Respondents Brief — Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc.
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- Supreme Court, U.S
FILED —
2000
IN THE |
Supreme Court of the United StateRK
No. 99-1257
—,
=
CAROL M. BROWNER, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ef al.,
Petitioners,
Vv.
AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS, INC.., ef al.,
Respondents.
On a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
For the District of Columbia Circuit
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS
APPALACHIAN POWER COMPANY, et al.,
DAVID E, MENOTTI HENRY V. NICKEL
WILLIAM F, PEDERSEN - F, WILLIAM BROWNELL
JEFFREY A. KNIGHT (Counsel of Record)
SHAWPITTMAN JAMES N. CHRISTMAN
2300 N Street, N.W. LUCINDA MINTON LANGWORTHY
Washington, D.C. 20037 HUNTON & WILLIAMS
(202) 663-8675 1900 K Street, N.W.
Counsel for American Washington, D.C. 20006
Forest & Paper (202) 955-1500
Association, American Counsel for Appalachian Power
Iron & Steel Institute, and Co., et al., American Public
Alliance of Automobile Power Association, and
Manufacturers National Association of
Home Builders
September 9, 2000
[Additional Counsel Listed Inside]
WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. — (202) 789-0096 -— WASHINGTON, D. C. 20001
BEST AVAILABLE COPY
OOP
G. WILLIAM FRICK
M. ELIZABETH COX
AMERICAN PETROLEUM
INSTITUTE
1220 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 682-8250
Counsel for American
Petroleum Institute
RUSSEL S. FRYE
COLLIER, SHANNON, RILL &
SCOTT, PLLC
3050 K Street, N.W., Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20007
(202) 342-8878
and
RICHARD WASSERSTROM
AMERICAN FOREST & PAPER
ASSOCIATION, INC.
1111 19th Street, N.W.
8th Floor
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 463-2582
Counsel for American Forest
& Paper Association, Inc.
GRANT CRANDALL
General Counsel
UNITED MINE WORKERS OF
/,MERICA, AFL-CIO
8315 Lee Highway
Fairfax, VA 22031
(703) 208-7200
and
EUGENE M. TRISKO
P.O. Box 596
Berkeley Springs, WV 25411
(304) 258-1977
Counsel for United Mine
Workers of America, AFL-CIO
DAVID F. ZOLL
ALEXANDRA DAPOLITO DUNN
AMERICAN CHEMISTRY
COUNCIL
1300 Wilson Boulevard
Arlington, VA 22209
(703) 741-5165
Counsel for American
Chemistry Council
JULIE BECKER
ALLIANCE OF AUTOMOBILE
MANUFACTURERS
1401 H Street, N.W.
Suite 900
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 326-5500
Counsel for Alliance of
Automobile Manufacturers
HAROLD P. QUINN, JR.
NATIONAL MINING
ASSOCIATION
1130 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 463-2652
Counsel for National Mining
Association
MARCELLE SHOOP
Associate General Counsel
KENNECOTT UTAH COPPER
CORPORATION
8315 West 3595 South
P.O. Box 6001
Magna, Utah 84044-6001
(801) 252-3000
Counsel for Kennecott Holdings
Corporation, Kennecott
Energy and Coal Company
and Kennecott Services
Company
PETER S. GLASER
SHOOK, HARDY & BACON
600 14th Street, N.W.
Suite 800
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 639-5627
Counsel for Western Fuels
Association, Inc.
NEWMAN R., PORTER
LEWIS AND ROCA
40 N. Central Avenue
Phoenix, AZ 85004
(602) 262-5786
Counsel for Nevada Mining
Association, Newmont Gold
Company, and Meridian Gold
Company
DAVID M. FLANNERY
JACKSON & KELLY
P.O. Box 553
1600 Laidley Tower
Charleston, WV 25322
(304) 340-1017
Counsel for Midwest Ozone
Group and West Virginia
Chamber of Commerce
KURT E, BLASE
O’CONNOR & HANNAN
Suite 500
1666 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006-2803
(202) 887-1400
Counsel for Kennecott Holdings
Corporation, Kennecott Energy
and Coal Company, Kennecott
Services Company, and
National Stone Association
DUANE J. DESIDERIO
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
HOME BUILDERS
1201 1Sth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C, 20005
(202) 861-2146
Counsel for National Associa-
tion of Home Builders
MAURICE H. MCBRIDE
NATIONAL PETROCHEMICAL &
REFINERS ASSOCIATION
1899 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 457-0480
Counsel for National
Petrochemical & Refiners
Association
TIMOTHY L. HARKER
THE HARKER LAW FIRM
9500 Accord Drive
Potomac, MD 20854
(301) 983-0964
and
THOMAS J. GRAVES
NATIONAL PAINT AND
COATINGS ASSOCIATION, INC.
1500 Rhode Island Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 462-6272
Counsel for National Paint and
Coatings Association
DAVID M. FRIEDLAND
BEVERIDGE & DIAMOND
1350 I Street, N.W.
Suite 700
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 789-6000
Counsel for Phoenix Cement
Company.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Whether the court of appeals properly remanded to the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA” or “the
Agency”) revised National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (“NAAQS”) promulgated under Section 109 of
the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409, for the Agency to
develop an intelligible principle for risk management
decisions, and whether the court of appeals properly
construed the scope of the Agency’s discretion in
defining those criteria.
Whether the court had jurisdiction to review final action
taken by the EPA Administrator under the Clean Air Act
which resolved the question of whether the congressional
“Subpart 2” ozone risk management program restricted
EPA's authority to adopt and enforce a more stringent
ozone NAAQS.
Whether the comprehensive and long-term risk
management program Congress enacted to ensure
reductions of ozone in the ambient air restricted EPA’s
authority to e:tablish a more stringent ozone NAAQS.
AMENDED DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
1. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 29.6 and the Corporate
Disclosure Statement filed by Appalachian Power Co., ef
al., in its Response to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari
filed in this case, the following list discloses additional
parent companies, and publicly held companies that own
10% or more, of any party joining in this brief.
Carolina Power & Light Co.
(10% or greater owner: State Street Bank &
Trust Co. Boston)
Illinois Power
(a subsidiary of Dynergy, Inc.)
Kennecott Energy and Coal Co.
(an indirect subsidiary of Rio Tinto PLC)
Kennecott Holdings Corporation
(an indirect subsidiary of Rio Tinto PLC)
Kennecott Services Company
(an indirect subsidiary of Rio Tinto PLC)
Otter Tail Power Co.
(10% or greater owner: Otter Tail Power Co.
ESOP)
2. The following parties joining this brief have no parent
corporations, and no publicly-held companies have a 10%
or greater ownership interest in these parties.
American Chemistry Council (formerly Chemical
Manufacturers Association)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ee aE Pchicsrncsscestniinsiantsntininnntintpatsinataintaina i
AMENDED DISCLOSURE STATEMENT..................c00000+. li
ee Ca crniniirinnncnniescemnetiniesininnsinapiniieiinian vi
TITIES citerisisnsensaccnsienieddannneniniinaanineppesniasiiumniititimiusiminiiitiien XV
CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY AND
REGULATORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED........................ l
STATERGENT OF THEE CARB qnn.2..ccecceccscsescesssescsssessesscressess |
D, FER CACO e WI cncsncecscececessennnessnanecesncensnannen 2
a, FR ee ID cccrserensctncnienpecnntnsntiemmenian 2
B. Application and Enforcement of NAAQG.............. 3
ll. THE 1997 OZONE AND PM NAAQS
Sa OR crcctrerasericemnsrantemsasensnnnesemmmnannnennenemmnaent 6
A. The Administrative Record on Ozone................... 7
B. The Administrative Record on PM.................000++ 10
C. The Impacts of Standard Revision....................... 15
D. The Administrator’s Decisions.................000000000+ 16
iV
Ill. THE D.C. CIRCUIT DECISIONS.................ccccccecceeeees 19
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .............cccccsccssssscsssessesseesessee 20
GEES cnecemmissnnnssetinseemmaninsenireasinenimenanenet 22
I. EPA IMPROPERLY CONSTRUED THE
STATUTE TO PROVIDE NO _ LEGAL
STANDARD, OR “INTELLIGIBLE
PRINCIPLE,” THAT WOULD GUIDE ITS
EXERCISE OF PUBLIC HEALTH RISK
MANAGEMENT JUDGMENT . ..............cccccesseeseeeeeees 22
A. EPA Improperly Claims Unfettered Authority to
Exercise Public Health Risk Management
BRIE, connsnscensenscmesnnamanmecingnenennemitintite 24
B. EPA Is Obligated To Identify the Principle that
Guides Its Exercise of Rulemaking Authority
Even Where Congress Acts By Broad
TIMID, cuncntincernéncenionteninicnimanmmionnunemnen 31
C. There Is Law To Apply To Guide EPA’s Exercise
of Risk Management Judgment......................0.. 33
Il. EPA’S REVISION TO THE OZONE NAAQS,
TOGETHER WITH ITS REVOCATION OF
THE EXISTING STANDARD, IS
REVIEWABLE FINAL AGENCY ACTION................ 35
A. EPA’s Determination of Its Authority To Revise
the Ozone NAAQS Is Final Action.................... 36
Vv
B. EPA’s Decision To Replace Subpart 2 Is Ripe. .. 40
III. SUBPART 2 RESTRICTS EPA’S AUTHORITY
TO REVISE THE OZONE NAAQS.....0.......cccccesceeeeseees 42
A. Subpart 2’s Plain Language Precludes EPA From
Replacing the Existing Ozone NAAQG. ............ 42
B. Subpart 2’s History and Structure Confirm It Is the
Exclusive Plan for Managing Ozone. .................. 47
C. Subpart 2 Renders the Revised Ozone NAAQS
Sei erciciuvestinnnsisnsnaninininsbdiatipiitinsaasiniaibinliaieniiiians 49
Ie cinctenicesinsicnicenesnnenvatipaniananennastti iperipesisiamiaiitias 50
eae ctrennesncitnnenincnsninnaianenennnnnnsateninniiitidiiianiiniesis la
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES Page
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
ee eG I rtencsicerineminnimninn 25
AT&T Corp. v. lowa Utilities Board, 525 US.
Be citrerscsensceinntscnininsinmnmmninnaiiiiann 25, 35
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136
ne ee EN 41
Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322
le Ge Cee ericremecnenacnnimen: wnenenenennenen 24
American Lung Association v. EPA, 134 F.3d 388
i ee 23, 30
American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90
EE crncnsesmecemsaneesemenssseneveenmmesennsstarmmnnssneeee 33
American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027
(D.C. Cir.)., modified, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir.
FUP ncecccesecescapssssensecesssnssesevescevensunescsssusnesuecssooees passim
Barrick Goldstrike Mines, Inc. v. Browner, 215
ee 39
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) .......cccccccceeeeeeeeeees 38
Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371
ee 23, 26
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837
eT 34, 35, 44
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
ae Te a ccncccensnnnenestnenenenenneenn 28
Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998)........ccccccceeees 30
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821)....... 40
Vii
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120
SPs Se CI cnccieehiienenhsiniieirnscsebiecsiieiecinsintieanienaen 30, 49
FPC v. Conway, 426 U.S. 271 (1976).......cccccccccccesceeeees 33
Federal Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc.,
as UT cneriieiissinirieheiaiatiisetinielnaataacaastaas 25
Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Association vy.
De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982) .......cccccccceeeeees 38
HRI, Inc. v. EPA, 198 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 2000)......... 38
Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U.S. 578
° ” Sea 21, 38, 39, 40, 41
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979)..........000. 30
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) ccccccccccsssssssssssssessooe 29
Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO y.
American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607
SETI chtersinansstsineatniateiisiat enesiieiiinineniatitameeniariais 25, 26, 29, 30
International Union, UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d
ee 24
J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276
ee I nstrtcritescnrinitertaiiniaitaccialieniacnaeateataiatenias 25
Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) ......cccccccccccscseeeeseeees 25
Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996).......... 25, 30
Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S.
ae ee crsceteidainteiasiinienbaiiataeeniaiiiaeainiiiincanssaaainael 41
Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service,
Inc., 486 U.S. 825 (1988) .........cccceceeseeeseesceseeseeeeeees 46
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
SIE TEE weriesinctattsiincmneniotintbennnibiininnsinienbiaastinatiiianasarees 31, 33
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989)....... 25,34
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463
ee a ee cncitsnenmiinniecnemntencipteccsemeniinneiniues 23, 30
Vill
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319
ees Sete UTI nticicaissciineivniedieuienlacibdeiantanindnaaniciataaclied
National Cable Television Association v. United
BENNER, GES WB. FID COG Pa prccccssesecesccssescscessesscees
New York Central Securities Corp. v. United
A, ee Sy ee ee cetticccncntndiitntteitionisanien
Ohio Forestry Association v. Sierra Club, 523
ele Se ihccicins hchelistciisiiscaniesbieaisitibiialdeiiiiaaeieals
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388
GSU ccahssceacaeceshetaniiehaaeaiaeiepiaiiaeeinlamasenatia hae
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections y.
Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998) ............ccsscccssssseeees
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997)............cccceeeeeees
Robertso.. v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490
eran ET nITTITIIIIT ihciscaseniiaeaadeasinsaietstegniniiianiasiaddiinbaiaieaeas
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983) .........
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947)............
Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 US.
Pee Te ccdndianisseabiibiceneciipincscpinideumionnishieiubabdicnnbligistis
Touby v. United States, 508 U.S. 160 (1991).....25,
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) ...........
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC,
Se BaP IE aiccntcsiticssstidistadenicsintniiniinpainiiantins
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305
IS diciibaedpenaninnsiaiaisdaditieadindenasisibidiediniaamuiviate’
Wyoming Outdoor Council v. United States Forest
Service, 165 F.3d 43 (D.C. Cir. 1999)...0...0..0.0...
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S., 414 (1944) ..........
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
I a tied aealtidiae esata
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965)..............ccccseeeeeeeees
32, 34
1X
STATUTES
The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq.
ee I HE WII cticcctncccicssiasinisnpsensigtnaneeanctien l
Se Oe i ee rs OF Pee entenctictntteeenidarseatsccenssbterenin 34
CAA § 101(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b) ....... eee 1,24
CAA § 107(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d) ............ 42, 43, 44, 45
CAA § 107(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(1) «0.0.0... cece ceeees 43
CAA § 107(d)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(1)(A)............ 3
CAA § 107(d)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(1)(B)............. 3
CAA § 107(d)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(3) .......000... 42, 43
CAA § 107(d)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(4) ...42, 43, 44, 45
CAA § 108, 42 U.S.C. § 7408... 3, 22, 35, 49
CAA § 108(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a) 0.0... eceecceeeeeeeeeeeeees 2
CAA § 108(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(2)...........cccccceeeeees 3
CAA § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7409........0...0... 21, 24, 28, 34, 35
CAA § 109(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) ........... ee. 3, 22, 49
CAA § 109(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d) ..3, 36, 38, 46, 49, 50
CAA § 110(a), 42 U.S.C. § 741O(a).......cccccccccccscssescccessees 4
CAA § 110(a)(2)(I), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(1)................ 4
CAA §§ 171-179B, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7509a................. 4
CAA § 172(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7502(a) ...... cee eceeesceeeeeeees 44
CAA § 172(a)(1)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 7502(a)(1)(C)....... 4, 43
CAA § 172(a)(2)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 7502(a)(2)(D)........... 43
CAA § 175A(d), 42 U.S.C. § 750Sa(d)........... ccc eceeeeeeeeee 5
ee ae itn Se Ios 0 GENET cenctcccetnsanaicncionnnnsanenbiiiidincs 43
CAA § 181(a), 42 U.S.C.
) 37, 42, 44, 45, 46, 48, 49
CAA § 181(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 751 1(a)(1)................ 43, 45
CAA § 181(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7511(b) ............ 37, 44, 46, 48
CAA § 181(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 751 1(b)(1)....... eee 43
CAA §§ 181-185B, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7511-7511f.....0..0.0.. 5
x
ny 5
CAA § 182(a)-(e), 42 U.S.C. § 751 la(a)-(e) «0.0.0.0... 48
CAA §§ 182-185B, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7511a-7511f..........0..... l
CAA § 183(g), 42 U.S.C. § 751 1b(g) «0.0... eeceeeeeeeeee 48
ee Oe a Ae is OF UE i acccecelicensieticiiansiciisriesiseibinn 48
CAA § 184(a), 42 U.S.C. § 751 1¢(a)........... oe are eee 5
CAA § 184(b)(1)(a), 42 U.S.C. § 751 1e(b)(1)(a)............. 5
CAA §§ 186-187, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7512-7512a ..........0..... 46
CAA § 188-190, 42 U.S.C. § 7513-7513b ........ eee 46
ee ees Ne rc Te ei ciiiinitnticistasinisesssenainsciinidanieites 46
CAA § 307(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) .............. 1, 39, 40, 41
CAA § 307(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) 0.2... eceeeeeees 38
CAA § 307(d)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(3) .......00ccccceeeee 13
CAA § 307(d)(9), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9) ........0cccceeeeee 23
FEDERAL REGULATIONS
40 C.F.R. § 50.9(b) (1999) 0. cece 1, 18, 21, 37, 39
40 C.F.R. § 50.10 (1999)...ccccccccccsessecssessesseesessees 18, 21, 37
FEDERAL REGISTER
aac tlie 7
I asa 6
AT a ea ee 7
4 8 4 ET ee roe 48
I alia 6
I a i ileal 7
Fee re I I ices cscmeiinilnenitinaiehes 17
a ial clelemaclaes 17
IE nr nnn en NTE 39
Fe i Cy See IO iicrresnccsnnennccnscnncnmmniacceciints 7, 16
xl
i SSR Decent na neon mone
I I
ae es Be ccesicticeetiiisincncitccisnneciiiniinisinaie 15
Be Us SINT stecceniitirscisosiisstestisiainaatitininnn 17
ee ee SR icccsisiicneisiectiinccsipieisiitiiantumanamnenionts
I I a
BL, , SE EEO ENT
62 Fed. Reg. SEGES (1997).........ccccecccccesccceees 17, 18, 21,
Be es es I aictteniicicecsiicincsencnieansniinenieens 7
rr
Be ee I ccccccecittnsiinsnisisinbeihippbapaditiabiatiadanta
EE ee
G2 Fed. Reg. SEBGE (1997).......ccccccccccssssccscccccccccseeses 17
ey By I cicccnssesnsensicnnecsendsceticcenesmeniiidie
a icccrcncnicunintnssemniciasesiianimnnieal
62 Fed. Reg. 36578-BS (1997).........ccccccccccoscsscscsccccsescoeees
62 Fed. Reg. 38883 (1997)................cccceceeee 17, 18, 21,
ae ee CN SI CDR ccrcteccccnscsncncccnasnsnscnsnessiees
Se Fe, , Fe FR cccsecescrccccncnscnsesecsancensennen
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
136 Cong. Rec. 130 (Jan. 23, 1990), reprinted in 4
Sen. Comm. on Env’t and Pub. Works, A
Legislative History of the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990 (Comm. Print 1993)
I iiss tincanictiinnido ictal 4,
136 Cong. Rec. H12867 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990)
(Rep. Fields), reprinted in 1 Sen. Comm. on
Env’t and Pub. Works, A Legislative History
of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990
IR. TUTE GI hnnicincannnsiiennnteniineiévaimncinnaseinninies
Xli
H.R. 3030, 101st Cong., §§ 101(a), 103, reprinted
in 2 Sen. Comm. on Env’t and Pub. Works, A
Legislative History of the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990 (Comm. Print 1993)............... 45
H.R. Rep. No. 101-490, pt. 1 (1990), reprinted in
2 Sen. Comm. on Env’t and Pub. Works,
101st Cong., 2d Sess., A Legislative History of
the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990
IE, TRIE GUM icceciesenscenccssenmmninenctenh 4, 45, 47, 48
H.R. Rep. No. 101-952 (1990), reprinted in | Sen.
Comm. on Env’t and Pub. Works, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess., A Legislative History of the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (Comm.
PD TERED sceinsnesistienmenictecsncieccscteninsainenentianinesaies 4, 45
S. Rep. No. 91-1196 (1970), reprinted in 1 Sen.
Comm. on Pub. Works, A Legislative History
of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 (Comm.
PE Fe icicinsstascavisinesnestisidimchibitinaiainammniinnens 40
S. 1630, 101st Cong., §§ 101, 107, reprinted in 3
Sen. Comm. on Env’t and Pub. Works, A
Legislative History of the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990 (Comm. Print 1993)............... 45
MISCELLANEOUS
Committee on the Institutional Means for
Assessment of Risks to Public Health,
National Research Council, Risk Assessment
in the Federal Government: Managing the
PRD Ce censensencsensessnrreniestnnsinmesesessenmengnasaen 26
EPA, Air Quality Criteria for Particulate Matter
SUITED sxccnccssnnsstuniennesnnianiineinneniianenieniioniaeth 11, 12, 13
Xili
EPA, Regulatory Analyses for the Particulate
Matter and Ozone National Ambient Air
Quality Standards and Proposed Regional
MERE DUTT ERS TEN ie Wes 15
EPA, Responses to Significant Comments on the
1996 Proposed Rule on the National Ambient
Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter
5 Ne Pa Tee Tern 16
EPA, Responses to Significant Comments on the
National Ambient Air Quality Standards for
I te cnisintinasiniininicibdaaielibiiie a ei 16
EPA, Review of National Ambient Air Quality
Standards for Ozone (1996) ........cccccccseeceeeeeeeeeee 6, 7,9
EPA, Review of the National Ambient Air Quality
Standards for Particulate Matter (1996) 11, 12, 13, 14
Gary Taubes, Epidemiology Faces Its Limits, 269
I TI ic ticnseinineiiitentniniiheciinniiated tet 12
L. Bressman, Schechter Poultry at _ the
Millennium: A Delegation Doctrine for the
Administrative State, 109 Yale L.J. 1399
TTS See cecennstnneediaiscaniatiashiiiiiemibeegtinas: 29, 35
Leland Deck, et al., A Particulate Matter Risk
Assessment for Philadelphia and Los Angeles
I MA TT EE ch AR Oe 14
Letter from Dr. George T. Wolff, Chair, CASAC,
to Hon. Carol M. Browner (Nov. 30, 1995).....8, 9, 10
Letter from Dr. George T. Wolff, Chair, CASAC,
to Hon. Carol M. Browner (Jun. 13, 1996) ..11, 14, 15
Memorandum from Harvey M. Richmond to
Karen Martin (Feb. 11, 1997)..........cccccccssscssessseeseeees 9
U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of
the United States (119th ed. 1999)... cece 15, 16
XIV
W. Wilson, Congressional Government (1885)
30
GLOSSARY
The following is a glossary of acronyms and abbreviations
used in this brief.
Act Clean Air Act
Administrator Administrator of the United
States Environmental
Protection Agency
Agency United States Environmental
Protection Agency
APC Appalachian Power Co., ef
al.
CAA Clean Air Act
CASAC Clean Air Scientific
Advisory Committee
EPA United States Environmental
Protection Agency
NAAQS National Ambient Air
Quality Standards
OJA Joint Appendix in D.C. Cir.
Case No. 97-1441
OSP Ozone Staff Paper
XV
PM
PM,
PM, ;
PMJA
PPM
PMSP
Subpart |
Subpart 2
Xvi
Particulate Matter |
Particulate Matter with an
aerodynamic diameter less
than or equal to 10 microns
Particulate Matter with an
aerodynamic diameter less
than or equal to 2.5 microns
Joint Appendix in D.C. Cir.
Case No. 97-1440
Parts Per Million
Particulate Matter Staff Paper
Subpart | of Part D of Title I
of the Clean Air Act
Subpart 2 of Part D of Title I
of the Clean Air Act
CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY AND
REGULATORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The following additional statutory and regulatory
provisions are involved in this case: CAA §§ 101(b), 182-
185B, and 307(b); 40 C.F.R. § 50.9(b).'
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A fundamental principle of our system of government is
that executive branch agencies may exercise only that power
that Congress has delegated to them. While Congress often
delegates in broad terms in areas that are technically and
scientifically complex, that delegation must specifically
provide—or the executive branch agency must derive from
the authorizing legislation—an intelligible principle that
constrains the agency’s discretion in a manner consistent
with the congressional delegation. Just as no executive
branch agency may exercise a policy judgment that Congress
has not delegated to it, no executive branch agency may
substitute its policy judgment for that of Congress.
The actions of the Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA” or “the Agency”) at issue here violate this principle.
In 1997, citing the Clean Air Act (“CAA” or “the Act’), 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401 ef seqg., and the policy judgment of its
Administrator, EPA replaced existing National Ambient Air
Quality Standards (“NAAQS”) for ozone and particulate
matter (“PM”) with revised standards. In each instance,
while EPA characterized ranges of health risks associated
with alternative standards, the Agency did not articulate any
principle based on the Act to guide its exercise of risk
' These provisions are reproduced in the attached Appendix (“App. _”),
or the Appendix to Conditional Cross-Pet. in Case No. 99-1431.
2
management judgment in selecting standards from that range
of risks. By revising the ozone NAAQS, EPA also replaced
the statutory program for reducing ozone enacted by
Congress in 1990 with a more stringent program of EPA’s
own creation.
Because EPA’s actions are incompatible with the scope of
authority delegated to that Agency by Congress, they must be
vacated. The Court should instruct EPA that Congress has
not authorized it to establish a more stringent ozone NAAQS
and that, in promulgating a NAAQS, it must articulate the
principle, based on the Act, that it applies in exercising its
risk management judgment.’
I. THE STATUTORY SCHEME.
A. The NAAQS Program.
The NAAQS program is the centerpiece of the Clean Air
Act. It requires a joint effort by EPA and the States, with
EPA responsible for establishing NAAQS and the States
responsible for implementing them.
NAAQS apply to air pollutants that EPA finds “may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or
welfare” and that result from “numerous or diverse” mobile
and stationary sources. CAA § 108(a). Prior to setting
standards, EPA must prepare a “criteria document” that
“accurately reflects the latest scientific knowledge useful in
? While the reviewing court correctly objected to EPA’s construction of
the statute as providing no intelligible principle for risk management
decisions, as Appalachian Power Co., et al., (“APC”) and American
Trucking Associations, Inc., ef al, (“ATA”) explain in Case No. 99-
1426, the Act provides the basis for such a principle. Acceptance of the
arguments in Case No. 99-1426 regarding the proper construction of the
Act would require that the revised standards at issue here be vacated.
3
indicating the kind and extent of all identifiable effects on
public health or welfare” of varying quantities of the
pollutant in the ambient air. CAA § 108(a)(2); see also Br.
for Resp’ts Appalachian Power Co., ef a/., in Support of
Pet’rs (99-1426) 6, 37-39 [hereinafter “APC Br.”’).
Based on the criteria document, the Agency sets “primary”
NAAQS at a level “requisite to protect the public health”
with an “adequate margin of safety,” and “secondary”
NAAQS at a level “requisite to protect the public welfare
from any known or anticipated adverse effects.” CAA
§ 109(b). NAAQS may be revised “as may be appropriate”
in accordance with §§ 108 and 109(b). CAA § 109(d); see
APC Br. 39-42.
In promulgating or revising NAAQS, EPA must consult
an independent scientific review committee—the Clean Air
Scientific Advisory Committee (“CASAC”)—that advises
the Agency on (1) the “adequacy” and “basis” for existing
and revised NAAQS, (2) “the relative contribution to air
pollution concentrations of natural as well as anthropogenic
activity,” and (3) “any adverse public health, welfare, social,
economic, or energy effects” from different approaches to
NAAQS implementation. CAA § 109(d).
B. Application and Enforcement of NAAQS.
In order to implement a NAAQS, States are responsible
for identifying and submitting to EPA a list of areas to be
designated “attainment” (meeting the standard),
“nonattainment” (not meeting the standard), or
“unclassifiable.” CAA § 107(d)(1)(A). EPA then
promulgates these designations, making “such modifications
as the Administrator deems _ necessary.” CAA
§ 107(d)(1)(B). At that time, EPA “may classify”
nonattainment areas to provide an attainment date or “for
other purposes” unless “classifications are specifically
4
provided under other provisions” of the Act. CAA
§ 172(a)(1(C).
Once areas are designated and, if appropriate, classified
pursuant to the Act, States are responsible for adopting State
Implementation Plans (“SIPs”) that provide for
“implementation, maintenance, and enforcement” of the
NAAQS. CAA §110(a). For areas that are designated
nonattainment, the SIP must “meet the applicable
requirements of Part D.”. CAA § 110(a)(2)(I). General
requirements for nonattainment area plans are found in
Subpart | of Part D of Title I of the Act. CAA §§ 171-179B.
In 1990, Congress recognized that, for a variety of
reasons, the general classification and planning provisions of
Part D of the Act were not appropriate to address ozone
nonattainment and ozone “maintenance” based upon the
established 1-hour ozone NAAQS.’ Reflecting the failure of
many areas to attain the ozone NAAQS,’ as well as
Congress’ determination that massive economic dislocation
and impossible deadlines driven by the general planning
provisions were neither necessary nor appropriate responses
to ozone health risks,’ Congress in 1990 designated the 1977
> HLR. Rep. No. 101-952, at 335 (1990), reprinted in 1 Sen. Comm. on
Env’t and Pub. Works, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., A Legislative History of the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, at 1785 (Comm. Print 1993)
{hereinafter /990 Legis. Hist.], OJA 3546; see also H.R. Rep. No. 101-
490, pt. 1, at 146-49 (1990), reprinted in 2 1990 Legis. Hist., supra,
3170-72, OJA 3557-59; 136 Cong. Rec. 130-33 (Jan. 23, 1990),
reprinted in 4 1990 Legis. Hist., supra, 4832-39 (Sen. Chafee); APC Br.
15-17.
* H.R. Rep. No. 101-490, pt. 1, at 229-31, reprinted in 2 1990 Legis.
Hist., supra note 3, at 3253-55, OJA 359° 3600.
* See supra note 3.
5
Amendments’ General Provisions “Subpart 1” of Part D of
Title I of the Act, and added a new Subpart 2 to Part D of
Title 1. Subpart 2 “specifically provide[s]” for ozone
classifications and, based on those classifications, for detailed
regulatory requirements that Congress had concluded would
represent a pragmatic solution to reducing ozone
concentrations throughout the country. See CAA §§ 181-
185B.
Subpart 2 comprehensively addresses classification of
areas and control programs for ozone. It explains how areas
designated nonattainment for ozone are to be regulated, and
includes specific regulatory programs for volatile organic
compounds and nitrogen oxides, substances that contribute to
ozone formation. See, e.g., CAA § 182.
Subpart 2 also imposes requirements on areas that attain
the ozone NAAQS. As an example of the specificity of the
balances struck by Congress even for “attainment areas,”
each metropolitan area with a population of 100,000 or
greater in the Northeastern States “ozone transport region”
established by Congress in Subpart 2 must adopt an enhanced
vehicle inspection and maintenance program. CAA § 184(a),
(b)(1)(A). And nonattainment areas that achieve attainment
are subject to “maintenance plans” that “include a
requirement that [if the NAAQS is again violated,] the State
will implement all measures [including Subpart 2
requirements]. . . that were contained in the State
implementation plan for the area before redesignation” to
attainment. CAA § 175A(d).
In short, Congress “stood up to the plate” in Subpart 2 and
defined a risk management program to resolve the health
risks from ozone, rather than continuing the politically “feel
good” deadlines and control strategies that failed under
Subpart 1. Subpart 2 is Congress’ comprehensive and long-
6
term program to reduce health risks associated with ozone
concentrations in the ambient air.
Il. THE 1997 OZONE AND PM NAAQS REVISIONS.
Both ozone and PM have been the subject of NAAQS
since the beginning of the ambient standards program.
Ozone has been subject to a 1-hour NAAQS of 0.12 ppm that
EPA established in 1979 and reaffirmed in 1993 as protective
of public health with an adequate margin of safety. 58 Fed.
Reg. 13008, OJA 3449. PM has been subject to annual and
24-hour NAAQS that use PM,, as a size indicator, and that
were adopted in 1987 in place of earlier, less stringent
standards measuring PM as Total Suspended Particulate
(TSP). 52 Fed. Reg. 24634, PMJA 208.
In its brief, EPA asserts that scientific evidence that has
emerged since these NAAQS were last reviewed shows that
the existing standards fail to protect “millions of Americans
from adverse health effects.” EPA Br. 2. According to EPA,
“a wide range of adverse health effects were occurring at
concentrations below the pre-existing PM and ozone
NAAQS.” /d. 31 (emphasis added). But these assertions are
not the stated basis for the revised NAAQS and, indeed, do
not reflect the rulemaking records.°
Far from reflecting a response to demonstrated adverse
public health effects, EPA’s rulemaking determinations
represent a “policy choice” to provide more “margin of
safety” in light of “uncertainties associated with inconclusive
scientific and technical information” and “hazards that
* 62 Fed. Reg. 38656, PMJA 6 (PM risk estimates “should not be viewed
as demonstrated health impacts”); see also EPA, Review of National
Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone 104 (1996) [hereinafter OSP},
OJA 1914 (ozone risk estimates are not “demonstrated health impacts”).
7
research has not yet identified.” 62 Fed. Reg. 38857, OJA 2;
id. 38653, PMJA 3.’ This is because, contrary to EPA’s
assertions, the rulemaking records contain estimates of health
risk, not demonstrated adverse public health effects that are
occurring as a result of exposure to these pollutants.* The
existence of such risks was recognized in previous NAAQS
proceedings and, as EPA’s risk assessments show, are also
addressed by the existing NAAQS.°
As a result, as the record of these proceedings and the
Agency’s decisions show, this case is not about whether or
not EPA can regulate based on predictions of health risk.
Rather, it is about EPA’s failure to exercise reasoned pubiic
health risk management judgment as to the level of protection
that is “appropriate” among a range of “risk” options.
A. The Administrative Record on Ozone.
Reflecting that the rulemaking to revise the ozone
NAAQS was based on small, predicted health risks, the
’ See also EPA Br. (D.C. Cir. 97-1441) 35 (EPA “appropriately applied
margin of safety considerations in choosing among options.”); id. 48.
* See, e.g., 62 Fed. Reg. 38665, PMJA 15 (“[T]he Administrator believes
that it is more appropriate to provide additional protection against the risk
posed by PM by adding new standards for the fine fraction of PM,,.”); id.
38863, OJA 8 (explaining that the Administrator sought to reduce risk).
” See 58 Fed. Reg. 13015, OJA 3456 (lung function changes even on days
when the NAAQS was not exceeded); 52 Fed. Reg. 24642, PMJA 216
(noting the data suggest a “continuum of response” with the risk
“decreasing with concentration”); see also OSP, supra note 6, at 24, OJA
1834 (“Prior to completion of the previous review . . . there was a
substantial data base defining health effects of [ozone].”); 43 Fed. Reg.
26964, OJA 3518 (discussing range of health risks considered in
establishing 1979 NAAQS). Nor do the revised standards eliminate the
risk. EPA has not identified any level that is without risk for either
pollutant.
8
Administrator’s science advisers (CASAC) questioned the
need for the revised ozone NAAQS. As CASAC concluded:
[T]here is no ‘bright line’ which distinguishes any
of the proposed standards (either the level or the
number of allowable exceedences) as being
significantly more protective of public health. For
example, the differences in the percent of outdoor
children . . . responding between the present
standard and the most stringent proposal .. . are
small and their ranges overlap for all health
endpoints.'°
The administrative record on ozone sheds light on
CASAC’s concerns regarding appropriate standard revisions.
The record shows that, while attaining the existing 1-hour
ozone NAAQS would not eliminate all health risk associated
with exposure to ozone, a new NAAQS would not
necessarily reduce the remaining risk, and might even
increase it. The question EPA confronted therefore was what
level of health “risk” is “requisite” to protect the “public
health” given this record.
EPA’s own risk assessment found that the range of
estimated risk (expressed as the number or percent of
individuals in the sensitive population (outdoor children)""
° Letter from Dr. George T. Wolff, Chair, CASAC, to Hon. Carol M.
Browner 3 (Nov. 30, 1995) [hereinafter CASAC Ozone Letter], OJA 238
(emphasis added). EPA is simply wrong when it states that CASAC “did
not mean” that “the public health effects were the same at any level”
within the range. See EPA Br 33 n.23.
'' Bec se the risk assessment focuses on the sensitive subpopulation and
because it took into account the full range of dose/response information
contained in the health studies, it reflects responses by sensitive, as well
as typical, individuals.
9
predicted to respond to ozone at least once a year) overlapped
with the range of estimated risk if EPA retained the existing
standard.’ The overlap occurred for all the various types of
health effects that were analyzed. In fact, for approximately
one-third of the population evaluated, the new standard could
~place the population at greater risk than if the standard
remained unchanged."
Thus, EPA staff acknowledged that ranges of estimated
risk were little different for the 1-hour and 8-hour ozone
NAAQS." In fact, the staff concluded that an 8-hour
NAAQS of 0.09 ppm (which they indicated would be
roughly equivalent to the 1-hour NAAQS) “would reduce
estimated exposures of the at-risk population sufficiently to
provide some margin of safety.”"°
CASAC agreed. The Committee endorsed the full range
of options suggested by the staff, including no increase in the
"See CASAC Ozone Letter, supra note 10, at 3, OJA 238. Moreover, this
risk assessment did not even comprehensively address the uncertainties in
the data. APC Br. 11 & nn.16-20; see also CASAC Ozone Letter, supra -
note 10, at 2, OJA 237 (large uncertainties exist in the risk estimates);
OSP, supra note 6, at 55, OJA 1865 (noting that children do not appear to
experience the symptoms from ozone exposure that are modeled in the
risk assessment).
"62 Fed. Reg. 38867, OJA 12; OSP, supra note 6, at 80, OJA 1891.
Similarly, asthmatic hospital admissions in New York City were
predicted either to decrease slightly (0.2%) or increase slightly (0.03%)
depending on the form of the 0.08 ppm 8-hour standard. (EPA selected a
form for the standard that was between the two options evaluated.) See
Non-State CAA Pet’rs and Intervenors’ Br. (D.C. Cir. 97-1441) 52.
‘* OSP, supra note, 6, at 125, 130, OJA 1935, 1940; Memorandum from
Harvey M. Richmond to Karen Martin 5 (Feb. 11, 1997), OJA 2318.
'* OSP, supra note 6, at 167, OJA 1977: see also APC Br. 10-13, for
further discussion of the ozone record.
10
stringency of the standard.'° In fact, of the ten CASAC panel
members who expressed their opinions, four specifically
recommended an 8-hour NAAQS no more stringent than the
existing NAAQS and three others included 0.09 ppm within
their recommended range.'’ Because of overlapping risk
estimates, CASAC indicated that EPA’s selection of a
specific standard would have to reflect “policy judgment.”
But what decisional standard would govern that “policy
judgment”? CASAC provided no answer and was even told
by EPA not to provide information called for by the Act (e.g.,
“implementation impacts”) that could inform that policy
judgment.”
B. The Administrative Record on PM.
Although recommending the adoption of a NAAQS for
fine PM, CASAC noted “the many unanswered questions and
uncertainties regarding the issue of causality” of health
effects by the pollutant, which created uncertainty about the
level of health protection under a revised standard. These
'° CASAC Ozone Letter, supra note 10, at 3, OJA 238.
'” Id., OJA 238. Thus, whatever concerns CASAC may once have had
with the adequacy of the protection provided by the existing standard, see
EPA Br. 13 (citing a letter written by CASAC in 1989), after reviewing
the latest scientific information as presented in the OSP and Criteria
Document the majority of CASAC was comfortable with recommending
a standard at the stringency of the existing one.
'* CASAC Ozone Letter, supra note 10, at 3, OJA 238.
'° Compare CASAC Tr. (3/21/95), 36-39, OJA 253-54 (EPA’s Gleason
states that CASAC’s responsibilities concerning implementation
Strategies are “irrelevant to how we set standards”), with CASAC Tr.
(3/19/95), 37-38, OJA 285-86 (CASAC member Price notes a “bit of a
conflict” with EPA in that there “is not that review” of the “the interface
of science and control strategy issues” called for by the Act).
11
uncertainties affecting EPA’s risk characterization included:
“exposure misclassification, measurement error, the influence
of confounders, the shape of the dose-response function, . . .
the lack of an understanding of toxicological mechanisms,
and the existence of possible alternative explanations.” Ags
a result, CASAC was unable to form a consensus on
appropriate NAAQS for fine PM.”!
Confirming CASAC’s concerns, EPA staff “emphasize[d]
the unusually large uncertainties” associated with
establishing standards for PM,..” These uncertainties
included the “lack of demonstrated mechanisms” that “limits
judgments about causality of effects and appropriate
concentration-response models to apply in quantitatively
estimating risks” associated with PM, ,.”
EPA staff also acknowledged “the question as to whether
or to what extent the observed effects attributed to PM
exposures are confounded by other pollutants commonly
occurring in community air.” The EPA staff noted that
° Letter from Dr. George T. Wolff, Chair, CASAC, to Hon. Carol M.
Browner 3 (June 13, 1996) [hereinafter CASAC PM Letter], PMJA 3163
(emphasis added).
*" Id. 2, PMJA 3162.
” EPA, Review of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for
Particulate Matter VII-41 (1996) [hereinafter PMSP], PMJA 2153
(emphasis added).
*® Id. VII-42, PMJA 2154.
* Id., PMJA 2154. A “confounder” in an epidemiological study is an
“independent risk factor [e.g., another pollutant] for the outcome” (e.g.,
mortality) that is “associated with the exposure variable” (e.g., ambient
PM). EPA, Air Quality Criteria for Particulate Matter 12-24 (1996)
[hereinafter PMCD], PMJA 1398. Failure to consider a “confounder” in
12
several authors “have demonstrated that it may not be
possible to separate individual effects of multiple
pollutants.” The staff recognized that, even when
Statistically significant, reported associations between
particulate matter and health effects were “weak” and the
relative risks’” were “consistently ‘small’’’’—indeed, so
small that epidemiologists are generally reluctant to believe
such risk findings.’
Furthermore, while EPA emphasizes that a number of
epidemiological studies addressed PM effects, EPA Br. 9,
most of those studies involved PM size fractions other than
the PM,, fraction that EPA chose to regulate.”* And most of
eee
an epidemiological study may produce inaccurate or exaggerated
associations with the variable of concern (i.e., PM).
*> PMSP, supra note 22, at VII-42 to VII-43, PMJA 2154-55.
*° PMCD, supra note 24, at 12-346 to 12-347, PMJA 1720-21.
>” See Gary Taubes, Epidemiology Faces Its Limits, 269 Science 164, 168
(1995), PMJA 3134. While EPA argues that the concept of statistical
significance can be used to separate associations that “may reflect cause-
and-effect relationships” from those that may be the product of “chance,”
EPA Br. 9 n.10, statistical significance “only takes into consideration
random variation in the data. It ignores the systematic errors, the biases
and confounders, that will almost invariably overwhelm the statistical
variation.” Taubes, supra, at 168, PMJA 3134 (citing Norman Breslow,
University of Washington). In short, the existence of a statistically
Significant association does not establish either causality or the
significance of health risk.
*8 See 62 Fed. Reg. 38676, PMJA 26 (citing PMSP, supra note 22, at V-
60b to V-60c, V-61a, PMJA 2023-24, 2026). While several studies are
listed in the tables relied on by EPA, only Schwartz, et al. (1996),
Thurston, et al. (1994), Schwartz, et al. (1994), Dockery, et al. (1993),
and Pope, et al. (1995) reported a statistically significant relationship
with PM,,;. Two studies in those tables reported no statistically
significant association between PM, , and the studied effects, Ostro, et al.
13
those studies ignored the important effect of confounders
(e.g., the presence of other pollutants or other variables that
could have produced the effect). See supra note 27.
The record showed that in six of seven studies in which
confounders were fully analyzed, the initial association
reported between PM and health effects lost statistical
significance.” As the staff acknowledged, therefore, studies
that failed to consider a full array of confounders “probably
overestimate[d] the PM effect.” Yet, during the
rulemaking, EPA consistently denied to the public data
needed to analyze the role of confounders in the critical PM,
studies.”
Although EPA put forward quantitative projections of the
health impacts of low levels of PM, ,, the uncertainties in the
science were so great that Agency staff warned that its “risk
estimates . . . should not be interpreted as precise measures of
risk.””’ Similarly, CASAC noted that the risk assessment did
(1993) and Neas, et. ai. (1995). The daily PM,, levels were as high in
the studies that did not report statistical significance as in the ones that
did.
** See Non-State Fine PM Pet. Br. (D.C. Cir. 97-1440) 17.
*° PMCD, supra note 24, at 12-333, PMJA 1707.
" EPA did not make the data available even though EPA itself had
funded the most critical studies and despite a requirement that “the
factual data on which the proposed rule is based” be placed in the public
docket. See CAA § 307(d)(3). EPA's failure to place these data in the
docket, and its implications for the validity of the PM, , standards, was
one of the issues that the lower court said it would resolve only after EPA
responded to the court’s remand. Non-State Fine PM Pet. Br. (D.C. Cir.
97-1440) 33-44; 175 F.3d 1034, Pet. App. Sa.
* PMSP, supra note 22, at VI-1, PMJA 2051 (emphasis added). Among
the uncertainties acknowledged by EPA staff were “uncertainties in the
concentration-response” relationship, use of ambient concentrations “as a
14
not include all of the uncertainties and that the combined
effect of those uncertainties was not examined.” Thus,
EPA’s risk assessment was simply “premised on the
assumption that PM (measured as PM,, and PM, .) is causally
related to the health effects observed in the epidemiological
studies and/or that PM is a useful index for the mixture of
pollutants that is related to these effects.”
For these reasons, CASAC observed that EPA’s risk
assessments were of “limited value” for identifying an
appropriate standard’’ and noted “the existence of possible
alternative explanations” for the effects examined in the risk
assessment.” While most of the science advisers endorsed
the concept of a PM,, standard, only 2 of 21 specifically
recommended an annual NAAQS as stringent as the one EPA
surrogate for population exposures,” the lack of site-specific risk
estimates for PM,, and uncertain estimates of baseline incidence of
hospital admissions and respiratory symptoms. /d. at VI-1, VI-7, VI-14,
VI-21, PMJA 2051, 2058, 2066, 2073. EPA assumed there was no
threshold for the effects. PMSP. supra note 22, at VI-16; PMJA 2068.
*’ CASAC PM Letter, supra note 20, at 3, PMJA 3163; see also Leland
Deck, et al., A Particulate Matter Risk Assessment for Philadelphia and
Los Angeles 105 (1996), PMJA 3362 (co-pollutants were not addressed).
** PMSP, supra note 22, at VI-1, PMJA 2051 (emphasis added).
However, CASAC noted “the many unanswered questions and
uncertainties regarding the issue of causality.” CASAC PM Letter, supra
note 20, at 3, PMJA 3163.
** CASAC PM Letter, supra note 20, at 3, PMJA 3163. EPA’s reliance
on this risk assessment to quantify health effects from PM concentrations
below the previous standards, EPA Br. 2, is therefore unwarranted.
*° CASAC PM Letter, supra note 20, at 3, PMJA 3163.
15
chose to make its controlling standard.’’ In an observation
that reflected the nature of the record, CASAC also noted that
any decision on NAAQS revision would require “policy
judgments.”*
C. The Impacts of Standard Revision.
In contrast to the uncertain health risk and inconclusive
science on which the Administrator’s decisions were based,
the ozone and PM NAAQS revisions would impose real and
substantial burdens on society. For example, EPA observed
in its regulatory impact assessment that the revised standards
would create implementation difficulties and may be
unachievable in many areas.” Nevertheless, the Agency
estimated that the revised ozone and PM NAAQS could
together cost as much as $47 billion annually.“ Others
(including the Council for Economic Advisors) estimated
that the revised NAAQS would be even more expensive. See
APC Br. 17-19. By comparison, only $18 billion were spent
on medical research in the U.S. the year the NAAQS were
promulgated. See U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Statistical
Abstract of the United States 118, Table 163 (119th ed.
1999). Of this, $16.5 billion were government sponsored,
" Id. at 5, PMJA 3165; see also 62 Fed. Reg. 38670, PMJA 20
(explaining the annual NAAQS will be “the generally controlling
standard”).
** CASAC PM Letter, supra note 20, at 4, PMJA 3164. As with ozone,
however, see supra note 19, EPA’s science advisers did not address
factors such as implementation impacts that could have informed EPA's
policy judgment.
* EPA, Regulatory Analyses for the Particulate Matter and Ozone
National Ambient Air Quality Standards and Proposed Regional Haze
Rule ES-12, 7-2, 7-5 (1997), OJA 2919, 2930-31.
” Id. ES-12 to ES-13, OJA 2919-20.
16
and $1.5 billion were privately sponsored. /d. These figures
illuminate the disparity between the investments that would
be compelled in this case to address uncertain health risks
and the government’s total investment in medical research
directed at demonstrated adverse public health effects.
D. The Administrator’s Decisions.
The Ozone and PM NAAQS-The Administrator explained
that her decisions to revise the NAAQS reflected her
judgment as to how much protection is “sufficient{]” in light
of “uncertainties associated with inconclusive scientific and
technical information” and “hazards that research has not yet
identified.” 62 Fed. Reg. 38857, OJA 2; id. 38653 PMJA 3.
But rather than explain what principles guided her exercise of
“policy judgment” in selecting among regulatory options
based upon uncertain predictions of risk, the Administrator
addressed at length the factors that did not guide her
judgment. These factors, which could have provided a
principled approach to making risk management decisions,
included the cost and technological feasibility of controls, the
disruptive impact of replacing the congressional ozone
reduction program with a new program to be devised by
EPA, and the public health “disbenefits” of more restrictive
standards.*'
The Administrator did explain the factors that she used to
characterize the health risk associated with PM and ozone.
These included “the nature and severity of the health effects
“' 62 Fed. Reg. 38878-85, OJA 23-30; id. 38683-95, PMJA 33-45; EPA,
Responses to Significant Comments on the National Ambient Air Quality
Standards for Ozone 128-33 (July 1997), OJA 210-15; EPA, Responses
to Significant Comments on the 1996 Proposed Rule on the National
Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter 112 (July 1997),
PMJA 312.
17
involved, the size of the sensitive population(s) at risk, the
types of health information available, and the kind and
degree of uncertainties that must be addressed.’
Based on these factors and the scientific record described
above, the Agency presented ranges of risks for alternative
standard levels.“ For ozone, EPA selected a revised standard
from this range at a level that, in the Agency’s judgment,
reflected the level at which “public health impacts . . . [are]
important and sufficiently large as to warrant a standard.’
For PM, EPA selected the 15 g/m’ annual PM, , NAAQS on
the grounds that the evidence for health risk below that level
was too uncertain.”
“ See 62 Fed. Reg. 38883, OJA 28: id. 38688, PMJA 38.
* For ozone, it identified a range of standards from 0.09 ppm (which it
equated to the existing 1-hour NAAQS) to 0.07 ppm. 62 Fed. Reg.
38858, OJA 3. For the annual PM,, standards (the controlling PM, ,
standard), id. 38670, PMJA 20, EPA identified a range of 12 g/m’ to 20
ug/m’. 61 Fed. Reg. 65659, PMJA 140. The range proposed for the 24-
hour PM,, standard was 20 g/m’ to 65 g/m’. Jd, PMJA 140. The
Agency set secondary NAAQS for both ozone and PM, , at the level of
the primary NAAQS. 62 Fed. Reg. 38877, OJA 22; id. 38683, PMJA 33.
“ 62 Fed. Reg. 38868, OJA 13; see also EPA Br. (D.C. Cir. 97-1441) 41
(A 0.09 ppm standard “would not adequately address the uncertainties
concerning...chronic effects,” while “uncertainties concerning chronic
effects were too great to warrant selection of the second- or third-highest
forms” of a 0.08 ppm standard.); id. 42-43 (EPA is not required “to make
any specific ‘findings,”” not even a finding that regulatory action is
needed to protect against a “significant risk of harm.”).
* See 62 Fed. Reg. 38675, PMJA 25: EPA Br. 11. Reflecting the
uncertainty and sizable impacts, the President ultimately instructed EPA
to complete a further review of the science prior to implementing these
standards. 62 Fed. Reg. 38421, PMJA 195.
18
What the Agency did not do was to articulate a principle
based on the statute for managing those risks—i.e, a principle
that explains why certain risks were “sufficiently large” to
require regulation or how much uncertainty is too much.”
The Agency did not articulate a principle that a court could
use for assessing whether the resulting standard is
reasonable.*’
Subpart 2—In its “[flinal decision on the primary
standard” for ozone, EPA explained how “the Act should be
interpreted” regarding the interplay of Subpart 2 and EPA’s
ozone NAAQS revision authority. As EPA explained, “the
1-hour standard will remain applicable to an area until EPA
determines that it has attained the 1-hour standard.” At that
time, the |-hour standard and Subpart 2 “will no longer apply
to that area.” 62 Fed. Reg. 38873, OJA 18 (final decision);
see id. 38884-85, OJA 29-30 (response to comments). EPA
therefore concluded that it had statutory authority to adopt a
more stringent ozone NAAQS that would override the
comprehensive Subpart 2 ozone risk management program
adopted by Congress for ozone attainment, nonattainment,
and maintenance areas. Based on that interpretation, EPA
promulgated regulatory provisions (40 C.F.R. §§ 50.9(b),
50.10) that “replac(ed] the existing 1-hour [standard]. . . with
a new [more stringent] 8-hour [standard].” 62 Fed. Reg.
38873, 38894-95, OJA 18, 39-40.
*° See 175 F.3d 1036, Pet. App. 10a.
”’ See, e.g., 62 Fed. Reg. 38883, OJA 28; id. 38688, PMJA 38; see also
EPA Br. 28-29 (requiring consistent decisional criteria is “inconsistent
with EPA’s own expert assessment of the flexibility necessary to apply
Section 109’s mandate to all the pollutants for which EPA must develop
standards”).
19
fil. THE D.C. CIRCUIT DECISIONS.
Faced with EPA’s failure to articulate an intelligible
principle to guide its exercise of public health risk
management judgment, a three-judge panel of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
held (with Judge Tatel dissenting) that EPA’s interpretation
of the Clean Air Act would render the Act’s applicable
provisions an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power. 175 F.3d 1034, Pet. App. 5a. Because the court
believed that these provisions might be subject to an
interpretation that would not violate the nondelegation
doctrine, however, the court remanded both revised NAAQS
to EPA. The court directed EPA to develop a construction of
the Act that would provide an intelligible principle for EPA’s
exercise of risk management judgment.”
In remanding the NAAQS, however, the court tied EPA’s
hands in developing this “intelligible principle.” The lower
court did this by reaffirming the D.C. Circuit’s previous
interpretations of the Act to preclude EPA from relying on
many factors that the Agency otherwise should have
considered to guide its risk management judgment when
promulgating NAAQS.”
The panel also unanimously held that there was no
ambiguity that Congress intended implementation of an
“* Because it concluded that EPA’s interpretation of the Act was flawed,
the lower court left unanswered critical questions concerning EPA’s
interpretation of the science. See supra note 31. Thus, it is misleading
for the American Lung Association to state that the court “did not. . .
question the validity of the science relied upon by EPA... .” ALA Br.
11.
” Those interpretations of the Act are fully briefed in Case No. 99-1426.
20
ozone NAAQS to proceed under Subpart 2, and agreed with
petitioners that Subpart 2 “must preclude the EPA from
requiring areas to comply either more quickly or with a more
stringent ozone NAAQS.” 175 F.3d 1049, Pet. App. 40a
(emphasis added). The panel, however, refused to set aside
the primary and secondary 8-hour stan¢ ards, 175 F.3d 1057,
Pet. App. 57a-58a, presumably restricting EPA’s authority on
remand to the promulgation of revised standards that would
not be more stringent than the |-hour standard.
In response to requests for rehearing and reconsideration
en banc, the full circuit court declined to hear the case. The
panel declined to modify its opinion on “nondelegation” or
on consideration of the protective effects of a criteria
pollutant. 195 F.3d 6, 10, Pet. App. 7la, 82a. After
unanimously disagreeing with EPA’s contention that it
lacked jurisdiction over questions concerning the effect of
Subpart 2, the panel, in an opinion and a partial concurrence,
affirmed that the revised standard could be enforced “only in
conformity with Subpart 2.” Jd. 10, Pet. App. 81a.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. This case concerns the bedrock principle that an agency
may act only within the limits of the authority delegated to it
by Congress. Unless an agency can enunciate the limits of
*® The court also unanimously remanded the ozone standards because
EPA had failed to consider evidence that ozone in the ambient air is
protective with regard to exposure to solar ultraviolet radiation that has
been associated with skin cancer and cataracts. 175 F.3d. 1051-53, Pet.
App. 44a-49a. Furthermore, the court vacated the Agency’s new coarse
PM standards because the Agency’s chosen pollutant indicator, PM, ,
was “poorly matched to the relevant pollution agent.” /d. 1055, Pet. App.
53a. Neither of these holdings, which will require further rulemaking on
remand, are before this Court.
21
that delegation, it is not possible for the court to evaluate the
validity of its action and it is not possible for the agency to
adopt rules that reflect “reasoned” decisionmaking.
In these rulemakings, EPA revised the ozone and PM
NAAQS that were previously found “requisite to protect the
public health” with an “adequate margin of safety.” EPA
made its decision based not on findings of demonstrated
health effects, but rather based on the Administrator’s
_ evaluation of public health risks.
In promulgating the revised NAAQS, EPA described at
length factors it used to characterize the risks at issue but was
silent on how it went about managing those risks. According
to the Administrator, her decision was “largely judgmental in
nature . . . and may not be amenable to quantification in
terms of what risk is ‘acceptable’ or any other metric.” 62
Fed. Reg. 38883, OJA 28; id. 38688, PMJA 38. Yet, it is the
formulation of this very policy judgment that Congress
delegated to EPA under § 109 of the CAA. The absence of
any explanation by EPA of the principle that guided that
exercise of judgment, based on the authority delegated to it
by Congress, renders EPA’s actions unlawful.
2. EPA’s argument that the courts have no jurisdiction to
review EPA’s resolution of whether Subpart 2 restricts its
NAAQS revision authority is wrong. Respondents agree
with EPA that its final ozone NAAQS rules, 40 C.F.R.
§§ 50.9(b), 50.10, are facially inconsistent with the
legislative program for managing ozone health risks. Under
the CAA’s pre-enforcement review scheme, and this Court’s
decision in Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U.S. 578
(1980), the court of appeals correctly reviewed the validity of
these rules—a necessary element of which was the scope of
EPA’s authority to implement a revised, and more stringent,
22
ozone NAAQS in light of the comprehensive Subpart 2
program for managing ozone health risks.
3. The language of the statute, the legislative history, and
the structure of the Act all make clear that Subpart 2 is
Congress’ exclusive, long-term program for managing ozone
health risks. Because, as EPA concedes, EPA’s more
stringent revised ozone NAAQS cannot be implemented or
enforced under Subpart 2, EPA’s decision to revise the ozone
NAAQS is neither “appropriate” in accordance with §§ 108
and 109(b) nor lawful, given the comprehensive statutory
program. |
ARGUMENT
I. EPA IMPROPERLY CONSTRUED THE
STATUTE TO PROVIDE NO LEGAL STANDARD,
OR “INTELLIGIBLE PRINCIPLE,” THAT
WOULD GUIDE ITS EXERCISE OF PUBLIC
HEALTH RISK MANAGEMENT JUDGMENT.
In reviewing EPA’s decisions to revise the ozone and PM
NAAQS, the D.C. Circuit invoked the so-called “weak” form
of the nondelegation doctrine. 175 F.3d 1038, Pet. App. 14a
(distinguishing the “strong” form). This is not a doctrine
used by courts to declare statutes unconstitutional.*' To the
contrary, it is a canon of statutory construction-designed to
preserve the constitutionality of broad congressional
delegations of authority. See infra note 56. All this doctrine
Says is that the agency must articulate, based on its
authorizing legislation, the decisional principle that Congress
*' The lower court thus adhered to the principle that courts show restraint
when resolving issues implicating separation-of-powers disputes. See
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 833 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring).
23
provided to guide the agency’s exercise of rulemaking
authority.
This is not unusual. Reviewing courts must always
identify the legal standard applied by an agency in order to
assess the consistency of the agency’s action with the
articulated statutory principle. See, e.g, American Lung
Ass'n v. EPA, 134 F.3d 388, 392-93 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
To be sure, there are several ways the lower court could
have reached the same result: that the Agency’s refusal to
state a reason for its choice among alternative risk
management options was “arbitrary and capricious” under the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”);* that the Agency
did not adequately explain its action; or that EPA
misinterpreted the statute as providing no principle to guide
its exercise of public health risk management judgment.
Whichever basis for decision one chooses, the essential
principle is the same: an agency must explain what it does in
light of Congress’ delegation of authority. It must explain
that for the benefit of the public, the courts that may have to
review its actions, the Congress that must exercise oversight,
and the future agency decisionmakers that must make
consistent decisions. Because EPA has not in this case
offered any intelligible principle to guide its exercise of
public heath risk management judgment, the court properly
sent this case back to EPA.
* See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 43 (1983). CAA § 307(d)(9) provides for the same review.
* See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196-97 (1947); Burlington
Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167-68 (1962).
24
A. EPA Improperly Claims Unfettered Authority to
Exercise Public Health Risk Management
Judgment.
This case involves EPA’s exercise of “policy” judgment to
revise existing NAAQS to provide more “margin of safety”
in response to uncertain and overlapping estimates of health
risk. In this situation, the CAA calls for EPA to make a
decision about how to manage “public health” risk.
According to the statute, EPA is to set a standard that
provides a level of pollution “requisite” to protect the “public
health” with an “adequate margin of safety,” CAA § 109,—a
standard that must “promote” both public health and welfare
and the “productive capacity” of the country. CAA § 101(b).
In this case, EPA merely characterized a range of
uncertain risks and selected from that range without
identifying any statutory principle that was guiding this
selection. That the lower court demanded that EPA identify
some legal standard restricting its exercise of discretion is not
unusual. Courts commonly set aside agency orders because
the agency failed to apply the correct legal standard when it
promulgated a rule or took some other action. Similarly,
where an agency construes a statute to provide no legal
standard at all to constrain its discretion, the courts properly
have questioned that construction under the nondelegation
doctrine.*» Remanding the case for EPA to construe the Act
* For example, in Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322 US.
607, 618-19 (1944), Congress authorized the agency to define “area of
production” in geographic terms, leading the Court to disapprove a
regulation dependent on the number of workers involved instead.
*° See, e.g., National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S.
336, 342-43 (1974); International Union, UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310,
25
to provide an intelligible principle that would constrain how
it manages public health risk is in full keeping with the
Court’s decisions. This Court always has demanded that
agencies be guided by an intelligible principle.”
EPA suggests that it has interpreted the statute to
recognize limits on its standard revision authority.
According to EPA, it considered the types of health evidence,
the severity of harm, the uncertainty of risk, and the size of
the sensitive population to define a range of risks.
Considering these factors, EPA explains, led it to select a
standard greater than zero risk but more stringent than the
existing ambient standards. EPA Br. 31-33.
1313 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see also AT&T Corp. v. lowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S.
366, 388-89, 392 (1999).
°° See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 374 n7 (1989)
(nondelegation doctrine requires narrow construction of statutes that
might otherwise be unconstitutional); /ndustrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO
v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980) (plurality)
(agency should be allowed to characterize statute in a way to avoid
unconstitutional delegation); National Cable Television Ass'n, 415 U.S.
at 342 (“the hurdles revealed in [A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), and JW. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v.
United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928)] lead us to read the [Independent
Offices Appropriation Act] narrowly to avoid constitutional problems”);
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1965) (construing statute so as to avoid
an invalid delegation); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958) (the act
in question does “not delegate to the Secretary the kind of authority
exercised”); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
*” See, e.g., Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 758, 771 (1996);
Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165 (1991); FEA v. Algonquin
SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 559-60 (1976).
26
EPA’s factors, however, characterize risk but say nothing
about managing it.’ And that is the problem with EPA’s
rulemaking—FEPA identifies no principle to guide its exercise
of public health risk management judgment.”
Risk management judgment involves the selection and
justification of a regulatory option. No matter how extensive
the Agency’s data base for risk predictions, or how elaborate
the Agency’s risk characterization, characterizing risks is not
the same as explaining what risk in the range presented by
the Agency is “requisite” to protect “public health” with an
“adequate margin of safety.” EPA’s failure to articulate how
it managed the risk presented by these pollutants in light of
these statutory standards and the purposes section of the Act
contravenes precisely what Congress directed EPA to do in
these rulemakings. “
For ozone, for example, EPA explains that estimated
health risks and exposures decreased with more restrictive
* Cf Committee on the Institutional Means for Assessment of Risks to
Public Health, National Research Council, Risk Assessment in the
Federal Government: Managing the Process 28-33 (1983) (identifying
the components of risk assessment).
® See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't, 448 U.S. at 645-46 (public health
regulation must be based on significant public health risks).
* In attempting to articulate a more precise standard, EPA added in its
rehearing papers that its guiding principle was to set a level “necessary
for public health protection: neither more nor Jess stringent than
necessary, but ‘requisite."” 195 F.3d 6, Pet. App. 72a (emphasis in
original). Now, EPA asserts that it need not supply a principle that
establishes a NAAQS at the “right” level. EPA Br. 27. EPA counsels’
evolving view of what the statute requires highlights the very
inadequacies that troubled the lower court. See Burlington Truck, 371
U.S. at 168-69. In any event, post hoc rationalizations of counsel cannot
save an agency’s inadequate explanation of its action. /d.
27
standards. EPA then argues that there were “important and
meaningful” differences in the character of scientific
evidence regarding risk for various standards. EPA Br. 33.
But EPA’s science advisers concluded that none of the
standards under consideration, including the current standard,
could be distinguished as being significantly more protective
of public health.” Against this background, the
Administrator’s assertion that public health impacts were
“important and sufficiently large to warrant a standard set at a
level of 0.08 ppm,” 62 Fed. Reg. 38868, OJA 13, simply
reflects unexplained “policy” judgment. As the lower court
observed, this is a “self-sufficient justification for every
refusal to define limits.” 175 F.3d 1037, Pet. App. 12a-13a.
Similarly, for PM, the Administrator observed that while
“inherent scientific uncertainties are too great to support
[PM,,] standards based on the lowest concentrations
measured,” revised standards more stringent than the existing
standards were appropriate “despite [the] well recognized
uncertainties.” | As the lower court observed, the
“increasing-uncertainty argument is helpful only if some
principle reveals how much uncertainty is too much.” 175
F.3d 1036, Pet. App. 10a.
Ultimately, according to the Administrator, she is
authorized by the Act to revise NAAQS based on a “policy
judgment” to provide more margin of safety, even if health
impacts “may not be amenable to quantification in terms of
what risk is ‘acceptable’ or any other metric.” 62 Fed. Reg.
38688, PMJA 38; id. 38883, OJA 28. It is this assertion of
unfettered authority to exercise discretion to which the lower
*' See supra p. 8.
* 62 Fed. Reg. 38675, PMJA 25; see supra pp. 10-14.
28
court objected. 175 F.3d 1035, Pet. App. 8a (EPA’s revision
decision is “nothing more than a statement that lower
exposure levels are associated with lower risk to public
health.”’).
By offering as its decisional criteria factors that go only to
risk characterization, and not public heath risk management,
EPA would tur the Clean Air Act into a statute like the
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), for which
judicial review looks only at the procedure the agency
followed. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490
U.S. 332, 350 (1989) (citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978)). If the Agency
has followed an elaborate procedure and identified the range
of potential health risks, EPA argues, judicial review should
cease. There is to be, in effect, no review of its substantive
decisionmaking at all.
This argument may work for a statute that, like NEPA,
requires only “procedure” and not a “substantive”
decisionmaking result. It does not work for a statute that,
like § 109, demands a substantive outcome: a level of air
quality “requisite to protect” the “public health” with an
“adequate margin of safety.”
EPA in fact comes close to arguing its § 109
decisionmaking is a matter “committed to agency discretion
by law” and therefore unreviewable. See Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971). But
that cannot be so because, as even EPA concedes, the Clean
Air Act unquestionably provides law to apply. EPA Br. 22.
In short, the problem here is that EPA has interpreted the
Statute to provide no principle to guide its exercise of risk
management judgment—a problem so fundamental that, if
Congress had written the Act as interpreted by EPA, the
constitutionality of the statute would have been called into
29
question. It is for this reason that the court below invoked
the nondelegation doctrine.
Since the creation of the Interstate Commerce
Commission, this country has engaged in the process of
turning over government decisions to specialized agencies.
Concomitant with the delegation of decisionmaking authority
is a requirement that the decisionmakers remain accountable,
and that Congress remains accountable. This means that
agency decisionmakers must explain their rationale in light of
Congress’ delegation of authority.
Agencies must explain the statutory standard that guides
their exercise of rulemaking discretion and how consideration
of relevant science is applied in reference to that standard.
This explanation is important for multiple reasons implicated
by the nondelegation doctrine, as the lower court explained.
175 F.3d 1038, Pet. App. 14a. First, an explanation is
necessary so that the courts can exercise judicial review.”
There must be ascertainable standards to which a reviewing
court may turn, for “it will not do for a court to be compelled
to guess at the theory underlying the agency’s action... .”
Chenery, 332 U.S. at 196-97.
Second, an explanation is necessary so that Congress can
exercise its own oversight of the agency. For there to be
informed legislative oversight, Congress must be able to
understand how the agency has interpreted the delegation it
* See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953 n.16 (1983); Skinner v. Mid-
America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 218-19 (1989); Industrial Union
Dep't, 448 U.S. at 686 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); see also L. Bressman,
Schechter Poultry at the Millennium: A Delegation Doctrine for the
Administrative State, 109 Yale L.J. 1399, 1440 (April 2000).
30
has been given.“ Third, an explanation of the principle
underlying a decision is necessary so that agency
decisionmakers themselves can, in the future, be consistent.
State Farm, 463 U.S. at 46-49, 56-57. Fourth, the public has
a right to be told what Congress has delegated to the
Executive Branch, and whether the Executive Branch has
acted within its congressionally delegated powers. Clinton v.
New York, 524 U.S. 417, 449-53 (1998) (Kennedy, J,
concurring).
The requirement that an agency explain the statutory
principle that guides its exercise of judgment should be
enforced all the more strictly in a case like this one, where
the decision being made is of enormous importance in terms
of its broad impacts on society. Cf Industrial Union Dep't,
448 U.S. at 686. As the D.C. Circuit stated in remanding a
different NAAQS, “[w]here, as here, Congress has delegated
to an administrative agency the critical task of assessing the
public health and the power to make decisions of national
import in which individuals’ lives and welfare hang in the
balance, that agency has the heaviest of obligations to explain
and expose every step of its reasoning.” As the court
explained, “(ujnless [the Administrator] describes the
standard under which she has arrived at this conclusion,
supported by a ‘[]plausible’ explanation, . . . we have no
basis for exercising our responsibility to determine whether
her decision is ‘arbitrary [or] capricious. . . .”” American
Lung, 134 F.3d at 392-93 (emphasis added; citation omitted).
“ See W. Wilson, Congressional Government 303 (1885), cited in
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 132 (1979); see also Loving, 517
U.S. at 773.
* American Lung Ass'n, 134 F.3d at 392; see also FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 S Ct. 1291, 1301 (2000).
31
If agencies need not explain their decisions in light of the
legal standard imposed by Congress, we will be left with a
government of men, not of laws. Cf. Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 646 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring). Guarding against this result are the checks
provided by the coordinate branches—especially judicial
review—and, more fundamentally, an insistence on written
rules applied as objectively as possible—insistence, in short,
on the rule of law. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
575-76 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
By contrast, the EPA’s position in this case furthers the
pernicious idea that some decisions are beyond the
understanding both of the public and the courts—that some
decisions, indeed the most important ones, must ultimately
turn on unquantifiable, inexplicable policy “judgment” by the
Executive. Reliance on unexplained agency judgment leads
to rulemaking by ideology, prejudice, or messianic urge.
This is not the “rule of law.”
In sum, the agency must first explain the statutory
principle it has applied based on Congress’ delegation of
authority, and the courts must then say what the law is
ultimately. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803). That is all the D.C. Circuit has asked EPA to do in
this case—a most unremarkable outcome when measured
against EPA’s remarkable claim of unfettered authority to
exercise public health risk management judgment.
B. EPA Is Obligated To Identify the Principle that
Guides Its Exercise of Rulemaking Authority Even
Where Congress Acts By Broad Delegation.
In large part, the Government’s argument for waving EPA
through the judicial review gate is that the courts have
affirmed the constitutionality of other, broad delegations.
EPA Br. 26-30; Mass/NJ Br. 39-41. In those cases, however,
32
parties did not seek review of whether “the will of Congress
[had] been obeyed” by the agency, see Yakus v. United
States, 321 U.S, 414, 426 (1944), but rather whether the
statute was drafted so as to make that inquiry impossible (i.e.,
whether the statute itself created a nondelegation problem).
In those cases, the Court found an ample basis for the
agency to articulate, by resort to the statutory language,
legislative history, and other indicia of congressional intent,
defining principles for making its judgment. As a result, the
cases on which EPA relies do not stand for the proposition
that an agency may implement delegated authority without
articulating an “intelligible principle.”
For example, in Touby, the Court rejected a challenge to
Congress’ delegation of power to the Attorney General to add
drugs temporarily to the schedule of controlled substances
when “necessary to avoid an imminent hazard to the public
safety.” 500 U.S. at 166. As the Court found, the statute
articulated clear boundaries for the Attorney General’s
discretion, id at 167, and the question whether the Attomey
General had obeyed this legislative command was not before
the Court. By contrast, the question before the court of
appeals in this case was whether the delegated agency had
acted in accordance with a defined principle grounded in the
statutory language and purpose.”
That the Court has found in other cases that there were
sufficient limits on the agency’s discretion to satisfy facial
challenges to the constitutionality of a statute does not
suggest that an agency need not identify those limits when
* See also Skinner, 490 U.S. 212 (challenge to the constitutionality of a
statute directing the Secretary of Transportation to establish user fees to
cover costs of pipeline safety program, not to consistency of the resultin
regulatory program with the statute).
33
exercising its discretion.” If anything, the Court’s careful
analysis of the congressional delegation in these cases
confirms the need for agency action to be guided by an
intelligible principle founded in the language and purposes of
the Act.™
As the Court has observed, the touchstone of the non-
delegation doctrine remains that “private rights are protected
by access to the courts fo fest the application of the policy in
light of the[] legislative declaration{].” American Power &
Light, 329 U.S. at 105 (emphasis added). All the lower
court’s decision says is that EPA cannot construe Congress’
broad delegation of NAAQS revision authority to authorize
unfettered risk management judgment. Rather, the Agency
must explain the statutory principle that constrains its
exercise of discretion.
C. There Is Law To Apply To Guide EPA’s Exercise
of Risk Management Judgment.
Where an agency, as here, has interpreted a statute to
provide no principle to guide its exercise of discretion, the
court must look to the statute and congressional intent to
ascertain whether there is law to apply. See Marbury, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) at 177 (“It is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is.”). Thus, in
every challenge to a statute vider the nondelegation doctrine,
this Court has analyzed the statute and congressional intent to
ascertain whether Congress has identified legal standards for
*” See, e.g., American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 US. 90, 105
(1946); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943);
New York Central Securities Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12 (1932).
** See also FPC v. Conway, 426 U.S. 271 (1976) (Commission must use
Statutory “undue discrimination” principle when selecting a standard
from the “zone of reasonableness”).
34
the agency to use in deriving an intelligible principle for its
exercise of discretion.”
Rather than simply remanding the case to EPA to
determine whether there is law to apply that would save the
constitutionality of the statute, therefore, this Court, in the
exercise of its Article III function, must itself resolve whether
the CAA provides guidance for the development of an
“intelligible principle.” To find the law, this Court should
ask, as a first step, whether Congress has unambiguously
stated its intention. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S.
837, 842-43 & n.9 (1984). Congress has done so.
As explained by APC and ATA in Case No. 99-1426,
Congress intended that EPA exercise its public health risk
management judgment based on consideration of the overall
impact of its decision on society. EPA cannot merely
characterize risks to individual health that might be caused by
breathing a pollutant and then, without explanation, choose a
risk level that EPA declares is “sufficiently large” to justify a
revised NAAQS. See supra pp. 26-27. Instead, EPA must
explain why the regulatory option chosen satisfies the
decisional criteria in § 109, why it promotes the statutory
purposes in § 101, and why it was selected and other options
rejected. APC Br. 27-45.
Once the Court determines that there is law to apply under
a Chevron Step 1 analysis, thereby defining the scope of
EPA’s discretion under § 109, EPA can then exercise its
discretion under the Act in a manner consistent with Chevron
Step 2, and in a manner that is not arbitrary and that reflects
reasoned decisionmaking. The Agency is not required, as
EPA argues, to develop a precise metric for the exercise of
® See, e.g., Touby, 500 U.S. at 166; Mistretta 488 U.S. at 374-77.
35
risk management judgment. See EPA Br. 26. Rather, as the
lower court observed, what is required is “reasonable
coherence” based on application of the statutory language
and purposes. 175 F.3d 1039-40, Pet. App. 17a-18a.
In this case, EPA’s failure to explain itself runs afoul of
Chevron in the same way the FCC did in AT&T Corp. There
the Court struck down the FCC’s interpretation of a statute as
unreasonable because the FCC had failed to supply any
“limiting standard, rationally related to the goals of the Act.”
525 U.S. at 388; see also Bressman, supra note 63, at 1434.
Here the nondelegation doctrine and Chevron converge to
a crystalline point: that the agency must explain the “limiting
standard” that guided its exercise of public health risk
management judgment. Only if this Court finds that the
normal meaning of “public health,” the language of §§ 108
and 109, and the statutory purposes of the Act provide no
guidance for the Agency’s exercise of public health risk
management judgment would there be a_ statutory
nondelegation problem—one that could not be overcome by
the Agency by interpreting the Act under Chevron Step 2.
II. EPA’S REVISION TO THE OZONE NAAQS,
TOGETHER WITH ITS REVOCATION OF THE
EXISTING STANDARD, IS REVIEWABLE FINAL
AGENCY ACTION.
In Subpart 2 of Part D of Title I of the Act, Congress
enacted a comprehensive program for reducing ozone
following decades of unrealistic deadlines and control
measures that proved inadequate to the task. The court below
held that Subpart 2 “must preclude the EPA from requiring
areas to comply either more quickly or with a more stringent
ozone NAAQS.” 175 F.3d 1049, Pet. App. 40a. As the court
observed, if EPA could adopt and implement a more
36
stringent ozone standard under a more expeditious schedule,
this comprehensive Subpart 2 “risk management” program
adopted by Congress “would have been stillborn had the EPA
revised the ozone NAAQS immediately after the Congress
enacted the 1990 amendments.” /d. 1050, Pet. App. 42a.
Even though Subpart 2 precludes EPA from requiring
areas to comply “more quickly or with a more stringent
ozone NAAQS,” the court refused to set aside the standard
on this basis because, in its view, the “appropriateness”
language of § 109(d) does not allow EPA to reject a standard
revision based on “implementation” factors. Nevertheless, in
remanding the ozone NAAQS on nondelegation grounds, the
court made clear that the ozone “standard is [un]likely to
engender costly compliance activities in light of our
determination that it can be enforced only in conformity with
Subpart 2.” 195 F.3d 10, Pet. App. 81a (emphasis added).
For the reasons discussed below, the court of appeals had
jurisdiction to resolve petitioners’ challenges based on
Subpart 2. While the court properly held that Subpart 2 is the
exclusive congressional risk management program for
addressing ozone health risks (and thereby restricts EPA’s
authority to implement or to enforce a more stringent ozone
NAAQS), it was wrong when it held that the primary and the
identical secondary 8-hour standard could be adopted and
remain in effect during the remand proceeding.
A. EPA’s Determination of Its Authority To Revise
the Ozone NAAQS Is Final Action.
EPA argues that the lower court’s decision concerning the
interplay between Subpart 2 and the revised NAAQS was
“premature[],” an argument EPA first detailed in its rehearing
petition. EPA Br. 35. The court rejected this argument,
because EPA “reached a final decision regarding its power to
37
implement its revised ozone standard.” 195 F.3d 9, Pet. App.
78a. :
Section 181(a) of Subpart 2 explains how Congress
intended areas to be classified as nonattainment “for ozone,”
for purposes of imposing statutorily-mandated compliance
deadlines and attainment measures. Section 181(b) explains
how areas designated as in attainment for ozone are to be
redesignated to nonattainment if their ozone air quality
deteriorates in the future. In these provisions, Congress
provided that all of the Act’s requirements and timetables
“for ozone” are to be implemented to attain and maintain the
ozone NAAQS that existed in 1990. This is confirmed by
other Subpart 2 provisions, as discussed in Part III below.
In the rulemaking at issue here, EPA promulgated a rule
that simultaneously established a more stringent 8-hour
ozone NAAQS and made the 1l-hour ozone NAAQS and
related Subpart 2 program automatically inapplicable to an
area once EPA determines that its air quality meets the 1-
hour NAAQS. 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.9(b) & 50.10. Industry and
States petitioned the D.C. Circuit to review EPA’s rule as
facially inconsistent with the ozone risk management plan
codified by Congress in Subpart 2—asking the court to
resolve “[w]hether EPA is authorized to substitute its policy
judgment for that of Congress by replacing the statutory
ozone reduction program designed specifically to implement
the 1-hour NAAQS with a new program to implement a
different [more stringent] NAAQS.””
EPA recognizes in its brief that it would be “impossible”
to implement the more stringent 8-hour NAAQS that EPA
” Non-Staie CAA Pet’rs & Intervenors’ Br. (D.C. Cir. No. 97-1441) 2,
29; see also APC Resp. to Pet. for Cert. (99-1257) 22.
38
adopted in a manner that was consistent with Congress’
ozone attainment program in Subpart 2. EPA Br. 47; see
also Mass/NJ Br 47-48 (applying Subpart 2 to that standard
would be “bizarre’’). Precisely for this reason, and because
EPA’s 8-hour NAAQS addressed no new health effects
associated with ozone, those seeking review of EPA’s revised
ozone NAAQS argued that Subpart 2 “codified” the 1-hour
NAAQS and that a more stringent, revised ozone NAAQS
therefore was not “appropriate” under § 109(d). Non-State
CAA Pet’rs and Intervenors’ Br. (D.C. Cir. 97-1441) 33.
By rejecting these arguments, EPA’s final rule resolved
the interplay of Subpart 2 and EPA’s authority to establish a
more stringent ozone NAAQS. This is a final Agency action,
and review of that action had to be sought within 60 days of
its publication in the Federal Register. CAA § 307(b)(1); see
also Harrison, 446 U.S. at 587-94.
EPA now argues that petitioners below really challenged
not a rule, but “preamble statements” that are not “final
agency action.” See supra p. 18. EPA is wrong. EPA's
promulgation of its more stringent 8-hour standard presents
facial inconsistencies with the Subpart 2 risk management
program. Consequently, that action’s validity vel non can be
resolved only by resolving whether Subpart 2 restricts EPA’s
authority to adopt and to implement a more stringent revised
ozone NAAQS. The court’s review of EPA’s statements in
the final rule preamble is entirely appropriate to permit the
court to understand that rule’s nature, purpose, and basis.
See, e.g., Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta,
458 U.S. 141, 158 (1982).”!
™ See also HRI, Inc. v. EPA, 198 F.3d 1224, 1244 n.13 (10th Cir. 2000)
(“preamble to a regulation is evidence of an agency’s contemporaneous
39
Moreover, the preamble statements signed by the
Administrator” are authoritative explanations of EPA’s
position on its authority to implement its more stringent 8-
hour ozone NAAQS under Subpart |. That position, which
in any event is embodied in the rule’s text, 40 C.F.R.
§ 50.9(b), will “alter the legal regime” to which EPA, States,
and regulated parties are subject. See Bennett v. Spear, 520
U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997) (reviewing Fish & Wildlife
Service’s Biological Opinion as final action under
Endangered Species Act). Such preamble statements are
themselves reviewable,” and review is particularly warranted
here, where §307(b) directs review of any final
Administrator action. Harrison, 446 U.S. at 589.
Finally, in a separate but related case, EPA has
acknowledged that its decision regarding the relationship
between the revised ozone NAAQS and Subpart 2 was
reviewable below as final action in the present case. In EDF
v. Browner, D.C. Cir. 98-1363, EPA argued the court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction in that case to hear EDF’s
challenge to EPA’s determination that the 1-hour NAAQS
and Subpart 2 were inapplicable in specific areas that had met
the 1-hour NAAQS. EPA Br. (D.C. Cir. 98-1363) 27-28,
App. 22a-23a. According to EPA, “[o]ther participants in the
[ozone] NAAQS rulemaking understood the implications of
understanding of its proposed rules”) (quoting Wyoming Outdoor Council
v. United States Forest Serv., 165 F.3d 43, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).
” See supra p. 18; see also 62 Fed. Reg. 38424, PMJA 192
(memorandum from President Clinton).
” Indeed, EPA recently argued to the D.C. Circuit that a preamble
statement itself may be reviewable action. See Barrick Goldstrike Mines,
Inc. v. Browner, 215 F.3d 45, 48 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
40
EPA’s interpretation and challenged aspects of it in the
pending ATA litigation”—the case before this Court. /d. 29,
App. 23a.
In sum, EPA’s promulgation of a new standard to replace
the 1l-hour standard and the statutory Subpart 2 ozone
attainment program was final agency action that was
reviewable under § 307(b) of the Clean Air Act.
B. EPA’s Decision To Replace Subpart 2 Is Ripe.
As discussed above, whether the Act precludes EPA from
replacing the 1-hour ozone NAAQS with a new, more
stringent NAAQS that cannot be implemented under Subpart
2 is a pure question of law that requires no further factual
development. See also 195 F.3d 8-9; Pet. App. 77a-79a.
As this Court has recognized, federal courts “have no
more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is
given, than to usurp that which is not given.””* In § 307(b) of
the Act, Congress authorized courts of appeals to review any
final EPA action under the Act. CAA § 307(b); Harrison,
446 U.S. at 589. The sweeping nature of Congress’ directive
that judicial review of “any” final CAA actions occur
immediately is clear on the statute’s face, id. at 588, and the
legislative history confirms Congress’ purpose. /d. at 589-
90. Quick resolution of the validity of EPA actions is
crucial, inter alia, to maintain “the integrity of the time
sequences provided through the Act.” See S. Rep. No. 91-
1196, at 41 (1970), reprinted in 1 Sen. Comm. on Pub.
™ Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821); see also
Harrison, 446 U.S. at 593. There is no constitutional barrier to giving
effect to Congress’ judicial review directive in § 307(b). Because the
petitions for review raised a purely legal issue, i.e., whether Subpart 2
provides EPA’s sole authority to enforce ozone NAAQS, the court was
fully able to review that issue.
41
Works, A Legislative History of the Clean Air Amendments of
1970, at 441 (Comm. Print 1974).
As a result, the justiciability concerns underlying Abbott
Labs v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967), are absent here. That
is, Abbott Labs’ two-pronged ripeness test embodies the
prudential doctrine that “courts, through avoidance of
premature adjudication, [should refrain] from entangling
themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative
policies, and also [is intended] to protect the agencies from
judicial interference until an administrative decision has been
formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way... .” /d. at
148. As seen above, however, Congress in the CAA
specifically instructed courts to review final actions “pre-
enforcement” in order to ensure early resolution of challenges
to EPA’s execution of the CAA. See Ohio Forestry Ass'n v.
Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 737 (1998) (action was “unlike
agency rules that Congress has specifically instructed the
courts to review ‘pre-enforcement’”’) (citing Harrison, 446
U.S. at 592-93; CAA § 307(b)).”
Because Congress directed that all final EPA actions under
the CAA be subject to immediate review, and because the
issue presented requires no further development, the lower
court did not err in reviewing the action here.”°
" For the same reason, EPA’s reliance on Lujan v. National Wildlife
Fed'n, see EPA Br. 36, is misplaced. See 497 U.S. 871, 891 (1990)
(noting that challenges may be brought under certain “statutes [that]
permit . . . judicial review, directly, even before the concrete effects
normally required for APA review are felt”) (emphasis added).
”® Even if the Court deems the issue presented for review to the lower
court subject to Abbott Labs, this Court should find the issue ripe. As
explained above, the question of EPA’s legal authority under Subparts |
and 2 is “purely legal,” and hardship from delayed review would ensue
from the disruption to State and industry planning and control efforts.
42
Iii. SUBPART 2 RESTRICTS EPA’S AUTHORITY
TO REVISE THE OZONE NAAQS.
EPA claims “[t]he only issue involving ‘implementation’
before the court of appeals . . . was whether the participants
were correct that the Section 181(a) scheme precluded EPA
from promulgating the revised standard.” EPA Br. 35.”
Addressing this issue, however, requires an understanding of
Subpart 2 and how it restricts EPA’s authority with respect to
a more stringent revised NAAQS for ozone. The facial
incompatibility between Subpart 2 and EPA’s establishment
of the more stringent 8-hour ozone NAAQS shows that EPA
lacked authority to implement or enforce a more stringent
NAAQS, and indeed lacked authority to replace the 1-hour
ozone NAAQS as the template for Congress’ detailed
statutory “risk management” program.
A. Subpart 2’s Plain Language Precludes EPA From
Replacing the Existing Ozone NAAQS.
Section 107(d) contains the requirements for designations
and redesignations of areas as attainment, nonattainment, or
unclassifiable for any criteria pollutant. Section 107(d)(4)
requires States and EPA to designate areas for ozone within
240 days after enactment of the 1990 CAA Amendments.
Under § 107(d)(3), areas may later be “redesignated.” And
See State Resp. Br. (99-1257) § II1.B.3. Moreover, in fashioning a
remedy, 195 F.3d 10, Pet. App. 81a-82a, it was appropriate for the court
to review EPA's implementation authority under Subpart 2. See
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-12 (1982).
” This was not the only implementation issue raised by Industry
petitioners, as intervenors supporting EPA below recognize. See
Mass/NJ Pet. for Cert. (99-1263) 14, 22.
43
§ 107(d)(1) addresses area designations under a new or
revised NAAQS.
Subpart 2 requires that “[eJach area designated
nonattainment for ozone pursuant to section 107(d) of this
Act’—not any specific paragraph of § 107(d), but any part of
§ 107(d)—be classified “by operation of law” under Subpart
2 and then regulated pursuant to Subpart 2’s timetables and
control measures. CAA § 181(a)(1) (emphasis added).
Congress also directed in § 181 that “/aj/ny area that is
designated attainment or unclassifiable for ozone under
section 107(d)(4) of this Act, and that is subsequently
redesignated to nonattainment for ozone under section
107(d)(3) of this Act, shall, at the time of the redesignation,
be classified by operation of law in accordance with table |
under subsection (a) of Section 181.” CAA § 181(b)(1)
(emphasis added).
Thus, Subpart 2 by its plain terms governs management of
ozone indefinitely, until Congress changes the statutory
scheme. The Subpart 2 deadlines have not all run; indeed, as
the second sentence of § 181(b)(1) makes clear, they will be
reset and run anew any time an area initially designated under
§ 107(d)(4) becomes nonattainment “for ozone.”
Moreover, as the lower court recognized, Congress
provided in § 172(a)(1)(C) that EPA’s generic authority
under Subpart | to classify areas for purposes of applying an
attainment date “shall not apply with respect to
nonattainment areas for which classifications [and attainment
dates] are specifically provided under other provisions of
[Part D].” 175 F.3d 1048, Pet App. 37a. Likewise, Congress
provided in § 172(a)(2)(D) that Subpart 1’s attainment dates
“shall not apply with respect to nonattainment areas for
which attainment dates are specifically provided under other
44
provisions of [Part D].” As noted above, Subpart 2
specifically provides classifications and attainment dates for
“fejach area designated nonattainment for ozone pursuant to
section 107(d)” (emphasis added).
Contrary to claims by Massachusetts, New Jersey and
ALA, therefore, Congress made clear in § 172(a) that EPA’s
Subpart | authority to classify and to regulate nonattainment
areas is expressly limited, because Congress has “specifically
provided” a scheme for classification and attainment
deadlines under Subpart 2. EPA argues, however, that
because Subpart 2 addresses the 1-hour ozone NAAQS,
Subpart 2 does not “specifically provide[]” an alternative to
Subpart 1 for an ozone NAAQS designed to replace the 1-
hour ozone NAAQS. /d. This argument is entirely circular.
As the lower court found, EPA’s position ignores the plain
language of § 181(a), which makes Subpart 2 broadly
applicable to “[e]ach area designated nonattainment for ozone
pursuant to section 107(d)” (emphasis added). EPA's
argument also ignores § 181(b), which makes Subpart 2
applicable to any area that is “subsequently redesignated to
nonattainment for ozone” (emphasis added). The lower court
correctly found under “Step 1” of Chevron that the statute on
its face disposes of EPA’s arguments by establishing a
comprehensive and long range risk management program for
ozone. 175 F.3d 1048, Pet. App. 38a-39a.
EPA nevertheless argues that the court of appeals erred by
not interpreting the plain language of CAA § 181(a) (which
refers to “[eJach area designated nonattainment for ozone
pursuant to section 107(d)”) to refer only to those areas
designated under § 107(d)(4). The court below found,
however, that “Congress intentionally referred to § 107(d) as
a whole,” 175 F.3d 1049, Pet. App. 39a, making Subpart 2
applicable to all areas that are “designated nonattainment for
45
ozone pursuant to section 107(d).” CAA § 181(a). As the
court concluded, “the reference to § 107(d) in § 181(a)(1)
appears to have been purposeful and not the drafting error
EPA's interpretation implies.” 175 F3d 1048, Pet. App. 39a.
The legislative history confirms that Congress rejected a
limited scope for the Subpart 2 risk management scheme.
The Senate’s version of Subpart 2 classified only initia’
designations.” Moreover, this Senate Bill did not require
using “design values” based on the 1-hour NAAQS, as did
§ 181(a) as enacted, but tied classification to the degree the
area was in nonattainment with the ozone NAAQS. /d.
Similarly, the Bill referred to the House Energy and
Commerce Committee would have made the Subpart 2
scheme applicable only to designations under § 107(d)(4)’s
predecessor.” Subsequently, that Committee replaced that
specific reference to § 107(d)(4) with the general reference to
all nonattainment designations “for ozone pursuant to section
107(d).”""" The Conference Committee then reported the text
of the revised House Bill in lieu of the Senate’s,*' and the
conferees’ version was enacted. This change in legislative
language that reflects a congressional intent to adopi a
comprehensive and exclusive risk management program for
ozone must be given effect. Cf Russello v. United States,
464 US. 16, 23-34 (1983).
”® See S. 1630, 101st Cong., §§ 101, 107, reprinted in 3 1990 Legis. Hist.,
supra note 3, at 4124-25, 4195.
” See H.R. 3030, 101st Cong., §§ 101(a), 103, reprinted in 2 1990 Legis.
Hist., supra note 3, at 3748-49, 3795-96.
© HLR. Rep. No. 101-490, pt. 1, at 3-6, 17, reprinted in 2 1990 Legis.
Hist., supra note 3, at 3027-30, 3041.
*' See H.R. Rep. No. 101-952, at 27-28, reprinted in 1 1990 Legis. Hist.,
supra note 3, at 1477-78.
46
In a final effort to find some supportive language in the
statute, EPA notes § 181(a)’s subheading: “Classification and
attainment dates for 1989 nonattainment areas.” But “(t]he
title of a statute . . . cannot limit the plain meaning of the text.
For interpretative purposes, [statutory headings are] of use
only when [they] shed light on some ambiguous word or
phrase.” See Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections v. Yeskey,
524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998) (emphasis added). In any event,
this subheading does not contradict § 181(a)’s plain meaning,
EPA Br. 47; it reflects Congress’ intent that it is the existing
1-hour ozone NAAQS that EPA is supposed to administer,
not a revised, more stringent one “for ozone.” Cf. § 181(b).
Furthermore, contrary to Massachusetts and New Jersey’s
suggestion, Subpart 2’s plain language does not make
superfluous Congress’ grant to EPA of authority to review
and revise the NAAQS and to designate and to classify
nonattainment areas under Subpart 1. Mass/NJ Br. 47.
EPA’s review of the ozone NAAQS, for example, would
inform Congress of the adequacy of the statutory ozone
program as “appropriate.” Moreover, even under the court of
appeals’ decision, § 109(d) and Subpart | still apply to other
criteria pollutants for which Congress has not provided a
comprehensive risk management program based on a specific
NAAQS. For example, in Subpart 4 of Part D, Congress
enacted an exclusive risk management program for the
attainment of PM,,, CAA §§ 188-190," but no such program
for PM,,. Likewise in Subpart 5, Congress provided no
program comparable to Subpart 2 for any of three other
criteria pollutants: sulfur oxides, nitrogen dioxide, and lead.
See CAA §191. Thus, Subpart 1 applies to a revised
®2 See also CAA §§ 186-187 (establishing carbon monoxide program).
47
NAAQS for these criteria pollutants, and to NAAQS for any
new criteria pollutants EPA may list. By contrast, allowing
EPA to replace the ozone NAAQS makes Subpart 2
superfluous. As a result, this interpretation must be rejected.
See Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486
U.S. 825, 837 & n.11 (1988).
B. Subpart 2’s History and Structure Confirm It Is
the Exclusive Plan for Managing Ozone.
EPA’s revision of the ozone NAAQS also ignores
Congress’ description of Subpart 2 as the comprehensive risk
management program for ozone. As the House noted when it
modified its version of Subpart 2 to cover all ozone
designations, “[iJn 1977, Congress tried to waive [sic] a
‘magic wand’ and command that all [ozone] nonattainment
areas will meet the applicable [NAAQS]. . . by . . . December
31, 1987 . . . [That] date [has] come and gone and it is clear
that . . . we had no ‘magic’ solutions.’ As a result,
Congress enacted Subpart 2 to “address the failure of our
nonattainment areas to achieve ambient air quality deadlines
in existing law .... We have not [in Subpart 2], however,
simply continued to tell the states to do a [Subpart 1] plan to
clean their air. That did not work.’”™
Congress, in 1990, thus concluded that legislating how to
attain the ozone standard was as important, from a public
* H.R. Rep. No. 101-490, pt. 1, at 146-47, reprinted in 2 1990 Legis.
Hist., supra note 3, at 3170-71, OJA 3557-58.
** 136 Cong. Rec. H12867 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (Rep. Fields),
reprinted in 1 1990 Legis. Hist., supra note 3, at 1236, OJA 3543; see
also 136 Cong. Rec. 132, reprinted in 4 1990 Legis. Hist., supra note 3,
at 4837 (Sen. Chafee).
48
health standpoint, as setting the standard itself.*° According
to the House Committee, a long-term strategy that mandated
control measures and sanctions for failure to achieve required
ozone reductions was necessary.
This is precisely what Subpart 2 accomplishes. Subpart 2,
uniquely, reflects Congress’ response to risk management,
not by imposing deadlines and general requirements that
must be developed by states and then seeing these deadlines
and general requirements fail to achieve the desired ozone
reductions, but by adopting a comprehensive risk
management program that Congress concluded embodies
sound public health policy with respect to reducing ambient
ozone concentrations.
Subpart 2 provides a detailed timetable for attaining the
ozone NAAQS, both in areas currently in nonattainment and
areas becoming nonattainment in the future. CAA § 181(a),
(b).° It provides a manner for reducing ozone levels
depending on the severity of the pollution. See, e.g.,
§ 182(a)-(e). It provides a legislative check on EPA’s use of
a methodology for determining ozone air quality. § 183(g).
It provides interstate ozone pollution requirements. § 184; see
also supra pp. 4-5.
*° See H.R. Rep. No. 101-490, pt. 1, at 145-49, reprinted in 2 1990 Legis.
Hist., supra note 3, at 3169-73 (discussing the failure to attain reductions
of ozone under Subpart 1), OJA 3556-60.
* Although ALA points to EPA's treatment of some nonattainment areas
as “submarginal,” ALA Br. 39-40, as evidence that Subpart 2 does not
apply comprehensively to all nonattainment areas, EPA has indicated that
submargina! areas are “subject to the time schedule of subpart 2” if their
air quality calls for reclassification under Table 1. 57 Fed. Reg. 13525.
Thus, Subpart 2 is a comprehensive response to the ozone nonattainment
problem.
49
The only reasonable interpretation of this comprehensive
and long term risk management program is that Congress
meant for Subpart 2 to be the exclusive federal statutory
program for lowering ambient ozone levels. EPA’s
establishment of its 8-hour ozone NAAQS renders irrelevant
this carefully crafted legislation. Given Congress’ detailed
legislation, it is not plausible to conclude EPA retained
authority to adopt a NAAQS inconsistent with this program.
Cf Brown & Williamson, 120 S.Ct. at 1301 (legislation
regulating sale of tobacco confirmed Congress’ intent to
restrict FDA authority to regulate tobacco as “drug”’).
C. Subpart 2 Renders the Revised Ozone NAAQS
Unlawful.
Section 109(d) authorizes EPA to revise a NAAQS only as
“appropriate” in accordance with CAA §§ 108 and 109(b).
As discussed above, the court of appeals was correci that a
revised, more stringent NAAQS could not be implemented or
enforced except in conformity with Subpart 2. But if a more
stringent revised NAAQS cannot be enforced except in
conformity with Subpart 2, and as EPA explains, only the 1-
hour NAAQS can be implemented and enforced under
Subpart 2, it is not “appropriate” to revise that NAAQS under
§ 109(d) to establish a more stringent NAAQS for ozone.
Because Subpart 2 is Congress’ comprehensive and long
term program for managing ozone, and because this program
applies to “ozone nonattainment areas” generally,*’ this
*’ Section 181(a) addresses “primary standard{s}” only in specifying outer
dates for attainment of the 1-hour NAAQS. Subpart 2 otherwise simply
addresses “area[s] designated nonattainment for ozone.”
2 50
conclusion applies with equal force to primary and secondary
ozone NAAQS.™
This Court therefore should affirm the lower court’s
holding that Subpart 2 restricts EPA’s authority to enforce a
more stringent ozone NAAQS, should reject that court’s
holding that EPA may promulgate a standard that is contrary
to § 109(d) and Subpart 2, and should vacate the revised
ozone NAAQS as inconsistent with the congressional
program for achieving ozone reductions.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court should order vacatur of the
revised NAAQS for ozone and PM, ..
Respectfully submitted,
DAVID E. MENOTTI
WILLIAM F. PEDERSEN
JEFFREY A. KNIGHT
SHAWPITTMAN
2300 N Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037
(202) 663-8675
Counsel for American Forest
& Paper Association,
American Iron & Steel
Institute, and Alliance of
Automobile Manufacturers
HENRY V. NICKEL
F. WILLIAM BROWNELL
(Counsel of Record)
JAMES N. CHRISTMAN
LUCINDA M. LANGWORTHY
HUNTON & WILLIAMS
1900 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 955-1500
Counsel for Appalachian
Power Co., et al., American
Public Power Association,
and National Association of
Home Builders
** In any event, the court of appeals was correct to remand the secondary
NAAQS due to the extent EPA relied on the primary NAAQS in
promulgating it. 175 F.3d 1040; Pet. App. 18a.
G. WILLIAM FRICK
M. ELIZABETH COX
AMERICAN PETROLEUM
INSTITUTE
1220 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 682-8250
Counsel for American
Petroleum Institute
MAURICE H. MCBRIDE
NATIONAL PETROCHEMICAL &
REFINERS ASSOCIATION
1899 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 457-0480
Counsel for National
Petrochemical & Refiners
Association
NEWMAN R. PORTER
LEWIS AND ROCA
40 N. Central Avenue
Phoenix, AZ 85004
(602) 262-5786
Counsel for Nevada Mining
Association, Newmont Gold
Company, and Meridian
Gold Company
DAVID F. ZOLL
ALEXANDRA DAPOLITO DUNN
AMERICAN CHEMISTRY
COUNCIL
1300 Wilson Boulevard
Arlington, VA 22209
(703) 741-5165
Counsel for American
Chemistry Council
JULIE BECKER
ALLIANCE OF AUTOMOBILE
MANUFACTURERS
1401 H STREET, N.W.
Suite 900
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 326 5500
Counsel for Alliance of
Automobile Manufacturers
HAROLD P. QUINN, JR.
NATIONAL MINING
ASSOCIATION
1130 17" Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 463-2652
Counsel for National Mining
Association
KuRT E. BLASE
O’CONNOR & HANNAN
Suite 500
1666 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006-2803
(202) 887-1400
Counsel for Kennecott
Holdings Corporation,
Kennecott Energy and
Coal Company, Kennecott
Services Company, and
National Stone Association
RUSSELL S. FRYE
COLLIER, SHANNON, RILL &
ScoTT, PLLC
3050 K Street, N.W.
Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20007
(202) 342-8878
and
RICHARD WASSERSTROM
AMERICAN FOREST & PAPER
ASSOCIATION, INC.
1111 19th Street, N.W.
8" Floor
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 463-2582
Counsel for American Forest
& Paper Association, Inc.
MARCELLE SHOOP
Associate General Counsel
KENNECOTT UTAH COPPER
CORPORATION
8315 West 3595 South
P.O. Box 6001
Magna, Utah 84044-6001
(801) 252-3000
Counsel for Kennecott Holdings
Corporation, Kennecott
Energy and Coal Company,
and Kennecott Services Co.
TIMOTHY L. HARKER
THE HARKER LAW FIRM
9500 Accord Drive
Potomac, MD 20854
(301) 983-0964
and
THOMAS J. GRAVES
NATIONAL PAINT AND
COATINGS ASSOCIATION,
INC.
1500 Rhode Island Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 462-6272
Counsel for National Paint and
Coatings Association
GRANT CRANDALL
General Counsel
UNITED MINE WORKERS OF
AMERICA, AFL-CIO
8315 Lee Highway
Fairfax, VA 22031
(703) 208-7200
and
EUGENE M. TRISKO
P.O. Box 596
Berkeley Springs, WV 25411
(304) 258-1977
Counsel for United Mine
Workers of America, AFL-CIO
DUANE J. DESIDERIO
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
HOME BUILDERS
1201 15th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 861-2146
Counsel for National
Association of Home Builders
September 9, 2000
DAVID M. FLANNERY
‘JACKSON & KELLY
P.O. Box 553
1600 Laidley Tower
Charleston, WV 25322
(304) 340-1017
Counsel for Midwest Ozone
Group, and West Virginia
Chamber of Commerce
PETER S. GLASER
SHOOK, HARDY & BACON
600 14" Street, N.W.
Suite 800
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 639-5627
Counsel for Western Fuels
Association, Inc.
DAVID M. FRIEDLAND
BEVERIDGE & DIAMOND
1350 I Street, N.W.
Suite 700
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 789-6000
Counsel for Phoenix Cement Co.
APPENDICES
APPENDICES
. 40 C.F.R. § 50.9 National 1-hour primary
and secondary ambient air quality standards for
I i crcecccssenercenscsssntstanmensiorcnsmmnesssennennn la
. S. 1630, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., § 107 (1990)
(Additional Requirements for Ozone
Nonattainment Areas) (excerpt).................cc0cce0eeeees 2a
. H.R. 3030, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., § 103 (1990)
(Additional Provisions for Ozone
Nonattainment Areas) (excerpt). ...............00cccccceeeeees Sa
. H.R. Rep. No. 101-952, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.,
(1990) (Additional Provisions for Ozone
Nonattainment Areas) (excerpt)...................c.000000: 12a
. Brief of Respondent United States
Environmental Protection Agency, Environmental
Defense Fund v. Browner (D.C. Cir. No.
ITT ccnistintecepnsitennniuniienesntitnatinintenininabitiidia 19a
. Appalachian Power Co., ef al., Petition
for D.C. Circuit Review of EPA Ozone
I cxenctnsecnnsesceneneemennnsnenpenmeenntenen 25a
la
APPENDIX A
40 C.F.R. § 50.9 National 1-hour primary and secondary
ambient air quality standards for ozone (Excerpt)
* . *
(b) The 1-hour standards set forth in this section will no
longer apply to an area once EPA determines that the area has
air quality meeting the |-hour standard. Area designations are
codified 40 CFR part 81.
2a
APPENDIX B
S.1630, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., § 107 (1990) (Additional
Requirements for Ozone Nonattainment Areas) (excerpt)
ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR OZONE
NONATTAINMENT AREAS
Sec. 107. Part D of the Clean Air Act is amended by
adding the following new subpart at the end thereof:
“SUBPART 2—ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS REGARDING
OZONE NONATTAINMENT AREAS
“CLASSIFICATIONS OF OZONE NONATTAINMENT
AREAS
“SEC. 181. (a) CLASSIFICATION BY OPERATION OF
LAW.—Each area designated nonattainment for ozone under
section 107(f)(3) is hereby classified by operation of law in
one of the following categories based upon the percentage by
which such standard is exceeded:
“Area classification Amount by which standard exceeded
Moderate ozone nonattainment area. Not greater than 20 per centum
Serious ozone nonattainment area — More than 20 per centum but less
than 50 per centum
Severe ozone nonattainment area __. Equal to or greater than 50 per
centum but not more than 120
per centum
Extreme ozone nonattainment area More than 120 per centum
“(b) DATA AND METHODS FOR
CLASSIFICATION.-For purposes of determining the
3a
percentage by which the national primary ambient air quality
standard for ozone is exceeded in any area —
“(1) the most recent monitoring data available as
determined by the Administrator shall be used; and
“(2) the interpretation methodology issued by
the Administrator most recently before the date of
enactment of this subpart for determining attainment of
the standard shall be applicable (including the design
value, reference methods, and _ guidelines for
interpretation of ozone air quality standards).
Not later than thirty days after the enactment of this subpart,
the Administrator shall publish a notice of the percentages by
which the national primary ambient air quality standard for
ozone was exceeded in each area referred to in subsection (a).
“(c) DEADLINES FOR #ATTAINMENT.-The
following deadlines apply to the ozone nonattainment areas
classified in accordance with subsection (a):
Applicable attainment due (in
years after enactment of the
“Area classification Clean Air Act Amendments of 1989)
CS eee 5 years
EIT sassonninenstenesenembnensngniennneneianennen 10 years
nrc tases tsi asincnniaatandin 15 years
PIII sscsunsscinnsncenansenennanpcnsemesaniitis 20 years
“(d) REFERENCES TO TERMS.—Any reference in
this subpart to a ‘moderate area’, a ‘serious area’ a ‘severe
area’, or an ‘extreme area’ shall be considered a reference to a
moderate ozone nonattainment area, a serious ozone
nonattainment area, a severe ozone nonattainment area, or an
4a
extreme ozone nonattainment area as classified under this
section.
“(e) Any area that is not designated nonattainment
for ozone under section 107 as of the date of enactment of this
section, and that is subsequently redesignated to
nonattainment for ozone under section 107, shall, at the time
of the redesignation, be classified by operation of law in
accordance with the table under subsection (a). Upon its
classification, the area shall be subject to the same
requirements under section 110, subpart | of this part, and this
subpart that would have applied had the area been so classified
as of the time of the classification under subsection (a), except
that any absolute, fixed date applicable in connection with any
such requirement is extended by operation of law by a period
equal to the length of time between the date of enactment of
this section and the date the area is classified.
* * *
Sa
APPENDIX C
H.R. 3030, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., § 103 (1990) (Additional
Provisions for Ozone Nonattainment Areas) (excerpt)
SEC. 103. ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS FOR OZONE
NONATTAINMENT AREAS.
Part D of title I is amended by adding the following new
subpart at the end thereof:
“Subpart 2 —Additional Provisions for Ozone
Nonattainment Areas
“Sec. 181. Classifications and attainment dates.
“Sec. 182. Plan submissions and requirements.
“Sec. 183. Federal ozone measures.
“Sec. 184. | Control of interstate ozone air pollution.
“Sec. 185. Enforcement for Severe and Extreme ozone
nonattainment areas for failure to attain.
“Sec. 185A. Transitional areas.
“Sec. 185B. NO, and VOC study.
“SEC. 181. CLASSIFICATIONS AND ATTAINMENT
DATES.
“(a) CLASSIFICATION AND ATTAINMENT
DATES FOR 1989 NONATTAINMENT AREAS.~(1) Each
area designated nonattainment for ozone pursuant to section
107(d) shall be classified at the time of such designation,
under table 1, by operation of law, as a Marginal Area, a
Moderate Area, a Serious Area, a Severe Area, or an Extreme
Area based on the design value for the area. The design value
shall be calculated according to the interpretation
6a
methodology issued by the Administrator most recently before
the date of the enactment of the Clean air Act Amendments of
1990. For each area classified under this subsection, the
primary standard attainment date for ozone shall be as
expeditiously as practicable but not later than the date
provided in table 1.
“TABLE |
Primary standard attainment
Area class Design Value* date**
Marginal... .. O121 up to 0.138... 3 years after enactment
Moderate cece O<.138 up t0 0.160 0000000000...............6 years after enactment
Serious ... 0.160 up to 0.180... coe 9 years after enactment
Severe Ll .... 1S years after enactment
Extreme Locccceeseseee, 0.280 and above coc. 20 years after enactment
*The design value is measured in parts per million (ppm)
**The primary standard attainment date is measured from the date of the enactment of the
Clean Air Amendments of 1990
“(2) Notwithstanding table 1, in the case of a severe
area with a 1988 ozone design value between 0.190 and 0.280
ppm, the attainment date shall be 17 years (in lieu of 15 years)
after the date of the enactment of the Clean Air Amendments
of 1990.
“(3) At the time of publication of the notice under
section 107(d)(4) (relating to area designations) for each ozone
nonattainment area, the Administrator shall publish a notice
announcing the classification of such ozone nonattainment
area. The provisions of section 172(a)(1)(B) (relating to lack
of notice and comment and judicial review) shall apply to such
classification.
7a
“(4) If an area classified under paragraph (1) (Table
1) would have been classified in another category if the design
value in the area were 5 percent greater or 5 percent less than
the level on which such classification was based, the
Administrator may, in the Administrator’s discretion, within
90 days after the initial classification, by the procedure
required under paragraph (3), adjust the classification to place
the area in such other category. In making such adjustment,
the Administrator may consider the number of exceedances of
the national primary ambient air quality standard for ozone in
the area, the level of pollution transport between the area and
other affected areas, including both intrastate and interstate
transport, and the mix of sources and air pollutants in the area.
“(S) Upon application by any _ State, the
Administrator may extend for | additional year (hereinafter
referred to as the ‘Extension Year’) the date specified in Table
1 of subsection (a) if-
“(A) the State has complied with all
requirements and commitments pertaining to the area
in the applicable implementation plan, and
“(B) no more than 1 exceedance of the
national ambient air quality standard level for ozone
has occurred in the area in the year preceding the
Extension Year.
No more than 2 one-year extensions may be issued under this
paragraph for a single nonattainment area.
“(b) NEW DESIGNATIONS AND
RECLASSIFICATIONS.—
8a
“(1) NEW DESIGNATIONS TO
NONATTAINMENT.—Any area that is designated attainment
or unclassifiable for ozone under section 107(d)(4), and that is
subsequently redesignated to nonattainment for ozone under
section 107(d)(3), shall, at the time of the redesignation, be
classified by operation of law in accordance with Table 1
under subsection (a). Upon its classification, the area shall be
subject to the same requirements under section 110, subpart |
of this part, and this subpart that would have applied had the
area been so classified at the time of the notice under
subsection (a)(3), except that any absolute, fixed date
applicable in connection with any such requirement is
extended by operation of law by a period equal to the length of
time between the date of the enactment of the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990 and the date the area is classified under
this paragraph.
“(2) RECLASSIFICATION UPON FAILURE TO
ATTAIN.—{A) Within 6 months following the applicable
attainment date (including any extension thereof) for an ozone
nonattainment area, the Administrator shall determine, based
on the area’s design value (as of the attainment date), whether
the area attained the standard by that date. Except for any
Severe or Extreme area, any area that the Administrator finds
has not attained the standard by that date shall be reclassified
by operation of law in accordance with Table | of subsection
(a) to the higher of—
(i) the next higher classification for
the area, or
(ii) — the classification applicable to
the area’s design value as determined at the time of the
notice required under subparagraph (B).
9a
No area shall be reclassified as Extreme under clause (ii).
(B) The Administrator shall publish a notice
in the Federal Register, no later than 6 months
following the attainment date, identifying each area
that the Administrator has determined under
subparagraph (A) as having failed to attain and
identifying the reclassification, if any, described under
subparagraph (A).
“(3) VOLUNTARY RECLASSIFICATION.—The
Administrator shall grant the request of any State to reclassify
a nonattainment area in that State in accordance with Table |
of subsection (a) to a higher classification. The Administrator
shall publish a notice in the Federal Register of any such
request and of action by the Administrator granting the
request.
(4) FAILURE OF SEVERE AREAS TO ATTAIN
STANDARD.—{A) If any Severe Area fails to achieve the
national primary ambient air quality standard for ozone by the
applicable attainment date (including any extension thereof),
the fee provisions under section 185 shall apply within the
area, the percent reduction requirements of section
182(c)(2)(B) and (C) relating to reasonable further progress
demonstration and NO, control) shall continue to apply to the
area, and the State shall demonstrate that such percent
reduction has been achieved in each 3-year interval after such
failure until the standard is attained. Any failure to make such
a demonstration shall be subject to the sanctions provided
under this part.
(B) In addition to the requirements of
subparagraph (A), if the ozone design value for a
10a
Severe Area referred to in subparagraph (A) is above
0.140 ppm for the year of the applicable attainment
date, or if the area has failed to achieve its most recent
milestone under section 182(g), the new source review
requirements applicable under this subpart in Extreme
Areas shall apply in the area and the term ‘major
source’ and ‘major stationary source’ shall have the
same meaning as in Extreme Areas.
‘“(C) In addition to the requirements of
subparagraph (A) for those areas referred to in
subparagraph (A) and not covered by subparagraph
(B), the provisions referred to in subparagraph (B)
shall apply after 3 years from the applicable attainment
date unless the area has attained the standard by the
end of such 3-year period.
“(D) _ If, after the date of the enactment of the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, the Administrator
modifies the method of determining compliance with
the national primary ambient air quality standard, a
design value or other indicator comparable to 0.140 in
terms of its relationship to the standard shall be used in
lieu of 0.140 for purposes of applying the provisions of
subparagraphs (B) and (C).
“(c) REFERENCES TO TERMS.~{1) Any
reference to this subpart to a ‘Marginal Area’, a ‘Moderate
Area’, a ‘Serious Area’, a ‘Severe Area’ or an ‘Extreme Area’
shall be considered a reference to a Marginal Area, a Moderate
Area, a Serious Area, a Severe Area, or an Extreme Area as
respectively classified under this section.
lla
“(2) Any reference in this subpart to ‘next higher
classification’ or comparable terms shall be considered a
reference to the classification related to the next higher set of
design values in Table 1.
* * *
12a
APPENDIX D
H.R. Rep. No. 101-952, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990)
(Additional Provisions for Ozone Nonattainment Areas)
(excerpt)
SEC. 103. ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS FOR OZONE
NONATTAINMENT AREAS.
Part D of title | of the Clean Air Act is amended by
adding the following new subpart at the end thereof:
“Subpart 2 —Additional Provisions for Ozone
Nonattainment Areas
“Sec. 181. Classifications and attainment dates.
“Sec. 182. | Plan submissions and requirements.
“Sec. 183. | Federal ozone measures.
“Sec. 184. Control of interstate ozone air pollution.
“Sec. 185. | Enforcement for Severe and Extreme ozone
nonattainment areas for failure to attain.
“Sec. 185A. Transitional areas.
“Sec. 185B. NO, and VOC study.
SEC. 181. CLASSIFICATIONS AND ATTAINMENT
DATES.
“(a) CLASSIFICATION AND ATTAINMENT
DATES FOR 1989 NONATTAINMENT AREAS.—{1) Each
area designated nonattainment for ozone pursuant to section
107(d) shall be classified at the time of such designation,
under table 1, by operation of law, as a Marginal Area, a
Moderate Area, a Serious Area, a Severe Area, or an Extreme
l3a
Area based on the design value for the area. The design value
shall be calculated according to the interpretation
methodology issued by the Administrator most recently before
the date of the enactment of the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990. For each area classified under this subsection, the
primary standard attainment date for ozone shall be as
expeditiously as practicable but not later than the date
provided in table 1.
“TABLE |
_ re ima: Primary standard attainment
Area class Design Value* date**
Marginal 0 121 up to 0 138 3 years after enactment
Moderate 0 138 up to 0 160 6 years after enactment
Serious 0 160 up to 0 180 9 years after enactment
Severe 0 180 up to 0 280 1S years after enactment
Extreme 0 280 and above 20 years after enactment
*The design value is measured in parts per million (ppm).
**The primary standard attainment date is measured from the date of the
enactment of the Clean Air Amendments of 1990.
“(2) Notwithstanding table 1, in the case of a severe
area with a 1988 ozone design value between 0.190 and 0.280
ppm, the attainment date shall be 17 years (in lieu of 15 years)
after the date of the enactment of the Clean Air Amendments
of 1990.
“(3) At the time of publication of the notice under
section 107(d)(4) (relating to area designations) for each ozone
nonattainment area, the Administrator shall publish a notice
announcing the classification of such ozone nonattainment
area. The provisions of section 172(a)(1)(B) (relating to lack
of notice and comment and judicial review) shall apply to such
classification.
l4a
“(4) If an area classified under paragraph (1) (Table
1) would have been classified in another category if the design
value in the area were 5 percent greater or 5 percent less than
the level on which such classification was based, the
Administrator may, in the Administrator’s discretion, within
90 days after the initial classification, by the procedure
required under paragraph (3), adjust the classification to place
the area in such other category. In making such adjustment,
the Administrator may consider the number of exceedances of
the national primary ambient air quality standard for ozone in
the area, the level of pollution transport between the area and
other affected areas, including both intrastate and interstate
transport, and the mix of sources and air pollutants in the area.
“(S) Upon application by any State, the
Administrator may extend for | additional year (hereinafter
referred to as the ‘Extension Year’) the date specified in table
1 of paragraph (1) of this subsection if—
“(A) the State has complied with all
requirements and commitments pertaining to the area
in the applicable implementation plan, and
“(B) no more than | exceedance of the
national ambient air quality standard level for ozone
has occurred in the area in the year preceding the
Extension Year.
No more than 2 one-year extensions may be issued under this
paragraph for a single nonattainment area.
“(b) NEW DESIGNATIONS AND
RK ECLASSIFICATIONS.—
lSa
“(1) NEW DESIGNATIONS TO
NONATTAINMENT.~—Any area that is designated attainment
or unclassifiable for ozone under section 107(d)(4), and that is
subsequently redesignated to nonattainment for ozone under
section 107(d)(3), shall, at the time of the redesignation, be
classified by operation of law in accordance with table | under
subsection (a). Upon its classification, the area shall be
subject to the same requirements under section 110, subpart |
of this part, and this subpart that would have applied had the
area been so classified at the time of the notice under
subsection (a)(3), except that any absolute, fixed date
applicable in connection with any such requirement is
extended by operation of law by a period equal to the length of
time between the date of the enactment of the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990 and the date the area is classified under
this paragraph.
“(2) RECLASSIFICATION UPON FAILURE TO
ATTAIN.—{A) Within 6 months following the applicable
attainment date (including any extension thereof) for an ozone
nonattainment area, the Administrator shall determine, based
on the area’s design value (as of the attainment date), whether
the area attained the standard by that date. Except for any
Severe or Extreme area, any area that the Administrator finds
has not attained the standard by that date shall be reclassified
by operation of law in accordance with table | of subsection
(a) to the higher of —
“(i) the next higher classification for the
area, or
“(ii) the classification applicable to the
area’s design value as determined ai the time of the
notice required under subparagraph (B).
l6a
No area shall be reclassified as Extreme under clause (ii).
“(B) The Administrator shall publish a notice
in the Federal Register, no later than 6 months
following the attainment date, identifying each area
that the Administrator has determined under
subparagraph (A) as having failed to attain and
identifying the reclassification, if any, described under
subparagraph (A).
“(3) VOLUNTARY RECLASSIFICATION.—The
Administrator shall grant the request of any State to reclassify
a nonattainment area in that State in accordance with table | of
subsection (a) to a higher classification. The Administrator
shall publish a notice in the Federal Register of any such
request and of action by the Administrator granting the
request.
(4) FAILURE OF SEVERE AREAS TO ATTAIN
STANDARD.—{A) If any Severe Area fails to achieve the
national primary ambient air quality standard for ozone by the
applicable attainment date (including any extension thereof),
the fee provisions under section 185 shall apply within the
area, the percent reduction requirements of section
182(c)(2)(B) and (C) relating to reasonable further progress
demonstration and NO_ control) shall continue to apply to the
area, and the State shall demonstrate that such percent
reduction has been achieved in each 3-year interval after such
failure until the standard is attained. Any failure to make such
a demonstration shall be subject to the sanctions provided
under this part.
17a
(B) In addition to the requirements of subparagraph
(A), if the ozone design value for a Severe Area referred to in
subparagraph (A) is above 0.140 ppm for the year of the
applicable attainment date, or if the area has failed to achieve
its most recent milestone under section 182(g), the new
source review requirements applicable under this subpart in
Extreme Areas shall apply in the area and the term ‘major
source’ and ‘major stationary source’ shall have the same
meaning as in Extreme Areas.
“(C) In addition to the requirements of subparagraph
(A) for those areas referred to in subparagraph (A) and not
covered by subparagraph (B), the provisions referred to in
subparagraph (B) shall apply after 3 years from the applicable
attainment date unless the area has attained the standard by the
end of such 3-year period.
“(D) _ If, after the date of the enactment of the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1990, the Administrator modifies the
method of determining compliance with the national primary
ambient air quality standard, a design value or other indicator
comparable to 0.140 in terms of its relationship to the standard
shall be used in lieu of 0.140 for purposes of applying the
provisions of subparagraphs (B) and (C).
“(c) REFERENCES TO TERMS.~{1) Any
reference to this subpart to a ‘Marginal Area’, a ‘Moderate
Area’, a ‘Serious Area’, a ‘Severe Area’, or an ‘Extreme Area’
shall be considered a reference to a Marginal Area, a Moderate
Area, a Serious Area, a Severe Area, or an Extreme Area as
respectively classified under this section.
“(2) Any reference in this subpart to ‘next
higher classification’ or comparable terms shall be
considered a reference to the classification related to
the next higher set of design values in table 1.
*
18a
*
*
19a
APPENDIX E
Brief of Respondent United States Environmental
Protection Agency, Environmental
Defense Fund v. Browner
(D.C. Cir. No. 98-1363) (excerpt)
ORAL ARGUMENT SCHEDULED
FOR SEPTEMBER 7, 1999
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 98-1363
ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, et al.,
Petitioners,
V.
CAROL M. BROWNER, et al.,
Respondent,
ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF FINAL ACTION
OF THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY
FINAL BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
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LOIS J. SCHIFFER
Assistant Attorney General
OF COUNSEL: Environment and Natural
Resources Division
JAN M. TIERNEY
Office of General Counsel ALICE L. MATTICE
U.S. Environmental Attorney, Environmental
Protection Agency Defense Section
401 M Street, S.W. U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20604 _—~P.O.. Box 23986
(202) 260-5095 Washington, D.C. 20026-3986
(202) 514-2327
Date: June 21, 1999
* * *
Section 307(b) of the Act establishes a sixty-day period
for seeking judicial review of agency rules. 42 U.S.C. §
7607(b). This Court has “repeatedly held that temporal
limitations on judicial review are jurisdictional in nature.”
National Mining Ass'n v. Department of the Interior, 70 F.3d
1345, 1350 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Eagle-Picher Indus. v. EPA, 759
F.2d 905, 911-12 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The time limits on
petitions for review of agency rules reflect a deliberate
congressional choice to impose finality on agency decisions, in
order to conserve agency resources and provide guidance and
stability to those affected by the agency action. Eagle-Picher,
795 F.2d at 911-12.
Petitioners’ central claim in this case is that EPA’s
criterion for phasing out the one-hour ozone NAAQS is
unlawful because it does not require redesignating “clean”
nonattainment areas to attainment pursuant to section
107(d)(3)(E) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(3)(E)(iv), and
therefore does not require States to submit plans for
maintaining the one-hour NAAQS indefinitely after
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attainment. Pet.Br. 2, 21, 31-33, 42. '? However, that issue
was resolved by EPA’s 1997 Rule. 40 C.F.R. § 50.9(b).
The 1997 Rule is clear on its face. The Rule states,
without qualification, that the one-hour standard “will no
longer apply” to an area once EPA determines that it has “air
quality meeting the l-hour standard.” 40 C.F.R. § 50.9(b).
Thus, “air quality meeting the 1-hour standard” is the only
criterion for revocation. The Rule also specifically states that
“{ajrea designations are codified in 40 CFR part 81,” which
includes the list of designations of areas for the one-hour
ozone standard. /d. The inclusion of this reference provides
notice that the designations for the one-hour standard in 40
C.F.R. part 81 would be affected by EPA’s action. Jd.
Petitioners attempt to draw an artificial distinction
between the revocation of the one-hour standard (which they
appear to concede was addressed in the 1997 Rule) and the
allegedly “separate” decision to remove the associated
designations for revocation areas in 40 C.F.R. part 81. Pet.Br.
30. However, designations are for a particular NAAQS and
are linked to that NAAQS. E.g., 42 USC. §
7407(d)(1)(A)(i)-(ii) (“attainment” and “nonattainment”
designations defined as meeting or not meeting a particular
'? Although they now challenge the removal of attainment or unclassifiable
designations in summary fashion (Pet.Br. 2, 4), Petitioners did not object to
the removal of attainment or unclassifiable designations in their comments,
and therefore cannot do so here. See EDF Comments, JA 182-188; NRDC
Comments, JA 189-194. Linemaster Switch Corp. v. EPA, 938 F. 2d 1299,
1308-09 (D.C. Cir. 1991). In any event, Petitioners’ alleged injury - an
asserted “gap” in PSD requirements for areas designated attainment or
unclassifiable - is illusory. As discussed above, Petitioners read EPA’s
PSD regulations too narrowly. PSD will in fact continue to apply to such
areas. Supra 21.
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NAAQS); see infra 43-44.”° In its implementation policy
statement issued contemporaneously with the ozone NAAQS
proposal, supra 13, EPA made clear that it viewed revocation
of the one-hour standard as also revoking the associated
designations: “the designations [for the one-hour standard]
would remain in effect so long as the current l-hour ozone -
NAAQS remains in effect,” 61 Fed. Reg. at 65,754 -- and, by
necessary implication, would not remain in effect thereafter.
As discussed above, EPA initially proposed an
approach similar to the one Petitioners urge here, whereby the
Agency would delay revocation of the one-hour standard (and
thus the associated designations) until it made designations for
the revised eight-hour standard. /d.; see supra 13. However,
EPA changed that approach in light of its revised legal
interpretation of the interplay of Subpart 2 and EPA’s NAAQS
revision authority. 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,873; supra 13-14. In
this context, the decision to revoke the one-hour standard
necessarily meant that EPA was also revoking the designations
associated with it. Petitioners were active and highly
sophisticated participants in both the NAAQS rulemaking and
the discussions on implementation, and could not reasonably
have understood otherwise.”'
2° Petitioners elsewhere assert (Pet.Br. 36, 38-39) that designations are
linked to “the pollutant ozone,” not to particular NAAQS. As
demonstrated below, that argument is not supported by the statutory
language and is plainly incorrect. /nfra 43-45.
?! EDF and NRDC submitted comments on the proposed ozone and
particulate matter NAAQS revisions and on EPA’s proposed
implementation guidance. Further, EDF and NRDC were members of the
Subcommittee for Ozone, Particulate Matter, and Regional Haze, part of
the Clean Air Act Advisory Committee created pursuant to the Federal
Advisory Committee Act. The Subcommittee’s purpose was to develop
and recommend to EPA strategies for the implementation of the ozone and
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Further, if there were any room for doubt as to EPA’s
meaning, the Presidential Memorandum, __ issued
contemporaneously with and referenced in the preamble to the
1997 Rule (at 62 Fed. Reg. 38,856) removed it. The
Memorandum was explicit, stating that under the 1997 Rule
States “will not have to provide maintenance plans for those
areas that attain the [one]-hour standard.” 62 Fed. Reg. at
38,424. Petitioners thus had clear notice that EPA was not
requiring States to develop maintenance plans. Because
maintenance plans are required only as a prerequisite for
redesignation under section 107(d)(3)(E), Petitioners also had
clear notice that EPA was not retaining the one-hour
designations that would otherwise have made maintenance
plans relevant.
Other participants in the NAAQS _ rulemaking
understood the implications of EPA’s interpretation and
challenged aspects of it in the pending ATA litigation
concerning the revised ozone NAAQS. ~~ Indeed, those
arguments are premised on their recognition that the one-hour
standard (and thus the programs associated with it) would not
be revoked for an area until the standard was met, but then
would be revoked. Specifically, in ATA, industry and State
petitioners argued that the continued applicability of the one-
hour standard and Subpart 2 prohibited EPA from revising the
one-hour standard and associated designations at all, in part
because EPA’s action created an alleged “patchwork” of
different control requirements associated with different
particulate matter standards and the regional haze strategy, which EPA was
then developing.
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standards.” Thus, the petitioners in ATA well recognized that
the 1997 Rule removed all planning requirements for the one-
hour standard for an area, once that standard was revoked.
Petitioners here were similarly on notice of the issues
resolved by the 1997 Rule; indeed, they now challenge EPA’s
determination regarding the interplay between the pre-existing
one-hour and the revised eight-hour standard from a different
perspective. Having apparently made a decision not to raise
those issues at that time, they cannot do so now. Further, even
if Petitioners had some doubt,” their proper course would
have been to file a protective petition for review and let the
Court decide whether the case was properly brought. See
Eagle-Picher, 759 F.2d at 914 (in the analogous ripeness
context, “... if there is any doubt about the ripeness of a
claim, petitioners must bring their challenge in a timely
fashion or risk being time-barred”) (emphasis in original). As
Eagle-Picher instructs, id. at 912, the risk of guessing wrong
should fall on Petitioners, not the Court, EPA, or the
communities and States relying on EPA’s rule.
* * *
22 See American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., et al. v. EPA, No. 97-1441 and
consolidated cases, Brief of Non-State Clean Air Act Petitioners and
Intervenors 22-25, JA 211-215; Brief of Petitioner States 5-9 & n.4, JA
217-221; Reply Brief of Petitioner States 8-10, JA 223-225.
> Petitioners do not address the timeliness issue in their brief. At most,
they hint obliquely that the Revocation Rule was the first time they
understood that EPA was removing designations associated with the one-
hour standard, and was not requiring areas previously designated
nonattainment to prepare maintenance plans for the one-hour standard.
Pet. Br. 28, 43-44. As demonstrated above, their asserted confusion is not
credible.
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APPENDIX F
Appalachian Power Co., et al., Petition for D.C. Circuit
Review of EPA Ozone NAAQS Rulemaking
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
)
APPALACHIAN POWER COMPANY, et al.,)
Petitioners, )
)
v. ) Docket No. _
)
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL )
PROTECTION AGENCY, )
Respondent. )
)
PETITION FOR REVIEW
Pursuant to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, and § 307(b) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7607(b), Appalachian Power Company, et al., hereby
petition the Court to review a final rule issued by Respondent
United States Environmental Protection Agency. This rule
revises the national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS)
for ozone. The rule is entitled “National Ambient Air Quality
Standards for Ozone,” and it was published on July 18, 1997
at 62 Federal Register 38,856-96. The Petitioners are listed in
Attachment A to this petition. Petitioners own and operate
facilities that will be affected by this final rule. A copy of the
Federal Register notice announcing this final rule is
Attachment B to this petition.
Dated: August 15, 1997
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Respectfully submitted,
Henry V. Nickel
F. William Brownell
Lucinda Minton Langworthy
Ross S. Antonson
HUNTON & WILLIAMS
1900 K Street, N.W., Suite 1200
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 955-1500 s
Counsel for Appalachian Power
Company, et al.
ey
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