Respondents Brief — District of Columbia v. Tri County Industries, Inc.

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No. 99-1953 | :

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ET AL..,

Petitioners,

Vv.

TRI COUNTY INDUSTRIES, INC..,

Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for

the District of Columbia Circuit

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT

FRANK J. EMIG

Counsel of Record

LAW OFFICES OF FRANK J. EMIG

Greenway Center East, Suite 314

7525 Greenway Center Drive

Greenbelt, Maryland 20770

(301) 345-7002

Counsel for Respondent

nBEST

QUESTION PRESENTED

Did the D.C. Circuit err when it determined by conducting

a “more searching inquiry” that the district court abused its

discretion in ordering a new tnal?

ee ee i ES

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED .........0:0:c0scsssesssscsssssssssessecseseees i

CE iv

TID reset eeeenepnemnnnnsennenennectazensenesumannneent l

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............0..ccesccccccccscessecsescses |

5 ET 2

gre 5

ae IE Cs PUEDEN cccccesccceccscecscesscssccscecesees 11

SEE GEE ceennnernnsmnccssascsessesenssenseesese 12

V. THE D.C. CIRCUIT’S DECISION ..................... 12

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................cccccsccsssesssseeeees 14

IIIT. ‘ucerhicienernctnneseceeensanensenneensesentseenenssmnesannesensenen 15

I. DUE TO THE DISTRICT’S FAILURE TO

TIMELY RAISE THIS ISSUE, THE D.C.

CIRCUIT HAS NEVER EXPLAINED THE -

SIGNIFICANCE OF CONDUCTING A

MORE SEARCHING INQUIRY ..............:00000000 15

Il. THE MORE SEARCHING INQUIRY BY

THE D.C. CIRCUIT DID NOT AFFECT

THE VALIDITY OF ITS DECISION ................. 21

A. A More Searching Inquiry May Signify

A Closer Review Of The Issues In The

Case To Determine Whether The Dis-

trict Court Abused Its Discretion ................... 23

ill

B. A More Searching Inquiry May Also

Signify That The Abuse Of Discretion

Standard Was Applied More Exactingly

Due To Seventh Amendment Consid-

RE, Gay eee

Ill. THE DISTRICT COURT DID ABUSE ITS

DISCRETION WHEN IT VACATED THE

JURY'S AWARD AND GRANTED A

GERD WIIIIED ccneuscnsvesnetnememsdsnnscsseetensesensssencennueseene

IV. IF THIS COURT DETERMINES THAT

THE D.C. CIRCUIT EMPLOYED AN ER-

RONEOUS STANDARD OF APPELLATE

REVIEW, THE CASE SHOULD BE RE-

MANDED FOR THE D.C. CIRCUIT TO

APPLY THE CORRECT STANDARD OF

SREY sxcusstiitesutiosssenbidenremessmnnmncemastsmnennnenccen

Se TTTT stcresomicsssisininiuduieantanensicaisinnsiitlionnansusinaniiaaiitiians

IV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 US.

Eee 41

Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144

TTI esiinsinpicinannlsnneneataneaiaiainniiningibianantnidiandeaiesimmmaaiimneein 21

Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405

SEITE tehneitecereemntinatiiptansenannananenaiattasantniidanienaianiinnniuntgtdnmanes 24

Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33

SITE andanscuneceinipenesmansentinidantegubidinnntemammcinamatpnienennmenrees 16

ALPO Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 997

dh 5

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242

ITI ssttnsteinnapiarecectenncdsingiatininnsemabiapeibamanetinenmemenmenes: 4)

Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997) ........ccccccceeeeeeeenes 21

Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550 (1886) ..............c00000+ 37

Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 492

SC le

Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171 (D.C. Cir.

FURETTIE? ‘<cnenseccesnitsiinsensieensgeseniguanneneniiidinglesinibeanmatenienmeneniit 20

Carson v. Polley, 689 F.2d 562 (Sth Cir. 1982) ............. 23

Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391

V. TOIT, FOS U.S. SSB (IGG) nneeneeeeceecerevesccvescccceseseszes 25

Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485

STITT inccniinmnncetinimnecnntiemnpntainmmnienmnnan 33

City of Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257

SED cenenesciteencnenenscatenimenmnmcaimemenmnnaneaene 15

Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384

I entemninsineesrrnnannsisnamesimmadintienmesiantesiiianenieeneternens 30

Country Club Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. FDIC,

918 F. Supp. 429 (DDC. 1996) .........2022.000-000020022200002 6

Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998) ..........--.... 41

Vv

Dagnello v. Long Island R.R. Co., 289 F.2d 797

I Mista inde natnanatas lta team

Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935) .......cccceeecceeeeees

Doolin Sec. Sav. Bank v. Office of Thrift Super-

vision, 156 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1998) .........cccceceeeeeees

EEOC v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 476

EERE SY. A eave ney ye

First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514

SN DED tecrcnncnsesnenemenstinnaianienneamnncememens

Foust v. Munson S_S. Lines, 229 U.S. 77 (1936) ............

FTC v. Grolier, Inc.,462 U.S. 19 (1983) .................00000

Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518

SS ORT snnntsncscscnaisnecsniantmnnniiainieniinnnemnnnnds

Grant v. United States Air Force, 197 F.3d 539

asd UII ctieaiscinsiietietiiidehaiieiianieigttiieiaatandatantiniieaieiaasiall

Grogan v. General Maint. Serv. Co., 763 F.2d

Sse I I etitcsirscmnscinesensntmmiianiionmmmanenisetis

Grunenthal v. Long Island R.R. Co., 393 U.S.

ED scniiinseniinidennsitsnciienemnenenmennieaiiiantienncnmnenet

Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance

Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308 (1999) .........cccceeceeeeees

Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1984),

cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985).............-.cccccceeeeeeees

Holmes v. City of Massillon, 78 F.3d 1041 (6th

Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 935 (1996) ........ccccccceeee

Hutchinson v. Stuckey, 952 F.2d 1418 (D.C. Cir.

LE Ee ee ee

Jeffries v. Potomac Dev. Corp., 822 F.2d 87

Ee ae

Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22 (1889) ........2...cccccesee0eees

Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996) ....................

Langevine v. District of Columbia, 106 F.3d

ES. re

vi

Lind v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 278 F.2d 79 (3d

Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 835 (1960) ...........cc-:c0000 23, 28

Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545

GREED encenssesnescssteserssntmmeneumntsnnmiecctnicnuneste assesssnsseessseeseee 21

Massey v. Gulf Oil Corp., 508 F.2d 92 (Sth Cir.),

cert. denied, 423 U.S. 838 (1975) .........scceccseeeereeseeees 23

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S.

fe 21

McBride v. Merrell Dow & Pharmaceuticals,

Inc., 800 F.2d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1986) .........2:-cccceeeeeeees 20

McClanahan v. Morauer & Hartzell, Inc., 404

ee 16

McNeal v. Hi-Lo Powered Scaffolding, Inc., 836

Pg oe ee passim

Medcom Holding Co. v. Baxter Travenol Labo-

ratories, Inc., 106 F.3d 1388 (7th Cir. 1997) .............. 27

National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Greenberg,

SED FBG FEO GAL. Cie. TRG cccccctcspecessesesessecescccssecces 10

New York v. Uplinger, 467 U.S. 246 (1984) ............:000+. 15

Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433 (1830) ........... 25

Patterson v. Portich, 853 F.2d 1399 (7th Cir.

SITET) conscunosssscnsessvenensenmmnnciinienntaniamsemmeetininietemmesaneess 33

Pennzoil Producing Co. v. Offshore Exp., Inc.,

943 F.2d 1465 (Sila Cir. 1991 R ..2..20...0cccocecossrevescsoseeeees 32

Pullman-Standard vy. Swint, 456 U.S. 273

SERIE cocevccusessceeusesennnssrsenssnsénnenienenintitinnemecaieninmeneees 31

Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., 749 F2d

i 30

Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225

ITIIEIIT concceccessnsesstiiansecenenisonsedinaninisantucsmmupainsninannenensetsen 31

Samaritan Inns, Inc. v. District of Columbia,

Tok beef oe | 33, 34

Superbird Farms, Inc. v. Perdue Farms, Inc.,

oe bi ty ls |. eee 27

Vil

Synovus Fin. Corp. v. Board of Governors, 952

TT 10

Tatum v. Morton, 562 F.2d 1279 (D.C. Cir.

SUIT UE icccsienisndundecciibdeanitandjsetilinaiatinsiiiincintiasiniceiiummmnanss 32

Taylor v. Washington Terminal Co., 409 F.2d

145 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 835

TEE? cartonsnnsidmnnedimdtiimeagetlaesianempemmeaeagl 23, 26, 36

United States v. Byers, 740 F.2d 1104 (D.C. Cir.

GUREEEY. sacscosssanssecesoanenenssaqsenvecessenasoanssccansessncceneapecaepesnntts 20

United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814 (3d Cir.

TEPEI TET suttrinnesetagunetsimesenescesmnnimeneimanenmeneetieinmemeet 30

United States v. Epstein, 608 F.2d | (D.C. Cir.

SRIUETEY ceciniiesiineallataiiiaiatadaiiaipstuasia stciaaieennienenninenndl 34

United States v. Robinson, 560 F.2d 507 (2d Cir.

SUI UEY sertisissenssscensccnnicsnmentiniensnatianitanennutitednbidmteressuatis 37

United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326 (1988) ................ 24

Van Boxel v. Journal Company Employees Pen-

sion Trust, 836 F.2d 1048 (7th Cir. 1988) .................. 30

Vander Zee v. Karabatsos, 589 F.2d 723 (D.C.

Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 962 (1979) ............ 23

Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440 (2000) .............. 20

Wilburn v. Maritrans GP Inc,.4+39 F.3d 350 (3d

eh Se rrnciniscersccunsoesemaptensetiiantiininnatainveiindtaonenuteecs 23

Willoughby v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 100

F.3d 999 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520

SE CRITE cevittecnmcssieidinrnithinaptibiaduimaitncninignnstiti 34

Woodley Park Community Ass'n v. District of

Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 490 A.2d

CE | eae 38-39

Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992) .............. 21

CONSTITUTION |

eID WI hccocncocencnscenanstiniamtasttenncnsnsienitinnes passim

vill

STATUTES AND RULES

GRUB. 6 DGGB ccccccrccccccccsccccscccssscscscsescssnncssesssscsososoosses 5

Fed. R. App. P. 28(b)(5) ........ssssssssssersersersessrsersssesserees 19

Fed. R. App. P. 40(a)(3) ........ssscssecrseesesesssssnsssessrsnseees 20

Ped, BR. Evid. 16D1e) ...0ccccccccccesccsscccsccescasssossossscssssssessosess 34

Pad, BR. Biel GBB .ncccccccescccscccccscsccssscssessssscsscsesssessvocsseose 37

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Law (Ber-

- NATE C. Gavit O6., 1941) ...cccrrcsecccrcccccssccresssscroessssensees 29

Childress & Davis, Federal Standards of Review

CBB E. TODD ccccccccccsccccceccsscessesscccccsccessnsscsosssssossooooooees 30

11 Charles Alan Wright, et al , Federal Practice

and Procedure (2d ed. 1995) ..........:cccsccccesceeereeerereeeeeees 27

IN THE

Supreme Court of the GAnited States

No. 99-1953

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

Vv.

TRI COUNTY INDUSTRIES, INC.,

Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for

the District of Columbia Circuit

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT’

OPINIONS BELOW

In addition to the decisions identified by the Petitioners, the

January 14, 1997 decision of the United States Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (J.A. 18-30) is

reported at 104 F.3d 455. The January 17, 1996 decision of

the United States District Court for the District of Columbia

(J.A. 10-17) is reported at 932 F. Supp. 4.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This lawsuit involves the violation of Tri County’s consti-

tutional nghts by the District. This determination was made

Respondent’s Rule 29.6 statement appears in the Brief in

Opposition at page i.

2

by the D.C. Circuit in 1997 and was not appealed further by

the District. The question of the actual loss sustained by Tri

County as a result of the District’s unconstitutional actions,

which a jury determined to be $5 million, is the subject of

these proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND.

Tri County replaces underground fuel storage tanks in the

Washington metropolitan area. J.A. 39.' If the surrounding

soil has become contaminated with petroleum from such

tanks, Tr County must also excavate and transport the soil to

a treatment facility. J.A. 39-40. Tr County removes well

over 60,000 tons of contaminated soil per year, but must haul

it to other cities due to the unavailability of treatment facili-

ties in the Washington area. J.A. 35, 40.

On June 1, 1992, Tri County leased a 53,000 square foot

warehouse (“the Bryant Street warehouse’) in an industrial

area of northeast Washington, D.C., with the intention of

operating its own soil remediation unit? inside this building.

Pl. Ex. 2, R. 4, 79 (4/14/98).2 On July 1, 1992, Tri County

applied to the District of Columbia Department of Consumer

& Regulatory Affairs (“DCRA”) for a building permit to

operate a soil remediation facility at this location. R. 433

(4/16/98). An extensive governmental review of this project

followed, including visits to the site by District regulatory

officials. J.A. 8, 9. During this investigation, Tri County

informed the District, inter alia, that it intended to treat

approximately 75,000 tons of contaminated soil per year and

' References to “J.A.” are to the Joint Appendix, to “Pet.” are

to the Petition for Certiorari, to “Pet. App.” are to the Appendix to

the Petition for Certiorari, and to “Rep. Pet.” are to the Reply to

Brief in Opposition.

2 This equipment cleans contaminated soil by a thermal process

that vaporizes the petroleum contaminants.

3 References to pages in the Record (“R.”) are to the transcript

of the first trial, docket entries 111-114.

3

that the soil would be transported to the facility in covered

dump trucks traveling through a commercial and industnal

area. J.A. 100, 101. Tm County intended to purchase the

same soil cleaning equipment that it had used several years

earlier on a temporary basis elsewhere in the city and which

had been tested and approved by District regulatory officials

at that time. J.A. 40-41.

On December 11, 1992, the District issued an air quality

approval to Tri County for this facility. J.A. 126. It prohib-

ited the treatment of hazardous waste material but authorized

Tri County to process soil “contaminated with gasoline,

diesel oil, fuel oil or kerosene.” J.A. 128. On December 22,

1992, Ferial Bishop, the administrator of the Distnct’s

Environmental Regulation Administration, concluded that an

environmental impact statement would not be required since

the project would result in no significant environmental

impact. J.A. 130. On February 26, 1993, the District issued

Tri County a building permit to renovate the “existing

warehouse as per plans for industrial process and storage.

(Soil Remediation Facility)” Pl. Ex. 5, R. 4, 80-81

(4/14/98). James Sweeney, a DCRA employee, testified that

if the contaminated soil was kept inside the warehouse, as Tri

County intended, it would have no effect on the surrounding

homes and the project would not imminently and substan-

tially affect the public health, safety and welfare. J.A. 97-98.

Tri County then began extensive and costly renovations of

this warehouse to accommodate its new business. Under its

air quality approval, Tri County was required to test the soil

remediation equipment after installation to ensure that it was

operating in accordance with approved emission levels. J.A.

127. Accordingly, toward the end of the construction period,

Tri County began having contaminated soil transported to the

warehouse in anticipation of the delivery and required testing

of the soil remediation equipment. J.A. 35, 37-38.

Before the equipment arrived at the site, public opposition

to the project surfaced. J.A. 19. On September 20, 1993, a

community meeting was held near the proposed site. /d.

Hampton Cross, the Acting Director of DCRA, and Merrick

4

Malone of the District's Department of Housing and Com-

munity Development (“DHCD”), attended this meeting. J.A.

89 and D.C. Circuit No. 96-7022, Plaintiff's Appendix, A.

142, A. 269. Maione voiced concerns about the effects of Tn

County’s project on a proposed DHCD project that was

purportedly to be constructed adjacent to the Tn County

project. /d. at A. 143, A. 279-290. Although Malone’s

information regarding this project was wrong—the area

designated for possible redevelopment was over three blocks

from the Tn County facility, id. at A. 143, A. 291-305—

Cross nevertheless relied upon that information and

immediately suspended Tn County’s building permit. /d. at

A. 144, A. 311-312. As the D.C. Circuit observed, Cross

“pursued no procedure at all to assess whether the alleged

change in circumstances materially undermined his agency's

prior finding” that the project was not a danger to health and

safety. J.A. 29. Without affording Tn County any pre-

deprivation or prompt post-deprivation hearing to challenge

this indefinite suspension of its permit, the District violated

Tn County’s procedural due process rights, as the D.C.

Circuit held in the first appeal in this case. J.A. 27-30.

When Cross indicated that he could not withdraw this

spontaneous suspension, Tri County decided to terminate this

project. J.A. 48, 53. An administrative appeal was not

feasible due to its indefinite duration, uncertain outcome and

continued project costs, which included payment for the soil

cleaning equipment to prevent its resale. J.A. 47, 48. In

November, 1993, Tri County proceeded to cancel the lease

on the Bryant Street warehouse, which was costing $14,000

per month in rent, and thereafter removed the contaminated

soil from the building. J.A. 38, 48.

The costs to Tri County of this failed project were enor-

mous. It had spent or incurred costs of $536,421 for profes-

sional and consulting assistance in obtaining the permit, lease

payments, renovation costs and other project-related ex-

penses. J.A. 36, 132, R. 101 (4/14/98). Tri County was also

deprived of the opportunity to earn substantial profits from

this project.

Il. THE FIRST TRIAL.

On September 20, 1994, Tri County filed suit against the

District of Columbia and its employees seeking damages

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the violation of Tn County’s due

process rights. The district court granted the District’s

motion for summary judgment and rejected Tn County’s

constitutional claims. J.A. 2, D.E. 47. On appeal, a panel of

the D.C. Circuit, consisting of Chief Judge Edwards and

Circuit Judges Williams and Sentelle, held that “Cross’s

‘procedure’ .. . deprived Tri County of property without due

process of law.” 104 F.3d at 462. The D.C. Circuit de-

scribed the actions of Cross as “a classic case of shooting

from the hip on complex technical matters.” /d. It also

determined that there was “provision for correction of the

sort of suspension issued by Cross, but uncertainty as to its

likely speed.” Jd. at 461. The case was remanded to the

district court for proof of damages sustained by Tn County,

as well as consideration of the District’s defenses of moot-

ness and failure to mitigate damages. J.A. 29-30.

Prior to trial, Tri County sought summary judgment on its

claim for damages. R. D.E. 57 (4/15/97). The district court

denied the motion and stated that lost profits of a relatively

new business would be speculative. J.A. 33. Its sole author-

ity for this statement was Country Club Associates Limited

Partnership v. FDIC, 918 F. Supp. 429 (D.D.C. 1996).* That

case, however, was governed by Virginia law, which bars

recovery of lost profits by a new business as a matter of law.

The district court was advised that under District of Colum-

bia law, a new business can assert a claim for lost profits.

See ALPO Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 997 F.2d

949, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1993). At trial, the district court accord-

ingly instructed the jury, without objection by the District,

that a new business could recover future profits. J.A. 125.

+ The District quotes this portion of the district court’s opinion

in its brief (p. 7) but omits the reference to Country Club. Con-

trary to its assertion, there was no “pretrial evidentiary ruling.”

Pet. Br. 8.

6

During tnal, Tri County established that it had incurred

$536,421 in costs for this project. J.A. 132. The District did

not object to the admissibility of the evidence estublishing

these costs, did not cross-examine Tri County regarding them

and did not present any evidence that questioned the validity

or the reasonableness of these expenditures.

Tn County also established that the District's unconstitu-

tional action deprived it of substantial future lost profits. Its

president, Glenn Selzer, testified that Tri County could have

kept this plant fully operational (processing 75,000 tons of

soil per year) with the contaminated soil that it removes from

its own projects. R. 131-132 (4/15/98). Vincent DiRenzo,

who was recognized without objection as an expert in the

field of remediation of soil with petroleum content (J.A. 60),

stated that there was sufficient contaminated soil available in

the Washington area so that Tri County could have treated

75,000 tons per year from 1994 through 2000. J.A. 62-63.

He also testified to the market rate for decontamination of

such soil during this same seven-year period. J.A. 62. The

District presented no evidence refuting these opinions.°*

Dr. Joel Morse, a financial economist from the University

of Baltimore, was recognized without objection as an expert

in his field. J.A. 66. Dr. Morse computed projected revenues

for the Tri County facility from 1994 through 2000 based

upon the market rates provided by DiRenzo and the antici-

pated operating costs of the plant. J.A. 67, 139-142, R. 262-

263 (4/15/98). The operating costs of the facility were based

upon the detailed sworn testimony of six other Tri County

witnesses. After adjusting for inflation and present value, Dr.

> In its brief, the District quotes extensively from DiRenzo’s

written report of March 24, 1995, regarding reduced soil prices and

a facility in another city that went out of business. Pet. Br. 7-8.

The District itself objected to this report and it was not admitted

into evidence. R. 244 (4/15/98). During DiRenzo’s testimony,

moreover, the District did not question DiRenzo regarding soil

prices or the closed competitor and it did not raise such issues to

the jury in closing argument.

,

Morse testified that the total lost profits for 1994 through

2000 amounted to $11,628,174. J.A. 66, 67, 139-142. The

District of Columbia did not object to any of this testimony

by Dr. Morse.

The District of Columbia presented no evidence during trial

indicating that Dr. Morse’s method of valuation was im-

proper or unreliable. The District also produced no evidence

to refute any of the revenue or cost figures that appeared in

Dr. Morse’s report.° The District never suggested that there

were costs associated with this project that were omitted

from Dr. Morse’s report. The District produced no witnesses

to challenge Dr. Morse’s opinion of lost profits of

$11,628,174 by stating that the figure was either too high or

too speculative.

The District did present three defenses to Tri County’s

claim during trial. First, it argued that Tri County failed to

mitigate its damages by not appealing the unconstitutional

suspension of its permit. R. 329-330 (4/16/98). Tm County

presented testimony that pursuing an administrative appeal

was not reasonable in view of the length of time involved (8

to 12 months) (J.A. 54) and the additional costs of approxi-

mately $1 million that it would have incurred to keep the

project viable during the appeal process. J.A. 47-48. There

was also testimony from Cross that the Board of Appeals and

® In a belated effort to discredit Dr. Morse’s opinions, the

District mistakenly asserts that the five employees assigned to the

plant would each work 75 hours per week. Pet. Br. 9. This was an

argument that was initially raised before the D.C. Circuit rather

than at tral. D.C. Cir. No. 99-7028, Appellee’s Brief, 11. Tn

County stated that this contention had been waived. /d., Reply

Brief, 5, 18. It also responded to the argument by noting that the

facility would normally require three persons to operate it.

J.A. 57. Five persons were projected as employees so that the

additional half shift would be covered without the need for

overtime. Dr. Morse’s report reflects this fact since the laborers’

salaries are based on a 40 hour work week. J.A. 141. See D.C.

Cir. No. 99-7028, Reply Brief, 5, 18.

8

Review, which would have jurisdiction over the appeal, was

politically motivated and would act at the direction of the

Mayor and Chief of Staff, who were opposed to the con-

tinuation of the project. J.A. 53-54, 89-92.

The District also asserted a claim of mootness. R. 473-474

(4/16/98). It alleged that Tri County’s building permit was

automatically suspended when the company failed to appear

for a hearing on October 13, 1993, at the Office of Adjudica-

tion. Such hearing had been scheduled to consider the

validity of a notice of infraction given to Tn County follow-

ing an inspector’s site visit on September 2, 1993. J.A. 85-

86, 88. The infraction notice was for operating a soil reme-

diation business without a certificate of occupancy. J.A. 81.

A stop work order for the same violation had also been

posted by the District on the property on September 22,

1993. J.A. 83-84. Tri County established that it could have

removed the suspension and the stop work order at its

discretion simply by paying the fine of $1,525 and by taking

away the soil in the warehouse or by obtaining its certificate

of occupancy.’ J.A. 82, 85, 87-89. Tri County believed that

the unconstitutional suspension of September 20, 1993, was

the major roadblock to the continuation of the project. J.A.

46-47. Until this suspension was lifted, there was no need

for Tri County to resolve the stop work order or the Octo-

ber 13, 1993 suspension. J.A. 46-47.

The District’s third defense involved the alleged health and

safety risks associated with Tri County’s project. J.A. 72-73.

In its opening statement, the District described these pro-

ceedings as “a case in which a community .. . stood up and

opposed a project which they felt was detrimental to the

health, safety and welfare of the community.” R. 69

(4/14/98). The District questioned one of Tri County’s

? According to the District's own witnesses, a certificate of

occupancy was relatively easy to obtain. It would be issued

following an inspection to verify that the construction work had

been performed in accordance with approved plans and specifica-

tions. J.A. 81-83.

9

witnesses about “health risks associated with the handling

and processing of contaminated soil....” R. 214-215

(4/15/98). Tm County objected to the prejudicial aspect of

this issue. J.A. 72 and R. 383 (4/16/98). The trial court

agreed and advised the District that “you’re fighting the last

war. Those issues were decided once by the District of

Columbia .... When they granted the building permit.” R.

311-312 (4/15/98), 387, 392 (4/16/98). The court informed

the District that “it is conceivable that after hearing the

testimony of a witness expressing generalized health and

safety concerns .. . I will. . . strike it.” J.A. 76. The district

court told the District that it had to establish, in addition to

health or safety concerns, the existence of a legal mechanism

that would have permitted it to stop this project.* J.A. 76-77.

Despite the tral court’s admonition, the District continued

to produce witnesses and exhibits which raised only concerns

regarding the safety of the project. The trial court continued

to ask the District if it could identify “a legal vehicle in

which the community concerns could properly have been

considered.” R. 384-387 (4/16/98). When it became appar-

ent that such evidence would not be produced, the trial court

stated that “{w)hat is still not in the case is ... that the

District of Columbia on health and safety grounds would

have ultimately refused permission of this plant to go for-

ward.” R. 474 (4/16/98). The trial court then excluded the

District’s prior testimony regarding the health and safety

effects of the project by concluding that such issues had been

fully considered and resolved by the permitting process. J.A.

123.

The district court also struck a post-suspension letter dated

October 15, 1993, from DCRA to Tri County seeking further

information regarding this project. J.A. 145. DCRA em-

ployee Sweeney admitted that the information requested in

the October 15, 1993 letter would normally have been

considered by DCRA during its review of the building permit

* The trial court also believed that community opposition alone

would not be sufficient to close the project. R. 392 (4/16/98).

10

application. J.A. 98. Sweeney, however, never asked

anyone in DCRA if they had this information before sending

this letter to Tri County. J.A. 98-99. Tn County did not

respond to this letter since it had already furnished this

information. J.A. 50-51. The District was unable to estab-

lish any legal authority allowing this request for further

information. J.A. 103, 105, 115. See also J.A. 20. The

October 15, 1993 correspondence was followed by another

letter on December 6, 1993. J.A. 148. This second letter

notified Tri County that the failure to respond to the Octo-

ber 15, 1993 letter “constitutes grounds for disapproval of the

project.” J.A. 149. It also referred to “likely significant

adverse environmental impacts on nearby homes” that had

not been established by any evidence. J.A. 149. The district

court excluded both letters as prejudicial since they pur-

ported to suspend Tri County’s permit for not responding to a

letter that had no legal basis for being sent as well as the

unsupported reference to “likely significant adverse envi-

ronmental impacts on nearby homes.” J.A. 119. °

° Three other new factual issues were raised for the first time

during the D.C. Circuit appeal by the District. The first involved

DiRenzo’s estimate of trucking costs. The only evidence during

trial regarding trucking costs was Selzer’s testimony of $1.00 per

ton. J.A. 42. The District never challenged the reasonableness of

this rate during tnal. The higher rate in DiRenzo’s report was

never entered in evidence nor referred to by the District during

trial. The District then mentions that the Carter report assumes a

production rate of 20 tons per hour, when in fact the plant can treat

at least 25 tons of soil per hour. Pet. Br. 9-10. The report used the

lower rate as an average in order to reflect 75,000 tons of soil

being treated annually. Lodging 17. Lastly, the District refers to

the fact that Tn County paid $17.50 per ton to have the soil

delivered to the Bryant Street warehouse. This price seems to

conflict with Selzer’s estimated trucking costs of $1.00 per ton.

Tri County argued to the D.C. Circuit that since the District did not

raise this issue at tnal the matter had been waived based upon

National Federation of Federal Employees v. Greenberg, 983 F.2d

286, 288-289 (D.C. Cir. 1993), and Synovus Financial Corp. v.

Board of Governors, 952 F.2d 426, 431 (D.C. Cir. 1991). See

11

The distnct court informed the jury that there were four

issues in this case: the alleged failure to mitigate damages;

the amount spent by Tri County on this project in reliance on

its building permit; the amount of lost profits that Tn County

sustained; and whether Tri County’s claim was moot as a

result of the stop work order. J.A. 123-124. The instructions

on lost profits were detailed. J.A. 124-125. The jury was

instructed that in computing lost profits, it could “consider

the uncertainty which makes the success of a new business

problematical” as well as “the success or failure of other like

businesses.” J.A. 125.

The jury deliberated and awarded Tri County $5 million in

compensatory damages. Pet. App. 11. In reaching this

decision, the jury necessarily rejected the District’s factual

defenses of mitigation and mootness.

Ill. POST TRIAL MOTIONS.

The District filed a “Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding

the Verdict or, in the Alternative, for a New Tnal” and

asserted its defenses of mootness, failure to mitigate and the

speculative nature of Tri County’s damages. The Rule 50

motion was denied, but the district court granted a new tnal

unless Tri County accepted a remittitur of $1 million. Pet.

App. 12, 14. Tr County rejected the remittitur.

The Memorandum Order granting the new tnal was brief

and centered on four issues. Specifically, the district court

concluded that: Tri County was unreasonable as a matter of

law in not appealing the unlawful suspension of its building

permit; its lost profit claim was speculative; the jury verdict

for lost profits was grossly excessive and shocked the con-

science of the court; and the district court erred in its exclu-

sion of evidence of the likely course of future community

D.C. Cir. No. 99-7028, Reply Brief, 17. It also argued that if such

evidence had been presented at trial, there would have been

testimony that the $17.50 per ton charge included not only trans-

portation but also excavation and purchase of backfill. /d. at 5 n.3.

12

resistance and regulatory activities with respect to the reme-

diation facility. Pet. App. 12-14.

IV. THE SECOND TRIAL.

The second trial resulted in a verdict of only nominal dam-

ages to Tri County due to erroneous and prejudicial eviden-

tiary rulings. Such rulings were part of the appeal noted by

Tri County, but were not considered by the D.C. Circuit since

it reinstated the original jury verdict on the ground that the

district court abused its discretion in granting a new trial.

V. THE D.C. CIRCUIT’S DECISION.

A panel of the D.C. Circuit, consisting of Chief Judge

Edwards and Circuit Judges Silberman and Henderson,

“review[ed] the district court’s grant of a new trial for abuse

of discretion.” Pet. App. 5. See also id. at 7, 10. The Court

ruled that a more searching inquiry is required when the

district court grants a new trial due to the concern that the

district court’s granting of a new trial might “encroach on the

jury’s fact-finding function.” Pet. App. 5. The D.C. Circuit

concluded that the district court “did abuse its discretion,”

reversed the district court’s order that granted a new trial and

reinstated the $5 million jury verdict. Pet. App. 10.

The D.C. Circuit rejected the district court’s conclusion

that Tri County failed to mitigate its damages when it did not

seck reinstatement of its suspended building permit. Pet.

App. 6-7. In view of Tri County’s explanation that the Board

of Appeals and Review was politically motivated and that an

appeal was too slow and costly, the court held that the

evidence presented an issue for the jury concerning “what

action was reasonable under the circumstances.” Pet. App. 6.

The D.C. Circuit concluded that the district court abused its

discretion in taking the issue of mitigation of damages away

from the jury and deciding it as a matter of law.

The D.C. Circuit also disagreed with the trial court’s ruling

that as a matter of law Tri County’s evidence of lost profits

was too speculative and remote. The appellate court, citing

Supreme Court precedent, stated that proof of damages may

——- - oe ee

13

be based on a reasonable estimate when the defendant has

prevented the ascertainment of the amount of damages with

certainty. Pet. App. 8. The D.C. Circuit examined the

testimony of eight witnesses produced by Tri County and

noted that “[t}heir respective opinions were left largely

unchallenged by the District.” Pet App. 8. It held that Tri

County’s estimates of loss were “sufficiently well-founded to

avoid characterization as ‘mere speculation or guess.’ Pet.

App. 9.

The D.C. Circuit then rejected the district court’s legal

conclusion that the jury award was excessive. The test to be

applied was whether the award was “within the ‘reasonable

range within which the jury may properly operate.’ Pet.

App. 9. The D.C. Circuit stated that Tri County presented

evidence of costs totaling $536,421 and lost profits of

$11,628,174. Pet. App. 9. Since the jury award was less

than half of the amount proven at trial, it was within the

range of the evidence and should not have been characterized

as excessive.

Finally, the D.C. Circuit addressed the trial court’s state-

ment that it had erred by not allowing the District to prove

the “very real likelihood that the District of Columbia would

have closed down the remediation facility ... or that it never

would have been permitted to commence operations at all.”

Pet. App. 9. The D.C. Circuit disagreed with this erroneous

legal conclusion of the district court that was unsupported by

the record and placed the blame for lack of such proof

squarely on the District. It stated that:

Despite its reliance on this argument, the District

never met the tnal court’s repeated injunction to

show how the health and safety issue would have

triggered additional regulatory procedures or other-

wise allowed the District to rescind its earlier ap-

proval. See J.A. 172; see also id. at 168-69, 172-75,

186-87. In short, the District failed to show that

conimunity concern would be brought to bear on Tri

County’s operation, specifically through the regu-

latory process. Pet. App. 10.

14

As a result, the district court’s decision during trial to strike

testimony regarding safety concerns over Tri County’s

project was not an abuse of discretion because, in addition to

being unfairly prejudicial, such issues had already been

considered and resolved by the District during the permitting

process. Pet. App. 10.

The District then filed a petition for rehearing and, in the

alternative, for rehearing en banc. It argued for the first time

that by conducting a more searching inquiry, the D.C. Circuit

applied an overly restrictive standard of review. Both

petitions were denied by the D.C. Circuit without explana-

tion. Pet. App. 16-17.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The D.C. Circuit has never explained the meaning or effect

of conducting a more searching inquiry. The District is

unable to establish that this phrase affected the abuse of

discretion standard of appellate review, although it had the

opportunity to raise this issue with the D.C. Circuit. The writ

of certiorari should be dismissed as improvidently granted in

view of the uncertainty surrounding a “more searching

inquiry.”

A more searching inquiry does not have any substantive

connotations. It only indicates that the D.C. Circuit con-

ducted a more searching review of the record due to the

conflict between the views of the judge and the jury. Such

additional review is necessary to make certain that a party

has not been deprived of its right to a jury trial.

Even if a more searching inquiry constituted a stricter

abuse of discretion standard of review, such action was

appropriate. The jury’s examination of the facts was entitled

to greater deference than the trial judge’s review of the

evidence. Such greater deference is afforded by a stricter

abuse of discretion standard.

Further, the errors committed by the district court were

legal in nature. Such erroneous rulings constituted abuse of

discretion. Regardless of whether a more searching inquiry

15

was conducted, the D.C. Circuit was correct in reversing the

district court’s grant of a new trial under an ordinary abuse of

discretion standard.

Lastly, if this Court determines that the D.C. Circuit did

apply the wrong standard of review, the case should be

remanded for reconsideration especially because the D.C.

Circuit never reviewed Tri County’s objections to the second

trial.

ARGUMENT

I. DUE TO THE DISTRICT’S FAILURE TO TIMELY

RAISE THIS ISSUE, THE D.C. CIRCUIT HAS

NEVER EXPLAINED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF

CONDUCTING A MORE SEARCHING INQUIRY.

Although the District had every opportunity below to chal-

lenge the use of a “more searching inquiry,” it failed to do so

until after the court of appeals had issued its opinion. As a

result, the D.C. Circuit had no occasion to identify or defend

the basis for engaging in such an inquiry, explain what it

meant by this phrase, or demonstrate the effect, if any, the

inquiry had on its decision. Instead, it simply alluded to a

“more searching inquiry” while recognizing abuse of discre-

tion as the standard, and gave no indication of how it applied

a more searching inquiry.

This case, therefore, presents a poor vehicle for the Court

to consider the validity of the “more searching inquiry”

approach. In similar circumstances where the Court is left

with insufficient information to evaluate the meaning and

effect of the decision below, the Court has found it advisable

to dismiss the writ as improvidently granted. See City of

Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257, 258-259 (1987) (writ

dismissed as improvidently granted where question presented

was whether municipality could be held liable for inadequate

training of employees under negligence standard, but City

did not object to jury instruction that negligence would

suffice); New York v. Uplinger, 467 U.S. 246, 248 (1984)

(dismissing the writ because “the opinion of the Court of

16

Appeals is fairly subject to varying interpretations”);

McClanahan v. Morauer & Hartzell, Inc., 404 U.S. 16, 16

(1971) (dismissing the writ since “the record does not

adequately present” the question on which certiorari was

granted). This disposition is particularly appropriate where,

as here, the petitioners’ failure to join issue below is the

cause of the inadequacy of the record. Accordingly, for the

reasons explained below, we respectfully submit that the writ

should be dismissed as imiprovidently granted.

The standard of review to be applied by an appellate court

when a district court has granted a new trial is abuse of

discretion. See Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal,

Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 279 (1989); Allied Chem. Corp. v.

Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36-37 n.3 (1980). The D.C.

Circuit expressly applied this standard when it reviewed and

set aside the district court’s grant of a new tnal. It stated on

three occasions in its opinion that it reviewed the lower

court’s decision to award a new trial for an abuse of discre-

tion. Pet. App. 5, 7, 11. While it indicated that in the

circumstances of this case it conducted a more searching

inquiry as part of its abuse of discretion review, nothing in its

opinion gives any indication that the court below ever

wavered from an abuse of discretion standard in this case.

On this record, the District itself is left at something of a

loss to explain how a more searching inquiry might have

been different—let alone erroneously so—from the abuse of

discretion review it claims was not conducted.'® On the one

'0 Without textual support for this contention in the D.C. Cir-

cuit’s opinion, the District is forced to rely on several lines from

the transcript of the oral argument in which one of the judges says

there was a rather restrictive standard for taking away a jury

verdict-and ordering a new 4rial according to McNeal v. Hi-Lo

Powered Scaffolding, Inc,, 836 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Pet. 22,

n.11. Even assuming that this statement refers to the standard of

review used by the appellate court, it is the written opinion that is

the final expression of the D.C. Circuit’s position. The opinion

acknowledges that abuse of discretion is the appropriate standard

of appellate review and does not suggest that a harsher abuse of

17

hand, the District continues to recognize that “the D.C.

Circuit ruled that the district court had abused its discretion

in granting a new trial.” Pet. Br. 20 (emphasis added). At

the other extreme, the District contends that the court of

appeals adopted a “strict scrutiny standard,” and used a

“strict scrutiny approach.” /d. at 42. It contends, without

express support in the D.C. Circuit’s opinion, that the court

gave “no deference” to the trial court, id. at 43, and took it

upon itself to “substitute its judgment” for the trial judge’s.

Id. While the District no doubt believes that the D.C. Circuit

overstepped it bounds in this manner, this charge could be

leveled by any party when a decision in its favor is reversed

under an abuse of discretion standard. The District’s char-

acterization of the D.C. Circuit’s action does not establish

the metes and bounds of any “more searching inquiry” or that

such an inquiry made a difference in this case.

The simple fact is that the D.C. Circuit’s opinion states

only that it is applying abuse of discretion review and that it

is conducting a more searching inquiry under that review

because of the Seventh Amendment interests at stake. It

provides no guidance on how this inquiry is applied, how it

affects the abuse of discretion review, and how it might have

made a difference in this case. There is no suggestion in the

D.C. Circuit’s opinion that the more searching inquiry was

outcome determinative. Thus, both parties as well as the

Court are in a poor position to evaluate the propriety of a

“more searching inquiry.”

On the record of this case, it is hardly surprising that the

D.C. Circuit saw no need to defend or explain the “more

searching inquiry,” because no party objected to the use of

discretion standard of review was employed. The quotation also is

not as supportive as the District contends. While counsel for the

District was referring to the standard of appellate review, it appears

that the D.C. Circuit was referring to the standard that the trial

court had to apply to set aside the jury verdict. These are two

separate issues and it seems that the parties were talking at cross-

purposes.

18

such an inquiry. Specifically, while it was on notice that a

“more searching inquiry” might be used and had ample

opportunity to object, the District did not present to the court

below any challenge to the use of that inquiry. It is therefore

hardly in a position to challenge that inquiry now, particu-

larly where its own acquiescence has resulted in the lack of

clarity present here.

When Tri County filed its brief with the D.C. Circuit, it

clearly specified that abuse of discretion was the standard of

review applicable to this case. In the very first paragraph of

the Argument section of its brief—captioned “A. THE

FIRST TRIAL-STANDARD OF REVIEW”—Tri County

stated that “The trial court’s decision to grant a new trial will

be given close scrutiny in order to protect the litigant’s nght

to a jury tral.” D.C. Cir. No. 99-7028, Appellant’s Brief at

30. Tri County cited McNeal v. Hi-Lo Powered Scaffolding,

Inc., supra, aS supporting authority for this approach.

McNeal states that the granting of a new tral will be re-

viewed for abuse of discretion, and that “a more searching

inquiry is required to prevent the trial court from ‘en-

croach[ing] on the jury’s important fact-finding function.’ ”

Id. at 646 (citation omitted). Tri County then asserted that

abuse of discretion occurs when the district court applies the

wrong legal standard or relies on clearly erroneous facts. It

proceeded to identify four instances in which the trial court

abused its discretion by granting a new trial. At this point,

the District was on notice that Tri County wished the D.C.

Circuit to conduct “a more searching inquiry” of the record

and to conclude that the lower court had abused its discretion

in granting a new trial.

In its brief, the District conceded that an abuse of discretion

standard applied. D.C. Cir. No. 99-7028, Appellees’ Brief at

22. It was, however, completely silent on the appropriateness

of a more searching inquiry by the D.C. Circuit. This was

the time to state any objection to the use of a more searching

inquiry. Given that the “more searching inquiry” standard is

the sole basis on which the District petitioned this Court for a

writ of certiorari, it is all the more remarkable that the

19

District failed to object to the D.C. Circuit’s well established

rule. This may very well be because the District recognized

that the inquiry suggested by Tn County did not substan-

tively affect or modify the abuse of discretion standard of

appellate review. Of course, had the District genuinely

considered the inquiry to result in a different standard of

review, as it now contends, then its silence waives its nght to

press that issue further.'' Whatever the reason for the

District's acquiescence, its silence deprived the court of

appeals of an opportunity to defend the standard or even to

articulate what the standard meant, which in turn, inhibits

this Court from meaningfully reviewing the question on

which certiorari was granted.

The District admits that, to the extent that the D. C. Circuit

used a stricter standard, it was made aware of that fact at oral

argument in the court of appeals. It concedes that “[{a]t oral

argument, in a colloquy with counsel for the District, the

D.C. Circuit underscored the importance of its close appellate

scrutiny standard derived from its decision in McNeal v. Hi-

Lo.” Pet. 22,n.11. Shortly after oral argument and before an

opinion was issued, the District wrote two letters to the D.C.

Circuit in an effort to supplement its argument. J.A. 7,

docket entries 11/18/99 & 11/23/99. Neither letter men-

tioned whether conducting a more searching inquiry affected

appellate review for abuse of discretion or objected to such

an inquiry.

Not surprisingly, the opinion rendered by the D.C. Circuit

adopted the uncontested standard of review that was sug-

gested by the parties: the district court’s grant of a new tnal

was reviewed for abuse of discretion and a more searching

inquiry was conducted. Pet. App. 5.

'! Rule 28(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure

required the District to set forth its own statement of the applicable

standard of review if it was dissatisfied with Tri County’s state-

ment.

_

20

The District responded to this unfavorable decision with a

petition for rehearing and, in the alternative, for rehearing en

banc. In its petition, the District argued for the very first

time that a more searching inquiry creates a new standard of

appellate review and conflicts with Gasperini v. Center for

Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996). The D.C. Circuit

denied both petitions without explanation and without even

requesting a response from Tri County. See Pet. App. 16-17

and Fed. R. App. P. 40(a)(3).'*

To the extent that the District contends that Gasperini

prohibits an appellate court from conducting a more search-

ing inquiry, it had ample opportunity to assert this argument

in its brief and elsewhere before the D.C. Circuit issued its

opinion. As a result, the D.C. Circuit’s denial of the petition

for rehearing was entirely proper. See Weisgram v. Marley

Co., 528 U.S. 440, 120 S. Ct. 1011, 1021 n.11 (2000) (“Nor

do we foreclose the possibility that a court of appeals might

properly deny a petition for rehearing because it pressed an

argument that plainly could have been formu!ated in a party’s

brief.”’)

Because the District failed to question the suitability or

meaning of a more searching inquiry, the D.C. Circuit has

never been given the opportunity to discuss the overall effect

that this phrase had on its opinion. The District does not

know if the D.C. Circuit placed any substantive connotations

'2 There is no way of knowing whether the D.C. Circuit thought

the District's argument was waived, meritless or immaterial. In

prior decisions, the court of appeals has refused to consider issues

not raised or discussed by the parties in their initial bnefs. See

Grant v. United States Air Force, 197 F.3d 539, 542 n.6 (D.C. Cir.

1999); Doolin Sec. Sav. Bank v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 156

F.3d 190, 191 (D.C. Cir. 1998); McBride v. Merrell Dow &

Pharms., Inc., 800 F.2d 1208, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1986); United States

v. Byers, 740 F.2d 1104, 1115-16 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (claim

raised for the first time in a petition for rehearing will not be

considered unless there has been a supervening change of fact or

law); Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

21

on a “more searching inquiry.” As a result of the District’s

failure to join issue below, it was not explained in the D.C.

Circuit decision and the parties and this Court are now left to

speculate on the meaning and effect of a more searching

inquiry on the decision of the D.C. Circuit. In these circum-

stances, the issue should not be reviewed by this Court. See

Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 538 (1992) (“Pru-

dence also dictates awaiting a case in which the issue was

fully litigated below, so that we will have the benefit of

developed arguments on both sides and lower court opinions

squarely addressing the question.”) (citing Lytle v. Household

Mfg.. Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 552 n.3 (1990)); Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 379 n.5 (1996); Grupo

Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc.,

527 U.S. 308, 318 n.3 (1999); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452,

464 (1997); EEOC vy. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 476

U.S. 19, 24 (1986) (“Our normal practice ... is to refrain

from addressing issues not raised in the Court of Appeals.”);

FTC v. Grolier, Inc., 462 U.S. 19, 23 n.6 (1983); Adickes v.

S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 147 n.2 (1970).

II. THE MORE SEARCHING INQUIRY CON-

DUCTED BY THE D.C. CIRCUIT DID NOT AF-

FECT THE VALIDITY OF ITS DECISION.

The District devotes a significant portion of its brief to an

historical analysis of the district court’s ability to grant a new

trial. Pet. Br. 29-40. Tri County does not disagree that a new

trial could be granted either in the Eighteenth Century or at

the present time when the verdict is against the weight of the

evidence or if the damages awarded were excessive.'?

However, the trial court's ability to order a new trial does not

imply that an appellate court is prohibited from reviewing its

decision for abuse of discretion or from conducting a more

'3 The District also states that the trial court at common law had

discretion to grant another trial “on evidentiary grounds” (Pet. Br.

at 35-36) or if it “unwisely excluded evidence from the jury's

consideration,” Pet. Br. at 29, but the authorities cited in the

District's brief do not support these assertions.

22

searching inquiry, which are the issues involved in this case.

The historical authorities cited by the District for the propo-

sition that “a district court judge has broad discretion to order

new jury trials for a variety of reasons” (Pet. Br. 29) do not

address this question. Indeed, as the Court itself recognized

in Gasperini—at least in the context of denials of new trial

motions-— there was apparently no opportunity for appellate

review at common law. See 518 U.S. at 434; id. at 443

(Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 452-454 & n.3 (Scalia, J.,

dissenting). Thus, other than establishing the undisputed

point that tral courts have, historically and to the present,

enjoyed discretion to award new trials for a variety of rea-

sons, the District’s extended historical discussion is largely

beside the point.

What is at issue in this case is the propriety of the D.C.

Circuit’s “more searching inquiry.” As we have explained,

evaluation of that question is made difficult by the court’s

failure to explain what that inquiry involved and how it

affected its analysis and decision. In the absence of specific

guidance from the D.C. Circuit, however, we can discern two

possible meanings of the more searching inquiry. The D.C.

Circuit could have intended this type of inquiry to be a means

of looking more closely than it otherwise would have to

determine whether the district court abused its discretion.

That the court was engaged in this “closer look” inquiry is

supported by both the “more searching” language the court

used and its continued reliance on an abuse of discretion

standard of review. Alternatively, the D.C. Circuit may have

intended its more searching inquiry to involve a more exact-

ing application of an abuse of discretion standard—in effect

changing the standard of review—due to Seventh Amend-

ment considerations. While we see no support in the court’s

opinion for concluding that it changed the standard of

review—as opposed to taking a closer look for abuse of

discretion—it is such a change that the District attacks here.

In any event, for the reasons explained below, either ap-

proach is permissible.

23

A. A More Searching Inquiry May Signify A Closer

Review Of The Issues In The Case To Determine

Whether The District Court Abused Its Discretion.

The more searching inquiry approach originated from Lind

v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 278 F.2d 79 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,

364 U.S. 835 (1960), and has been consistently recognized

by the D.C. Circuit since that time.'* It has also been fol-

lowed by the Third, Fifth and Sixth Circuits.'>

In this case, the D.C. Circuit’s opinion significantly did not

identify this more searching inquiry as a modification of the

applicable abuse of discretion standard of review. Nor do

any of the prior D.C. Circuit cases that employed a more

searching inquiry ever state that under such an inquiry the

abuse of discretion standard of review was modified or

applied more strictly. Thus, the court’s articulation of such

an inquiry might suggest only that the appellate court will

'4 See Taylor v. Washington Terminal Co., 409 F.2d 145, (D.C.

Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 835 (1969); Vander Zee v. Karabat-

sos, 589 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 962

(1979); Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert.

denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985); McNeal v. Hi-Lo Powered Scaf-

folding, Inc., 836 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Hutchinson v.

Stuckey, 952 F.2d 1418 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Langevine v. District of

Columbia, 106 F.3d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

'S Wilburn v. Maritrans GP, Inc., 139 F.3d 350, 363 (3d Cir.

1998) (reviewing court exercises “closer degree of scrutiny when

the district court grants a motion for new trial because it believes

the jury’s verdict is against the weight of the evidence.”); Massey

v. Gulf Oil Corp., 508 F.2d 92, 95 (Sth Cur.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.

838 (1975); Carson v. Polley, 689 F.2d 562, 570 (Sth Cir. 1982)

(“Our review of a district court’s decision to grant a new trial is

broader than our review of a district court’s denied of a new tnal,

but the standard remains one of abuse of discretion.”); Holmes v.

City of Massillon, 78 F.3d 1041, 1047 (6th Cir.) (reviewing court

must “closely scrutinize” decision to grant new trial on grounds

that verdict was against the weight of the evidence), cert. denied,

519 U.S. 935 (1996).

24

consider more closely and in greater detail the record and the

issues due to the conflict between the judge and the jury’s

perception of the case. When a new triai has been granted,

an appellate court may have to review questions of whether

damages were excessive or whether the verdict was against

the weight of the evidence presented. Such review becomes

more involved and difficult because of a conflict between the

judge and the jury in their view of the case. The appellate

court owes deference to the decisions of both the judge and

the jury and must resolve this conflict by analyzing the trial

more carefully. This necessarily results in a more detailed

investigation than when a motion for new trial is denied. In

the latter situation, both the judge and the jury have agreed

on a particular result and the appellate review becomes more

limited due to the considerable deference owed to both the

judge and the jury. See Grogan v. General Maint. Serv. Co.,

763 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

This distinction does not imply that appellate review of

cases involving denials of new trial motions is perfunctory.

“[A] decision calling for the exercise of judicial discretion

‘hardly means that it is unfettered by meaningful standards or

shielded from thorough appellate review.’ United States v.

Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 336 (1988) (emphasis supplied)

(quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 416

(1975)). See also Grunenthal v. Long Island R.R. Co., 393

U.S. 156 (1968), in which a judge’s denial of a new trial

motion on grounds of excessiveness was to be reviewed for

abuse of discretion. In applying this standard, the court of

appeals was required to make a “detailed appraisal of the

evidence bearing on damages.” /d. at 156. However, when a

new trial is denied, the appellate court’s analysis of the trial

is aided by the lack of disagreement between the judge and

the jury, both of which are entitled to deference by the

appellate court. When a new trial has been granted and there

is conflict between the judge and the jury, additional appel-

late scrutiny is required.

A more searching inquiry such as this is appropriate when

the trial court sets aside a jury verdict and grants a new tral

25

because the right to a jury trial has been affected. In Dimick

v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935), which held that the trial

judge’s increase of a jury award of damages violated the Re-

examination Clause of the Seventh Amendment, the Court

stated that “Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is

of such importance and occupies so firm a place in our

history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the

right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost

care.” See also Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local

No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 (1990); Foust v. Munson

S.S. Lines, 299 U.S. 77, 84 (1936); Parsons v. Bedford, 28

U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446 (1830) (Story, J.) (“The trial by jury is

justly dear to the American people. It has always been an

object of deep interest and solicitude, and every encroach-

ment upon it has been watched with great jealousy.”).

The D.C. Circuit’s approach of conducting a more search-

ing inquiry to determine if a trial judge has abused his

discretion in setting aside a jury verdict is probably related

only to the need to resolve the conflict between the jury and

the trial judge rather than to the standard of review. Such

closer review is entirely consistent with this Court’s directive

in Dimick. It would reflect a consideration of the nght of the

jury to assess damages, the discretion that the tral judge has

in certain instances to set aside a jury verdict and the re-

quirement of legally sufficient grounds for its nullification by

the district court. It would not result in the modification of

the abuse of discretion standard of review.

As we understand the District’s position, it is not objecting

if this is the interpretation that the D.C. Circuit applied to a

more searching inquiry. Rep. Pet. 1. The District is seeking

abuse of discretion review and received it under this con-

struction of the phrase.

26

B. A More Searching Inquiry May Also Signify That

The Abuse Of Discretion Standard Was Applied

More Exactingly Due To Seventh Amendment Con-

siderations.

By conducting a more searching inquiry, the D.C. Circuit

may have signified that it was applying an abuse of discretion

standard more strictly. While this interpretation—-i.e., that

the range of a trial court’s discretion is narrowed——is not in

our view apparent from the D.C. Circuit’s opinion or its

earlier decisions, it is nevertheless a conceivable explanation

of the effect of conducting a more searching inquiry. It is, in

any event, the possibility of a more searching standard of

review that animates the District’s case in this Court. Even if

such an interpretation were supported, however, it would not

be an erroneous standard of appellate review.

In Taylor v. Washington Terminal Co., 409 F.2d at 148, the

court stated that “In this jurisdiction particularly, District

Court judges have given great weight to jury verdicts.” The

court noted that in jury trials, deference is due to the trial

judge who personally observes the witnesses and considers

the evidence. “But against his judgment, we must consider

that the agency to whom the Constitution allocates the fact-

finding function in the first instance—the jury—has evalu-

ated the facts differently.” /d. Even if one assumes that the

D.C. Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision under a

heightened abuse of discretion standard, it was fully justified

in order to protect this constitutional night.

In the context of this case, greater deference because of

Seventh Amendment concerns must be given to the jury

rather than to the trial judge. As the D.C. Circuit has stated,

“where ... it is clear that the jury has stayed within the

reasonable range, the deference due its findings of fact

outweighs the deference due the trial judge’s first hand

review of the evidence.” /d. at 149. The jury has been given

the primary and constitutional responsibility to weigh the

evidence, assess credibility and determine the amount of

damages. Any interference with this right to have the jury

determine the facts by the granting of a new tnal can be

—— _——- =

27

reviewed under a stricter abuse of discretion standard. This

approach recognizes that when the jury is properly perform-

ing its constitutionally assigned function, the trial judge may

not intervene into the area of fact finding. Dimick very

clearly prohibits such curtailment of the jury’s delegated

powers. By applying the abuse of discretion standard more

strictly when a new trial has been granted, an appellate court

is indicating that it is extending greater deference to the

jury’s determination of the facts, rather than to the trial judge.

The District’s reliance on Gasperini in support of its con-

trary argument is also misplaced. There, this Court held for

the first time that a federal appellate court could review a

trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial based on an

allegedly excessive jury verdict. Most circuit courts of

appeal had already been reviewing the denial of new trial

motions based on a claim of an excessive jury verdict.'© One

of the issues considered in Gasperini was whether any such

appellate review was consistent with the Seventh Amend-

ment. The Court’s recognition that some appellate review is

available and its endorsement of an abuse of discretion

standard when the jury’s verdict is not thrown out plainly do

not foreclose the use of a stricter abuse of discretion standard

where the trial court rejects the jury’s conclusion.

The District also relies on Medcom Holding Co. v. Baxter

Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 106 F.3d 1388 (7th Cir. 1997),

in an effort to establish that greater deference should not be

accorded to the jury’s findings. In Medcom, the Seventh

Circuit indicated that prior to Gasperini, it applied the abuse

of discretion standard “ ‘somewhat more exacting[ly]’ when

the district court granted a new trial because of Seventh

Amendment considerations.” /d. at 1397 (quoting Superbird

Farms, Inc. v. Perdue Farms, Inc., 970 F.2d 238, 247 (7th

Cir. 1992)). Medcom ended this practice in the Seventh

Circuit and reviewed the district court’s grant of a motion for

new trial on damages “with somewhat more deference to the

'© See 11 Charles Alan Wright, er al., Federal Practice and

Procedure § 2820, at 209 (2d ed. 1995).

28

district court, utilizing an ordinary abuse of discretion

standard.” /d. As we have explained, however, Gasperini

does not address whether an abuse of discretion standard of

review may be applied strictly when new trial motions have

been granted and thus Medcom's supposition that the Sev-

enth Circuit’s more exacting inquiry did not survive Gas-

perini does not follow. Apart from its reference to Gasper-

ini, Medcom fails to set forth any reason for not reviewing a

district court’s grant of a new trial under a stricter abuse of

discretion standard.

The District attacks the possible use of a heightened stan-

dard with the facile contention that the Seventh Amendment

right to a jury trial is not implicated in the least when a jury

verdict is set aside, so long as another jury trial is available.

But unless some deference is afforded to the first jury verdict,

the right to a trial by jury is substantially undercut. Settled

legal principles make clear that the result of a jury trial is to

be protected and that simply granting another trial is not a

panacea for infringement of that right. Thus, for example, it

is well settled that a trial court—while possessing substantial

discretion to grant new trials—-does not possess unfettered

discretion to do so, as it well could if a new jury tnal were a

sufficient protection of any Seventh Amendment interest.

See Lind, 278 F.2d at 88 (“this discretion must still be

exercised in accordance with ascertainable legal standards”).

Thus, while the District cites Blackstone for the proposition

that a second trial yields a more correct result since counsel

and the judge are better informed and prepared, Pet. Br. 32-

33, Blackstone also indicates that a second jury trial was not

always available at the discretion of the court:

Sufficient grounds must be shown to satisfy them,

that it is necessary to justice that the cause should

be further considered .... Nor do the courts lend

too easy an ear to every application for a review of

the former verdict. They must be satisfied, that

there are strong probable grounds, to suppose that

the merits have not been fairly and fully discussed

— — - -

29

and that the decision is not agreeable to the justice

and truth of the case.

Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Law, 701-02 (Bernard C.

Gavit ed., 1941).

The historical requirement that the original jury verdict not

be set aside without adequate grounds implies that it is more

significant than getting the issue “right” by another trial. If

the focus is only the correctness of the ultimate result, then

no limitations would be imposed on the lower court’s grant

of a new trial. A judge would be able to set aside a jury

verdict whenever he believed in his sole discretion that the

parties could present a more effective case to a second jury.

An initial jury determination would be rendered meaningless

if the trial judge could exercise such authority and control.

Therefore, a trial court’s disagreement with the jury’s ver-

dict quite naturally raises Seventh Amendment concerns

about trampling on the right to a jury tnal—concerns which

are not present when as in Gasperini, the trial court upholds

the jury’s determination and denies a bid for a new tnal. As

this case came to the D.C. Circuit, therefore, there was a

concern that the district court (which had initially thrown out

Tri County’s suit only to be reversed by the court of appeals)

may have infringed Tri County’s constitutional right to trial

by jury. In an effort to make certain that such interference

did not occur, the D.C. Circuit properly employed a “more

searching inquiry.”

Il, THE DISTRICT COURT DID ABUSE ITS

DISCRETION WHEN IT VACATED THE

JURY’S AWARD AND GRANTED A NEW

TRIAL.

In any event, whether a “more searching inquiry” imper-

missibly alters the scope of review under the abuse of discre-

tion standard proves largely academic in this case when both

the scope of that standard and the nature of the decision at

issue are properly understood. This is so because the court of

appeals found that each of the four bases upon which the

30

district court decided to grant a new trial constituted error as

a matter of law.

The District's brief is largely premised on the supposition

that abuse of discretion review is a fixed and definite stan-

dard, describing precisely one and only one type of review.

It has long been understood, however, that-—as Judge Posner

has observed—‘“the words [abuse of discretion] describe a

range of standards ... in which the amount of deference

given the trial judge’s rulings varies with the nature of the

ruling—a range that overlaps clear error, and even error,

period.” Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., 749 F.2d 380,

390 (7th Cir. 1984).'7 See also, e.g., United States v. Criden,

648 F.2d 814, 817 (3d Cir. 1981) (“Although the standard of

review in such instances is generally framed as ‘abuse of

discretion,’ in fact the scope of review will be directly related

to the reason why that category or type of decision is com-

mitted to the trial court’s discretion in the first instance”);

Childress & Davis, Federal Standards of Review § 4.21 at 4-

131 (3d ed. 1999) (abuse of discretion has “sliding contextual

meaning”).

Included in the range of things that might constitute an

abuse of discretion are legal errors. As this Court has con-

sistently observed, “{a] district court by definition abuses its

discretion when it makes an error of law.” Koon v. United

States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996); accord Cooter & Gell v.

Hartmax Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990) (“A district court

would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its ruling on

an erroneous view of the law.”); Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 448

(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Indeed, it is a familiar, if somewhat

circular, maxim that deems an error of law an abuse of

discretion.”). Where errors of law are at issue, of course, an

appellate court does not have to defer to the district court’s

resolution, but instead engages in de novo review. Koon, 518

'? Cf Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees’ Pension Trust, 836

F.2d 1048, 1052 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J.) (discussing arbitrary

and capricious standard of review and noting that the standard of

review “may be a range, not a point.”)

31

U.S. at 100; First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514

U.S. 938, 948 (1995); Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499

U.S. 225, 239-240 (1991). Further, “if a district court’s

findings rest on an erroneous view of the law, they may be

set aside on that basis.” Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S.

273, 287 (1982).

Accordingly, where legal errors are at issue, a “more

searching inquiry”—even if otherwise improper by failing to

accord the district court an appropriate amount of defer-

ence—would not be error because review of legal errors is de

novo in any event. In other words, a conclusion that the

district court abused its discretion by committing legal errors

is unaffected by the existence of any “more searching in-

quiry.”” As we demonstrate below, in this case the district

court’s reasons for granting a new trial were wrong as a

matter of law, and therefore there was no error in conducting

a “more searching inquiry” even if such an inquiry were

improper when considering questions of fact or evidentiary

weight that led a district court to throw out a jury’s determi-

nation.

First, the district court committed legal error by concluding

that Tri County’s lost profit claim was barred as a matter of

law. Although the District contended that Tri County failed

to mitigate its damages when it opted not to pursue an

administrative appeal, the D.C. Circuit indicated that a duty

to mitigate is “a question that turns on what action was

reasonable under the circumstances.” Pet. App. 5 (citations

omitted). Even the district court acknowledged in its memo-

randum order that there was a factual dispute involving the

reasonableness of pursuing administrative remedies. The

jury properly considered the evidence produced by Tri

County that an administrative appeal was too costly and that

there were serious questions of the impartiality of the adjudi-

catory board. The jury, after being fully instructed, decided

that the District had not established by a preponderance of

the evidence that Tri County had failed to mitigate its dam-

ages. Pet. App. 12. Accordingly, it was error as a matter of

law for the district court to hold that Tri County was “unrea-

32

sonable per se” in not appealing the suspension. /d. That

ruling constituted an intrusion by the judge into a strictly

factual dispute that the jury had resolved in Tn County’s

favor. As the D.C. Circuit stated, “it [the district court]

abused its discretion in declaring ex post that Tn County's

failure to pursue administrative remedies to reinstate its

permit was per se unreasonable, thereby withdrawing the

mitigation issue from the jury.” Pet. App. 7 (citation omit-

ted).

The cases cited by the District in its brief do not undermine

the D.C. Circuit’s holding. Pet. Br. 48. In Pennzoil Pro-

ducing Co. v. Offshore Exp., Inc., 943 F.2d 1465 (Sth Cir.

1991), the district court, following a non-jury trial, deter-

mined that the plaintiff failed to mitigate its damages when it

did not flare a well and that administrative approval, which

was not pursued, would likely have been granted for such

action.'* The appellate court only held that this factual

finding was not clearly erroneous. In Pennzoil, the trier of

fact merely viewed the evidence regarding the efficacy of an

administrative appeal differently. There was no attempt by

the appellate court to state that administrative appeals must

be pursued in all instances or else a party will have failed to

mitigate its damages as a matter of law.

Similarly, in Tatum v. Morton, 562 F.2d 1279, 1283 (D.C.

Cir. 1977), the Court of Appeals clearly stated that “the

district court’s per se approach—of imposing an absolute

duty to mitigate—was not sound.” The D.C. Circuit consid-

ered the problem to be one of reasonableness. /d. at 1284.

Since Tatum was relied on by the D.C. Circuit in its opinion

as authority for the proposition that mitigation was a jury

'8 In an effort to bolster its argument, the District incorrectly

cites Pennzoil for the proposition that administrative action should

be taken “even if exception would not have been granted.” Pet. Br.

at 48. The district court after trial found just the opposite. The

court of appeals stated “the district court noted that exceptions are

often granted in emergencies and that an exception would likely

have been granted to Pennzoil.” 943 F.2d at 1476.

33

issue (Pet. App. 7), it is odd that the District cites the case as

supporting authority. Nor are the other two cases relied on

by the District apposite. See Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v.

celly, 241 U.S. 485, 489 (1916); Patterson v. Portich, 853

F.2d 1399, 1408 (7th Cir. 1988). Both merely recognize the

unremarkable proposition that a party must exert reasonable

efforts to mitigate damages. They have no bearing on the

appropriateness of deciding this issue as a matter of law.

The second legal error occurred when the district court

concluded that Tri County’s proof of lost profits was “too

speculative and remote and that it failed to meet the required

standard of reasonable certainty.” Pet. App. 13. At trial, Tri

County established that there was a demand for a soil reme-

diation facility in the Washington area, the capacity of its

equipment, the market rate for treating contaminated soil and

the operating costs of its facility.'9 All of this evidence was

admitted without objection by the District, including the

testimony of Dr. Morse that lost profits amounted to

$11,628,174.

Because the District never allowed Tri County to start its

new business, actual income and expense figures were

unavailable. According to Samaritan Inns, Inc. v. District of

Columbia, 114 F.3d 1227, 1234-35 (D.C. Cir. 1997), in this

situation “proof of the amount of damages may be based on a

reasonable estimate.” As the D.C. Circuit observed follow-

ing its discussion of the witnesses and testimony presented

on this issue, “they were sufficiently well-founded to avoid

characterization as ‘mere speculation or guess.” Pet. App. 9

(citation omitted).

The legal error consisted of the district court’s disregard of

the standard applied in the D.C. Circuit for determining

'9 The District’s cross examination of witnesses who testified

regarding operating costs was practically non-existent. Even

though utilities represented approximately 40% of the costs of this

project, the District did not ask a single question of the mechanical

engineer (Carter) who testified to such costs.

34

whether damages are speculative and not reasonably certain.

“I will be enough if the evidence shows the extent of the

damages as a matter of just and reasonable inference, al-

though the result be only approximate.” Samaritan Inns, 114

F.3d at 1235 (citation omitted). As the D.C. Circuit con-

cluded, Tri County’s evidence met this standard. By ruling

as a matter of law that Tri County’s extensive evidence of

damages was speculative, the district court was improperly

resolving the strictly factual dispute of the amount of dam-

ages that had already been considered by the jury, just as it

did on the mitigation issue.

In an effort to label the evidence of lost profits as specula-

tive, the District now resorts to an analysis of the evidence.

Pet. Br. 46-48. It completely ignores the fact that it failed to

object to any of Tri County’s evidence of $12 million in

damages as being speculative in nature. Since the evidence

was admitted it became part of the record to be considered by

the trier of fact. See United States v. Epstein, 608 F.2d 1, 8-9

(D.C. Cir. 1979); Willoughby v. Potomac Elec. Power Co.,

100 F.3d 999, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S.

1197 (1997); Fed. R. Evid. 103(a). The fact that DiRenzo, in

response to a question from the district court, stated that a

Baltimore facility had closed is not particularly probative.

The District introduced no evidence regarding the Baltimore

facility’s operating costs, foreclosing the jury from consid-

ering whether that facility’s failure was simply a function of

a more expensive soil remediation unit, a costlier site loca-

tion, mismanagement, or inability to get sufficient soil from

companies such as Tri County that excavate contaminated

soil.2° These considerations prevent one from drawing the

conclusion as a matter of law that Tri County’s operation

would not have been profitable.

20 The unchallenged testimony at trial was that Tn County, as

part of its normal operations, produced enough contaminated soil

to keep its proposed facility fully operational. Record 131-132

(4/15/98)

35

Similarly, the closure of a Virginia facility because its

permit was withdrawn sheds no light on the question of Tri

County’s profitability. If anything, given the continuing

market for contaminated soil, the closure of two competing

facilities would only benefit Tri County. Lastly, while

DiRenzo testified that market prices had dropped, he stated

without objection that they had leveled off at $32 per ton and

anticipated this rate to be constant from 1997-2000. J.A. 62.

Dr. Morse’s report adjusted the income from the operations

based upon these lower market rate projections. J.A. 139.

These factual issues, none of which the District even ar-

gued to the jury, demonstrate that the question of damages

quite properly belonged to the jury. It was not the type of

issue that the district court could resolve as a matter of law.

The jury evaluated this testimony, comparing it to the

evidence of $12 million in damages from Tri County’s

witnesses and reached a compromise verdict. The mere

existence of a factual dispute over the profitability of a

venture does not render Tri County’s evidence speculative as

a matter of law. While the district court labeled Tri County’s

proof of future profits a “pro-forma statement of income and

expenses” (J.A. 13), there was no evidence that any of the

figures in Dr. Morse’s report were inaccurate or that items of

expense were omitted.

The third legal error committed by the district court in-

volved its description of the portion of the jury award attrib-

utable to lost profits ($4.5 million) as grossly excessive.*'! In

its D.C. Circuit brief, Tri County argucd that the district court

committed legal error by determining, despite the applicable

2! Usually, excessive verdicts occur when a jury is asked to

value intangibles such as pain and suffering and its award is

affected by passion or prejudice. In these situations, the tral

court’s decision to grant a new trial is given deference because it

was in a better position to observe if the jury’s verdict was im-

properly influenced by sympathy or prejudice. The nature of Tn

County’s evidence was different because it established a specific

amount of damages for the jury to consider.

36

legal standard, that the jury’s verdict was excessive and

shocked the conscience of the court. Dc. Cir. No. 99-7028,

Appellant’s brief, 44-45. Even though this argument was

separately identified in Tri County’s brief, the District’s bnef

never responded to it. By not challenging the issue of

excessiveness of the verdict before the D.C. Circuit, the

District has waived it in these proceedings.

In any event, because Tri County’s proof of damages at

trial exceeded $12 million, there was no legal basis for the

district court to declare as a matter of law that the jury’s $5

million verdict was excessive. The reasons given by the

district court to support this conclusion were all factual

issues—-the lack of experience by Tn County, a diminishing

market price and the failure of a soil remediation facility in

Virginia. Tri County was entitled to have these factual issues

resolved by the jury. The district court erred by not follow-

ing controlling legal precedent which specifies when a jury’s

award of damages may be set aside on the grounds of exces-

siveness.

The D.C. Circuit cited Langevine v. District of Columbia,

106 F.3d 1018, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1997), on this issue and

quoted a portion of that decision. Pet. App. 9. The language

preceding the quotation is also important. It states that “a

jury’s determination of damages may only be disturbed if it

‘is sO inordinately large as obviously to exceed the maximum

limit of a reasonable range within which the jury may prop-

erly operate’ /d. (quoting Jeffries v. Potomac Dev. Corp.,

822 F.2d 87, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). The District dismissively

refers to this statement as a “rule of thumb” and asserts that it

“seriously intruded into the district court’s analysis of the

excessiveness of the award.” Pet. 19; Pet. Br. 43. This

statement, however, reflects the law in the D.C. Circuit for at

least the past thirty years. See Taylor v. Washington Termi-

nal Co., 409 F.2d at 149. It is an appropriate and well-

considered legal definition of “excessive damages,” which

ei Ge .

37

the District never challenged before the D.C. Circuit.2? Since

Tn County’s evidence of damages exceeded the jury’s

verdict, the district court’s determination that it was exces-

sive constituted legal error. The mere fact that a verdict

seemed generous to the district court is an insufficient basis

for setting it aside. See Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22

(1889); Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 565 (1886).

The final legal error committed by the district court relates

to the question of the District’s ability to close this facility.

During trial, the district court excluded all testimony regard-

ing community opposition to the project as well as testimony

involving its effects on health and safety. Such decision was

made for three reasons. First, the District admitted that after

an extensive review, Tn County’s proposed project would

not have a significant environmental impact. Second,

testimony of generalized community opposition and potential

health effects was extremely prejudicial to Tri County’s case.

Third, as the D.C. Circuit stated, “[t]he District never met the

trial court’s repeated injunction to show how the health and

safety issue would have triggered additional regulatory

procedures or otherwise allowed the District to rescind its

earlier approval.”2> Pet. App. 10. In its memorandum

22 The determination of when damages are excessive is a legal

question. See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 435 (“ ‘but surely there must

be an upper limit, and whether that has been surpassed is not a

question of fact with respect to which reasonable men may differ,

but a question of law’ ”) (quoting Dagnello v. Long Island R.R.

Co., 289 F.2d 797, 806 (2d Cir. 1961)); 518 U.S. at 437 n.22

(“Whether damages are excessive for the claim-in-suit must be

governed by some law.”) (emphasis in original).

23 With respect to this ruling by the trial court, the D.C. Circuit

stated that “the district court did not abuse its discretion in ex-

cluding the evidence” under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Jd A

trial judge has wide discretion in rulings involving Rule 403

because “he is in a superior position to evaluate the impact of the

evidence” and his determination will rarely be disturbed on appeal.

United States v. Robinson, 560 F.2d 507, 514 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.

denied, 435 U.S. 905 (1978).

38

opinion, the district court attempted to revise this ruling by

stating that “I did not permit defendants to prove at trial, that

there would be continued community resistance to increased

dump truck traffic along Bryant Street ... and a very real

likelihood that the District of Columbia would have closed

down the remediation facility .. . or that it would never have

been permitted to commence operations at all.” Pet. App. 14.

This revised view of the trial is not supported by the record.

The transcript indicates that the district court’s repeated

inquiries about a regulatory process to close the Tri County

facility went unanswered. This is not a question of the

district court restricting proof on this subject. The District

was simply unable to articulate, by proffer or by testimony,

any means of closing this project. The district court com-

mitted legal error by asserting in its memorandum opinion as

a basis for granting a new trial that it had wrongfully ex-

cluded the District’s “evidence” of the likely closure of the

Tri County facility. No such evidence existed.

In its brief the District argues that there were three ways in

which it could have re-evaluated the safety of this project and

rescinded its earlier approval. First, it states that before a

certificate of occupancy is issued an applicant must pass

certain unspecified health and safety standards. Pet. Br. 49.

The only supporting reference given for further health and

safety evaluation before a certificate of occupancy is issued

is J.A. 113-114. This portion of the joint appendix is merely

a non-evidentiary statement of the District’s counsel that Tri

County still had to test its equipment and obtain a certificate

of occupancy. This argument was not supported by any

evidence and was contradicted by the District’s own wit-

nesses who testified that a certificate of occupancy is granted

if the construction work is completed in accordance with the

approved plans and specifications. J.A. 81-83. As a result

Tn County could have obtained its certificate of occupancy

without additional review of the safety of its proposed

project.

The District next argues based on Woodley Park Commu-

nity Association v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning

39

Adjustment, 490 A.2d 628 (D.C. 1985), that the community

could have challenged the issuance of the building permit.

This contention was never before the district court since the

District failed to cite Woodley Park until the appeal before

the D.C. Circuit. Tri County asserted that this argument had

been waived. D.C. Circuit No. 99-7028, Reply Bref, 21.

During trial there was also no proffer by the District of any

community group that was prepared to take legal action to

stop this facility so that any such proceedings were entirely

speculative. As the district court stated “this is not to say...

that you may not have an appropriate way to talk about

community opposition after the fact, but I don’t know what it

is yet. I haven’t seen the foundation.” R. 387 (4/16/98).

Further, the building permit had been issued to Tri County on

February 26, 1993. When the unconstitutional suspension

occurred approximately seven months later, Tri’ County had

expended hundreds of thousands of dollars in reliance on its

building permit and its project was close to being operational.

Woodley Park indicates that any effort by the local commu-

nity to challenge this project would have been barred by

laches.

Lastly, the District states that it could have re-evaluated the

project on the grounds of misrepresentation. The District

produced no witnesses who testified to the circumstances

under which they had regulatory authority to review projects

following issuance of a building permit. In any event this

project could not have been examined again because the

District was not deceived when it issued a building permit to

Tri County. It admittedly had conducted a full and extensive

review of the project. R. 402-403 (4/16/98). The District

also knew exactly where the facility was located with respect

to adjoining residences because of its pre-permit inspections

of the site that occurred prior to December 11, 1992. See

J.A. 8-9. In addition, there was evidence from Sweeney that

so long as the soil was kept inside the warehouse, as Tri

County intended, it would have no effect on surrounding

homes. J.A. 97-98. The District further knew that there

would be more than a little employee traffic generated by this

facility. In November, 1992 Sweeney was aware that dump

40

trucks were going to be carrying the soil to the Tri County

facility. J.A. 100. The District was aware that Tri County

intended to treat 75,000 tons of soil per year at this facility.

J.A. 100-101. Under these circumstances the District could

not have proved that it was misled when it issued a building

permit to Tri County on February 26, 1993 or that there was

any basis for re-opening the review process.

As a result, the district court’s decision to exclude all evi-

dence of health, safety and community resistance was proper.

The alternative was to prejudice Tri County with allegations

that might have frightened the jury but would not have

prevented the continuation of the project.24 The district court

committed legal error in its memorandum order when it

sought to modify this ruling without any factual or legal

basis.

Under these circumstances, where the district court has

committed legal errors, its decision to grant a new trial

deserves no deference by the appellate court. The memoran-

dum opinion was properly reversed by application of an

ordinary abuse of discretion standard since it consisted solely

of erroneous legal conclusions. The fact that these conclu-

sions were not correct fully justified the D.C. Circuit’s

reinstatement of the original jury verdict, without regard to

the issue of a more searching inquiry.

24 The same rationale existed with respect to the exclusion of the

two post-suspension letters from the District to Tn County. The

District could not establish any legal basis for sending the October

15, 1993 correspondence. The failure to respond to that letter

could not justify the suspension contained in the December 6, 1993

letter. To allow the jury to consider these two documents would

have created the false impression that Tn County had acted

wrongly in noi responding to them.

a

4]

IV. IF THIS COURT DETERMINES THAT THE

D.C. CIRCUIT EMPLOYED AN ERRONEOUS

STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW, THE

CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR THE

D.C. CIRCUIT TO APPLY THE CORRECT

STANDARD OF REVIEW.

If this Court should determine that the D.C. Circuit did

apply the wrong standard of review, the appropriate course of

action would be to remand for reconsideration in light of the

correct standard. Contrary to the District’s suggestion that

this Court should apply any standard in the first instance, Pet.

Br. 46-49, the usual course is to permit the lower courts to

engage in that task. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 257 (1986); Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574,

601 (1998); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.

200, 237 (1995). The District has identified no reason not to

follow that course here. Such action would be particularly

appropriate in this case because the D.C. Circuit would in

any event have to consider the issues Tri County raised as

errors with respect to the second trial.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the United

States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

FRANK J. EMIG

Counsel of Record

LAW OFFICES OF FRANK J. EMIG

Greenway Center East, Suite 314

7525 Greenway Center Drive

Greenbelt, Maryland 20770

(301) 345-7002

Counsel for Respondent

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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