Respondents Brief — American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Browner

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Gapreme Court, US.

FILED

JUL 21 200

2

«

No. 99-1426 CLERK

In The Supreme Court of the United States

AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS, INC... ET AL.,

Cross-Petitioners,

v.

CAROL M. BROWNER, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL..,

Cross-Respondents.

On Writ Of Certiorari To The

United States Court of Appeals For The District Of Columbia Circuit

BRIEF OF STATES OF OHIO, MICHIGAN AND WEST

VIRGINIA IN SUPPORT OF CROSS-PETITIONERS

BETTY D. MONTGOMERY

Attorney General of Ohto

EDWARD B. FOLEY

State Solicitor

JUDITH L. FRENCH*

ELISE W. PORTER

FRANK J. REED, JR.

Assistant Attorneys General

Office of the Attorney General

30 East Broad Street, 17th Flr.

Columbus, Ohio 43215-3428

(614) 466-2872

Counsel for Respondent State of Ohio

*Counsel of Record

| Additional Counsel Listed on Inside Cover]

MARK J. RUDOLPH

Deputy Chief

Ottice of Legal Services

West Virginia Division of

Environmental Protection

1356 Hanstord Street

Charleston, West Virginia 25301]

(304) 558-9160

Counsel for Respondent State of West Virginia

JENNIFER M. GRANHOLM

Attorney General of Michigan

THOMAS CASEY

Solicitor General

ALAN F. HOFFMAN

PAMELA J. STEVENSON

Assistant Attorneys General

Natural Resources Division

300 S. Washington, Suite 315

Lansing. Michigan 48917

(517) 373-7540

Counsel for Responcent State of Michigan

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Clean Air Act requires that the Environmental

Protection Agency must, in setting national air quality

standards, ignore all factors “other than health effects relating

to pollutants in the air,” given that consideration of such

factors would permit both the Agency and reviewing courts

to avoid confronting constitutional nondelegation issues.

Ea. ~—_>

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ee I crcenseresnnnsnineneenncenmnsnssnentmennnsetl i

COs a Cy CD cccrertarsnesremnnemmnnninene iil

A. The Court Should Avoid Consideration of

the Nondelegation Issue by Interpreting

Section 109 to Allow EPA to Consider

Factors Other Than Direct Public Health

Effects When Setting A National Ambient

ET a ec cnevsssssnscssnnnensemenneenes 4

B. The Language and the Legislative History

of Section 109, as well as Principles of

Administrative Policy, Support the

Consideration of Costs and Other Factors

Besides Direct Public Health Effects in

Setting a National Ambient Air Quality

PRIN, ccscesncsecsnetsnmnesssmmemeemenammenmenies 10

a ag Onarnccevscncapsienscsnsevennsnsnnnsssescentenasmesemmpesnsesteets 22

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

CASES

American Petroleum Inst. v. Costle,

oe fly lk | | 14

American Petroleum Inst. v. U.S. EPA,

4 & Bl | ee 14

American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA,

175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999)..........cccccoceeese passim

Chevron U.S.A. v. NRDC,

£28 fe 9, 10, 16, 21

Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA,

el 15, 20

Ethyl Corp. v. U.S. EPA,

51 F.3d 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1995)................cccceees 14, 19

George E. Warren Corp. v. U.S. EPA,

199 F.3d 616 (D.C. Cir. 1998)...........ccccccccscccccceeees 13

Gomez v. United States,

Sa eas Se cccncensnssutmnnsennssnienenensemensmeenescned 4

Grand Canyon Air Tour Coalition v. FAA,

ok oe 13

Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit,

ee ee ee icicnnestsneneuneremenensepencammneneininenes |

International Union v. OSHA,

ee Se is Gale Be Recercccesecenenscscnsnecesien 19

Lead Industries Ass'n. v. U.S. EPA,

647 F.2d 1130(D.C. Cir. 1980)...................... passim

Michigan Department of Environmental Quality v. EPA

2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 3209

ie Ga Ge eeetenesnenmmnnennen 14, 15

Natural Resources Defense Council v. U.S. EPA,

902 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1990).........cccccccccsssrssrsesees 14

National Resources Defense Council v. U.S. EPA,

oe Te ee 13

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

Natural Resources Defense Council v. U.S. EPA,

824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987)... passim

Union Electric Co. v. U.S. EPA,

gE R Re eS EERIE 14

STATUTES

Clean Air Act §101;

Eee a ee 2

Clean Air Act §107;

Ps I iii aint iia 2

Clean Air Act §108;

Is aici 2, 11

Clean Air Act §108(a)(2);

a Ne ETT 11

Clean Air Act §108(a)(2)(A)-(B):

42 U.S.C. 7408(a)(2)(A)-(B) .......ccccccrsssesssssssseeseees 1]

Clean Air Act §108(b);

I 7,8, 11

Clean Air Act §108(b)(1);

Eee 11,12

Clean Air Act §108(b)(2);

I ls 12

Clean Air Act, §109;

I a ial passim

Clean Air Act, §109(b);

a aati alliances ia 15, 16

Clean Air Act, §109(b)(1);

Eo 10, 11

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

Clean Air Act, §109(d);

PRR oy 15

Clean Air Act, §109(d)(2)(A);

G2 U.S.C. FEBPIG ZA) ceccccccvccccccescccccccccvcccceccsccees 15

Clean Air Act, §109(d)(2)(C (iv);

42 U.S.C. 7409(d (2M CIV) .....ceccscesssscrrrereeereeeeeees 15

Clean Air Act, §1 10;

gk ky ses 5

Clean Air Act §110(a)(1);

Pog Ca |) 8

Clean Air Act §110(a)(2)(A);

42 U.S.C. T41 O(a 2A) .ceeceeereereereeeeeneneeneeneenneees 8

Clean Air Act §112;

SUE FOES cccencscsssreseesmemmennne 12, 15

FEDERAL REGISTER

62 Fed. Reg. at 38,652 (1997) ........cccrcsersrrsssrrrscsseeserees 19

62 Fed. Reg. at 38,856 (1997) .......csssssscsserrreeeeerreseeeesenees 20

62 Fed. Reg. at 38,863/3 (1997) .....ccccccccccesereeeeereeeeeeeeneeeees 5

62 Fed. Reg. at 38,867 (1997) .....ccccccscssseseseneereeeseeeeeeeeeeees 20

62 Fed. Reg. at 38,883/2 (1997) ........cscccsssserssessereeeeeeereeeeees 6

62 Fed. Reg. at 38,688 (1997) ..ccccccccssseeeeeeerereeeeeeeeeeeeees 19

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

MISCELLANEOUS

Senate Public Works Subcommittee on Air

Pollution, 91st Cong. 160 (1970)..........ccccceeeeeeeees 17

Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle 11-21 (Harvard

Ey GID Ce Phcrsemnescecessssonsesesnsnemensnstenmseneed 6

Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,

Report, 127 (May 12, 1977)

GOED CIID ccccscesenecsesencosscsencnnenssssssesseneesen 17

Congressional Research Service of the Library of

Congress for the Committee on Environment

and Public Works, U.S. Senate, A Legislative

History of the Clean Air Act Amendments of

FOR PD 6 Oe ee Piantesenninsnnennennsnemenmmenne 18

Stephen G. Breyer, Richard B. Steward, Cass R.

Sunstein & Matthew L. Sitzer, Administrative

Law & Regulatory Policy 65 (4th ed. 1999).......... 18

Wendy Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic

Risk Regulation, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1613

GST, Fier Prcnssncccscssenssssenscsncamemssnesinienesemvenen 19

INTRODUCTION

The States of Ohio, Michigan and West Virginia

(“Supporting States”), along with a number of other parties,

challenged the 1997 revisions to the national ambient air

quality standards for ozone and particulate matter issued

under section 109 of the Clean Air Act by the Environmental

Protection Agency (“EPA”). The District of Columbia

Circuit agreed with the challengers that EPA had not

articulated an “intelligible principle” for its revisions, and

remanded the case to the agency to do so. American

Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034-40 (D.C. Cir.

1999). However, the lower court, based on flawed precedent

in the Circuit, also held that the Administrator of EPA is

unable to consider any factor other than direct public health

effects when setting or revising a standard under section 109.

Id. at 1040-41. The Supporting States opposed EPA's

petition for certiorari (No. 99-1257)', and supported the

conditional cross-petition for certiorari of the American

Trucking Associations (No. 99-1426), both of which were

granted. The Supporting States submit this brief in support

of cross-petitioners American Trucking Associations in Case

No. 99-1426.

The regulation of public health and the environment

is of manifest importance to the Supporting States. Long

before federal legislation for air pollution controls, the Court

acknowledged the States’ responsibility to use their police

powers to combat air pollution. “Legislation designed to free

from pollution the very air that people breathe clearly falls

within the exercise of even the most traditional concept of

what is compendiously known as the police power.” Huron

Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442 (1960).

' Ohio did not oppose certiorari on the first question presented in EPA's

petition.

2

The Supporting States not only acknowledge, but

embrace their responsibility to ensure public health and a

safe environment. The Supporting States support efforts to

promote a healthy environment and control air pollution, and

therefore support the general goals and policies embodied in

the Clean Air Act. The Supporting States also support the

policy that consideration of public health is the primary

consideration in setting and implementing air standards.

Congress’s passage of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.

7401 et seg. (°CAA” or “the Act”), established a federal-state

partnership for controlling air pollution, but confirmed that

the States maintain primary responsibility for ensuring that

clean air is achieved. Specifically, while EPA is responsible

for setting and periodically revising air quality standards

under sections 108 and 109, the States are responsible for

adopting and enforcing an implementation plan that will

assure that the standards are met under sections 107 and 110.

CAA §§107, 108, 109, 110; 42 U.S.C. 7407, 7408, 7409,

7410.

EPA’s decisions in this case, as well as the lower

court's interpretation of section 109 of the Clean Air Act,

upset this federal-state partnership. The District of Columbia

Circuit, following a line of cases starting with Lead

Industries Ass'n vy. U.S. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir.

1980), held that EPA is bereft of discretion to consider the

social, economic and environmental costs of a national

ambient air quality standard under section 109; EPA can

consider only the direct public health consequences of the

particular pollutant. This interpretation can and does result in

EPA setting unrealistic standards without considering

numerous other factors, including the cost of implementation,

direct and indirect effects on the economy such as higher

costs for energy, and even the adverse health effects of a

lower amount of the pollutant. In addition, under EPA’s

3

interpretation, it can set a standard without a_ specific

explanation of the standard’s health benefits.

The States are then left to enforce an unjustified

standard that may be impossible to implement. Such an

unreasonable interpretation, when applied to a non-threshold

pollutant, would effect an unconstitutional delegation of

legislative power. See 175 F.3d at 1033.

The Supporting States therefore submit this brief to

respectfully request that the Court affirmatively resolve the

Statutory issue by holding that EPA can and should consider

costs as well as benefits when setting or revising a national

ambient air quality standard under section 109. Not only will

this interpretation avoid a potential constitutional issue, it

also is a reasonable interpretation of both the language and

the legislative history of the Clean Air Act. In addition, the

EPA can only make sound regulatory decisions, which the

States are expected to implement, when all factors regarding

a proposed standard are taken into account.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Industry parties have devoted approximately 100

pages of detailed analysis of the issues in this case. The

Supporting States do not reiterate all of that analysis here, but

submit this brief to present arguments most relevant to the

States. In addition, rather than repeat the factual account and

background adequately covered elsewhere, the Supporting

States hereby adopt the Statement of the Case of the

American Trucking Associations’ brief in this case.

The Supporting States submit this brief to make two

main points. First, EPA’s and the lower court’s

interpretation of section 109 creates significant problems for

the States. EPA’s failure to consider factors other than direct

public health effects in setting an air quality standard may

4

require States to meet an unjustified standard that is

impossible to implement using “enforceable” control

measures.

Second, the language and legislative history of the

Clean Air Act, as well as sound administrative judgment,

indicate that an interpretation of section 109 of the Act that

allows EPA to consider factors other than direct public health

effects of a non-threshold pollutant is reasonable. EPA’s

interpretation is unreasonable because it prevents the

consideration of non-public health factors, but allows EPA

unfettered discretion to set the standard without an

intelligible basis.

ARGUMENT

A. The Court Should Avoid Consideration of the

Nondelegation Issue by Interpreting Section 109 to

Allow EPA to Consider Factors Other Than Direct

Public Health Effects When Setting A National

Ambient Air Quality Standard.

This Court has made clear on numerous occasions

that it is “settled policy to avoid an interpretation of a federal

statute that engenders constitutional issues if a reasonable

alternative interpretation poses no constitutional question.”

Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 864 (1989). In this

case, a correct interpretation of section 109 will avoid

altogether the need to reach the nondelegation issue raised by

the lower court. The Supporting States therefore respectfully

request that this Court affirmatively avoid the constitutional

issue, affirm the lower court’s finding that EPA has failed to

articulate intelligible principles for selecting standards for

5

ozone and particulate matter, and allow EPA on remand to

consider costs and other non-health factors in adopting those

intelligible principles.

The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals

correctly found that EPA has failed to find an “intelligible

principle” for selecting a standard for ozone and fine

particulates. 175 F.3d at 1034. It therefore correctly

remanded the revised standard to EPA “to give the agency an

opportunity to extract a determinate standard on its own.”

175 F.3d at 1038. However, in so doing, the court acted as if

constrained by Lead Industries and its progeny to deny EPA

the one tool that would most help in selecting an air pollution

standard: the consideration of costs and other non-health

factors.

Ozone and fine particulates are “non-threshold”

pollutants; that is, there is no threshold amount, above which

deleterious health effects are certain, and below which no

health effects are known. As the lower court stated, “EPA

regards ozone definitely, and [particulate matter] likely, as

non-threshold pollutants, /.e. ones that have some possibility

of some adverse health impact (however slight) at any

exposure level above zero.” 175 F.3d at 1034, citing Ozone

Final Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38863/3 (1997). See also Natural

Resources Defense Council v. U.S. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146,

1148 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“Vinyl Chloride”) (a “non-threshold”

pollutant is one that “appears to create a risk to health at all

non-zero levels of emission”). Cf. Lead Industries, 647 F.2d

at 1137-41 (discussing various thresholds for lead exposure

used to support the standard for lead). The court below also

noted that “the only concentration|] for ozone... that is

6

utterly risk-free, in the sense of direct health impacts, is

zero.” 175 F.3d at 1034. ~

In the absence of a health threshold for a pollutant

such as ozone, it is not surprising that EPA has difficulty

articulating an “intelligible principle” based on health alone

for its ozone standard, as any presence of the pollutant is

assumed to present some threat to health. Without the ability

to consider some other factor, only one logical result is

possible if section 109 is read to protect against any threat to

health: EPA must set the standard for a non-threshold

pollutant at zero.

However, rather than setting the standard at zero,

EPA chooses to interpret section 109 to allow the

Administrator essentially unbounded discretion to select any

level of protection for a non-threshold pollutant, without

articulating a principled reason for doing so. Although EPA

states reasons for which it claims to have chosen the ozone

standard, they consist of vague references to “the nature and

severity” of health effects, “the size of the sensitive

populations at risk,” and the “kind and degree of

uncertainties that must be addressed.” 175 F.3d at 1034-35,

citing Ozone Final Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,883/2 (1997).

These factors do not provide a principled method for drawing

a line identifying a level of air quality that is “requisite” to

protect the “public health,” nor to determine “safety,” so that

an “adequate margin of safety” can be established. Viny/

Chloride, 824 F.2d at 1163-65.

* Threshold pollutants are not directly at issue in this case; however the

same arguments presented here with regard to non-threshold pollutants

may be made to some extent for threshold pollutants. Although there

may be a health-based threshold above which these pollutants pose a risk,

and that threshold should be the primary factor in setting the standard, it

is still a question whether the cost of abating a certain percentage of the

pollutant is worth the risk reduction. See Breyer, Breaking the Vicious

Circle 11-21 (Harvard University Press 1993).

The dilemma produced by Lead Industries and its

progeny, and EPA’s standardless assertion of authority is

what led the D.C. Circuit to invoke the nondelegation

doctrine, for if EPA does indeed have such boundless

discretion, then Congress has delegated too much legislative

authority to an executive agency. However, this Court is not

bound by the Lead Industries line of cases. The correct

interpretation of section 109 will permit EPA to establish

principled reasons for the standards set for non-threshold

pollutants, thus setting boundaries for EPA’s discretion, and

eliminating the nondelegation problem. Rather than

considering the constitutional nondelegation doctrine, the

Supporting States respectfully request that the Court reject

the rationale of the Lead Industries line of cases, thereby

permitting EPA to consider factors other than direct public

health effects when setting or revising a standard for an air

pollutant.

EPA's standardless assertion of authority creates

serious problems between the federal government and the

States. Despite EPA’s alleged inability to consider factors

other than direct public health effects, it is required to gather

and issue to the States information on just such factors when

setting the criteria on which the standards are based. The

States are issued “information on air pollution control

techniques,” including “data relating to the cost of

installation and operation, energy requirements, emission

reduction benefits, and environmental impact of the emission

control technology.” CAA §108(b); 42 U.S.C. 7408(b). In

addition, the information must include data on “available

technology and alternative methods of prevention and control

of air pollution,” as well as “aiternative fuels, processes, and

operating methods.” CAA §108(b); 42 U.S.C. 7408(b).

After EPA has set the standard, each State is required

to develop a state implementation plan, or SIP for that

8

pollutant. CAA §110; 42 U.S.C. 7410. Specifically, section

110 requires the States to adopt and submit to EPA a plan to

implement, maintain and enforce air quality standards. CAA

$1 10(a)(1); 42 U.S.C. 7410(a)(1). According to the Act, the

plan is to “include enforceable emission limitations and other

control measures, means or techniques (including economic

incentives such as fees, marketable permits, and auctions of

emissions rights), as well as schedules and timetables for

compliance, as may be necessary or appropriate to meet the

applicable requirements of this chapter.” CAA §110

(a2 A); 42 U.S.C. 7410(a)(2)(A).

In practical terms, States implement federal standards

by limiting emissions from “sources,” ¢.g., manufacturing

plants, electric utilities, automobiles. A manufacturing plant,

for example, may be forced to reduce emissions to meet State

requirements by purchasing advanced technology pollution

control equipment or reducing its hours of operation. An

electric utility, for example, may be forced to reduce

emissions by changing its fuel source to cleaner burning coal

imported from outside the region. State officials may reduce

automobile emissions by imposing emissions testing on car

owners and forcing equipment upgrades for older models.

The emission reductions resulting from the

combination of these individual control measures—imposed

through permit requirements for plants or license

requirements for car owners—create a State’s overall

strategy for implementing the federal standard. In creating

this strategy and making the difficult policy choices among

possible control measures, a State is presumably required to

consider and use the information provided for it under

section 108(b) on control techniques, costs of installation and

operation, energy requirements, emission reduction benefits,

and environmental impacts of the emission control

technology. CAA §108(b) 42 U.S.C. 7408(b). In addition,

this information is provided to the States early in the process,

9

presumably to allow them to participate in the federal rule-

making process.

Under the federal government's interpretation, EPA

could adopt a standard without considering any factor other

than direct public health effects, and without requiring EPA

to intelligibly explain the standard. At the same time,

however, the States must create the overall scheme for

meeting the standard by using “enforceable” control

measures and taking technological feasibility, cost and all the

other factors mentioned in section 108(b) into account.

If EPA’s interpretation is correct, it is free to

knowingly set a standard for a pollutant that is economically

impossible for the States to implement, and yet is

unsupported by an intelligible explanation of why EPA drew

the line where it did. The States are left in an impossible

position—required to attain the standard by a specific

deadline, using “enforceable emission limitations and other

control measures,” and taking cost and _ technological

feasibility into account, but without adequate public health

justifications.

If and when EPA provides adequate public health

justification and properly takes costs, technological

feasibility and other factors into account when setting a

national standard for a pollutant, the federal government can

then articulate an intelligible principle by which the standard

is set, and will be, in effect, taking responsibility for its own

decisions. The effects of technological feasibility, cost and

other factors, as well as the specific public health benefits of

an air quality standard can be debated openly with EPA. And

the standards, and the rationale behind them, will be properly

reviewable under the standard articulated in Chevron U.S.A.

v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

10

This Court is not bound by Lead Industries. The

Supporting States respectfully request that the Court resolve

this case without reaching the nondelegation doctrine by

correctly interpreting section 109 to allow and require EPA

to consider costs and other factors besides direct public

health effects in setting a standard for ozone and other non-

threshold pollutants.

B. The Language and the Legislative History of

Section 109, as well as Principles of Administrative

Policy, Support the Consideration of Costs and

Other Factors Besides Direct Public Health Effects

in Setting a National Ambient Air Quality

Standard.

When a court reviews a statutory interpretation

asserted by an executive agency, the court must answer two

questions. The first is “whether Congress has directly

spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of

Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter, . . .” Chevron,

467 U.S. at 842. If the statute is silent or ambiguous, the

court must determine whether the construction given it by the

administrative agency is “based on a permissible construction

of the statute.” /d. at 843. Lead Industries was wrongly

decided because the most reasonable interpretation of the

language of section 109 and related sections is that EPA has

the authority to consider factors other than health when

setting an air standard. And in addition to the language of

the statute, the legislative history and general principles of

administrative policy support the consideration of costs as

well as benefits when setting an air quality standard.

l. Under section 109, “ambient air quality standards”

are set, “the attainment and maintenance of which in the

judgment of the Administrator, based on such criteria and

allowing an adequate margin of safety, are requisite to

protect the public health.” CAA §109 (b)(1); 42 U.S.C.

enna

7409(b)(1). The language of section 109, and particularly its

use of the terms “criteria” and “margin of safety,” indicates

that EPA may consider factors other than public health in

setting a standard under section 109.”

EPA is to set or revise a standard under section 109

based on “criteria” issued under section 108. EPA issues the

“criteria” in the form of a document summarizing studies and

other scientific information on the direct public health effects

of a particular pollutant. Under section 108, the criteria “shall

accurately reflect the latest scientific knowledge useful in

indicating the kind and extent of all identifiable effects on

public health or welfare which may be expected from the

presence of such pollutant in the ambient air, ...” In

addition, the criteria are to incorporate information on a non-

exclusive list of factors, including other factors that might

alter the effects of the pollutant on public health and the

effect of other pollutants that might interact to cause adverse

health effects. CAA §108(a)(2)(A)-(B); 42 U.S.C.

7408(a)(2)(A)-(B). The fact that the list in section 108(a)(2)

is non-exclusive at least suggests that factors other than

“effects on public health or welfare” may be considered

when issuing “criteria” upon which to set or revise a

standard.

But even more telling is the very next subsection,

108(b). Simultaneously with issuance of the criteria, EPA

collects and issues to the States “information on air pollution

control techniques.” CAA §108(b)(1); 42 U.S.C. 7408(b)(1).

EPA gathers the information in consultation with advisory

committees and federal departments and agencies. CAA

* For more extensive discussions of the language of section 109 and

related sections, see Brief of American Trucking Associations Argument,

part Il A & B; see also Brief of Appalachian Power Company Argument,

part 1A & B.

12

§$108(b)(1); 42 U.S.C. 7408(b)(1). The information includes

data on a wide range of factors, including cost of installation

and operation, energy requirements, emission reduction

benefits, environmental impacts of the emission control

technology, alternative fuel processes, and operating methods

that will result in elimination or reduction of emissions,

CAA §108(b)(1); 42 U.S.C. 7408(b)(1). Section 108(b)(2)

also provides for the establishment of a standing consulting

committee for each pollutant, to develop the information in

section 108(b)(1). CAA §108(b)(2); 42 U.S.C. 7408(b)(2).

It is unlikely that Congress intended for EPA to gather and

issue information on factors other than direct public health

effects to aid the States in implementing a standard, if they

did not also intend for EPA itself to consider the information

in setting the standard.

The use of the term “public health” suggests that

factors other than medical effects are to be considered in

setting a standard. See American Trucking Associations

Brief, section II A. In addition, the use of the language

“margin of safety” in section 109 strongly suggests that

factors other than health are to be considered in setting a

standard. The word “margin” implies that there is a line from

which that margin is measured. When EPA sets a standard

for a threshold pollutant, as it did in Lead Industries, that line

may be supplied by the threshold itself. (Lead is, or was at

the time of Lead Industries, considered a_ threshold

pollutant.) But where a non-threshold pollutant such as

ozone is under scrutiny, there is no principled way, using

only direct public health effects, to determine such a line. A

“margin” must be measured from something, and if health

factors alone do not supply the line, then other factors must.

This point is explored in Vinyl Chloride. In Vinyl

Chloride, the D.C. Circuit held that section 112, which

requires EPA to set an air quality standard for hazardous

pollutants with an “ample margin of safety” to protect the

13

public health, did not preclude a consideration of costs. Vinyl

Chloride, 824 F.2d at 1163. Vinyl Chloride suggests that

EPA must make an initial determination of what is “safe”

based solely on “the risk to health.” /d. at 1165 although this

determination “does not require a finding that ‘safe’ means

‘risk free,” or free from uncertainty. /d. EPA is to

determine what inferences can be drawn from available

scientific data, and decide what risks are “acceptable.”

However, the court goes on to state that “by its nature the

finding of risk is uncertain” and “at this point of the

regulatory process . . . the Administrator may set the

emission standard at the lowest level that is technologically

feasible.” /d. In other words, once “safe” is determined

using direct public health effects, EPA may use technological

feasibility (and presumably other factors) to provide the

“margin of safety.”

In addition to Vinyl Chloride, other cases hold that

an agency can consider costs if not expressly precluded

from doing so by statutory language. See George E. Warren

Corp. v. U.S. EPA, 159 F.3d 616, 622-23 (D.C. Cir.

1998)(nothing in text precludes EPA’s consideration of

effects of proposed rule on the price and supply of

gasoline); Grand Canyon Air Tour Coalition v. FAA, 154

F.3d 455, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1998)(FAA may consider costs,

though not mentioned in the statute, in plan for “substantial

restoration of the natural quiet”); National Resources

Defense Council v. U.S. EPA, 937 F.2d 641, 645 (D.C. Cir.

1991)(EPA may use cost-benefit analysis in determining

whether fugitive dust from coal mines is a “major”

contributor to “significant deterioration” under sections 160

et seq.). As the D.C. Circuit observed recently, “These

cases are unexceptional in their general view that preclusion

of cost consideration requires a rather express congressional

direction.” Michigan Dep't of Environmental Quality v.

V4

EPA, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 3209 at *36-40 (D.C. Cir.

March 3, 2000) (“NOx SIP call” (emphasis supplied).*

Lead Industries directly contradicts this point. Lead

Industries held that where Congress did not expressly and

specifically provide for consideration of cost or other factors,

an agency may not consider them. 647 F.2d at 1148. See

also National Resources Defense Council v. U.S. EPA, 902

F.2d 962, 972-73 (D.C. Cir. 1990)(EPA precluded from

considering the health consequences of unemployment in

setting particulate standard); American Petroleum Inst. v.

Costle, 665 F.2d 1176, 1184-85 (D.C. Cir. 1981)(EPA cannot

consider attainability and cost justifications for ozone

standards); Vinyl Chloride, 824 F.2d at 1158-59 (dicta that

section 109 does “not allow consideration of technological or

economic feasibility”).

To be sure, the courts have correctly held that where

statutory language exclusively articulates the factors relevant

to an agency's decision, the agency may not base its decision

on other, irrelevant factors. See, e.g., Union Elec. Co. v. U.S.

EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976)(provision enumerating eight

criteria for consideration did not authorize consideration of

other criteria); American Petroleum Inst. v. U.S. EPA, 52

F.3d 1113, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (goal of ethane! marker

protection may not be considered in promulgating regulations

under section 211 because it could “possibly make air quality

worse”); Ethyl Corp. v. U.S. EPA, 51 F.3d 1053 (D.C. Cir.

1995 (denial of waiver based on health considerations (rather

than the statutorily-required criterion) found impermissible),

* The Supporting States were among those who challenged EPA's NOx

SIP call rule. EPA’s position in that case is wholly inconsistent with its

position here; there, EPA inappropriately overemphasized costs almost to

the exclusion of the impact on air quality in the determination of

“significant contribution.”

Catt

15

See also NOx SIP call, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 3209, *93

(Sentelle, J., dissenting).

But where, as here, there is no language articulating

an exclusive list of relevant factors, and no language

precluding the consideration of factors other than direct

public health effects, the Lead Industries rationale makes

little sense. The mandate in section 109(b), “an adequate

margin of safety,” is similar to “ample margin of safety,” the

language analyzed in Vinyl Chloride. The “adequate margin

of safety” language permits EPA less scientific uncertainty

than “ample margin of safety.” Environmental Defense Fund

v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Other than that,

there is no principled reason to distinguish the “margin of

safety” language in section 109(b) and in section 112.

Finally, section 109(d), under which EPA is to review

and revise criteria and standards every five years, requires the

establishment of an independent scientific review committee

to review and recommend changes to the criteria and

standards. CAA §109(d)(2)(A); 42 U.S.C. 7409(d)(2 (A). In

addition to advising the Administrator of areas in which

additional knowledge and research on public health effects is

needed, the committee is to advise the Administrator of a

large number of other factors. These factors include “any

adverse public health, welfare, social, economic, or energy

effects which may result from various strategies for

attaumment and maintenance of such national ambient air

quality standards.” CAA §109%d)2)”Cyiv); 42 U.S.C.

740% 0) 2C iv). in other words, the committee is to

investigate and report to the Administrator about public

health and non-public health factors regarding the national air

standards, Again, it is unlikely that Congress intended the

independent review committee and the Administrator to

investigate these factors, and yet not consider them when

revising an air standard,

16

In short, there is no “express congressional direction”

in the Clean Air Act as a whole, or in section 109 that

precludes EPA from considering cost or other factors when

setting or revising an air quality standard. On the contrary, a

reasonable interpretation of the language of the Act as a

whole, and section 109 itself, is that EPA is to gather and

consider such information when revising an air quality

standard. The Court should therefore hold that, properly

analyzed under Chevron and other cases, section 109(b)

allows EPA to consider costs as well as benefits in setting or

revising a standard.

2. The legislative history of the Clean Air Act also

includes indications that, while “criteria” deal exhaustively

with the scientific information available on the direct public

health effects of a particular pollutant, a “standard” should

also take other, non-health factors into account. The general

tenor of the debates certainly indicates a get-tough attitude

towards air pollution, and clearly demonstrates that the Act

was intended to be technology forcing. However, the history

also suggests that economic and technological factors were

not to be entirely ignored.

An exchange on this issue took place during 1970

Senate Public Works Subcommittee Hearings on Air

Pollution. At one point in the discussion, Senator Muskie

was discussing criteria and standards with Undersecretary of

the Department of Health Education and Welfare Veneman:

Muskie: The standard is something

different from the criteria, isn’t

it?

Veneman: The criteria are the basis upon

which you establish the

standard.

17

Muskie: How does that differ from a

criterion? What else is there of

a standard? ...

Veneman: . . .As well as the health

aspect, there are esthetic,

economic and other aspects.

You may want to take other

things into consideration in

your standards.

Senate Public Works Subcommittee on Air Pollution, 91“

Cong. 160 (1970).

The history of the 1977 amendments also contains a

pertinent comment in the Report by the Committee on

Interstate and Foreign Commerce. The Committee listed a

number of shortcomings in the existing standards, and then

stated:

The foregoing deficiencies in the [standards] are

pervasive and not easily cured. Some have

suggested that since the standards are to protect

against all known or anticipated effects and

since no safe thresholds can be established, the

ambient standards should be set at zero or

background levels. Obviously, this no-risk

philosophy ignores all economic and _ social

consequences and is impractical.

Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Report, 127

(May 12, 1977)(emphasis supplied).

Moreover, Congress has provided more than mere

suggestions, at least with regard to ozone. Congress has

18

already recognized that attainment of the |-hour ozone

standard was impossible or nearly so in some regions. In

enacting Title I, Part D, Subpart 2, Congress has set up an

alternative regime for managing ozone pollution, clearly

recognizing that attainment of the standard originally set by

EPA was not feasible given current technology. Comments

of Senator Durenberger with regard to the 1990 amendments

to the Act demonstrate this point:

{T]he whole purpose of this bill is, wherever

possible, to substitute, for artificial

unascertainable standards of health or safety,

technology standards that suit the economic

progress of an industrial society.

Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress

for the Committee on Environment and Public Works, U.S.

Senate, A_ Legislative History of the Clean Air Act

Amendments of 1990, 5683 (1993). As Congress clearly took

cost, technological feasibility and other factors into account

when it passed Subpart 2 of the Clean Air Act, it is

unreasonable to assume that Congress intends for EPA to

ignore these factors when revising a standard for the same

pollutant.”

3. Finally, sound administrative policy indicates that

cost in its broadest sense is always a factor in making a

decision about the environment and public health. “(CJan an

agency sensibly decide whether a risk is significant without

also examining the cost of eliminating it?” Stephen G.

Breyer, Richard B. Steward, Cass R. Sunstein & Matthew L.

Sitzer, Administrative Law & Regulatory Policy 65 (4" ed.

> As will be argued at more length in the Supporting States’ second brief,

given the existence of Subpart 2, EPA cannot revise the ozone standard at

all.

Be ak

19

1999). As discussed above, the consideration of non-health

factors is the only sensible way to establish an air quality

standard for a non-threshold pollutant. A_ cost-benefit

analysis means “only a systematic weighing of the pros and

cons” of a particular standard. /nternational Union v. OSHA,

938 F.2d 1310, 1319-21 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Public health

factors are not ignored, and indeed should be the primary

factor in determining a standard.

Some commentators have taken the view that

environmental agencies, while claiming to make decisions

based on science, are in reality largely cost and policy-

driven. Wendy Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk

Regulation, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1613 (Nov. 1995). Wagner

espouses the view that environmental agencies have

perpetuated a “science charade” in which they exaggerate the

role of science in setting standards in order to avoid

accountability for the underlying policy decisions.

Where, as here, the scientific support for a more

stringent standard is thin, cost and other non-health factors

are even more important in making a sound administrative

decision. EPA’s action in revising the ozone standard is

unsupported by any reliable scientific evidence sufficiently

demonstrating health benefits for the new standard. Instead,

EPA admits that the new ozone standard is largely the result

of a policy judgment. Reasons for the revised standard “were

largely judgmental in nature . . . and may not be amenable to

quantification in terms of what risk is ‘acceptable,’ or any

other metric.” 62 Fed. Reg. 38652, 38688 (1997).

EPA has not shown that the proposed ozone standard

is “requisite to protect the public health” with “an adequate

margin of safety.” The Court has construed “safety” under

the Clean Air Act as “a significant risk of harm.” Vinyl

Chloride, 824 F.2d at 1153 (quoting /ndustrial Union Dep't,

AFL-CIO vy. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 642

20

(1980)). See also Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 51 F.3d 1053, 1063

(D.C. Cir. 1995) (EPA’s departure from “significant risk of

harm” to “reasonable basis for concern” standard criticized).

As mentioned above, the statutory mandate to provide

an “adequate” margin of safety permits EPA to take into

account somewhat less scientific uncertainty than under an

“ample” margin of safety. EDF, 598 F.2d at 81. However,

the margin of safety inquiry supposes a significant public

health risk, and EPA has not demonstrated that the revised

ozone standard is needed to avoid significant health risks.

EPA admits that the science supporting the change in

the standard is uncertain. See, e¢.g., 62 Fed. Reg. 38856,

38867 (1997) (“the Administrator and CASAC have

recognized . . . that there are many uncertainties inherent in

[risk] assessments and that the resulting ranges of

quantitative risk estimates do not reflect all of the

uncertainties associated with the numerous assumptions

inherent in such analyses”). The dubious science relied on

by EPA was criticized by many, including the State of Ohio.

“It is not possible to make an informed change in the

standard since there is no statistical basis upon which to

distinguish the range of proposals.” Ohio's Comments,

Record No. IV-D-9934.

Without hard scientific facts showing a significant

risk of harm, EPA must have revised the standard based on

other factors as well. EPA admits that it selected the ozone

standard based on “public health policy judgments in

addition to determinations of a strictly scientific nature.” 62

Fed. Reg. 38856, 38867 (1997). These vague “judgments”

make it impossible to determine whether the standard

provides an “adequate margin of safety.”

With such uncertain health benefits for the new

standard, the prudent course is to balance them against costs

oe

and other factors. To be useful, however, estimates of costs

and other impacts must be comprehensive and accurate. The

Regulatory Impact Analysis (“RIA”) that EPA prepared (but

presumably did not consider in setting the ozone standard)

grossly underestimates the cost of the standard. For instance,

Ohio estimated that partial compliance with the standard for

the state would cost $760 million, while the RIA estimated

that partial compliance for the entire nation would cost $600

million. Ohio’s Comments, Record No. 1V-D-9934.°

In short, prudent administrative policy and plain

common sense demand that EPA consider costs and other

relevant factors when setting a new national ambient air

quality standard, while keeping the public health as its

primary goal. The Court should interpret section 109 to

allow and require that consideration.

The language of the Clean Air Act, as well as the

legislative history, point to the reasonable conclusion that the

EPA is to consider factors other than direct public health

effects when setting and revising a national ambient air

quality standard. Under the first part of Chevron, therefore, a

reviewing court must put the Congressional intent into effect.

But even if the intent is unclear, sound administrative policy

and plain logic render EPA’s rationale for revision of the

ozone and particulate standards “unintelligible.” Under the

second part of Chevron, a reviewing court must hold that

EPA’s rationale reflects an “impermissible construction of

the statute.”

* For a more extensive discussion of the costs of the revised ozone

standard, see Briet of Appalachian Power Company, er a/., Introduction,

part [I and Briet of American Trucking Associations, ef a/., Introduction,

part B I.

22

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the States of Ohio,

Michigan and West Virginia respectfully request that the

Court avoid the potential constitutional issue by reversing the

decision of the court of appeals to the extent that it precludes

EPA from considering “actors other than direct public health

effects of a pollutay’ when it sets or revises a national

ambient air qualit standard. In addition, the Supporting

States respectfully request that the Court order the lower

court to vacate the ozone and particulate matter standards,

and remand this case to EPA for reconsideration of those

standards.

Respectfully submitted,

BETTY D. MONTGOMERY

Attorney General of Ohio

EDWARD B. FOLEY

State Solicitor

JUDITH L. FRENCH*

ELISE W. PORTER

FRANK J. REED, JR.

Assistant Attorneys General

Office of the Attorney General

™®) East Broad Street, 17th Floor

Columbus, Ohio 43215-3428

(614) 466-2872

C aunsel for Respondent State of Ohio

*Counsel of Record

July, 2000

| Additional Counsel Listed on Next Page]

23

MARK J. RUDOLPH

Deputy Chief

Office of Legal Services

West Virginia Division of

Environmental Protection

1356 Hansford Street

Charleston, West Virginia 25301

(304) 558-9160

Counsel for Respondent State of West Virginia

JENNIFER M. GRANHOLM

Attorney General of Michigan

THOMAS CASEY

Solicitor General

ALAN F. HOFFMAN

PAMELA J. STEVENSON

Assistant Attorneys General

Natural Resources Division

300 S. Washington, Suite 315

Lansing, Michigan 48917

(517) 373-7540

Counsel for Respondent State of Michigan

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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