Amicus Curiae Brief — Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc.
Supreme Court brief2001
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No. 99-1257 tS
In The
Supreme Court of the |United States
S
CAROL M. BROWNER, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
- a a =e
AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS, INC., ET AL.,
Respondents.
S
On Writ Of Certiorari To The
United States Court Of Appeals
For The District Of Columbia Circuit
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BRIEF AMICI CURIAE OF THE INSTITUTE
FOR JUSTICE AND THE CATO INSTITUTE
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.................0.0000-. ii
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE..................... 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT....................--. 2
I. THIS COURT SHOULD MEANINGFULLY
ENFORCE THE NONDELEGATION DOC-
WE oa eUdednedpedinnsensensdamectnedcecens 4
II. SECTION 109(B)(1) OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT
FAILS TO PROVIDE AN INTELLIGIBLE PRIN-
CIPLE BY WHICH TO SET AIR QUALITY
STANDARDS FOR NON-THRESHOLD POLLU-
Ph 8 Ceinbececasevirsradscdeudcadibtieswies 13
A. Congress Has Knowingly Failed to Provide
EPA with an Intelligible Principle for Set-
ting Air Quality Standards for Non-Thresh-
Se STEEN WtkcsS ca vecudesededvsacesads 14
1. The Clean Air Amendments of 1970... 14
2. The Clean Air Amendments of 1977... 18
B. EPA’s Attempts to Set NAAQS Demonstrate
that Congress Has Failed to Provide EPA
with an Intelligible Principle for Setting Air
Quality Standards for Non-Threshold Pollu-
SE Cod ceeecereneséecevecsesoeoneseuceeue 22
III. THIS COURT SHOULD HOLD SECTION
109(B)(1) UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED
TO NON-THRESHOLD POLLUTANTS........ 26
SP 645 <nnundadivadasndupeudediakeessees 30
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. GS (1908) ....cccccccscsccsececscesennneenue 11
American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. EPA, 175
F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999)..........eeeeeeees 4, 21, 28
American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. EPA, 195
R3d 4 (DC. Cie. 1999)... cccccsqccccsssuseeeuneuee 28
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963)............. 13
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).............4. 5, 6
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)............... 4, 6, 8
Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (1904)............ 10
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)..........eeeeeees 28
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998)..5, 6, 7
Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892) ...........20008- 9, 10
Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst.,
448 U.S. 607 (1980)................. 11, 12, 13, 26, 30
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) .......... eee eeees 5
].W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S.
994 (1988)... cccccccescesausenneee 10, 11, 12, 13
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920) .... 79
Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens
for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S.
252 (1991)... cccccccceccessssesueeun nena 5
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Page
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989)........ 12
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S.
CRESS RSECGSenscencecccecccceseecececes: 12
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
i ES oc. ceGseccncccescccccccccces 5
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935)..... 11
Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364
thee ee hee e kee cbeeeeccescesceeceecece: 10
United ‘States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81
eee Pee eke eecasecococescceecccceccce 4
Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219
eee ce Ce Recnecesecccsesececcccecces )
Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825) ..... 8
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944)........... 12
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
ee cc cee coneccecoccccccesees 5
EEE ee 5
EE neces accaccccececccececcsecce 5
Copes AND STATUTES
EE 27
Te . cccccecccccccccces 27
33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A)...... 0.0 c cc ceecceeeeeeeeees 27
Te nn... ccccccccccscccccccecs 27
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Page
42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(4)(D). 66. e eens 27
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671........ eneaehescesedsuenenas 14
42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1). «2... eee eee ee eee ees 15
42 U.S.C. § 7409... ccc ccc e cece ee teeennees 15
42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1). ... 6 ee eee eee 2, 3, 14, 15
42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(2). .. 2... ee cece ee eee rere eens 15
42 U.S.C. § 7409)... 22. cece cece cece ence eee eenees 15
47 U.S.C. § WMa) ... 1. c weer c cece e eee eeeeceennes tocae
MisceELLANEOUS
43 Fed. Reg. 46,246 (1978) .........-.-eeeeees 16, 23, 24
50 Fed. Reg. 25,532 (1985) ..... 2... 0c cece e eee ees 23
50 Fed. Reg. 37,484 (1985) ........ 65. cece cere eee eee 23
53 Fed. Reg. 14,926 (1988) ..... 2... 2.5 - cece eee e eens 23
62 Fed. Reg. 38,652 (1997) ............ce cece eeeeeeee 23
62 Fed. Reg. 38,856 (1997) .......... 0 cece eee eeees 23, 24
Air Quality Management Division, U.S. EPA,
Review of the National Ambient Air Quality Stan-
dards for Lead: Assessment of Scientific and Techni-
cal Information (1989) ..........000eeeeeeeeeeeeeees 23
Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate
Matter and Ozone: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong.
CRGTE) . ov cccccccccccccccccncccccccesoccccceseccess 22
Vv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
The Federalist No. 47 (C. Rossiter ed., 1961) ........ 7,8
Joseph Feller, Non-Threshold Pollutants and Air
Quality Standards, 24 Envtl. L. 821 (1994)...16, 24, 25
Steven F. Huefner, The Supreme Court's Avoidance of
the Nondelegation Doctrine in Clinton v. City of
New York: More Than “a Dime’s Worth of Differ-
ence”, 49 Cath. U. L. Rev. 337 (2000)............... 8
Mark K. Landy, et al., The Environmental Protection
Agency: Asking the Wrong Questions from Nixon
fe I CI baci cecbeds cube ceded 23
Legislative History of the Clean Air Amendments
Se GE WEb Beccncdesscusesssiccssedccousences 17, 18
Legislative History of the Clean Air Amendments
GS Wee) WE Oi ccncevecscsccccnncsensecdsonenceess 16
Legislative History of the Clean Air Amendments
Ge Gave e Wh UE tnndconcesccccseviccsaseseesses 17, 20
Legislative History of the Clean Air Amendments
pS Ree re er 19, 20, 22
Legislative History of the Clean Air Amendments
OI 20
John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, in the
Tradition of Freedom, 244 (M. Mayer ed., 1957)...... 7
Randall Lutter & Christopher Wolz, UV-B Screen-
ing by Tropospheric Ozone: Implications for the
National Ambient Air Quality Standards, 31 Envtl.
ae, GS Pee See GI veces cccccuccccssccceess 21
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Joseph V. Rodricks, et al., Significant Risk Decisions
in Federal Regulatory Agencies, 7 Regulatory Tox-
icology and Pharmacology 307 (1987) ........-.
David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could
the Court Give It Substance?, 83 Mich. L. Rev.
v7.0). .) eer
Senate Committee on Public Works, 93rd Cong.,
2d Sess., Coordinating Comm. on Air Quality
Studies, Nat’l Academy of Sciences, Air Quality
and Automobile Emission Control (Comm.
Primt 1974) .....cccccccccccccccccscccssccssceces
Cass Sunstein, Is The Clean Air Act Unconstitu-
Page
tional?, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 303 (1999) ........ 16, 24, 26
Wendy Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk
Regulation, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1613 (1995) ......
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE!
The Institute for Justice is a nonprofit, public interest
law firm committed to defending the essential founda-
tions of a free society through securing greater protection
for individual liberty and restoring constitutional limits
on the power of government. Toward that end, the Insti-
tute seeks to reinvigorate those founding principles, such
as the separation of powers, crucial to the preservation of
freedom.
The Cato Institute was established in 1977 as a non-
partisan public policy research foundation dedicated to
advancing the principles of individual liberty, free mar-
kets, and limited government. Cato’s Center for Constitu-
tional Studies was established in 1989 to help restore the
principles of limited constitutional government, includ-
ing the idea that the U.S. Constitution separates power
among three coordinate branches of the federal govern-
ment in order to preserve citizens’ liberty. The instant
case squarely addresses the limits on the power of Con-
gress to delegate its power to executive agencies and thus
is of central interest to Cato and the Center.
1 In conformity with Supreme Court Rule 37, amici have
obtained the consent of the parties to the filing of this brief, and
letters of consent have been filed with the Clerk. Amici also state
that counsel for a party did not author this brief in whole or in
part and that no persons or entities other than amici, their
members, and their counsel made a monetary contribution to
the preparation and submission of this brief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Section 109(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7409(b)(1), is unconstitutional as applied to non-thresh-
old pollutants because the statute provides no intelligible
principle by which the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) is to set National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS) for such pollutants.
In order to preserve the liberty of the American peo-
ple, the Constitution’s Framers separated power among
three coordinate branches of the federal government.
Implicit in this structure is the idea that the political
branches may not reallocate authority among themselves
as they see fit. Accordingly, this Court has long recog-
nized that Congress may not freely delegate the legisla-
tive powers vested in it by the Constitution.
In order to enforce what is known as the nondelega-
tion doctrine, this Court has held that Congress must
provide executive agencies or others with an intelligible
principle to govern the exercise of delegated authority.
But unfortunately, in a series of precedents over the last
60 years, this Court has refused to meaningfully enforce
this important constitutional requirement. Instead, it has
allowed Congress to avoid its responsibility to make diffi-
cult policy choices, thereby impairing the separation of
powers and diminishing individual liberty. The instant
case, however, presents this Court with an appropriate
opportunity to breathe life into the intelligible principle
test once again.
When Congress passed the Clean Air Amendments of
1970, it assumed that those air pollutants falling under
the ambit of Section 109 were threshold pollutants, mean-
ing that there was a concentration level above which
those pollutants were a threat to health and below which
they were not. It thus directed EPA to establish primary
air quality standards below the threshold concentration
for adverse health effects, mandating that such standards
be “requisite to protect the public health” with “an ade-
quate margin for safety.” 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1).
It soon became clear, however, that many, if not all,
Section 109 pollutants were actually non-threshold pollu-
tants, meaning that adverse health impacts occurred at
any concentration level above zero. While Congress recog-
nized this reality at the time that it passed the Clean Air
Amendments of 1977 and clearly indicated that it did not
want the NAAQS for non-threshold pollutants set at zero,
it nonetheless failed to set forth a new intelligible princi-
ple. As a result, the principle by which EPA is directed to
set air quality standards for non-threshold pollutants is
not only unintelligible but it is nonsensical, as it is impos-
sible for EPA to set standards that “protect the public
health” with an “adequate margin for safety.”
The statute as currently written requires EPA to
engage in an entirely arbitrary exercise of determining a
degree of adverse health effects that is acceptable, an
inquiry for which the Clean Air Act provides no guid-
ance. Therefore, in a matter with enormous impact on
both the health of the American people and the vitality of
the nation’s economy, Congress has abdicated its consti-
tutional responsibility to make a fundamental policy
choice. Although it easily could have provided an intel-
ligible principle to cabin EPA’s discretion, Congress has
instead impermissibly delegated its legislative power to
the agency.
While the D.C. Circuit correctly ruled be'ow that
EPA’s construction of Section 109(b)(1) in its ozone and
particulate matter (PM) rules effectuated an unconstitu-
tional delegation of power, its decision to allow EPA “an
opportunity to extract a determinate standard on its
own”2 was inappropriate. The nondelegation doctrine
does not permit an agency to supply its own intelligible
principle where none is present in the statute. The point
of the nondelegation doctrine is not that agencies must
provide rational explanations for their behavior, but that
Congress must set forth an intelligible principle to guide
agency discretion. As Congress has failed to do so here,
this Court should declare Section 109(b)(1) to be uncon-
stitutional as applied to non-threshold pollutants.
I. THIS COURT SHOULD MEANINGFULLY
ENFORCE THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE.
The separation of powers plays a crucial role in our
constitutional framework. As this Court has noted, “The
principle of separation of powers was not simply an
abstract generalization in the minds of the Framers: it
was woven into the document that they drafted in Phila-
delphia in the summer of 1787.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 124 (1976). Although many aspects of the Constitution
are premised on the importance of checks and balances,
central to the Framers’ design was the distribution of the
2 American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027,
1038 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
federal government’s power among three coordinate
_ branches, with legislative powers vested in Congress,
executive powers vested in the President, and judicial
powers vested in this Court as well as such inferior
courts as Congress would establish. See U.S. Const. art. I,
§ 1; art. II, § 1; art. III, § 1.
This arrangement is not designed to secure efficiency
or to promote administrative convenience; rather, “[t]he
ultimate purpose of this separation of powers is to pro-
tect the liberty and security of the governed.” Metro-
politan Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the
Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc. 501 U.S. 252, 272 (1991).3
Accordingly, this Court often has rejected efforts by Con-
gress and the President to rearrange power in a manner
hostile to our constitutional framework. In no less than
six cases over the last 25 years, this Court has struck
down congressional enactments as contrary to the consti-
tutionally mandated separation of powers.* In these
3 See also Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986) (“That
this system of division and separation of powers produces
conflicts, confusion, and discordance at times is inherent, but it
was deliberately so structured . . . to provide avenues for the
operation of checks on the exercise of governmental power”).
4 See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998)
(invalidating Line Item Veto Act); Metropolitan Washington
Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc.,
501 U.S. 252 (1991) (invalidating provision of Transfer Act
regarding composition of Metropolitan Washington Airports
Authority’s Board of Review); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714
(1986) (invalidating portion of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
Act); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (invalidating “legislative
veto” provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act);
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S 50
cases, this Court reached the same conclusion whether
Congress had aggressively encroached on another
branch’s power or had instead chosen to voluntarily cede
its own power. Compare Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714
(1986) (striking down attempt by Congress to assign exec-
utive powers to officer under its control) with Clinton v.
City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (invalidating con-
gressional attempt to delegate to the President the power
to amend Acts of Congress). This is because the separa-
tion of powers is not designed to safeguard the interests
of those occupying public office; rather, its purpose is to
protect the liberty of the American people.
In Clinton v. City of New York, Justice Kennedy
explained why this Court must not allow a branch of
government to voluntarily relinquish the powers vested
in it by the Constitution:
To say the political branches have a somewhat
free hand to reallocate their own authority
would seem to require the acceptance of two
premises: first, that the public good demands it,
and second, that liberty is not at risk. The for-
mer premise is inadmissible. The Constitution’s
structure requires a stability which transcends
the convenience of the moment. The latter prem-
ise, too, is flawed. Liberty is always at stake when
one or more branches seek to transgress the separa-
tion of powers.
(1982) (invalidating Bankruptcy Act’s delegation of authority to
Article I courts); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (invalidating
composition of the Federal Election Commission as established
by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971).
524 U.S. at 449-50 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations
omitted) (emphasis added).5
It has long been established, therefore, that Congress
may not freely delegate its legislative powers. This princi-
ple, commonly referred to as the nondeiegation doctrine,
traces its roots back to two of Europe’s most distin-
guished and influential political philosophers. John
Locke, writing in 1690, stated that “[t]he legislative can-
not transfer the power of making laws to any other
hands; for it being but a delegated power from the peo-
ple, they:who have it cannot pass it over to others.”6
Locke pointed out that the power vested by the people in
the legislature was “only to make laws, and not to make
legislators.”? Montesquieu, furthermore, warned of the
dangers that would result from allowing legislative and
executive powers to be joined together: “When the legis-
lative and executive powers are united in the same per-
son or body, there can be no liberty, because
apprehensions may arise lest the same monarch or senate
should enact tyrannical laws to execute them in a tyranni-
cal manner.”®
> Justice Kennedy also observed, “That a congressional
cession of power is voluntary does not make it innocuous. The
Constitution is a compact enduring for more than our time, and
one Congress cannot yield up its own powers, much less those
of other Congresses to follow. Abdication of responsibility is not
part of the constitutional design.” Clinton, 524 U.S. at 452
(citations omitted).
¢ John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, in the Tradition
of Freedom 244 (M. Mayer ed., 1957).
7 Id.
8 The Federalist No. 47, at 303 (C. Rossiter ed., 1961)
(quoting Montesquieu).
This sentiment had a marked impact on the Framers
of the Constitution. James Madison quoted that passage
from Montesquieu in Federalist No. 47, and, in addition,
echoed the French philosopher’s view that “there can be
no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are
united in the same person, or body of magistrates.”? This
Court has acknowledged the influence of Montesquieu’s
work as well: “the Constitution was . . . true to Montes-
quieu’s well-known maxim that the legislative, executive,
and judicial departments ought to be separate and dis-
tinct.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 120.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the nondelegation
doctrine emerged early in this Court’s jurisprudence. In
Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42 (1825), for
example, Chief Justice Marshall wrote, “It will not be
contended that Congress can delegate to the Courts, or to
any other tribunals, powers which are strictly and exclu-
sively legislative.” The doctrine, however, did not figure
prominently in this Court’s nineteenth-century jurispru-
dence for congressional delegations in that era were few
and far between. Those delegations that did take place
almost always shared at least one of two common fea-
tures. First, Congress “legislated in contingency,” mean-
ing that it authorized the President to take prescribed
action when he ascertained certain facts to be true.!° And
second, almost all such “delegations” arose in those areas
9 Id. (quoting Montesquieu).
10 See, e.g., Steven F. Huefner, The Supreme Court's
Avoidance of the Nondelegation Doctrine in Clinton v. City of New
York: More Than “a Dime’s Worth of Difference”, 49 Cath. U. L.
Rev. 337, 342-46 (2000).
of foreign affairs and trade that are closely related to the
President’s executive power to formulate foreign policy.!!
In Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892), for example, the
Court considered the constitutionality of a statute remov-
ing tariffs on the importation of certain agricultural
goods, but authorizing the President to reimpose tariffs
upon goods from any country failing to treat American
goods reciprocally. Rejecting a nondelegation doctrine
challenge, the Court held that the statute did not
empower the President to make law but instead autho-
rized him to find facts in enforcing the trade policy
established by Congress. 143 U.S. at 692-93. In so holding,
however, this Court strongly reaffirmed the vitality of the
nondelegation doctrine: “That Congress cannot delegate
legislative power to the President is a principle univer-
sally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance
of the system of government ordained by the Constitu-
tion.” Id. at 692.
Near the end of the century, Congress began to dele-
gate authority more frequently, and as a result more cases
involving delegation began to reach this Court. In some
of these cases, congressional attempts to relinquish legis-
lative powers were struck down. See Washington v. W.C.
Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 227 (1924) (prohibiting Con-
gress from delegating the “power to alter the maritime
law”); United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81,
87-88 (1921) (holding that the Lever Act, which made it
unlawful for any person to charge unreasonable prices
11 See id. at 343-346; David Schoenbrod, The Delegation
Doctrine: Could the Court Give It Substance?, 83 Mich. L. Rev.
1223, 1262-63 (1985).
10
for “necessaries,” amounted to a delegation by Congress
of legislative power to courts); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v.
Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 164 (1920) (invalidating improper
delegation of maritime law to the states). In other cases,
delegations were upheld; but in each of these instances,
this Court made it clear that delegated authority must be
accompanied by adequate congressional guidance. See,
e.g., Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364, 386
(1907) (“[T]he Secretary of War will only execute the
clearly expressed will of Congress, and will not, in any
true sense, exert legislative or judicial power”); Buttfield
v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 496 (1904) (“[The Tea Act] does
not, in any real sense, invest administrative officials with
the power of legislation. Congress legislated on the sub-
ject as far as was reasonably practicable”).
In ].W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S.
394 (1928), a case like Field v. Clark involving tariff adjust-
ment, this Court attempted to synthesize its nondelega-
tion doctrine precedents. In doing so, it recognized the
importance of maintaining the separation of powers, see
id. at 406 (“[I]t is a breach of the National fundamental
law if Congress gives up its legislative power and trans-
fers it to the President”), while at the same time acknowl-
edging that enforcement of the principle was not
susceptible to a bright-line rule if the federal government
was to remain capable of effectively exercising its sub-
stantive powers. See id. (“In determining what [a branch
of government] may do in seeking assistance from
another branch, the extent and character of that assis-
tance must be fixed according to common sense and the
inherent necessities of governmental co-ordination”).
11
Striking a balance between these countervailing con-
cerns, this Court set forth a new standard for assessing
the constitutionality of congressional delegations,
explaining that “[i]f Congress shall lay down by legisla-
tive act an intelligible principle [to govern the exercise of
delegated authority], such legislative action is not a for-
bidden delegation of legislative power.” Id. at 409.
Implementing the “intelligible principle” test, this
Court soon struck down two statutes for failing to set
forth adequate standards to guide the conduct of the
executive branch. In Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S.
388 (1935), it invalidated a section of the National Indus-
trial Recovery Act (NIRA) authorizing the President to
prohibit the interstate transportation of petroleum priced
in violation of state-imposed production quotas. The
Court complained that the statute “left the matter to the
President without standard or rule, to be dealt with as he
pleased.” Id. at 418. Similarly, in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), this Court
struck down another section of the NIRA, this one
empowering the President to establish “codes of fair com-
petition” in certain industries “for the protection of con-
sumers, competitors, employees, and others, in
furtherance of the public interest.” The Court once again
observed that Congress’ grant of authority was open-
ended, “set(ting] up no standards, aside from the general
aims of rehabilitation, correction, and expansion
described in section one [of the NIRA].” Id. at 541.
In the 65 years since Schechter, however, this Court
has largely abdicated its responsibility of ensuring that
congressional delegations of authority are accompanied
by intelligible principles. See Industrial Union Dep't v.
12
American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 674-75 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring) (“[T]he principle that Con-
gress could not simply transfer its legislative authority to
the Executive fell under a cloud”). As a result, it has
upheld numerous delegations of open-ended authority
against nondelegation doctrine challenges. See, e.g., Yakus
v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426-27 (1944) (upholding
delegation to Price Administrator of authority to fix
“fair” and “equitable” commodities prices); National
Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943)
(affirming FCC’s authority to regulate broadcast licensing
“as public interest, convenience, or necessity require”).
Crucially, though, this Court has never overruled the J.W.
Hampton, Jr., Co. “intelligible principle” test, ostensibly
continuing to apply it even in cases affirming the consti-
tutionality of seemingly unbounded delegated discretion.
See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372
(1989). Moreover, despite the general trend, various Jus-
tices, from time to time, have called for exhuming the
nondelegation doctrine from this Court's jurisprudential
graveyard.
In Industrial Union Dep't, for example, Chief Justice
Rehnquist argued in a concurring opinion that a provi-
sion of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970
ran afoul of the nondelegation doctrine. In doing so, he
identified the important functions served by the doctrine:
(1) “ensur[ing] to the extent consistent with orderly gov-
ernmental administration that important choices of social
policy are made by Congress, the branch of our Govern-
ment most responsive to the popular will”; (2) guarantee-
ing that the recipients of delegated authority are
provided with “an ‘intelligible principle’ to guide the
13
exercise of the delegated discretion”; and (3) facilitating
judicial review of “the exercise of delegated legislative
discretion.” 448 U.S. at 685-86. See also Arizona v. Califor-
nia, 373 U.S. 546, 626 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting in
part).
While each of these functions may appear unrelated
to the others, they are not, for each, in its own way, is a
manner in which the nondelegation doctrine helps to
secure the liberty of the American people. For this reason,
liberty is threatened when the nondelegation doctrine, an
important component of the separation of powers, is
ignored. And it is for this reason that this Court should
revitalize the nondelegation doctrine.
Il. SECTION 109(B)(1) OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT
FAILS TO PROVIDE AN INTELLIGIBLE PRINCI-
PLE BY WHICH TO SET AIR QUALITY STAN-
DARDS FOR NON-THRESHOLD POLLUTANTS.
The instant case provides this Court with an impor-
tant opportunity to reinvigorate the nondelegation doc-
trine by meaningfully applying the intelligible principle
test set forth in ].W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. As will be shown,
Congress’ failure to provide an intelligible principle here
was neither borne of necessity nor practicality. It instead
resulted from a misunderstanding about the effects of air
pollutants. And while Congress recognized its mistake
over two decades ago, it consciously chose to ignore the
conundrum its prior directive had created for EPA, thus
abdicating its constitutional responsibility to provide
meaningful guidance to the agency.
14
A. Congress Has Knowingly Failed to Provide EPA
with an Intelligible Principle for Setting Air
Quality Standards for Non-Threshold Pollu-
tants.
In order to understand why Section 109(b)(1) fails to
provide an intelligible principle by which to set air qual-
ity standards for non-threshold pollutants, it is necessary
to review the history of the provision. When Section 109
was adopted in 1970, Congress assumed that the pollu-
tants covered by the provision had discernible thresholds
above which pollution levels threatened health and below
which they did not. On this basis, legislators established
a regulatory regime based on the intelligible principle
that air pollution would be controlled by keeping the
level of pollutants below their respective thresholds -
“with an adequate margin of safety,” 42 U.S.C.
§ 7409(b)(1). By 1977, however, Congress fully recognized
that many Section 109 pollutants had no such thresholds
at all. But despite a clear awareness of the nature of these
pollutants and an express recognition of the economic
and practical infeasibility of banning such pollutants alto-
gether, Congress did not alter the provision, thus depriv-
ing EPA of an intelligible principle by which to set air
quality standards for non-threshold pollutants.
1. The Clean Air Amendments of 1970
With the passage of the Clean Air Amendments of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671), Congress initiated a massive effort
15
to clean the nation’s air. The National Ambient Air Qual-
ity Standards (NAAQS), 42 U.S.C. § 7409, which are sup-
posed to represent the maximum concentrations of
various air pollutants that are compatible with “public
health and welfare,” are a central component of that
effort. The basic rules governing NAAQS are laid out in
Sections 108 and 109 of the Clean Air Act. Pursuant to
Section 108, EPA develops an “air quality” “criteria docu-
ment” for “each air pollutant —- emissions of which
... Cause or contribute to air pollution which may reason-
ably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare”
and “the presence of which in the ambient air results
from numerous or diverse mobile or stationary sources.”
42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1). Once these criteria documents are
reviewed by the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Commit-
tee, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d), EPA promulgates primary and
secondary NAAQS for the pollutant, which are also
reviewed by the Advisory Committee. The primary
NAAQS is set at a level “requisite to protect the public
health” with “an adequate margin of safety.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 7409(b)(1). The secondary NAAQS is set at a level
“requisite to protect the public welfare.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 7409(b)(2).
The legislators’ extensive discussion of ambient air
quality in 1970 reveals that Congress at that time pre-
sumed that all pollutants addressed by Section 109 were
“threshold pollutants” - namely pollutants with an iden-
tifiable level above which adverse health effects are
observed and below which those health effects are absent.
Because they believed that every relevant pollutant had a
discernible threshold, legislators articulated the following
principle by which to set air quality standards: A primary
16
NAAQS should be set safely below a pollutant’s thresh-
old level.
In order to assure that threshold levels for pollutants
would not be surpassed, Congress directed EPA to isolate
an exact threshold level for each pollutant, and then
establish an air quality standard sufficiently below that
level so as to avoid adverse health effects with “an ade-
quate margin of safety.”!? See 43 Fed. Reg. 46,246, 46,247
(1978) (“It is clear from section 109 that [EPA] should not
attempt to place the standard at a level estimated to be at
the threshold for adverse health effects but should set the
standard at a lower level in order to provide a margin of
safety”).
As Representative Rogers explained, “The Secre-
tary . . . will set a national air quality standard for
ambient air quality . . . based on criteria, scientific infor-
mation as to how many parts per million are permissible
for particular pollutants.” Legislative History of the
Clean Air Amendments of 1970 (“Legislative History”),
Vol. II, at 819. Rogers, along with his colleagues, however,
never conceived of the possibility that zero parts per
million would be permissible for a particular pollutant.
They had complete confidence in the threshold model
12 See Joseph Feller, Non-Threshold Pollutants and Air
Quality Standards, 24 Envtl. L. 821, 823 (1994) (“A
critical . . . assumption underlies . . . the structure of the Clean
Air Act. . . . The assumption is that, for each pollutant of
concern, there is a threshold concentration, represented by the
NAAQS, above which the pollutant is a threat to health or
welfare and below which it is not”); see also Cass Sunstein, Is
The Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 303, 314
(1999).
17
because scientists had already identified safe non-zero
thresholds for all pollutants studied pursuant to the Air
Quality Act of 1967 that were likely to be regulated under
Section 109.}5
The expert testimony of Dr. John T. Middleton, Commis-
sioner of the National Air Pollution Control Administration,
exemplifies the scientific understanding of the time. In the
context of extended testimony before the Senate Subcommit-
tee on Air and Water Pollution on the Clean Air Amend-
ments of 1970, Dr. Middleton lent credence to the threshold
model by testifying that it could yield “a level of air quality
that will be protective of health.” Id. at 1184. According to
Dr. Middleton, “The criteria documents state the level at
which [health] effects begin, some measurable things that are
observed to take place. The Clean Air Act provides that the
standards shall be protective of health, which means they
must be lesser than the level at which this thing was
observed.” Id. at 1185.'4
13 These five pollutants - sulfur oxides, particulates, carbon
monoxide, hydrocarbons, and photochemical oxidants — were at
the time all considered threshold pollutants, as evidenced by
exhibit 1 presented by Senator Muskie to the Senate. Legislative
History of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Vol. I, at 243-47.
The fact that thresholds had already been identified for these
pollutants was referred to repeatedly throughout legislative
reports and debates. See, e.g., Senate Committee on Public
Works Report, id. at 409; Remarks of Representative Jarman,
Legislative History, Vol. II at 815.
44 The Senate Committee on Public Works Report
demonstrates that the Committee concurred with Dr.
Middleton’s interpretation: “Ambient air quality is sufficient to
protect the health of such persons whenever there is an absence
of adverse effect on the health of a statistically related sample of
18
In adopting the threshold concept as the underlying
principle by which air quality standards are set, Con-
gress’ original mandate to EPA was therefore quite sim-
ple. It directed EPA to isolate thresholds for air pollutants
and then, without performing cost-benefit analysis, to
promulgate strict standards with “an adequate margin of
safety” to assure that those concentration levels were not
reached. Or, as Senator Muskie put it, “[The Act] states
that all Americans in all parts of the Nation should have
clean air to breathe, air that will have no adverse effects
on their health.” Legislative History, Vol. I, at 224
(emphasis added).
2. The Clean Air Amendments of 1977
After passage of the 1970 Amendments, the EPA
began setting air quality standards “on the assumption
that [ ] thresholds d[id] exist.”!5 By 1977, however, legis-
lators knew that the language of Section 109 had been
based on a myth - that.pollutants covered by Section 109
standards were not all threshold pollutants. Indeed, sev-
eral of the pollutants, including ozone, which were previ-
ously considered threshold pollutants, were now clearly
persons in sensitive groups from exposure to the ambient air.”
Id. at Vol. I, 410 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Committee
instructed, “An ambient air quality standard, therefore, should
be the maximum permissible ambient air level of an air
pollution agent which will protect the health of any group of the
population.” Id.
15 See Senate Comm. On Public Works, 93rd Cong., 2d
Sess., Coordinating Comm. on Air Quality Studies, Nat’l
Academy of Sciences, Air Quality and Automobile Emission
Control 17 (Comm. Print 1974).
19
identified by legislators as non-threshold pollutants -
pollutants that yield adverse health effects at any concen-
tration level. Moreover, because non-threshold pollutants
are adverse to public health at any level, legislators knew
that setting “safe” standards for such pollutants was not
only economically undesirable but, as a practical matter,
impossible.'* Nevertheless, Congress declined to provide
EPA meaningful guidance in setting NAAQS for non-
threshold pollutants.
The House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce’s Report on the 1977 Clean Air Amendments
expressly declared that the threshold concept underlying
the 1970 Amendments was misguided. The Committee
admitted that while “[t]he national primary standards are
based on the assumption that a no-effects threshold exists and
can be proved; in fact, this assumption appears to be false.”
Legislative History of the Clean Air Amendments of 1977,
Vol. IV, at 2577 (emphasis in original). It quoted a
National Academy of Sciences study reflecting the scien-
tific understanding of the time. That study concluded:
[I]n no case is there evidence that the threshold
levels have a clear physiological meaning, in the
“sense that there are genuine adverse health
effects at and above some level of pollution, but
no effects at all below that level. On the con-
trary, evidence indicates that the amount of
health damage varies with upward and down-
ward variations in the concentration level of the
pollutant, with no sharp lower limit.
16 For example, ozone is present naturally in the
atmosphere while PM results from almost all combustion.
20
Id. Ultimately, the Committee itself concluded: “!T]he
‘safe threshold’ concept is, at best, a necessary myth to
permit the setting of some standards.” Id. at 2578 (emphasis
added).
After admitting that the threshold concept was
flawed, however, the Committee simply declined to
address the enormous regulatory problem posed by non-
threshold pollutants, namely how EPA can promulgate
non-arbitrary standards for non-threshold pollutants
without banning those pollutants altogether. The Com-
mittee concluded as follows: “Some have suggested that
since the standards are to protect against all known or
anticipated effects and since no safe thresholds can be
established, the ambient standards should be set at zero
or background levels. Obviously, this no-risk philosophy
ignores all economic and social consequences and is
impractical.” Id. at 2594. The Committee therefore recog-
nized that Section 109’s language could not be logically
applied to non-threshold pollutants, but proposed no
alternative.
The House and Senate debates on the 1977 Clean Air
Amendments mirrored the House Committee Report. In
the House, Representative Bingham declared: “We now
know that there is no such thing as a safe level of air
pollutants. The only safe level of sulfur dioxides, nitrous
oxides, hydrocarbons and the rest, especially given their
synergistic effects, can only be zero.” Id., Vol. VII, at 6222.
In the Senate, meanwhile, Senator Muskie stated:
“[T]Jestimony on the health question over the last 7 years
over and over again has made the point that there is no
such thing as a threshold for health effects.” Id., Vol. III,
at 1030. Accordingly, Senator Muskie conceded that
21
under the standards then in effect, “there [were] health
effects that [were] not protected against.” Id. Congress
thus expressly disavowed the threshold concept without
changing Sections 108 and 109 to reflect the newfound
understanding of ambient air quality.
Because it did not wish to make an admittedly tough
policy choice about which principle should guide the
establishment of NAAQS for non-threshold pollutants,
Congress left in place the anachronistic “requisite to pro-
tect the public health” “with an adequate margin of
safety” language that does not provide an intelligible
principle for air quality regulation. The statutory lan-
guage is a complete mismatch with the scientific reality,
as Congress itself recognized. Many adverse health
effects can only be eliminated through a complete ban on
non-threshold pollutants, yet Congress expressly dis-
missed this option as infeasible.'7 And, in any event,
since ozone and nitrogen dioxide, among other non-
threshold pollutants, occur naturally in the environment,
EPA could not eliminate them entirely even if it wanted
to do so. Therefore, as George T. Woolf, former Chairman
of the EPA’s Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee has
17 Moreover, “public health” is really not even fully
protected through a complete ban on non-threshold pollutants.
For example, reducing ozone levels leads to adverse health
effects, such as skin cancer, see Randall Lutter & Christopher
Wolz, UV-B Screening by Tropospheric Ozone: Implications for the
National Ambient Air Quality Standards, 31 Envtl. Sci. & Tech.
142A, 145 (1997), and efforts to rid the atmosphere of particulate
matter would cause economic devastation and thus lead to a
host of significant adverse health effects. See American Trucking
Associations, Inc., 175 F.3d at 1038 n.4.
22
recognized, the application of Section 109(b)(1), which is
based on the 1970 threshold concept, to non-threshold
pollutants, is not only undesirable but impossible.'®
Moreover, the existence of the “adequate margin of
safety” mandated by the provision is itself contingent
upon the existence of a threshold level above zero, a
threshold level which in most cases does not exist. As
such, the statute as written simply cannot be applied to
non-threshold pollutants.!9 But despite its clear recogni-
tion of the dilemma created by its prior directive, Con-
gress knowingly chose not to remedy its error and
articulate an intelligible principle by which to regulate
non-threshold pollutants.
B. EPA’s Attempts to Set NAAQS Demonstrate
that Congress Has Failed to Provide EPA with
an Intelligible Principle for Setting Air Quality
Standards for Non-Threshold Pollutants.
It is now known that most, if not all, of the six
pollutants currently regulated under Section 109 are non-
18 Woolf has stated, “(T]he paradigm of selecting a
standard at the lowest-observable-effects-level and then
providing an ‘adequate margin of safety’ is not possible.” EPA’s
Rulemakings on the National Ambient Air Quality Standards
for Particulate Matter and Ozone: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 89 (1997) (statement of
George T. Woolf).
19 The House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce itself recognized in 1977 “that the margin of safety
concept is . . . an illusion.” Legislative History of the Clean Air
Amendments of 1977, Vol. IV, at 2578.
23
threshold pollutants.?° In establishing NAAQS, EPA has
acknowledged that it has been unable to identify any
discernible threshold for adverse health effects with
respect to ozone, see 62 Fed. Reg. 38,856, 38,863 (1997),
particulate matter, see 62 Fed. Reg. 38,652, 38,670 (1997),
sulfur dioxide, see 53 Fed. Reg. 14,926, 14,930 (1988),
carbon monoxide, see 50 Fed. Reg. 37,484, 37,487-88
(1985), or nitrogen dioxide, see 50 Fed. Reg. 25,532,
25,538-39 (1985). And although EPA did identify a discer-
nible threshold for the only other pollutant regulated
under Section 109 - lead - in setting a 1978 NAAQS, see
43 Fed. Reg. 46,246, 46,247-49, it has since admitted that
lead appears to be a non-threshold pollutant as well.?!
Consequently, in implementing Section 109, EPA has
faced the following choice: (1) set NAAQS for non-thresh-
old pollutants at zero; or (2) arbitrarily select a non-zero
standard at which adverse health effects still exist. Given
that the first option is at odds with the intent of Congress
and impossible to achieve (as well as economically devas-
tating to attempt), it is not surprising that EPA has chosen
the second path.
The problem with this choice, however, is that the
Clean Air Act “provides no guidance as to how EPA
20 See Mark K. Landy, et al., The Environmental Protection
Agency: Asking the Wrong Questions from Nixon to Clinton 55-56,
78-79 (1994).
21 See Air Quality Management Division, U.S. EPA, Review
of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Lead: Assessment
of Scientific and Technical Information, at III-54 (1989) (“the
available data . . . suggest a continuum of health risks down to
the lowest levels measured”).
24
should determine what non-zero level of risk is accept-
able.”22 Because the Act is based on the anachronistic
threshold concept, “the result of the statutory framework
is to misframe the key question and also to give EPA little
guidance for answering and asking that question.” The
lack of direction provided to EPA is especially problem-
atic because of the enormous impact the agency’s policy
choices can have on the nation’s economy.”4
Absent an intelligible principle by which to set
NAAQS for non-threshold pollutants, EPA has behaved
in one of two ways. First, in certain cases it has openly
admitted that its standards do not guard against known
adverse health effects, while making little if any effort to
explain how allowing such effects to occur is consistent
with the Act’s requirement that standards protect public
health “with an adequate margin of safety.” For example,
one wonders in the instant case why it is consistent with
the statute for 58,000 children a year in nine of our
nation’s urban areas to experience “large lung function
decreases” because of exposure to ozone, but inconsistent
with the statute for 97,000 children to experience such
effects. See 62 Fed. Reg. 38,856, 38,865; see also 43 Fed.
Reg. 46,246, 46,253-55 (1978) (over 20,000 children will
have unsafe blood lead levels under lead NAAQS).
22 Feller, supra note 12, at 832.
23 Sunstein, supra note 12, at 376.
24 For example, the cost of attaining EPA’s revised PM
standards is estimated to be anywhere from $37 billion to $150
billion annually, reducing the real after-tax income of the
average American by 1-2%. See Brief of Respondents
Appalachian Power Company, et al., No. 99-1426, at 17.
25
Alternatively, EPA often seeks to disguise the arbi-
trary nature of its standards by mischaracterizing scien-
tific data to make it appear as though a threshold may
exist where in fact none does. As a former EPA attorney
notes, “Where evidence suggests a continuum of effects
at all pollutant concentrations, EPA has characterized the
data as establishing uncertainty as to the threshold levels
rather than suggesting that no threshold level exists.”*°
This is encouraged by the Clean Air Act itself as “the
need to choose some non-zero ‘safe’ level of pollution
creates an incentive for this sort of risk recharacteriza-
tion.” Id. at 844. One commentator has identified the
EPA’s modus operandi as an “intentional science cha-
rade” where “agency bureaucrats consciously disguise
policy choices as science.” Because no non-zero stan-
dard is “safe,” EPA inevitably considers economic factors
in setting standards though costs must be publicly disre-
garded by the agency because of the statutory language.””
The statute’s lack of an intelligible principle thus
makes effective judicial review of air quality standards
impossible. Courts, like EPA, are given no guidance as to
the level of adverse health effects that is acceptable, and
must review rulemaking proceedings in which EPA
understandably distorts complex scientific data and
25 Feller, supra note 12, at 838. For detailed case studies of
this phenomenon regarding particulate matter and ozone, see
id. at 838-854, and Wendy Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic
Risk Regulation, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1613, 1640-44 (1995),
respectively.
26 Wagner, supra note 25, at 1640.
27 See id. at 1641.
26
refuses to acknowledge key factors influencing its deci-
sions in a bid to fit a square peg in a round hole. If the
status quo is maintained, one noted legal scholar has
predicted, “The day will eventually come when the same
court of appeals holds that EPA has behaved unlawfully
both for regulating above a certain level and for regulat-
ing below that level!””®
Ill. THIS COURT SHOULD HOLD SECTION
109(B)(1) UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED
TO NON-THRESHOLD POLLUTANTS.
In asking this Court to invalidate Section 109(b)(1) as
applied to non-threshold pollutants, amici recognize that
we are asking this Court to take a significant step, but it
is an appropriate one under the circumstances.
The decision as to what principle should be used to
set air quality standards is “quintessentially one of legis-
lative policy,” Industrial Union Dep't, 448 U.S. at 686
(Rehnquist, J., concurring), and one with enormous
impact on the health of the American people and the
vitality of the nation’s economy. It involves no subject,
such as foreign affairs or Indian affairs, where the execu-
tive branch possesses “residual authority,” id. at 684, nor
any power, such as the management of public property,
that is not legislative.??
28 Sunstein, supra note 12, at 322.
29 In both areas, this Court has properly adopted a
deferential stance with respect to congressional delegations. See
Schoenbrod, supra note 11, at 1265.
27
Furthermore, Congress’ failure to provide an intellig-
ible principle here is not justified by the “ ‘inherent
necessities’ of the situation.” Id. at 676. In a variety of
other statutes regulating pollutants and hazardous sub-
stances, Congress has expressly set forth intelligible prin-
ciples, such as cost-benefit analysis and technological
feasibility, to guide agency discretion. See e.g., Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C.
§§ 136(bb), 136a(c)(5)(D) (utilizing cost-benefit analysis);
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(A), 1314(b)(1)
(employing standards based on technological feasibility);
Safe Water Drinking Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(4)(D)
(using standards of economic and technological fea-
sibility). Moreover, agencies themselves have adopted
principles for managing risk, such as defining a maxi-
mally acceptable risk, which Congress could use in this
context.%°
For constitutional purposes, it is not significant
which principle is ultimately chosen; what is significant is
that Congress supplies it. Amici, for instance, may agree
with Cross-Petitioners that cost-benefit analysis from a
policy perspective reflects a sensible way of developing
air quality standards under Section 109. This purported
interpretation, however, is no more supported by the
language of the statute and the legislative history than is
3° See Joseph V. Rodricks, et al., Significant Risk Decisions in
Federal Regulatory Agencies, 7 Regulatory Toxicology and
Pharmacology, 307, 309-13 (1987).
28
@ maximally acceptable risk standard, technological fea-
sibility standard, or a host of other standards Congress
could have supplied, but did not.*!
While the D.C. Circuit thus correctly ruled that EPA’s
construction of Section 109(b)(1) in its ozone and PM
rules effectuated an unconstitutional delegation of power,
the remedy it ordered was inappropriate. In light of Con-
gress’ abdication of its responsibility to set forth an intel-
ligible principle for setting air quality standards for non-
threshold pollutants, the court’s decision to allow EPA to
“extract a determinate standard on its own” was in error.
American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027,
1038 (D.C. Cir. 1999). As no intelligible principle is
“apparent from the statute,” id. at 1034, or the legislative
history, the appropriate remedy here is to hold Section
109(b)(1) unconstitutional as applied to non-threshold
pollutants.
The underlying purpose of the nondelegation doc-
trine is not vindicated by a remedy ordering that “EPA in
effect draft a different, narrower version of the Clean Air
Act.” American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. EPA, 195 F.3d
4, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Silberman, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc). Section 109 either provides
31 While it could be argued that EPA’s choice of any of these
principles might pass muster under the framework of Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-843 (1984), this does not save the statute from a
nondelegation doctrine challenge. On the contrary, the fact that
multiple contradictory intelligible principles would pass muster
under Chevron itself demonstrates that Congress has run afoul
of the nondelegation doctrine by failing to supply its own
intelligible principle for setting air quality standards.
29
an intelligible principle for setting NAAQS for non-
threshold pollutants or it does not. If it does, EPA’s fail-
ure to articulate that principle, while legally troubling on
other grounds, does not implicate the nondelegation doc-
trine. But if, as we believe, Section 109 provides no such
intelligible principle, the fact that EPA may be able to
supply its own intelligible principle cannot save the stat-
ute from a nondelegation doctrine. The constitutional basis
of the nondelegation doctrine is that Congress, not executive
agencies, must make important policy choices, which form the
core of the legislative power.
Though the precedent set here may contradict recent
jurisprudential trends, the rule of law is really a modest
one: Congress is free to legislate or not, or to delegate its
authority or not, as it sees fit; all it may not do is to
effectuate a wholesale transfer of the legislative power to
the executive. That is the essence of the separation of
powers. The crucial limiting factor is the requirement of
an intelligible principle.5? Accordingly, this Court should
require Congress to fulfill its constitutional responsibility
to set forth an intelligible principle by which EPA is to set
air quality standards for non-threshold pollutants by
holding Section 109(b)(1) unconstitutional as applied to
non-threshold pollutants.
32 Limits must exist on Congress’ ability to delegate
legislative power to executive agencies. Surely, for example,
Congress could not direct the Internal Revenue Service to set tax
rates so that “the public interest, convenience, and necessity
will be served.” Cf. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a).
30
CONCLUSION
To paraphrase Chief Justice Rehnquist in Industrial
Union Dep't, 448 U.S. at 687, if this Court is ever to
reshoulder the burden of ensuring that Congress itself
make critical policy decisions, this is surely the case in
which to do it. For the foregoing reasons, amici respect-
fully request that this Court revitalize the nondelegation
doctrine by holding Section 109(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act
unconstitutional as applied to non-threshold pollutants.
Respectfully submitted,
WituiamM H. MEttor* Rocer PrLon
Cunt Bouck TimotHy LYNCH
DEBORAH SIMPSON Rosert A. Levy
MattHew B. Berry Rona.tp D. RoTruNDA
INstTITUTE For JusTICE Cato INsTITUTE
1717 Pennsylvania Ave., 1000 Mass. Ave., N.W.
N.W. Washington, D.C. 20001
Suite 200 (202) 842-0200
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 955-1300
*Counsel of Record
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.