Amicus Curiae Brief — Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc.

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No. 99-1257 tS

In The

Supreme Court of the |United States

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CAROL M. BROWNER, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

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AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS, INC., ET AL.,

Respondents.

S

On Writ Of Certiorari To The

United States Court Of Appeals

For The District Of Columbia Circuit

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BRIEF AMICI CURIAE OF THE INSTITUTE

FOR JUSTICE AND THE CATO INSTITUTE

IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.................0.0000-. ii

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE..................... 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT....................--. 2

I. THIS COURT SHOULD MEANINGFULLY

ENFORCE THE NONDELEGATION DOC-

WE oa eUdednedpedinnsensensdamectnedcecens 4

II. SECTION 109(B)(1) OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT

FAILS TO PROVIDE AN INTELLIGIBLE PRIN-

CIPLE BY WHICH TO SET AIR QUALITY

STANDARDS FOR NON-THRESHOLD POLLU-

Ph 8 Ceinbececasevirsradscdeudcadibtieswies 13

A. Congress Has Knowingly Failed to Provide

EPA with an Intelligible Principle for Set-

ting Air Quality Standards for Non-Thresh-

Se STEEN WtkcsS ca vecudesededvsacesads 14

1. The Clean Air Amendments of 1970... 14

2. The Clean Air Amendments of 1977... 18

B. EPA’s Attempts to Set NAAQS Demonstrate

that Congress Has Failed to Provide EPA

with an Intelligible Principle for Setting Air

Quality Standards for Non-Threshold Pollu-

SE Cod ceeecereneséecevecsesoeoneseuceeue 22

III. THIS COURT SHOULD HOLD SECTION

109(B)(1) UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED

TO NON-THRESHOLD POLLUTANTS........ 26

SP 645 <nnundadivadasndupeudediakeessees 30

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295

U.S. GS (1908) ....cccccccscsccsececscesennneenue 11

American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. EPA, 175

F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999)..........eeeeeeees 4, 21, 28

American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. EPA, 195

R3d 4 (DC. Cie. 1999)... cccccsqccccsssuseeeuneuee 28

Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963)............. 13

Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).............4. 5, 6

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)............... 4, 6, 8

Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (1904)............ 10

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)..........eeeeeees 28

Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998)..5, 6, 7

Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892) ...........20008- 9, 10

Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst.,

448 U.S. 607 (1980)................. 11, 12, 13, 26, 30

INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) .......... eee eeees 5

].W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S.

994 (1988)... cccccccescesausenneee 10, 11, 12, 13

Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920) .... 79

Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens

for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S.

252 (1991)... cccccccceccessssesueeun nena 5

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989)........ 12

National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S.

CRESS RSECGSenscencecccecccceseecececes: 12

Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line

i ES oc. ceGseccncccescccccccccces 5

Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935)..... 11

Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364

thee ee hee e kee cbeeeeccescesceeceecece: 10

United ‘States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81

eee Pee eke eecasecococescceecccceccce 4

Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219

eee ce Ce Recnecesecccsesececcccecces )

Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825) ..... 8

Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944)........... 12

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

ee cc cee coneccecoccccccesees 5

EEE ee 5

EE neces accaccccececccececcsecce 5

Copes AND STATUTES

EE 27

Te . cccccecccccccccces 27

33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A)...... 0.0 c cc ceecceeeeeeeeees 27

Te nn... ccccccccccscccccccecs 27

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(4)(D). 66. e eens 27

42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671........ eneaehescesedsuenenas 14

42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1). «2... eee eee ee eee ees 15

42 U.S.C. § 7409... ccc ccc e cece ee teeennees 15

42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1). ... 6 ee eee eee 2, 3, 14, 15

42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(2). .. 2... ee cece ee eee rere eens 15

42 U.S.C. § 7409)... 22. cece cece cece ence eee eenees 15

47 U.S.C. § WMa) ... 1. c weer c cece e eee eeeeceennes tocae

MisceELLANEOUS

43 Fed. Reg. 46,246 (1978) .........-.-eeeeees 16, 23, 24

50 Fed. Reg. 25,532 (1985) ..... 2... 0c cece e eee ees 23

50 Fed. Reg. 37,484 (1985) ........ 65. cece cere eee eee 23

53 Fed. Reg. 14,926 (1988) ..... 2... 2.5 - cece eee e eens 23

62 Fed. Reg. 38,652 (1997) ............ce cece eeeeeeee 23

62 Fed. Reg. 38,856 (1997) .......... 0 cece eee eeees 23, 24

Air Quality Management Division, U.S. EPA,

Review of the National Ambient Air Quality Stan-

dards for Lead: Assessment of Scientific and Techni-

cal Information (1989) ..........000eeeeeeeeeeeeeees 23

Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate

Matter and Ozone: Hearings Before the Sub-

comm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the

House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong.

CRGTE) . ov cccccccccccccccccncccccccesoccccceseccess 22

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

The Federalist No. 47 (C. Rossiter ed., 1961) ........ 7,8

Joseph Feller, Non-Threshold Pollutants and Air

Quality Standards, 24 Envtl. L. 821 (1994)...16, 24, 25

Steven F. Huefner, The Supreme Court's Avoidance of

the Nondelegation Doctrine in Clinton v. City of

New York: More Than “a Dime’s Worth of Differ-

ence”, 49 Cath. U. L. Rev. 337 (2000)............... 8

Mark K. Landy, et al., The Environmental Protection

Agency: Asking the Wrong Questions from Nixon

fe I CI baci cecbeds cube ceded 23

Legislative History of the Clean Air Amendments

Se GE WEb Beccncdesscusesssiccssedccousences 17, 18

Legislative History of the Clean Air Amendments

GS Wee) WE Oi ccncevecscsccccnncsensecdsonenceess 16

Legislative History of the Clean Air Amendments

Ge Gave e Wh UE tnndconcesccccseviccsaseseesses 17, 20

Legislative History of the Clean Air Amendments

pS Ree re er 19, 20, 22

Legislative History of the Clean Air Amendments

OI 20

John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, in the

Tradition of Freedom, 244 (M. Mayer ed., 1957)...... 7

Randall Lutter & Christopher Wolz, UV-B Screen-

ing by Tropospheric Ozone: Implications for the

National Ambient Air Quality Standards, 31 Envtl.

ae, GS Pee See GI veces cccccuccccssccceess 21

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Joseph V. Rodricks, et al., Significant Risk Decisions

in Federal Regulatory Agencies, 7 Regulatory Tox-

icology and Pharmacology 307 (1987) ........-.

David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could

the Court Give It Substance?, 83 Mich. L. Rev.

v7.0). .) eer

Senate Committee on Public Works, 93rd Cong.,

2d Sess., Coordinating Comm. on Air Quality

Studies, Nat’l Academy of Sciences, Air Quality

and Automobile Emission Control (Comm.

Primt 1974) .....cccccccccccccccccscccssccssceces

Cass Sunstein, Is The Clean Air Act Unconstitu-

Page

tional?, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 303 (1999) ........ 16, 24, 26

Wendy Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk

Regulation, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1613 (1995) ......

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE!

The Institute for Justice is a nonprofit, public interest

law firm committed to defending the essential founda-

tions of a free society through securing greater protection

for individual liberty and restoring constitutional limits

on the power of government. Toward that end, the Insti-

tute seeks to reinvigorate those founding principles, such

as the separation of powers, crucial to the preservation of

freedom.

The Cato Institute was established in 1977 as a non-

partisan public policy research foundation dedicated to

advancing the principles of individual liberty, free mar-

kets, and limited government. Cato’s Center for Constitu-

tional Studies was established in 1989 to help restore the

principles of limited constitutional government, includ-

ing the idea that the U.S. Constitution separates power

among three coordinate branches of the federal govern-

ment in order to preserve citizens’ liberty. The instant

case squarely addresses the limits on the power of Con-

gress to delegate its power to executive agencies and thus

is of central interest to Cato and the Center.

1 In conformity with Supreme Court Rule 37, amici have

obtained the consent of the parties to the filing of this brief, and

letters of consent have been filed with the Clerk. Amici also state

that counsel for a party did not author this brief in whole or in

part and that no persons or entities other than amici, their

members, and their counsel made a monetary contribution to

the preparation and submission of this brief.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Section 109(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 7409(b)(1), is unconstitutional as applied to non-thresh-

old pollutants because the statute provides no intelligible

principle by which the Environmental Protection Agency

(EPA) is to set National Ambient Air Quality Standards

(NAAQS) for such pollutants.

In order to preserve the liberty of the American peo-

ple, the Constitution’s Framers separated power among

three coordinate branches of the federal government.

Implicit in this structure is the idea that the political

branches may not reallocate authority among themselves

as they see fit. Accordingly, this Court has long recog-

nized that Congress may not freely delegate the legisla-

tive powers vested in it by the Constitution.

In order to enforce what is known as the nondelega-

tion doctrine, this Court has held that Congress must

provide executive agencies or others with an intelligible

principle to govern the exercise of delegated authority.

But unfortunately, in a series of precedents over the last

60 years, this Court has refused to meaningfully enforce

this important constitutional requirement. Instead, it has

allowed Congress to avoid its responsibility to make diffi-

cult policy choices, thereby impairing the separation of

powers and diminishing individual liberty. The instant

case, however, presents this Court with an appropriate

opportunity to breathe life into the intelligible principle

test once again.

When Congress passed the Clean Air Amendments of

1970, it assumed that those air pollutants falling under

the ambit of Section 109 were threshold pollutants, mean-

ing that there was a concentration level above which

those pollutants were a threat to health and below which

they were not. It thus directed EPA to establish primary

air quality standards below the threshold concentration

for adverse health effects, mandating that such standards

be “requisite to protect the public health” with “an ade-

quate margin for safety.” 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1).

It soon became clear, however, that many, if not all,

Section 109 pollutants were actually non-threshold pollu-

tants, meaning that adverse health impacts occurred at

any concentration level above zero. While Congress recog-

nized this reality at the time that it passed the Clean Air

Amendments of 1977 and clearly indicated that it did not

want the NAAQS for non-threshold pollutants set at zero,

it nonetheless failed to set forth a new intelligible princi-

ple. As a result, the principle by which EPA is directed to

set air quality standards for non-threshold pollutants is

not only unintelligible but it is nonsensical, as it is impos-

sible for EPA to set standards that “protect the public

health” with an “adequate margin for safety.”

The statute as currently written requires EPA to

engage in an entirely arbitrary exercise of determining a

degree of adverse health effects that is acceptable, an

inquiry for which the Clean Air Act provides no guid-

ance. Therefore, in a matter with enormous impact on

both the health of the American people and the vitality of

the nation’s economy, Congress has abdicated its consti-

tutional responsibility to make a fundamental policy

choice. Although it easily could have provided an intel-

ligible principle to cabin EPA’s discretion, Congress has

instead impermissibly delegated its legislative power to

the agency.

While the D.C. Circuit correctly ruled be'ow that

EPA’s construction of Section 109(b)(1) in its ozone and

particulate matter (PM) rules effectuated an unconstitu-

tional delegation of power, its decision to allow EPA “an

opportunity to extract a determinate standard on its

own”2 was inappropriate. The nondelegation doctrine

does not permit an agency to supply its own intelligible

principle where none is present in the statute. The point

of the nondelegation doctrine is not that agencies must

provide rational explanations for their behavior, but that

Congress must set forth an intelligible principle to guide

agency discretion. As Congress has failed to do so here,

this Court should declare Section 109(b)(1) to be uncon-

stitutional as applied to non-threshold pollutants.

I. THIS COURT SHOULD MEANINGFULLY

ENFORCE THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE.

The separation of powers plays a crucial role in our

constitutional framework. As this Court has noted, “The

principle of separation of powers was not simply an

abstract generalization in the minds of the Framers: it

was woven into the document that they drafted in Phila-

delphia in the summer of 1787.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.

1, 124 (1976). Although many aspects of the Constitution

are premised on the importance of checks and balances,

central to the Framers’ design was the distribution of the

2 American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027,

1038 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

federal government’s power among three coordinate

_ branches, with legislative powers vested in Congress,

executive powers vested in the President, and judicial

powers vested in this Court as well as such inferior

courts as Congress would establish. See U.S. Const. art. I,

§ 1; art. II, § 1; art. III, § 1.

This arrangement is not designed to secure efficiency

or to promote administrative convenience; rather, “[t]he

ultimate purpose of this separation of powers is to pro-

tect the liberty and security of the governed.” Metro-

politan Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the

Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc. 501 U.S. 252, 272 (1991).3

Accordingly, this Court often has rejected efforts by Con-

gress and the President to rearrange power in a manner

hostile to our constitutional framework. In no less than

six cases over the last 25 years, this Court has struck

down congressional enactments as contrary to the consti-

tutionally mandated separation of powers.* In these

3 See also Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986) (“That

this system of division and separation of powers produces

conflicts, confusion, and discordance at times is inherent, but it

was deliberately so structured . . . to provide avenues for the

operation of checks on the exercise of governmental power”).

4 See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998)

(invalidating Line Item Veto Act); Metropolitan Washington

Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc.,

501 U.S. 252 (1991) (invalidating provision of Transfer Act

regarding composition of Metropolitan Washington Airports

Authority’s Board of Review); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714

(1986) (invalidating portion of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings

Act); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (invalidating “legislative

veto” provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act);

Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S 50

cases, this Court reached the same conclusion whether

Congress had aggressively encroached on another

branch’s power or had instead chosen to voluntarily cede

its own power. Compare Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714

(1986) (striking down attempt by Congress to assign exec-

utive powers to officer under its control) with Clinton v.

City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (invalidating con-

gressional attempt to delegate to the President the power

to amend Acts of Congress). This is because the separa-

tion of powers is not designed to safeguard the interests

of those occupying public office; rather, its purpose is to

protect the liberty of the American people.

In Clinton v. City of New York, Justice Kennedy

explained why this Court must not allow a branch of

government to voluntarily relinquish the powers vested

in it by the Constitution:

To say the political branches have a somewhat

free hand to reallocate their own authority

would seem to require the acceptance of two

premises: first, that the public good demands it,

and second, that liberty is not at risk. The for-

mer premise is inadmissible. The Constitution’s

structure requires a stability which transcends

the convenience of the moment. The latter prem-

ise, too, is flawed. Liberty is always at stake when

one or more branches seek to transgress the separa-

tion of powers.

(1982) (invalidating Bankruptcy Act’s delegation of authority to

Article I courts); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (invalidating

composition of the Federal Election Commission as established

by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971).

524 U.S. at 449-50 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations

omitted) (emphasis added).5

It has long been established, therefore, that Congress

may not freely delegate its legislative powers. This princi-

ple, commonly referred to as the nondeiegation doctrine,

traces its roots back to two of Europe’s most distin-

guished and influential political philosophers. John

Locke, writing in 1690, stated that “[t]he legislative can-

not transfer the power of making laws to any other

hands; for it being but a delegated power from the peo-

ple, they:who have it cannot pass it over to others.”6

Locke pointed out that the power vested by the people in

the legislature was “only to make laws, and not to make

legislators.”? Montesquieu, furthermore, warned of the

dangers that would result from allowing legislative and

executive powers to be joined together: “When the legis-

lative and executive powers are united in the same per-

son or body, there can be no liberty, because

apprehensions may arise lest the same monarch or senate

should enact tyrannical laws to execute them in a tyranni-

cal manner.”®

> Justice Kennedy also observed, “That a congressional

cession of power is voluntary does not make it innocuous. The

Constitution is a compact enduring for more than our time, and

one Congress cannot yield up its own powers, much less those

of other Congresses to follow. Abdication of responsibility is not

part of the constitutional design.” Clinton, 524 U.S. at 452

(citations omitted).

¢ John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, in the Tradition

of Freedom 244 (M. Mayer ed., 1957).

7 Id.

8 The Federalist No. 47, at 303 (C. Rossiter ed., 1961)

(quoting Montesquieu).

This sentiment had a marked impact on the Framers

of the Constitution. James Madison quoted that passage

from Montesquieu in Federalist No. 47, and, in addition,

echoed the French philosopher’s view that “there can be

no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are

united in the same person, or body of magistrates.”? This

Court has acknowledged the influence of Montesquieu’s

work as well: “the Constitution was . . . true to Montes-

quieu’s well-known maxim that the legislative, executive,

and judicial departments ought to be separate and dis-

tinct.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 120.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the nondelegation

doctrine emerged early in this Court’s jurisprudence. In

Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42 (1825), for

example, Chief Justice Marshall wrote, “It will not be

contended that Congress can delegate to the Courts, or to

any other tribunals, powers which are strictly and exclu-

sively legislative.” The doctrine, however, did not figure

prominently in this Court’s nineteenth-century jurispru-

dence for congressional delegations in that era were few

and far between. Those delegations that did take place

almost always shared at least one of two common fea-

tures. First, Congress “legislated in contingency,” mean-

ing that it authorized the President to take prescribed

action when he ascertained certain facts to be true.!° And

second, almost all such “delegations” arose in those areas

9 Id. (quoting Montesquieu).

10 See, e.g., Steven F. Huefner, The Supreme Court's

Avoidance of the Nondelegation Doctrine in Clinton v. City of New

York: More Than “a Dime’s Worth of Difference”, 49 Cath. U. L.

Rev. 337, 342-46 (2000).

of foreign affairs and trade that are closely related to the

President’s executive power to formulate foreign policy.!!

In Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892), for example, the

Court considered the constitutionality of a statute remov-

ing tariffs on the importation of certain agricultural

goods, but authorizing the President to reimpose tariffs

upon goods from any country failing to treat American

goods reciprocally. Rejecting a nondelegation doctrine

challenge, the Court held that the statute did not

empower the President to make law but instead autho-

rized him to find facts in enforcing the trade policy

established by Congress. 143 U.S. at 692-93. In so holding,

however, this Court strongly reaffirmed the vitality of the

nondelegation doctrine: “That Congress cannot delegate

legislative power to the President is a principle univer-

sally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance

of the system of government ordained by the Constitu-

tion.” Id. at 692.

Near the end of the century, Congress began to dele-

gate authority more frequently, and as a result more cases

involving delegation began to reach this Court. In some

of these cases, congressional attempts to relinquish legis-

lative powers were struck down. See Washington v. W.C.

Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 227 (1924) (prohibiting Con-

gress from delegating the “power to alter the maritime

law”); United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81,

87-88 (1921) (holding that the Lever Act, which made it

unlawful for any person to charge unreasonable prices

11 See id. at 343-346; David Schoenbrod, The Delegation

Doctrine: Could the Court Give It Substance?, 83 Mich. L. Rev.

1223, 1262-63 (1985).

10

for “necessaries,” amounted to a delegation by Congress

of legislative power to courts); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v.

Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 164 (1920) (invalidating improper

delegation of maritime law to the states). In other cases,

delegations were upheld; but in each of these instances,

this Court made it clear that delegated authority must be

accompanied by adequate congressional guidance. See,

e.g., Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364, 386

(1907) (“[T]he Secretary of War will only execute the

clearly expressed will of Congress, and will not, in any

true sense, exert legislative or judicial power”); Buttfield

v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 496 (1904) (“[The Tea Act] does

not, in any real sense, invest administrative officials with

the power of legislation. Congress legislated on the sub-

ject as far as was reasonably practicable”).

In ].W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S.

394 (1928), a case like Field v. Clark involving tariff adjust-

ment, this Court attempted to synthesize its nondelega-

tion doctrine precedents. In doing so, it recognized the

importance of maintaining the separation of powers, see

id. at 406 (“[I]t is a breach of the National fundamental

law if Congress gives up its legislative power and trans-

fers it to the President”), while at the same time acknowl-

edging that enforcement of the principle was not

susceptible to a bright-line rule if the federal government

was to remain capable of effectively exercising its sub-

stantive powers. See id. (“In determining what [a branch

of government] may do in seeking assistance from

another branch, the extent and character of that assis-

tance must be fixed according to common sense and the

inherent necessities of governmental co-ordination”).

11

Striking a balance between these countervailing con-

cerns, this Court set forth a new standard for assessing

the constitutionality of congressional delegations,

explaining that “[i]f Congress shall lay down by legisla-

tive act an intelligible principle [to govern the exercise of

delegated authority], such legislative action is not a for-

bidden delegation of legislative power.” Id. at 409.

Implementing the “intelligible principle” test, this

Court soon struck down two statutes for failing to set

forth adequate standards to guide the conduct of the

executive branch. In Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S.

388 (1935), it invalidated a section of the National Indus-

trial Recovery Act (NIRA) authorizing the President to

prohibit the interstate transportation of petroleum priced

in violation of state-imposed production quotas. The

Court complained that the statute “left the matter to the

President without standard or rule, to be dealt with as he

pleased.” Id. at 418. Similarly, in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry

Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), this Court

struck down another section of the NIRA, this one

empowering the President to establish “codes of fair com-

petition” in certain industries “for the protection of con-

sumers, competitors, employees, and others, in

furtherance of the public interest.” The Court once again

observed that Congress’ grant of authority was open-

ended, “set(ting] up no standards, aside from the general

aims of rehabilitation, correction, and expansion

described in section one [of the NIRA].” Id. at 541.

In the 65 years since Schechter, however, this Court

has largely abdicated its responsibility of ensuring that

congressional delegations of authority are accompanied

by intelligible principles. See Industrial Union Dep't v.

12

American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 674-75 (1980)

(Rehnquist, J., concurring) (“[T]he principle that Con-

gress could not simply transfer its legislative authority to

the Executive fell under a cloud”). As a result, it has

upheld numerous delegations of open-ended authority

against nondelegation doctrine challenges. See, e.g., Yakus

v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426-27 (1944) (upholding

delegation to Price Administrator of authority to fix

“fair” and “equitable” commodities prices); National

Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943)

(affirming FCC’s authority to regulate broadcast licensing

“as public interest, convenience, or necessity require”).

Crucially, though, this Court has never overruled the J.W.

Hampton, Jr., Co. “intelligible principle” test, ostensibly

continuing to apply it even in cases affirming the consti-

tutionality of seemingly unbounded delegated discretion.

See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372

(1989). Moreover, despite the general trend, various Jus-

tices, from time to time, have called for exhuming the

nondelegation doctrine from this Court's jurisprudential

graveyard.

In Industrial Union Dep't, for example, Chief Justice

Rehnquist argued in a concurring opinion that a provi-

sion of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970

ran afoul of the nondelegation doctrine. In doing so, he

identified the important functions served by the doctrine:

(1) “ensur[ing] to the extent consistent with orderly gov-

ernmental administration that important choices of social

policy are made by Congress, the branch of our Govern-

ment most responsive to the popular will”; (2) guarantee-

ing that the recipients of delegated authority are

provided with “an ‘intelligible principle’ to guide the

13

exercise of the delegated discretion”; and (3) facilitating

judicial review of “the exercise of delegated legislative

discretion.” 448 U.S. at 685-86. See also Arizona v. Califor-

nia, 373 U.S. 546, 626 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting in

part).

While each of these functions may appear unrelated

to the others, they are not, for each, in its own way, is a

manner in which the nondelegation doctrine helps to

secure the liberty of the American people. For this reason,

liberty is threatened when the nondelegation doctrine, an

important component of the separation of powers, is

ignored. And it is for this reason that this Court should

revitalize the nondelegation doctrine.

Il. SECTION 109(B)(1) OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT

FAILS TO PROVIDE AN INTELLIGIBLE PRINCI-

PLE BY WHICH TO SET AIR QUALITY STAN-

DARDS FOR NON-THRESHOLD POLLUTANTS.

The instant case provides this Court with an impor-

tant opportunity to reinvigorate the nondelegation doc-

trine by meaningfully applying the intelligible principle

test set forth in ].W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. As will be shown,

Congress’ failure to provide an intelligible principle here

was neither borne of necessity nor practicality. It instead

resulted from a misunderstanding about the effects of air

pollutants. And while Congress recognized its mistake

over two decades ago, it consciously chose to ignore the

conundrum its prior directive had created for EPA, thus

abdicating its constitutional responsibility to provide

meaningful guidance to the agency.

14

A. Congress Has Knowingly Failed to Provide EPA

with an Intelligible Principle for Setting Air

Quality Standards for Non-Threshold Pollu-

tants.

In order to understand why Section 109(b)(1) fails to

provide an intelligible principle by which to set air qual-

ity standards for non-threshold pollutants, it is necessary

to review the history of the provision. When Section 109

was adopted in 1970, Congress assumed that the pollu-

tants covered by the provision had discernible thresholds

above which pollution levels threatened health and below

which they did not. On this basis, legislators established

a regulatory regime based on the intelligible principle

that air pollution would be controlled by keeping the

level of pollutants below their respective thresholds -

“with an adequate margin of safety,” 42 U.S.C.

§ 7409(b)(1). By 1977, however, Congress fully recognized

that many Section 109 pollutants had no such thresholds

at all. But despite a clear awareness of the nature of these

pollutants and an express recognition of the economic

and practical infeasibility of banning such pollutants alto-

gether, Congress did not alter the provision, thus depriv-

ing EPA of an intelligible principle by which to set air

quality standards for non-threshold pollutants.

1. The Clean Air Amendments of 1970

With the passage of the Clean Air Amendments of

1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604 (codified as amended at 42

U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671), Congress initiated a massive effort

15

to clean the nation’s air. The National Ambient Air Qual-

ity Standards (NAAQS), 42 U.S.C. § 7409, which are sup-

posed to represent the maximum concentrations of

various air pollutants that are compatible with “public

health and welfare,” are a central component of that

effort. The basic rules governing NAAQS are laid out in

Sections 108 and 109 of the Clean Air Act. Pursuant to

Section 108, EPA develops an “air quality” “criteria docu-

ment” for “each air pollutant —- emissions of which

... Cause or contribute to air pollution which may reason-

ably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare”

and “the presence of which in the ambient air results

from numerous or diverse mobile or stationary sources.”

42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1). Once these criteria documents are

reviewed by the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Commit-

tee, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d), EPA promulgates primary and

secondary NAAQS for the pollutant, which are also

reviewed by the Advisory Committee. The primary

NAAQS is set at a level “requisite to protect the public

health” with “an adequate margin of safety.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 7409(b)(1). The secondary NAAQS is set at a level

“requisite to protect the public welfare.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 7409(b)(2).

The legislators’ extensive discussion of ambient air

quality in 1970 reveals that Congress at that time pre-

sumed that all pollutants addressed by Section 109 were

“threshold pollutants” - namely pollutants with an iden-

tifiable level above which adverse health effects are

observed and below which those health effects are absent.

Because they believed that every relevant pollutant had a

discernible threshold, legislators articulated the following

principle by which to set air quality standards: A primary

16

NAAQS should be set safely below a pollutant’s thresh-

old level.

In order to assure that threshold levels for pollutants

would not be surpassed, Congress directed EPA to isolate

an exact threshold level for each pollutant, and then

establish an air quality standard sufficiently below that

level so as to avoid adverse health effects with “an ade-

quate margin of safety.”!? See 43 Fed. Reg. 46,246, 46,247

(1978) (“It is clear from section 109 that [EPA] should not

attempt to place the standard at a level estimated to be at

the threshold for adverse health effects but should set the

standard at a lower level in order to provide a margin of

safety”).

As Representative Rogers explained, “The Secre-

tary . . . will set a national air quality standard for

ambient air quality . . . based on criteria, scientific infor-

mation as to how many parts per million are permissible

for particular pollutants.” Legislative History of the

Clean Air Amendments of 1970 (“Legislative History”),

Vol. II, at 819. Rogers, along with his colleagues, however,

never conceived of the possibility that zero parts per

million would be permissible for a particular pollutant.

They had complete confidence in the threshold model

12 See Joseph Feller, Non-Threshold Pollutants and Air

Quality Standards, 24 Envtl. L. 821, 823 (1994) (“A

critical . . . assumption underlies . . . the structure of the Clean

Air Act. . . . The assumption is that, for each pollutant of

concern, there is a threshold concentration, represented by the

NAAQS, above which the pollutant is a threat to health or

welfare and below which it is not”); see also Cass Sunstein, Is

The Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 303, 314

(1999).

17

because scientists had already identified safe non-zero

thresholds for all pollutants studied pursuant to the Air

Quality Act of 1967 that were likely to be regulated under

Section 109.}5

The expert testimony of Dr. John T. Middleton, Commis-

sioner of the National Air Pollution Control Administration,

exemplifies the scientific understanding of the time. In the

context of extended testimony before the Senate Subcommit-

tee on Air and Water Pollution on the Clean Air Amend-

ments of 1970, Dr. Middleton lent credence to the threshold

model by testifying that it could yield “a level of air quality

that will be protective of health.” Id. at 1184. According to

Dr. Middleton, “The criteria documents state the level at

which [health] effects begin, some measurable things that are

observed to take place. The Clean Air Act provides that the

standards shall be protective of health, which means they

must be lesser than the level at which this thing was

observed.” Id. at 1185.'4

13 These five pollutants - sulfur oxides, particulates, carbon

monoxide, hydrocarbons, and photochemical oxidants — were at

the time all considered threshold pollutants, as evidenced by

exhibit 1 presented by Senator Muskie to the Senate. Legislative

History of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Vol. I, at 243-47.

The fact that thresholds had already been identified for these

pollutants was referred to repeatedly throughout legislative

reports and debates. See, e.g., Senate Committee on Public

Works Report, id. at 409; Remarks of Representative Jarman,

Legislative History, Vol. II at 815.

44 The Senate Committee on Public Works Report

demonstrates that the Committee concurred with Dr.

Middleton’s interpretation: “Ambient air quality is sufficient to

protect the health of such persons whenever there is an absence

of adverse effect on the health of a statistically related sample of

18

In adopting the threshold concept as the underlying

principle by which air quality standards are set, Con-

gress’ original mandate to EPA was therefore quite sim-

ple. It directed EPA to isolate thresholds for air pollutants

and then, without performing cost-benefit analysis, to

promulgate strict standards with “an adequate margin of

safety” to assure that those concentration levels were not

reached. Or, as Senator Muskie put it, “[The Act] states

that all Americans in all parts of the Nation should have

clean air to breathe, air that will have no adverse effects

on their health.” Legislative History, Vol. I, at 224

(emphasis added).

2. The Clean Air Amendments of 1977

After passage of the 1970 Amendments, the EPA

began setting air quality standards “on the assumption

that [ ] thresholds d[id] exist.”!5 By 1977, however, legis-

lators knew that the language of Section 109 had been

based on a myth - that.pollutants covered by Section 109

standards were not all threshold pollutants. Indeed, sev-

eral of the pollutants, including ozone, which were previ-

ously considered threshold pollutants, were now clearly

persons in sensitive groups from exposure to the ambient air.”

Id. at Vol. I, 410 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Committee

instructed, “An ambient air quality standard, therefore, should

be the maximum permissible ambient air level of an air

pollution agent which will protect the health of any group of the

population.” Id.

15 See Senate Comm. On Public Works, 93rd Cong., 2d

Sess., Coordinating Comm. on Air Quality Studies, Nat’l

Academy of Sciences, Air Quality and Automobile Emission

Control 17 (Comm. Print 1974).

19

identified by legislators as non-threshold pollutants -

pollutants that yield adverse health effects at any concen-

tration level. Moreover, because non-threshold pollutants

are adverse to public health at any level, legislators knew

that setting “safe” standards for such pollutants was not

only economically undesirable but, as a practical matter,

impossible.'* Nevertheless, Congress declined to provide

EPA meaningful guidance in setting NAAQS for non-

threshold pollutants.

The House Committee on Interstate and Foreign

Commerce’s Report on the 1977 Clean Air Amendments

expressly declared that the threshold concept underlying

the 1970 Amendments was misguided. The Committee

admitted that while “[t]he national primary standards are

based on the assumption that a no-effects threshold exists and

can be proved; in fact, this assumption appears to be false.”

Legislative History of the Clean Air Amendments of 1977,

Vol. IV, at 2577 (emphasis in original). It quoted a

National Academy of Sciences study reflecting the scien-

tific understanding of the time. That study concluded:

[I]n no case is there evidence that the threshold

levels have a clear physiological meaning, in the

“sense that there are genuine adverse health

effects at and above some level of pollution, but

no effects at all below that level. On the con-

trary, evidence indicates that the amount of

health damage varies with upward and down-

ward variations in the concentration level of the

pollutant, with no sharp lower limit.

16 For example, ozone is present naturally in the

atmosphere while PM results from almost all combustion.

20

Id. Ultimately, the Committee itself concluded: “!T]he

‘safe threshold’ concept is, at best, a necessary myth to

permit the setting of some standards.” Id. at 2578 (emphasis

added).

After admitting that the threshold concept was

flawed, however, the Committee simply declined to

address the enormous regulatory problem posed by non-

threshold pollutants, namely how EPA can promulgate

non-arbitrary standards for non-threshold pollutants

without banning those pollutants altogether. The Com-

mittee concluded as follows: “Some have suggested that

since the standards are to protect against all known or

anticipated effects and since no safe thresholds can be

established, the ambient standards should be set at zero

or background levels. Obviously, this no-risk philosophy

ignores all economic and social consequences and is

impractical.” Id. at 2594. The Committee therefore recog-

nized that Section 109’s language could not be logically

applied to non-threshold pollutants, but proposed no

alternative.

The House and Senate debates on the 1977 Clean Air

Amendments mirrored the House Committee Report. In

the House, Representative Bingham declared: “We now

know that there is no such thing as a safe level of air

pollutants. The only safe level of sulfur dioxides, nitrous

oxides, hydrocarbons and the rest, especially given their

synergistic effects, can only be zero.” Id., Vol. VII, at 6222.

In the Senate, meanwhile, Senator Muskie stated:

“[T]Jestimony on the health question over the last 7 years

over and over again has made the point that there is no

such thing as a threshold for health effects.” Id., Vol. III,

at 1030. Accordingly, Senator Muskie conceded that

21

under the standards then in effect, “there [were] health

effects that [were] not protected against.” Id. Congress

thus expressly disavowed the threshold concept without

changing Sections 108 and 109 to reflect the newfound

understanding of ambient air quality.

Because it did not wish to make an admittedly tough

policy choice about which principle should guide the

establishment of NAAQS for non-threshold pollutants,

Congress left in place the anachronistic “requisite to pro-

tect the public health” “with an adequate margin of

safety” language that does not provide an intelligible

principle for air quality regulation. The statutory lan-

guage is a complete mismatch with the scientific reality,

as Congress itself recognized. Many adverse health

effects can only be eliminated through a complete ban on

non-threshold pollutants, yet Congress expressly dis-

missed this option as infeasible.'7 And, in any event,

since ozone and nitrogen dioxide, among other non-

threshold pollutants, occur naturally in the environment,

EPA could not eliminate them entirely even if it wanted

to do so. Therefore, as George T. Woolf, former Chairman

of the EPA’s Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee has

17 Moreover, “public health” is really not even fully

protected through a complete ban on non-threshold pollutants.

For example, reducing ozone levels leads to adverse health

effects, such as skin cancer, see Randall Lutter & Christopher

Wolz, UV-B Screening by Tropospheric Ozone: Implications for the

National Ambient Air Quality Standards, 31 Envtl. Sci. & Tech.

142A, 145 (1997), and efforts to rid the atmosphere of particulate

matter would cause economic devastation and thus lead to a

host of significant adverse health effects. See American Trucking

Associations, Inc., 175 F.3d at 1038 n.4.

22

recognized, the application of Section 109(b)(1), which is

based on the 1970 threshold concept, to non-threshold

pollutants, is not only undesirable but impossible.'®

Moreover, the existence of the “adequate margin of

safety” mandated by the provision is itself contingent

upon the existence of a threshold level above zero, a

threshold level which in most cases does not exist. As

such, the statute as written simply cannot be applied to

non-threshold pollutants.!9 But despite its clear recogni-

tion of the dilemma created by its prior directive, Con-

gress knowingly chose not to remedy its error and

articulate an intelligible principle by which to regulate

non-threshold pollutants.

B. EPA’s Attempts to Set NAAQS Demonstrate

that Congress Has Failed to Provide EPA with

an Intelligible Principle for Setting Air Quality

Standards for Non-Threshold Pollutants.

It is now known that most, if not all, of the six

pollutants currently regulated under Section 109 are non-

18 Woolf has stated, “(T]he paradigm of selecting a

standard at the lowest-observable-effects-level and then

providing an ‘adequate margin of safety’ is not possible.” EPA’s

Rulemakings on the National Ambient Air Quality Standards

for Particulate Matter and Ozone: Hearings Before the

Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the House

Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 89 (1997) (statement of

George T. Woolf).

19 The House Committee on Interstate and Foreign

Commerce itself recognized in 1977 “that the margin of safety

concept is . . . an illusion.” Legislative History of the Clean Air

Amendments of 1977, Vol. IV, at 2578.

23

threshold pollutants.?° In establishing NAAQS, EPA has

acknowledged that it has been unable to identify any

discernible threshold for adverse health effects with

respect to ozone, see 62 Fed. Reg. 38,856, 38,863 (1997),

particulate matter, see 62 Fed. Reg. 38,652, 38,670 (1997),

sulfur dioxide, see 53 Fed. Reg. 14,926, 14,930 (1988),

carbon monoxide, see 50 Fed. Reg. 37,484, 37,487-88

(1985), or nitrogen dioxide, see 50 Fed. Reg. 25,532,

25,538-39 (1985). And although EPA did identify a discer-

nible threshold for the only other pollutant regulated

under Section 109 - lead - in setting a 1978 NAAQS, see

43 Fed. Reg. 46,246, 46,247-49, it has since admitted that

lead appears to be a non-threshold pollutant as well.?!

Consequently, in implementing Section 109, EPA has

faced the following choice: (1) set NAAQS for non-thresh-

old pollutants at zero; or (2) arbitrarily select a non-zero

standard at which adverse health effects still exist. Given

that the first option is at odds with the intent of Congress

and impossible to achieve (as well as economically devas-

tating to attempt), it is not surprising that EPA has chosen

the second path.

The problem with this choice, however, is that the

Clean Air Act “provides no guidance as to how EPA

20 See Mark K. Landy, et al., The Environmental Protection

Agency: Asking the Wrong Questions from Nixon to Clinton 55-56,

78-79 (1994).

21 See Air Quality Management Division, U.S. EPA, Review

of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Lead: Assessment

of Scientific and Technical Information, at III-54 (1989) (“the

available data . . . suggest a continuum of health risks down to

the lowest levels measured”).

24

should determine what non-zero level of risk is accept-

able.”22 Because the Act is based on the anachronistic

threshold concept, “the result of the statutory framework

is to misframe the key question and also to give EPA little

guidance for answering and asking that question.” The

lack of direction provided to EPA is especially problem-

atic because of the enormous impact the agency’s policy

choices can have on the nation’s economy.”4

Absent an intelligible principle by which to set

NAAQS for non-threshold pollutants, EPA has behaved

in one of two ways. First, in certain cases it has openly

admitted that its standards do not guard against known

adverse health effects, while making little if any effort to

explain how allowing such effects to occur is consistent

with the Act’s requirement that standards protect public

health “with an adequate margin of safety.” For example,

one wonders in the instant case why it is consistent with

the statute for 58,000 children a year in nine of our

nation’s urban areas to experience “large lung function

decreases” because of exposure to ozone, but inconsistent

with the statute for 97,000 children to experience such

effects. See 62 Fed. Reg. 38,856, 38,865; see also 43 Fed.

Reg. 46,246, 46,253-55 (1978) (over 20,000 children will

have unsafe blood lead levels under lead NAAQS).

22 Feller, supra note 12, at 832.

23 Sunstein, supra note 12, at 376.

24 For example, the cost of attaining EPA’s revised PM

standards is estimated to be anywhere from $37 billion to $150

billion annually, reducing the real after-tax income of the

average American by 1-2%. See Brief of Respondents

Appalachian Power Company, et al., No. 99-1426, at 17.

25

Alternatively, EPA often seeks to disguise the arbi-

trary nature of its standards by mischaracterizing scien-

tific data to make it appear as though a threshold may

exist where in fact none does. As a former EPA attorney

notes, “Where evidence suggests a continuum of effects

at all pollutant concentrations, EPA has characterized the

data as establishing uncertainty as to the threshold levels

rather than suggesting that no threshold level exists.”*°

This is encouraged by the Clean Air Act itself as “the

need to choose some non-zero ‘safe’ level of pollution

creates an incentive for this sort of risk recharacteriza-

tion.” Id. at 844. One commentator has identified the

EPA’s modus operandi as an “intentional science cha-

rade” where “agency bureaucrats consciously disguise

policy choices as science.” Because no non-zero stan-

dard is “safe,” EPA inevitably considers economic factors

in setting standards though costs must be publicly disre-

garded by the agency because of the statutory language.””

The statute’s lack of an intelligible principle thus

makes effective judicial review of air quality standards

impossible. Courts, like EPA, are given no guidance as to

the level of adverse health effects that is acceptable, and

must review rulemaking proceedings in which EPA

understandably distorts complex scientific data and

25 Feller, supra note 12, at 838. For detailed case studies of

this phenomenon regarding particulate matter and ozone, see

id. at 838-854, and Wendy Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic

Risk Regulation, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1613, 1640-44 (1995),

respectively.

26 Wagner, supra note 25, at 1640.

27 See id. at 1641.

26

refuses to acknowledge key factors influencing its deci-

sions in a bid to fit a square peg in a round hole. If the

status quo is maintained, one noted legal scholar has

predicted, “The day will eventually come when the same

court of appeals holds that EPA has behaved unlawfully

both for regulating above a certain level and for regulat-

ing below that level!””®

Ill. THIS COURT SHOULD HOLD SECTION

109(B)(1) UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED

TO NON-THRESHOLD POLLUTANTS.

In asking this Court to invalidate Section 109(b)(1) as

applied to non-threshold pollutants, amici recognize that

we are asking this Court to take a significant step, but it

is an appropriate one under the circumstances.

The decision as to what principle should be used to

set air quality standards is “quintessentially one of legis-

lative policy,” Industrial Union Dep't, 448 U.S. at 686

(Rehnquist, J., concurring), and one with enormous

impact on the health of the American people and the

vitality of the nation’s economy. It involves no subject,

such as foreign affairs or Indian affairs, where the execu-

tive branch possesses “residual authority,” id. at 684, nor

any power, such as the management of public property,

that is not legislative.??

28 Sunstein, supra note 12, at 322.

29 In both areas, this Court has properly adopted a

deferential stance with respect to congressional delegations. See

Schoenbrod, supra note 11, at 1265.

27

Furthermore, Congress’ failure to provide an intellig-

ible principle here is not justified by the “ ‘inherent

necessities’ of the situation.” Id. at 676. In a variety of

other statutes regulating pollutants and hazardous sub-

stances, Congress has expressly set forth intelligible prin-

ciples, such as cost-benefit analysis and technological

feasibility, to guide agency discretion. See e.g., Federal

Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C.

§§ 136(bb), 136a(c)(5)(D) (utilizing cost-benefit analysis);

Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(A), 1314(b)(1)

(employing standards based on technological feasibility);

Safe Water Drinking Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(4)(D)

(using standards of economic and technological fea-

sibility). Moreover, agencies themselves have adopted

principles for managing risk, such as defining a maxi-

mally acceptable risk, which Congress could use in this

context.%°

For constitutional purposes, it is not significant

which principle is ultimately chosen; what is significant is

that Congress supplies it. Amici, for instance, may agree

with Cross-Petitioners that cost-benefit analysis from a

policy perspective reflects a sensible way of developing

air quality standards under Section 109. This purported

interpretation, however, is no more supported by the

language of the statute and the legislative history than is

3° See Joseph V. Rodricks, et al., Significant Risk Decisions in

Federal Regulatory Agencies, 7 Regulatory Toxicology and

Pharmacology, 307, 309-13 (1987).

28

@ maximally acceptable risk standard, technological fea-

sibility standard, or a host of other standards Congress

could have supplied, but did not.*!

While the D.C. Circuit thus correctly ruled that EPA’s

construction of Section 109(b)(1) in its ozone and PM

rules effectuated an unconstitutional delegation of power,

the remedy it ordered was inappropriate. In light of Con-

gress’ abdication of its responsibility to set forth an intel-

ligible principle for setting air quality standards for non-

threshold pollutants, the court’s decision to allow EPA to

“extract a determinate standard on its own” was in error.

American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027,

1038 (D.C. Cir. 1999). As no intelligible principle is

“apparent from the statute,” id. at 1034, or the legislative

history, the appropriate remedy here is to hold Section

109(b)(1) unconstitutional as applied to non-threshold

pollutants.

The underlying purpose of the nondelegation doc-

trine is not vindicated by a remedy ordering that “EPA in

effect draft a different, narrower version of the Clean Air

Act.” American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. EPA, 195 F.3d

4, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Silberman, J., dissenting from

denial of rehearing en banc). Section 109 either provides

31 While it could be argued that EPA’s choice of any of these

principles might pass muster under the framework of Chevron

U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.

837, 842-843 (1984), this does not save the statute from a

nondelegation doctrine challenge. On the contrary, the fact that

multiple contradictory intelligible principles would pass muster

under Chevron itself demonstrates that Congress has run afoul

of the nondelegation doctrine by failing to supply its own

intelligible principle for setting air quality standards.

29

an intelligible principle for setting NAAQS for non-

threshold pollutants or it does not. If it does, EPA’s fail-

ure to articulate that principle, while legally troubling on

other grounds, does not implicate the nondelegation doc-

trine. But if, as we believe, Section 109 provides no such

intelligible principle, the fact that EPA may be able to

supply its own intelligible principle cannot save the stat-

ute from a nondelegation doctrine. The constitutional basis

of the nondelegation doctrine is that Congress, not executive

agencies, must make important policy choices, which form the

core of the legislative power.

Though the precedent set here may contradict recent

jurisprudential trends, the rule of law is really a modest

one: Congress is free to legislate or not, or to delegate its

authority or not, as it sees fit; all it may not do is to

effectuate a wholesale transfer of the legislative power to

the executive. That is the essence of the separation of

powers. The crucial limiting factor is the requirement of

an intelligible principle.5? Accordingly, this Court should

require Congress to fulfill its constitutional responsibility

to set forth an intelligible principle by which EPA is to set

air quality standards for non-threshold pollutants by

holding Section 109(b)(1) unconstitutional as applied to

non-threshold pollutants.

32 Limits must exist on Congress’ ability to delegate

legislative power to executive agencies. Surely, for example,

Congress could not direct the Internal Revenue Service to set tax

rates so that “the public interest, convenience, and necessity

will be served.” Cf. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a).

30

CONCLUSION

To paraphrase Chief Justice Rehnquist in Industrial

Union Dep't, 448 U.S. at 687, if this Court is ever to

reshoulder the burden of ensuring that Congress itself

make critical policy decisions, this is surely the case in

which to do it. For the foregoing reasons, amici respect-

fully request that this Court revitalize the nondelegation

doctrine by holding Section 109(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act

unconstitutional as applied to non-threshold pollutants.

Respectfully submitted,

WituiamM H. MEttor* Rocer PrLon

Cunt Bouck TimotHy LYNCH

DEBORAH SIMPSON Rosert A. Levy

MattHew B. Berry Rona.tp D. RoTruNDA

INstTITUTE For JusTICE Cato INsTITUTE

1717 Pennsylvania Ave., 1000 Mass. Ave., N.W.

N.W. Washington, D.C. 20001

Suite 200 (202) 842-0200

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 955-1300

*Counsel of Record

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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