Amicus Curiae Brief — Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cty. v. Army Corps of Engineers

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Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

ey)

No. 99-117

In the

Supreme Court of th

+

SOLID WASTE AGENCY OF NORTHERN

COOK COUNTY, Petitioner,

Vv.

UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS

OF ENGINEERS, et al., Respondents.

+

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court

of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

+

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF PACIFIC LEGAL

FOUNDATION, RANDY PETERSON,

AND CALIFORNIA CATTLEMEN’S ASSOCIATION

IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITIONERS

+

ANNE M. HAYES

Counsel of Record

M. REED HOPPER

Pacific Legal Foundation

10360 Old Placerville Road,

Suite 100

Sacramento, California 95827

Telephone: (916) 362-2833

Facsimile: (916) 362-2932

Counsel for Amici Curiae

——

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the United States Army Corps of Engineers,

consistent with the Clean Water Act and the Commerce Clause

of the United States Constitution, may assert jurisdiction over

isolated intrastate waters solely because those waters do or

potentially could serve as habitat of migratory birds.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

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I. THE MIGRATORY BIRD RULE DOES NOT

COMPORT WITH THE CLEAN WATER ACT

BECAUSE IT IS AN UNREASONABLE

INTERPRETATION OF THE TERMS

“NAVIGABLE WATERS” AND “WATERS OF

GE STU. och ccseesbestsccseusveuss 7

A. The Migratory Bird Rule Allows the Corps to

Exercise Jurisdiction over Virtually Any Waters

NE 4.5:6404555.0040ko es Otekeratheenes 7

B. “Navigable Waters” and “Waters of the United

States” Cannot Reasonably Bear the

Interpretation Given to These Terms by the

Corps by Which Bird Use, Alone, Renders

Waters “Waters of the United States” ........... 14

Il. THE MIGRATORY BIRD RULE IS

UNREASONABLE BECAUSE IT STRETCHES

FEDERAL AUTHORITY FAR BEYOND THAT

ALLOWED UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE ... 19

Ill. BECAUSE CLEAN WATER ACT VIOLATIONS

CAN RESULT IN SIGNIFICANT PENALTIES, IT

IS UNREASONABLE TO ALLOW THE CORPS

TO EMPLOY THE MIGRATORY BIRD RULE TO

SELECTIVELY REGULATE WHATEVER LAND

USES IT DEEMS UNDESIRABLE ................ 24

SE 5 sec cen se dcbeannbeboad sex edabereevess 30

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

Association of American Railroads v. Costle,

$62 F.2d 1310(D.C. Cir. 1977) .............0005 15

Borden Ranch Partnership v. United States

Army Corps of Engineers, 1999 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 21,389 (E.D. Cal. 1999) ............... 18, 29

Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States,

ee ke ie aceon eeees es aeesees 25

Cargill, Inc. v. United States,

tn ce cne eee UREeeeEeeees 21

Connally v. General Construction Co.,

rE eee ic ecewennenneeeses 25-26

FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,

Ee coc ce léeeeeseseeansceceses |

Federal Maritime Commission v. Seatrain Lines, Inc.,

ee eb dace genaneseececes 19

Howell v. United States Army Corps of Engineers,

794 F. Supp. 1072 (D.N.M. 1992) ..........4.. 27-28

Jones v. United States,

EE ccccswencececencecececesse l

Laguna Gaiuna, Inc. v. Browner,

58 F.3d 564 (10th Cir. 1995).................. 11,27

Leslie Salt Co. v. United States,

PG CUED cccccccencccccosceces 20

Leslie Salt Co. v. United States,

896 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1990),

cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126 (1991) ............. 13, 25

iV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—C ontinued

Rueth v. United States Environmental Protection

Agency, 13 F.3d 227 (7th Cir. 1993) ............... 28

Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v.

United States Army Corps of Engineers,

998 F. Supp. 946 (N.D. Ill. 1998) ..............005. 5

Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v.

United States Army Corps of Engineers,

191 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 1999). ................ passim

Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v.

United States Army Corps of Engineers,

Sea Gs ED bnsécdesedassdecdbcedseceucs 5

Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 715 F. Supp. 726

(E.D. Va. 1988), aff'd without opinion,

885 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1989) .................008-. )

United States v. Ashland Oil and

Transportation Co., 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974) ... 18

United States v. Byrd,

609 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1979). ................ 28-29

United States v. Hanousek,

176 F.3d. 1116 (9th Cir. 1999) ...............0... 30

United States v. Jin Fuey Moy,

ee EE watboduccceunesendeeenes 19-20

United States v. Lopez,

oo PT 1, 9, 19, 21-23

United States v. Menasche,

PE SE ow cevecdcnbédwastacteenes 16

United States v. Morrison,

es CREE, cnccdcsnsdacacwunnaes 1, 21-24

i al

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

United States v. Riverside Bayview

Homes, Inc., No. 84-701,

1985 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 25 (Oct. 16, 1985) ....... 8, 13

United States v. Riverside Bayview

Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985)... 0.0... 8, 14, 18-19

United States v. Wilson,

133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997)................ 2, 16, 20

Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson

Corp., 24 F.3d 962 (7th Cir. 1994) .. 2... ..0.00.... 16

Constitutions

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Statutes

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$465 0d.0beu beens vewensseudideuebin 8, 24

De cticneneestscntevebessdsnckscecenseans 14

DO +0eb otkSSECKSEKkeewkseedenidebsenenens 8

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Regulations

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DRED Sivcvecdteeedeasedesecenseus 9,11, 16

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of. 8 GF PT eee 10, 12-13

Rules

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Miscellaneous

Conference Report, House Debate,

Committee Print (January 1973) .................. 17

John A. Leman, The Birds: Regulation of Isolated

Wetlands and the Limits of the Commerce Clause,

28 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1237 (1995) ......... 13-14, 26

Kenneth Culp Davis, Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,

Administrative Law Treatise § 6.8

I a ad 26

Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory

Construction, § 46:06 (2000) ...............0056- 16

vil

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Senate Consideration of the Report of the

Conference Committee, October 4, 1972,

93rd Congress, A Legislative History of the

Water Pollution Control Act Amendments

of 1972, Committee Print (January 1973)........ 16-17

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.3, Pacific Legal

Foundation (PLF), Randy Peterson, and California Cattlemen's

Association respectfully submit this brief amicus curiae in

support of the Petitioners.’ Written consent for amicus

participation in this case was granted by counsel of record for

all parties. These consent letters have been lodged with the

Clerk of this Court.

PLF is the largest and most experienced nonprofit public

interest law foundation of its kind in America. Founded in

1973, PLF provides a voice in the courts for mainstream

Americans who believe in limited government, private property

rights, individual freedom, and free enterprise. PLF litigates

nationwide in state and federal courts with the support of

thousands of citizens from coast to coast. PLF is headquartered

in Sacramento, California, and has offices in Miami, Florida;

Honolulu, Hawaii; Bellevue, Washington; and a liaison office

in Anchorage, Alaska.

PLF has participated in numerous cases concerning the

Commerce Clause and administrative agency power. For

example, PLF participated as amicus curiae before this Court in

United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000); Jones v.

United States, 120 S. Ct. 1904 (2000); FDA v. Brown &

Williamson Tobacco Corp., 1208. Ct. 1291 (2000); and United

States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). PLF filed a brief amicus

curiae supporting the Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari

in this case.

' Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, Amici Curiae affirm

that no counsel for any party in this case authored this brief in

whole or in part; and, furthermore, that no person or entity has

made a monetary contribution specifically for the preparation or

submission of this brief.

2

PLF seeks to augment the arguments of Petitioner by

further elucidating the inherent limitations on Congress’

Article | authority under the Constitution, and by providing

additional background on the regulatory scheme under which

the Respondent federal agency is operating. PLF believes its

public policy perspective and litigation experience will provide

a unique viewpoint on the issues presented in this case. PLF

believes this additional viewpoint will aid this Court in

evaluating the merits of this case.

Amicus Randy Peterson owns land in West Valley City,

Utah, a suburb of Salt Lake City. Although there is no surface

water evident on the land, the Army Corps of Engineers

asserted that the lands were “wetlands,” basing _ their

determination upon the saturation of soil below the surface for

a period of 12% of the growing season, which, in this Utah

location, amounts to roughly 2-3 weeks of the year. The Corps

asserted jurisdiction based upon the migratory bird rule.

Mr. Peterson has asked the Corps how it made its

jurisdictional determination, pointing out that any “wetlands”

on his property were isolated and, therefore, not subject to the

Corps’ jurisdiction under United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251

(4th Cir. 1997). Rather than explain the basis of the Corps’

jurisdiction, a Corps supervisor responded by warning him that

they would take legal action if he attempted to proceed with

development plans without applying for a permit.

Mr. Peterson is disturbed by and opposed to the Corps’

ability to exercise land use control over his property through the

mere assertion of jurisdiction. He supports the Petitioners in

the hope that this Court will provide much needed clarification

on the scope of the Corps’ authority under the Clean Water Act.

Mr. Peterson believes his experience, as reflective of the

experience of many landowners across the nation, will provide

this Court with a viewpoint not represented by the parties to this

litigation.

3

Amicus California Cattlemen’s Association is a nonprofit

corporation that was founded in 1917 to represent California’s

beef cattle industry in legislative and regulatory affairs. Beef

cattle producers operate on over 40 million of California’s

100 million acres and contributed $1.5 billion to the state’s

$19.7 billion agriculture economy as recently as 1993. The

industry provides more than 26,000 jobs from the ranch level to

the processing level in the State of California alone.

The California Cattlemen’s Association’s members

conduct their ranching operations on land that can include

swales, ditches, vernal pools, and man-made stock ponds and

watering holes. Due to California’s geology, ranching land in

California’s central valley is often covered with “hardpan,” that

is, clay soils in which rainwater does not percolate through the

ground, but instead stands until it evaporates. As a result, these

ponds and pools are isolated; they have no surface or

underground hydrologic connection to any other bodies of

water, let alone rivers or lakes that traverse state lines.

Cattle ranching operations, especially small-scale

operations, are often just one part of a ranch’s total agribusiness

operations, which can include timber and other crops. As a

result, ranching operations can involve changes in land use.

When such land alteration activities occur, cattlemen in

California are increasingly encountering Corps personnel who

assert permitting jurisdiction over these activities. This process

is resulting in significant impacts on the members of the

California Cattlemen’s Association, including forcing them to

abandon or change proposed land uses, delaying or halting

economically necessary changes to their land uses, or forcing

them to provide significant and costly mitigation. Because the

“waters” in question are isolated, the primary grounds for

jurisdiction invoked by the Corps is the migratory bird rule.

The California Cattlemen’s Association believes that the

Corps’ assertion of jurisdiction over these private land uses

4

based upon the use by migratory birds of man-made watering

holes or incidental swales extends the Corps jurisdiction beyond

what was intended under either the Clean Water Act or the

Constitution of the United States. The Association believes this

Court should be aware of their members interests and cognizant

of how the migratory bird rule is being applied in ruling on the

merits of this case.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Petitioner, Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook

County (SWANCC), is a municipal corporation made up of 23

different municipalities in Northern Cook County, Illinois.

Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States

Army Corps of Engineers, 191 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 1999)

(SWANCC). SWANCC was created by these municipalities to

address, in a comprehensive way, the need for a safe and cost-

effective means of disposing of nonhazardous waste generated

by the communities within these municipalities. /d. at 847.

To this end, SWANCC purchased a 533-acre parcel

intended to be utilized as a balefill site. /d. at 848. The parcel,

however, had an assortment of trenches and depressions on it,

reflecting the land’s prior use as a strip mine. /d. These

trenches, scattered throughout the site, make up a network of

seasonal and permanent ponds. /d. SWANCC’s original plans

called for utilizing a 267-acre portion of the parcel. /d.

Accordingly, in 1986, because the creation of the balefill site

would require filling in these wet depressions, SWANCC

contacted the Corps to determine whether a permit under

Section 404 of the Clean Water Act was required. /d. The

Corps inspected the site, and concluded that it had no

jurisdiction. /d.

SWANCC, however, did not utilize its original plan but,

instead, decided to proceed with a plan that would cover

414 acres of the site. /d. Accordingly, one year after the

original inspection, SWANCC asked the Corps, again, whether

5

its new proposed balefill site contained any jurisdictional

wetlands. /d. After another on-site inspection, the Corps

responded in the negative. /d. According to the Corps, the

waters on the-site did not meet the regulatory definition of

“wetlands.” /d.

Shortly thereafter, however, the Illinois Nature Preserves

Commission, a state agency, informed the Corps that migratory

birds used the site. /d. As expressed by the court below, “[t}his

new information made all the difference to the Corps, because

of the so-called migratory bird rule.” /d. That is, pursuant to its

guidelines, the Corps asserted jurisdiction over the site because

of the site’s use by migratory birds. Under the agency’s

reckoning, migratory bird use satisfies the constitutional

requirement that the federal government may only reach

activities that substantially affect interstate commerce because

people spend millions of dollars every year hunting and

observing migratory birds. /d. at 850.

Based on the Corps’ assertion of jurisdiction, SWANCC

applied for a Section 404 permit. /d. at 849. The Corps denied

it. /d. A revised permit application was also denied. /d.

Subsequently, SWANCC filed this action in federal court

challenging the Corps’ jurisdiction. SWANCC contended that

migratory bird use was insufficient to establish federal

commerce jurisdiction over an isolated wetland. /d. The

district court, following circuit precedent, ruled in favor of the

Corps. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United

States Army Corps of Engineers, 998 F. Supp. 946, 951-52

(N.D. Ill. 1998) (Solid Waste). The Seventh Circuit Court of

Appeals affirmed. SWANCC, 191 F.3d at 847. This Court

granted SWANCC’s petition for wnt of certiorari to resolve

whether the Corps’ jurisdiction comports with the Clean Water

Act and with the Commerce Clause. Solid Waste Agency of

Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of

Engineers, 120 S. Ct. 2003 (2000).

6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The migratory bird rule is a jurisdictional rule employed

by the Corps to reach isolated intrastate bodies of water under

the Clean Water Act. The basic premise of the rule is that,

regardless of the character, use, or origin of the body of water

in question, the Corps may regulate it as a “water of the United

States” solely based upon its use by migratory birds.

Because the rule does not attempt to define itself by

reference to the statutory term “navigable waters . . . of the

United States,” the migratory bird rule is an unreasonable

interpretation of the Corp’s jurisdiction under the Act. By

fashioning this extra-regulatory test to assert jurisdiction over

land uses where connections to interstate commerce are, at best,

extremely tenuous, the Corps has arrogated to itself the power

to regulate virtually any land uses it chooses, and for reasons

unrelated to the pollution control purposes which were the

impetus behind the Clean Water Act. While Congress

understood and intended that implementation of the Clean

Water Act would serve broad environmental goals, the Corps

may not use this broad intent to expand its jurisdiction beyond

the specific terms set forth in the Act—to regulate the

“navigable waters . . . of the United States.”

The migratory bird rule is also unreasonable because it

construes federal power beyond that allowed under the

Commerce Clause. Use of waters by migratory birds does not

make the filling of those waters an activity that “substantially

affects” interstate commerce within the meaning of this Court’s

precedents. In particular, the use of the aggregation principle,

by which the government determines “substantial effects” by

aggregating activities that have minimal impacts on interstate

commerce, does not apply to noneconomic activities. Further,

the activity here—the filling of waters used by migratory

birds—has such an attenuated link to any interstate commerce

impacts that upholding the migratory bird rule as a valid

7

interpretation of the commerce power would be tantamount to

sanctioning a federal police power without limits.

Finally, violations of the Clean Water Act carry with them

significant penalties, both civil and criminal. Where the

violation of a law has such significant impacts on individuals,

itis unconscionable that the Corps may use vague jurisdictional

grounds like the migratory bird rule to exercise permitting

authority over private land use activities. By avoiding fixed and

verifiable standards as the basis for its jurisdiction, the Corps

has an almost unfettered ability to make unilateral decisions

about its own jurisdiction, thereby subjecting landowners to

arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.

For these reasons, Amici respectfully submit that the

migratory bird rule is invalid.

ARGUMENT

I

THE MIGRATORY BIRD RULE DOES

NOT COMPORT WITH THE CLEAN

WATER ACT BECAUSE IT IS AN

UNREASONABLE INTERPRETATION

OF THE TERMS “NAVIGABLE

WATERS” AND “WATERS OF THE

UNITED STATES”

A. The Migratory Bird Rule Allows the Corps to

Exercise Jurisdiction over Virtually Any Waters

Whatsoever

The Clean Water Act was enacted in 1972 “to restore and

maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the

Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). One of the means by

which Congress sought to achieve this purpose was through

regulating the discharge of pollutants into bodies of water.

Consequently, under the Act, an individual must apply for a

permit, commonly referred to as a Section 404 permit, from the

Army Corps of Engineers “for the discharge of dredged or fill

material into the navigable waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a). The

term “navigable waters” is defined by statute: “The term

‘navigable waters’ means the waters of the United States,

including the territorial seas.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).

In 1985, in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,

Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985), this Court addressed the question

whether the statutory terms “navigable waters” and “waters of

the United States” properly encompassed within them wetlands

adjacent to navigable bodies of water and their tributanes. /d.

at 123. In resolving that question in the affirmative, this Court

specifically withheld expressing an opinion on whether the

statute empowered the Corps to regulate wetlands not adjacent

to open bodies of water—that is, isolated wetlands. /d.

at 131.8. This case requires this Court to address the question

left open in Riverside Bayview; specifically, whether the Corps’

jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act extends to wetlands or

other waters not connected to navigable bodies of water or their

tributaries, and, more specifically, whether the Corps may do so

under the so-called “migratory bird rule.” In order to resolve

that question, it is important to understand what the migratory

bird rule is, and from where it derives.

Although the Assistant Solicitor General alluded to the

migratory bird rule during oral argument in United States v.

Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., No. 84-701, 1985 U.S. Trans.

LEXIS 25, at *18-*19 (Oct. 16, 1985), the rule did not appear

as an official Corps policy until 1986, when the Corps

recodified its jurisdictional regulations in the Federal Register.

SWANCC, 191 F.3d at 852. The gist of the rule, as cast by the

court below, is that use of any water by migratory birds renders

that water subject to federal regulation under the Commerce

Clause because people spend millions of dollars every year

hunting and observing migratory birds, including crossing state

lines to do so, and that, therefore, destruction of bird habitat, in

9

the aggregate, “substantially affects” interstate commerce

within the meaning of this Court's decision in United States v.

Lopez. SWANCC, 191 F.3d at 850.

Technically, the migratory bird rule is not a “rule” at all,

in that it has not been formally adopted as a regulation. /d. It

has been found, itistead, to be an “interpretive” guideline

describing one means by which the Corps can assert jurisdiction

under its “other waters” regulation. /d. But see Tabb Lakes,

Ltd. v. United States, 715 F. Supp. 726 (E.D. Va. 1988), aff'd

without opinion, 885 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1989) (finding that the

migratory bird rule was a substantive rule, and that the Corps

had violated the APA by promulgating it without complying

with notice and comment requirements). The “other waters”

regulation is one provision of the Corps’ jurisdictional

regulation, codified at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3. The “other waters”

regulation purports to grant the Corps regulatory jurisdiction

over:

(3) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers,

streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats,

sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet

meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use,

degradation or destruction of which could affect

interstate or foreign commerce including any such

waters:

(i) Which are or could be used by interstate or

foreign travelers for recreational or other purposes;

or

(11) From which fish or shellfish are or could be

taken and sold in interstate or foreign commerce; or

(iii) Which are used or could be used for industrial

purpose by industries in interstate commerce .. . .

33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3).

10

The regulation itself contains no language referencing the

migratory bird rule. However, in the Federal Register notice

announcing the rule, the Corps explained that the inclusion of

any waters “which could affect interstate or foreign commerce”

effected a broader reach than what appeared on the face of the

regulation:

EPA has clarified that waters of the United States at

40 C.F.R. 328.3(a)(3) also include the following

waters:

a. Which are or would be used as habitat by birds

protected by Migratory Bird Treaties; or

b. Which are or would be used as habitat by other

migratory birds which cross state lines; or

c. Which are or would be used as habitat for

endangered species; or

d. Used to irrigate crops sold in_ interstate

commerce.

51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,217 (1986). Thus, the migratory bird

rule does not limit itself to waters used by migratory birds, but

to waters that potentially serve as habitat for birds or other

wildlife, or that might be used for some other purpose that

impacts interstate commerce.

Inthe Corps’ 1988 revision to its rules, it further explained

its jurisdiction under the migratory bird rule by citing to an

internal memorandum from EPA’s general counsel addressing

the question of whether Clean Water Act jurnsdiction required

actual connections to interstate commerce, or were satisfied

merely by potential use, including potential use by migratory

birds or other wildlife. The memorandum stated:

in simplified terms, the answer ts that if the evidence

reasonably shows that the waters “are used or would

be used” by migratory birds or endangered species,

it is covered by EPA’s regulation. ... In addition,

if a particular waterbody shares the characteristics of

other waters whose use by and value to migratory

birds is well established and those characteristics

make it likely that the waterbody in question will

also be used by migratory birds, it would also seem

to fall clearly within the definition . . . .

Memorandum from Francis S. Blake to Richard E. Sanderson

of Sept. 12, 1985. Thus, despite the holding of the Court below

that the regulation only reaches actual migratory bird habitat

(that is, where a bird species “naturally lives or grows”),

SWANCC, 191 F.3d at 850, the Corps construes its Clean Water

Act jurisdiction more broadly. For example, in a case called

Laguna Gatuna, Inc. v. Browner, 58 F.3d 564 (1 0th Cir. 1995),

the EPA asserted Clean Water Act jurisdiction not on a finding

that a sinkhole used by Laguna Gatuna for industrial wastewater

served as bird habitat, but on the sole finding that dead

migratory birds were found near the sinkhole. /d. at 565.

Further, the Corps is not limited by the “other waters”

regulation to ponds or wetlands or any of the other categories of

“waters” spelled out in its “other waters” regulation when

asserting jurisdiction under the migratory bird rule. For

example, in the present case, the Corps concluded that

SWANCC’s property did not contain wetlands, natural ponds,

sloughs, praine potholes, lakes or any of the “other waters”

delineated in the regulation. The Corps had its own agents

Carry out on-site inspections on SWANCC’s property on two

separate occasions, and these agents specifically found that the

man-made ditches on the property did not constitute “wetlands”

within the Corps’ regu/atory definition of the term. SWANCC,

191 F.3d at 848. But the Corps found jurisdiction anyway,

based upon the “catch-all” language of the “other waters”

regulation, specifically, “{aJll other waters . . . the use,

degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate or-

foreign commerce.” 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3). Thus, the

12

migratory bird rule is not simply a means by which the Corps

asserts jurisdiction over instrastate wetlands, lakes, or other

ecologically significant or natural bodies of water; rather, it is

the jurisdictional test the Corps employs to reach waters of any

nature. As the Corps explained in its 1986 Federal Register

notice:

For clarification it should be noted that we generally

do not consider the following waters to be “Waters

of the United States.” However, the Corps reserves

the right on a case-by-case basis to determine that a

particular waterbody within these categories of

waters is a water of the United States. EPA also has

the right to determine on a case-by-case basis if any

of these waters are “waters of the United States.”

(a) Non-tidal drainage and irrigation ditches

excavated on dry land.

(b) Artificially irngated areas which would revert

to upland if the irrigation ceased.

(c) Artificial lakes or ponds created by excavating

and/or diking dry land to collect and retain water and

which are used exclusively for such purposes as

stock watering, irrigation, settling basins, or nce

growing.

(d) Artificial reflecting or swimming pools or other

small ornamental bodies of water created by

excavating and/or diking dry land to retain water for

primarily aesthetic reasons.

(e) Waterfilled depressions created in dry land

incidental to construction activity and pits excavated

in dry land for the purpose of obtaining fill, sand, or

gravel unless and until the construction or excavation

operation is abandoned and the resulting body of

-

~~

13

water meets the definition of waters of the United

States (see 33 C.F.R. 328.3(a)).

51 Fed. Reg. at 41,217 (emphasis added); see also Leslie

Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1990), cert.

denied, 498 U.S. 1126 (1991) (upholding Corps’ ability to

exercise jurisdiction over artificially created waters used by

migrating birds—in that case, salt crystallization pits—in

accord with this language).

Thus, the “other waters” rule is just that—a regulation that

purports to grant the Corps jurisdiction over any other water

whatsoever, so long as the Corps can identify some link

between that water and interstate commerce. Indeed, at oral

argument in Riverside Bayview, when a member of this Court

surmised that a man watering his back yard a lot would not be

subject to the Clean Water Act, the Assistant Solicitor General

responded:

Unless we could show that he has got some interstate

commerce activity going on in his back yard, and the

Corps would take it upon itself to make that showing

itself, and not require the back yard owner to come

in and demonstrate it, the absence of the commerce

connection to the Corps’s satisfaction.

United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 1985 U.S.

Trans. LEXIS 25, at *14.

As a result, the migratory bird rule, as an interpretation of

the “other waters” regulation, allows the Corps to regulate any

type of water—and all manner of local and private land

uses—so long as the Corps can show that migratory birds use

such waters. Given the fact that the United States is hoine to

some 2.5 to 6 billion birds, two-thirds of which migrate,

John A. Leman, The Birds: Regulation of Isolated Wetlands

and the Limits of the Commerce Clause, 28 U.C. Davis L. Rev.

14

1237, 1241 (1995), it is hard to imagine what waters the Corps

cannot reach through the migratory bird rule.

B. “Navigable Waters” ar’ “Waters of the

United States” Cannot. asonably Bear the

Interpretation Given to These Terms by the Corps

by Which Bird Use, Alone, Renders Waters

“Waters of the United States”

As stated above, the Clean Water Act gives the Army

Corps of Engineers permitting authority over discharges into the

“navigeble waters,” defined by statute as “waters of the United

States.” 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 1362. The Petitioners have

comprehensively argued that these terms were intended by

Congress to relate to a specific category of waters. Moreover,

even granting that these terms may be sufficiently ambiguous

to allow some degree of agency interpretation, the Corps has

patently failed to resolve the ambiguity in a manner that

comports with the intent of the statutory language.

In Riverside Bayview, this Court held that the Clean Water

Act was intended “to regulate at least some waters that would

not be deemed ‘navigable’ under the classical understanding of

that term.” Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 133. But it does not

follow from this holding that the Corps may ignore the statutory

language, and the intent behind it, in construing the scope of its

jurisdiction and, further, that the Corps can regulate such waters

for purposes unrelated to the overriding purpose of the Clean

Water Act, which is to protect the Nation’s waterways from the

deleterious effects of pollution. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)-(7).

However, this is precisely how the Corp’s jurisdiction has

come to be understood. As the Seventh Circuit cast the issue,

the statutory terms “navigable waters” and “waters of the

United States” do not have any particular relevance in defining

the scope of the Corps’ jurisdiction. Instead, the Corps may

simply “reach{] as many waters as the Commerce Clause

allows,” SWANCC, 191 F.3d at 851, and, further, may regulate

15

those waters for any purpose related to “restor[ing] and

maintain{ ing] the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of

the Nation’s waters,” id. at 852 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)).

Indeed, in this case, the Corps denied SWANCC’s permit not

because it would result in pollution of the nation’s waterways,

but based on the more amorphous “public interest” standards

enunciated in 33 C.F.R. § 320.4, see Brief for the Petitioner

at 9-10 (citing Administrative Record at 15,658-59), which

includes the assessment of factors such as aesthetics, historical

value, recreation, safety, food and fiber production,

“considerations of property ownership and, in general, the needs

and welfare of the people,” in addition to considerations more

apropos to environmental regulation. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a)(1).

While one may not fault, in general, the agency’s ability to

exercise discretion in carrying out its statutory mandate to

protect the interests that the Clean Water Act was enacted to

remedy, it is another thing entirely to treat the broad interests

enunciated in the preamble to the Act as defining the

jurisdictional grant of authority to the Corps.

A preamble no doubt contributes to a general

understanding of a statute, but it is not an operative

part of the statute and it does not enlarge or confer

powers on administrative agencies or officers. . . .

The operative provisions of statutes are those which

prescribe rights and duties and otherwise declare the

legislative will.

Association of American Railroads v. Costle, 562 F.2d 1310,

1316(D.C. Cir. 1977) (footnote omitted).

The Clean Water Act confers on the Corps the authority to

regulate “navigable waters . . . of the United States”—and all

that may imply—but not anything else. But here, the Corps has

not given sufficient consideration to what Congress intended by

its statutory language—or rather, has construed legislative

intent from a selective reading of the legislative history.

16

However broad the term “waters” may be, the Corps

cannot get around the underlying premise that,

“Waters of the United States” must be a subset of

“water”; otherwise why insert the qualifying clause

in the statute? (No one suggests that the function of

this phrase is to distinguish domestic waters from

those of Canada or Mexico.)

Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 24 F.3d

962, 965 (7th Cir. 1994) (emphasis in original). Indeed, the

Fourth Circuit had little trouble in finding that the statutory

language had to have some relevance in construing the reach of

the Corps’ authority. In striking down the Corps’ “other

waters” regulation as u/tra vires, that court concluded:

This regulation purports to extend the coverage of

the Clean Water Act to a variety of waters that are

intrastate, nonnavigable, or both, solely on the basis

that the use, degradation, or destruction of such

waters could affect interstate commerce. ... When

viewed in light of its statutory authority, 33 C.F.R.

§ 328.3(a)(3) (1993), which defines “waters of the

United States” to include intrastate waters that need

have nothing to do with navigable or interstate

waters, expands the statutory phrase “waters of the

United States” beyond its definitional limit.

United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 257 (4th Cir. 1997). In

short, the Fourth Circuit held, consistent with the precept that

courts must give effect to every word in a statute, see Norman J.

Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 46:06 (2000);

United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955), that

the Corps was not free to define the statutory language any way

it pleased in construing its own jurisdiction under the Act.

Even Congress, in acknowledging that the phrase

“navigable waters of the United States” should “be given the

17

broadest constitutional interpretation,” Senate Consideration of

the Report of the Conference Committee, October 4, 1972, 93rd

Congress, A Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control

Act Amendments of 1972, Committee Print (January 1973)

at 173, understood the term “waters of the United States” as

having a distinct meaning:

It is intended that the term “navigable waters”

include all water bodies, such as lakes, streams, and

rivers, regarded as public navigable waters in law

which are navigable in fact when the form, in their

ordinary condition by themselves or by uniting with

other waters or other systems of transportation, such

as highways or railroads, a continuing highway over

which commerce is or may be carried on with other

States or with foreign countries in the customary

means of trade and travel in which commerce is

conducted today. /n such cases the commerce on

such waters would have a substantial economic

effect on interstate commerce.

Id. (emphasis added). See also Conference Report, House

Debate, Committee Print (January 1973), at 250 (citation

omitted) (“The ‘gist of the Federal test’ is the waterway’s use

‘as a highway,’ not whether it is ‘a part of a navigable interstate

or international commercial highway.’”). Thus, the Corps’

attempt to read the definitional phrase “waters of the United

States” as being an open-ended license to define waters any way

they chose is insupportable.

Indeed, in Riverside Bayview, this Court’s holding that the

Clean Water Act reached wetlands adjacent to navigable

waterways was premised on the principle that the starting point

for construing the Corps’ jurisdiction was the notion that,

though the Clean Water Act itself allowed the Corps to regulate

waters that were not themselves navigable, the Act was directed

18

at the specified class of waters that were an appropriate focus of

federal regulation. This Court reasoned:

We cannot say that the Corps’ conclusion that

adjacent wetlands are inseparably bound up with the

“waters” of the United States—based as it is on the

Corps’ and EPA’s technical expertise—is

unreasonable.

Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 134. By stating the issue in this

manner, this Court expressly acknowledged that the “adjacent

wetlands” rule was based upon the notion that the “point at

which water ends and land begins,” id. at 132, is necessarily a

technical one, and that therefore the Corps’ expert

determination that adjacent wetlands were “inseparably bound

up” with the “waters of the United States” rendered adjacent

wetlands, in fact, part of the “waters of the United States”

subject to the Act.

But unlike the adjacent wetlands at issue in Riverside

Bayview, there is no confusion on the point that the migratory

bird rule reaches not only waters that are not “navigable in

fact,” but small, isolated waters like ponds or watering holes

completely contained within a private parcel of land. Indeed, by

definition, the migratory bird rule is employed precisely to

reach those waters that the Corps cannot otherwise reach

through its more traditional test of linking a given water body

to an interstate waterway. See United States v. Ashland Oil and

Transportation Co., 504 F.2d 1317, 1320 (6th Cir. 1974)

(construing Clean Water Act to reach a creek that was a

tributary of another creek that was a tributary of a river that was

a tributary of a navigable river). Rather, the migratory bird rule

is more typically used to reach an isolated puddle in the middle

of a farmer’s field. See Borden Ranch Partnership v. United

States Army Corps of Engineers, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

21,389, at *43-44 (E.D. Cal. 1999).

19

Thus, while the term “waters of the United States” may be

sufficiently ambiguous to allow the Corps some “wiggle” room

in its interpretation, see Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 133,

there is no basis in law or in the statute that entitles the Corps

to “wiggle” itself completely out of the fact that “waters of the

United States” is a subset of all the waters in the United States.

Through the migratory bird rule, the Corps has “bootstrap[ped]

itself into an area in which it has no jurisdiction by repeatedly

violating its statutory mandate.” Federal Maritime

Commission v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 745 (1973).

Both law and logic preclude the Corps from construing the term

“navigable waters . . . of the United States” to reach any waters,

so long as those waters are used or could be used by migratory

birds. Accordingly, this Court should find that the migratory

bird rule is an unreasonable interpretation of the term “waters

of the United States” in the text of the Clean Water Act.

THE MIGRATORY BIRD RULE IS

UNREASONABLE BECAUSE IT STRETCHES

FEDERAL AUTHORITY FAR BEYOND THAT

ALLOWED UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

As this Court stated in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.

549 (1995), “(t]he Constitution creates a Federal Government

of enumerated powers,” id. at 552, and one of those powers is

the power “to regulate commerce . . . among the several states.”

U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8. In this case, the United States contends

that the power to regulate interstate commerce encompasses

within it the power to regulate isolated, instrastate bodies of

water that are used by migratory birds. This is an unreasonable

interpretation of the Act.

A statute must be construed, if fairly possible,

so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is

unconstitutional but also grave doubts upon that

score.

20

United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401 (1915).

Because the rule, both on its face and as applied, gives rise to

serious doubts as to whether the Corps is exercising its

permitting authority consistent with the limits of federal power,

this Court should hold the migratory bird rule invalid.

Even were this Court to construe the rule as though it were

duly enacted by Congress, it is constitutionally troublesome.

See Wilson, 133 F.3d at 257. At first blush, and perhaps the

second and third, the connection between interstate commerce

and the use of ponds by birds does not readily come to mind.

However, the Army Corps of Engineers, with the sanction of

several courts of appeals, SWANCC, 191 F.3d 845; Leslie Salt

Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388 (9th Cir. 1995), has

ingeniously devised a connection that, it argues, supplies the

requisite nexus between birds and commerce. As explained by

the court below:

“{T]hroughout North America, millions of people

annually spend more than a billion dollars on

hunting, trapping, and observing migratory birds.

Yet the cumulative loss of wetlands has reduced the

populations of many species and consequently the

ability of people to hunt, trap, and observe those

birds.” Statistics produced by the U.S. Census

Bureau reveal that approximately 3.1 million

Americans spent $1.3 billion to hunt migratory birds

in 1996, and that about 11 percent of them traveled

across state lines to do so. Another 17.7 million

people spent time observing birds in states other than

their states of residence; 14.3 million of these took

trips specifically for this purpose; and approximately

9.5 million traveled for the purpose of observing

shorebirds, such as herons. There is no need to dally

on this point: we find (once again) that the

destruction of migratory bird habitat and the

attendant decrease in the populations of these birds

21

“substantially affects” interstate commerce. The

effect may not be observable as each isolated pond

used by the birds for feeding, nesting, and breeding

is filled, but the aggregate effect is clear, and that is

all the Commerce Clause requires.

SWANCC, 191 F.3d at 850 (citations omitted). Thus, according

to the Seventh Circuit and the Corps, the migratory bird rule

satisfies the third Lopez test—that is, it is a regulation of an

activity that substantially affects interstate commerce—because

destruction of its habitat, in the aggregate, substantially affects

interstate commerce related to the hunting and observing of

migratory birds. SWANCC, 191 F.3d at 849-50.

While the Seventh Circuit drew its conclusion with the

benefit of this Court’s analysis in Lopez, the court misapplied

it. See Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 955 (1995)

(Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). More

critically, it misapplied it in a context—through

aggregation—which this Court has further clarified through its

subsequent decision in United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct.

1740 (2000).

In United States v. Lopez, this Court struck the Gun Free

School Zones Act as beyond the authority of Congress to enact

under the Commerce Clause. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552. In so

doing, this Court noted that the act could not

be sustained under our cases upholding regulations

of activities that arise out of or are connected with a

commercial transaction, which viewed in the

aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.

Id. at 561. Nevertheless, the court below found it sufficient that

the destruction of bird habitat, in the aggregate, was sufficient

to create the “substantial effects” necessary to uphold the

migratory bird rule. SWANCC, 191 F.3d at 850.

22

However, in Morrison, this Court affirmed that the

aggregation principle may not be invoked to sanction

congressional action every time Congress chooses to regulate

intrastate noneconomic activity. Morrison dealt with the

constitutionality of the federal Violence Against Women Act.

The provision in question gave private litigants the right to

bring a federal claim against any individual who committed a

“crime of violence motivated by gender.” Morrison, 1208S. Ct.

at 1747. In defending the constitutionality of the Act from a

Commerce Clause challenge, the government argued that the

Act regulated an activity that “substantially affected” interstate

commerce because violence against women, in the aggregate,

had significant effects on the economy in terms of time lost

from jobs, medical costs, and other impacts. /d: at 1752. The

Court rejected the notion that the aggregation of isolated

activities was automatically sufficient to meet the requisite

“substantial effects” test:

While we need not adopt a categorical rule against

aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity

in order to decide these cases, thus far in our

Nation’s history our cases have upheld Commerce

Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where

that activity is economic in nature.

Id. at 1751 (emphasis added). Here, the Corps is regulating the

fill of waters, an activity that is not, by its nature, economic.

Viewed in light of Morrison's holding, because the destruction

of waters is not inherently economic, the aggregation principle

does not protect the rule.

Thus, the rule is only valid if it meets the other

“substantial effects” tests, such as if the rule contains a

jurisdictional element requiring that the destruction of a

particular water would have impacts on interstate commerce,

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561, or could otherwise be sustained under

23

an independent analysis of substantial effects, id. at 562. But,

again, the migratory bird mile fails.

First, the rule contains no jurisdictional element in the

sense intended by Lopez. That is, though bird use is the

“jurisdictional element” employed by the Corps, even where

migratory birds in fact use a given body of water, the Corps’

rule does not require any showing that the destruction of the

water would impact the identified commerce in migratory bird

hunting or observing. Second, under an independent analysis,

this Court made it clear that a Commerce Clause rationale may

not employ a method of reasoning which would admit of no

limits on the commerce power. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1752.

Specifically, this Court held that the commerce power did not

allow the federal government to regulate any activity, such as

violence against women, that could be linked through a long

causal chain to indirect and unspecified effects on interstate

commerce, such as impacts on jobs and medical costs. Because

virtually all human activity has similar, though attenuated,

impacts on commerce, such a line of reasoning would

effectively grant Congress unlimited authority to regulate any

human activity, and “completely obliterate the Constitution’s

distinction between national and local authority.” /d.

Like the link between violence and commerce espoused in

the Violence Against Women Act, the Corps’ theory of a link

between interstate commerce in hunting and birdwatching and

the destruction of bird habitat proves too much. See Lopez,

514 U.S. at 564. In Morrison, the regulation in question

targeted only “gender-motivated” violence; consequently, there

was no direct correlation between the specific regulated conduct

and the supposed commerce impacts. As this Court noted, all

violence, of whatever nature, had even greater impacts on the

economy than the subset of violence that constitutes gender-

motivated vielence. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1753. Thus, this

Court reasoned, if Congress could regulate gender-motivated

24

violence, it could regulate all murder and all crime—a power

that went far beyond what the Commerce Clause permitted. /d.

Similarly, any impacts on the commerce in bird hunting

and watching do not directly correlate to the destruction of

waters that are regulated under the migratory bird rule. If the

Corps may regulate “waters” simply because they may be used

by migratory birds, the Corps line of reasoning would enable

Congress to regulate any land or object that is used by any

animal at all, since the ownership, breeding, sale, observation,

hunting, and studying of all animals surely has an even greater

effect on interstate commerce than the mere use of isolated

ponds by migratory birds. In short, the rationale employed by

the Corps in invoking the migratory bird rule admits of no

limits on the federal commerce power.

Because the migratory bird rule expands federal authority

beyond that granted to the federal government under the Com-

merce Clause, it is an unreasonable interpretation of what

Congress intended when it granted the Corps authority to

regulate the “navigable waters . . . of the United States.”

Accordingly, this Court should hold the migratory bird rule

invalid.

BECAUSE CLEAN WATER ACT VIOLATIONS

CAN RESULT IN SIGNIFICANT PENALTIES, IT IS

UNREASONABLE TO ALLOW THE CORPS

TO EMPLOY THE MIGRATORY BIRD RULE

TO SELECTIVELY REGULATE WHATEVER

LAND USES IT DEEMS UNDESIRABLE

Violations of the Clean Water Act carry with them

substantial penalties, including criminal penalties that can entail

confinement and significant fines. 33 U.S.C. § 1319. And

because the Act makes it unlawful to “discharge . . . dredged or

fill material into the navigable waters” without a permit,

33 U.S.C. § 1344(a), criminality depends as much upon the

25

overt act of filling as it does on the character of the water or.

land in question—specifically, whether any portion of the

property constitutes “waters of the United States.”

Consequently, it is critical that the statutory term “waters of the

United States” bears a meaning that permits the Corps to reach

the types of activities and individuals Congress intended to

reach.

But the migratory bird rule allows the Corps to reach such

a broad array of properties and waters that it is affirmatively

unhelpful in enabling an individual to make a definitive

determination as to whether or not any land he or she may own

contains “waters” subject to the Corps’ permitting jurisdiction.

In short, the migratory bird rule, by allowing the Corps to reach

not only significant waters such as lakes and rivers, but man-

made ditches, SWANCC, 191 F.3d at 848, and abandoned pits

created for industrial use, Leslie Salt, 896 F.2d at 359-60, even

where those waters do not constitute “wetlands” within the

regulatory definition of that term, SWANCC, 191 F.3d at 848,

is an interpretation that “contains no such definite standard

from which one can start in the calculation of his duty.” Boyce

Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337 on

(Jackson, J., dissenting).

That the terms of a penal statute creating a new

offense must be sufficiently explicit to inform those

who are subject to it what conduct on their part will

render them liable to its penalties, is a

well-recognized requirement, consonant alike with

ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of

law. And a statute which either forbids or requires

the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of

common intelligence must necessarily guess at its

meaning and differ as to its application, violates the

first essential of due process of law.

26

Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391

(1926). The migratory bird rule is just the type of amorphous

rule that raises serious due process problems. It allows the

Corps to reach any type of waters solely on the basis that those

waters could be used by migratory birds. Accordingly, because

migratory birds are ubiquitous, see Leman, supra, the migratory

bird rule enables the Corps to assert jurisdiction over property

subject only to the subjective judgment of individual agency

officials as to what lands ought or vugnt not to be regulated.

The purpose of rules is to ensure fair, consistent, and

objective standards that enable the regulated commur:ty to

understand what the law requires. See generally, Kenneth Culp

Davis, Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise § 6.8

(Third Ed. 1994). But rules, even unenacted ones like the

migratory bird rule, are useless if they do not serve these ends.

Indeed, given the Corps’ expansive understanding of the waters

it may regulate under the migratory bird rule, the Corps’ other

jurisdictional regulations relating to the definition of terms like

“wetlands,” 33 C.F.R. § 328(b), “tidal waters,” 33 C.F.R.

§ 328(f) and “navigable waters” 33 C.F.R. § 329.4, for purposes

of Section 404 jurisdiction, are manifestly pointless. If a

landowner hires the nation’s foremost hydrologists and

biologists to survey the soils and flora on his property and they

conclude that the property contains no wetlands, the entire

exercise can be summarily negated by the predilections of a

single bird that decides to have a bath. In the end, there is no

avoiding the fact that, under the regime of the migratory bird

rule, whether one is breaking the law depends entirely upon

whether birds have, or could have, used one’s property. This is

a bizarre ground on which to base criminal or civil liability.

But more pragmatically, the expansive notion of

jurisdiction evidenced by the migratory bird rule—that is, that

any type of water at all may be regulated by the Corps—leaves

the regulated community in the dark as to whether a given

assertion of jurisdiction by the Corps is legitimate. As a result,

27

every assertion of jurisdiction must be taken as valid by

landowners, because there is no verifiable standard against

which they may measure legitimate versus illegitimate

enforcement.

In practice, it is not unusual for landowners to receive

informal “notices,” informing them, with no specificity

‘whatsoever, that the land they are deveioping “may” contain

waters subject to Section 404 permitting jurisdiction, and that

the unlawful filling of these waters can subject them to heavy

tunes or penalties. See Notice at Appendix “A.” Once

confronted by such a notice, landowners are unavoidably bound

up in the permitting scheme, solely at the Corps’ discretion.

Thus, once the Corps asserts jurisdiction, a party must either

risk civil or criminal prosecution, or submit to regulation. See

Laguna Gatuna, 58 F.3d at 566. Because “potential” bird use

is enough to create Corps’ jurisdiction, the individual being

regulated is subject entirely to the Corps’ unilateral judgment as

to the characterization of his land as “waters of the United

States.”

For example, in Howell v. United States Army Corps of

Engineers, 794 F. Supp. 1072 (D.N.M. 1992), a plaintiff who

had received a cease and desist order from the Corps challenged

the assertion of jurisdiction over his property in a declaratory

relief action, claiming that his land did not contain any wetlands

subject to the Clean Water Act. /d. at 1074. In accord with

settled law, the Court dismissed the case for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. /d. But the Court’s analysis is revealing of

how inherently open to abuse the Corps’ regulatory process is.

A letter from the Corps to the plaintiff stated:

We intend to conduct a wetland delineation on your

property to determine in detail the extent of wetlands

initially investigated by Mr. Wood. .. .

When all of the available information has been

reviewed and our wetland delineation has been

28

completed and verified, | will request you to apply

for an after-the-fact permit... .

Id. at 1074 (emphasis added). In short, the Corps’ issued its

cease and desist order despite its admission that it had no clear

knowledge of the existence or extent oi wetlands on the

property in question. The Court, in finding no provision in the

Clean Water Act for pre-enforcement judicial review, displayed

remarkable irony in concluding:

It is clear from the cease-and-desist letter quoted

above that the Corps will not finalize its decision

until it conducts its “wetland delineation” and

decides whether to issue a permit. Only at that time,

and perhaps not until the Corps forces compliance

through penalties or judicial action, will the

plaintiff know the concrete effects of the Corps’

decision.

Id. at 1074-75 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). As

explained by the court, the plaintiff landowner had no recourse

to judicial review of the Corps’ initial unsubstantiated assertion

of jurisdiction. See also Rueth v. United States Environmental

Protection Agency, 13 F.3d 227 (7th Cir. 1993). Further,

whether or not his land contained “wetlands” depended solely

upon what the Corps itself concluded—after-the-fact, and only

by means of forcing the landowner to submit to an on-site

inspection of his land by government agents: “The issue

concerns factual determinations properly resolved through

agency expertise and reviewable by this Court once a record is

developed by the agency.” Id. at 1075 (emphasis added). See

also United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1979):

In the course of obtaining the permit he can extract

from the Corps an exact statement of where the

wetlands are and protect himself from further legal

proceedings. Furthermore, Byrd cannot complain of

the absence of a legal description of the wetlands

——————_

29

since, as the district court noted, he has refused to

permit his land to be surveyed.

Id. at 1209. In short, the Corps gets to call all the shots.

This degree of regulatory power, coupled with an

amorphous definition of “waters of the United States” that

allows a Corps agent to legitimize the Corps’ authority simply

by finding that a pond “would be” used by a bird gives the

Corps complete discretion to decide, unilaterally, whether a

given land use activity may or may not be lawful. See Borden

Ranch, 19 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21,389 at *43-44 (Court agreed

with Corps that a vernal pool “was or would have been

inhabited” by a threatened species; therefore, the destruction of

the pond affected interstate commerce.). This is an open

invitation to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.

As a practical matter, the mere assertion of jurisdiction by

the Corps becomes jurisdiction as a matter of law, because such

decisions are not immediately reviewable and because the

Corps is capable, through its standardless migratory bird rule,

of establishing jurisdiction under the most marginal rationales

which no prudent landowner can, at present, ignore at the risk

of criminal or civil liability. When an administrative agency,

such as the Corps, “holds all the cards” as to the

implementation of a regulatory permitting program, due process

demands, first, that the agency exercise only that power granted

to it, and second, that it define the elements of an offense with

sufficient specificity to put the public on notice. The Corps’

refusal to define “waters of the United States” by reference to

objective standards makes regulatory abuse not merely a

possibility, but virtually guaranteed, since Corps personnel

themselves are not bound by consistent rules.

Where a federal law, such as the Clean Water Act, can

subject individuals to criminal and civil penalties, see 33 U.S.C.

§ 1319, it is unconscionable that a federal agency is able to

implement the law in a manner that has no objective, verifiable

30

standards by which an individual can discern the requirements

of the law. In the Clean Water Act, which has been held by

some courts to be a “public welfare” statute in which violations

can be criminally prosecuted in the absence of any criminal

intent, see United States v. Hanousek, 176 F.3d. 1116 (9th Cir.

1999), see also 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1), the possibility of

arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement demands that the terms

of the law be defined with a high degree of specificity.

Because liability is not merely predicated upon the overt

act of filling, but on the character of the land which is being

filled, it is unreasonable to sanction a definition of “waters of

the United St-tes” which bears only what meaning the Corps

chooses to assign to it, and, in particular, which depends upon

whether a bird uses it. The migratory bird rule is an

unreasonable interpretation of the term “waters of the United

States” because it is patently unreasonable to predicate criminal

and civil liability upon a Corps official’s subjective calculation

of where a bird may choose to alight.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Amici respectfully submit that

the decision of the court below should be REVERSED.

DATED: July, 2000.

Respectfully submitted,

ANNE M. HAYES

Counsel of Record

M. REED HOPPER

Pacific Legal Foundation

10360 Old Placerville Road,

Suite 100

Sacramento, California 95827

Telephone: (916) 362-2833

Facsimile: (916) 362-2932

Counsel for Amici Curiae

Appendix A-1

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

U.S. ARMY ENGINEER DISTRICT, SACRAMENTO

[SEAL] CORPS OF ENGINEERS

1325 J STREET

SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 95814-2922

REPLY TO

ATTENTION OF

NOTICE

The Corps of Engineers’ employee delivering this notice

believes your construction activities are in violation of

Federal Law.

Anyone engaged in any construction activity in a water-

way of the United States or adjacent wetlands must

secure a Department of the Army permit before construc-

tion is initiated. If you are engaged in such construction

activity, and do not have a permit, you are violating

Federal Law and are subject to fines up to $50,000.00 per

day of construction activity, depending on the nature of

the activity. Any contractor performing work in waters of

the United States or adjacent wetlands without a permit

is subject to the same penalties as the landowner for

whom the work is being performed.

Should you currently be engaged in unauthorized work,

we recommend that you cease work. Cessation of work is

an indication of a good faith attempt to comply with the

law. In any event, a formal cease and desist order will be

promptly issued to anyone engaged in illegal work.

If you have any questions which the employee delivering

this notice cannot answer, please contact one of the fol-

lowing Regulatory Offices, or our Office of Counsel (916)

557-5290.

Appendix A-2

California and Sacramento District, Corps of

Nevada Engineers

Regulatory Section

1325 J Street

Sacramento, CA 95814-2922

Phone (916) 557-5250

Utah Sacramento District, Corps of

Engineers

Utah Regulatory Office

1403 South 600 West, Suite A

Bountiful, Utah 84010

Phone (801) 295-8380

Western Colorado Sacramento District, Corps of

Engineers

Grand Junction Regulatory Office

400 Rood Avenue, Room 142

Grand Junction, Colorado

81501-2563

Phone: (303) 243-1199

/s/ Laurence R. Sadoff

LAURENCE R. SADOFF

Colonel, CE

District Engineer

1. Section 404, Clean Water Act (33 USC 1344)

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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