Amicus Curiae Brief — Miller v. French

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Jan BOO G OO] Ficen

Nos. 99-224 & 99-58 i 28 20

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

JACK R. DUCKWORTH,

Petitioner,

vs. |

RICHARD A. FRENCH,

Respondent.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Petitioner,

vs.

RICHARD A. FRENCH,

Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF

AMICI CURIAE

AMERICANS FOR EFFECTIVE

LAW ENFORCEMENT, INC.,

JOINED BY THE

NATIONAL SHERIFFS’ ASSOCIATION

IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITIONERS.

(List of Counsel on Inside Front Cover)

;oowdL)

Of Counsel: Counsel For Amici Curiae:

RICHARD WEINTRAUB, ESQ. WAYNE W. SCHMIDT, ESQ.

National Sheriffs’ Association | Executive Director

1450 Duke Street Americans for Effective

Alexandria, Virginia 22314 Law Enforcement, Inc.

5519 N. Cumberland Ave.

Suite 1008

Chicago, Illinois 60656

E-mail: AELE@aol.com

BERNARD J. FARBER, ESQ.

1126 West Wolfram

Chicago, Illinois 60657-4330

E-mail: bernfarber@aol.com

JAMES P. MANAK, ESQ.

Counsel of Record

421 Ridgewood Avenue

Suite 100

Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137-4900

Tele/Fax (630) 858-6392

E-mail: lelp@xnet.com

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................. ii

BRIEF OF AMICICURIAE .............6045: 1

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ............... l

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................ 2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ................ 3

ET ives dcheacemenseedeecseqaeiss 5

THE AUTOMATIC STAY PROVISION OF

THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT

IS A PROPER MEASURE TO PREVENT

MICRO-MANAGEMENT OF CORREC-

TIRRWAL, PACAILITEBS. 2. ccc cc ccccccccees 5

A. CONGRESS PROPERLY IMPOSED

PROCEDURAL DEADLINES RELATING

TO INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IN PRISONER

EEN nbc dubdrckenenedccescese dence 5

B. THE AUTOMATIC STAY PROVISION

OF THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM

ACT DOES NOT INTERFERE WITH THE

Pee 7

C. THE AUTOMATIC STAY PROVISION IS

NEEDED TO PREVENT UNNECESSARY

DELAY IN PRISON INJUNCTION PRO-

CHEDENGG. 2... ccc cccccccccccccccccsees 8

CONCLUSION . wc ccc cccccccccccccesccecss 12

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page

Abbott v. Thornburg, 490 U.S. 401 (1989) ...... 10

Berwanger v. Cottey, 178 F.3d 834 (7th Cir. 1999) . 9

French v. Duckworth, French and United

States of America, intervenor-appellant,

178 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 1999) .......... passim

French v. Owens, 777 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir. 1985)... 8

Hadix v. Johnson, 144 F.3d 925 (6th Cir. 1998) . 8,9

Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail,

EE 8 ibd due esc bcedeeépes 9

Ruiz v. Johnson, 178 F.3d 385 (Sth Cir. 1999) .... 9

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) ........... 10

United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)

Pin cccesen teetecakeatcawaces 3,7

Statutes

nD iin vekes gadengeeaenas 5

rE. i: 4 vhevechoecedinbeees 6

SP eis EEE Sov cccacccicccsses passim

ED nc cb cncddvesecedéssees 6

Congressional Materials

141 Cong. Rec. $14,418 (1995) ...............

141 Cong. Rec. $14,419 (1995) .............--.

Pub. L. No. 105-119, @ 123, 11

Stat. 2440, 2470 (1997)

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE

This brief is filed pursuant to Rule 37 of the United

States Supreme Court. Consent to file has been granted

by respective Counsel for the Petitioners and

Respondent. The letters of consent have been filed with

the Clerk of this Court, as required by the Rules.’

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc.

(AELE), as a national not-for-profit citizens organi-

zation, is interested in establishing a body of law making

the police effort more effective, in a constitutional

manner. It seeks to improve the operation of the police

function to protect our citizens in their life, liberties, and

property, within the framework of the various state and

federal constitutions.

AELE has previously appeared as amicus curiae

over 100 times in the Supreme Court of the United States

and over 35 times in other courts, including the Federal

District Courts, the Circuit Courts of Appeal, and various

state courts, such as the Supreme Courts of California,

Illinois, Ohio, and Missouri.

' As required by Rule 37.6 of the United States Supreme Court, the

following disclosure is made: This brief was authored for the amici

by James P. Manak, Esq., counsel of record; Bernard J. Farber,

Esq.; and Wayne W. Schmidt, Esq., Executive Director of

authored this brief. Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc.,

made the complete monetary contribution to the preparation and

submission of this brief, without financial support from any source,

directly or indirectly.

The National Sheriffs’ Association (NSA), is the

largest organization of sheriffs and jail administrators in

America, consisting of over 40,000 members. It conducts

programs of training, publications, and related educa-

tional efforts to raise the standard of professionalism

among the nation’s sheriffs and jail administrators. While

it is interested in the effective administration of justice in

America, it strives to achieve this while respecting the

rights guaranteed to all under the Constitution.

Amici are national organizations that represent the

interests of law enforcement and correctional officials

who formulate and implement policy for detention

facilities, jails, and prisons. Because of this, we possess

direct knowledge of the impact of the ruling of the court

below, and we wish to impart that knowledge to this

Court.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh

Circuit, French v. Duckworth, French and United States

of America, intervenor-appellant, 178 F.3d 437 (7th Cir.

1999), held unconstitutional, as a violation of separation-

of-powers, the “automatic stay” provision of the Prison

Litigation Reform Act, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3626

(e)(2). This provides that any motion to modify or

terminate prospective relief in a prison conditions case

operates as an automatic stay beginning on the thirtieth

day after such a motion is made (which time period may

be extended by an additional sixty days for good cause

by the trial court). A panel of the Seventh Circuit ruled

that § 3626(e)(2) violated the principle articulated in

United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871),

that Congress does not have the power to impose a rule

of decision for pending judicial cases, apart from its

power to change the underlying applicable law.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Congress, in enacting the Prison Litigation Reform

Act, made a legislative determination that there should be

an end to unnecessary and burdensome “micro-

management” of correctional institutions by the courts.

It changed the underlying applicable law concerning the

instances in which injunctive relief could be granted,

requiring findings that the relief is narrowly drawn,

extends no further than necessary to correct the violation

of the federal right, and is the least intrusive means

necessary to correct the violation of the federal right. The

procedural deadlines for judicial action on a timely

motion to terminate existing prospective relief are just

that—procedural, and do not dictate the result which the

court entertaining the motion will reach in a particular

case.

The “automatic stay” provision of the Act does not

violate separation-of-powers or constitute undue interfer-

ence by the other branches of government in the judicial

process. It requires a finding of necessity and prevents

relief predicated on superseded legal standards. Congress

intended that courts should ordinarily defer to correc-

tional officials for day-to-day decision making and the

allocation of resources.

Amici believe that the upholding of this “automatic

stay” provision is essential to ensure that injunctive relief

that is ongoing actually is necessary to remedy ongoing

violations of constitutional rights. Injunctive orders

entered prior to the enactment of the Prison Litigation

Reform Act may not, in many instances, be adequately

based on judicial findings of constitutional violations and

also may be overbroad in their scope. The procedural

deadlines contained in the “automatic stay” provision of

the Prison Litigation Reform Act serve as a safeguard to

prevent prospective relief granted under now superseded

legal standards, in some cases decades ago, from being

continued for years or decades yet to come without

judicial findings that such relief is appropriate under

current law.

This Court has appropriately and increasingly

recognized, in a variety of its recent decisions concern-

ing prison litigation, that correctional officials faced with

the already difficult task of administering and running

detention facilities, jails, and prisons, should be canted

substantial deference in the making of their day-to-day

decisions and allocation of resources. The legal standards

for injunctive relief enacted by Congress in the Prison

Litigation Reform Act, along with the procedural

deadlines which assist in enforcing them, are in line with

the Court’s deference to correctional officials, while still

providing judicial remedies in those instances where

prisoners’ constitutional rights are violated.

Accordingly, amici urge this Court to reverse the

ruling of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Seventh Circuit, and uphold the constitutionality of 18

U.S.C. § 3626(e)(2).

ARGUMENT

THE AUTOMATIC STAY PROVISION OF THE

PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT IS A PROPER

MEASURE TO PREVENT MICRO-MANAGEMENT

OF CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES.

A. CONGRESS PROPERLY IMPOSED PROCE-

DURAL DEADLINES RELATING TO INJUNCTIVE

RELIEF IN PRISONER CASES.

When Congress passed the Prison Litigation

Reform Act in 1996, it very clearly made a legislative

determination that federal courts had engaged, in some

instances, in “micro-management” of correctional

facilities. See, e.g., 141 Cong. Rec. $14,419 (1995)

(statement of Sen. Abraham) (“No longer will prison

administration be turned over to Federal judges for the

indefinite future for the slightest reason”); id. at $14,418

(statement of Sen. Hatch) (“I believe that the courts have

gone too far in micro-managing our Nation’s prisons.”).

In the Act, Congress provided that injunctive relief

should be granted only in cases where violations of

federally protected rights were found and that such

orders should be:

1. Narrowly drawn;

2. Limited in all cases to relief necessary to correct

the violation of a federal right; and

3. Utilizing the “least intrusive means” necessary to

correct the violation of the federal right.

18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1).

Recognizing that many correctional institutions

were already operating under existing injunctions,

Congress also provided a mechanism for correctional

administrators to seek termination of an outdated

injunctive order which does not meet the current legal

standard for grants of prospective relief as summarized

above. Section 3626(a)(2) provides for the immediate

termination of prospective relief upon a finding that it

does not meet this standard, with the trial court able to

deny such immediate termination upon entering written

findings, based on the record, that the standard was met.

Congress evidently was also concerned about what

would happen if a trial court did not hold a timely

hearing to make a determination, one way or the other,

about whether an existing injunctive order met the

current legal standard. Accordingly, it adopted, in 18

U.S.C. § 3626(e)(2), the provision involved in this case,

that a motion to terminate or modify an existing

injunctive order would act as an automatic stay after no

judicial action was taken for thirty days. In 1997

amendments to the Prison Litigation Reform Act,

Congress provided that the trial court could postpone the

effective date of this automatic stay “for not more than

60 days for good cause,” but that “no postponement shall

be permissible because of general congestion of the

court’s calendar.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(3). See Pub. L.

No. 105-119, @ i123, 11 Stat. 2440, 2470 (1997) (adding

this language).

The Seventh Circuit panel has incorrectly inter-

preted these mere procedural guidelines to be improper

Congressional interference with the judicial function. Yet

these deadlines are no different from procedural dead-

lines properly imposed on the courts by statutes in many

eee ree

other areas and upheld even when fundamental

constitutional rights such as life, liberty, or property are

involved. See Judge Easterbrook, joined by Judge

Manion and Seventh Circuit Chief Judge Posner,

dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc by the

Seventh Circuit, French v. Duckworth, 178 F.3d at 448-

53.

B. THE AUTOMATIC STAY PROVISION OF THE

PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT DOES NOT

INTERFERE WITH THE JUDICIAL PROCESS.

The Seventh Circuit panel ruled that the “automatic

stay” provision violates the principle articulated in

United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871),

that Congress does not have the power to impose a rule

of decision for pending judicial cases, apart from its

power to change the underlying applicable law. This

concern is misplaced, as the “automatic stay”

provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act is

entirely different. It does not attempt to dictate to the

trial judge what result to reach, prevent the holding of

hearings, the consideration of evidence, the entering of

findings, the issuance of orders on those findings, or

attempt to remove jurisdiction from the federal courts.

In holding as it did, in Judge Easterbrook’s view,

the Seventh Circuit panel “has invented a right of the

judicial branch to freedom from deadlines.” French v.

Duckworth, 178 F.3d at 453.

Whether or not the “automatic stay” provision is

interpreted as preserving the equitable power of the

courts to “stay the stay” in appropriate circumstances or

states absolute deadlines which cannot be modified, see

Hadix v. Johnson, 144 F.3d 925, 946, (6th Cir. 1998)

(equitable power to suspend automatic stay remains) and

French v. Duckworth, 178 F.3d 437, 443 (7th Cir. 1999)

(statute does not allow suspension of automatic stay by

trial court), the provision, in stating procedural deadlines,

does not violate separation-of-powers or constitute undue

interference by the other branches of government in the

judicial process.

C. THE AUTOMATIC STAY PROVISION IS NEEDED

TO PREVENT UNNECESSARY DELAY IN PRISON

INJUNCTION PROCEEDINGS.

Many injunctions in prison and jail cases were

entered under now superseded legal standards, in some

cases decades ago. Sometimes, these orders were entered

without detailed findings that ongoing constitutional

violations existed then—much less now-—years later.

The immediate case is just one example of how

litigation over prison conditions has been prolonged, and

the dangers of not imposing some procedural deadlines

to promote timely review. Prisoners in an Indiana

correctional facility filed a class action lawsuit against

the state complaining of prison conditions almost three

decades ago. French v. Duckworth, 178 F.3d at 438.

Some of the relief sought by the prisoners was granted in

an injunction affirmed fifteen years ago in French v.

Owens, 777 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir. 1985), and the prison

has operated under that injunction, as modified over

time, ever since.

What happened in the instant case in more recent

years?

Defendants sought termination of the decree

by a motion in June 1997. Almost two years

have passed, but the district judge has yet to

take a single step toward acting on this

request—and the last word of the panel’s

opinion is “affirmed.” A process that is

supposed to be rapid drags on with no end in

sight.”

French v. Duckworth, 178 F. 3d at 449 (Easterbrook, J.,

dissenting).

Nor, unfortunately, is this case unique. In Hadix v.

Johnson, 144 F.3d 925 (6th Cir. 1998), the appeals court

had to revisit an injunctive order against Michigan

correctional officials which stemmed from litigation

begun in 1980. Hadix v. Johnson, 144 F.3d at 930. In

Ruiz v. Johnson, 178 F.3d 385 (Sth Cir. 1999), the court

considered whether to terminate federal consent orders

that had governed Texas prisons for “almost twenty-five

years.” Ruiz v. Johnson, 178 F.3d at 387. In Berwanger

v. Cottey, 178 F.3d 834 (7th Cir. 1999), a panel of the

Seventh Circuit examined the status of injunctive orders

against a county jail growing out of litigation which

began in 1972.

When egregious violations of prisoner rights are

found to be ongoing, no one would deny that injunctive

relief may be appropriate. On the other hand, the

extraordinary relief of injunction should be used only to

cure actually present violations and should be terminated

or modified in a timely manner when conditions or the

underlying law change. Indeed, that is the essence of this

Court’s ruling in Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail,

502 U.S. 367 (1991). Instead, in some instances,

injunctive orders which once were found appropriate and

necessary linger on despite the passage of new genera-

tions of prisoners and correctional officials, despite

changing prison conditions, and despite the lawful

enactment of a new legal standard for injunctive

relief.

This Court has properly recognized, in a variety of

its recent decisions concerning prison litigation, that

correctional officials faced with the already difficult task

of administering and running detention facilities, jails,

and prisons, should be granted substantial deference in

the making of their day-to-day decisions and allocation

of resources. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78

(1987); Abbott v. Thornburg, 490 U.S. 401 (1989).

Prison and jail administrators must manage the

housing, feeding, clothing, safety, medical and mental

health care, exercise, recreation, telephone use, postal

needs, personal funds, and personal property of

prisoners. They must provide adequate access to the

courts and counsel, access to religious worship, reason-

able accommodation for prisoners with disabilities—

along with rehabilitative programs such as work and

education, counseling and other treatment for alcohol

and drug dependency. With limited financial and

personnel resources, administrators must manage inmates

with violent propensities, and others who refuse to

follow institutional rules of behavior.

The legal standards for injunctive relief adopted by

Congress in the Act, along with the procedural deadlines

for enforcing them, are in line with this Court’s past

deference to correctional officials, while still providing

judicial remedies in those instances where prisoners’

constitutional rights are violated.

Accordingly, amici urge this Court to reverse the

ruling of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Seventh Circuit, and uphold the constitutionality of 18

U.S.C. Sec. 3626()(2).

CONCLUSION

Amici urge this Court to reverse the decision of the

court below on the basis of the precedents of this Court

and sound judicial policy.

Of Counsel:

Respectfully submitted,

Counsel For Amici Curiae:

RICHARD WEINTRAUB, ESQ. WAYNE W. SCHMIDT, ESQ.

National Sheriffs’ Association

1450 Duke Street

Alexandria, Virginia 22314

Executive Director

Americans for Effective

Law Enforcement, Inc.