Amicus Curiae Brief — American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Browner

No. 99-1426

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

UNITED STATES

AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS, INC., ET AL.,

Cross-Petitioners,

Vv

CAROL M. BROWNER, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.,

Cross-Respondents.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF AMICI CURIAE OF AEI-BROOKINGS JOINT CENTER FOR

REGULATORY STUDIES, KENNETH J. ARROW,

ELIZABETH E. BAILEY, WILLIAM J. BAUMOL,

JAGDISH BHAGWATI, MICHAEL J. BOSKIN,

DAVID F. BRADFORD, ROBERT W. CRANDALL,

MAUREEN L. CROPPER, CHISTOPHER C. DEMUTH,

GEORGE C. EADS, MILTON FRIEDMAN, JOHN D. GRAHAM,

WENDY L. GRAMM, ROBERT W. HAHN, PAUL L. JOSKOW,

ALFRED E. KAHN, PAUL R. KRUGMAN, LESTER B. LAVE,

ROBERT E. LITAN, RANDALL W. LUTTER, PAUL W. MACAVOY,

PAUL W. MCCRACKEN, JAMES C. MILLER III,

WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS,

WALLACE E. OATES, PETER PASSELL, SAM PELTZMAN,

PAUL R. PORTNEY, ALICE M. RIVLIN, MILTON RUSSELL,

RICHARD L. SCHMALENSEE, CHARLES L. SCHULTZE,

V. KERRY SMITH, ROBERT M. SOLOW, ROBERT N. STAVINS,

JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, LAURA D’ ANDREA TYSON,

W. KIP VISCUSI, MURRAY L. WEIDENBAUM, JANET L. YELLEN,

AND RICHARD J. ZECKHAUSER IN SUPPORT OF

1150 17* St, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 797-6120

ray al, 2000

Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

JUL 2 1 2000

7 2p

TABLE OF CONTENTS

B. Nature and Importance of Benefit-Cost Analysis .....

C. Evolution of the Use of Benefit-Cost Analysis

in Regulatory Decisionmaking ...................5

> WwW

I. AGROUP OF ECONOMISTS DEVELOPS A

CONSENSUS ON THE USE OF BENFFIT-COST

ANALYSIS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL

II. IF AT ALL POSSIBLE GIVEN THE RELEVANT

LEGAL AUTHORITIES, THE COURT SHOULD

HOLD THAT SECTION 109(B) ALLOWS

CONSIDERATION OF BOTH BENEFITS AND

AND COSTS WHEN SETTING NAAQS.......... 11

Be Ge Me CE esc ccccccccccscscccccee

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA,

499 U.S. 1062 GC. Cie. 15GB) onc sstocsacnneuuee 3

State of Michigan v. EPA,

2000 WL 180650 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ................ 6

Statutes:

42 USL. § FERRET) .. ccecaccesescu eee 7, 8, 11

62 FED. REG. 38,856 (July 18, 1997) ............... 11

Executive Order 12291,

46 FED. REG. 13,193 (Feb. 17,1981) ............ 5, 6

Executive Order 12866,

58 FED. REG. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993) ..... 2, 5,6, 11, 12

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of

1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 857 (Codified in 15

U. S.C. § GE ane.) .. occcccccenv es enneeee 6

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4,

109 Stat. 48 (Codified in 2 U. S.C. § 1535) ........... 6

Miscellaneous:

KENNETH J. ARROW, MAUREEN L. CROPPER,

GEORGE C. EADS, ROBERT W. HAHN, LESTER B. LAVE,

ROGER G. NOLL, PAUL R. PORTNEY, MILTON RUSSELL,

RICHARD L. SCHMALENSEE, V. KERRY SMITH, AND

ROBERT N. STAVINS, BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS IN

ENVIRONMENTAL, HEALTH, AND SAFETY REGULATION:

A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES (1996) ............ 4,9

ROBERT W. CRANDALL, CHRISTOPHER DEMUTH,

ROBERT W. HAHN, ROBERT E. LITAN,

PIETRO S. NIVOLA, AND PAUL R. PORTNEY, AN AGENDA

FOR FEDERAL REGULATORY REFORM (1997) ........ 4

ROBERT H. FRANK AND CASS R. SUNSTEIN, COST-BENEFIT

ANALYSIS AND RELATIVE POSITION (2000) .......... 7

Richard H. Pildes and Cass R. Sunstein,

Reinventing the Regulatory State,

Ee ee 5

Tammy O. Tengs and John D. Graham,

The Opportunity Costs of Haphazard Social Investments

in Life-saving, in RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED:

GETTING BETTER RESULTS FROM REGULATION

CEE ccccuccecccksconcecce 2

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

This brief is being submitted on behalf of a group of

economists.’ The purpose of the brief is not to attempt to guide

the Court on legal issues but to inform it on economic ones. To

put ourselves in the best possible position to offer the Court our

expertise, we have tried to understand, in light of the legal task

confronting the Court, where our own economic expertise might

have a useful role to play.

To that end, we understand that the lawyers who

brought this case framed the following question for the Court’s

consideration: “Whether the Clean Air Act requires that the

Environmental Protection Agency ignore all factors ‘other than

health effects relating to pollutants in the air’” when setting

National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS). We also

understand that this question has arisen in part because the

United States Court of Appeals in Washington, D.C., whose

responsibility it is to review air quality standards issued by the

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), has interpreted the

Clean Air Act as barring the EPA from even considering the

potential costs of its air quality regulations.

The merits of this legal debate between the D.C. Circuit

and the counsel who have contested the D.C. Circuit’s views are

beyond the scope of our economic expertise and hence of this

brief. Nonetheless, we respectfully offer the following

observations with hopes that they may ultimately prove useful.

The importance of this issue cannot be overstated. Both

the direct benefits and costs of environmental, health, and safety

regulations are substantial—estimated to be several hundred

' No counsel for any party to this case authored this brief in whole or

im part; and no person other than the amici, their members, or their counsel

made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this

brief. ‘,

%

billion dollars annually. If these resources were better allocated

with the objective of reducing human health risik, schoilars have

predicted that tens of thousands more lives could ne saved each

year. All presidents since Nixon—both Democratic and

Republican-have attempted to make environmental, health, and

safety regulations more efficient by requiring some form of

oversight attempting to balance benefits and costs. President

Reagan and President Clinton each crafted an executive order

that required an explicit balancing of benefits and costs for

major regulations to the extent permitted by law. A

comprehensive regulatory impact analysis (RIA) prepared in

conformance with President Clinton’s Executive Order 12866

was done for the ozone and particulate matter rulemaking, but

it played no official or overt part in the decision in this case

because of the D.C. Circuit’s view that costs must not be

considered.

The issue presented in this case is of great significance

to amici curiae. In 1998, the American Enterprise Institute

(AEI) and the Brookings Institution established the AEI-

Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies (Joint Center) to

help improve regulation and the regulatory process. A principal

focus of the Joint Center is to analyze the economic benefits and

costs of regulations, such as the ones being considered here, and

to explore the implications of court decisions involving

regulation. The Joint Center and the economists submitting this

brief have a substantial interest in seeing that the Court

? See Tammy O. Tengs and John D. Graham, The Opportunity Costs

of Haphazard Social Investments in Life-Saving, in RISKS, COSTS, AND

LIVES SAVED: GETTING BETTER RESULTS FROM REGULATION (Robert W.

Hahn ed. 1996). (The authors, from the Harvard School of Public Health,

calculated that improved priority setting across federal agencies could

provide either savings of $31.1 billion from current cost levels with no

additional loss of life or savings of 60,200 lives at current cost levels.)

——" oer OS eee gee ae se ee Pha

3.

interprets the Clean Air Act in a manner that encourages sound

decisions and in a way that is consistent with the law as

established by Congress.

To that end the Joint Center asked the economists who

are signatories to this brief to identify principles that are

appropriate for setting National Ambient Air Quality Standards

as well as for making other important regulatory decisions. The

Joint Center and these economists are accordingly submitting

this brief in the interest of improving regulatory decisionmaking

as well as making it more transparent. All parties have

consented to the filing of this brief.

BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

In 1996, the EPA initiated rulemakings to revise the

National Ambient Air Quality Standards for ozone and

particulate matter (PM). The EPA prepared an RIA that

suggested that the costs of the ozone standards would exceed

the benefits while the benefits of the particulate matter standards

would exceed the costs. The Joint Center strongly favors using

such RIAs in decisionmaking and, without endorsing the quality

of all aspects of the RIA here, believes that the ozone and PM

RIA should have been considered in setting the standards. The

D.C. Circuit ruled, however, that Lead Industries barred any

consideration of costs and hence was unwilling to consider

whether a balancing of benefits and costs might provide the

requisite “intelligible principle” needed to resolve the

constitutional problems that it found with EPA’s interpretation

of the statute.’

> See Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 499 U.S. 1042 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

-4-

B. Nature and Importance of Benefit-Cost

Analysis

The concern of the Joint Center along with that of the

other signatories is how analytical methods, such as benefit-cost

analysis, should be used in regulatory decisionmaking.‘ These

methods can help promote the design of better regulations by

providing a sensible framework for comparing the alternatives

involved in any regulatory choice. Such analysis improves the

chances that regulations will be designed to achieve a particular

social goal specified by legislators at a lower cost.* In addition,

they can make the regulatory process more transparent by

providing an analytical basis for a decision. Greater transparency

in the process, in turn, will help hold regulators and lawmakers

more accountable for their decisions.

These analytical methods are neither anti- nor

proregulation; they can suggest reasons why it would be

desirable to have tighter or more lenient standards depending on

the resuiis of an analysis. For example, the benefit-cost analyses

in the RIA on particulate matter and ozone could be interpreted

as suggesting that the ozone standard should not be lowered

while a new PM standard for fine particles should be introduced

to protect public health.

* See KENNETH J. ARROW, MAUREEN L. CROPPER, GEORGE C. EADS,

ROBERT W. HAHN, LESTER B. LAVE, ROGER G. NOLL, PAUL R. PORTNEY,

MILTON RUSSELL, RICHARD L. SCHMALENSEE, V. KERRY SMITH, AND

ROBERT N. STAVINS, BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS IN ENVIRONMENTAL,

HEALTH, AND SAFETY REGULATION: A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES (1996)

(“Arrow et al.”); see also ROBERT W. CRANDALL, CHRISTOPHER DEMUTH,

ROBERT W. HAHN, ROBERT E. LITAN, PIETRO S. NIVOLA, AND

PAUL R. PORTNEY, AN AGENDA FOR FEDERAL REGULATORY REFORM

(1997).

> See ARROW et all.

-5-

Cc. Evolution of the Use of Benefit-Cost Analysis

in Regulatory Decisionmaking

Over the past two decades, support has been growing

for the proposition that weighing of benefits and costs should

play a more central role in regulatory decisionmaking. All three

branches of government have recognized the importance of

considering benefits and costs in designing regulation.°

To address the increase in regulatory activity over the

past three decades, the past five presidents and President

Clinton have introduced different analytical requirements and

oversight mechanisms with varying degrees of success. A

central component of later oversight mechanisms was formal

economic analysis, which included benefit-cost analysis and

cost-effectiveness analysis. Since 1981, presidents have required

the preparation of RIAs for a predefined class of significant

regulations.’ President Reagan’s Executive Order 12291

required an RIA for each significant regulation whose annual

impact on the economy was estimated to exceed $100 million.

President Bush used the same executive order. President

Clinton’s and President Reagan’s executive orders require a

benefit-cost analysis for significant regulations as well as an

® See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes and Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the

Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 8-11 (1995).

’ While the definition of a “significant” regulation has changed

somewhat over time, it is generally a regulation that is expected to have

one or more of the following characteristics: an annual impact on the

economy of $100 million or more; a major increase in costs or prices for

consumers or business; or significant effects on competition, employment,

investment, productivity, or innovation. President Reagan’s Executive

Order 12291 described such regulations as “major,” while President

Clinton’s Executive Order 12866 described them as “significant.” We will

use the term significant because it is used by the most recent executive

order.

-6-

assessment of reasonably feasible alternatives to the planned

regulation."

Congress has also shown increasing interest in

emphasizing the balancing of benefits and costs in regulatory

decisions. The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness

Act of 1996 requires agencies to submit final regulations to

Congress for review.” The regulatory accountability provisions

of 1996, 1997, and 1998 require the Office of Management and

Budget to assess the benefits and costs of existing federal

regulatory programs and to recommend programs or specific

regulations to reform or eliminate. The Unfunded Mandates

Reform Act of 1995 requires agencies, unless prohibited by law,

to choose the most cost-effective regulatory approach or

otherwise explain why they have not chosen this alternative.'°

The courts have also been receptive to the use of

benefit-cost analysis in decisionmaking. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit

recently held in State of Michigan v. EPA, 2000 WL 180650, at

*12 (D.C. Cir. 2000), that “[i]t is only where there is ‘clear

congressional intent to preclude consideration of cost’ that we

find agencies barred from considering costs.” The court went on

to cite various cases and legal authorities for the “general view

* The language in those two executive orders is very similar, suggesting

bipartisan presidential support for benefit-cost analysis. See Executive

Order 12291, 46 FED. REG. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981). “Regulatory action

shall not be undertaken unless the potential benefits to society for the

regulation outweigh the potential costs to society. . .. Regulatory objectives

shall be chosen to maximize the net benefits to society.” Jd. at § 2. See

also Executive Order 12866, 58 FED. REG. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993). “In

deciding whether and how to regulate, agencies should assess all costs and

benefits of available regulatory alternatives. . . . Further, in choosing

among alternative regulatory approaches, agencies should select those

approaches that maximize net benefits . . ., unless a statute requires another

approach.” /d. at § 1.

* 15 U.S.C. § 601 et seq.

0 20U.S.C. § 1535.

S.

that preclusion of cost consideration requires a rather specific

congressional direction.” /d. This case and others led Professors

Robert H. Frank and Cass R. Sunstein to conclude that

“[flederal law now reflects a kind of default principle: Agencies

will consider costs, and thus undertake cost-benefit analysis, if

Congress has not unambiguously said that they cannot.””"'

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

As we understand it, the D.C. Circuit did not allow the

EPA to consider the costs of complying with ozone and PM

NAAQS. As we further understand it, this legal ruling can be

overturned only by this Court. As economists, we believe that

the D.C. Circuit’s ruling not allowing the EPA to consider

important information relating to the consequences of its

regulatory actions is economically unsound. Without delving

into the legal aspects of the case, we present below why we

think the Court should aliow the EPA to consider costs in

setting standards. In particular, we believe that, as a general

principle, regulators should be allowed to consider explicitly the

full consequences of their regulatory decisions. These

consequences include the regulation’s benefits, costs, and any

other relevant factors.

ARGUMENT

We approach the question presented in this case from

the perspective of the “default principle” summarized by

Professors Frank and Sunstein.

Nothing in the following statutory text of section 109(b)

of the Clean Air Act precludes consideration of costs:

National primary ambient air quality standards

. . . Shall be ambient air quality standards the

'! ROBERT H. FRANK ANDCASS R. SUNSTEIN, COST-BENEFIT ANAL YSIS

AND RELATIVE POSITION, (AEI-Brookings Joint Center for R.egulatory

Studies Working Paper 00-5, 2000), at 8.

attainment and maintenance of which in the

judgment of the Administrator, based on such

criteria and allowing a margin of safety, are

requisite to protect the public health.'”

Indeed, the plain aim of this provision is protecting the “public

health,” and that aim is unlikely to be achieved without, at least,

an implicit balancing of benefits and costs.

Benefit-cost analysis is simply a tool that can aid in

making decisions. Most people do a kind of informal

benefit-cost analysis when considering the personal pros and

cons of their actions in everyday life—more for big decisions, like

choosing a college or job or house, than for little ones, like

driving to the grocery store. Where decisions, such as federal

environmental regulations, are by their nature public rather than

private, the government, as a faithful agent of its citizens, should

do something similar. :

Carefully considering the social benefits and social costs

of a course of action makes good sense. Economists and other

students of government policy have developed ways of making

those comparisons systematic. Those techniques fall under the

label benefit-cost analysis. Benefit-cost analysis does not

provide the policy answer, but rather defines a useful framework

for debate, either by a legislature or, where the legislature has

delegated to a specialized agency the responsibility of pursuing

‘a general good, by that agency.

'? 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1).

-9-

I. A GROUP OF ECONOMISTS DEVELOPS A

CONSENSUS ON THE USE OF BENEFIT-COST

ANALYSIS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL

REGULATION.

Economists, other policy experts, and the regulatory

agencies themselves have produced a large literature on the

methods and applications of benefit-cost analysis. There are, and

always will be, many uncertainties and disagreements about

those methods and their application in particular cases.

Nevertheless, a wide consensus exists on certain fundamental

matters. In 1996, a group of distinguished economists, including

Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow, were assembled to develop

principles for benefit-cost analysis in environmental, health, and

safety regulation.'? Here, we summarize and paraphrase for the

Court a number of principles that we think could be helpful in

this case, which involves the review of the EPA’s NAAQS

standard-setting decisions.

A benefit-cost analysis is a useful way of organizing

a comparison of the favorable and unfavorable effects of

proposed policies. Benefit-cost analysis can help the

decisionmaker better understand the implications of a decision.

It should be used to inform decisionmakers. Benefit-cost

analysis can provide useful estimates of the overall benefits and

costs of proposed policies. It can also assess the impacts of

proposed policies on consumers, workers, and owners of firms

and can identify potential winners and losers.

In many cases, benefit-cost analysis cannot be used to

prove that the economic benefits of a decision will exceed or fall

short of the costs. Yet benefit-cost analysis should play an

important role in informing the decisionmaking process, even

when the information on benefits, costs, or both is highly

uncertain, as is often the case with regulations involving the

3 See ARROW et al.

-10-

environment, health, and safety.

Economic analysis can be useful in designing

regulatory strategies that achieve a desired goal at the

lowest possible cost. Too frequently, environmental, health,

and safety regulation has used a one-size-fits-all or

command-and-control approach. Economic analysis can

highlight the extent to which cost savings can be achieved by

using alternative, more flexible approaches that reward

performance.

Benefit-cost analysis should be required for all major

regulatory decisions. The scale of a benefit-cost analysis should

depend on both the stakes involved and the likelihood that the

resulting information will affect the ultimate decision.

, Agencies should not be bound by a strict benefit-cost

test, but should be required to consider available

benefit-cost analyses. There may be factors other than

economic benefits and costs that agencies will want to weigh in

decisions, such as equity within and across generations.

Not all impacts of a decision can be quantified or

expressed in dollar terms. Care should be taken to ensure

-that quantitative factors do not dominate important

qualitative factors in decisionmaking. A common critique of

benefit-cost analysis is that it does not emphasize factors that are

not easily quantified or monetized. That critique has merit.

There are two principal ways to address it: first, quantify as

many factors as are reasonable and quantify or characterize the

relevant uncertainties; and second, give due consideration to

factors that defy quantification but are thought to be important.

a.

Il. IF AT ALL POSSIBLE GIVEN THE RELEVANT

LEGAL AUTHORITIES, THE COURT SHOULD

HOLD THAT SECTION 109%B) ALLOWS

CONSIDERATION OF BOTH BENEFITS AND

COSTS WHEN SETTING NAAQS.

We believe all of the available information should be

considered in making any important decision. If costs or other

types of data are deliberately left out, the quality of

decisionmaking is likely to suffer. In particular, we make one

recommendation, closely related to the Arrow et al. principles:

The Court should allow the EPA to consider costs in setting

NAAQS, so that these costs can then be assessed along with

benefits and any other important information.

We believe that it would be imprudent for the EPA to

ignore costs totally, particularly given their magnitude in this

case. Together, the EPA estimates that those standards could

cost on the order of $50 billion annually. Not considering costs

makes it difficult to set a defensible standard, especially when

there is no threshold level below which health risks disappear.

The EPA acknowledges that exposure to ozone presents a

“continuum” of risk, as opposed to a threshold below which

adverse health effects cease to occur.'* If the EPA is required to

set a standard “to protect the public health” with an “adequate

margin of safety,” then ignoring costs could lead to a decision

to set the standard at zero pollution.'* That alternative, however,

would be self-defeating—it would harm public health by

threatening the very economic prosperity on which public health

primarily depends.

Once the Court allows the EPA to consider costs,

Executive Order 12866 will require the EPA to consider the full

range of benefits and costs in setting NAAQS. We think that

'* 62 FED. REG. 38,856, 38,863 (July 18, 1997).

'S Clean Air Act § 109(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1).

-12-

considering such information could improve both the regulatory

decisionmaking process by making it more transparent and the

regulatory decision by allowing all relevant information to be

considered explicitly.

CONCLUSION

We believe that this Supreme Court case involving the

setting of National Ambient Air Quality Standards could be a

historic moment in the making of regulatory policy. This brief

has argued that it would be imprudent not to consider costs in

the setting of standards. In accordance with Executive Order

12866, we also believe that the full range of benefits and costs

should be considered in decisionmaking. Accordingly, this Court

should allow the Environmental Protection Agency to consider

costs in setting nationwide air quality standards, so that this

information can be considered along with benefits and any other

relevant factors in setting a standard.

Respectfully submitted,

Robert E. Litan

Counsel of Record

AEI-BROOKINGS

JOINT CENTER FOR

REGULATORY STUDIES

1150 17" St., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 797-6120

ao eng nag ee PT

=.

The amici curiae are:

AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies

Kenneth J. Arrow

Professor of Economics Emeritus, Stanford University

Nobel Laureate in Economics

Elizabeth E. Bailey

John C. Hower Professor of Public Policy, Wharton School,

University of Pennsylvania

Former Commissioner, Civil Aeronautics Boar«:

William J. Baumol

Professor of Economics Emeritus, Princeton University

Director, C. V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York

University

Jagdish Bhagwati

Arthur Lehman Professor of Economics and Professor of Political

Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations

Michael J. Boskin

T. M. Friedman Professor of Economics, Stanford University

Former Chairman, President’s Council of Economic Advisers

David F. Bradford

Professor of Economics and Public Affairs, Princeton University

Former Member, President’s Council of Economic Advisers

Robert W. Crandall

Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution

Fellow, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies

-14-

Maureen L. Cropper

Professor of Economics, University of Maryland

Chair, EPA Advisory Council on Clean Air Compliance Analysis

Christopher C. DeMuth

Former Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory

Affairs, Office of Management and Budget

George C. Eads ‘

Vice President, Charles River Associates

Former Member, President’s Council of Economic Advisers

Milton Friedman

Senior Research Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University

Nobel Laureate in Economics

John D. Graham

Professor of Policy and Decision Sciences, Harvard School of

Public Health, Harvard University

Director, Harvard Center for Risk Analysis

Wendy L. Gramm

Director, Regulatory Studies Program, Mercatus Center, George

Mason University

Former Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory

Affairs, Office of Management and Budget

Robert W. Hahn

Director, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies

-15-

Paul L. Joskow

Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Director, MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy

Research

Alfred E. Kahn

Robert Julius Thorne Professor of Political Economy

Former Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board

Paul R. Krugman

Professor of Economics, Princeton University

Lester B. Lave

University Professor and Higgins Professor of Economics,

Member, EPA Advisory Council on Clean Air Compliance

Analysis

Robert E. Litan

Vice President and Director, Economic Studies Program,

Rensicines Intinedl

Codirector, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies

Randall W. Lutter

Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute

Fellow, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies

Paul W. MacAvoy

Williams Brothers Professor of Management Studies, Y ale School

of Management, Yale University

Former Member, President’s Council of Economic Advisers

-16-

Paul W. McCracken

Edmund Ezra Day Distinguished University Professor Emeritus of

Busi Administration. E ics, and Public Policy,

University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

Former Chairman, President’s Council of Economic Advisers

James C. Miller II

John M. Olin Distinguished Fellow, Citizens for a Sound Economy

Foundation

Former Director, Office of Management and Budget

William A. Niskanen

Chairman, Cato Institute

Former Member, President’s Council of Economic Advisers

William D. Nordhaus

Griswold Professor of Economics, Yale University

Former Member, President’s Council of Economic Advisers

Wallace E. Oates

Professor of Economics, University of Maryland

University Fellow, Resources for the Future

Peter Passell

Senior Fellow, Milken Institute

Sam Peltzman

Sears, Roebuck Professor of Economics and Financial Services,

Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago

Director, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy

and the State, University of Chicago

-17-

Paul R. Portney

President, Resources for the Future

Former Chief Economist, President’s Council on Environmental

Quality

Alice M. Rivi

Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution

Former Director, Office of Management and Budget

Milton Russell

Professor of Economics Emeritus, University of Tennessee

Former Assistant Administrator for Policy, Planning, and

Evaluation, Environmental Protection Agency

Richard L. Schmalensee

Dean, Alfred P. Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts

Institute of Technology

Former Member, President’s Council of Economic Advisers

Charles L. Schultze

Senior Fellow Emeritus, Brookings Institution

Former Chairman, President’s Council of Economic Advisers

V. Kerry Smith

University Distinguished Professor, North Carolina State

Universi

Director, Center for Environmental and Resource Economics

Policy, North Carolina State University

Robert M. Solow

Professor Emeritus, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Nobel Laureate in Economics

Robert N. Stavins

Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government, John F.

Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

Chairman, EPA Environmental Economics Advisory Committee

Joseph E. Stiglitz

Professor of Economics, Stanford University

Former Chairman, President’s Council of Economic Advisers

Laura D'Andrea Tyson

Dean, Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley

Former Chair, President’s Council of Economic Advisers

W. Kip Viscusi

John F. Cogan, Jr., Professor of Law and Economics, Harvard

Law School, Harvard University

Murray L. Weidenbaum :

Chairman, Center for the Study of American Business, Washington

University, St. Louis

Former Chairman, President’s Council of Economic Advisers

Janet L. Yellen

Eugene E. and Catherine M. Trefethen Professor of Business

Administration and Professor of Economics, University of

California, Berkeley

Former Chair, President’s Council of Economic Advisers

Richard J. Zeckhauser

Frank P. Ramsey Professor of Political Economy, John F. Kennedy

School of Government, Harvard University

MNS