Respondents Brief — District of Columbia v. Tri County Industries, Inc.
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No. 99-1953 | :
'
IN THE
Supreme Court of the Anited States
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ET AL..,
Petitioners,
Vv.
TRI COUNTY INDUSTRIES, INC..,
Respondent.
On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT
FRANK J. EMIG
Counsel of Record
LAW OFFICES OF FRANK J. EMIG
Greenway Center East, Suite 314
7525 Greenway Center Drive
Greenbelt, Maryland 20770
(301) 345-7002
Counsel for Respondent
nBEST
QUESTION PRESENTED
Did the D.C. Circuit err when it determined by conducting
a “more searching inquiry” that the district court abused its
discretion in ordering a new tnal?
ee ee i ES
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTION PRESENTED .........0:0:c0scsssesssscsssssssssessecseseees i
CE iv
TID reset eeeenepnemnnnnsennenennectazensenesumannneent l
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............0..ccesccccccccscessecsescses |
5 ET 2
gre 5
ae IE Cs PUEDEN cccccesccceccscecscesscssccscecesees 11
SEE GEE ceennnernnsmnccssascsessesenssenseesese 12
V. THE D.C. CIRCUIT’S DECISION ..................... 12
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................cccccsccsssesssseeeees 14
IIIT. ‘ucerhicienernctnneseceeensanensenneensesentseenenssmnesannesensenen 15
I. DUE TO THE DISTRICT’S FAILURE TO
TIMELY RAISE THIS ISSUE, THE D.C.
CIRCUIT HAS NEVER EXPLAINED THE -
SIGNIFICANCE OF CONDUCTING A
MORE SEARCHING INQUIRY ..............:00000000 15
Il. THE MORE SEARCHING INQUIRY BY
THE D.C. CIRCUIT DID NOT AFFECT
THE VALIDITY OF ITS DECISION ................. 21
A. A More Searching Inquiry May Signify
A Closer Review Of The Issues In The
Case To Determine Whether The Dis-
trict Court Abused Its Discretion ................... 23
ill
B. A More Searching Inquiry May Also
Signify That The Abuse Of Discretion
Standard Was Applied More Exactingly
Due To Seventh Amendment Consid-
RE, Gay eee
Ill. THE DISTRICT COURT DID ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT VACATED THE
JURY'S AWARD AND GRANTED A
GERD WIIIIED ccneuscnsvesnetnememsdsnnscsseetensesensssencennueseene
IV. IF THIS COURT DETERMINES THAT
THE D.C. CIRCUIT EMPLOYED AN ER-
RONEOUS STANDARD OF APPELLATE
REVIEW, THE CASE SHOULD BE RE-
MANDED FOR THE D.C. CIRCUIT TO
APPLY THE CORRECT STANDARD OF
SREY sxcusstiitesutiosssenbidenremessmnnmncemastsmnennnenccen
Se TTTT stcresomicsssisininiuduieantanensicaisinnsiitlionnansusinaniiaaiitiians
IV
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 US.
Eee 41
Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144
TTI esiinsinpicinannlsnneneataneaiaiainniiningibianantnidiandeaiesimmmaaiimneein 21
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405
SEITE tehneitecereemntinatiiptansenannananenaiattasantniidanienaianiinnniuntgtdnmanes 24
Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33
SITE andanscuneceinipenesmansentinidantegubidinnntemammcinamatpnienennmenrees 16
ALPO Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 997
dh 5
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242
ITI ssttnsteinnapiarecectenncdsingiatininnsemabiapeibamanetinenmemenmenes: 4)
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997) ........ccccccceeeeeeeenes 21
Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550 (1886) ..............c00000+ 37
Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 492
SC le
Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171 (D.C. Cir.
FURETTIE? ‘<cnenseccesnitsiinsensieensgeseniguanneneniiidinglesinibeanmatenienmeneniit 20
Carson v. Polley, 689 F.2d 562 (Sth Cir. 1982) ............. 23
Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391
V. TOIT, FOS U.S. SSB (IGG) nneeneeeeceecerevesccvescccceseseszes 25
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485
STITT inccniinmnncetinimnecnntiemnpntainmmnienmnnan 33
City of Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257
SED cenenesciteencnenenscatenimenmnmcaimemenmnnaneaene 15
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384
I entemninsineesrrnnannsisnamesimmadintienmesiantesiiianenieeneternens 30
Country Club Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. FDIC,
918 F. Supp. 429 (DDC. 1996) .........2022.000-000020022200002 6
Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998) ..........--.... 41
Vv
Dagnello v. Long Island R.R. Co., 289 F.2d 797
I Mista inde natnanatas lta team
Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935) .......cccceeecceeeeees
Doolin Sec. Sav. Bank v. Office of Thrift Super-
vision, 156 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1998) .........cccceceeeeeees
EEOC v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 476
EERE SY. A eave ney ye
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514
SN DED tecrcnncnsesnenemenstinnaianienneamnncememens
Foust v. Munson S_S. Lines, 229 U.S. 77 (1936) ............
FTC v. Grolier, Inc.,462 U.S. 19 (1983) .................00000
Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518
SS ORT snnntsncscscnaisnecsniantmnnniiainieniinnnemnnnnds
Grant v. United States Air Force, 197 F.3d 539
asd UII ctieaiscinsiietietiiidehaiieiianieigttiieiaatandatantiniieaieiaasiall
Grogan v. General Maint. Serv. Co., 763 F.2d
Sse I I etitcsirscmnscinesensntmmiianiionmmmanenisetis
Grunenthal v. Long Island R.R. Co., 393 U.S.
ED scniiinseniinidennsitsnciienemnenenmennieaiiiantienncnmnenet
Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance
Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308 (1999) .........cccceeceeeeees
Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985).............-.cccccceeeeeeees
Holmes v. City of Massillon, 78 F.3d 1041 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 935 (1996) ........ccccccceeee
Hutchinson v. Stuckey, 952 F.2d 1418 (D.C. Cir.
LE Ee ee ee
Jeffries v. Potomac Dev. Corp., 822 F.2d 87
Ee ae
Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22 (1889) ........2...cccccesee0eees
Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996) ....................
Langevine v. District of Columbia, 106 F.3d
ES. re
vi
Lind v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 278 F.2d 79 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 835 (1960) ...........cc-:c0000 23, 28
Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545
GREED encenssesnescssteserssntmmeneumntsnnmiecctnicnuneste assesssnsseessseeseee 21
Massey v. Gulf Oil Corp., 508 F.2d 92 (Sth Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 838 (1975) .........scceccseeeereeseeees 23
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S.
fe 21
McBride v. Merrell Dow & Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 800 F.2d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1986) .........2:-cccceeeeeeees 20
McClanahan v. Morauer & Hartzell, Inc., 404
ee 16
McNeal v. Hi-Lo Powered Scaffolding, Inc., 836
Pg oe ee passim
Medcom Holding Co. v. Baxter Travenol Labo-
ratories, Inc., 106 F.3d 1388 (7th Cir. 1997) .............. 27
National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Greenberg,
SED FBG FEO GAL. Cie. TRG cccccctcspecessesesessecescccssecces 10
New York v. Uplinger, 467 U.S. 246 (1984) ............:000+. 15
Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433 (1830) ........... 25
Patterson v. Portich, 853 F.2d 1399 (7th Cir.
SITET) conscunosssscnsessvenensenmmnnciinienntaniamsemmeetininietemmesaneess 33
Pennzoil Producing Co. v. Offshore Exp., Inc.,
943 F.2d 1465 (Sila Cir. 1991 R ..2..20...0cccocecossrevescsoseeeees 32
Pullman-Standard vy. Swint, 456 U.S. 273
SERIE cocevccusessceeusesennnssrsenssnsénnenienenintitinnemecaieninmeneees 31
Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., 749 F2d
i 30
Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225
ITIIEIIT concceccessnsesstiiansecenenisonsedinaninisantucsmmupainsninannenensetsen 31
Samaritan Inns, Inc. v. District of Columbia,
Tok beef oe | 33, 34
Superbird Farms, Inc. v. Perdue Farms, Inc.,
oe bi ty ls |. eee 27
Vil
Synovus Fin. Corp. v. Board of Governors, 952
TT 10
Tatum v. Morton, 562 F.2d 1279 (D.C. Cir.
SUIT UE icccsienisndundecciibdeanitandjsetilinaiatinsiiiincintiasiniceiiummmnanss 32
Taylor v. Washington Terminal Co., 409 F.2d
145 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 835
TEE? cartonsnnsidmnnedimdtiimeagetlaesianempemmeaeagl 23, 26, 36
United States v. Byers, 740 F.2d 1104 (D.C. Cir.
GUREEEY. sacscosssanssecesoanenenssaqsenvecessenasoanssccansessncceneapecaepesnntts 20
United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814 (3d Cir.
TEPEI TET suttrinnesetagunetsimesenescesmnnimeneimanenmeneetieinmemeet 30
United States v. Epstein, 608 F.2d | (D.C. Cir.
SRIUETEY ceciniiesiineallataiiiaiatadaiiaipstuasia stciaaieennienenninenndl 34
United States v. Robinson, 560 F.2d 507 (2d Cir.
SUI UEY sertisissenssscensccnnicsnmentiniensnatianitanennutitednbidmteressuatis 37
United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326 (1988) ................ 24
Van Boxel v. Journal Company Employees Pen-
sion Trust, 836 F.2d 1048 (7th Cir. 1988) .................. 30
Vander Zee v. Karabatsos, 589 F.2d 723 (D.C.
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 962 (1979) ............ 23
Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440 (2000) .............. 20
Wilburn v. Maritrans GP Inc,.4+39 F.3d 350 (3d
eh Se rrnciniscersccunsoesemaptensetiiantiininnatainveiindtaonenuteecs 23
Willoughby v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 100
F.3d 999 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520
SE CRITE cevittecnmcssieidinrnithinaptibiaduimaitncninignnstiti 34
Woodley Park Community Ass'n v. District of
Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 490 A.2d
CE | eae 38-39
Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992) .............. 21
CONSTITUTION |
eID WI hccocncocencnscenanstiniamtasttenncnsnsienitinnes passim
vill
STATUTES AND RULES
GRUB. 6 DGGB ccccccrccccccccsccccscccssscscscsescssnncssesssscsososoosses 5
Fed. R. App. P. 28(b)(5) ........ssssssssssersersersessrsersssesserees 19
Fed. R. App. P. 40(a)(3) ........ssscssecrseesesesssssnsssessrsnseees 20
Ped, BR. Evid. 16D1e) ...0ccccccccccesccsscccsccescasssossossscssssssessosess 34
Pad, BR. Biel GBB .ncccccccescccscccccscsccssscssessssscsscsesssessvocsseose 37
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Law (Ber-
- NATE C. Gavit O6., 1941) ...cccrrcsecccrcccccssccresssscroessssensees 29
Childress & Davis, Federal Standards of Review
CBB E. TODD ccccccccccsccccceccsscessesscccccsccessnsscsosssssossooooooees 30
11 Charles Alan Wright, et al , Federal Practice
and Procedure (2d ed. 1995) ..........:cccsccccesceeereeerereeeeeees 27
IN THE
Supreme Court of the GAnited States
No. 99-1953
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
Vv.
TRI COUNTY INDUSTRIES, INC.,
Respondent.
On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT’
OPINIONS BELOW
In addition to the decisions identified by the Petitioners, the
January 14, 1997 decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (J.A. 18-30) is
reported at 104 F.3d 455. The January 17, 1996 decision of
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
(J.A. 10-17) is reported at 932 F. Supp. 4.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This lawsuit involves the violation of Tri County’s consti-
tutional nghts by the District. This determination was made
Respondent’s Rule 29.6 statement appears in the Brief in
Opposition at page i.
2
by the D.C. Circuit in 1997 and was not appealed further by
the District. The question of the actual loss sustained by Tri
County as a result of the District’s unconstitutional actions,
which a jury determined to be $5 million, is the subject of
these proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND.
Tri County replaces underground fuel storage tanks in the
Washington metropolitan area. J.A. 39.' If the surrounding
soil has become contaminated with petroleum from such
tanks, Tr County must also excavate and transport the soil to
a treatment facility. J.A. 39-40. Tr County removes well
over 60,000 tons of contaminated soil per year, but must haul
it to other cities due to the unavailability of treatment facili-
ties in the Washington area. J.A. 35, 40.
On June 1, 1992, Tri County leased a 53,000 square foot
warehouse (“the Bryant Street warehouse’) in an industrial
area of northeast Washington, D.C., with the intention of
operating its own soil remediation unit? inside this building.
Pl. Ex. 2, R. 4, 79 (4/14/98).2 On July 1, 1992, Tri County
applied to the District of Columbia Department of Consumer
& Regulatory Affairs (“DCRA”) for a building permit to
operate a soil remediation facility at this location. R. 433
(4/16/98). An extensive governmental review of this project
followed, including visits to the site by District regulatory
officials. J.A. 8, 9. During this investigation, Tri County
informed the District, inter alia, that it intended to treat
approximately 75,000 tons of contaminated soil per year and
' References to “J.A.” are to the Joint Appendix, to “Pet.” are
to the Petition for Certiorari, to “Pet. App.” are to the Appendix to
the Petition for Certiorari, and to “Rep. Pet.” are to the Reply to
Brief in Opposition.
2 This equipment cleans contaminated soil by a thermal process
that vaporizes the petroleum contaminants.
3 References to pages in the Record (“R.”) are to the transcript
of the first trial, docket entries 111-114.
3
that the soil would be transported to the facility in covered
dump trucks traveling through a commercial and industnal
area. J.A. 100, 101. Tm County intended to purchase the
same soil cleaning equipment that it had used several years
earlier on a temporary basis elsewhere in the city and which
had been tested and approved by District regulatory officials
at that time. J.A. 40-41.
On December 11, 1992, the District issued an air quality
approval to Tri County for this facility. J.A. 126. It prohib-
ited the treatment of hazardous waste material but authorized
Tri County to process soil “contaminated with gasoline,
diesel oil, fuel oil or kerosene.” J.A. 128. On December 22,
1992, Ferial Bishop, the administrator of the Distnct’s
Environmental Regulation Administration, concluded that an
environmental impact statement would not be required since
the project would result in no significant environmental
impact. J.A. 130. On February 26, 1993, the District issued
Tri County a building permit to renovate the “existing
warehouse as per plans for industrial process and storage.
(Soil Remediation Facility)” Pl. Ex. 5, R. 4, 80-81
(4/14/98). James Sweeney, a DCRA employee, testified that
if the contaminated soil was kept inside the warehouse, as Tri
County intended, it would have no effect on the surrounding
homes and the project would not imminently and substan-
tially affect the public health, safety and welfare. J.A. 97-98.
Tri County then began extensive and costly renovations of
this warehouse to accommodate its new business. Under its
air quality approval, Tri County was required to test the soil
remediation equipment after installation to ensure that it was
operating in accordance with approved emission levels. J.A.
127. Accordingly, toward the end of the construction period,
Tri County began having contaminated soil transported to the
warehouse in anticipation of the delivery and required testing
of the soil remediation equipment. J.A. 35, 37-38.
Before the equipment arrived at the site, public opposition
to the project surfaced. J.A. 19. On September 20, 1993, a
community meeting was held near the proposed site. /d.
Hampton Cross, the Acting Director of DCRA, and Merrick
4
Malone of the District's Department of Housing and Com-
munity Development (“DHCD”), attended this meeting. J.A.
89 and D.C. Circuit No. 96-7022, Plaintiff's Appendix, A.
142, A. 269. Maione voiced concerns about the effects of Tn
County’s project on a proposed DHCD project that was
purportedly to be constructed adjacent to the Tn County
project. /d. at A. 143, A. 279-290. Although Malone’s
information regarding this project was wrong—the area
designated for possible redevelopment was over three blocks
from the Tn County facility, id. at A. 143, A. 291-305—
Cross nevertheless relied upon that information and
immediately suspended Tn County’s building permit. /d. at
A. 144, A. 311-312. As the D.C. Circuit observed, Cross
“pursued no procedure at all to assess whether the alleged
change in circumstances materially undermined his agency's
prior finding” that the project was not a danger to health and
safety. J.A. 29. Without affording Tn County any pre-
deprivation or prompt post-deprivation hearing to challenge
this indefinite suspension of its permit, the District violated
Tn County’s procedural due process rights, as the D.C.
Circuit held in the first appeal in this case. J.A. 27-30.
When Cross indicated that he could not withdraw this
spontaneous suspension, Tri County decided to terminate this
project. J.A. 48, 53. An administrative appeal was not
feasible due to its indefinite duration, uncertain outcome and
continued project costs, which included payment for the soil
cleaning equipment to prevent its resale. J.A. 47, 48. In
November, 1993, Tri County proceeded to cancel the lease
on the Bryant Street warehouse, which was costing $14,000
per month in rent, and thereafter removed the contaminated
soil from the building. J.A. 38, 48.
The costs to Tri County of this failed project were enor-
mous. It had spent or incurred costs of $536,421 for profes-
sional and consulting assistance in obtaining the permit, lease
payments, renovation costs and other project-related ex-
penses. J.A. 36, 132, R. 101 (4/14/98). Tri County was also
deprived of the opportunity to earn substantial profits from
this project.
Il. THE FIRST TRIAL.
On September 20, 1994, Tri County filed suit against the
District of Columbia and its employees seeking damages
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the violation of Tn County’s due
process rights. The district court granted the District’s
motion for summary judgment and rejected Tn County’s
constitutional claims. J.A. 2, D.E. 47. On appeal, a panel of
the D.C. Circuit, consisting of Chief Judge Edwards and
Circuit Judges Williams and Sentelle, held that “Cross’s
‘procedure’ .. . deprived Tri County of property without due
process of law.” 104 F.3d at 462. The D.C. Circuit de-
scribed the actions of Cross as “a classic case of shooting
from the hip on complex technical matters.” /d. It also
determined that there was “provision for correction of the
sort of suspension issued by Cross, but uncertainty as to its
likely speed.” Jd. at 461. The case was remanded to the
district court for proof of damages sustained by Tn County,
as well as consideration of the District’s defenses of moot-
ness and failure to mitigate damages. J.A. 29-30.
Prior to trial, Tri County sought summary judgment on its
claim for damages. R. D.E. 57 (4/15/97). The district court
denied the motion and stated that lost profits of a relatively
new business would be speculative. J.A. 33. Its sole author-
ity for this statement was Country Club Associates Limited
Partnership v. FDIC, 918 F. Supp. 429 (D.D.C. 1996).* That
case, however, was governed by Virginia law, which bars
recovery of lost profits by a new business as a matter of law.
The district court was advised that under District of Colum-
bia law, a new business can assert a claim for lost profits.
See ALPO Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 997 F.2d
949, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1993). At trial, the district court accord-
ingly instructed the jury, without objection by the District,
that a new business could recover future profits. J.A. 125.
+ The District quotes this portion of the district court’s opinion
in its brief (p. 7) but omits the reference to Country Club. Con-
trary to its assertion, there was no “pretrial evidentiary ruling.”
Pet. Br. 8.
6
During tnal, Tri County established that it had incurred
$536,421 in costs for this project. J.A. 132. The District did
not object to the admissibility of the evidence estublishing
these costs, did not cross-examine Tri County regarding them
and did not present any evidence that questioned the validity
or the reasonableness of these expenditures.
Tn County also established that the District's unconstitu-
tional action deprived it of substantial future lost profits. Its
president, Glenn Selzer, testified that Tri County could have
kept this plant fully operational (processing 75,000 tons of
soil per year) with the contaminated soil that it removes from
its own projects. R. 131-132 (4/15/98). Vincent DiRenzo,
who was recognized without objection as an expert in the
field of remediation of soil with petroleum content (J.A. 60),
stated that there was sufficient contaminated soil available in
the Washington area so that Tri County could have treated
75,000 tons per year from 1994 through 2000. J.A. 62-63.
He also testified to the market rate for decontamination of
such soil during this same seven-year period. J.A. 62. The
District presented no evidence refuting these opinions.°*
Dr. Joel Morse, a financial economist from the University
of Baltimore, was recognized without objection as an expert
in his field. J.A. 66. Dr. Morse computed projected revenues
for the Tri County facility from 1994 through 2000 based
upon the market rates provided by DiRenzo and the antici-
pated operating costs of the plant. J.A. 67, 139-142, R. 262-
263 (4/15/98). The operating costs of the facility were based
upon the detailed sworn testimony of six other Tri County
witnesses. After adjusting for inflation and present value, Dr.
> In its brief, the District quotes extensively from DiRenzo’s
written report of March 24, 1995, regarding reduced soil prices and
a facility in another city that went out of business. Pet. Br. 7-8.
The District itself objected to this report and it was not admitted
into evidence. R. 244 (4/15/98). During DiRenzo’s testimony,
moreover, the District did not question DiRenzo regarding soil
prices or the closed competitor and it did not raise such issues to
the jury in closing argument.
,
Morse testified that the total lost profits for 1994 through
2000 amounted to $11,628,174. J.A. 66, 67, 139-142. The
District of Columbia did not object to any of this testimony
by Dr. Morse.
The District of Columbia presented no evidence during trial
indicating that Dr. Morse’s method of valuation was im-
proper or unreliable. The District also produced no evidence
to refute any of the revenue or cost figures that appeared in
Dr. Morse’s report.° The District never suggested that there
were costs associated with this project that were omitted
from Dr. Morse’s report. The District produced no witnesses
to challenge Dr. Morse’s opinion of lost profits of
$11,628,174 by stating that the figure was either too high or
too speculative.
The District did present three defenses to Tri County’s
claim during trial. First, it argued that Tri County failed to
mitigate its damages by not appealing the unconstitutional
suspension of its permit. R. 329-330 (4/16/98). Tm County
presented testimony that pursuing an administrative appeal
was not reasonable in view of the length of time involved (8
to 12 months) (J.A. 54) and the additional costs of approxi-
mately $1 million that it would have incurred to keep the
project viable during the appeal process. J.A. 47-48. There
was also testimony from Cross that the Board of Appeals and
® In a belated effort to discredit Dr. Morse’s opinions, the
District mistakenly asserts that the five employees assigned to the
plant would each work 75 hours per week. Pet. Br. 9. This was an
argument that was initially raised before the D.C. Circuit rather
than at tral. D.C. Cir. No. 99-7028, Appellee’s Brief, 11. Tn
County stated that this contention had been waived. /d., Reply
Brief, 5, 18. It also responded to the argument by noting that the
facility would normally require three persons to operate it.
J.A. 57. Five persons were projected as employees so that the
additional half shift would be covered without the need for
overtime. Dr. Morse’s report reflects this fact since the laborers’
salaries are based on a 40 hour work week. J.A. 141. See D.C.
Cir. No. 99-7028, Reply Brief, 5, 18.
8
Review, which would have jurisdiction over the appeal, was
politically motivated and would act at the direction of the
Mayor and Chief of Staff, who were opposed to the con-
tinuation of the project. J.A. 53-54, 89-92.
The District also asserted a claim of mootness. R. 473-474
(4/16/98). It alleged that Tri County’s building permit was
automatically suspended when the company failed to appear
for a hearing on October 13, 1993, at the Office of Adjudica-
tion. Such hearing had been scheduled to consider the
validity of a notice of infraction given to Tn County follow-
ing an inspector’s site visit on September 2, 1993. J.A. 85-
86, 88. The infraction notice was for operating a soil reme-
diation business without a certificate of occupancy. J.A. 81.
A stop work order for the same violation had also been
posted by the District on the property on September 22,
1993. J.A. 83-84. Tri County established that it could have
removed the suspension and the stop work order at its
discretion simply by paying the fine of $1,525 and by taking
away the soil in the warehouse or by obtaining its certificate
of occupancy.’ J.A. 82, 85, 87-89. Tri County believed that
the unconstitutional suspension of September 20, 1993, was
the major roadblock to the continuation of the project. J.A.
46-47. Until this suspension was lifted, there was no need
for Tri County to resolve the stop work order or the Octo-
ber 13, 1993 suspension. J.A. 46-47.
The District’s third defense involved the alleged health and
safety risks associated with Tri County’s project. J.A. 72-73.
In its opening statement, the District described these pro-
ceedings as “a case in which a community .. . stood up and
opposed a project which they felt was detrimental to the
health, safety and welfare of the community.” R. 69
(4/14/98). The District questioned one of Tri County’s
? According to the District's own witnesses, a certificate of
occupancy was relatively easy to obtain. It would be issued
following an inspection to verify that the construction work had
been performed in accordance with approved plans and specifica-
tions. J.A. 81-83.
9
witnesses about “health risks associated with the handling
and processing of contaminated soil....” R. 214-215
(4/15/98). Tm County objected to the prejudicial aspect of
this issue. J.A. 72 and R. 383 (4/16/98). The trial court
agreed and advised the District that “you’re fighting the last
war. Those issues were decided once by the District of
Columbia .... When they granted the building permit.” R.
311-312 (4/15/98), 387, 392 (4/16/98). The court informed
the District that “it is conceivable that after hearing the
testimony of a witness expressing generalized health and
safety concerns .. . I will. . . strike it.” J.A. 76. The district
court told the District that it had to establish, in addition to
health or safety concerns, the existence of a legal mechanism
that would have permitted it to stop this project.* J.A. 76-77.
Despite the tral court’s admonition, the District continued
to produce witnesses and exhibits which raised only concerns
regarding the safety of the project. The trial court continued
to ask the District if it could identify “a legal vehicle in
which the community concerns could properly have been
considered.” R. 384-387 (4/16/98). When it became appar-
ent that such evidence would not be produced, the trial court
stated that “{w)hat is still not in the case is ... that the
District of Columbia on health and safety grounds would
have ultimately refused permission of this plant to go for-
ward.” R. 474 (4/16/98). The trial court then excluded the
District’s prior testimony regarding the health and safety
effects of the project by concluding that such issues had been
fully considered and resolved by the permitting process. J.A.
123.
The district court also struck a post-suspension letter dated
October 15, 1993, from DCRA to Tri County seeking further
information regarding this project. J.A. 145. DCRA em-
ployee Sweeney admitted that the information requested in
the October 15, 1993 letter would normally have been
considered by DCRA during its review of the building permit
* The trial court also believed that community opposition alone
would not be sufficient to close the project. R. 392 (4/16/98).
10
application. J.A. 98. Sweeney, however, never asked
anyone in DCRA if they had this information before sending
this letter to Tri County. J.A. 98-99. Tn County did not
respond to this letter since it had already furnished this
information. J.A. 50-51. The District was unable to estab-
lish any legal authority allowing this request for further
information. J.A. 103, 105, 115. See also J.A. 20. The
October 15, 1993 correspondence was followed by another
letter on December 6, 1993. J.A. 148. This second letter
notified Tri County that the failure to respond to the Octo-
ber 15, 1993 letter “constitutes grounds for disapproval of the
project.” J.A. 149. It also referred to “likely significant
adverse environmental impacts on nearby homes” that had
not been established by any evidence. J.A. 149. The district
court excluded both letters as prejudicial since they pur-
ported to suspend Tri County’s permit for not responding to a
letter that had no legal basis for being sent as well as the
unsupported reference to “likely significant adverse envi-
ronmental impacts on nearby homes.” J.A. 119. °
° Three other new factual issues were raised for the first time
during the D.C. Circuit appeal by the District. The first involved
DiRenzo’s estimate of trucking costs. The only evidence during
trial regarding trucking costs was Selzer’s testimony of $1.00 per
ton. J.A. 42. The District never challenged the reasonableness of
this rate during tnal. The higher rate in DiRenzo’s report was
never entered in evidence nor referred to by the District during
trial. The District then mentions that the Carter report assumes a
production rate of 20 tons per hour, when in fact the plant can treat
at least 25 tons of soil per hour. Pet. Br. 9-10. The report used the
lower rate as an average in order to reflect 75,000 tons of soil
being treated annually. Lodging 17. Lastly, the District refers to
the fact that Tn County paid $17.50 per ton to have the soil
delivered to the Bryant Street warehouse. This price seems to
conflict with Selzer’s estimated trucking costs of $1.00 per ton.
Tri County argued to the D.C. Circuit that since the District did not
raise this issue at tnal the matter had been waived based upon
National Federation of Federal Employees v. Greenberg, 983 F.2d
286, 288-289 (D.C. Cir. 1993), and Synovus Financial Corp. v.
Board of Governors, 952 F.2d 426, 431 (D.C. Cir. 1991). See
11
The distnct court informed the jury that there were four
issues in this case: the alleged failure to mitigate damages;
the amount spent by Tri County on this project in reliance on
its building permit; the amount of lost profits that Tn County
sustained; and whether Tri County’s claim was moot as a
result of the stop work order. J.A. 123-124. The instructions
on lost profits were detailed. J.A. 124-125. The jury was
instructed that in computing lost profits, it could “consider
the uncertainty which makes the success of a new business
problematical” as well as “the success or failure of other like
businesses.” J.A. 125.
The jury deliberated and awarded Tri County $5 million in
compensatory damages. Pet. App. 11. In reaching this
decision, the jury necessarily rejected the District’s factual
defenses of mitigation and mootness.
Ill. POST TRIAL MOTIONS.
The District filed a “Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding
the Verdict or, in the Alternative, for a New Tnal” and
asserted its defenses of mootness, failure to mitigate and the
speculative nature of Tri County’s damages. The Rule 50
motion was denied, but the district court granted a new tnal
unless Tri County accepted a remittitur of $1 million. Pet.
App. 12, 14. Tr County rejected the remittitur.
The Memorandum Order granting the new tnal was brief
and centered on four issues. Specifically, the district court
concluded that: Tri County was unreasonable as a matter of
law in not appealing the unlawful suspension of its building
permit; its lost profit claim was speculative; the jury verdict
for lost profits was grossly excessive and shocked the con-
science of the court; and the district court erred in its exclu-
sion of evidence of the likely course of future community
D.C. Cir. No. 99-7028, Reply Brief, 17. It also argued that if such
evidence had been presented at trial, there would have been
testimony that the $17.50 per ton charge included not only trans-
portation but also excavation and purchase of backfill. /d. at 5 n.3.
12
resistance and regulatory activities with respect to the reme-
diation facility. Pet. App. 12-14.
IV. THE SECOND TRIAL.
The second trial resulted in a verdict of only nominal dam-
ages to Tri County due to erroneous and prejudicial eviden-
tiary rulings. Such rulings were part of the appeal noted by
Tri County, but were not considered by the D.C. Circuit since
it reinstated the original jury verdict on the ground that the
district court abused its discretion in granting a new trial.
V. THE D.C. CIRCUIT’S DECISION.
A panel of the D.C. Circuit, consisting of Chief Judge
Edwards and Circuit Judges Silberman and Henderson,
“review[ed] the district court’s grant of a new trial for abuse
of discretion.” Pet. App. 5. See also id. at 7, 10. The Court
ruled that a more searching inquiry is required when the
district court grants a new trial due to the concern that the
district court’s granting of a new trial might “encroach on the
jury’s fact-finding function.” Pet. App. 5. The D.C. Circuit
concluded that the district court “did abuse its discretion,”
reversed the district court’s order that granted a new trial and
reinstated the $5 million jury verdict. Pet. App. 10.
The D.C. Circuit rejected the district court’s conclusion
that Tri County failed to mitigate its damages when it did not
seck reinstatement of its suspended building permit. Pet.
App. 6-7. In view of Tri County’s explanation that the Board
of Appeals and Review was politically motivated and that an
appeal was too slow and costly, the court held that the
evidence presented an issue for the jury concerning “what
action was reasonable under the circumstances.” Pet. App. 6.
The D.C. Circuit concluded that the district court abused its
discretion in taking the issue of mitigation of damages away
from the jury and deciding it as a matter of law.
The D.C. Circuit also disagreed with the trial court’s ruling
that as a matter of law Tri County’s evidence of lost profits
was too speculative and remote. The appellate court, citing
Supreme Court precedent, stated that proof of damages may
——- - oe ee
13
be based on a reasonable estimate when the defendant has
prevented the ascertainment of the amount of damages with
certainty. Pet. App. 8. The D.C. Circuit examined the
testimony of eight witnesses produced by Tri County and
noted that “[t}heir respective opinions were left largely
unchallenged by the District.” Pet App. 8. It held that Tri
County’s estimates of loss were “sufficiently well-founded to
avoid characterization as ‘mere speculation or guess.’ Pet.
App. 9.
The D.C. Circuit then rejected the district court’s legal
conclusion that the jury award was excessive. The test to be
applied was whether the award was “within the ‘reasonable
range within which the jury may properly operate.’ Pet.
App. 9. The D.C. Circuit stated that Tri County presented
evidence of costs totaling $536,421 and lost profits of
$11,628,174. Pet. App. 9. Since the jury award was less
than half of the amount proven at trial, it was within the
range of the evidence and should not have been characterized
as excessive.
Finally, the D.C. Circuit addressed the trial court’s state-
ment that it had erred by not allowing the District to prove
the “very real likelihood that the District of Columbia would
have closed down the remediation facility ... or that it never
would have been permitted to commence operations at all.”
Pet. App. 9. The D.C. Circuit disagreed with this erroneous
legal conclusion of the district court that was unsupported by
the record and placed the blame for lack of such proof
squarely on the District. It stated that:
Despite its reliance on this argument, the District
never met the tnal court’s repeated injunction to
show how the health and safety issue would have
triggered additional regulatory procedures or other-
wise allowed the District to rescind its earlier ap-
proval. See J.A. 172; see also id. at 168-69, 172-75,
186-87. In short, the District failed to show that
conimunity concern would be brought to bear on Tri
County’s operation, specifically through the regu-
latory process. Pet. App. 10.
14
As a result, the district court’s decision during trial to strike
testimony regarding safety concerns over Tri County’s
project was not an abuse of discretion because, in addition to
being unfairly prejudicial, such issues had already been
considered and resolved by the District during the permitting
process. Pet. App. 10.
The District then filed a petition for rehearing and, in the
alternative, for rehearing en banc. It argued for the first time
that by conducting a more searching inquiry, the D.C. Circuit
applied an overly restrictive standard of review. Both
petitions were denied by the D.C. Circuit without explana-
tion. Pet. App. 16-17.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The D.C. Circuit has never explained the meaning or effect
of conducting a more searching inquiry. The District is
unable to establish that this phrase affected the abuse of
discretion standard of appellate review, although it had the
opportunity to raise this issue with the D.C. Circuit. The writ
of certiorari should be dismissed as improvidently granted in
view of the uncertainty surrounding a “more searching
inquiry.”
A more searching inquiry does not have any substantive
connotations. It only indicates that the D.C. Circuit con-
ducted a more searching review of the record due to the
conflict between the views of the judge and the jury. Such
additional review is necessary to make certain that a party
has not been deprived of its right to a jury trial.
Even if a more searching inquiry constituted a stricter
abuse of discretion standard of review, such action was
appropriate. The jury’s examination of the facts was entitled
to greater deference than the trial judge’s review of the
evidence. Such greater deference is afforded by a stricter
abuse of discretion standard.
Further, the errors committed by the district court were
legal in nature. Such erroneous rulings constituted abuse of
discretion. Regardless of whether a more searching inquiry
15
was conducted, the D.C. Circuit was correct in reversing the
district court’s grant of a new trial under an ordinary abuse of
discretion standard.
Lastly, if this Court determines that the D.C. Circuit did
apply the wrong standard of review, the case should be
remanded for reconsideration especially because the D.C.
Circuit never reviewed Tri County’s objections to the second
trial.
ARGUMENT
I. DUE TO THE DISTRICT’S FAILURE TO TIMELY
RAISE THIS ISSUE, THE D.C. CIRCUIT HAS
NEVER EXPLAINED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF
CONDUCTING A MORE SEARCHING INQUIRY.
Although the District had every opportunity below to chal-
lenge the use of a “more searching inquiry,” it failed to do so
until after the court of appeals had issued its opinion. As a
result, the D.C. Circuit had no occasion to identify or defend
the basis for engaging in such an inquiry, explain what it
meant by this phrase, or demonstrate the effect, if any, the
inquiry had on its decision. Instead, it simply alluded to a
“more searching inquiry” while recognizing abuse of discre-
tion as the standard, and gave no indication of how it applied
a more searching inquiry.
This case, therefore, presents a poor vehicle for the Court
to consider the validity of the “more searching inquiry”
approach. In similar circumstances where the Court is left
with insufficient information to evaluate the meaning and
effect of the decision below, the Court has found it advisable
to dismiss the writ as improvidently granted. See City of
Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257, 258-259 (1987) (writ
dismissed as improvidently granted where question presented
was whether municipality could be held liable for inadequate
training of employees under negligence standard, but City
did not object to jury instruction that negligence would
suffice); New York v. Uplinger, 467 U.S. 246, 248 (1984)
(dismissing the writ because “the opinion of the Court of
16
Appeals is fairly subject to varying interpretations”);
McClanahan v. Morauer & Hartzell, Inc., 404 U.S. 16, 16
(1971) (dismissing the writ since “the record does not
adequately present” the question on which certiorari was
granted). This disposition is particularly appropriate where,
as here, the petitioners’ failure to join issue below is the
cause of the inadequacy of the record. Accordingly, for the
reasons explained below, we respectfully submit that the writ
should be dismissed as imiprovidently granted.
The standard of review to be applied by an appellate court
when a district court has granted a new trial is abuse of
discretion. See Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal,
Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 279 (1989); Allied Chem. Corp. v.
Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36-37 n.3 (1980). The D.C.
Circuit expressly applied this standard when it reviewed and
set aside the district court’s grant of a new tnal. It stated on
three occasions in its opinion that it reviewed the lower
court’s decision to award a new trial for an abuse of discre-
tion. Pet. App. 5, 7, 11. While it indicated that in the
circumstances of this case it conducted a more searching
inquiry as part of its abuse of discretion review, nothing in its
opinion gives any indication that the court below ever
wavered from an abuse of discretion standard in this case.
On this record, the District itself is left at something of a
loss to explain how a more searching inquiry might have
been different—let alone erroneously so—from the abuse of
discretion review it claims was not conducted.'® On the one
'0 Without textual support for this contention in the D.C. Cir-
cuit’s opinion, the District is forced to rely on several lines from
the transcript of the oral argument in which one of the judges says
there was a rather restrictive standard for taking away a jury
verdict-and ordering a new 4rial according to McNeal v. Hi-Lo
Powered Scaffolding, Inc,, 836 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Pet. 22,
n.11. Even assuming that this statement refers to the standard of
review used by the appellate court, it is the written opinion that is
the final expression of the D.C. Circuit’s position. The opinion
acknowledges that abuse of discretion is the appropriate standard
of appellate review and does not suggest that a harsher abuse of
17
hand, the District continues to recognize that “the D.C.
Circuit ruled that the district court had abused its discretion
in granting a new trial.” Pet. Br. 20 (emphasis added). At
the other extreme, the District contends that the court of
appeals adopted a “strict scrutiny standard,” and used a
“strict scrutiny approach.” /d. at 42. It contends, without
express support in the D.C. Circuit’s opinion, that the court
gave “no deference” to the trial court, id. at 43, and took it
upon itself to “substitute its judgment” for the trial judge’s.
Id. While the District no doubt believes that the D.C. Circuit
overstepped it bounds in this manner, this charge could be
leveled by any party when a decision in its favor is reversed
under an abuse of discretion standard. The District’s char-
acterization of the D.C. Circuit’s action does not establish
the metes and bounds of any “more searching inquiry” or that
such an inquiry made a difference in this case.
The simple fact is that the D.C. Circuit’s opinion states
only that it is applying abuse of discretion review and that it
is conducting a more searching inquiry under that review
because of the Seventh Amendment interests at stake. It
provides no guidance on how this inquiry is applied, how it
affects the abuse of discretion review, and how it might have
made a difference in this case. There is no suggestion in the
D.C. Circuit’s opinion that the more searching inquiry was
outcome determinative. Thus, both parties as well as the
Court are in a poor position to evaluate the propriety of a
“more searching inquiry.”
On the record of this case, it is hardly surprising that the
D.C. Circuit saw no need to defend or explain the “more
searching inquiry,” because no party objected to the use of
discretion standard of review was employed. The quotation also is
not as supportive as the District contends. While counsel for the
District was referring to the standard of appellate review, it appears
that the D.C. Circuit was referring to the standard that the trial
court had to apply to set aside the jury verdict. These are two
separate issues and it seems that the parties were talking at cross-
purposes.
18
such an inquiry. Specifically, while it was on notice that a
“more searching inquiry” might be used and had ample
opportunity to object, the District did not present to the court
below any challenge to the use of that inquiry. It is therefore
hardly in a position to challenge that inquiry now, particu-
larly where its own acquiescence has resulted in the lack of
clarity present here.
When Tri County filed its brief with the D.C. Circuit, it
clearly specified that abuse of discretion was the standard of
review applicable to this case. In the very first paragraph of
the Argument section of its brief—captioned “A. THE
FIRST TRIAL-STANDARD OF REVIEW”—Tri County
stated that “The trial court’s decision to grant a new trial will
be given close scrutiny in order to protect the litigant’s nght
to a jury tral.” D.C. Cir. No. 99-7028, Appellant’s Brief at
30. Tri County cited McNeal v. Hi-Lo Powered Scaffolding,
Inc., supra, aS supporting authority for this approach.
McNeal states that the granting of a new tral will be re-
viewed for abuse of discretion, and that “a more searching
inquiry is required to prevent the trial court from ‘en-
croach[ing] on the jury’s important fact-finding function.’ ”
Id. at 646 (citation omitted). Tri County then asserted that
abuse of discretion occurs when the district court applies the
wrong legal standard or relies on clearly erroneous facts. It
proceeded to identify four instances in which the trial court
abused its discretion by granting a new trial. At this point,
the District was on notice that Tri County wished the D.C.
Circuit to conduct “a more searching inquiry” of the record
and to conclude that the lower court had abused its discretion
in granting a new trial.
In its brief, the District conceded that an abuse of discretion
standard applied. D.C. Cir. No. 99-7028, Appellees’ Brief at
22. It was, however, completely silent on the appropriateness
of a more searching inquiry by the D.C. Circuit. This was
the time to state any objection to the use of a more searching
inquiry. Given that the “more searching inquiry” standard is
the sole basis on which the District petitioned this Court for a
writ of certiorari, it is all the more remarkable that the
19
District failed to object to the D.C. Circuit’s well established
rule. This may very well be because the District recognized
that the inquiry suggested by Tn County did not substan-
tively affect or modify the abuse of discretion standard of
appellate review. Of course, had the District genuinely
considered the inquiry to result in a different standard of
review, as it now contends, then its silence waives its nght to
press that issue further.'' Whatever the reason for the
District's acquiescence, its silence deprived the court of
appeals of an opportunity to defend the standard or even to
articulate what the standard meant, which in turn, inhibits
this Court from meaningfully reviewing the question on
which certiorari was granted.
The District admits that, to the extent that the D. C. Circuit
used a stricter standard, it was made aware of that fact at oral
argument in the court of appeals. It concedes that “[{a]t oral
argument, in a colloquy with counsel for the District, the
D.C. Circuit underscored the importance of its close appellate
scrutiny standard derived from its decision in McNeal v. Hi-
Lo.” Pet. 22,n.11. Shortly after oral argument and before an
opinion was issued, the District wrote two letters to the D.C.
Circuit in an effort to supplement its argument. J.A. 7,
docket entries 11/18/99 & 11/23/99. Neither letter men-
tioned whether conducting a more searching inquiry affected
appellate review for abuse of discretion or objected to such
an inquiry.
Not surprisingly, the opinion rendered by the D.C. Circuit
adopted the uncontested standard of review that was sug-
gested by the parties: the district court’s grant of a new tnal
was reviewed for abuse of discretion and a more searching
inquiry was conducted. Pet. App. 5.
'! Rule 28(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
required the District to set forth its own statement of the applicable
standard of review if it was dissatisfied with Tri County’s state-
ment.
_
20
The District responded to this unfavorable decision with a
petition for rehearing and, in the alternative, for rehearing en
banc. In its petition, the District argued for the very first
time that a more searching inquiry creates a new standard of
appellate review and conflicts with Gasperini v. Center for
Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996). The D.C. Circuit
denied both petitions without explanation and without even
requesting a response from Tri County. See Pet. App. 16-17
and Fed. R. App. P. 40(a)(3).'*
To the extent that the District contends that Gasperini
prohibits an appellate court from conducting a more search-
ing inquiry, it had ample opportunity to assert this argument
in its brief and elsewhere before the D.C. Circuit issued its
opinion. As a result, the D.C. Circuit’s denial of the petition
for rehearing was entirely proper. See Weisgram v. Marley
Co., 528 U.S. 440, 120 S. Ct. 1011, 1021 n.11 (2000) (“Nor
do we foreclose the possibility that a court of appeals might
properly deny a petition for rehearing because it pressed an
argument that plainly could have been formu!ated in a party’s
brief.”’)
Because the District failed to question the suitability or
meaning of a more searching inquiry, the D.C. Circuit has
never been given the opportunity to discuss the overall effect
that this phrase had on its opinion. The District does not
know if the D.C. Circuit placed any substantive connotations
'2 There is no way of knowing whether the D.C. Circuit thought
the District's argument was waived, meritless or immaterial. In
prior decisions, the court of appeals has refused to consider issues
not raised or discussed by the parties in their initial bnefs. See
Grant v. United States Air Force, 197 F.3d 539, 542 n.6 (D.C. Cir.
1999); Doolin Sec. Sav. Bank v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 156
F.3d 190, 191 (D.C. Cir. 1998); McBride v. Merrell Dow &
Pharms., Inc., 800 F.2d 1208, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1986); United States
v. Byers, 740 F.2d 1104, 1115-16 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (claim
raised for the first time in a petition for rehearing will not be
considered unless there has been a supervening change of fact or
law); Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
21
on a “more searching inquiry.” As a result of the District’s
failure to join issue below, it was not explained in the D.C.
Circuit decision and the parties and this Court are now left to
speculate on the meaning and effect of a more searching
inquiry on the decision of the D.C. Circuit. In these circum-
stances, the issue should not be reviewed by this Court. See
Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 538 (1992) (“Pru-
dence also dictates awaiting a case in which the issue was
fully litigated below, so that we will have the benefit of
developed arguments on both sides and lower court opinions
squarely addressing the question.”) (citing Lytle v. Household
Mfg.. Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 552 n.3 (1990)); Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 379 n.5 (1996); Grupo
Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc.,
527 U.S. 308, 318 n.3 (1999); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452,
464 (1997); EEOC vy. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 476
U.S. 19, 24 (1986) (“Our normal practice ... is to refrain
from addressing issues not raised in the Court of Appeals.”);
FTC v. Grolier, Inc., 462 U.S. 19, 23 n.6 (1983); Adickes v.
S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 147 n.2 (1970).
II. THE MORE SEARCHING INQUIRY CON-
DUCTED BY THE D.C. CIRCUIT DID NOT AF-
FECT THE VALIDITY OF ITS DECISION.
The District devotes a significant portion of its brief to an
historical analysis of the district court’s ability to grant a new
trial. Pet. Br. 29-40. Tri County does not disagree that a new
trial could be granted either in the Eighteenth Century or at
the present time when the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence or if the damages awarded were excessive.'?
However, the trial court's ability to order a new trial does not
imply that an appellate court is prohibited from reviewing its
decision for abuse of discretion or from conducting a more
'3 The District also states that the trial court at common law had
discretion to grant another trial “on evidentiary grounds” (Pet. Br.
at 35-36) or if it “unwisely excluded evidence from the jury's
consideration,” Pet. Br. at 29, but the authorities cited in the
District's brief do not support these assertions.
22
searching inquiry, which are the issues involved in this case.
The historical authorities cited by the District for the propo-
sition that “a district court judge has broad discretion to order
new jury trials for a variety of reasons” (Pet. Br. 29) do not
address this question. Indeed, as the Court itself recognized
in Gasperini—at least in the context of denials of new trial
motions-— there was apparently no opportunity for appellate
review at common law. See 518 U.S. at 434; id. at 443
(Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 452-454 & n.3 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Thus, other than establishing the undisputed
point that tral courts have, historically and to the present,
enjoyed discretion to award new trials for a variety of rea-
sons, the District’s extended historical discussion is largely
beside the point.
What is at issue in this case is the propriety of the D.C.
Circuit’s “more searching inquiry.” As we have explained,
evaluation of that question is made difficult by the court’s
failure to explain what that inquiry involved and how it
affected its analysis and decision. In the absence of specific
guidance from the D.C. Circuit, however, we can discern two
possible meanings of the more searching inquiry. The D.C.
Circuit could have intended this type of inquiry to be a means
of looking more closely than it otherwise would have to
determine whether the district court abused its discretion.
That the court was engaged in this “closer look” inquiry is
supported by both the “more searching” language the court
used and its continued reliance on an abuse of discretion
standard of review. Alternatively, the D.C. Circuit may have
intended its more searching inquiry to involve a more exact-
ing application of an abuse of discretion standard—in effect
changing the standard of review—due to Seventh Amend-
ment considerations. While we see no support in the court’s
opinion for concluding that it changed the standard of
review—as opposed to taking a closer look for abuse of
discretion—it is such a change that the District attacks here.
In any event, for the reasons explained below, either ap-
proach is permissible.
23
A. A More Searching Inquiry May Signify A Closer
Review Of The Issues In The Case To Determine
Whether The District Court Abused Its Discretion.
The more searching inquiry approach originated from Lind
v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 278 F.2d 79 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 835 (1960), and has been consistently recognized
by the D.C. Circuit since that time.'* It has also been fol-
lowed by the Third, Fifth and Sixth Circuits.'>
In this case, the D.C. Circuit’s opinion significantly did not
identify this more searching inquiry as a modification of the
applicable abuse of discretion standard of review. Nor do
any of the prior D.C. Circuit cases that employed a more
searching inquiry ever state that under such an inquiry the
abuse of discretion standard of review was modified or
applied more strictly. Thus, the court’s articulation of such
an inquiry might suggest only that the appellate court will
'4 See Taylor v. Washington Terminal Co., 409 F.2d 145, (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 835 (1969); Vander Zee v. Karabat-
sos, 589 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 962
(1979); Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985); McNeal v. Hi-Lo Powered Scaf-
folding, Inc., 836 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Hutchinson v.
Stuckey, 952 F.2d 1418 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Langevine v. District of
Columbia, 106 F.3d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
'S Wilburn v. Maritrans GP, Inc., 139 F.3d 350, 363 (3d Cir.
1998) (reviewing court exercises “closer degree of scrutiny when
the district court grants a motion for new trial because it believes
the jury’s verdict is against the weight of the evidence.”); Massey
v. Gulf Oil Corp., 508 F.2d 92, 95 (Sth Cur.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
838 (1975); Carson v. Polley, 689 F.2d 562, 570 (Sth Cir. 1982)
(“Our review of a district court’s decision to grant a new trial is
broader than our review of a district court’s denied of a new tnal,
but the standard remains one of abuse of discretion.”); Holmes v.
City of Massillon, 78 F.3d 1041, 1047 (6th Cir.) (reviewing court
must “closely scrutinize” decision to grant new trial on grounds
that verdict was against the weight of the evidence), cert. denied,
519 U.S. 935 (1996).
24
consider more closely and in greater detail the record and the
issues due to the conflict between the judge and the jury’s
perception of the case. When a new triai has been granted,
an appellate court may have to review questions of whether
damages were excessive or whether the verdict was against
the weight of the evidence presented. Such review becomes
more involved and difficult because of a conflict between the
judge and the jury in their view of the case. The appellate
court owes deference to the decisions of both the judge and
the jury and must resolve this conflict by analyzing the trial
more carefully. This necessarily results in a more detailed
investigation than when a motion for new trial is denied. In
the latter situation, both the judge and the jury have agreed
on a particular result and the appellate review becomes more
limited due to the considerable deference owed to both the
judge and the jury. See Grogan v. General Maint. Serv. Co.,
763 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
This distinction does not imply that appellate review of
cases involving denials of new trial motions is perfunctory.
“[A] decision calling for the exercise of judicial discretion
‘hardly means that it is unfettered by meaningful standards or
shielded from thorough appellate review.’ United States v.
Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 336 (1988) (emphasis supplied)
(quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 416
(1975)). See also Grunenthal v. Long Island R.R. Co., 393
U.S. 156 (1968), in which a judge’s denial of a new trial
motion on grounds of excessiveness was to be reviewed for
abuse of discretion. In applying this standard, the court of
appeals was required to make a “detailed appraisal of the
evidence bearing on damages.” /d. at 156. However, when a
new trial is denied, the appellate court’s analysis of the trial
is aided by the lack of disagreement between the judge and
the jury, both of which are entitled to deference by the
appellate court. When a new trial has been granted and there
is conflict between the judge and the jury, additional appel-
late scrutiny is required.
A more searching inquiry such as this is appropriate when
the trial court sets aside a jury verdict and grants a new tral
25
because the right to a jury trial has been affected. In Dimick
v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935), which held that the trial
judge’s increase of a jury award of damages violated the Re-
examination Clause of the Seventh Amendment, the Court
stated that “Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is
of such importance and occupies so firm a place in our
history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the
right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost
care.” See also Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local
No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 (1990); Foust v. Munson
S.S. Lines, 299 U.S. 77, 84 (1936); Parsons v. Bedford, 28
U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446 (1830) (Story, J.) (“The trial by jury is
justly dear to the American people. It has always been an
object of deep interest and solicitude, and every encroach-
ment upon it has been watched with great jealousy.”).
The D.C. Circuit’s approach of conducting a more search-
ing inquiry to determine if a trial judge has abused his
discretion in setting aside a jury verdict is probably related
only to the need to resolve the conflict between the jury and
the trial judge rather than to the standard of review. Such
closer review is entirely consistent with this Court’s directive
in Dimick. It would reflect a consideration of the nght of the
jury to assess damages, the discretion that the tral judge has
in certain instances to set aside a jury verdict and the re-
quirement of legally sufficient grounds for its nullification by
the district court. It would not result in the modification of
the abuse of discretion standard of review.
As we understand the District’s position, it is not objecting
if this is the interpretation that the D.C. Circuit applied to a
more searching inquiry. Rep. Pet. 1. The District is seeking
abuse of discretion review and received it under this con-
struction of the phrase.
26
B. A More Searching Inquiry May Also Signify That
The Abuse Of Discretion Standard Was Applied
More Exactingly Due To Seventh Amendment Con-
siderations.
By conducting a more searching inquiry, the D.C. Circuit
may have signified that it was applying an abuse of discretion
standard more strictly. While this interpretation—-i.e., that
the range of a trial court’s discretion is narrowed——is not in
our view apparent from the D.C. Circuit’s opinion or its
earlier decisions, it is nevertheless a conceivable explanation
of the effect of conducting a more searching inquiry. It is, in
any event, the possibility of a more searching standard of
review that animates the District’s case in this Court. Even if
such an interpretation were supported, however, it would not
be an erroneous standard of appellate review.
In Taylor v. Washington Terminal Co., 409 F.2d at 148, the
court stated that “In this jurisdiction particularly, District
Court judges have given great weight to jury verdicts.” The
court noted that in jury trials, deference is due to the trial
judge who personally observes the witnesses and considers
the evidence. “But against his judgment, we must consider
that the agency to whom the Constitution allocates the fact-
finding function in the first instance—the jury—has evalu-
ated the facts differently.” /d. Even if one assumes that the
D.C. Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision under a
heightened abuse of discretion standard, it was fully justified
in order to protect this constitutional night.
In the context of this case, greater deference because of
Seventh Amendment concerns must be given to the jury
rather than to the trial judge. As the D.C. Circuit has stated,
“where ... it is clear that the jury has stayed within the
reasonable range, the deference due its findings of fact
outweighs the deference due the trial judge’s first hand
review of the evidence.” /d. at 149. The jury has been given
the primary and constitutional responsibility to weigh the
evidence, assess credibility and determine the amount of
damages. Any interference with this right to have the jury
determine the facts by the granting of a new tnal can be
—— _——- =
27
reviewed under a stricter abuse of discretion standard. This
approach recognizes that when the jury is properly perform-
ing its constitutionally assigned function, the trial judge may
not intervene into the area of fact finding. Dimick very
clearly prohibits such curtailment of the jury’s delegated
powers. By applying the abuse of discretion standard more
strictly when a new trial has been granted, an appellate court
is indicating that it is extending greater deference to the
jury’s determination of the facts, rather than to the trial judge.
The District’s reliance on Gasperini in support of its con-
trary argument is also misplaced. There, this Court held for
the first time that a federal appellate court could review a
trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial based on an
allegedly excessive jury verdict. Most circuit courts of
appeal had already been reviewing the denial of new trial
motions based on a claim of an excessive jury verdict.'© One
of the issues considered in Gasperini was whether any such
appellate review was consistent with the Seventh Amend-
ment. The Court’s recognition that some appellate review is
available and its endorsement of an abuse of discretion
standard when the jury’s verdict is not thrown out plainly do
not foreclose the use of a stricter abuse of discretion standard
where the trial court rejects the jury’s conclusion.
The District also relies on Medcom Holding Co. v. Baxter
Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 106 F.3d 1388 (7th Cir. 1997),
in an effort to establish that greater deference should not be
accorded to the jury’s findings. In Medcom, the Seventh
Circuit indicated that prior to Gasperini, it applied the abuse
of discretion standard “ ‘somewhat more exacting[ly]’ when
the district court granted a new trial because of Seventh
Amendment considerations.” /d. at 1397 (quoting Superbird
Farms, Inc. v. Perdue Farms, Inc., 970 F.2d 238, 247 (7th
Cir. 1992)). Medcom ended this practice in the Seventh
Circuit and reviewed the district court’s grant of a motion for
new trial on damages “with somewhat more deference to the
'© See 11 Charles Alan Wright, er al., Federal Practice and
Procedure § 2820, at 209 (2d ed. 1995).
28
district court, utilizing an ordinary abuse of discretion
standard.” /d. As we have explained, however, Gasperini
does not address whether an abuse of discretion standard of
review may be applied strictly when new trial motions have
been granted and thus Medcom's supposition that the Sev-
enth Circuit’s more exacting inquiry did not survive Gas-
perini does not follow. Apart from its reference to Gasper-
ini, Medcom fails to set forth any reason for not reviewing a
district court’s grant of a new trial under a stricter abuse of
discretion standard.
The District attacks the possible use of a heightened stan-
dard with the facile contention that the Seventh Amendment
right to a jury trial is not implicated in the least when a jury
verdict is set aside, so long as another jury trial is available.
But unless some deference is afforded to the first jury verdict,
the right to a trial by jury is substantially undercut. Settled
legal principles make clear that the result of a jury trial is to
be protected and that simply granting another trial is not a
panacea for infringement of that right. Thus, for example, it
is well settled that a trial court—while possessing substantial
discretion to grant new trials—-does not possess unfettered
discretion to do so, as it well could if a new jury tnal were a
sufficient protection of any Seventh Amendment interest.
See Lind, 278 F.2d at 88 (“this discretion must still be
exercised in accordance with ascertainable legal standards”).
Thus, while the District cites Blackstone for the proposition
that a second trial yields a more correct result since counsel
and the judge are better informed and prepared, Pet. Br. 32-
33, Blackstone also indicates that a second jury trial was not
always available at the discretion of the court:
Sufficient grounds must be shown to satisfy them,
that it is necessary to justice that the cause should
be further considered .... Nor do the courts lend
too easy an ear to every application for a review of
the former verdict. They must be satisfied, that
there are strong probable grounds, to suppose that
the merits have not been fairly and fully discussed
— — - -
29
and that the decision is not agreeable to the justice
and truth of the case.
Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Law, 701-02 (Bernard C.
Gavit ed., 1941).
The historical requirement that the original jury verdict not
be set aside without adequate grounds implies that it is more
significant than getting the issue “right” by another trial. If
the focus is only the correctness of the ultimate result, then
no limitations would be imposed on the lower court’s grant
of a new trial. A judge would be able to set aside a jury
verdict whenever he believed in his sole discretion that the
parties could present a more effective case to a second jury.
An initial jury determination would be rendered meaningless
if the trial judge could exercise such authority and control.
Therefore, a trial court’s disagreement with the jury’s ver-
dict quite naturally raises Seventh Amendment concerns
about trampling on the right to a jury tnal—concerns which
are not present when as in Gasperini, the trial court upholds
the jury’s determination and denies a bid for a new tnal. As
this case came to the D.C. Circuit, therefore, there was a
concern that the district court (which had initially thrown out
Tri County’s suit only to be reversed by the court of appeals)
may have infringed Tri County’s constitutional right to trial
by jury. In an effort to make certain that such interference
did not occur, the D.C. Circuit properly employed a “more
searching inquiry.”
Il, THE DISTRICT COURT DID ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT VACATED THE
JURY’S AWARD AND GRANTED A NEW
TRIAL.
In any event, whether a “more searching inquiry” imper-
missibly alters the scope of review under the abuse of discre-
tion standard proves largely academic in this case when both
the scope of that standard and the nature of the decision at
issue are properly understood. This is so because the court of
appeals found that each of the four bases upon which the
30
district court decided to grant a new trial constituted error as
a matter of law.
The District's brief is largely premised on the supposition
that abuse of discretion review is a fixed and definite stan-
dard, describing precisely one and only one type of review.
It has long been understood, however, that-—as Judge Posner
has observed—‘“the words [abuse of discretion] describe a
range of standards ... in which the amount of deference
given the trial judge’s rulings varies with the nature of the
ruling—a range that overlaps clear error, and even error,
period.” Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., 749 F.2d 380,
390 (7th Cir. 1984).'7 See also, e.g., United States v. Criden,
648 F.2d 814, 817 (3d Cir. 1981) (“Although the standard of
review in such instances is generally framed as ‘abuse of
discretion,’ in fact the scope of review will be directly related
to the reason why that category or type of decision is com-
mitted to the trial court’s discretion in the first instance”);
Childress & Davis, Federal Standards of Review § 4.21 at 4-
131 (3d ed. 1999) (abuse of discretion has “sliding contextual
meaning”).
Included in the range of things that might constitute an
abuse of discretion are legal errors. As this Court has con-
sistently observed, “{a] district court by definition abuses its
discretion when it makes an error of law.” Koon v. United
States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996); accord Cooter & Gell v.
Hartmax Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990) (“A district court
would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its ruling on
an erroneous view of the law.”); Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 448
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Indeed, it is a familiar, if somewhat
circular, maxim that deems an error of law an abuse of
discretion.”). Where errors of law are at issue, of course, an
appellate court does not have to defer to the district court’s
resolution, but instead engages in de novo review. Koon, 518
'? Cf Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees’ Pension Trust, 836
F.2d 1048, 1052 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J.) (discussing arbitrary
and capricious standard of review and noting that the standard of
review “may be a range, not a point.”)
31
U.S. at 100; First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514
U.S. 938, 948 (1995); Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499
U.S. 225, 239-240 (1991). Further, “if a district court’s
findings rest on an erroneous view of the law, they may be
set aside on that basis.” Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S.
273, 287 (1982).
Accordingly, where legal errors are at issue, a “more
searching inquiry”—even if otherwise improper by failing to
accord the district court an appropriate amount of defer-
ence—would not be error because review of legal errors is de
novo in any event. In other words, a conclusion that the
district court abused its discretion by committing legal errors
is unaffected by the existence of any “more searching in-
quiry.”” As we demonstrate below, in this case the district
court’s reasons for granting a new trial were wrong as a
matter of law, and therefore there was no error in conducting
a “more searching inquiry” even if such an inquiry were
improper when considering questions of fact or evidentiary
weight that led a district court to throw out a jury’s determi-
nation.
First, the district court committed legal error by concluding
that Tri County’s lost profit claim was barred as a matter of
law. Although the District contended that Tri County failed
to mitigate its damages when it opted not to pursue an
administrative appeal, the D.C. Circuit indicated that a duty
to mitigate is “a question that turns on what action was
reasonable under the circumstances.” Pet. App. 5 (citations
omitted). Even the district court acknowledged in its memo-
randum order that there was a factual dispute involving the
reasonableness of pursuing administrative remedies. The
jury properly considered the evidence produced by Tri
County that an administrative appeal was too costly and that
there were serious questions of the impartiality of the adjudi-
catory board. The jury, after being fully instructed, decided
that the District had not established by a preponderance of
the evidence that Tri County had failed to mitigate its dam-
ages. Pet. App. 12. Accordingly, it was error as a matter of
law for the district court to hold that Tri County was “unrea-
32
sonable per se” in not appealing the suspension. /d. That
ruling constituted an intrusion by the judge into a strictly
factual dispute that the jury had resolved in Tn County’s
favor. As the D.C. Circuit stated, “it [the district court]
abused its discretion in declaring ex post that Tn County's
failure to pursue administrative remedies to reinstate its
permit was per se unreasonable, thereby withdrawing the
mitigation issue from the jury.” Pet. App. 7 (citation omit-
ted).
The cases cited by the District in its brief do not undermine
the D.C. Circuit’s holding. Pet. Br. 48. In Pennzoil Pro-
ducing Co. v. Offshore Exp., Inc., 943 F.2d 1465 (Sth Cir.
1991), the district court, following a non-jury trial, deter-
mined that the plaintiff failed to mitigate its damages when it
did not flare a well and that administrative approval, which
was not pursued, would likely have been granted for such
action.'* The appellate court only held that this factual
finding was not clearly erroneous. In Pennzoil, the trier of
fact merely viewed the evidence regarding the efficacy of an
administrative appeal differently. There was no attempt by
the appellate court to state that administrative appeals must
be pursued in all instances or else a party will have failed to
mitigate its damages as a matter of law.
Similarly, in Tatum v. Morton, 562 F.2d 1279, 1283 (D.C.
Cir. 1977), the Court of Appeals clearly stated that “the
district court’s per se approach—of imposing an absolute
duty to mitigate—was not sound.” The D.C. Circuit consid-
ered the problem to be one of reasonableness. /d. at 1284.
Since Tatum was relied on by the D.C. Circuit in its opinion
as authority for the proposition that mitigation was a jury
'8 In an effort to bolster its argument, the District incorrectly
cites Pennzoil for the proposition that administrative action should
be taken “even if exception would not have been granted.” Pet. Br.
at 48. The district court after trial found just the opposite. The
court of appeals stated “the district court noted that exceptions are
often granted in emergencies and that an exception would likely
have been granted to Pennzoil.” 943 F.2d at 1476.
33
issue (Pet. App. 7), it is odd that the District cites the case as
supporting authority. Nor are the other two cases relied on
by the District apposite. See Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v.
celly, 241 U.S. 485, 489 (1916); Patterson v. Portich, 853
F.2d 1399, 1408 (7th Cir. 1988). Both merely recognize the
unremarkable proposition that a party must exert reasonable
efforts to mitigate damages. They have no bearing on the
appropriateness of deciding this issue as a matter of law.
The second legal error occurred when the district court
concluded that Tri County’s proof of lost profits was “too
speculative and remote and that it failed to meet the required
standard of reasonable certainty.” Pet. App. 13. At trial, Tri
County established that there was a demand for a soil reme-
diation facility in the Washington area, the capacity of its
equipment, the market rate for treating contaminated soil and
the operating costs of its facility.'9 All of this evidence was
admitted without objection by the District, including the
testimony of Dr. Morse that lost profits amounted to
$11,628,174.
Because the District never allowed Tri County to start its
new business, actual income and expense figures were
unavailable. According to Samaritan Inns, Inc. v. District of
Columbia, 114 F.3d 1227, 1234-35 (D.C. Cir. 1997), in this
situation “proof of the amount of damages may be based on a
reasonable estimate.” As the D.C. Circuit observed follow-
ing its discussion of the witnesses and testimony presented
on this issue, “they were sufficiently well-founded to avoid
characterization as ‘mere speculation or guess.” Pet. App. 9
(citation omitted).
The legal error consisted of the district court’s disregard of
the standard applied in the D.C. Circuit for determining
'9 The District’s cross examination of witnesses who testified
regarding operating costs was practically non-existent. Even
though utilities represented approximately 40% of the costs of this
project, the District did not ask a single question of the mechanical
engineer (Carter) who testified to such costs.
34
whether damages are speculative and not reasonably certain.
“I will be enough if the evidence shows the extent of the
damages as a matter of just and reasonable inference, al-
though the result be only approximate.” Samaritan Inns, 114
F.3d at 1235 (citation omitted). As the D.C. Circuit con-
cluded, Tri County’s evidence met this standard. By ruling
as a matter of law that Tri County’s extensive evidence of
damages was speculative, the district court was improperly
resolving the strictly factual dispute of the amount of dam-
ages that had already been considered by the jury, just as it
did on the mitigation issue.
In an effort to label the evidence of lost profits as specula-
tive, the District now resorts to an analysis of the evidence.
Pet. Br. 46-48. It completely ignores the fact that it failed to
object to any of Tri County’s evidence of $12 million in
damages as being speculative in nature. Since the evidence
was admitted it became part of the record to be considered by
the trier of fact. See United States v. Epstein, 608 F.2d 1, 8-9
(D.C. Cir. 1979); Willoughby v. Potomac Elec. Power Co.,
100 F.3d 999, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S.
1197 (1997); Fed. R. Evid. 103(a). The fact that DiRenzo, in
response to a question from the district court, stated that a
Baltimore facility had closed is not particularly probative.
The District introduced no evidence regarding the Baltimore
facility’s operating costs, foreclosing the jury from consid-
ering whether that facility’s failure was simply a function of
a more expensive soil remediation unit, a costlier site loca-
tion, mismanagement, or inability to get sufficient soil from
companies such as Tri County that excavate contaminated
soil.2° These considerations prevent one from drawing the
conclusion as a matter of law that Tri County’s operation
would not have been profitable.
20 The unchallenged testimony at trial was that Tn County, as
part of its normal operations, produced enough contaminated soil
to keep its proposed facility fully operational. Record 131-132
(4/15/98)
35
Similarly, the closure of a Virginia facility because its
permit was withdrawn sheds no light on the question of Tri
County’s profitability. If anything, given the continuing
market for contaminated soil, the closure of two competing
facilities would only benefit Tri County. Lastly, while
DiRenzo testified that market prices had dropped, he stated
without objection that they had leveled off at $32 per ton and
anticipated this rate to be constant from 1997-2000. J.A. 62.
Dr. Morse’s report adjusted the income from the operations
based upon these lower market rate projections. J.A. 139.
These factual issues, none of which the District even ar-
gued to the jury, demonstrate that the question of damages
quite properly belonged to the jury. It was not the type of
issue that the district court could resolve as a matter of law.
The jury evaluated this testimony, comparing it to the
evidence of $12 million in damages from Tri County’s
witnesses and reached a compromise verdict. The mere
existence of a factual dispute over the profitability of a
venture does not render Tri County’s evidence speculative as
a matter of law. While the district court labeled Tri County’s
proof of future profits a “pro-forma statement of income and
expenses” (J.A. 13), there was no evidence that any of the
figures in Dr. Morse’s report were inaccurate or that items of
expense were omitted.
The third legal error committed by the district court in-
volved its description of the portion of the jury award attrib-
utable to lost profits ($4.5 million) as grossly excessive.*'! In
its D.C. Circuit brief, Tri County argucd that the district court
committed legal error by determining, despite the applicable
2! Usually, excessive verdicts occur when a jury is asked to
value intangibles such as pain and suffering and its award is
affected by passion or prejudice. In these situations, the tral
court’s decision to grant a new trial is given deference because it
was in a better position to observe if the jury’s verdict was im-
properly influenced by sympathy or prejudice. The nature of Tn
County’s evidence was different because it established a specific
amount of damages for the jury to consider.
36
legal standard, that the jury’s verdict was excessive and
shocked the conscience of the court. Dc. Cir. No. 99-7028,
Appellant’s brief, 44-45. Even though this argument was
separately identified in Tri County’s brief, the District’s bnef
never responded to it. By not challenging the issue of
excessiveness of the verdict before the D.C. Circuit, the
District has waived it in these proceedings.
In any event, because Tri County’s proof of damages at
trial exceeded $12 million, there was no legal basis for the
district court to declare as a matter of law that the jury’s $5
million verdict was excessive. The reasons given by the
district court to support this conclusion were all factual
issues—-the lack of experience by Tn County, a diminishing
market price and the failure of a soil remediation facility in
Virginia. Tri County was entitled to have these factual issues
resolved by the jury. The district court erred by not follow-
ing controlling legal precedent which specifies when a jury’s
award of damages may be set aside on the grounds of exces-
siveness.
The D.C. Circuit cited Langevine v. District of Columbia,
106 F.3d 1018, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1997), on this issue and
quoted a portion of that decision. Pet. App. 9. The language
preceding the quotation is also important. It states that “a
jury’s determination of damages may only be disturbed if it
‘is sO inordinately large as obviously to exceed the maximum
limit of a reasonable range within which the jury may prop-
erly operate’ /d. (quoting Jeffries v. Potomac Dev. Corp.,
822 F.2d 87, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). The District dismissively
refers to this statement as a “rule of thumb” and asserts that it
“seriously intruded into the district court’s analysis of the
excessiveness of the award.” Pet. 19; Pet. Br. 43. This
statement, however, reflects the law in the D.C. Circuit for at
least the past thirty years. See Taylor v. Washington Termi-
nal Co., 409 F.2d at 149. It is an appropriate and well-
considered legal definition of “excessive damages,” which
ei Ge .
37
the District never challenged before the D.C. Circuit.2? Since
Tn County’s evidence of damages exceeded the jury’s
verdict, the district court’s determination that it was exces-
sive constituted legal error. The mere fact that a verdict
seemed generous to the district court is an insufficient basis
for setting it aside. See Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22
(1889); Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 565 (1886).
The final legal error committed by the district court relates
to the question of the District’s ability to close this facility.
During trial, the district court excluded all testimony regard-
ing community opposition to the project as well as testimony
involving its effects on health and safety. Such decision was
made for three reasons. First, the District admitted that after
an extensive review, Tn County’s proposed project would
not have a significant environmental impact. Second,
testimony of generalized community opposition and potential
health effects was extremely prejudicial to Tri County’s case.
Third, as the D.C. Circuit stated, “[t]he District never met the
trial court’s repeated injunction to show how the health and
safety issue would have triggered additional regulatory
procedures or otherwise allowed the District to rescind its
earlier approval.”2> Pet. App. 10. In its memorandum
22 The determination of when damages are excessive is a legal
question. See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 435 (“ ‘but surely there must
be an upper limit, and whether that has been surpassed is not a
question of fact with respect to which reasonable men may differ,
but a question of law’ ”) (quoting Dagnello v. Long Island R.R.
Co., 289 F.2d 797, 806 (2d Cir. 1961)); 518 U.S. at 437 n.22
(“Whether damages are excessive for the claim-in-suit must be
governed by some law.”) (emphasis in original).
23 With respect to this ruling by the trial court, the D.C. Circuit
stated that “the district court did not abuse its discretion in ex-
cluding the evidence” under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Jd A
trial judge has wide discretion in rulings involving Rule 403
because “he is in a superior position to evaluate the impact of the
evidence” and his determination will rarely be disturbed on appeal.
United States v. Robinson, 560 F.2d 507, 514 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 905 (1978).
38
opinion, the district court attempted to revise this ruling by
stating that “I did not permit defendants to prove at trial, that
there would be continued community resistance to increased
dump truck traffic along Bryant Street ... and a very real
likelihood that the District of Columbia would have closed
down the remediation facility .. . or that it would never have
been permitted to commence operations at all.” Pet. App. 14.
This revised view of the trial is not supported by the record.
The transcript indicates that the district court’s repeated
inquiries about a regulatory process to close the Tri County
facility went unanswered. This is not a question of the
district court restricting proof on this subject. The District
was simply unable to articulate, by proffer or by testimony,
any means of closing this project. The district court com-
mitted legal error by asserting in its memorandum opinion as
a basis for granting a new trial that it had wrongfully ex-
cluded the District’s “evidence” of the likely closure of the
Tri County facility. No such evidence existed.
In its brief the District argues that there were three ways in
which it could have re-evaluated the safety of this project and
rescinded its earlier approval. First, it states that before a
certificate of occupancy is issued an applicant must pass
certain unspecified health and safety standards. Pet. Br. 49.
The only supporting reference given for further health and
safety evaluation before a certificate of occupancy is issued
is J.A. 113-114. This portion of the joint appendix is merely
a non-evidentiary statement of the District’s counsel that Tri
County still had to test its equipment and obtain a certificate
of occupancy. This argument was not supported by any
evidence and was contradicted by the District’s own wit-
nesses who testified that a certificate of occupancy is granted
if the construction work is completed in accordance with the
approved plans and specifications. J.A. 81-83. As a result
Tn County could have obtained its certificate of occupancy
without additional review of the safety of its proposed
project.
The District next argues based on Woodley Park Commu-
nity Association v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning
39
Adjustment, 490 A.2d 628 (D.C. 1985), that the community
could have challenged the issuance of the building permit.
This contention was never before the district court since the
District failed to cite Woodley Park until the appeal before
the D.C. Circuit. Tri County asserted that this argument had
been waived. D.C. Circuit No. 99-7028, Reply Bref, 21.
During trial there was also no proffer by the District of any
community group that was prepared to take legal action to
stop this facility so that any such proceedings were entirely
speculative. As the district court stated “this is not to say...
that you may not have an appropriate way to talk about
community opposition after the fact, but I don’t know what it
is yet. I haven’t seen the foundation.” R. 387 (4/16/98).
Further, the building permit had been issued to Tri County on
February 26, 1993. When the unconstitutional suspension
occurred approximately seven months later, Tri’ County had
expended hundreds of thousands of dollars in reliance on its
building permit and its project was close to being operational.
Woodley Park indicates that any effort by the local commu-
nity to challenge this project would have been barred by
laches.
Lastly, the District states that it could have re-evaluated the
project on the grounds of misrepresentation. The District
produced no witnesses who testified to the circumstances
under which they had regulatory authority to review projects
following issuance of a building permit. In any event this
project could not have been examined again because the
District was not deceived when it issued a building permit to
Tri County. It admittedly had conducted a full and extensive
review of the project. R. 402-403 (4/16/98). The District
also knew exactly where the facility was located with respect
to adjoining residences because of its pre-permit inspections
of the site that occurred prior to December 11, 1992. See
J.A. 8-9. In addition, there was evidence from Sweeney that
so long as the soil was kept inside the warehouse, as Tri
County intended, it would have no effect on surrounding
homes. J.A. 97-98. The District further knew that there
would be more than a little employee traffic generated by this
facility. In November, 1992 Sweeney was aware that dump
40
trucks were going to be carrying the soil to the Tri County
facility. J.A. 100. The District was aware that Tri County
intended to treat 75,000 tons of soil per year at this facility.
J.A. 100-101. Under these circumstances the District could
not have proved that it was misled when it issued a building
permit to Tri County on February 26, 1993 or that there was
any basis for re-opening the review process.
As a result, the district court’s decision to exclude all evi-
dence of health, safety and community resistance was proper.
The alternative was to prejudice Tri County with allegations
that might have frightened the jury but would not have
prevented the continuation of the project.24 The district court
committed legal error in its memorandum order when it
sought to modify this ruling without any factual or legal
basis.
Under these circumstances, where the district court has
committed legal errors, its decision to grant a new trial
deserves no deference by the appellate court. The memoran-
dum opinion was properly reversed by application of an
ordinary abuse of discretion standard since it consisted solely
of erroneous legal conclusions. The fact that these conclu-
sions were not correct fully justified the D.C. Circuit’s
reinstatement of the original jury verdict, without regard to
the issue of a more searching inquiry.
24 The same rationale existed with respect to the exclusion of the
two post-suspension letters from the District to Tn County. The
District could not establish any legal basis for sending the October
15, 1993 correspondence. The failure to respond to that letter
could not justify the suspension contained in the December 6, 1993
letter. To allow the jury to consider these two documents would
have created the false impression that Tn County had acted
wrongly in noi responding to them.
a
4]
IV. IF THIS COURT DETERMINES THAT THE
D.C. CIRCUIT EMPLOYED AN ERRONEOUS
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW, THE
CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR THE
D.C. CIRCUIT TO APPLY THE CORRECT
STANDARD OF REVIEW.
If this Court should determine that the D.C. Circuit did
apply the wrong standard of review, the appropriate course of
action would be to remand for reconsideration in light of the
correct standard. Contrary to the District’s suggestion that
this Court should apply any standard in the first instance, Pet.
Br. 46-49, the usual course is to permit the lower courts to
engage in that task. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 257 (1986); Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574,
601 (1998); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 237 (1995). The District has identified no reason not to
follow that course here. Such action would be particularly
appropriate in this case because the D.C. Circuit would in
any event have to consider the issues Tri County raised as
errors with respect to the second trial.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
FRANK J. EMIG
Counsel of Record
LAW OFFICES OF FRANK J. EMIG
Greenway Center East, Suite 314
7525 Greenway Center Drive
Greenbelt, Maryland 20770
(301) 345-7002
Counsel for Respondent
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.