Reply Brief — United States v. Locke
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Nos. 98-1701 and 98-1706
In the Supreme Court of the United States
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONER
V.
GARY LOCKE, GOVERNOR OF WASHINGTON, ET AL.
THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INDEPENDENT
TANKER OWNERS
(INTERTANKO), PETITIONER
5.
GARY LOCKE, GOVERNOR OF WASHINGTON, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
REPLY BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES
SETH P. WAXMAN
Solicitor General
( vary Se of Record
De partment of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
(202) 514-2217
ip i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
A. State vessel and operator rules within the
subject areas covered by Title II of the PWSA
are preempted 2
B. A Coast Guard regulation issued pursuant to Title I
of the PWSA, or a decision that there should be no
requirement at all, preempts state law 11
C. Neither a state’s police powers nor Section 1018 of the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990 saves the Washington
BAP rules from preemption under the PWSA and
international agreements 13
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc.,
411 U.S. 325 (1973) 15-16
Barrett v. City of New York, 232 US. 14 (1914) .............. 7
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Rel.
Bd., 330 U.S. 767 (1947) ‘ 19
California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949) 18, 19
Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 348 U.S. 61
- (1954) dons 6
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.)
299 (1852) 14
Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass n v. de la Cuesta,
458 U.S. 141 (1982) 15
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,
373 U.S. 132 (1963) 19
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) 1, 6, 15
Harman v. Chicago, 147 U.S. 396 (1893) 6, 7, 15
Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit,
362 U.S. 440 (1960) — 15
(I)
II
Cases Continued: Page
King v. St. Vincents Hosp., 502 U.S. 215 (1991) 3
Missouri Pac. R. R. v. Porter, 273 U.S. 341
(1927) 19
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co.,
54 U.S. (13 How.) 518 (1852) 6
Railroad Transfer Serv., Inc. v. City of Chicago,
386 U.S. 351 (1967) 6
Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151
(1978) 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 11, 12, 15, 16, 18
Sinnot v. Davenport, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 227
3 7. 14. 15
Southern Ry. v. Railroad Comm n, 236 U.S. 439
(1915) * 19
Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963) 6
The Roanoke, 189 U.S. 185 (1903) 20
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 208 (1942) 9
Constitution, treaty, statutes and regulations:
U.S. Const. Art. VI, Cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause) 15
Seafarers’ Training, Certification and Watchkeeping
Code, July 6, 1995, Int’l Maritime Org., Doc. Sales
No. IMO-945E (1996):
§ A-II/2 10
§ A-VIIT/2 .. 10
Act of June 23, 1936 (Tank Vessel Act), ch. 729,
49 Stat. 1889 4
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seg.
42 U.S.C. 7402 14
42 U.S.C. 7511b(f) ‘ 14
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seg.
33 U.S.C. 1314 14
33 U.S.C. 1342 .... 14
Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104
Stat. 484:
§ 1018, 104 Stat. 505 (33 U.S.C. 27189 1, 18, 16, 17, 18
III
Statutes and regulations Continued: Page
Port and Tanker Safety Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-474, 92 Stat. 1471:
§ 2, 92 Stat. 1472 1
5, 92 Stat. 1480
92 Stat. 1484
92 Stat. 1483 (46 U.S.C. g 70
92 Stat. 1486-1487 (46 U.S.C. °710, 3711 (1994 &
ne oe
Supp. III 1997)) 2
Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C.
1221 et Se.
Tit. I. 33 U.S.C. 1221 et seq.:
33 U.S.C. 1223 11
33 U.S.C, 1223(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997) 14
33 U.S.C. 1223(a)(1) 15
33 U.S.C. 1224 15
33 U.S.C, 2718 17
Tit. II. 46 U.S.C. 2101 et Sg.
46 U.S.C. 3708(a) 3, 4, 5, 14, 15, 16
46 U.S.C. 3710 (1994 & Supp. III 1997) .................. 2
46 U.S.C. 3711 2,7
46 U.S.C. 3711(a) 8
46 U.S.C. 3713 8
Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, Pub. L.
No. 92-340, Tit. II. § 201, 86 Stat. 428 4-5
86 Stat. 429 4
Wash. Admin. Code (1999):
§ 317-21-130 5. 13
§ 317-21-200 5
§ 317-21-200(1 Ma) 12
§ 317-21-205 7
93172720508) 10
§ 317-21-205(4) 12
§ 317-21-210 5,7
§ 317-21-215 5, 10
317 21-21 8v⁰ ) 13
§ 317-21-220 10
IV
Statutes and regulations—Continued: Page
§ 317-21-230 5, 9, 10
§ 317-21-235 5, 13
§ 317-21-240 5
§ 317-21-245 5
§ 317-21-250(1) 5, 10
§ 317-21-260(1) to (3) 10
§ 317-21-260(5) 5
§ 317-21-265 5
§ 317-21-410 7
§ 317-21-540 13
Wash. Rev. Code § 88.46.080(1) (1996) 7
33 C. F. R.:
Pt. 155 5
Pt. 156 5
Pt. 157 5
Pt. 159 5
Pt. 164 5
Section 164.13(c) 12
46 C. F. R.:
Subch. A:
Pt. 2:
§ 2.014 5
Subch. B:
Pt. 15:
§ 15.1109 12
§ 15.1111 12
Subch. D:
Pt. 35 ... 5
Miscellaneous:
58 Fed. Reg. 27,630 (1993) 12
62 Fed. Reg. (1997):
pp. 5197-5199 9
pp. 34,506-34,541 9
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 658, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) 16
Miscellaneous—Continued: Page
H.R. Rep. No. 563, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971) ................... 12
H.R. Rep. No. 2962, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) ................. 3
Memorandum of Agreement on Oil Pollution Preven-
tion and Response Between the Commander, Eleventh
Coast Guard District, and the State of California
(July 1997) 11
S. Rep. No. 724, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) 4
U.S. Dep't of Transp., Ten Years Later: Oil Spill
Prevention and Response in the United States,
1989-1999 (1999) 20
REPLY BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES
Our opening brief explains how Titles I and II of the Ports
and Waterways Safety Act WSA), as amended by the Port
and Tanker Safety Act (PTSA) and supplemented by inter-
national agreements and implementing Coast Guard regu-
lations, preempt state vessel and navigation rules. First,
Title II of the PWSA vests exclusive authority in the Secre-
tary to promulgate rules addressing a number of subjects
encompassed by the Washington BAP rules and to issue
licenses certifying compliance with those federal require-
ments. As recognized in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435
U.S. 151 (1978), because Congress intended the Secretary to
decide what rules are necessary in the general areas speci-
fied in Title II, that Title preempts state rules in those areas
even in the absence of a federal requirement precisely on
point. And, under an unbroken line of this Court’s cases
starting with Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), a
federal license to operate a vessel may not be supplemented
or interfered with by a state requirement. Second, if the
Coast Guard has promulgated a federal navigation rule
under Title I of the PWSA or determined that there should
be no rule on the subject, a state rule on the same subject is
ousted. In the absence of such a Coast Guard rule or
determination on a matter falling within Title I. however,
the state rule would not be preempted. That two-prong ap-
proach is mandated by the language of the PWSA (see U.S.
Br. 24-28) and this Court’s construction of Titles I and II of
the PWSA in Ray (see id. at 25-27), and is consistent with
the long history of federal vessel regulation (id. at 18-23).
Respondents variously argue that the text of the PWSA
does not support our submission, that Ras holding is
limited to design and construction standards for vessels, that
inherent state police powers authorize the rules promulgated
by the State, and that Section 1018 of the Oil Pollution Act
(1)
2
should be construed to authorize the BAP rules. Those argu-
ments are unpersuasive.
A. State Vessel And Operator Rules Within The Subject
Areas Covered By Title II Of The PWSA Are Preempted
Title II of the PWSA (as amended by the PTSA) requires
that “the Secretary shall issue, and may from time to time
amend or repeal, regulations for the design, construction,
alteration, repair, maintenance, operation, equipping, per-
sonnel qualification, or manning of vessels * as may be
necessary for increased protection against hazards to life and
property, for navigation and vessel safety, and for enhanced
protection of the marine environment.” 92 Stat. 1483
(codified at 46 U.S.C. 3703(a)). Title II also requires a vessel
operator to carry a certificate showing compliance with
those rules issued by the Secretary, which, in the case of
foreign-flag vessels, may be met with a valid certificate
“issued by a foreign nation pursuant to any treaty, con-
vention, or other international agreement to which the
United States is a party.” 92 Stat. 1486-1487 (codified as
amended at 46 U.S.C. 3710, 3711 (1994 & Supp. III 1997)).
Thus, Title II preempts state rules in two ways: (1) the
Secretary’s exclusive duty to promulgate rules with respect
to subjects covered by Title II preempts the field as to those
subjects; and (2) the holder of a federal license may not be
required to meet state standards that would alter or modify
a licensee’s right to operate a vessel in accordance with the
federal license.
1. As confirmed in Ray, PWSA Title II preempts state
law in the fields addressed by that Title. See U.S. Br. 24-28.
Respondents argue that Ray’s holding with respect to Title
II subjects is limited to design and construction features of
vessels. See Wash. Br. 20-24; Resp.-Int. Br. 19.' The text of
1 Respondent-Intervenors describe Ras holding as a “plurality” of
the Court (Br. 19), but that is plainly incorrect. The Court’s opinion with
Title II, however, does not support respondents’ argument
that “design” and “construction” should be treated differ-
ently from “alteration, repair, maintenance, operation, equip-
ping, personnel qualification, or manning of vessels,” because
all of those subjects appear in the same statutory phrase.
See 46 U.S.C. 3703(a). See, g., King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp.,
502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991) (words in a statutory provision
should not be treated as “pebbles in alien juxtaposition”).
Respondents’ argument also is inconsistent with the House
Report on the Tank Vessel Act of 1936, which first conferred
authority to promulgate regulations on those subjects. That
report, which was quoted by the Court in Ray (435 U.S. at
166), explained that the Act was intended to establish a
“reasonable and uniform set of rules and regulations” not
only for ship “construction” and “equipping,” but also for
“operation” and “manning.” H.R. Rep. No. 2962, 74th Cong.,
2d Sess. 2 (1936) (emphasis added) (quoted in U.S. Br. 23).
Moreover, the reasons given by the Court that the Title II
design and construction requirements preempt those fields
apply equally to the other fields listed in what is now 46
U.S.C. 3703(a). The Court emphasized the mandatory na-
ture of the obligation Congress imposed on the Secretary,
who “‘shall establish’ such rules and regulations as may
be necessary with respect to the design, construction, and
operation of the covered vessels and with respect to a vari-
ety of related matters.” Ray, 435 U.S. at 161 (emphasis
added); see also id. at 163 n.14 (noting the Secretary’s
authority under Title II “to insure that adequately trained
personnel are in charge of tankers”); U.S. Br. 24. Although
the State calls the “shall establish” language a “minor
textual signall] (Wash. Br. 23), the Ray Court treated it as
respect to Parts I, II, and III was unanimous, seven justices joined Parts
V and VII, and six justices joined Parts IV and VI. See 435 U.S. at 181
(Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 190 (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
4
significant in understanding why state rules in those fields
under Title II are preempted. The Court noted the require-
ments that the Secretary engage in consultations before pro-
mulgating rules, 435 U.S. at 161°; inspect tank vessels “for
compliance with the regulations which he is required to issue
for the protection of the marine environment,” id. at 162; and
issue a certificate of compliance or accept a foreign certifi-
cate that entitles the vessel to navigate in U.S. waters free
from state interference, id. at 163-164. The Court also em-
phasized that Congress had determined that uniformity and
consistency with international standards applicable to the
subjects covered by Title II would best achieve safety and
environmental protection, “since the problem of marine
pollution is world-wide.” Id. at 166 (quoting S. Rep. No. 724,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1972)).
Those considerations are as pertinent to the “alteration,
repair, maintenance, operation, equipping, personnel quali-
fication, and manning of vessels” (46 U.S.C. 3703(a)) as
they are to a vessel's “design” or “construction” standards
(ibid.). State BAP rules on subjects covered by Title II, as
2 Under the PWSA provision addressed by the Court in Ray, the
Secretary was required to consult only with federal agencies. See 435
U.S. at 161 (discussing provision at 86 Stat. 429). That provision was
amended by the PTSA to require consultation with “officials of State and
local governments,” “representatives of port and harbor authorities or
associations,” and “representatives of environmental groups.” 92 Stat.
1484. Congress thus intended that state and local interests would be
taken into account by the Coast Guard through the consultation process
that precedes the adoption of a single federal rule, not imposed
unilaterally by States and localities through their own independent rules.
The amici States argue (Br. 16-18, 20) that the word “operation”
should not be construed so broadly as to preempt exercises of state power
to prevent pollution. Since the passage of the Tank Vessel Act of 1936,
however, Congress has directed the Federal Government to regulate
tankers “with respect to the operation of such vessels” (as well as design,
construction, manning, and the duties and qualifications of officers and
crew). Act of June 23, 1936, ch. 729, 49 Stat. 1889. See also PWSA, Pub.
5
codified at 46 U.S.C. 3703(a), therefore, are preempted.
“The Supremacy Clause dictates that the federal judgment
L. No. 92-340, Tit. II. § 201, 86 Stat. 428 (same language); PTSA, Pub. L.
No. 95-474, § 5, 92 Stat. 1483 (inclusion of “operation” in list of other
subjects). Those regulations with respect to vessel “operation,” which are
the subject of federal licenses, ordinarily have addressed mechanical or
systems-based features of the vessel, or the manner in which personnel
must be trained to use on-board equipment. See 46 C.F.R. 2.01-6
(describing “Certificates issued to foreign vessels” by referencing 46
C.F.R. Subch. D, Pt. 35, and 33 C.F.R. Pts. 155, 156, 157, 159, and 164).
Moreover, those regulations impose quite stringent and specific anti-
pollution standards for on-board equipment, transfer procedures, and
handling of oil and other hazardous cargoes. Thus, aspects of vessel
operations covered by Title II and by a federal license or certification
issued pursuant to Title II are subject to exclusive federal regulation, and
state measures in the field covered by the license are therefore
preempted. Compare pp. 11-13, infra (discussing preemptive effect of
different “operating requirements” issued by Coast Guard under Title I).
See provisions of Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-200 (1999) (watch
practices: manning); § 317-21-210 (engineering operating procedures:
equipment and operations), § 317-21-215 (operating procedures, pre-
arrival tests and designs: equipment and operations); § 317-21-230 (train-
ing: personnel qualifications); § 317-21-240 (personnel evaluation: per-
sonnel qualifications); § 317-21-245 (work hours: manning); § 317-21-250(1)
(language proficiency: personnel qualifications); § 317-21-260(5) (main-
tenance: repair and alteration); § 317-21-265 (technology: equipment and
operations).
The State asserts that it “waives” its drug testing requirements under
Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-235 (1999) when they conflict with a foreign
country’s requirements, but the affidavit they cite makes ciear that the
waiver is within the discretion of the enforcing official and is not required
by state law. See J.A. 256. In any event, the State concedes that its
requirements differ from federal regulations, see Wash. Br. 47-48, and
does not deny that its rules have significant extra-territorial effects in
ways not contemplated by Coast Guard regulations. See U.S. Br. 33-35.
As to its event reporting rule (Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-130 (1999)),
the State makes no attempt to rebut the arguments in our opening brief
(at 39-40) for why it is preempted and cites nothing in the memorandum of
agreement between the State and the Coast Guard for why the sharing of
information about events saves the unilateral state reporting rule.
that a vessel is safe to navigate United States waters prevail
over the contrary state judgment.” Ray, 435 U.S. at 165.
2. Respondents do not contest the continuing validity
or applicability of this Court’s decisions holding that the
rights enjoyed under a federal navigation license may not be
abridged by additional state requirements. Ray, 435 U.S. at
164 (“Congress did not anticipate that a vessel * * *
holding a Secretary’s permit, or its equivalent, to carry the
relevant cargo would nevertheless be barred by state law
from operating in the navigable waters of the United
States.“); U.S. Br. 22 & n.9 (collecting cases).
As this Court has observed in applying that rule in
another federal licensing context: “A State may not enforce
licensing requirements which, though valid in the absence of
federal regulation, give ‘the State’s licensing board a virtual
power of review over the federal determination’ that a
person or agency is qualified and entitled to perform certain
functions, or which impose upon the performance of activity
sanctioned by federal license additional conditions not
contemplated by Congress.” Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379,
385 (1963) (footnote omitted). “No State law can hinder or
obstruct the free use of a license granted under an act of
Congress.” Ibid. (quoting Pennsylvania v. Wheeling &
Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 566 (1852)).° Yet
5 Eg, Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 215 (“The object of the license,
then, cannot be to ascertain the character of the vessel, but to do what it
professes to do—that is, to give permission to a vessel already proved by
her enrolment to be American, to carry on the coasting trade.”); Harman
v. Chicago, 147 U.S. 396, 407 (1893) (rejecting city’s imposition of license
fee on tug operator because then It Ihe license of the United States would
be insufficient to give him free access to those waters”).
See also Railroad Trunsfer Serv., Inc. v. City of Chicago, 236 U.S.
351, 358-359 (1967) (federal license for railroad transfer services cannot be
supplemented or overridden by city ordinance); Castle v. Hayes Freight
Lines, Inc., 348 U.S. 61, 64 (1954) (“[I}t would be odd if a state could take
action amounting to a suspension or revocation of an interstate [motor]
7
the State’s requirement of an “oil spill prevention plan” is
tantamount to a state licerse, because no vessel may legally
operate in state waters unless it has filed and received
approval for such a “plan”; and that plan must in turn
demonstrate compliance with the comprehensive state
requirements, many of which operate in fields preempted by
federal law or Coast Guard regulations. See Wash. Rev.
Code § 88.46.080(1) (1996); see also, e. g., Wash. Admin. Code
§§ 317-21-200, 317-21-205, 317-21-210 (1999) (describing what
operating, engineering, and navigational requirements must
be satisfied in the “oil spill prevention plan”).’
Respondents argue that the international treaties and
agreements pursuant to which the Coast Guard recognizes
and enforces such licenses for foreign vessels do not inde-
pendently preempt state law. That argument is misplaced
for two reasons. First, federal preemption under Title II
arises from that Title’s provision that a foreign vessel may
not operate on the navigable waters of the United States
without a federal certificate recognized and accepted by the
Secretary. See 46 U.S.C. 3711; see also U.S. Br. 30-31.“ In
carrier’s [Interstate Commerce Clommission- granted right to operate.)
Barrett v. City of New York, 232 U.S. 14, 31 (1914) (collecting cases).
Although the State now disavows any attempt to impede a vessel
from actually entering its waters (Wash. Br. 5 n.5), it has not renounced
the civil and criminal penalties called for under state law for vessels that
do not comply with the BAP rules. See id. at 5. In Harman, this Court
treated a city’s “imposition of a fine” for noncompliance with local licensing
rules as a basis for finding a preemptive conflict with federal licensing
laws. See 147 U.S. at 406-407. Thus, any effort by the State to impose a
requirement that impedes the exercise of rights enjoyed under the federal
(or federally-recognized international) license would “den[y] to the vessel
in question” the “full enjoyment of the right to carry on the coasting
trade.” Sinnot v. Davenport, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 227, 242 (1859).
8 The State does not cite or discuss 46 U.S.C. 3711. Respondent-
Intervenors do cite Section 3711, but misapprehend it, noting that it states
that the “Secretary does not have to accept foreign certificates of
compliance.” Resp.-Int. Br. 45 n.35 (emphasis omitted). Section 3711
8
Ray this Court noted that Title II of the PWSA “directs the
Secretary to inspect tank vessels for compliance with the
regulations which he is required to issue for the protection of
the marine environment,” and that “the consequent privilege
of having on board the relevant cargo [is] evidenced by certi-
ficates of compliance issued by the Secretary or by appropri-
ate endorsements on the vessels’ certificates of inspection.”
435 U.S. at 162-163. Respondents do not contest that
SOLAS, STCW, MARPOL, and the ISM Code (which is a
part of SOLAS) all require certifications that Congress has
authorized the Secretary to accept on behalf of the United
States. See 46 U.S.C. 3711(a); U.S. Br. 5-9 & n.5.
Second, respondents’ contention (Wash. Br. 31; Resp.-Int.
Br. 39-42) that the international agreements are not “self-
executing” is irrelevant. The general provisions quoted and
cited by respondents (Wash. Br. 30-31; Resp.-Int. Br. 41 &
n.33), which provide that such international agreements
must be given domestic legal effect, have been fully and
completely complied with under United States domestic law.
See U.S. Br. 7 (SOLAS), 8 n.4 (MARPOL), 9 (STCW), 37
affords the Coast Guard the opportunity to assess whether the certificate
of compliance is valid and reflects the actual conditions aboard the
vessel. If the Coast Guard has grounds for rejecting the certificate, it
can take appropriate enforcement measures against the vessel. See
<<http:/hwww.uscg.mil/hq/g-m/pse/psc.htm>> (detailing, inter alia, Coast
Guard month-by-month detentions of vessels, which flag nations have the
best and worst records for detentions, and which vessels are in non-
compliance with international conventions). The Coast Guard cannot deny
entry to a foreign-flag vessel that fully complies with the certificate of
compliance, because to do so would violate the terms of applicable inter-
national agreements. See U.S. Br. 7-9, 30-31. And a State may not in any
event enforce the certification requirement. Respondent-Intervenors also
mischaracterize 46 U.S.C. 3713, which prohibits the operation in U.S.
waters of vessels that do not comply with federal regulations but which,
by its plain terms, is not restricted to “construction and design char-
acteristics,” as respondents erroneously assert. See Resp. Int. Br. 34 n.28.
(ISM Code).“ Accordingly, “state law must yield when it is
inconsistent with, or impairs the policy or provisions of, a
treaty or of an international compact or agreement.” United
States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 208, 230-231 (1942).
An illustration of the rule that the State may not impose a
requirement that denies a right of a federal licensee is the
BAP rule on personnel training. The State says that the
United States “misunderstands this requirement” (Wash.
Br. 45)," which by its plain terms requires “training beyond
the training necessary to obtain a license or merchant ma-
rine document.” Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-230 (1999).
Once a vessel has been duly licensed as complying with
STCW requirements, a State has no power to impose any
additional requirements on the federal license—even if all
the State seeks to do is to doublecheck that the federal gov-
® Contrary to respondent-intervenors’ assertion (Br. 42 n.33), the
1995 amendments to the STCW Convention have been implemented by
federal law. On June 26, 1997, the Coast Guard issued an interim rule giv-
ing full legal effect to the 1995 STCW amendments for personnel serving
on U.S. ships as of July 28, 1997. See 62 Fed. Reg. 34,506-34,541; see also
id. at 5197-5199.
10 The State asserts that it “has disclaimed power to ‘control ships“
because it “directs its regulation at owners and operators to avoid conflict
with the operative provisions of international law.” Wash. Br. 31-32. The
State cannot avoid preemption in that manner. The owners and operators
“control” the ships the State seeks to regulate, and it is non-compliance by
the vessel and its crew with substantive state requirements that causes
the State to impose civil and criminal penalties against the owners and
operators.
1 According to the State, we also “misunderstand[]” the state rules
regarding emergency procedures (Wash. Br. 44) and language proficiency
(id. at 46). Although we disagree with that assessment, to the extent the
state rules are susceptible to misinterpretation, they raise serious safety
and environmental concerns for vessel operators, who may become
confused over what rules to apply. That confusion will only proliferate if
other States have the authority to override the national and international
regime by imposing their own vessel requirements.
10
ernment’s determination is correct. See p. 6, supra. Yet
even by its own admission, the State’s requirements go
beyond STCW requirements. The STCW Code § A-II/2 pro-
vision requires personnel to have a requisite understanding
of watch practices, uses of compasses, and corre tions to
errors in compasses, so that the officer in charge of the
navigational watch may make necessary course corrections.
See STCW Code § A-VIII/2(21.5.2, 34.2). The state BAP
rules micro-manage the officer in charge by requiring fre-
quent comparisons of compass readings, regardless of
operating conditions and the potential to divert the officers
and crew from other more pressing navigational duties. See
Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-205(8) (1999) (discussed at
Wash. Br. 41). Precisely because of such differences in
approach to training and certification, Congress determined
that the national rule would be to accept the training and
crew procedures certified under such agreements as the
STCW and SOLAS, and to vest the Coast Guard with the
power to implement and enforce those requirements. See
U.S. Br. 7-8, 30-31, 35. Thus, with respect to those BAP
rules that adopt, supplement, or seek to impose require-
ments in addition to those recognized to obtain a license or
certification to operate in United States waters, they are
preempted.”
3. The amici States point to a 1993 memorandum of
agreement (MOA) between California and the Coast Guard
as creating a “cooperative program for oil spill prevention
and response.” Amici States Br. 8. That MOA, however, is
no longer valid. It has been superseded by a 1997 memoran-
12 See provisions in Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-215 (1990) (pre-
arrival equipment tests: SOLAS certificate); § 317-21-220 (emergency pro-
cedure proficiency: STCW certificate); § 317-21-230 (crew training: STCW
certificate); § 317-21-250(1) (language proficiency: STCW certificate);
§ 317-21-260(1) to (3) (management policies and practices: ISM Code certi-
ficate). See generally U.S. Br. App. la-17a.
—. — —
11
dum of agreement, which the amici States allude to and
which fully supports our submission in this case. Memoran-
dum of Agreement on Oil Pollution Prevention and Response
Between the Commander, Eleventh Coast Guard District,
and the State of California (July 1997). Whatever ambiguity
amici may perceive in the now-superseded 1993 MOA, the
1997 MOA reiterates that “(federal inspection requirements
associated with vessel safety are not subject to supplemental
State regulations.” Id. J V. A. I. It further provides that
“the State has the authority to promulgate regulations
concerning oil spill prevention which do not conflict with, and
which are not otherwise preempted by, Federal law.”
Id. NX. A. Cooperative Federal-State efforts to respond to
and contain oil spill, are an important aspect of protecting
the marine environment, but those efforts do not support the
conclusion that federal vessel and operator regulations lack
preemptive force over state rules on the same subjects.
B. A Coast Guard Regulation issued Pursuant To Title I Of
The PWSA, Or A Decision That There Should Be No
Requirement At All, Preempts State Law
Title I of the PWSA, as amended by the PTSA, addresses
“Vessel Operating Requirements.” See 92 Stat. 1472; 33
U.S.C. 1223 (caption). The subjects addressed in that Title
pertain to “operations” in the sense of navigating the
vessel the types of traffic safety rules this Court noted in
Ray. See 435 U.S. at 161 & n.9. Congress enacted Title I in
1972 “to broaden the Coast Guard’s authority to establish
rules for port safety and protection of the environment.” /d.
at 169 n.20. As we have explained (see U.S. Br. 26-28), a
federal regulation issued pursuant to Title I (or a Coast
Guard determination that there should be no requirement at
all on a subject) ousts a state rule on the same subject,
whereas a state rule is valid in the absence of such a
regulation or determination. See Ray, 435 U.S. at 171-172
(the “relevant inquiry” under Title I is “whether the
12
Secretary has either promulgated his own * * *
requirement * * * or has decided that no such requirement
should be imposed at all”); id. at 174 (quoting H.R. Rep. No.
563, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 15 (1971) (Title I revised to “make it
absolutely clear that the Coast Guard regulation of vessels
preempts state action in the field”).” Respondents do not
cite a single case of this Court upholding a state navigation
requirement when a federal rule addresses the same subject.
In an attempt to justify certain state rules as “necessi-
tated by local conditions,” the State defends its rule govern-
ing operation in restricted visibility (Wash. Admin. Code
§ 317-21-200(1)(a) (1999)) as compelled by the “congested
waters of the Strait of Juan de Fuca and Puget Sound”
(Wash. Br. 42). Yet by its terms the BAP rule applies
throughout state waters. When promulgating its rule re-
quiring two licensed deck officers on watch on the bridge,
see 33 C.F.R. 164.13(c), the Coast Guard specifically in-
tended the rule to apply in “all navigable waters of the U.S.,
particularly in the congested waterways of the United
States. 58 Fed. Reg. 27,630 (1992). The uniform application
of that rule furthers compliance with the STCW crew rest
requirements implemented domestically through 46 C. F. R.
15.1109, 15.1111, which are designed to prevent fatigued
mariners from navigating vessels. The State, however,
asserts the authority to impose a rule that overrides the
STCW requirement (Wash. Br. 43), notwithstanding the
contrary judgments by the Coast Guard and the members of
the International Maritime Organization that a uniform re-
Por an example of the type of local traffic rule that would not be
preempted, see Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-205(4) (1999) (providing that
la] master of a tanker carrying cargo shall use at least one assist tug for
anchoring and departing anchorages in the port of Port Angeles. The port
of Port Angeles includes all navigable waters west of 123 degrees, 24
minutes west longitude encompassed by Ediz Hook”). There is no Coast
Guard regulation on that subject, see U.S. Br. App. 6a, nor any Coast
Guard determination that there should be no such requirement at all.
—
13
gime enables a master to organize his crew rest schedule to
avoid the hazards of a tired crew when vessels travel to
multiple ports over a span of a few days.
A number of Washington State’s BAP rules that appear to
fall into the realm governed by Title I rather than Title II of
the PWSA concern subjects also addressed by the federal
rules. Those BAP rules are preempted. By contrast,
although certain of the equipment rules adopted by other
States, which are featured by the amici States (Br. 6-9),
might be preempted by applicable Coast Guard regulations,
other state rules addressed to other matters would not be.
In any future case challenging the validity of such rules in
other States, the preemption analysis set out should be
applied to analyze specific rules at issue.
C. Neither A State's Police Powers Nor Section 1018 Of The
Oil Pollution Act Of 1990 Saves The Washington BAP
Rules From Preemption Under The PWSA And Inter-
national A treements
Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of federal law,
respondents and their amici contend that two sources of law
save Washington’s BAP rules from preemption: inherent
police powers and Section 1018 of OPA. Respondents are
wrong on both counts.
1. This Court long ago rejected the first proposition—
that the reserved powers of the States authorize them to
4 See provisions of Wash. Admin. Code § 317-21-215(1)(a) (1999)
(prearrival tests and inspections); § 317-21-540 (advance notice of entry)
(diseussed in Wash. Br. 43-44). It bears noting that, like the state
restricted-visibility rule discussed in the text, these other BAP rules are
not specifically directed to particularly problematic passageways in its
waters, but rather apply throughout all state waters. Moreover, to the
extent that provisions of Wash. Admin. Code §§ 317-21-130 (1999) (event
reporting of marine casualties) and 317-21-235 (drug testing) are
considered rules of local application, they also are preempted by the
existence of federal rules. See U.S. Br. 33-34, 39-40.
14
regulate navigation, at least where Congress has taken the
matter in hand:
The whole commercial marine of the country is placed
by the Constitution under the regulation of Congress,
and all laws passed by that body in the regulation of
navigation and trade, whether foreign or coastwise, [are]
therefore but the exercise of an undisputed power.
When, therefore, an act of the Legislature of a State
prescribes a regulation of the subject repugnant to and
inconsistent with the regulation of Congress, the State
law must give way; and this, without regard to the
source of power whence the State Legislature derived
its enactment.
Sinnot v. Davenport, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 227, 243 (1859).
The amici States argue, however, that “local pollution
control measures regarding tank vessels are no different
from the local pilotage requirements sustained in Cooley.”
Amici States Br. 16. That contention is incorrect. First, as
the Cooley Court itself noted, Congress by statute permitted
States to impose local pilotage requirements; the state rule
was not upheld as an exercise of inherent police power. See
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 315
(1852) (citing 1789 statute). Second, although the federal
Clean Air Act (see 42 U.S.C. 7402, 7511b(f)) and Clean
Water Act (see 33 U.S.C. 1314, 1342) do expressly provide a
role for States in establishing certain anti-pollution rules
that apply to vessels, those provisions do not override the
congressional determinations established in the PWSA and
PTSA that uniform federal standards shall apply to the “de-
sign, construction, alteration, repair, maintenance, operation,
equipping, personnel qualification, and manning” of vessels
(46 U.S.C. 3708(a)), and that the Secretary likewise may
adopt preemptive navigation rules of national or local
applicability to promote safety and protection of the marine
environment (33 U.S.C. 1223(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997)).
15
The State calls its navigation rules oil “spill prevention”
requirements (Wash. Br. 12, 13, 38, 40, 42, 44), and the amici
States assert that the vessel rules support the underlying
purpose of pollution prevention (Amici States Br. 12-13).
But those motivations do not alter the reality that the rules
directly regulate vessels in navigation. In any event, a
State’s reasons for adopting such measures are irrelevant
under the Supremacy Clause. See, e. g., Fidelity Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982). And, in
fact, this Court has rejected similar police-power rationales
for state regulation of vessels. See, ¢.g., Gibbons, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) at 53, 200-202 (rejecting argument that State’s
regulation is “nothing more than [regulation of] property
* * subject to the control of the sovereign power”);
Sinnot, 63 U.S. (22 How.) at 242 (rejecting argument that
state police power permits vessel licensing requirement
where federal license rule exists); Harman, 147 U.S. at 408-
409 (rejecting city’s contention that license fee was justified
to fund deepening of Chicago River). Indeed, in Ray the
Court distinguished precisely the kinds of environmental
rules upon which respondents rely (Wash. Br. 15; Resp.-Int.
Br. 17-20) by noting that “in none of the relevant cases sus-
taining the application of state laws to federally licensed or
inspected vessels did the federal licensing or inspection
procedure implement a substantive rule of federal law ad-
dressed to the object also sought to be achieved by the chal-
lenged state regulation.” 435 U.S. at 164 (citing, e.g., Huron
Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960)).
In Ray, as here, Titles I and II are designed to protect the
marine environment, as well as to promote safety and pro-
tect life and property. See 33 U.S.C. 1223(a)(1), 1224; 46
U.S.C. S).“
% Nor does Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S.
325 (1973), support respondents’ position. In Askew, the Court upheld a
state rule imposing strict liability for an oil spill “from any waterfront
16
2. Respondents’ reliance on Section 1018 of OPA is also
misplaced. In our opening brief (at 44), we demonstrate,
inter alia, that Section 1018 simply does not apnly to this
case because all of the preemptive federal rules at issue here
derive from some source of law other than OPA. The State
nonetheless contends that It he language of subsections
1018(a) and (e) is very broad” (Wash. Br. 25) and that lil
would make no sense for Congress to express a broad sav-
ings of state powers from preemption in § 1018, if it had
already preempted those state powers” (id. at 26). The State
provides no support for that proposition in the text of OPA
or any of this Court’s decisions. Section 1018 prevides only
that “{njothing in this Act“ i e., nothing in OPA itself—
shall affect the authority of the States to impose certain
requirements. 33 U.S.C. 2718. It in no way affects the pre-
emptive effect of other Acts (such as the PWSA and PTSA),
of international agreements, or of Coast Guard regulations
issued under those Acts or to enforce those agreements. See
U.S. Br. 44-45. The Conference Report on OPA expressly
states that it “does not disturb the Supreme Court’s decision
in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Company, 435 U.S. 151 (1978),”
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 653, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 122 (1990),
facility” or “any ship destined for or leaving such facility,” id. at 327, in
part because “{iJt is clear at the outset that the Federal Act does not
preclude, but in fact allows,” States to impose additional liability for oil
spills, id. at 329. The United States, as amicus curiae, had expressed the
view that separate vessel equipment requirements contemplated under
state law would be preempted by recently promulgated Coast Guard
regulations, see 71-1082 U.S. Br. at 30-35, but acknowledged that a direct
conflict with state law had not been presented since the State had not yet
issued regulations. Accordingly, the Court opined that “the question
whether such [state] regulations will conflict with Coast Guard regulations
* * * should await a concrete dispute under applicable Florida regu-
lations.” 411 U.S. at 387. What the Court actually decided in Askew—that
States may impose additional liability requirements for oil spills—is a pro-
position with which no party to this litigation disagrees.
17
which confirmed the preemptive effect of Title II of the
PWSA and of Coast Guard regulations issued under Title I.“
The State attempts to explain away the Conference
Report’s affirmation of Ray by asserting that “(t]he refer-
ence to Ray in the Conference Report confirms only that the
broad language of § 1018 does not undo the careful holding in
Ray that the field of tanker design and construction is
preempted.” Wash. Br. 27. Having misstated the holding
in Ray (see U.S. Br. 24-28; pp. 2-4, supra), the State then
imputes that misunderstanding to the Conference Com-
mittee that inserted Section 1018. But Congress's intent not
to “undo” Ray must include the aspects of the decision in
Ray addressing the field-preemptive effect of Title II of the
PWSA and the preemptive effect of Coast Guard regulations
addressing other subjects under Title I of the PWSA.
Unlike respondents, the court of appeals recognized that
Section 1018 by its terms does not apply to the PWSA or
other statutes that confer authority on the Coast Guard to
issue regulations that preempt state law. See Pet. App. 1la-
12a. The court nevertheless held that Section 1018 of OPA,
as Congress’s most recent statute in the field, divests the
Coast Guard of that authority under other statutes. /d. at
15a-16a. Respondents make no effort to defend that star-
tling proposition, which cannot be reconciled with the bed-
rock principle that Congress can change the law only by
passing a new law. See U.S. Br. 44. Nor do respondents
1 The legislative history of OPA quoted by the State (Wash. Br. 26-
29) similarly shows only that Congress did not intend for OPA to preempt
state law in certain respects. Nothing in any of the legislative history
cited by respondents evidences any intent by Congress that Section 1018
would negate the preemptive scope of rules promulgated pursuant to the
PWSA or PTSA, which are intended to further environmental protection
as well as vessel safety. And contrary to respondent-intervenors’ con-
tention (Br. 31 n.23), the statements of Coast Guard officials it quotes in no
way suggest that OPA freed States to adopt rules that conflict with Coast
Guard regulations.
18
contest the applicability of this Court’s decisions holding
that savings clauses should not be read to conflict with
directives in federal statutes. See id. at 45 n.20 (collecting
eases). Thus, there is no occasion here for the Court to
attempt to resolve the differences among the other parties
over whether Section 1018 applies only to Title I of OPA or
only to financial requirements. It is sufficient in this case for
the Court to hold that the phrase “[nJothing in this Act”
means what it says and that Section 1018 therefore does not
trump the preemptive power of other extant federal laws.
3. The State contends that some of its BAP rules incor-
porate applicable Coast Guard regulations and international
treaty provisions and therefore should not be deemed pre-
empted because they are “identical” to those standards. See
Wash. Br. 19, 44 (citing California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725
(1949)). In Zook, the Court upheld a state law prohibiting
the sale or arrangement of any transportation over a state
highway if the transporting carrier lacked a permit from the
Interstate Commerce Commission. The Zook Court based
its decision in part on the absence of any intent by Congress
for the federal law to be exclusive, while noting at the same
time that “if a case falls within an area in commerce thought
to demand a uniform national rule, state action is struck
down.” 336 U.S. at 728. Unlike in Zook, that situation is
manifestly present here, in light of the comprehensive na-
tional and international regime regarding vessels that this
Court specifically recognized in Ray. And even as to regu-
lations promulgated under Title I, Congress intended that
there be one decisionmaker, even when national uniformity
was not required. See Ray, 435 U.S. at 177. Moreover, the
State asserts the authority to apply its own enforcement
standards to its allegedly identical substantive rules, and
thereby impose civil fines and criminal punishments on vio-
lators. See Wash. Br. 5. But because state officials do not
have the authority to enforce national and international
standards—only the Coast Guard has been granted such
19
authority (see U.S. Br. 8)—such unilateral actions by state
officers threaten to impair the Nation’s international obliga-
tions. See Belgium et al. Amici Br. 4; Canada Amicus Br. 5.
Moreover, the Zook Court emphasized that the subject of
the state rules to enforce safety and good-faith require-
ments for the use of its own highways”—was within “the
state’s normal power.” 336 U.S. at 737. As we demonstrate
(U.S. Br. 18-23) and as was recognized by the district court
(Pet. App. 61a), regulations of vessels in interstate or inter-
national navigation are traditionally a matter of national con-
cern. In numerous other cases, the Court has held that iden-
tical or supplemental state laws are preempted by federal
law.“ In any event, respondents never contest our central
thesis for conflict: that the international regime requires uni-
formity in vessel and staffing requirements (and in aspects of
navigation regulated by the Coast Guard under Title I that
are enforced by national officers). That regime is frustrated
by the efforts of the several States of the United States to
enforce their own rules.
4. The detailed international and federal statutory and
regulatory regime enforced by the Coast Guard has pro-
duced significant benefits to the marine environment of the
United States. Since the Exxon Valdez disaster, the aver-
7 See, e.g., Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Rel. Bd., 330
U.S. 767, 776 (1947) (identical state rule preempted by federal rule
where exercise of concurrent jurisdiction means that enforcement “action
by [state agency) necessarily denies the discretion of the [federal]”),
Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Porter, 273 U.S. 341, 346 (1927) (state rule “cannot
be applied in coincidence with, as complementary to or as in opposition to,
federal enactments which disclose the intention of Congress to enter a
field of regulation that is within its jurisdiction”); Southern Ry. v.
Railroad Comm'n, 236 U.S. 439, 447-448 (1915) (virtually identical state
requirement on railroads held preempted by federal rule). Florida Lime
& Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963), which the amici
States cite (Br. 21), is inapposite, because in that case the state and federal
standards were dissimilar.
20
age number of oil spills of more than 10,000 gallons has
dropped by approximately 50%; the ratio of gallons spilled
per million gallons of oil shipped has decreased by 50% (from
ten to five gallons spilled per million shipped); and there
have been no major oil spills of more than one million gallons
from vessels since 1990. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Ten Years
Later: Oil Spill Prevention and Response in the United
States, 1989-1999, at 8 (1999). The comprehensive federal
regime, which applies uniformly to vessels moving in inter-
national and interstate commerce, confirms the wisdom of
the longstanding national and international approach to
vessel safety. By contrast, “it is almost impossible for [the
master] * * * to acquaint himself with the laws of each
individual State he may visit.” The Roanoke, 189 U.S. 185,
195 (1903) (invalidating State of Washington lien law applied
against vessels).
* * * * *
For the foregoing reasons, and those stated in our opening
brief, the judgment of the court of appeals should be re-
versed and the case remanded for further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted.
SETH P. WAXMAN
Solicitor General
NOVEMBER 1999
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