Amicus Curiae Brief — Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cty. v. Army Corps of Engineers
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Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
ey)
No. 99-117
In the
Supreme Court of th
+
SOLID WASTE AGENCY OF NORTHERN
COOK COUNTY, Petitioner,
Vv.
UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS
OF ENGINEERS, et al., Respondents.
+
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
+
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF PACIFIC LEGAL
FOUNDATION, RANDY PETERSON,
AND CALIFORNIA CATTLEMEN’S ASSOCIATION
IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITIONERS
+
ANNE M. HAYES
Counsel of Record
M. REED HOPPER
Pacific Legal Foundation
10360 Old Placerville Road,
Suite 100
Sacramento, California 95827
Telephone: (916) 362-2833
Facsimile: (916) 362-2932
Counsel for Amici Curiae
——
i
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the United States Army Corps of Engineers,
consistent with the Clean Water Act and the Commerce Clause
of the United States Constitution, may assert jurisdiction over
isolated intrastate waters solely because those waters do or
potentially could serve as habitat of migratory birds.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
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I. THE MIGRATORY BIRD RULE DOES NOT
COMPORT WITH THE CLEAN WATER ACT
BECAUSE IT IS AN UNREASONABLE
INTERPRETATION OF THE TERMS
“NAVIGABLE WATERS” AND “WATERS OF
GE STU. och ccseesbestsccseusveuss 7
A. The Migratory Bird Rule Allows the Corps to
Exercise Jurisdiction over Virtually Any Waters
NE 4.5:6404555.0040ko es Otekeratheenes 7
B. “Navigable Waters” and “Waters of the United
States” Cannot Reasonably Bear the
Interpretation Given to These Terms by the
Corps by Which Bird Use, Alone, Renders
Waters “Waters of the United States” ........... 14
Il. THE MIGRATORY BIRD RULE IS
UNREASONABLE BECAUSE IT STRETCHES
FEDERAL AUTHORITY FAR BEYOND THAT
ALLOWED UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE ... 19
Ill. BECAUSE CLEAN WATER ACT VIOLATIONS
CAN RESULT IN SIGNIFICANT PENALTIES, IT
IS UNREASONABLE TO ALLOW THE CORPS
TO EMPLOY THE MIGRATORY BIRD RULE TO
SELECTIVELY REGULATE WHATEVER LAND
USES IT DEEMS UNDESIRABLE ................ 24
SE 5 sec cen se dcbeannbeboad sex edabereevess 30
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases
Association of American Railroads v. Costle,
$62 F.2d 1310(D.C. Cir. 1977) .............0005 15
Borden Ranch Partnership v. United States
Army Corps of Engineers, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21,389 (E.D. Cal. 1999) ............... 18, 29
Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States,
ee ke ie aceon eeees es aeesees 25
Cargill, Inc. v. United States,
tn ce cne eee UREeeeEeeees 21
Connally v. General Construction Co.,
rE eee ic ecewennenneeeses 25-26
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
Ee coc ce léeeeeseseeansceceses |
Federal Maritime Commission v. Seatrain Lines, Inc.,
ee eb dace genaneseececes 19
Howell v. United States Army Corps of Engineers,
794 F. Supp. 1072 (D.N.M. 1992) ..........4.. 27-28
Jones v. United States,
EE ccccswencececencecececesse l
Laguna Gaiuna, Inc. v. Browner,
58 F.3d 564 (10th Cir. 1995).................. 11,27
Leslie Salt Co. v. United States,
PG CUED cccccccencccccosceces 20
Leslie Salt Co. v. United States,
896 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126 (1991) ............. 13, 25
iV
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—C ontinued
Rueth v. United States Environmental Protection
Agency, 13 F.3d 227 (7th Cir. 1993) ............... 28
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v.
United States Army Corps of Engineers,
998 F. Supp. 946 (N.D. Ill. 1998) ..............005. 5
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v.
United States Army Corps of Engineers,
191 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 1999). ................ passim
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v.
United States Army Corps of Engineers,
Sea Gs ED bnsécdesedassdecdbcedseceucs 5
Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 715 F. Supp. 726
(E.D. Va. 1988), aff'd without opinion,
885 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1989) .................008-. )
United States v. Ashland Oil and
Transportation Co., 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974) ... 18
United States v. Byrd,
609 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1979). ................ 28-29
United States v. Hanousek,
176 F.3d. 1116 (9th Cir. 1999) ...............0... 30
United States v. Jin Fuey Moy,
ee EE watboduccceunesendeeenes 19-20
United States v. Lopez,
oo PT 1, 9, 19, 21-23
United States v. Menasche,
PE SE ow cevecdcnbédwastacteenes 16
United States v. Morrison,
es CREE, cnccdcsnsdacacwunnaes 1, 21-24
i al
Vv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc., No. 84-701,
1985 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 25 (Oct. 16, 1985) ....... 8, 13
United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985)... 0.0... 8, 14, 18-19
United States v. Wilson,
133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997)................ 2, 16, 20
Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson
Corp., 24 F.3d 962 (7th Cir. 1994) .. 2... ..0.00.... 16
Constitutions
2 RR A Re ee ee 19
Statutes
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4 SS re ene 14
DEE £66t00e00800 0040 d000b 0060s ebenuneed 24, 29
Ps + .2déceecudslceiunes esa ebaenenks 30
DT tettcnendebeseeedeudedsceeusteasneseuns 14
$465 0d.0beu beens vewensseudideuebin 8, 24
De cticneneestscntevebessdsnckscecenseans 14
DO +0eb otkSSECKSEKkeewkseedenidebsenenens 8
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
Regulations
pa | PPT errr err reTTT TTT eT TTT ee 15
REED ccchecdseccecvenesececesdaceuecese 15
DRED Sivcvecdteeedeasedesecenseus 9,11, 16
DED cbc beedecucheuseusseducesensseneesee 26
DEED <.ckteceunssusdvedvdusssducivenenheses 26
DES Sevan sendetsewesdeedieadbeneurneaderes 26
of. 8 GF PT eee 10, 12-13
Rules
Se BGP ovccccescsindoscessccsanscsi l
UE ods udecbedessseuvasdeevecedsanensoees l
Miscellaneous
Conference Report, House Debate,
Committee Print (January 1973) .................. 17
John A. Leman, The Birds: Regulation of Isolated
Wetlands and the Limits of the Commerce Clause,
28 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1237 (1995) ......... 13-14, 26
Kenneth Culp Davis, Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Administrative Law Treatise § 6.8
I a ad 26
Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory
Construction, § 46:06 (2000) ...............0056- 16
vil
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
Senate Consideration of the Report of the
Conference Committee, October 4, 1972,
93rd Congress, A Legislative History of the
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1972, Committee Print (January 1973)........ 16-17
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.3, Pacific Legal
Foundation (PLF), Randy Peterson, and California Cattlemen's
Association respectfully submit this brief amicus curiae in
support of the Petitioners.’ Written consent for amicus
participation in this case was granted by counsel of record for
all parties. These consent letters have been lodged with the
Clerk of this Court.
PLF is the largest and most experienced nonprofit public
interest law foundation of its kind in America. Founded in
1973, PLF provides a voice in the courts for mainstream
Americans who believe in limited government, private property
rights, individual freedom, and free enterprise. PLF litigates
nationwide in state and federal courts with the support of
thousands of citizens from coast to coast. PLF is headquartered
in Sacramento, California, and has offices in Miami, Florida;
Honolulu, Hawaii; Bellevue, Washington; and a liaison office
in Anchorage, Alaska.
PLF has participated in numerous cases concerning the
Commerce Clause and administrative agency power. For
example, PLF participated as amicus curiae before this Court in
United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000); Jones v.
United States, 120 S. Ct. 1904 (2000); FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 1208. Ct. 1291 (2000); and United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). PLF filed a brief amicus
curiae supporting the Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari
in this case.
' Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, Amici Curiae affirm
that no counsel for any party in this case authored this brief in
whole or in part; and, furthermore, that no person or entity has
made a monetary contribution specifically for the preparation or
submission of this brief.
2
PLF seeks to augment the arguments of Petitioner by
further elucidating the inherent limitations on Congress’
Article | authority under the Constitution, and by providing
additional background on the regulatory scheme under which
the Respondent federal agency is operating. PLF believes its
public policy perspective and litigation experience will provide
a unique viewpoint on the issues presented in this case. PLF
believes this additional viewpoint will aid this Court in
evaluating the merits of this case.
Amicus Randy Peterson owns land in West Valley City,
Utah, a suburb of Salt Lake City. Although there is no surface
water evident on the land, the Army Corps of Engineers
asserted that the lands were “wetlands,” basing _ their
determination upon the saturation of soil below the surface for
a period of 12% of the growing season, which, in this Utah
location, amounts to roughly 2-3 weeks of the year. The Corps
asserted jurisdiction based upon the migratory bird rule.
Mr. Peterson has asked the Corps how it made its
jurisdictional determination, pointing out that any “wetlands”
on his property were isolated and, therefore, not subject to the
Corps’ jurisdiction under United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251
(4th Cir. 1997). Rather than explain the basis of the Corps’
jurisdiction, a Corps supervisor responded by warning him that
they would take legal action if he attempted to proceed with
development plans without applying for a permit.
Mr. Peterson is disturbed by and opposed to the Corps’
ability to exercise land use control over his property through the
mere assertion of jurisdiction. He supports the Petitioners in
the hope that this Court will provide much needed clarification
on the scope of the Corps’ authority under the Clean Water Act.
Mr. Peterson believes his experience, as reflective of the
experience of many landowners across the nation, will provide
this Court with a viewpoint not represented by the parties to this
litigation.
3
Amicus California Cattlemen’s Association is a nonprofit
corporation that was founded in 1917 to represent California’s
beef cattle industry in legislative and regulatory affairs. Beef
cattle producers operate on over 40 million of California’s
100 million acres and contributed $1.5 billion to the state’s
$19.7 billion agriculture economy as recently as 1993. The
industry provides more than 26,000 jobs from the ranch level to
the processing level in the State of California alone.
The California Cattlemen’s Association’s members
conduct their ranching operations on land that can include
swales, ditches, vernal pools, and man-made stock ponds and
watering holes. Due to California’s geology, ranching land in
California’s central valley is often covered with “hardpan,” that
is, clay soils in which rainwater does not percolate through the
ground, but instead stands until it evaporates. As a result, these
ponds and pools are isolated; they have no surface or
underground hydrologic connection to any other bodies of
water, let alone rivers or lakes that traverse state lines.
Cattle ranching operations, especially small-scale
operations, are often just one part of a ranch’s total agribusiness
operations, which can include timber and other crops. As a
result, ranching operations can involve changes in land use.
When such land alteration activities occur, cattlemen in
California are increasingly encountering Corps personnel who
assert permitting jurisdiction over these activities. This process
is resulting in significant impacts on the members of the
California Cattlemen’s Association, including forcing them to
abandon or change proposed land uses, delaying or halting
economically necessary changes to their land uses, or forcing
them to provide significant and costly mitigation. Because the
“waters” in question are isolated, the primary grounds for
jurisdiction invoked by the Corps is the migratory bird rule.
The California Cattlemen’s Association believes that the
Corps’ assertion of jurisdiction over these private land uses
4
based upon the use by migratory birds of man-made watering
holes or incidental swales extends the Corps jurisdiction beyond
what was intended under either the Clean Water Act or the
Constitution of the United States. The Association believes this
Court should be aware of their members interests and cognizant
of how the migratory bird rule is being applied in ruling on the
merits of this case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Petitioner, Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
County (SWANCC), is a municipal corporation made up of 23
different municipalities in Northern Cook County, Illinois.
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States
Army Corps of Engineers, 191 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 1999)
(SWANCC). SWANCC was created by these municipalities to
address, in a comprehensive way, the need for a safe and cost-
effective means of disposing of nonhazardous waste generated
by the communities within these municipalities. /d. at 847.
To this end, SWANCC purchased a 533-acre parcel
intended to be utilized as a balefill site. /d. at 848. The parcel,
however, had an assortment of trenches and depressions on it,
reflecting the land’s prior use as a strip mine. /d. These
trenches, scattered throughout the site, make up a network of
seasonal and permanent ponds. /d. SWANCC’s original plans
called for utilizing a 267-acre portion of the parcel. /d.
Accordingly, in 1986, because the creation of the balefill site
would require filling in these wet depressions, SWANCC
contacted the Corps to determine whether a permit under
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act was required. /d. The
Corps inspected the site, and concluded that it had no
jurisdiction. /d.
SWANCC, however, did not utilize its original plan but,
instead, decided to proceed with a plan that would cover
414 acres of the site. /d. Accordingly, one year after the
original inspection, SWANCC asked the Corps, again, whether
5
its new proposed balefill site contained any jurisdictional
wetlands. /d. After another on-site inspection, the Corps
responded in the negative. /d. According to the Corps, the
waters on the-site did not meet the regulatory definition of
“wetlands.” /d.
Shortly thereafter, however, the Illinois Nature Preserves
Commission, a state agency, informed the Corps that migratory
birds used the site. /d. As expressed by the court below, “[t}his
new information made all the difference to the Corps, because
of the so-called migratory bird rule.” /d. That is, pursuant to its
guidelines, the Corps asserted jurisdiction over the site because
of the site’s use by migratory birds. Under the agency’s
reckoning, migratory bird use satisfies the constitutional
requirement that the federal government may only reach
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce because
people spend millions of dollars every year hunting and
observing migratory birds. /d. at 850.
Based on the Corps’ assertion of jurisdiction, SWANCC
applied for a Section 404 permit. /d. at 849. The Corps denied
it. /d. A revised permit application was also denied. /d.
Subsequently, SWANCC filed this action in federal court
challenging the Corps’ jurisdiction. SWANCC contended that
migratory bird use was insufficient to establish federal
commerce jurisdiction over an isolated wetland. /d. The
district court, following circuit precedent, ruled in favor of the
Corps. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers, 998 F. Supp. 946, 951-52
(N.D. Ill. 1998) (Solid Waste). The Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed. SWANCC, 191 F.3d at 847. This Court
granted SWANCC’s petition for wnt of certiorari to resolve
whether the Corps’ jurisdiction comports with the Clean Water
Act and with the Commerce Clause. Solid Waste Agency of
Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers, 120 S. Ct. 2003 (2000).
6
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The migratory bird rule is a jurisdictional rule employed
by the Corps to reach isolated intrastate bodies of water under
the Clean Water Act. The basic premise of the rule is that,
regardless of the character, use, or origin of the body of water
in question, the Corps may regulate it as a “water of the United
States” solely based upon its use by migratory birds.
Because the rule does not attempt to define itself by
reference to the statutory term “navigable waters . . . of the
United States,” the migratory bird rule is an unreasonable
interpretation of the Corp’s jurisdiction under the Act. By
fashioning this extra-regulatory test to assert jurisdiction over
land uses where connections to interstate commerce are, at best,
extremely tenuous, the Corps has arrogated to itself the power
to regulate virtually any land uses it chooses, and for reasons
unrelated to the pollution control purposes which were the
impetus behind the Clean Water Act. While Congress
understood and intended that implementation of the Clean
Water Act would serve broad environmental goals, the Corps
may not use this broad intent to expand its jurisdiction beyond
the specific terms set forth in the Act—to regulate the
“navigable waters . . . of the United States.”
The migratory bird rule is also unreasonable because it
construes federal power beyond that allowed under the
Commerce Clause. Use of waters by migratory birds does not
make the filling of those waters an activity that “substantially
affects” interstate commerce within the meaning of this Court’s
precedents. In particular, the use of the aggregation principle,
by which the government determines “substantial effects” by
aggregating activities that have minimal impacts on interstate
commerce, does not apply to noneconomic activities. Further,
the activity here—the filling of waters used by migratory
birds—has such an attenuated link to any interstate commerce
impacts that upholding the migratory bird rule as a valid
7
interpretation of the commerce power would be tantamount to
sanctioning a federal police power without limits.
Finally, violations of the Clean Water Act carry with them
significant penalties, both civil and criminal. Where the
violation of a law has such significant impacts on individuals,
itis unconscionable that the Corps may use vague jurisdictional
grounds like the migratory bird rule to exercise permitting
authority over private land use activities. By avoiding fixed and
verifiable standards as the basis for its jurisdiction, the Corps
has an almost unfettered ability to make unilateral decisions
about its own jurisdiction, thereby subjecting landowners to
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
For these reasons, Amici respectfully submit that the
migratory bird rule is invalid.
ARGUMENT
I
THE MIGRATORY BIRD RULE DOES
NOT COMPORT WITH THE CLEAN
WATER ACT BECAUSE IT IS AN
UNREASONABLE INTERPRETATION
OF THE TERMS “NAVIGABLE
WATERS” AND “WATERS OF THE
UNITED STATES”
A. The Migratory Bird Rule Allows the Corps to
Exercise Jurisdiction over Virtually Any Waters
Whatsoever
The Clean Water Act was enacted in 1972 “to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). One of the means by
which Congress sought to achieve this purpose was through
regulating the discharge of pollutants into bodies of water.
Consequently, under the Act, an individual must apply for a
permit, commonly referred to as a Section 404 permit, from the
Army Corps of Engineers “for the discharge of dredged or fill
material into the navigable waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a). The
term “navigable waters” is defined by statute: “The term
‘navigable waters’ means the waters of the United States,
including the territorial seas.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
In 1985, in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,
Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985), this Court addressed the question
whether the statutory terms “navigable waters” and “waters of
the United States” properly encompassed within them wetlands
adjacent to navigable bodies of water and their tributanes. /d.
at 123. In resolving that question in the affirmative, this Court
specifically withheld expressing an opinion on whether the
statute empowered the Corps to regulate wetlands not adjacent
to open bodies of water—that is, isolated wetlands. /d.
at 131.8. This case requires this Court to address the question
left open in Riverside Bayview; specifically, whether the Corps’
jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act extends to wetlands or
other waters not connected to navigable bodies of water or their
tributaries, and, more specifically, whether the Corps may do so
under the so-called “migratory bird rule.” In order to resolve
that question, it is important to understand what the migratory
bird rule is, and from where it derives.
Although the Assistant Solicitor General alluded to the
migratory bird rule during oral argument in United States v.
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., No. 84-701, 1985 U.S. Trans.
LEXIS 25, at *18-*19 (Oct. 16, 1985), the rule did not appear
as an official Corps policy until 1986, when the Corps
recodified its jurisdictional regulations in the Federal Register.
SWANCC, 191 F.3d at 852. The gist of the rule, as cast by the
court below, is that use of any water by migratory birds renders
that water subject to federal regulation under the Commerce
Clause because people spend millions of dollars every year
hunting and observing migratory birds, including crossing state
lines to do so, and that, therefore, destruction of bird habitat, in
9
the aggregate, “substantially affects” interstate commerce
within the meaning of this Court's decision in United States v.
Lopez. SWANCC, 191 F.3d at 850.
Technically, the migratory bird rule is not a “rule” at all,
in that it has not been formally adopted as a regulation. /d. It
has been found, itistead, to be an “interpretive” guideline
describing one means by which the Corps can assert jurisdiction
under its “other waters” regulation. /d. But see Tabb Lakes,
Ltd. v. United States, 715 F. Supp. 726 (E.D. Va. 1988), aff'd
without opinion, 885 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1989) (finding that the
migratory bird rule was a substantive rule, and that the Corps
had violated the APA by promulgating it without complying
with notice and comment requirements). The “other waters”
regulation is one provision of the Corps’ jurisdictional
regulation, codified at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3. The “other waters”
regulation purports to grant the Corps regulatory jurisdiction
over:
(3) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers,
streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats,
sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet
meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use,
degradation or destruction of which could affect
interstate or foreign commerce including any such
waters:
(i) Which are or could be used by interstate or
foreign travelers for recreational or other purposes;
or
(11) From which fish or shellfish are or could be
taken and sold in interstate or foreign commerce; or
(iii) Which are used or could be used for industrial
purpose by industries in interstate commerce .. . .
33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3).
10
The regulation itself contains no language referencing the
migratory bird rule. However, in the Federal Register notice
announcing the rule, the Corps explained that the inclusion of
any waters “which could affect interstate or foreign commerce”
effected a broader reach than what appeared on the face of the
regulation:
EPA has clarified that waters of the United States at
40 C.F.R. 328.3(a)(3) also include the following
waters:
a. Which are or would be used as habitat by birds
protected by Migratory Bird Treaties; or
b. Which are or would be used as habitat by other
migratory birds which cross state lines; or
c. Which are or would be used as habitat for
endangered species; or
d. Used to irrigate crops sold in_ interstate
commerce.
51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,217 (1986). Thus, the migratory bird
rule does not limit itself to waters used by migratory birds, but
to waters that potentially serve as habitat for birds or other
wildlife, or that might be used for some other purpose that
impacts interstate commerce.
Inthe Corps’ 1988 revision to its rules, it further explained
its jurisdiction under the migratory bird rule by citing to an
internal memorandum from EPA’s general counsel addressing
the question of whether Clean Water Act jurnsdiction required
actual connections to interstate commerce, or were satisfied
merely by potential use, including potential use by migratory
birds or other wildlife. The memorandum stated:
in simplified terms, the answer ts that if the evidence
reasonably shows that the waters “are used or would
be used” by migratory birds or endangered species,
it is covered by EPA’s regulation. ... In addition,
if a particular waterbody shares the characteristics of
other waters whose use by and value to migratory
birds is well established and those characteristics
make it likely that the waterbody in question will
also be used by migratory birds, it would also seem
to fall clearly within the definition . . . .
Memorandum from Francis S. Blake to Richard E. Sanderson
of Sept. 12, 1985. Thus, despite the holding of the Court below
that the regulation only reaches actual migratory bird habitat
(that is, where a bird species “naturally lives or grows”),
SWANCC, 191 F.3d at 850, the Corps construes its Clean Water
Act jurisdiction more broadly. For example, in a case called
Laguna Gatuna, Inc. v. Browner, 58 F.3d 564 (1 0th Cir. 1995),
the EPA asserted Clean Water Act jurisdiction not on a finding
that a sinkhole used by Laguna Gatuna for industrial wastewater
served as bird habitat, but on the sole finding that dead
migratory birds were found near the sinkhole. /d. at 565.
Further, the Corps is not limited by the “other waters”
regulation to ponds or wetlands or any of the other categories of
“waters” spelled out in its “other waters” regulation when
asserting jurisdiction under the migratory bird rule. For
example, in the present case, the Corps concluded that
SWANCC’s property did not contain wetlands, natural ponds,
sloughs, praine potholes, lakes or any of the “other waters”
delineated in the regulation. The Corps had its own agents
Carry out on-site inspections on SWANCC’s property on two
separate occasions, and these agents specifically found that the
man-made ditches on the property did not constitute “wetlands”
within the Corps’ regu/atory definition of the term. SWANCC,
191 F.3d at 848. But the Corps found jurisdiction anyway,
based upon the “catch-all” language of the “other waters”
regulation, specifically, “{aJll other waters . . . the use,
degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate or-
foreign commerce.” 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3). Thus, the
12
migratory bird rule is not simply a means by which the Corps
asserts jurisdiction over instrastate wetlands, lakes, or other
ecologically significant or natural bodies of water; rather, it is
the jurisdictional test the Corps employs to reach waters of any
nature. As the Corps explained in its 1986 Federal Register
notice:
For clarification it should be noted that we generally
do not consider the following waters to be “Waters
of the United States.” However, the Corps reserves
the right on a case-by-case basis to determine that a
particular waterbody within these categories of
waters is a water of the United States. EPA also has
the right to determine on a case-by-case basis if any
of these waters are “waters of the United States.”
(a) Non-tidal drainage and irrigation ditches
excavated on dry land.
(b) Artificially irngated areas which would revert
to upland if the irrigation ceased.
(c) Artificial lakes or ponds created by excavating
and/or diking dry land to collect and retain water and
which are used exclusively for such purposes as
stock watering, irrigation, settling basins, or nce
growing.
(d) Artificial reflecting or swimming pools or other
small ornamental bodies of water created by
excavating and/or diking dry land to retain water for
primarily aesthetic reasons.
(e) Waterfilled depressions created in dry land
incidental to construction activity and pits excavated
in dry land for the purpose of obtaining fill, sand, or
gravel unless and until the construction or excavation
operation is abandoned and the resulting body of
-
~~
13
water meets the definition of waters of the United
States (see 33 C.F.R. 328.3(a)).
51 Fed. Reg. at 41,217 (emphasis added); see also Leslie
Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1126 (1991) (upholding Corps’ ability to
exercise jurisdiction over artificially created waters used by
migrating birds—in that case, salt crystallization pits—in
accord with this language).
Thus, the “other waters” rule is just that—a regulation that
purports to grant the Corps jurisdiction over any other water
whatsoever, so long as the Corps can identify some link
between that water and interstate commerce. Indeed, at oral
argument in Riverside Bayview, when a member of this Court
surmised that a man watering his back yard a lot would not be
subject to the Clean Water Act, the Assistant Solicitor General
responded:
Unless we could show that he has got some interstate
commerce activity going on in his back yard, and the
Corps would take it upon itself to make that showing
itself, and not require the back yard owner to come
in and demonstrate it, the absence of the commerce
connection to the Corps’s satisfaction.
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 1985 U.S.
Trans. LEXIS 25, at *14.
As a result, the migratory bird rule, as an interpretation of
the “other waters” regulation, allows the Corps to regulate any
type of water—and all manner of local and private land
uses—so long as the Corps can show that migratory birds use
such waters. Given the fact that the United States is hoine to
some 2.5 to 6 billion birds, two-thirds of which migrate,
John A. Leman, The Birds: Regulation of Isolated Wetlands
and the Limits of the Commerce Clause, 28 U.C. Davis L. Rev.
14
1237, 1241 (1995), it is hard to imagine what waters the Corps
cannot reach through the migratory bird rule.
B. “Navigable Waters” ar’ “Waters of the
United States” Cannot. asonably Bear the
Interpretation Given to These Terms by the Corps
by Which Bird Use, Alone, Renders Waters
“Waters of the United States”
As stated above, the Clean Water Act gives the Army
Corps of Engineers permitting authority over discharges into the
“navigeble waters,” defined by statute as “waters of the United
States.” 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 1362. The Petitioners have
comprehensively argued that these terms were intended by
Congress to relate to a specific category of waters. Moreover,
even granting that these terms may be sufficiently ambiguous
to allow some degree of agency interpretation, the Corps has
patently failed to resolve the ambiguity in a manner that
comports with the intent of the statutory language.
In Riverside Bayview, this Court held that the Clean Water
Act was intended “to regulate at least some waters that would
not be deemed ‘navigable’ under the classical understanding of
that term.” Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 133. But it does not
follow from this holding that the Corps may ignore the statutory
language, and the intent behind it, in construing the scope of its
jurisdiction and, further, that the Corps can regulate such waters
for purposes unrelated to the overriding purpose of the Clean
Water Act, which is to protect the Nation’s waterways from the
deleterious effects of pollution. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)-(7).
However, this is precisely how the Corp’s jurisdiction has
come to be understood. As the Seventh Circuit cast the issue,
the statutory terms “navigable waters” and “waters of the
United States” do not have any particular relevance in defining
the scope of the Corps’ jurisdiction. Instead, the Corps may
simply “reach{] as many waters as the Commerce Clause
allows,” SWANCC, 191 F.3d at 851, and, further, may regulate
15
those waters for any purpose related to “restor[ing] and
maintain{ ing] the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
the Nation’s waters,” id. at 852 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)).
Indeed, in this case, the Corps denied SWANCC’s permit not
because it would result in pollution of the nation’s waterways,
but based on the more amorphous “public interest” standards
enunciated in 33 C.F.R. § 320.4, see Brief for the Petitioner
at 9-10 (citing Administrative Record at 15,658-59), which
includes the assessment of factors such as aesthetics, historical
value, recreation, safety, food and fiber production,
“considerations of property ownership and, in general, the needs
and welfare of the people,” in addition to considerations more
apropos to environmental regulation. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a)(1).
While one may not fault, in general, the agency’s ability to
exercise discretion in carrying out its statutory mandate to
protect the interests that the Clean Water Act was enacted to
remedy, it is another thing entirely to treat the broad interests
enunciated in the preamble to the Act as defining the
jurisdictional grant of authority to the Corps.
A preamble no doubt contributes to a general
understanding of a statute, but it is not an operative
part of the statute and it does not enlarge or confer
powers on administrative agencies or officers. . . .
The operative provisions of statutes are those which
prescribe rights and duties and otherwise declare the
legislative will.
Association of American Railroads v. Costle, 562 F.2d 1310,
1316(D.C. Cir. 1977) (footnote omitted).
The Clean Water Act confers on the Corps the authority to
regulate “navigable waters . . . of the United States”—and all
that may imply—but not anything else. But here, the Corps has
not given sufficient consideration to what Congress intended by
its statutory language—or rather, has construed legislative
intent from a selective reading of the legislative history.
16
However broad the term “waters” may be, the Corps
cannot get around the underlying premise that,
“Waters of the United States” must be a subset of
“water”; otherwise why insert the qualifying clause
in the statute? (No one suggests that the function of
this phrase is to distinguish domestic waters from
those of Canada or Mexico.)
Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 24 F.3d
962, 965 (7th Cir. 1994) (emphasis in original). Indeed, the
Fourth Circuit had little trouble in finding that the statutory
language had to have some relevance in construing the reach of
the Corps’ authority. In striking down the Corps’ “other
waters” regulation as u/tra vires, that court concluded:
This regulation purports to extend the coverage of
the Clean Water Act to a variety of waters that are
intrastate, nonnavigable, or both, solely on the basis
that the use, degradation, or destruction of such
waters could affect interstate commerce. ... When
viewed in light of its statutory authority, 33 C.F.R.
§ 328.3(a)(3) (1993), which defines “waters of the
United States” to include intrastate waters that need
have nothing to do with navigable or interstate
waters, expands the statutory phrase “waters of the
United States” beyond its definitional limit.
United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 257 (4th Cir. 1997). In
short, the Fourth Circuit held, consistent with the precept that
courts must give effect to every word in a statute, see Norman J.
Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 46:06 (2000);
United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955), that
the Corps was not free to define the statutory language any way
it pleased in construing its own jurisdiction under the Act.
Even Congress, in acknowledging that the phrase
“navigable waters of the United States” should “be given the
17
broadest constitutional interpretation,” Senate Consideration of
the Report of the Conference Committee, October 4, 1972, 93rd
Congress, A Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972, Committee Print (January 1973)
at 173, understood the term “waters of the United States” as
having a distinct meaning:
It is intended that the term “navigable waters”
include all water bodies, such as lakes, streams, and
rivers, regarded as public navigable waters in law
which are navigable in fact when the form, in their
ordinary condition by themselves or by uniting with
other waters or other systems of transportation, such
as highways or railroads, a continuing highway over
which commerce is or may be carried on with other
States or with foreign countries in the customary
means of trade and travel in which commerce is
conducted today. /n such cases the commerce on
such waters would have a substantial economic
effect on interstate commerce.
Id. (emphasis added). See also Conference Report, House
Debate, Committee Print (January 1973), at 250 (citation
omitted) (“The ‘gist of the Federal test’ is the waterway’s use
‘as a highway,’ not whether it is ‘a part of a navigable interstate
or international commercial highway.’”). Thus, the Corps’
attempt to read the definitional phrase “waters of the United
States” as being an open-ended license to define waters any way
they chose is insupportable.
Indeed, in Riverside Bayview, this Court’s holding that the
Clean Water Act reached wetlands adjacent to navigable
waterways was premised on the principle that the starting point
for construing the Corps’ jurisdiction was the notion that,
though the Clean Water Act itself allowed the Corps to regulate
waters that were not themselves navigable, the Act was directed
18
at the specified class of waters that were an appropriate focus of
federal regulation. This Court reasoned:
We cannot say that the Corps’ conclusion that
adjacent wetlands are inseparably bound up with the
“waters” of the United States—based as it is on the
Corps’ and EPA’s technical expertise—is
unreasonable.
Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 134. By stating the issue in this
manner, this Court expressly acknowledged that the “adjacent
wetlands” rule was based upon the notion that the “point at
which water ends and land begins,” id. at 132, is necessarily a
technical one, and that therefore the Corps’ expert
determination that adjacent wetlands were “inseparably bound
up” with the “waters of the United States” rendered adjacent
wetlands, in fact, part of the “waters of the United States”
subject to the Act.
But unlike the adjacent wetlands at issue in Riverside
Bayview, there is no confusion on the point that the migratory
bird rule reaches not only waters that are not “navigable in
fact,” but small, isolated waters like ponds or watering holes
completely contained within a private parcel of land. Indeed, by
definition, the migratory bird rule is employed precisely to
reach those waters that the Corps cannot otherwise reach
through its more traditional test of linking a given water body
to an interstate waterway. See United States v. Ashland Oil and
Transportation Co., 504 F.2d 1317, 1320 (6th Cir. 1974)
(construing Clean Water Act to reach a creek that was a
tributary of another creek that was a tributary of a river that was
a tributary of a navigable river). Rather, the migratory bird rule
is more typically used to reach an isolated puddle in the middle
of a farmer’s field. See Borden Ranch Partnership v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21,389, at *43-44 (E.D. Cal. 1999).
19
Thus, while the term “waters of the United States” may be
sufficiently ambiguous to allow the Corps some “wiggle” room
in its interpretation, see Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 133,
there is no basis in law or in the statute that entitles the Corps
to “wiggle” itself completely out of the fact that “waters of the
United States” is a subset of all the waters in the United States.
Through the migratory bird rule, the Corps has “bootstrap[ped]
itself into an area in which it has no jurisdiction by repeatedly
violating its statutory mandate.” Federal Maritime
Commission v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 745 (1973).
Both law and logic preclude the Corps from construing the term
“navigable waters . . . of the United States” to reach any waters,
so long as those waters are used or could be used by migratory
birds. Accordingly, this Court should find that the migratory
bird rule is an unreasonable interpretation of the term “waters
of the United States” in the text of the Clean Water Act.
THE MIGRATORY BIRD RULE IS
UNREASONABLE BECAUSE IT STRETCHES
FEDERAL AUTHORITY FAR BEYOND THAT
ALLOWED UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
As this Court stated in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 (1995), “(t]he Constitution creates a Federal Government
of enumerated powers,” id. at 552, and one of those powers is
the power “to regulate commerce . . . among the several states.”
U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8. In this case, the United States contends
that the power to regulate interstate commerce encompasses
within it the power to regulate isolated, instrastate bodies of
water that are used by migratory birds. This is an unreasonable
interpretation of the Act.
A statute must be construed, if fairly possible,
so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is
unconstitutional but also grave doubts upon that
score.
20
United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401 (1915).
Because the rule, both on its face and as applied, gives rise to
serious doubts as to whether the Corps is exercising its
permitting authority consistent with the limits of federal power,
this Court should hold the migratory bird rule invalid.
Even were this Court to construe the rule as though it were
duly enacted by Congress, it is constitutionally troublesome.
See Wilson, 133 F.3d at 257. At first blush, and perhaps the
second and third, the connection between interstate commerce
and the use of ponds by birds does not readily come to mind.
However, the Army Corps of Engineers, with the sanction of
several courts of appeals, SWANCC, 191 F.3d 845; Leslie Salt
Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388 (9th Cir. 1995), has
ingeniously devised a connection that, it argues, supplies the
requisite nexus between birds and commerce. As explained by
the court below:
“{T]hroughout North America, millions of people
annually spend more than a billion dollars on
hunting, trapping, and observing migratory birds.
Yet the cumulative loss of wetlands has reduced the
populations of many species and consequently the
ability of people to hunt, trap, and observe those
birds.” Statistics produced by the U.S. Census
Bureau reveal that approximately 3.1 million
Americans spent $1.3 billion to hunt migratory birds
in 1996, and that about 11 percent of them traveled
across state lines to do so. Another 17.7 million
people spent time observing birds in states other than
their states of residence; 14.3 million of these took
trips specifically for this purpose; and approximately
9.5 million traveled for the purpose of observing
shorebirds, such as herons. There is no need to dally
on this point: we find (once again) that the
destruction of migratory bird habitat and the
attendant decrease in the populations of these birds
21
“substantially affects” interstate commerce. The
effect may not be observable as each isolated pond
used by the birds for feeding, nesting, and breeding
is filled, but the aggregate effect is clear, and that is
all the Commerce Clause requires.
SWANCC, 191 F.3d at 850 (citations omitted). Thus, according
to the Seventh Circuit and the Corps, the migratory bird rule
satisfies the third Lopez test—that is, it is a regulation of an
activity that substantially affects interstate commerce—because
destruction of its habitat, in the aggregate, substantially affects
interstate commerce related to the hunting and observing of
migratory birds. SWANCC, 191 F.3d at 849-50.
While the Seventh Circuit drew its conclusion with the
benefit of this Court’s analysis in Lopez, the court misapplied
it. See Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 955 (1995)
(Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). More
critically, it misapplied it in a context—through
aggregation—which this Court has further clarified through its
subsequent decision in United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct.
1740 (2000).
In United States v. Lopez, this Court struck the Gun Free
School Zones Act as beyond the authority of Congress to enact
under the Commerce Clause. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552. In so
doing, this Court noted that the act could not
be sustained under our cases upholding regulations
of activities that arise out of or are connected with a
commercial transaction, which viewed in the
aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.
Id. at 561. Nevertheless, the court below found it sufficient that
the destruction of bird habitat, in the aggregate, was sufficient
to create the “substantial effects” necessary to uphold the
migratory bird rule. SWANCC, 191 F.3d at 850.
22
However, in Morrison, this Court affirmed that the
aggregation principle may not be invoked to sanction
congressional action every time Congress chooses to regulate
intrastate noneconomic activity. Morrison dealt with the
constitutionality of the federal Violence Against Women Act.
The provision in question gave private litigants the right to
bring a federal claim against any individual who committed a
“crime of violence motivated by gender.” Morrison, 1208S. Ct.
at 1747. In defending the constitutionality of the Act from a
Commerce Clause challenge, the government argued that the
Act regulated an activity that “substantially affected” interstate
commerce because violence against women, in the aggregate,
had significant effects on the economy in terms of time lost
from jobs, medical costs, and other impacts. /d: at 1752. The
Court rejected the notion that the aggregation of isolated
activities was automatically sufficient to meet the requisite
“substantial effects” test:
While we need not adopt a categorical rule against
aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity
in order to decide these cases, thus far in our
Nation’s history our cases have upheld Commerce
Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where
that activity is economic in nature.
Id. at 1751 (emphasis added). Here, the Corps is regulating the
fill of waters, an activity that is not, by its nature, economic.
Viewed in light of Morrison's holding, because the destruction
of waters is not inherently economic, the aggregation principle
does not protect the rule.
Thus, the rule is only valid if it meets the other
“substantial effects” tests, such as if the rule contains a
jurisdictional element requiring that the destruction of a
particular water would have impacts on interstate commerce,
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561, or could otherwise be sustained under
23
an independent analysis of substantial effects, id. at 562. But,
again, the migratory bird mile fails.
First, the rule contains no jurisdictional element in the
sense intended by Lopez. That is, though bird use is the
“jurisdictional element” employed by the Corps, even where
migratory birds in fact use a given body of water, the Corps’
rule does not require any showing that the destruction of the
water would impact the identified commerce in migratory bird
hunting or observing. Second, under an independent analysis,
this Court made it clear that a Commerce Clause rationale may
not employ a method of reasoning which would admit of no
limits on the commerce power. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1752.
Specifically, this Court held that the commerce power did not
allow the federal government to regulate any activity, such as
violence against women, that could be linked through a long
causal chain to indirect and unspecified effects on interstate
commerce, such as impacts on jobs and medical costs. Because
virtually all human activity has similar, though attenuated,
impacts on commerce, such a line of reasoning would
effectively grant Congress unlimited authority to regulate any
human activity, and “completely obliterate the Constitution’s
distinction between national and local authority.” /d.
Like the link between violence and commerce espoused in
the Violence Against Women Act, the Corps’ theory of a link
between interstate commerce in hunting and birdwatching and
the destruction of bird habitat proves too much. See Lopez,
514 U.S. at 564. In Morrison, the regulation in question
targeted only “gender-motivated” violence; consequently, there
was no direct correlation between the specific regulated conduct
and the supposed commerce impacts. As this Court noted, all
violence, of whatever nature, had even greater impacts on the
economy than the subset of violence that constitutes gender-
motivated vielence. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1753. Thus, this
Court reasoned, if Congress could regulate gender-motivated
24
violence, it could regulate all murder and all crime—a power
that went far beyond what the Commerce Clause permitted. /d.
Similarly, any impacts on the commerce in bird hunting
and watching do not directly correlate to the destruction of
waters that are regulated under the migratory bird rule. If the
Corps may regulate “waters” simply because they may be used
by migratory birds, the Corps line of reasoning would enable
Congress to regulate any land or object that is used by any
animal at all, since the ownership, breeding, sale, observation,
hunting, and studying of all animals surely has an even greater
effect on interstate commerce than the mere use of isolated
ponds by migratory birds. In short, the rationale employed by
the Corps in invoking the migratory bird rule admits of no
limits on the federal commerce power.
Because the migratory bird rule expands federal authority
beyond that granted to the federal government under the Com-
merce Clause, it is an unreasonable interpretation of what
Congress intended when it granted the Corps authority to
regulate the “navigable waters . . . of the United States.”
Accordingly, this Court should hold the migratory bird rule
invalid.
BECAUSE CLEAN WATER ACT VIOLATIONS
CAN RESULT IN SIGNIFICANT PENALTIES, IT IS
UNREASONABLE TO ALLOW THE CORPS
TO EMPLOY THE MIGRATORY BIRD RULE
TO SELECTIVELY REGULATE WHATEVER
LAND USES IT DEEMS UNDESIRABLE
Violations of the Clean Water Act carry with them
substantial penalties, including criminal penalties that can entail
confinement and significant fines. 33 U.S.C. § 1319. And
because the Act makes it unlawful to “discharge . . . dredged or
fill material into the navigable waters” without a permit,
33 U.S.C. § 1344(a), criminality depends as much upon the
25
overt act of filling as it does on the character of the water or.
land in question—specifically, whether any portion of the
property constitutes “waters of the United States.”
Consequently, it is critical that the statutory term “waters of the
United States” bears a meaning that permits the Corps to reach
the types of activities and individuals Congress intended to
reach.
But the migratory bird rule allows the Corps to reach such
a broad array of properties and waters that it is affirmatively
unhelpful in enabling an individual to make a definitive
determination as to whether or not any land he or she may own
contains “waters” subject to the Corps’ permitting jurisdiction.
In short, the migratory bird rule, by allowing the Corps to reach
not only significant waters such as lakes and rivers, but man-
made ditches, SWANCC, 191 F.3d at 848, and abandoned pits
created for industrial use, Leslie Salt, 896 F.2d at 359-60, even
where those waters do not constitute “wetlands” within the
regulatory definition of that term, SWANCC, 191 F.3d at 848,
is an interpretation that “contains no such definite standard
from which one can start in the calculation of his duty.” Boyce
Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337 on
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
That the terms of a penal statute creating a new
offense must be sufficiently explicit to inform those
who are subject to it what conduct on their part will
render them liable to its penalties, is a
well-recognized requirement, consonant alike with
ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of
law. And a statute which either forbids or requires
the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application, violates the
first essential of due process of law.
26
Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391
(1926). The migratory bird rule is just the type of amorphous
rule that raises serious due process problems. It allows the
Corps to reach any type of waters solely on the basis that those
waters could be used by migratory birds. Accordingly, because
migratory birds are ubiquitous, see Leman, supra, the migratory
bird rule enables the Corps to assert jurisdiction over property
subject only to the subjective judgment of individual agency
officials as to what lands ought or vugnt not to be regulated.
The purpose of rules is to ensure fair, consistent, and
objective standards that enable the regulated commur:ty to
understand what the law requires. See generally, Kenneth Culp
Davis, Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise § 6.8
(Third Ed. 1994). But rules, even unenacted ones like the
migratory bird rule, are useless if they do not serve these ends.
Indeed, given the Corps’ expansive understanding of the waters
it may regulate under the migratory bird rule, the Corps’ other
jurisdictional regulations relating to the definition of terms like
“wetlands,” 33 C.F.R. § 328(b), “tidal waters,” 33 C.F.R.
§ 328(f) and “navigable waters” 33 C.F.R. § 329.4, for purposes
of Section 404 jurisdiction, are manifestly pointless. If a
landowner hires the nation’s foremost hydrologists and
biologists to survey the soils and flora on his property and they
conclude that the property contains no wetlands, the entire
exercise can be summarily negated by the predilections of a
single bird that decides to have a bath. In the end, there is no
avoiding the fact that, under the regime of the migratory bird
rule, whether one is breaking the law depends entirely upon
whether birds have, or could have, used one’s property. This is
a bizarre ground on which to base criminal or civil liability.
But more pragmatically, the expansive notion of
jurisdiction evidenced by the migratory bird rule—that is, that
any type of water at all may be regulated by the Corps—leaves
the regulated community in the dark as to whether a given
assertion of jurisdiction by the Corps is legitimate. As a result,
27
every assertion of jurisdiction must be taken as valid by
landowners, because there is no verifiable standard against
which they may measure legitimate versus illegitimate
enforcement.
In practice, it is not unusual for landowners to receive
informal “notices,” informing them, with no specificity
‘whatsoever, that the land they are deveioping “may” contain
waters subject to Section 404 permitting jurisdiction, and that
the unlawful filling of these waters can subject them to heavy
tunes or penalties. See Notice at Appendix “A.” Once
confronted by such a notice, landowners are unavoidably bound
up in the permitting scheme, solely at the Corps’ discretion.
Thus, once the Corps asserts jurisdiction, a party must either
risk civil or criminal prosecution, or submit to regulation. See
Laguna Gatuna, 58 F.3d at 566. Because “potential” bird use
is enough to create Corps’ jurisdiction, the individual being
regulated is subject entirely to the Corps’ unilateral judgment as
to the characterization of his land as “waters of the United
States.”
For example, in Howell v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers, 794 F. Supp. 1072 (D.N.M. 1992), a plaintiff who
had received a cease and desist order from the Corps challenged
the assertion of jurisdiction over his property in a declaratory
relief action, claiming that his land did not contain any wetlands
subject to the Clean Water Act. /d. at 1074. In accord with
settled law, the Court dismissed the case for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. /d. But the Court’s analysis is revealing of
how inherently open to abuse the Corps’ regulatory process is.
A letter from the Corps to the plaintiff stated:
We intend to conduct a wetland delineation on your
property to determine in detail the extent of wetlands
initially investigated by Mr. Wood. .. .
When all of the available information has been
reviewed and our wetland delineation has been
28
completed and verified, | will request you to apply
for an after-the-fact permit... .
Id. at 1074 (emphasis added). In short, the Corps’ issued its
cease and desist order despite its admission that it had no clear
knowledge of the existence or extent oi wetlands on the
property in question. The Court, in finding no provision in the
Clean Water Act for pre-enforcement judicial review, displayed
remarkable irony in concluding:
It is clear from the cease-and-desist letter quoted
above that the Corps will not finalize its decision
until it conducts its “wetland delineation” and
decides whether to issue a permit. Only at that time,
and perhaps not until the Corps forces compliance
through penalties or judicial action, will the
plaintiff know the concrete effects of the Corps’
decision.
Id. at 1074-75 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). As
explained by the court, the plaintiff landowner had no recourse
to judicial review of the Corps’ initial unsubstantiated assertion
of jurisdiction. See also Rueth v. United States Environmental
Protection Agency, 13 F.3d 227 (7th Cir. 1993). Further,
whether or not his land contained “wetlands” depended solely
upon what the Corps itself concluded—after-the-fact, and only
by means of forcing the landowner to submit to an on-site
inspection of his land by government agents: “The issue
concerns factual determinations properly resolved through
agency expertise and reviewable by this Court once a record is
developed by the agency.” Id. at 1075 (emphasis added). See
also United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1979):
In the course of obtaining the permit he can extract
from the Corps an exact statement of where the
wetlands are and protect himself from further legal
proceedings. Furthermore, Byrd cannot complain of
the absence of a legal description of the wetlands
——————_
29
since, as the district court noted, he has refused to
permit his land to be surveyed.
Id. at 1209. In short, the Corps gets to call all the shots.
This degree of regulatory power, coupled with an
amorphous definition of “waters of the United States” that
allows a Corps agent to legitimize the Corps’ authority simply
by finding that a pond “would be” used by a bird gives the
Corps complete discretion to decide, unilaterally, whether a
given land use activity may or may not be lawful. See Borden
Ranch, 19 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21,389 at *43-44 (Court agreed
with Corps that a vernal pool “was or would have been
inhabited” by a threatened species; therefore, the destruction of
the pond affected interstate commerce.). This is an open
invitation to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
As a practical matter, the mere assertion of jurisdiction by
the Corps becomes jurisdiction as a matter of law, because such
decisions are not immediately reviewable and because the
Corps is capable, through its standardless migratory bird rule,
of establishing jurisdiction under the most marginal rationales
which no prudent landowner can, at present, ignore at the risk
of criminal or civil liability. When an administrative agency,
such as the Corps, “holds all the cards” as to the
implementation of a regulatory permitting program, due process
demands, first, that the agency exercise only that power granted
to it, and second, that it define the elements of an offense with
sufficient specificity to put the public on notice. The Corps’
refusal to define “waters of the United States” by reference to
objective standards makes regulatory abuse not merely a
possibility, but virtually guaranteed, since Corps personnel
themselves are not bound by consistent rules.
Where a federal law, such as the Clean Water Act, can
subject individuals to criminal and civil penalties, see 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319, it is unconscionable that a federal agency is able to
implement the law in a manner that has no objective, verifiable
30
standards by which an individual can discern the requirements
of the law. In the Clean Water Act, which has been held by
some courts to be a “public welfare” statute in which violations
can be criminally prosecuted in the absence of any criminal
intent, see United States v. Hanousek, 176 F.3d. 1116 (9th Cir.
1999), see also 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1), the possibility of
arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement demands that the terms
of the law be defined with a high degree of specificity.
Because liability is not merely predicated upon the overt
act of filling, but on the character of the land which is being
filled, it is unreasonable to sanction a definition of “waters of
the United St-tes” which bears only what meaning the Corps
chooses to assign to it, and, in particular, which depends upon
whether a bird uses it. The migratory bird rule is an
unreasonable interpretation of the term “waters of the United
States” because it is patently unreasonable to predicate criminal
and civil liability upon a Corps official’s subjective calculation
of where a bird may choose to alight.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Amici respectfully submit that
the decision of the court below should be REVERSED.
DATED: July, 2000.
Respectfully submitted,
ANNE M. HAYES
Counsel of Record
M. REED HOPPER
Pacific Legal Foundation
10360 Old Placerville Road,
Suite 100
Sacramento, California 95827
Telephone: (916) 362-2833
Facsimile: (916) 362-2932
Counsel for Amici Curiae
Appendix A-1
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
U.S. ARMY ENGINEER DISTRICT, SACRAMENTO
[SEAL] CORPS OF ENGINEERS
1325 J STREET
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 95814-2922
REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF
NOTICE
The Corps of Engineers’ employee delivering this notice
believes your construction activities are in violation of
Federal Law.
Anyone engaged in any construction activity in a water-
way of the United States or adjacent wetlands must
secure a Department of the Army permit before construc-
tion is initiated. If you are engaged in such construction
activity, and do not have a permit, you are violating
Federal Law and are subject to fines up to $50,000.00 per
day of construction activity, depending on the nature of
the activity. Any contractor performing work in waters of
the United States or adjacent wetlands without a permit
is subject to the same penalties as the landowner for
whom the work is being performed.
Should you currently be engaged in unauthorized work,
we recommend that you cease work. Cessation of work is
an indication of a good faith attempt to comply with the
law. In any event, a formal cease and desist order will be
promptly issued to anyone engaged in illegal work.
If you have any questions which the employee delivering
this notice cannot answer, please contact one of the fol-
lowing Regulatory Offices, or our Office of Counsel (916)
557-5290.
Appendix A-2
California and Sacramento District, Corps of
Nevada Engineers
Regulatory Section
1325 J Street
Sacramento, CA 95814-2922
Phone (916) 557-5250
Utah Sacramento District, Corps of
Engineers
Utah Regulatory Office
1403 South 600 West, Suite A
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Phone (801) 295-8380
Western Colorado Sacramento District, Corps of
Engineers
Grand Junction Regulatory Office
400 Rood Avenue, Room 142
Grand Junction, Colorado
81501-2563
Phone: (303) 243-1199
/s/ Laurence R. Sadoff
LAURENCE R. SADOFF
Colonel, CE
District Engineer
1. Section 404, Clean Water Act (33 USC 1344)
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.