Amicus Curiae Brief — Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc.
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| No. 99-1257 | LED |
IN THE | SEP 1 1 2000
Supreme Court of the United States
~~
CAROL M. BROWNER, PI HER, THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
Vv.
AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS, INC., ET AL.,
Respondents.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
BRIEF AMICI CURIAE OF GARY E. MARCHANT,
CARY COGLIANESE, DANIEL M. BYRD ITI,
GAIL CHARNLEY, MAUREEN L. CROPPER,
E. DONALD ELLIOTT, DAVID L. FAIGMAN, JAMES K.
HAMMITT, JAMES E. KRIER, WILLIAM H. LASH Il,
ROGER O. McCLELLAN, THOMAS W. MERRILL,
LARS NOAH, JOYCE E. PENNER, ROBERT PHALEN,
JEFFREY J. RACHLINSKI, JOSEPH SANDERS,
ROBERT N. STAVINS, JONATHAN B. WIENER and
JAMES D. WILSON IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
UCUES GH, DE MUG 6 cock ccccccunedscecesess l
EE 6casunddccdkadeteaeeeeakeencuuenel l
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..............--eeeeee. 3
EE Wiocdundwaeedenses vena bieeeanaaiee 4
I. SCIENCE ALONE CANNOT PROVIDE A
BASIS FOR RISK MANAGEMENT
PE ccakensudsneeudess senuiscusenes 4
A. Science Describes and Explains.......... 5
B. Risk Management Prescribes ............ 5
.. Agencies Can Use Science as
SE ‘<tcuceneabesuveusesuaneet 8
II. SCIENCE ALONE CANNOT PROVIDE A
BASIS FOR THE OZONE AND PM NAAQS .... 9
A. Science Alone Cannot Guide Standard-
Setting for Non-Threshold Air
RRS ree rere Sar Ce ee 10
B. EPA’s Exclusive Reliance on Science
to Justify its Standards Creates the
Appearance of a “Charade” ............ 12
Ill. §PRINCIPLED STANDARD-SETTING
REQUIRES CONSIDERATION OF MORE
PROMS cebecduvccuvanceesecedeaus 15
GRUMENEEE 6 6cbbvcccdecacwasenecucesécecaues 18
APPENDIX: IDENTIFICATION OF AMICI] .......... 19
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases:
Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC,
ee etn eueceeesessesense 12
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
Te ee eee een eeepeeeeaseness 5
Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst.,
i. eee ckeeheneeeeseesiseces 7
Statutes:
Clean Air Act §108(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(2) .. 2.2.66... 2
Clean Air Act §109(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. §7409(b)(1) . 2 eee. |
Clean Air Act §307(d), 42 U.S.C. §7607(d) ...........6044.. 2
Miscellaneous:
54 Fed. Reg. 38,044 (Sept. 14, 1989) 2... 0... ccc 15
61 Fed. Reg. 17,960 (Apr. 23, 1996) .. 2... 6. oe ec eee 8
62 Fed. Reg. 38,856 (July 18, 1997) ............4.. 2,3,6,10,11
62 Fed. Reg. 38,652 (July 18, 1997) ..........0 ccc eeee 2,11
63 Fed. Reg. 43,756 (Aug. 14, 1998)... 2... eee eens 8
Air Quality Standards: Science-Driven Ozone, PM
Proposals Will Be Finished by July 19, EPA Says,
27 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 2068 (Feb. 14, 1997) ........... 3
Kenneth J. Arrow, Maureen L. Cropper, George
C. Eads, Robert W. Hahn, Lester B. Lave,
Roger G. Noll, Paul R. Portney, Milton Russell,
Richard Schmalensee, V. Kerry Smith, and Robert
N. Stavins, Js There a Role for Benefit-Cost
Analysis in Environmental, Health, and Safety
Regulation?, 272 SCIENCE 221(1996) .............. 17
Testimony of Carol M. Browner, EPA Administrator,
Before the Subcomm. on National Economic
Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory
Affairs of the House Comm. on Government
Reform and Oversight (Apr. 23, 1997)
i ih tic bGendaddevessseeeeseuenens 3
DANIEL M. BYRD III & C. RICHARD COTHERN,
INTRODUCTION TO RISK ANALYSIS: A
SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO SCIENCE-BASED
DECISION MAKING (2000) 2.0.0... ee
J. CLARENCE DAVIES, COMPARING ENVIRONMENTAL
PE pancsdenncesceennesdndeoeseeenaess
George Eads, The Confusion of Goals and
Instruments: The Explicit Consideration of
Cost in Setting National Ambient Air Quality
Standards, in MARY GIBSON (ed.), TO BREATHE
FREELY: RISK, CONSENT, AND AIR 222 (1985) ........
EPA, Science Policy Council, Guidance for Risk
16
Characterization (Feb. 1995) ..............000eeee 7,8
DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND
MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN THE LAW (1999) .............
Joseph M. Feller, Non-Threshold Pollutants and
Air Quality Standards, 24 ENVTL. LAW 821
DEE sci nivecnuunsadnnkhesenede sedebsisuwsset
Congressional Testimony of John D. Graham,
Director of Harvard Center for Risk Analysis,
on Clean Air Act Reauthorization (Oct. 14,
SEY CED soccccuchencacceceses 9,
JOHN D. GRAHAM & JONATHAN B. WIENER (eds.),
RISK VS. RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING
HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1995) .............
C. Boyden Gray, The Clean Air Act Under
Regulatory Reform, 11 Tul. Envtl. L. J.
Ps 24660 4UKbauseuSoeneesenssseeceneades
Sheila Jasanoff, Contested Boundaries in Policy-
Relevant Science, 17 SOC. STUD. SCI. 195 (1987) .......
MARC K. LANDY, MARC J. ROBERTS & STEPHEN
R. THOMAS, THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY: ASKING THE WRONG QUESTIONS (1990) ....
WILLIAM W. LOWRANCE, OF ACCEPTABLE RISK:
SCIENCE AND THE DETERMINATION OF SAFETY (1976) ..
Gary E. Marchant, Turning Two Blind Eyes:
The EPA's Failure to Consider Costs
and Health Benefits in Revising the Ozone
Standard, 11 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 261 (1998) .............
THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING
TEED ecncuvénsanceccosdsdecscnses
iV
R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS:
THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT (1983) ....... 12,13,15
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES/NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT
IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: MANAGING
IE oc ccucucctcuusersasecceces 5,6,7
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING
RISK: INFORMING DECISIONS IN A DEMOCRATIC
sc. ciaceeseteshsbedeaseneensscae 6,17
Craig N. Oren, Run Over By American Trucking
Part I; Can EPA Revive Its Air Quality
Standards?, 29 ENVT’L L. REP. 10,653
Dt Pc ct bceeheueneeeihandedeéheseocenss 6,14
March Sadowitz & John D. Graham, A Survey of
Residual Cancer Risks Permitted by
Health, Safety and Environmental Policy,
PE a SS dundesncedbsnessehdendeceesese< 15
Cass R. Sunstein, /s the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?,
Fp ee Ee SEP GUEEED weccccecccnccccescs 14,17
Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic
Risk Regulation, 95 COL. L. REV. 1613 (1995) .... 9,12,14
Edward W. Warren & Gary E. Marchant,
“More Good Than Harm”: A First
Principle for Environmental Agencies and
Reviewing Courts, 20 ECOL. L. Q. 379 (1993) ........ 17
Closure Letter from George T. Wolff, Chair,
Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee,
to Administrator Carol M. Browner (Nov. 30,
1995) (EPA-SAB-CASAC-LTR-96-002) ............. 11
Written Statement of George T. Wolff, Chair, EPA’s
Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee’s
Panels on Ozone and PM, for the House Comm.
On Health and Env’t, Subcomm. On Oversight
and Investigations (Apr. 10, 1997) (1997 WL
PE nnbaserenkeuaetueehs seeudbunccestecns 12
INTEREST OF THE AMICI
Amici are professors and scientists with scholarly or
professional interests in the intersection of law and science.
The various amici have taught, researched, and published on
issues involving law, science, and policy. Brief summaries of
the qualifications and affiliations of the individual amici are
provided at the end of this brief.
Amici have an interest in seeing that the Court is informed
on the appropriate use and limitations of science in setting
national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) under the
Clean Air Act. While amici support reliance on science to
assess the risks of alternative air quality standards, science
alone cannot provide a principled justification for setting such
standards.
Amici file this brief solely as individuals and not on behalf
of the institutions with which they are affiliated. In addition,
amici take no position on the merits of the specific air quality
standards at issue in this case. Rather, their views address the
broader question of the role of science in the process by which
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sets air
quality standards.’
BACKGROUND
The Clean Air Act calls for the EPA Administrator to use
he: ‘dgment” to select a primary NAAQS that is “requisite to
prot. _: the public health” based on the criteria document and
allowing “an adequate margin of safety.” 42 U.S.C.
§7409(b)(1). The statute also specifies that the criteria
document shall “reflect the latest scientific knowledge” about
' Pursuant to Rule 37.6 of the Rules of this Coust, omici state that no person
or entity, other than the individual amici, authored this brief in whole or in
part, or made any monetary contribution to the preparation or submission
of this brief. Letters of consent to the filing of this brief from all parties
have been lodged with the Clerk of the Court pursuant to Rule 37.3.
2
the public health and welfare’ effects of the pollutant in
question. /d. § 7408(a)(2).
At every step in this proceeding, including before this
Court, EPA has purported to rely exclusively on scientific
factors to justify its selection of revised NAAQS for ozone and
particulate matter (PM). Even though EPA appears to
acknowledge in its rulemaking preambles that setting air
quality standards is a “policy choice,”’ the only criteria it
identifies for making such choices are scientific ones.
In its brief filed in this Court, EPA identified three types
of limitations on its NAAQS rulemaking discretion which the
Agency argues satisfy the “intelligible principle” requirement.
Brief for Petitioner U.S. EPA, No. 99-1257, at 23-24 (July 21,
2000) (hereinafter “EPA Br.”’). The three limitations are the
criteria documents reflecting “the latest scientific knowledge,”
the advice from the EPA’s Clean Air Scientific Advisory
Committee (CASAC), and the rulemaking requirements of
section 307(d) of the Clean Air Act. The latter “limitation” is
procedural only, while the first two factors emphasize scientific
inputs.
Likewise, in the NAAQS rulemakings, EPA justified the
selection of its NAAQS standards based exclusively on health
effects and scientific criteria. For example, EPA claimed to
select its ozone standard based solely on “public health policy
judgments in addition to determinations of a strictly scientific
nature,” with assessments of risk playing a “central role in
identifying an appropriate level.” 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,863
(quotation omitted). The only type of public health “policy
? Under the Clean Air Act, “welfare” effects refer to non-human biological
and physical effects, not monetary measures of impacts as economists use
the term.
> EPA, Ozone Final Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,856, 38,857 (July 18, 1997);
EPA, PM Final Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,652, 38,653 (July 18, 1997).
3
judgments” that EPA identified were factors such as the nature
and severity of health effects, the types of health evidence, the
kind and degree of uncertainties involved, and the size and
nature of the sensitive populations at risk. /d. at 38,883; EPA
Br. at 5.
Finally, in testimony to Congress on the proposed ozone
and PM NAAQS, EPA’s Administrator stated that “[a]s you
can see from the description of the process I went through to
choose proposed levels on ozone and particulate matter, the
focus has been entirely on health, risk, exposure and damage to
the environment.” Testimony of Carol M. Browner, EPA
Administrator, Before the Subcomm. on National Economic
Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs of the
House Comm. on Government Reform and Oversight (Apr. 23,
1997) (1997 WL 10571215). In defending her selection of the
proposed standards to the public, the Administrator reportedly
claimed that “I think it is not a question of judgment, | think it
is a question of science.” Air Quality Standards: Science-
Driven Ozone, PM Proposals Will Be Finished by July 19, EPA
Says, 27 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 2068 (Feb. 14, 1997).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Throughout this proceeding, EPA has identified no policy
or normative criteria to justify its NAAQS standards, thus
suggesting that science alone can be used to determine the
appropriate air quality standard. Science plays a critical,
indeed essential, role in evaluating the risks of possible air
quality standards being considered for adoption by EPA.
However, science by itself cannot provide the justification for
selecting a particular air quality standard. Especially in setting
standards for non-threshold pollutants, such as in this case,
scientific evidence cannot alone indicate where the standard
should be set, since any level above zero will cause some health
effects. To provide a principled and consistent basis for
justifying the setting of such standards at some level above
4
zero, EPA must articulate other factors -- whether they be costs
or other policy criteria -- to guide its decisions on where to set
national ambient air quality standards.
ARGUMENT
As in the proceedings below, EPA’s brief filed in this
Court identifies no factors or criteria other than scientific
evidence to guide its selection of revised primary national
ambient air quality standards for ozone and particulate matter.
While science’ is a critical, indeed essential, input in
developing standards, science alone cannot provide an
“intelligible principle” to guide policy decisions about the level
at which to set EPA’s revised NAAQS.
I. SCIENCE ALONE CANNOT PROVIDE A BASIS
FOR RISK MANAGEMENT DECISIONS
Science has played a prominent and important role in
agency regulatory decisions, as well as in judicial review of
those decisions. Such reliance on science is justified given the
advances that science has made over the past few decades in
understanding environmental risks. Yet, purporting to rely
solely on science to answer questions science is not designed
to address is as misguided as it would be to disregard relevant
scientific information. Science plays an appropriate and central
role in regulatory agencies’ assessments of risk, by providing
systematic and reliable knowledge about the world. In contrast,
risk management decisions, including decisions on setting
health standards, are ones for which science alone cannot
provide a principled foundation.
* The term “science” as used throughout this brief refers to the natural
sciences.
5
A. Science Describes and Explains
As this Court recently noted, science is “a process for
proposing and refining theoretical explanations about the
world.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509
U.S. 579, 590 (1993) (citing Brief for American Association
for the Advancement of Science et al. as Amici Curiae 7-8). As
such, science seeks to supply verifiable descriptions of, and
explanations about, what is, rather than imposing judgments
about what should be. Science describes, it does not prescribe.
B. Risk Management Prescribes
In the context of health and environmental risks, science
plays a critical role in identifying, describing, and quantifying
risks, but it does not tell us whether such risks are acceptable or
should be reduced. The National Academy of Sciences (NAS)
recognized this distinction in its influential 1983 report known
as the “Red Book,” which established a framework for risk
analysis on which regulatory agencies continue to rely today.
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES/NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT:
MANAGING THE PROCESS (1983) (“NAS Red Book’’).
The NAS distinguished risk assessment from risk
management. It defined risk assessment as “the
characterization of the potential adverse health effects of
human exposures to environmental hazards.” /d. at 18. Risk
assessment is based on scientific information, supplemented
with what have been termed “risk assessment policy”
judgments to bridge gaps aiid uncertainties in the scientific
evidence. Jd. at 37.° Risk assessment is considered to be
* Such risk assessment policy judgments include factors such as which
health effects to consider and to group together, the type of models and
assumptions to use in the risk assessment, how to extrapolate data fron one
small segment of a population to the entire population, and how to ccoinpute
(continued...)
6
predominantly -- though not exclusively’ — based on scientifi¢
evidence and analysis.
Risk management, on the other hand, is “an agency
decision-making process that entails consideration of political,
social, economic, and engineering information with risk-related
information to develop, analyze, and compare regulatory
options and to select the appropriate regulatory response to a
potential chronic health hazard.” NAS Red Book at 18-19.
Risk management “necessarily requires the use of value
judgments on such issues as the acceptability of risk and the
reasonableness of the costs of control.” Jd. at 19.’ Asa
subsequent National Research Council report reiterated,
“science alone can never be an adequate basis for a risk
decision” because “[r]isk decisions are, ultimately, public
policy choices.”* This Court has likewise recognized that the
* (...continued)
and present uncertainties. NAS Red Book at 29-33. These risk assessment
policy judgments are comparable to the “public health policy judgments”
that EPA identified as a basis for its NAAQS decisions. See 62 Fed. Reg.
at 38,883; supra pp. 2-3.
° E.g., Sheila Jasanoff, Contested Boundaries in Policy-Relevant Science,
17 Soc. STuD. Sci. 195, 211 (1987) (noting that analysts have “agreed that
very little in a typical risk assessment could be labeled as pure science’’);
DANIEL M. ByRrbD III & C. RICHARD COTHERN, INTRODUCTION TO RISK
ANALYSIS: A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO SCIENCE-BASED DECISION
MAKING 6-8, 330-34 (2000) (risk assessment inherently and inevitably
involves some judgment).
” See also Craig N. Oren, Run Over By American Trucking Part J; Can
EPA Revive Its Air Quality Standards?, 29 ENVT’L L. REP. 10,653, 10,660
(Nov. 1999) (“the decision of who should be protected, and what effects
they should be protected against, is an ethical decision, not a scientific
one”).
* NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING RISK: INFORMING
DECISIONS IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 26 (1996). This report cautioned
against too strict of a separation between risk assessment and risk
management, because non-scientific deliberative and policy factors can also
be relevant to risk assessment. /d. at 34.
7
setting of health and environmental standards is primarily a
policy rather than scientific undertaking.”
Risk assessment is therefore understood to be
predominantly (but not exclusively) a scientific undertaking,
whereas risk management decisions, including the selection of
standards, require making value judgments that extend beyond
the scope of science.'® The National Academy recommended
that regulatory agencies should “maintain a clear conceptual
distinction between assessment of risks and consideration of
risk management alternatives; that is, the scientific findings and
policy judgments embodied in risk assessments should be
explicitly distinguished from the political, economic, and
technical considerations that influence the design and choice of
regulatory strategies.” NAS Red Book at 7.
EPA has endorsed and relied on the NAS’s distinction
between risk assessment and risk management.'' For example,
* In the Court’s 1980 review of OSHA’s benzene occupational exposure
standard, Justice Marshall’s dissenting opinion stated: “[W }hen the question
involves determination of an acceptable level of risk, the ultimate decision
must necessarily be based on considerations of policy as well as empirically
verifiable facts. Factual determinations can at most define the risk in some
statistical way; the judgment whether that risk is tolerable cannot be based
solely on a resolution of the facts.” Industrial Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v.
American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 706 (1980). The plurality opinion
quoted Justice Marshall’s statement, and then responded: “We agree. Thus,
while the Agency must support its finding that a certain level of risk exists
by substantial evidence, we recognize that its determination that a particular
level of risk is ‘significant’ will be based largely on policy considerations.”
Id. at 655 n.62 (plurality opinion).
'© See also WILLIAM W. LOWRANCE, OF ACCEPTABLE RISK 75-76 (1976)
(“Determining safety, then, involves two extremely different kinds of
activities... Measuring risk - measuring the probability and severity of
harm-is an empirical, scientific activity; Judging safety- judging the
acceptability of risks, is a normative, political activity.”).
"' E.g., EPA, Science Policy Council, Guidance for Risk Characterization
2 (Feb. 1995) (available at http://www.epa.gov/ORD/spc/rcguide.htm) (“In
. (continued...)
8
in a recent EPA guidance on conducting risk analysis, EPA
directed that agency staff should clearly separate risk
assessment from risk management, with risk assessment
involving the selection, evaluation and presentation of
“scientific information,” but not “decisions on the acceptability
of any risk level for protecting public health or selecting
procedures for reducing risks.” EPA, Risk Characterization
Guidance, supra note 11, at 3.
In contrast, EPA noted that risk management decisions
should be based on, to the extent permissible, a consideration
of “technological feasibility (e.g., treatability, detection limits),
economic, social, political, and legal factors,” in addition to the
output of the risk assessment process. /d. According to EPA,
“risk assessors and risk managers should understand that the
regulatory decision is usually not determined solely by the
outcome of the risk assessment.” Jd. In order to make risk
assessments “transparent,” EPA has further stated that it is
important “that conclusions drawn from the science are
identified separately from policy judgments and risk
management decisions.” 63 Fed. Reg. 43,756, 43,769 (Aug.
14, 1998). ;
3. Agencies Can Use Science as a “Charade”
Notwithstanding broad acceptance that science alone
cannot justify judgments about acceptable levels of risk,
regulatory agencies such as EPA may find it expedient to cloak
policy judgments under the guise of science. Professor Wendy
'' (...continued)
1984, EPA endorsed these [NAS] distinctions between risk assessment and
risk management for Agency use, and later relied on them in developing
risk assessment guidelines.”) (endnotes omitted) [hereinafter EPA Risk
Characterization Guidance); EPA, 61 Fed. Reg. 17,960, 17,960 (Apr. 23,
1996) (citing NAS report in adopting risk assessment guidelines “to ensure
that the risk assessment process was maintained as a scientific effort
separate from risk management.”).
9
Wagner has dubbed this practice a “science charade,” which
occurs when “agencies exaggerate the contributions made by
science in setting [environmental] standards in order to avoid
accountability for the underlying policy decision.”"””
Professor Wagner identified several political, legal and
institutional incentives for agencies to engage in the science
charade by exaggerating the role and capability of science in
making environmental decisions. /d. at 1650-73. For example,
the strong deference that reviewing courts give EPA’s scientific
determinations creates “strong and virtually inescapable
incentives to conceal policy choices under the cover of
scientific judgments and citations.” Jd. at 1663. Professor
Wagner identified previous NAAQS rulemakings as examples
of a science charade. /d. at 1640-44.
II. SCIENCE ALONE CANNOT PROVIDE A BASIS
FOR THE OZONE AND PM NAAQS
Science is central to evaluating the health risks of possible
alternative air quality standards, but the decision of which
standard to adopt is a risk management determination. As
such, standard-setting should utilize all the available scientific
evidence on health effects, but also needs to incorporate policy
considerations. Scientific data on ozone and particulate matter
do not and cannot, without more, provide a principled
justi fication for the level at which the respective NAAQS are
set.
'? Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95
COL. L. REV. 1613, 1617 (1995).
'> See Congressional Testimony of John D. Graham, Director of Harvard
Center for Risk Analysis, on Clean Air Act Reauthorization (Oct. 14, 1999)
(1999 WL 27595650) (“scientific information (alone) does not typically
provide an intelligible basis for the setting of safe (yet non-zero) amounts
of air pollution.”).
10
A. Science Alone Cannot Guide Standard-Setting for
Non-Threshold Air Pollutants
The scientific data for ozone and PM indicate a continuum
of health effects down to background (or natural)
concentrations of the pollutant in the air, at which point the
health effects associated with the pollutants cannot be
distinguished from effects caused by other factors. There
appears to be no clear demarcation of a discrete threshold
below which a standard could be set to avoid all health
vffects.'* EPA acknowledges that there is probably no
threshold level for ozone below which no health effects would
be expected to occur:
The Administrator’s decision to propose the level of
an 8-hour primary O, standard at 0.08 ppm ...
necessarily reflected a recognition ... that it is likely
that O, may elicit a continuum of biological
responses down to background concentrations...
Thus, in the absence of any discernable threshold, it
is not possible to select a level below which
absolutely no effects are likely to occur. Nor does it
seem possible, in the Administrator’s judgment, to
identify a level at which it can be concluded with
confidence that no “adverse” effects are likely to
occur.
62 Fed. Reg. at 38,863 (citation omitted). EPA further
acknowledged that “no standard within the range of levels and
forms considered in this review, including the selected standard
'* Science can provide a distinct starting point for standard-setting for a
pollutant for which the scientific evidence indicates a threshold in the
exposure-response relationship, although the decision to set the standard at
or below the threshold is itself a policy rather than scientific determination.
In such cases, the Administrator can focus on how far below the threshold
to set the standard to achieve an “adequate margin of safety,” which also is
a policy decision.
11
is risk-free, due to the continuum of risk likely posed by
exposures to ambient O, potentially down to background
levels.” Jd. at 38,873."°
Given a continuum of health effects, science provides
information on the frequency and severity of adverse effects at
various levels, but this information by itself does not identify
the level at which to set the standard. For non-threshold
pollutants, the only standard that could conceivably protect
against all health effects would be a standard set at the level of
zero, an option that EPA has explicitly ruled out. E.g., 62 Fed.
Reg. at 38,863 (“a zero-risk standard is neither possible nor
required by the Act’’).
EPA’s own Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee
concluded with respect to ozone that “there is no bright line
which distinguishes any of the proposed standards (either the
level or the number of allowable exceedences) as being
significantly more protective of health” and “[c]onsequently,
the selection of a specific level and number of allowable
exceedences is a policy judgment.””"* In testimony to Congress,
the Chair of CASAC reiterated that “the decisions to select a
given level or number of allowable exceedences within their
proposed ranges cannot be based on science;” rather, the
'S See also id. at 38,867 (“Clearly, for pollutants, such as O,, that have no
discernable thresholds for health effects, no standard can be risk-free.”).
With respect to particulate matter, EPA similarly noted that “the single most
important factor influencing the uncertainty associated with the risk
estimates is whether or not a threshold concentration exists below which
PM-associated health risks are not likely to occur.” 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,656.
The Agency also recognized that the alternative PM standards it considered
“will not be risk-free.” /d.
'© Closure Letter from George T. Wolff, Chair, Clean Air Scientific
Advisory Committee, to Administrator Carol M. Browner (Nov. 30, 1995),
at 3 (EPA-SAB-CASAC-LTR-96-002) (emphasis added).
12
selection of a particular standard is “strictly a policy
judgment.””’
B. EPA’s Exclusive “eliance on Science to Justify its
Standards Creates the Appearance of a “Charade”
In its brief filed in this Court, as well as in the proceedings
below, EPA has defended its selection of its revised ozone and
PM NAAQS based solely on scientific grounds. See pp. 2-3,
supra. In addition, EPA suggests that this Court should be
highly deferential to its selection of NAAQS standards
precisely because it is a “scientific determination.”'* EPA’s
justification for its NAAQS standards appears to fit the pattern
of what has been called a “science charade,” in which an
agency attempts to use science to justify its standards, even
though the level and form of the standards is not something that
science alone can determine.
Scholars have suggested that EPA has not been forthright
in justifying its selection of current and past NAAQS standards
based solely on science, when the selection of such a standard
necessarily depends on risk management value judgments.”
'’ Written Statement of George T. Wolff, Chair, EPA’s Clean Air
Scientific Advisory Committee’s Panels on Ozone and PM, for the House
Comm. on Health and Env’t, Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations
(Apr. 10, 1997) (1997 WL 10569483).
'’ EPA Br. at 27 (“When examining this kind of scientific determination,
as opposed to simple findings of fact, a reviewing court must generally be
at its most deferential.”) (quoting Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462
U.S. 87, 103 (1983)).
'? Wagner, supra note 12, at 1640-44 (EPA’s reliance on scientific and
medical evidence alone to justify its previous ozone NAAQS is a “vivid
illustration” of an “intentional science charade”); R. SHEP MELNICK,
REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 261
(1983) (“There is, in short, no simple answer to the question of how the
EPA sets air quality standards. Medical evidence cannot offer definitive
guidance.... The-EPA itself has refused to deal with the problem in a
(continued...)
13
Professor David Faigman, for example, has recently argued that
the “real loser in the PM/ozone drama was candor”’:
The debate was phrased almost entirely in terms of
science when the science played a decidedly minor
role in the actual decision.... Science should not be
used to hide what are essentially the true bases for
decision.”
Amici do not purport to know the “true bases” of EPA’s
selection of its NAAQS, only that science alone cannot provide
a consistent and principled basis for its standard-setting.
EPA claims to exclude, for example, considerations of
costs and feasibility in setting air quality standards. However,
as Professor Joseph Feller, a former EPA attorney, has written,
“fijf all costs are truly ignored, then no risk would be
acceptable.””' Scholars and commentators from a diverse range
of viewpoints have argued that EPA does consider costs in
setting its air quality standards, even though it excludes
consideration of costs in its public justification for its
standards.” Dr. John Graham, Director of the Harvard Center
(...continued)
forthright manner, hiding its policy choices behind its interpretation of
scientific evidence.”); Graham, supra note 13 (“When multi-billion dollar
rulemaking decisions are made, it is inevitable that regulators will consider
the consequences of their actions as well as the reasonableness of the
relationship between risks, benefits and costs.”).
a DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUES OF SCIENCE
IN THE LAW 187 (1999).
?" Joseph M. Feller, Non-Threshold Pollutants and Air Quality Standards,
24 ENVTL. LAW 821, 833 (1994).
2 Eg, FAIGMAN, supra note 13, at 183 (“In practice, therefore, despite the
legal technicality limiting EPA to promulgating regulations solely to
promote health, costs are an integral part of the policy-making process at
EPA.”); MELNICK, supra note 12, at 297 (“[R]egulators inevitably consider
cost [in setting air quality standards]. vdeo
14
for Risk Analysis, has further argued that EPA’s “legal fiction”
that it does not consider costs when setting NAAQS is
“dysfunctional” because “it (1) reduces political accountability
for value judgments and political choices, [and] (2) hides from
public scrutiny claims that are made about risks, benefits and
costs (since such claims are driven ‘underground’ in the course
of regulatory deliberations).” Graham, supra note 13.
EPA’s exclusive reliance on science to justify its standard
selection thus creates the appearance that the Agency is using
science to shield its decision-making from scrutiny. See
Wagner, supra note 12, at 1656 (agencies may be able to find
refuge from controversial public debates by relying on the
* (...continued)
how they do.”); MARC K. LANDY, MARC J. ROBERTS & STEPHEN R.
THOMAS, THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: ASKING THE
WRONG QUESTIONS 238 (1990) (“[I}n the absence of any threshold for risk,
some balancing between costs and benefits had to be implicit in the standard
setting decision - a reality EPA neither acknowledged nor forced the
Congress to confront.”); George Eads, The Confusion of Goals and
Instruments: The Explicit Consideration of Cost in Setting National Ambient
Air Quality Standards, in MARY GIBSON (ed.), TO BREATHE FREELY: RISK,
CONSENT, AND AIR 222, 229 (1985) (it is a “policy fiction” that costs are
not considered in setting NAAQS); Oren, supra note 7, at 10,662 (“EPA
inevitably must therefore consider costs in standard-setting to help decide
how stringent to make the standards.”); THOMAS O. MCGARITY,
REINVENTING RATIONALITY 253 (1991) (“The institution has considered
costs and benefits, and the advice that the Administrator receives orally
from subordinates reflects those considerations.”); Gary E. Marchant,
Turning Two Blind Eyes: The EPA's Failure to Consider Costs and Health
Benefits in Revising the Ozone Standard, 11 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 261, 267-68
(1998) (EPA failed “to ‘come clean’ about the true nature of its decision-
making”); C. Boyden Gray, The Clean Air Act Under Regulatory Reform,
11 TUL. ENVTL. L. J. 235, 235 (1998) (“The plain fact is that the EPA has
for a long time considered costs and benefits in setting ambient
standards—only it has done so behind closed doors....”); Cass R. Sunstein,
Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional? , 98 Mich. L. REV. 303, 317-318
(1999) (“Only insiders know for certain whether EPA does in fact consider
costs in issuing national ambient air quality standards,” but evidence
suggests that “costs do matter in the context of standard-setting for
nonthreshold pollutants.”).
15
science charade); MELNICK, supra note 12, at 297 (“Far from
opening agency decisionmaking to public view, the courts have
allowed and encouraged the EPA to sustain a myth and to keep
secret its bureaucratic motives.”). More significantly, such
reliance prevents the Agency from including the careful and
open consideration of relevant policy considerations in its
justification for its air quality standards.
Ill. PRINCIPLED STANDARD-SETTING REQUIRES
CONSIDERATION OF MORE THAN SCIENCE
The EPA has available to it several alternative approaches
by which it could incorporate policy considerations into the
reasons it provides for setting and revising NAAQS. Such
alternative approaches have been relied upon by the EPA and
other agencies in other contexts and have been endorsed in the
risk management literature. By adopting one or more of these
approaches and openly addressing the policy choices reflected
in each, EPA can provide a more principled and consistent
explanation for its air quality standards.
The Agency could begin by establishing an acceptable
risk level as its core policy criterion. For example, EPA has
defined “acceptable risk” for hazardous air pollutants based on
a maximum individual mortality risk of no greater than | in 10
thousand. 54 Fed. Reg. 38,044 (Sept. 14, 1989). The agency
has similarly set acceptable risk levels to guide its decision
making under other statutes.” To be sure, extending this
“acceptable risk” approach to NAAQS will be complicated by
the diverse range of types and severity of health effects
* The Agency has defined acceptable risk targets under the Clean Water
Liability Act (“Superfund”), the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide & Rodenticide Act, and the Safe
Drinking Water Act. See generally March Sacowitz & John D. Graham, A
Survey of Residual Cancer Risks Permitted by Health, Safety and
Environmental Policy, 6 Risk 17 (1995).
16
attributed to ozone or PM exposure. Moreover, using such an
approach would mean that the acceptable risk level would
become the standard no matter what the costs of achieving it.
Nevertheless, if the Agency chose to pursue such an approach
in order to establish an intelligible principle for setting air
quality standards, it could then apply its acceptable risk
criterion to select the least burdensome standard that results in
an acceptable level of risk.”
Alternatively, the Agency could find a principle for
standard-setting in the comparison of the adverse health and
environmental effects of pollutants to any countervailing,
beneficial effects of those pollutants (such as screening out
harmful ultraviolet radiation).” The Agency would thereby
select a level that minimizes overall risk. In such instances of
risk-risk tradeoffs, the Agency would combine scientific
information about risk with policy judgment about how best to
resolve the tradeoff. See generally JOHN D. GRAHAM &
JONATHAN B. WIENER, RISK VS. RISK: TRADEOFFS IN
PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1995).
Another option is for the Agency to consider the full
range of costs, beyond countervailing health risks, that can be
anticipated to arise from a proposed standard. The Agency
could use these broader estimates of costs to balance against
estimated benefits in determining the level at which to set a
standard. As already noted, it may be that EPA already tacitly
** Comparative risk analysis may also be helpful in deciding acceptable risk
levels, in which the Agency would compare ozone or PM risks to similar
risks from other causes. See generally J. CLARENCE DAVIES, COMPARING
ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS (1996).
** The Court of Appeals found that EPA had failed to consider such risk-
risk tradeoffs in setting its ozone standards. American Trucking
Associations, Inc. v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 175 F. 3d
1027, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Because it did not seek review of that
holding by this Court, EPA is required to consider such risk-risk tradeoffs
on remand.
17
takes costs or feasibility considerations into account. By
openly incorporating the use of economic analysis into its
decision making, the EPA could provide a consistent basis for
setting particular air quality standards. As a group of
distinguished economists has collectively noted, “[t]he
estimation of benefits and costs of a proposed regulation can
provide illuminating evidence for a decision, even if precision
cannot be achieved.””* In the case of non-threshold pollutants,
consideration of costs would not only be illuminating but also
is probably inevitable.”’ Open deliberation of both benefits and
costs by the Agency would provide a principled basis for
setting air quality standards.”
Finally, as with costs, the Agency could incorporate
into its decision-making explicit and detailed considerations of
issues of equity. It would be relevant to risk management
decisions for the Agency to consider how the effects of
alternative standards may be distributed within society, such as
whether health nsks are differentially distributed across
different racial and socio-economic groups.”
*° Kenneth J. Arrow, Maureen L. Cropper, George C. Eads, Robert W.
Hahn, Lester B. Lave, Roger G. Noll, Paul R. Portney, Milton Russell,
Richard Schmalensee, V. Kerry Smith, and Robert N. Stavins, /s There a
Role for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental, Health, and Safety
Regulation?, 272 SCIENCE 221(1996).
” Sunstein, supra note 22, at 378 (“The problem is that it is impossible to
assess ‘safety’ in a cost vacuum. In general cost-benefit analysis should be
followed, acknowledging that it will raise some hard questions of value.”’)
* See Edward W. Warren & Gary E. Marchant, “More Good Than Harm”:
A First Principle for Environmental Agencies and Reviewing Courts, 20
ECOL. L. Q. 379 (1993).
= NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING RISK, supra note 6, at
40 (noting that “[f]or some interested and affected parties in risk decisions,
managing environmental risks has become a question of fairness, moral
responsibility, and distributional equity.”)
18
EPA’s current approach, purporting to rely exclusively
on scientific evidence of adverse health effects, has precluded
it from openly adopting alternative approaches that would
provide a more reasoned basis for guiding its policy judgment.
As with any risk management decision, to justify air quality
standards in a principled manner the EPA should expressly
consider policy criteria such as acceptable risk, costs, risk-risk
tradeoffs, or equity in addition to all the available science.
CONCLUSION
The lower court’s conclusion that EPA “oilers no
intelligible principle by which to identify a stopping point”
(175 F.3d at 1037) is well supported by an understanding of the
appropriate role that science is able to play in risk management
decision making. While science can identify the level and
severity of the health effects from different levels of exposure
to ozone or PM in various populations, science alone cannot
establish what is acceptable for society.
Respectfully submitted,
GARY E. MARCHANT CARY COGLIANESE
Center for the Study of Law, Counsel of Record
Science and Technology Harvard University
Arizona State University John F. Kennedy School of
College of Law Government
P.O. Box 877906 79 John F. Kennedy Street
Tempe, AZ 85257-7906 Cambridge, MA 02138
(480) 965-3246 (617) 495-1402
SEPTEMBER 11, 2000
19
APPENDIX
IDENTIFICATION OF AMICI
GARY E. MARCHANT is Associate Professor of Law at Arizona
State University School of Law, and a Faculty Fellow at the Center
for the Study of Law, Science and Technology at the same
institution. His academic degrees include a J.D. from Harvard in
1990, an M.P.P from the Kennedy School of Government in 1990,
and a Ph.D. in Genetics from the University of British Columbia in
1986. His research and teaching interests include Environmental
Law, Risk Assessment and Management, Genetics and the Law, and
La‘v, Science, and Technology.
CARY COGLIANESE is Associate Professor of Public Policy at
Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. He
received his J.D., M.P.P. (public policy), and Ph.D. in political
science from the University of Michigan. His interdisciplinary
research in administrative and environmental law explores the
impact of procedural design and judicial review on the regulatory
process. He teaches in the areas of law, regulatory policy, and
ethics.
DANIEL M. BYRD III received both B.A. (1964) and Ph.D. (1971)
degrees from Yale University. Since 1988, Dr. Byrd has directed
Consultants in Toxicology, Risk Assessment and Product Safety
(CTRAPS), a scientific support firm that helps clients acquire,
interpret, and use biomedical information. Previously, he conducted
independent research into mechanisms of chemotherapeutic drugs at
Roswell Park Memorial Institute and at the University of Oklahoma.
He subsequently held positions in the Office of Chemical Control,
the Office of Pesticide Programs, the Carcinogen Assessment Group,
and the Science Advisory Board (SAB) at the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA).
GAIL CHARNLEY is an internationally recognized expert in
environmental health risk assessment and risk management science
and policy. Dr. Charnley has over 20 years of experience in
environmental toxicology, human health risk assessment, and risk
management. During its tenure, she was executive director of the
Presidential/Congressional Commission on Risk Assessment and
20
Risk Management, mandated by Congress to evaluate the role that
risk assessment and risk management play in federal regulatory
programs. She is immediaic past-president of the international
Society for Risk Analysis and holds an adjunct faculty position at
the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis.
MAUREEN L. CROPPER is a Professor of Economics at the
University of Maryland, a Lead Economist at the World Bank and
a University Feilow at Resources for the Future. She is past
president of the Association of Environmental and Resource
Economists and chairs the Advisory Council on Clean Air
Compliance Analysis, a subcommittee of EPA’s Science Advisory
Board. Most of Dr. Cropper’s research has dealt with valuing
environmental amenities, especially environmental health effects,
both from an empirical and a theoretical perspective. Her current
research deals with valuing the health impacts of pollution in
developing countries and with the economics of deforestation.
E. DONALD ELLIOTT is Professor (Adjunct) of Law at Yale Law
School and Georgetown University Law Center, and a Partner in the
Washington, D.C. office of Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker. He
is a former Assistant Administrator and General Counsel of the U.S.
Environmental Pvotection Agency from 1989-1991, and was
previously the Julien and Virginia Cornell Professor of
Environmental Law and Litigation at Yale Law School. His
research interests are in Law and Science, Environmental Law, and
Administrative Law. He is Advisor on Law and Science to the
Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology and Government, the
Federal Courts Study Committee and the Federal Judicial Center.
DAVID L. FAIGMAN is a Professor of Law at the University of
California, Hastings College of Law. He writes extensively on
subjects related to the law’s use of science. He is a coauthor/coeditor
of the three volume work Modern Scientific Evidence: The Law and
Science of Expert Testimony (West Group, 1997, 2000 Supp.) (with
David H. Kaye, Michael J. Saks and Joseph Sanders). He is also the
author of the recently published book, Legal Alchemy: The Use and
Misuse of Science in the Law (W.H. Freeman & Co. 1999).
JAMES K. HAMMITT is Associate Professor of Economics and
Decision Sciences at Harvard University. His research concerns the
APRS.
21
development and application of quantitative methods -- including
benefit-cost, decision, and risk analysis, game theory, and
mathematica! modeling -- to health and environmental policy. His
current research topics include the management of long-term
environmental issues with important scientific uncertainties, such as
global climate change and stratospheric-ozone depletion, the
evaluation of ancillary benefits and countervailing risks associated
with risk-control measures, and the characterization of social
preferences over health and environmental risks using revealed-
preference and contingent-valuation methods. He received his Ph.D.
in 1988 from Harvard University.
JAMES E. KRIER is Earl Warren DeLano Professor of Law at the
University of Michigan Law School. He has taught and written in
the field of environmental law for thirty years. He is the author of
Environmental Law and Policy (1971), with a second edition
published in 1978 (with Richard Stewart). He is also the co-author
(with Ursin) of Pollution and Policy (University of California Press
1977).
WILLIAM HENRY LASH, III is Professor of Law at George Mason
University School of Law, and Distinguished Senior Fellow at the
Center for the Study of American Business, Washington University.
He is also an Adjunct Fellow at Citizens for a Sound Economy and
Visiting Professor of Law, Boston College School of Law. He has
testified before Congressional committees, spoken before industry
and business associations, and written on the limits of EPA
regulatory authority and the law and economics of climate change.
ROGER O. McCLELLAN is President Emeritus of the Chemical
Industry Institute of Toxicology, having served as President of the
Institute from 1988 through 1999, and is an Adjunct Professor at
Duke University, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, North
Carolina State University, University of New Mexico, and
Washington State University. Dr. McClellan has served as past
Chairman of EPA’s Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee, is a
member of the Executive Committee of EPA’s Science Advisory
Board, has served on several past and current committees of the
National Academy of Sciences/National Research Council, and has
served in an advisory role to numerous other governmental and
private organizations on toxicology issues. He has received
22
numerous honors, including election to membership in the Institute
of Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences.
THOMAS W. MERRILL is Professor of Law, Northwestern
University School of Law. He was formerly a Deputv Solicitor
General (1987-1990) of the United States. His academic interests
are centered on Administrative Law but also include Environmental
Law and Constitutional Law.
LARS NOAH isa Professor of Law at the University of Florida. His
scholarly work has focused on questions of law and medicine,
administrative procedure, and products liability, and he has done
work for the National Institutes of Health and National Academy of
Sciences (Institute of Medicine).
JOYCE E. PENNER is a Professor in the Department of
Atmospheric, Oceanic, and Space Sciences at the University of
Michigan, Ann Arbor, and is Director of the Laboratory for
Atmospheric Science and Environmental Research. She has ongoing
research relating to improving climate models through the addition
of interactive chemistry and the description of aerosols and their
direct and indirect effects on the radiation balance in climate models.
These models run in both a parallel computing environment and
vector supercomputers. She has an ongoing interest in urban,
regional and global tropospheric chemistry and budgets, cloud and
aerosol interactions and cloud microphysics, climate and climate
change, model development and interpretation.
ROBER7 PHALEN isa Professor of Community and Environmental
Medicine at the College of Medicine of the University of California,
Irvine, CA. He is also the Director of the Air Pollution Health
Effects Laboratory at the University of California, Irvine.
JEFFREY J. RACHLINSKI is Professor of Law at Cornell Law
School. His academic degrees include a B.A./M.A. in Psychology
from the Johns Hopkins University (1988), a J.D. from Stanford Law
School (1993), and a Ph.D. in Psychology from Stanford University
(1994). Dr. Rachlinski was a National Science Foundation Graduate
Fellow in psychology at Stanford University from 1989 to 1993, and
a visiting associate professor at the University of Chicago Law
School in the spring of 1999. His research interests primarily
23
involve the application of cognitive and social psychology to law,
but also include some aspects of Environmental Law.
JOSEPH SANDERS is A.A. White Professor of Law at the
University of Houston. He earned both a J.D. and a Ph.D. in
sociology from Northwestern University. His research and writing
interests include mass torts and scientific evidence. He is the author
of Bendectin on Trial (1998) and is a co-editor of Modern Scientific
Evidence (1997).
ROBERT N. STAVINS is the Albert Pratt Professor of Business and
Government, and Faculty Chair of the Environment and Natural
Resources Program at the John F. Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University. He is a University Fellow of Resources for the
Future, the Chairman of the Environmental Economics Advisory
Committee of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Science
Advisory Board, and a Member of EPA’s Clean Air Act Advisory
Committee, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and the
editorial boards of several scholarly journals. He directed Project
88, a bi-partisan effort co-chaired by former Senator Timothy Wirth
and the late Senator John Heinz, to develop innovative approaches
to environmental and resource problems. Prior to coming to
Harvard, he was a staff economist at the Environmental Defense
Fund.
JONATHAN B. WIENER is Professor at the Law School and at the
Nicholas School of the Environment, Duke University, where he
writes and teaches on issues of environmental law and risk
regulation. In 1999 he was a visiting professor at Harvard Law
School. His writing includes Risk vs. Risk (1995) (with John
Graham) anc “Managing the Iatrogenic Risks of Risk Management,”
9 Risk 39-82 (1998). He has served as President of the Society for
Risk Analysis, Research Triangle Chapter, and as a senior aide in the
President’s Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), the Office of
Science & Technology Policy (OSTP), and the Department of
Justice, in both the Clinton and Bush administrations. He clerked for
Judge Jack B. Weinstein, U.S. District Court, EDNY, and for Judge
Stephen G. Breyer, U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, after
graduating from college and law school at Harvard.
24
JAMES D. WILSON is Senior Fellow and leader of the risk analysis
program in the Center for Risk Management at Resources for the
Future. An organic chemist by training, he spent twenty-nine years
with the Monsanto Company, in research, research management and
then health and environmental policy. His research has focused on
structure-activity relationships, including environmental chemistry
broadly, “dioxin” and related chemicals, relation of chemical
structure to physical and physiological properties, the use of science
in decision making, and the influence of organizational structure on
decision making. His current research at RFF concerns the
development and use of standardized risk assessment practices,
particularly default options. He was President of the Society for Risk
Analysis in 1993 and was named a Fellow of the Society in that year.
He holds an A.B. from Harvard and a Ph.D. (organic chemistry)
from the University of Washington.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.