Respondents Brief — Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc.

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- Supreme Court, U.S

FILED —

2000

IN THE |

Supreme Court of the United StateRK

No. 99-1257

—,

=

CAROL M. BROWNER, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ef al.,

Petitioners,

Vv.

AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS, INC.., ef al.,

Respondents.

On a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

For the District of Columbia Circuit

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS

APPALACHIAN POWER COMPANY, et al.,

DAVID E, MENOTTI HENRY V. NICKEL

WILLIAM F, PEDERSEN - F, WILLIAM BROWNELL

JEFFREY A. KNIGHT (Counsel of Record)

SHAWPITTMAN JAMES N. CHRISTMAN

2300 N Street, N.W. LUCINDA MINTON LANGWORTHY

Washington, D.C. 20037 HUNTON & WILLIAMS

(202) 663-8675 1900 K Street, N.W.

Counsel for American Washington, D.C. 20006

Forest & Paper (202) 955-1500

Association, American Counsel for Appalachian Power

Iron & Steel Institute, and Co., et al., American Public

Alliance of Automobile Power Association, and

Manufacturers National Association of

Home Builders

September 9, 2000

[Additional Counsel Listed Inside]

WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. — (202) 789-0096 -— WASHINGTON, D. C. 20001

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

OOP

G. WILLIAM FRICK

M. ELIZABETH COX

AMERICAN PETROLEUM

INSTITUTE

1220 L Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 682-8250

Counsel for American

Petroleum Institute

RUSSEL S. FRYE

COLLIER, SHANNON, RILL &

SCOTT, PLLC

3050 K Street, N.W., Suite 400

Washington, D.C. 20007

(202) 342-8878

and

RICHARD WASSERSTROM

AMERICAN FOREST & PAPER

ASSOCIATION, INC.

1111 19th Street, N.W.

8th Floor

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 463-2582

Counsel for American Forest

& Paper Association, Inc.

GRANT CRANDALL

General Counsel

UNITED MINE WORKERS OF

/,MERICA, AFL-CIO

8315 Lee Highway

Fairfax, VA 22031

(703) 208-7200

and

EUGENE M. TRISKO

P.O. Box 596

Berkeley Springs, WV 25411

(304) 258-1977

Counsel for United Mine

Workers of America, AFL-CIO

DAVID F. ZOLL

ALEXANDRA DAPOLITO DUNN

AMERICAN CHEMISTRY

COUNCIL

1300 Wilson Boulevard

Arlington, VA 22209

(703) 741-5165

Counsel for American

Chemistry Council

JULIE BECKER

ALLIANCE OF AUTOMOBILE

MANUFACTURERS

1401 H Street, N.W.

Suite 900

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 326-5500

Counsel for Alliance of

Automobile Manufacturers

HAROLD P. QUINN, JR.

NATIONAL MINING

ASSOCIATION

1130 17th Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 463-2652

Counsel for National Mining

Association

MARCELLE SHOOP

Associate General Counsel

KENNECOTT UTAH COPPER

CORPORATION

8315 West 3595 South

P.O. Box 6001

Magna, Utah 84044-6001

(801) 252-3000

Counsel for Kennecott Holdings

Corporation, Kennecott

Energy and Coal Company

and Kennecott Services

Company

PETER S. GLASER

SHOOK, HARDY & BACON

600 14th Street, N.W.

Suite 800

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 639-5627

Counsel for Western Fuels

Association, Inc.

NEWMAN R., PORTER

LEWIS AND ROCA

40 N. Central Avenue

Phoenix, AZ 85004

(602) 262-5786

Counsel for Nevada Mining

Association, Newmont Gold

Company, and Meridian Gold

Company

DAVID M. FLANNERY

JACKSON & KELLY

P.O. Box 553

1600 Laidley Tower

Charleston, WV 25322

(304) 340-1017

Counsel for Midwest Ozone

Group and West Virginia

Chamber of Commerce

KURT E, BLASE

O’CONNOR & HANNAN

Suite 500

1666 K Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006-2803

(202) 887-1400

Counsel for Kennecott Holdings

Corporation, Kennecott Energy

and Coal Company, Kennecott

Services Company, and

National Stone Association

DUANE J. DESIDERIO

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF

HOME BUILDERS

1201 1Sth Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C, 20005

(202) 861-2146

Counsel for National Associa-

tion of Home Builders

MAURICE H. MCBRIDE

NATIONAL PETROCHEMICAL &

REFINERS ASSOCIATION

1899 L Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 457-0480

Counsel for National

Petrochemical & Refiners

Association

TIMOTHY L. HARKER

THE HARKER LAW FIRM

9500 Accord Drive

Potomac, MD 20854

(301) 983-0964

and

THOMAS J. GRAVES

NATIONAL PAINT AND

COATINGS ASSOCIATION, INC.

1500 Rhode Island Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 462-6272

Counsel for National Paint and

Coatings Association

DAVID M. FRIEDLAND

BEVERIDGE & DIAMOND

1350 I Street, N.W.

Suite 700

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 789-6000

Counsel for Phoenix Cement

Company.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether the court of appeals properly remanded to the

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA” or “the

Agency”) revised National Ambient Air Quality

Standards (“NAAQS”) promulgated under Section 109 of

the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409, for the Agency to

develop an intelligible principle for risk management

decisions, and whether the court of appeals properly

construed the scope of the Agency’s discretion in

defining those criteria.

Whether the court had jurisdiction to review final action

taken by the EPA Administrator under the Clean Air Act

which resolved the question of whether the congressional

“Subpart 2” ozone risk management program restricted

EPA's authority to adopt and enforce a more stringent

ozone NAAQS.

Whether the comprehensive and long-term risk

management program Congress enacted to ensure

reductions of ozone in the ambient air restricted EPA’s

authority to e:tablish a more stringent ozone NAAQS.

AMENDED DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

1. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 29.6 and the Corporate

Disclosure Statement filed by Appalachian Power Co., ef

al., in its Response to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari

filed in this case, the following list discloses additional

parent companies, and publicly held companies that own

10% or more, of any party joining in this brief.

Carolina Power & Light Co.

(10% or greater owner: State Street Bank &

Trust Co. Boston)

Illinois Power

(a subsidiary of Dynergy, Inc.)

Kennecott Energy and Coal Co.

(an indirect subsidiary of Rio Tinto PLC)

Kennecott Holdings Corporation

(an indirect subsidiary of Rio Tinto PLC)

Kennecott Services Company

(an indirect subsidiary of Rio Tinto PLC)

Otter Tail Power Co.

(10% or greater owner: Otter Tail Power Co.

ESOP)

2. The following parties joining this brief have no parent

corporations, and no publicly-held companies have a 10%

or greater ownership interest in these parties.

American Chemistry Council (formerly Chemical

Manufacturers Association)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ee aE Pchicsrncsscestniinsiantsntininnntintpatsinataintaina i

AMENDED DISCLOSURE STATEMENT..................c00000+. li

ee Ca crniniirinnncnniescemnetiniesininnsinapiniieiinian vi

TITIES citerisisnsensaccnsienieddannneniniinaanineppesniasiiumniititimiusiminiiitiien XV

CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY AND

REGULATORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED........................ l

STATERGENT OF THEE CARB qnn.2..ccecceccscsescesssescsssessesscressess |

D, FER CACO e WI cncsncecscececessennnessnanecesncensnannen 2

a, FR ee ID cccrserensctncnienpecnntnsntiemmenian 2

B. Application and Enforcement of NAAQG.............. 3

ll. THE 1997 OZONE AND PM NAAQS

Sa OR crcctrerasericemnsrantemsasensnnnesemmmnannnennenemmnaent 6

A. The Administrative Record on Ozone................... 7

B. The Administrative Record on PM.................000++ 10

C. The Impacts of Standard Revision....................... 15

D. The Administrator’s Decisions.................000000000+ 16

iV

Ill. THE D.C. CIRCUIT DECISIONS.................ccccccecceeeees 19

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .............cccccsccssssscsssessesseesessee 20

GEES cnecemmissnnnssetinseemmaninsenireasinenimenanenet 22

I. EPA IMPROPERLY CONSTRUED THE

STATUTE TO PROVIDE NO _ LEGAL

STANDARD, OR “INTELLIGIBLE

PRINCIPLE,” THAT WOULD GUIDE ITS

EXERCISE OF PUBLIC HEALTH RISK

MANAGEMENT JUDGMENT . ..............cccccesseeseeeeeees 22

A. EPA Improperly Claims Unfettered Authority to

Exercise Public Health Risk Management

BRIE, connsnscensenscmesnnamanmecingnenennemitintite 24

B. EPA Is Obligated To Identify the Principle that

Guides Its Exercise of Rulemaking Authority

Even Where Congress Acts By Broad

TIMID, cuncntincernéncenionteninicnimanmmionnunemnen 31

C. There Is Law To Apply To Guide EPA’s Exercise

of Risk Management Judgment......................0.. 33

Il. EPA’S REVISION TO THE OZONE NAAQS,

TOGETHER WITH ITS REVOCATION OF

THE EXISTING STANDARD, IS

REVIEWABLE FINAL AGENCY ACTION................ 35

A. EPA’s Determination of Its Authority To Revise

the Ozone NAAQS Is Final Action.................... 36

Vv

B. EPA’s Decision To Replace Subpart 2 Is Ripe. .. 40

III. SUBPART 2 RESTRICTS EPA’S AUTHORITY

TO REVISE THE OZONE NAAQS.....0.......cccccesceeeeseees 42

A. Subpart 2’s Plain Language Precludes EPA From

Replacing the Existing Ozone NAAQG. ............ 42

B. Subpart 2’s History and Structure Confirm It Is the

Exclusive Plan for Managing Ozone. .................. 47

C. Subpart 2 Renders the Revised Ozone NAAQS

Sei erciciuvestinnnsisnsnaninininsbdiatipiitinsaasiniaibinliaieniiiians 49

Ie cinctenicesinsicnicenesnnenvatipaniananennastti iperipesisiamiaiitias 50

eae ctrennesncitnnenincnsninnaianenennnnnnsateninniiitidiiianiiniesis la

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES Page

A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,

ee eG I rtencsicerineminnimninn 25

AT&T Corp. v. lowa Utilities Board, 525 US.

Be citrerscsensceinntscnininsinmnmmninnaiiiiann 25, 35

Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136

ne ee EN 41

Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322

le Ge Cee ericremecnenacnnimen: wnenenenennenen 24

American Lung Association v. EPA, 134 F.3d 388

i ee 23, 30

American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90

EE crncnsesmecemsaneesemenssseneveenmmesennsstarmmnnssneeee 33

American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027

(D.C. Cir.)., modified, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir.

FUP ncecccesecescapssssensecesssnssesevescevensunescsssusnesuecssooees passim

Barrick Goldstrike Mines, Inc. v. Browner, 215

ee 39

Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) .......cccccccceeeeeeeeeees 38

Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371

ee 23, 26

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837

eT 34, 35, 44

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,

ae Te a ccncccensnnnenestnenenenenneenn 28

Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998)........ccccccceeees 30

Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821)....... 40

Vii

FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120

SPs Se CI cnccieehiienenhsiniieirnscsebiecsiieiecinsintieanienaen 30, 49

FPC v. Conway, 426 U.S. 271 (1976).......cccccccccccesceeeees 33

Federal Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc.,

as UT cneriieiissinirieheiaiatiisetinielnaataacaastaas 25

Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Association vy.

De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982) .......cccccccceeeeees 38

HRI, Inc. v. EPA, 198 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 2000)......... 38

Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U.S. 578

° ” Sea 21, 38, 39, 40, 41

Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979)..........000. 30

INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) ccccccccccsssssssssssssessooe 29

Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO y.

American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607

SETI chtersinansstsineatniateiisiat enesiieiiinineniatitameeniariais 25, 26, 29, 30

International Union, UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d

ee 24

J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276

ee I nstrtcritescnrinitertaiiniaitaccialieniacnaeateataiatenias 25

Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) ......cccccccccccscseeeeseeees 25

Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996).......... 25, 30

Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S.

ae ee crsceteidainteiasiinienbaiiataeeniaiiiaeainiiiincanssaaainael 41

Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service,

Inc., 486 U.S. 825 (1988) .........cccceceeseeeseesceseeseeeeeees 46

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137

SIE TEE weriesinctattsiincmneniotintbennnibiininnsinienbiaastinatiiianasarees 31, 33

Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989)....... 25,34

Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State

Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463

ee a ee cncitsnenmiinniecnemntencipteccsemeniinneiniues 23, 30

Vill

National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319

ees Sete UTI nticicaissciineivniedieuienlacibdeiantanindnaaniciataaclied

National Cable Television Association v. United

BENNER, GES WB. FID COG Pa prccccssesecesccssescscessesscees

New York Central Securities Corp. v. United

A, ee Sy ee ee cetticccncntndiitntteitionisanien

Ohio Forestry Association v. Sierra Club, 523

ele Se ihccicins hchelistciisiiscaniesbieaisitibiialdeiiiiaaeieals

Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388

GSU ccahssceacaeceshetaniiehaaeaiaeiepiaiiaeeinlamasenatia hae

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections y.

Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998) ............ccsscccssssseeees

Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997)............cccceeeeeees

Robertso.. v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490

eran ET nITTITIIIIT ihciscaseniiaeaadeasinsaietstegniniiianiasiaddiinbaiaieaeas

Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983) .........

SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947)............

Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 US.

Pee Te ccdndianisseabiibiceneciipincscpinideumionnishieiubabdicnnbligistis

Touby v. United States, 508 U.S. 160 (1991).....25,

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) ...........

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC,

Se BaP IE aiccntcsiticssstidistadenicsintniiniinpainiiantins

Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305

IS diciibaedpenaninnsiaiaisdaditieadindenasisibidiediniaamuiviate’

Wyoming Outdoor Council v. United States Forest

Service, 165 F.3d 43 (D.C. Cir. 1999)...0...0..0.0...

Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S., 414 (1944) ..........

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343

I a tied aealtidiae esata

Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965)..............ccccseeeeeeeees

32, 34

1X

STATUTES

The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq.

ee I HE WII cticcctncccicssiasinisnpsensigtnaneeanctien l

Se Oe i ee rs OF Pee entenctictntteeenidarseatsccenssbterenin 34

CAA § 101(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b) ....... eee 1,24

CAA § 107(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d) ............ 42, 43, 44, 45

CAA § 107(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(1) «0.0.0... cece ceeees 43

CAA § 107(d)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(1)(A)............ 3

CAA § 107(d)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(1)(B)............. 3

CAA § 107(d)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(3) .......000... 42, 43

CAA § 107(d)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(4) ...42, 43, 44, 45

CAA § 108, 42 U.S.C. § 7408... 3, 22, 35, 49

CAA § 108(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a) 0.0... eceecceeeeeeeeeeeeees 2

CAA § 108(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(2)...........cccccceeeeees 3

CAA § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7409........0...0... 21, 24, 28, 34, 35

CAA § 109(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) ........... ee. 3, 22, 49

CAA § 109(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d) ..3, 36, 38, 46, 49, 50

CAA § 110(a), 42 U.S.C. § 741O(a).......cccccccccccscssescccessees 4

CAA § 110(a)(2)(I), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(1)................ 4

CAA §§ 171-179B, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7509a................. 4

CAA § 172(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7502(a) ...... cee eceeesceeeeeeees 44

CAA § 172(a)(1)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 7502(a)(1)(C)....... 4, 43

CAA § 172(a)(2)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 7502(a)(2)(D)........... 43

CAA § 175A(d), 42 U.S.C. § 750Sa(d)........... ccc eceeeeeeeeee 5

ee ae itn Se Ios 0 GENET cenctcccetnsanaicncionnnnsanenbiiiidincs 43

CAA § 181(a), 42 U.S.C.

) 37, 42, 44, 45, 46, 48, 49

CAA § 181(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 751 1(a)(1)................ 43, 45

CAA § 181(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7511(b) ............ 37, 44, 46, 48

CAA § 181(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 751 1(b)(1)....... eee 43

CAA §§ 181-185B, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7511-7511f.....0..0.0.. 5

x

ny 5

CAA § 182(a)-(e), 42 U.S.C. § 751 la(a)-(e) «0.0.0.0... 48

CAA §§ 182-185B, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7511a-7511f..........0..... l

CAA § 183(g), 42 U.S.C. § 751 1b(g) «0.0... eeceeeeeeeeee 48

ee Oe a Ae is OF UE i acccecelicensieticiiansiciisriesiseibinn 48

CAA § 184(a), 42 U.S.C. § 751 1¢(a)........... oe are eee 5

CAA § 184(b)(1)(a), 42 U.S.C. § 751 1e(b)(1)(a)............. 5

CAA §§ 186-187, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7512-7512a ..........0..... 46

CAA § 188-190, 42 U.S.C. § 7513-7513b ........ eee 46

ee ees Ne rc Te ei ciiiinitnticistasinisesssenainsciinidanieites 46

CAA § 307(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) .............. 1, 39, 40, 41

CAA § 307(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) 0.2... eceeeeeees 38

CAA § 307(d)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(3) .......00ccccceeeee 13

CAA § 307(d)(9), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9) ........0cccceeeeee 23

FEDERAL REGULATIONS

40 C.F.R. § 50.9(b) (1999) 0. cece 1, 18, 21, 37, 39

40 C.F.R. § 50.10 (1999)...ccccccccccsessecssessesseesessees 18, 21, 37

FEDERAL REGISTER

aac tlie 7

I asa 6

AT a ea ee 7

4 8 4 ET ee roe 48

I alia 6

I a i ileal 7

Fee re I I ices cscmeiinilnenitinaiehes 17

a ial clelemaclaes 17

IE nr nnn en NTE 39

Fe i Cy See IO iicrresnccsnnennccnscnncnmmniacceciints 7, 16

xl

i SSR Decent na neon mone

I I

ae es Be ccesicticeetiiisincncitccisnneciiiniinisinaie 15

Be Us SINT stecceniitirscisosiisstestisiainaatitininnn 17

ee ee SR icccsisiicneisiectiinccsipieisiitiiantumanamnenionts

I I a

BL, , SE EEO ENT

62 Fed. Reg. SEGES (1997).........ccccecccccesccceees 17, 18, 21,

Be es es I aictteniicicecsiicincsencnieansniinenieens 7

rr

Be ee I ccccccecittnsiinsnisisinbeihippbapaditiabiatiadanta

EE ee

G2 Fed. Reg. SEBGE (1997).......ccccccccccssssccscccccccccseeses 17

ey By I cicccnssesnsensicnnecsendsceticcenesmeniiidie

a icccrcncnicunintnssemniciasesiianimnnieal

62 Fed. Reg. 36578-BS (1997).........ccccccccccoscsscscsccccsescoeees

62 Fed. Reg. 38883 (1997)................cccceceeee 17, 18, 21,

ae ee CN SI CDR ccrcteccccnscsncncccnasnsnscnsnessiees

Se Fe, , Fe FR cccsecescrccccncnscnsesecsancensennen

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

136 Cong. Rec. 130 (Jan. 23, 1990), reprinted in 4

Sen. Comm. on Env’t and Pub. Works, A

Legislative History of the Clean Air Act

Amendments of 1990 (Comm. Print 1993)

I iiss tincanictiinnido ictal 4,

136 Cong. Rec. H12867 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990)

(Rep. Fields), reprinted in 1 Sen. Comm. on

Env’t and Pub. Works, A Legislative History

of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990

IR. TUTE GI hnnicincannnsiiennnteniineiévaimncinnaseinninies

Xli

H.R. 3030, 101st Cong., §§ 101(a), 103, reprinted

in 2 Sen. Comm. on Env’t and Pub. Works, A

Legislative History of the Clean Air Act

Amendments of 1990 (Comm. Print 1993)............... 45

H.R. Rep. No. 101-490, pt. 1 (1990), reprinted in

2 Sen. Comm. on Env’t and Pub. Works,

101st Cong., 2d Sess., A Legislative History of

the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990

IE, TRIE GUM icceciesenscenccssenmmninenctenh 4, 45, 47, 48

H.R. Rep. No. 101-952 (1990), reprinted in | Sen.

Comm. on Env’t and Pub. Works, 103d

Cong., 2d Sess., A Legislative History of the

Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (Comm.

PD TERED sceinsnesistienmenictecsncieccscteninsainenentianinesaies 4, 45

S. Rep. No. 91-1196 (1970), reprinted in 1 Sen.

Comm. on Pub. Works, A Legislative History

of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 (Comm.

PE Fe icicinsstascavisinesnestisidimchibitinaiainammniinnens 40

S. 1630, 101st Cong., §§ 101, 107, reprinted in 3

Sen. Comm. on Env’t and Pub. Works, A

Legislative History of the Clean Air Act

Amendments of 1990 (Comm. Print 1993)............... 45

MISCELLANEOUS

Committee on the Institutional Means for

Assessment of Risks to Public Health,

National Research Council, Risk Assessment

in the Federal Government: Managing the

PRD Ce censensencsensessnrreniestnnsinmesesessenmengnasaen 26

EPA, Air Quality Criteria for Particulate Matter

SUITED sxccnccssnnsstuniennesnnianiineinneniianenieniioniaeth 11, 12, 13

Xili

EPA, Regulatory Analyses for the Particulate

Matter and Ozone National Ambient Air

Quality Standards and Proposed Regional

MERE DUTT ERS TEN ie Wes 15

EPA, Responses to Significant Comments on the

1996 Proposed Rule on the National Ambient

Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter

5 Ne Pa Tee Tern 16

EPA, Responses to Significant Comments on the

National Ambient Air Quality Standards for

I te cnisintinasiniininicibdaaielibiiie a ei 16

EPA, Review of National Ambient Air Quality

Standards for Ozone (1996) ........cccccccseeceeeeeeeeeee 6, 7,9

EPA, Review of the National Ambient Air Quality

Standards for Particulate Matter (1996) 11, 12, 13, 14

Gary Taubes, Epidemiology Faces Its Limits, 269

I TI ic ticnseinineiiitentniniiheciinniiated tet 12

L. Bressman, Schechter Poultry at _ the

Millennium: A Delegation Doctrine for the

Administrative State, 109 Yale L.J. 1399

TTS See cecennstnneediaiscaniatiashiiiiiemibeegtinas: 29, 35

Leland Deck, et al., A Particulate Matter Risk

Assessment for Philadelphia and Los Angeles

I MA TT EE ch AR Oe 14

Letter from Dr. George T. Wolff, Chair, CASAC,

to Hon. Carol M. Browner (Nov. 30, 1995).....8, 9, 10

Letter from Dr. George T. Wolff, Chair, CASAC,

to Hon. Carol M. Browner (Jun. 13, 1996) ..11, 14, 15

Memorandum from Harvey M. Richmond to

Karen Martin (Feb. 11, 1997)..........cccccccssscssessseeseeees 9

U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of

the United States (119th ed. 1999)... cece 15, 16

XIV

W. Wilson, Congressional Government (1885)

30

GLOSSARY

The following is a glossary of acronyms and abbreviations

used in this brief.

Act Clean Air Act

Administrator Administrator of the United

States Environmental

Protection Agency

Agency United States Environmental

Protection Agency

APC Appalachian Power Co., ef

al.

CAA Clean Air Act

CASAC Clean Air Scientific

Advisory Committee

EPA United States Environmental

Protection Agency

NAAQS National Ambient Air

Quality Standards

OJA Joint Appendix in D.C. Cir.

Case No. 97-1441

OSP Ozone Staff Paper

XV

PM

PM,

PM, ;

PMJA

PPM

PMSP

Subpart |

Subpart 2

Xvi

Particulate Matter |

Particulate Matter with an

aerodynamic diameter less

than or equal to 10 microns

Particulate Matter with an

aerodynamic diameter less

than or equal to 2.5 microns

Joint Appendix in D.C. Cir.

Case No. 97-1440

Parts Per Million

Particulate Matter Staff Paper

Subpart | of Part D of Title I

of the Clean Air Act

Subpart 2 of Part D of Title I

of the Clean Air Act

CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY AND

REGULATORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The following additional statutory and regulatory

provisions are involved in this case: CAA §§ 101(b), 182-

185B, and 307(b); 40 C.F.R. § 50.9(b).'

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A fundamental principle of our system of government is

that executive branch agencies may exercise only that power

that Congress has delegated to them. While Congress often

delegates in broad terms in areas that are technically and

scientifically complex, that delegation must specifically

provide—or the executive branch agency must derive from

the authorizing legislation—an intelligible principle that

constrains the agency’s discretion in a manner consistent

with the congressional delegation. Just as no executive

branch agency may exercise a policy judgment that Congress

has not delegated to it, no executive branch agency may

substitute its policy judgment for that of Congress.

The actions of the Environmental Protection Agency

(“EPA” or “the Agency”) at issue here violate this principle.

In 1997, citing the Clean Air Act (“CAA” or “the Act’), 42

U.S.C. §§ 7401 ef seqg., and the policy judgment of its

Administrator, EPA replaced existing National Ambient Air

Quality Standards (“NAAQS”) for ozone and particulate

matter (“PM”) with revised standards. In each instance,

while EPA characterized ranges of health risks associated

with alternative standards, the Agency did not articulate any

principle based on the Act to guide its exercise of risk

' These provisions are reproduced in the attached Appendix (“App. _”),

or the Appendix to Conditional Cross-Pet. in Case No. 99-1431.

2

management judgment in selecting standards from that range

of risks. By revising the ozone NAAQS, EPA also replaced

the statutory program for reducing ozone enacted by

Congress in 1990 with a more stringent program of EPA’s

own creation.

Because EPA’s actions are incompatible with the scope of

authority delegated to that Agency by Congress, they must be

vacated. The Court should instruct EPA that Congress has

not authorized it to establish a more stringent ozone NAAQS

and that, in promulgating a NAAQS, it must articulate the

principle, based on the Act, that it applies in exercising its

risk management judgment.’

I. THE STATUTORY SCHEME.

A. The NAAQS Program.

The NAAQS program is the centerpiece of the Clean Air

Act. It requires a joint effort by EPA and the States, with

EPA responsible for establishing NAAQS and the States

responsible for implementing them.

NAAQS apply to air pollutants that EPA finds “may

reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or

welfare” and that result from “numerous or diverse” mobile

and stationary sources. CAA § 108(a). Prior to setting

standards, EPA must prepare a “criteria document” that

“accurately reflects the latest scientific knowledge useful in

? While the reviewing court correctly objected to EPA’s construction of

the statute as providing no intelligible principle for risk management

decisions, as Appalachian Power Co., et al., (“APC”) and American

Trucking Associations, Inc., ef al, (“ATA”) explain in Case No. 99-

1426, the Act provides the basis for such a principle. Acceptance of the

arguments in Case No. 99-1426 regarding the proper construction of the

Act would require that the revised standards at issue here be vacated.

3

indicating the kind and extent of all identifiable effects on

public health or welfare” of varying quantities of the

pollutant in the ambient air. CAA § 108(a)(2); see also Br.

for Resp’ts Appalachian Power Co., ef a/., in Support of

Pet’rs (99-1426) 6, 37-39 [hereinafter “APC Br.”’).

Based on the criteria document, the Agency sets “primary”

NAAQS at a level “requisite to protect the public health”

with an “adequate margin of safety,” and “secondary”

NAAQS at a level “requisite to protect the public welfare

from any known or anticipated adverse effects.” CAA

§ 109(b). NAAQS may be revised “as may be appropriate”

in accordance with §§ 108 and 109(b). CAA § 109(d); see

APC Br. 39-42.

In promulgating or revising NAAQS, EPA must consult

an independent scientific review committee—the Clean Air

Scientific Advisory Committee (“CASAC”)—that advises

the Agency on (1) the “adequacy” and “basis” for existing

and revised NAAQS, (2) “the relative contribution to air

pollution concentrations of natural as well as anthropogenic

activity,” and (3) “any adverse public health, welfare, social,

economic, or energy effects” from different approaches to

NAAQS implementation. CAA § 109(d).

B. Application and Enforcement of NAAQS.

In order to implement a NAAQS, States are responsible

for identifying and submitting to EPA a list of areas to be

designated “attainment” (meeting the standard),

“nonattainment” (not meeting the standard), or

“unclassifiable.” CAA § 107(d)(1)(A). EPA then

promulgates these designations, making “such modifications

as the Administrator deems _ necessary.” CAA

§ 107(d)(1)(B). At that time, EPA “may classify”

nonattainment areas to provide an attainment date or “for

other purposes” unless “classifications are specifically

4

provided under other provisions” of the Act. CAA

§ 172(a)(1(C).

Once areas are designated and, if appropriate, classified

pursuant to the Act, States are responsible for adopting State

Implementation Plans (“SIPs”) that provide for

“implementation, maintenance, and enforcement” of the

NAAQS. CAA §110(a). For areas that are designated

nonattainment, the SIP must “meet the applicable

requirements of Part D.”. CAA § 110(a)(2)(I). General

requirements for nonattainment area plans are found in

Subpart | of Part D of Title I of the Act. CAA §§ 171-179B.

In 1990, Congress recognized that, for a variety of

reasons, the general classification and planning provisions of

Part D of the Act were not appropriate to address ozone

nonattainment and ozone “maintenance” based upon the

established 1-hour ozone NAAQS.’ Reflecting the failure of

many areas to attain the ozone NAAQS,’ as well as

Congress’ determination that massive economic dislocation

and impossible deadlines driven by the general planning

provisions were neither necessary nor appropriate responses

to ozone health risks,’ Congress in 1990 designated the 1977

> HLR. Rep. No. 101-952, at 335 (1990), reprinted in 1 Sen. Comm. on

Env’t and Pub. Works, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., A Legislative History of the

Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, at 1785 (Comm. Print 1993)

{hereinafter /990 Legis. Hist.], OJA 3546; see also H.R. Rep. No. 101-

490, pt. 1, at 146-49 (1990), reprinted in 2 1990 Legis. Hist., supra,

3170-72, OJA 3557-59; 136 Cong. Rec. 130-33 (Jan. 23, 1990),

reprinted in 4 1990 Legis. Hist., supra, 4832-39 (Sen. Chafee); APC Br.

15-17.

* H.R. Rep. No. 101-490, pt. 1, at 229-31, reprinted in 2 1990 Legis.

Hist., supra note 3, at 3253-55, OJA 359° 3600.

* See supra note 3.

5

Amendments’ General Provisions “Subpart 1” of Part D of

Title I of the Act, and added a new Subpart 2 to Part D of

Title 1. Subpart 2 “specifically provide[s]” for ozone

classifications and, based on those classifications, for detailed

regulatory requirements that Congress had concluded would

represent a pragmatic solution to reducing ozone

concentrations throughout the country. See CAA §§ 181-

185B.

Subpart 2 comprehensively addresses classification of

areas and control programs for ozone. It explains how areas

designated nonattainment for ozone are to be regulated, and

includes specific regulatory programs for volatile organic

compounds and nitrogen oxides, substances that contribute to

ozone formation. See, e.g., CAA § 182.

Subpart 2 also imposes requirements on areas that attain

the ozone NAAQS. As an example of the specificity of the

balances struck by Congress even for “attainment areas,”

each metropolitan area with a population of 100,000 or

greater in the Northeastern States “ozone transport region”

established by Congress in Subpart 2 must adopt an enhanced

vehicle inspection and maintenance program. CAA § 184(a),

(b)(1)(A). And nonattainment areas that achieve attainment

are subject to “maintenance plans” that “include a

requirement that [if the NAAQS is again violated,] the State

will implement all measures [including Subpart 2

requirements]. . . that were contained in the State

implementation plan for the area before redesignation” to

attainment. CAA § 175A(d).

In short, Congress “stood up to the plate” in Subpart 2 and

defined a risk management program to resolve the health

risks from ozone, rather than continuing the politically “feel

good” deadlines and control strategies that failed under

Subpart 1. Subpart 2 is Congress’ comprehensive and long-

6

term program to reduce health risks associated with ozone

concentrations in the ambient air.

Il. THE 1997 OZONE AND PM NAAQS REVISIONS.

Both ozone and PM have been the subject of NAAQS

since the beginning of the ambient standards program.

Ozone has been subject to a 1-hour NAAQS of 0.12 ppm that

EPA established in 1979 and reaffirmed in 1993 as protective

of public health with an adequate margin of safety. 58 Fed.

Reg. 13008, OJA 3449. PM has been subject to annual and

24-hour NAAQS that use PM,, as a size indicator, and that

were adopted in 1987 in place of earlier, less stringent

standards measuring PM as Total Suspended Particulate

(TSP). 52 Fed. Reg. 24634, PMJA 208.

In its brief, EPA asserts that scientific evidence that has

emerged since these NAAQS were last reviewed shows that

the existing standards fail to protect “millions of Americans

from adverse health effects.” EPA Br. 2. According to EPA,

“a wide range of adverse health effects were occurring at

concentrations below the pre-existing PM and ozone

NAAQS.” /d. 31 (emphasis added). But these assertions are

not the stated basis for the revised NAAQS and, indeed, do

not reflect the rulemaking records.°

Far from reflecting a response to demonstrated adverse

public health effects, EPA’s rulemaking determinations

represent a “policy choice” to provide more “margin of

safety” in light of “uncertainties associated with inconclusive

scientific and technical information” and “hazards that

* 62 Fed. Reg. 38656, PMJA 6 (PM risk estimates “should not be viewed

as demonstrated health impacts”); see also EPA, Review of National

Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone 104 (1996) [hereinafter OSP},

OJA 1914 (ozone risk estimates are not “demonstrated health impacts”).

7

research has not yet identified.” 62 Fed. Reg. 38857, OJA 2;

id. 38653, PMJA 3.’ This is because, contrary to EPA’s

assertions, the rulemaking records contain estimates of health

risk, not demonstrated adverse public health effects that are

occurring as a result of exposure to these pollutants.* The

existence of such risks was recognized in previous NAAQS

proceedings and, as EPA’s risk assessments show, are also

addressed by the existing NAAQS.°

As a result, as the record of these proceedings and the

Agency’s decisions show, this case is not about whether or

not EPA can regulate based on predictions of health risk.

Rather, it is about EPA’s failure to exercise reasoned pubiic

health risk management judgment as to the level of protection

that is “appropriate” among a range of “risk” options.

A. The Administrative Record on Ozone.

Reflecting that the rulemaking to revise the ozone

NAAQS was based on small, predicted health risks, the

’ See also EPA Br. (D.C. Cir. 97-1441) 35 (EPA “appropriately applied

margin of safety considerations in choosing among options.”); id. 48.

* See, e.g., 62 Fed. Reg. 38665, PMJA 15 (“[T]he Administrator believes

that it is more appropriate to provide additional protection against the risk

posed by PM by adding new standards for the fine fraction of PM,,.”); id.

38863, OJA 8 (explaining that the Administrator sought to reduce risk).

” See 58 Fed. Reg. 13015, OJA 3456 (lung function changes even on days

when the NAAQS was not exceeded); 52 Fed. Reg. 24642, PMJA 216

(noting the data suggest a “continuum of response” with the risk

“decreasing with concentration”); see also OSP, supra note 6, at 24, OJA

1834 (“Prior to completion of the previous review . . . there was a

substantial data base defining health effects of [ozone].”); 43 Fed. Reg.

26964, OJA 3518 (discussing range of health risks considered in

establishing 1979 NAAQS). Nor do the revised standards eliminate the

risk. EPA has not identified any level that is without risk for either

pollutant.

8

Administrator’s science advisers (CASAC) questioned the

need for the revised ozone NAAQS. As CASAC concluded:

[T]here is no ‘bright line’ which distinguishes any

of the proposed standards (either the level or the

number of allowable exceedences) as being

significantly more protective of public health. For

example, the differences in the percent of outdoor

children . . . responding between the present

standard and the most stringent proposal .. . are

small and their ranges overlap for all health

endpoints.'°

The administrative record on ozone sheds light on

CASAC’s concerns regarding appropriate standard revisions.

The record shows that, while attaining the existing 1-hour

ozone NAAQS would not eliminate all health risk associated

with exposure to ozone, a new NAAQS would not

necessarily reduce the remaining risk, and might even

increase it. The question EPA confronted therefore was what

level of health “risk” is “requisite” to protect the “public

health” given this record.

EPA’s own risk assessment found that the range of

estimated risk (expressed as the number or percent of

individuals in the sensitive population (outdoor children)""

° Letter from Dr. George T. Wolff, Chair, CASAC, to Hon. Carol M.

Browner 3 (Nov. 30, 1995) [hereinafter CASAC Ozone Letter], OJA 238

(emphasis added). EPA is simply wrong when it states that CASAC “did

not mean” that “the public health effects were the same at any level”

within the range. See EPA Br 33 n.23.

'' Bec se the risk assessment focuses on the sensitive subpopulation and

because it took into account the full range of dose/response information

contained in the health studies, it reflects responses by sensitive, as well

as typical, individuals.

9

predicted to respond to ozone at least once a year) overlapped

with the range of estimated risk if EPA retained the existing

standard.’ The overlap occurred for all the various types of

health effects that were analyzed. In fact, for approximately

one-third of the population evaluated, the new standard could

~place the population at greater risk than if the standard

remained unchanged."

Thus, EPA staff acknowledged that ranges of estimated

risk were little different for the 1-hour and 8-hour ozone

NAAQS." In fact, the staff concluded that an 8-hour

NAAQS of 0.09 ppm (which they indicated would be

roughly equivalent to the 1-hour NAAQS) “would reduce

estimated exposures of the at-risk population sufficiently to

provide some margin of safety.”"°

CASAC agreed. The Committee endorsed the full range

of options suggested by the staff, including no increase in the

"See CASAC Ozone Letter, supra note 10, at 3, OJA 238. Moreover, this

risk assessment did not even comprehensively address the uncertainties in

the data. APC Br. 11 & nn.16-20; see also CASAC Ozone Letter, supra -

note 10, at 2, OJA 237 (large uncertainties exist in the risk estimates);

OSP, supra note 6, at 55, OJA 1865 (noting that children do not appear to

experience the symptoms from ozone exposure that are modeled in the

risk assessment).

"62 Fed. Reg. 38867, OJA 12; OSP, supra note 6, at 80, OJA 1891.

Similarly, asthmatic hospital admissions in New York City were

predicted either to decrease slightly (0.2%) or increase slightly (0.03%)

depending on the form of the 0.08 ppm 8-hour standard. (EPA selected a

form for the standard that was between the two options evaluated.) See

Non-State CAA Pet’rs and Intervenors’ Br. (D.C. Cir. 97-1441) 52.

‘* OSP, supra note, 6, at 125, 130, OJA 1935, 1940; Memorandum from

Harvey M. Richmond to Karen Martin 5 (Feb. 11, 1997), OJA 2318.

'* OSP, supra note 6, at 167, OJA 1977: see also APC Br. 10-13, for

further discussion of the ozone record.

10

stringency of the standard.'° In fact, of the ten CASAC panel

members who expressed their opinions, four specifically

recommended an 8-hour NAAQS no more stringent than the

existing NAAQS and three others included 0.09 ppm within

their recommended range.'’ Because of overlapping risk

estimates, CASAC indicated that EPA’s selection of a

specific standard would have to reflect “policy judgment.”

But what decisional standard would govern that “policy

judgment”? CASAC provided no answer and was even told

by EPA not to provide information called for by the Act (e.g.,

“implementation impacts”) that could inform that policy

judgment.”

B. The Administrative Record on PM.

Although recommending the adoption of a NAAQS for

fine PM, CASAC noted “the many unanswered questions and

uncertainties regarding the issue of causality” of health

effects by the pollutant, which created uncertainty about the

level of health protection under a revised standard. These

'° CASAC Ozone Letter, supra note 10, at 3, OJA 238.

'” Id., OJA 238. Thus, whatever concerns CASAC may once have had

with the adequacy of the protection provided by the existing standard, see

EPA Br. 13 (citing a letter written by CASAC in 1989), after reviewing

the latest scientific information as presented in the OSP and Criteria

Document the majority of CASAC was comfortable with recommending

a standard at the stringency of the existing one.

'* CASAC Ozone Letter, supra note 10, at 3, OJA 238.

'° Compare CASAC Tr. (3/21/95), 36-39, OJA 253-54 (EPA’s Gleason

states that CASAC’s responsibilities concerning implementation

Strategies are “irrelevant to how we set standards”), with CASAC Tr.

(3/19/95), 37-38, OJA 285-86 (CASAC member Price notes a “bit of a

conflict” with EPA in that there “is not that review” of the “the interface

of science and control strategy issues” called for by the Act).

11

uncertainties affecting EPA’s risk characterization included:

“exposure misclassification, measurement error, the influence

of confounders, the shape of the dose-response function, . . .

the lack of an understanding of toxicological mechanisms,

and the existence of possible alternative explanations.” Ags

a result, CASAC was unable to form a consensus on

appropriate NAAQS for fine PM.”!

Confirming CASAC’s concerns, EPA staff “emphasize[d]

the unusually large uncertainties” associated with

establishing standards for PM,..” These uncertainties

included the “lack of demonstrated mechanisms” that “limits

judgments about causality of effects and appropriate

concentration-response models to apply in quantitatively

estimating risks” associated with PM, ,.”

EPA staff also acknowledged “the question as to whether

or to what extent the observed effects attributed to PM

exposures are confounded by other pollutants commonly

occurring in community air.” The EPA staff noted that

° Letter from Dr. George T. Wolff, Chair, CASAC, to Hon. Carol M.

Browner 3 (June 13, 1996) [hereinafter CASAC PM Letter], PMJA 3163

(emphasis added).

*" Id. 2, PMJA 3162.

” EPA, Review of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for

Particulate Matter VII-41 (1996) [hereinafter PMSP], PMJA 2153

(emphasis added).

*® Id. VII-42, PMJA 2154.

* Id., PMJA 2154. A “confounder” in an epidemiological study is an

“independent risk factor [e.g., another pollutant] for the outcome” (e.g.,

mortality) that is “associated with the exposure variable” (e.g., ambient

PM). EPA, Air Quality Criteria for Particulate Matter 12-24 (1996)

[hereinafter PMCD], PMJA 1398. Failure to consider a “confounder” in

12

several authors “have demonstrated that it may not be

possible to separate individual effects of multiple

pollutants.” The staff recognized that, even when

Statistically significant, reported associations between

particulate matter and health effects were “weak” and the

relative risks’” were “consistently ‘small’’’’—indeed, so

small that epidemiologists are generally reluctant to believe

such risk findings.’

Furthermore, while EPA emphasizes that a number of

epidemiological studies addressed PM effects, EPA Br. 9,

most of those studies involved PM size fractions other than

the PM,, fraction that EPA chose to regulate.”* And most of

eee

an epidemiological study may produce inaccurate or exaggerated

associations with the variable of concern (i.e., PM).

*> PMSP, supra note 22, at VII-42 to VII-43, PMJA 2154-55.

*° PMCD, supra note 24, at 12-346 to 12-347, PMJA 1720-21.

>” See Gary Taubes, Epidemiology Faces Its Limits, 269 Science 164, 168

(1995), PMJA 3134. While EPA argues that the concept of statistical

significance can be used to separate associations that “may reflect cause-

and-effect relationships” from those that may be the product of “chance,”

EPA Br. 9 n.10, statistical significance “only takes into consideration

random variation in the data. It ignores the systematic errors, the biases

and confounders, that will almost invariably overwhelm the statistical

variation.” Taubes, supra, at 168, PMJA 3134 (citing Norman Breslow,

University of Washington). In short, the existence of a statistically

Significant association does not establish either causality or the

significance of health risk.

*8 See 62 Fed. Reg. 38676, PMJA 26 (citing PMSP, supra note 22, at V-

60b to V-60c, V-61a, PMJA 2023-24, 2026). While several studies are

listed in the tables relied on by EPA, only Schwartz, et al. (1996),

Thurston, et al. (1994), Schwartz, et al. (1994), Dockery, et al. (1993),

and Pope, et al. (1995) reported a statistically significant relationship

with PM,,;. Two studies in those tables reported no statistically

significant association between PM, , and the studied effects, Ostro, et al.

13

those studies ignored the important effect of confounders

(e.g., the presence of other pollutants or other variables that

could have produced the effect). See supra note 27.

The record showed that in six of seven studies in which

confounders were fully analyzed, the initial association

reported between PM and health effects lost statistical

significance.” As the staff acknowledged, therefore, studies

that failed to consider a full array of confounders “probably

overestimate[d] the PM effect.” Yet, during the

rulemaking, EPA consistently denied to the public data

needed to analyze the role of confounders in the critical PM,

studies.”

Although EPA put forward quantitative projections of the

health impacts of low levels of PM, ,, the uncertainties in the

science were so great that Agency staff warned that its “risk

estimates . . . should not be interpreted as precise measures of

risk.””’ Similarly, CASAC noted that the risk assessment did

(1993) and Neas, et. ai. (1995). The daily PM,, levels were as high in

the studies that did not report statistical significance as in the ones that

did.

** See Non-State Fine PM Pet. Br. (D.C. Cir. 97-1440) 17.

*° PMCD, supra note 24, at 12-333, PMJA 1707.

" EPA did not make the data available even though EPA itself had

funded the most critical studies and despite a requirement that “the

factual data on which the proposed rule is based” be placed in the public

docket. See CAA § 307(d)(3). EPA's failure to place these data in the

docket, and its implications for the validity of the PM, , standards, was

one of the issues that the lower court said it would resolve only after EPA

responded to the court’s remand. Non-State Fine PM Pet. Br. (D.C. Cir.

97-1440) 33-44; 175 F.3d 1034, Pet. App. Sa.

* PMSP, supra note 22, at VI-1, PMJA 2051 (emphasis added). Among

the uncertainties acknowledged by EPA staff were “uncertainties in the

concentration-response” relationship, use of ambient concentrations “as a

14

not include all of the uncertainties and that the combined

effect of those uncertainties was not examined.” Thus,

EPA’s risk assessment was simply “premised on the

assumption that PM (measured as PM,, and PM, .) is causally

related to the health effects observed in the epidemiological

studies and/or that PM is a useful index for the mixture of

pollutants that is related to these effects.”

For these reasons, CASAC observed that EPA’s risk

assessments were of “limited value” for identifying an

appropriate standard’’ and noted “the existence of possible

alternative explanations” for the effects examined in the risk

assessment.” While most of the science advisers endorsed

the concept of a PM,, standard, only 2 of 21 specifically

recommended an annual NAAQS as stringent as the one EPA

surrogate for population exposures,” the lack of site-specific risk

estimates for PM,, and uncertain estimates of baseline incidence of

hospital admissions and respiratory symptoms. /d. at VI-1, VI-7, VI-14,

VI-21, PMJA 2051, 2058, 2066, 2073. EPA assumed there was no

threshold for the effects. PMSP. supra note 22, at VI-16; PMJA 2068.

*’ CASAC PM Letter, supra note 20, at 3, PMJA 3163; see also Leland

Deck, et al., A Particulate Matter Risk Assessment for Philadelphia and

Los Angeles 105 (1996), PMJA 3362 (co-pollutants were not addressed).

** PMSP, supra note 22, at VI-1, PMJA 2051 (emphasis added).

However, CASAC noted “the many unanswered questions and

uncertainties regarding the issue of causality.” CASAC PM Letter, supra

note 20, at 3, PMJA 3163.

** CASAC PM Letter, supra note 20, at 3, PMJA 3163. EPA’s reliance

on this risk assessment to quantify health effects from PM concentrations

below the previous standards, EPA Br. 2, is therefore unwarranted.

*° CASAC PM Letter, supra note 20, at 3, PMJA 3163.

15

chose to make its controlling standard.’’ In an observation

that reflected the nature of the record, CASAC also noted that

any decision on NAAQS revision would require “policy

judgments.”*

C. The Impacts of Standard Revision.

In contrast to the uncertain health risk and inconclusive

science on which the Administrator’s decisions were based,

the ozone and PM NAAQS revisions would impose real and

substantial burdens on society. For example, EPA observed

in its regulatory impact assessment that the revised standards

would create implementation difficulties and may be

unachievable in many areas.” Nevertheless, the Agency

estimated that the revised ozone and PM NAAQS could

together cost as much as $47 billion annually.“ Others

(including the Council for Economic Advisors) estimated

that the revised NAAQS would be even more expensive. See

APC Br. 17-19. By comparison, only $18 billion were spent

on medical research in the U.S. the year the NAAQS were

promulgated. See U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Statistical

Abstract of the United States 118, Table 163 (119th ed.

1999). Of this, $16.5 billion were government sponsored,

" Id. at 5, PMJA 3165; see also 62 Fed. Reg. 38670, PMJA 20

(explaining the annual NAAQS will be “the generally controlling

standard”).

** CASAC PM Letter, supra note 20, at 4, PMJA 3164. As with ozone,

however, see supra note 19, EPA’s science advisers did not address

factors such as implementation impacts that could have informed EPA's

policy judgment.

* EPA, Regulatory Analyses for the Particulate Matter and Ozone

National Ambient Air Quality Standards and Proposed Regional Haze

Rule ES-12, 7-2, 7-5 (1997), OJA 2919, 2930-31.

” Id. ES-12 to ES-13, OJA 2919-20.

16

and $1.5 billion were privately sponsored. /d. These figures

illuminate the disparity between the investments that would

be compelled in this case to address uncertain health risks

and the government’s total investment in medical research

directed at demonstrated adverse public health effects.

D. The Administrator’s Decisions.

The Ozone and PM NAAQS-The Administrator explained

that her decisions to revise the NAAQS reflected her

judgment as to how much protection is “sufficient{]” in light

of “uncertainties associated with inconclusive scientific and

technical information” and “hazards that research has not yet

identified.” 62 Fed. Reg. 38857, OJA 2; id. 38653 PMJA 3.

But rather than explain what principles guided her exercise of

“policy judgment” in selecting among regulatory options

based upon uncertain predictions of risk, the Administrator

addressed at length the factors that did not guide her

judgment. These factors, which could have provided a

principled approach to making risk management decisions,

included the cost and technological feasibility of controls, the

disruptive impact of replacing the congressional ozone

reduction program with a new program to be devised by

EPA, and the public health “disbenefits” of more restrictive

standards.*'

The Administrator did explain the factors that she used to

characterize the health risk associated with PM and ozone.

These included “the nature and severity of the health effects

“' 62 Fed. Reg. 38878-85, OJA 23-30; id. 38683-95, PMJA 33-45; EPA,

Responses to Significant Comments on the National Ambient Air Quality

Standards for Ozone 128-33 (July 1997), OJA 210-15; EPA, Responses

to Significant Comments on the 1996 Proposed Rule on the National

Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter 112 (July 1997),

PMJA 312.

17

involved, the size of the sensitive population(s) at risk, the

types of health information available, and the kind and

degree of uncertainties that must be addressed.’

Based on these factors and the scientific record described

above, the Agency presented ranges of risks for alternative

standard levels.“ For ozone, EPA selected a revised standard

from this range at a level that, in the Agency’s judgment,

reflected the level at which “public health impacts . . . [are]

important and sufficiently large as to warrant a standard.’

For PM, EPA selected the 15 g/m’ annual PM, , NAAQS on

the grounds that the evidence for health risk below that level

was too uncertain.”

“ See 62 Fed. Reg. 38883, OJA 28: id. 38688, PMJA 38.

* For ozone, it identified a range of standards from 0.09 ppm (which it

equated to the existing 1-hour NAAQS) to 0.07 ppm. 62 Fed. Reg.

38858, OJA 3. For the annual PM,, standards (the controlling PM, ,

standard), id. 38670, PMJA 20, EPA identified a range of 12 g/m’ to 20

ug/m’. 61 Fed. Reg. 65659, PMJA 140. The range proposed for the 24-

hour PM,, standard was 20 g/m’ to 65 g/m’. Jd, PMJA 140. The

Agency set secondary NAAQS for both ozone and PM, , at the level of

the primary NAAQS. 62 Fed. Reg. 38877, OJA 22; id. 38683, PMJA 33.

“ 62 Fed. Reg. 38868, OJA 13; see also EPA Br. (D.C. Cir. 97-1441) 41

(A 0.09 ppm standard “would not adequately address the uncertainties

concerning...chronic effects,” while “uncertainties concerning chronic

effects were too great to warrant selection of the second- or third-highest

forms” of a 0.08 ppm standard.); id. 42-43 (EPA is not required “to make

any specific ‘findings,”” not even a finding that regulatory action is

needed to protect against a “significant risk of harm.”).

* See 62 Fed. Reg. 38675, PMJA 25: EPA Br. 11. Reflecting the

uncertainty and sizable impacts, the President ultimately instructed EPA

to complete a further review of the science prior to implementing these

standards. 62 Fed. Reg. 38421, PMJA 195.

18

What the Agency did not do was to articulate a principle

based on the statute for managing those risks—i.e, a principle

that explains why certain risks were “sufficiently large” to

require regulation or how much uncertainty is too much.”

The Agency did not articulate a principle that a court could

use for assessing whether the resulting standard is

reasonable.*’

Subpart 2—In its “[flinal decision on the primary

standard” for ozone, EPA explained how “the Act should be

interpreted” regarding the interplay of Subpart 2 and EPA’s

ozone NAAQS revision authority. As EPA explained, “the

1-hour standard will remain applicable to an area until EPA

determines that it has attained the 1-hour standard.” At that

time, the |-hour standard and Subpart 2 “will no longer apply

to that area.” 62 Fed. Reg. 38873, OJA 18 (final decision);

see id. 38884-85, OJA 29-30 (response to comments). EPA

therefore concluded that it had statutory authority to adopt a

more stringent ozone NAAQS that would override the

comprehensive Subpart 2 ozone risk management program

adopted by Congress for ozone attainment, nonattainment,

and maintenance areas. Based on that interpretation, EPA

promulgated regulatory provisions (40 C.F.R. §§ 50.9(b),

50.10) that “replac(ed] the existing 1-hour [standard]. . . with

a new [more stringent] 8-hour [standard].” 62 Fed. Reg.

38873, 38894-95, OJA 18, 39-40.

*° See 175 F.3d 1036, Pet. App. 10a.

”’ See, e.g., 62 Fed. Reg. 38883, OJA 28; id. 38688, PMJA 38; see also

EPA Br. 28-29 (requiring consistent decisional criteria is “inconsistent

with EPA’s own expert assessment of the flexibility necessary to apply

Section 109’s mandate to all the pollutants for which EPA must develop

standards”).

19

fil. THE D.C. CIRCUIT DECISIONS.

Faced with EPA’s failure to articulate an intelligible

principle to guide its exercise of public health risk

management judgment, a three-judge panel of the United

States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

held (with Judge Tatel dissenting) that EPA’s interpretation

of the Clean Air Act would render the Act’s applicable

provisions an unconstitutional delegation of legislative

power. 175 F.3d 1034, Pet. App. 5a. Because the court

believed that these provisions might be subject to an

interpretation that would not violate the nondelegation

doctrine, however, the court remanded both revised NAAQS

to EPA. The court directed EPA to develop a construction of

the Act that would provide an intelligible principle for EPA’s

exercise of risk management judgment.”

In remanding the NAAQS, however, the court tied EPA’s

hands in developing this “intelligible principle.” The lower

court did this by reaffirming the D.C. Circuit’s previous

interpretations of the Act to preclude EPA from relying on

many factors that the Agency otherwise should have

considered to guide its risk management judgment when

promulgating NAAQS.”

The panel also unanimously held that there was no

ambiguity that Congress intended implementation of an

“* Because it concluded that EPA’s interpretation of the Act was flawed,

the lower court left unanswered critical questions concerning EPA’s

interpretation of the science. See supra note 31. Thus, it is misleading

for the American Lung Association to state that the court “did not. . .

question the validity of the science relied upon by EPA... .” ALA Br.

11.

” Those interpretations of the Act are fully briefed in Case No. 99-1426.

20

ozone NAAQS to proceed under Subpart 2, and agreed with

petitioners that Subpart 2 “must preclude the EPA from

requiring areas to comply either more quickly or with a more

stringent ozone NAAQS.” 175 F.3d 1049, Pet. App. 40a

(emphasis added). The panel, however, refused to set aside

the primary and secondary 8-hour stan¢ ards, 175 F.3d 1057,

Pet. App. 57a-58a, presumably restricting EPA’s authority on

remand to the promulgation of revised standards that would

not be more stringent than the |-hour standard.

In response to requests for rehearing and reconsideration

en banc, the full circuit court declined to hear the case. The

panel declined to modify its opinion on “nondelegation” or

on consideration of the protective effects of a criteria

pollutant. 195 F.3d 6, 10, Pet. App. 7la, 82a. After

unanimously disagreeing with EPA’s contention that it

lacked jurisdiction over questions concerning the effect of

Subpart 2, the panel, in an opinion and a partial concurrence,

affirmed that the revised standard could be enforced “only in

conformity with Subpart 2.” Jd. 10, Pet. App. 81a.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1. This case concerns the bedrock principle that an agency

may act only within the limits of the authority delegated to it

by Congress. Unless an agency can enunciate the limits of

*® The court also unanimously remanded the ozone standards because

EPA had failed to consider evidence that ozone in the ambient air is

protective with regard to exposure to solar ultraviolet radiation that has

been associated with skin cancer and cataracts. 175 F.3d. 1051-53, Pet.

App. 44a-49a. Furthermore, the court vacated the Agency’s new coarse

PM standards because the Agency’s chosen pollutant indicator, PM, ,

was “poorly matched to the relevant pollution agent.” /d. 1055, Pet. App.

53a. Neither of these holdings, which will require further rulemaking on

remand, are before this Court.

21

that delegation, it is not possible for the court to evaluate the

validity of its action and it is not possible for the agency to

adopt rules that reflect “reasoned” decisionmaking.

In these rulemakings, EPA revised the ozone and PM

NAAQS that were previously found “requisite to protect the

public health” with an “adequate margin of safety.” EPA

made its decision based not on findings of demonstrated

health effects, but rather based on the Administrator’s

_ evaluation of public health risks.

In promulgating the revised NAAQS, EPA described at

length factors it used to characterize the risks at issue but was

silent on how it went about managing those risks. According

to the Administrator, her decision was “largely judgmental in

nature . . . and may not be amenable to quantification in

terms of what risk is ‘acceptable’ or any other metric.” 62

Fed. Reg. 38883, OJA 28; id. 38688, PMJA 38. Yet, it is the

formulation of this very policy judgment that Congress

delegated to EPA under § 109 of the CAA. The absence of

any explanation by EPA of the principle that guided that

exercise of judgment, based on the authority delegated to it

by Congress, renders EPA’s actions unlawful.

2. EPA’s argument that the courts have no jurisdiction to

review EPA’s resolution of whether Subpart 2 restricts its

NAAQS revision authority is wrong. Respondents agree

with EPA that its final ozone NAAQS rules, 40 C.F.R.

§§ 50.9(b), 50.10, are facially inconsistent with the

legislative program for managing ozone health risks. Under

the CAA’s pre-enforcement review scheme, and this Court’s

decision in Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U.S. 578

(1980), the court of appeals correctly reviewed the validity of

these rules—a necessary element of which was the scope of

EPA’s authority to implement a revised, and more stringent,

22

ozone NAAQS in light of the comprehensive Subpart 2

program for managing ozone health risks.

3. The language of the statute, the legislative history, and

the structure of the Act all make clear that Subpart 2 is

Congress’ exclusive, long-term program for managing ozone

health risks. Because, as EPA concedes, EPA’s more

stringent revised ozone NAAQS cannot be implemented or

enforced under Subpart 2, EPA’s decision to revise the ozone

NAAQS is neither “appropriate” in accordance with §§ 108

and 109(b) nor lawful, given the comprehensive statutory

program. |

ARGUMENT

I. EPA IMPROPERLY CONSTRUED THE

STATUTE TO PROVIDE NO LEGAL STANDARD,

OR “INTELLIGIBLE PRINCIPLE,” THAT

WOULD GUIDE ITS EXERCISE OF PUBLIC

HEALTH RISK MANAGEMENT JUDGMENT.

In reviewing EPA’s decisions to revise the ozone and PM

NAAQS, the D.C. Circuit invoked the so-called “weak” form

of the nondelegation doctrine. 175 F.3d 1038, Pet. App. 14a

(distinguishing the “strong” form). This is not a doctrine

used by courts to declare statutes unconstitutional.*' To the

contrary, it is a canon of statutory construction-designed to

preserve the constitutionality of broad congressional

delegations of authority. See infra note 56. All this doctrine

Says is that the agency must articulate, based on its

authorizing legislation, the decisional principle that Congress

*' The lower court thus adhered to the principle that courts show restraint

when resolving issues implicating separation-of-powers disputes. See

Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 833 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring).

23

provided to guide the agency’s exercise of rulemaking

authority.

This is not unusual. Reviewing courts must always

identify the legal standard applied by an agency in order to

assess the consistency of the agency’s action with the

articulated statutory principle. See, e.g, American Lung

Ass'n v. EPA, 134 F.3d 388, 392-93 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

To be sure, there are several ways the lower court could

have reached the same result: that the Agency’s refusal to

state a reason for its choice among alternative risk

management options was “arbitrary and capricious” under the

Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”);* that the Agency

did not adequately explain its action; or that EPA

misinterpreted the statute as providing no principle to guide

its exercise of public health risk management judgment.

Whichever basis for decision one chooses, the essential

principle is the same: an agency must explain what it does in

light of Congress’ delegation of authority. It must explain

that for the benefit of the public, the courts that may have to

review its actions, the Congress that must exercise oversight,

and the future agency decisionmakers that must make

consistent decisions. Because EPA has not in this case

offered any intelligible principle to guide its exercise of

public heath risk management judgment, the court properly

sent this case back to EPA.

* See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463

U.S. 29, 43 (1983). CAA § 307(d)(9) provides for the same review.

* See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196-97 (1947); Burlington

Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167-68 (1962).

24

A. EPA Improperly Claims Unfettered Authority to

Exercise Public Health Risk Management

Judgment.

This case involves EPA’s exercise of “policy” judgment to

revise existing NAAQS to provide more “margin of safety”

in response to uncertain and overlapping estimates of health

risk. In this situation, the CAA calls for EPA to make a

decision about how to manage “public health” risk.

According to the statute, EPA is to set a standard that

provides a level of pollution “requisite” to protect the “public

health” with an “adequate margin of safety,” CAA § 109,—a

standard that must “promote” both public health and welfare

and the “productive capacity” of the country. CAA § 101(b).

In this case, EPA merely characterized a range of

uncertain risks and selected from that range without

identifying any statutory principle that was guiding this

selection. That the lower court demanded that EPA identify

some legal standard restricting its exercise of discretion is not

unusual. Courts commonly set aside agency orders because

the agency failed to apply the correct legal standard when it

promulgated a rule or took some other action. Similarly,

where an agency construes a statute to provide no legal

standard at all to constrain its discretion, the courts properly

have questioned that construction under the nondelegation

doctrine.*» Remanding the case for EPA to construe the Act

* For example, in Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322 US.

607, 618-19 (1944), Congress authorized the agency to define “area of

production” in geographic terms, leading the Court to disapprove a

regulation dependent on the number of workers involved instead.

*° See, e.g., National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S.

336, 342-43 (1974); International Union, UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310,

25

to provide an intelligible principle that would constrain how

it manages public health risk is in full keeping with the

Court’s decisions. This Court always has demanded that

agencies be guided by an intelligible principle.”

EPA suggests that it has interpreted the statute to

recognize limits on its standard revision authority.

According to EPA, it considered the types of health evidence,

the severity of harm, the uncertainty of risk, and the size of

the sensitive population to define a range of risks.

Considering these factors, EPA explains, led it to select a

standard greater than zero risk but more stringent than the

existing ambient standards. EPA Br. 31-33.

1313 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see also AT&T Corp. v. lowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S.

366, 388-89, 392 (1999).

°° See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 374 n7 (1989)

(nondelegation doctrine requires narrow construction of statutes that

might otherwise be unconstitutional); /ndustrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO

v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980) (plurality)

(agency should be allowed to characterize statute in a way to avoid

unconstitutional delegation); National Cable Television Ass'n, 415 U.S.

at 342 (“the hurdles revealed in [A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.

United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), and JW. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v.

United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928)] lead us to read the [Independent

Offices Appropriation Act] narrowly to avoid constitutional problems”);

Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1965) (construing statute so as to avoid

an invalid delegation); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958) (the act

in question does “not delegate to the Secretary the kind of authority

exercised”); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).

*” See, e.g., Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 758, 771 (1996);

Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165 (1991); FEA v. Algonquin

SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 559-60 (1976).

26

EPA’s factors, however, characterize risk but say nothing

about managing it.’ And that is the problem with EPA’s

rulemaking—FEPA identifies no principle to guide its exercise

of public health risk management judgment.”

Risk management judgment involves the selection and

justification of a regulatory option. No matter how extensive

the Agency’s data base for risk predictions, or how elaborate

the Agency’s risk characterization, characterizing risks is not

the same as explaining what risk in the range presented by

the Agency is “requisite” to protect “public health” with an

“adequate margin of safety.” EPA’s failure to articulate how

it managed the risk presented by these pollutants in light of

these statutory standards and the purposes section of the Act

contravenes precisely what Congress directed EPA to do in

these rulemakings. “

For ozone, for example, EPA explains that estimated

health risks and exposures decreased with more restrictive

* Cf Committee on the Institutional Means for Assessment of Risks to

Public Health, National Research Council, Risk Assessment in the

Federal Government: Managing the Process 28-33 (1983) (identifying

the components of risk assessment).

® See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't, 448 U.S. at 645-46 (public health

regulation must be based on significant public health risks).

* In attempting to articulate a more precise standard, EPA added in its

rehearing papers that its guiding principle was to set a level “necessary

for public health protection: neither more nor Jess stringent than

necessary, but ‘requisite."” 195 F.3d 6, Pet. App. 72a (emphasis in

original). Now, EPA asserts that it need not supply a principle that

establishes a NAAQS at the “right” level. EPA Br. 27. EPA counsels’

evolving view of what the statute requires highlights the very

inadequacies that troubled the lower court. See Burlington Truck, 371

U.S. at 168-69. In any event, post hoc rationalizations of counsel cannot

save an agency’s inadequate explanation of its action. /d.

27

standards. EPA then argues that there were “important and

meaningful” differences in the character of scientific

evidence regarding risk for various standards. EPA Br. 33.

But EPA’s science advisers concluded that none of the

standards under consideration, including the current standard,

could be distinguished as being significantly more protective

of public health.” Against this background, the

Administrator’s assertion that public health impacts were

“important and sufficiently large to warrant a standard set at a

level of 0.08 ppm,” 62 Fed. Reg. 38868, OJA 13, simply

reflects unexplained “policy” judgment. As the lower court

observed, this is a “self-sufficient justification for every

refusal to define limits.” 175 F.3d 1037, Pet. App. 12a-13a.

Similarly, for PM, the Administrator observed that while

“inherent scientific uncertainties are too great to support

[PM,,] standards based on the lowest concentrations

measured,” revised standards more stringent than the existing

standards were appropriate “despite [the] well recognized

uncertainties.” | As the lower court observed, the

“increasing-uncertainty argument is helpful only if some

principle reveals how much uncertainty is too much.” 175

F.3d 1036, Pet. App. 10a.

Ultimately, according to the Administrator, she is

authorized by the Act to revise NAAQS based on a “policy

judgment” to provide more margin of safety, even if health

impacts “may not be amenable to quantification in terms of

what risk is ‘acceptable’ or any other metric.” 62 Fed. Reg.

38688, PMJA 38; id. 38883, OJA 28. It is this assertion of

unfettered authority to exercise discretion to which the lower

*' See supra p. 8.

* 62 Fed. Reg. 38675, PMJA 25; see supra pp. 10-14.

28

court objected. 175 F.3d 1035, Pet. App. 8a (EPA’s revision

decision is “nothing more than a statement that lower

exposure levels are associated with lower risk to public

health.”’).

By offering as its decisional criteria factors that go only to

risk characterization, and not public heath risk management,

EPA would tur the Clean Air Act into a statute like the

National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), for which

judicial review looks only at the procedure the agency

followed. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490

U.S. 332, 350 (1989) (citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power

Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978)). If the Agency

has followed an elaborate procedure and identified the range

of potential health risks, EPA argues, judicial review should

cease. There is to be, in effect, no review of its substantive

decisionmaking at all.

This argument may work for a statute that, like NEPA,

requires only “procedure” and not a “substantive”

decisionmaking result. It does not work for a statute that,

like § 109, demands a substantive outcome: a level of air

quality “requisite to protect” the “public health” with an

“adequate margin of safety.”

EPA in fact comes close to arguing its § 109

decisionmaking is a matter “committed to agency discretion

by law” and therefore unreviewable. See Citizens to Preserve

Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971). But

that cannot be so because, as even EPA concedes, the Clean

Air Act unquestionably provides law to apply. EPA Br. 22.

In short, the problem here is that EPA has interpreted the

Statute to provide no principle to guide its exercise of risk

management judgment—a problem so fundamental that, if

Congress had written the Act as interpreted by EPA, the

constitutionality of the statute would have been called into

29

question. It is for this reason that the court below invoked

the nondelegation doctrine.

Since the creation of the Interstate Commerce

Commission, this country has engaged in the process of

turning over government decisions to specialized agencies.

Concomitant with the delegation of decisionmaking authority

is a requirement that the decisionmakers remain accountable,

and that Congress remains accountable. This means that

agency decisionmakers must explain their rationale in light of

Congress’ delegation of authority.

Agencies must explain the statutory standard that guides

their exercise of rulemaking discretion and how consideration

of relevant science is applied in reference to that standard.

This explanation is important for multiple reasons implicated

by the nondelegation doctrine, as the lower court explained.

175 F.3d 1038, Pet. App. 14a. First, an explanation is

necessary so that the courts can exercise judicial review.”

There must be ascertainable standards to which a reviewing

court may turn, for “it will not do for a court to be compelled

to guess at the theory underlying the agency’s action... .”

Chenery, 332 U.S. at 196-97.

Second, an explanation is necessary so that Congress can

exercise its own oversight of the agency. For there to be

informed legislative oversight, Congress must be able to

understand how the agency has interpreted the delegation it

* See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953 n.16 (1983); Skinner v. Mid-

America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 218-19 (1989); Industrial Union

Dep't, 448 U.S. at 686 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); see also L. Bressman,

Schechter Poultry at the Millennium: A Delegation Doctrine for the

Administrative State, 109 Yale L.J. 1399, 1440 (April 2000).

30

has been given.“ Third, an explanation of the principle

underlying a decision is necessary so that agency

decisionmakers themselves can, in the future, be consistent.

State Farm, 463 U.S. at 46-49, 56-57. Fourth, the public has

a right to be told what Congress has delegated to the

Executive Branch, and whether the Executive Branch has

acted within its congressionally delegated powers. Clinton v.

New York, 524 U.S. 417, 449-53 (1998) (Kennedy, J,

concurring).

The requirement that an agency explain the statutory

principle that guides its exercise of judgment should be

enforced all the more strictly in a case like this one, where

the decision being made is of enormous importance in terms

of its broad impacts on society. Cf Industrial Union Dep't,

448 U.S. at 686. As the D.C. Circuit stated in remanding a

different NAAQS, “[w]here, as here, Congress has delegated

to an administrative agency the critical task of assessing the

public health and the power to make decisions of national

import in which individuals’ lives and welfare hang in the

balance, that agency has the heaviest of obligations to explain

and expose every step of its reasoning.” As the court

explained, “(ujnless [the Administrator] describes the

standard under which she has arrived at this conclusion,

supported by a ‘[]plausible’ explanation, . . . we have no

basis for exercising our responsibility to determine whether

her decision is ‘arbitrary [or] capricious. . . .”” American

Lung, 134 F.3d at 392-93 (emphasis added; citation omitted).

“ See W. Wilson, Congressional Government 303 (1885), cited in

Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 132 (1979); see also Loving, 517

U.S. at 773.

* American Lung Ass'n, 134 F.3d at 392; see also FDA v. Brown &

Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 S Ct. 1291, 1301 (2000).

31

If agencies need not explain their decisions in light of the

legal standard imposed by Congress, we will be left with a

government of men, not of laws. Cf. Youngstown Sheet &

Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 646 (1952) (Jackson, J.,

concurring). Guarding against this result are the checks

provided by the coordinate branches—especially judicial

review—and, more fundamentally, an insistence on written

rules applied as objectively as possible—insistence, in short,

on the rule of law. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,

575-76 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).

By contrast, the EPA’s position in this case furthers the

pernicious idea that some decisions are beyond the

understanding both of the public and the courts—that some

decisions, indeed the most important ones, must ultimately

turn on unquantifiable, inexplicable policy “judgment” by the

Executive. Reliance on unexplained agency judgment leads

to rulemaking by ideology, prejudice, or messianic urge.

This is not the “rule of law.”

In sum, the agency must first explain the statutory

principle it has applied based on Congress’ delegation of

authority, and the courts must then say what the law is

ultimately. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137

(1803). That is all the D.C. Circuit has asked EPA to do in

this case—a most unremarkable outcome when measured

against EPA’s remarkable claim of unfettered authority to

exercise public health risk management judgment.

B. EPA Is Obligated To Identify the Principle that

Guides Its Exercise of Rulemaking Authority Even

Where Congress Acts By Broad Delegation.

In large part, the Government’s argument for waving EPA

through the judicial review gate is that the courts have

affirmed the constitutionality of other, broad delegations.

EPA Br. 26-30; Mass/NJ Br. 39-41. In those cases, however,

32

parties did not seek review of whether “the will of Congress

[had] been obeyed” by the agency, see Yakus v. United

States, 321 U.S, 414, 426 (1944), but rather whether the

statute was drafted so as to make that inquiry impossible (i.e.,

whether the statute itself created a nondelegation problem).

In those cases, the Court found an ample basis for the

agency to articulate, by resort to the statutory language,

legislative history, and other indicia of congressional intent,

defining principles for making its judgment. As a result, the

cases on which EPA relies do not stand for the proposition

that an agency may implement delegated authority without

articulating an “intelligible principle.”

For example, in Touby, the Court rejected a challenge to

Congress’ delegation of power to the Attorney General to add

drugs temporarily to the schedule of controlled substances

when “necessary to avoid an imminent hazard to the public

safety.” 500 U.S. at 166. As the Court found, the statute

articulated clear boundaries for the Attorney General’s

discretion, id at 167, and the question whether the Attomey

General had obeyed this legislative command was not before

the Court. By contrast, the question before the court of

appeals in this case was whether the delegated agency had

acted in accordance with a defined principle grounded in the

statutory language and purpose.”

That the Court has found in other cases that there were

sufficient limits on the agency’s discretion to satisfy facial

challenges to the constitutionality of a statute does not

suggest that an agency need not identify those limits when

* See also Skinner, 490 U.S. 212 (challenge to the constitutionality of a

statute directing the Secretary of Transportation to establish user fees to

cover costs of pipeline safety program, not to consistency of the resultin

regulatory program with the statute).

33

exercising its discretion.” If anything, the Court’s careful

analysis of the congressional delegation in these cases

confirms the need for agency action to be guided by an

intelligible principle founded in the language and purposes of

the Act.™

As the Court has observed, the touchstone of the non-

delegation doctrine remains that “private rights are protected

by access to the courts fo fest the application of the policy in

light of the[] legislative declaration{].” American Power &

Light, 329 U.S. at 105 (emphasis added). All the lower

court’s decision says is that EPA cannot construe Congress’

broad delegation of NAAQS revision authority to authorize

unfettered risk management judgment. Rather, the Agency

must explain the statutory principle that constrains its

exercise of discretion.

C. There Is Law To Apply To Guide EPA’s Exercise

of Risk Management Judgment.

Where an agency, as here, has interpreted a statute to

provide no principle to guide its exercise of discretion, the

court must look to the statute and congressional intent to

ascertain whether there is law to apply. See Marbury, 5 U.S.

(1 Cranch) at 177 (“It is emphatically the province and duty

of the judicial department to say what the law is.”). Thus, in

every challenge to a statute vider the nondelegation doctrine,

this Court has analyzed the statute and congressional intent to

ascertain whether Congress has identified legal standards for

*” See, e.g., American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 US. 90, 105

(1946); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943);

New York Central Securities Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12 (1932).

** See also FPC v. Conway, 426 U.S. 271 (1976) (Commission must use

Statutory “undue discrimination” principle when selecting a standard

from the “zone of reasonableness”).

34

the agency to use in deriving an intelligible principle for its

exercise of discretion.”

Rather than simply remanding the case to EPA to

determine whether there is law to apply that would save the

constitutionality of the statute, therefore, this Court, in the

exercise of its Article III function, must itself resolve whether

the CAA provides guidance for the development of an

“intelligible principle.” To find the law, this Court should

ask, as a first step, whether Congress has unambiguously

stated its intention. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S.

837, 842-43 & n.9 (1984). Congress has done so.

As explained by APC and ATA in Case No. 99-1426,

Congress intended that EPA exercise its public health risk

management judgment based on consideration of the overall

impact of its decision on society. EPA cannot merely

characterize risks to individual health that might be caused by

breathing a pollutant and then, without explanation, choose a

risk level that EPA declares is “sufficiently large” to justify a

revised NAAQS. See supra pp. 26-27. Instead, EPA must

explain why the regulatory option chosen satisfies the

decisional criteria in § 109, why it promotes the statutory

purposes in § 101, and why it was selected and other options

rejected. APC Br. 27-45.

Once the Court determines that there is law to apply under

a Chevron Step 1 analysis, thereby defining the scope of

EPA’s discretion under § 109, EPA can then exercise its

discretion under the Act in a manner consistent with Chevron

Step 2, and in a manner that is not arbitrary and that reflects

reasoned decisionmaking. The Agency is not required, as

EPA argues, to develop a precise metric for the exercise of

® See, e.g., Touby, 500 U.S. at 166; Mistretta 488 U.S. at 374-77.

35

risk management judgment. See EPA Br. 26. Rather, as the

lower court observed, what is required is “reasonable

coherence” based on application of the statutory language

and purposes. 175 F.3d 1039-40, Pet. App. 17a-18a.

In this case, EPA’s failure to explain itself runs afoul of

Chevron in the same way the FCC did in AT&T Corp. There

the Court struck down the FCC’s interpretation of a statute as

unreasonable because the FCC had failed to supply any

“limiting standard, rationally related to the goals of the Act.”

525 U.S. at 388; see also Bressman, supra note 63, at 1434.

Here the nondelegation doctrine and Chevron converge to

a crystalline point: that the agency must explain the “limiting

standard” that guided its exercise of public health risk

management judgment. Only if this Court finds that the

normal meaning of “public health,” the language of §§ 108

and 109, and the statutory purposes of the Act provide no

guidance for the Agency’s exercise of public health risk

management judgment would there be a_ statutory

nondelegation problem—one that could not be overcome by

the Agency by interpreting the Act under Chevron Step 2.

II. EPA’S REVISION TO THE OZONE NAAQS,

TOGETHER WITH ITS REVOCATION OF THE

EXISTING STANDARD, IS REVIEWABLE FINAL

AGENCY ACTION.

In Subpart 2 of Part D of Title I of the Act, Congress

enacted a comprehensive program for reducing ozone

following decades of unrealistic deadlines and control

measures that proved inadequate to the task. The court below

held that Subpart 2 “must preclude the EPA from requiring

areas to comply either more quickly or with a more stringent

ozone NAAQS.” 175 F.3d 1049, Pet. App. 40a. As the court

observed, if EPA could adopt and implement a more

36

stringent ozone standard under a more expeditious schedule,

this comprehensive Subpart 2 “risk management” program

adopted by Congress “would have been stillborn had the EPA

revised the ozone NAAQS immediately after the Congress

enacted the 1990 amendments.” /d. 1050, Pet. App. 42a.

Even though Subpart 2 precludes EPA from requiring

areas to comply “more quickly or with a more stringent

ozone NAAQS,” the court refused to set aside the standard

on this basis because, in its view, the “appropriateness”

language of § 109(d) does not allow EPA to reject a standard

revision based on “implementation” factors. Nevertheless, in

remanding the ozone NAAQS on nondelegation grounds, the

court made clear that the ozone “standard is [un]likely to

engender costly compliance activities in light of our

determination that it can be enforced only in conformity with

Subpart 2.” 195 F.3d 10, Pet. App. 81a (emphasis added).

For the reasons discussed below, the court of appeals had

jurisdiction to resolve petitioners’ challenges based on

Subpart 2. While the court properly held that Subpart 2 is the

exclusive congressional risk management program for

addressing ozone health risks (and thereby restricts EPA’s

authority to implement or to enforce a more stringent ozone

NAAQS), it was wrong when it held that the primary and the

identical secondary 8-hour standard could be adopted and

remain in effect during the remand proceeding.

A. EPA’s Determination of Its Authority To Revise

the Ozone NAAQS Is Final Action.

EPA argues that the lower court’s decision concerning the

interplay between Subpart 2 and the revised NAAQS was

“premature[],” an argument EPA first detailed in its rehearing

petition. EPA Br. 35. The court rejected this argument,

because EPA “reached a final decision regarding its power to

37

implement its revised ozone standard.” 195 F.3d 9, Pet. App.

78a. :

Section 181(a) of Subpart 2 explains how Congress

intended areas to be classified as nonattainment “for ozone,”

for purposes of imposing statutorily-mandated compliance

deadlines and attainment measures. Section 181(b) explains

how areas designated as in attainment for ozone are to be

redesignated to nonattainment if their ozone air quality

deteriorates in the future. In these provisions, Congress

provided that all of the Act’s requirements and timetables

“for ozone” are to be implemented to attain and maintain the

ozone NAAQS that existed in 1990. This is confirmed by

other Subpart 2 provisions, as discussed in Part III below.

In the rulemaking at issue here, EPA promulgated a rule

that simultaneously established a more stringent 8-hour

ozone NAAQS and made the 1l-hour ozone NAAQS and

related Subpart 2 program automatically inapplicable to an

area once EPA determines that its air quality meets the 1-

hour NAAQS. 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.9(b) & 50.10. Industry and

States petitioned the D.C. Circuit to review EPA’s rule as

facially inconsistent with the ozone risk management plan

codified by Congress in Subpart 2—asking the court to

resolve “[w]hether EPA is authorized to substitute its policy

judgment for that of Congress by replacing the statutory

ozone reduction program designed specifically to implement

the 1-hour NAAQS with a new program to implement a

different [more stringent] NAAQS.””

EPA recognizes in its brief that it would be “impossible”

to implement the more stringent 8-hour NAAQS that EPA

” Non-Staie CAA Pet’rs & Intervenors’ Br. (D.C. Cir. No. 97-1441) 2,

29; see also APC Resp. to Pet. for Cert. (99-1257) 22.

38

adopted in a manner that was consistent with Congress’

ozone attainment program in Subpart 2. EPA Br. 47; see

also Mass/NJ Br 47-48 (applying Subpart 2 to that standard

would be “bizarre’’). Precisely for this reason, and because

EPA’s 8-hour NAAQS addressed no new health effects

associated with ozone, those seeking review of EPA’s revised

ozone NAAQS argued that Subpart 2 “codified” the 1-hour

NAAQS and that a more stringent, revised ozone NAAQS

therefore was not “appropriate” under § 109(d). Non-State

CAA Pet’rs and Intervenors’ Br. (D.C. Cir. 97-1441) 33.

By rejecting these arguments, EPA’s final rule resolved

the interplay of Subpart 2 and EPA’s authority to establish a

more stringent ozone NAAQS. This is a final Agency action,

and review of that action had to be sought within 60 days of

its publication in the Federal Register. CAA § 307(b)(1); see

also Harrison, 446 U.S. at 587-94.

EPA now argues that petitioners below really challenged

not a rule, but “preamble statements” that are not “final

agency action.” See supra p. 18. EPA is wrong. EPA's

promulgation of its more stringent 8-hour standard presents

facial inconsistencies with the Subpart 2 risk management

program. Consequently, that action’s validity vel non can be

resolved only by resolving whether Subpart 2 restricts EPA’s

authority to adopt and to implement a more stringent revised

ozone NAAQS. The court’s review of EPA’s statements in

the final rule preamble is entirely appropriate to permit the

court to understand that rule’s nature, purpose, and basis.

See, e.g., Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta,

458 U.S. 141, 158 (1982).”!

™ See also HRI, Inc. v. EPA, 198 F.3d 1224, 1244 n.13 (10th Cir. 2000)

(“preamble to a regulation is evidence of an agency’s contemporaneous

39

Moreover, the preamble statements signed by the

Administrator” are authoritative explanations of EPA’s

position on its authority to implement its more stringent 8-

hour ozone NAAQS under Subpart |. That position, which

in any event is embodied in the rule’s text, 40 C.F.R.

§ 50.9(b), will “alter the legal regime” to which EPA, States,

and regulated parties are subject. See Bennett v. Spear, 520

U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997) (reviewing Fish & Wildlife

Service’s Biological Opinion as final action under

Endangered Species Act). Such preamble statements are

themselves reviewable,” and review is particularly warranted

here, where §307(b) directs review of any final

Administrator action. Harrison, 446 U.S. at 589.

Finally, in a separate but related case, EPA has

acknowledged that its decision regarding the relationship

between the revised ozone NAAQS and Subpart 2 was

reviewable below as final action in the present case. In EDF

v. Browner, D.C. Cir. 98-1363, EPA argued the court lacked

subject matter jurisdiction in that case to hear EDF’s

challenge to EPA’s determination that the 1-hour NAAQS

and Subpart 2 were inapplicable in specific areas that had met

the 1-hour NAAQS. EPA Br. (D.C. Cir. 98-1363) 27-28,

App. 22a-23a. According to EPA, “[o]ther participants in the

[ozone] NAAQS rulemaking understood the implications of

understanding of its proposed rules”) (quoting Wyoming Outdoor Council

v. United States Forest Serv., 165 F.3d 43, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).

” See supra p. 18; see also 62 Fed. Reg. 38424, PMJA 192

(memorandum from President Clinton).

” Indeed, EPA recently argued to the D.C. Circuit that a preamble

statement itself may be reviewable action. See Barrick Goldstrike Mines,

Inc. v. Browner, 215 F.3d 45, 48 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

40

EPA’s interpretation and challenged aspects of it in the

pending ATA litigation”—the case before this Court. /d. 29,

App. 23a.

In sum, EPA’s promulgation of a new standard to replace

the 1l-hour standard and the statutory Subpart 2 ozone

attainment program was final agency action that was

reviewable under § 307(b) of the Clean Air Act.

B. EPA’s Decision To Replace Subpart 2 Is Ripe.

As discussed above, whether the Act precludes EPA from

replacing the 1-hour ozone NAAQS with a new, more

stringent NAAQS that cannot be implemented under Subpart

2 is a pure question of law that requires no further factual

development. See also 195 F.3d 8-9; Pet. App. 77a-79a.

As this Court has recognized, federal courts “have no

more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is

given, than to usurp that which is not given.””* In § 307(b) of

the Act, Congress authorized courts of appeals to review any

final EPA action under the Act. CAA § 307(b); Harrison,

446 U.S. at 589. The sweeping nature of Congress’ directive

that judicial review of “any” final CAA actions occur

immediately is clear on the statute’s face, id. at 588, and the

legislative history confirms Congress’ purpose. /d. at 589-

90. Quick resolution of the validity of EPA actions is

crucial, inter alia, to maintain “the integrity of the time

sequences provided through the Act.” See S. Rep. No. 91-

1196, at 41 (1970), reprinted in 1 Sen. Comm. on Pub.

™ Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821); see also

Harrison, 446 U.S. at 593. There is no constitutional barrier to giving

effect to Congress’ judicial review directive in § 307(b). Because the

petitions for review raised a purely legal issue, i.e., whether Subpart 2

provides EPA’s sole authority to enforce ozone NAAQS, the court was

fully able to review that issue.

41

Works, A Legislative History of the Clean Air Amendments of

1970, at 441 (Comm. Print 1974).

As a result, the justiciability concerns underlying Abbott

Labs v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967), are absent here. That

is, Abbott Labs’ two-pronged ripeness test embodies the

prudential doctrine that “courts, through avoidance of

premature adjudication, [should refrain] from entangling

themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative

policies, and also [is intended] to protect the agencies from

judicial interference until an administrative decision has been

formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way... .” /d. at

148. As seen above, however, Congress in the CAA

specifically instructed courts to review final actions “pre-

enforcement” in order to ensure early resolution of challenges

to EPA’s execution of the CAA. See Ohio Forestry Ass'n v.

Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 737 (1998) (action was “unlike

agency rules that Congress has specifically instructed the

courts to review ‘pre-enforcement’”’) (citing Harrison, 446

U.S. at 592-93; CAA § 307(b)).”

Because Congress directed that all final EPA actions under

the CAA be subject to immediate review, and because the

issue presented requires no further development, the lower

court did not err in reviewing the action here.”°

" For the same reason, EPA’s reliance on Lujan v. National Wildlife

Fed'n, see EPA Br. 36, is misplaced. See 497 U.S. 871, 891 (1990)

(noting that challenges may be brought under certain “statutes [that]

permit . . . judicial review, directly, even before the concrete effects

normally required for APA review are felt”) (emphasis added).

”® Even if the Court deems the issue presented for review to the lower

court subject to Abbott Labs, this Court should find the issue ripe. As

explained above, the question of EPA’s legal authority under Subparts |

and 2 is “purely legal,” and hardship from delayed review would ensue

from the disruption to State and industry planning and control efforts.

42

Iii. SUBPART 2 RESTRICTS EPA’S AUTHORITY

TO REVISE THE OZONE NAAQS.

EPA claims “[t]he only issue involving ‘implementation’

before the court of appeals . . . was whether the participants

were correct that the Section 181(a) scheme precluded EPA

from promulgating the revised standard.” EPA Br. 35.”

Addressing this issue, however, requires an understanding of

Subpart 2 and how it restricts EPA’s authority with respect to

a more stringent revised NAAQS for ozone. The facial

incompatibility between Subpart 2 and EPA’s establishment

of the more stringent 8-hour ozone NAAQS shows that EPA

lacked authority to implement or enforce a more stringent

NAAQS, and indeed lacked authority to replace the 1-hour

ozone NAAQS as the template for Congress’ detailed

statutory “risk management” program.

A. Subpart 2’s Plain Language Precludes EPA From

Replacing the Existing Ozone NAAQS.

Section 107(d) contains the requirements for designations

and redesignations of areas as attainment, nonattainment, or

unclassifiable for any criteria pollutant. Section 107(d)(4)

requires States and EPA to designate areas for ozone within

240 days after enactment of the 1990 CAA Amendments.

Under § 107(d)(3), areas may later be “redesignated.” And

See State Resp. Br. (99-1257) § II1.B.3. Moreover, in fashioning a

remedy, 195 F.3d 10, Pet. App. 81a-82a, it was appropriate for the court

to review EPA's implementation authority under Subpart 2. See

Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-12 (1982).

” This was not the only implementation issue raised by Industry

petitioners, as intervenors supporting EPA below recognize. See

Mass/NJ Pet. for Cert. (99-1263) 14, 22.

43

§ 107(d)(1) addresses area designations under a new or

revised NAAQS.

Subpart 2 requires that “[eJach area designated

nonattainment for ozone pursuant to section 107(d) of this

Act’—not any specific paragraph of § 107(d), but any part of

§ 107(d)—be classified “by operation of law” under Subpart

2 and then regulated pursuant to Subpart 2’s timetables and

control measures. CAA § 181(a)(1) (emphasis added).

Congress also directed in § 181 that “/aj/ny area that is

designated attainment or unclassifiable for ozone under

section 107(d)(4) of this Act, and that is subsequently

redesignated to nonattainment for ozone under section

107(d)(3) of this Act, shall, at the time of the redesignation,

be classified by operation of law in accordance with table |

under subsection (a) of Section 181.” CAA § 181(b)(1)

(emphasis added).

Thus, Subpart 2 by its plain terms governs management of

ozone indefinitely, until Congress changes the statutory

scheme. The Subpart 2 deadlines have not all run; indeed, as

the second sentence of § 181(b)(1) makes clear, they will be

reset and run anew any time an area initially designated under

§ 107(d)(4) becomes nonattainment “for ozone.”

Moreover, as the lower court recognized, Congress

provided in § 172(a)(1)(C) that EPA’s generic authority

under Subpart | to classify areas for purposes of applying an

attainment date “shall not apply with respect to

nonattainment areas for which classifications [and attainment

dates] are specifically provided under other provisions of

[Part D].” 175 F.3d 1048, Pet App. 37a. Likewise, Congress

provided in § 172(a)(2)(D) that Subpart 1’s attainment dates

“shall not apply with respect to nonattainment areas for

which attainment dates are specifically provided under other

44

provisions of [Part D].” As noted above, Subpart 2

specifically provides classifications and attainment dates for

“fejach area designated nonattainment for ozone pursuant to

section 107(d)” (emphasis added).

Contrary to claims by Massachusetts, New Jersey and

ALA, therefore, Congress made clear in § 172(a) that EPA’s

Subpart | authority to classify and to regulate nonattainment

areas is expressly limited, because Congress has “specifically

provided” a scheme for classification and attainment

deadlines under Subpart 2. EPA argues, however, that

because Subpart 2 addresses the 1-hour ozone NAAQS,

Subpart 2 does not “specifically provide[]” an alternative to

Subpart 1 for an ozone NAAQS designed to replace the 1-

hour ozone NAAQS. /d. This argument is entirely circular.

As the lower court found, EPA’s position ignores the plain

language of § 181(a), which makes Subpart 2 broadly

applicable to “[e]ach area designated nonattainment for ozone

pursuant to section 107(d)” (emphasis added). EPA's

argument also ignores § 181(b), which makes Subpart 2

applicable to any area that is “subsequently redesignated to

nonattainment for ozone” (emphasis added). The lower court

correctly found under “Step 1” of Chevron that the statute on

its face disposes of EPA’s arguments by establishing a

comprehensive and long range risk management program for

ozone. 175 F.3d 1048, Pet. App. 38a-39a.

EPA nevertheless argues that the court of appeals erred by

not interpreting the plain language of CAA § 181(a) (which

refers to “[eJach area designated nonattainment for ozone

pursuant to section 107(d)”) to refer only to those areas

designated under § 107(d)(4). The court below found,

however, that “Congress intentionally referred to § 107(d) as

a whole,” 175 F.3d 1049, Pet. App. 39a, making Subpart 2

applicable to all areas that are “designated nonattainment for

45

ozone pursuant to section 107(d).” CAA § 181(a). As the

court concluded, “the reference to § 107(d) in § 181(a)(1)

appears to have been purposeful and not the drafting error

EPA's interpretation implies.” 175 F3d 1048, Pet. App. 39a.

The legislative history confirms that Congress rejected a

limited scope for the Subpart 2 risk management scheme.

The Senate’s version of Subpart 2 classified only initia’

designations.” Moreover, this Senate Bill did not require

using “design values” based on the 1-hour NAAQS, as did

§ 181(a) as enacted, but tied classification to the degree the

area was in nonattainment with the ozone NAAQS. /d.

Similarly, the Bill referred to the House Energy and

Commerce Committee would have made the Subpart 2

scheme applicable only to designations under § 107(d)(4)’s

predecessor.” Subsequently, that Committee replaced that

specific reference to § 107(d)(4) with the general reference to

all nonattainment designations “for ozone pursuant to section

107(d).”""" The Conference Committee then reported the text

of the revised House Bill in lieu of the Senate’s,*' and the

conferees’ version was enacted. This change in legislative

language that reflects a congressional intent to adopi a

comprehensive and exclusive risk management program for

ozone must be given effect. Cf Russello v. United States,

464 US. 16, 23-34 (1983).

”® See S. 1630, 101st Cong., §§ 101, 107, reprinted in 3 1990 Legis. Hist.,

supra note 3, at 4124-25, 4195.

” See H.R. 3030, 101st Cong., §§ 101(a), 103, reprinted in 2 1990 Legis.

Hist., supra note 3, at 3748-49, 3795-96.

© HLR. Rep. No. 101-490, pt. 1, at 3-6, 17, reprinted in 2 1990 Legis.

Hist., supra note 3, at 3027-30, 3041.

*' See H.R. Rep. No. 101-952, at 27-28, reprinted in 1 1990 Legis. Hist.,

supra note 3, at 1477-78.

46

In a final effort to find some supportive language in the

statute, EPA notes § 181(a)’s subheading: “Classification and

attainment dates for 1989 nonattainment areas.” But “(t]he

title of a statute . . . cannot limit the plain meaning of the text.

For interpretative purposes, [statutory headings are] of use

only when [they] shed light on some ambiguous word or

phrase.” See Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections v. Yeskey,

524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998) (emphasis added). In any event,

this subheading does not contradict § 181(a)’s plain meaning,

EPA Br. 47; it reflects Congress’ intent that it is the existing

1-hour ozone NAAQS that EPA is supposed to administer,

not a revised, more stringent one “for ozone.” Cf. § 181(b).

Furthermore, contrary to Massachusetts and New Jersey’s

suggestion, Subpart 2’s plain language does not make

superfluous Congress’ grant to EPA of authority to review

and revise the NAAQS and to designate and to classify

nonattainment areas under Subpart 1. Mass/NJ Br. 47.

EPA’s review of the ozone NAAQS, for example, would

inform Congress of the adequacy of the statutory ozone

program as “appropriate.” Moreover, even under the court of

appeals’ decision, § 109(d) and Subpart | still apply to other

criteria pollutants for which Congress has not provided a

comprehensive risk management program based on a specific

NAAQS. For example, in Subpart 4 of Part D, Congress

enacted an exclusive risk management program for the

attainment of PM,,, CAA §§ 188-190," but no such program

for PM,,. Likewise in Subpart 5, Congress provided no

program comparable to Subpart 2 for any of three other

criteria pollutants: sulfur oxides, nitrogen dioxide, and lead.

See CAA §191. Thus, Subpart 1 applies to a revised

®2 See also CAA §§ 186-187 (establishing carbon monoxide program).

47

NAAQS for these criteria pollutants, and to NAAQS for any

new criteria pollutants EPA may list. By contrast, allowing

EPA to replace the ozone NAAQS makes Subpart 2

superfluous. As a result, this interpretation must be rejected.

See Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486

U.S. 825, 837 & n.11 (1988).

B. Subpart 2’s History and Structure Confirm It Is

the Exclusive Plan for Managing Ozone.

EPA’s revision of the ozone NAAQS also ignores

Congress’ description of Subpart 2 as the comprehensive risk

management program for ozone. As the House noted when it

modified its version of Subpart 2 to cover all ozone

designations, “[iJn 1977, Congress tried to waive [sic] a

‘magic wand’ and command that all [ozone] nonattainment

areas will meet the applicable [NAAQS]. . . by . . . December

31, 1987 . . . [That] date [has] come and gone and it is clear

that . . . we had no ‘magic’ solutions.’ As a result,

Congress enacted Subpart 2 to “address the failure of our

nonattainment areas to achieve ambient air quality deadlines

in existing law .... We have not [in Subpart 2], however,

simply continued to tell the states to do a [Subpart 1] plan to

clean their air. That did not work.’”™

Congress, in 1990, thus concluded that legislating how to

attain the ozone standard was as important, from a public

* H.R. Rep. No. 101-490, pt. 1, at 146-47, reprinted in 2 1990 Legis.

Hist., supra note 3, at 3170-71, OJA 3557-58.

** 136 Cong. Rec. H12867 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (Rep. Fields),

reprinted in 1 1990 Legis. Hist., supra note 3, at 1236, OJA 3543; see

also 136 Cong. Rec. 132, reprinted in 4 1990 Legis. Hist., supra note 3,

at 4837 (Sen. Chafee).

48

health standpoint, as setting the standard itself.*° According

to the House Committee, a long-term strategy that mandated

control measures and sanctions for failure to achieve required

ozone reductions was necessary.

This is precisely what Subpart 2 accomplishes. Subpart 2,

uniquely, reflects Congress’ response to risk management,

not by imposing deadlines and general requirements that

must be developed by states and then seeing these deadlines

and general requirements fail to achieve the desired ozone

reductions, but by adopting a comprehensive risk

management program that Congress concluded embodies

sound public health policy with respect to reducing ambient

ozone concentrations.

Subpart 2 provides a detailed timetable for attaining the

ozone NAAQS, both in areas currently in nonattainment and

areas becoming nonattainment in the future. CAA § 181(a),

(b).° It provides a manner for reducing ozone levels

depending on the severity of the pollution. See, e.g.,

§ 182(a)-(e). It provides a legislative check on EPA’s use of

a methodology for determining ozone air quality. § 183(g).

It provides interstate ozone pollution requirements. § 184; see

also supra pp. 4-5.

*° See H.R. Rep. No. 101-490, pt. 1, at 145-49, reprinted in 2 1990 Legis.

Hist., supra note 3, at 3169-73 (discussing the failure to attain reductions

of ozone under Subpart 1), OJA 3556-60.

* Although ALA points to EPA's treatment of some nonattainment areas

as “submarginal,” ALA Br. 39-40, as evidence that Subpart 2 does not

apply comprehensively to all nonattainment areas, EPA has indicated that

submargina! areas are “subject to the time schedule of subpart 2” if their

air quality calls for reclassification under Table 1. 57 Fed. Reg. 13525.

Thus, Subpart 2 is a comprehensive response to the ozone nonattainment

problem.

49

The only reasonable interpretation of this comprehensive

and long term risk management program is that Congress

meant for Subpart 2 to be the exclusive federal statutory

program for lowering ambient ozone levels. EPA’s

establishment of its 8-hour ozone NAAQS renders irrelevant

this carefully crafted legislation. Given Congress’ detailed

legislation, it is not plausible to conclude EPA retained

authority to adopt a NAAQS inconsistent with this program.

Cf Brown & Williamson, 120 S.Ct. at 1301 (legislation

regulating sale of tobacco confirmed Congress’ intent to

restrict FDA authority to regulate tobacco as “drug”’).

C. Subpart 2 Renders the Revised Ozone NAAQS

Unlawful.

Section 109(d) authorizes EPA to revise a NAAQS only as

“appropriate” in accordance with CAA §§ 108 and 109(b).

As discussed above, the court of appeals was correci that a

revised, more stringent NAAQS could not be implemented or

enforced except in conformity with Subpart 2. But if a more

stringent revised NAAQS cannot be enforced except in

conformity with Subpart 2, and as EPA explains, only the 1-

hour NAAQS can be implemented and enforced under

Subpart 2, it is not “appropriate” to revise that NAAQS under

§ 109(d) to establish a more stringent NAAQS for ozone.

Because Subpart 2 is Congress’ comprehensive and long

term program for managing ozone, and because this program

applies to “ozone nonattainment areas” generally,*’ this

*’ Section 181(a) addresses “primary standard{s}” only in specifying outer

dates for attainment of the 1-hour NAAQS. Subpart 2 otherwise simply

addresses “area[s] designated nonattainment for ozone.”

2 50

conclusion applies with equal force to primary and secondary

ozone NAAQS.™

This Court therefore should affirm the lower court’s

holding that Subpart 2 restricts EPA’s authority to enforce a

more stringent ozone NAAQS, should reject that court’s

holding that EPA may promulgate a standard that is contrary

to § 109(d) and Subpart 2, and should vacate the revised

ozone NAAQS as inconsistent with the congressional

program for achieving ozone reductions.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court should order vacatur of the

revised NAAQS for ozone and PM, ..

Respectfully submitted,

DAVID E. MENOTTI

WILLIAM F. PEDERSEN

JEFFREY A. KNIGHT

SHAWPITTMAN

2300 N Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20037

(202) 663-8675

Counsel for American Forest

& Paper Association,

American Iron & Steel

Institute, and Alliance of

Automobile Manufacturers

HENRY V. NICKEL

F. WILLIAM BROWNELL

(Counsel of Record)

JAMES N. CHRISTMAN

LUCINDA M. LANGWORTHY

HUNTON & WILLIAMS

1900 K Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 955-1500

Counsel for Appalachian

Power Co., et al., American

Public Power Association,

and National Association of

Home Builders

** In any event, the court of appeals was correct to remand the secondary

NAAQS due to the extent EPA relied on the primary NAAQS in

promulgating it. 175 F.3d 1040; Pet. App. 18a.

G. WILLIAM FRICK

M. ELIZABETH COX

AMERICAN PETROLEUM

INSTITUTE

1220 L Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 682-8250

Counsel for American

Petroleum Institute

MAURICE H. MCBRIDE

NATIONAL PETROCHEMICAL &

REFINERS ASSOCIATION

1899 L Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 457-0480

Counsel for National

Petrochemical & Refiners

Association

NEWMAN R. PORTER

LEWIS AND ROCA

40 N. Central Avenue

Phoenix, AZ 85004

(602) 262-5786

Counsel for Nevada Mining

Association, Newmont Gold

Company, and Meridian

Gold Company

DAVID F. ZOLL

ALEXANDRA DAPOLITO DUNN

AMERICAN CHEMISTRY

COUNCIL

1300 Wilson Boulevard

Arlington, VA 22209

(703) 741-5165

Counsel for American

Chemistry Council

JULIE BECKER

ALLIANCE OF AUTOMOBILE

MANUFACTURERS

1401 H STREET, N.W.

Suite 900

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 326 5500

Counsel for Alliance of

Automobile Manufacturers

HAROLD P. QUINN, JR.

NATIONAL MINING

ASSOCIATION

1130 17" Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 463-2652

Counsel for National Mining

Association

KuRT E. BLASE

O’CONNOR & HANNAN

Suite 500

1666 K Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006-2803

(202) 887-1400

Counsel for Kennecott

Holdings Corporation,

Kennecott Energy and

Coal Company, Kennecott

Services Company, and

National Stone Association

RUSSELL S. FRYE

COLLIER, SHANNON, RILL &

ScoTT, PLLC

3050 K Street, N.W.

Suite 400

Washington, D.C. 20007

(202) 342-8878

and

RICHARD WASSERSTROM

AMERICAN FOREST & PAPER

ASSOCIATION, INC.

1111 19th Street, N.W.

8" Floor

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 463-2582

Counsel for American Forest

& Paper Association, Inc.

MARCELLE SHOOP

Associate General Counsel

KENNECOTT UTAH COPPER

CORPORATION

8315 West 3595 South

P.O. Box 6001

Magna, Utah 84044-6001

(801) 252-3000

Counsel for Kennecott Holdings

Corporation, Kennecott

Energy and Coal Company,

and Kennecott Services Co.

TIMOTHY L. HARKER

THE HARKER LAW FIRM

9500 Accord Drive

Potomac, MD 20854

(301) 983-0964

and

THOMAS J. GRAVES

NATIONAL PAINT AND

COATINGS ASSOCIATION,

INC.

1500 Rhode Island Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 462-6272

Counsel for National Paint and

Coatings Association

GRANT CRANDALL

General Counsel

UNITED MINE WORKERS OF

AMERICA, AFL-CIO

8315 Lee Highway

Fairfax, VA 22031

(703) 208-7200

and

EUGENE M. TRISKO

P.O. Box 596

Berkeley Springs, WV 25411

(304) 258-1977

Counsel for United Mine

Workers of America, AFL-CIO

DUANE J. DESIDERIO

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF

HOME BUILDERS

1201 15th Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 861-2146

Counsel for National

Association of Home Builders

September 9, 2000

DAVID M. FLANNERY

‘JACKSON & KELLY

P.O. Box 553

1600 Laidley Tower

Charleston, WV 25322

(304) 340-1017

Counsel for Midwest Ozone

Group, and West Virginia

Chamber of Commerce

PETER S. GLASER

SHOOK, HARDY & BACON

600 14" Street, N.W.

Suite 800

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 639-5627

Counsel for Western Fuels

Association, Inc.

DAVID M. FRIEDLAND

BEVERIDGE & DIAMOND

1350 I Street, N.W.

Suite 700

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 789-6000

Counsel for Phoenix Cement Co.

APPENDICES

APPENDICES

. 40 C.F.R. § 50.9 National 1-hour primary

and secondary ambient air quality standards for

I i crcecccssenercenscsssntstanmensiorcnsmmnesssennennn la

. S. 1630, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., § 107 (1990)

(Additional Requirements for Ozone

Nonattainment Areas) (excerpt).................cc0cce0eeeees 2a

. H.R. 3030, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., § 103 (1990)

(Additional Provisions for Ozone

Nonattainment Areas) (excerpt). ...............00cccccceeeeees Sa

. H.R. Rep. No. 101-952, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.,

(1990) (Additional Provisions for Ozone

Nonattainment Areas) (excerpt)...................c.000000: 12a

. Brief of Respondent United States

Environmental Protection Agency, Environmental

Defense Fund v. Browner (D.C. Cir. No.

ITT ccnistintecepnsitennniuniienesntitnatinintenininabitiidia 19a

. Appalachian Power Co., ef al., Petition

for D.C. Circuit Review of EPA Ozone

I cxenctnsecnnsesceneneemennnsnenpenmeenntenen 25a

la

APPENDIX A

40 C.F.R. § 50.9 National 1-hour primary and secondary

ambient air quality standards for ozone (Excerpt)

* . *

(b) The 1-hour standards set forth in this section will no

longer apply to an area once EPA determines that the area has

air quality meeting the |-hour standard. Area designations are

codified 40 CFR part 81.

2a

APPENDIX B

S.1630, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., § 107 (1990) (Additional

Requirements for Ozone Nonattainment Areas) (excerpt)

ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR OZONE

NONATTAINMENT AREAS

Sec. 107. Part D of the Clean Air Act is amended by

adding the following new subpart at the end thereof:

“SUBPART 2—ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS REGARDING

OZONE NONATTAINMENT AREAS

“CLASSIFICATIONS OF OZONE NONATTAINMENT

AREAS

“SEC. 181. (a) CLASSIFICATION BY OPERATION OF

LAW.—Each area designated nonattainment for ozone under

section 107(f)(3) is hereby classified by operation of law in

one of the following categories based upon the percentage by

which such standard is exceeded:

“Area classification Amount by which standard exceeded

Moderate ozone nonattainment area. Not greater than 20 per centum

Serious ozone nonattainment area — More than 20 per centum but less

than 50 per centum

Severe ozone nonattainment area __. Equal to or greater than 50 per

centum but not more than 120

per centum

Extreme ozone nonattainment area More than 120 per centum

“(b) DATA AND METHODS FOR

CLASSIFICATION.-For purposes of determining the

3a

percentage by which the national primary ambient air quality

standard for ozone is exceeded in any area —

“(1) the most recent monitoring data available as

determined by the Administrator shall be used; and

“(2) the interpretation methodology issued by

the Administrator most recently before the date of

enactment of this subpart for determining attainment of

the standard shall be applicable (including the design

value, reference methods, and _ guidelines for

interpretation of ozone air quality standards).

Not later than thirty days after the enactment of this subpart,

the Administrator shall publish a notice of the percentages by

which the national primary ambient air quality standard for

ozone was exceeded in each area referred to in subsection (a).

“(c) DEADLINES FOR #ATTAINMENT.-The

following deadlines apply to the ozone nonattainment areas

classified in accordance with subsection (a):

Applicable attainment due (in

years after enactment of the

“Area classification Clean Air Act Amendments of 1989)

CS eee 5 years

EIT sassonninenstenesenembnensngniennneneianennen 10 years

nrc tases tsi asincnniaatandin 15 years

PIII sscsunsscinnsncenansenennanpcnsemesaniitis 20 years

“(d) REFERENCES TO TERMS.—Any reference in

this subpart to a ‘moderate area’, a ‘serious area’ a ‘severe

area’, or an ‘extreme area’ shall be considered a reference to a

moderate ozone nonattainment area, a serious ozone

nonattainment area, a severe ozone nonattainment area, or an

4a

extreme ozone nonattainment area as classified under this

section.

“(e) Any area that is not designated nonattainment

for ozone under section 107 as of the date of enactment of this

section, and that is subsequently redesignated to

nonattainment for ozone under section 107, shall, at the time

of the redesignation, be classified by operation of law in

accordance with the table under subsection (a). Upon its

classification, the area shall be subject to the same

requirements under section 110, subpart | of this part, and this

subpart that would have applied had the area been so classified

as of the time of the classification under subsection (a), except

that any absolute, fixed date applicable in connection with any

such requirement is extended by operation of law by a period

equal to the length of time between the date of enactment of

this section and the date the area is classified.

* * *

Sa

APPENDIX C

H.R. 3030, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., § 103 (1990) (Additional

Provisions for Ozone Nonattainment Areas) (excerpt)

SEC. 103. ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS FOR OZONE

NONATTAINMENT AREAS.

Part D of title I is amended by adding the following new

subpart at the end thereof:

“Subpart 2 —Additional Provisions for Ozone

Nonattainment Areas

“Sec. 181. Classifications and attainment dates.

“Sec. 182. Plan submissions and requirements.

“Sec. 183. Federal ozone measures.

“Sec. 184. | Control of interstate ozone air pollution.

“Sec. 185. Enforcement for Severe and Extreme ozone

nonattainment areas for failure to attain.

“Sec. 185A. Transitional areas.

“Sec. 185B. NO, and VOC study.

“SEC. 181. CLASSIFICATIONS AND ATTAINMENT

DATES.

“(a) CLASSIFICATION AND ATTAINMENT

DATES FOR 1989 NONATTAINMENT AREAS.~(1) Each

area designated nonattainment for ozone pursuant to section

107(d) shall be classified at the time of such designation,

under table 1, by operation of law, as a Marginal Area, a

Moderate Area, a Serious Area, a Severe Area, or an Extreme

Area based on the design value for the area. The design value

shall be calculated according to the interpretation

6a

methodology issued by the Administrator most recently before

the date of the enactment of the Clean air Act Amendments of

1990. For each area classified under this subsection, the

primary standard attainment date for ozone shall be as

expeditiously as practicable but not later than the date

provided in table 1.

“TABLE |

Primary standard attainment

Area class Design Value* date**

Marginal... .. O121 up to 0.138... 3 years after enactment

Moderate cece O<.138 up t0 0.160 0000000000...............6 years after enactment

Serious ... 0.160 up to 0.180... coe 9 years after enactment

Severe Ll .... 1S years after enactment

Extreme Locccceeseseee, 0.280 and above coc. 20 years after enactment

*The design value is measured in parts per million (ppm)

**The primary standard attainment date is measured from the date of the enactment of the

Clean Air Amendments of 1990

“(2) Notwithstanding table 1, in the case of a severe

area with a 1988 ozone design value between 0.190 and 0.280

ppm, the attainment date shall be 17 years (in lieu of 15 years)

after the date of the enactment of the Clean Air Amendments

of 1990.

“(3) At the time of publication of the notice under

section 107(d)(4) (relating to area designations) for each ozone

nonattainment area, the Administrator shall publish a notice

announcing the classification of such ozone nonattainment

area. The provisions of section 172(a)(1)(B) (relating to lack

of notice and comment and judicial review) shall apply to such

classification.

7a

“(4) If an area classified under paragraph (1) (Table

1) would have been classified in another category if the design

value in the area were 5 percent greater or 5 percent less than

the level on which such classification was based, the

Administrator may, in the Administrator’s discretion, within

90 days after the initial classification, by the procedure

required under paragraph (3), adjust the classification to place

the area in such other category. In making such adjustment,

the Administrator may consider the number of exceedances of

the national primary ambient air quality standard for ozone in

the area, the level of pollution transport between the area and

other affected areas, including both intrastate and interstate

transport, and the mix of sources and air pollutants in the area.

“(S) Upon application by any _ State, the

Administrator may extend for | additional year (hereinafter

referred to as the ‘Extension Year’) the date specified in Table

1 of subsection (a) if-

“(A) the State has complied with all

requirements and commitments pertaining to the area

in the applicable implementation plan, and

“(B) no more than 1 exceedance of the

national ambient air quality standard level for ozone

has occurred in the area in the year preceding the

Extension Year.

No more than 2 one-year extensions may be issued under this

paragraph for a single nonattainment area.

“(b) NEW DESIGNATIONS AND

RECLASSIFICATIONS.—

8a

“(1) NEW DESIGNATIONS TO

NONATTAINMENT.—Any area that is designated attainment

or unclassifiable for ozone under section 107(d)(4), and that is

subsequently redesignated to nonattainment for ozone under

section 107(d)(3), shall, at the time of the redesignation, be

classified by operation of law in accordance with Table 1

under subsection (a). Upon its classification, the area shall be

subject to the same requirements under section 110, subpart |

of this part, and this subpart that would have applied had the

area been so classified at the time of the notice under

subsection (a)(3), except that any absolute, fixed date

applicable in connection with any such requirement is

extended by operation of law by a period equal to the length of

time between the date of the enactment of the Clean Air Act

Amendments of 1990 and the date the area is classified under

this paragraph.

“(2) RECLASSIFICATION UPON FAILURE TO

ATTAIN.—{A) Within 6 months following the applicable

attainment date (including any extension thereof) for an ozone

nonattainment area, the Administrator shall determine, based

on the area’s design value (as of the attainment date), whether

the area attained the standard by that date. Except for any

Severe or Extreme area, any area that the Administrator finds

has not attained the standard by that date shall be reclassified

by operation of law in accordance with Table | of subsection

(a) to the higher of—

(i) the next higher classification for

the area, or

(ii) — the classification applicable to

the area’s design value as determined at the time of the

notice required under subparagraph (B).

9a

No area shall be reclassified as Extreme under clause (ii).

(B) The Administrator shall publish a notice

in the Federal Register, no later than 6 months

following the attainment date, identifying each area

that the Administrator has determined under

subparagraph (A) as having failed to attain and

identifying the reclassification, if any, described under

subparagraph (A).

“(3) VOLUNTARY RECLASSIFICATION.—The

Administrator shall grant the request of any State to reclassify

a nonattainment area in that State in accordance with Table |

of subsection (a) to a higher classification. The Administrator

shall publish a notice in the Federal Register of any such

request and of action by the Administrator granting the

request.

(4) FAILURE OF SEVERE AREAS TO ATTAIN

STANDARD.—{A) If any Severe Area fails to achieve the

national primary ambient air quality standard for ozone by the

applicable attainment date (including any extension thereof),

the fee provisions under section 185 shall apply within the

area, the percent reduction requirements of section

182(c)(2)(B) and (C) relating to reasonable further progress

demonstration and NO, control) shall continue to apply to the

area, and the State shall demonstrate that such percent

reduction has been achieved in each 3-year interval after such

failure until the standard is attained. Any failure to make such

a demonstration shall be subject to the sanctions provided

under this part.

(B) In addition to the requirements of

subparagraph (A), if the ozone design value for a

10a

Severe Area referred to in subparagraph (A) is above

0.140 ppm for the year of the applicable attainment

date, or if the area has failed to achieve its most recent

milestone under section 182(g), the new source review

requirements applicable under this subpart in Extreme

Areas shall apply in the area and the term ‘major

source’ and ‘major stationary source’ shall have the

same meaning as in Extreme Areas.

‘“(C) In addition to the requirements of

subparagraph (A) for those areas referred to in

subparagraph (A) and not covered by subparagraph

(B), the provisions referred to in subparagraph (B)

shall apply after 3 years from the applicable attainment

date unless the area has attained the standard by the

end of such 3-year period.

“(D) _ If, after the date of the enactment of the

Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, the Administrator

modifies the method of determining compliance with

the national primary ambient air quality standard, a

design value or other indicator comparable to 0.140 in

terms of its relationship to the standard shall be used in

lieu of 0.140 for purposes of applying the provisions of

subparagraphs (B) and (C).

“(c) REFERENCES TO TERMS.~{1) Any

reference to this subpart to a ‘Marginal Area’, a ‘Moderate

Area’, a ‘Serious Area’, a ‘Severe Area’ or an ‘Extreme Area’

shall be considered a reference to a Marginal Area, a Moderate

Area, a Serious Area, a Severe Area, or an Extreme Area as

respectively classified under this section.

lla

“(2) Any reference in this subpart to ‘next higher

classification’ or comparable terms shall be considered a

reference to the classification related to the next higher set of

design values in Table 1.

* * *

12a

APPENDIX D

H.R. Rep. No. 101-952, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990)

(Additional Provisions for Ozone Nonattainment Areas)

(excerpt)

SEC. 103. ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS FOR OZONE

NONATTAINMENT AREAS.

Part D of title | of the Clean Air Act is amended by

adding the following new subpart at the end thereof:

“Subpart 2 —Additional Provisions for Ozone

Nonattainment Areas

“Sec. 181. Classifications and attainment dates.

“Sec. 182. | Plan submissions and requirements.

“Sec. 183. | Federal ozone measures.

“Sec. 184. Control of interstate ozone air pollution.

“Sec. 185. | Enforcement for Severe and Extreme ozone

nonattainment areas for failure to attain.

“Sec. 185A. Transitional areas.

“Sec. 185B. NO, and VOC study.

SEC. 181. CLASSIFICATIONS AND ATTAINMENT

DATES.

“(a) CLASSIFICATION AND ATTAINMENT

DATES FOR 1989 NONATTAINMENT AREAS.—{1) Each

area designated nonattainment for ozone pursuant to section

107(d) shall be classified at the time of such designation,

under table 1, by operation of law, as a Marginal Area, a

Moderate Area, a Serious Area, a Severe Area, or an Extreme

l3a

Area based on the design value for the area. The design value

shall be calculated according to the interpretation

methodology issued by the Administrator most recently before

the date of the enactment of the Clean Air Act Amendments of

1990. For each area classified under this subsection, the

primary standard attainment date for ozone shall be as

expeditiously as practicable but not later than the date

provided in table 1.

“TABLE |

_ re ima: Primary standard attainment

Area class Design Value* date**

Marginal 0 121 up to 0 138 3 years after enactment

Moderate 0 138 up to 0 160 6 years after enactment

Serious 0 160 up to 0 180 9 years after enactment

Severe 0 180 up to 0 280 1S years after enactment

Extreme 0 280 and above 20 years after enactment

*The design value is measured in parts per million (ppm).

**The primary standard attainment date is measured from the date of the

enactment of the Clean Air Amendments of 1990.

“(2) Notwithstanding table 1, in the case of a severe

area with a 1988 ozone design value between 0.190 and 0.280

ppm, the attainment date shall be 17 years (in lieu of 15 years)

after the date of the enactment of the Clean Air Amendments

of 1990.

“(3) At the time of publication of the notice under

section 107(d)(4) (relating to area designations) for each ozone

nonattainment area, the Administrator shall publish a notice

announcing the classification of such ozone nonattainment

area. The provisions of section 172(a)(1)(B) (relating to lack

of notice and comment and judicial review) shall apply to such

classification.

l4a

“(4) If an area classified under paragraph (1) (Table

1) would have been classified in another category if the design

value in the area were 5 percent greater or 5 percent less than

the level on which such classification was based, the

Administrator may, in the Administrator’s discretion, within

90 days after the initial classification, by the procedure

required under paragraph (3), adjust the classification to place

the area in such other category. In making such adjustment,

the Administrator may consider the number of exceedances of

the national primary ambient air quality standard for ozone in

the area, the level of pollution transport between the area and

other affected areas, including both intrastate and interstate

transport, and the mix of sources and air pollutants in the area.

“(S) Upon application by any State, the

Administrator may extend for | additional year (hereinafter

referred to as the ‘Extension Year’) the date specified in table

1 of paragraph (1) of this subsection if—

“(A) the State has complied with all

requirements and commitments pertaining to the area

in the applicable implementation plan, and

“(B) no more than | exceedance of the

national ambient air quality standard level for ozone

has occurred in the area in the year preceding the

Extension Year.

No more than 2 one-year extensions may be issued under this

paragraph for a single nonattainment area.

“(b) NEW DESIGNATIONS AND

RK ECLASSIFICATIONS.—

lSa

“(1) NEW DESIGNATIONS TO

NONATTAINMENT.~—Any area that is designated attainment

or unclassifiable for ozone under section 107(d)(4), and that is

subsequently redesignated to nonattainment for ozone under

section 107(d)(3), shall, at the time of the redesignation, be

classified by operation of law in accordance with table | under

subsection (a). Upon its classification, the area shall be

subject to the same requirements under section 110, subpart |

of this part, and this subpart that would have applied had the

area been so classified at the time of the notice under

subsection (a)(3), except that any absolute, fixed date

applicable in connection with any such requirement is

extended by operation of law by a period equal to the length of

time between the date of the enactment of the Clean Air Act

Amendments of 1990 and the date the area is classified under

this paragraph.

“(2) RECLASSIFICATION UPON FAILURE TO

ATTAIN.—{A) Within 6 months following the applicable

attainment date (including any extension thereof) for an ozone

nonattainment area, the Administrator shall determine, based

on the area’s design value (as of the attainment date), whether

the area attained the standard by that date. Except for any

Severe or Extreme area, any area that the Administrator finds

has not attained the standard by that date shall be reclassified

by operation of law in accordance with table | of subsection

(a) to the higher of —

“(i) the next higher classification for the

area, or

“(ii) the classification applicable to the

area’s design value as determined ai the time of the

notice required under subparagraph (B).

l6a

No area shall be reclassified as Extreme under clause (ii).

“(B) The Administrator shall publish a notice

in the Federal Register, no later than 6 months

following the attainment date, identifying each area

that the Administrator has determined under

subparagraph (A) as having failed to attain and

identifying the reclassification, if any, described under

subparagraph (A).

“(3) VOLUNTARY RECLASSIFICATION.—The

Administrator shall grant the request of any State to reclassify

a nonattainment area in that State in accordance with table | of

subsection (a) to a higher classification. The Administrator

shall publish a notice in the Federal Register of any such

request and of action by the Administrator granting the

request.

(4) FAILURE OF SEVERE AREAS TO ATTAIN

STANDARD.—{A) If any Severe Area fails to achieve the

national primary ambient air quality standard for ozone by the

applicable attainment date (including any extension thereof),

the fee provisions under section 185 shall apply within the

area, the percent reduction requirements of section

182(c)(2)(B) and (C) relating to reasonable further progress

demonstration and NO_ control) shall continue to apply to the

area, and the State shall demonstrate that such percent

reduction has been achieved in each 3-year interval after such

failure until the standard is attained. Any failure to make such

a demonstration shall be subject to the sanctions provided

under this part.

17a

(B) In addition to the requirements of subparagraph

(A), if the ozone design value for a Severe Area referred to in

subparagraph (A) is above 0.140 ppm for the year of the

applicable attainment date, or if the area has failed to achieve

its most recent milestone under section 182(g), the new

source review requirements applicable under this subpart in

Extreme Areas shall apply in the area and the term ‘major

source’ and ‘major stationary source’ shall have the same

meaning as in Extreme Areas.

“(C) In addition to the requirements of subparagraph

(A) for those areas referred to in subparagraph (A) and not

covered by subparagraph (B), the provisions referred to in

subparagraph (B) shall apply after 3 years from the applicable

attainment date unless the area has attained the standard by the

end of such 3-year period.

“(D) _ If, after the date of the enactment of the Clean

Air Act Amendments of 1990, the Administrator modifies the

method of determining compliance with the national primary

ambient air quality standard, a design value or other indicator

comparable to 0.140 in terms of its relationship to the standard

shall be used in lieu of 0.140 for purposes of applying the

provisions of subparagraphs (B) and (C).

“(c) REFERENCES TO TERMS.~{1) Any

reference to this subpart to a ‘Marginal Area’, a ‘Moderate

Area’, a ‘Serious Area’, a ‘Severe Area’, or an ‘Extreme Area’

shall be considered a reference to a Marginal Area, a Moderate

Area, a Serious Area, a Severe Area, or an Extreme Area as

respectively classified under this section.

“(2) Any reference in this subpart to ‘next

higher classification’ or comparable terms shall be

considered a reference to the classification related to

the next higher set of design values in table 1.

*

18a

*

*

19a

APPENDIX E

Brief of Respondent United States Environmental

Protection Agency, Environmental

Defense Fund v. Browner

(D.C. Cir. No. 98-1363) (excerpt)

ORAL ARGUMENT SCHEDULED

FOR SEPTEMBER 7, 1999

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 98-1363

ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, et al.,

Petitioners,

V.

CAROL M. BROWNER, et al.,

Respondent,

ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF FINAL ACTION

OF THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION AGENCY

FINAL BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

20a

LOIS J. SCHIFFER

Assistant Attorney General

OF COUNSEL: Environment and Natural

Resources Division

JAN M. TIERNEY

Office of General Counsel ALICE L. MATTICE

U.S. Environmental Attorney, Environmental

Protection Agency Defense Section

401 M Street, S.W. U.S. Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20604 _—~P.O.. Box 23986

(202) 260-5095 Washington, D.C. 20026-3986

(202) 514-2327

Date: June 21, 1999

* * *

Section 307(b) of the Act establishes a sixty-day period

for seeking judicial review of agency rules. 42 U.S.C. §

7607(b). This Court has “repeatedly held that temporal

limitations on judicial review are jurisdictional in nature.”

National Mining Ass'n v. Department of the Interior, 70 F.3d

1345, 1350 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Eagle-Picher Indus. v. EPA, 759

F.2d 905, 911-12 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The time limits on

petitions for review of agency rules reflect a deliberate

congressional choice to impose finality on agency decisions, in

order to conserve agency resources and provide guidance and

stability to those affected by the agency action. Eagle-Picher,

795 F.2d at 911-12.

Petitioners’ central claim in this case is that EPA’s

criterion for phasing out the one-hour ozone NAAQS is

unlawful because it does not require redesignating “clean”

nonattainment areas to attainment pursuant to section

107(d)(3)(E) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(3)(E)(iv), and

therefore does not require States to submit plans for

maintaining the one-hour NAAQS indefinitely after

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attainment. Pet.Br. 2, 21, 31-33, 42. '? However, that issue

was resolved by EPA’s 1997 Rule. 40 C.F.R. § 50.9(b).

The 1997 Rule is clear on its face. The Rule states,

without qualification, that the one-hour standard “will no

longer apply” to an area once EPA determines that it has “air

quality meeting the l-hour standard.” 40 C.F.R. § 50.9(b).

Thus, “air quality meeting the 1-hour standard” is the only

criterion for revocation. The Rule also specifically states that

“{ajrea designations are codified in 40 CFR part 81,” which

includes the list of designations of areas for the one-hour

ozone standard. /d. The inclusion of this reference provides

notice that the designations for the one-hour standard in 40

C.F.R. part 81 would be affected by EPA’s action. Jd.

Petitioners attempt to draw an artificial distinction

between the revocation of the one-hour standard (which they

appear to concede was addressed in the 1997 Rule) and the

allegedly “separate” decision to remove the associated

designations for revocation areas in 40 C.F.R. part 81. Pet.Br.

30. However, designations are for a particular NAAQS and

are linked to that NAAQS. E.g., 42 USC. §

7407(d)(1)(A)(i)-(ii) (“attainment” and “nonattainment”

designations defined as meeting or not meeting a particular

'? Although they now challenge the removal of attainment or unclassifiable

designations in summary fashion (Pet.Br. 2, 4), Petitioners did not object to

the removal of attainment or unclassifiable designations in their comments,

and therefore cannot do so here. See EDF Comments, JA 182-188; NRDC

Comments, JA 189-194. Linemaster Switch Corp. v. EPA, 938 F. 2d 1299,

1308-09 (D.C. Cir. 1991). In any event, Petitioners’ alleged injury - an

asserted “gap” in PSD requirements for areas designated attainment or

unclassifiable - is illusory. As discussed above, Petitioners read EPA’s

PSD regulations too narrowly. PSD will in fact continue to apply to such

areas. Supra 21.

22a

NAAQS); see infra 43-44.”° In its implementation policy

statement issued contemporaneously with the ozone NAAQS

proposal, supra 13, EPA made clear that it viewed revocation

of the one-hour standard as also revoking the associated

designations: “the designations [for the one-hour standard]

would remain in effect so long as the current l-hour ozone -

NAAQS remains in effect,” 61 Fed. Reg. at 65,754 -- and, by

necessary implication, would not remain in effect thereafter.

As discussed above, EPA initially proposed an

approach similar to the one Petitioners urge here, whereby the

Agency would delay revocation of the one-hour standard (and

thus the associated designations) until it made designations for

the revised eight-hour standard. /d.; see supra 13. However,

EPA changed that approach in light of its revised legal

interpretation of the interplay of Subpart 2 and EPA’s NAAQS

revision authority. 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,873; supra 13-14. In

this context, the decision to revoke the one-hour standard

necessarily meant that EPA was also revoking the designations

associated with it. Petitioners were active and highly

sophisticated participants in both the NAAQS rulemaking and

the discussions on implementation, and could not reasonably

have understood otherwise.”'

2° Petitioners elsewhere assert (Pet.Br. 36, 38-39) that designations are

linked to “the pollutant ozone,” not to particular NAAQS. As

demonstrated below, that argument is not supported by the statutory

language and is plainly incorrect. /nfra 43-45.

?! EDF and NRDC submitted comments on the proposed ozone and

particulate matter NAAQS revisions and on EPA’s proposed

implementation guidance. Further, EDF and NRDC were members of the

Subcommittee for Ozone, Particulate Matter, and Regional Haze, part of

the Clean Air Act Advisory Committee created pursuant to the Federal

Advisory Committee Act. The Subcommittee’s purpose was to develop

and recommend to EPA strategies for the implementation of the ozone and

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Further, if there were any room for doubt as to EPA’s

meaning, the Presidential Memorandum, __ issued

contemporaneously with and referenced in the preamble to the

1997 Rule (at 62 Fed. Reg. 38,856) removed it. The

Memorandum was explicit, stating that under the 1997 Rule

States “will not have to provide maintenance plans for those

areas that attain the [one]-hour standard.” 62 Fed. Reg. at

38,424. Petitioners thus had clear notice that EPA was not

requiring States to develop maintenance plans. Because

maintenance plans are required only as a prerequisite for

redesignation under section 107(d)(3)(E), Petitioners also had

clear notice that EPA was not retaining the one-hour

designations that would otherwise have made maintenance

plans relevant.

Other participants in the NAAQS _ rulemaking

understood the implications of EPA’s interpretation and

challenged aspects of it in the pending ATA litigation

concerning the revised ozone NAAQS. ~~ Indeed, those

arguments are premised on their recognition that the one-hour

standard (and thus the programs associated with it) would not

be revoked for an area until the standard was met, but then

would be revoked. Specifically, in ATA, industry and State

petitioners argued that the continued applicability of the one-

hour standard and Subpart 2 prohibited EPA from revising the

one-hour standard and associated designations at all, in part

because EPA’s action created an alleged “patchwork” of

different control requirements associated with different

particulate matter standards and the regional haze strategy, which EPA was

then developing.

24a

standards.” Thus, the petitioners in ATA well recognized that

the 1997 Rule removed all planning requirements for the one-

hour standard for an area, once that standard was revoked.

Petitioners here were similarly on notice of the issues

resolved by the 1997 Rule; indeed, they now challenge EPA’s

determination regarding the interplay between the pre-existing

one-hour and the revised eight-hour standard from a different

perspective. Having apparently made a decision not to raise

those issues at that time, they cannot do so now. Further, even

if Petitioners had some doubt,” their proper course would

have been to file a protective petition for review and let the

Court decide whether the case was properly brought. See

Eagle-Picher, 759 F.2d at 914 (in the analogous ripeness

context, “... if there is any doubt about the ripeness of a

claim, petitioners must bring their challenge in a timely

fashion or risk being time-barred”) (emphasis in original). As

Eagle-Picher instructs, id. at 912, the risk of guessing wrong

should fall on Petitioners, not the Court, EPA, or the

communities and States relying on EPA’s rule.

* * *

22 See American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., et al. v. EPA, No. 97-1441 and

consolidated cases, Brief of Non-State Clean Air Act Petitioners and

Intervenors 22-25, JA 211-215; Brief of Petitioner States 5-9 & n.4, JA

217-221; Reply Brief of Petitioner States 8-10, JA 223-225.

> Petitioners do not address the timeliness issue in their brief. At most,

they hint obliquely that the Revocation Rule was the first time they

understood that EPA was removing designations associated with the one-

hour standard, and was not requiring areas previously designated

nonattainment to prepare maintenance plans for the one-hour standard.

Pet. Br. 28, 43-44. As demonstrated above, their asserted confusion is not

credible.

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APPENDIX F

Appalachian Power Co., et al., Petition for D.C. Circuit

Review of EPA Ozone NAAQS Rulemaking

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

)

APPALACHIAN POWER COMPANY, et al.,)

Petitioners, )

)

v. ) Docket No. _

)

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL )

PROTECTION AGENCY, )

Respondent. )

)

PETITION FOR REVIEW

Pursuant to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, and § 307(b) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 7607(b), Appalachian Power Company, et al., hereby

petition the Court to review a final rule issued by Respondent

United States Environmental Protection Agency. This rule

revises the national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS)

for ozone. The rule is entitled “National Ambient Air Quality

Standards for Ozone,” and it was published on July 18, 1997

at 62 Federal Register 38,856-96. The Petitioners are listed in

Attachment A to this petition. Petitioners own and operate

facilities that will be affected by this final rule. A copy of the

Federal Register notice announcing this final rule is

Attachment B to this petition.

Dated: August 15, 1997

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Respectfully submitted,

Henry V. Nickel

F. William Brownell

Lucinda Minton Langworthy

Ross S. Antonson

HUNTON & WILLIAMS

1900 K Street, N.W., Suite 1200

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 955-1500 s

Counsel for Appalachian Power

Company, et al.

ey

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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