Amicus Curiae Brief — Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc.

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| No. 99-1257 | LED |

IN THE | SEP 1 1 2000

Supreme Court of the United States

~~

CAROL M. BROWNER, PI HER, THE

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

Vv.

AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS, INC., ET AL.,

Respondents.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF AMICI CURIAE OF GARY E. MARCHANT,

CARY COGLIANESE, DANIEL M. BYRD ITI,

GAIL CHARNLEY, MAUREEN L. CROPPER,

E. DONALD ELLIOTT, DAVID L. FAIGMAN, JAMES K.

HAMMITT, JAMES E. KRIER, WILLIAM H. LASH Il,

ROGER O. McCLELLAN, THOMAS W. MERRILL,

LARS NOAH, JOYCE E. PENNER, ROBERT PHALEN,

JEFFREY J. RACHLINSKI, JOSEPH SANDERS,

ROBERT N. STAVINS, JONATHAN B. WIENER and

JAMES D. WILSON IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

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EE 6casunddccdkadeteaeeeeakeencuuenel l

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..............--eeeeee. 3

EE Wiocdundwaeedenses vena bieeeanaaiee 4

I. SCIENCE ALONE CANNOT PROVIDE A

BASIS FOR RISK MANAGEMENT

PE ccakensudsneeudess senuiscusenes 4

A. Science Describes and Explains.......... 5

B. Risk Management Prescribes ............ 5

.. Agencies Can Use Science as

SE ‘<tcuceneabesuveusesuaneet 8

II. SCIENCE ALONE CANNOT PROVIDE A

BASIS FOR THE OZONE AND PM NAAQS .... 9

A. Science Alone Cannot Guide Standard-

Setting for Non-Threshold Air

RRS ree rere Sar Ce ee 10

B. EPA’s Exclusive Reliance on Science

to Justify its Standards Creates the

Appearance of a “Charade” ............ 12

Ill. §PRINCIPLED STANDARD-SETTING

REQUIRES CONSIDERATION OF MORE

PROMS cebecduvccuvanceesecedeaus 15

GRUMENEEE 6 6cbbvcccdecacwasenecucesécecaues 18

APPENDIX: IDENTIFICATION OF AMICI] .......... 19

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases:

Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC,

ee etn eueceeesessesense 12

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,

Te ee eee een eeepeeeeaseness 5

Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst.,

i. eee ckeeheneeeeseesiseces 7

Statutes:

Clean Air Act §108(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(2) .. 2.2.66... 2

Clean Air Act §109(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. §7409(b)(1) . 2 eee. |

Clean Air Act §307(d), 42 U.S.C. §7607(d) ...........6044.. 2

Miscellaneous:

54 Fed. Reg. 38,044 (Sept. 14, 1989) 2... 0... ccc 15

61 Fed. Reg. 17,960 (Apr. 23, 1996) .. 2... 6. oe ec eee 8

62 Fed. Reg. 38,856 (July 18, 1997) ............4.. 2,3,6,10,11

62 Fed. Reg. 38,652 (July 18, 1997) ..........0 ccc eeee 2,11

63 Fed. Reg. 43,756 (Aug. 14, 1998)... 2... eee eens 8

Air Quality Standards: Science-Driven Ozone, PM

Proposals Will Be Finished by July 19, EPA Says,

27 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 2068 (Feb. 14, 1997) ........... 3

Kenneth J. Arrow, Maureen L. Cropper, George

C. Eads, Robert W. Hahn, Lester B. Lave,

Roger G. Noll, Paul R. Portney, Milton Russell,

Richard Schmalensee, V. Kerry Smith, and Robert

N. Stavins, Js There a Role for Benefit-Cost

Analysis in Environmental, Health, and Safety

Regulation?, 272 SCIENCE 221(1996) .............. 17

Testimony of Carol M. Browner, EPA Administrator,

Before the Subcomm. on National Economic

Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory

Affairs of the House Comm. on Government

Reform and Oversight (Apr. 23, 1997)

i ih tic bGendaddevessseeeeseuenens 3

DANIEL M. BYRD III & C. RICHARD COTHERN,

INTRODUCTION TO RISK ANALYSIS: A

SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO SCIENCE-BASED

DECISION MAKING (2000) 2.0.0... ee

J. CLARENCE DAVIES, COMPARING ENVIRONMENTAL

PE pancsdenncesceennesdndeoeseeenaess

George Eads, The Confusion of Goals and

Instruments: The Explicit Consideration of

Cost in Setting National Ambient Air Quality

Standards, in MARY GIBSON (ed.), TO BREATHE

FREELY: RISK, CONSENT, AND AIR 222 (1985) ........

EPA, Science Policy Council, Guidance for Risk

16

Characterization (Feb. 1995) ..............000eeee 7,8

DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND

MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN THE LAW (1999) .............

Joseph M. Feller, Non-Threshold Pollutants and

Air Quality Standards, 24 ENVTL. LAW 821

DEE sci nivecnuunsadnnkhesenede sedebsisuwsset

Congressional Testimony of John D. Graham,

Director of Harvard Center for Risk Analysis,

on Clean Air Act Reauthorization (Oct. 14,

SEY CED soccccuchencacceceses 9,

JOHN D. GRAHAM & JONATHAN B. WIENER (eds.),

RISK VS. RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING

HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1995) .............

C. Boyden Gray, The Clean Air Act Under

Regulatory Reform, 11 Tul. Envtl. L. J.

Ps 24660 4UKbauseuSoeneesenssseeceneades

Sheila Jasanoff, Contested Boundaries in Policy-

Relevant Science, 17 SOC. STUD. SCI. 195 (1987) .......

MARC K. LANDY, MARC J. ROBERTS & STEPHEN

R. THOMAS, THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

AGENCY: ASKING THE WRONG QUESTIONS (1990) ....

WILLIAM W. LOWRANCE, OF ACCEPTABLE RISK:

SCIENCE AND THE DETERMINATION OF SAFETY (1976) ..

Gary E. Marchant, Turning Two Blind Eyes:

The EPA's Failure to Consider Costs

and Health Benefits in Revising the Ozone

Standard, 11 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 261 (1998) .............

THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING

TEED ecncuvénsanceccosdsdecscnses

iV

R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS:

THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT (1983) ....... 12,13,15

NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES/NATIONAL

RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT

IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: MANAGING

IE oc ccucucctcuusersasecceces 5,6,7

NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING

RISK: INFORMING DECISIONS IN A DEMOCRATIC

sc. ciaceeseteshsbedeaseneensscae 6,17

Craig N. Oren, Run Over By American Trucking

Part I; Can EPA Revive Its Air Quality

Standards?, 29 ENVT’L L. REP. 10,653

Dt Pc ct bceeheueneeeihandedeéheseocenss 6,14

March Sadowitz & John D. Graham, A Survey of

Residual Cancer Risks Permitted by

Health, Safety and Environmental Policy,

PE a SS dundesncedbsnessehdendeceesese< 15

Cass R. Sunstein, /s the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?,

Fp ee Ee SEP GUEEED weccccecccnccccescs 14,17

Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic

Risk Regulation, 95 COL. L. REV. 1613 (1995) .... 9,12,14

Edward W. Warren & Gary E. Marchant,

“More Good Than Harm”: A First

Principle for Environmental Agencies and

Reviewing Courts, 20 ECOL. L. Q. 379 (1993) ........ 17

Closure Letter from George T. Wolff, Chair,

Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee,

to Administrator Carol M. Browner (Nov. 30,

1995) (EPA-SAB-CASAC-LTR-96-002) ............. 11

Written Statement of George T. Wolff, Chair, EPA’s

Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee’s

Panels on Ozone and PM, for the House Comm.

On Health and Env’t, Subcomm. On Oversight

and Investigations (Apr. 10, 1997) (1997 WL

PE nnbaserenkeuaetueehs seeudbunccestecns 12

INTEREST OF THE AMICI

Amici are professors and scientists with scholarly or

professional interests in the intersection of law and science.

The various amici have taught, researched, and published on

issues involving law, science, and policy. Brief summaries of

the qualifications and affiliations of the individual amici are

provided at the end of this brief.

Amici have an interest in seeing that the Court is informed

on the appropriate use and limitations of science in setting

national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) under the

Clean Air Act. While amici support reliance on science to

assess the risks of alternative air quality standards, science

alone cannot provide a principled justification for setting such

standards.

Amici file this brief solely as individuals and not on behalf

of the institutions with which they are affiliated. In addition,

amici take no position on the merits of the specific air quality

standards at issue in this case. Rather, their views address the

broader question of the role of science in the process by which

the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sets air

quality standards.’

BACKGROUND

The Clean Air Act calls for the EPA Administrator to use

he: ‘dgment” to select a primary NAAQS that is “requisite to

prot. _: the public health” based on the criteria document and

allowing “an adequate margin of safety.” 42 U.S.C.

§7409(b)(1). The statute also specifies that the criteria

document shall “reflect the latest scientific knowledge” about

' Pursuant to Rule 37.6 of the Rules of this Coust, omici state that no person

or entity, other than the individual amici, authored this brief in whole or in

part, or made any monetary contribution to the preparation or submission

of this brief. Letters of consent to the filing of this brief from all parties

have been lodged with the Clerk of the Court pursuant to Rule 37.3.

2

the public health and welfare’ effects of the pollutant in

question. /d. § 7408(a)(2).

At every step in this proceeding, including before this

Court, EPA has purported to rely exclusively on scientific

factors to justify its selection of revised NAAQS for ozone and

particulate matter (PM). Even though EPA appears to

acknowledge in its rulemaking preambles that setting air

quality standards is a “policy choice,”’ the only criteria it

identifies for making such choices are scientific ones.

In its brief filed in this Court, EPA identified three types

of limitations on its NAAQS rulemaking discretion which the

Agency argues satisfy the “intelligible principle” requirement.

Brief for Petitioner U.S. EPA, No. 99-1257, at 23-24 (July 21,

2000) (hereinafter “EPA Br.”’). The three limitations are the

criteria documents reflecting “the latest scientific knowledge,”

the advice from the EPA’s Clean Air Scientific Advisory

Committee (CASAC), and the rulemaking requirements of

section 307(d) of the Clean Air Act. The latter “limitation” is

procedural only, while the first two factors emphasize scientific

inputs.

Likewise, in the NAAQS rulemakings, EPA justified the

selection of its NAAQS standards based exclusively on health

effects and scientific criteria. For example, EPA claimed to

select its ozone standard based solely on “public health policy

judgments in addition to determinations of a strictly scientific

nature,” with assessments of risk playing a “central role in

identifying an appropriate level.” 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,863

(quotation omitted). The only type of public health “policy

? Under the Clean Air Act, “welfare” effects refer to non-human biological

and physical effects, not monetary measures of impacts as economists use

the term.

> EPA, Ozone Final Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,856, 38,857 (July 18, 1997);

EPA, PM Final Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,652, 38,653 (July 18, 1997).

3

judgments” that EPA identified were factors such as the nature

and severity of health effects, the types of health evidence, the

kind and degree of uncertainties involved, and the size and

nature of the sensitive populations at risk. /d. at 38,883; EPA

Br. at 5.

Finally, in testimony to Congress on the proposed ozone

and PM NAAQS, EPA’s Administrator stated that “[a]s you

can see from the description of the process I went through to

choose proposed levels on ozone and particulate matter, the

focus has been entirely on health, risk, exposure and damage to

the environment.” Testimony of Carol M. Browner, EPA

Administrator, Before the Subcomm. on National Economic

Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs of the

House Comm. on Government Reform and Oversight (Apr. 23,

1997) (1997 WL 10571215). In defending her selection of the

proposed standards to the public, the Administrator reportedly

claimed that “I think it is not a question of judgment, | think it

is a question of science.” Air Quality Standards: Science-

Driven Ozone, PM Proposals Will Be Finished by July 19, EPA

Says, 27 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 2068 (Feb. 14, 1997).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Throughout this proceeding, EPA has identified no policy

or normative criteria to justify its NAAQS standards, thus

suggesting that science alone can be used to determine the

appropriate air quality standard. Science plays a critical,

indeed essential, role in evaluating the risks of possible air

quality standards being considered for adoption by EPA.

However, science by itself cannot provide the justification for

selecting a particular air quality standard. Especially in setting

standards for non-threshold pollutants, such as in this case,

scientific evidence cannot alone indicate where the standard

should be set, since any level above zero will cause some health

effects. To provide a principled and consistent basis for

justifying the setting of such standards at some level above

4

zero, EPA must articulate other factors -- whether they be costs

or other policy criteria -- to guide its decisions on where to set

national ambient air quality standards.

ARGUMENT

As in the proceedings below, EPA’s brief filed in this

Court identifies no factors or criteria other than scientific

evidence to guide its selection of revised primary national

ambient air quality standards for ozone and particulate matter.

While science’ is a critical, indeed essential, input in

developing standards, science alone cannot provide an

“intelligible principle” to guide policy decisions about the level

at which to set EPA’s revised NAAQS.

I. SCIENCE ALONE CANNOT PROVIDE A BASIS

FOR RISK MANAGEMENT DECISIONS

Science has played a prominent and important role in

agency regulatory decisions, as well as in judicial review of

those decisions. Such reliance on science is justified given the

advances that science has made over the past few decades in

understanding environmental risks. Yet, purporting to rely

solely on science to answer questions science is not designed

to address is as misguided as it would be to disregard relevant

scientific information. Science plays an appropriate and central

role in regulatory agencies’ assessments of risk, by providing

systematic and reliable knowledge about the world. In contrast,

risk management decisions, including decisions on setting

health standards, are ones for which science alone cannot

provide a principled foundation.

* The term “science” as used throughout this brief refers to the natural

sciences.

5

A. Science Describes and Explains

As this Court recently noted, science is “a process for

proposing and refining theoretical explanations about the

world.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509

U.S. 579, 590 (1993) (citing Brief for American Association

for the Advancement of Science et al. as Amici Curiae 7-8). As

such, science seeks to supply verifiable descriptions of, and

explanations about, what is, rather than imposing judgments

about what should be. Science describes, it does not prescribe.

B. Risk Management Prescribes

In the context of health and environmental risks, science

plays a critical role in identifying, describing, and quantifying

risks, but it does not tell us whether such risks are acceptable or

should be reduced. The National Academy of Sciences (NAS)

recognized this distinction in its influential 1983 report known

as the “Red Book,” which established a framework for risk

analysis on which regulatory agencies continue to rely today.

NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES/NATIONAL RESEARCH

COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT:

MANAGING THE PROCESS (1983) (“NAS Red Book’’).

The NAS distinguished risk assessment from risk

management. It defined risk assessment as “the

characterization of the potential adverse health effects of

human exposures to environmental hazards.” /d. at 18. Risk

assessment is based on scientific information, supplemented

with what have been termed “risk assessment policy”

judgments to bridge gaps aiid uncertainties in the scientific

evidence. Jd. at 37.° Risk assessment is considered to be

* Such risk assessment policy judgments include factors such as which

health effects to consider and to group together, the type of models and

assumptions to use in the risk assessment, how to extrapolate data fron one

small segment of a population to the entire population, and how to ccoinpute

(continued...)

6

predominantly -- though not exclusively’ — based on scientifi¢

evidence and analysis.

Risk management, on the other hand, is “an agency

decision-making process that entails consideration of political,

social, economic, and engineering information with risk-related

information to develop, analyze, and compare regulatory

options and to select the appropriate regulatory response to a

potential chronic health hazard.” NAS Red Book at 18-19.

Risk management “necessarily requires the use of value

judgments on such issues as the acceptability of risk and the

reasonableness of the costs of control.” Jd. at 19.’ Asa

subsequent National Research Council report reiterated,

“science alone can never be an adequate basis for a risk

decision” because “[r]isk decisions are, ultimately, public

policy choices.”* This Court has likewise recognized that the

* (...continued)

and present uncertainties. NAS Red Book at 29-33. These risk assessment

policy judgments are comparable to the “public health policy judgments”

that EPA identified as a basis for its NAAQS decisions. See 62 Fed. Reg.

at 38,883; supra pp. 2-3.

° E.g., Sheila Jasanoff, Contested Boundaries in Policy-Relevant Science,

17 Soc. STuD. Sci. 195, 211 (1987) (noting that analysts have “agreed that

very little in a typical risk assessment could be labeled as pure science’’);

DANIEL M. ByRrbD III & C. RICHARD COTHERN, INTRODUCTION TO RISK

ANALYSIS: A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO SCIENCE-BASED DECISION

MAKING 6-8, 330-34 (2000) (risk assessment inherently and inevitably

involves some judgment).

” See also Craig N. Oren, Run Over By American Trucking Part J; Can

EPA Revive Its Air Quality Standards?, 29 ENVT’L L. REP. 10,653, 10,660

(Nov. 1999) (“the decision of who should be protected, and what effects

they should be protected against, is an ethical decision, not a scientific

one”).

* NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING RISK: INFORMING

DECISIONS IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 26 (1996). This report cautioned

against too strict of a separation between risk assessment and risk

management, because non-scientific deliberative and policy factors can also

be relevant to risk assessment. /d. at 34.

7

setting of health and environmental standards is primarily a

policy rather than scientific undertaking.”

Risk assessment is therefore understood to be

predominantly (but not exclusively) a scientific undertaking,

whereas risk management decisions, including the selection of

standards, require making value judgments that extend beyond

the scope of science.'® The National Academy recommended

that regulatory agencies should “maintain a clear conceptual

distinction between assessment of risks and consideration of

risk management alternatives; that is, the scientific findings and

policy judgments embodied in risk assessments should be

explicitly distinguished from the political, economic, and

technical considerations that influence the design and choice of

regulatory strategies.” NAS Red Book at 7.

EPA has endorsed and relied on the NAS’s distinction

between risk assessment and risk management.'' For example,

* In the Court’s 1980 review of OSHA’s benzene occupational exposure

standard, Justice Marshall’s dissenting opinion stated: “[W }hen the question

involves determination of an acceptable level of risk, the ultimate decision

must necessarily be based on considerations of policy as well as empirically

verifiable facts. Factual determinations can at most define the risk in some

statistical way; the judgment whether that risk is tolerable cannot be based

solely on a resolution of the facts.” Industrial Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v.

American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 706 (1980). The plurality opinion

quoted Justice Marshall’s statement, and then responded: “We agree. Thus,

while the Agency must support its finding that a certain level of risk exists

by substantial evidence, we recognize that its determination that a particular

level of risk is ‘significant’ will be based largely on policy considerations.”

Id. at 655 n.62 (plurality opinion).

'© See also WILLIAM W. LOWRANCE, OF ACCEPTABLE RISK 75-76 (1976)

(“Determining safety, then, involves two extremely different kinds of

activities... Measuring risk - measuring the probability and severity of

harm-is an empirical, scientific activity; Judging safety- judging the

acceptability of risks, is a normative, political activity.”).

"' E.g., EPA, Science Policy Council, Guidance for Risk Characterization

2 (Feb. 1995) (available at http://www.epa.gov/ORD/spc/rcguide.htm) (“In

. (continued...)

8

in a recent EPA guidance on conducting risk analysis, EPA

directed that agency staff should clearly separate risk

assessment from risk management, with risk assessment

involving the selection, evaluation and presentation of

“scientific information,” but not “decisions on the acceptability

of any risk level for protecting public health or selecting

procedures for reducing risks.” EPA, Risk Characterization

Guidance, supra note 11, at 3.

In contrast, EPA noted that risk management decisions

should be based on, to the extent permissible, a consideration

of “technological feasibility (e.g., treatability, detection limits),

economic, social, political, and legal factors,” in addition to the

output of the risk assessment process. /d. According to EPA,

“risk assessors and risk managers should understand that the

regulatory decision is usually not determined solely by the

outcome of the risk assessment.” Jd. In order to make risk

assessments “transparent,” EPA has further stated that it is

important “that conclusions drawn from the science are

identified separately from policy judgments and risk

management decisions.” 63 Fed. Reg. 43,756, 43,769 (Aug.

14, 1998). ;

3. Agencies Can Use Science as a “Charade”

Notwithstanding broad acceptance that science alone

cannot justify judgments about acceptable levels of risk,

regulatory agencies such as EPA may find it expedient to cloak

policy judgments under the guise of science. Professor Wendy

'' (...continued)

1984, EPA endorsed these [NAS] distinctions between risk assessment and

risk management for Agency use, and later relied on them in developing

risk assessment guidelines.”) (endnotes omitted) [hereinafter EPA Risk

Characterization Guidance); EPA, 61 Fed. Reg. 17,960, 17,960 (Apr. 23,

1996) (citing NAS report in adopting risk assessment guidelines “to ensure

that the risk assessment process was maintained as a scientific effort

separate from risk management.”).

9

Wagner has dubbed this practice a “science charade,” which

occurs when “agencies exaggerate the contributions made by

science in setting [environmental] standards in order to avoid

accountability for the underlying policy decision.”"””

Professor Wagner identified several political, legal and

institutional incentives for agencies to engage in the science

charade by exaggerating the role and capability of science in

making environmental decisions. /d. at 1650-73. For example,

the strong deference that reviewing courts give EPA’s scientific

determinations creates “strong and virtually inescapable

incentives to conceal policy choices under the cover of

scientific judgments and citations.” Jd. at 1663. Professor

Wagner identified previous NAAQS rulemakings as examples

of a science charade. /d. at 1640-44.

II. SCIENCE ALONE CANNOT PROVIDE A BASIS

FOR THE OZONE AND PM NAAQS

Science is central to evaluating the health risks of possible

alternative air quality standards, but the decision of which

standard to adopt is a risk management determination. As

such, standard-setting should utilize all the available scientific

evidence on health effects, but also needs to incorporate policy

considerations. Scientific data on ozone and particulate matter

do not and cannot, without more, provide a principled

justi fication for the level at which the respective NAAQS are

set.

'? Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95

COL. L. REV. 1613, 1617 (1995).

'> See Congressional Testimony of John D. Graham, Director of Harvard

Center for Risk Analysis, on Clean Air Act Reauthorization (Oct. 14, 1999)

(1999 WL 27595650) (“scientific information (alone) does not typically

provide an intelligible basis for the setting of safe (yet non-zero) amounts

of air pollution.”).

10

A. Science Alone Cannot Guide Standard-Setting for

Non-Threshold Air Pollutants

The scientific data for ozone and PM indicate a continuum

of health effects down to background (or natural)

concentrations of the pollutant in the air, at which point the

health effects associated with the pollutants cannot be

distinguished from effects caused by other factors. There

appears to be no clear demarcation of a discrete threshold

below which a standard could be set to avoid all health

vffects.'* EPA acknowledges that there is probably no

threshold level for ozone below which no health effects would

be expected to occur:

The Administrator’s decision to propose the level of

an 8-hour primary O, standard at 0.08 ppm ...

necessarily reflected a recognition ... that it is likely

that O, may elicit a continuum of biological

responses down to background concentrations...

Thus, in the absence of any discernable threshold, it

is not possible to select a level below which

absolutely no effects are likely to occur. Nor does it

seem possible, in the Administrator’s judgment, to

identify a level at which it can be concluded with

confidence that no “adverse” effects are likely to

occur.

62 Fed. Reg. at 38,863 (citation omitted). EPA further

acknowledged that “no standard within the range of levels and

forms considered in this review, including the selected standard

'* Science can provide a distinct starting point for standard-setting for a

pollutant for which the scientific evidence indicates a threshold in the

exposure-response relationship, although the decision to set the standard at

or below the threshold is itself a policy rather than scientific determination.

In such cases, the Administrator can focus on how far below the threshold

to set the standard to achieve an “adequate margin of safety,” which also is

a policy decision.

11

is risk-free, due to the continuum of risk likely posed by

exposures to ambient O, potentially down to background

levels.” Jd. at 38,873."°

Given a continuum of health effects, science provides

information on the frequency and severity of adverse effects at

various levels, but this information by itself does not identify

the level at which to set the standard. For non-threshold

pollutants, the only standard that could conceivably protect

against all health effects would be a standard set at the level of

zero, an option that EPA has explicitly ruled out. E.g., 62 Fed.

Reg. at 38,863 (“a zero-risk standard is neither possible nor

required by the Act’’).

EPA’s own Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee

concluded with respect to ozone that “there is no bright line

which distinguishes any of the proposed standards (either the

level or the number of allowable exceedences) as being

significantly more protective of health” and “[c]onsequently,

the selection of a specific level and number of allowable

exceedences is a policy judgment.””"* In testimony to Congress,

the Chair of CASAC reiterated that “the decisions to select a

given level or number of allowable exceedences within their

proposed ranges cannot be based on science;” rather, the

'S See also id. at 38,867 (“Clearly, for pollutants, such as O,, that have no

discernable thresholds for health effects, no standard can be risk-free.”).

With respect to particulate matter, EPA similarly noted that “the single most

important factor influencing the uncertainty associated with the risk

estimates is whether or not a threshold concentration exists below which

PM-associated health risks are not likely to occur.” 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,656.

The Agency also recognized that the alternative PM standards it considered

“will not be risk-free.” /d.

'© Closure Letter from George T. Wolff, Chair, Clean Air Scientific

Advisory Committee, to Administrator Carol M. Browner (Nov. 30, 1995),

at 3 (EPA-SAB-CASAC-LTR-96-002) (emphasis added).

12

selection of a particular standard is “strictly a policy

judgment.””’

B. EPA’s Exclusive “eliance on Science to Justify its

Standards Creates the Appearance of a “Charade”

In its brief filed in this Court, as well as in the proceedings

below, EPA has defended its selection of its revised ozone and

PM NAAQS based solely on scientific grounds. See pp. 2-3,

supra. In addition, EPA suggests that this Court should be

highly deferential to its selection of NAAQS standards

precisely because it is a “scientific determination.”'* EPA’s

justification for its NAAQS standards appears to fit the pattern

of what has been called a “science charade,” in which an

agency attempts to use science to justify its standards, even

though the level and form of the standards is not something that

science alone can determine.

Scholars have suggested that EPA has not been forthright

in justifying its selection of current and past NAAQS standards

based solely on science, when the selection of such a standard

necessarily depends on risk management value judgments.”

'’ Written Statement of George T. Wolff, Chair, EPA’s Clean Air

Scientific Advisory Committee’s Panels on Ozone and PM, for the House

Comm. on Health and Env’t, Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations

(Apr. 10, 1997) (1997 WL 10569483).

'’ EPA Br. at 27 (“When examining this kind of scientific determination,

as opposed to simple findings of fact, a reviewing court must generally be

at its most deferential.”) (quoting Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462

U.S. 87, 103 (1983)).

'? Wagner, supra note 12, at 1640-44 (EPA’s reliance on scientific and

medical evidence alone to justify its previous ozone NAAQS is a “vivid

illustration” of an “intentional science charade”); R. SHEP MELNICK,

REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 261

(1983) (“There is, in short, no simple answer to the question of how the

EPA sets air quality standards. Medical evidence cannot offer definitive

guidance.... The-EPA itself has refused to deal with the problem in a

(continued...)

13

Professor David Faigman, for example, has recently argued that

the “real loser in the PM/ozone drama was candor”’:

The debate was phrased almost entirely in terms of

science when the science played a decidedly minor

role in the actual decision.... Science should not be

used to hide what are essentially the true bases for

decision.”

Amici do not purport to know the “true bases” of EPA’s

selection of its NAAQS, only that science alone cannot provide

a consistent and principled basis for its standard-setting.

EPA claims to exclude, for example, considerations of

costs and feasibility in setting air quality standards. However,

as Professor Joseph Feller, a former EPA attorney, has written,

“fijf all costs are truly ignored, then no risk would be

acceptable.””' Scholars and commentators from a diverse range

of viewpoints have argued that EPA does consider costs in

setting its air quality standards, even though it excludes

consideration of costs in its public justification for its

standards.” Dr. John Graham, Director of the Harvard Center

(...continued)

forthright manner, hiding its policy choices behind its interpretation of

scientific evidence.”); Graham, supra note 13 (“When multi-billion dollar

rulemaking decisions are made, it is inevitable that regulators will consider

the consequences of their actions as well as the reasonableness of the

relationship between risks, benefits and costs.”).

a DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUES OF SCIENCE

IN THE LAW 187 (1999).

?" Joseph M. Feller, Non-Threshold Pollutants and Air Quality Standards,

24 ENVTL. LAW 821, 833 (1994).

2 Eg, FAIGMAN, supra note 13, at 183 (“In practice, therefore, despite the

legal technicality limiting EPA to promulgating regulations solely to

promote health, costs are an integral part of the policy-making process at

EPA.”); MELNICK, supra note 12, at 297 (“[R]egulators inevitably consider

cost [in setting air quality standards]. vdeo

14

for Risk Analysis, has further argued that EPA’s “legal fiction”

that it does not consider costs when setting NAAQS is

“dysfunctional” because “it (1) reduces political accountability

for value judgments and political choices, [and] (2) hides from

public scrutiny claims that are made about risks, benefits and

costs (since such claims are driven ‘underground’ in the course

of regulatory deliberations).” Graham, supra note 13.

EPA’s exclusive reliance on science to justify its standard

selection thus creates the appearance that the Agency is using

science to shield its decision-making from scrutiny. See

Wagner, supra note 12, at 1656 (agencies may be able to find

refuge from controversial public debates by relying on the

* (...continued)

how they do.”); MARC K. LANDY, MARC J. ROBERTS & STEPHEN R.

THOMAS, THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: ASKING THE

WRONG QUESTIONS 238 (1990) (“[I}n the absence of any threshold for risk,

some balancing between costs and benefits had to be implicit in the standard

setting decision - a reality EPA neither acknowledged nor forced the

Congress to confront.”); George Eads, The Confusion of Goals and

Instruments: The Explicit Consideration of Cost in Setting National Ambient

Air Quality Standards, in MARY GIBSON (ed.), TO BREATHE FREELY: RISK,

CONSENT, AND AIR 222, 229 (1985) (it is a “policy fiction” that costs are

not considered in setting NAAQS); Oren, supra note 7, at 10,662 (“EPA

inevitably must therefore consider costs in standard-setting to help decide

how stringent to make the standards.”); THOMAS O. MCGARITY,

REINVENTING RATIONALITY 253 (1991) (“The institution has considered

costs and benefits, and the advice that the Administrator receives orally

from subordinates reflects those considerations.”); Gary E. Marchant,

Turning Two Blind Eyes: The EPA's Failure to Consider Costs and Health

Benefits in Revising the Ozone Standard, 11 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 261, 267-68

(1998) (EPA failed “to ‘come clean’ about the true nature of its decision-

making”); C. Boyden Gray, The Clean Air Act Under Regulatory Reform,

11 TUL. ENVTL. L. J. 235, 235 (1998) (“The plain fact is that the EPA has

for a long time considered costs and benefits in setting ambient

standards—only it has done so behind closed doors....”); Cass R. Sunstein,

Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional? , 98 Mich. L. REV. 303, 317-318

(1999) (“Only insiders know for certain whether EPA does in fact consider

costs in issuing national ambient air quality standards,” but evidence

suggests that “costs do matter in the context of standard-setting for

nonthreshold pollutants.”).

15

science charade); MELNICK, supra note 12, at 297 (“Far from

opening agency decisionmaking to public view, the courts have

allowed and encouraged the EPA to sustain a myth and to keep

secret its bureaucratic motives.”). More significantly, such

reliance prevents the Agency from including the careful and

open consideration of relevant policy considerations in its

justification for its air quality standards.

Ill. PRINCIPLED STANDARD-SETTING REQUIRES

CONSIDERATION OF MORE THAN SCIENCE

The EPA has available to it several alternative approaches

by which it could incorporate policy considerations into the

reasons it provides for setting and revising NAAQS. Such

alternative approaches have been relied upon by the EPA and

other agencies in other contexts and have been endorsed in the

risk management literature. By adopting one or more of these

approaches and openly addressing the policy choices reflected

in each, EPA can provide a more principled and consistent

explanation for its air quality standards.

The Agency could begin by establishing an acceptable

risk level as its core policy criterion. For example, EPA has

defined “acceptable risk” for hazardous air pollutants based on

a maximum individual mortality risk of no greater than | in 10

thousand. 54 Fed. Reg. 38,044 (Sept. 14, 1989). The agency

has similarly set acceptable risk levels to guide its decision

making under other statutes.” To be sure, extending this

“acceptable risk” approach to NAAQS will be complicated by

the diverse range of types and severity of health effects

* The Agency has defined acceptable risk targets under the Clean Water

Liability Act (“Superfund”), the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,

the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide & Rodenticide Act, and the Safe

Drinking Water Act. See generally March Sacowitz & John D. Graham, A

Survey of Residual Cancer Risks Permitted by Health, Safety and

Environmental Policy, 6 Risk 17 (1995).

16

attributed to ozone or PM exposure. Moreover, using such an

approach would mean that the acceptable risk level would

become the standard no matter what the costs of achieving it.

Nevertheless, if the Agency chose to pursue such an approach

in order to establish an intelligible principle for setting air

quality standards, it could then apply its acceptable risk

criterion to select the least burdensome standard that results in

an acceptable level of risk.”

Alternatively, the Agency could find a principle for

standard-setting in the comparison of the adverse health and

environmental effects of pollutants to any countervailing,

beneficial effects of those pollutants (such as screening out

harmful ultraviolet radiation).” The Agency would thereby

select a level that minimizes overall risk. In such instances of

risk-risk tradeoffs, the Agency would combine scientific

information about risk with policy judgment about how best to

resolve the tradeoff. See generally JOHN D. GRAHAM &

JONATHAN B. WIENER, RISK VS. RISK: TRADEOFFS IN

PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1995).

Another option is for the Agency to consider the full

range of costs, beyond countervailing health risks, that can be

anticipated to arise from a proposed standard. The Agency

could use these broader estimates of costs to balance against

estimated benefits in determining the level at which to set a

standard. As already noted, it may be that EPA already tacitly

** Comparative risk analysis may also be helpful in deciding acceptable risk

levels, in which the Agency would compare ozone or PM risks to similar

risks from other causes. See generally J. CLARENCE DAVIES, COMPARING

ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS (1996).

** The Court of Appeals found that EPA had failed to consider such risk-

risk tradeoffs in setting its ozone standards. American Trucking

Associations, Inc. v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 175 F. 3d

1027, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Because it did not seek review of that

holding by this Court, EPA is required to consider such risk-risk tradeoffs

on remand.

17

takes costs or feasibility considerations into account. By

openly incorporating the use of economic analysis into its

decision making, the EPA could provide a consistent basis for

setting particular air quality standards. As a group of

distinguished economists has collectively noted, “[t]he

estimation of benefits and costs of a proposed regulation can

provide illuminating evidence for a decision, even if precision

cannot be achieved.””* In the case of non-threshold pollutants,

consideration of costs would not only be illuminating but also

is probably inevitable.”’ Open deliberation of both benefits and

costs by the Agency would provide a principled basis for

setting air quality standards.”

Finally, as with costs, the Agency could incorporate

into its decision-making explicit and detailed considerations of

issues of equity. It would be relevant to risk management

decisions for the Agency to consider how the effects of

alternative standards may be distributed within society, such as

whether health nsks are differentially distributed across

different racial and socio-economic groups.”

*° Kenneth J. Arrow, Maureen L. Cropper, George C. Eads, Robert W.

Hahn, Lester B. Lave, Roger G. Noll, Paul R. Portney, Milton Russell,

Richard Schmalensee, V. Kerry Smith, and Robert N. Stavins, /s There a

Role for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental, Health, and Safety

Regulation?, 272 SCIENCE 221(1996).

” Sunstein, supra note 22, at 378 (“The problem is that it is impossible to

assess ‘safety’ in a cost vacuum. In general cost-benefit analysis should be

followed, acknowledging that it will raise some hard questions of value.”’)

* See Edward W. Warren & Gary E. Marchant, “More Good Than Harm”:

A First Principle for Environmental Agencies and Reviewing Courts, 20

ECOL. L. Q. 379 (1993).

= NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING RISK, supra note 6, at

40 (noting that “[f]or some interested and affected parties in risk decisions,

managing environmental risks has become a question of fairness, moral

responsibility, and distributional equity.”)

18

EPA’s current approach, purporting to rely exclusively

on scientific evidence of adverse health effects, has precluded

it from openly adopting alternative approaches that would

provide a more reasoned basis for guiding its policy judgment.

As with any risk management decision, to justify air quality

standards in a principled manner the EPA should expressly

consider policy criteria such as acceptable risk, costs, risk-risk

tradeoffs, or equity in addition to all the available science.

CONCLUSION

The lower court’s conclusion that EPA “oilers no

intelligible principle by which to identify a stopping point”

(175 F.3d at 1037) is well supported by an understanding of the

appropriate role that science is able to play in risk management

decision making. While science can identify the level and

severity of the health effects from different levels of exposure

to ozone or PM in various populations, science alone cannot

establish what is acceptable for society.

Respectfully submitted,

GARY E. MARCHANT CARY COGLIANESE

Center for the Study of Law, Counsel of Record

Science and Technology Harvard University

Arizona State University John F. Kennedy School of

College of Law Government

P.O. Box 877906 79 John F. Kennedy Street

Tempe, AZ 85257-7906 Cambridge, MA 02138

(480) 965-3246 (617) 495-1402

SEPTEMBER 11, 2000

19

APPENDIX

IDENTIFICATION OF AMICI

GARY E. MARCHANT is Associate Professor of Law at Arizona

State University School of Law, and a Faculty Fellow at the Center

for the Study of Law, Science and Technology at the same

institution. His academic degrees include a J.D. from Harvard in

1990, an M.P.P from the Kennedy School of Government in 1990,

and a Ph.D. in Genetics from the University of British Columbia in

1986. His research and teaching interests include Environmental

Law, Risk Assessment and Management, Genetics and the Law, and

La‘v, Science, and Technology.

CARY COGLIANESE is Associate Professor of Public Policy at

Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. He

received his J.D., M.P.P. (public policy), and Ph.D. in political

science from the University of Michigan. His interdisciplinary

research in administrative and environmental law explores the

impact of procedural design and judicial review on the regulatory

process. He teaches in the areas of law, regulatory policy, and

ethics.

DANIEL M. BYRD III received both B.A. (1964) and Ph.D. (1971)

degrees from Yale University. Since 1988, Dr. Byrd has directed

Consultants in Toxicology, Risk Assessment and Product Safety

(CTRAPS), a scientific support firm that helps clients acquire,

interpret, and use biomedical information. Previously, he conducted

independent research into mechanisms of chemotherapeutic drugs at

Roswell Park Memorial Institute and at the University of Oklahoma.

He subsequently held positions in the Office of Chemical Control,

the Office of Pesticide Programs, the Carcinogen Assessment Group,

and the Science Advisory Board (SAB) at the U.S. Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA).

GAIL CHARNLEY is an internationally recognized expert in

environmental health risk assessment and risk management science

and policy. Dr. Charnley has over 20 years of experience in

environmental toxicology, human health risk assessment, and risk

management. During its tenure, she was executive director of the

Presidential/Congressional Commission on Risk Assessment and

20

Risk Management, mandated by Congress to evaluate the role that

risk assessment and risk management play in federal regulatory

programs. She is immediaic past-president of the international

Society for Risk Analysis and holds an adjunct faculty position at

the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis.

MAUREEN L. CROPPER is a Professor of Economics at the

University of Maryland, a Lead Economist at the World Bank and

a University Feilow at Resources for the Future. She is past

president of the Association of Environmental and Resource

Economists and chairs the Advisory Council on Clean Air

Compliance Analysis, a subcommittee of EPA’s Science Advisory

Board. Most of Dr. Cropper’s research has dealt with valuing

environmental amenities, especially environmental health effects,

both from an empirical and a theoretical perspective. Her current

research deals with valuing the health impacts of pollution in

developing countries and with the economics of deforestation.

E. DONALD ELLIOTT is Professor (Adjunct) of Law at Yale Law

School and Georgetown University Law Center, and a Partner in the

Washington, D.C. office of Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker. He

is a former Assistant Administrator and General Counsel of the U.S.

Environmental Pvotection Agency from 1989-1991, and was

previously the Julien and Virginia Cornell Professor of

Environmental Law and Litigation at Yale Law School. His

research interests are in Law and Science, Environmental Law, and

Administrative Law. He is Advisor on Law and Science to the

Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology and Government, the

Federal Courts Study Committee and the Federal Judicial Center.

DAVID L. FAIGMAN is a Professor of Law at the University of

California, Hastings College of Law. He writes extensively on

subjects related to the law’s use of science. He is a coauthor/coeditor

of the three volume work Modern Scientific Evidence: The Law and

Science of Expert Testimony (West Group, 1997, 2000 Supp.) (with

David H. Kaye, Michael J. Saks and Joseph Sanders). He is also the

author of the recently published book, Legal Alchemy: The Use and

Misuse of Science in the Law (W.H. Freeman & Co. 1999).

JAMES K. HAMMITT is Associate Professor of Economics and

Decision Sciences at Harvard University. His research concerns the

APRS.

21

development and application of quantitative methods -- including

benefit-cost, decision, and risk analysis, game theory, and

mathematica! modeling -- to health and environmental policy. His

current research topics include the management of long-term

environmental issues with important scientific uncertainties, such as

global climate change and stratospheric-ozone depletion, the

evaluation of ancillary benefits and countervailing risks associated

with risk-control measures, and the characterization of social

preferences over health and environmental risks using revealed-

preference and contingent-valuation methods. He received his Ph.D.

in 1988 from Harvard University.

JAMES E. KRIER is Earl Warren DeLano Professor of Law at the

University of Michigan Law School. He has taught and written in

the field of environmental law for thirty years. He is the author of

Environmental Law and Policy (1971), with a second edition

published in 1978 (with Richard Stewart). He is also the co-author

(with Ursin) of Pollution and Policy (University of California Press

1977).

WILLIAM HENRY LASH, III is Professor of Law at George Mason

University School of Law, and Distinguished Senior Fellow at the

Center for the Study of American Business, Washington University.

He is also an Adjunct Fellow at Citizens for a Sound Economy and

Visiting Professor of Law, Boston College School of Law. He has

testified before Congressional committees, spoken before industry

and business associations, and written on the limits of EPA

regulatory authority and the law and economics of climate change.

ROGER O. McCLELLAN is President Emeritus of the Chemical

Industry Institute of Toxicology, having served as President of the

Institute from 1988 through 1999, and is an Adjunct Professor at

Duke University, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, North

Carolina State University, University of New Mexico, and

Washington State University. Dr. McClellan has served as past

Chairman of EPA’s Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee, is a

member of the Executive Committee of EPA’s Science Advisory

Board, has served on several past and current committees of the

National Academy of Sciences/National Research Council, and has

served in an advisory role to numerous other governmental and

private organizations on toxicology issues. He has received

22

numerous honors, including election to membership in the Institute

of Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences.

THOMAS W. MERRILL is Professor of Law, Northwestern

University School of Law. He was formerly a Deputv Solicitor

General (1987-1990) of the United States. His academic interests

are centered on Administrative Law but also include Environmental

Law and Constitutional Law.

LARS NOAH isa Professor of Law at the University of Florida. His

scholarly work has focused on questions of law and medicine,

administrative procedure, and products liability, and he has done

work for the National Institutes of Health and National Academy of

Sciences (Institute of Medicine).

JOYCE E. PENNER is a Professor in the Department of

Atmospheric, Oceanic, and Space Sciences at the University of

Michigan, Ann Arbor, and is Director of the Laboratory for

Atmospheric Science and Environmental Research. She has ongoing

research relating to improving climate models through the addition

of interactive chemistry and the description of aerosols and their

direct and indirect effects on the radiation balance in climate models.

These models run in both a parallel computing environment and

vector supercomputers. She has an ongoing interest in urban,

regional and global tropospheric chemistry and budgets, cloud and

aerosol interactions and cloud microphysics, climate and climate

change, model development and interpretation.

ROBER7 PHALEN isa Professor of Community and Environmental

Medicine at the College of Medicine of the University of California,

Irvine, CA. He is also the Director of the Air Pollution Health

Effects Laboratory at the University of California, Irvine.

JEFFREY J. RACHLINSKI is Professor of Law at Cornell Law

School. His academic degrees include a B.A./M.A. in Psychology

from the Johns Hopkins University (1988), a J.D. from Stanford Law

School (1993), and a Ph.D. in Psychology from Stanford University

(1994). Dr. Rachlinski was a National Science Foundation Graduate

Fellow in psychology at Stanford University from 1989 to 1993, and

a visiting associate professor at the University of Chicago Law

School in the spring of 1999. His research interests primarily

23

involve the application of cognitive and social psychology to law,

but also include some aspects of Environmental Law.

JOSEPH SANDERS is A.A. White Professor of Law at the

University of Houston. He earned both a J.D. and a Ph.D. in

sociology from Northwestern University. His research and writing

interests include mass torts and scientific evidence. He is the author

of Bendectin on Trial (1998) and is a co-editor of Modern Scientific

Evidence (1997).

ROBERT N. STAVINS is the Albert Pratt Professor of Business and

Government, and Faculty Chair of the Environment and Natural

Resources Program at the John F. Kennedy School of Government,

Harvard University. He is a University Fellow of Resources for the

Future, the Chairman of the Environmental Economics Advisory

Committee of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Science

Advisory Board, and a Member of EPA’s Clean Air Act Advisory

Committee, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and the

editorial boards of several scholarly journals. He directed Project

88, a bi-partisan effort co-chaired by former Senator Timothy Wirth

and the late Senator John Heinz, to develop innovative approaches

to environmental and resource problems. Prior to coming to

Harvard, he was a staff economist at the Environmental Defense

Fund.

JONATHAN B. WIENER is Professor at the Law School and at the

Nicholas School of the Environment, Duke University, where he

writes and teaches on issues of environmental law and risk

regulation. In 1999 he was a visiting professor at Harvard Law

School. His writing includes Risk vs. Risk (1995) (with John

Graham) anc “Managing the Iatrogenic Risks of Risk Management,”

9 Risk 39-82 (1998). He has served as President of the Society for

Risk Analysis, Research Triangle Chapter, and as a senior aide in the

President’s Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), the Office of

Science & Technology Policy (OSTP), and the Department of

Justice, in both the Clinton and Bush administrations. He clerked for

Judge Jack B. Weinstein, U.S. District Court, EDNY, and for Judge

Stephen G. Breyer, U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, after

graduating from college and law school at Harvard.

24

JAMES D. WILSON is Senior Fellow and leader of the risk analysis

program in the Center for Risk Management at Resources for the

Future. An organic chemist by training, he spent twenty-nine years

with the Monsanto Company, in research, research management and

then health and environmental policy. His research has focused on

structure-activity relationships, including environmental chemistry

broadly, “dioxin” and related chemicals, relation of chemical

structure to physical and physiological properties, the use of science

in decision making, and the influence of organizational structure on

decision making. His current research at RFF concerns the

development and use of standardized risk assessment practices,

particularly default options. He was President of the Society for Risk

Analysis in 1993 and was named a Fellow of the Society in that year.

He holds an A.B. from Harvard and a Ph.D. (organic chemistry)

from the University of Washington.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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