Reply Brief — United States v. Locke

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Nos. 98-1701 and 98-1706

In the Supreme Court of the United States

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONER

V.

GARY LOCKE, GOVERNOR OF WASHINGTON, ET AL.

THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INDEPENDENT

TANKER OWNERS

(INTERTANKO), PETITIONER

5.

GARY LOCKE, GOVERNOR OF WASHINGTON, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES

SETH P. WAXMAN

Solicitor General

( vary Se of Record

De partment of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

(202) 514-2217

ip i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

A. State vessel and operator rules within the

subject areas covered by Title II of the PWSA

are preempted 2

B. A Coast Guard regulation issued pursuant to Title I

of the PWSA, or a decision that there should be no

requirement at all, preempts state law 11

C. Neither a state’s police powers nor Section 1018 of the

Oil Pollution Act of 1990 saves the Washington

BAP rules from preemption under the PWSA and

international agreements 13

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc.,

411 U.S. 325 (1973) 15-16

Barrett v. City of New York, 232 US. 14 (1914) .............. 7

Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Rel.

Bd., 330 U.S. 767 (1947) ‘ 19

California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949) 18, 19

Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 348 U.S. 61

- (1954) dons 6

Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.)

299 (1852) 14

Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass n v. de la Cuesta,

458 U.S. 141 (1982) 15

Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,

373 U.S. 132 (1963) 19

Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) 1, 6, 15

Harman v. Chicago, 147 U.S. 396 (1893) 6, 7, 15

Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit,

362 U.S. 440 (1960) — 15

(I)

II

Cases Continued: Page

King v. St. Vincents Hosp., 502 U.S. 215 (1991) 3

Missouri Pac. R. R. v. Porter, 273 U.S. 341

(1927) 19

Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co.,

54 U.S. (13 How.) 518 (1852) 6

Railroad Transfer Serv., Inc. v. City of Chicago,

386 U.S. 351 (1967) 6

Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151

(1978) 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 11, 12, 15, 16, 18

Sinnot v. Davenport, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 227

3 7. 14. 15

Southern Ry. v. Railroad Comm n, 236 U.S. 439

(1915) * 19

Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963) 6

The Roanoke, 189 U.S. 185 (1903) 20

United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 208 (1942) 9

Constitution, treaty, statutes and regulations:

U.S. Const. Art. VI, Cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause) 15

Seafarers’ Training, Certification and Watchkeeping

Code, July 6, 1995, Int’l Maritime Org., Doc. Sales

No. IMO-945E (1996):

§ A-II/2 10

§ A-VIIT/2 .. 10

Act of June 23, 1936 (Tank Vessel Act), ch. 729,

49 Stat. 1889 4

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seg.

42 U.S.C. 7402 14

42 U.S.C. 7511b(f) ‘ 14

Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seg.

33 U.S.C. 1314 14

33 U.S.C. 1342 .... 14

Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104

Stat. 484:

§ 1018, 104 Stat. 505 (33 U.S.C. 27189 1, 18, 16, 17, 18

III

Statutes and regulations Continued: Page

Port and Tanker Safety Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.

95-474, 92 Stat. 1471:

§ 2, 92 Stat. 1472 1

5, 92 Stat. 1480

92 Stat. 1484

92 Stat. 1483 (46 U.S.C. g 70

92 Stat. 1486-1487 (46 U.S.C. °710, 3711 (1994 &

ne oe

Supp. III 1997)) 2

Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C.

1221 et Se.

Tit. I. 33 U.S.C. 1221 et seq.:

33 U.S.C. 1223 11

33 U.S.C, 1223(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997) 14

33 U.S.C. 1223(a)(1) 15

33 U.S.C. 1224 15

33 U.S.C, 2718 17

Tit. II. 46 U.S.C. 2101 et Sg.

46 U.S.C. 3708(a) 3, 4, 5, 14, 15, 16

46 U.S.C. 3710 (1994 & Supp. III 1997) .................. 2

46 U.S.C. 3711 2,7

46 U.S.C. 3711(a) 8

46 U.S.C. 3713 8

Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, Pub. L.

No. 92-340, Tit. II. § 201, 86 Stat. 428 4-5

86 Stat. 429 4

Wash. Admin. Code (1999):

§ 317-21-130 5. 13

§ 317-21-200 5

§ 317-21-200(1 Ma) 12

§ 317-21-205 7

93172720508) 10

§ 317-21-205(4) 12

§ 317-21-210 5,7

§ 317-21-215 5, 10

317 21-21 8v⁰ ) 13

§ 317-21-220 10

IV

Statutes and regulations—Continued: Page

§ 317-21-230 5, 9, 10

§ 317-21-235 5, 13

§ 317-21-240 5

§ 317-21-245 5

§ 317-21-250(1) 5, 10

§ 317-21-260(1) to (3) 10

§ 317-21-260(5) 5

§ 317-21-265 5

§ 317-21-410 7

§ 317-21-540 13

Wash. Rev. Code § 88.46.080(1) (1996) 7

33 C. F. R.:

Pt. 155 5

Pt. 156 5

Pt. 157 5

Pt. 159 5

Pt. 164 5

Section 164.13(c) 12

46 C. F. R.:

Subch. A:

Pt. 2:

§ 2.014 5

Subch. B:

Pt. 15:

§ 15.1109 12

§ 15.1111 12

Subch. D:

Pt. 35 ... 5

Miscellaneous:

58 Fed. Reg. 27,630 (1993) 12

62 Fed. Reg. (1997):

pp. 5197-5199 9

pp. 34,506-34,541 9

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 658, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) 16

Miscellaneous—Continued: Page

H.R. Rep. No. 563, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971) ................... 12

H.R. Rep. No. 2962, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) ................. 3

Memorandum of Agreement on Oil Pollution Preven-

tion and Response Between the Commander, Eleventh

Coast Guard District, and the State of California

(July 1997) 11

S. Rep. No. 724, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) 4

U.S. Dep't of Transp., Ten Years Later: Oil Spill

Prevention and Response in the United States,

1989-1999 (1999) 20

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES

Our opening brief explains how Titles I and II of the Ports

and Waterways Safety Act WSA), as amended by the Port

and Tanker Safety Act (PTSA) and supplemented by inter-

national agreements and implementing Coast Guard regu-

lations, preempt state vessel and navigation rules. First,

Title II of the PWSA vests exclusive authority in the Secre-

tary to promulgate rules addressing a number of subjects

encompassed by the Washington BAP rules and to issue

licenses certifying compliance with those federal require-

ments. As recognized in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435

U.S. 151 (1978), because Congress intended the Secretary to

decide what rules are necessary in the general areas speci-

fied in Title II, that Title preempts state rules in those areas

even in the absence of a federal requirement precisely on

point. And, under an unbroken line of this Court’s cases

starting with Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), a

federal license to operate a vessel may not be supplemented

or interfered with by a state requirement. Second, if the

Coast Guard has promulgated a federal navigation rule

under Title I of the PWSA or determined that there should

be no rule on the subject, a state rule on the same subject is

ousted. In the absence of such a Coast Guard rule or

determination on a matter falling within Title I. however,

the state rule would not be preempted. That two-prong ap-

proach is mandated by the language of the PWSA (see U.S.

Br. 24-28) and this Court’s construction of Titles I and II of

the PWSA in Ray (see id. at 25-27), and is consistent with

the long history of federal vessel regulation (id. at 18-23).

Respondents variously argue that the text of the PWSA

does not support our submission, that Ras holding is

limited to design and construction standards for vessels, that

inherent state police powers authorize the rules promulgated

by the State, and that Section 1018 of the Oil Pollution Act

(1)

2

should be construed to authorize the BAP rules. Those argu-

ments are unpersuasive.

A. State Vessel And Operator Rules Within The Subject

Areas Covered By Title II Of The PWSA Are Preempted

Title II of the PWSA (as amended by the PTSA) requires

that “the Secretary shall issue, and may from time to time

amend or repeal, regulations for the design, construction,

alteration, repair, maintenance, operation, equipping, per-

sonnel qualification, or manning of vessels * as may be

necessary for increased protection against hazards to life and

property, for navigation and vessel safety, and for enhanced

protection of the marine environment.” 92 Stat. 1483

(codified at 46 U.S.C. 3703(a)). Title II also requires a vessel

operator to carry a certificate showing compliance with

those rules issued by the Secretary, which, in the case of

foreign-flag vessels, may be met with a valid certificate

“issued by a foreign nation pursuant to any treaty, con-

vention, or other international agreement to which the

United States is a party.” 92 Stat. 1486-1487 (codified as

amended at 46 U.S.C. 3710, 3711 (1994 & Supp. III 1997)).

Thus, Title II preempts state rules in two ways: (1) the

Secretary’s exclusive duty to promulgate rules with respect

to subjects covered by Title II preempts the field as to those

subjects; and (2) the holder of a federal license may not be

required to meet state standards that would alter or modify

a licensee’s right to operate a vessel in accordance with the

federal license.

1. As confirmed in Ray, PWSA Title II preempts state

law in the fields addressed by that Title. See U.S. Br. 24-28.

Respondents argue that Ray’s holding with respect to Title

II subjects is limited to design and construction features of

vessels. See Wash. Br. 20-24; Resp.-Int. Br. 19.' The text of

1 Respondent-Intervenors describe Ras holding as a “plurality” of

the Court (Br. 19), but that is plainly incorrect. The Court’s opinion with

Title II, however, does not support respondents’ argument

that “design” and “construction” should be treated differ-

ently from “alteration, repair, maintenance, operation, equip-

ping, personnel qualification, or manning of vessels,” because

all of those subjects appear in the same statutory phrase.

See 46 U.S.C. 3703(a). See, g., King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp.,

502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991) (words in a statutory provision

should not be treated as “pebbles in alien juxtaposition”).

Respondents’ argument also is inconsistent with the House

Report on the Tank Vessel Act of 1936, which first conferred

authority to promulgate regulations on those subjects. That

report, which was quoted by the Court in Ray (435 U.S. at

166), explained that the Act was intended to establish a

“reasonable and uniform set of rules and regulations” not

only for ship “construction” and “equipping,” but also for

“operation” and “manning.” H.R. Rep. No. 2962, 74th Cong.,

2d Sess. 2 (1936) (emphasis added) (quoted in U.S. Br. 23).

Moreover, the reasons given by the Court that the Title II

design and construction requirements preempt those fields

apply equally to the other fields listed in what is now 46

U.S.C. 3703(a). The Court emphasized the mandatory na-

ture of the obligation Congress imposed on the Secretary,

who “‘shall establish’ such rules and regulations as may

be necessary with respect to the design, construction, and

operation of the covered vessels and with respect to a vari-

ety of related matters.” Ray, 435 U.S. at 161 (emphasis

added); see also id. at 163 n.14 (noting the Secretary’s

authority under Title II “to insure that adequately trained

personnel are in charge of tankers”); U.S. Br. 24. Although

the State calls the “shall establish” language a “minor

textual signall] (Wash. Br. 23), the Ray Court treated it as

respect to Parts I, II, and III was unanimous, seven justices joined Parts

V and VII, and six justices joined Parts IV and VI. See 435 U.S. at 181

(Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 190 (Stevens,

J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

4

significant in understanding why state rules in those fields

under Title II are preempted. The Court noted the require-

ments that the Secretary engage in consultations before pro-

mulgating rules, 435 U.S. at 161°; inspect tank vessels “for

compliance with the regulations which he is required to issue

for the protection of the marine environment,” id. at 162; and

issue a certificate of compliance or accept a foreign certifi-

cate that entitles the vessel to navigate in U.S. waters free

from state interference, id. at 163-164. The Court also em-

phasized that Congress had determined that uniformity and

consistency with international standards applicable to the

subjects covered by Title II would best achieve safety and

environmental protection, “since the problem of marine

pollution is world-wide.” Id. at 166 (quoting S. Rep. No. 724,

92d Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1972)).

Those considerations are as pertinent to the “alteration,

repair, maintenance, operation, equipping, personnel quali-

fication, and manning of vessels” (46 U.S.C. 3703(a)) as

they are to a vessel's “design” or “construction” standards

(ibid.). State BAP rules on subjects covered by Title II, as

2 Under the PWSA provision addressed by the Court in Ray, the

Secretary was required to consult only with federal agencies. See 435

U.S. at 161 (discussing provision at 86 Stat. 429). That provision was

amended by the PTSA to require consultation with “officials of State and

local governments,” “representatives of port and harbor authorities or

associations,” and “representatives of environmental groups.” 92 Stat.

1484. Congress thus intended that state and local interests would be

taken into account by the Coast Guard through the consultation process

that precedes the adoption of a single federal rule, not imposed

unilaterally by States and localities through their own independent rules.

The amici States argue (Br. 16-18, 20) that the word “operation”

should not be construed so broadly as to preempt exercises of state power

to prevent pollution. Since the passage of the Tank Vessel Act of 1936,

however, Congress has directed the Federal Government to regulate

tankers “with respect to the operation of such vessels” (as well as design,

construction, manning, and the duties and qualifications of officers and

crew). Act of June 23, 1936, ch. 729, 49 Stat. 1889. See also PWSA, Pub.

5

codified at 46 U.S.C. 3703(a), therefore, are preempted.

“The Supremacy Clause dictates that the federal judgment

L. No. 92-340, Tit. II. § 201, 86 Stat. 428 (same language); PTSA, Pub. L.

No. 95-474, § 5, 92 Stat. 1483 (inclusion of “operation” in list of other

subjects). Those regulations with respect to vessel “operation,” which are

the subject of federal licenses, ordinarily have addressed mechanical or

systems-based features of the vessel, or the manner in which personnel

must be trained to use on-board equipment. See 46 C.F.R. 2.01-6

(describing “Certificates issued to foreign vessels” by referencing 46

C.F.R. Subch. D, Pt. 35, and 33 C.F.R. Pts. 155, 156, 157, 159, and 164).

Moreover, those regulations impose quite stringent and specific anti-

pollution standards for on-board equipment, transfer procedures, and

handling of oil and other hazardous cargoes. Thus, aspects of vessel

operations covered by Title II and by a federal license or certification

issued pursuant to Title II are subject to exclusive federal regulation, and

state measures in the field covered by the license are therefore

preempted. Compare pp. 11-13, infra (discussing preemptive effect of

different “operating requirements” issued by Coast Guard under Title I).

See provisions of Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-200 (1999) (watch

practices: manning); § 317-21-210 (engineering operating procedures:

equipment and operations), § 317-21-215 (operating procedures, pre-

arrival tests and designs: equipment and operations); § 317-21-230 (train-

ing: personnel qualifications); § 317-21-240 (personnel evaluation: per-

sonnel qualifications); § 317-21-245 (work hours: manning); § 317-21-250(1)

(language proficiency: personnel qualifications); § 317-21-260(5) (main-

tenance: repair and alteration); § 317-21-265 (technology: equipment and

operations).

The State asserts that it “waives” its drug testing requirements under

Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-235 (1999) when they conflict with a foreign

country’s requirements, but the affidavit they cite makes ciear that the

waiver is within the discretion of the enforcing official and is not required

by state law. See J.A. 256. In any event, the State concedes that its

requirements differ from federal regulations, see Wash. Br. 47-48, and

does not deny that its rules have significant extra-territorial effects in

ways not contemplated by Coast Guard regulations. See U.S. Br. 33-35.

As to its event reporting rule (Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-130 (1999)),

the State makes no attempt to rebut the arguments in our opening brief

(at 39-40) for why it is preempted and cites nothing in the memorandum of

agreement between the State and the Coast Guard for why the sharing of

information about events saves the unilateral state reporting rule.

that a vessel is safe to navigate United States waters prevail

over the contrary state judgment.” Ray, 435 U.S. at 165.

2. Respondents do not contest the continuing validity

or applicability of this Court’s decisions holding that the

rights enjoyed under a federal navigation license may not be

abridged by additional state requirements. Ray, 435 U.S. at

164 (“Congress did not anticipate that a vessel * * *

holding a Secretary’s permit, or its equivalent, to carry the

relevant cargo would nevertheless be barred by state law

from operating in the navigable waters of the United

States.“); U.S. Br. 22 & n.9 (collecting cases).

As this Court has observed in applying that rule in

another federal licensing context: “A State may not enforce

licensing requirements which, though valid in the absence of

federal regulation, give ‘the State’s licensing board a virtual

power of review over the federal determination’ that a

person or agency is qualified and entitled to perform certain

functions, or which impose upon the performance of activity

sanctioned by federal license additional conditions not

contemplated by Congress.” Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379,

385 (1963) (footnote omitted). “No State law can hinder or

obstruct the free use of a license granted under an act of

Congress.” Ibid. (quoting Pennsylvania v. Wheeling &

Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 566 (1852)).° Yet

5 Eg, Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 215 (“The object of the license,

then, cannot be to ascertain the character of the vessel, but to do what it

professes to do—that is, to give permission to a vessel already proved by

her enrolment to be American, to carry on the coasting trade.”); Harman

v. Chicago, 147 U.S. 396, 407 (1893) (rejecting city’s imposition of license

fee on tug operator because then It Ihe license of the United States would

be insufficient to give him free access to those waters”).

See also Railroad Trunsfer Serv., Inc. v. City of Chicago, 236 U.S.

351, 358-359 (1967) (federal license for railroad transfer services cannot be

supplemented or overridden by city ordinance); Castle v. Hayes Freight

Lines, Inc., 348 U.S. 61, 64 (1954) (“[I}t would be odd if a state could take

action amounting to a suspension or revocation of an interstate [motor]

7

the State’s requirement of an “oil spill prevention plan” is

tantamount to a state licerse, because no vessel may legally

operate in state waters unless it has filed and received

approval for such a “plan”; and that plan must in turn

demonstrate compliance with the comprehensive state

requirements, many of which operate in fields preempted by

federal law or Coast Guard regulations. See Wash. Rev.

Code § 88.46.080(1) (1996); see also, e. g., Wash. Admin. Code

§§ 317-21-200, 317-21-205, 317-21-210 (1999) (describing what

operating, engineering, and navigational requirements must

be satisfied in the “oil spill prevention plan”).’

Respondents argue that the international treaties and

agreements pursuant to which the Coast Guard recognizes

and enforces such licenses for foreign vessels do not inde-

pendently preempt state law. That argument is misplaced

for two reasons. First, federal preemption under Title II

arises from that Title’s provision that a foreign vessel may

not operate on the navigable waters of the United States

without a federal certificate recognized and accepted by the

Secretary. See 46 U.S.C. 3711; see also U.S. Br. 30-31.“ In

carrier’s [Interstate Commerce Clommission- granted right to operate.)

Barrett v. City of New York, 232 U.S. 14, 31 (1914) (collecting cases).

Although the State now disavows any attempt to impede a vessel

from actually entering its waters (Wash. Br. 5 n.5), it has not renounced

the civil and criminal penalties called for under state law for vessels that

do not comply with the BAP rules. See id. at 5. In Harman, this Court

treated a city’s “imposition of a fine” for noncompliance with local licensing

rules as a basis for finding a preemptive conflict with federal licensing

laws. See 147 U.S. at 406-407. Thus, any effort by the State to impose a

requirement that impedes the exercise of rights enjoyed under the federal

(or federally-recognized international) license would “den[y] to the vessel

in question” the “full enjoyment of the right to carry on the coasting

trade.” Sinnot v. Davenport, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 227, 242 (1859).

8 The State does not cite or discuss 46 U.S.C. 3711. Respondent-

Intervenors do cite Section 3711, but misapprehend it, noting that it states

that the “Secretary does not have to accept foreign certificates of

compliance.” Resp.-Int. Br. 45 n.35 (emphasis omitted). Section 3711

8

Ray this Court noted that Title II of the PWSA “directs the

Secretary to inspect tank vessels for compliance with the

regulations which he is required to issue for the protection of

the marine environment,” and that “the consequent privilege

of having on board the relevant cargo [is] evidenced by certi-

ficates of compliance issued by the Secretary or by appropri-

ate endorsements on the vessels’ certificates of inspection.”

435 U.S. at 162-163. Respondents do not contest that

SOLAS, STCW, MARPOL, and the ISM Code (which is a

part of SOLAS) all require certifications that Congress has

authorized the Secretary to accept on behalf of the United

States. See 46 U.S.C. 3711(a); U.S. Br. 5-9 & n.5.

Second, respondents’ contention (Wash. Br. 31; Resp.-Int.

Br. 39-42) that the international agreements are not “self-

executing” is irrelevant. The general provisions quoted and

cited by respondents (Wash. Br. 30-31; Resp.-Int. Br. 41 &

n.33), which provide that such international agreements

must be given domestic legal effect, have been fully and

completely complied with under United States domestic law.

See U.S. Br. 7 (SOLAS), 8 n.4 (MARPOL), 9 (STCW), 37

affords the Coast Guard the opportunity to assess whether the certificate

of compliance is valid and reflects the actual conditions aboard the

vessel. If the Coast Guard has grounds for rejecting the certificate, it

can take appropriate enforcement measures against the vessel. See

<<http:/hwww.uscg.mil/hq/g-m/pse/psc.htm>> (detailing, inter alia, Coast

Guard month-by-month detentions of vessels, which flag nations have the

best and worst records for detentions, and which vessels are in non-

compliance with international conventions). The Coast Guard cannot deny

entry to a foreign-flag vessel that fully complies with the certificate of

compliance, because to do so would violate the terms of applicable inter-

national agreements. See U.S. Br. 7-9, 30-31. And a State may not in any

event enforce the certification requirement. Respondent-Intervenors also

mischaracterize 46 U.S.C. 3713, which prohibits the operation in U.S.

waters of vessels that do not comply with federal regulations but which,

by its plain terms, is not restricted to “construction and design char-

acteristics,” as respondents erroneously assert. See Resp. Int. Br. 34 n.28.

(ISM Code).“ Accordingly, “state law must yield when it is

inconsistent with, or impairs the policy or provisions of, a

treaty or of an international compact or agreement.” United

States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 208, 230-231 (1942).

An illustration of the rule that the State may not impose a

requirement that denies a right of a federal licensee is the

BAP rule on personnel training. The State says that the

United States “misunderstands this requirement” (Wash.

Br. 45)," which by its plain terms requires “training beyond

the training necessary to obtain a license or merchant ma-

rine document.” Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-230 (1999).

Once a vessel has been duly licensed as complying with

STCW requirements, a State has no power to impose any

additional requirements on the federal license—even if all

the State seeks to do is to doublecheck that the federal gov-

® Contrary to respondent-intervenors’ assertion (Br. 42 n.33), the

1995 amendments to the STCW Convention have been implemented by

federal law. On June 26, 1997, the Coast Guard issued an interim rule giv-

ing full legal effect to the 1995 STCW amendments for personnel serving

on U.S. ships as of July 28, 1997. See 62 Fed. Reg. 34,506-34,541; see also

id. at 5197-5199.

10 The State asserts that it “has disclaimed power to ‘control ships“

because it “directs its regulation at owners and operators to avoid conflict

with the operative provisions of international law.” Wash. Br. 31-32. The

State cannot avoid preemption in that manner. The owners and operators

“control” the ships the State seeks to regulate, and it is non-compliance by

the vessel and its crew with substantive state requirements that causes

the State to impose civil and criminal penalties against the owners and

operators.

1 According to the State, we also “misunderstand[]” the state rules

regarding emergency procedures (Wash. Br. 44) and language proficiency

(id. at 46). Although we disagree with that assessment, to the extent the

state rules are susceptible to misinterpretation, they raise serious safety

and environmental concerns for vessel operators, who may become

confused over what rules to apply. That confusion will only proliferate if

other States have the authority to override the national and international

regime by imposing their own vessel requirements.

10

ernment’s determination is correct. See p. 6, supra. Yet

even by its own admission, the State’s requirements go

beyond STCW requirements. The STCW Code § A-II/2 pro-

vision requires personnel to have a requisite understanding

of watch practices, uses of compasses, and corre tions to

errors in compasses, so that the officer in charge of the

navigational watch may make necessary course corrections.

See STCW Code § A-VIII/2(21.5.2, 34.2). The state BAP

rules micro-manage the officer in charge by requiring fre-

quent comparisons of compass readings, regardless of

operating conditions and the potential to divert the officers

and crew from other more pressing navigational duties. See

Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-205(8) (1999) (discussed at

Wash. Br. 41). Precisely because of such differences in

approach to training and certification, Congress determined

that the national rule would be to accept the training and

crew procedures certified under such agreements as the

STCW and SOLAS, and to vest the Coast Guard with the

power to implement and enforce those requirements. See

U.S. Br. 7-8, 30-31, 35. Thus, with respect to those BAP

rules that adopt, supplement, or seek to impose require-

ments in addition to those recognized to obtain a license or

certification to operate in United States waters, they are

preempted.”

3. The amici States point to a 1993 memorandum of

agreement (MOA) between California and the Coast Guard

as creating a “cooperative program for oil spill prevention

and response.” Amici States Br. 8. That MOA, however, is

no longer valid. It has been superseded by a 1997 memoran-

12 See provisions in Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-215 (1990) (pre-

arrival equipment tests: SOLAS certificate); § 317-21-220 (emergency pro-

cedure proficiency: STCW certificate); § 317-21-230 (crew training: STCW

certificate); § 317-21-250(1) (language proficiency: STCW certificate);

§ 317-21-260(1) to (3) (management policies and practices: ISM Code certi-

ficate). See generally U.S. Br. App. la-17a.

—. — —

11

dum of agreement, which the amici States allude to and

which fully supports our submission in this case. Memoran-

dum of Agreement on Oil Pollution Prevention and Response

Between the Commander, Eleventh Coast Guard District,

and the State of California (July 1997). Whatever ambiguity

amici may perceive in the now-superseded 1993 MOA, the

1997 MOA reiterates that “(federal inspection requirements

associated with vessel safety are not subject to supplemental

State regulations.” Id. J V. A. I. It further provides that

“the State has the authority to promulgate regulations

concerning oil spill prevention which do not conflict with, and

which are not otherwise preempted by, Federal law.”

Id. NX. A. Cooperative Federal-State efforts to respond to

and contain oil spill, are an important aspect of protecting

the marine environment, but those efforts do not support the

conclusion that federal vessel and operator regulations lack

preemptive force over state rules on the same subjects.

B. A Coast Guard Regulation issued Pursuant To Title I Of

The PWSA, Or A Decision That There Should Be No

Requirement At All, Preempts State Law

Title I of the PWSA, as amended by the PTSA, addresses

“Vessel Operating Requirements.” See 92 Stat. 1472; 33

U.S.C. 1223 (caption). The subjects addressed in that Title

pertain to “operations” in the sense of navigating the

vessel the types of traffic safety rules this Court noted in

Ray. See 435 U.S. at 161 & n.9. Congress enacted Title I in

1972 “to broaden the Coast Guard’s authority to establish

rules for port safety and protection of the environment.” /d.

at 169 n.20. As we have explained (see U.S. Br. 26-28), a

federal regulation issued pursuant to Title I (or a Coast

Guard determination that there should be no requirement at

all on a subject) ousts a state rule on the same subject,

whereas a state rule is valid in the absence of such a

regulation or determination. See Ray, 435 U.S. at 171-172

(the “relevant inquiry” under Title I is “whether the

12

Secretary has either promulgated his own * * *

requirement * * * or has decided that no such requirement

should be imposed at all”); id. at 174 (quoting H.R. Rep. No.

563, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 15 (1971) (Title I revised to “make it

absolutely clear that the Coast Guard regulation of vessels

preempts state action in the field”).” Respondents do not

cite a single case of this Court upholding a state navigation

requirement when a federal rule addresses the same subject.

In an attempt to justify certain state rules as “necessi-

tated by local conditions,” the State defends its rule govern-

ing operation in restricted visibility (Wash. Admin. Code

§ 317-21-200(1)(a) (1999)) as compelled by the “congested

waters of the Strait of Juan de Fuca and Puget Sound”

(Wash. Br. 42). Yet by its terms the BAP rule applies

throughout state waters. When promulgating its rule re-

quiring two licensed deck officers on watch on the bridge,

see 33 C.F.R. 164.13(c), the Coast Guard specifically in-

tended the rule to apply in “all navigable waters of the U.S.,

particularly in the congested waterways of the United

States. 58 Fed. Reg. 27,630 (1992). The uniform application

of that rule furthers compliance with the STCW crew rest

requirements implemented domestically through 46 C. F. R.

15.1109, 15.1111, which are designed to prevent fatigued

mariners from navigating vessels. The State, however,

asserts the authority to impose a rule that overrides the

STCW requirement (Wash. Br. 43), notwithstanding the

contrary judgments by the Coast Guard and the members of

the International Maritime Organization that a uniform re-

Por an example of the type of local traffic rule that would not be

preempted, see Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-205(4) (1999) (providing that

la] master of a tanker carrying cargo shall use at least one assist tug for

anchoring and departing anchorages in the port of Port Angeles. The port

of Port Angeles includes all navigable waters west of 123 degrees, 24

minutes west longitude encompassed by Ediz Hook”). There is no Coast

Guard regulation on that subject, see U.S. Br. App. 6a, nor any Coast

Guard determination that there should be no such requirement at all.

—

13

gime enables a master to organize his crew rest schedule to

avoid the hazards of a tired crew when vessels travel to

multiple ports over a span of a few days.

A number of Washington State’s BAP rules that appear to

fall into the realm governed by Title I rather than Title II of

the PWSA concern subjects also addressed by the federal

rules. Those BAP rules are preempted. By contrast,

although certain of the equipment rules adopted by other

States, which are featured by the amici States (Br. 6-9),

might be preempted by applicable Coast Guard regulations,

other state rules addressed to other matters would not be.

In any future case challenging the validity of such rules in

other States, the preemption analysis set out should be

applied to analyze specific rules at issue.

C. Neither A State's Police Powers Nor Section 1018 Of The

Oil Pollution Act Of 1990 Saves The Washington BAP

Rules From Preemption Under The PWSA And Inter-

national A treements

Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of federal law,

respondents and their amici contend that two sources of law

save Washington’s BAP rules from preemption: inherent

police powers and Section 1018 of OPA. Respondents are

wrong on both counts.

1. This Court long ago rejected the first proposition—

that the reserved powers of the States authorize them to

4 See provisions of Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-215(1)(a) (1999)

(prearrival tests and inspections); § 317-21-540 (advance notice of entry)

(diseussed in Wash. Br. 43-44). It bears noting that, like the state

restricted-visibility rule discussed in the text, these other BAP rules are

not specifically directed to particularly problematic passageways in its

waters, but rather apply throughout all state waters. Moreover, to the

extent that provisions of Wash. Admin. Code §§ 317-21-130 (1999) (event

reporting of marine casualties) and 317-21-235 (drug testing) are

considered rules of local application, they also are preempted by the

existence of federal rules. See U.S. Br. 33-34, 39-40.

14

regulate navigation, at least where Congress has taken the

matter in hand:

The whole commercial marine of the country is placed

by the Constitution under the regulation of Congress,

and all laws passed by that body in the regulation of

navigation and trade, whether foreign or coastwise, [are]

therefore but the exercise of an undisputed power.

When, therefore, an act of the Legislature of a State

prescribes a regulation of the subject repugnant to and

inconsistent with the regulation of Congress, the State

law must give way; and this, without regard to the

source of power whence the State Legislature derived

its enactment.

Sinnot v. Davenport, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 227, 243 (1859).

The amici States argue, however, that “local pollution

control measures regarding tank vessels are no different

from the local pilotage requirements sustained in Cooley.”

Amici States Br. 16. That contention is incorrect. First, as

the Cooley Court itself noted, Congress by statute permitted

States to impose local pilotage requirements; the state rule

was not upheld as an exercise of inherent police power. See

Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 315

(1852) (citing 1789 statute). Second, although the federal

Clean Air Act (see 42 U.S.C. 7402, 7511b(f)) and Clean

Water Act (see 33 U.S.C. 1314, 1342) do expressly provide a

role for States in establishing certain anti-pollution rules

that apply to vessels, those provisions do not override the

congressional determinations established in the PWSA and

PTSA that uniform federal standards shall apply to the “de-

sign, construction, alteration, repair, maintenance, operation,

equipping, personnel qualification, and manning” of vessels

(46 U.S.C. 3708(a)), and that the Secretary likewise may

adopt preemptive navigation rules of national or local

applicability to promote safety and protection of the marine

environment (33 U.S.C. 1223(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997)).

15

The State calls its navigation rules oil “spill prevention”

requirements (Wash. Br. 12, 13, 38, 40, 42, 44), and the amici

States assert that the vessel rules support the underlying

purpose of pollution prevention (Amici States Br. 12-13).

But those motivations do not alter the reality that the rules

directly regulate vessels in navigation. In any event, a

State’s reasons for adopting such measures are irrelevant

under the Supremacy Clause. See, e. g., Fidelity Fed. Sav. &

Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982). And, in

fact, this Court has rejected similar police-power rationales

for state regulation of vessels. See, ¢.g., Gibbons, 22 U.S.

(9 Wheat.) at 53, 200-202 (rejecting argument that State’s

regulation is “nothing more than [regulation of] property

* * subject to the control of the sovereign power”);

Sinnot, 63 U.S. (22 How.) at 242 (rejecting argument that

state police power permits vessel licensing requirement

where federal license rule exists); Harman, 147 U.S. at 408-

409 (rejecting city’s contention that license fee was justified

to fund deepening of Chicago River). Indeed, in Ray the

Court distinguished precisely the kinds of environmental

rules upon which respondents rely (Wash. Br. 15; Resp.-Int.

Br. 17-20) by noting that “in none of the relevant cases sus-

taining the application of state laws to federally licensed or

inspected vessels did the federal licensing or inspection

procedure implement a substantive rule of federal law ad-

dressed to the object also sought to be achieved by the chal-

lenged state regulation.” 435 U.S. at 164 (citing, e.g., Huron

Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960)).

In Ray, as here, Titles I and II are designed to protect the

marine environment, as well as to promote safety and pro-

tect life and property. See 33 U.S.C. 1223(a)(1), 1224; 46

U.S.C. S).“

% Nor does Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S.

325 (1973), support respondents’ position. In Askew, the Court upheld a

state rule imposing strict liability for an oil spill “from any waterfront

16

2. Respondents’ reliance on Section 1018 of OPA is also

misplaced. In our opening brief (at 44), we demonstrate,

inter alia, that Section 1018 simply does not apnly to this

case because all of the preemptive federal rules at issue here

derive from some source of law other than OPA. The State

nonetheless contends that It he language of subsections

1018(a) and (e) is very broad” (Wash. Br. 25) and that lil

would make no sense for Congress to express a broad sav-

ings of state powers from preemption in § 1018, if it had

already preempted those state powers” (id. at 26). The State

provides no support for that proposition in the text of OPA

or any of this Court’s decisions. Section 1018 prevides only

that “{njothing in this Act“ i e., nothing in OPA itself—

shall affect the authority of the States to impose certain

requirements. 33 U.S.C. 2718. It in no way affects the pre-

emptive effect of other Acts (such as the PWSA and PTSA),

of international agreements, or of Coast Guard regulations

issued under those Acts or to enforce those agreements. See

U.S. Br. 44-45. The Conference Report on OPA expressly

states that it “does not disturb the Supreme Court’s decision

in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Company, 435 U.S. 151 (1978),”

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 653, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 122 (1990),

facility” or “any ship destined for or leaving such facility,” id. at 327, in

part because “{iJt is clear at the outset that the Federal Act does not

preclude, but in fact allows,” States to impose additional liability for oil

spills, id. at 329. The United States, as amicus curiae, had expressed the

view that separate vessel equipment requirements contemplated under

state law would be preempted by recently promulgated Coast Guard

regulations, see 71-1082 U.S. Br. at 30-35, but acknowledged that a direct

conflict with state law had not been presented since the State had not yet

issued regulations. Accordingly, the Court opined that “the question

whether such [state] regulations will conflict with Coast Guard regulations

* * * should await a concrete dispute under applicable Florida regu-

lations.” 411 U.S. at 387. What the Court actually decided in Askew—that

States may impose additional liability requirements for oil spills—is a pro-

position with which no party to this litigation disagrees.

17

which confirmed the preemptive effect of Title II of the

PWSA and of Coast Guard regulations issued under Title I.“

The State attempts to explain away the Conference

Report’s affirmation of Ray by asserting that “(t]he refer-

ence to Ray in the Conference Report confirms only that the

broad language of § 1018 does not undo the careful holding in

Ray that the field of tanker design and construction is

preempted.” Wash. Br. 27. Having misstated the holding

in Ray (see U.S. Br. 24-28; pp. 2-4, supra), the State then

imputes that misunderstanding to the Conference Com-

mittee that inserted Section 1018. But Congress's intent not

to “undo” Ray must include the aspects of the decision in

Ray addressing the field-preemptive effect of Title II of the

PWSA and the preemptive effect of Coast Guard regulations

addressing other subjects under Title I of the PWSA.

Unlike respondents, the court of appeals recognized that

Section 1018 by its terms does not apply to the PWSA or

other statutes that confer authority on the Coast Guard to

issue regulations that preempt state law. See Pet. App. 1la-

12a. The court nevertheless held that Section 1018 of OPA,

as Congress’s most recent statute in the field, divests the

Coast Guard of that authority under other statutes. /d. at

15a-16a. Respondents make no effort to defend that star-

tling proposition, which cannot be reconciled with the bed-

rock principle that Congress can change the law only by

passing a new law. See U.S. Br. 44. Nor do respondents

1 The legislative history of OPA quoted by the State (Wash. Br. 26-

29) similarly shows only that Congress did not intend for OPA to preempt

state law in certain respects. Nothing in any of the legislative history

cited by respondents evidences any intent by Congress that Section 1018

would negate the preemptive scope of rules promulgated pursuant to the

PWSA or PTSA, which are intended to further environmental protection

as well as vessel safety. And contrary to respondent-intervenors’ con-

tention (Br. 31 n.23), the statements of Coast Guard officials it quotes in no

way suggest that OPA freed States to adopt rules that conflict with Coast

Guard regulations.

18

contest the applicability of this Court’s decisions holding

that savings clauses should not be read to conflict with

directives in federal statutes. See id. at 45 n.20 (collecting

eases). Thus, there is no occasion here for the Court to

attempt to resolve the differences among the other parties

over whether Section 1018 applies only to Title I of OPA or

only to financial requirements. It is sufficient in this case for

the Court to hold that the phrase “[nJothing in this Act”

means what it says and that Section 1018 therefore does not

trump the preemptive power of other extant federal laws.

3. The State contends that some of its BAP rules incor-

porate applicable Coast Guard regulations and international

treaty provisions and therefore should not be deemed pre-

empted because they are “identical” to those standards. See

Wash. Br. 19, 44 (citing California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725

(1949)). In Zook, the Court upheld a state law prohibiting

the sale or arrangement of any transportation over a state

highway if the transporting carrier lacked a permit from the

Interstate Commerce Commission. The Zook Court based

its decision in part on the absence of any intent by Congress

for the federal law to be exclusive, while noting at the same

time that “if a case falls within an area in commerce thought

to demand a uniform national rule, state action is struck

down.” 336 U.S. at 728. Unlike in Zook, that situation is

manifestly present here, in light of the comprehensive na-

tional and international regime regarding vessels that this

Court specifically recognized in Ray. And even as to regu-

lations promulgated under Title I, Congress intended that

there be one decisionmaker, even when national uniformity

was not required. See Ray, 435 U.S. at 177. Moreover, the

State asserts the authority to apply its own enforcement

standards to its allegedly identical substantive rules, and

thereby impose civil fines and criminal punishments on vio-

lators. See Wash. Br. 5. But because state officials do not

have the authority to enforce national and international

standards—only the Coast Guard has been granted such

19

authority (see U.S. Br. 8)—such unilateral actions by state

officers threaten to impair the Nation’s international obliga-

tions. See Belgium et al. Amici Br. 4; Canada Amicus Br. 5.

Moreover, the Zook Court emphasized that the subject of

the state rules to enforce safety and good-faith require-

ments for the use of its own highways”—was within “the

state’s normal power.” 336 U.S. at 737. As we demonstrate

(U.S. Br. 18-23) and as was recognized by the district court

(Pet. App. 61a), regulations of vessels in interstate or inter-

national navigation are traditionally a matter of national con-

cern. In numerous other cases, the Court has held that iden-

tical or supplemental state laws are preempted by federal

law.“ In any event, respondents never contest our central

thesis for conflict: that the international regime requires uni-

formity in vessel and staffing requirements (and in aspects of

navigation regulated by the Coast Guard under Title I that

are enforced by national officers). That regime is frustrated

by the efforts of the several States of the United States to

enforce their own rules.

4. The detailed international and federal statutory and

regulatory regime enforced by the Coast Guard has pro-

duced significant benefits to the marine environment of the

United States. Since the Exxon Valdez disaster, the aver-

7 See, e.g., Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Rel. Bd., 330

U.S. 767, 776 (1947) (identical state rule preempted by federal rule

where exercise of concurrent jurisdiction means that enforcement “action

by [state agency) necessarily denies the discretion of the [federal]”),

Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Porter, 273 U.S. 341, 346 (1927) (state rule “cannot

be applied in coincidence with, as complementary to or as in opposition to,

federal enactments which disclose the intention of Congress to enter a

field of regulation that is within its jurisdiction”); Southern Ry. v.

Railroad Comm'n, 236 U.S. 439, 447-448 (1915) (virtually identical state

requirement on railroads held preempted by federal rule). Florida Lime

& Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963), which the amici

States cite (Br. 21), is inapposite, because in that case the state and federal

standards were dissimilar.

20

age number of oil spills of more than 10,000 gallons has

dropped by approximately 50%; the ratio of gallons spilled

per million gallons of oil shipped has decreased by 50% (from

ten to five gallons spilled per million shipped); and there

have been no major oil spills of more than one million gallons

from vessels since 1990. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Ten Years

Later: Oil Spill Prevention and Response in the United

States, 1989-1999, at 8 (1999). The comprehensive federal

regime, which applies uniformly to vessels moving in inter-

national and interstate commerce, confirms the wisdom of

the longstanding national and international approach to

vessel safety. By contrast, “it is almost impossible for [the

master] * * * to acquaint himself with the laws of each

individual State he may visit.” The Roanoke, 189 U.S. 185,

195 (1903) (invalidating State of Washington lien law applied

against vessels).

* * * * *

For the foregoing reasons, and those stated in our opening

brief, the judgment of the court of appeals should be re-

versed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

Respectfully submitted.

SETH P. WAXMAN

Solicitor General

NOVEMBER 1999

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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