undue
preference or advantage to [Page 15] any person or
subject[ing] any person to any undue prejudice or
disadvantage... .” 16 U.S.C. § 824d(b). Section 206 of the
FPA further provides in relevant part that
[w]henever the Commission, after a hearing had
upon its own motion or upon complaint, shall find
that any rate, charge, or classification, demanded,
observed, charged, or collected by any public utility
for any transmission or sale subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission, or that any rule,
regulation, practice, or contract affecting such rate,
charge, or classification is unjust, unreasonable,
unduly discriminatory or preferential, the
Commission shall determine the just and reasonable
rate, charge, classification, rule, regulation, practice,
or contract to be thereafter observed arid in force,
and shall fix the same by order.
16 U.S.C. § 824e(a). The statutory issues before us are
whether these provisions give FERC the authority to order
involuntary wheeling as a generic remedy, and if they do,
whether FERC satisfied the procedural and evidentiary
requirements imposed by these provisions.
Order 888’s open access requirement, and that we have jurisdiction to
18a
1. §§ 205 and 206 and Otter Tail Power Company
The Commission did not write on a blank slate when it
interpreted FPA §§ 205 and 206 as giving it the authority to
order involuntary wheeling as a generic remedy for systemic
anti-competitive behavior. Puget and Dalton argue
principally that the Supreme Court’s decision in Otter Tail
Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973), controls
the disposition of this issue. Otter Tail was an antitrust case
in which the Supreme Court addressed whether the district
court could require Otter Tail Power Company to wheel
power for its competitors as a remedy for monopolistic
practices. Contrary to the company’s arguments, the
Supreme Court concluded that the district court’s order did
not impermissibly conflict with the authority of the Federal
Power Commission, FERC’s predecessor, because the
agency did not have the power itself to order involuntary
wheeling under Part II of the FPA, which includes §§ 205
and 206. Puget and Dalton [Page 16] cite various circuit
court precedents, including one from this circuit, as
construing Ctter Tail to prevent the Commission from
ordering involuntary wheeling as a generic remedy. See,
e.g., Florida Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 660 F.2d 668 (Sth
Cir. Unit B Nov. 1981); New York State Electric & Gas
Corp. v. FERC, 638 F.2d 388 (2d Cir. 1980); Richmond
Power & Light v. FERC, 574 F.2d 610 (DC. Cir. 1978).
Finally, Puget and Dalton note that subsequent to Otter Tail,
Congress enacted FPA § 211, 16 U.S.C. § 824), giving FERC
the authority to impose open access on a case-by-case basis
to remedy a broad range of problems. The petitioners argue
that, if FPA §§ 205 and 206 authorize the Commission to
impose open access, and if Otter Tail does not prohibit such
action, then there was no reason for Congress to enact § 211.
In response, the Commission contends that we should
not read Otter Tail as limiting its authority under FPA § 206
to remedy discriminatory behavior, since Otter Tail was an
antitrust case and not an undue discrimination case. The
19a
by the petitioners are not on point and do not prohibit a
generic open access remedy. The Commission points instead
to our decision in Associated Gas Distributors v. FERC, 824
F.2d 981, 998 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (AGD), in which we upheld a
similar open access transportation requirement imposed by
FERC on natural gas transmission, as the controlling
precedent. Finally, FERC argues that Congress enacted FPA
§ 211 to broaden its already existing authority to order
involuntary wheeling, as FPA §§ 205 and 206 authorize such
action only as a remedy-for undue discrimination. -
We agree with FERC that our decision in AGD controls
the disposition of this issue. In AGD, we reviewed a FERC
order imposing open access conditions on pipelines
transporting natural gas. See 824 F.2d at 997-1001.
Considering arguments quite similar to those made by the
petitioners here, we concluded that Otter Tail does not
constrain FERC from mandating open access where it finds
circumstances of undue discrimination to exist. See id. at
998-99. Turning to relevant circuit precedent, we construed
Richmond Power & Light as supporting only the proposition
that a refusal to [Page 17] provide transmission services to
another utility was not per se unduly discriminatory and we
noted that the court in Florida Power & Light expressly left
open the question of whether FERC could impose open
access conditions as a remedy for anti-competitive behavior.
See id. at 999. Further, we pointed out that our reading of
Richmond is consistent with other precedent, specifically
Central lowa Power Coop. v. FERC, 606 F.2d. 1156 (D.C.
Cir. 1979), in which we upheld FERC’s use of its authority to
prevent undue discrimination to condition its approval of a
power-pooling agreement upon removal of membership
criteria which denied certain privileges to some but not all
participants. See AGD, 824 F.2d at 999. Indeed, in AGD,
we noted that open access relies upon the very same
principles that we upheld in Central Iowa. See id. Although
AGD addressed open access under the anti-discrimination
20a
provisions of the Natura! Gas Act (NGA) rather than FPA §§
205 and 206, we have repeatedly recognized the similarity of
the two statutes and held that they should be interpreted
consistently. See Environmental Action v. FERC, 996 F. 2d
401, 410 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v.
FERC, 860 F.2d 446, 454 (DC. Cir. 1988); see also
Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 577 n.7 (1981).
Thus, AGD counsels the conclusion that, while Otter Tail
may represent a general rule that FERC’s authority to order
open access is limited, the FPA, like the NGA, makes an
exception to that rule where FERC finds undue
discrimination.
Moreover, as in AGD, the deferential standard of
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
467 US. 837 (1984), governs our review of FERC’s
interpretation of FPA §§ 205 and 206. See AGD, 824 F.2d at
1001. If we agreed with Puget and Dalton that the Supreme
Court’s Otter Tail opinion dictates a particular construction
of §§ 205 and 206, then the Commission’s contrary
interpretation would not be entitled to Chevron deference.
See Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S.
116, 131 (1990) (“Once we have determined a Statute’s clear
meaning, we adhere to that determination under the doctrine
of stare decisis, and we judge an agency’s later interpretation
of the statute against [Page 18] our prior determination of the
statute’s meaning.”). But having concluded that Otter Tail
does not govern the disposition of this case, we are faced
solely with considering the validity of FERC’s interpretation
of the FPA, a statute that the Commission administers. In
AGD, we concluded that FERC reasonably interpreted the
NGA’s ambiguous anti-discrimination provisions as giving it
broad authority to remedy unduly discriminatory behavior
through a generic open access requirement. See AGD, 824
F.2d at 1001. Given the FPA’s similar language, we can
only reach the same conclusion with respect to Order 888.
For all of these reasons, we find that the Commission has the
2la
authority under FPA §§ 205 and 206 to require open access
as a generic remedy to prevent undue discrimination.
2. § 206(a) Procedural and Evidentiary Requirements
Puget and Dalton next argue that, even if FPA §§ 205
and 206 authorize FERC to impose open access generically,
§ 206(a) imposes certain procedural and evidentiary
requirements for action which the Commission failed in two
separate but related ways to satisfy. First, the petitioners
claim that FPA § 206(a) requires substantial evidence of
contemporaneous “unjust, unreasonable, unduly
discriminatory or preferential” behavior before the
Commission can act. The Commission made no finding of
discrimination or monopoly control on the part of Georgia
Power Company or Puget. None of the applications or
complaints filed with the Commission accused these
petitioners of unduly discriminatory or anti-competitive
behavior. Instead, the Commission premised Order 888 on a
generic finding that public utility holders as a group have
sufficient monopoly power over the transmission of
electricity to engage in unduly discriminatory and anti-
competitive practices, and that this condition will worsen in
the future. To support its finding, the Commission relied
upon unsubstantiated allegations of discriminatory conduct in
public comments, its own experience in reviewing
applications and complaints, and its own understanding of
the incentives for monopolists to behave discriminatorily.
[Page 19] Puget and Dalton additionally assert that FPA
§ 206(a) requires that the requisite findings of undue
discrimination be made in the context of a hearing. Although
they concede that a rulemaking proceeding can satisfy the
statute’s hearing requirement, Puget and Dalton maintain that
the rulemaking proceeding nevertheless must clearly identify
the challenged activities and actors, and give the accused
actors the opportunity to demonstrate that their activities
were not unlawful. The petitioners protest that the
22a
Commission’s notice-and-comment rulemaking process did
not afford them such opportunity.
FERC claims the discretion under NLRB v. Bell
Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 293 (1974), to choose between
rulemaking and case-by-case adjudication, and FERC
contends that its generic rulemaking process fully satisfied
the requirements of FPA § 206(a). FERC concedes that it
relied upon general findings of systemic monopoly
conditions and the resulting potential for anti-competitive
behavior, rather than evidence of monopoly and undue
discrimination on the part of individual utilities. Citing our
opinion in Wisconsin Gas Co. v. FERC, 770 F.2d 1144, 1166
(D.C. Cir. 1985), however, FERC maintains that such
findings are sufficient to substantiate its decision to impose
the open access requirement. Finally, FERC observes that
we rejected these same arguments in AGD. See 824 F.2d at
1008 (citing Wisconsin Gas, 770 F.2d at 1165-68).
Again, we must agree with the Commission. In
American Public Gas Ass’n v. FPC, we held that the
Commission could exercise its authority under NGA § 5(a),
the provision parallel to FPA § 206, through rulemaking as
well as adjudication. See 567 F.2d 1016, 1064-67 (D.C. Cir.
1977); See also Wisconsin Gas, 770 F.2d at 1153
(articulating the American Public Gas holding). Congress
subsequently ratified the American Public Gas holding when
it enacted the Department of Energy Organization Act, 42
U.S.C. § 7173(c) (1994). See Wisconsin Gas, 770 F.2d at
1153 n.8 (acknowledging the Act). That statute provides that
“the establishment of rates and charges under the Federal
Power Act [16 U.S.C. 79a et seq.] or the Natural Gas Act
[15 U.S.C. 717 et seq.], may be conducted by [Page 20] rule
making procedures.” 42 USC. § 7173(c) (brackets in
original). By passing a statute adopting the holding of
American Public Gas, and explicitly applying that rule to the
FPA as well as the NGA, Congress signaled its intent that the
23a
hearing requirements of NGA § S(a) and FPA § 206(a) be
: similarly.
holding that the Commission was required to make
specific findings that individual rater charged by individual
pipelines were unlawful, or to offer empirical proof for all
a generic rule to eliminate
discrimination. See AGD, 824 F.2d at 1008-09. Upon
comparison of the order considered in AGD with Order 888,
if anything, FERC more thoroughly documented the reasons
for its actions in Order 888 than in the earlier natural gas
order.
claims that AGD and Wisconsin Gas are
distinguishable, and that this case is governed by Electricity
Consumers Resource Council v. FERC, 747 F.2d 1511 (DC.
Cir. 1984), in which we reversed FERC’s adoption of a rate
based on an economic theory in the absence of a discussion
of the practical applications of that theory. See 747 F.2d at
1514. As the AGD court recognized, however, the court in
Electricity Consumers was persuaded that the Commission
had distorted the economic theory it claimed to apply. See
AGD, 824 F.2d at 1008. Just as the pipelines in AGD did,
Puget has failed to articulate exactly how FERC has distorted
the theories on which it relies in Order 888. Additionally, the
AGD court rejected the idea that “Electricity Consumer's
reference to ‘economic theory’ was intended to invalidate
agency reliance on generic factual predictions merely
because they are typically studied in the field called
economics.” Id. Following the rationale of Wisconsin Gas
24a
and AGD, we conclude that [Page 21] FERC has satisfied the
requirements for invoking its authority under FPA § 206(a).
3. Discriminatory Effect of Order 888
Dalton charges that, even if the FPA permits FERC to
impose involuntary wheeling generally, the open access
requirement of Order 888 causes rather than remedies
discrimination, and therefore violates FPA § 206(a)’s express
requirement that FERC act against undue discrimination.
Specifically, Dalton and the other non-jurisdictional owners
of the Georgia ITS facilities invested millions of dollars in
those facilities in order to use the facilities each owns and
receive reciprocal open access transmission services from the
other owners. Under the Open Access Transmission Tariff
(OATT), other customers do not have to make such
investments to use the Georgia ITS facilities FERC
responds that Order 888 does not unduly discriminate
between old and new customers of integrated transmission
systems like the Georgia ITS; and that if Dalton has evidence
that the tariff results in undue discrimination in its individual
circumstances, Dalton remains free to file a petition under
FPA § 206 for redress, and FERC will consider its claim.
FERC’s conclusion that its open access requirement is
not unduly discriminatory is subject only to arbitrary and
capricious review. See 5 USC. § 706(2)(A) (1994):
Sithe/Independence Power Partners, LP v. FERC, 165 F.3d
944, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Union Pacific Fuels, Inc. v.
FERC, 129 F.3d 157, 161 (D.C. Cir. 1997). We conclude
that FERC has adequately explained why its open access
requirement is not unduly discriminatory. Relying upon
extensive commentary as well as its own experiences, FERC
concluded that, as a general matter, transmission industry
conditions were conducive to discriminatory practices and
anti—competitive behavior, such that case-by-case
adjudication could not adequately address the problem.
FERC also recognized that its generic findings may have
exceptions, and thus that Order 888 may in individual
In another stab at demonstrating the discriminatory
imposed by Order 888 on Dalton’s rights upon termination of
the ITS Agreement are inconsistent with GPC’s obligations
under the nuclear licenses, and that the interference will
result in discrimination against Dalton. FERC maintains that
it agreed in addressing GPC’s Order 888 compliance filing to
treat the ITS Agreements separately
Ultimately, Dalton has offered no present injury from the
alleged conflict, so this issue is mot mpe for review. Dalton
will only be injured if, upon termination of the ITS
Agreement, Order 888 interferes with Dalton’s might to
transmission services. Dalton’s own argument suggests as
much, observing that FERC “left to GPC the decision
25a
whether it ‘must, but cannot, comply with separate orders’ of
NRC and FERC and whether it will present evidence of such
conflict to either Commission,” and complaining that even if
GPC does act, “the orders under review provide no assurance
provided by the nuclear licenses will be respected under the
OATT.” Br. [Page 23]of Petitioner Dalton at 23 (quoting
Order 888-A, 4 41,048 at 30,452). In short, GPC and FERC
are still in the process of determining whether the antitrust
provisions even conflict with Order 888, as well as hc. to
deal with any such inconsistency’ Accordingly, this issue is
not appropriate for judicial review at this time
B. Constitutional Challenge Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause
Puget and amicus curiae Pacific Legal Foundation
(Pacific) contend that Order 888 violates the Takings Clause
of the Fifth Amendment. These petitioners maintain that
Order 888’s open access requirement engineers a “taking” in
two ways: First, that FERC’s open access requirement effects
a regulatory taking by arbitrarily changing pricing
methodology in a way that excessively deprives transmission
owners of their investments in facilities; and, second, that the
open access requirement allows a physical invasion, a
permanent physical occupation, by taking away the
transmission owners’ right to exclude competitors from their
transmission property. We cannot grant relief on either
ground
When the action of the federal government effects a
“taking” for Fifth Amendment purposes, there is no inherent
constitutional defect, provided just compensation is available
At bottom, both of the petitioners’ Fifth Amendment claims
turn not on whether open access effects a taking, but whether
$
GPC’s management of the Georgia ITS is subject to the direction
of a committee that includes Dalton representatives
27a
FERC’s cost-based transmission pricing policies in the end
provide just compensation. The remedy of just compensation
is not within our jurisdiction but that of the United States
Court of Federal Claims, under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1491. See Bell Atlantic Tel. Cos. v. Federal
Communications Comm'n, 24 F.3d 1441, 1444 n.1 (DC. Cir.
1994); Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. United States,
987 F.2d 806, 815-16 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
We recognize that our jurisdiction to review an agency's
construction of a statute necessarily involves an exercise of
[Page 24]the policy of avoiding constitutional issues where
possible, even though the issues may concern arguable
takings amenable to Tucker Act remedy, “when ‘there is an
identifiable class of cases in which application of a statute
will necessarily constitute a taking.” Bell Atlantic, 24 F.3d
at 1445 (DC. Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 128 n.5 (1985)). We
need not decide whether this case falls within that category,
however, because even if it did, any takings problem created
by Order 888 does not raise such significant constitutional
doubt as to require us to construe the FPA to prohibit FERC
from ordering open access. If there is a taking, and a claim
for just compensation, then that is a Tucker Act matter to be
pursued in the Court of Federal Claims, and not before us.
lI] FEDERAL VERSUS STATE JURISDICTION OVER
TRANSMISSION SERVICES
Vertically integrated utilities use their own facilities to
generate, transmit, and distribute electricity to their
customers. Traditionally, the customer paid one combined
rate for both the power and its delivery, thus the industry
refers to such sales as “bundled.” To the extent that bundled
sales are made directly to the end user of the electricity, they
are also recognized as retail sales. Utilities may also sell the
electricity they generate at wholesale to other utilities or
other resellers of power, which then resell that power to their
own customers. Thus, the same utility may use its facilities
28a
to serve both retail and wholesale customers. Vertically
integrated utilities use their transmission facilities to move
electricity over long distances, and use local distribution lines
to deliver the electricity to the end user.
Even before Congress enacted the FPA, the Supreme
Court held that states could not regulate wholesale sales of
electricity. See Public Utils. Comm’n of RI. v. Attleboro
Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927). A few years later in
1935, Congress included in the FPA a provision giving the
Federal Power Commission, FERC’s predecessor agency, the
authority to regulate “the sale of [electric] energy at whole-
[Page 25]sale,” as well as “the transmission of electric energy
in interstate commerce.” FPA § 201(a), 16 US.C. § 824(a)
(1994) FERC also limited federal regulation “to those
matters which are not subject to regulation by the States,” id ,
and reserved to the states “jurisdiction .. over facilities used
for the generation of electric energy or over facilities used in
local distribution or only for the transmission of electric
energy in intrastate commerce...” FPA § 201(b), 16 U.S.C
§ 824(b). Pursuant to these provisions, FERC has regulated
wholesale power sales and interstate transmissions, and state
agencies have retained jurisdiction over bundled retail
transactions, including service issues and the intrastate sale
and distribution of electricity through local distribution
facilities.
Initially, as most transactions involved either a
wholesale or a retail sale, and correspondingly transmission
or local distribution facilities, this regulatory division of
labor was straight-forward in application. Indeed, in 1935,
when Congress enacted the FPA, the networks of high-
voltage, long-distance transmission lines which today
crisscross the United States did not exist. Instead, vertically
integrated utilities individually built facilities sufficient to
meet the power needs of their customers. Over time,
however, the landscape of the electric industry changed.
to consumers. These industry participants do not
transmission lines, so they rely upon the utilities that
such facilities to provide transmission services. In addition
electricity at wholesale. Some states even mandate
unbundling of retail services. As a result of these changes,
facilities once used solely for local distribution of bundled
retail sales now engage regularly in [Page 26}Junbundled
wholesale transmissions and retail delivery as well. Thus,
while the electricity world once neatly divided into spheres
of retail versus wholesale sales and local distribution versus
transmission facilities, such is no longer the case
In Order 888, FERC reinterpreted FPA § 201 to
accommodate the new industry practices and conditions.
FERC left the regulation of bundled retail transmissions to
the states, concluding that “when transmission is sold at retail
as part and parcel of the delivered product called electric
energy, the transaction is a sale of electric energy at retail.”
Order 888, 9 31,036 at 31,781. Nevertheless, FERC asserted
jurisdiction over all unbundled retail transmissions, and left
to the states only the sales portion of unbundled retail
transactions, on the ground that FPA § 201 gives it
jurisdiction without qualification over all transmission by
public utilities in interstate commerce. See id. Also, while
acknowledging that FPA § 201(b) explicitly places retail
transmissions by “facilities used in local distribution” beyond
the Commission’s jurisdiction, FERC adopted a seven factor
that category, and claimed exclusive authority over those that
30a
do not. See id. at 31,780, 31,784. In the present litigation,
each of these changes is challenged, with some petitioners
claiming that FERC went too far, and others contending that
the Commission did not go far enough in asserting
jurisdiction.
A. Bundled Retail Sales
Several state regulatory commissions complain that
FERC exceeded the boundaries of its statutory authority by
asserting jurisdiction over unbundled retail transmissions.
These state petitioners argue that the plain meaning and
history of FPA § 201(a) gives FERC the authority to regulate
only transmissions of electricity consumed in a state other
than that in which the electricity was generated, if the
transmission was not otherwise subject to state regulation.
The states historically have regulated retail transmissions as
part of bundled retail sales of electricity, while FERC has
regulated wholesale transmissions; and the division of
regulatory jurisdiction should not change merely because
those transac-[Page 27]tions have now been unbundled into
separate generation, transmission, and sales components.
Two groups of transmission dependent utilities, TAPS
and TDU Systems, and the nation’s largest power wholesaler,
Enron Power Marketing (collectively the “unbundling and
discounting” or “U&D” petitioners), both intervene on the
side of FERC with respect to the states’ claim, and separately
challenge FERC’s interpretation of its jurisdiction on
different grounds. The U&D petitioners contend that FERC
impermissibly limited its jurisdiction by leaving the
regulation of bundled retail transmissions to the states.
These parties maintain that FERC has the authority to
regulate both bundled and unbundled retail transmissions,
and that FERC violates FPA § 206 by limiting the scope of
Order 888 to the latter. To establish that bulk transmission
by utilities is transmission in interstate commerce regardless
of whether the power is sold at wholesale or retail, the U&D
petitioners cite particularly FPC v. Florida Power & Light
3la
Co., 404 U.S. 453 (1972), and Jersey Central Power & Light
Co. v. FPC, 319 U.S. 61 (1943), two of the cases relied upon
by FERC in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, ] 32,514 at
33,135-42. As further support that FERC’s jurisdiction
extends to all interstate transmissions, the U&D petitioners
offer NGA precedent recognizing FERC’s authority over all
interstate gas transportation, if not the gas being transported.
See, e.g. FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 406 U.S. 621,
636 (1972); United Distribution Cos. v. FERC, 88 F.3d 1105,
1153 (DC. Cir. 1996) (UDC); Mississippi River
Transmission Corp. v. FERC, 969. F.2d 1215 (D.C. Cir.
1992). These petitioners contend that excluding bundled
retail transmissions from the OATT will permit
discrimination and give owners a competitive advantage,
contrary to the mandate of FPA § 206(a) that FERC
eliminate undue. discrimination. Accordingly, the U&D
petitioners claim that FERC erred when it declined to
mandate functional unbundling for an owner’s transmissions
to bundled retail customers of (1) its own generated power or
(2) power purchased at wholesale.
In response to these challenges, FERC maintains that the
plain meaning of FPA § 201 gives the Commission jurisdic-
[Page 28]tion over all interstate transmissions without
qualification, while at the same time limiting jurisdiction
over sales to wholesale sales. Relying particularly on Florida
Power & Light and Jersey Central Power & Light, FERC
asserts broad jurisdiction over all transmission activities in
interstate commerce.- As for bundled retail sales, FERC’s
position is that once the transmission service is bundled with
generation and local distribution, it becomes merely a
component of the retail sale itself, over which FERC has no
jurisdiction. FERC maintains that natural gas jurisprudence
is inapplicable because the language of the NGA and FPA
differ on this issue, and the natural gas cases turned on the
existence of a regulatory gap that does not exist in the
electricity feld. FERC also asserts that its interpretation of
the FPA’s jurisdictional grant is entitled to deference under
32a
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
467 U. S. 837 (1984).
Both FPA § 201(a) and (b) clearly and unambiguously
confer upon FERC jurisdiction over the “transmission of
electric energy in interstate commerce.” FPA § 201(c)
further provides that “electric energy shall be held to be
transmitted in interstate commerce if transmitted from a State
and consumed at any point outside thereof.” 16 U.S.C. §
824(c). In both Florida Power & Light and Jersey Central
Power & Light, the Supreme Court considered whether
certain indirect transmissions of electrical power across state
lines represented transmissions in interstate commerce.
Jersey Central Power & Light involved the transmission
of energy generated by Jersey Central in New Jersey. Jersey
Central transmitted electricity to the New Jersey transmission
facilities of another company, Public Service, which then
transmitted the power first to another of its New Jersey
facilities, and then on to a facility owned by yet a third
company and located in the middle of a body of water
separating New Jersey from Staten Island, New York. The
third company in the chain then transmitted the energy first
to its own facilities in New York, then finally and ultimately
to consumers in New York. Jersey Central’s own
transmission facilities were located solely in New Jersey, and
as were [Page 29]the facilities used by Public Service to
receive the transmissions from Jersey Central.
The Supreme Court recognized that Jersey Central had
no control over the transmissions’ destination once the
electricity was delivered to Public Service, see Jersey
Central, 319 U.S. at 65, and that the total flow of electricity
from Jersey Central to New York was small. See id. at 66.
Nevertheless, because some electricity generated by Jersey
Central in New Jersey was consumed in New York, the Court
upheld FERC’s jurisdiction under FPA § 201, over Jersey
Central’s transmission facilities as utilized for transmissions
in interstate’s commerce. See id. at 67. The Court said that,
33a
under FPA § 201(a) and (b), FERC’s power extends over all
facilities “which transmit energy actually moving in
interstate commerce.” Id at 72. The Court emphasized,
however, that “mere connection” of one utility’s transmission
facilities to those of another transmitting in interstate
commerce was insufficient for jurisdiction under FPA § 201.
Id.
The Court revisited the issue in Florida Power & Light,
which involved certain Florida and Georgia utilities who
voluntarily connected their transmission facilities to
coordinate their activities and exchange power as required to
meet temporary needs. Like Jersey Central, FP&L’s
transmission facilities were confined to Florida, and none of
FP&L’s transmission lines directly connected with those of
out-of-state companies. Nevertheless, because FP&L was a
member of a group of interconnected utilities, its
transmission lines connected with those of other Florida
utilities; and the lines of one of those other utilities, Florida
Power Corp., interconnected just short of Florida’s northern
border with those of Georgia Power Co. Records indicated
that power transfers between FP&L and Florida Power
coincided with transfers between Florida Power and Georgia
Power.
In Jersey Central, logs of the relevant companies
demonstrated at least a dozen occasions when facilities in
New York drew power from certain lines at times when
Jersey Central was the only supplier of electricity to those
lines. See Florida Power & Light, 404 U.S. at 459. By way
of contrast, [Page 30] there was no similar evidence that
power generated by FP&L specifically passed through
Florida Power to Georgia Power, with Florida Power serving
as a mere conduit. See id. At best, company records
demonstrated instances when transfers between FP&L and
Florida Power occurred at or about the same time as transfers
between Florida Power and Georgia Power. See id. at 457.
34a
Instead, the Court considered two theories by which
FP&L’s power could be deemed transmitted across state
lines. The first posited a cause and effect relationship by
which every flick of a light switch would cause every
generator on a multi-state interconnected system to produce
some quantity of additional electricity to maintain the
system’s balance, and thus to transmit electric energy
throughout the system and across state lines. The second
theory suggested that where the transmission lines of two
utilities interconnect, their energy commingles, such that
inevitably some energy transmitted by FP&L to Florida
» wer was then transmitted to Georgia Power and across
state lines.
Despite its statement in Jersey Central that “mere
connection determines nothing,” 319 U.S. at 72, the Court
relied on the second of these theories to conclude that FP&L
facilities were transmitting energy in interstate commerce,
and left open the possible validity of the cause and effect
theory. See 404 U.S. at 462-63. Writing in dissent, Justice
Douglas characterized the Court’s opinion as “mean{ing] that
every privately owned interconnected facility in the United
States...is within the [Federal Power Commission’s]
jurisdiction,” such that otherwise local utilities would now be
subject to the mandates of the federal bureaucracy. Id. at 471
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
The Supreme Court has interpreted the language in FPA
§ 201 regarding FERC’s jurisdiction over transmissions in
interstate commerce. We are bound by the High Court's
dictates to conclude that the FPA gives FERC the authority
to regulate transmissions at issue here, whether retail or
wholesale. Even if the Court had not so spoken, however,
and even if we independently concluded that the statute’s text
[Page 31]was less than clear, it is the law of this circuit that
the deferential standard of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), applies to
an agency’s interpretation of its own statutory jurisdiction.
35a
See Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. FERC, 28 F.3d 1281,
1283-84 (D.C. Cir. 1994). As guided by Chevron, unless
Congress has directly spoken to the contrary, or FERC has
unreasonably or impermissibly interpreted the statute, we
must defer to the Commission’s construction of ambiguous
provisions of the FPA. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. In
this age of interconnected transmission grids, and given the
accompanying technological complexities, we would be hard
pressed to conclude that FERC’s interpretation of § 201(c) as
giving it jurisdiction over both wholesale and retail
transmissions is unreasonable or impermissible.
Nevertheless, we are not persuaded that this conclusion
requires FERC to mandate unbundling and assert jurisdiction
overall retail transmissions. Just as FPA § 201 gives FERC
jurisdiction over transmissions in interstate commerce and
sales at wholesale, the statute also clearly contemplates state
jurisdiction over local distribution facilities and retail sales.
The statute is much less clear about exactly where the lines
between those activities are to be drawn. A regulator could
reasonably construe transmissions bundled with generation
and delivery services and sold to a consumer for a single
charge as either transmission services in interstate commerce
or as an integral component of a retail sale. Yet FERC has
jurisdiction over one, while the states have jurisdiction over
the other. FERC’s decision to characterize bundled
transmissions as part of retail sales subject to state
jurisdiction therefore represents a statutorily permissible
policy choice to which we must also defer under Chevron.
Accordingly, we affirm FERC’s decisions in Order 888 to
assert jurisdiction over unbundled retail transmissions while
leaving regulation of bundled retail transmissions to the
states.
B. Local Distribution Facilities
FPA §201(b) explicitly excludes from FERC jurisdiction
“facilities used in local distribution or only for the transmis-
[Page 32]sion of electric energy in intrastate commerce.” 16
36a
U.S.C. § 824(b)(1). Historically, wholesale sales have not
for the most part involved local distribution facilities. FERC
claims that increased unbundling gives resellers the
opportunity to reconfigure the wholesale sales so that they
might now occur on those facilities which traditionally have
been treated as local distribution facilities. | Moreover,
FERC’s assertion of jurisdiction over the transmission
component of unbundled retail sales blurred the line between
local distribution facilities and facilities used for transmission
in interstate commerce
In Order 888, FERC claimed exclusive authority over
the regulation of facilities which sell and transmit electricity
at wholesale to customers who will resell the electricity to
end users. With respect to unbundled retail sales, FERC
acknowledged that transmissions by “facilities used in local
distribution” are beyond the Commission’s jurisdiction,
while facilities engaged in interstate transmission are subject
to FERC jurisdiction under FPA § 201(a). Thus FERC
adopted a seven factor jurisdictional test to identify whether a
facility is a local distribution facility subject to state
jurisdiction or a facility engaged in interstate transmission
subject to FERC jurisdiction.” In short, under Order 888,
’ The Commission’s seven factor test involves evaluating on a case-
by-case basis whether the activities of the facilities in question
correspond with seven specific indicators of local distribution:
(1) Local distribution facilities are normally in close proximity to
retail customers.
(2) Local distribution facilities are primarily radial in character.
(3) Power flows into local distribution systems; it rarely, if ever,
flows out.
(4) When power enters a local distribution system, it is not
reconsigned or transported on to some other market.
(5) Power entering a local distribution system is consumed in a
comparatively restricted geographic area.
(6) Meters are based at the transmission/local distribution interface
to measure flows into the local distribution system.
(7) Local distribution systems will be of reduced voltage.
Order 888, 4 31,036 at 31,981.
37a
when a [Page 33)public utility is engaged in wholesale
transmission, FERC has jurisdiction regardless of the nature
of the facility, but when the public utility is engaged in
unbundled retail transmission, the facts and circumstances
will determine whether the facilities are subject to FERC or
state jurisdiction.
The state petitioners argue that FERC’s dual approach
radically expands its jurisdiction and violates Congress’
explicit directive in FPA § 201(b) that regulation of local
distribution facilities be left to the states. The states contend
that Congress clearly intended to preserve state jurisdiction
over local distribution facilities, regardless of whether the
energy comes from out of state or the sale is a wholesale sale
The states maintain that, by claiming jurisdiction over any
facility transporting energy for resale, regardless of whether
the facility might otherwise be a local distribution facility
under the seven factor test, FERC has adopted the circular
reasoning that wholesale sales do not occur on local
distribution facilities, so any facility that engages in
wholesale activities is not a local distribution facility. The
states contend further that FERC offers no reasoned analysis
of why local distribution should be defined differently for
wholesale versus retail sales. The states finally charge that,
under Order 888, nearly identical facilities would be under
federal jurisdiction and state jurisdiction for different
customers receiving indistinguishable service. Such a
situation, they contend, will only encourage energy marketers
to choose their regulator by using middlemen to shift the
point at which title to the power transfers, and thus
undermine the jurisdictional certainty that Order 888 states is
necessary for competition.
FERC responds that it is not asserting jurisdiction over
local distribution facilities, but assers that when a public
utility delivers unbundled energy at wholesale to a supplier
for the purpose of resale to an end user, FPA § 201 gives
FERC unqualified authority to assert jurisdiction over the
38a
facility used to effect that transaction. When the public
utility is engaged in unbundled retail transmission, however,
[Page 34] the circumstances of a specific case will determine
whether the facilities used are subject to FERC or state
jurisdiction. The arguments by the states do no more than
raise policy concerns which are for FERC and not the court.
See Arent v. Shalala, 70 F.3d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
Intervening again on FERC’s behalf on this issue, the
U&D petitioners add that FERC’s use of different tests is
appropriate given the differences in the two separate
jurisdictional grants of FPA § 201. The interveners argue
that, given the statute’s clear grant to FERC of jurisdictior
over all aspects of wholesale sales FERC is fully justified in
employing a functional test to identify wholesale
transmissions. In contrast, because FERC’s jurisdiction over
retail sales is limited to transmissions in interstate commerce,
the seven factor test is more appropriate.
We agree that FERC’s dual approach to assessing its
jurisdiction stems from the fact that FPA § 201 contains
more than one jurisdictional grant. FPA § 201(b) denies
FERC jurisdiction over local distribution facilities “except as
specifically provided in this subchapter and subchapter III.
16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (emphasis added). FPA § 201(a)
makes clear that all aspects of wholesale sales are subject to
federal regulation, regardless of the facilities used. FERC’s
assertion of jurisdiction over all wholesale transmissions,
regardless of the nature of the facility, is clearly within the
scope of its statutory authority. Moreover, various cases
support the proposition that FERC regulates all aspects of
wholesale transactions. See, e.g, Duke Power Co. v. FPC,
401 F.2d 930, 935-36 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (noting that the FPC
regulates public utility facilities used in wholesale
transmissions or sales in interstate commerce), Arkansas
Power & Light Co. v. FPC, 368 F.2d 376, 383 (8th Cir.
1966) (stating that the functional use of the transmission
lines—wholesale versus retail—controls), | Wisconsin-
39a
Michigan Power Co. v. FPC, 197 F.2d 472, 477 (7th Cir.
1952) (finding that transmission facilities used at wholesale
are not “local distribution facilities”).
[Page 35] The seven factor test applies only to
unbundled retail sales, where FERC seeks to regulate
pursuant to the separate grant of jurisdictional authority over
transmissions in interstate commerce. In this context, the
definition of “facilities used in local distribution” becomes
relevant. The statute does not define “facilities used in local
distribution,” but instead leaves that task to FERC. As
Chevron counsels us, FERC’s interpretation of undefined and
ambiguous statutory terms is entitled to deference. See
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
FERC has adopted a multi-factor test to determine the
nature of transmission facilities. In a footnote, Order 888
says that distribution-only facilities which sell only at retail
will still be considered local distribution facilities. See Order
888, | 31,036 at 31,981 n.99. This is consistent with the fact
that states historically have regulated bundled retail sales to
end users. However, Order 888 implicitly recognizes the
current reality that many primarily retail utilities engage in
both local distribution and interstate transmissions, and seeks
through the seven factors to discern each facility’s primary
function. We cannot agree with the state petitioners that this
approach is unreasonable or otherwise impermissible
IV. RECIPROCITY
Section 6 of the Tariff contains a reciprocity provision
resting on the principle that any public utility offering “non-
discriminatory open access transmission for the benefit of
customers should be able to obtain the same non-
discriminatory access in return.” Order 888, J 31,036 at
31,760. Non-public _utilities—those outside _ the
state-owned, see 16 U.S.C. § 824(f)}—would otherwise not
have to offer open-access. Under the Tariff, a public utility
40a
does not have to offer them access unless they reciprocate.
In order to avoid controversies between public and non-
public utilities regarding reciprocal service, the Commission
adopted a voluntary “safe harbor” provision pursuant to
which non-public utilities could submit a transmission tariff
to the Commission for a [Page 36]determination whether it
satisfied the reciprocity condition. If it did, the public utility
would have to offer service; if it did not, the public utility
could refuse service (although it had the option of waiving
the reciprocity condition, as did the Commission itself).
A. Indirect Regulation of Non-Jurisdictional Utilities
Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD), a state entity,
provides electrical generation, transmission and distribution
service to wholesale and retail customers throughout
Nebraska.’ It claims that the Commission, through the
reciprocity provision, has reached beyond its statutory
authority and is illegally attempting to regulate entities,
including NPPD, over which the Commission has no
jurisdiction, in violation of the Federal Power Act and the
Tenth Amendment to the Constitution. NPPD admits that
pursuant to Nebraska law, all state power districts are
obligated to provide open access transmission service. They
have been doing so for years. This is doubtless why, after
Order No. 888 issued, another Nebraska public power district
so easily obtained a safe harbor declaration. See Omaha Pub.
Power Dist., 81 F.E.R.C. 4 61,054 (1997). In light of this,
the Commission argues—and we agree—that NPPD’s
petition is unripe. Since NPPD already offers open access
transmission, it is far from certain that the reciprocity
7 “Nebraska is unique among the States in the Union in that all
seston and distributi =n ided by
generation, Wansmuenes Seton ond distribution ey — - =
responsible to, and serve at the voting pleasure of, the rate-payers they
serve.” NPPD Brief at 2.
4la
provision will have any effect on it.* It certainly
demonstrated any particular hardship that it would
we refused to engage in judicial review
See AT&T Corp. v. lowa Utils. Bd., 525 U. S. 366, 386
(1999). From all that appears, no public utility has refused,
or even threatened to refuse, to give NPPD access to its
transmission system in the wake of [Page 37] Order No.
888.” Given the fact that public utilities may waive the
reciprocity provision anyway, and that NPPD has the same
option of obtaining a safe harbor as did the Omaha Public
Power District, we are not persuaded that the provision is
currently altering NPPD’s conduct of its affairs or that
withholding judicial review will cause it any hardship
whatever. “Unlike the drug manufacturers in Abbott
Laboratories [v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967)], but like the
cosmetics companies in Toilet Goods Ass’n v. Gardner, 387
U.S. 158, 164 (1967), NPPD need not change its “behavior
or risk costly sanctions.” Clean Air Implementation Project
v. EPA, 150 F.3d 1200, 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Furthermore,
exactly how the Commission will fill in the contours of the
reciprocity provision remains to be seen. That it may defer to
state commissions) as it indicated in Houston Lighting &
Power Co., 81 F.E.R.C. ¥ 61,015 (1997), order on reh’g, 83
F.E.R.C. J 61,181 (1998), affects NPPD’s contention that the
Commission is seeking to bring about nationwide uniformity
by forcing non-public utilities to comply with its “detailed
mandates.” NPPD Brief at 5. We therefore believe the
issues raised would benefit from a more concrete setting in
which NPPD can demonstrate exactly how the reciprocity
provision has affected its primary conduct. See Clean Air
. The Commission made clear thai existing contracts will not be
affected. See Order 888-A, 4 31,048 at 30,181.
’ For this reason we find unpersuasive NPPD’s claim that the
Tariff's reciprocity provision places it at a disadvantage in negotiations
because a public utility may simply refuse to provide service without any
fear of a Commission caforcement action. See NPPD Reply Brief at 4-5.
42a
Implementation Project, 150 F.3d at 1204. For all these
reasons, NPPD’s challenge to the reciprocity provision is not
ripe for judicial review.
B. Limitation on Reciprocity
The Investor Owned Utilities (IOUs) challenge the
following limitation on reciprocity: non-public utilities owe
reciprocal open access only to the public utility from which
they take open access service—not to all utilities. See IOU
Brief at 40-44; IOU Reply Brief at 18-29. These petitioners
argue that the Commission has left open the door for non-
public utilities [Page 38] to discriminate against all other
utilities and that it has done so solely because of tax
considerations that no longer apply.
We agree with Commission counsel that tax
considerations were not the only basis on which the
Commission’s limitation rested. The Commission stated that
“the reciprocity requirement strikes an appropriate balance
by limiting its application to circumstances in which the non-
public utility seeks to take advantage of open access on a
public utility’s system.” Order 888, 31,036 at 31,762. The
Commission also explained that it “dof[es] not have the
authority to require non-public utilities to make their systems
generally available.” Id. at 31,761. The Commission stated
also that it did not want broad open access reciprocity to
jeopardize the tax-exempt financing non-public utilities
enjoy,'° that the IRS was then reexamining the question, id.
at 31,762, and that if the tax issue is favorably resolved, it
will reconsider the matter. Order 888-A, 9 31,048 at 30,287.
The IRS has now acted. See Temporary Regulations
§ 1.141-7T(f), in 63 Fed. Reg. 3256 (1998). The lOUs argue
that we must therefore remand for reconsideration. See IOU
Brief at 44 (citing Panhandle Eastern Pipeline v. FERC, 890
10 See 26 U.S.C. §§ 141, 142 (permitting “private activity” bonds and
“local furnishing” bonds, respectively).
43a
F.2d 435, 439 (D.C. Cir, 1989); National Fuel Gas
Corp. v. FERC, 899 F.2d 1244, 1249-50 (D.C. Cir. 1990):
Ciba-Geigy v. EPA, 46 F.3d 1208 (D.C. Cir, 1995)).
We think not. So far as we know, the IRS has not
finalized its temporary and proposed regulations. The IRS
acknowledges that its temporary regulations “raised[ ] a
number of complex technical issues” many of which “may
need to be addressed legislatively” and it anticipates that the
finalization process will take three years to accomplish. 63
Fed. Reg. at 3258-59. Second, as the Commission indicates,
the possible tax consequences of requiring open access from
non-jurisdictional utilities was its secondary concern. The
Commission’s greater concern was its lack of jurisdiction to
do what the IOUs ask And lastly the Commission should be
[Page 39] taken at its word that it will reconsider the scope of
reciprocity when and if the temporary tax regulations are
finalized.
V. STRANDED COST RECOVERY PROVISIONS
Ordering open access transmission, Order 888-A
explains that “[t]he most critical transition issue that arises as
a result of the Commission’s actions in this rulemaking is
how to deal with the uneconomic sunk costs that utilities
prudently incurred under an industry regime that rested on a
regulatory framework and a set of expectations that are being
fundamentally altered.” Order 888-A, 7 31,048 at 30,346.
“If a former wholesale requirements customer or a former
retail customer uses the new open access to reach a new
supplier,” FERC said, “we believe that the utility is entitled
to recover legitimate, prudent and verifiable costs that it
incurred under the prior regulatory regime.” Order 888, 1
31,036 at 31,789. |
According to FERC, these “stranded” costs consist pre
dominantly of costs of building generation capacity, which
utilities incurred with the expectation that they would use the
additional capacity to serve existing customers. See Notice
44a
of Proposed Rulemaking, Recovery of Stranded Costs by
Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, FERC Stats. &
Regs. 932,507 at 32,863-64, 59 Fed. Reg. 35,274 (1994)
(“Stranded Cost NOPR”). Because of the increased
competition in the generation market that will result from
open access, this capacity may become underutilized or
uneconomical, i.e., “stranded.” Stranded costs also include
nonrecurring costs approved by regulators that, in order to
avoid rate increases, were recovered over a period of years
instead of at the time the expenditures were made. Known as
“regulatory assets,” these costs include deferred income
taxes, deferred pension and other employee benefit and
retirement costs, research and development, extraordinary
property losses, and the phase-in of new plant costs. Nuclear
decommissioning costs and costs to buy out high-priced fuel
and power contracts may also become stranded as a result of
open access.
[Page 40] Exercising its exclusive jurisdiction over
wholesale power sales, FERC through Order 888 gave
utilities the opportunity to recover their stranded costs from
former wholesale customers who take advantage of open
access transmission to purchase power from other suppliers.
Order 888, J 31,036 at 31,810. With respect to stranded
costs resulting from state-ordered retail wheeling, Order 888
provides that FERC will consider stranded cost claims only
when state regulatory agencies lack authority to do so. Id. at
31,824-25. Order 888 also designated FERC as the primary
forum for stranded cost claims stemming from what are
known as new municipalizations and municipal annexations.
See Order 888-A, 9 31,048 at 30,404; Order 888-B, 81 FERC
at 62,104. Stranded costs in these situations result from retail
(as opposed to wholesale) power sales.
Petitioners challenge nearly every aspect of FERC’s
stranded cost policy as set forth in Order 888, from the
mechanics of calculating customers’ stranded cost
obligations to whether FERC has authority to address
45a
stranded costs at all. We begin with those challenges that
relate to the recovery of wholesale stranded costs (Section
V.A), then turn to challenges to Order 888’s treatment of
retail stranded costs (Section V.B). We affirm FERC’s
stranded cost policy in all respects, except we vacate that
portion of the orders dealing with the treatment of energy
costs in the market option and remand to FERC for further
explanation. See Section V.A.5.c.
A. V_ ‘‘esale Stranded Costs
In... _ ™"@ nondiscriminatory open access transmission
as a remedy for undue discrimination, FERC recognized that
it “cannot change the rules of the game without providing a
mechanism for recovery of the costs caused by such
regulatory-mandated change.” Order 888-A, J 31,048 at
30,346. Under the pre-open access regulatory regime,
utilities entered into long-term contracts to make wholesale
power sales to municipal, cooperative, and investor-owned
utilities. See Stranded Cost NOPR, { 32,507 at 32,862.
Because these customers had no source of power supply
other than [Page 41] their historic utility, these contracts were
typically extended at the end of their term. This produced an
implicit obligation by the utilities to continue satisfying their
customers’ power needs, as well as a reciprocal expectation
by customers of continued service. See-id. at 32,863-64. To
satisfy expected customer demand, utilities invested money,
built facilities, and entered into long-term fuel or power
contracts, relying on the “regulatory compact” under which
utility shareholders accepted lower rates of return on their
investment in exchange for the certainty of regulated rates
and resulting ability to recover prudently incurred costs. See
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Promoting Wholesale
Competition Through Open Access Non-discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of
Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities,
FERC Stats. & Regs. 32,514 at 33,049, 60 Fed. Reg. 17,662
(1995).
46a
Order 888 fundamentally undermines utilities’
expectation of continued service and cost recovery. A
utility's requirements customers may now use the utility's
open access transmission service to purchase power from
other suppliers at the end of their contract terms. if
customers leave before paying their share of costs the historic
utility incurred on their behalf, the utility will be left with
stranded costs, which it will either absorb or shift to
remaining customers.
Unless utilities are able to recover stranded costs, FERC
reasoned, their ability to compete and attract investor capital
in a deregulated market may be seriously impaired. FERC
therefore decided that it had to “address recovery of the
transition costs of moving from a monopoly-regulated regime
to one in which all sellers can compete on a fair basis and in
which electricity is more competitively priced.” Order 888, {
31,036 at 31,635. In reaching this conclusion, FERC relied
on its experience in restructuring the natural gas industry,
where this court faulted it for failing to provide transitional
mechanisms such as stranded cost recovery. FERC
explained: “We have learned from our experience in the
natural gas area the importance of addressing competitive
transition issues early and with as much certainty to market
participants as possible.” Id.
[Page 42] In shaping its stranded cost recovery
mechanism, FERC had to balance two competing interests:
speeding the transition to competition versus protecting
utilities that had incurred costs with the expectation that their
customers would remain and eventually pay those costs
through electricity rates. Allowing recovery of stranded
costs, FERC acknowledged, would delay full realization of
the benefits of open access-lower electricity rates—because
customers facing stranded cost liability might continue
purchasing power from their historic utility even though
competitors are selling power at lower rates. See Order 888-
A, 9 31,048 at 30,355. Indeed, a customer would only switch
47a
suppliers if the competitor offered a rate less than the historic
utility’s rate plus the customer’s stranded cost liability. But
given the highly regulated nature of the electricity industry,
in which utilities incurred costs with the expectation of
recouping them, FERC concluded that the delay was a
necessary component of its open access program. See id.
Mindful of its ultimate goal of converting the electricity
industry into a competitive market, however, FERC
fashioned the stranded cost recovery provisions to be
transitional, allowing utilities to recover stranded costs only
in connection with wholesale requirements contracts entered
into on or before July 11, 1994 (the date of the stranded cost
notice of proposed rulemaking). See 18 CFR.
§ 35.26(b)(8), 35.26(c)(1)(v)-(vi).
As to precisely who should pay for stranded costs,
utilities and customers not surprisingly had dramatically
different positions. Customers argued that utilities should
absorb most, if not all, stranded costs. Utilities (and their
investors) argued that customers should pay.
Facing an enormously difficult task in balancing these
sharply conflicting positions, FERC crafted a rule that
requires customers to pay stranded costs but only in certain
circumstances. Most important, in order to recover stranded
costs from a customer, the historic utility must prove that it
had a reasonable expectation of continued service to that
particular customer for a certain number of years beyond the
end of the contract term, a utility unable to prove such an
expectation may not recover stranded costs under Order 888.
[Page 43] See 18 C.F.R. § 35.26(c)(2)(i). Moreover, a utility
able to demonstrate a reasonable expectation of continued
service may recover stranded costs only if its wholesale
customer actually takes advantage of the utility’s open access
tariff to obtain access to a new generation supplier at the end
of its contract term (i.e., the former customer continues to use
the historic utility’s transmission service but no longer
purchases power from it). See 18 CFR. § 35,26(b)(1)(i).
48a
Through these two limitations, FERC balanced the interests
of utilities and customers by allowing utilities to recover their
stranded costs only if they can demonstrate a reasonable
expectation of continued service and requiring customers to
pay those costs only if they take advantage of their historic
utility’s open access transmission to reach cheaper sources of
power. And of course, no customer will have to pay stranded
costs at all if it continues purchasing power from its historic
utility throughout the period during which the utility has a
reasonable expectation of continued service—precisely what
the customer would have done in the absence of Order 888's
open access requirement.
Under Order 888, stranded costs are calculated on a
“revenues lost” basis. A departing customer’s stranded cost
obligation equals the estimated revenue it would have paid
had it continued to purchase power from the historic utility
minus the current market value of the power it would have
purchased, calculated over the period the utility is determined
to have a reasonable expectation of continued service to that
customer. See 18 C.F.R. § 35.26(c)(2)(iii). In other words,
the stranded cost formula is not tied to particular stranded
assets or contractual commitments, but rather awards utilities
the difference between the pre-open access cost-based rate
and the post-open access market rate. Once a customer's
stranded cost liability is calculated, it may pay through a
lump-sum payment, installment payments, or a surcharge to
the transmission rate charged by the historic utility. See
Order 888, J 31,036 at 31,799.
Before turning to petitioners’ arguments, we emphasize
what should be obvious from the foregoing summary of
Order 888: Order 888 awards stranded costs to no one. It
does [Page 44] nothing more than establish a mechanism by
which utilities may seek to recover stranded costs. To
recover stranded costs, a utility must demonstrate its
continued expectation of service at an evidentiary hearing.
The customer may appear at that hearing and, through
49a
evidentiary submissions of its own, attempt to demonstrate
that the utility had no such expectation. Only after such a
hearing may FERC decide whether a utility can recover
stranded costs and, if so, how much.
Petitioners mount many challenges to Order 888’s
stranded cost recovery provisions. For purposes of analysis,
we group these challenges into five categories: (1) challenges
to FERC’s authority to provide for stranded cost recovery
(section V.A.1); (2) claims that Order 888 conflicts with cost
causation principles and case law developed under the
Natural Gas Act (section V.A.2); (3) challenges to FERC’s
Mobile-Sierra findings (section V.A.3); (4) claims that FERC
arbitrarily and capriciously failed to provide for stranded cost
recovery by certain entities, such as transmission dependent
utilities and generation and transmission cooperatives
(section V.A.4); and (5) challenges to various technical
aspects of Order 888’s stranded cost recovery provisions
(section V.A.5).
1. FERC’s Authority to Provide for Stranded Cost
Recovery
A group called Petitioners Opposing Stranded Cost
Recovery (“POSCR”) advances three challenges to FERC’s
authority to provide for stranded cost recovery: (1) as a
factual matter, utilities could never have had a reasonable
expectation of continued service to wholesale customers
beyond the contract term; (2) sections 206 and 212 of the
Federal Power Act (“FPA”) forbid stranded cost recovery;
and (3) our decision in Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v.
FERC, 28 F.3d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1994), holds that stranded cost
recovery is anticompetitive. We consider each argument in
turn.
a Reasonable expectation of continued service
To recover stranded costs relating to a specific departing
wholesale requirements customer, a utility must show that it
[Page 45]had a reasonable expectation of service to that
50a
customer beyond the term of its existing contract. See 18
CFR. § 35.26(c)(2)(i). Pointing out that contracts define
the extent of the parties’ obligations and that customers have
long exercised their rights to purchase power from other
suppliers at the end of their contract terms. POSCR contends
that utilities could never have had an expectation of service
eyond their contract terms. In considering this argument it
important to remember that Order 888 does not itself
award stranded costs; it merely establishes a procedure by
which utilities may petition FERC in individual proceedings
to recover stranded costs from a specific customer based on a
specific evidentiary showing. Utilities failing to show an
expectation of continued service will be unable to recover
stranded costs. POSCRs challenge thus amounts to a claim
that no utility could ever, under any circumstances, have had
a reasonable expectation to serve a wholesale customer
beyond the term of its contract. We review this claim under
the APA’s familiar arbitrary and capricious standard. See 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Williams Field Services Group, Inc. v.
FERC, 194 F.3d 110, 115 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
Responding to this same challenge in Order 888-A,
FERC explained that utilities historically had an implicit
obligation to serve customers beyond the contract term for a
simple reason: Customers had no means of reaching
alternative suppliers. See Order 888-A, 4 31,048 at 30,354.
As part of that obligation to serve, FERC found, a local
utility “had a concomitant obligation to plan to supply [its]
customers’ continuing needs, and planned its system taking
account of the wholesale load. In many cases the wholesale
customers participated by supplying load forecasts.” Id. In
making capital decisions and predicting future demand,
utilities frequently consulted with their wholesale
requirements customers. For these reasons, FERC
concluded, utilities may have a reasonable expectation of
continued service to particular customers. See id. at 30,354-
55.
Sla
Not only is FERC’s judgment about utilities’ reasonable
expectations precisely the type of policy assessment to which
we owe great deference, but POSCR points to nothing sug-
[Page 46]gesting that FERC’s reasoning is arbitrary and
capricious. In fact, POSCRs argument completely ignores
the highly regulated nature of the electricity industry prior to
Order 888. Unlike competitive markets, where buyers may
freely purchase from many sellers, the monopolistic character
of the electricity industry, combined with the congressionally
highly dependent on a single supplier—their historic utility
Indeed, as interveners point out, utilities were even unable to
choose not to renew an expiring wholesale requirements
contract without first notifying FERC. See 18 C.F.R. § 35.15
(1995) (repealed by Order 888). Although it may well be
true, as POSCR argues, that some wholesale customers have
long been able to purchase unbundled transmission service,
we think such evidence is best reserved for individual
proceedings, where a department customer can attempt to
refute the utility’s claim that it had an expectation of
b. Sections 206 and 212 of the FPA
Section 206(a) of the FPA gives FERC authority to
“determine the just and reasonable rate, charge,
classification, rule, regulation, practice, or contract to be
thereafter observed and in force” if it finds that any existing
arrangement “is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory
or preferential.” 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a). Relying on section
206(a) as the basis for Order 888, FERC found that utilities
had used their monopoly transmission power to discriminate
against potential competitors and that such practices would
increase as competitive pressures in the industry increased.
Order 888, 31,036 at 31,676, 31,682.
POSCR contends that Order 888’s stranded cost
recovery provisions themselves violate FERC’s own
construction of section 206, the construction FERC relied on
52a
as the basis for the open access rule. According to POSCR,
“(t]he stranded cost rule perpetuates the very ‘discrimination’
FERC found unlawful, and subjects the same victims—
customers held hostage to uneconomic electric generation by
transmission monopolists—to continued abuse.”
[Page 47]In challenging FERC’s policy decision to
provide for stranded cost recovery, POSCR conflates the
violation (FERC’s generic determination that utilities’
practice of prohibiting access to their transmission lines on
reasonable terms was unduly discriminatory) with the
remedy (FERC’s more limited finding that recovery of
stranded costs in particular circumstances would not be
unduly discriminatory). FERC has not, as POSCR contends,
given “unduly discriminatory” different meanings, rather, it
has applied the term in different contexts.
POSCR’s argument thus boils down to a challenge to
FERC’s conclusion that the stranded cost recovery prescribed
in Order 888 is not unduly discriminatory, a challenge
meriting arbitrary and capricious review. Viewed through
this lens, we think FERC more than adequately explained
why it concluded that stranded cost recovery is not unduly
discriminatory—stranded cost recovery, FERC said, is
transitional only, follows cost causation principles, and
requires utilities to prove that they had a reasonable
expectation of continued service. FERC faced an
enormously difficult task. It had to balance the transition to
competitive markets against the need to maintain the
competitiveness of utilities that had incurred costs based on a
reasonable expectation that they would recoup them. We
find nothing either arbitrary or capricious in how FERC
struck this balance.
POSCR next contends that stranded cost recovery
violates section 212 of the FPA, which governs the rates for
transmission ordered by FERC pursuant to section 211. 16
U.S.C. §§ 824j-k. Because FERC-jurisdictional utilities are
no longer subject to sections 211 and 212, this argument
53a
relates only to those situations in which FERC orders
211 and these utilities then seek to recover stranded costs in
their transmission rates. See 18 C.F.R. § 35.26(c)(1)(vi)-
(vii). Section 212 allows FERC to order “rates, char zes,
terms, and conditions which permit the recovery by [a
transmitting] utility of all the costs incurred in connection
services, including, but not limited to, an appropriate share, if
any, of legitimate, verifiable and [Page 48] economic costs,
including taking into account any benefits to the transmission
system of providing the transmission service, and the costs of
any enlargement of transmission facilities.” 16 USC. §
824k(a). Contending that economic costs” cannot be read to
include payment of stranded costs, which by definition relate
to generation (not transmission) services, POSCR reads
section 212 to preclude stranded cost recovery.
Straightforward application of the Chevron doctrine
demonstrates the lack of merit in this argument. See
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
467 U.S. 837 (1984). Because Congress has not “directly
spoken to the precise question at issue”—do “economic
costs” include stranded costs?—and because nothing in the
Statute precludes recovering through transmission rates costs
that were traditionally recovered through generation rates, the
term “economic costs” is ambiguous. Id. at 842.
Proceeding to Chevron’s second step, we ask whether
FERC has reasonably interpreted the term “economic costs.”
See id. at 843. We have no doubt that it has. As FERC
explained, but for section 211 wheeling orders, there would
be no stranded costs. Stranded costs, according to FERC, are
therefore economic costs of section 211 wheeling. See Order
888-A, J 31,048 at 30,390. POSCR offers nothing to
undermine this eminently reasonable interpretation of the
Statute.
c. Implications of Cajun
54a
Next, POSCR contends that our decision in Cajun Elec.
Power Coop., Inc. v. FERC, 28 F.3d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1994),
condemns stranded cost recovery as anticompetitive. A pre-
Order 888 decision, Cajun reviewed two tariffs allowing a
utility, Entergy Corporation, to sell power at market rates,
and a third tariff providing for open access to Entergy’s
transmission services at cost-based rates. The third tariff
gave Entergy an opportunity to recover stranded costs from
customers who no longer purchase power from Entergy but
use its transmission lines to reach other suppliers—exactly
the circumstances in which Order 888 provides for stranded
cost recovery. Under the tariff, the stranded cost charge was
included in Entergy’s transmission rate. See id. at 175-77.
[Page 49] Characterizing the stranded cost provision as a
“tying arrangement” under antitrust law, Cajun explained that
under the tariff, Entergy could charge a former customer for
the cost of generation services when the customer wished to
purchase only transmission services, because Entergy has a
monopoly over transmission, customers would have no
choice but to pay costs relating to generation they no longer
wanted from Entergy. Id. at 177-78. Thus, because “Entergy
could use its monopoly over transmission services to
eliminate competition in the market for generation services,”
the net effect of the tariffs may be anticompetitive. Id. at
176.
Of significance to this case, however, we did not strike
down the tariffs. Instead, we remanded the case for FERC to
determine “how much competition in fact is dampened” by
the stranded cost provision. Id. at 178. Thus, contrary to
POSCR’s suggestion, Cajun does not represent a blanket
condemnation of stranded cost recovery; rather, recognizing
that such recovery could be anticompetitive, Cajun directed
FERC to evaluate and justify the potential anticompetitive
impact. This is precisely what FERC has done in Order 888.
It expressly considered the anticompetitive effects of
stranded cost recovery. See Order 888-A, § 31,048 at
30,372-74. Then, stressing the transitional nature
prediction about the future impact of its own
policies to which we ordinarily defer.” Louisiana Energy and
Power Auth. v. FERC, 141 F.3d 364, 370 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
2. Natural Gas Precedent and Conformance to Cost
Causation Principles
Having rejected POSCR’s arguments that FERC lacks
authority to authorize stranded cost recovery, we turn to its
[Page SOJargument that FERC has failed adequately to
explain why Order 888 requires departing customers to pay
one-hundred percent of stranded costs. In support of this
argument, POSCR claims that our decisions reviewing
FERC’s restructuring of the natural gas industry require cost
sharing, it also argues that Order 888’s stranded cost
recovery conflicts with the cost causation principles that
traditionally govern allocation of costs.
a. Natural gas precedent: AGD, K N Energy, and UDC
In introducing competition into the electricity industry,
FERC has taken essentially the same path that it took in
restructuring the natural gas industry, although what FERC
has done in a single order in the electricity industry (Order
888) it did in a series of orders in the natural gas industry.
Because POSCR relies so heavily on FERC’s natural gas
orders and our decisions reviewing them, we begin by
summarizing them in some detail
Finding practices in the natural gas industry “unduly
discriminatory” in violation of the Natural Gas Act, FERC
56a
began by issuing Order 436, which “unbundled” pipeline
transportation and merchant functions. Regulation of Natural
Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, Order No.
436, FERC Stats. & Regs, J 30,665, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,408
(1985) (rehearing orders omitted). At the time of Order 436,
pipelines were facing enormous liabilities under long-term
“take-or-pay” contracts. Entered into when gas prices were
expected to rise, these contracts obligated pipelines to
purchase minimum quantities of gas from wellhead
producers at fixed prices that turned out to be well in excess
of market prices. See Associated Gas Distributors v. FERC,
824 F.2d 981, 1021 (DC. Cir. 1987) (*AGD”). Although
FERC estimated take-or-pay liabilities at billions of dollars,
and although Order 436 would exacerbate the take-or-pay
problem by providing incentives to pipeline customers to
purchase gas from cheaper suppliers, FERC declined to take
any action with respect to the contracts. In AGD, we found
that FERC’s decision to do nothing failed to meet the
requirements of reasoned decisionmaking, citing FERC’s
“seeming [Page 51] blindness to the possible impact of Order
No. 436 on take-or-pay liability’ and permanent market
distortions that may result from FERC’s inaction. Id. at
1021-23, 1025. Specifically, we noted, in words echoed by
FERC years later in Order 888, that consumers who
purchased from the “least nimble” local distribution
companies would “be stuck with the burden of the overpriced
gas.” Id. at 1023.
In response to AGD, FERC issued Order 500,
Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead
Decontrol, Order No. 500, FERC Stats. & Regs. 4 30,761, 52
Fed. Reg. 30,334 (1987) (rehearing orders omitted).
Recognizing that no one segment of the gas industry was
wholly responsible for the take-or-pay problem, Order 500
allowed pipelines to recover take-or-pay costs through
“equitable sharing.” Pipelines that willingly absorbed
twenty-five to fifty percent of their costs could require sales
customers to match that amount through a fixed charge.
57a
Pipelines could recover any balance through commodity rates
or volumetric surcharges, borne by both sales and
transportation customers. For an overview of these
components of Order 500, see KN Energy, Inc. v. FERC, 968
F.2d 1295, 1297-98 (D.C. Cir. 1992). We sustained this
approach in KN Energy, holding that even though Order 500
replaced traditional “cost causation” principles with cost
spreading and value-of-service concepts, it did not violate
Natural Gas Act section 4’s requirement that rates be just and
reasonable. Id. at 1301-02. Citing statements in AGD that
“all actors in the natural gas industry” are “candidates” for
absorbing take-or-pay liability, we relied on “the unusual
circumstances surrounding the take-or-pay problem, and the
limited nature—both in time and scope—of the
Commission’s departure from the cost-causation principle.”
Id. at 1301.
Concluding that Order 436 had been only partially
successful in introducing competition into the natural gas
industry, FERC issued its third major restructuring order,
Order 636. Pipeline Service Obligations and Revisions to
Regulations Governing Self-Implementing Transportation;
and Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial
Wellhead Decontrol, Order No. 636, FERC Stats. & Regs.
7 30,939, 57 Fed. [Page 52] Reg. 13,267 (1992) (rehearing
orders omitted). That order imposed mandatory unbundling
of sales and transportation services and allowed sales
customers to reduce the amount of gas they had to purchase
pursuant to existing contracts. When customers took
advantage of this option and purchased gas from sources
other than the pipelines, the pipelines were once again left
with substantial take-or-pay liabilities. Labeling the costs of
reducing these liabilities gas supply realignment or GSR
costs, Order 636 authorized pipelines to bill current
transportation customers for one hundred percent of their
GSR costs by charging either a negotiated exit fee or
reservation fee surcharge. Order 636 also authorized
pipelines to recover all stranded costs in rate filings. In the
58a
natural gas industry, stranded costs represented the costs of
pipeline assets (such as storage facilities) used to provide
bundled sales services that were not directly assignabie to
transportation customers. For an overview of these
components of Order 636, see United Distribution Cos. v.
FERC, 88 F.3d 1105, 1125-27, 1176-78 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(“UDC”).
In UDC, we affirmed FERC’s determination that
pipelines could recover all stranded costs through filed rates,
so long as FERC “adequately balanced the interests of
investors and ratepayers.” Id. at 1180. Reaffirming the
appropriateness of the cost spreading and value-of-service
princip’’s approved in K N Energy, we found that FERC’s
allocation of GSR costs to pipeline transportation customers,
as opposed to the pipelines themselves, properly applied
those principles. Id. at 1182. Although recognizing that
GSR costs stemmed from pipeline sales customers, not
transportation customers, we found that FERC appropriately
imposed the costs on transportation customers because these
customers benefited from the availability of lower-priced
transportation and also because FERC could not spread costs
to the pre-Order 636 sales customers since those customers
no longer purchased gas from the pipelines. Id. at 1185-86.
We remanded for FERC to explain more fully why pipelines
should not have to pay some of the costs, noting an
inconsistency in the Commission’s analysis: While FERC
applied cost spreading principles to justify imposing costs on
transportation customers, it [Page 53]invoked cost causation
principles in concluding that pipelines should not have to pay
any of these costs. Id. at 1188-90. We explicitly stated,
however, that we were not saying that “it is impossible, or
even improbable, that the Commission on remand can
establish a convincing rationale for exempting the pipelines.”
Id. at 1189.
POSCR reads this history to require FERC to order cost
sharing, but it ignores Order 888’s explanation of the
59a
difference between natural gas restructuring and the situation
in the electricity industry. Most fundamentally, Order 888
explains, stranded cost recovery in the electricity. industry
conforms to cost causation principles, which normally govern
the allocation of costs and require customers to pay the costs
they caused. See Order 888, 7 31,036 at 31,798. Cost
causation principles could not be applied in natural gas
restructuring, Order 888 explains, because many customers
had already begun purchasing gas from other suppliers before
FERC bad addressed the take-or-pay problem on remand
from AGD, and because the filed rate doctrine prohibits
assessing charges against former customers. Id. at 31,800-
01. Order 888 also explains that unlike stranded costs in the
electricity industry, the take-or-pay liabilities in the gas
industry were extraordinary. The billions of dollars of take-
or-pay liabilities resulted not from Order 636, but from
earlier regulatory policies that had encouraged pipelines to
enter into long-term, fixed-price gas purchase contracts,
combined with declining gas prices that made those contracts
uneconomical. See Order 888-A, J 31,048 at 30,380. Under
all of these circumstances, “[t]o have allocated these costs
solely to any one segment of the industry would have
imposed a crushing new burden on that segment.” Id. at
30,380-81.
Stranded costs in the electricity industry, Order 888
explains, are quite different. Resulting directly from Order
888, they represent “ordinary costs that have always been,
and are currently, included in the utility’s rates for electric
generation approved by the Commission.” Id. at 30,382.
Moreover, wholesale customers may avoid stranded cost
liability by continuing to purchase power from their historic
utility, precisely what they probably would have done in the
[Page 54] absence of Order 888. In other words, in contrast
to the natural gas industry, where customers would have
faced enormous new burdens had FERC forced them to pay
take-or-pay costs, customers in the electricity industry face
no new burdens; instead, Order 888 requires them to pay
60a
nothing more than costs they would have had to pay in the
absence of Order 888. In the electricity industry, the only
effect of stranded cost recovery is delayed realization of the
full benefits of a competitive market.
In light of these differences between the natural gas and
electricity industries and FERC’s exhaustive treatment of the
natural gas restructuring in Order 888, POSCR’s contention
that FERC has failed “to offer a coherent rationale, rising to
the level of reasoned decisionmaking” for not imposing cost
sharing is wholly without merit. Equally without merit is
POSC® 5 assertion that UDC “teaches that, were customers
and utilities benefit from an open access rule/order that leads
to early contract termination and where anticompetitive
conduct by utilities has given rise to the need for the open
access order, utilities must share transition costs.” POSCR
ignores three important points. First, FERC, not this court,
determined that cost sharing was appropriate with respect to
take-or-pay liabilities. _ UDC merely affirmed FERC’s
decision. Second, KN Energy recognized that cost sharing in
the natural gas industry was a departure from the cost
causation principles that normally apply, a departure justified
by extraordinary circumstances in the natural gas industry.
KN Energy, 968 F.2d at 1301-02. And finally, as to stranded
costs that more closely resemble those at issue in this case—
for example, pipeline assets that would no longer be fully
employed when customers took advantage of unbundling to
purchase gas from alternative suppliers—FERC ordered and
UDC affirmed, that pipelines recover one-hundred percent of
those costs.
b. Conformance to cost causation principles
Having established that the natural gas cases impose no
obligation on FERC to order cost sharing, we next consider
POSCR’s argument, that the inclusion of stranded costs in
[Page 55] transmission rates does not conform to cost
causation principles. This is so, POSCR asserts, because
Order 888’s stranded cost provisions require customers to
6la
pay through transmission rates for costs the utility previously
incurred to provide generation services.
aimed only at the method of payment, not at the fact that
payment is required. But even viewing POSCR’s challenge
more broadly, as a claim that stranded cost recovery no
matter what the method of payment violates cost causation
principles, we think it lacks merit.
We have explained the cost causation principle as
follows: “Simply put, it has been traditionally required that
all approved rates reflect to some degree the costs actually
caused by the customer who must pay them.” KN Energy,
968 F.2d at 1300. Given this definition, we are puzzled by
POSCR’s claim that because inclusion of stranded costs in
transmission rates requires customers to pay currently for
costs incurred in the past, it violates cost causation principles.
To some degree, all utility rates reflect past costs; utilities
typically expend funds today (for example, constructing
generation facilities), fully expecting to recover those costs
through future rates. In fact, current rates often include past
costs that utilities deferred in order to avoid rate increases.
Cost causation requires not that costs be incurred at the same
time they are included in rates, but that the rates “reflect to
some degree the costs actually caused by the customer who
must pay them.” Id.
In fashioning Order 888’s stranded cost recovery
provisions, FERC went to great lengths to ensure that
customers would be responsible for only those costs they
caused.
[T]he Rule is consistent with the traditional cost
causation principle because it recognizes the link
62a
between the incurrence of the stranded costs and the
decision of a [Page S6]particular generation
customer to use open-access transmission on the
utility’s system to leave the utility’s generation
system and shop for power, and bases the utility’s
ability to recover stranded costs on its ability to
demonstrate that it incurred costs with the
reasonable expectation that the customer would
remain on its generation system beyond the term of
the contract.
Order 888-A, 9 31,048 at 30,382.
We cannot see how including stranded costs in
transmission rates instead of lump sum payments changes
this analysis. To the extent POSCR is arguing that including
in a transmission rate costs incurred to provide generation
services violates cost causation principles, we reiterate that
stranded costs are not costs of providing the physical
transmission services but, as Order 888-A explains, they are
utilities’ cost of open access transmission. See Order 888-A,
q 31,048 at 30,389 & n.634. More generally, given the
fundamental changes wrought by Order 888 and the
unprecedented opportunity for customers to purchase power
from alternative suppliers, we are quite comfortable deferring
to FERC’s judgment that stranded cost recovery—through
transmission rates or otherwise—conforms to cost causation
principles. In fact, FERC may have violated cost causation
principles had it failed to assign stranded costs to customers
who caused them.
POSCR next argues that Order 888 is unduly
discriminatory because including stranded costs in
transmission rates forces transmission customers who
previously used a utility's generation capacity to pay higher
costs than new transmission customers. Disagreeing, FERC
determined that requiring customers receiving similar
services to pay different rates is necessitated by Order 888's
open access requirement. See Order 888-A, 31,048 at
63a
30,388-90. Cf. AGD, 824 F.2d at 1009 (“[T]he mere fact of
a rate disparity is not enough to constitute unlawful
discrimination.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Moreover, FERC concluded the application of cost causation
principles justifies this different treatment. See Order 888-A,
] 31,048 at 30,379, 30,388-90. Seeing noth-[Page 57]ing
unreasonable (let alone arbitrary or capricious) in FERC’s
policy judgment, we reject POSCR’s challenge.
Nor do we agree with POSCR’s argument that stranded
cost recovery violates the filed rate doctrine, which “forbids a
regulated entity to charge rates for its services other than
those properly filed with the appropriate federal regulatory
authority.” Western Resources, Inc. v. FERC, 72 F.3d 147,
149 (D.C. Cir. 1995). In Western Resources, we held that
FERC’s assignment to current customers of costs relating to
take-or-pay liabilities did not violate the filed rate doctrine.
Recognizing that “a central purpose of the doctrine is to
enable purchasers to know in advance the consequences of
the purchasing decisions they make,” we determined that the
doctrine was satisfied where customers received “adequate
notice of a rate in advance of the service to which it relates.”
Id. at 149-50 (internal quotation marks omitted). Order 888’s
stranded cost policy satisfies this requirement because
customers electing to purchase power generation from a
source other than the transmitting utility from which they had
purchased power in the past will be aware of the costs when
making that decision.
3. FERC’s Mobile-Sierra Findings
Under the Supreme Court’s Mobile-Sierra doctrine,
where parties have negotiated a contract that sets firm prices
or dictates a specific method of computing charges and
includes a clause denying either party the right to change
such prices or charges unilaterally, “FERC may abrogate or
modify the contract only if the public interest so requires.”
Texaco, Inc. v. FERC, 148 F.3d 1091, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1998);
see also FPC v. Sierra Pacific Power Co., 350 US. 348, 353-
64a
55 (1956); United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv.
Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1956). We have recognized
that “the ‘public interest’ that permits FERC to modify
private contracts is different from and more exacting than the
‘public interest’ that FERC seeks to serve when it
promulgates its rules.” Texaco, 148 F.3d at 1097.
FERC usually makes Mobile-Sierra determinations on a
case-by-case basis. A party seeking to modify a contract
[Page 58]containing a Mobile-Sierra clause petitions FERC.
That party bears the burden of convincing FERC that the
modification is in the public interest.
Order 888 departs from this normal case-by-case
practice by making two generic public interest findings, one
focused on utilities, the other on customers. These generic
findings relieve utilities and customers of the burden of
demonstrating in individual proceedings that the proposed
modifications are in the public interest. As to utilities, Order
888 ruled that it was in the public interest to allow them to
add stranded cost amendments to their contracts if they could
demonstrate, in accordance with Order 888, that they had a
reasonable expectation of continued service. See Order 888-
A, § 31,048 at 30,394-95. This finding rested on two
considerations: that the burden of unrecoverable stranded
costs could impair utilities’ access to capital markets, which
could in turn precipitate the departure of other customers,
thus worsening the utilities’ financial condition and
threatening its ability to provide reliable service, and that
allowing customers to leave a utility without paying their
share of costs would shift those costs to other customers who
lack alternative power sources. See Order 888, J] 31,036 at
31,811. For its second generic finding, FERC concluded that
it was in the public interest to allow customers to modify
their wholesale requirements contracts in any way upon a
showing that the terms are no longer just and reasonable. See
Order 888-A, § 31,048 at 30,189. Observing that the
contracts in question “were entered into during an era in
65a
Over access to their transmission facilities,” FERC based this
finding on the unequal bargaining power between utilities
and customers. Id. at 30,193. Because “[mJany of these
contracts -vere the result of uneven bargaining power
that have occurred (and are continuing to occur) in the
industry may render their contracts to be no longer in the
public interest or just and reasonable.” Id.
Challenging the first finding, POSCR argues that FERC
lacks authority to make a generic public interest finding that
[Page S9]allows for contract modification in an entire class
of cases. POSCR insists that FERC can only proceed on a
case-by-case basis, determining in each case whether a
particular contract modification is in the public interest.
Even if FERC has authority to make generic findings,
POSCR goes on to argue, FERC’s Order 888 finding is
unsupported by substantial evidence. The investor owned
utilities (“IOUs”) challenge the second finding, arguing that
allowing customers to seek modification of all contract
terms, while limiting utilities to stranded cost provisions,
fails adequately to balance competing interests.
a. FERC’s authority to sake a generic public interest
finding
66a
contractual rights and the regulatory power to modify
contracts when necessary to protect the public interest.”
Northeast Utilities Serv. Co. v. FERC, 55 F.3d 686, 689 (Ist
Cir. 1995). In Mobile, the Supreme Court reognized that
intervening circumstances may create a situation im which
contractual terms and conditions that were just and
reasonable at the time the contract was executed are no
longer just and reasonable. 350 U.S. at 344-45. But
concluding that a utility is not typically “entitled to be
relieved of its improvident bargain,” the Sierra Court
required that FERC’s predecessor, the Federal Power
Commission, show more than that the contract was unjust
and unreasonable—the-Commission had to find that contract
modification was in the public interest. 350 U.S. at 355.
In most cases, intervening circumstances are unique to
the relationship between contracting parties. See, eg.
Northeast [Page 60] Utilities, 55 F.3d 686 (affirming FERC’s
modification to the rate schedule of a contract as a condition
for approval of a merger between two parties to the contract).
But where intervening circumstances—in this instance,
FERC—mandated open access transmission—affect an ent're
class of contracts in an identical manner, we find nothing in
the Mobile-Sierra doctrine to prohibit FERC from responding
with a public interest finding applicable to all contracts of
that class. Moreover, in providing for stranded cost recovery,
FERC has not relieved utilities of “improvident bargains,”
the concern of the Sierra Court, rather, it has recognized that
open access affects all utilities in the same manner, namely
leaving them vulnerable to potentially unrecoverable
stranded costs. In fact, to deny FERC authority to make
generic findings in such a case would simply impose on it
and the parties the repetitive burden of proving the public
interest in each and every case.
In sustaining FERC’s generic finding, we are influenced
by the fact that before recovering stranded costs, a utility
must prove that it had a reasonable expectation of continued
67a
service to a particular customer. As the IOUs intervening on
behalf of FERC explain, the need to make this showing adds
a particularized element to FERC’s generic public interest
finding. Viewed this way, Order 888’s generic is
We stress that generic Mobile-Sierra findings are
b. FERC’s stranded cost public interest finding
Having concluded that the Mobile-Sierra doctrine
permits a generic finding in this case, we turn to POSCR’s
claim that the finding was unsupported by substantial
evidence. POSCR faults FERC for failing to adduce
evidence to support its conclusion that denying stranded cost
POSCR also thinks that the impact on customers of failing to
provide for stranded cost recovery is insufficient to support a
68a
With respect to POSCR’s first point, it is certainly true
that Sierra identified impairment of “the financial ability of
the public utility to continue its service” as one factor
supporting a public interest finding. Sierra, 350 U. S. at 355.
Although public interest findings made on a case-by-
case basis necessarily evaluate the harm to the particular
utility seeking modification, that is not true where, as here,
FERC implements a generic change in the industry. Just as
that change can support a generic public interest finding, that
generic finding can be supported by generic industry -wide
evidence. FERC has produced such evidence. The record
contains estimates of stranded costs amounting to $200
billion or more. See Stranded Cost NOPR, q 32,507 at
32,866. It also includes comments from representatives of
the financial community stating that “the prospect of not
recovering stranded costs could erode a utility’s ability to
attract capital.”
POSCR points out that eighty-five to ninety percent of
the estimated $200 billion of stranded costs relates to retail
sales, not wholesale sales. True enough, but we find no basis
for questioning FERC’s conclusion that unrecovered
stranded [Page 62] costs of even ten percent of 200 billion—
the low end of the wholesale stranded cost estimate—could
have serious consequences for utilities. See Order 888,
31,036 at 31,790. In any event, if POSCR turns out to be
correct about the absence of a wholesale stranded cost
problem, few utilities will avail themselves of Order 888's
stranded cost recovery provisions.
excessive burden on the remaining customers who, for
whatever reason, cannot leave and therefore may have to bear
69a
those costs.” Order 888, 7 31,036 at 31,811. POSCR does
not agree with FERC that the failure to recover stranded costs
will create an “‘undue burden” on remaining customers. But
disagreeing with FERC is not enough. To prevail in this
court, POSCR must demonstrate that FERC’s prediction that
failure to recover stranded costs will create an undue burden
on remaining customers is unsupported by substantial
evidence, see 16 U.S.C. § 8251(b), which is another way of
saying it is arbitrary and capricious. See Michigan
Consolidated Gas Co. v. FERC, 883 F.2d 117, 124 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (“[M]aking ... predictions is clearly within the
Commission’s expertise and will be upheld if rationally
based on record evidence.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted). This POSCR has failed to do.
c. FERC’s public interest finding regarding customers
The IOUs mount two challenges to FERC’s second
public interest finding—that it was in the public interest to
allow customers to seek modification of their wholesale
requirements contracts. Unlike POSCR, the IOUs make no
claim that the finding lacks substantial evidence; rather, they
contend that FERC’s decision to allow customers to seek
modification of all contract terms, while limiting utilities to
adding stranded cost provisions, fails to balance FERC’s
competing concerns: respecting existing contractual
commitments and accelerating the transition to competition.
They also complain that FERC has failed adequately to
explain [Page 63] why affording customers this broad ability
to modify their contracts is in the public interest.
FERC gave two justifications for affording customers a
broader opportunity than utilities to modify their contracts,
both of which seem perfectly rational to us. First, Order 888-
A explains, “these contracts were entered into during an era
in which transmission providers exercised monopoly control
over access to their transmission facilities.” Order 888-A,
31,048 at 30,193. Also, the “unprecedented competitive
changes ... may affect whether such contracts continue to be
70a
just and reasonable or not unduly discriminatory both as to
the direct customers of the contracts, as well as to indirect,
third-party consumers....” Id. at 30,193-94. In fact, Order
888 rests on the very premise that by denying competitors
access to their transmission lines, utilities engaged in undue
discrimination. Confined to purchasing power from their
local utilities, customers suffered from this lack of access. In
the natural gas restructuring, we affirmed FERC’s decision to
allow customers to seek to modify their sales contracts
because those contracts “necessarily reflect the pipelines’
monopoly power.” AGD, 824 F.2d at 1017. The same
reasons call for affirming FERC’s decision here. In addition,
as FERC has explained, the harm to third parties (i.e.,
customers of the wholesale requirements customers) that may
result from adherence to uneconomical contracts further
justifies its conclusion. Sze Order 888-A, J 31,048 at 30,194.
Remedying potential un.airness to utilities by allowing them
to seek stranded cost recovery if a customer shortens the term |
of a contract, FERC struck a balance between customers and )
utilities that can hardly be characterized as arbitrary or
capricious.
4. Availability of Stranded Cost Recovery to
——.. Nonjurisdictional Utilities and G&T Cooperatives
Section 201 of the FPA gives FERC jurisdiction over
“public utilities” but not over federal and state utilities. 16
U.S.C. § 824. Although FERC required utilities not subject
to its jurisdiction ( “nonjurisdictional utilities”) to provide
reciprocal open access transmission when they use a jurisdic-
[Page 64]tional utility’s open access tariff, it declined to
provide a mechanism for them to recover stranded costs,
Explaining that it promulgated its reciprocity provision
pursuant to fairness concerns, not statutory authority, FERC
reasoned that it lacked jurisdiction to provide stranded cost
recovery for nonjurisdictional utilities. See Order 888-A,
31,048 at 30,364. FERC recommended that these utilities
include stranded cost provisions in their open access tariffs;
Provisions, its lack of jurisdiction over entities like
Dairyland, and the ability of nonjurisdictional utilities to
include stranded cost provisions in their Open access tariffs,
We see no reason to question FERC’s judgment on this issue.
The same is true with respect to the transmission
dependent utilities (“TDUs”). Like the Dairyland petitioners,
they claim that FERC acted arbitrarily and Capriciously by
failing to provide a mechanism for them to recover stranded
costs Owning few or no transmission facilities, TDUs serve
their loads using other utilities’ transmission systems. Not
only are TDUs nonjurisdictional utilities, but, as Order 888-
_ Aexplains, open access does not Cause their costs to become
stranded—their customers have always had an option to use
other utilities’ transmission services to purchase power. See
Order 888-A, 9 31,048 at 30,365.
Dairyland also contends that FERC acted arbitrarily and
capriciously when it declined to treat a generation and
72a
function as single economic units, Dairyland claims that
G&T cooperatives have reasonable expectations of continued
service to retail customers of their member cooperatives that
with respect to retail customers of their wholesale customers.
This difference, Dairyland argues, requires FERC to allow
G&T cooperatives to recover stranded costs from their
member cooperatives’ customers.
Rejecting Dairyland’s petition for rehearing on this
point, FERC noted that treating a G&T cooperative and its
members as a single economic unit for purposes of stranded
cost recovery would conflict with its treatment of these same
cooperatives as distinct entities in its reciprocity provisions.
Order 888-A, J 31,048 at 30,366. There, FERC agreed with
Dairyland’s proposal that if a G&T cooperative seeks open
access transmission from a public utility, “then only the G&T
cooperative, and not its member distribution cooperatives,
would be required to offer [reciprocal] transmission service.”
Order 888, § 31,036 at 31,763. Moreover, FERC reasoned,
recovering from a retail customer of a member cooperative
is, in effect, recovering from an indirect customer, a situation
that FERC declined to include in its stranded cost rule. See
Order 888-A, J 31,048 at 30,166.
It is true that FERC could have treated G&T
cooperatives and their members as single economic units for
stranded cost purposes. But FERC’s explanation of why it
chose not to do s0, particularly the fact that G&T
cooperatives and their members were treated is distinct
entities for reciprocity purposes, is entirely reasonable.
5. Challenges to Technical Aspects of Order 888's
Stranded Cost Recovery Provisions
Several petitioners mount challenges to various technical
aspects of the stranded cost recovery provisions. Before
[Page 66] addressing these challenges, we emphasize the
very limited scope of our review. For us to undo what FERC
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has done, petitioners must persuade us that FERC’s actions
were arbitrary or capricious. “Highly deferential,” the
arbitrary and capricious standard “presumes the validity of
agency action.” National Mining Ass’n. v. Mine Safety and
Health Admin., 116 F.3d 520, 536 (1997). Where, as here,
the issue before us “requires a high level of technical
expertise, we must defer to the informed discretion of the
responsible federal agencies.” Marsh v. Oregon Natural
Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 (1989) (internal
quotation marks omitted). It is not enough for petitioners to
convince us of the reasonableness of their views, see UDC,
88 F.3d at 1169 (“The existence of a second reasonable
course of action does not invalidate an agency’s
determination.”); those arguments should be presented to
FERC, whose commissioners are appointed by the President
and confirmed by the Senate with the expectation that they,
not Article III courts, will make policy judgments.
To prevail in this court, petitioners must demonstrate
that FERC’s policy judgments are arbitrary or capricious, a
heavy burden indeed. See National Treasury Employees
Union v. Hefler, 53 F.3d 1289, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“The
‘scope’ of review under the “arbitrary and capricious”
standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its
judgment for that of the agency.”) (quoting Motor Vehicles
Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983.)). With this very deferential scope of review in
mind, we turn to petitioners’ arguments.
a. POSCR’s challenges to the stranded cost formula
Reasoning that it would be burdensome to identify each
and every asset that would become underutilized as a result
of Order 888, FERC adopted a “revenues lost” formula to
determine a departing customer’s stranded cost obligation.
Order 888, 7 31,036 at 31,839. For each year a utility can
prove that it had a reasonable expectation of continued
service to a particular customer, the formula calculates the
customer’s stranded cost obligation by subtracting the com-
74a
[Page 67]petitive market value of the power the customer
would have purchased from the utility (as estimated by the
utility) from the amount the customer would have paid had it
remained a generation customer of the utility (based on
FERC-approved rates that the customer paid the prior three
years). Id. at 31,839-40.
POSCR claims that this formula gives utilities no
incentive to mitigate their stranded costs. Not so. The
formula automatically provides such an incentive by
subtracting from utilities’ recovery the market price of the
power—utilities that fail to sell the power at market prices
will not recover their full costs. POSCR also claims that the
formula fails accurately to measure stranded costs because it
is based on an estimate of those costs at one point in time.
Responding, FERC explained why it rejected a “true-up”
provision that would have made adjustments to the amount
the customer owed to reflect market conditions over the
reasonable expectation period. According to FERC, such an
approach would have created enormous uncertainty,
outweighing any potential increase in accuracy. See Order
888-A, J 31,048 at 30,427-28. POSCR has offered no basis
for us to question this reasoning.
POSCR’s claim that the formula gives utilities an
incentive to minimize their estimate of the market value of
the power the customer would have purchased is similarly
groundless. To avoid precisely this result, Order 888 gives
customers an option to either market or broker the capacity
and associated energy they would have purchased from their
historic utility, effectively reducing their stranded cost
obligations by the difference between the actual market value
of the power and the utility’s estimate of the market value.
See Order 888, 9 31,036 at 31,844. Order 888 also gives
customers an option to substitute the price of power under the
customer’s contract with a new supplier for the utility’s
estimate of the market value. See id.
b. Inclusion of known and measurable costs
The IOUs take issue with Order 888’s stranded cost
recovery formula because the estimate of the price the
customer would have paid for the power is based on rates for
the prior three years: according to the IOUs, this approach
fails to consider known and measurable costs resulting from
regulatory mandates that may have been deferred pursuant to
filed rate schedules and FERC-approved settlements. The
costs they cite include deferred costs of generation that have
already been approved for inclusion in the rate base, costs
relating to approved qualifying facility contracts, and
government-imposed costs such as deferred taxes and nuclear
decommissioning.
Although it is true that the revenue calculation measures
only current rates and not deferred costs, Order 888 allows
customers and utilities to file for a change in the rates before
the customer’s requirements contract terminates; in such
cases, FERC will calculate the customer’s stranded cost
obligation based on those new rates. See Order 888-A_
] N31,048 at 30,427. While seeking to avoid detailed listings
of specific costs that may become stranded, FERC has
adequately preserved utilities’ ability to include known,
measurable costs in revenue estimates through a ratemaking
proceeding.
c. Treatment of energy costs in the market option
The IOUs challenge FERC’s treatment of energy costs in
the market option. To mitigate utilities’ incentives to
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minimize their estimates of the market value of the power
(the competitive market value estimate or “CMVE”), Order
888 affords customers an option to buy the power stranded
by their departure from the utility and resell it. Order 888,
31,036 at 31,844. Customers would purchase generation
[Page 69] capacity at the utility’s estimated market value of
the capacity and associated energy at average system variable
cost. Id. at 31,845. Thus if a customer believes that a utility
is underestimating the price at which it could sell the power,
the customer can buy the power and then resell it. While
customers exercising this option would still have to pay their
stranded cost obligation as calculated under the formula, they
would effectively offset the obligation by keeping the profit
on the resale of the power. Id. at 31,845 n.879.
The IOUs contend that allowing customers to pay
average variable cost for the associated energy is inconsistent
with Order 888’s definition of the CMVE, which equals the
market value of both the generation capacity and associated
energy. See id. at 31,839 (defining CMVE as “the utility’s
estimate of the average annual revenues ... that it can receive
by selling the released capacity and associated energy, based
on a market analysis performed by the utility”). Customers
could receive a windfall, the IOUs claim, by exercising the
market option although they will pay average variable cost
for the associated energy, they will be able to resell it at the
presumably higher market price. At the same time, utilities
will be unable to recover the full market value of the power
because they will be forced to sell the associated energy at
cost.
Responding to this argument in Order 888-A, FERC
offered two justifications for allowing customers to purchase
the associated energy at average variable cost. First, because
the capacity being marketed would not generally be
associated with a single asset, customers exercising this
option are purchasing a “slice of the system” and thus should
pay average variable cost. Second, customers should be able
77a
to purchase energy at the price they pay, typically
average variable cost. See Order 888-A, 7 31,048 at 30,433.
But neither explanation responds to the IOUs argument that
defining CMVE as the market price of both the Capacity and
associated energy is inconsistent with allowing customers
exercising the market option to purchase associated energy at
average variable cost. In its brief in this court, FERC
continues to misapprehend the IOUs’ argument, largely reit-
[Page 70] erating the same arguments and failing to address
The market option’s stated intention is to reduce a
utility’s incentive to understate the CMVE. See Order 888,
31,036 at 31,842. If it did understate the CMVE, then
keeping the difference. But FERC’s policy of allowing
customers to purchase the associated energy at cost gives
customers an incentive to exercise the market option even
when a utility has appropriately estimated CMVE because
they can buy the energy at cost and resell it at the presumably
higher market price. FERC’s failure to explain whether it
intended this result and if so, the justification for permitting
customers to receive a windfall while undercompensating
utilities constitutes a failure of reasoned decisionmaking.
See AGD, 824 F.2d at 1030 (“We do not require that FERC
reach any particular conclusion; we merely mandate that it
reach its conclusion by reasoned decisionmaking.”). We
therefore vacate this portion of the orders and remand the
issue to FERC for further consideration.
d. Rescission of notice of termination provision
Until FERC issued Orders 888 and 889, it had required
parties to power sales contracts to notify it sixty days prior to
cancellation of a contract or termination of a contract by its
Own terms. See 18 C.F.R. § 35.15 (repealed by Order 888).
Orders 888 and 889 eliminate the requirement that parties
notify FERC in advance when a contract terminates by its
Own terms, but only with respect to contracts executed after
78a
July 9, 1996; in other cases of contract cancellation or
termination, parties must still notify FERC in advance. See
18 C.F.R. § 35.15 (1999). TDU petitioners claim that in
rescinding the notice requirement, FERC ignored the fact that
utilities still have substantial market power. That some
utilities retain market power in generation, however, does not
undermine Orders 888 and 889. Through these orders, FERC
sought to move the electricity industry toward competition;
by providing an open access mechanism through which
buyers may purchase power from suppliers other than trans-
[Page 71]mitting utilities. FERC substantially reduced.
Utilities’ market power. Eliminating the notice requirement
furthered that policy. Moreover, customers who believe
termination of their contracts is unjust can seek relief from
FERC pursuant to section 206 of the FPA; See Order 888-A,
4 31,048 at 30,393.
e. Provision for benefits lost
The TDU petitioners claim that FERC acted arbitrarily
and capriciously by failing to provide a mechanism for
customers purchasing power at below-market rates to
preserve those rates at the termination of their contract with
their historic utility. Just as utilities may have expectations
of continued service to particular customers, the TDU
petitioners contend, customers may have _ reasonable
expectations of continuing to receive wholesale requirements
service from their historic utility at cost-based rates. Order
888-A says that the Commission does “not have a sufficient
basis on which to make generic findings that customers under
such contracts may be entitled to extend a contract at the
existing rate.” Order 888-A, J 31,048 at 30,393 (emphasis
removed). Moreover, the order explains, “the consequences
of customers’ expectations as a general matter would not
have the potential to shift significant costs to other
customers,” whereas utilities’ failure to recover stranded
costs could potentially shift the costs to other customers. Id.
Most important, FERC has not foreclosed customers in this
situation from seeking relief As Order 888-A explains,
customer may “exercise its procedural rights under section
requirement.” Id. (footnote omitted). Given that agencies
“enjoy ] broad discretion in determining how best to handle
related, yet discrete, issues in terms of procedures ... and
priorities,” we think FERC’s refusal to promulgate a generic
rule on this issue was entirely reasonable. Mobil Oil Explo-
[Page 72]ration & Producing Southeast, Inc. v. United
Distrib. Cos., 498 U.S. 211, 230 (1990).
B. Retail Stranded Costs
Recognizing state agency authority to address stranded
costs that relate to retail power sales, Order 888 limits
FERC’s role as a forum for the recovery of these costs to two
situations: when customers take advantage of state-ordered
wheeling to reach new power suppliers and when former
retail customers become wholesale customers through what
is known as municipalization or municipal annexation. See
Order 888-A_ 7 31,048 at 30,402, 30,410. In the former
scenario, FERC will consider Proposals for the recovery of
stranded costs only when the appropriate state regulatory
1. Stranded Costs Arising from Retail Wheeling
Stranded costs may result from state unbundling of retail
, where retail customers take advantage of state-ordered
retail wheeling to reach new generation suppliers. See Order
888, 9 31,036 at 31,819. Observing that both FERC and the
EE
80a
states have authority to address these stranded costs, Order
888 explains that:
[B]ecause it is a state decision to permit or require
the retail wheeling that causes retail stranded costs
to occur, we will leave it to state regulatory
authorities to deal with any stranded costs
occasioned by retail wheeling. The only
circumstance in which we will entertain requests to
recover stranded costs caused by retail wheeling is
when the state regulatory authority does not have
authority under state law to address stranded costs
when the retail wheeling is required.
Order 888, § 31,036 at 31,824-25 (footnote omitted). FERC
will provide for recovery of those stranded costs through the
transmission rate the former supplying utility charges the
departing customer. Order 888-A, | 31,048 at 30,410. (As
discussed in Section III supra, FERC has jurisdiction over
[Page 73]the transmission component of unbundled retail
sales.). In evaluating claims for stranded cost recovery,
FERC will use the same standards as it applies with respect
to wholesale stranded costs (i.e., it will require utilities to
demonstrate a reasonable expectation of continued service).
See Order 888, 4 31,036 at 31,819 n.722.
Two sets of petitioners challenge FERC’s retail stranded
cost recovery provisions from opposite sides. The States and
POSCR contend that FERC exceeded its jurisdiction by
asserting rate authority over retail stranded costs. The IOUs
argue that FERC abdicated its statutory authority by failing
to agree to consider all proposals for recovery of stranded
costs that arise from retail wheeling. Because we think
FERC has appropriately exercised its jurisdiction, we reject
both claims.
a. FERC’s jurisdiction over retail stranded costs
The States’ and POSCR’s arguments boil down to the
following: Because retail stranded costs relate primarily to
rr yaar
Status of these costs.
commissions, not this Commission, have
“jurisdiction” over cer-[Page 74]tain “costs. “
Neither the state commissions nor this Commission
has exclusive jurisdiction over “costs.” Each
regulatory authority has jurisdiction to determine
“rates” for services subject to its jurisdiction and, in
determining rates, may take into account all of the
costs incurred by the utility.
Order 888-A, 9 31,048 at 30,414. In other words, as FERC
explained in its brief “regulatory authorities do not carve out
so-called ‘wholesale costs’ that only FERC can take into
account in determining rates subject to state jurisdiction.”
Instead. “{uJnder historical cost-of-service ratemaking, each
regulato y authority, in exercising its respective
jurisdiction, reviews the total costs incurred by a utility to
82a
provide service and makes its separate and independent
determination of what costs may be recovered through rates
within its jurisdiction.” Order 888-A, J 31,048 at 30,414.
Thus, while petitioners correctly point out that section
201(b) of the FPA denies FERC jurisdiction over “facilities
used for the generation of electric energy,” that provision
does not necessarily prevent FERC from including costs
relating to generating facilities in iransmission rates, over
which FERC indisputably has jurisdiction 16 USC. §
824(b). This is so because this part of section 201(b) is
modified by the phrase “except as specifically provided in
this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter.” Id.
Given that section 201(a) grants FERC jurisdiction over “the
transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce” and,
therefore, over transmission rates, 16 U.S.C. § 824(a), FERC
may exercise jurisdiction over generation facilities to the
extent necessary to regulate interstate transmission.
This is exactly the construction that we gave section
201(b) in Mississippi Industries v. FERC, 808 F.2d 1525,
1543-45 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (subsequent history omitted).
There, petitioners challenged FERC’s authority to reallocate
costs relating to generation facilities among utilities that were
parties to a power sales agreement. Justifying its authority to
reallo-[Page 75]cate such costs, FERC relied on its
“undisputed jurisdiction over interstate sales of electric
energy at wholesale.” Id. at 1543. We agreed: “[A]lthough
allocating cost does, to some extent, result in the ‘regulation
of matters relating to generation,’ such regulation is valid
under the FPA when it is the byproduct of a legitimate
exercise of FERC’s power to regulate wholesale rates.” Id.
In reaching this conclusion, we rejected petitioners’ argument
that “the statutory prohibition of federal regulation of
[generation] facilities in section 201(b) becomes meaningless
if FERC is permitted to allocate the costs of a plant,” given
FERC’s undisputed responsibility to regulate the wholesale
sale of power. Id. at 1543-44. Under Mississippi Industries,
stranded cost recovery provisi ns run afoul of section 201(a)
petitioners point out that the case “involved authority to
allocate generation costs to a wholesale sales rate (which
may, of course, include generation costs)” True, but
Mississippi Industries provides clear authority for the
Proposition that there is no per se jurisdictional bar to
FERC’s including generation costs in jurisdictional rates,
whether wholesale sales rates or transmission rates. Thus
narrowed, the question before us is this: Is inclusion of
stranded costs relating to generation facilities in transmission
rates the byproduct of a legitimate exercise of FERC’s
authority over transmission rates? In most cases the answer
would be no, but given the highly unusual circumstances of
this case, we think the answer is yes. Just as FERC may
include generation-related wholesale stranded costs in
transmission rates (see Section V.A.1.b), it may include
generation-related retail stranded costs in transmission rates.
That retail stranded costs were [Page 76]originally reflected
“costs” of providing transmission services: “While such
costs are not a cost of operating the physical transmission
system, nevertheless, they are an economic cost incurred as a
result of being required to provide retai] transmission.”
Order 888-A, ¥ 31,048 at 30,414 n.708 While we agree that
generation-related retail costs are not typically “costs”
relating to transmission services, the fundamental changes
84a
wrought by state-ordered retail wheeling, as well as the
narrow circumstances in which FERC will consider stranded
cost recovery claims, justify the conclusion that these costs
are costs of providing transmission service.
Petitioners claim that by agreeing to consider retail
stranded cost recovery claims, FERC has unduly interfered
with state legislative processes and decisions. We disagree.
FERC has limited its “interference” to instances where state
commissions have no authority even to address stranded cost
recovery claims. Describing its role as limited to “fill[ing]
any regulatory gap,” FERC made it clear that it will deny
consideration to any utility seeking stranded cost recovery “if
a state regulatory authority with authority to address retail
wheeling stranded costs has in fact addressed such costs,
regardless of whether the state regulatory authority has
allowed full recovery, partial recovery, or no recovery.”
Order 888-A, 931,048 at 30,415. Under _ these
circumstances, it can hardly be said that FERC has usurped
state authority.
b. FERC’s refusal to assert jurisdiction over all retail
stranded costs.
Contending that FERC did not go far enough, the [OUs
challenge the agency’s refusal to consider claims for stranded
costs resulting from state-ordered retail wheeling unless the
relevant state regulatory commission lacks authority to
address such claims. They claim that FERC should have
agreed to consider proposals for retail stranded cost recovery
whether or not the state commission had authority to address
the claim, and even whether or not a state commission with
such authority had already addressed the claim. In support
[Page 77]of their position the IOUs advance three related
arguments. They allege first that by concluding that it had
jurisdiction over retail stranded costs but declining to
exercise it, FERC abdicated its legal authority. Second, they
say, FERC violated its statutory obligation to ensure just and
reasonable rates. And finally, they contend that FERC erred
With respect to their first argument, the IOUs claim that
once FERC determined that it had jurisdiction over retail
stranded costs, the agency had to exercise that jurisdiction.
In making this argument, the IOUs make the same mistake
POSCR made: They confuse FERC jurisdiction over costs
with its jurisdiction over rates. FERC has not “concluded
that it shares jurisdiction over retail stranded costs with the
states,” as the IOUs assert. As we explained above, “costs”
are not jurisdictional. The FPA speaks not in terms of
“costs,” but in terms of “rates,” requiring FERC to ensure
that rates are just, reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory.
FERC indisputably has jurisdiction over interstate
transmission rates. In essence, then, the IOUs claim that
FERC has no discretion to leave retail stranded cost recovery
to state authorities.
We review claims that an agency lacks discretion to
follow (or decline to follow) a certain course of action by
examining the agency’s governing statute as well as its own
regulations. See, e. 8., National Wildlife Federation v.
statute gives EPA “substantial room to exercise its expertise
in determining the appropriate grounds for listing”). The
1OUs have failed to point to any Statutory provision that robs
FERC of discretion to decide, as a matter of policy, that state
regulato-[Page 78)]ry commissions should serve as the
primary forum for retail stranded cost recovery. Our own
examination of the FPA reveals no such provision either.
pues
86a
Sections of the statute giving FERC jurisdiction over
transmission in interstate commerce, 16 U.S.C. § 824(a), and
requiring FERC to ensure that rates are just and reasonable,
16 U.S.C. § 824d(a), do not alone create a mandatory duty to
consider proposals for retail stranded cost recovery.
The two Supreme Court cases the 1OUs rely on provide
no support for their position, for in both cases the agencies,
unlike FERC in this case, failed to comply with a specific
statutory mandate. In MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218 (1994),
the Supreme Court held that the FCC could not exempt
certain communication common carriers from filing a tariff,
the statute specified that all carriers must file tariffs.
Similarly, in FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S. 380 (1974), the
Supreme Court determined that the FPC could not exempt
certain producers from the statute’s requirement that rates be
just and reasonable. Under these cases, FERC would
abdicate its statutory obligations if it, for example, exempted
certain utilities from the requirement that rates be just and
reasonable (as in Texaco), or if it refused to review
transmission rate filings altogether. These cases do not hold
that in carrying out its statutory obligations, FERC has no
discretion to determine as a matter of policy that states are
better positioned to address costs originally included in retail
rate Lases. What
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